The Foreign Policy Centre is an independent think-tank committed to developing innovative thinking and effective solutions for our increasingly interdependent world.

Foreign policy has never been more important in our lives. It governs everything from the jobs we do to the food we eat. We can no longer afford to see it as the work of diplomats alone. The Foreign Policy Centre will bring together all of the major actors in foreign policy – companies, charities, pressure groups and all government departments from the Home Office to the DTI. We will broaden perceptions of what foreign policy is, encourage public debate about our foreign policy goals and find new ways to get people involved.

The Foreign Policy Centre publishes books and reports, organises high-profile conferences, public lectures and seminars and runs major in-house research programmes on cross-cutting international issues.

For further information and subscription details, please contact:

About the Author

Mark Leonard is Director of The Foreign Policy Centre. He is the author of internationally acclaimed reports on European legitimacy and identity and invented the concept of "rebranding Britain". He writes and broadcasts extensively on British, European and International politics for publications including The Guardian, Financial Times, the New Statesman and The Express, and is a presenter of BBC's Analysis programme. Mark previously worked as Senior Researcher at the think-tank Demos and as a journalist at The Economist. Mark is a member of the Executive Council of Britain in Europe.

Also by Mark Leonard
Politics Without Frontiers: The role of political parties
in Europe's future
BritainTM: Renewing our identity
Making Europe Popular: The search for European identity
Rediscovering Europe
Modernising the monarchy

Network Europe:
The new case for Europe

Mark Leonard

Acknowledgements

Introduction:
The new case for Europe

As the European debate reaches fever pitch, it makes less and less sense. Pro-Europeans don't seem to know what their case is any more. They can no longer rely on the success of the European project in the post-war period. Their old case – based around the trinity of peace, prosperity and democracy – was clear and attractive, but it has little relevance for people today. Now they are stronger on what they are against – isolation, narrow nationalism, being left behind – than what they are for.
Their failure has allowed the sceptics to make the running. The Santer Commission crisis, the low turn-out in the European Elections, and the EU's inability to do anything about Kosovo without US support are held up as the latest symptoms of its lack of capacity and legitimacy. And now, they say, we are being asked to open up the citadels of state sovereignty – our currency, our defence policy, our borders – without much say over what is done.
We can all agree that the status quo is far from perfect – but the alternatives seem even less appealing. People are being asked to make an impossible choice. The sceptics want to repatriate power to the national level and dismantle the EU to create a free trade area. They claim that this is the only way to regain the democratic rights that our ancestors risked their lives for. But loosening our ties with the rest of Europe flies in the face of global change. Our national

governments can't deliver the basic things we need on their own any more. Our physical security, a clean environment and economic prosperity can only be guaranteed through inter-dependence, co-operation and pooling sovereignty. The loose instrumental relationships between members of a free trade area will never be able to give us the strong bonds of trust and binding rules that we need to maintain a single market – let alone protect the environment or co-operate on foreign policy.

Pro-Europeans claim that a European constitution, giving more power to the European Parliament or electing the Commission President, will help put the EU back in touch with its citizens and address its lack of capacity. Though most do not support the idea of a federal state, their proposals seem to lead us inexorably closer to that destination. This would not just be unpopular, it would be very damaging to our economic and political prospects. In the global information age, we need national governments that are decentralised, closer to the people and in competition with each other, not the lumbering leviathan of a country called Europe.

People don't want to be forced to choose between a federal superstate and a free trade area – neither will allow us to thrive in the next millennium. We want to be able to combine the military and environmental protection, the large markets, and the global power which European integration can deliver, with the flexibility, strong national identities and democracy that we enjoy at a national level. It is time to show that we can really have the best of both worlds.

This pamphlet aims to present the new case for Europe. It will show that we can combine democratic legitimacy, national identity and effective European action to tackle cross-border problems – but only if we learn to think about the EU in a different way.

Properly understood, the EU is neither a failed free trade area, nor a state in construction. It is an entirely novel form of political organisation: a network. This is a decentralised political system organised around many centres of power including member states, European institutions and Non Governmental Organisations. They share power and sovereignty as equals, rather than having their roles defined by a hierarchical constitutional settlement.

This pamphlet will use the lessons from successful networks in business to develop a new political theory, and show how "Network Europe" can allow us to co-operate where it is necessary on cross-border problems – while promoting the healthy competition between countries that has driven so much of the continent's innovation.1 But a network of states cannot just be about effectiveness – it needs to be based on shared values, and political legitimacy as well.

At the heart of the theory of "Network Europe" is a new model of democracy and legitimacy. It depends on us creating the first political system that is not tied to a single state, which allows us to have political debates across frontiers – without destroying our national democracies. I challenge the idea that giving more power to the European Parliament, or electing the Commission President can provide the legitimacy we need. Instead, I look at reforms involving direct democracy and changes to the European Council and political parties that will allow us to have a debate about the kind of Europe we want to live in, so that our continent can be run in the interests of its citizens rather than interest groups and lobbies.2

This revolutionary theory of European integration will guide us through the reform debate and show that European integration does not need to involve impossible sacrifices. By starting with the challenges of the next century – rather than the successes of the last – it will allow us to build a broad coalition for Europe.

1. Europe confused:
Living with the ghost of federalism

A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of federalism undelivered. The ghosts of Monnet and his dreams of a European state don't just provide easy knocking-copy for Eurosceptic election addresses – they are preventing pro-Europeans from understanding the EU we have and building the Europe we need.

Everywhere in the European lexicon we see the elusive dream of a country called Europe. The Euro-elites' sparkling new buildings are draped in blue and gold flags, and Beethoven's 9th symphony is the lift-muzak of choice. They draft communiqués about political union, economic government, and a common foreign and security policy. They have made us citizens of Europe, represented by a European Parliament, carrying European passports and awaiting the jangle of euros in our pockets.

But the shallow trappings of statehood are just that. Political union in the Maastricht Treaty is just Euro-speak for regular meetings of EU foreign ministers. In reality, the Common Foreign and Security Policy remains aspirational – Europe often issues joint declarations, but would never have been able to do anything about Kosovo without American help. All "economic government" really means, despite the Euro, is co-ordinating a small range of policies.3 European citizenship seems simply to repackage the rights we already have, bringing little new beyond the right to vote in local and European elections for the 2 per cent who settle in another EU country – when so many of us don't even want to vote in our own. And the European Parliament is not a real parliament (it cannot elect a government or initiate legislation), nor is the way we elect it European – the elections tend simply to be low profile referendums on the performance of each national government.4

This gulf between the sparkling symbols of statehood and the more mundane reality of co-operation between states is not just a problem of semantics. By presenting the EU as a state in construction, governments are fuelling fears of homogeneity. The EU is seen as a political project imposed on an unwilling public, rather than an organic response to our problems. This also creates a crisis of expectations, because the EU cannot deliver the things that its trappings seem to promise. Above all, it points to a crippling muddle in the thinking and policies that are being pursued within the EU.

Until we can understand the nature of the EU, we will not be able to deal with the two defining challenges facing it today: developing the capacity to deal with cross-border problems such as defence and organised crime. And delivering the public legitimacy the EU needs to be effective – without this it will not be allowed to develop the capacities it needs.

People are right to worry about legitimacy. They know that the structures of the European Union do not just secure a single market and common standards – they are political instruments for solving shared problems. Whilst large majorities consistently support EU action on the environment, defence, and international

crime, the EU spends most of its time and resources doing the things that most people don't see as priorities. Half of the EU budget still supports farmers through the CAP.5 This continent-sized gap between what people expect from the EU and the policies they get is leaching away at public support for the EU as well as stopping it from working effectively.

People feel disconnected from the decisions that are made in their name – that is if they know about them at all. A healthy political system depends upon debate and competition between alternative visions of the future – the EU simply doesn't deliver this. The EU's power and significance have grown steadily – and so legislation, business and social movements have become increasingly transnational. But European politics and political parties have remained overwhelmingly national in their thinking and organisation. While political parties have not developed the European consciousness to drive the European agenda, European interest groups and companies have. There are already 10,000 lobbyists acting on their behalf in Brussels – twice the number of senior Commission officials. Unless the EU develops into a political sphere, the agenda will continue to be set by interest groups.6

Everybody claims to be tackling these problems. But are they going about it in the right way? The problem is that the debate is shaped by contrasting the EU, which is perceived as undemocratic, and national governments which are seen as legitimate, but no longer capable of delivering the goods alone. So both sides fall into the trap of thinking that political legitimacy can only be delivered on the model of the nation-state – after all, it's the only model we've had so far. We are stuck with an image of Europe as a federal house three-quarters built, where its owners ran out of money, or political will, before the roof could be built.

While the Eurosceptics want to smash it down and rebuild legitimacy by repatriating powers to the nation states, too many of their opponents think that the EU can only be legitimate by becoming more like a state in its own right. Even those who do not favour the destination of a federal state have not developed any alternative model to guide them through the reform debate. Therefore the idea of using some of the tools of nation-building – writing a European constitution, electing a European President, and turning the European Parliament into a proper European Parliament – are attracting new supporters under the attractive rubric of 'democratising Europe'.7 As we shall see in Chapter 4, each of these ideas is leading pro-Europeans down a blind-alley.

We get the wrong solutions because we do not seem able to conceive of a political system that is not based around a single state. Journalists and politicians struggle to imagine politics outside a representative parliamentary or presidential system. We have yet to develop the concept of a political system with many centres of power rather than a single one. This is why the debate about European legitimacy cannot move forward. And this failure of imagination goes further – many commentators simply rely on their own political systems as a model of legitimacy and would like to see them writ large. The Germans, motivated by the success of their own "constitutional patriotism", see a constitution as an answer. The British model of parliamentary sovereignty means that we tend to see Westminster and Brussels as mutually exclusive – we are only just learning in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as well as in Europe about how power can be shared. And so the British debate is between supporters of the House of Commons and the European Parliament. French unease about parliamentary power leads to calls for a second chamber of national parliamentarians based on their Senate. And the Italians and Belgians are so suspicious of their national systems that they support whichever blue-print bears least resemblance to the polities they love to hate.

So we still have overwhelmingly national visions of where the European project might lead. This reflects earlier debate about the European project – which has often not been 'European' at all because we experienced our shared history in very different ways. The European bargain arose from a coincidence of different national interests and priorities in the immediate post-war period. Germany's wish to return gradually to respectability through deferential co-operation and being 'tied in' to Europe coincided with the French desire to achieve security and exercise a share of power beyond her material means. Britain's wartime victory meant she could remain complacently aloof from these continental arrangements, until the need to 'catch-up' meant joining quickly and agreeing to abide by the bargains already struck so as not to be left even further behind.8 It is now time to stop having a debate based on the different hang-ups of the century we are leaving so that we can develop a new politics around the common challenges which we all face in the future. To do this we must think about reform in a more imaginative way – not debating institutions for institutions' sake and agonising over whether it is the French, German or British ones that are best in theory. We will need to create new forms of politics which do not reflect or replicate any of our national systems. But creative thought will come from putting institutions to one side while we focus first on what we want Europe to do. It is only then that we will know what sort of institutions we need to build.

2. The new context for Europe: Globalization and European Union

It is not difficult to understand why people saw European federalism as the answer 50 years ago. Fiercely independent and aggressive states were the only political model we understood – and nobody wanted to live through another war between them. The priorities in 1950 were very clear: the need to pacify a continent of over-powerful states, and to reconstruct the economies and societies that were devastated by war. That is why European co-operation began with the heavy industries which had provided the raw material for weapons of destruction, and which, after the war, lay at the heart of the continent's economic future.9 Today, we have inherited the institutions first created for these tasks – and which helped to make the second half of the 20th century as peaceful and prosperous as the first half was bloody. But war between the EU's nation-states is now utterly unthinkable. The Coal and Steel Community belongs to a previous economic and political age
Instead, we now have to respond to challenges which Europe's founders never dreamt of. Global financial pressures on industry and employment levels, environmental degradation, post-Cold War responsibilities such as protecting minorities against ethnic cleansing, international crime and drugs rackets. What unites these problems is that it is no longer a question of over-mighty states needing to be pacified, but of individual governments being unable to guarantee the basic things people need to survive and flourish – physical security, a

clean environment, economic opportunity. In short, the European story has come full-circle.

Interdependence at the heart of Sovereignty
None of the things which did most to give states their meaning in the past – economic sovereignty, military security, national identity – are the same any more. These primary goods which states were created to deliver can now only be guaranteed by interdependence.

Economies used to be primarily national. Economics textbooks covered the international economy last – as an interesting add-on to the main course. Today, all analysis must start with globalization. Only Iraq, Serbia and North Korea could claim to have truly national economies. To aspire to the closely-guarded economic sovereignty of the past is to opt out of the race for economic growth and prosperity. The role for states instead is to join together in international regulatory regimes such as the WTO and the EU – to ensure that competition has rules, that it will deliver prosperity, and that it does not become a Dutch auction where governments compete to trim their national regulatory regimes. This will become even more important as European countries adapt to a global economy that is increasingly powered by knowledge and innovation rather than raw materials and production.10

The same is true of military security. Few of the most advanced states now defend themselves on their own; most achieve military security by co-operating with others. Compulsory military service – the embodiment of the nation's collective strength and will – is being phased out in many countries. The old realpolitik security rule-book is being re-written: jealously guarding borders, aggressively preserving national sovereignty and protecting national secrets is no longer the best way to guarantee our security. States now protect themselves by sharing information and intelligence – with mutual surveillance through satellites, the inspection of weapons sites, and international agreements. And when EU countries do need to take up arms – against rogue states like Serbia and Iraq that still operate on the old balance of power model – they do so as part of large international coalitions to defend values and common security, rather than to expand their own territory.11

The power and significance of a strong homogenous national and political identity has also been transformed by globalization. It is not just that the nation state has lost its monopoly over the production and distribution of culture, as people are exposed to news, art, literature, television, films, fashion and food from all over the world every day.12 Or the fact that countries are having to recast their identities in a multicultural age, as the legacy of their colonial histories comes home to roost. On a political level, people are reasserting their local and regional identities, and demanding decentralised government at this level. On a personal level, people are becoming more at ease with multiple, many-layered identities – which are more rooted in social practices and emotional ties than parliaments and constitutions.13 Governments are increasingly realising that the case for multiculturalism is not just an ethical one – but that it can give them a practical edge in the global economic contests for promoting inward investment, tourism, and exports. As Andrew Marr has argued, "The paradox of global culture is that, while it offers everyone the same products and stories to consume, it is also constantly looking for points of difference, something new to sell or exploit. In the knowledge economy, cultural complexity doesn't just produce wealth; it is wealth".14

The success of small states

The traditional answer to these new demands would be to look for strength and safety by creating a bigger country – just as German and Italian principalities came together to form new countries in the 19th century. Big states have been created to protect economic and physical security more effectively by having large markets and big armies. As we have seen, there is still some of this impulse in the European project. But big countries are not the panacea that Monnet and his associates believed. In a post-Fordist age, many national institutions are already seen to be operating at too large a level.

Over 70 years ago, Ludwig von Mises, in a classic critique of state socialism, showed how the growing informational requirements of an economy were increasingly making effective state planning impossible. Centralised decision-making was not difficult in a feudal system where the lord could easily gather enough knowledge of the market and the local climate to plan his peasants' activities effectively . But changes in technology and the growing complexity of the economy make it impossible for central decision-makers in countries and large companies to amass all of the technical expertise and knowledge necessary to make the right decisions. This is because most of the knowledge is stored in peoples' heads on the ground and is overwhelmingly local in nature. So a more decentralised system – where those at the periphery are not simply robots carrying out orders but have genuine autonomy – delivers better decisions than those made by central planners who are out of touch with local needs, and who act as a bottleneck preventing innovation and experimentation.

As the information revolution has gathered speed, large, hierarchical companies like IBM and AT&T – which fell prey to smaller, quicker, more nimble competitors – realised that they would have to devolve decision-making or die. The trend towards mega-mergers to create global brands has gone hand-in-hand with this shift towards much more localised decision-making – where power is decentralised and co-ordinated not so much through instrumental market relationships with their related transaction costs but through more informal networks that are tied together by common interests.

Countries have also come to realise that there is a size limit to effective government – citizens increasingly demand institutions which can respond quickly, communicate better and understand the mood of the people. Hence the current trends towards devolved power in centralised countries like the UK and Spain.

In fact, the strongest argument for the innovation of small states comes from Europe's own history. In this millennium, Europe transformed itself from a struggling backwater to a powerhouse through the development of small states. Paul Kennedy has written that, "At the beginning of the sixteenth century it was by no means apparent that [the cluster of states in Europe] was destined to rise above all the rest. But however imposing and organised some of those oriental empires appeared by comparison with Europe, they all suffered from the consequences which insisted upon a uniformity of belief and practice, not only in the official state religion, but also in such areas as commercial activities and weapons development. The lack of any such supreme authority in Europe and the warlike rivalries among its kingdoms and city-states stimulated a constant search for military improvements, which interacted fruitfully with the newer technological and commercial advances that were also being thrown up in this competitive, entrepreneurial environment. Possessing fewer obstacles to change, European societies entered into a constantly upward spiral of economic growth and enhanced military effectiveness which, over time, was to carry them ahead of all other regions of the globe".15

Of course, Europe's invention of small nation states was a mixed blessing. It allowed a continent which accounted for just 8 per cent of the world's surface

and 14 per cent of its population to punch dramatically above its weight. The fierce competition – economic, technological, military, political – powered Europe's prosperity, scientific advances, cultural richness and political innovations. But it also drove destructive urges which, in an age of mass production and mass destruction, threatened to destroy the entire planet. European countries have now come together to ensure that they don't destroy each other again, but will they be able to maintain the virtuous spiral of innovation?

The key will be preserving competition between states. In the last few decades, it is small states and micro-states that have been most successful in adapting to the challenges of the globalized world. While bigger countries have expended much energy on simply holding themselves together – on financing large armies and maintaining internal order – smaller states such as Denmark, Ireland, Holland and Singapore have forged ahead. Built on a human scale, they have been able to tap into an intensity of belonging that eludes larger units. Above all, those countries which instinctively know that they cannot control the world have been better at adapting to the need to compete in it.

The Belgian statesman, Paul-Henri Spaak, once remarked, "there are only two kinds of countries in Europe today; those that are small and know it, and those that are small and do not". Spaak was talking about foreign policy – a call on France and the UK after Suez to abandon their Great Power ambitions and realise that only European action can give them a place at the top-table. But today, his words are as true of domestic policy: bigger countries need to create the conditions that have given small states their edge: a propensity to adapt, openness to the world, good international links and government that is close to its people.

So the key to success in the next century will be developing strong external security by co-operating with others in the world while fostering innovation, decentralisation and fleetness of foot at home. This is why, if the European Union did not exist, we would need to invent it.16 The European Union shows that Europe is once again leading the way – it is fifty years ahead of any other international organisation. It is already the world's largest market (twice the size of Japan, and bigger than the US) and its largest exporter and importer (responsible for a quarter of world trade). With half a century's experience of co-operating, pooling sovereignty and co-ordinating policy, it represents an unparalleled test of how government and politics can do more than simply react as other spheres of activity go global.

But, at the same time, the EU is twenty years behind what its citizens want – in terms of what it delivers, and above all in how its decisions are made. Opinion polls show that publics across Europe are acutely aware of the limits of their national governments' powers, and want to see the EU play a role in solving the problems without frontiers that are too big for their own governments. Large majorities across EU countries, including the UK, want decisions on foreign policy, measures to protect the environment and the fight against international crime and drugs to be taken at a European rather than at a national level.17 At the same time, people are also very attached to their own countries and do not want to see them merged into a European state. Over 60 per cent across the EU think that the EU should be responsible only for areas that cannot be settled at a national level. In short, people want to enjoy the security that only big countries can afford without sacrificing the adaptability of small countries, or the national identities and traditions that they are attached to.18

To meet these demands, Europe's politicians need to learn to deliver a number of different – and apparently contradictory – things at the same time: co-operation and competition between states; decentralisation and integration; strong

national identities and a single European voice on the world stage. The EU can show that these are not contradictions – if it can develop into a different sort of political system from that which we have known in the past. But for Europe to reform in the right way, we must ensure that we understand it – not just its shortcomings, but the reasons why it has been able to foster its remarkable achievements to date.

3. Understanding Europe as
a network

The traditional visions of Europe – as an embryonic federal state or as a free trade area which should steer clear of the political arena – are now outdated. They will not help us tackle the challenges which we will face in the future. We need to understand the European Union in a different way if we are to reform it rationally. Although nobody would deny that the current EU is messy and flawed, it already has many of the features that will allow it to thrive in an era of interdependence. On the one hand, it has put an end to the traditional idea of a sovereign state in Europe. By developing links that go far beyond the intergovernmental co-operation in international organisations like GATT or the OECD, Member States have developed a genuine single market and shared tools to solve cross-border problems and a genuine single market. But, on the other hand, far from destroying them, this interdependence has actually revitalised and rescued the nation states.19 Member states have not transferred their sovereignty to a higher level – they have organised mechanisms for pooling and sharing sovereignty, while at the same time preserving competition between states.
Despite the fact that it often tries to look like one, the EU is not an embryonic nation state in its own right. Its institutions do not have the extensive powers of coercion, the hierarchical bureaucracy or large welfare budget that states have. Even if you include interpreters and translators, the Commission employs only 17,000 officials – less than Birmingham City Council. Nobody would claim that the European Commission is a perfect model of efficiency and effectiveness – but nor is it the bureaucratic monster of sceptic mythology. We need to reform it in a way which shows more clearly that Europe does respect the need to be small and flexible.
However, living up to the rhetoric of devolution and subsidiarity will not be enough. The key question is how to organise the relationship between the different centres of power in a decentralised organisation – and ensure enough co-ordination between their activities. This is a problem which countries and companies have been grappling with for years. There are two traditional solutions: creating a federalist structure to define the relationships within the system, or creating market relationships to link different centres. The debate about the future of the EU has been structured around a battle between these two visions.

In political theory, federalism is seen as the classic way to deliver decentralisation – parcelling out power between different levels of government according to functions (see Figure 1). There have been different models of how federalism should be delivered. Monnet's technocratic blueprint sought to move towards a federal state by stealth through economic integration and the creation of European elites, with political integration to follow at a later stage; Spinelli was the most influential of those who wanted to start with a political community based around the people, with a European Constitution, Parliament, and Supreme Court. Despite their differences, like all federal systems, both visions depend on creating a hierarchical relationship between a single centre and the other holders of power. A federal Europe with a constitution could be very decentralised in practice – if the rhetoric of power being exercised at the lowest possible level is followed – but the relationship between the different levels would remain hierarchical. There might be fewer layers of management between the top and bottom of the pyramid – but the important decisions about where power should be exercised would still be taken by the centre.
Federalism faces three problems. First, people are not ready for a hierarchical structure in which national governments are wholly subordinate to a central EU command – they will accept integration where necessary to deliver a public good, but they also want the maximum amount of national and local autonomy to be preserved. Secondly, we need additional layers of government to be as flexible and output-orientated as possible – a whole federal layer of government on top of national and often regional government will be seen as inevitably bureaucratic and inefficient. But, more importantly, we have seen that hierarchical organisations are ill-equipped to deal with the political and economic demands that globalization and technological change are forcing upon us. In business, as in politics, large and centralised regimes – from AT&T and IBM to the Soviet Union – have been unable to deal with the increasingly complex informational requirements of the world we live in. Increasingly, Max Weber's ideal of a rational hierarchical bureaucracy has been replaced by more informal, self-organised forms of co-ordination. As Francis Fukuyama has written, "it is no accident that hierarchies have gotten into trouble precisely at that time that societies around the world have been making the transition from industrial to high-tech, information-based forms of production".20
But the traditional alternative to federalism is equally outdated and inadequate – the idea that Europe should simply be a free trade area, with minimal political content (see Figure 2). This is intended to encourage innovation and diversity, and respect national identities. But a single market cannot exist without political integration. It is necessarily a political construction, as the only way to tackle protectionist measures is to agree on binding rules to govern the market, and mechanisms to enforce them. Even if it were possible to develop a single market without political content, it would not be desirable because Europe is also about protecting political choice. And many of the political challenges we face – from organised crime to environmental pollution – depend on European action. The alternative is not a national solution – it is no solution at all. To solve these problems we need to forge much deeper relationships between European countries than the instrumental ones that arise from a common market.
So neither of these traditional models is appropriate for organising the complex set of relationships between the different component parts of the EU. The hierarchical federal model would destroy the consensus for Europe amongst national governments and peoples, and create a rigid structure that is ill-suited to the information age. The free market model is too loose and instrumental to allow the EU to tackle the most pressing problems we are facing.

But there is another solution to the problem of co-ordinating highly decentralised organisations which has not entered mainstream political debate – this is the Network (see Figure 3). Though most people don't realise it, or talk in these terms, this is already the model which is closest to the EU we have. Networks don't figure prominently in political theory, but we all benefit from them in our everyday lives – in friendships, clubs, churches, trade unions, political parties or the Internet. These networks are not planned by a central authority – they arise from the interactions of decentralised actors. The rules and order that govern them depend on reciprocal relationships, shared values and a common identity rather than on a rigid hierarchy.

The model of the network has been successfully adopted by some large companies. Perhaps the best example is Visa. Visa's founder, Dee Hock wanted to create an organisation capable of managing a huge number of rapid transactions all over the world, without expanding into a bloated hierarchical corporation unable to deal with the complexity of these transactions and cash flows. Hock decided that the Visa model would be governed by core principles: the organisation would be equitably owned by all participants (over 20,000 financial institutions); it would distribute power and function to the maximum degree not allowing any faction or institution to dominated decision making; it should be capable of constant modification within these principals and it must embrace diversity and change. Visa is effectively a skeletal organisation that relies for its strength and success on enabling others to flourish. Though its products are accepted in over 200 countries, and used by 350 million people to make 7.2 bn transactions which are worth 650 billion dollars per annum, Visa has a tiny central administration with only 3000 employees in 21 offices around the world.

This model of the networked organisation in business with small operating units that sometimes compete with each other and at other times co-operate is very different from both the federal and free market models. It shows how, in the economic sphere, organisations can come together as equals and build relationships around a shared ethos and shared outward goals – much as the EU has done in the political sphere.[21]

In fact, the reason that the EU has been accepted, and succeeded in getting this far, is precisely because it is already a network with many centres of power rather than a single one. These centres of power, or "hubs" are member states, European institutions and other actors which share power horizontally, rather than vertically according to the rigidly pre-defined blue-print of a constitution. They are all interdependent, and though they have different weight on different issues, no hub, however powerful, can ignore the others. These hubs have links across many different levels – between regions, companies, pressure groups, regional and national governments and the range of European institutions. This web of connections is so dense that the sharp distinction between domestic and foreign policy has become blurred as countries sign up to agreements which have implications for many traditional areas of domestic policy – right down to the composition of beer and sausages.

The key to a network system is that it is about much more than instrumental co-operation. Networks need common values, a common style of decision-making and a shared set of objectives to maximise their benefits. The fact that the EU's system is inclusive has allowed it to get beyond the "zero-sum" competitive bargaining of many international organisations when each individual issue is considered in isolation, and success for one state is seen to be achieved at the expense of its opponents. In the EU, member states comply with European decisions which go against them because everybody is seen to win in the long-term from having agreed some binding rules and procedures. This complex set of relationships has allowed the EU to develop tools of co-operation to tackle

cross-border problems, whilst preserving strong national identities and avoiding the information overload that endangers hierarchical systems.

But our "Network Europe" has not come about as a result of a conscious plan – it is a fluke. It is the product of an uneasy truce between the traditional visions – as in a balance of power system where countries peacefully coexist not because they have agreed to do so, but only while they seek to muster the strength to maximise their own power and influence. In the EU, over the years, both federalists and free-traders have periodically managed to capture the agenda and secured institutions and programmes which correspond to them – the direct election of the European Parliament, the creation of the Single Market, the 'pillarisation' of the EU system at Maastricht. But no single vision has managed to achieve unanimous support – and never will. As a result, everybody sees Network Europe as a transitionary phase – to be replaced by one of the other visions of Europe when conditions allow. This conflict between visions, and institutions, has prevented Europe from fulfilling its potential as a network. We would never have been able to get to where we are now without this ambiguity about the nature of the EU. But, with reform at the top of the European agenda, it is now time to pause to understand the nature of the extraordinary system we have created and to see "Network Europe" as a desirable goal that we can unite around – rather than an unfortunate staging post on the road to a federal state or a free trade area. We can then start to reform it rationally. Just as commercial organisations such as Visa give their members a clear set of shared outward goals and incentives, the EU should start to be clearer about the benefits that it accords its members. As it continues to develop, "Network Europe" should aim to provide:

l   Decentralised governance – a decentralised system where power is shared horizontally between member states, European institutions and non-state actors, rather than vertically within a state
l   Security – building tools to cope with cross-border problems such as defence, the environment, and cross-border crime
l   Economic power – creating a big market and currency with rules that govern them
l   Competition – mechanisms for sharing information and best practice to promote innovation so that governments learn from each other
l   Compliance – supranational watch-dogs and techniques for mutual surveillance to ensure that the agreed rules are complied with
l   Inclusion – redistribution across nations and regions to prevent exclusion from and distortions to the single market
l   Democracy – mechanisms of political control and direct democracy to give citizens control over the institutions and the agenda
l   Shared Values – a system which embodies and promotes common values at home and abroad: democracy, diversity, openness, compromise, solidarity, individual free exchange, and quality of life
l   A Single Voice in the World – a way of speaking with a single voice in world forums, on foreign policy, defence, trade, and currency.

The EU has done well on some of these issues – but it also has a long way to go. It has already developed many of the tools that make the network work – new forms of decision-making and supra-national watchdogs. Its most impressive achievements have been within the economic sphere – the single market, the Euro, and the structural adjustment programmes to ensure that new applicants and under-developed regions are not excluded form the single market. It has been less successful at developing a framework for external security, promoting

competition between countries, and speaking with a single voice on the world stage. Its single biggest failure has been at developing a framework of democratic and political control – and the resulting lack of legitimacy brings the entire European project into disrepute. Unfortunately, we have not yet developed a reform agenda that is appropriate for the current EU to deliver or likely to solve these problems.

4. Misunderstanding the EU:
How the reform agenda could threaten Network Europe

European reform is not held back because we disagree about what the problems are. There is broad consensus about the need to tackle the legitimacy deficit and lack of capacity. But the problems have continued to get worse rather than better because people have misunderstood the EU and looked for solutions in the wrong places.

We have not properly understood the role that political institutions have played in delivering legitimacy within nation states. They were the key to creating national identity and legitimating the state because they offered new rights and freedoms that people were desperate to attain; and they guaranteed physical and material security at a time of great upheaval. The EU cannot replicate this process simply by repackaging existing rights with a European gloss – or imposing new institutions on an unwilling populace. European citizenship will only acquire meaning when it translates into real entitlements that people want, and which they cannot get at the national level.

More importantly, the traditional reform agenda has not understood how the emerging EU system, Network Europe, will be different from a traditional state. The EU system is path-breaking, unique, without precedent. And so it is essential that the reform agenda builds on this novelty and sees how it needs to evolve. Reform must not endanger the innovation and flexibility we already benefit from. Unfortunately, many of the measures most often proposed to make Europe more legitimate do just that. They look for comfort and reassurance in the institutions we are most familiar with, and seek to recreate the nation state at a higher level.

If Network Europe is to develop, reformers need to understand that there are three key differences between the EU and a state.22 Each makes delivering legitimacy and effectiveness more complicated. But it is these differences which have allowed the EU to get where it is today – and which reformers must respect as they seek to change it.

Why the EU can never have an executive president

Harry S. Truman famously had a sign on his desk in the White House – "the buck stops here". He would not know where to put it in the European Union. The reform debate too often turns into an argument about which European institution should have the most claim to it. Should it be national governments, or the Parliament elected by Europe's citizens, or should we elect a powerful Commission President

to play this role? This debate misses the point. There is not, and can never be, a central figure or body like a President or Prime Minister solely responsible for setting the agenda and driving it forward.

We have seen that European integration has transformed the nature of nation states, but it has not destroyed them. In fact, national identities remain central to its success. As a result, it would be impossible to have a single election for an executive EU president. Even in strongly pro-European countries like Germany and Italy, people would be more likely to vote for a candidate of their own nationality, than a candidate from another country. They would not accept their national governments being "lorded over" by an EU President.

The strength of "Network Europe" is that though different countries may have different weights on different issues, none, however powerful, can ignore the others. This is why national governments and peoples have come to accept the EU. Its fragile legitimacy would be shattered if individual countries felt consistently ignored – just as many Scots began to question the viability of a United Kingdom that seemed to have a perpetual Conservative Government which took no account of their divergent values.

But the fact that there are myriad competing interests operating in Europe, which must be represented in debate, makes it more difficult for the EU to act effectively, and to develop the leadership and capacity it needs to punch its weight on the world stage. The key will be to balance the desire to speak with one voice in the world, with the need to accommodate many voices at home.

Why the EU can't be a parliamentary democracy

The need to balance leadership with inclusion also explains why the EU cannot be a parliamentary democracy on the national model. A majoritarian form of politics which rides roughshod over those taking the minority view would endanger the consensus on which Europe is built.

But even if it were acceptable, representative parliamentary democracy will not produce a solution to Europe's legitimacy problems. This is partly because the main focus of peoples' political identities continues to be the nation state which delivers them the services they care about: welfare, health and education. European elections will probably continue to be a referendum on national regimes, rather than a forum for people to debate competing visions of the EU. This means that the European Parliament will always have less legitimacy than the European Council which is made up of the Heads of State and Government that people recognise.

There are also limits to the legitimacy of representative politics – even at a national level. Across the world, there are increasing calls to supplement pure representative democracy with measures such as referendums and citizens' juries. People today are better educated; their concerns are more diverse; and they are less passive in their approach to authority and politics. Because traditional structures don't seem to be keeping up, we see falling turnout and an increasing alienation. We are beginning to have these debates about giving greater range and depth to political participation at a national level, but they have not been transferred to the European level where they are even more relevant.23 Because the EU will never have a government or single centre of power (which citizens can replace if it becomes unpopular), direct democracy is the only way that citizens can be able to have an impact on the whole EU agenda (see conclusion). The fact that the European Parliament cannot by itself deliver legitimacy does not mean that politics does not matter. Conflict and competition are the essential elements of any democratic system: as different groups of people put forward alternative programmes for the future, and then battle it out to convince the public that their vision is the right one. If the politicians

disappoint or break their promises, voters can 'throw the bums out'. The problem is that politics in the European Union doesn't work like that. There are plenty of politicians – but no genuine political contests at the European level. We have seen that this is the direct result of the dispersion and flexible sharing of power. But the negative consequence is that questions of European politics – within all of the EU's institutions – are structured around artificial debates about more or less integration, and different conceptions of the national interest, rather than between different visions for Europe and of the policies which it should pursue.24

In a network where power is distributed between many players, political parties can play an important role as the glue that holds all the hubs together, aggregates different interests and gives the whole system a sense of direction. The key will be to imagine new ways of doing this without constructing the centralised hierarchical institutions which Europe will not accept or bear.

The flexible sharing of powers:
why the EU should avoid a constitution

A network system cannot have a classic division of powers between an executive, legislature and judiciary where the three institutions each have exclusive roles. Dividing powers up in this hierarchical way would emasculate the national governments which people want to remain at the centre of political life in each country. But we do need to ensure that there are binding rules which the members agree to and keep – and which EU citizens can influence.

To cope with this conundrum, the EU has developed an innovative structure that allows all of the institutions jointly to share the roles of executive, legislative and judiciary. They alternate in their power and responsibility in different policy areas and at different stages in the decision-making process.25 Control of decision-making by national governments (through the Council of Ministers, the rotating presidency, the executive summits every six months), is combined with the management of European business by a euro-technocracy which is directed by a politically appointed European Commission and overseen by the European Parliament, the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. So, in practice, the Council acts as an executive on long-term issues, setting the agenda and delegating management power to the Commission. The Commission acts as an executive in the short term, for example on trade and agricultural policy. The European Parliament and European Court of Justice have an oversight role in many of these procedures.26 While some of this complexity is necessary to maintain political control while avoiding the gridlock and lack of compliance that most international organisations face, it does make the EU very difficult for its citizens to understand. Eight out of ten people claim to know "little" or "nothing" about the EU.

However, calls for a European Constitution to explain the EU misdiagnose the existing problem and could make it worse. The inevitable wrangling over its content would make Maastricht look like a family picnic, exacerbating rather than closing the gulf between elites and citizens. The most likely outcome of this debate would be to freeze the EU's future development and entrench a settlement ill-equipped to deal with the challenges to come. It makes no sense to contemplate a constitution before the EU has developed its security and defence identity, measures to tackle cross-border crime, and reformed its institutions to deal with enlargement.

But it is more than a question of timing. A hierarchical constitutional settlement (which established a single executive, legislature and judiciary) would destroy the essence of European integration, make Europe less rather than more effective, and could cause the whole project to unravel. If it fixed too

much, it would be likely to prevent the EU from developing in areas where some member states had reservations even where there is a strong "coalition of the willing". It would endanger the competition between states that has delivered some of the most important innovations in public policy. Finally, a European constitution runs against the very grain of our changing societies – where the pressure from citizens is to devolve decision-making and power from a national level and to bring it to a higher level only when clear tests for integration are met and where there are obvious benefits from doing so. So we should concentrate on explaining and making sense of this complexity – rather than destroying the EU we have created for the sake of intellectual clarity.

5. The new agenda for reform:
Legitimacy and effectiveness
in Network Europe

We have seen that the European Union's problems are a direct product of its uniqueness. We want the EU to deliver the things we usually expect of a political system – but we can't use the traditional tools. Because we need to combine leadership with inclusion, we can't get it from an Executive President. Because democratic control must respect national identity, it won't come from a European parliamentary democracy. And we must combine clarity with flexibility – so we should avoid a rigid constitution. We also need Network Europe to deliver many goods that might seem to be in conflict with each other – co-operation between states which compete and innovate; decentralisation and integration; internal diversity and a single voice on the world stage.
This might sound like the European equivalent of calling for more public spending and lower taxes, or less traffic with more car use. But it is not – what European publics want from Europe is deliverable. The strength of "Network Europe" is that it can avoid the false dichotomies which have shaped the debate so far. But this can only happen if the reform agenda is driven by an understanding of networks and what makes them work, rather than the traditional theory of state-building. Otherwise, the reform agenda will become another round in the battle between competing visions of Europe and the supporters of different European institutions.
To get Network Europe right, there should be three central areas for the reform agenda:
The first is participation. For a network to work effectively, the right hubs need to be represented – otherwise people become alienated from a distant system whose agenda is captured by special interests. At present, the interests of citizens and consumers are less well represented than those of lobbies and nations. And the political parties that could aggregate different interests are not active enough in the European arena. So we need to reinvent politics so that it can operate effectively beyond states as well as within them.
Secondly, we need to get the links between these hubs right. We have seen that for the EU to be effective, it must combine co-operation on cross-border issues,

with the competition between companies and countries which drives innovation and allows for the spread of good practice. To achieve this, we need to untangle crossed wires – while we need checks and balances, institutions should not be designed to naturally compete against each other at the expense of solving problems. And we need to make some connections which are missing at present. Finally, the network needs a strong ethos – the guiding missions, values and identity which hold the system together. This can provide the system with a sense of direction, because the different parts of the network feel loyalty to a higher goal. The individual transactions will not just be instrumental, they will be underpinned by trust if the network is cohesive and has a strong sense of identity.

If we look at each of these areas, we can see where the EU is falling short, before looking at possible ways forward in the conclusion.

Reinventing politics and participation

Everyone now accepts that a purely technocratic Europe will never be able to lead, let alone inspire. It is almost a decade since Jacques Delors famously said that "Europe began as an elitist project in which it was believed that all that was required was to convince the decision makers. That phase of benign despotism is over". But while everybody pays lip-service to legitimacy, we haven't really got any further in working out how we might deliver it within the existing European system. Too many people still hope that a federal system will eventually come into existence and dissolve the problem.

So what would legitimacy look like in a European context? At a European level, as elsewhere, political legitimacy is about the quality of the connection between citizens and the policies that are made in their name. Political systems match public policy to citizens' priorities by making trade-offs between competing interests and bundling them into strategic programmes which the voters can choose between. But getting the right policies is not enough. People need to feel that they are part of the process that makes them – and that they can hold the institutions that implement them to account.

This sense of legitimacy and democratic control is in decline even at a national level where there is a hierarchical system centred around a single government which political parties can compete to control. Network Europe's political system is much more complicated, operating across many centres of power. This makes the cohesive function of politics even more important in ensuring that decision-making is not utterly fragmented and can aggregate interests; that parts of the system do clash with others in different fora; and that citizens are part of the decision-making process rather than passive consumers of polices made in their name. But our efforts to deliver political control over European policy must not undermine the strong national identity and national political systems which are vital to economic innovation and public participation.

So far, European politics has only delivered one side of the equation. The genuine need to maintain national identity has been allowed to squeeze out the vital debates on social and economic priorities and values that cut across national boundaries. There is no clear way for citizens to vote for, or debate, the kind of Europe they want and what values and socio-economic priorities it should promote. Special interest groups and lobbies have stepped into the vacuum created by the absence of politics and are increasingly setting the agenda. Instead of aggregating interests, the EU system has created different institutions to represent nations, citizens, and the European interest – the European Council and Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the Commission. This means that the European interest is not seen as the sum of the interests of member states and citizens – but as something separate and

naturally in conflict with them. Institutional conflict is built into the system. The Council and Commission regularly cross swords over their shared executive role. The European Parliament clashes with the Council over its legislative role, and flexes its muscles over the Commission. National Parliaments feel alienated from the EU, and resent the European Parliament's role in the decision-making process. So instead of working towards coherent objectives, the EU often seems at odds with itself.

We clearly need to put the politics into Europe. But before we decide where it should go and how we put it there, we must understand how it has failed to develop in all the main institutions.

The most visible institution is the European Commission – which many people actually think is the EU. The Commission was deliberately constructed to be above the political fray – to save European publics and politicians from themselves. This means that many think of the EU as a bureaucratic machine, rather than a political body. Commissioners swear an oath of allegiance to European integration when they take office, promising to leave behind ties to their countries and political parties. The Commission does have a vital role in insuring that decisions rise above the level of the lowest common denominator. But its inability to define its guiding European interest in terms of socio-economic priorities and values has meant that its clearest goal has often been to increase its own power within the system. The Commission's awareness of its legitimacy problem has made things worse rather than better – because it can't run for election, it has tried to build a coalition of support by inviting as many interest groups as possible into the decision-making process. This has helped well-funded and organised producer lobbies to prevail over consumer interests.

One might expect more divisions over socio-economic interests or a stronger Consumer voice from the politicians in the European Council and Council of Ministers. But because these bodies were designed to reflect the national interest, their discussions are typical of European debate at every level – about more or less Europe, or different national interests, rather than which direction Europe should go in. Even when the Convergence Criteria for the Single Currency were set, the European Council did not discuss the social and economic implications for employment or welfare spending – only whether Europe should proceed with the plan, and which member states to exclude. The rotating Presidency of the European Council does not help to give political leadership. Every country enjoys its time in the sun and is keener to launch its own projects than set a clear political agenda or bring existing projects to fruition. And the timing of this "buggins turn" system leaves much to chance. The British government had only been in power for a few months when its presidency started, while the German government was not even fully formed.

The Council of Ministers is even less political. The fact that decision-making has been split into a huge array of sectoral councils – including some where the EU has very little role, such as health, education, culture, youth and industry – means that decision-making is very fragmented and easily dominated by organised interests. The departmental ministers who make policy and distribute subsidies do not have to raise the money they hand out and there is no time limit on their discussions. This means that Ministers tend to act more as glorified lobbyists for particular interests than as politicians outlining a strategic programme. In practice, 90 per cent of decisions are arrived at by national civil servants in informal policy networks with national experts and organised interests. The fact that there is so little structured political debate or interest aggregation is partly a product of the failure of the Foreign Ministers' General Affairs Council which is meant to co-ordinate the work of

other councils. As the European policy agenda has ballooned, and many urgent foreign policy issues have appeared, the General Affairs Council has totally failed to keep pace.

Direct elections to the European Parliament were established to make up for this lack of accountability and political debate – the parliament is meant to represent the peoples of Europe. The European Parliament is the one institution that is organised on party lines, and its party groupings are becoming more disciplined and cohesive. But the Parliament cannot be expected to turn people's priorities for Europe into a coherent political programme for the continent. As we have seen, its elections are fought on national rather than European issues, so people do not get to vote for the kind of Europe they want within their own countries, never mind across them. The Parliament's culture and procedures are not geared to airing real political disagreements. It depends on a de facto coalition between the centre-left and centre-right groupings, and requires a two-thirds majority on the most important questions such as budgetary matters. So, the European Parliament cannot set the strategic agenda for Europe – it is not a focal point of public debate; we don't recognise its members and it doesn't have the powers. It does, however, play an increasingly important role as a watchdog within the EU system – it acts as a check on bad legislation, oversees the EU budget, scrutinises the Central Bank and monitors the workings of the Commission. It is helping the EU to work better – even if it is unlikely to set the public imagination on fire. What holds it back is that it is judged against an inappropriate yardstick – as if it were Europe's equivalent of the Bundestag or the House of Commons.

The EU's inability to hold real political debates stems from the fact that it was not initially conceived of as a political body. National governments wanted to create a regulatory framework which would allow them to shift responsibility for unexciting but important issues requiring technocratic solutions to a European level. As a result, political parties have not got involved in the process. The political structures that have evolved fit this mould, and enshrine a political deficit. Discussions are focused on regulations, dominated by horse-trading, and most decisions are taken by national civil servants. But a model of decision-making designed for technical issues like lawn-mower sound emissions and the composition of tomato paste is inappropriate for deciding how the single currency or a European foreign policy should work.

The reason that we need to reinvent politics is that we are trying to create the first political system that is not tied to a single state, one that allows us to have political debates across frontiers. This will mean thinking about politics very differently. Instead of seeing EU politics as a bolt-on extra that can be confined to the European Parliament, we need to ensure that the political debate runs through all the EU institutions. But improving representative democracy will not be enough. Because the EU will never have a single government or president that citizens can vote out, we need more direct ways to involve citizens in deciding the future of the EU. In the conclusion I will propose ways both to reform the EU's representative system and to introduce direct democracy so the EU can both respect national identify and give a voice to people's priorities.

Getting the right links: delivering competition and co-operation
Network Europe is about having our cake – and eating it too. We need to be able to co-operate on a continental scale to deliver solutions to the problems which need cross-border solutions, speak with a single voice on global issues where we share interests, and create a large and dynamic single market and currency. But at the same time we need to preserve the competition between countries and

companies that has acted as a spur to innovation over the centuries. Only the structure of a network can ensure this. But for it to function effectively we need to have connexions that work.

At the moment, EU member states often co-operate in areas where they should compete, and compete in areas where they should be speaking with a single voice. Our historical inheritance is a European Union that often seems to be most integrated where it is least relevant. The core projects in the history of European integration – the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom or the CAP – are now either redundant, or in desperate need of reform. But the fragmented nature of the Council of Ministers and the inertia of sectoral councils has made it difficult to move co-operation out of these increasingly defunct traditional areas of integration.

At the same time, the EU has not yet developed the capacity to deal with international crime, drugs, or the environment – let alone a crisis such as Kosovo. In fact, the EU is particularly weak at providing its member states with the external security they need – because instead of co-operating and coming up with common solutions – the EU often works against itself on the world stage. While the EU is able to protect our trading interests very effectively by speaking with one voice, its foreign and defence identity has been undermined by fifteen separate foreign policies.

The EU's traditional techniques for co-operation were innovative in their time. It now needs to develop new models suitable for today's cross-border problems. The model of convergence criteria that was developed for the single currency provides a practical way to develop the EU's defence capacity. Setting a strict time-table and quantitative and qualitative critieria for capacity for each member state which wishes to and is able to participate should allow us to get beyond warm words. Other recent innovations to encourage co-operation, such as Qualified Majority Voting, constructive abstentions in the Council of Ministers, or the "flexibility" clause signed at Amsterdam should all allow us to develop capacity on the environment, or on solving international crime.

We also need to build the EU's capacity for competition. Among its greatest achievements is the economic competition of the single market – it now needs to enhance political competition between countries, too. Instead of a highly centralised model of political economy, or the anarchy of unregulated competition, the single market replaced 15 different national regulatory regimes with binding rules and an apparatus to police them – delivering the biggest free market the world has ever seen and ensuring that it is underpinned by basic standards.

We now need a single market for government and ideas. There are many areas of government activity which legitimately remain national in scope, but which are of common interest to the EU as a whole. National policy failure – in education, employment, welfare, labour market reform, social exclusion, health or pensions – could damage other countries through its impact on the functioning of the single market and the Eurozone. There will be no support for centralising decision-making in these areas, but we can all benefit from mechanisms for monitoring and peer review. Member states have an interest in agreeing to clear common objectives, within a defined timetable, which each can meet in the way most appropriate to their own experience and national conditions. The EU's role in these policy areas will not be to drive the policy agenda, or devise "one-size-fits-all" solutions, but to collect information, monitor progress, bench-mark countries' achievements and highlight their shortcomings. Each EU member should see its partners as common learning resources across the full range of policy – so that the European Union becomes a laboratory for policy innovation.27

The most advanced experiments with political competition are in employment policy, where Member States have agreed guidelines and targets for employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities, and then prepared National Action Plans to achieve these. Progress has been reviewed at subsequent summits. Similarly, EU member states have agreed national targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions in line with the Kyoto agreement, while retaining responsibility for implementation.

But there are barriers to developing this kind of structured competition. One is the mindset of the Commission and some member states. There is still a strong tendency to see harmonisation and minimum standards as the only way to tackle European challenges. The recent wrangles over tax policy showed this very clearly – and there is still strong pressure to seek to develop a single model for social policy or labour markets. Even when competition has been applied, too many think that it is a temporary experiment, which could be replaced with traditional integration in due course – there have already been calls for an EU carbon tax to be implemented if EU governments don't look set to meet their Kyoto targets.

The other barrier is the EU's lack of flexibility. Even when it does recognise its deficiencies, it finds it very difficult to reform itself. Its Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) are cumbersome, inflexible, lengthy and unfocussed. Progress is often bogged down by protracted wrangling over fringe topics of peripheral concern to the vast majority of members. The final two weeks before the last IGC saw 55 new proposals from member states, hampering coherent discussion and strategic planning of the future direction of the EU as a whole.28 So to get its links right, the EU will need to change its mindset, and develop better ways of reforming itself.

Giving Network Europe a sense of direction and ethos

Network Europe also needs to develop shared values and a common set of objectives if it is to effectively promote co-operation and competition. The network needs to develop cohesion, but not according to the traditional model of state building. Durkheim famously described how hierarchical organisations were glued together by functions, with the division of labour creating a kind of "mechanical solidarity" between different cogs in a machine. In a similar way, federal countries are not just held together by a clear identity, but by clearly specified tasks and a specified line of command.

When these hierarchical relationships are weaker or absent, it is important to develop cohesion through a shared sense of identity, a common set of objectives and a common way of doing business. Fukuyama has argued that a network is "a group of individual agents who share informal norms or values beyond those necessary for ordinary market transactions". If daily tools, tasks and structures of the organisation are linked to a higher goal then this provides a glue which holds the network relationships together through establishing a shared sense of direction. The relationship between husbands and wives, traditionally defined by a hierarchical and uneven division of household labour, has moved towards a more equal partnership based on a shared sense of identity and common projects.29 We no longer see very hierarchical systems as legitimate or effective, but need to deliver more attractive forms of cohesion to avoid highly instrumental relationships between individual hubs, characterised by zero-sum thinking, high transaction costs and results which rarely get beyond the lowest common denominator.

Perhaps as a result of its functionalist roots, the European project has not succeeded in developing a sense of identity which inspires its citizens. Raymond Aron has written that 'the European idea is empty ... It was created by

intellectuals, and that fact accounts for its genuine appeal to the mind and its feeble appeal to the heart'.30 The EU is well aware that this is its Achilles' heel. It has given much time and thought to the task of creating Europeans. But its attempts to create a European identity have addressed the issue in exactly the wrong way.

Instead of building on the Europe that we live in our everyday lives – in holiday snapshots, on supermarket shelves, in history lessons, on school exchanges, in novels, films, music and restaurants – politicians tend to start with abstract and elitist ideas from European history. Roman law, democracy, Judaeo-Christian ethics, the Renaissance, humanism, rationalism, empiricism, romanticism and classicism are merged together with key personalities from Descartes to Beethoven to construct a European cultural heritage.31 And this identity has been communicated and expressed through the adoption of Beethoven's 9th symphony as an anthem, the gold stars on the blue background as a flag, the celebration of Europe Day on 9 May and the creation of the European passport.

At best, this attempt to create European identity has failed to appeal beyond the Eurocrat-elite; at worst it has increased Euroscepticism and fear of the EU with its nation-building symbols. If the EU sets itself up to compete with national identities, it will fail. Instead of working against the identities we have, seeking to impose an ersatz, esperanto identity with no genuine emotional appeal, the EU should be working with the genuine European identities which already exist – and show how Europe is adding something to the identities we cherish.

The EU has so far been missing an attractive overarching narrative which gives the identity a content and shows why it delivers something that we want. What should Europe do about this failure of its identity projects to take a grip on its peoples? One answer is that it could tackle the identity deficit, and the lack of understanding of the EU and what it does, by calling a constitutional convention. The model of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany suggest that a European constitution could over time deliver increased understanding, participation and pride in the European project. But this seems unlikely to be the answer for Europe today. We have seen the difficulties which the process of constitution-forming would create and, in fact, the proposal replicates the mistake of thinking that European identity will follow as soon as the EU resembles a nation-state.

Its not just that a European identity can't replace national identity – it can't draw on many of the elements which have promoted national identities in the past. But while the EU can't rely on a shared religion, ethnicity or a single education system to inculcate identity myths, this is not a problem since we are not trying to create the sort of identity which people are prepared to die for. The European identity which we are striving for will have to be very different from the national identities which it will supplement. It must be based on a set of common values and objectives.

And so the real lesson which we need to learn from the US if we are to give identity and cohesion to Network Europe has nothing to do with its federal structure or constitutional obsessions. What the Americans have, which Europe needs, is a dream – a vision of the values which the United States shares, which helps it to debate and decide where it is going. The American Dream has inspired successive generations to improve their lot, held together a mongrel nation, and given Americans a clear sense of the future.

It is time to harness the powerful untapped European identity to provide a European dream. This will be different to the American dream, because Europe has different values to the United States. We value our rich diversity and would reject a homogenous melting-pot; we want prosperity, but understand quality-of-

life in less materialistic terms; we value social solidarity as well as social change; we believe in sharing power as well as projecting it. A European identity, which values all of the diversity which Europe contains, can provide a beacon of what Europe stands for which attracts those queuing up to join; can help to provide the social capital to lubricate particular transactions; and bring Europe to life for its citizens.

Europe has an opportunity to define what it stands for in the Millennial Declaration which the Helsinki summit will release this December. The EU needs to take this opportunity to give European citizens a much clearer sense of what Europe is and what it is for; to give applicant countries a sense of the standards they will have to live up to; and to provide a route-map for European reform. But, above all, the EU will have to embody this identity – based on democracy, diversity, solidarity, quality of life, multilateralism and compromise – in its actions at home and abroad. In the past it has often failed to live up to its ideals. It talks of diversity but the reality is often harmonisation. It talks of democracy, but the reality is a democratic deficit. It talks of common challenges, but too often can't find common solutions.

Conclusion:
Reforming Network Europe

This is the moment for European reform. There is widespread agreement on the need to make Europe more effective, better understood and more legitimate. But everything depends on how we do it.

We have seen that the traditional reform agenda risks taking us even further from the Europe which we need to thrive, and could turn people off by making Europe seem like a threat to well-being and identity.

In this pamphlet, I have tried to set out a new way of thinking about Europe – which takes us beyond the false choices which have structured the debate in the past. The theory of Network Europe will also allow us to construct a new reform agenda which will not just make Europe more effective, but more popular too. This will provide us with a vital platform to start rebuilding the consensus for Europe.

The test of European legitimacy will not be the precise structure of the EU's institutions – they should just be a means to an end. The real test will be the EU's ability to deliver the things that its citizens expect of it. In 2020, people will want to see an EU that is powerful enough to defend its security, to tackle organised crime, to promote jobs and a clean environment. But they will also expect to retain a strong sense of national identity and to have control over the key decisions which affect their lives.

That is why the key challenges for European reform are:

(1)   To reconnnect Network Europe to its citizens – by reinventing politics and participation so that it can operate beyond states as well as within them;

(2)   To untangle Network Europe's crossed wires – by cutting back bureaucratic and institutional conflict, and enhancing the EU's ability to promote co-operation and competition in the right areas
(3)   To develop a clear ethos for Network Europe – to ensure that Network Europe is held together through shared objectives, identity and a common sense of destiny.

So, how can we get closer to the Europe we need?

(1) Reconnecting Citizens – Reinventing Politics
Dispersing power is essential in Europe – but the first casualty can be accountability and political debate. How can we develop a focus for political contests in a network with many centres of power? At present, the EU is good at representing countries and special interests, but not citizens. The key to changing this is integrating politics into the whole institutional framework – not treating it as a bolt-on extra confined to the European Parliament. We need to make all of the institutions more representative of Europe's citizens and better at airing the political conflicts which cut across national boundaries. Political parties have a key role to play in this as they are represented in all EU countries and all EU institutions. They are still the only body that exist expressly to link public policy with the public. But improving the representative side will not be enough. Unlike national democracies, the EU system will never have a single government which voters can throw out. So we also need to allow citizens to participate in a more direct way – so that we can make choices about the Europe we want, rather than being offered it on an all-or-nothing basis. The proposals below show how we can deliver political contests at the EU level without undermining national democracies.

Reinvigorating representative democracy
To reinvigorate representative democracy, we must concentrate on reforming the European Council so that it can give political direction to the whole EU system. It is the EU institution with the most power and legitimacy because it contains Europe's best-known and most powerful political leaders. It is time for these leaders to remember that they are party leaders as well as heads of government, and to treat the European Council as a political forum, not only somewhere that they defend their national interests. Obviously the European Council will continue to be split between the different national interests, but suitably reformed it could also play a role in debating the political issues that cut across national boundaries.
By acting as a more political body, the European Council can develop tools for strategic decision-making and leadership, and provide the political and policy framework for the Commission's legislative, financial and administrative proposals. Building on the now established practice of party caucusing before summits, party leaders and heads of government need to use and develop the transnational party infrastructures to feed their agenda into the Council of Ministers, national parliaments and European Parliament. This will overcome some of the institutional rivalry and promote greater coherence. The Commission will again be able to fulfil its central role of encouraging member states to stick to the commitments which they sign up to in front of the cameras, rather than posing as a European government in waiting. And the Parliament will act as a democratic check within the system – scrutinising legislation and the running of the commission, rather than lobbying for more legislative power.
How can this come about?

l   Scrap the rotating EU Presidency, and deliver strategic leadership. The six-monthly rotating EU Presidency should be scrapped as it stops the EU from developing real leadership – everybody starts their favourite projects; there is much less interest in bringing them to fruition. It should be replaced by a Presidency that is elected by the member states of the European Council for a two year period. The elected Presidency should be a consortium of three member states – one member state should take the chair on each pillar of the EU. The Council as a whole should issue a five year programme at the beginning of each Commission term, and an annual programme of work each year. Party leaders should use their transnational party groups to produce draft programmes of EU work for them to support in the European Council.

l   Council of Europe Ministers. A powerful new authority, made up of Europe Ministers with deputy PM status, should meet monthly in Brussels and co-ordinate the work of the different Councils of Ministers to ensure that a strategic agenda is being followed and be responsible for strategic co-ordination. Their role would be to drive through the priorities agreed by the European Council, with the support of their countries' diplomatic representatives in Brussels who meet as COREPER. This would encourage national politicians to see the European sphere as continuation of national politics. There should be party caucuses of the Europe Ministers before each meeting.

l   Enhance the Parliament's Watchdog role, not its legislative powers. The European Parliament's role as a democratic watchdog should be strengthened. It does not need any more legislative power, but it should be given the right to censure individual commissioners, and also access to the minutes of the European Central Bank, so that it can hold it to account more effectively.

Supplementing representative politics with direct democracy
Reforming representative democracy in this way within the EU would make the EU system more strategic, and allow citizens to see a link between the way they vote in national elections, and the policies being pursued at a European level. But people will also want a more direct way of participating and voting for what we want Europe to do. So we should consider ways to supplement representative politics with direct democracy.

l   Europe-wide Referendums. Many countries already have referendums about the EU – on questions like EU membership, treaty reform or whether to adopt the Euro. But these are really national debates which get mixed up with the jockeying for position of national political parties between general elections. To give citizens the chance to influence the European agenda directly, we need a different sort of European referendum. These would give citizens across Europe the chance to overturn an existing piece of EU legislation, or to put a new legislative issue on the agenda in policy areas of EU competence. The votes would be held if a set number of signatures (as a percentage of population) was collected in three quarters of member states, and would need to be won by 'double majority' – a majority across the EU, and victory in most of member states. The votes could be held on the same day as elections to the European Parliament.32

l   European People's panel. The European Commission already conducts quarterly opinion polls in all EU countries for its Eurobarometer studies. But the questions are not very closely related to the needs of policy-makers. These should be transformed into a standing people's panel that any policy-maker in

the EU's institutions or in national governments can draw upon to test public attitudes to what the EU's priorities should be, and how service delivery can be improved from the point-of-view of the user. Representative panels of 5000 people in each country could be used to test proposals made before each European summit, and an independent report outlining public attitudes and priorities should be circulated to all policy-makers in advance.

(2) Untangling Wires – Ensuring Europe co-operates and competes

We have seen why EU members need to compete and co-operate if they are to survive and thrive in the future. But the EU has often co-operated in the areas which needed competition – and competed over the cross-border problems which need common action. Its ability to act on the global stage has been undermined by 15 separate voices. Internally, EU institutions have competed over which should have more power, instead of working together towards a shared agenda. We need widespread institutional change, to make the institutions more responsive, flexible and capable of working in a joined-up way. We also need to challenge the mindset which assumes that harmonisation and minimum standards will provide a solution, and develop the institutional capacity to structure competition between countries.

l   Joined-up government, not sectoral representation. The Council of Ministers is organised around Sectoral Councils which make EU decision-making highly segmented, unstrategic, and easily open to producer capture. We need to vastly reduce their number – to just four. This will allow strategic decision-making and focus political attention on the key issues – just as the need to compete for parliamentary time in national parliaments creates a discipline on their legislative agenda. The new Council of European Ministers should co-ordinate the strategic agenda agreed by Heads of Government; working with EcoFin (Finance Ministers), a Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence, and one dealing with Justice and Home Affairs.

       This means scrapping sectoral councils for Agriculture, Environment, Transport, Fisheries, Social Affairs, Industry, Research, Internal Market, Development, Energy, Health, Budget, Education, Telecommunications, Consumer Affairs, Culture, etc. The Council of European Ministers should create and oversee European Ministerial Taskforces, made up of a range of Ministers from different departmental backgrounds to tackle other issues. This will help to break up the departmental fiefdoms which have come to dominate in EU decision-making.

l   A streamlined Commission, supporting policy competition. The Commission has to become more strategic and less prone to seek harmonisation in areas which need competition. Reducing its labyrinthine structure (DGs I-XXII), which only lobbyists and academics understand, it should be streamlined to match a reformed European Council with four divisions dealing with Finance and Economics; Foreign and Security Policy; Justice and Home Affairs, and Structural Reform which would be chaired by Commission Vice-Presidents. For all other areas, the President should set up working-groups chaired by a co-ordinating Commissioner.

       With a reformed European Council providing political direction, the Commission should focus on ensuring that member states keep to the promises which they have made, of speaking for the EU in global negotiations, and, above all, of developing the EU's capacity for benchmarking. The Commission should gather information on best practice, work with member states to make methods of data collection and reporting as similar as possible to allow reliable

comparisons, and have the confidence to highlight the shortcomings of countries which aren't meeting the agreed targets.

l   Outcome-led reform, not Intergovernmental Conferences.
One obstacle to getting Europe right is the attempt to deliver reform through Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs). We should replace them with themed 'reform summits' which tackle one key challenge at a time. The EU cannot cope with having IGCs too often – after the Maastricht experience in 1991, the Amsterdam IGC of 1997 was deliberately kept low-key. But it is now time to find more rational ways to deliver reform. An IGC effectively puts the EU into 'constitutional convention' mode, where everything gets brought to the table as member states pile extra issues onto the agenda, and the focus is on fudging the inevitable disagreements. We have seen that the EU is most likely to progress by focusing on specific agreed challenges, like Defence, rather than trying and failing to solve everything at once.

(3) Developing ethos, identity and leadership
The key to successful reform – and an effective, legitimate EU – will be developing the ethos, identity and leadership which can give the EU cohesion and a sense of direction. We will deliver legitimacy by reinventing politics and ensuring that Europe is effective, but we also need to strengthen our shared ethos to encourage positive-sum co-operation – so that Europe's peoples have a clear sense of what Europe is, and what it is not; and so that Europe's policy-makers have a clear vision to guide the reform process.

l   Mission Statement. The EU should make sure that the Millennial Declaration is a genuine Mission statement for the EU, which sets out its values and vision of the EU and the world which it seeks to contribute to, and back this up with concrete pledges which it can meet over the next five years.

l   Understand what makes Europe different. Europe has much in common with the United States, and a love of US popular culture is shared across Europe. But there are key differences. Above all, we value our rich diversity and would reject a homogenous melting-pot; we want prosperity, but understand quality-of-life in less materialistic terms; we value social solidarity as well as social change; we believe in sharing power as well as projecting it. These can underpin a specifically European identity.

l   Match its actions to its values. There is a powerful, if latent, European identity emerging – in our increasingly similar lifestyles, patterns of consumption, values and priorities – but the EU's institutions too often seem to threaten rather than embody it. The EU must be sensitive to customs which are central to national identity and European diversity from double decker buses in the UK to carrot jam in Portugal; and must promote innovation and competition rather than harmonisation. The EU must also tackle the problems which undermine European identity such as fraud, inefficiency and excessive secrecy.

l   Promote European values in the world. The EU should be seen to stand for European values in a global context by supporting multilateralism, democracy, environmental protection, diversity, social conditions, and freedom of speech in institutions like the WTO and the UN, as well as through its humanitarian and military interventions.

Winning the argument

If we understand the nature of Network Europe and reform it in the right way, we have a unique opportunity to build a broad coalition for Europe. But to do this we must first bury the ghosts of federalism and free trade areas so that we can start to define a European dream which is appropriate for our age.

The pro-European case must once again convince Europe's peoples that European integration is something that they need to improve their lives rather than something imposed upon them for political reasons.

The starting point should not be Europe's historic achievements, but the need to co-operate to solve shared problems. There is powerful latent support for this vision in peoples' growing sense of European identity, and their gut feeling that we need to co-operate with others to thrive in an era of global change. The theory of "Network Europe" makes sense of these instincts, and provides the basis for an attractive, forward-looking and unthreatening European future.

But developing fresh thinking for the EU will have benefits that go far beyond our continent. It is not just that regional organisations everywhere will continue to study the EU as they consider their own future co-operation. Developing new forms of legitimacy for this unique system will also help us to reform other multilateral organisations – such as the WTO, UN and IMF – as we seek to reshape politics to ensure that power remains subject to democratic control. A new era of global co-operation and interdependence offers opportunities for progressives, but it cannot be delivered at the expense of the democratic rights that citizens have struggled for centuries to win. So getting the EU right is not just essential for its own sake, but will be a vital element in maintaining the consensus for globalization and developing a new internationalism.[33]

Notes

1. Robert Cooper has spoken about the need to develop spheres of co-operation and competition.
2. The best and most comprehensive discussion of the EU political system is Hix Simon, The Political System of the European Union, Macmillan, London
3. Hall Ben, 1999, Does EMU lead to economic government?, Centre for European Reform, London.
4. Reif K and Schmitt H, 1980, "Nine Second Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for analysisng the European Election Results", European Journal of Political Research, vol 8, no 1.
5. Directorate General X, 1998, Eurobarometer: public Opinion in the European Union, European Commission Brussels.
6. See Leonard Mark, Politics without Frontiers, 1997, Demos, London or Hix Simon, 1995, "Parties at a European level and the legitimacy of EU socio-economic policy", Journal of Common Market Studies, December.
7. Many distinguished people have called for a European Constitution recently including Paddy Asdown, Jonathan Freedland and Andrew Marr in the UK and Wolfgang Schauble and Karl Lamers in Germany. The most convincing and detailed proposal for electing a European President was Laver MJ, Gallagher M, Marsh M, Singh R, and Tonra B, 1995, Electing the President of the European Commission, Trinity College, Dublin.
8. For a full account of this see Young Hugo, 1998, This Blessed Plot, Macmillan, London, or Denman Roy, 1996, Missed Chances, Cassell, London
9. Dedman Martin, 1996, The origins and development of the European Union, 1945-95, Routledge,London.
10. Peter Mandelson MP made this point very eloquently in a speech to a seminar organised by the British Embassy in Bonn in March 1998.
11. Cooper Robert, 1997, The postmodern state and the world order, Demos, London

12. Held David, McGrew Anthony, Goldblatt David, Perraton Jonathan, 1999, Globalization, The Foreign Policy Centre, London.
13. Synergy Brand Values Ltd., Insight 97: a survey into social change, BMRB, London.
14. Marr Andrew, "Perils of ethnic purity", The Observer, 4 July 1999, London.
15. Kennedy Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.
16. Peter Mandelson made this point in a speech in a CER/Prospect lecture in Brussels in June 1999.
17. Directorate General X, 1998, Eurobarometer: public Opinion in the European Union, European Commission Brussels.
18. Directorate General X, 1998, Eurobarometer: public Opinion in the European Union, European Commission Brussels.
19. Millward Alan, 1992, The European Rescue of the Nation State, Routledge, London.
20. Fukuyama Francis, The Great Disruption.
21. This account of the Visa model has been drawn from Mulgan Geoff and Briscoe Ivan, The Society of Networks: A New Model of the Information Super Highway and the Communications Supermarket, Demos, London.
22. Hix Simon, 1998, "The Study of the European Union: the 'new governance' agenda and its rival", European Public Policy, March 1998.
23. Peter Mandelson MP made this point in a speech to a seminar organised by the British Embassy in Bonn in March 1998.
24. Leonard Mark, 1997, Politics without Frontiers: the role of political parties in Europe's future, Demos, London.
25. Hix Simon, 1998, "The Study of the European Union: the 'new governance' agenda and its rival", European Public Policy, March 1998.
26. Hix Simon, 1999, The Political System of the European Union, Macmillan, London.
27. Hall Ben, 1999, "A new model of integration", Centre For European Reform Briefing, Centre For European Reform, London.
28. Edwards Geoffrey and Philippart Eric, forthcoming, Theorising European Integration: the role of the IGC.
29. Mulgan Geoff, 1997, Connexity: how to live in a connected world, Chatto & Windus, London.
30. Aron R, 1954, The Century of total war, Doubleday, Garden city.
31. Smith AD, 1992, 'National Identity and the Idea of European Unity', International Affairs, London.
32. Hix Simon, 1998, "Choosing Europe", Eurovisions, Demos, London.
33. Held David, McGrew Anthony, Goldblatt David, Perraton Jonathan, 1999, Globalization, The Foreign Policy Centre, London.

GLOBALIZATION   KEY CONCEPTS, Number One
David Held & Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt & Jonathan Perraton
April 12th 1999; £4.95, plus £1 p+p.
Globalization is the buzz-word of the age – but how many people understand it?
In this much-needed concise and authoritative guide, globalization's leading
theorists thrash out what it really means, and argue that we need to rethink
politics to keep up with the changing shape of power. Globalization launches the
Key Concepts series – holding all of the hidden assumptions behind foreign
policy up to the light, and unpacking the key terms to find out what they really
mean for policy-makers today.

'An indispensable counterweight to optimists and pessimists alike'
Will Hutton

MAKING THE COMMONWEALTH MATTER – INTERIM REPORT
Kate Ford and Sunder Katwala
April 26th 1999 (50th Anniversary of Commonwealth); £4.95, plus £1 p+p.
This exciting, influential and controversial report has sparked off the most
lively debate about the Commonwealth's future for many years. It shows how a
more effective, equal and valued Commonwealth could connect more with its 1.6
billion people, enhancing its contribution to our multiethnic societies, to
human rights and to prosperity.

'The biggest shake-up of the Commonwealth since it was set up in its present
form 50 years ago' The Independent on Sunday
'The ideas will have to be taken seriously' Daily Mail

BRITAIN AS EUROPE: A Thousand Years of History
Linda Colley
The leading historian of British identity shows that Eurosceptic myths of
'Europe and Britain' as separate and monolithic distort Britain's long European
history, and misrepresents the nature of Continental Europe in the past and
today.

Subscribe to The Foreign Policy Centre
From only £25 per year, you will receive the following benefits:

l   FREE copy of GLOBALIZATION
l   At least 6 Foreign Policy Centre publications
l   1 / 3 off other Foreign Policy Centre publications
l   The Foreign Policy Centre Quarterly Newsletter
l   Regular mailings with full details of all Foreign Policy Centre
publications and events
l   Sizeable discounts on all Foreign Policy Centre events

Please order below: by cheque payable to The Foreign Policy Centre with card
number and expiry date or by invoice (institutions only)

            Type of Subscription   Price
(please tick)   n   Individuals £50
     n   Concessions £25
           (Students, OAPs, JSA)
     n   Organisations   £150

```
    n     Libraries   £200
          (will receive ALL publications)
```

Concessions will be asked for proof of status.

Personal details
Name: Ms/Mrs/Mr
Address
Postcode
Tel   Fax
e-mail
Organisation
Return with payment to The Foreign Policy Centre, Panton House,
25 Haymarket, London, SW1Y 4EN T 0171 925 1800