

AFTER THE WAR: Bush's America and the new world order

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Michael Lind:

The rise of the neo-conservatives

There has been a break with America's post-1945 global policy- you see this most especially in the rhetoric of the neo-conservatives who are the allies of the Bush Administration- talking about the US as an empire, as a successor to the British Empire. The conservative magazine- 'policy review' features lessons from British India for the American empire in the Middle East.

Now this is very peculiar, particularly for me. I was what was known as a cold war liberal. We were the Kennedy-Johnson domestic liberals who supported the United States', entire soviet policy in the 1970's and the 1980's. We were the original neo-conservatives: that means something different today.

I remember spending much of my youth debating people on the left-who accused the US of only wanting to create its own empire - the cold war was supposedly an excuse for this ambition. This is what Hitler had said in his Table Talk during World War II- that Roosevelt wanted to create his own empire to replace the British Empire; a number of cynical British Tories came to the same conclusion.

I think that Hitler and the Tories and some of the people on the radical left were actually incorrect. Roosevelt in the 1940's during World War II had something more ambitious in mind than creating just an American version of the British or the French or the Japanese colonial empire. It was instead to create a post -imperial world order. It is not completely well understood what the original project of post-1945 American internationalism was- It is sometimes called Wilsoniaism. But it should be called Rooseveltism because Roosevelt served in the naval department during the Woodrow Wilson administration, and had learned from the mistakes of the League of Nations.

One of the things he learned was that internationalism had to be based on a concert of the great powers and he had in mind the big three at the time- The British Empire, the Soviet Union and the United States. Obviously the cold war disrupted that vision. But that vision was basically that there would be a kind of steering committee of the great powers. It would be institutionalised in the security council and that the great powers would not be rivals, but instead, participate in a status quo alliance. An alliance not against change, but an alliance in which change is guided. Something more like the concert of Europe in the 19th century.

This was not a very radical conception -it was very conservative and realist. In terms of the actual structure of world order, it was the goal of the United States to replace colonial empires, and economic spheres of influence with a global political system which would be centred in the united nations and which

power would be concentrated in a few great powers who would police the world- protect the peace against the kind of wars that had generated the two great wars in the 20th century.

Economically, the goal was not free trade as such- most of the new deal democrats like FDR had nothing against developing countries subsidizing their industries or using tariffs in some cases. Developing countries could deviate from the idea of free trade, however, you could not have an imperialist economic systems in which one nation controlled dozens of other nations economies.

Now this Wilsonian/ Rooseveltian world view has been dismissed for half a century as being naïve and utopian, particularly by realists in the central European tradition, many whom have been influential in American foreign policy- like Henry Kissenger.

It seems to me that looking back at half a century it was pretty successful- it had pretty much achieved what it had set out to do. The Rooseveltians and their British allies (and their allies in the rest of the world) felt that one of the problems causing world wars was the existence of militaristic casts and that societies like Germany and Japan had to be purged from the influence of the Samurais and so on. No one can doubt that this sociological transformation was a success -to the point that now Americans complain that the Germans and the Japanese are too pacifist.

In terms of the structure of global order, it was felt that the competition for empire, rather than national rivalries amongst the great powers themselves, had been a major cause for the world wars. This holds out in retrospect. The world wars, in my view, were triggered by Germany's desire to create a European empire, which could compete with these extra European, British, American and Russian Empires.

We have changed the rules of the game. Even in the cold war there was never any question that either the US or the Soviet Union would conquer and annex territory The cold war took the form solely of a contest for influence- where you supported one government or another within states such as Vietnam or Korea. There was never any thought that the borders of the great powers would ever change.- that you could invade a country, enslave its people and plunder its resources.

This kind of imperialism was discredited in this post- 1945 world order. Even in Israel, the United States has never accepted the legitimacy of unauthorised annexation of territory (not withstanding the United States close ties with Israel) because this violates the most fundamental post 1945 rule- that you cannot can't conquer and annex territory.

The post world war II order was really then the first international order. We talk about international relations going back to the 16th, 17th centuries and so on, but really before 1945 we had an inter-imperial world order- if you go back to the 1900, most of what was defined as the 'human race' was gathered from

a few European capitals including this one, and so it was not really international.

Even after world war II the initial membership of the united Nations was only about 50 independent countries, because the European Empires had not yet decolonised. Membership is now close to 200 I believe. Most of the initial but sovereign countries in the initial UN Assembly were South American countries that had been former Spanish and Portuguese colonies.

So this really is the first real international world order in history. FDR thought that the former British and American draft of the UN would have to be revised after 25 or 50 years. He thought by the 1960's you would need to have a new look at the UN. He would be amazed to come back in 2003 and find out that the victors of World War II are still the security council powers. I will conclude on what arises from that situation: It seems to me that there are two mistaken approaches now, particularly in the United States (but not in the united states only):

- one is to scrap the post 1945 international system, (which as I say is the first international system on a global scale, anyway in human history) in favour of a fairly traditional imperial system. But it seems to me that this is a regression from the vision that American leaders had in the middle of the C20th, to want to go back to something like the world of the 1800's or the 1900's.
- I have been dumbfounded in the last few years by the fact that many of the neo-conservatives, especially in the Bush Administration- have never sought an American precedence- American leaders, American thinking for the new world order. They constantly cite European and British imperial precedent, for what they want the new world order to be like. If you go to lexis nexus and type in the weekly standard and policy review- (these are American conservative magazines) you'll find a hundred admiring references to Winston Churchill and one reference to FDR or Truman or any other post- war American president.

Increasingly, it's the young Churchill, the young Tory imperialist, who is being held up by these same self styled imperialists in New York and Washington, as models to America. So it is not even an American tradition, it is sort of a reversion to older British and European imperial traditions.

I don't think this is sustainable. I would be opposed to it even if it were. But I don't think it is sustainable because I don't believe the American people have the stomach for governing peoples against their will, which is what you have to do for extended periods of time if you are a genuine empire instead of undertaking temporary interventions to restore local balance, knock out tyrants etc.

I think it is a mistake to assume that because the United States is so large, economically and militarily, that you somehow have to translate this into a

kind of neo-European, C19th imperial system, instead of continuing to work through the international order that the US created and prospered under after 1945.

If anyone says that the US after the cold war, has such overwhelming material and military dominance, that it is just natural for it to become an imperial power. We had twice as much power (as a relative percentage of the world) in 1945- the US had about 50% of all world industrial production. We have about a quarter of that now.

The US had the opportunity to create a traditional imperial system in 1945, it rejected it- both for reasons of American ideals, but also for practical reasons: The US was an offshore power that had been shut out of most of the markets by European Empires for most of its history, and since the C18th had long dreamed of a world in which you had an integrated global economy of some sort - and you had joint great power policing to replace the exclusionist spheres of economic influence.

The problem with the opposition in the US and to a certain extent, elsewhere in the world is that they are what I call reactionary internationalists. By that I mean they are defending the American inspired internationalism of the 1940's and 1950's half a century late.

It seems to me that if the American Internationalists of the post world war II period and their allies were around today they would be shocked that the institutions have not evolved to fit the times. It makes no sense to have a great power steering committee such as the UN Security Council in which Japan and Germany are not permanent members alongside France and Britain and China. Philip Bobbitt has made the interesting point that the G8 nations which are meeting today-provide a better list of the actual great powers in the world today than the kind of fossilised security council.

I would like to see a new internationalism, which by its very nature has to be shared by many countries, which will try to achieve the goals of the post 1945 internationalism by contemporary means. Now whether this could be done through the existing UN institutions or it has to be done outside of existing international bodies , I don't know.

But I think right now, both options are unsustainable- whether the imperial option or the mere status quo option. My fear is that in the absence in the move to revitalise the international system (in which the US would have a leading but not exclusive role for the 21st century), America will attempt to exempt itself from the norms and institutions of international life, will instead of creating a imperial order, will simply end up inspiring other great powers to do the same thing, and then we will be back in a genuine 19th Century world . It doesn't mean that the US and Europe will be at loggerheads necessarily. But my fear is that in the absence of a new internationalism we will simply lapse back into the default pattern-which is the military spheres of influence by self-interested great powers.

Mark Leonard :

That was a brilliant start to the evening. I am now going to ask Robert Harvey to carry on. Robert is a former Conservative Member of Parliament and member of the Commons Foreign Affairs committee. He is also a distinguished journalist, who was an Assistant Editor of the Economist; he was also the foreign affairs and leaders writer for the Daily Telegraph. He has reported on many conflicts including the last Gulf War, the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan.

He argued back in 1995 that resentment about the rise of globalisation, its perceived injustices and the rise of ethnic nationalism would undermine our security. These arguments did not fit the mood of the times, they were widely rejected but they have now been updated in his new book 'Global disorder' which seems to be finding a more receptive audience. Maybe you can start where Michael finished off.

Robert Harvey:

I found myself in such agreement with Michael that some of my comments may seem supercilious. Apart from the idea that America is a great nation, I have admired America all my life. Especially with its intervention in the Second World War; with the Marshall plan, the creation of a security structure, which guaranteed peace in Europe for nearly five decades.

America set the example for superpowerdom that lasted until the end of the cold war. The appalling tragedy of September 11th instilled an entirely understandable new resolve in the American people.

A resolve both to respond to that terrorism attack in particular, and to deter further such barbaric acts in the future. All of America's allies and most of the world shared that resolve.

As with most other American interventions across the globe, I, and many others supported the ousting of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the destruction of the Al-Qaeda camps there. This was a justified act of self-defence against an act of aggression against America from foreign soil, fully in conformity with the UN charter.

Since then however, the United States, under the influence of extraordinary alliance of neo-conservatives and the religious right, has taken advantage of the new mood of resolution after September 11th to elaborate an entirely new security doctrine to the world. This consists of a Bush doctrine of pre-emptive deterrence, announced almost exactly a year ago at the US Point military Academy. He declared:

'We must take this battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.'

'Old-fashioned deterrence', he argued, 'means nothing against shadowy terrorists networks with no nations or citizens to defend. 'Containment' he said, 'is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorists allies.'

'If we wait for threats to fully materialise, we would have waited too long.'

Well the Bush doctrine of pre-emption has been widely criticised as a departure from the international order that has prevailed since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This recognised the absolute sovereignty and legal equality of states.

The US Secretary of State, Daniel Webster in 1837 established that pre-emptive hostile action could only be justified 'where there is an instant overwhelming necessity, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation.'

Pre-emptive war was specifically treated as a war crime at the Nuremberg trials as it was the excuse for much of Hitler's aggression (as well as that by Japan at Pearl Harbour). The UN charter outlaws 'the threat or use of force against the territorial independence or the integrity, or the political independence of any state.' Article 51 of the charter allows self-defence only if 'an armed attack occurs against a nation and not before.'

The danger of elevating pre-emption to the level of a doctrine is that many other countries could do so as well. For example; India and Pakistan, in their recent nuclear confrontation.

As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has said ' It isn't in the American national interest to establish pre-emption as a universal principal available to every nation.'

Pre-emption also requires extremely good intelligence and a high degree of certainty as to the other side's preparations or intentions. Neither which are usually readily available. It also requires overwhelming success; otherwise the other side can strike back, arguing legitimate self-defence.

The new strategy was first put into place as we all know, in Iraq with tragic results. I pay tribute to the extraordinary courage and restraint of British and American soldiers in that conflict. But the war there was in the view of millions across the world, (including long standing supporters of America, such as myself) illegal, immoral and ill conceived with the potential of causing a catastrophe in the region, and a greatly heightened terrorist threat.

It was illegal because International law did not recognise pre-emption. Iraq's act of aggression ended with the end of the Gulf war in 1991, when the invasion of the country could arguably be justified. The only justification , which might have allowed action in Iraq, was the Iraqi non-compliance with

UN resolutions relating to the destruction of its nuclear biological and chemical weapons.

After Iraq's expulsion of UN weapons inspectors in the late 1990's, the problem was resolved under intense allied military pressure with the re-admission of the inspectors, and increased Iraqi co-operation last year. Without securing a second resolution to authorise attack, (because it was clear that no such resolution would have passed through the security council), American and British forces unilaterally attacked. To this date no clear evidence has emerged as to the existence of these weapons, although they may yet be found.

America's refusal to readmit impartial UN weapons inspectors will serve to discredit any such find (if it is made by American inspectors). What we do know is that they were not used in the recent war, where the very survival of Saddam Hussein's regime was at stake, and they have proved extremely difficult to find since.

We do know that the Prime Minister of this country was at best, mislead, and at worst actually lied- when he declared without equivocation, to the British people, Parliament and his own party, that I quote :

'Saddam's weapons of biological weapons destruction programme is active, detailed and growing. Iraq has chemical and biological weapons. Saddam has continued to produce them. He has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons which could be activated within 45 minutes, and he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability,'

We know that Tony Blair further misled his own parliamentary party in ascertaining, that he had secret intelligence proving his assertion which had to withheld so as not to endanger intelligence sources in Iraq.

Now that the regime has fallen and those sources cannot be harmed, what is this intelligence and why have they not led to the discovery of the missing weapons?

British governments have fallen for much lesser lies or misjudgements than these awesome issues of war and peace, life and death. We know that president Bush has repeatedly and deliberately, blurred the truth- by associating Al - Qaeda in his public pronouncements with Iraq, when there is no evidence of a link between the two: one an Islamic fundamentalist movement, the other secular and socialist. Saddam regarded Muslim fundamentalist as his bitterest ideological foes (and fought a war with fundamentalist Iran, involving a million casualties to show).

Have we exchanged the tyranny of cold war confrontation for single mega power domination? I still hope and believe that America has been getting the catharsis of September 11th out of its system, that Iraq is a one-off and that this administration's reckless adventurism will be replaced by a reversion to

the moderate and judicial use of power that characterised American foreign policy in the past. But consider this in terms of America's own interest: Rarely has such a huge pouring of international sympathy (as that generated by September 11th), been so quickly dispersed by the actions of the Bush Administration.

Consider Iraq itself, the loss of 150 coalition troops was tragic, but the loss of at least 12,000 Iraqi's, (and possibly double that) was even worse. The lawlessness that has broken out all over Iraq, makes many Iraqi's pine for the bad old days. Certainly they are no friends of America, whose sanctions they blame as much as Saddam for their privations. The breakdown in essential services- in hospital treatments, the spread of cholera in the south, the continuing deaths; all are part of the mounting price of liberation. I won't go on about the Iraqi situation because we'll get there, I am sure in the questions.

Let me end on a note of hope: Islamic fundamentalism, before September 11th was in decline (in terms of popular support) in Iran, Algeria, Jordan and maybe in Egypt. With Iraq behind it (although consequences in that country will be with us for years to come), America must now finally purge the anger generated by September 11th out of its system, and return to rational, measured policies designed to reduce tensions by all available security means. As well as winning the popular support of all ordinary people in the Middle East and across the globe, and make them fear terrorism as much as we do.

The quarrel between America and Europe may not last. There are significant differences of interest but we also have far too much in common. Above all, there is a need to construct a new world security order which brings together: legality, international authority and global acceptance- with actual enforcement, in place of the current outdated post-cold war structures of NATO and the unreformed UN, and I happy to go into that in questions.

In my book 'Global disorder' I try to suggest how this might be done. It is time now to address these issues. For heaven help us all if Iraq is not merely the end of post 9-11 healing process, but actually is the beginning of a new and uncontrolled American confrontation with much of the rest of the world.

Thank you. Our third speaker Shirley Williams is perhaps a living embodiment of the trans-atlantic relationship. She's spent a lot of time in the last few years dividing her time between British politics and American academia. Also, in the last few months she has almost been permanently on our TV screens arguing the case for the UN, international order and acting as a real thorn in the government's side on the whole Iraq issue. Hopefully you can pick up on the points that Robert and Michael, have made, and maybe set out a positive agenda for the future.

Shirley Williams:

First of all I have listened to two extremely exceptional contributions and I don't intend to repeat what has already been said.

I have one difference of opinion with Mr Harvey which I will come back to. However I must say that it was an extremely impressive analysis, most of which I happen to agree with. Let me also underline Michael's original speech, in the sense that I think that even looking back into history, the immediate post war period was a staggering tribute to American imagination, generosity and an awareness of the world's problems of a kind of which there is no earlier example.

I think that one of the earlier speakers noted that some people may be called conservative internationalists. I think that was a marvellous example (no matter how conservative and constructivist it was) of the capacity and the vision, America had in seeing the way in which the world might move.

A period which Jean Atkinson called the 'beginning of creation'. The immediate period after the second world war was so remarkable, that it brought about transformations that the current day America finds itself uneasy to live with. Perhaps the most astonishing example of that is the German commitment to avoiding war at almost any cost-which is exactly what most people (immediately after the second world war) wanted to see Germany become. This is now a source of frustration with Germany, for being in many ways, excessively appeasing.

However, I want to take issue, just one issue with Mr Harvey: I think this doesn't start with 11.9. I think 11.9. was the opportunity for many neo-conservatives to actually build on what was a long standing programme. If you go back to 1992, you will see this in the original documents signed by Richard Pearl. You will see it repeated in the open letter to president Clinton in 1998. They used September 11th as a launching pad for this programme. In some ways that's what is frightening about it.

We ought to take note of the fact that Congress has become increasingly un-internationalist. That is because of what I think is the rather frightening pattern of fund raising for American political campaigns - which means well organised groups outside the United States can have a very powerful effect on who gets elected. The outstanding example of that is the American-Israeli political action committee. But it is certainly not the only one. There are groups of Poles, groups of Ukrainians, group of immigrant sets (Mexico), who have a tremendous impact on American politics and on the attitudes of the American congress. This is made more difficult by the fact that so many congressmen and women no longer travel abroad. Partly because if they do, they come under attack from their local newspapers, for having (what is known in this country) 'jollies'. In effect what they are doing is ceasing to learn about the world outside.

In this context finally I want to say that the Clinton Administration is by no means to be treated as a kind of angelic model. The Clinton administration began all this. It signed long ago, the biological weapons convention, which was allowed to slip away and was not used.

Clinton personally signed up to the international criminal court, knowing that it would never pass in congress. Clinton signed the Kyoto accords on the environment, knowing that they would never pass through congress. I respect Clinton as a brilliant communicator, but it is a great mistake to see what is happening in the United States as being wholly related to the recent position of the neo-cons following the terrorist act.

In that context one final point which I think is extremely important, which is that the United States with some justification, has been contemptuous of the European Union for failing to pull its act together, and for being an effective soft power but in no sense an effective hard power.

There is real contempt about the European Union, which does not completely exclude the United Kingdom. We ought to recognise that some of that contempt is very strongly justified. Where are we now? Lets take two recent and troubling examples: Mr Harvey, I think spoke eloquently about the war and I won't go over old ground. But we are in a new situation that is probably only dubiously legal. It has the retrospective legality of the resolution passed today at the United Nations about the post war Iraq.

It is a very dodgy document, and if you look at it closely you find that what it does is to give the occupying powers in Iraq -United states and the United Kingdom, a quite extraordinary degree of authority and control. Not least including the distribution and pumping of oil, and the provision to look at the existing reserves of money from past oil sales- an astonishing degree of control.

There have been desperate efforts by the government to pull the United Nations back into the middle of this scene. It has been pulled back marginally but not in the middle, and no one can pretend that it was, and if you don't believe me, look at the UN resolution passed today. You will see where the occupying powers stand: at the centre. This means that they have grave responsibilities. These responsibilities are not being properly discharged.

As occupying powers, they had a duty under the Geneva convention to; protect the local civilians, to protect the infrastructure, to protect the services like hospitals (and indeed like university and museums). This is not happening even after a month. I think that there will be grave questions, raised in world assemblies- including the United Nations, about the way in which the occupying powers have been excessively optimistic in the way they could re-establish order in Iraq.

Where do we go from here?

We ought to start without kidding ourselves. There is some legitimacy within the United States agrument about weapons of mass destruction and how one deals with collapsed or collapsing states in the current world. There are many collapsed or collapsing states, particularly in the developing world, which the international institutions have treated absolutely shabbily, including the WTO and the G8. The decision-making structures are tremendously weighted

against the developing world and in favour of the developed world. And even though our government is better than most, there is an extraordinary long way to go before there is a level playing field. So what do we do? Well the United States whether we like it or not is extraordinarily powerful. There are three things you can do: One of the things is to do what Tony Blair has done.

I am completely opposed to his invasion of Iraq, but I completely respect his harsh analysis of the situation which leads him to say the only thing to do is to hug this great power and at the same time pull it slightly over towards a more multinationalist position. He is doing that with some effect- there is some cosmetics within it, but there is certainly some reality. The second thing you can do is to follow the French line: which is essentially to argue that we have got to have is a multi-polar world. It is a long pull to get there because the EU has been essentially irresponsible in relying on American defence.

As Sir Roderick Braithwaite has said (in a brilliant article in Prospect) it has allowed itself to be so integrated into American intelligence structures that there is a real question whether Europe and particularly, Britain could follow any independent foreign policy at all. It would take a generation to create any degree of independence for Europe and particularly the United Kingdom.

Which brings me to my third point, which is where I think we should go: European soft power- economic power, civil service power, understanding of how police work, is going to become more and more desperately needed by the United States, because there, is a clear unwillingness to stick with the long haul. They are not that kind of country. The separation of powers doesn't go for democracies in the long haul; it goes for democracies in the short haul. it wants quick results.

What does that mean? It means that as in Afghanistan, it will hand over responsibilities bit by bit. Has the EU and the rest of the world got the guts to take on these responsibilities? To pay for them? To train the Afghan police? To provide the people necessary? Watch this space: I doubt it but we would be very influential if we did.

I could say the same about Iraq. The bottom line for me is that there is a very large area of influence in the non-military area, complimenting and in some cases, obstructing what the United States wants to do. But the big question which I will leave with you Mark. Will Europe pull itself together to the point that it can deliver anything?

I conclude with a postscript, I brought with me today from the House of Commons, the new extradition treaty which has just been signed by the UK and the United States. It is unique in that it is an extradition treaty which says, that those people which the United States wishes to extradite from Britain to the United States will no longer be required to show evidence that there is reason to believe they have committed a crime

It is not mutual. There is no such requirement placed on the United States, if the British want to extradite (as they have often done with IRA terrorists) ,

there is no reciprocity at all. This to my mind is the dangerous sign of the world to come, if we can't manage to pull the United States to a greater degree of mutuality. Thank you.

Mark Leonard:

Our final speaker tonight also regularly spends a lot of time in Bush country. He divides his time between Austin- Texas, Washington and London. He has held many senior posts, including chairing the National Security Council for both Democrat and Republican administrations. He is probably best known in the UK for his massive bestseller- The shield of Achilles, which re-interprets the history of the 20th century as a long war in which conditions about military confrontation lasted from the outbreak of the first world war to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Most recently he has argued with extraordinary eloquence for the intervention in Iraq, in Prospect magazine. Putting forward (what I think) one of the persuasive cases for an attack. So maybe you can sent out your answers to the questions raised by the previous speakers and maybe pick up on some of the points they have made.

Philip Bobbitt:

Michael's first point, that aspirations regarding empire, reflect the poverty of imagination, and a complete misunderstanding of the 20th century post-imperial project. Seems to me exactly the post-imperial world order of which America intervened in World War I, - a view of an order which was not shared by most of our allies. In fact the post-imperial order, (which was fought over in world war II) was an order shared by only some of our allies.

There is a general acceptance I think, of a post-imperial national order today. Even if as I believe, it is already beginning to crumble. The big break with Bush's administration that Michael talks about, I see a little differently. I would say that there were two breaks: One political and the other existential.

The first break came when the Bush administration in 2001, tried to walk away from North Korea, it took itself out of the middle East peace process, made a number of public announcements on Kyoto and a host of other matters on which we had hoped to work on collaboratively with our allies.

Every single one of these steps has come back to hurt the administration. I think then there was a break from the internationalist tradition that stretches from Roosevelt to Johnson to Clinton. That break was defined by the president's campaign during which he said that his administration would not get into nation building, we will take care of our own first and his disdain for international institutions and cooperation. A second break happened. It happened as a reaction to September the 11th. And that it was not a break brought about by the present political judgement, or by the desire to be a shark of the world or a kind of cowboy.

It was a break caused by reality. It was evidence of tremendous change in world affairs. It is very distressing to me that we continue to talk as if that event is really just an added version of earlier events. And the dramatic change in response to of this is acting out of the deepest nemeses.

Let me mention two things that disturbed me in Bush's policies: first the doctrine of pre-emption, and second, the rejection of the hitherto successful doctrine of containment. I believe that both of these American policies are not the last word, but the first recognition of a new world in which we all interact. And it behoves us to look this world straight in the eye and recognise it for what it is, and not to pretend to ourselves that it is really a simple problem, misunderstood by simple people in Washington.

The problem is two elements, and what makes it important is the intersection of these two elements: The first is the development of a global terrorist network. One that has a standing army, a consistent source of finance, has its own intelligence, it runs a rudimentary welfare system for the militants and their families, has treaties and alliances with states, and it has a consistent hierarchy both militarily and politically.

I very often hear principally from this country and France that the only thing new about September 11th and Al-Qaeda, is that Americans were hit, that you have vast experience with the IRA, with ETA, experience that goes back to the middle of the 19th century with the Russian anarchists. This to me shows a real failure to appreciate what is new. Al-Qaeda really is something new. I don't think that Osama Bin Laden will be studied in the political science departments in 20 or 30 years. I think they will be defeated and his place taken by somebody else. I think he will be studied in the business schools, because what he did was to take terrorism and completely change it. To de-simplify it, to globalise it. To make it a presence that no longer sought nation building, but sought the kind of role hitherto only enjoyed by states.

The reason the United States was attacked on September the 11th, was the same reason it was attacked on December the 7th 1941: It is not because we are hated. You may attack your younger brother because you hate him, but states don't go to war because they hate each other. Japan attacked the United States not because it hated Franklin Roosevelt or because it hated the people in Texas, New York or California. It attacked the United States because it thwarted their plans for regional domination. And that is the same reason why we were attacked on September 11th. The difference is when a state attacks another state, you know where it is. That is not true with a globalised network like Al-Qaeda. That is why it makes it so hard to deter. There is no particular place against which you can retaliate.

There is another danger - that is the development of weapons of mass destruction. They are becoming cheaper and more widely available, and therefore more dangerous. It is this that has changed the role of containment. When I taught in this country back in the 1980's, I taught the history of strategy and my speciality was the history of nuclear strategy. I would always say to my students; 'no new ideas please.' It was a problem that was well

understood and the system was relatively stable. Now we are going into a period where this can no longer be said with such confidence.

Suppose Saddam Hussein had gotten hold of nuclear weapons? (This I thought was the best rationale for the invasion of Iraq, coupled with some of the humanitarian things that I think will flow from a change of regime) What would have happened? Would we have been unable to deter him from attacking New York? Why? After all, we had been able to deter the Russians for 50 years, why couldn't we deter the Iraqis? That was never the problem.

The problem was that we ourselves would have been deterred from taking a regional role. I cannot imagine our putting 400,000 troops in Saudi Arabia if Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons. So both deterrence (with respect to non-state actors, or virtual states like Al-Qaeda), and containment, (with respect to regional powers), began to break down.

It's not I think that Bush administration has the wrong doctrine. In my opinion they don't have a doctrine. But they desperately need a doctrine. They need a way of explaining to our people and to allies exactly what the political criteria are for pre-emption, intervention, and for a post-containment world. To say that, is not to say that the doctrines we already have, will do just as well because they won't. I will say two more things and go to questions:

One of my favourite professors said something to me that I can never forget, he said: 'The worse night I ever spent was better than the worse lecture I ever heard.' So I'll try and wind it up. I'll just say two things:

First of all, the need for war in Iraq is not unique. It begins back with Kosovo. You'll all remember that the Russians used the veto to block UN endorsement for NATO action in Kosovo. You may also recall that such was our successful intervention there that the UN Security Council ratified that by a series of proposals, putting UN personnel into Kosovo, to partly (along with NATO) administer the post-war environment. Today the same thing is happening in the New Order. I know that Robert Harvey will be glad to know that the UN inspectors are going back into Iraq, as pro this resolution.

The problem is not, I think (as perhaps many of you, maybe everyone of you believes), that we need a check on intervention, that you have a rogue state based in Washington that is just hell bent on making everybody look like Texas. The problem is not knowing when not to intervene, and not being able to organise institutions to intervene.

I cannot bring myself to believe that the world would be better if Saddam Hussein was still in power-particularly for the Iraqis for heavens' sake! The problem is that the world has too little intervention. Think of the million people who died in central Africa and ask yourself - where is the UN now?

I think that you will find that as we become more and more prosperous, more and more self-absolved, we'll find all sorts of good reasons not to intervene. Not to trouble ourselves with all those messy conflicts which plague other

people. I agree with Shirley Williams- the future lies with those three alternatives: alienation, unilateralism and a kind of productive marketing of collective goods. Goods which all should have: a global health regime, attention to climate change, but yes also, standards and processes for humanitarian and political intervention.

Thank you.

ENDS