

**THE EUROPEAN INCLUSION INDEX  
IS EUROPE READY FOR THE GLOBALISATION OF  
PEOPLE?**

*Framework Document*

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**With a foreword by  
Commissioner António Vitorino**

**In association with  
The British Council and Sciences Po**

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## ABOUT THE PARTNERS

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The British Council in Brussels plays a key role in the European strategy. For more information, please contact Sharon Memis, Head of the Europe Programme, on +32 2 2270857 or by email via [sharon.memis@britishcouncil.be](mailto:sharon.memis@britishcouncil.be). Alternatively you can visit the web site [www.britishcouncil.org/belgium](http://www.britishcouncil.org/belgium).

The **Observatoire de la Politique Etrangère** was founded in Paris in 2002, and gathers young specialists in Foreign Policy studies and International Relations. The Group's research projects are currently centred on New European foreign policy issues, Coping with Transnational challenges, and France's foreign policy - old and new. For further information please contact: [frederic.charillon@wanadoo.fr](mailto:frederic.charillon@wanadoo.fr)

The Brussels-based **Migration Policy Group (MPG)** is an independent organisation committed to policy development on migration and mobility, and diversity and anti-discrimination by facilitating the exchange between stakeholders from all sectors of society, with the aim of contributing to innovative and effective responses to the challenges posed by migration and diversity ([www.migpolgroup.com](http://www.migpolgroup.com)).

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## The European Inclusion Index Project

The European Inclusion Index project presented by the Foreign Policy Centre in association with the British Council and the “Sciences Po” defines a very precise approach to the immigration phenomenon. The project takes proper account of all aspects of Europe’s immigration debate. It is always a complicated task to try to regulate the movement of people. Yet to neglect the forecasts and potential concerns relating to immigration could mean paying an even higher price in the future.

The main idea of the project – an index charting EU member states’ performances on different facets of immigration policy that will both be accessible to the public and create a sort of positive competition among governments - is very likely to bring improvements to the immigration debate as a whole. Any actions or inaction, commitments or non-commitments, by countries in the field of immigration will be measured. The desire of states to be leaders rather than laggards will be overwhelming. A new commitment by states to innovative immigration policies, at a national but also particularly at an urban level, is crucial to create momentum. Their engagement with the need to enact changes and find constructive solutions is irreplaceable.

The different strands of study envisaged by the project – **Citizenship and Identity; Access to Labour Market; and Political Participation** – can be put together under the heading of an integration policy – an important feature of immigration policy in itself. The duty that falls on states to readapt their societies in order to welcome new communities is immense. Governments must underline respect for the universal values that their states stand for and that attract immigration. But it should not be forgotten that the process of adaptation is not a one-way track. Immigrant communities have to respect the identity of their host society and attempt to develop a sense of integration. It is a process of mutual acceptance and tolerance. Therefore, strengthening the codification and implementation of the rights that contribute to a sense of belonging to a single community – such as those of association, access to

education, political participation and freedom of movement - seems to be a step in the right direction.

The issue of the labour market connects to a tension currently seen at the European level: the ageing of the population and the desire to maintain economic competitiveness in the future. Even if in some European countries this problem can still find a temporary solution in the unplanned influx of immigrant communities, other countries have already passed this stage and have come to the realistic conclusion that there is an undeniable need for a coordinated management of these influxes combined with other national policies. But then again, pressure should not only be imposed on states: the immigrant communities also need to engage themselves in the process of inclusion in the labour market. If, on the one hand, countries need to stress and assure non-discriminatory access to jobs, on the other hand, those who want to have access to them should, for instance, be able to speak the native language of the host country.

On the basis of this overview, it is clear that the ideas of integration and commitment to rights stand out as central to the effort that must be made in shaping the future of immigration. The strength and will of the states can and will make a difference in the approach to the issue; therefore, any push, even if it seems small, might bring significant improvements.

I am therefore happy to support the objectives pursued by the “European Inclusion Index”, to which I wish all the best.

António Vitorino

Member of the European Commission, responsible for  
Justice and Home affairs

## **The European Inclusion Index: is Europe ready for the globalisation of people?**

We are entering a crucial phase in Europe's history. Changes in economics, demography and world structures mean that more than ever before Europe needs to embrace diversity and to recognise the need and advantages of incorporating skills from around the world. At the moment Europe's economy represents 30% of the global economy; soon its share will fall to 15%. Therefore, its ability to deal with new people and be open to new skills will be the key determinant of its success in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

Europe's leaders are aware of these challenges. In the latest draft of the EU Constitution they committed their countries to 'pluralism, tolerance, justice, equality, solidarity and non-discrimination'. An anti-discrimination framework has also been set out in the EU Treaty's Article 13 which provides two clear anti-discrimination directives. Likewise, in 1997 they launched the European Convention on Nationality in an effort to establish continent-wide norms of nationality and citizenship.

However, despite these large-scale transformations and the commitment on paper by leaders, citizenship and integration policies in Europe are lagging behind those in new migration countries such as Canada and Australia. While some European countries are becoming more open to the idea of economic migration and anti-discrimination legislation has become a condition for EU accession, Europe is still littered with gross anachronisms when it comes to promoting progressive citizenship and inclusion strategies. Some countries continue to maintain that citizenship is a right of blood, many countries forbid dual citizenship, and others have yet to introduce work permit schemes which can allow them to cope with severe labour shortages. Likewise, institutions across Europe have failed to keep up with the growing diversity of their societies and in most countries minorities remain severely under-represented in their political institutions (if at all). The central problem is that, although EU member states face similar challenges – whether it's the ageing of their populations or the tensions emerging from the growing diversity of their populations – questions surrounding citizenship and inclusion

continue to be dealt with solely at a national level. Furthermore, pledges to unify nationality and citizenship policies tend to be thin and lacking in genuine commitment from all members. For example, so far the only countries which have signed up to the European Convention on Nationality are Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden.

The Foreign Policy Centre, in partnership with the British Council in Brussels and Sciences Po in Paris, is creating an Index to measure and rank European countries' standards of inclusion and approaches to diversity. The aim is for the Index to act as an overarching mechanism which can allow them to compare policies and performance.

The Index will identify the leaders and laggards by ranking the EU member states against one another across a range of criteria (political, social and economic). By doing so, we will attempt to help guide debates about inclusion and diversity in the pan-European political and public arena and to trigger a healthy sense of competition between states, encouraging member states to raise their standards at a national level as well as to lend, borrow, share and adapt methods of good practice.

To do this we will set out a clear model of success which all countries can strive towards and against which they will all be benchmarked. The idea is that countries should be judged against these benchmarks annually in the same way that they are on measure of economic reform under the so-called 'Lisbon Process' (see Box 1).

In this framework document we set out some of the issues which will guide the thinking around the Index. We also present some sample indicators which we hope will stimulate discussion. The paper looks primarily at issues surrounding newcomers and ethnic minorities more broadly as we believe that Europe's success or failure in dealing with these groups is the determining factor in terms of its ability to adapt to the globalisation of people.

### **Box 1: The 'Lisbon Process'**

The 'Lisbon Process' was launched in 2000 pioneering a new method of European governance whereby the European Council sets targets for itself, and then takes on the responsibility at national level for fulfilling those commitments. The Commission took on a monitoring role. The Lisbon Process is significant in this context as it developed a method of transnational governance which was dependent on the transmission of objectives rather than directives.

Lisbon opens up enormous scope for greater accountability. Governments set themselves up as being prepared to be judged by their performance in certain fields and to be criticised for inaction.

### **Methodology**

Measuring the success or failure of a country's citizenship and inclusion policies is not an easy task because these are largely abstract concepts which draw upon countries' histories and political structures. Furthermore, some EU member states are relatively new to debates about inclusion and therefore lack the structures and tools to track the performance of minorities and newcomers.

Our indicators will be divided into thin and thick definitions of citizenship and inclusion. Thin indicators will reflect legal and political formalities, such as the number of years which people are required to wait before being eligible for citizenship or whether countries are putting in place rules to ensure that political institutions are a reflection of the ethnic make-up of their societies. These indicators will measure both whether a country has a set of policies and legislation in place which aims to protect newcomers and ethnic minorities from discrimination and whether these policies are being implemented fairly and effectively.

The thick or substantive definitions will be developed according to two sets of additional factors. Firstly, we will examine whether host communities are opening up to newcomers. For this we will look, for example, at changes taking place in public opinion and the rates of success for Right parties are having at a local level. Secondly, we will look at whether newcomers are playing an active role in the country's social, political, economic and cultural life. Box 2 summarises some possible indicators of newcomer integration through time.

**Box 2: Dimensions of integration**

| Dimension | Short-term   | Long-term  |
|-----------|--|--|
| Economic  | Entry into the job market<br>Financial independence  | Career advancement<br>Income parity  |
| Social    | Established social network<br>Accessing institutions | Diversity within social networks<br>Engaging in efforts to change institutions   |
| Cultural  | Adaptation of various aspects of lifestyle           | Engaging in efforts to redefine cultural identity                                |
| Political | Voting   | Participation in political parties<br>Participation in socio-political movements |

Based on these criteria we will seek to create three separate indexes looking at the following areas (the final country ranking will reflect countries' performances in all of these areas): Citizenship and Identity, Access to the Labour Market and Political Participation.

**The project**

The Index will be the result of a one-year research project which will seek to draw on expertise from across Europe and to consult the potential end users:

*European seminar series:* The Foreign Policy Centre (London), the British Council (Brussels) and Sciences Po (Paris) will each coordinate a seminar on one of the three topics in each of their respective cities to brainstorm and engage key academics and policymakers, inviting them to pool data resources, contacts and ideas.

*Research papers:* The Index will draw from a series of academic papers on each of the three areas. We will be working in conjunction with two academic partners: Dr Andrew Geddes (Deputy Director of the Europe in the World Centre at the University of Liverpool) and Professor Zig Layton-Henry (former Director of the ESRC Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations at the University of Warwick).

**Using the Index**

In time, the publication of the revised Index should become an annual fixture in the European calendar similar to the Human Development Index or the yearly World Values Survey. The Index will be available electronically for NGOs, think tanks, campaigning organisations and the media around Europe.

Through our activities and the production of an Index we will aim to benefit the following groups across Europe:

*Campaigning organisations and advocacy groups:* The Index will be a way of holding governments to account.

*Policymakers from member states:* The Index will work as a platform for exchange across the EU – sharing good practice and innovation, and comparing performance with other member states.

*The general public:* We will endeavour to set out the Index in a format which is easily accessible to the general public. The Index will seek to engage people by avoiding the legalism which tends to characterise EU documents and will be presented in an accessible way without shying away from causing debate and disagreement.

## **Part One: Citizenship and Identity**

The vast historical, cultural and legal differences which determine citizenship policies and attitudes across Europe make member states apprehensive about relinquishing control over their citizenship policies.

However, the lack of an overarching notion of European citizenship poses problems in the context of free movement of labour. Over 15 million long-term and legally resident third-country nationals in the EU are excluded from any political process because they are not classed as citizens in their respective countries of residence. While a large proportion will not be seeking citizenship, anecdotal evidence shows that a substantial number of those who do continue to be excluded.

Europe's member states will be assessed in terms of how their citizenship models fit in with the way in which the world is changing. At present EU member states range across the spectrum of citizenship models. France, for example, is an assimilationist country which requires primacy of the State and its institutions and prescribes loyalty to them above all else. Until recently, Holland was an actively multiculturalist country, giving primacy to group rights over individual rights and creating a series of minority groups rather than one diverse community. Britain meanwhile comes closest to applying what Michael Ignatieff has labelled a policy of 'acculturation', a model of citizenship which promotes two-way adaptation and which has given rise to groupings such as Caribbean or Asian-Britishness.

The Index will move beyond these largely academic notions of citizenship policy and will concentrate on the policies which countries are putting in place to deliver citizenship for newcomers in a way which suits Europe's contemporary reality. It will be based on the following features.

Firstly, it will analyse whether countries have inclusive citizenship policies or place restrictions on the kinds of individuals who are eligible for citizenship (see Box 3). The starting point will be that citizenship should be open to people of all origins and ideally should be granted as early as possible in order to give people rights and act

as a catalyst for integration. Key questions will include: Can anyone become a fully-fledged citizen regardless of whether or not they have been born in the country? What are the time constraints placed on the granting of citizenship? Countries will be penalised for either applying blood-rights (*jus sanguinis*) as opposed to birth rights (*jus soli*) to citizenship or for placing very long lead up times to the granting of citizenship.

Secondly, we will rank countries' openness to multiple identities by looking at their approaches to dual citizenship. In an age of globalisation and multiple identities states cannot ask individuals to break from their different identities. In the words of Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer: "Accepting the legitimacy of dual nationality is justified as a matter of respect for a migrant's connections and affiliations with the country of origin. Furthermore, many foreign nationals who are otherwise eligible for citizenship may not apply if attaining citizenship requires them to sever their legal ties to their original country."<sup>1</sup> Europe needs a concept of citizenship which marries strong ties which bind people together as a community, with the possibility for individual self-expression and other types of identity, including local and religious identities, and other nationalities. The Index will therefore penalise countries which do not make room for dual nationality.

The third step will be to rank countries' performance in terms of the way in which they manage the naturalisation process and the extent to which they provide services to guide the integration process.

Migration experts often say that the process of integration starts on day one because people's sense of belonging is often defined during these initial stages. People who are made to wait indefinitely, are given little information or are treated disrespectfully will clearly be less willing to adapt and co-operate with the integration process. We will therefore look at the processing of citizenship application – both in terms of the effectiveness of the process (how long it takes) and

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<sup>1</sup> T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, *Citizenship Policies for an age of migration*, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002)

the effort made to inform and welcome newcomers. Linked to this we will also be looking at the naturalisation rates in each country, in other words, the proportion of non-citizens which actually apply for citizenship in a given year.

While citizenship should be an option for all, those who are granted citizenship need to be aware of the rights and responsibilities which it entails. The Index will therefore place value on the tools which countries can use to add weight to the granting of citizenship, such as citizenship ceremonies and tests. Language tuition will also be key to this process as it is the key to entering the labour market and operating effectively in the host society. We will also seek to measure the thicker definitions of language, scoring countries according to the efforts put in place to respect people's right to preserve the language of their country of origin. Useful indicators could include whether states provide information in a range of languages or whether the children of newcomers can receive language tuition.

The final step will be to analyse the extent to which countries are putting in place policies which make the granting of citizenship into a two-way process. While many European countries are working to ensure that newcomers are aware of their responsibilities and learn the language of the country in which they are settling, most are failing to make host communities aware of their responsibilities as members of an increasingly diverse society. This failure becomes most evident when looking at public opinion surveys.

Public opinion regarding newcomers to Europe tends to be contradictory. Although the numbers of Europeans who are actively tolerant outnumber those who are intolerant, the most common responses can be classified only as 'passively tolerant' or 'ambiguous'. Many Europeans favour policies designed to improve the coexistence of majorities and minorities, and believe that diversity is good for their societies. In 2000, 48% of Europeans felt immigrants had enriched the cultural life of their country. However, a majority of Europeans voiced concerns over minorities and think that they threaten social peace and welfare. The polls show that Europeans tend to be particularly concerned about the impact which

migration can have on unemployment, social welfare and educational standards.<sup>2</sup>

### Box 3: Criteria for citizenship policy in selected countries across Europe

**Austria:** jus sanguinis, citizenship by naturalisation after 10 years  
**Belgium:** jus soli / jus sanguinis combination, naturalisation takes 5 years, 3 if married to a Belgian  
**Denmark:** jus sanguinis, renounce previous citizenship, naturalisation after 7 years, Danish language requirement.  
**France:** jus soli / sanguinis mix, dual nationality allowed, 5 years residence for naturalisation, French language required.  
**Germany:** jus sanguinis, dual nationality not allowed. A child gets German citizenship if one parent is a German national. Adults who have lived in Germany for 8 years, are 'integrated' and can speak German are also eligible.  
**Italian:** acquired by descent, birth on territory, declaration, by marriage, naturalisation. Requires 10 years residence for non-EU, 4 for EU persons,  
**Holland:** jus sanguinis / solis for 3<sup>rd</sup> generation. 5 years residence, societal integration and Dutch language knowledge for naturalisation.  
**UK:** jus sanguinis post-1981, British nationality act 1981 reduced number of people eligible to claim citizenship through entitlement. Eligible for citizenship after 3 years if married to a UK national. Children of permanent residents can acquire citizenship if they are born in the UK and have spent their first 10 years in the UK.  
**European Citizenship:** automatic EU citizenship granted to nationals of the 15 member states. Guarantees freedom of movement within the EU, the right to petition, the right to vote and to stand in EU elections.

The Index will use public opinion surveys as a means of measuring whether the host community is playing an active role in the integration process.

<sup>2</sup> Source: *Attitudes to 3<sup>rd</sup> Country Nationals in Europe*, (Eurobarometer Survey 2000)

| Outline of indicators: Citizenship and Identity   |
|---|
| What is the legal basis for citizenship of the member state?  |
| Is dual nationality allowed?  |
| How efficient / lengthy is the processing of citizenship applications?  |
| How much does it cost the applicant?  |
| What are the refusal rates?   |
| Does the applicant have a right to know the reasons for refusal?  |
| How many years of legal residence does it take to become naturalised?   |
| What civic / language requirements do member states impose for citizenship?                                     |
| Do governments provide language lessons? If so, how many hours are provided free of charge?                     |
| Are citizenship lessons / tests a requirement?  |
| Is language tuition provided?   |
| What is the temperature of public opinion towards 3 <sup>rd</sup> country nationals, immigrants and minorities? |
| Is the government putting in place programmes aimed at shifting public opinion?                                 |

## Part Two: Access to the Labour Market

Economists have shown that demographics are going to be the most important factor determining Europe's economic future. Labour forces will begin to shrink over the next 25 years and ageing populations will be increasingly dependent on a smaller economically active population. Italy, Spain, Greece, Finland, Germany, Austria and the UK's economically active population will begin to decline by 2015.

Europe already relies on migration to plug many of its labour market needs. Migrants make up about 20 million out of 380 million living in the EU and almost two-thirds of the net population growth in Europe is due to immigration. Without positive net immigration the populations of Italy, Germany, Greece, and Sweden would already be in decline.

The problem is that apart from a few ad hoc and relatively unsuccessful attempts at promoting formal immigration, such as Germany's recent attempt to recruit 20,000 IT experts from the Indian sub-continent, most of this migration takes place illegally.

Furthermore, newcomers to Europe and ethnic minorities still face serious challenges in the labour market (see Box 4). Countries' inability to tackle these deficiencies not only impact on the economic welfare of migrants and ethnic minorities. They are also a vital component in the social and cultural integration of immigrants. Furthermore, allowing them to actively contribute to Europe's economy is the best way of tackling the prejudice among host communities.

Examples from Europe show that successful labour market policies often do not correlate with openness in terms of countries' citizenship policies. For example while Germany may be criticised for the model of citizenship which it applies, newcomers find entry into the labour market relatively less challenging because special schemes have been put in place in order to streamline newcomers' access to work.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See for example, Andrew Geddes, *Ethnic Minorities in the Labour Market: Comparative Policy Approaches*.

## Box 4: Comparative rates of unemployment among ethnic minority and majority populations across Europe<sup>4</sup>

| Country    | Ethnic unemployment | Majority unemployment |
|------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Austria    | 8.1%                | 4.5%                  |
| Belgium    | -                   | 9.5%                  |
| Denmark    | 12.3% (1997)        | 3.4%                  |
| Finland    | 29.3%               | 13.5%                 |
| France     | 23.7%               | 11.1%                 |
| Germany    | 20.3%               | 9.3%                  |
| Greece     | -                   | 10.9%                 |
| Holland    | 20%                 | 4%                    |
| Ireland    | -                   | 7.5%                  |
| Italy      | 12%                 | 11.8%                 |
| Luxembourg | 4.4%                | 2.1%                  |
| Portugal   | -                   | 5.2%                  |
| Spain      | -                   | 18.8%                 |
| Sweden     | 33.6%               | 6%                    |
| UK         | 15%                 | 6.4%                  |

The Index will focus on three central aspects of European labour market policies with relation to migration and ethnic minorities. As in the case of citizenship, it will reflect both the thin (formal) and thick (substantive) definitions of labour market inclusion.

We will firstly focus on the issue of work permits. Illegal migration is harmful to both migrants and receiving countries. Migrants suffer because they lack rights and are exposed to abuse. Receiving countries are destabilised because populations become insecure and public opinion hardens. The hardening of public opinion in turn puts a strain on countries' overall ability to recruit from outside. The Index will therefore reward countries which have well-established work permit schemes which allow migrants to gain access to the labour

<sup>4</sup> Source: European Employment Observatory, 'National Labour Market Policies', "Trends" bulletin, Spring 1999.

market legally and can reassure the host populations that they are not becoming overrun by unwelcome forms of migration.

The second aspect of this will be the policies which are put in place to counteract the ethnic and other penalties faced by newcomers and well-established ethnic minorities. Anti-discrimination laws are clearly the most effective way of achieving initial success in improving access to and performance in the labour market. Britain, for example, is the European country with both the most stringent anti-discrimination laws and the best results in terms of performance in the labour market.

However, in Europe equal rights are not a guarantee for equal treatment. The Index will therefore seek both to tease out whether newcomers are able to gain employment and to measure the ethnic penalties which continue to plague most of Europe's labour market.

#### **Outline of Indicators: Access to the Labour Market**

Have the countries got schemes to recruit 3<sup>rd</sup> country nationals in place?

Is there a work permit scheme in operation?

What are the differences in unemployment / labour market participation ratios between domestic and 3<sup>rd</sup> country national / ethnic minority workforce?

Are there policies in place to help integrate 3<sup>rd</sup> country nationals ethnic minorities into the labour market?

What are the wage differentials between domestic and 3<sup>rd</sup> country national workforce?

### **Part Three: Political Participation**

Populations in Europe are becoming ever more ethnically diverse. However, these changes are not reflected in European institutions and instruments of power. 20 million legal residents are disenfranchised from the political process and ethnic minorities are sorely under-represented both at the national and at the European levels. If British democratic institutions were a true reflection of its ethnic diversity there would be some 47 black and Asian MP's – there are currently only 12. Similarly in Germany only 4 out of the 605-member Bundestag are from ethnic minority backgrounds.

The fact that Europe's political institutions aren't representative will pose serious problems for Europe in the future. Europe will find it increasingly hard to be seen as a beacon of democracy around the world when it is clearly suffering from large deficiencies in its own levels political representation. Furthermore, without the creation of truly representative bodies EU institutions will continue to be sapped of their legitimacy and will be unable to act as a bulwark against racist and exclusionary policies.

The EU does actually call upon its member states to grant long-term 3<sup>rd</sup> country nationals "rights which are as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizen."<sup>5</sup> By law, in every European country each citizen has the right to political participation, can stand for elected office, as well as form and create policy. However, these requirements are implemented differently from country to country and are failing to address the gross inadequacies of representation fast enough.

The Index's thin definition of political participation will simply imagine that all ethnic minorities should be represented in the political and public domain in proportion to their percentage of the entire national population. In the short-term, radical policies need to be put in place to tackle the severe deficit which faces all European member states and EU institutions. Countries need to have policies in place for

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<sup>5</sup> European Parliament resolution on the Commission report on citizenship in the Union.

streamlining the entry of newcomers and minority groups into the political arena, whether this is in the form of targets for political parties or the more radical option of quotas. Political parties in particular need to put these policies in place in order to reach out to minority voters. Linked to this, the Index will also explore whether mainstream (as opposed to far Right) parties (a) are legally permitted to voice anti-minority sentiments and (b) do so in the run up to elections.

However, we will also seek to analyse thicker notions of inclusion and diversity in the political sphere by measuring to what extent people from any background can 'make it' in politics. For example in the UK, the recent accession of a black woman to the part of Secretary of State for International Development did not happen by way of her representing a particular minority group but was based on her individual merit. To assess this thicker sense of inclusion in political participation age and gender will be useful factors to consider. Furthermore, these definitions should not be based on minority groups being represented by self-appointed minority leaders with thin roots in the communities themselves. In order for them to be genuinely representative they need to reflect the cross-section of people who belong to these communities, including women and young people. A requirement of this could include whether minorities are in fact turning up to vote in elections and are taking up party membership.

The flip-side of this will be to measure public responses to a political set-up which reflects the diverse composition of European societies. For example, how would people feel about having a President or Prime Minister of different ethnic origin from that of the host community? How successful are far Right political candidates in local elections?

Finally, the Index will also consider how minorities are represented in the wider instruments of power and influence, such as campaigning organisations and the media. Formal politics is not the only way in which people can gain a political role in this day and age. Other, non-state actors, are today of equal importance. We will therefore also

explore the inclusivity of other institutions that are fast becoming central to political life.

#### **Outline of Indicators: Political representation**

Are there policies in place to address political under-representation (e.g. quotas or targets)?

Do political parties ban members from expressing anti-minority sentiments?

How many 'visible minority' representatives are in service in the following levels:

Local?  
Cabinet?  
Parliament?  
EU?

What are the success rates of far Right parties at local level?

What are the levels of political participation / party membership among ethnic minorities?

What are the diversity levels among senior civil servants, media chiefs and news editors?

## **Conclusion**

The European Citizenship and Inclusion Index will seek to determine how ready different European countries are for the globalisation of people. Getting this right will be key for European prosperity, social cohesion and its ability to stand for democracy and human rights on the global stage.

During the course of this year we hope to develop a baseline indicator for all 15 EU member states. However, we also aim to integrate the 10 new members in due course. Once this baseline indicator has been established we will be able to look at the absolute position of each European country over time.