Array ( [0] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8385 [post_author] => 70 [post_date] => 2025-09-09 00:01:43 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-09-08 23:01:43 [post_content] => The 80^th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), opening on Tuesday 9 September 2025 in New York, might mark the end of the UN’s human rights pillar as we know it.   The United Nations (UN) is being reshaped: What is unfolding is a strategic campaign to control who gets to speak, what can be said, and which values survive. The withdrawal of the United States (US) from multilateralism has, once again, created space that China is now readily occupying – whilst the UN Secretariat looks the other way. A particular responsibility now rests with France and, notably, the United Kingdom (UK) as permanent members of the Security Council to uphold the values the institution was built up to achieve 80 years ago.   The reorientation of the US involves withdrawing support from key multilateral bodies.^[1] This is not the first time the US has distanced itself from the UN system: under President George W. Bush, the US disengaged from climate and human rights mechanisms, while Trump’s first term (2017-2021) saw a more sweeping retreat from multilateralism.^[2] His administration withdrew from the Human Rights Council, UNESCO, the WHO, and the Paris Agreement, and repeatedly attacked the legitimacy of the UN itself — reflecting a longstanding hostility toward multilateral institutions within the Republican establishment, exemplified by figures like Ambassador John Bolton.^[3]   This exodus created a vacuum each time. This time, China is moving in to fill it — and has, indeed, methodically prepared for this moment through a four-part strategy: fill the void left by US retreat and Western lethargy; weaken independent civil society access; control the narrative through proxies and silence dissent; and escape accountability for mass atrocities.   Firstly, China’s ascent in the UN is about setting new terms of debate. By inserting vague references to ‘mutual respect’, ‘non-interference’, and ‘cultural values’ into UN human rights language, it is eroding the normative clarity of international human rights standards — and facing little resistance from Western states.^[4]   Secondly, China is silencing critical civil society voices before they can even enter the room. Independent NGOs struggle to gain or maintain accreditation, while government-organised NGOs — entities that serve as state mouthpieces — are amplified.^[5] These proxies praise Beijing’s record, attack critics, and reframe human rights as a matter of development alone. In short, China is ‘choking civil society’ at the United Nations and securing a self-congratulatory performance for itself.^[6]   This redefinition of norms and participation cannot succeed without silence. That is why China’s repression is not merely a domestic concern. As recognised by the G7 recently, diaspora communities are monitored, threatened, and harassed. Systematic surveillance and intimidation of Uyghurs and Tibetans by Chinese agents operating under diplomatic cover has become a reality throughout Europe, as the Transnational Repression (TNR) in the UK Working Group also documented in its evidence submitted to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on transnational repression in the UK.^[7] China’s surveillance of civil society abroad is codified within its Overseas NGO Law, enacted in 2016, and constitutes an essential component of the silencing of Chinese dissent internationally.^[8] China’s targeting of dissent abroad is the third pillar of its strategy to control the narrative on the global stage.   Finally, while reshaping the UN from within and silencing dissent, China simultaneously contributes to undermining the institution’s authority. Nowhere is this clearer than in the response to grave abuses in Xinjiang. In 2022, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a landmark assessment, detailing allegations of arbitrary detention of hundreds of thousands people, torture, sexual violence, forced labour, family separation, and the systemic persecution of Uyghurs and other minorities through a legal and policy framework that enables ongoing persecution.^[9] These findings pointed to possible crimes against humanity.^[10] Yet the Human Rights Council vote to even debate the Xinjiang report was defeated.^[11] Since then, no accountability has been secured.   In this context, the UK has a unique responsibility — and opportunity — to step up as a principled leader on human rights and multilateralism. As the FPC’s recent report underscores, the UK’s credibility depends on consistency: defending universal human rights through policy, diplomacy, and resource allocation.^[12] This includes calling out transnational repression, resisting the erosion of civil society access at the UN, and backing concrete reforms that ensure the human rights pillar remains central to the UN’s future.   A group of human rights leaders assembled through Human Rights Compass, recommended the establishment of a cross-regional leadership coalition for human rights, modelled on the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. Driven by states from all regions, the coalition could counterbalance efforts to hijack the system.^[13] Given the unique reach of Britain’s diplomatic presence, and the UK’s responsibility and role as permanent member of the Security Council, it could be well placed to lead such an effort at the occasion of the 80^th General Assembly.   In this sense, the President of the 80^th General Assembly, Annalena Baerbock, has rightly placed human rights at the heart of the UNGA High-Level Week. UNGA80 could serve as the moment where states agree to embed rights-based approaches into peacebuilding, humanitarian response, and sustainable development.   The credibility of the United Nations is being drained, quietly and strategically. A UN that cannot speak freely, include independent voices, or address grave violations is no longer a forum for international law. It becomes a stage for repression, dressed in multilateral clothing.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   Florian Irminger is President of Progress & Change Action Lab and member of the Foreign Policy Centre’s Advisory Council.     ^[1] The White House, Withdrawing the United States from and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations, February 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-and-ending-funding-to-certain-united-nations-organizations-and-reviewing-united-states-support-to-all-international-organizations/ ^[2] Rajesh Sahu, The Missing Nexus: A Historical and Contemporary Position of the United States, Journal of Communication, November 2023, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00208817231204663; George W. Bush, White House archives, President Bush Addresses the United Nations General Assembly, September 2007, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070925-4.html ^[3] John Bolton, U.S. Ambassador to the UN speech on reform, YouTube, posted by HipHughes, March 2006, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOINBs8eOdk ^[4] Vivian Sun, China’s Human Rights Discourse: Reshaping the International Framework – Part One, Human Rights Research Center, November 2024, https://www.humanrightsresearch.org/post/china-s-human-rights-discourse-reshaping-the-international-framework-part-one; UN News, China’s Foreign Minister stresses principle of non‑interference at UN debate, September 2012, https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/09/421682; China (Wang Yi, Minister for Foreign Affairs), Statement at the UN General Assembly General Debate (79th Session), September 2024, https://gadebate.un.org/en/79/china ^[5] Devex, For many human rights NGOs, UN access remains out of reach, February 2020, https://www.devex.com/news/for-many-human-rights-ngos-un-access-remains-out-of-reach-96516 ^[6] Rana Siu Inboden, China at the UN: Choking Civil Society, Journal of Democracy, July 2021, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-at-the-un-choking-civil-society/ ^[7] Tackling TNR in the UK Working Group, UK Parliament Human Rights Joint Committee, Written evidence submitted by Tackling TNR in the UK Working Group (TRUK0154), September 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/138140/pdf/; Foreign Policy Centre, Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group, August 2025, https://fpc.org.uk/tackling-transnational-repression-in-the-uk-working-group/; G7 (Group of Seven), G7 Leaders’ Statement on Transnational Repression, June 2025, https://g7.canada.ca/en/news-and-media/news/g7-leaders-statement-on-transnational-repression/ ^[8] U.S.-Asia Law Institute, Securitizing Overseas Nonprofit Work in China: Five years of the Overseas NGO Law framework and its new application to academic institutions, November 2021, https://usali.org/usali-perspectives-blog/securitizing-overseas-nonprofit-work-in-china ^[9] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China, August 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchr-assessment-human-rights-concerns-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region ^[10] Human Rights Watch, China: UN needs to address crimes against humanity, August 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/08/27/china-un-needs-address-crimes-against-humanity ^[11] Amnesty International, China: Xinjiang vote failure betrays core mission of UN Human Rights Council, October 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/10/china-xinjiang-vote-failure-betrays-core-mission-of-un-human-rights-council/ ^[12] Poppy Ogier, Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy, Foreign Policy Centre, September 2025, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/playing-to-our-strengths-the-future-of-the-uks-soft-power-in-foreign-policy/ ^[13] Progress & Change Action Lab, Human Rights Compass: Real‑Time Policy Analysis & Advocacy, June 2025, https://progress-change-actionlab.org/human-rights-compass#kpg_209169 [post_title] => Op ed: US Retreat from Multilateralism: Open Doors for Chinese Repression [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-us-retreat-from-multilateralism-open-doors-for-chinese-repression [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-09-08 13:42:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-09-08 12:42:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8385 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [1] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6808 [post_author] => 70 [post_date] => 2023-03-30 10:19:56 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-03-30 09:19:56 [post_content] => An arsonist is (once again) presiding over the international firefighting institution. However, there are steps states and civil society can take to push back during Russia’s Presidency of the UN Security Council in April.   On 24 February 2022, Ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya from Ukraine called upon his peers at the table of the United Nations Security Council to do the right thing: “Call [President] Putin, call [Foreign Minister] Lavrov to stop aggression!”[1]  It would have been the right thing to do for any President of the Security Council on that day. But the Security Council was not presided over by anybody; Russia’s Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya was the chair in February 2022.   Ambassador Nebenzya will once again take over the rotating presidency of the Security Council in April 2023, the very institution tasked to safeguard “the maintenance of international peace and security.”[2]   This presidency must be used as an opportunity to shame Russia and raise key thematic concerns highlighting Russia’s responsibility for war crimes in Ukraine and against the Ukrainian people. There are four areas of work, which can - and should - be addressed by States and civil society at the Security Council this April:  

• Raise publicly the issue of protection of children in armed conflicts: Security Council resolution 2225 establishes abduction of children as a trigger to list parties to armed conflict in the annual report of the Secretary General on the issue.[3] As the International Criminal Court Pre-Trial Chamber issued warrants of arrest for the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s Commissioner for Children’s Rights, the Security Council has the opportunity to discuss the situation of children in armed conflict again, with reports from the ground in Ukraine and from the Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry, which itself reported on the abduction of Ukrainian children by Russian forces.[4] States should request for the Council to hold such a briefing; should the presidency refuse or not include it in the programme of work, member states should hold a public event — for example under the Arria-Formula— of their own with high-level speakers.[5] The Secretary General is to publish his annual report on the issue in June, and not addressing the issue during Russia’s presidency would be a failure.

 

• Shed the light on the repression against freedom of expression in Russia: We cannot ignore that Putin’s war against Ukraine comes amidst two decades of repression and criminalisation of dissent. Just days ago, Moscow police raided the homes of nine staff and board members of Memorial, one of Russia’s leading human rights organisations and a co-recipient of the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize. Russia’s presidency provides an opportunity to thematise the interrelation between peace and stability, human rights, and the rule of law.[6] Seventy one states had signed up to such an intention through the Appeal of 13 June.[7] Human rights should be better integrated into the work of the Council, but the opportunity to seize in April is rather to discuss how repression of dissent, opposition, independent media and civil society is an early warning sign of potential regional instability.[8] Russia is in this way a case study, upon which Council members should shine a spotlight.

 

• Take action to address the environmental disaster of the war: The Security Council should take action firstly in welcoming the work of the UN International Law Commission, which adopted its Draft principles on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts.[9] Based on that action, it should recognise the importance of the activities undertaken by the UN Environment Programme in Ukraine in relation to the war and mandate an assessment of the impact of the war in Ukraine on the environment to be presented to the Council swiftly.

 

• States should hold the presidency to the rules of procedure of the Council: Security Council member states must prepare their diplomats to lead “floor fights” against the presidency on the interpretation and respect of the rules of procedures of the Council and the United Nations Charter itself. Holding Russia accountable to UN rules of procedures are “necessary fights” in order to highlight the responsibility of a permanent member of the Security Council towards the institution and, in the words of the Preamble of the UN Charter, “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” In order to avoid the scenes of 24 February 2022, states must compel Ambassador Nebenzya, in order to “for the proper fulfilment of the responsibilities of the presidency” to step aside during the consideration of issues directly connected to the Russian Federation, as foreseen by rule 20 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure.[10] However, this will not suffice; should there be a renewed attempt in April to vote on a Security Council resolution — in fact Ukraine and its allies would be well inspired to once again come to the table of the Security Council — member states should require explanation from the presidency and interpretation by the Secretariat of the duty foreseen in paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the UN Charter that “a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”[11]

  When an arsonist is playing the firefighter, you cannot continue business as usual. Making use of the mechanisms provided by the institutions is a way to ensure that Russia does not have a comfortable month at the presidency of the United Nations Security Council. The above outlined actions would in no way hamper the Council’s ability to function in April, utilising the spirit of “compartmentalistion” in order to avoid the Council being blocked.[12] Yet taking these steps would ensure that Russia’s leadership of the Council is never again just a normal presidency.     Florian Irminger, a member of FPC’s Advisory Council, is a dedicated strategist for human rights and climate justice advocacy. Over the past two decades, he has served as a local elected official, as secretary general of a national political party, and in leadership positions of local and international NGOs. Florian’s experience extends from Europe to the United Nations, Central Asia to Central Africa, Baku to Minsk through Kyiv. He led Human Rights House Foundation’s advocacy, in which function he was instrumental in securing the attention of the Security Council to the situation in Crimea, including through organising the first events and Arria Formula briefings at the United Nations.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   [1]  Alex Leff, The impassioned plea from Ukraine's U.N. ambassador to Russia to stop the war, npr news, 24 February 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/02/24/1082806285/ukraine-ambassador-russia-security-council   [2] Security Council Presidency, United Nations Security Council, December 2022, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/presidency   [3] Security Council Resolution 2225, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 21 September 2017, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/document/security-council-resolution-2225/   [4] Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, International Criminal Court, 17 March 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and; Laura Gozzi, Deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia is war crime - UN, BBC News, 16 March 2023, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64985009   [5] Arria-Formula Meetings, UN Security Council Working Methods, Security Council Report, 16 December 2020, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/arria-formula-meetings.php   [6] Rachel Denber, Russia Opens New Case against Memorial, Human Rights Watch, 21 March 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/21/russia-opens-new-case-against-memorial   [7] Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland launches the appeal of June 13th to put Human Rights at the Heart of Conflict Prevention: “Security and human rights make a perfect match", The Federal Council, Switzerland Government, 13 June 2016, https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-62152.html   [8] Joanna Weschler, Human rights and the Security Council: practical steps to build effectiveness, Universal Rights Group Geneva, 12 December 2022, https://www.universal-rights.org/blog/human-rights-and-the-security-council-practical-steps-to-build-effectiveness/   [9] Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, International Law Commission, 22 September 2022, https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/8_7.shtml   [10] Provisional Rules of Procedure, Chapter IV: Presidency, United Nations Security Council, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/rop/chapter-4   [11] Composition, Article 13, United Nations Charter, Chapter V: The Security Council, United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-5   [12] Sebastian von Einsiedel et al, The UN Security Council in an Age of Great Power Rivalry, United Nations University Working Paper Series Number 04, February 2015, https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6112/UNSCAgeofPowerRivalry.pdf   [post_title] => Russia’s Presidency of the UN Security Council – how States and Civil Society should respond [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => russias-presidency-of-the-un-security-council-how-states-and-civil-society-should-respond [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-03-30 10:43:04 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-03-30 09:43:04 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6808 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) )