Turks in Europe:

Why are we afraid?

Preface by Stephen Twigg

Sarah Schaefer
Greg Austin
Kate Parker

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*This pamphlet is dedicated to Erden Caner
and his fellow 'Turks in Europe'
who inspired this analysis*

About the Authors

Stephen Twigg joined the Foreign Policy Centre as Director in August 2005. He was involved with the FPC from its conception in 1998 and since then as a Member of the Board. After being General Secretary of the Fabian Society in 1996 to 1997, Stephen was elected as Member of Parliament for Enfield Southgate in 1997 and re-elected in 2001. Following his re-election, he was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the House of Commons, the Rt Hon. Robin Cook MP, and then as a junior minister in the Department for Education and Skills between 2002 and 2005, reaching the post of Minister for School Standards in 2004. Stephen also contributes weekly to the Aegis Trust in their work against genocide. Stephen graduated with a BA from Oxford in Politics, Philosophy and Economics.

Sarah Schaefer is Europe Director at the Foreign Policy Centre. Her experience has included spells in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and as a political correspondent at The Independent. A former Director of Communications at the Social Market Foundation, she was more recently political adviser at the FCO to Dr Denis MacShane when he was Europe Minister. More recently, she was Director of Strategy and Communications at Britain in Europe.

Dr Greg Austin is Director of Research at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and the author or editor of several books and major reports on China. He has held senior posts, including Director of Research and Director of the Asia Programme, in the Brussels and Washington offices of the International Crisis Group, the leading multi-national NGO publishing field-based policy analysis in support of conflict prevention. He was the principal author of three reports by the International Crisis Group on the Taiwan Strait published in June 2003. In the course of this project, he interviewed senior officials in the USA, China and Taiwan. He has held posts in the Australian National University, Bradford University (Peace Studies), the Australian Commission in Hong Kong, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in the Australian parliament. He has also worked as a Ministerial adviser in the development

cooperation and defence portfolios, as an intelligence analyst, and as foreign affairs and defence correspondent for a leading Australian newspaper. He has postgraduate qualifications in international relations and international law.

Kate Parker is a Research Associate at the Foreign Policy Centre, having previously worked at the European Commission Delegation in Washington, D.C. She specialised in the Middle East during her MA in Politics at the University of Edinburgh and is now working towards her MSc in Middle East Politics at the School of Oriental and African Studies.

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PREFACE

The prospect of Turkey's entry into the European Union has triggered a remarkable outburst of fear and anxiety in some European member states. In France, many voters that rejected the constitutional treaty in France cited Turkey's prospective membership as one of the reasons.

This is awkward for Britain, which has taken a strategic lead in ushering Turkey into the EU. British diplomats are working desperately behind the scenes to ensure that the British Presidency is not overshadowed by the collapse of the accession talks. While EU member states agreed last December for the first round of negotiations to go ahead, the rejection of the constitutional treaty gave fresh impetus to those who had nursed the deepest reservations about this historic step in the development of the EU.

In France, Dominique de Villepin has already demanded that an extra hurdle be placed in Turkey's way, calling upon the Turks to recognise the present Republic of Cyprus before the talks can resume. Similarly, Angela Merkel, has made opposition to Turkey's membership her flagship foreign policy during the election campaign. Turkey, she argues, should enjoy a 'privileged partnership' with the EU – a euphemism for second-class status – a proposal that has backing in other, smaller member states such as Austria.

Despite this strong opposition, it is still likely that – as so often in the deliberations of the EU – a face-saving diplomatic fudge will be negotiated behind the scenes. A probable compromise will be that enlargement criteria generally will be toughened, without singling Turkey out. Thus, the issue will be kept at bay, without the explicit rejection of Turkey's membership. It is not difficult to imagine how potentially damaging and perhaps disastrous such diplomatic gamesmanship could be when reported in the Turkish media.

It is lazy to write this off as another EU fiasco. The real problem lies in the fear that the governments of certain member states have of their own publics. It cannot be argued often enough, or forcefully enough, that it is in our collective economic, geo-political and strategic interest to bring our key ally in the Muslim world into the EU. European politicians are rightly sceptical of the American inclination to see a 'clash of civilisations' in the 21st Century. At the same time, in the wake of 9/11, the Madrid bombings and the attacks on London, we cannot hide from the problem of militant Islam and its appeal to young Muslims living in the West. Here is a supremely important opportunity to welcome a secularised Muslim state into the family of European nations.

But hope will not win over fear unless we understand what makes Europeans frightened of Turkey's membership. We have to grasp why so many are so afraid, and the role that labour market crowding and supposedly 'insurmountable' cultural differences play in nurturing these anxieties.

As Sarah Schaefer argues in this pamphlet, some countries such as Germany that have large Turkish populations fear further migration because they have not yet come to terms with the post-war influx of Turks. Rather than integrating migrants into German society, successive German governments have pursued the opposite policy. The result has been the emergence of so-called 'parallel societies' where Turks and Germans live alongside each other, often without subscribing to the same set of basic values and even without speaking the same language.

Many Turks living in Germany are economically disadvantaged, with unemployment biting particularly hard among the younger generation. In a country that is suffering from soaring joblessness, anxiety about further immigration is inevitable.

But millions of Turks already live in Germany and their alienation from mainstream German society cannot continue if that country wants to preserve a civilised level of social cohesion. Citizenship classes and a fresh focus on German language lessons have a part

to play in drawing in the younger generation and ensuring that they feel a sense of belonging. This should be all about empowerment, rather than indoctrination. Common citizenship brings freedom as well as responsibility.

That said, integration is a two-way street, which is one of many reasons why Turkish membership of the EU is about much more than trade and defence. Accession would send a powerful signal not only to Turkey itself, but to those of Turkish extraction already living in Europe; it would be a dramatic step forward in the history of European multi-culturalism and in the more urgent efforts, post-9/11, to find ways of ensuring that Muslims and non-Muslims can live side by side. In the long term, Turkish membership might encourage the emergence of a truly modern, European version of Islam: that is a form of Muslim living that also incorporates a basic set of European values, women's equality and human rights.

This in turn adds urgency to the task of European self definition and identity. To what, exactly, are we inviting new entrants to the EU to integrate? The past fifty years of migration are a story of mixed success. In a world of hectic mobility and change, we will need to be more confident of our own values and the boundaries we set. The prospect of Turkish accession is a welcome opportunity to revisit these questions.

The debacle surrounding the No votes in France and the Netherlands on the EU Constitution in May and June this year show that voters in those countries are unhappy with the way their governments are handling this rapid change. Much has been said linking the No votes to opposition to Turkey's EU accession. Yet, as Greg Austin and Kate Parker argue in their paper, public disaffection toward Turkey's accession is due more to general disaffection with enlargement of the EU. The real discontent and confusion seems tied more to migration and identity issues at a general rather than to any specific aversion toward Turks and Turkey.

So far, the British public seems untroubled by the prospect of Turkey's membership. This may be explained by the low levels of unemployment in Britain and the heterogeneity of the Turkish-

speaking ethnic group in this country. Many British Turks were granted full citizenship a long time ago, and the vast majority speak English.

This, more than the fate of the constitutional treaty, is the EU's moment of truth in 2005. History will not judge us kindly if we fail to treat Turkey with respect, and – in so doing – signal to our own ethnic minorities that we have little faith in their capacity to integrate, or of others to follow them. Translated from political rhetoric into social reality, 'privileged partnership' is a shabby offer to make to the millions of Turks that already live in Europe. What will future generations say about us if we turn our backs now, with so much at stake, and so much to gain, on the best Muslim friend we have?

Stephen Twigg
Director

Germany: A Case Study of Failed Integration?

Sarah Schaefer

The pledge to oppose Turkey's membership of the European Union has been one of the key planks of the Christian Democrat's manifesto at the 2005 German general election. Rather than full membership, Frau Merkel argued, Turkey could enjoy a 'privileged partnership' with the EU.

But the CDU has not been alone in their scepticism about Turkey's prospective accession. Many Germans point to insurmountable cultural differences and diverging historical perspectives that would make any integration of the new member state impossible. One only has to read German newspapers, watch German TV or look at the dozens of blogs that have been dedicated to proposed Turkish EU membership to get a glimpse of how deep-rooted is this anxiety.

The topic of Turkey's entry is inextricably linked to the debate over how integration of the millions of Turkish immigrants that already live in Germany has fared and how unemployment figures would be affected. Unemployment figures are twice as high in areas where Turks are already concentrated, such as Kreuzberg, a Berlin district, and critics argue that Turkey's EU entry would lead to greater numbers of migrants and thus even more unemployment.

Additionally, there has been a flurry of films and novels in recent years, many produced by German-born Turks, criticising the treatment of women by more fundamentalist sections of the Turkish community. Many Germans feel that the existence of human rights abuses through forced marriages is unacceptable within their society and argue that there cannot be further enlargement of the EU to include Turkey, given the perceived failure of integration within their own country. Others argue, however, that it is easy to generalise the concern about women's rights and that it is crucial to understand

that not all Turkish women are forced into marriages or suffering from domestic abuse.

The question of the integration of Muslim groups within European societies has gained in urgency since the events of 7/7 and 21/7 in London. The fear that 'parallel societies' have emerged and diverged in German cities that are already beyond any real legislative and cultural reach has dominated the debate about integration and injected a new level of suspicion into German life.

Angela Merkel initially re-ignited the debate over the failure of successive governments' integration policy in November 2004, when she started a so-called patriotism debate. She questioned migrants' commitment to German values and announced her commitment to a so-called *Leitkultur*, a set of guiding principles of German culture. Gerhard Schroder, the SPD Chancellor, rejected Frau Merkel's accusation that his government was failing German values, but, crucially, admitted to shortcomings in the integration process by warning of 'parallel societies' within Germany and calling for more integration of migrant communities. His speech stirred up debate both domestically and internationally. The Italian newspaper *La Republicana* went so far as claiming Schroder had 'ended a taboo for the Left'. Herr Schroder's government changed the country's approach towards immigration for good when he introduced the new Immigration Act, the *Zuwanderungsgesetz*, which sought to address migration for the first time in post-war German history. Otto Schily, the SPD Minister for the Interior, described its introduction on 1 January 2005 as a watershed in German attitudes towards integration: 'the new Immigration Act is an expression of the recognition that there has been migration to Germany for many years and that there will be migration for many years to come. This legislation therefore sets a landmark. We will never again allow ourselves to be in the dark about this matter.'[1]

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[1] *Das neue Zuwanderungsgesetz ist ein Ausdruck des Erkenntnis dass es in Deutschland seit vielen Jahren Zuwanderung gibt und auch in Zukunft geben wird. Es markiert damit eine Grenze. Hinter diesem Erkenntnis werden wir nie wieder zuruckfallen.*

Other measures that have been considered include citizenship ceremonies and an oath of allegiance. There have also been proposals that would aim to bring the Muslim religion into the mainstream of society by developing a European version of Islam that stresses the rights of women as equals. These measures would see the introduction of Islamic professorships at universities and lessons in the Koran along-side those of the Bible in German schools.

The resistance before spring 2005 to introducing legislation that addresses the question of integration in German society can be understood when examining Germany's difficult historical past. The feeling was that a country that was responsible for the persecution and murder of minorities only in the last century should welcome migrants in its society without imposing any cultural values upon them. Many commentators and politicians, including Herr Schily[2], say, that as a result of the history of Nazi Germany, German society has until recently been in denial about the reality of politics of integration; the political right has long argued that Germany is not an 'immigration country', while left-wingers have painted an idyllic picture of multi-cultural harmony.

It is only in the last two years, ironically coinciding with the debate over Turkish membership of the EU, that Germany has begun its search to decide what type of country it is seeking to in be the 21st century. Sceptics fear that the development of 'parallel societies' is so advanced that they cannot be reconciled easily, if at all, and their opposition to Turkish EU membership is therefore difficult to overcome.

However, others realise that Turkish migrants have been part of German society for 50 years and that there have been many positive aspects. While there remain real problems with the social integration of the third generation of migrants and unemployment levels, many have found educational and professional success. In other words,

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[2] See Otto Schily's review of Necla Kelek's novel 'Die Fremde Braut', in *Der Spiegel,* April 2005.

the existence of Turkish migrants in Germany is now part of shared German history, impossible to disentangle.

In response to an interview with the former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt last year in which he argued that it had been a mistake to invite so-called guest workers from foreign cultures to Germany after World War II, Lale Akgun, a Turkish-born SPD MP wrote in an open letter:

> Today there should be no question anymore whether it was right or wrong to invite guest-workers to come to Germany, because we are now talking about 50 years of German history, the shared history of Germans and migrants… I, for one, found your thesis deeply hurtful. Not only to the achievements of the first generation migrants that has always worked very hard, but also as a fatal political signal.[3]

It is this shared history that countries such as Germany have to focus on to ensure that the integration of migrants is a success. The multicultural aspects of German society are not an option for the future, but they are real and already existing facets of German life. There are over 3.2 millions Muslims living in Germany of which 2.6 million are Turks or Germans with Turkish origins. Out of these 2.6 million, there are approximately 800,000 that are German citizens that have a German passport either because they were born in Germany or they applied for one. This means there are up to 1.8 million Turkish migrants living in Germany who have no German passport.

It is the responsibility of German politicians, Germans, and migrants to develop a model of German identity they all feel comfortable with, at a time when relations between Muslims and non-Muslim in

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[3] Open letter by Lale Akgun in response to Helmut Schmidt's interview in *Das Hamburger Abendblatt*, November 2004: *Ich bin 1962 nach Deutschland gekommen, heute bin ich 51 Jahre alt….Heute stellt sich nicht mehr die Frage ob es richtig oder falsch gewesen sei, Arbeitskrafte ins Land zu holen denn wir reden hier von 50 Jahren bundesdeutsche Geschichte von Deutschen und Zugewanderten….Ich jedenfalls habe Ihre Thesen alse tiefe Krankung empfunden. Nicht nur gegnuber der Lebenleistungen der Migranten erster Generation, die stets hart gearbeitet haben, sondern auch als ein fatales politisches Signal.*

Europe are at a critical point. Professor Bassam Tibi, co-founder of the Arabic Organisation for Human Rights, said that 'no democracy can allow that women are treated in an inferior way'.[4]

To adapt his words, no European democracy, post the London bombings, can allow Muslim fundamentalism that does not recognise or respect values of the country of residence. This challenge will need to be met by the United Kingdom, Germany, but also by Turkey. Because it is only when Turkey embraces the values of other European democracies that the 'insurmountable' cultural differences between the different countries can be overcome. The prospect of Turkish EU membership should therefore be regarded as a unique opportunity by Germany to heal its rifts that have emerged from its previous reluctance to articulate a coherent approach to integration.

Guest Workers, Not Immigrants

The new Immigration Act, introduced on 1 January 2005, marked a turning point in Germany's approach to immigration and integration. For many years, even though successive German governments invited guest workers to come to their country to fill the labour shortage caused by WWII, Germans never saw their country as an 'immigration country'.

Under the new legislation, which has the maxim of 'give and take', immigrants have to take integration courses and learn German. There is a focus on improving the German of children at schools through special lessons for children for whom it is not their first language.

There are now two types of 'leaves to remain', a limited leave to remain (*befristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis*), and an unlimited leave to remain (*Niederlassungserlaubnis*). The aim of the restructuring of the different headings was to base the system on the reasons for the leave to remain, i.e. education, work, family, humanitarian. For

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[4] Professor Bassam Tibi, *Die Gotteskrieger und die falsche Toleranz*, Alice Schwarzer (ed), Kiepenhauer & Witsch.

example, in order to ease economic migration, the Act allows highly skilled migrants to apply for unlimited leave to remain, self-employed limited leave to remain, if they invest 1 million euros and create at least ten jobs, and students that have successfully completed their studies, to seek employment for one year after graduation. However, despite criticism from all parties, the Schroder government stopped short of introducing a points system, as operated in Canada, to achieve 'managed integration'. The Schroder government has also amended existing legislation to strengthen the rights of Turkish women. In other words, women who now enter Germany and get divorced because they are victims of domestic violence will retain their leave to remain and the custody of their children.

The Act marks a turning point in Germany's approach to immigration and integration because it addresses, not only the need for immigration to ensure the continued success of the German economy, but also acknowledges the previous failure to introduce integrationist measures. As Cem Ozdemir, the Turkish-born Green MEP, has said: 'without language skills labour-market integration is damned to fail, and the same is true of social dialogue with people outside immigrants' own ethnic reference group…All the same, the demographic problems recognised on all sides cannot be solved by immigration alone. We must also make use of and assist the potential workforce that we have already in Germany.'[5] Many children were written off as 'lost' in the discussion about the connections between demographic developments, manpower shortages and immigration.

The first Turkish guest-workers that were invited to come to work in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s were treated completely differently. German governments were determined to maintain the policy mantra that Germany is no 'immigration country' and only limited status was offered to Turks based on the assumption that they should be encouraged to return to their homeland once their work commitments were over. When the first migrants came to Germany, the only legislation that covered immigration stemmed from Nazi Germany. The Auslanderpolizeiverordnung (AVPO)

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[5] Cem Ozdemir in an interview with the Goethe Institute April 2005.

introduced on 22 August 1938, only permitted foreigners leave to remain if their personality and reason for staying in Germany 'deserved hospitality'.[6] There were no special rights or a different status for migrants that had stayed in the country long-term. Similarly under the AVPO, there was no provision for unlimited leave to remain or a permit allowing a right to remain. Ironically, the legal interpretation of the Nazi legislation proved more liberal than an Act that was passed to update the legislation, *das Auslandergesetz* (AuslG), in 1965 because under the Nazi AVPO immigrants who had committed a crime could only be deported after being sentenced: under the interpretation of the Bonn Republic, leave to remain could be disallowed if an immigrant had been charged. In addition, prior to 1965, Turks had a legal basis to remain in Germany dating back to the German-Turkish Agreement from 1927 which stated that Turks had the right to enter Germany with a visa and leave to remain unless convicted of criminal activity or special circumstances applied.

Turks were not the only migrants to enter post-war Germany and in December 1955 a separate agreement was signed with Italy to allow Italians to come to the country as guest-workers. As a result, the number of migrants rose from 73,000 in 1954, to around 167,000 in 1959, to 811,000 in 1963 and to over one million in 1965. It soon became apparent that the AVPO stemming from Hitler's government had become ill-equipped to deal with the rising numbers of guest-workers and the German Parliament, the Bundestag, passed the AuslG in 1965. The aim of the new legislation was to create an 'open, liberal and humane' policy towards foreigners and strengthen the status of long-term migrants. It remained Germany's basis for its approach towards migrants for the next 25 years.

Under the AuslG 1965, the leave to remain was only permitted if the interests of the Federal Republic were not harmed. Migrants still had to prove that they 'deserved hospitality'; a phrase first used in Nazi legislation and that was seen as controversial by many critics at the

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[6] German translation: Under paragraph 1 of the AVPO, *der Aufenthalt sollte Auslandern nur erlaubt sein, 'die nach ihrer Personlichkeit und dem Zweck ihres Aufenthalts im Reichsgebiet die Gewhar bieten, dass sie der ihnen gewhrten Gastfreundschaft wurdig sind'.*

time.[7] The legislation introduced an unlimited leave to remain although special conditions could apply and it could be revised and limited at any point if necessary. This flexible interpretation of the leave to remain therefore made it still difficult for migrants to achieve a truly unlimited leave to remain and was described by some critics as amounting to an 'act of mercy'.[8]

Migrants' children were allowed to remain in the country until they were 16 years old, after completing the minimum of their school education, and could retain their status if they found employment. Conditions that might alter the leave to remain included the failure to have a valid passport, the failure to register a change of address and criminal offences.

By 1973, changed economic circumstances and a different structure of the labour market meant that Germany announced a stop to its policy of inviting guest-workers to the country. But the change of policy had an unexpected side effect. Migrants, determined to remain and concerned that their return visits to their home country might alter their status, increasingly moved their families to live with them in Germany and thus became even more committed to staying. As a result, the number of foreigners living in Germany rose to 3.9 million in 1973, to 4.5 million in 1989. The Schmidt government sought to counter this trend by limiting the right of families to join migrants to children less than 16 years old. Further, a migrant that wanted his family to join him, had to prove that he had lived in Germany for at least eight years and had been married for at least one year. Any children over the age of 16 were not allowed to enter.

The main underlying principle behind the legislation was to avoid the integration of foreigners and for years it was maintained by German's governing politicians that Germany was not a country of immigration. To manifest this policy stance, in 1983, the German Parliament passed further measures that eased and rewarded the return of guest-workers by granting them the re-payment of

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[7] Dr Ralf Gutmann, *40 Jahre Auslnaderrecht fur Turken in Germany*, p23.
[8] Heldmann, *Auslanderrecht*, 1974, p.27.

contributions to their pensions if they declared their willingness to return.

The AuslG 1965 was finally revised in 1990 after growing criticism that its flexible interpretation gave scope to subjective decisions regarding migrants' leave to remain. Under this new AuslG, migrants therefore have to prove that they have had leave to remain for the past five years, have a work permit, basic German language and an address of residence. Members of the second generation were allowed to retain their leave to remain even if convicted of minor criminal offences. Moreover, after eight years and proof of 60 contributions to their pension scheme, migrants are now allowed to become self-employed. For the first time, the naturalisation of long-standing migrants and members of the second generation was also simplified although some observers such as Herr Ozdemir still point to a distinction in the treatment of Turkish citizens: 'the question remains; Are those that are naturalised really Germans? Will they be regarded as Germans or will they be continued to be treated as a Turk with a German passport.'[9]

With the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997, the treatment of migrants has increasingly acquired a European dimension. Over the past five years, various directives covering asylum and migration have been adopted by EU member states that concern refugees, family re-unification and the legal position of non-EU citizens. Given the demographical situation in many EU member states, the import of highly-skilled labour to ensure continued competitiveness and managed migration is once again a policy priority. It was thus that the Schroder government introduced the new Immigration Act in 2005. Many believe that a Canada-style points system that encourages migration of highly skilled professionals will be the next logical step for Germany.

Yet the new legislation also marked a turning point for how Germany sees itself in the 21st century. It has finally succumbed to the reality of 50 years of migrants living in its midst and thus softened its language on not being an immigrant country. During the 1980s,

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[9] Interview with Cem Ozdemir in *Der Neuen Osnabrucker Zeitung*, 7 February 2005.

Germany became more aware of multiculturalism as a societal phenomenon. Mainly led by parts of the Green Party and the Left, politicians celebrated the so-called *Multi-Kulti Gesellschaft*[10], as a means in itself and argued specifically for co-existence rather than integration. But this philosophy of co-existence failed to address the need by migrants to integrate themselves in German society and fuelled criticism by right-wing parties. The Greens and the SPD have since distanced themselves from the term and Katja Husen, the Greens' women spokesperson said in 2004 in an interview with *Der Spiegel*: 'we don't use the term *Multi-Kulti* anymore. It sounds like a playful concept, but integration is no game.'

An additional problem has been the continued popularity of right-wing parties, such as the NPD, in Germany, particularly in the East. If the NPD manages to increase its mandate in the forthcoming general election and exploit fears over unemployment, the gulf between different Turkish migrants and Germans could worsen as Turks find themselves victims of racist attacks.

As the next section will show in more detail, the lack of integrationist measures was coupled for many years with reluctance by Germany to impose a basic set of values on foreigners out of fear that it might invoke memories of Nazi Germany and a strong German national identity. In other words, Turkish migrants were not expected to show any allegiance to Germany because there was no overtly defined basic set of values that they had to subscribe to. This confused identity and the political objective merely to offer a legislative framework for migrants' rights and responsibilities for the limited time that they were working in Germany resulted in the phenomenon already alluded to of 'parallel societies'.

Problems of Interpretation: Culture and Values

A dominant theme in recent German literature and films has been the difficulties of the Turkish population to integrate into German life. *Gegen die Wand*, the acclaimed film by Fatih Akin, gained such

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[10] *Multi-Kulti* is a German phrase for multiculturalism and its abbreviated use also has colloquial, uncomplicated connotations.

national prominence that it won the category of Best Film at the 2004 Berlinale, the German equivalent of the BAFTAs. The film is a harrowing account of a young Turkish woman's desperate attempt to flee her strict parents, come to terms with her confused identity, and paints a harrowing picture of the brutality against women and the catastrophic consequences of family honour in Turkish families.

The film unmasks integration as an illusion. It is based in Germany but has not a single native German speaker in any of the key roles and solely focuses on different dynamics within a part of Hamburg that is a Turkish ghetto.

Another example of this genre is a book by Necla Kelek, *Die Fremde Braut*, which was published in 2004. In the book, Frau Kalek, a Turk with a German passport, tells the story of three young Turkish women that were forced to leave Turkey and marry a Turk living in Germany. Once in Germany, they cannot speak the language and are completely dependent on their immediate family and/or husbands. Integration into German society is hence impossible for these women and they describe how they 'did not come to live in Germany, but in a family'.[11]

Frau Kelek's account is highly critical of Islam as a whole, arguing that its underlying values may be incompatible with those of democracies. She argues that each member of a community is responsible to his or her family, the community and God, while freedom and responsibilities towards the community were not necessarily irreconcilable but may be difficult to realise in practice. In other words, she asks, how much tolerance do Muslims demand to practice intolerance?

The uncertainty over how the values of Islam and German democracy can co-exist was illustrated by a case that was referred to the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. The dispute, between an Afghan-born teacher Fereshta Ludin and the Land Baden-Wurttemberg, was over whether she should be allowed to

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[11] Necla Kele, *Die Fremde Braut: Ein Bericht aus dem Inneren des turkischen Lebens in Deutschland*, Kiepenhauer & Witsch, Koln.

wear a headscarf while teaching at a state school. The 2003 ruling by the court, that it should be up to individual Lander (regional) governments to decide, showed how confused Germany still is when its tolerance towards foreign migrants and cultural difference is tested.

The case became a cause célèbre in Germany, with Frau Ludin arguing that it was her basic human right to practice her religion. Others, however, such as the well-known German feminist Alice Schwarzer criticised the veil as the very symbol of the separation between Muslims and non-Muslims and accused Frau Ludin of belonging to the Islam Kollegg, an Islamic institution that believes that Muslim women are 'clean' while German women are 'unclean'. 'These are not harmless definitions… For the past 25 years, the veil of women has been the flag of the Islamic crusader. It is the symbol of separation. It is time to put an end to this generous pseudo tolerance – and to begin some serious respect. Respect of the millions of Muslims that are even more threatened by the terror from their own people than we are.'[12]

Like the debate over the headscarf, both *Gegen die Wand* and *Fremde Braut* touched a raw nerve in German society. The fact that they were written by Turks meant that they could not be dismissed as anti-Turkish or anti-integrationist propaganda but at the same time, many were cautious that their content might give ammunition to right-wingers who have long argued that integration has failed. Some critics have argued that they paint a caricatured picture in which all Turkish women suffer at the hands of their families or husbands, and give an unfair account of how Turks have integrated in Germany.

Yet, the questions in both works need a serious and urgent answer. An increasing audience of Germans now accept that 'parallel societies' have indeed emerged over the years and have called for a more sensitive, open and honest debate. While forced marriages are illegal and the Schroder government toughened sentencing for those

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[12] Alice Schwarzer, *Der Spiegel*, 26/2003.

who force such unions, in reality, politicians do not expect the new legislation to end them.

As Otto Schily, the former German interior minister, said in an interview with *Der Spiegel* in November 2004, the biggest problem was that women that are forced into marriage were unlikely to report their husbands to the authorities. Moreover, governments had no power to interfere with arranged marriages, which Frau Kelek described as an equal means to keep Turkish women captive.

Others, such as Cem Ozdemir, point out that forced marriages cannot possibly be compared with arranged marriages and says that part of the prejudice against Turks is based on the confusion between the two because Germans have not been explained the difference.

According to a recent study by the Department for the Family, only ten per cent of young Turkish women in Germany are in favour of arranged marriages; nearly two-thirds would accept such arrangements for themselves 'under no circumstances'. Yet how many of these women will go against the will of their families? Another recent government study paints a different picture: it found that 25 per cent of interviewed Turkish women said that they only met their husband after their wedding and 9 per cent said they were forced into marriage.

The inability of German authorities to prevent severe human rights abuses of women by fundamentalist parts of the Turkish community against its own women became apparent in 1990 when the 16 year old Turkish girl Fikriye Mecitoglu was killed by her brother in an honour killing because she was involved in a relationship with a Kurd.

At that time, the German sociologist Karin Konig was already arguing that Turkish women were the most disadvantaged group in German society. Often lacking a German passport, they do not have electoral representation, do not speak German and have in some cases never left the house or street they live in. According to Frau Konig, many social workers had shied away from revealing the true

extent of the treatment of some Turkish women because they did not want to inflame racism and prejudice against Turks in Germany, 'The deep insights into traditions of Turkish fundamentalism can in society, in which multiculturalism does not play an important part, only serve to inflame the hatred of foreigners – to see the Turkish male as a prime object of hate.'[13]

A study in 1990 by Barbara John, the CDU spokeswoman for women in Berlin's regional government, found that Turkish women were still, even after years, 'completely alien to German society' and 'not capable of getting on without outside help'. Liberal middle and upper classes that had liberated the role of women were both still limited not only in Germany but also in Turkey, although it must be stressed that in Turkey students are not permitted to wear headscarves in universities or in schools.

To complicate matters, many women also still dream of returning to Turkey one day and do not want to lose touch with their roots. Frau Konig adds: 'it is a Turkish saying that the purity of women is the honour of men. *Namus* – honour – is a central concept in the Turkish worldview. The honour of their women is their most important value.'

According to a study of domestic violence published in 2004, 25 per cent of the whole female population admit to have suffered from domestic violence, compared to 38 per cent of Turkish women. Of those, nearly twice as much are beaten up, strangled or threatened with a weapon.

The integration of Turks has to some extent also been hampered by some of the Turkish newspapers available in Germany. The most popular daily paper, *Hurriyet* (*Freedom*) has a circulation of 53,000 although the real number of its readers is estimated much higher. In 2001, a survey revealed that 38 per cent of Turks read the paper whereas the market share of other papers such as *Tukiye* or *Milliyet* is under 10 per cent.

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[13] Karin Konig, '*Tschador, Ehre und Kulturkonflikt, Veranderungsprozesse turkischer Frauen und Madchen durch dir Emigration und ihre soziokulturellen Folgen*', *Verlag fur interkulturelle Koounikation.*

The paper recently caused controversy when it launched a campaign against domestic violence. Critics dismissed the campaign as cynical as they had previously printed defamatory articles against three outspoken Turkish women writers, Seyran Ates, Necla Kelek and Serap Cileli. When these women attacked the practice of honour killings to mark International Women's Day, the paper wrote 'the involvement of some of our women in the propaganda campaign by the German media and some individuals has caused concern'.[14] The paper has a history of naming critical voices such as journalists, intellectuals and politicians and will then subsequently quote members of the Turkish community that express alarm at the stance expressed.

The Way Forward

There can be no doubt that the insistence on treating Turks as guests, rather than fellow citizens has worsened the isolation of Turkish women in German society. The previous resistance to integration as a policy has allowed the development of fundamentalist pockets within the Turkish community that now, in turn, have served to symbolise the gulf between the two cultures.

Recent films and books have highlighted the problem but they will have also compounded incomprehension and even disgust felt by significant parts of the German population towards Turkish communities living in their midst. It must be conceded that these films and books have focused on one aspect of Turkish communities and the drama and division may have distorted reality.

A measured dialogue is crucial in overcoming this perceived clash of cultures but there also has to be recognition by Germans that the principal cause of the present situation is the refusal to acknowledge that Turks now form a part of German society. The new Immigration Act was a step in the right direction and it will now be the equal responsibility of the Turkish population to integrate.
As Cem Ozdmir, has argued, multiculturalism has 'nothing to do with cultural relativism because human and fundamental rights should set

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[14] *Hurriyet* , 10 March 2005.

the standards for the co-existence of different ethnic groups, religions and cultures. These standards are enshrined by the constitution and the rights enshrined in it, which are simultaneously both rights and duties'.[15] To ensure better integration, it is crucial to focus on the young. Better support structures are needed; all-day schools should be expanded and pre-school education should be compulsory so that disadvantaged children, regardless of whether they are migrants or Germans, enjoy better educational opportunities.

Recent initiatives, such as 'Germany Reads Aloud', attempt to foster enthusiasm for reading among children and young people with or without a background in migration. The municipal level, given Germany's federal structure, can play an important part here.

The organisations representing migrants should also articulate their interests more effectively. Many of these organisations are still being led by the first generation, which do not have a strong enough feeling of themselves as citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany and too rarely speak of a sense of shared identity. Apart from this, migrants must understand that they have got to prepare their children for life in society by making sure their children have German friends, or for example, by sending them to a German sports club.

Similarly, Germany needs to follow the example of Britain and improve the representation of ethnic minorities and immigrants in political life. As Cem Ozdemir has argued: 'it would also be desirable if the CDU and CSU were to become more open to migrants interested in politics.'

Germany also needs to develop a more defined sense of its identity that can then be shared by migrants. Herr Ozdemir added: 'for Germany, I would wish a bit more pride in our federal republic. Being German should first of all mean identification with our constitution, the values enshrined in it and our political culture – that is the roof under which private cultural self-realisation would then take place.

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[15] Private interview, August 2005.

And that would be multiculturalism – something quite different from cultural relativism.'

Conclusion: Implications for Turkish EU Membership

As this chapter has shown, much of the opposition to Turkish membership can be linked to the perceived failed integration of the existing Turkish population in Germany. Particularly in the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks in London, it is crucial that Germans, along with other member states, can build a dialogue with Muslims and continue to address previous failures of integrationist policies.

The negotiations with Turkey will last for at least ten years and the country has a unique opportunity to introduce reforms, both economic and social, that can turn Turkey into a modern, secular 21st century country. If leading politicians such as Frau Merkel continue their opposition to Turkish entry, the progress that has been made in Turkey to improve its record on human rights will be stalled.

Equally importantly, it will send a hostile signal to Turks living within Germany. The presence of Turks in the EU is not an option but a reality, and has been so for the past 50 years. The prospect of Turkey's entry may thus not only aid the stabilisation of South Eastern Europe and the spread of democracy into the region but also heal the wounds of failed integration in EU member states such as Germany.

Turkish newspapers such as the German edition of *Hurriyet* claim they are in favour of Turkish entry but, through the nature of their reporting, harm the chances of its success because they encourage Turks to think that Germany is enemy territory. A stalling of negotiations would give these newspapers further ammunition to alienate their readers from Germany.

As this chapter has argued, integration of migrants is a two-way street. It is not just Germany that is coming to terms with its Turkish population. Turkey has so far been reluctant to engage with the

question of Turkish migrants living in Germany and has to play a more active part in the new dialogue.

Turkey's prospect of EU membership would create a reformist atmosphere in the country badly needed for change. The opposition by Frau Merkel, the CDU and other parties will be used by anti-reformist forces to argue that EU membership is never likely to happen and fuel distrust of the EU and its intentions.

If integration of Turks is to be a success, the importance of this political message cannot be understated. The events of 7/7 in London have shown the damage that so-called 'parallel societies' can do to a society. Surely this should be a wake-up call to European governments that further integration of ethnic minorities is not a luxury in a modern society but the key to their peaceful future.

The Mono-cultural Delusion: Turkey and Migration Politics

Greg Austin and Kate Parker

In July 2005 there was little evidence of enthusiasm in the EU for the decision taken by the European Commission to adopt a new negotiating mandate and begin talks with Turkey on 3 October 2005. For the first time in EU history, candidate country negotiations are now being held with a deliberate statement of their open ended nature and no guarantee of their conclusion.

The situation has been further complicated by the demand from France through its Prime Minister and former Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, that Turkey had to recognise Cyprus before talks would be taken any further.[1] Ankara was outraged by the statement which it saw as going against previous agreements and assurances that no new conditions would be imposed on Turkey.[2] On the one hand, the French position is totally defensible. It would be inconceivable that any country acceding to a union of sovereign states refuses to offer diplomatic recognition to a member of the union. On the other hand, there is room to question France's motives. One wonders how long it took the Quai d'Orsay to come up with this 'device', long since sitting dormant in the background, to delay the opening of talks. Austria's finance minister, Karl-Heinz Grasser, has said he will strive to ensure full that membership is not a realistic option for Turkey. He argues that Croatia and other Balkan states have a right to be part of the club before Turkey, a lesson that he believes should be learnt from the French and Dutch referendums.

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[1] Stephen Castle, 'Turkey must recognise Cyprus if it wants EU talks, says French PM', *Independent*, 3 August 2005, http://news.independent.co.uk/europe/article303263.ece.
[2] Speech by Romano Prodi before the Turkish Grand National Assembly, in Turkey in Europe Monitor, CEPS, http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item_id=1228.

According to FCO officials, it is highly likely that the talks with Turkey on accession, which will go ahead under the UK presidency, will be slowed down significantly after their 'formal opening' on 3 October. Another diplomatic source reports that France, Germany and Austria are looking for yet new formulas of ambivalence to describe the EU official position towards Turkey's accession.

The confusion at international level about Turkey and the EU mirrors the domestic scene in a number of EU countries, as Sarah Schaefer's previous chapter on Germany showed. The voters don't know what to make of it. They know that issues of national identity, the economy, social welfare and future migration are all tied up in some rather momentous way with Turkey's projected accession, but cannot see too clearly how. This leaves undisturbed certain levels of fear and anxiety.

This chapter looks more deeply at attitudes in other countries and at a broader pan-European level, but it tries to bring the argument back down to the individual level. At a personal level, what do the 'Turks in Europe' represent? How are they linked, if at all, to the issue of Turkey's accession to the European Union? It is far from clear. There are as many answers to these questions as there are shades of political opinion. What we do know for sure is that the idea of Turkey being a member of the EU is not a welcome one for some Europeans.

This chapter finds more anxiety and fear about migration in general than about Turkey, but it suggests that those fears are channelled in public debate into the issue of Turkey's accession. As Egemen Bagis, MP for Istanbul and Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minster Recep Tayyip Erdogan, recently observed: the legal process for Turkish accession started in 1963 and 'some continental politicians are acting as if they first heard about Turkey last winter, [and] take it for amusement'.[3]

Also asserted in the chapter is that it is the responsibility of Europe's political leaders, parliamentarians, media commentators and

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[3] http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=65407.

academic specialists to address the concerns of their voters about identity and migration at the same time as acting with sober propriety toward the international implications of their domestic political stands. It proceeds on the assumption that the confusion can be dispelled in a positive way by those who are willing. The chapter also makes brief comment on why this all matters. It highlights some arguments less commonly heard (the need for an EU 'ideology' of migration) to overlay ones that already surface more often, such as the need for the EU to honour its international commitments or the virtue of integrating a secular Muslim country into the Union.

French Voters Are Not Afraid of Turkey

We have seen several clumsy attempts by French leaders to deal with the issues of Muslims and Turks in Europe. The first came from former French President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, also President of the EU Constitutional Convention, who said that Turkey's accession to the EU would be 'the end of Europe'.[4] He said it was 'not a European country'. He called those who have pushed for Turkey's accession the 'enemies' of the European Union.[5] Giscard's comments on Turkey were interpreted by many, rightly or wrongly, as related to the failed push to have strong references in the EU Constitutional Treaty as having a Christian provenance.

The second move came from President Jacques Chirac. During the campaign for the French referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005, he backed calls for France to hold a referendum on whether Turkey should enter the European Union.[6] Chirac also said that he had asked the government to consider a constitutional amendment calling for a vote whenever the EU wants to include a new member. He noted that a vote on Turkey's accession was not likely to occur for more than a decade.

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[4] BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2420697.stm.
[5] *Le Monde*, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3210,36-297386,0.html.
[6] BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3707332.stm.

The statement by Jacques Chirac seemed sensible enough: the voters of France should be allowed a referendum on the accession of Turkey to the EU. On basic principles, it would be hard to challenge: modern democracy requires the consent of the people. In terms of political expediency, it seemed reasonable enough: Chirac hoped to separate a referendum vote on the constitutional treaty from any possible contamination by unreasonable fears about Turkey's possible accession some time in the medium term future. The statement by Chirac was, however, poorly thought out, came out of a position of weakness and played all too readily to the politics of division and difference championed by the party of Jean-Marie Le Pen.

The question of accession of a new member has never been put to referendum in other EU member states. There is nothing in the history or treaties of the EU to suggest that it should be. The question of Turkey's eligibility as a European country to join has already been unanimously settled by the European Council[7] in the affirmative on several occasions.

The third move had come earlier: the ban by the French government on wearing of 'conspicuous religious symbols' (meant to include head scarves worn by Muslim women) in schools. This ban has encouraged other authorities in Europe to impose dress rules on women. In December 2004, the Maaseik City Council in the Netherlands banned the wearing of a burka (a body-covering garment with veiled holes for the eyes) and a niqab (a face veil covering the lower part of the face up to the eyes).[8] But such decisions were not new; there had been such bans before in France, and in Turkey as well.[9]

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[7] Heads of State of all member states (or in different 'formations', such as the General Affairs Council of foreign ministers/minister for Europe).

[8] 'City to pay woman's fine for breach of burka ban', Expatica, Netherlands 25 August 2005, www.expatica.com.

[9] The European Court of Human Rights has fallen in behind such bans, including one in Istanbul University, ruling that 'regulations imposing restrictions on the wearing of Islamic headscarves and the measures taken to implement them were justified in principle and proportionate to the aims pursued and, therefore, could be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society"'. European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, *(application no. 44774/98),* Judgment,

But the French electors, for all of the media hype and posturing of their political leadership, are simply not that opposed to Turks or Turkey's entry into the EU. An Ipsos-*Le Figaro* poll shows that No-voters of the 29 May referendum on the EU Constitution were not mainly anti-EU. Of the poll conducted that day with 3,355 respondents, representative of the voting population, 72 per cent of the No-voters said they were comfortable with 'pursuit of European integration' (*le construction européenne*).[10] Another poll the same day had only 19 per cent of No-voters saying that Europe threatened French identity.[11] This poll reported that only 18 per cent of the No-voters it surveyed cited Turkey as the reason for their No vote.

A Eurobarometer survey in June 2005 suggested that as little as six per cent of those that voted No in the Constitutional referendum did so because they were opposed to Turkish accession.[12] (In the Netherlands, the corresponding figure in a Eurobarometer survey was three per cent.)[13]

In the Eurobarometer report on France released in September 2005, only 20 per cent of those surveyed who said they were opposed to the Constitution identified Turkey's EU accession as the reason.[14] In the same poll, while 67 per cent of those asked listed unemployment as among the most important problems facing the country, only 11 per cent also gave immigration as a serious problem.

Strasbourg, 29 June 2004. See http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/cronache/giurisprudenza_comunitaria/cedu_velo/Sentenza_cedu_velo.pdf.

[10] http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/articles/1545.asp?rubId=17.

[11] TNS Sofres/Unilog poll of 1,500 eligible voters cited in the *International Herald Tribune*, 31 May 2005, p. 4. Respondents could choose more than one answer.

[12] Flash Eurobarometer, *The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in France*, Fieldwork: 30 & 31 May 2005, Publication: June 2005, p. 17, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/fl171_en.pdf.

[13] Flash Eurobarometer, *The European Constitution: post-referendum survey in The Netherlands*, Fieldwork: 02/04 June 2005, Publication: June 2005, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/fl172_en.pdf.

[14] Eurobarometre 63.4, *L'Opinion Publique dans L'Union Europeenne*, France, Spring, 2005, September 2005, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_nat_fr.pdf.

Thus, only about fifteen per cent of the French electorate at most have registered a strong view opposing Turkey's accession *because* it is Turkey. It should be borne in mind that some 58 per cent of French voters are simply opposed to any expansion to include new members in the Balkans, whether Romania, Bulgaria or Turkey. The issue in contention is one of enlargement pure and simple. As the Eurobarometer survey released in September 2005 suggested:

> support for enlargement in France (32% for, 58% against) is broadly less than the average in the 25 EU member states (50% for, 38% against, 12% undecided); only the German figures (33% for, 61% against) and those for Austria (31% for, 58% against) show a stronger opposition.[15]

It is possible therefore to conclude that any negative positioning by a French government on Turkish entry as distinct from other accession candidates is a result of personal prejudices from the political leaders espousing such views. It cannot come from any belief that the electorate will respond positively to such opposition. One qualification to this might be that strong opposition by French political leaders to Turkish entry is an easier way of tapping into what is mostly opposition to further enlargement or unease with immigration.

Contradictory elements in such surveys need to be taken into account. On the one hand, when asked if an improvement in human rights in Turkey in ten years should give it the right of EU entry, most French respondents were in favour (88 per cent). When prompted with a question whether 'les différences culturelles entre la Turquie et les Etats membres de l'UE sont trop importantes pour permettre cette adhésion', most respondents also agreed (62 per cent). Does

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[15] '*Le soutien de l'opinion française à l'élargissement [32% pour, 58% contre] est largement inférieur à la moyenne UE-25 (50% pour, 38% contre, 12 ne se prononcent pas). Parmi les Etats de l'Union européenne, seules les opinions allemande (33% pour, 61% contre) et autrichienne (31% pour, 58% contre) manifestent une opposition plus forte que celle constatée en France*', Eurobarometre 63.4, *L'Opinion Publique dans L'Union Europeenne*, France, Spring, 2005, September 2005, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/ eb63_nat_fr.pdf.

this mean that the biggest difference in values is seen as observance of human rights or as religious identification?

Britons Are Not Afraid of Turkey

A recent study on Turks in Britain, *Young Turks and Kurds*,[16] revealed some symmetries between the experience of young Turks in Britain and in countries such as Germany: principally socio-economic disadvantages and the problems associated with growing up in exclusively Turkish neighbourhoods. Yet – crucially – there does not seem to be the same fear of 'parallel societies' that exists in countries such as Germany. The report also found that in spite of the waves of migration to London and the UK, surprisingly little is still known at a public level about the experiences of London's Turkish speakers or those who have Turkish origins. Prior to the report, very little research had been conducted into the British contingent of the Turkish diaspora.

Turks in Britain can, in fact, be divided into three main groups: Turkish Cypriots, mainland Turks and Kurdish refugees, all of whom have had separate experiences when integrating and have different cultural histories. Recent estimates have suggested that there are 80,000 Turkish people living in Britain of whom 60,000 live in London. In addition, there are an estimated 120,000 Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish-speaking community has been described as one of the most self-sufficient such groups in London with half a dozen local community-based newspapers. Yet, given the respective cultural, social and historical backgrounds of those from Turkey, on the one hand, and Cyprus, on the other, it is wrong to think of British Turks en bloc.

The presence of Turkish Cypriots is an important twist in the British story, because they have not settled in such numbers in any other European country. Unlike other Turkish-speaking migrants, they have a colonial connection with Britain and first began to migrate to

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[16] Pinar Enneli, Tariq Modood and Harriet Bradley, *Young Turks and Kurds: A set of 'invisible' disadvantaged groups*, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, London, 2005, http://www.jrf.org.uk/bookshop/eBooks/185935274X.pdf.

Britain between 1945 and 1955, attracted by high levels of employment here in the post-war years.

Turkish migration from mainland Turkey to the UK did not start until the late 1960s and Kurds began to enter in larger numbers, often with refugee status, in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the economic circumstances were far less favourable. As a result, Turkish Cypriots are the most settled and prosperous of the various groups and nearly two-thirds of young Turkish Cypriots now in Britain were born here.

While the socio-economic difficulties facing Turkish-speaking youths in Britain are not dissimilar to those suffered by their counterparts living in countries such as Germany, the cultural gulf seems to be less pronounced. The report found that all families that were interviewed strongly disagreed with arranged marriages – one of the key reasons for the cultural alienation felt by Germans towards the Turkish community. Yet, the same report found that 68 per cent of young females and 75 per cent of males chose other identities rather than 'British'. Religious identity does not seem central: less than 5 per cent chose religion over their own identity.

While many Turkish-speaking youth do still face socio-economic disadvantages, the combination of continued economic growth, the heterogeneity of the Turkish-speaking community in Britain and the granting of citizenship (rather than their captivity in a limbo status) have all conspired to nurture a comparatively relaxed approach to integration among the Turkish community and the British people as a whole.

While the prospect of Turkey's EU membership has evoked fears in some member states, the British public has not yet expressed such anxiety. This may be partly due to a lack of awareness of the negotiations, of course. But one recent study has linked the patterns of anti-immigrant sentiment in part to past experience of immigration.[17]

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[17] See Christina Boswell, Meng-Hsuan Chou and Julie Smith, *Reconciling demand for labour migration with public concerns about immigration: Germany and the UK*,

As Sarah Schaefer has argued elsewhere, this is dramatically illustrated by the opposition in Germany to Turkey's entry – a reflection of fears that liberal labour migration policies can sow the seeds of serious socio-economic problems in subsequent years. By contrast, the British psyche does not, by and large, associate immigration with irreconcilable social tensions. The issue is controversial in this country, but not toxic.

This owes much to the fact that West Indian and Asian immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s had automatic access to citizenship, and thus the full spectrum of civil and political rights. From the start, politicians were dependent on the votes of these newcomers, and mainstream parties shied away from rhetoric that smacked of racism (witness the way in which the Conservative Party turned its back on Enoch Powell after his infamous 'rivers of blood' speech).

More recently, however, this truce seemed to have been breached when the Conservative Party fought the 2005 general election with a strong emphasis on its plans to limit the numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers. This in itself illustrated one of the main problems now affecting this issue in Britain: that is, the blurring of the categories of asylum seeker and economic migrant. Tony Blair's government has sought to address this confusion by arguing that we need migrants to ensure continued economic growth, while, at the same time, insisting on stricter control on asylum seekers.

In Germany, by contrast, most people have a welcoming attitude towards asylum seekers and refugees, but, threatened by gloomy employment figures, are firmly opposed to further economic migration.

According to the *Young Turks* study, Turks do not occupy a clear position in the 'white/non-white' divide on which current understanding of 'ethnic minorities' in the UK is based.[18] In the 1991

Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, August 2005, http://www.agf.org.uk/pubs/pdfs/1415web.pdf.
[18] p. ix.

census, Turks identified themselves as 'white' even though Turkey is widely perceived in Britain to be a Third World, non-white country.

Explaining Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: Theories

There are a number of possible interpretations of anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe today.

One popular interpretation links the concern to the personal religious choice of Turkish people. There is a belief in Europe that the values of Islam, as represented vicariously by the Turkish state and its people, are somehow incompatible with what is held by some to be a predominantly 'Christian' Europe. Such concerns about admitting a large, predominantly Muslim state have been fanned by the global mobilisation of fundamentalist or extremist Muslim views, and their 'guilt by association' with terrorism. Fears about the possibly negative effects of Turkish accession to the EU are also fanned by the growing concerns among ordinary people in Europe about the place of Muslim immigrant communities already inside the EU. How well integrated are they? Do they represent some sort of fundamental and irreconcilable clash of values with European society?

Another interpretation might put it down to a narrower question of image and identity. There is not a high degree of affection in Europe for Turks. As one commentator observed, they have an 'image deficit' as well as an 'affection deficit'. [19]

But according to the Anglo-German study, the available data ('albeit fairly limited') does not lend itself to the view that anti-immigrant sentiment is based on rational concerns, such as fear about jobs.[20] The study suggests that the sentiment is more likely explained by

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[19] See remarks by Andre Fontaine, cited in 'L'Image des Turcs en Occident', based on Stéphane Yérasimos, 'Quel bonheur de se nommer Turc!', in *Les Turcs*, éditions Autrement, September 1994, hors série N° 76, http://www.tetedeturc.com/Prejuges/ Prejuges.htm#la_per_cent20Première_per_cent20Guerre_per_cent20Mondiale_per cent20à per cent20aujourd'hui.
[20] Boswell, Chou and Smith, 'Reconciling demand for labour migration with public concerns about immigration'*,* p. 28.

'factors which have little to do with immigration as such'. The study concluded that the feeling against immigrants is 'linked to other sorts of social, political or economic change'. This implies that these other concerns are 'being displaced, or projected, onto the issue of migration'. The study suggested that 'immigration appears to offer a particularly well-suited set of issues for articulating diverse problems linked to unemployment, social security, criminality and shared norms'.[21]

The study identified three sets of theories. The first links 'anxieties about immigration to the decline in the capacity of liberal democratic welfare states to guarantee socioeconomic security for their citizens'. The anxiety attributes 'responsibility for the scarcity of resources to outsiders who are abusing the system'.[22] The second set links such anxieties to 'uncertainty about the state's role as provider of internal security and national defence' in the face of a changing international environment.[23] The third set looks to 'changing patterns of collective identification', arguing that 'traditional categories of identification and bonds of solidarity such as class, church, ideology or nation-state have declined since the 1950s' and been replaced by 'new categories of collective identity or bonds of solidarity' in collective anxiety.

If these causes are accepted, it is both possible and necessary to dig deeper into how these attitudes are formed. Why are Turks or Turkey 'defined and targeted as objects of resentment or hostility'?[24] There are three main causes:

- ❑ patterns of political mobilisation, mainly influenced by party politics and the media;
- ❑ these patterns of mobilisation are in turn shaped by prevalent norms about the appropriate treatment of immigration, migrants and ethnic minority groups, or 'ideologies of migration';

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[21] Ibid. p. 34.
[22] Ibid. p. 35.
[23] Ibid. p. 36.
[24] Ibid. p. 35. The study posed this question in general terms, without specific mention of any country.

❑   attitudes towards migration are influenced by shared beliefs about previous policy failures (or successes) in the area of immigration.[25]

Most readers will be familiar with the efforts within various countries of Europe at political mobilisation around negative images of immigrants or ethnic minorities. Several examples have been mentioned above. Most people, voters included, can see through them, as evidenced by the low numbers of voters in many countries expressing concern about immigration as a serious national problem.

Yet changes to the legislative frameworks of EU countries governing immigration seem overly sensitive to ephemeral media images of what is working and not working in immigration policy and the associated policies of 'integration' of immigrant communities. This has been particularly evident in reactions to terrorist incidents in the Netherlands and the UK which have linked the attacks to lack of integration of immigrants.

Thus the three factors mentioned above may not necessarily be sequential or distinguishable. The following two sections address them, first looking very briefly at the political messaging around Turkey's 'Europeanness', and then by looking at the lack of an EU-wide 'ideology' of migration.

Political Messaging about Turkey's 'European-ness'

There is almost certainly a strong link between the opposition to Turkey's accession on the one hand and, on the other, weak knowledge of the country, including its expatriate population in Europe and its historic participation in 'European' institutions. A study funded by the Dutch government concluded that the process of Turkey's accession 'should be based on an informed overall judgement by the European populations, and one that includes knowledge of Turkish Islam and Turkish Muslims'. The study advocated a 'well-informed European public debate on Turkish

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[25] Ibid. p. 37.

accession'.[26] The present authors agree. Responsible politicians should correct key knowledge gaps.

Turkey's participation in the institutions of Europe has been a huge success by a number of measures. As a panel of eminent European statesmen have noted, the Council of Europe, the 'guardian of European values and principles', admitted Turkey as a full member in 1949 only a few months after the Council was set up by the Treaty of London.[27] It judged that Turkey satisfied its two conditions for membership: to be a European country and to respect human rights, pluralistic democracy and the rule of law. (It needs to be noted that on human rights, Turkey's record for many decades (like that of Greece, Spain and Portugal for part of the time) was very bad. In 1952, Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and became a cornerstone of the Euro-Atlantic defence system. It also acceded to the Organisation of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, later OECD) and it was a party to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Turkey is party to no fewer than 17 European human rights instruments and is subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.

In security terms, Turkey has been a key member of the European defence community since 1945. It was on the front line in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, at a time when there was little threat of a Soviet-led invasion across the inner German border. In that crisis, US nuclear missile bases in Turkey would have been attacked had war broken out. As part of the settlement between the USA and the USSR, John Kennedy agreed to withdraw the nuclear missiles from Turkey.

In 1990 and 1991, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Turkey played a central role in the coalition that liberated Kuwait and it later provided support for the return of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees

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[26] Scientific Council for Government Policy, Presentation of the report, *The European Union, Turkey and Islam*, Amsterdam: AUP, 2004, p. 2, http://greens-efa.org/pdf/documents/Istanbul/Asbeek_EN.pdf.
[27] Independent Commission on Turkey, *Turkey in Europe: More than a Promise?,* September 2004, http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/english.pdf.

to Iraq. In 2002, Turkey provided bases, over-flight rights and ground forces for the war in Afghanistan to displace Al Qaeda and overthrow the Taliban. Turkey took a turn leading the ISAF in Kabul. Turkish troops have also served in peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Kosovo.

There are also negative sides to this history. Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974, went out of NATO at the time, and continues to recognise the 'Turkish Cypriot state', while refusing to recognise the state of Cyprus. (Turkey has however expressed support for a UN plan to end the division to Cyprus.)[28] Turkey has regularly been the subject of negative findings by the European Court of Human Rights. But this record, when compared with that of Russia, Poland or East Germany under Communist rule between 1948 and 1989, is not so bad as to place it beyond or outside of Europe. Poland and East Germany are now worthy observers of 'European values'.

Looking at Turkey's place in Europe on a more personal level, few outside the specialist community would know that there are already some five million ethnic Turks living in European countries outside Turkey. (These figures include Bulgaria and Romania, but most are in Germany.) Figure 1 shows the numbers for current EU countries (3.8 million). For comparison's sake, the number of Turks in Europe is seven-fold the population of Luxembourg and about the same as the total population of Ireland.[29] Some 1.3 million Turkish immigrants in the EU have become citizens of their country of residence.

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[28] Turkish Foreign Ministry web-site, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/ MainIssues/Cyprus/Cyprus_Issue.htm/.
[29] Özgür Sağmal, 'The changing face of Turks in Europe', Interview with Faruk Şen, *Turkish Time*, 15 August 2004, http://www.turkishtime.org/30/4_2_en.asp.

Table 1: Turks in EU Countries[30]
(thousands)

	Total	Turkish nationality	Naturalised
Germany	2,642	1,912	730
France	370	196	174
Netherlands	270	96	174
Austria	200	120	80
Belgium	110	67	43
UK	70	37	33
Denmark	53	39	14
Sweden	37	14	23

The post-war migration of Turks to Europe began with 'guest workers' who arrived under the terms of a Labour Export Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1961, followed by a similar agreement with the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria in 1964; France in 1965 and Sweden in 1967. As one Turkish observer noted, 'it has now been over 40 years and a Turk who went to Europe at the age of 25 has nearly reached the age of 70. His children have reached the age of 45 and their children have reached the age of 20'.[31]

These people have made an important contribution to the economic prosperity of Europe.[32] One study reports that '1.2 million Turks, who comprise 0.75 per cent of the total working population in EU Countries, have contributed 107.8 billion DM or 55.1 billion Euros to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the EU from 1998 onwards'.[33] For comparison's sake, this amounts to twice the annual GNP of Luxembourg and 51 per cent of Greece's GDP.[34]

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[30] Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey*, Europe: More than a promise?,* 2004.

[31] Cüneyt Zapsu, 'Turks in Europe', Libertarian International, 11 December 2004, http://www.libertarian.to/NewsDta/templates/news1.php?art=art804.

[32] Özgür Sağmal, 'The changing face of Turks in Europe', Interview with Faruk Şen, *Turkish Time*, 15 August 2004, http://www.turkishtime.org/30/4_2_en.asp.

[33] 1998 prices.

[34] According to the same study, '72.9 per cent of the contribution to the GDP amounting to 107.8 billion DM made by the Turks living in mainly eight EU countries in 1998 was realized by Turks living in Germany. The contribution to the Gross

One little remarked feature of the Turkish diaspora in Europe is its contribution to business development through the estimated 73,200 ethnic Turk entrepreneurs in Europe. The percentage of entrepreneurs in the EU's Turkish population has been estimated at 6.2 per cent in 1999 (4.8 per cent in 1995). According to the Turkish Research Centre, in 1999 the total annual turn-over achieved by Turkish entrepreneurs was 61.2 billion DM for a total investment of 15.4 billion DM. The total number of employees in Turkish companies in the same year was 366,000.

Of some special note, there has been a remarkable increase in the amount of Turkish capital staying in Europe, rather than being remitted to Turkey. In 1998, the remittance to Turkey reached US$5.3 billion, but this figure dropped to US$800 million in 2004 and fell further to $300 million in the first 6 months of 2005.[35] This suggests some gradual severing of personal ties between Turks in Europe and Turkey, but reflects even more the growth of the Turkish economy.

The movement of EU citizens to Turkey tells another interesting story about the relationship. More than half of all EU travellers to Turkey come from Germany.[36] Nationals of a number of European countries can enter Turkey without a passport, requiring only an ID card. (The countries are Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland.)

Europe's Missing 'Ideology' of Migration

Since 1999, EU leaders have recognised the need for a common immigration policy, but it has been slow to materialise. This reflects the absence of an EU-wide consensus on what migration represents. As one study in 2003 noted: 'at the same time as the EU was premised on the free movement of people within the borders,

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National Product (GNP) made by the Turks living in Germany amounted to 78.6 billion DM in 1998'.

[35] Ismail Altunsoy, 'Money Remittances from Overseas Turks Decrease', 24 July 2005, Zamam Online, http://www.zaman.com/?bl=economy&alt=&hn=22121.

[36] Sağmal, 'The changing face of Turks in Europe'.

there is no common policy on migration'.[37] It might not seem so startling that national governments have reserved to themselves powers of decision in an area affecting social stability and national identity. At the same time, however, as the study noted, a community policy has begun to develop in areas of asylum policy and anti-discrimination.[38] But as the theoretical approach described above suggests, it is through the 'ideology' of migration that host communities learn to react to the immigrants at an individual level. It is this absence of a pan-European ideology of migration that in large part explains why attitudes in Germany and the UK to immigrants and asylum seekers, and Turks in particular, can be so dichotomous.

Europe has not shown any strong interest in promoting the virtues of migration in broad social and economic terms, in strong contrast to countries like the USA, Canada and Australia which have depended heavily on migration for population growth and which, as a consequence, have strong national ethos that 'immigrant states' are a good and natural thing.

The other side of the coin is that political leaders in Europe have ignored the negative impact on national identity of a range of related, but quite diverse, forces (such as the migration effects of the political union created in 1992 or the global resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism). As the study referred to at the start of this section

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[37] Andrew Geddes, *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*, Sage, London, 2003, p.198.
[38] According to the European Commission: 'The European Commission has made proposals for developing this policy, adopting a two-track approach: establishing a common legal framework concerning the conditions of admission and stay of third-country nationals on the one hand, and an open coordination procedure to encourage the gradual convergence of policies not covered by European legislation on the other. The objective is to manage migration flows better by a coordinated approach which takes into account the economic and demographic situation of the EU. In spite of the restrictive immigration policies which have been in place since the 1970s in most Member States, large numbers of *migrants* have continued to come to the EU looking for work together with asylum-seekers and *illegal immigrants*. ... Furthermore, the EU needs migrants in certain sectors and regions as one element of the policies being developed to deal with its economic and demographic needs.' See http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/immigration/fsj_immigration_intro_en.htm.

found, 'member states have not given themselves the tools to do the job'. The study also found that the development of an EU migration policy was affected by the lack of public consultation on it.[39] This slow pace of response to the need for an ideology of migration can be shown in the failure of 12 of the 15 EU member-states to meet the 2003 deadline to comply with a Racial Equality Directive issued in 2000 designed to protect immigrants and ethnic minorities from discrimination.[40] The Directive was based on a decision of the European Council.

It is now time to change this lack of attention to a European 'ideology' of migration: is it good or bad, and what should the main governing principles around issues of integration be. The idea that France or cities in the Netherlands can view the wearing of certain clothes (head scarves and chadoors) as a threat to public order, a decision backed up (strangely) by the European Court of Human Rights, while the majority of EU countries do not, sits rather oddly in a continent that prides itself on the values of personal liberty.[41] It also sits very uncomfortably in a continent that only six decades ago witnessed the systematic extermination of six million people because of visible (and imagined) 'differences'.

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[39] Ibid. p. 199.
[40] The Racial Equality Directive 2000/43/EC, adopted in 2000, prohibits discrimination against people on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. The rules cover a wide range of areas where unfair treatment might occur, including access to jobs, working conditions, rates of pay and the rights and benefits linked to a job. In addition, they also include access to education and training, social security benefits and health care and access to and supply of goods and services which are available to the public, including housing. In all countries, governments also have to designate a body to provide practical and independent support and guidance to victims of racial discrimination. This means creating a body to perform this role if one does not already exist. See http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/1047& format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
[41] According to the Pew Survey published in July 2005: 'Majorities in the U.S., Canada and Great Britain, as well as pluralities in Spain, Russia and Poland, view such prohibitions as a bad idea. However, in France, where a ban on wearing head scarves and other "conspicuous" religious symbols in secular schools went into effect last year, a large majority (78%) favors such prohibitions. They are joined in this view by smaller majorities in Germany (54%), the Netherlands (51%) and by nearly two-thirds of the Indian public (66%).' See http://pewglobal.org/reports/ display.php?ReportID=248.

There is rising political tension between those in Europe who see integration as a one-sided operation, with new comers being obliged only 'to fit in' (to assimilate themselves), and those who see it as a more open process which not only allows for changes in the 'host' population but which is also manageable. In respect of the Turks, this has been eloquently framed: 'Western Europeans wanted a workforce, but in came humans. They have been regarded as an economic additive rather than human beings for many long years by both European and Turkish governments.'[42] He went on to say that: 'the unknown is feared, and the feared is regarded as an enemy. Europe must know Turkey and Turks well in order to prevent this situation'.

It seems inevitable that voter concern and anxiety about immigration will increase, and that there will be even larger divergences between national practices and degrees of comfort, unless the EU leaders can establish a common and principled view of what migration and immigration represent to the Union as a whole.

Rising Tide of Xenophobia and Religious Mistrust

There can be little doubt that the first five years of this decade have seen an increase in xenophobia and religious mistrust in Europe. For example, in January 2005, the U.S. State Department singled out Europe as the site of increasing anti-Semitism in the first four years of this century.[43] In a poll by the Anti-Defamation League in 2004, the UK was identified as the only one of ten countries surveyed to have shown a significant increase in anti-Semitic attitudes rather than a decrease between 2002 and 2004.[44] These changes can be linked in part to the international policies of Israel, but they are no less notable for that.

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[42] Zapsu, 'Turks in Europe'.
[43] State Department, 'Report on Global Anti-Semitism prepared for the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees', 5 January 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/Jan/05-93928.html?chanlid=eur.
[44] Anti-Defamation League, 'Attitudes towards Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Ten European Countries', April 2004. This assessment was based on the number of respondents who answered positively to at least two of four statements that painted Jews in a negative light.

These negative views in public opinion toward Jews have been traced in part to the way in which government, media and community leaders project their views about Israel into the public domain. This was one of the main conclusions arising from the reactions in 2003 and 2004 to a European poll in 2003 in which 59 per cent of respondents identified Israel among 15 named countries as a threat to world peace, compared with 53 per cent identifying Iran, North Korea and the USA in the same list as a similar threat.[45]

There has also been a rise in mistrust of Muslim immigrants. The Pew survey of 2005 on attitudes to Islam found: 'those who consider immigration (from the Middle East and North Africa or from Eastern Europe) to be a bad thing are more likely to oppose Turkey's membership into the European Union'. The survey found that this link is 'particularly strong in the Netherlands, France and Germany'. It also found that that 'those who are more concerned about Islamic extremism in their homeland are more likely to oppose having Turkey join the EU, especially in Germany, France, and the Netherlands'.[46] In these countries, there were high levels of doubt that Muslim immigrants would try to adapt to their new social settings.[47] More importantly, according to the Pew survey, 'substantial majorities across Western Europe' felt that the Muslim residents' sense of religious identity was growing and that this was a 'bad thing for the country'.[48]

In the Pew survey, the concerns expressed over this growing sense of Islamic identity were varied. In France, Spain and Poland, the bigger fear was that it could lead to violence. In the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, the fear was that a heightened sense of Islamic identity 'would impede Muslim integration into the larger society'.

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[45] http://www.adl.org/PresRele/ASInt_13/4390_13.htm.
[46] http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=812.
[47] In Germany 88 per cent and France 59 per cent were of this opinion. For comparison, only 49 per cent of Americans shared the same view.
[48] More than 75 per cent of respondents in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain gave this opinion. For comparisons, the response on this point in Great Britain and Eastern Europe was lower, and in the USA and Canada around 50 per cent.

The Secular Europe Delusion

Against this background perception of the threat posed by a growing sense of religious identity among Muslim residents of Europe, doubts have been expressed over whether Turkey can remain a secular state. The view is that if it cannot remain 'secular', it should not join the secular EU. The view of Europe as secular and Turkey as non-secular (now or in the future) can even be heard coming from some who support Turkish accession to the EU.[49]

The proposition that Europe is, or should be secular, is open to serious questioning. This was the very firm view taken in a study commissioned by the Dutch government:

> many current member states do not always observe strict neutrality towards religion and religious denominations either. Some have a formal state church, others have created *de facto* privileged positions for some denominations, for instance by granting one denomination the monopoly on religious education in state schools. Such diverse national arrangements often reflect divergent, historically rooted relations between religion, state and society. There is thus no unambiguous or fixed European standard against which Turkey can be judged.[50]

Most importantly, the report expressed the hope that Europe's leaders 'will not shy away from making this case before their national publics'.[51]

Religion can and should remain an important part of personal, community and national life. The principles that apply include freedom of religion, freedom of worship, freedom of conscience, non-discrimination on the basis of religious belief, and (arguably) freedom from unsolicited religious proselytising. There will always be

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[49] See for example, Anatole Kaletsky, 'Let Turkey join the EU', *Times Online*, 7 October 2004, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,1061-1297612,00.html: 'would not the successful assimilation of Turkish Muslims into European secular civilisation pose the ultimate challenge to the fundamentalist fantasy of a new Caliphate to rule over a reunited Muslim world?'
[50] *The European Union, Turkey and Islam*, p. 4.
[51] Ibid. pp. 5-6.

disputes about how best to interpret these principles in particular cases, but in discussion of Turkey's accession to the EU, these must be the issues of religion that are discussed, not broad and untrue generalisations about Europe being secular.

The Mono-Cultural Delusion

Underpinning much of the anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe (and indirectly the negative attitude to Turkey's accession) is the belief in a unique and unchanging national culture, one that needs to be protected from the diluting and transformative effectives of migration. A British study on the political approaches to Turkey in Germany concluded that 'an underlying thread in these discourses is the rather problematic assumption of coexisting pure and homogenous cultural identities'.[52]

This is one of the most profound and important observations about European politics today. There is a new battle for the 'political sociology of the nation state in an integrating Europe' and it is being shaped by many factors apart from migration, domestic debates about Islam, or accession to the EU of new members. Confusion about the parameters of this battle, and the positions to stake out, is evident throughout Europe. So far, the dominant tendency has been to revert to classic 'conservative' positions of opposing change. Many leaders have evoked ideas and turns of phrase that suit more comfortably with more jingoistic regimes of the past.

The national identity in member states of the EU as it existed in 1992 is 'under threat', if by that we mean it will change. That is one of the inevitable consequences, and for many one of the main aims, of the political and economic integration started by the Maastricht Treaty that set up a new political and economic Union. But somebody had better tell the people instead of maintaining the dangerous political fiction that we can all be Europeans and that nothing of our national 'cultures' or national 'identities' will be lost.

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[52] Deniz Göktürk (School of Modern Languages, University of Southampton), 'Turkish delight – German fright: Migrant identities in transnational cinema', Working Paper, Transnational Communities Project, 99-01, 1999, http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/mediated. pdf.

The attempt of the UK government to promote 'Britishness' as one bastion against these surging tides of change represents one possible approach to this problem. The UK government took the view that it is important for a country like Britain to be able to identify broad unifying elements of a national story that have some potential to bind people and communities together in a common purpose. Instead of concentrating on a more narrowly 'cultural' idea, the essence of Britishness was seen to be adherence to shared political and social values of a pluralist society. Yet even that approach has attracted some ridicule. In a society that is composed of hugely diverse cultures, and which is therefore by its very nature multi-cultural, any effort by government to identify a unifying theme built around a mono-cultural theme or image is likely to be both useless and counter-productive unless it specifically and graphically incorporates the multi-cultural aspect.

Rejection of the term 'multiculturalism' as a political philosophy privileging legal and social norms of immigrant or minority 'cultures' over those of a common legal system is understandable. But this is just journalistic shorthand. We need to be careful that in insisting on a cohesive community built around one set of legal practices and principles, we are not in effect rejecting multiculturalism as representing one of the essential features of the state in modern Europe. It is simply nonsense to imagine that the UK can return to some sort of mono-cultural community, and it is potentially destructive to hold that up as a yardstick either for assessing a country's suitability for membership of the EU or for assessing the virtue or otherwise of policies affecting immigrants.

Why Does it Matter?

A repudiation of Turkey's accession on 'cultural' grounds, if by that is meant religious adherence, may well be taken by Europe's Muslim citizens as a repudiation of them. A repudiation of Turkey's accession on 'cultural' grounds is but one element of a wider trend in Europe toward the politics of division and 'race hatred' and it must be addressed as that. The disarray among Europe's political elite on how to handle issues of enlargement of the Union, in the face of

popular discontent in key countries (France, Germany, Netherlands) with the projected accession of Turkey, will threaten the future of the EU (political unions, like marriages, do break up, and often in the strangest and least expected ways).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The treaty establishing the European Union signed in 1992 at Maastricht had as one its aims the 'introduction of a citizenship of the Union'. Another aim was to 'respect the national identities of its Member States'. Little progress has been made on the former, and political leaders throughout Europe are now in a quandary over the latter. With the decisions of the European Council in 1999 at Tampere, the matter became even more complicated, as members agreed to extend more rights and protections to third-country nationals (non-citizen immigrants) residing within the EU. There is a new political contest about the relationship between the Union and its 'national' components, and how they all should deal with 'outsiders'. This has been provoked in large part by the enlargement of 2004, by prospective enlargements (including Turkey), and growing anxiety about immigration and integration.

The process of European integration since the Treaty of Rome in 1957 has been one of putting aside differences in culture and history in the interests of creating a new 'common European home' and a sense of shared community. The process of European integration after 1992 may have been intended to 'submerge' national difference in a united Europe, but it has most definitively never been about obliterating national difference. Most importantly, the Union arrangements were never meant to use national difference as a basis of exclusion. This acceptance of difference has been visible at three levels: between states (as with France and Germany in the original Coal and Steel Community), among diverse national communities within states (Flemish and Walloons), and between immigrant groups and the communities into which they have moved. Social inclusion has been a byword of modern politics because it is an established fact that social exclusion, like the politics of difference, is a destructive force that gradually undermines society.

The contribution of France to the integration of Europe has been immense. But, quite unwittingly, several French leaders have in recent times created a new threat to the future of the European Union. The threat they have created need not prove to be a fatal one but it is life-threatening and, if not treated, will spread like a cancer, with unpredictable consequences. This may sound melodramatic, but the 'politics of difference' that underpinned the moves by the two French leaders on Turkey's accession to the EU can often take subtle forms, that can too readily be exploited by the politicians of hate to sow serious division and ultimately fan inter-communal violence.

Thus, the issue of Turkey's accession to the EU is part of a bigger set of political issues. These issues need to be addressed within the EU if it is to negotiate credibly and responsibly with Turkey on accession.

Turkish people already in the EU will have a big role to play in this process because they represent one face of the domestic issues the EU must now confront in the area of national identity, inter-communal relations and multicultural state formation. The transformative effects of Turkish immigration into the EU are not just a metaphor for the transformations within Turkey that have qualified it for EU accession or the transformative effect on Turkey of eventual entry. The effects of Turkish immigration into the EU are a part of the Union's future. There is no going back to an imagined mono-cultural past that tries to submerge immigrant communities into some imagined 'pure and homogenous cultural identity'.

The Turkish diaspora in Europe forms a permanent and largely integrated part of the EU. This does co-exist with a desire to maintain traditional links and customs with other Turks in the EU as well as in Turkey. Turks in Europe could serve as a uniting factor between Turkey and the EU.

Recommendations:

EU leaders should devote considerably more attention, and urgently so, to the question of demographic change in the face of global

labour market realities and declining European birth-rates. The push for a common EU policy on migration launched in Tampere in 1999 has to be speeded up.

There is a need to 'normalise cultural diversity' within an EU 'ideology' of migration, regardless of whether that movement of people is from one EU member to another, or from outside the EU. The need is even greater for normalising the diversity represented by the coexistence within the EU, already long established, of different religions (Judaism, Islam, Sikhism, Hinduism). Policies of any government which single out a single religion such as Islam are potentially as damaging as those that once singled out Judaism and the Jews.

There is a need to promote the benefits of migration. EU governments need to be much more open about their migration policies, document the success stories and have much wider public consultation. Some discussion in countries like the UK of the contribution of migrating Britons to other countries of Europe and the world might be one place to start. But in Europe one rarely hears of the individual success stories of outward European migration.

The Turkish diaspora could be better mobilised by Ankara to promote ties and dispel the myth of cultural incompatibility. A report published by the 'Turkey Research Center' in the Netherlands argued that Turks in Europe and the NGOs they are involved with have the potential and experience to contribute to Turkish-EU relations but they are not able to use their capability sufficiently. To this end, Turkey should promote the reforms it has undertaken and in turn Turks in Europe will be able to promote the image of Turks abroad.

EU governments should be promoting a concept of citizenship that does not promote a mono-cultural delusion ('Britishness') or privilege a particular cultural or religious identity and engage the population in a way that recognises Turks as part of the European community of people.

Appendix 1: History of EU-Turkish Accession

On 3 October 2005, EU membership negotiations are scheduled to open with Turkey, which has been an associate member of the EU since 1963 and an official candidate since 1999. When the European Council decided on 17 December 2004 to open accession negotiations with Turkey this was confirmed by the European heads of state on 17 June 2005.

- **February 1952**: Turkey becomes a full member of NATO.
- **September 1959**: Ankara applies for associate membership of the European Economic Community
- **September 1963**: The Ankara Agreement (an association agreement) is signed to take Turkey to Customs Union and finally to full EEC membership. The first financial protocol is also signed.
- **November 1970**: The Additional Protocol and the second financial protocol signed in Brussels.
- **January 1973**: The Additional Protocol enters into force. It sets out comprehensively how the Customs Union would be established
- **July 1974**: Turkey invades Cyprus.
- During the **first half of the 1980s,** relations between Turkey and the Community come to a virtual freeze following the military coup d'état on 12 September 1980.
- **September 1986**: The Turkey-EEC Association Council meeting revives the association process.
- **14 April 1987**: Turkey applies for full EEC membership.
- **December 1989**: The Commission endorses Turkey's eligibility for membership but defers the assessment of its application.

- **March 1995**: Turkey-EU Association Council finalises the agreement on the Customs Union, which enters into force on 1 January 1996.

- **December 1997**: At the Luxembourg Summit, EU leaders decline to grant candidate status to Turkey.

- **December 1999**: EU Helsinki Council decides on the candidate status of Turkey.

- **March 2001**: The EU Council of Ministers adopts EU-Turkey Accession Partnership.

- **March 2001**: The Turkish government adopts the National Programme of Turkey for the adoption of EU laws.

- **September 2001**: Turkish parliament adopts over 30 amendments to the constitution in order to meet the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership.

- **August 2002**: The Turkish Parliament passes sweeping reforms to meet the EU's human rights criteria.

- **13 December 2002**: The Copenhagen European Council resolves that if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU would open accession negotiations with Turkey. In the meantime, EU leaders have agreed to extend and deepen co-operation on the EC-Turkey Customs Union and to provide Turkey with increased pre-accession financial assistance.

- **May 2003**: The EU Council of Ministers decides on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions of the Accession Partnership with Turkey .

- **January 2004**: Turkey signs a protocol banning death penalty in all circumstances, a move welcomed by the EU.

- **March 2004**: Council of Europe recommends ending monitoring of Turkey.

- **October 2004**: Commission issues progress report on Turkey.

- **17 December 2004**: European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 - with strings attached.

- **23 May 2005:** Turkey names Economy Minister Ali Babacan as the country's chief accession negotiator.

- **1 June 2005:** Turkey's revised penal code, first adopted in September 2004, enters into force.

- **17 June 2005:** The Council reiterates the EU's determination to proceed with the enlargement process.

- **29 June 2005:** The Commission presents its 'rigorous' negotiating framework to Ankara.

- **3 October 2005**: Accession talks are scheduled to be opened with Turkey.

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