

GLOBAL THINKING

The War of Words

Mark Leonard argues that Europeans are more likely to be listened to than the US.

In reacting to this summer's embassy bombing in Karachi, President Bush addressed the Muslim world as well as his own citizens: "They claim they are religious people, and then they blow up Muslims", he said of the perpetrators. Back in 1998, when the American Embassy in Nairobi was bombed, President Clinton focused much more heavily on the Americans injured even though many Kenyans had been killed. Though President Bush was criticised for his talk of "crusades" days after September 11th, recent remarks show that the administration has realised that America needs to change the way it speaks to the rest of the world.



William Reeve, BBC World Service Trust, filling a report via satphone in Afghanistan

When Colin Powell appointed Charlotte Beers as assistant secretary of state, he said: "I wanted one of the world's greatest advertising experts, because what are we doing? We're selling. We're selling a product". As Chief Executive of the advertising giant, J Walter Thompson, Beers hit the headlines by eating the dog food she was promoting to prove how tasty it could be. Her role now is to mastermind "a hundred years war" to convert the Arab and Muslim worlds to American values.

But Beers will not be doing the browbeating that many will associate with the American "hard sell". She says that the key is to start with her audience's priorities (or "walk in their shoes" as she puts it). She wants America to engage them emotionally – not bombard them with "megaphone diplomacy". This is a justifiable charge against American propaganda efforts in Afghanistan. Tactics ranged from "leaflet bombs" showing women beaten by the Taliban with the message: "Is this the future you want for your children and your women?" to single channel wind-up radios that only tune into the "Voice of America".

Beers favours a different approach. One of her early initiatives was rebranding the Voice of America's Arabic service as 'Radio Sawa' ('Radio Together'). Gone are the hours of US government monitored talk that attracted a small audience of older decision-makers. In its place is a fast-paced music channel aimed at the young who subliminally ingest news bulletins in between blasts of Britney Spears and the Backstreet Boys. Beers also plans to launch a 24-hour Arabic satellite news channel that will take on the mighty Al-Jazeera.

Her other projects include airing short videos that profile the lives of Muslim Americans - teachers, basketball players, firemen. The intended message is that the United States is an open society, tolerant and accepting of all religions. What is more, these projects are backed by serious money –

\$900 million to fund promotional materials, cultural and educational exchanges and new radio and television channels in the Middle East.

But America must realise that in contrast to European states it starts from a very low base. A senior official in the White House conceded to me that it will take a lot to overcome Middle Eastern cynicism: "We've made no attempts to communicate with ordinary Arabs unless we are bombing them or imposing sanctions on them – I wouldn't like us if I were them".

And the deeper problem is that a communications strategy can't work if it cuts against the grain of American foreign policy. It will be impossible to win hearts and minds unless the people being targeted get a sense that America really cares about them as individuals – not just because Americans are scared that they might become terrorists. This administration, in particular, has demonstrated that it values coercive power above all else. This means that public diplomacy can only be seen as the projection of power. Sophisticated attempts at building relationships with foreign publics will be undercut by unilateralist policies that always put American interests first. Radio Sawa will not be able to defeat the censorship of other governments because its own editorial content will still reflect the views of the American Government. For all Charlotte Beers' good intentions, American public diplomacy could

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The Foreign Policy Centre
Elizabeth House
Mezzanine Floor
39 York Road
London
SE1 7NQ

Tel: 0207 401 5350
Fax: 0207 401 5351
email: info@fpc.org.uk

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become mired by these contradictions – a velvet fist in an iron glove.

Europe, on the other hand, does not have the same problems as America. This could open up an important space for Britain to lead the European Union in providing an alternative to public diplomacy. Because Europeans do not rely on the hard power which America takes for granted, Europeans have had to draw on other sources of influence. When Tony Blair appears on the world stage, he draws as much on his moral authority in Northern Ireland as on his formal economic or military power. Europeans are also well-versed in how public opinion in other states affects our own politics – whether it is Danes or Irish who enjoy saying No in referendums, British Euro-scepticism, or French paranoia about British beef. Ask Romano Prodi.

The European history of multi-lateralism also brings a different – and less messianic – tone to dealings with the rest of the world. It is highly unlikely that any European leader – Berlusconi perhaps excepted – would talk about an axis of evil. Europe's public diplomacy institutions are not seen as conveyor belts for propaganda: the Goethe Institut and the British Council talk about 'mutuality' and 'building relationships' rather than selling British or German values. The BBC's international broadcasting channel is called the "World Service", not the "Voice of Britain".

So can Europe play the same role in the battle for public opinion as America does in the air and on the field? On the surface, it looks promising. Even at a purely economic level, if you add up the budgets of all the European countries they dwarf American expenditure (Britain alone spends half as much as America, while France and Germany spend even more). But as in so many areas Europe punches below its weight because it spreads its resources too thinly – and often even competes against itself. Robert Templer, of the International Crisis Group, cites Afghanistan as "a conspicuous failure of public diplomacy". Western nations have concentrated on branding their aid and assistance in a competitive fashion.

Templer claims this has robbed the fledgling central Afghan administration of profile, legitimacy and, ultimately, stability. The French, for example, have proudly reopened the Lycee in Kabul and played on old links to Ahmed Shah Massoud in an attempt to promote their influence in the area. They also undermined the unifying symbolism of the return of the old King, Zahir Shah, by very publicly receiving the Defence Minister who had snubbed the King by being in Paris at the time of his return.

Britain, or any other European country for that matter, cannot really claim to have a national interest of its own – distinct from western or European interests – in more than perhaps fifty countries – a quarter of the UN's membership. In most of the world, competition will be counterproductive, wasting resources while undermining the West's objectives in those countries. Each country should focus national promotion on the few key countries where they have a real bilateral interest. The starting point for a new approach, which Tony Blair should propose at the Danish EU summit this winter, is for the European Union to develop a plan for co-operatively funded public diplomacy in countries where it has no differentiated interests, but a pressing communal need.

If European countries are serious about developing a common foreign policy they should play to their strengths rather than their weaknesses. Instead of crippling ourselves with envy of American hard power, we should commit serious resources to developing an arsenal of soft power. While the contradictions in American public diplomacy remain, it will become even more important that Europe find the credibility to build real relationships with citizens around the world.

Mark Leonard is author of *Public Diplomacy* (£14.95) and Director of the Foreign Policy Centre. Order online at www.fpc.org.uk/reports. The Foreign Policy Centre is establishing a Public Diplomacy Forum for embassies to share expertise on the practice of public diplomacy. For further information email mark@fpc.org.uk

FOREIGN POLICY CENTRE PROJECTS

The Foreign Policy Centre The Foreign Policy Centre is a centre-left think tank that develops innovative approaches to policy which help foster a global community committed to democracy, human rights and social justice. Through its research agenda, publications, events, and commitment to engaging a broad range of actors, the Centre challenges conventional wisdom on the effectiveness of international systems and institutions, and the roles of citizens, business, and non-governmental organisations in global governance. A brief outline of our current areas of work is as follows:

THE FUTURE OF DIPLOMACY

This summer the Centre published *Going Public*, an exploration of how Governments can influence publics abroad. It was the culmination of two years' international research, drawing heavily on interviews with Harvard Academic Joseph Nye and Downing Street Spokesman Alistair Campbell. The next phase of the project will be a re-examination of Norway's international image and standing.

For more information contact Mark on mark@fpc.org.uk

EUROPE PROGRAMME

For more information on any of the Europe Programme projects contact Tom Arbutnott on tom@fpc.org.uk

The Next Generation Democracy programme works across the EU and accession countries to explore new models for democracy in Europe, with a particular focus on the Convention on the Future of Europe. It includes regular seminars in different EU countries, a series of policy-briefs, a major conference in Taormina and a web-site www.network-europe.net. During the year its outputs have included *Linking National Politics to Europe* by Simon Hix, an innovative model for the election of the European Commission President Ana Palacio, now Spanish Foreign Minister.

The Future of Rural Communities The Future of European Rural Communities is a year long project

aimed at finding ways in which the Common Agricultural Policy can be reformed. Chaired by Lord Haskins, former Rural Recovery Coordinator and Chairman of Northern Foods, it has gathered evidence at seminars in Poland, Paris and Berlin. Its outputs will be research outlining the benefits of CAP reform to consumers and the environment, as well as a political route-map showing how agreement might be reached. Researchers working on the project include Jack Thurston, former Special Advisor to Agriculture Minister Nick Brown, Jonny Trapp Steffenson, a Danish CAP reform expert, and Vicki Swales, Head of Agricultural Policy at the RSPB.

Soft Voters and the Euro

Following on from the Foreign Policy Centre's ground-breaking work on public opinion and the Euro, a panel of leading polling experts will consider in detail who the "floating voters" on the Euro are, and suggest ways in which they can be influenced.

For more information contact Tom Arbutnott on Tom@fpc.org.uk

THE RISK AND SECURITY PROGRAMME

Explores the increasing exposure of individuals, charities, aid agencies and Governments operating around the world to risk. The programme looks at the nature of the threats and explores ways in which they can be managed. Over the last year, the *Kidnapping Business* has become the authoritative international text on economic kidnapping, and was featured in a recent edition of *Foreign Policy* magazine. This summer it will be followed by *Travel Advice*, an examination of the role of the Foreign Office in providing information to everyone from backpackers and business personnel on their safety abroad. In the Autumn, Rachel Briggs will edit a collection of pieces on how the business community can best prepare itself for a terrorist attack. *The Unlikely Counter-Terrorists* will include pieces on the changing threat and will explore what companies are doing post-September 11.

'The Corporate Personnel Security in Emerging Markets' research project, which started in March 2002 will run until July 2003 and will culminate in a major policy report. Between now and July next year, there will be a series of seminars and working papers.

For more information contact Rachel Briggs on Rachel@fpc.org.uk

NORTH-SOUTH PROGRAMME

The centre is developing a new strand of work on North-South issues, which will be launched at the Labour party conference with "Africa: Is the West Just Walking By", an event (in association with Oxfam) bringing together Corporate, NGO and Government representatives. It will be followed by an iconoclastic collection of essays by African thinkers and practitioners (in association with CDC Capital Partners) to be published in early 2003.

For further information contact Phoebe Griffith on phoebe@fpc.org.uk

GLOBAL BRITONS PROGRAMME

The Global Britons Programme, directed by *Independent* Columnist Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, is a research project that looks at what Britishness means to people across the United Kingdom in the wake of September 11 and northwest England racial disturbances. The project has sought to involve those far from the London political orbit, holding meetings in Birmingham, Manchester, Edinburgh, and will shortly visit Cardiff as well as London. The range of contributors has been eclectic: at recent sessions Afghan asylum seekers, Islamic women and school age students joined the politicians and academics in discussion. As part of the programme we are publishing a collection of essays on Britishness with contributions by Phillip Dodd, David Blunkett, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, David Lammy MP and Ziauddin Sardar. Work with schools to incorporate an "internationalist perspective" into citizenship education will follow in 2003.

For more information contact Phoebe Griffith on phoebe@fpc.org.uk



NO MORE SUMMITS

Constitutional Reform will only make the EU more unpopular, according to Sir Michael Butler

It has become obligatory for Europe's political class to bemoan the "democratic deficit" in the EU. We are told that this must be corrected by recommendations from the Convention on the Future of Europe. But there is a danger that the kind of constitutional reform it is considering will have precisely the opposite effect – proving the EU remains opaque and pre-occupied with arcane debates of little interest outside of Brussels committee rooms.

Anti-Europeans and Federalists both argue that the EU is "undemocratic". Anti-Europeans hope that this will lead to "renegotiation" of its Treaties; federalists hope to use it to open the door to the United States of Europe. Too many European pragmatists have become fellow travellers of this unholy alliance. To deny that there is a democratic deficit seems no longer politically acceptable. Every ministerial speech, seminar, conference (and even publications put out by the Foreign Policy Centre) begin with a series of mea culpas about the failings of European Democracy.

There is a deficit, but it is a deficit of consent not of democracy. Too many people are moving towards support for the Le Pens of this world, and say that they do not understand what the EU is or what it is for. There is a rising tide of nationalism. But this will not be fixed by renegotiating the Treaties or allowing the President of the Commission to be elected.

The EU is not like a country with a democratically elected government. If it were, democratic theory and practice would demand that the people be able to change their government by voting it out at periodic elections. The fact

that the European Parliament is called a Parliament has compounded the confusion because it is normal to feel that a Parliament ought to be able to change the government. The European Parliament can sack the European Commission, but it cannot sack the government of the EU because it is the Council (the member states) and not the Commission that takes the decisions.

The European Commission is an independent organisation – not just a civil service. It has the role of making sure that the member states carry out their Treaty obligations and can take them to the European Court if they do not. It has the exclusive right to propose draft legislation, though in practice it works with governments who wish to see specific legislation proposed. It has a crucial role in implementing the decisions of the Council and in representing the EU internationally. But it is the Council that is the decision-making body.

Increasingly in recent years, it is the European Council composed of the



Margaret Thatcher supported majority voting to create the Single Market

Heads of Government that has played the leading role. All the member states are required by treaty to be democracies and so the representatives of their countries in the Council are subject to the democratic control exercised by their national Parliaments. Some national Parliaments do the job more thoroughly than others, but all the Ministers who speak in the Council pay great attention to their political constituencies at home. If the EU is not to become a super-state, national Parliaments must be the main element of democratic control over decisions taken by Ministers in the Council.

The Eurosceptics, like Margaret Thatcher, argue that majority voting in the Council destroys accountability to their Parliaments of those Ministers who are outvoted. Yet in 1985 she agreed that, in order to remove national barriers to free trade, majority voting was essential if the Single Market was to be created. My own experience in the Council was that Ministers much preferred not to outvote each other. Decisions were normally taken by consensus, except that votes were sometimes taken at the request of an isolated Minister – so that he could tell his own Parliament he had had no choice. In practice, however, the usual consequence of the existence of a provision for majority voting was to stimulate the civil servants and Ministers in any minority country to think up ways in which a compromise could be devised that served the interests of all the members. Because of this Britain has been voted down a negligible number of times. A theoretical diminution of accountability is the price paid for getting things done.

But Ministerial accountability to

Parliament is not the only element of democratic control in the EU. The directly elected European Parliament contributes another important element. It was responsible for the removal of the Santer Commission. Still more important in practice is the contribution it makes to improve draft legislation. If the representatives of the Council and the Parliament cannot reach agreement, draft legislation cannot be adopted. To this should be added all the many ways in which the Commission, and increasingly Ministers also, seek to consult with members of the European Parliament.

There is, though, a deficit of consent. Politicians in many countries blame unpopular policies on the EU to avoid taking responsibility themselves. There is a low-turn out in European Elections and a pervasive ignorance about what the EU does. But what is the remedy? Rather than the constitutional tinkering proposed by federalists, the answer lies in more effective communication about the EU's purpose.

The right way ahead is not for the heads of Government to quarrel for several days in order to produce a voting system that only a powerful computer will be able to understand, as they did at Nice. It would be better if they worked out how best jointly to explain the EU to their peoples. The Convention on the Future of Europe could be suspended until the enlargement negotiations are completed. If changes to the Treaties are needed to make enlargement work, the new members should be in on the process after they have joined.

This would allow the endless constitutional wrangling to be put on ice while the new members settle in. It would frustrate the nefarious designs of the Eurosceptics and Federalists by allowing for time for a new-found unity of European Ministers to work together to make the EU comprehensible to its citizens. ❖❖

Sir Michael Butler is former British Ambassador to the EU. A longer version of this article can be read at www.fpc.org.uk/writes

GLOBAL THINKING

One year after September 11, it is difficult to disagree with Stanley Hoffman's view that for Liberals in America "Bin Laden didn't help". After a year in which the Republican Right has gone largely unchallenged, we ask famous progressives for their take on the war on terror so far. Amid the gloom about a more unilateralist America, there are shafts of light: Social scientist Robert Putnam has documented an unexpected increase in solidarity across racial lines after September 11, whilst Ben Barber argues that globalism has become the new "realism" in international affairs. Pippa Norris notices that, whatever is happening on CNN, Americans are getting on with their own lives.

Another positive consequence has been that the depth of hostility to the US in the Middle East has finally got through to the White House. Mark Leonard argues that the Administration's response – more educational exchanges and Arab radio stations playing Brittany Spears – will never work if they cut against the grain of American foreign policy. Far better, he argues, to let the European Union use its "soft power" to fight extremism.

With all this emphasis on a rejuvenated transatlantic relationship, debate about the future of Europe has gone of the boil. We ask MORI's Simon Atkinson and John Curtice find out the identity of the "floating voters" who will decide the Euro Referendum. Former EU Ambassador Sir Michael Butler claims that talk of a "democratic deficit" in Europe is playing to a Eurosceptic agenda. And Andrew Geddes argues that immigrants won't provide a magic solution to Europe's ageing population.

Elsewhere, Yasmin Alibhai Brown and Tom Nairn spar over Britishness, Rachel Briggs examines the record numbers of Britons getting into trouble abroad, and *Economist* Editor Bill Emmott tells us why we should be worried about the weakness of corporate power. As ever, the autumn is a time of frenetic activity at the Foreign Policy Centre. Keep up with our programme of publications and events at www.fpc.org.uk, or drop us a line at info@fpc.org.uk. We'd love to hear from you.

Rob Blackhurst

Editor, *Global Thinking*

The Foreign Policy Centre In The News

"The report provides a robustly pro-European critique of where the EU is failing the delivery test"

The *Observer* Think-tank review on *Can Europe Earn the Right to Act?* Sunday 25 August

"Another strong point in the Foreign Policy Centre's report is that western Governments engage in much unnecessary competition in public diplomacy in countries where they do not have separate interests"

Martin Woollacott, *The Guardian*, on *Public Diplomacy* Friday 2 August

"More Britons than ever are getting into trouble while abroad, but most do not bother to seek Foreign Office advice before they go, according to a new report"

The *Observer*, Escape Travel Section, on *Travel Advice: Getting Information to Those Who Need It*, Sunday 25 August



Two Tribes

Is Britishness an imperial relic or a progressive non-ethnic identity? Yasmin Alibhai-Brown debates with Tom Nairn. Both took part in The Global Britons Forum in Scotland, an event to discuss the future of Britishness. To read a transcript visit www.fpc.org.uk



Dear Tom, 'How British Are We?' is the question we are asked to address in this exchange. And yet you have already declared Britain terminally ill, in need perhaps of mercy killing to end its suffering. This half way house of controlled devolution cannot be sustained. A new free Scotland must be created to redress a great historical injustice. As an ex-subject of the British Empire, which the Scots enthusiastically participated in of course, how can I fail to rejoice in this? It evokes in me many profound memories. That reclamation kindled similar passions in India and in East Africa where I was born. I went to Makerere University and joined other idealists who knew freedom was more than replacing one flag with another.

But the larger part of me is frightened by the implications: the ease with which you give up on the modern British nation and your sanguine belief that Scottish nationalism will not necessarily produce excluding, mean and dangerous influences. The irony is that black and Asian Britons today feel more deeply about their British identity than any of the indigenous groups. Once, not that long ago, this identity represented humiliation. We had blue British passports (we kept in bank safe deposit boxes with the most precious family jewels) which since 1968 had been rendered worthless, denying us the basic rights of citizenship in this country. We were never accepted as of this island. I am still asked every week where I come from and why I speak such good English. But in the last few years we have embraced and transformed Britishness and by doing so redefined the British identity. Now Scottish, Welsh and English nationalists want to take this away and relegate us to those lesser beings who have no ancestral connections to this land. I do not want to see cultural, racial and now post-devolution fragmentation which is likely to destroy this new emerging British

identity and replace it with something simpler and sweeter where we can all pretend that the 'other' will never confront our own complacency. That, I fear, is where you may be taking us.

Yours,
Yasmin

Dear Yasmin, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are countries of massive (and still continuing) emigration. They all suffer from absurdly small immigrant numbers, and so have not benefited from the cross-fertilizing you describe. In a time of reawakening this is a severe handicap. As you must have noticed, not a single representative of black or Asian Scots got into parliament at our first elections. Some blame attaches to the Scottish Labour Party's selection procedures. But of course most of it lies unavoidably in a one-percent electorate, severely divided within itself. This is only the ancient unfairness Norman Davies has described in *The Isles*. The principal white tribe not only has most of the population, the fertile land, the economy, the international status and armed force; today, it gets most of the immigrants too!

Self-government is one way of trying to counterbalance the in-built 85% English hegemony that Britain once stood for. Haywire fringes apart, I don't really see much heedless or exclusivist passion at work there. It would be more accurate to say there's a mounting determination in the periphery to renegotiate Britain, "to create a looser, more equal and less informal common roof". Nationalism is a way of doing this. It means standing on one's own feet, not communing with a genetic spirit-world. And so far, it doesn't strike me as much different from what you mean by transforming Britishness. Renegotiation implies consenting parties willing to negotiate

and one of these – the most important one – is still missing: England. I suspect what you really fear is a nativist English reaction to our assorted provocations, which might rebound upon you as well as on us.

Where I disagree absolutely with you is on your remedy. It advocates clinging to the old Devil for fear of something worse. The British realm needs replacing, not transforming. Here your language unintentionally colludes with that of the *ancien régime*, always eager for gradual changes guaranteed to prop up conservative customs and power. Blairism is now into this blessed plot stuff up to its neck. The prospect of indefinite office has convinced him of Middle England's indifference to constitutional matters. The worrying thing about your position is not what you mean by it, but how this Anglo-idiot élite is bound to read it: for the latter, keeping Britain now means Ken Livingstone falling under one of his own buses, a Clone-House of Lords and first-past-the-post until Kingdom come (in the person of Prince Willie). This is the real fall of Britishness, in more than rhetoric. But is it really inconceivable that a new, all-colours, thoroughly civic English nationalism could react against such traditions in decay? Four nations talk to me is no conventicle of ancestor-worshippers, from which newcomers will be excluded. It's a way of looking forward to a different Britain, whether as a confederation, an association, or simply as equal members of the European Union. A genuine community of citizens is the only real safeguard for incomers and minorities and this is exactly what Old Britain in its pickle-preserved state is not. Is not and (I must say in spite of your case for the contrary) never will be. Striving to keep the latter going is the one thing certain to bring the wolves into the house. It wouldn't be the first time that the Left had dismissed nationality-politics, only to see it fall straight into the paws of a

resurgent Right slaving about come-backs, former glories and family values.

Dear Tom.

It is extraordinary how differently we see Britishness today. You see it as an Old Devil. I see it as subversive of all nationalisms and fundamentalisms, undergoing changes it barely understands.

The transformations I embrace with passion are not those of devolution but you know that already, not least because of the reasons you mention in your letter. The brand new, young, rediscovered Scottish nation, locked as it is in an ethnic redefinition of itself, found no space for the visible communities. You have lived there for generations without even noticing (the greatest insult I suppose) that they relegated black Britons to second class status. Ditto Wales. These are the real, proven dangers of the Scotland you want. I embrace quite a different vision which cannot survive in these smaller, stronger nations, not even if a powerful and popular civic bond is promoted by political leaders. It is Goodness Gracious Me and East is East, which are proudly New British. They could never be Scottish, Welsh or English. It means an Indian director, Shekhar Kapoor making an exquisitely honest film of Elizabeth the First, the most English of monarchs and then being feted as a British success.

This Britishness is capable of moral challenges to groups which have become oppressive under the hiding places provided by traditional multiculturalism and of getting them to see themselves as part of this country rather than visitors who will one day go back home to countries long left behind which mean little to their children. Politically active black and Asian people like myself have spent years fighting against shrinking and simplistic identities which many in our communities are drawn to. You and yours are engaged in exactly the opposite project. And yes there are the restive English (remember Defoe who said 'From this amphibious ill born mob began, that vain, ill-natured thing, the Englishman') on whose lands most of us live.

What has been unleashed cannot be contained again but it can be

circumscribed and made less appealing by the invention of a better, broader identity, that of New Britishness.

Dear Yasmin,

This is where we go on disagreeing: I think Britain is still essentially 'as it once was'. Neither we on the periphery nor you in the heartland can forge this New Britishness. Only the English majority can accomplish that, by combining more serious constitutional change with greater determination on the European side. They have to become Europeans for deep-political reasons not via Gordon Brown's miserable list of economic pretexts, in three or thirteen year's time. With all its failings, the European Union remains the best example of nationalities combining to escape their past and enshrining their new formula in written-constitutional terms (which alone will provide the long-range guarantees I think you want). That's what they already think in the Republic of Ireland. I hope it's what we will come to believe in the Republic of Scotland. I wish one could say 'and in the Republic of England' also – but so much of the majority ethos seems not to want this direction at all. It prefers to tread water and place its hope in significant yet secondary 'transformations', like the films you mention, or the ascent of Asians in the British media (incidentally, just as striking in Scotland as down south). East is East is a brilliant historical film portraying the England of a few years back, and I agree things have altered for the better. Having lived in London at the height of Powellism, I need no persuading about that.

And yet (as you plainly fear) things could still slide backwards. That's what I meant about the wolves. We do have a few mangy specimens scurrying around the dustbins up here, but (inevitably) the main pack is near your back door, in England. Don't blame us for their howling! A renewed English identity is required to disable them, rather than Tony Blair's rehash of old Britland. ❖❖❖

This interchange will be published as an Appendix to Tom Nairn's new book *Pariah: Misfortunes of the British Kingdom* (Verso, July 2002, £13 hardback).

EDITORIAL TEAM

Editor Rob Blackhurst
Editorial Assistant Kate Jelley
Graphic Designers John Breeze
Michael Breeze

Please send correspondence and review copies to Rob Blackhurst.

For further copies (£2.50 each), please contact Rob Blackhurst at rob@fpc.org.uk

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THE FOREIGN POLICY CENTRE TEAM

Mark Leonard Director
Veena Vasista Deputy Director

Yasmin Alibhai-Brown Senior Researcher

Tom Arbuthnott Europe Programme Manager

Rachel Briggs Risk and Security Programme Manager

Phoebe Griffith Researcher and Executive Assistant to the Director

Andrew Geddes Senior Research Associate

Beth Ginsburg Senior Research Associate

Simon Hix Senior Research Associate

INTERNS

Kate Jelley
Leonora Fitzgibbons
Andrew Small
Abi Tyler
Claire Wring
Ngila Bevan

Across the Barricades

Consultation rather than crowd control is the way for global institutions to deal with civil society, claims Michael Edwards

The recent G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, showed how little energy Western governments have expended in involving civil society in global governance. With over \$100 million of taxpayer's money spent on enforcing a six kilometre exclusion zone, one wonders what signals were sent to the wider world about citizen participation in politics. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien called this "getting back to business-as-usual", despite the fact that representative and direct democracy have coexisted in healthy tension since the days of Ancient Greece.

But though it has yet to be translated into practice, the publication of *NGO Rights and Responsibilities* by the Foreign Policy Centre eighteen months ago marked the beginning of a consensus on civil society involvement in global governance. Citizens groups can improve the quality of decision-making in international institutions by making the system more transparent and involving those whose support is required to make decisions work. These contributions, however, are not realized in every context, since the outcome of civil society involvement depends on whose voices are represented, how competing interests are reconciled, and whether civic groups are effective in playing their evolving roles. Unless participation is effectively structured, the result may be gridlock, or chaotic policy-creation processes open to manipulation by the loudest groups. The question for NGOs and governments, therefore, is "how" to structure citizen participation in global governance, not "why".

Behind the scenes in Canada, some significant discussions took place between G8 government "sherpas" from Canada, France, Japan and the UK, and representatives from NGOs under the auspices of the "Forum Internacional de Montreal", supported by the Ford Foundation. This group debated the rationale for civil society

involvement and brainstormed potential solutions. As hosts of next year's G8 Summit, French follow-up will be essential, and thus far the signs are good: the French Government is already making plans to meet with representatives from French and global civil society well before the Summit to discuss tactics, including the radical network ATTAC. In Canada, the House of Commons' Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade has called for a "task force on G8 reform" to "look at options for expanding democratic public access... and enlarging participation by parliamentarians and non-state actors in the G8 Summit's structure, mandate and processes." The UK Government should support such a task force and implement its recommendations when they host the Summit in two years time.

Further progress in this direction will have to resolve the tensions that exist between structuring participation (to guard against those who shout loudest, or have the richest backers, dominating the debate), and protecting diversity (the hallmark of a healthy civil society). In striking this balance, some argue that we should push for democratically elected non-state bodies to stand alongside inter-governmental structures, such as a "Global Peoples' Council" to complement the Security Council and the UN General Assembly, but there is little political support for these ideas from governments in any part of the world. Others recommend minimal changes that can easily be accommodated into the structure of international institutions, like the NGO advisory committees to the World Bank and UNDP. These ideas enjoy more political support, but lack the resources and mandate to make any real difference. The most important innovations lie between these two extremes, in experiments that balance greater access to debates with more attention to NGO legitimacy. Examples include multi-stakeholder bodies that

foster honest engagement between governments, business and civil society groups (much in use at the upcoming Johannesburg Conference on Sustainable Development), and discussions between civil society groups and inter-governmental bodies outside of their formal sessions, as in the OECD Committee process. Alternative reports from civil society groups can also be tabled alongside official reports from governments, as in the UN Commission on the Rights of the Child.

These innovations work best when backed by codes of conduct that instill the same self-discipline in global NGO networks that marked out the US Civil Rights Movement and other successful causes – the New Economics Foundation's "Code of Protest", for example, or Friends of the Earth-Europe's "Principles for Peaceful Protest." In 2001, the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) in the US developed an exchange of accredited places between Northern and Southern NGOs at the WTO Ministerial meeting in Qatar.

The role of civil society will continue to increase over the coming years. The issue is not 'whether' but 'how best' to realize the potential of citizen involvement in global governance, offset any associated costs, and balance the demand for rules with the benefits of organic development. Heavy handed regulation by governments and inter-governmental bodies is unlikely to yield the best results, since the temptation will always be for some states to use the rules to exclude dissenting voices. Instead, we should look for measures that provide incentives to responsible practice, and reward those who rise to the challenge with more access to the negotiating table. In the 21st Century, civil society will have a voice in world affairs, if not a vote, and both governments and NGOs must structure those voices in ways that promote genuine democracy. ❖❖❖

Michael Edwards is Director of Governance and Civil Society at the Ford Foundation, and author of *Future Positive and Global Citizen Action. NGO Rights and Responsibilities* is published by The Foreign Policy Centre (£9.95)

BON VOYAGE

Rachel Briggs argues that travel advice isn't getting to those who need it

More and more Britons are falling into trouble overseas each year. Statistics from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) show that the number of Britons detained or imprisoned overseas rose by nearly a half between 1995/6 and 2000/1, and the number of emergency passports issued rose by a quarter. The types of problems travellers faced range from stomach upsets brought on by ignoring warnings not to drink the tap water to more serious assaults, kidnappings or even lengthy jail sentences.

The Foreign Office predicts that overseas travel will grow by ten per cent in the next two years, but cannot guarantee that its funding for consular services, which include travel advice and help for Britons who fall into trouble, will rise at the same speed. And with one-fifth of travellers still not taking out travel insurance, the pressure on the FCO will continue.

Travellers are unlikely to be getting into trouble for a lack of available information. The FCO began publishing advice in 1990, and other organisations offer dedicated services for business travellers, independent travellers, aid workers and holiday-makers. But this information is failing to get to those who need it. The majority of travellers don't realise they need travel advice. In a recent poll, fewer than one in ten respondents were able to name a risk they may have faced on their last trip overseas. And in an unpublished study of BG employees in Sao Paulo and Cairo, most employees consistently underestimated the level of the risks they faced.

There is evidence to suggest that some travellers do not seek out advice because they assume that someone else is looking after them. According to Bob Boyce of Tour Operator Thomas Cook: "Customers don't feel that they need to consider the difficulties of travelling to a country on their own. The majority buy packages, are met by our reps, are hand-delivered to the

hotel, and the reps are there for any problems they might have during their holiday." Equally, many business travellers assume either that their company would not send them to work in a high risk environment, or that they would be able to initiate security to eradicate the risks.

One of the main obstacles to the successful communication of travel advice is the diversity of those travelling. While tour operators complain that the FCO's advice is becoming too long, many companies have expressed a need for more detailed information. And while the FCO might warn against all but essential travel to a particular country, business risk consultancies may be advising their clients on how they can operate there.

The only way to tackle this is to make more vigorous efforts to reach the different travelling groups. The FCO should continue to maintain a central information source, which remains free, to ensure that safety is not limited by ability to pay. But the specialized services, which are needed to give the targeted information, are expensive, and Government should work in partnership with the tour operators, travel agents, companies and insurers that have an interest in ensuring their customers and employees remain safe.

The FCO's *Know Before You Go* campaign to encourage travellers to take out travel insurance and check travel advice has proved a successful example of partnership with the travel industry. The scope of this campaign should be expanded by signing up companies, risk consultancies and aid agencies. It could also produce literature and material appropriate for Business and Aid workers – from advice of travelling safely with lap-tops for business travellers to keeping safe in conflict zones for aid workers.

The FCO could also do more to market its services directly to end-users. If each unique user of its website equated to



one trip abroad this would mean that the site was consulted in just ten per cent of trips. A dedicated on-line marketing

strategy for the site could help to increase traffic by directing those looking for related products, such as insurance and flights, towards the site.

The most effective time to communicate travel advice is immediately prior to, or during, the trip. Government should investigate ways of ensuring that travel advice is included with travel documents, and should also investigate the feasibility of working with campaign partners to disseminate information at key locations, such as in the main holiday resorts, or in executive departure lounges. UK embassies, like their US counterparts, should have a named employee responsible for proactively liaising with the business community on matters of security. This is particularly important for small and medium sized enterprises who may not have large operations in each market.

Of course, even with the best dissemination channels, individual travellers cannot be forced to act on the information they receive. But a better co-ordinated system would make much more effective use of the growing number of resources that are on offer aimed at ensuring Britons get back home safely. ❖❖❖

Corporate Personnel Security in Emerging Markets is a 16-month research project. For more details, please contact Rachel Briggs. *Travel Advice: Getting information to those who need it* is published by the Foreign Policy Centre. It was kindly supported by Thomas Cook Tour operations.

LIBERALISM AFTER 9/11

September 11 made life difficult for liberals in America – the Clinton Administration was retrospectively blamed for leaving Bin Laden intact, everyone was under pressure to rally around the Commander in Chief they had scorned just months before, multilateralism in a world of lukewarm allies seemed a self-indulgent fantasy. Here are some of America's most celebrated progressives giving their take on the war on terror so far.



"September 11 shows the importance but also the limits of soft-power. You can't imagine that soft power is going to convert

Mohammad Atta or the Taliban. We have the paradox of places like Iran where American Culture is profoundly offensive to the conservative faction of the Clergy who are in Government. It is actually quite attractive to a number of younger teenagers who watch Western videos, surreptitiously. Most of soft power is generated by civil society. If Hollywood movies, for example, portray consumerism, individualism and feminism – women running around scantily clad, in the eyes of others, and not obeying their husbands – many people will applaud that but many people will be repelled by it. The American Government can't do anything about that. It's not going to tell Hollywood to stop Baywatch. So if the Hollywood products give a one-sided view of American culture, the Government through Voice of America can ensure other dimensions of American culture are covered."

Joseph Nye
is Dean of the John F Kennedy School of Governance at Harvard

"September 11 has long-term consequences because it produces a new sense of vulnerability. This increases our unilateralist tendencies. At least in the case of the Cold War everyone realised that one needed allies, who were even more threatened than in the US because they were

closer to the Soviet Union. The instinct is that we can count only on ourselves – the others don't have the means, they don't have the guts. So only we can do that. And since we represent goodness against evil once again, we shouldn't have any scruples about it. The most salient effect is the increasing gap between the US and the rest of the world. During the Afghan campaign the Americans lived in another universe. I was in France recently, and I didn't get the sense that people thought they were at war with anyone. Well we hear all day long: "We are at war, we are at War!" It's bad for everything that liberals stand for: international co-operation, international organisations; trying to provide some international regulations in the market – not that it was ever popular in America. From the point of view of liberals the least one can say is that Bin Laden didn't help."

Stanley Hoffman
is Paul and Catherine Buttenwieser University Professor at Harvard. He is working on a book on the politics and ethics of global society

"In the aftermath of September 11 there was an increase in solidarity across racial lines in the United States. I guess I was a little surprised that that was the direction and that it was so marked and visible, whites trusting blacks more after 9/11, than those same people did a year ago. Other people's data suggests that there wasn't a particularly sharp increase [in tension] even between Muslims and non Muslims in the United States. So for diverse issues, if you're concerned with

the social connections in a sense of community in an ethnic and diverse society like ours, the effects of 9/11 were actually positive and not negative."

Robert Putnam
is Professor of Public Policy at Harvard and author of *Bowling Alone*



"Was this a defining moment? A lot of that was exaggerated. Some things have shifted a bit. But America is such a

big country and people have so many other things going on in their lives. They are not really going to be personally affected by these events. It is like the other seminal things which people on television and other people related to at the time. The assassination of Kennedy and the downing of the challenger are other cases in point. It has serious consequences for the CIA, for the domestic preparedness, for the budget. But whether it has consequences for the culture, I'm not sure. Every time I go back I watch BBC News – it is talking about Worldcom, ice-skaters, Bush in a domestic context, the economy, the Middle East and Palestine. It's talking about things that are going on in the rest of the world and America has forgotten it."

Pippa Norris
is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the JFK School of Government, Harvard and author of *Political Activism Worldwide*

"Leftist opposition to the war in Afghanistan faded in November and December of last year, not only because of the success of the war but also because of the enthusiasm with which so many Afghans greeted that success. The pictures of women showing their smiling faces to the world, of men shaving their beards, of girls in school, of boys playing soccer in shorts: all this was no doubt a slap in the face to leftist theories of American imperialism, but also politically disarming. There was (and is) still a lot to worry about: refugees, hunger, minimal law and order. But it was suddenly clear, even to many opponents of the war, that the Taliban regime had been the biggest obstacle to any serious effort to address the looming humanitarian crisis, and it was the American war that removed the obstacle. It looked (almost) like a war of liberation, a humanitarian intervention.

But the war was primarily neither of these things; it was a preventive war, designed to make it impossible to train terrorists in Afghanistan and to plan and organize attacks like that of September 11. And that war was never really accepted, in wide sections of the left, as either just or necessary."

Michael Walzer
Extracted from 'Can there be a decent left?', *Dissent Magazine*, Spring 2002



"The terrorist attacks of September 11 did without a doubt change the world forever, but they failed to change the ideological

viewpoint of either the left or right in any significant way. The warriors and unilateralists of the right still insist war conducted by an ever sovereign America is the only appropriate response to terrorism, while the left continues to talk about the need for internationalism, interdependency and an approach to global markets that redresses economic imbalances and thereby reduces the appeal of extremism. Following September 11, however, the realist tiger changed its

stripes: "Idealistic" internationalism has become the new realism. We face not a paradigm shift but the occupation of an old paradigm by new tenants. Democratic globalists are quite abruptly the new realists while the old realism – especially in its embrace of markets – looks like an

increasingly dangerous and utterly unrealistic dogma."

Benjamin R Barber
Benjamin Barber is based at the Democracy Collaborative, New York
Extracted from 'Beyond Jihad Vs McWorld', *The Nation*, January 21, 2002



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THE INSIDER INTERVIEW



The Insider Interview series examines the views and assumptions of influential figures who normally remain outside the public gaze. Mark Leonard and Rob Blackhurst speak to **Bill Emmott, Editor of *The Economist***, about power, morality and Bill Clinton's reading habits.

As with all *Economist* writers, Bill Emmott usually remains hidden behind the newspaper's famous cloak of journalistic anonymity. But this year he was forced into the limelight after he published an investigation into President Berlusconi's business dealings. The combined guns of Berlusconi's media Empire tried to exact revenge, though their choice sobriquet of "Lenin" seemed wide of the mark given Emmott's free-market pedegree.

Since his appointment, Emmott has brought *The Economist* back to rude health: increasing its world-wide circulation to 760 000, gaining a foothold in America, and relaunching it in full colour. He has maintained the paper's tradition for striking controversial poses – supporting Labour for the first time ever in 2001 and calling for Bill Clinton to "just go" at the height of the Lewinsky scandal.

His career at the *Economist* started as correspondent in Brussels – a responsibility he juggled with completing a PhD on the French Communist party. Posted to cover Japan in the eighties, he wrote *The Sun Also Sets*, a prediction of the country's economic woes that was so prescient it became a best-seller. After a spell as Business Editor he was appointed Editor in Chief of the *Economist* in 1993.

How widespread is the reach of *The Economist*?

We are in a way the glue that binds together internationally minded people, particularly those who are in business or who think about the kind

of things that we think about. But I would not go as far as to say that they have a common worldview. Our worldview is, as you know, basically liberalism – economic and political. We stand for free trade, individual liberties, democracy and so forth, but among this global class who read *The Economist*, I genuinely don't think there is a consensus on those views except at the most general level.

Do Presidents and Prime Ministers read us? I don't know whether George Bush does. I do know that Bill Clinton used to because the people in the White House and the National Security Agency told us that he would send them articles torn out of *The Economist* with questions written on for them to answer. But I'm sure that that's a much more Clinton thing to do than a Bush thing to do. I was just in Chile, and was invited to lunch by the President. He said he was a reader – I think that's why he must have invited me to lunch, apart from possibly to persuade me to publish articles on Chile favourable to him!

Has *The Economist* got things wrong because of its worldview?

Usually when we get things wrong because of a worldview we do so in one of two ways. One way is to get the direction of something right but the speed wrong. For example, approving of a process towards democracy in a country but not recognising that actually things aren't going to move as fast as we think, and are going to get tripped up on the way. A second way is when we agree with an end goal, but

when there is a complex path to get to it. Rail privatisation was the right thing to do, but that doesn't mean that it went right. At the time that it happened, we didn't think hard enough as to whether it was being done in the best way.

POWER

How much do you think about power? Is it a useful concept?

My answer before September 11th would have been not much - and not very useful. When September 11th happened I was researching a big supplement on America's role in the world. But I didn't really think of it in terms of power. I thought of it in terms of political and economic directions, relationships to other countries and so forth. The strange paradox of September 11th was that an act designed to show America's vulnerability, and to show the limits of its power, actually focused a huge amount of attention on the magnitude of American power. It was elevated in everybody's mind well beyond where it was before September 11th. I think it's actually unclear yet whether America feels strong, but it's made it look strong.

Do you think that power is something that lives in the world of states or do you think it is something that business can have as well?

Power applies to organisations and groups of all kinds, and certainly can apply to companies. They are quite

powerful, but not as powerful as their critics tend to think. In the last ten years increased competition and openness in the world economy has reduced the power of individual companies through increasing the contestability of their markets. Most of the worries about globalisation should really be worries about that loss of corporate power.

The abuses that have been exposed in America in the last nine months were not just to do with greed, but also to do with companies lying because they were in a competitive market in which they couldn't actually make profits. I think that that's just one example of how in this very competitive environment, competing for customers, capital, future brand position, future technological leadership can lead to abuses and excesses. Fraud in accounting is one case of that. Exploitation of workers in third world countries could potentially be another. Sidestepping environmental rules could be a third. I think that with all of them the best safeguard is scrutiny and openness. And I'm optimistic about all of these because basically it's such an open world, and I don't believe companies can get away with things for very long. But that doesn't mean they won't try.

MORALITY

Has business a social responsibility beyond creating jobs?

I'm sceptical. Customers are right to demand good products and reliable services. Employees are right to demand good working conditions. But I don't see that companies have a responsibility to do more than is required by a mixture of negotiations with their employees, legal obligations, and the long-term reputation of the company. I don't believe basically that companies should be philanthropic bodies, which is what I think the CSR

movement really has in mind, even if it doesn't quite express it in that way. Philanthropic bodies should be philanthropic bodies.

In BP's annual report they say they want to be a "force of good in the world". Do you think that's misguided?

Yes. I don't think it's cynical in the case of BP or Shell. It's well meant but it invites a cynical response and that's why it's misguided. A lot of these CSR statements that companies make are like invitations to people to try and find ways in which they don't live up to them. And the broader the claim, like "we want to be a force of good in the world," the less likely you are going to be able to live up to it.

Does government morality suffer in war in the same way that corporate morality suffers in recessions?

Yes I do. The problem for governments is that the world isn't full of black and white, good and evil. There are a lot of trade-offs. War is the clearest example of when governments find this very difficult. Say, when the trade-off concerns how many civilian casualties is too many for the Americans in Afghanistan or in the future in Iraq. Or when a government says it is in favour of democracy but then has an alliance with General Musharaff. Those sorts of trade-offs happened all the time during the Cold War, and although their number can be limited a government cannot avoid them altogether.

ACCOUNTABILITY

How can we ensure that governments make the right decisions?

Continual scrutiny. I'm very much a believer in freedom of information.

I think that that's important in America and it would be very desirable to have greater freedom in Britain. One of the big disappointments with New Labour on the constitutional front has been their failure to bring in a proper freedom of information bill. And, coming back to America, why I basically have faith in American power, which I do, is because, first of all I trust America's intentions: I think you have to have a sense of their motives. But second my feeling is that if they do bad things they won't do them for very long because they have a more open system that has become even more open since Vietnam. Third, there is not at present the cloud of pragmatic necessity under which abuses can carry on for many years, which is what happened in the Cold War, and why many bad things were done by the CIA and others.

Kissinger once said that America is an unaccountable hegemon. He put quite powerfully this idea that there are neither limits to its power internationally, because other countries are relatively too weak, nor domestically, because the public is not sufficiently interested or informed about foreign policy.

One should always worry about it but I think he underrates the strength of domestic accountability. He's right about the lack of foreign accountability really, as no one is able to counter a really determined American action. Since Vietnam there has been considerable restraint from domestic politics on American foreign policy. I think it's actually part of the problem. That's why Clinton was so hesitant, so on-off, in the 1990s in his foreign policy – the American public's fear of failure, fear of casualties, fear of entanglement. I think that's had a very powerful effect. So now after September 11th you've got a more unanimous domestic view that something must be done and yet there

WHO ARE THE EURO WAVERERS?

Simon Atkinson and Roger Mortimore, MORI Social Research Institute

Throughout the year polls in Britain have found – in varying degrees – greater support for Britain joining the single currency than was the case in 2001. But none have come close to suggesting that an immediate referendum might vote in favour of doing so. Nor does there seem to be any steady momentum of increasing acceptance of the principle. So, if the government is to eventually call and win a referendum, whose minds do they have to change?

Since 1996, MORI has been asking an occasional question on the euro which gauges both the direction of attitudes and the strength of commitment. The question, repeated most recently in a post-budget survey for the Financial Times, is: “Which of the following best describes your own view of British participation in the single currency?”

Some 19% are strongly in favour, 29% strongly against. But there are almost as many in between: the “euro-waverers”. 46% said they were either “generally for” (24%) or “generally opposed” (22%). And 6% had no opinion. Those who can be persuaded one way or the other are the battleground of the Euro Referendum.

The maths are these. Those with no opinion won't vote, so the victor must secure at least half of the remaining 94%. The ten-point advantage that the solid “noes” currently have over the solid “ayes”, 29-to-19 against, has to be offset with an equally big lead for the euro among the waverers, so these must split better than 28-to-18 in favour. And that's assuming they can all be persuaded to vote because the fewer waverers who turn out, the harder that advantage among the strong “Noes” will be to overcome.

Who are the “waverers”? Geographically they are evenly spread



and men and women are equally likely to be keeping an open mind. However, they are a little younger than average (only a quarter are aged 55-and-over, compared to a third of all adults), slightly more middle class and affluent than average and more likely to be in a two-car household. They are also less likely to have no car than the rest of the population. Only one in eight rent from the council or a housing association. Most are in work (reflecting the age profile).

Not all these patterns hold when we break down the waverers into their two composite groups. The key group, clearly, are those who are “generally opposed”, whom the government must persuade that the euro would be good for the country. But, just as important to winning the referendum, the government must hang on to those who currently say they “generally support” the idea, but admit themselves potentially vulnerable to the arguments of the eurosceptics. Even remembering to be a little wary of the small sub-sample sizes involved in this further analysis, there are some striking differences which may play an important part in the campaign running up to a referendum.

Perhaps most noticeable is the regional differential – though each region has similar numbers of waverers, they are not all on the same side. The waverers in

the Midlands and the South East outside London are at present predominantly opposed to the euro, but in the capital itself there are few to be won over to the single currency while many admit they might swing the other way. Opponents of the Euro could do worse than to target the perception that Londoners will benefit from joining.

Politically, too, there are differences – only to be expected given the way the parties have set out their stalls on European policy. Among those who are currently opposed but might be persuaded, there are almost as many Tories as Labour supporters, but only a third as many Liberal Democrats. Of those who already support the euro, yet may need Tony Blair to stiffen their resolve, Labour has a three-to-one lead over the Tories who are, indeed, outnumbered by LibDems. The parties and their leaders may need to bear in mind these very different profiles as they campaign for votes in the referendum. Or indeed, in Mr Blair's case, in deciding whether to hold a referendum in the first place. ❖

The Foreign Policy Centre will be publishing *Who are the Euro-Waverers?* later this autumn

More detailed polling data on the Euro Waverers is available at www.fpc.org.uk

are still the hearings that took place a couple of weeks ago in the Senate, opening up a public debate about whether it will be right to declare war on Iraq. If that's not public accountability I don't know what is.

And how much does that degree of accountability depend on having national sovereignty?

I don't think it's a crucial component of it. What's crucial is a democratic tradition and a constitution that seeks to impede clear executive action – through a balance of powers and through accountability.

EUROPE

Do you think that the arguments against adopting the Euro are constitutional?

My view on the Euro is mainly economic. I don't think that it should be at heart a political question though politics of course plays a part. I don't think that the lack of democratic traditions in Union members should be a constraint to the development of the Euro. But I do think that they will be a constraint to Europe's development of a common foreign policy and of a prominent role in foreign and security affairs because I don't think that Europe is currently capable of forming an accountable government.

Can you foresee circumstances where you might support British membership of a single currency?

Yes. The circumstances are principally economic but do have a constitutional dimension to them. I would support British membership at a point when it was clear that the economic benefits of joining outweighed the risks, which is partly to do with exchange rates, and partly to do with the workings of the monetary policy system. There is also a

political dimension to the circumstances, which is that membership of the Euro for Britain depends strongly on having strong public backing for it, with a clear victory in a referendum. That in turn is unlikely to occur until there's a relatively stable view of Europe's constitutional shape. That doesn't mean frozen, but I think the idea of the European Union as a slippery slope towards ever closer union is one that puts off a lot of people and that it very much affects the character of the public debate here. And it would be better to join the Euro once the constitutional convention is completed and once the IGC has come up with a conclusion about the constitutional shape for the next period, for the next decade or whatever. Do I predict that Britain will ever join the Euro? Yes, I think it will.

CULTURE

To what extent does economic development depend on cultural factors?

Not much really. Culture may affect transitional periods, the ability of countries to change and the speed in which economic development takes place, but basically I believe that cultures change according to the stimuli around them. Chinese culture has been described at different times during the last hundred years as either a complete obstacle to economic development or as a most receptive culture to economic development depending on just what seems to be happening at the time. Korea used to be dismissed as a place for economic development on cultural grounds in the fifties... the rest is history.

Why have many parts of Africa failed to develop? What are the biggest problems facing the continent now?

Government and institutions. And the

inability of countries to set up and maintain institutions that have some transparency and rule of law and reliability for development. I think it was partly due to post-colonial troubles, and to the difficulty of setting up something new afterwards, as with Russia. Then there's been a different sort of colonial legacy which has been the unnatural nature of some of the nations. These are countries that are defined by borders, they are not nations that are defined by their history and ethnicity and so forth. That made it difficult to set up new institutions. So if I were asked to come up with some solution for Africa, I would probably say that a few borders ought to be changed.

You came out in favour of Labour in the 2001 election. What would it take for you to change next time around?

It would take two things really. One is that there would need to be a credible alternative. And second Blair would have had to cease to be effective in the way we want. We backed him in 2001, as the best conservative available, which was a cute way of saying the best centre-right candidate available. We felt that on balance the sort of things he was trying to do were in the direction we favoured and likelier to be in that direction than any alternative. So has he changed since then? No, I don't think he has materially. I don't even think the spending programme has really changed significantly, for it was launched before the election. We're sceptical whether they've done enough structural reform. So if the spending programme is shown to have clearly failed then we might feel that we should change. I certainly think that in foreign policy I would approve of him. ❖

IMMIGRANTS GET OLDER TOO

Immigration is not a magic solution to an ageing population, argues Andrew Geddes.

Arguments in favour of economic migration are beguiling. The effects of an ageing population on the labour market and welfare state require immigration because immigrants can fill labour market gaps and sustain pensions and health care. The UK population of state pensionable age is projected to increase from 10.8 million in 2000 to 11.9 million in 2011 and to peak at around 16 million in 2040.

But this replacement migration argument has a flaw: immigrants require replacements given that they settle down, have children and get old too. More and more immigration is then needed. Maintaining the support ratio that matches the working age population to the elderly population would require net migration into the UK of around 1 million people a year and increase the population to around 120 million by 2050. This is a ridiculous proposition for obvious social, political and economic reasons.

More practically, if the UK were to maintain a constant working age population and a constant total population then UN estimates suggest that this would require 48,000 and 114,000 new immigrants each year, respectively.

Net migration into the UK, however, currently outstrips this latter figure and is projected by the National Statistical Office to be around 160,000 a year until 2007. An explanation of this is the significant 'pull' effect generated by labour market shortages that tend to be specific rather than general. The construction sector illustrates this point. Increased government expenditure on public services coupled with changes in the housing market have generated a construction boom that is particularly focused on the south east of England, but sends ripples to the Midlands and

the North. From high skilled to low skilled occupations, there is an increased reliance within the construction industry on foreign workers (employed both legally and illegally). According to one senior construction industry figure, it's not unusual to go onto a site in London and find that 70-80 per cent of the workforce can speak little or no English. Labour shortages in the construction sector though are exacerbated by a dearth of young people entering the industry. Ideally attempts should be made to improve the construction industry's image and attract more domestic youngsters. However these will be longer-term ventures, and in the short to medium-term the pressing needs for workers will be filled by foreign workers.

There are also labour demands that cannot be met from the domestic workforce in key public sector jobs such as teaching and health care. Attempts to solve this problem though can beget others. Where shortages of teachers, doctors and nurses have arisen it is often because of the unavailability of affordable housing. Much of the demand for immigrant workers is in London and the South East where the regional economy is at risk of overheating. While immigrants may continue to fill specific skill gaps, they will not resolve welfare state problems, such as shortage of affordable housing and inflated living costs – and they may even exacerbate them. Nor will they resolve labour market problems.

Longer-term remedies would focus on

domestic solutions. We should seek to improve labour market participation and increase productivity. Within the EU, we should also aim to achieve greater labour mobility. The EU has resolved to tackle insufficient occupational mobility as part of the 'new European economy' agenda agreed in principle at the 2000 Lisbon summit. In 2000 only 16.4 per cent of workers in the EU had been in their job for less than one year, compared with 30 per cent in the USA. Only 1.2 per cent of the EU population changed region to live during 1999, compared with 5.9 per cent of people in the USA who moved between states.



Whist immigration might not be the optimal long-term solution for labour market shortages, we are going to need controlled migration in specific areas for the foreseeable future. That is why public fears on the issue must be challenged.

European Governments must tackle widespread misconceptions amongst their electorate about it. A conspicuous feature of public opinion in Britain is that most think there is far more immigration than there actually is. A MORI opinion poll published in the autumn of 2000 under the heading Are We an Intolerant Nation? found that,

on average, respondents thought that 20 per cent of the British population were immigrants. In reality, the figure is 4 per cent. Perhaps not surprisingly, 66 per cent of respondents also felt that there were too many immigrants.


In the early 1990s, fears that 25 million migrants would cross from Eastern Europe into the West led to restrictions on access from Soviet bloc countries. Similar fears provide the backdrop for the next EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. The accession negotiations have been riddled with mistrust because of assumptions from existing states about the potential for large-scale migration from Central and Eastern Europe.

So how many people from accession countries will want to move? Recent research on the potential scale of post-enlargement migration put the figure at around 500,000 people metaphorically 'sitting on their suitcases' with around another 5 million adjudged likely to move during the next 18 years (around 277,000 a year). Refocusing on the UK, our population is expected to increase from 59.8 million in 2000 to around 65 million by 2025. Around two-thirds of this projected increase is attributed to immigration with the remainder from natural increase.

Much of this immigration will be valuable in plugging skills gaps. Indeed in a recent White Paper, 'Secure Borders, Safe Haven', 2002, the government sets out immigration schemes including quotas for industries short of labour, a highly skilled migrant programme, and a work permit scheme extended to those with medium skills from outside the EU coming for a specific job. Whilst such measures are pragmatic responses to solving the short to medium term problem though, they are no substitute for improving homegrown skill levels and labour market mobility.

Dr Andrew Geddes is Senior Research Associate at the Foreign Policy Centre and Reader in Politics at the University of Liverpool.

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Simon Zadek

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Chris Haskins

July 2001


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REFUGEES IN OUR OWN LAND: Chronicles from a Palestinian Refugee Camp in Bethlehem

Muna Hamzeh

(Pluto Press; London, 2001;
ISBN 0-7453-1652-2)

PALESTINIAN REFUGEES: The Right of Return

Edited by Naseer Aruri

(Pluto Press; London, 2001;
ISBN 0-7543-1777-4)

Reading these books during the Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank makes it hard to treat their subject matter even-handedly. But it is important to recognise what both these books illustrate: that the politics of the oppressed can be as much an obstacle to peace as the tanks of the oppressors.

Muna Hamzeh's diaries of the first months of the Al-Aqsa intifada lend themselves to merciless parody. They are unrelenting in their employment of rhetorical artifice: be it heavy-handed irony, or plaintive addresses to inanimate objects or abstract nouns – "Rise, sunshine, rise!" "Cry, my eyes, cry!"; "Oh sweet smell of victory, could you be ours someday soon?" If the book is taken as an account of the everyday life of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, then this language is distracting, and the work is flawed as a result.

Two themes come out strongly: the strength of the refugee's attachment to the dream of returning to ancestral

lands in Israel; and the hatred of Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA), not just for their perceived misgovernment, but for their betrayal of that dream. Hamzeh's writings reveal a deep rift between the Palestinian people (particularly the refugees) and Arafat's PA. The establishment of a Palestinian statelet requires a settlement with Israel that would effectively abandon what is the most cherished dream in the refugee camps: return.

This rhetoric of return can be seen in more sophisticated form in the essay collection *Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return*. The essays cover a remarkable amount of territory – from the biblical justifications of the original expulsion, to the duties of the Lebanese government toward the refugees within their borders. The strength of the argument is impressive but, in the end, counterproductive. Attachment to a right of return, and to the litany of UN resolutions and rulings in international law which undoubtedly enshrine that right, can only be tantamount to a rejection of any practicable truce, as Israel cannot be cajoled to accept a proposition that means its elimination. Both of these books – within the context of the current intifada – provide insight into the failure of the Oslo peace process. While much of the Palestinian academic community, along with the great majority of refugees themselves, continue to define their political hopes, and their political language, in terms of 'return', then it will be all but impossible to go the final mile to peace.

Conrad Smewing

FAST FOOD NATION: What the all-American meal is doing to the world

Eric Schlosser

(Allen Lane The Penguin Press; 2001;
ISBN 0-141-00687-0)

While queuing for a late-night Big Mac it is easy to forget that the ingredients once breathed. It is even easier to overlook how they might have got

from living things to convenient, cardboard-wrapped burgers and nuggets. Eric Schlosser traces this journey, uncovering the messy, cruel and abusive business that allows your Mega Meal to be on your tray before you've had time to ask for extra ketchup. It is not a pleasant read.

Schlosser confirms what vegetarians have been telling us for years: quite literally "there is shit in the meat". But this is not a rant by someone who disapproves of the fast food industry on principle, or who believes that eating meat is intrinsically evil. He is diligent almost to the point of pedantry in his collection and presentation of data, but writes in a style that is lively and engrossing. At



times there is a whiff of romanticism (complete with old-style ranchers riding off into the sunset) for the now endangered practice of low intensity farming, but on the whole the tone remains cool and controlled.

The chapters on meatpacking plants, where 300 cattle an hour are ground into patties, are gruesome in the extreme, but it is the passages on the ruthlessness of the big American fast food chains that leave the most unpleasant taste. That McDonalds and co. demand standardised products is no surprise, but the implications this has for the wages, rights and working conditions of employees at all levels of the production chain are the real horror stories behind the Happy Meals. Schlosser highlights the industry's influence in the Senate (and in particular its connections with the Republican party), allowing

meatpacking companies in America effectively operate outside federal employment and safety laws. In his afterword he points out that the power wielded by global brands can and should be used for good, but that demand for higher standards of production (whether it be of trainers or burgers) must be driven by consumers.

Rebecca Lewis



FROM KOSOVO TO KABUL: Human Rights and Intervention

David Chandler

(Pluto Press; London, 2002;
ISBN 0 7453 1884 3)

Can the implementation of Human Rights ever damage democracy? David Chandler certainly argues that the current international promotion of such universal ethics does not further the democratic cause. The author systematically outlines the development of the human rights discourse: from the founding principles of neutrality and independence, still embodied in the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross; to the interventionist stance promoting human rights at the expense of national sovereignty, the authority of the UN and the international legal system. Far from conforming to the usual leftist critique of international intervention, Chandler argues that not only does indiscriminate advocating of human rights corrupt the democratic and egalitarian conceptions of political

decision-making, it is also symptomatic of a lack of real commitment to the very causes it claims to defend. In his view, as human rights activists focus on the individual victim of human atrocities, they eschew the capacity of collective humanity to achieve real betterment, which can only be achieved through political and not human rights.

Caroline Holmquist



THIS IS SERBIA CALLING

Matthew Collin

(Serpent's Tail; 2001;
ISBN 1 8524 2682 9)

RUSSIAN DISCO

Wladimir Kamier

(Paperback; 1 August 2002;
ISBN: 0091886694)

It's not all-together unsurprising that popular publishing has made little of the break-up of the former Soviet Union. However both these books – the latter printed this summer, the former last year – draw on very different social consequences of the Gorbachov era; both are written by magazine journalists and both concern, to varying degrees, lifestyle changes brought about by the break-up of the USSR in the early 1990s.

This is Serbia Calling details counter-cultural resistance in Milosevic's Belgrade, through the ten year biography of B-92, the only Serbian radio station to broadcast both independent news bulletins and an

uncompromising mix of western rock and dance music. Collin, former editor of I-D magazine, calls his book 'a chronology of Belgrade resistance, written from a Western perspective and seen through a partisan tourist's eye.' It begins with the optimistic times of cosmopolitan Belgrade just after the fall of the Berlin wall, and concludes in October 2000, when Milosevic is ousted and Belgrade and the city is ranked twelfth worst in the world to live in. He details the power struggles within the city itself, the various relationships between football hooligans, black marketers and the Serbian paramilitaries, on one side, and the dissident DJs and musicians, the student political groups and Western NGOs on the other. His book serves as a timely political work and as an engaging tale of a city under siege. It's less successful when alluding to political machinations beyond Belgrade's limits, but it explains the motivations behind those Serbians who, despite harbouring a deep love of Western culture, stayed on in their disintegrating homeland.

Russian Disco is the tale of those who left, of the fun to be had for Soviet émigrés in the newly liberated Berlin. Though Muscovite Wladimir Kamier touches on police harassment, racial stereotyping and the far right, his rye prose never leaves room for Collin's didacticism; Kamier delights in Western capitalism and the transience of expatriate life. In Kamier's Berlin the Vietnamese are all card sharps, the Turkish snack bar is staffed by Bulgarians, the Russian language radio station's doctor prescribes diesel for acne and something hilarious tends to happen if he and his friends drink a bottle of vodka or three. *Russian Disco* reads like a Chechen Alistair Cook ensconced in Western Europe with a couple of cases of Stolichnaya. This is *Serbia Calling* is a far grimmer affair. Kamier revels in the fun to be had by those who got away, Collin deals with the darker, drearier business left behind.

Alex Rayner is clubs editor of *The Face*



STATECRAFT

Margaret Thatcher

(Hardcover – 501pp; HarperCollins; ISBN 0007107528)

THE LADY'S NOT FOR LEARNING

Statecraft shows that the Hard Right hasn't understood the consequences of Globalisation.

Margaret Thatcher's *Statecraft* reads like a wish list dreamt up at a Republican Party hog-roast. This 500 page country-by-country guide to sorting out the world's problems marks her final transition from British patriot to cheerleader for the American Right. Strangely, for someone so obsessed with sovereignty, she now sees Britain as the 51st state with identical interests to those of the US. And after a decade in the company of Texan oil barons, Right-wing thinktanks and Richard Perle, she shares their world-view. American unilateralism is not only inevitable, it's desirable. Coalition building (like that assembled during the Gulf War) can only weaken American power and compromise its objectives. International law hands over power to the bad guys. Global warming is a ruse by the Anti-American left to tax consumption.

But though *Statecraft* occasionally feels like it has been assembled by committee (standard-issue anecdotes can be seen coming for miles), it is, in places, readable and stylish compared to the longuets of *The Downing Street Years*. And it's not all territory annexed by the hard right. Her criticisms of Clinton for refusing to allow bombing

below 15,000 ft during Kosovo are justified. Equally persuasive is her warning that nuclear proliferation will allow rogue states to abuse human rights without fear of Western intervention.

Like the other Cold Warriors in the White House, Thatcher has a spring in her step. She is relishing the return to a world of realpolitik, of "risk, conflict and latent violence". All too conveniently she writes off the nineties as an era in which "internationalism" became a decadent distraction that blinded the West to its interests.

But she fails to acknowledge that the nation state alone cannot protect us from this dangerous world. Globalization does not, in her formulation, "prevent Governments from "doing what they shouldn't be doing anyway" – it stops them from protecting citizens against environmental degradation and conflict. And the Thatcher imagination is so pre-occupied with dictators polishing their weapons that she won't acknowledge that the biggest threat comes from groups within failed states – where Government is too weak rather than too strong. It is difficult to see how her call for a return to cold war levels of military spending would protect America from men on planes with wire-cutters. For all her criticisms of abstraction in international law and the politics of the continentals, she's prepared to follow the will-o'-the-wisp that is the "war on international terrorism" without a murmur.

Most of the publicity (and advance) for *Statecraft* were inevitably earned by the chapters on Europe. Even here some of her attacks on a manufactured sense of European cultural identity are well made. Just because there are political reasons to have a European Union, there is no reason to pretend that "Beethoven and Debussy, Voltaire and Burke, Vermeer and Picasso, Notre Dame and St Paul's" are part of a unified heritage. But here again she refuses to acknowledge the EU's practical achievements: the sense of a wider European identity undeniably

provided a stabilising force for former soviet states after the fall of the iron curtain. Too often, her dislike for European political institutions seems inseparable from a dislike of Europeans. Germans, we learn, have a "marked inability to limit their ambitions or respect their neighbours", the Spanish "still have an inferiority complexity about the Armada" and, after all, "The Nazis spoke in terms that may strike us as eerily reminiscent of euro federalists".

This Spectatorish fogginess prevents *Statecraft* from saying much that is valuable about the modern world. Even her evocations of America are based on an orderly society of entrepreneurs who go "hunting and trapping" rather than the contemporary reality of a land where more young Black men go to Prison than go to college and where the porn industry makes more money than Hollywood. In her failure to grasp the consequences of globalization, Thatcher demonstrates the same quality that she attributes to European politicians: "a particularly shallow understanding of what constitutes Western civilization and underpins Western progress".

Rob Blackhurst is Communications Manager of the Foreign Policy Centre

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
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Sunday, 29 September – 1700–1830, Claremont Hotel
Robin Cook MP, Leader of the House of Commons; Neil Kinnock, European Commissioner; Peter Hain MP, Minister for Europe; Martin Jacques, writer and journalist; Roger Lyons, Amicus; Chair: Mark Leonard, Director of The Foreign Policy Centre

Between Europe and America – Where next for jobs and prosperity?

Monday, 30 September – 1245–1300, Revill's Hotel
Patricia Hewitt MP, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry; Will Hutton, author of *The World We're In*; James Wilson, Six Continents PLC; Chair: Tom Arbuthnott, The Foreign Policy Centre

Europe – Winning the Argument

Monday, 30 September – 1800–1930, Savoy Hotel
Peter Hain MP, Minister for Europe; Linda McAvan MEP, Deputy Leader, European Parliamentary Labour Party; Chris Haskins, former Chairman, Northern Foods; Bob Worcester, Chairman, MORI (tbc); Chair: Paul Adamson, Adamson Weber Shandwick

Pamphlets

Reclaiming Britain: Living Together After The Riots, 11 September and the Rise of the Right
Edited by Phoebe Griffith and Mark Leonard

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The Future of Rural Communities in Europe by Jack Thurston and Jonny Trapp Steffensen

The Future of European Rural Societies by Chris Haskins

European Policy Competition by Tom Arbuthnott

Risk Collection by Rachel Briggs

Migration in Europe by Andrew Geddes

October

Events Party Conference

Can we win the war against terrorism?

Tuesday, 1 October – 1800–2000, Sheraton Hotel
Geoff Hoon MP, Secretary of State for Defence; Pauline Neville-Jones, International BBC Governor; Chair: Mike Hammond, Marsh UK Ltd

British – do you mean me?

Wednesday, 2 October – 1300–1400, St John's Church Hall
Beverly Hughes MP, Minister of State for Citizenship, Immigration and Social Cohesion; David Lammy MP, Health Minister; Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, The Foreign Policy Centre; Beverly Bernard, Commission for Racial Equality; Chair: John Kampfner, *New Statesman*

Africa – Is the West just walking by?

Wednesday, 2 October – 1800–2000, Orbiston Hotel
Sally Keeble MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary for International Development; Justin Frosyth, Oxfam; Niels Christiansen, Nestlé; Chair: Zeinab Badawi, BBC

Pamphlets

The Future of European Rural Communities – Final Report by Chris Haskins

November

Events

European Voice – CAP Conference
Corporate Security Seminar

Publication

Corporate Security Working Paper