Array ( [0] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 9097 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-07-23 01:00:45 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-07-23 00:00:45 [post_content] => Democracy, for me, means accountable institutions anchored in the rule of law. It is not just about elections. Rather, it is everything that happens between elections to ensure people have access to three core values: dignity, safety, and a sense of belonging to a healthy and free society.   Moldova is experiencing the ruptures in the international rules-based order deeply. As Ukraine's neighbour, we are close to the frontline of its efforts to defend its sovereignty and European security. From the first day of Russia's full-scale invasion, we have faced threats to our own security, concerted efforts to undermine our democratic institutions, and a huge influx of refugees.^[1]   Moldova is a small country of 2.6 million people, yet in the first months of the war we hosted nearly one million Ukrainian refugees. Our society has not fractured – and Moldovan civil society has been instrumental in sustaining that cohesion, working alongside government and international partners.   The bravery and resilience shown by both Ukrainians and Moldovans is a source of hope. Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression. And despite unprecedented Russian misinformation and interference in the 2024 EU referendum and our presidential and parliamentary elections, Moldova remains on the path towards EU integration.^[2]   But we should not take our democracy, or public support for it, for granted.   Leaders say that we are living in a complex and chaotic world. Yet acknowledging this complexity is far from enough. We need our leaders to develop a realistic vision rooted in the value of human life – and to calibrate their promises to people's basic expectations. This requires the courage to listen to what the electorate tells them, especially when they are saying they need to live safe, dignified, and meaningful lives.   I believe the first expectation is to maintain peace and security. This is the core request any population makes of its leaders. The second is sustainable development, which means development rooted in democratic values. These are the foundations upon which citizens choose to place their trust in elected representatives and institutions.  

Accountability when It matters most

At the same time, in any healthy democracy, our leaders need to hold themselves accountable to high ethical standards, transparency, and respect for the rule of law. These principles matter most when they are politically inconvenient, and when applying them carries a cost. There can be no exceptions.   Democratic resilience cannot be measured only by how institutions respond to national crises. It must also be measured by how they respond to individual citizens in moments of vulnerability. An investigation into the death of Ludmila Vartic, in March 2026,  is one such test – and it goes to the heart of what democratic accountability means in practice.^[3] Ludmila was a mother of two and kindergarten teacher in Hâncești, who committed suicide after years of domestic abuse. Her husband held public office and carried a party card from the governing party. The criminal investigation was opened only after sustained pressure from her family. Dumitru Vartic was eventually charged with domestic violence resulting in death. The case remains ongoing.   Ludmila’s case highlights the wider societal problem of violence against women and girls in Moldova – a problem not unique to Moldova, but faced by societies around the world. It underscores the need for a more effective and consistent response from the state. A society that tolerates violence against women is not a society that offers freedom, safety, and dignity to all its citizens.   Moldova has the necessary legislation in place. It has ratified international conventions on violence against women. The question raised by the Vartic case is therefore not whether legal protections exist, but whether they are applied equally and consistently, regardless of who is implicated.   Accountability cannot be a selective virtue. Too often, in Moldova as elsewhere, politicians invoke democratic principles loudly from opposition and quietly set them aside once in office. The real measure of democratic maturity is not what leaders promise before they reach power – it is what they do when the inconvenient moment arrives: when the accused is an ally, when the investigation touches their own circle, when acting on principle carries a political cost. That is the moment that defines whether a democracy is real or merely performed.   The strongest argument Moldova can make for its European future is not the declarations its leaders make in Brussels. It is what its institutions do for people like Ludmila Vartic.   Moldova is at the most consequential moment in its post-Soviet history – granted EU candidate status in 2022, with accession negotiations opened in 2024. Some argue this is not the moment to risk destabilisation. I reject that framing: a democracy built on selective accountability is not one that Europe should admit, nor one that will endure.   The Vartic case is a reminder that democracy's credibility is always being tested – not in grand moments of constitutional design, but in the ordinary and often painful questions of whether institutions show up for people when it matters. Moldova has demonstrated, through its response to the refugee crisis, that a society can hold together under extraordinary pressure when the conditions of dignity, belonging, and security are actively maintained. But these conditions are not self-sustaining. They require leadership that is honest enough to acknowledge when they are being undermined – and institutions willing to take action in response.  

What democracy requires

Moldova's experience is not unique. Across this series, contributors have approached these questions from different angles but arrived at a comparable place: that trust erodes slowly before it breaks visibly; that what autocrats destroy first is not infrastructure but dignity, memory, and the capacity for agency; that disengagement is rarely apathy – it is fear. The formal architecture of democracy rests on foundations that are human before they are political. When people lack security, dignity, and belonging, no institutional design recovers them. When they have them, extraordinary things become possible.   The work ahead is not to restore a model that has run its course. It is to understand, honestly, what people actually need to live free and meaningful lives – and to build the political, cultural, and civic conditions in which that becomes possible.   That requires courage: the courage to listen, as much as the courage to speak. And the courage to collaborate across diversity and divides.   Democracy, in the end, is not defined only by what happens on election day. It is defined by what happens every day.     Explore the full mini-series here.   Liliana Gutan is a 2010 John Smith Fellow from Moldova. In her capacity as a member of the National Secretariat responsible for the successful implementation of these initiatives, the focus of Liliana’s work over the last three years has been on the Moldovan Chairmanships. This includes the organisation of numerous regional high level meetings, summits and conferences.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] Benedicta Solf and Casey O’Neill, Moldova Shoulders Disproportionately Large Ukrainian Population, in the Shadow of the European Union and Russia, Migration Policy Institute, December 2025, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/moldova-ukrainian-refugees ^[2] Stephen McGrath, Moldova narrowly votes to secure path toward EU membership after accusing Russie of interference, AP News, October 2024, https://apnews.com/article/moldova-elections-eu-referendum-russia-325cb2c13beb1d76565a6e2aadef971a; Claire Gilbody Dickerson, ‘Massive’ election interference by Russia, Moldovan officials say in decisive presidential vote, Sky News, November 2024, https://news.sky.com/story/massive-election-interference-by-russia-moldovan-officials-say-in-decisive-presidential-vote-13247385; Sarah Rainsford and Paul Kirby, Moldova’s pro-EU party wins vote mired in claims of Russian interference, BBC News, September 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx2rdlj8ejgo ^[3] Moldpres, Head of State on domestic violence and Ludmila Vartic case: We need justice, not speculation, May 2026, https://www.moldpres.md/eng/society/head-of-state-on-domestic-violence-and-ludmila-vartic-case-we-need-justice-not-speculation [post_title] => Beyond the Ballot Box: Democracy Is What Happens Between Elections [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => beyond-the-ballot-box-democracy-is-what-happens-between-elections [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-07-10 15:59:22 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-07-10 14:59:22 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=9097 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [1] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 9101 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-07-22 01:00:37 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-07-22 00:00:37 [post_content] => A turning point is approaching for the Belarusian Democratic Forces, which emerged in response to the rigged presidential elections in 2020. They have begun to lose momentum after six years of tireless advocacy for democratic change – and it is time for the movement to have a serious conversation about its current shape and strategic direction.   Negotiations between the US and Belarusian authorities, which resulted in the release of hundreds of political prisoners, have deepened divisions within the movement into two opposing camps: the supporters of the hard-pressure approach that allows no compromise until the regime is defeated, and the proponents of a flexible approach that accepts limited concessions as a means of securing incremental gains. This dilemma revealed much more than differences in tactics. It exposed a rupture around the fundamental question: what kind of political actor must the democratic movement become if it is to reclaim Belarus? Every geopolitical shift — negotiations over prisoners, the end of the war in Ukraine, changing Western priorities — will only deepen the divisions and further delay the prospect of returning home.   The divide therefore runs deeper than tactics. It highlighted the very qualities that have sustained the movement over the past six years. Since 2020, it has drawn strength from shared memory, moral clarity, and organisational durability in the face of repression, exile and war. These qualities were essential for survival, but are insufficient for development.   Resistance preserves identity under pressure. However, it offers little guidance on how to prevail against a regime that has repeatedly proven more violent, adaptable, and strategically agile. Resilience, by contrast, requires the capacity to adapt without losing that identity. The question, then, is whether the movement has mistaken preserving its existing form for the ability to evolve — confusing resilience for resistance, organisational visibility for political viability.   Rebuilding political viability requires restoring three capacities that both repression and geopolitical turbulence have gradually eroded.   1. Continuity of political meaning beyond the life-span of the current movement. Belarus has experienced three major waves of democratic mobilisation in the 21^st century alone: in 2006, 2010, and 2020. Yet the history of the movement for our independence and European orientation goes back centuries. The regime does its best to break the chain of memory by obliterating historical milestones and replacing them with a state-sponsored narrative centred solely on the “Great Patriotic War”. Sometimes we contribute to this ourselves: each new generation believes the predecessors are not worth exploration if they have not succeeded – and they eventually replenish the ranks themselves. Yet democratic movements survive not through uninterrupted victories but through continuity of meaning. Otherwise every new mobilisation begins from zero.   2. The second capacity is autonomous political agency. Operating in exile, the movement naturally relies on international support. However,  agency should not be built on external validation alone, such as through meetings with foreign country leaders and participation at global political fora. Legitimacy cannot be outsourced. A political actor that increasingly depends on outside confirmation is vulnerable to changing geopolitical priorities. And vice versa — it stays democratic and durable as long as it embodies the interests of the people it seeks to serve. No amount of international recognition can substitute for a living connection between democratic actors and the people they seek to serve.   3. Third, and perhaps most demanding of all, is the capacity for self-reflection and, consequently, adaptation. It requires honesty about our successes and failures, an awareness about the changing context, and acknowledging our structural limits to prevent us from falling into obsolete ways of thinking. Democratic movements fail not only when they lose their values, but also when they become unable to distinguish those values from the strategies once used to defend them. The former should endure; the latter should evolve. Сonfusing the two turns adaptation into betrayal and criticism into disloyalty. It takes a lot of courage to be intellectually and emotionally honest with oneself and to be able to admit the necessity of revision. But it is an important marker of a movement’s political maturity and a precondition for further growth.   Democratic movements can survive organisationally while collapsing politically. The Belarusian Democratic Forces risk precisely this: preserving their form while losing the capacity to act as a genuine political subject. This also has implications for foreign engagement: support is most effective when it contributes to adaptive political capacity rather than reinforcing institutional visibility.   To prevent the negative scenario, the movement should return to the fundamental question that structures this argument — what kind of political actor must the movement become if it is to shape Belarus’s future rather than be shaped by the country’s decline and shifting geopolitical realities?     Explore the full mini-series here.   Palina Brodik is co-founder and director of the Free Belarus Center, a member of the Coordination Council of Belarus and an official CCB delegate to the Congress of Regional and Local Authorities under the Council of Europe.  Palina has over a decade of experience in human rights and election observation. She has collaborated with organisations including UNDP in Ukraine and Belarus, the US-based Advocates for Human Rights, and the Center for Civil Liberties and has taken part in international and domestic election observation missions. She has coordinated the Eastern European edition of the Personal Democracy Forum and the Ostrogski Forum, as well as four seasons of the festival of Belarusian culture and activism "Hučna Fest".   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   [post_title] => Resistance Is Not Enough: Rethinking the Belarusian Democratic Movement [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => resistance-is-not-enough-rethinking-the-belarusian-democratic-movement [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-07-10 15:58:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-07-10 14:58:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=9101 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [2] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 9090 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-07-20 01:00:45 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-07-20 00:00:45 [post_content] => Civil society is how citizens can hold power to account. But what happens when organisations that exist to defend democratic life are no longer trusted to do so?   In functioning democracies, the answer barely needs asking. Transparent government, free expression, the right to challenge power and insist on the truth, all depend on a civil society that people believe in. It is through civil society that citizens engage with one another, mobilise in times of need, protect human rights, and advocate for change. When that belief erodes, so does the accountability it sustains.   For authoritarian governments, this erosion is not a problem. It is a strategy.   We are living in a time of profound uncertainty. The international rules-based order is no longer guaranteed. As authoritarianism and populism gain ground and democratic values come under pressure, civil society finds itself on the front line – and the forces working against it are organised and deliberate.  

Propaganda, legal threats, and institutional failings are making civil society more vulnerable

Kyrgyzstan is a clear example of how civil society can become vulnerable. In April 2024, the country passed a law on ‘foreign representatives’, requiring NGOs that receive foreign funding to register with the government – echoing Russia's and Georgia's foreign agent laws, though without the same criminal liability.^[1] This reflects a broader trend: growing authoritarianism and a shrinking civic space that make it harder for citizens and organisations to speak out.   Kyrgyzstan is not an isolated case. Across countries like Russia, Belarus, Georgia, and other Central Asian countries, the pattern is the same: governments are using legal pressure and narrative control to delegitimise the organisations that hold them accountable. In Russia, organised civil society and NGOs have been systematically portrayed as a threat to traditional values and national identity – and that same propaganda playbook is being exported across the region, eroding credibility of civil society organisations beyond its borders.   The threat is not solely external however. Parts of the NGO sector have been undermining their own credibility by remaining overly donor-centric, lacking transparency and failing to communicate their work and impact effectively to the public.   The effect of this sustained pressure on civil society and internal shortcomings is a loss of trust. People no longer believe that civil society organisations tell the truth, stand for something, or have anything meaningful to offer.   And when the connection between people and civil society breaks down, civil society can no longer fulfil its democratic function. The gap between organisations and the communities they exist to serve becomes a gap that weakens democracy.  

So how should civil society respond?

Some of the challenges are practical: funding, legal pressure, hostile information environments. But the deeper challenge is rebuilding trust and relevance. Old approaches and instruments are no longer enough. Civil society organisations need to think critically about how they are reaching people, how they come across, and whether they truly understand the context in which they operate.   Starting internally: transparency, accountability, and effectiveness are vital. Suspicions that NGOs are ineffective or opaque are widespread, and organisations need to take this seriously. Trust is rebuilt through actions, not just communication.   Yet internal renewal is only half the work. The deeper challenge is rebuilding the connection with communities – and that begins with an honest reckoning about how that connection was lost in the first place. It means going to where people already are: the school gate, the local market, the community group, the places where trust is built through presence rather than broadcast. It means speaking in a language that people recognise and not jargon that requires explaining. And it means reducing financial dependence on external donors by developing more diversified, locally rooted funding – through the public sector, social entrepreneurship, and direct community support.   Organisations need to be clear about both the work they do and what they stand for. The issues that civil society organisations address are often the issues that matter to people. When organisations can clearly demonstrate their relevance and impact, trust becomes easier to build and sustain.   Finally, where possible, constructive dialogue with governments should not be abandoned. Civil society organisations should seek to cooperate on practical, less politically contested challenges, building confidence and relationships before attempting to address more difficult issues.  

What leaders need in this moment

Civil society may be losing the narrative battle – but that does not mean war is lost. Leaders need a clear-eyed understanding of how we got here and what is at stake.   The forces working against democracy and civil society – authoritarianism, populism, propaganda, misinformation – are organised, deliberate, and adaptive. Responding to these forces requires not just resilience, but the willingness to change: to be honest about failure, to engage with people where they are, and to earn trust rather than assume it.   The goal is not simply to survive. It is to rebuild the kind of civil society that people feel belongs to them, one that reflects their concerns, speaks to their realities, and importantly, one that they would fight to defend.   Ultimately, trust cannot be demanded, it must be earned, sustained, and renewed over time.     Explore the full mini-series here.   Joldoshbek Osmonov is the team leader of the Civic Engagement for Development Project in Kyrgyzstan funded by the Swiss Development Agency. He has extensive work experience in international development organisations, think tanks, and the civil society sector and possesses strong expertise in civil society, governance, public policy, and local politics. Joldoshbek holds a master’s degree in public administration from the University of Pennsylvania, the United States, and BA in international relations from the American University of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, April 2024, Law Targeting Foreign-Funded NGOs Sends Chill Through Kyrgyz Civil Society, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-foreign-agents-chill/32893000.html [post_title] => Civil Society Organisations Are Losing the Narrative War – How Can Trust Be Rebuilt? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => civil-society-organisations-are-losing-the-narrative-war-how-can-trust-be-rebuilt [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-07-10 15:57:40 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-07-10 14:57:40 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=9090 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [3] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 9086 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-07-20 01:00:17 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-07-20 00:00:17 [post_content] => In Central Asia, citizens have not simply lost faith in institutions. They have stopped expecting institutions to deserve it.   Citizens are curious about reform, transparency, opportunity, participation, and modernisation. However, their everyday experience may be shaped by uneven services, opaque decision-making, limited civic space, or institutions that respond more readily to status than to need. And yet the instinct is to treat this as something politics alone can fix. It cannot. Trust is not primarily a political product; it is a learned disposition.   In such an environment, ‘leading by example’ is not a soft moral appeal. It is the structural basis of credibility. Where authority is culturally important, public conduct carries unusual weight; people watch whether officials, educators, business leaders, and civic actors behave according to the standards they ask others to accept. Trust is built when words and actions repeatedly meet.  

Education as democratic infrastructure

Trust is too often treated as a political problem to be solved only by policy: new laws, new strategies, new platforms, or new communications campaigns. These matter, but they are not enough. People learn, often early, whether cooperation is safe, whether disagreement is dangerous, whether success requires domination, and whether institutions deserve patience when they make mistakes. Education is therefore the overlooked foundation of democratic resilience, not because schools can replace politics, but because they form the habits of mind that make healthy politics possible.   This requires thinking about education more broadly than curriculum reform. It means treating classrooms, youth programmes, universities and informal learning spaces as laboratories of social behaviour. One powerful mechanism is gamification – designing learning environments that teach the logic of mutual gain. This is not about points and prizes. It is about showing young people, through experience, that achievement and contribution are not opposites. Too much public life is organised around zero-sum instincts: if one group advances, another must lose; if one entrepreneur succeeds, society has been exploited; if one community receives attention, another has been forgotten.   A better educational design can show young people that achievement and contribution are not opposites. A student can ‘win’ by building a business model that also solves a local problem. A team can score higher when it helps another team improve. A simulated city, school budget, or environmental challenge can reward cooperation, long-term thinking and shared benefits rather than only individual victory.   This matters in Central Asia because social cohesion cannot be imported through abstract democratic language. The region’s histories, hierarchies, kinship networks, respect for elders, and expectations of authority differ from Western European civic models. A copied template may sound progressive while failing to speak to local trust dynamics. Gamified education can translate democratic habits into lived experience: negotiation, responsibility, reciprocity, compromise, and service. It can show that success does not have to mean someone else’s defeat. That lesson, absorbed early, is a quiet defence against polarisation later.   A second mechanism is debate culture. Debate is not simply public speaking, nor is it the performance of defeating an opponent. At its best, it teaches a harder civic discipline: to hold a position firmly while remaining genuinely open to being changed by another argument. This is one of the deepest foundations of democratic life. A person who has practiced fair debate learns that disagreement is not betrayal, that criticism is not always an attack, and that losing an argument need not mean losing dignity. In societies where authority is often protected from challenge, debate culture can create respectful forms of questioning. It does not require young people to reject elders, institutions or tradition. It teaches them how to examine claims, ask for evidence and recognise complexity without collapsing into cynicism.   The difficulty is that most policy thinking moves in the opposite direction. It is top-down, structural and short-cycle. Governments and donors want measurable outcomes within a funding period. NGOs, especially in Central Asia, often work with precarious financing and constrained civic space, which pushes them toward safe projects, narrow indicators, and cautious language. But trust grows slowly. It needs continuity, repetition, and relationships. A three-month campaign cannot undo years of suspicion. A digital platform cannot substitute for credible behaviour. The most important work may be the least visible: a teacher who models fairness, a youth mentor who allows disagreement, a local project that proves cooperation can produce real results.  

Technology, trust and democratic resilience

Technology intensifies both the problem and the possibility. Disinformation widens the gap between rhetoric and reality. It makes it harder for leaders to maintain credibility and harder for citizens to know what deserves belief. In information environments shaped by rumours, propaganda, influencer politics and fragmented media, distrust can become self-protective: people stop believing not only false claims but also true ones. This is especially dangerous in societies where institutional trust is already fragile.   However, technology should not be treated only as a threat. In Central Asia, its effects are already mixed. Kazakhstan’s eGov system, for example, has shown how digital public services can reduce everyday friction between citizens and the state: when people can access documents, payments or applications online without relying on personal connections or opaque bureaucracy, technology can make institutions feel more predictable and less distant. Yet the same region has also shown the limits of digital trust, especially when online spaces are shaped by disinformation, surveillance fears, or sudden restrictions on access. The point is not to promise technological salvation. The point is to try low-risk, low-cost experiments – digital debate clubs, local problem-solving games, transparent community budgeting tools, media-literacy simulations, or platforms that allow citizens to track small public commitments – and to learn honestly from failure. Even attempting imperfect solutions can build trust when the process is transparent. People do not need institutions that never fail. They need institutions that admit limits, correct mistakes, and keep showing up.   In a region with civic actors may face pressure, where respect matters, where authority is personal as well as formal and where young people are navigating both traditional and global digital culture – this is not an abstract principle. Trust between citizens, communities, and institutions must be built from where people actually stand. Education, in this wider sense, is where the bridge can begin.   The African proverb captures the choice: “if you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together”. Trust cannot be rushed into existence by decree, branding, or institutional design alone. It is slow, collective work. It is learned through games that reward mutual success, debates that dignify disagreement, technologies that connect rather than manipulate, and leaders who make credibility visible through example. There are no shortcuts worth taking.     Explore the full mini-series here.   Farrukh Irnazarov is an international development expert with over 15 years of experience in economic policy, investment strategies, labour migration, trade, and agribusiness. He is the Co-Founder and Country Director for Uzbekistan at the Central Asian Development Institute (CADI) and Co-Founder of the RANSIF Group, a policy and research platform promoting responsible and transparent investment in Central Asia. Farrukh’s focus is on fostering constructive capital, designing investment screening mechanisms, and advancing private sector development across the region.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => No Shortcuts to Trust: Education, Civic Habits, and Social Resilience in Central Asia [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => no-shortcuts-to-trust-education-civic-habits-and-social-resilience-in-central-asia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-07-10 15:56:57 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-07-10 14:56:57 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=9086 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [4] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 9080 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-07-16 01:00:13 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-07-16 00:00:13 [post_content] => Young people are often described as the ‘future’, yet they are already shaping political life in the present. We are two young leaders from very different contexts: the UK and Turkmenistan. Even though our countries are culturally, socially and politically quite different, we found through indepth discussion in both – and we suspect across the globe – Gen Z are navigating complex barriers to formal participation while simultaneously creating new, constructive forms of civic engagement. If our leaders are serious about building resilient and peaceful societies, we have to transform our engagement with young people from tokenistic consultation to meaningful collaboration.   Young people’s agency is expressed not only through formal institutions such as voting or parliamentary participation, but also through civic activism, digital mobilisation, community leadership, and social entrepreneurship. However, our systems frequently fail to recognise this reality. Young people are invited into conversations symbolically rather than substantively, consulted without influence, and expected to participate in systems that were not designed with them in mind.   Through our work we hear from young people that they see themselves mentioned in speeches and strategies, but do not participate in decision-making spaces where power actually sits. Youth councils, consultations, and forums often exist without real influence over policy outcomes, reinforcing frustration and deepening distrust in institutions.   There are both formal and informal barriers for young people to engage with governance structures. These include limited access to policymakers, hierarchical political cultures, and a perception that the youth lack the experience or authority to contribute meaningfully. In formal settings, even practical factors such as language confidence, professional etiquette, and expectations around dress and behaviour can become invisible barriers that exclude young people from participation.   In the UK, organisations like My Life My Say and Flipgenn are actively breaking down these barriers – and it is working. In the lead-up to the most recent local elections, 444,874 young people registered to vote in April 2026 alone, and the Electoral Commission found that 81% of young people see living in a democracy as important.^[1] Yet such organisations remain the exception rather than the rule, and the lack of meaningful institutional pathways for engagement remains one of the greatest barriers young people face.   When those pathways are absent, the consequences are significant. In the UK, polling shows that 63% of 18–24-year-olds doubt any major political party could improve their lives, and 73% feel politicians do not care about people like them.^[2] In Turkmenistan, young people similarly describe a sense of distance from formal decision-making – feeling that their voices sometimes carry weight in community spaces but rarely reach the institutions where policy is shaped. In both contexts, the risk is the same: when young people feel that the system is not working for them, disengagement follows.   One example from Turkmenistan shows what becomes possible when this changes. Through the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) seminars on Climate Negotiations, Model OSCE, and Inclusive Climate Governance, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) supported Youth Climate Summer School, and the annual Local Conference of Youth (LCOY) endorsed by YOUNGO, young people from across Turkmenistan have come together to learn, exchange ideas, and contribute to addressing environmental challenges.^[3] These initiatives have been made possible thanks to the support of national institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education, as well as international partners such as UNICEF, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the OSCE, and diplomatic missions including the UK Embassy. Working together, these partners have created spaces where young people can develop their skills, collaborate with experts, and transform their ideas into practical initiatives that benefit their communities.   What has been most inspiring is seeing how young people respond when they are trusted and encouraged to contribute. Many participants have gone on to organise awareness campaigns, volunteer activities, and peer-learning initiatives, sharing their knowledge with others and inspiring more young people to get involved. They often speak about the pride and satisfaction they feel from being able to contribute to issues that matter to them and to their communities.^[4] These experiences show that when young people are given opportunities to learn, collaborate, and take responsibility, they develop into confident and active citizens. Society, in turn, benefits from their creativity, enthusiasm, and commitment to building a more sustainable future.   Representation matters. When people see someone like themselves making a difference, they feel empowered to believe they can do the same – and their sense of belonging to their country is strengthened when they can see themselves working within its structures and contributing to its future. But representation must not mean simply inviting young people to the table: it must mean giving them the authority, trust, and resources to shape outcomes. Youth engagement should also extend beyond parliaments and ministries. Community centres, universities, coworking spaces, and local initiatives often provide more accessible and psychologically safe environments for young people to engage in public life.   Leaders and policy-makers concerned about social cohesion among the next generation should understand that empowering young people to be active members of their society – in the spaces where they live, study and work – is precisely how trust and social capital are built. If we are serious about building resilient and inclusive societies, youth engagement must move beyond tokenism and toward genuine representation, civic education, and structural support. It requires real investment and commitment, but the evidence from both our countries is clear: when young people are given the opportunity to contribute, they do – and society as a whole is stronger for it.     Explore the full mini-series here.   Aaron Campbell is located at the intersection of Mental Health, EDI & Liberation, Advocacy for Young People, Higher Education and Politics/Policy, with a passion, drive, and focus on making long lasting and meaningful change within society, particularly for those who are marginalised. They graduated from the University of East Anglia with a degree in Computing and Graphic Design and since have worked with many organisations across multiple sectors including government, mental health, legal and grassroots organisations.   Gulshat Ayydova is a climate and youth advocate from Turkmenistan. She founded the Youth Climate Action Network Turkmenistan and leads a range of initiatives to engage young people in climate action. Her work includes organising eco camps, eco festivals, climate hackathons, and national youth conferences on climate change, as well as co-developing policy recommendations for the government. She currently serves as a member of the EU Youth Sounding Board for Central Asia. Gulshat is committed to advancing inclusive and sustainable climate policies in Turkmenistan.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] The Electoral Commission, Young people’s views on politics and voting 2026, March 2026, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/young-peoples-views-politics-and-voting-2026 ^[2] From a survey conducted by Opinium,  https://www.opinium.com/insight/ and commissioned by My Life My Say, https://www.mylifemysay.org.uk/ ^[3] UNICEF, UNICEF Launches Youth Climate Summer School 2025, June 2025, https://www.unicef.org/turkmenistan/press-releases/unicef-launches-youth-climate-summer-school-2025; UN Turkmenistan, Raising a Generation of Climate Leaders: Gulshat and Selbi Empower Youth for Climate Action in Turkmenistan, November 2025, ​​https://turkmenistan.un.org/en/305747-raising-generation-climate-leaders-gulshat-and-selbi-empower-youth-climate-action; OSCE, OSCE promotes youth engagement in climate change issues in Turkmenistan, July 2025, https://ashgabat.osce.org/centre-in-ashgabat/595459; OSCE, Model OSCE promotes youth leadership and climate diplomacy in Turkmenistan, April 2026, https://ashgabat.osce.org/news/centre-ashgabat/663259 ^[4] Statement based on participant feedback collected during workshops and informal discussions rather than a formal evaluation. [post_title] => Gen Z, Agency and Engagement: From Tokenism to Meaningful Collaboration [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => gen-z-democratic-participation [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-07-10 15:56:18 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-07-10 14:56:18 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=9080 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [5] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 9076 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-07-15 01:00:07 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-07-15 00:00:07 [post_content] => When I first became a JST Fellow in 2018  I had a very clear answer to the question: does change come from the topdown or the bottom-up? For years, working at the intersection of government and public life, I assumed the answer was obvious. Systems change systems. Institutions reform institutions. If you want a better democracy, you build better structures.   I no longer think that is quite right.   For the past nine years, I have been working as a psychotherapist specialising in leadership and occupational psychology. I work with individuals and the leaders who shape organisations, workplaces, and communities. And what I keep seeing is something that formal political analysis tends to overlook: the degree to which people's relationship to civic life is shaped not by policy, but by psychology – and, specifically, by fear.   Particularly the fear of being punished for being different. For speaking when you were not supposed to. For having an opinion that diverges from the group. This is the legacy of authoritarian and post-totalitarian cultures, and it does not disappear when constitutions change. It lives on in families, in workplaces, in the habits people develop around whether it is safe to show up, speak up, or push back.   When people disengage from democratic life, we tend to reach for familiar explanations: apathy, cynicism, misinformation, or low trust in institutions. These are real. Yet I think they often describe symptoms rather than causes. Beneath them, frequently, is a deeply internalised belief that participation carries risk – that visibility invites punishment, that difference is dangerous.   Comparative research across post-Soviet societies has long demonstrated a pattern of strong trust within families and close networks, combined with weak trust in institutions and public life. This suggests that democratic disengagement is not simply a political phenomenon, but a social and psychological inheritance: people learn where it is safe to trust, and where it is not.^[1]   Democracy, on this account, does not only fail because of bad institutions. It fails because those institutions are built on top of societies where the psychological conditions for participation have never been properly established. You cannot ask people to show up as active citizens if they have never been given reason to feel safe enough to do so.   This brings me to what I think is one of the most underrated questions in democratic renewal: what do people actually need before they can engage?   At our recent JST Ideas Exchange Forum - where we were re-thinking democracy for a new era -  we kept returning to the values of security, dignity, and belonging. And I think these are right, but I want to be precise about what they mean at the level of individuals and communities. They mean acknowledgement, first. Being seen. Having your history, your pain, and your particular experience of the world recognised before anyone asks anything of you.   The question of technology is inseparable from this. Digital spaces and social media have dramatically amplified the speed at which identity narratives travel – and in fragmented, polarised information environments, those narratives increasingly reward performance over authenticity, outrage over nuance. For people who are already uncertain whether it is safe to hold a distinct view, this only compounds the problem. The algorithmic incentive is to affiliate with a tribe, not to think independently. The psychological toll is a further erosion of the inner conditions that genuine civic participation requires.   And yet I remain genuinely optimistic – not naively, but because of what I see in my work. When people are given the conditions to take authority and responsibility for their own lives – when they feel safe enough to have a view, to act on it, to lead from where they stand – that capacity does not stay contained. It extends outward. It moves into families, workplaces, communities, and eventually into the political sphere. The circle of influence grows.   This is the bottom-up work that I believe is essential – not as a replacement for institutional reform, but as its necessary foundation. Top-down change without this is architecture built on unstable ground.   What would it mean to take this seriously at scale? It would mean that democracy promotion stops leading with structures and starts asking about the human conditions those structures are meant to serve. It means that leaders – of governments, organisations, and communities – learn to acknowledge before they ask. It means that the people who design civic participation processes understand something about the psychology of participation, not just its mechanics.   At the same time, taking the psychology of participation seriously does not mean removing responsibility from citizens themselves. Psychological safety is not the destination – it is the precondition. Democratic cultures cannot be built on safety alone. They require the gradual development of civic maturity: the capacity to tolerate disagreement, to remain engaged despite uncertainty, and to accept that participation inevitably involves risk, accountability and compromise. The task of democratic renewal is not to protect citizens from that burden, but to create the conditions in which they are able – and willing – to take it on.   This may be particularly important in post-authoritarian societies, where generations have learned that safety lies in conformity, silence or deference to authority. Democratic participation, in these contexts, is not only a political act but a psychological transition: from protected subjecthood to active citizenship, from seeking permission and certainty to exercising judgement and responsibility.   Perhaps the question is not whether change comes from the top-down or the bottom-up. Democracies ultimately depend on both: institutions that are trustworthy enough to invite participation, and citizens who have established a sense of political safety that enables them to embrace the psychological challenge of freedom itself.   None of this is quick or linear. However, I think we are, collectively, arriving at a moment that calls for rethinking – and that is, in its own way, a cause for hope.     Explore the full mini-series here.   Botagoz Zhumabekova is a psychotherapist and leadership psychologist, working at the intersection of emotional resilience, trauma-informed practice, and social change. Her professional background spans consulting for major international institutions, including serving as an independent consultant for European Bank (EBRD) projects. Botagoz is the author of a research project on leadership psychology and self-esteem, conducted in collaboration with senior women leaders and partners from major international corporations. In her therapeutic and group work, she specialises in the psychology of leadership, intergenerational trauma, and the emotional patterns that influence civic behaviour and decision-making.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] Roger Sapsford and Pamela Abbott, Trust, confidence and social environment in post-communist societies, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Volume 39, Issue 1, March 2006, pp. 59-71, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967067X05000668 [post_title] => The Psychological Roots of Democratic Disengagement [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-psychological-roots-of-democratic-disengagement [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-07-10 15:51:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-07-10 14:51:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=9076 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [6] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 9131 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-07-14 12:00:14 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-07-14 11:00:14 [post_content] => Armenia must decide on its nuclear technology path. The upper-middle-income state in the South Caucasus depends on nuclear energy for upwards of 30% of its energy mix; building a new plant would require a decade. Yerevan looks determined to extend the operation of the Metsamor’s nuclear power plant for as long as possible, potentially until 2036. What happens thereafter is a decision that must be taken by the end of 2026 or early 2027.    This paper explores the technological, political, and economic factors Armenia must factor in as it considers moving away from its long-standing commitment to Russian technology with Rosatom.   Read the full paper here.   Key conclusions: 1. The consensus for analysts interviewed for this paper is that Rosatom’s value proposition cannot be matched from an industrial policy perspective, particularly given unique spent-fuel-take-back and soft financing elements.   2. There is no apparent benefit for countries that assume the cost of de-risking private investment in experimental US SMR technology, such as Romania, Poland, or indeed Armenia.   3. The one measure Armenia can take to hedge its singular dependence on Rosatom is to consider an alternative supply of nuclear fuel, in cooperation with Westinghouse.   4. The South Caucasus is no longer dominated by a single military power. In this sense, technological ‘lock-ins’ and economic influence are factors that are likely to become diplomatically significant.   Dr Ilya Roubanis (PhD, EUI Florence) is Senior Fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Athens (IDIS) and Research Fellow at the Aletheia Research Institution. His business intelligence work spans energy and security, driven by HUMINT and strategic analysis across Europe and the MENA regions.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Long Read | The Technological Limits to Armenia’s Rosatom Decoupling Ambitions [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => long-read-the-technological-limits-to-armenias-rosatom-decoupling-ambitions [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-07-14 12:00:25 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-07-14 11:00:25 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=9131 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [7] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 9072 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-07-13 01:05:37 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-07-13 00:05:37 [post_content] => There was a time when war took my voice away. When reality becomes unbearable, reflection is reduced into mere observation. Silence ceases to be calm – it turns into the anticipation of terror from the sky. Under conditions of total war, people lose not only their homes, but also the capacity to narrate what is happening to them. Reason narrows to instinct. And everything that requires sensitivity – art, in particular – seems to fall mute. This is how we begin to treat culture as a luxury, as something that can be postponed until more stable times.   Yet the opposite is true: culture is not an adjunct to democracy; it is a precondition for agency.   We live in a time of eroding trust. Governments, media, and institutions are losing credibility. The frameworks that once defined democratic order no longer feel sufficient. Reality itself has fragmented. Policies and protocols may create structure, but they cannot resolve what is, at its core, a crisis of narratives – a rupture between identities, experiences, and meanings. This is not only a Ukrainian question. It is a European one.   Almost five years ago, storytelling and cinema became, for me, a way of resisting this fragmentation. A feature film script about the first months of the Russian full-scale invasion felt not like documentation, but rather reconstruction – an attempt to reclaim authorship over my own experience. In this sense, culture is not representation. It is a safe space where meaning is restored, and with it – the capacity to act.   Since 2022, I have noted a new habit: I catch myself observing people in large European cities as though through an invisible yet dense membrane. This distance is not geographical, but experiential. War creates a rupture that resists translation. And this gives rise to an uneasy question: is agency possible without the experience of existential risk?   Our unprocessed histories – colonial pasts, totalitarian traumas, genocide – return through narratives as recurring threats. This is why the figure of the antagonist is so central to contemporary storytelling. Yet the antagonist is not only what we fight against. It is what we recognise, ‘other’ and refuse to integrate.   Popular culture now offers telling examples. Squid Game does not invent a dystopia – it exposes the future shock of a traditional society. Adolescence does not resolve the problem of contemporary masculine identity – it renders the “accursed questions”^[1] even more complex. These stories resonate because they name what society already senses, but cannot yet articulate.   Post-totalitarian cultures – particularly in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia – face a different problem. They have inherited a cultural hero who is fundamentally passive: the silent dissident, the ironic observer, the one who survives but does not act. In such contexts, silence is mistakenly perceived as strength. In reality, it is often a symptom of learned helplessness. If this narrative remains unchanged, it will continue to reproduce itself – even under democratic conditions. A society that tells itself stories of endurance rather than action will continue to endure, but not to transform.   One of my most sincere sources of inspiration in recent months has been Václav Havel’s essay ‘The Power of the Powerless’, invoked by the Prime Minister of Canada during the 2026 forum in Davos. This text is not merely political commentary in the conventional sense. It is a cultural essay that describes how agency arises not from systems, but from small acts of redefinition – moments when individuals choose to refuse reproducing the scripts imposed upon them.   It seems that our societies today need not simply new content, but a new narrative structure, a different kind of cultural hero – one who acts without guarantees, speaks without certainty, and accepts vulnerability not as weakness, but as a condition of agency.   In Ukraine, the Revolution of Dignity of 2013-14 marked a defining moment when society's agency not only became unmistakably visible, but also emerged as a force capable of safeguarding democratic values. Since the first months of Russia's aggression in 2014, volunteer initiatives have quite literally helped keep the Ukrainian state functioning. Their work extends far beyond procuring military equipment and tactical medical supplies. Volunteers have built evacuation networks, supported internally displaced people, and helped devastated communities begin the long process of rebuilding.   The same spirit of initiative has also shaped Ukraine's soft power abroad. Many of the country's most effective international cultural and civic initiatives have not been orchestrated by the state but have grown organically through self-organisation and the networks of the Ukrainian diaspora. Ukraine has also demonstrated a remarkable ability to embrace digital innovation, with civil society playing a pivotal role not only in developing and implementing these innovations but also in rigorously testing their effectiveness and holding them to account.   Equally fundamental to Ukraine's contemporary sense of agency is the ongoing reimagining of local identities across its towns and villages. In recent years, communities have explored their own histories through a wide range of cultural and civic initiatives, rediscovering local heritage, engaging with the complexities of multicultural memory, and dismantling narratives imposed from outside. In doing so, they are reclaiming the right to tell their own stories, and, ultimately, to define themselves on their own terms.   Not all our societies are ready for such a shift. Many are still organised around survival rather than transformation. And this is precisely why the delicate work within the realm of the sensuous – cultural practice – cannot be secondary. Without it, political change lacks psychological grounding.   Our current moment is marked by simultaneities. For some, agency now signifies the basic capacity to act; for others, it denotes a deeply existential experience of subjecthood.   Until quite recently, the ‘Old World’ reliably provided institutional frameworks through which an individual could choose a profession, a way of life, political convictions, partners, or a place to live. Yet reality is unsettlingly clear that no structure can guarantee any longer either meaning or safety.   At such a moment, action becomes inseparable from responsibility: values come at a cost; freedom is not a default condition; neutrality, as an avoidance of choice, no longer functions.   Our identity now is action. It is our daily practice, be it screenwriting, art, human rights advocacy, or a commitment to the rule of law. Alternatively, it can also be the rejection of all the above in surrender to a totalitarian trend.   Democracy today does not begin with institutions. It begins with a shift in how we tell our stories.     Explore the full mini-series here.   Olga Reka is a Ukrainian producer, writer and cultural storyteller whose work explores archetypal and transformational narratives shaped by themes of war, dignity, trauma and cultural memory. With over 150 hours of national television to her credit, she has created award-winning fiction projects and is known for story worlds that reflect the contemporary Ukrainian experience. She currently co-ordinates the publication project “Ukraine and Ukrainians”, a historical ethnographic art album of the NCFC "The Ivan Honchar Museum", Gunia Project and The Ivan Honchar Charitable Foundation. Her recent films include the features “Nodokasa”, “Zenith” and “Misty in Places”; and the short “In the Shadows” (Grand Prix – Ukraina Festiwal Filmowy 2021; Special Jury Mention – Short of the Year 2021). Olga was also the showrunner and co-writer of “5baksiv.net”, Ukraine’s first web series and winner of the Grand Prix at Bilbao Web Fest 2017.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] "Accursed questions" (often called proklyatye voprosy in Russian) are universal, foundational inquiries about human existence that never have a single, final answer. [post_title] => From Silence to Agency: What Post-Totalitarian Societies Must Learn from Their Stories [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => from-silence-to-agency-what-totalitarian-societies-learn-stories [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-07-10 15:53:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-07-10 14:53:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=9072 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [8] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 9068 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-07-13 01:00:45 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-07-13 00:00:45 [post_content] => This article introduces a new series of short essays by JST Fellows – leaders working across Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia – exploring how societies can build the trust, agency and resilience needed for an era of fracture and flux.   We are living through a period of profound change and uncertainty. The erosion of the rules-based international order is causing instability on a global scale. Familiar frameworks and alliances, such as NATO, are no longer seen as providing security guarantees and a basis for shared understanding between states. The institutions that form the foundations of healthy democracy – the media, government, judiciary, and civil society – are not functioning in the way that they should. Media ecosystems no longer offer a shared factual reference point; governments struggle to deliver on the concerns of those they represent; judiciaries face growing pressure on their independence; and civil society is increasingly recast – through propaganda and hostile narratives – as a threat rather than a mechanism for accountability and civic action. It all adds up to a climate of social and political polarisation, creating distrust: in governments, in one another, and in democracy itself.   Added to this, the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) presents both opportunities and threats to how our societies and economies function. The political emergence of Gen Z, with youth-led protests in countries as disparate as Georgia, Nepal, Peru and Madagascar, is seen as evidence of growing frustration of young people with inequality, corruption, and the failure of existing institutions to respond to people's concerns.^[1]   These forces are not temporary disruptions but structural shifts reshaping political and social life. As such, they demand a new approach. This is not a time for nostalgia but for a collective rethink. Throughout this mini-series, our contributors delve into experiences of culture, trust and agency in their societies to explore a central question: What actions do we need to take and what stories must we ensure are heard, in order to shape and secure a healthy political and social order for the emerging global era?   In the articles that follow, JST Fellows explore this question in depth, offering diverse perspectives on what it means to rethink democracy through the lens of culture, trust, and agency. They look at opportunities and challenges emerging in media, technology, and information systems. They look at the power of identity and narratives, and their effect on social cohesion. And they look at agency and engagement, with a focus on young people.   These are not separate strands but interwoven dynamics that reinforce each other. Technology drives identity narratives. Identity politics shape how young people engage. And youth movements reshape information ecosystems.   Our Fellows, who come from countries across Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, write about how these forces are playing out in the contexts in which they live and work. Questions of identity, culture and memory also run throughout the series. Olga Reka, from Ukraine, writes about the critical role of the arts, culture, and storytelling in creating meaning and agency as a precondition for democracy. Botagoz Zhumabekova examines the psychological foundations of democratic participation, arguing that active citizenship depends not only on political opportunity but also on people feeling safe enough to engage.   Trust – or its absence – is a common theme. Gulshat Ayydova and Aaron Campbell look at what we can learn from the way young people already engage in informal spaces to encourage meaningful participation and build trust in political processes. Joldoshbek Osmonov, from Kyrgyzstan, looks at the legitimacy crisis facing civil society and how organisations can rebuild trust in the face of propaganda that presents them as a threat. Farrukh Irnazarov explores the role of education in building trust in institutions and civic responsibility across Central Asia.   Looking at democratic renewal through a political lens, Palina Brodik reflects on the future of the Belarusian democratic movement, arguing that preserving collective memory while remaining adaptable is essential to sustaining political agency in exile.   The series concludes with Liliana Gutan's reflection on Moldova, where democracy is measured not only by elections but by what institutions deliver between them. Her article brings together many of the themes explored throughout the series, arguing that democratic resilience ultimately depends on whether people experience dignity, security, and belonging in their everyday lives.   I hope these articles offer both provocation and possibility – showing what it looks like when values-driven leaders think seriously about the challenges of our time. They are part of the generation of diverse leaders needed in this moment, to shape a new order in which people can live in sustainable, peaceful and just societies.     Explore the full mini-series here.   John Alderdice, Professor, the Lord Alderdice. UK Trade Envoy to Azerbaijan & Central Asia and JST Trustee.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] Daniel Boffey, ‘We are very strong’: Georgia’s gen Z drives protests against return to past, The Guardian, May 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/16/georgia-gen-z-drives-protests-against-return-to-past-foreign-agents-law; Omkar Khandekar and Yam Kumari Kandel, How Gen Z-led protests put Nepal’s 1st female prime minister in power, NPR, September 2025, https://www.npr.org/2025/09/20/nx-s1-5545760/nepal-protests-gen-z; Marco Aquino and Alexander Villegas, Peru’s Gen Z rallies against President Boluarte, protesting over pensions and corruption, Reuters, September 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/perus-gen-z-rallies-against-president-boluarte-protesting-over-pensions-2025-09-27/; AP News, How Gen Z protesters brought down Madagascar’s government and now want the president out, October 2025, https://apnews.com/article/madagascar-protests-gen-z-rajoelina-e39ef11bd1f4a92f1f4b353900348219 [post_title] => How Can We Secure a Healthy Political and Social Order in a Fragmented World? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => how-can-we-secure-democracy-fragmented-world [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-07-10 15:53:06 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-07-10 14:53:06 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=9068 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [9] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 9043 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-07-07 01:00:49 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-07-07 00:00:49 [post_content] => On 15th June 2026, the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC), the Global Disorder Group at City St. George’s, University of London (City), Shout Out UK (SOUK), and the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Political and Media Literacy co-hosted a discussion examining the relationship between political rhetoric, information disorder, and democratic resilience.   The event was chaired by Susan Coughtrie, FPC’s Executive Director, and brought together an expert panel including: Dr Sasikumar Sundaram, Senior Lecturer at the Department of International Politics at City; Professor Inderjeet Parmar, Professor of International Politics at City; Effie Webb, reporter on The Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s (TBIJ) Big Tech team; Amelia Fairney, SOUK’s Head of Strategy and Communications; and closing reflections from Matt Bishop MP, Chair of the APPG on Political and Media Literacy.   The discussion explored how increasingly polarised political rhetoric, widening inequality, AI-driven misinformation, and fragmented media ecosystems are reshaping democratic discourse. Speakers examined the structural drivers of democratic strain, the role of technology in amplifying division, and practical approaches to strengthening political and media literacy.   This briefing outlines key themes and insights from the parliamentary panel discussion:

• Political rhetoric is a symptom of deeper structural transformations.
• The concentration of economic and technological power is reshaping democratic discourse.
• AI is accelerating existing vulnerabilities in the information ecosystem.
• Political and media literacy must be treated as democratic infrastructure.
• Strengthening democratic resilience requires systemic responses.

  To explore the key thematic takeaways from this expert discussion, you can download the full briefing here.  

“Democracy depends on freedom of speech, just as a democratic international order depends on the free flow of ideas and dialogue. Yet rhetoric has become a mainstay of power politics, displacing democratic dialogue. The rhetoric of civilizational glory, decline of the West, technological inevitability, and ideological discontentments among others reflect deeper inequalities between states, societies, actors, and institutions. Specifically, rising wealth inequalities and oligarchies have displaced state entrepreneurism aimed at public well being, which is driving rhetoric, disorder, and the crisis of democracy. Political and media literacy should therefore cultivate social purpose and critical judgment, asking not only how we communicate, but what kind of good life and accountabilities democratic societies ought to pursue.”

Dr Sasikumar Sundaram

 

“The challenges posed by misinformation, AI, and polarised rhetoric cannot be separated from the wider political economy of contemporary democracy. Extreme concentrations of economic and technological power have contributed to growing public distrust and of political exclusion and alienation. There is a widespread legitimacy crisis which fosters dangerous political movements. Political and media literacy are therefore not optional additions to democracy; they are vital democratic infrastructure. However, lasting democratic resilience will depend not only on helping citizens navigate information environments, but also on addressing the inequalities and imbalances of power that erode trust in the first place.”

Professor Inderjeet Parmar

  [post_title] => Expert Briefing | ‘Rhetoric, Disorder, and the Crisis of Democracy’ [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => expert-briefing-rhetoric-disorder-and-the-crisis-of-democracy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-07-03 15:25:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-07-03 14:25:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=9043 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [10] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 9058 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-07-06 12:57:20 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-07-06 11:57:20 [post_content] => Alex Sobel and Luke Cooper were recently in Gdańsk, Poland, for the Ukraine Recovery Conference where there is a clear and perceptible shift in tone and actions, mirroring our own shifting political focus.   Andy Burnham's pitch to lead Labour promises to overturn "four decades of neoliberalism".^[1] His ‘Manchesterism’ centres on an interventionist state: more public ownership within a foundational economy, an end to the privatisation premium that has raised the cost of basic services, and a restored state role in core utilities. He also pledges to devolve significant fiscal power to cities and regions. Burnham builds on existing Labour policies but frames them far more stridently – as a radical break with market fundamentalism.   Having been deeply involved in a range of meetings and events at the annual Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC), which took place in Gdańsk, Poland, on the 25-26 June, we feel it is important to emphasise though that this new economic thinking is not something unique to Britain – and, quite on the contrary, we are actually playing catch-up.   Governments all over the world are looking at how markets can be made to work in the public interest – and the large majority of states never went as far down the road of privatisation as the UK in the first place.   What we learnt at the URC Ukraine along with the other post-Soviet economies offers an important lens on this process. After its failed neoliberal transition in the 1990s, which enabled the oligarchic capture of large parts of its economy, Ukrainian public opinion has moved sharply against privatisation over the last two decades.^[2] Ukraine’s political debates, like any country, are complicated and diverse, but there is a discernible effort to move away from the old bureaucratic Soviet model while also recognising the importance of maintaining a key role for the state, including local government, in the economy. This is reflected above all in its wartime economy that sees, not only state enterprises, but also smaller and nimbler tech and drone firms, play a critical role.   There has been a notable mood shift on these issues at the URC. Even privatisation's most ardent supporters tend to concede that Ukraine’s strategically important industries should remain in public ownership, and there is a renewed interest in cooperatives and mutuals. Coordination between the public and private sector is the framing of choice of most panel contributions, advancing targeted and international calibrated industrial policy. A Japanese programme for example offers grants for technology transfer to Ukraine through business partnerships and co-creation, an approach Tokyo argues reflects how Europe and East Asia rebuilt after World War II.^[3]   In shifting toward Manchesterism, we could do far worse than take a closer look at Ukraine’s domestic policy. Yuliya Yurchenko, in her book Ukraine and the Empire of Capital, offers a trenchant criticism of Ukraine’s post-Maidan, IMF-mandated neoliberal reform programme. She highlights how the failure of that agenda to deliver sustainable growth has opened up new opportunities for social democratic thinking in Ukraine – and that this can have global policy implications, including for western countries. “Britain has a lot to learn from Ukraine's experience”, she argues, having also spent several days at the URC, with the “national rail and the recently rebuilt from scratch Mykolayiv water pipeline and treatment facility… the shining examples of efficacy and efficiency of state ownership combined with responsive management and relying on local contractors”.^[4]   While the UK gradually reverses rail privatisation, Ukraine’s state-run rail network has provided a critical lifeline for citizens through the war. Privatbank, which was nationalised in 2016 during Ukraine’s mid-decade financial crisis, is today highly profitable having been cleaned up and reformed under public ownership.^[5] State owned firms like Ukrhydroenergo (hydropower), Energoatom (nuclear), GTS Operator of Ukraine (gas transmission), Naftogaz (gas), and Ukrainian Defence Industry (defence production), all made significant contributions to Ukraine’s budget in 2024 and 2025.   In 2023, President Zelensky announced an ambition that, by 2027, all primary school children would receive free school meals. By 2025, just over half of children in this cohort were receiving meals, thanks to an ambitious programme of kitchen upgrades and the training of cooks to improve nutritional value, all against the challenges of operating schools in a war.   Ukraine’s system of local government also has the kind of fiscal powers that Burnham has advocated for cities and regions. Territorial communities receive some 64% of money raised through personal income taxes to spend on public services, housing and municipal and infrastructure investments.^[6] This fiscal freedom has been absolutely essential to the war effort, for instance, allowing free public transport in several cities including Kharkiv where the metro also acts as the main public shelters for citizens. In Lviv, which has a close relationship with Manchester under Mayor Andriy Sadovyi, there has been a huge expansion in the tram and guided bus network, as well as cycle infrastructure called "Lion on Wheels", with over 50% of residents now using public transport or cycles for journeys. Lviv has also expanded its city centre pedestrian zone creating one of the largest pedestrianised historic centres in Europe. The challenges that Ukraine has faced in the unevenness of local technical and administrative capacity to make the most of these powers and resources may well also prove to have shared lessons for Burnham’s reform agenda for kickstarting regional development.   International policy is central to Burnham’s mission This is why international policy should never be an afterthought when it comes to building our transformative agenda at home. The international arena provides a wellspring of ideas and global relationships that will be vitally important in creating a strong, foundational ballast for Burnham’s transformative domestic agenda. The lessons emerging from Ukraine can also support new Labour thinking in areas like defence production and international development, where we have often struggled to develop a distinctively social democratic approach and vision.   Alex Sobel is the Labour MP for Leeds Central and Headingley, and the Prime Minister’s Trade Envoy to Ukraine.   Luke Cooper is an Associate Professorial Research Fellow in International Relation at London School of Economics and Director of the LSE Ukraine Programme.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   Photo via war.ukraine.ua (Collection of War Photos)   ^[1] The Mirror, LIVE: Andy Burnham gives speech at the Great North Investment Summit ahead of Makerfield by-election, YouTube, May 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xWObFdHYz0A ^[2] Tymofii Brik and Vitalii Protsenko, Does crime undermine support for privatization? Evidence from Ukraine, Volume 39: Issue 1, pp. 91-117, Bristol University Press, March 2024, https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/view/journals/jpfpc/39/1/article-p91.xml ^[3] United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Green industrial recovery project for Ukraine, https://www.unido.org/girp-ukr-jpn ^[4] Autostrada, see: https://vodogin.autostrada.ua/en ^[5] Privatbank, Growing trust and supporting the national economy: PrivatBank has released its financial results for 2025, February 2026, https://privatbank.ua/en/news/2026/2/9/growing-trust-and-supporting-the-national-economy-privatbank-has-released-its-financial-results-for-2025 ^[6] Igor Piddubnyi, Serhii Tytiuk, Andrii Darkovich, “Military” PIT: How the Tax Allocation System Can Change and What It Will Lead To, Vox Ukraine, September 2023, https://voxukraine.org/en/military-pit-how-the-tax-allocation-system-can-change-and-what-it-will-lead-to [post_title] => Op-ed | Devolving to a More Resilient Nation: Lessons From Ukraine [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-devolving-to-a-more-resilient-nation-lessons-from-ukraine [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-07-06 13:01:51 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-07-06 12:01:51 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=9058 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [11] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8953 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-05-12 14:24:47 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-05-12 13:24:47 [post_content] => The local elections have shown how politically fragmented the UK has become in recent years. Both Labour and the Conservatives – the traditional parties of Government – have lost out. Reform UK are the big winners; and the Greens and Liberal Democrats are making gains, with the Greens continuing to make inroads into the UK’s urban centres.   This turbulence is likely to have impacts on the UK’s foreign and national security politics. It has long been the case that foreign policy in the UK has been driven by a broad, cross-party consensus. Yet the emergence of Reform, and to a lesser extent the Greens, threatens to disrupt this.   In my research, I have been looking into how people in the UK think about national security and foreign policy. What threats do they perceive as most significant? What makes them feel secure or insecure? And what are people’s national security priorities? My research (conducted at the end of 2025, prior to subsequent developments such as the war in Iran) shows that people’s perspectives on national security have become inseparable from their politics. National security is experienced and perceived differently within the UK – with those in different political communities believing very different things.   A notable finding is that those saying they would vote Reform UK tended to feel less secure in the UK. It is perhaps unsurprising that a sense of insecurity might lead people to vote for parties outside of the mainstream. They identify migration as their biggest concern, and are much more likely to do so than others in the UK. Conversely, they are much less concerned than others about global instability and climate change. They are more likely to see the UK’s nuclear deterrent as a source of security, and at the time of polling, were the voting cohort who were much more likely to see the UK’s relationship to the US, and President Donald Trump himself, as contributing positively to UK security They felt that UK foreign and economic policies made them less secure, and are less likely to see the UN and NATO as sources of security. Their policy priorities tend to include reducing migration and increasing defence spending.   Those intending to vote Green shared some similarities with potential Reform voters. They too, were less likely to feel that UK foreign and economic policies would make them secure. Yet their diagnosis of the problem was fundamentally different. Green voters were much less concerned about ‘traditional’ security threats such as terrorism, and instead placed greater emphasis on climate and economic insecurity. They were the voting cohort most concerned about President Trump and the UK’s relationship to the US, as well as the only cohort who overall felt that the UK’s nuclear deterrent made them less secure. They were notably the most opposed to increasing defence spending, instead, they would prioritise human security concerns, such as the economic and health insecurities of those living in the UK, alongside efforts to tackle climate change.   Green voters nevertheless viewed the UK as a global actor, seeing the UN as a source of security, and the UK as playing a role in global peacebuilding. When asked about the UK Government’s policy towards Ukraine, they were the cohort most likely to state that we have a moral obligation to help Ukraine protect itself. This contrasts with Reform voters, who were most likely to state we should instead prioritise spending money on those in need at home.   While these findings are not necessarily surprising, they are nevertheless important. In essence, they outline divergent paths for the UK’s national security and foreign policy that depart in significant ways from the current broad consensus.   Reform voters tend to want a more insular and self-sufficient United Kingdom, with resources focused domestically rather than on involvement in foreign conflicts, while maintaining ties with the US and Trump.   Green voters, by contrast, tend to be highly critical of the UK’s current tools of deterrence, such as defence spending and the nuclear deterrent, and instead see security as being produced through multilateralism, tackling the climate emergency, and investing in the human security needs of the UK.   The recent Strategic Defence Review and National Security Strategy both called for a ‘national conversation’ on the future of UK defence and security.^[1] My research highlights the challenges involved in that ambition.^[2] As the two-party system fractures, questions around what the UK’s national security and foreign policy priorities should be are likely to become increasingly politicised. If the UK is going to achieve cross-societal solidarity in a more difficult and dangerous world – and convince the public to pay for coherent long-term responses to wide-ranging security challenges – it is going to need a much more expansive, democratic conversation about what security is for, who it is for, and how it should be delivered.     Dr Thomas Martin is a Senior Lecturer in International Studies at The Open University. He is interested in national security politics, public opinion, and terrorism and counterterrorism.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, June 2025 ,https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/683d89f181deb72cce2680a5/The_Strategic_Defence_Review_2025_-_Making_Britain_Safer_-_secure_at_home__strong_abroad.pdf ^[2] Dr Thomas Martin, Public Opinion & National Security in the UK: A People-Centred Approach, GCSJ Policy Report, Centre for Global Challenges and Social Justice, The Open University, https://fass.open.ac.uk/research/centres/GCSJ/policy-incubator [post_title] => Op-ed | After the Locals: How Reform and the Greens Could Reshape Foreign Policy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => after-the-locals-how-reform-and-the-greens-could-reshape-foreign-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-05-29 14:03:23 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-05-29 13:03:23 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8953 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [12] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8901 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-04-07 09:30:12 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-04-07 08:30:12 [post_content] => The 7 April marks World Health Day, with this year’s theme: “Together for Health. Stand with Science.” The United Kingdom has long excelled at the latter. As a global leader in scientific research and innovation, UK institutions continue to shape the trajectory of global health. Yet the “Together for Health” component is increasingly under strain. Recent reductions in Official Development Assistance (ODA), including cuts to key global health initiatives, risk undermining the partnerships, trust, and sustained engagement required to translate scientific excellence into equitable global impact.   With only four years left until the 2030 deadline for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the global health agenda is at a critical inflection point.^[1] Progress on many health indicators has stalled; fragile health systems are under strain; new shocks from climate-driven disease patterns to conflict; lingering effects of pandemic disruption; and donor withdrawals all threaten hard-won gains.   While scientific discovery and innovation continue to expand what is possible in global health, progress on many health targets remains fragile, uneven, and deeply inequitable. This presents a defining opportunity for the United Kingdom to deepen its leadership in global health, not only by advancing science, but by ensuring it is mobilised through meaningful and sustained partnerships. If the UK chooses to bridge its world-leading scientific research and innovation with strategic political will and sustained financing, it can help advance health as a global public good whilst strengthening human rights. This choice is simply not possible if the UK continues to underappreciate and under-invest in its critical global role, impacting development co-operation for global progress and stability as well as reducing the benefit and soft power of the UK.   UK Soft Power UK universities and research institutions remain one of the strongest examples of the UK's soft power. UK science produces knowledge and innovation that directly shapes global health policy and practice.   These contributions not only improve health outcomes but also build networks of trust and collaboration, reinforcing the UK’s credibility on the world stage. Yet research alone is not enough. Soft power is most effective when combined with policy influence, sustained financing, and strong partnerships.   In this context, soft power must be understood not as a tool for advancing narrow national interest, but as a means of enabling collective progress through genuine equal global partnerships. At a time when global health is increasingly shaped by inward-looking, “country-first” approaches, the UK has an opportunity to model a different path, one where scientific leadership, financing, and partnerships are used to advance shared health outcomes and promote greater equity in global systems.   The UK’s leadership in global health now means turning innovation into accessible, rights-based solutions for those who need them most in close and equal partnership with impacted countries and communities in the Global South. Solutions must be driven by the priorities and needs of those most affected by the issues they are seeking to address, and implementation must be locally led by all impacted stakeholders.   Reforming the Global Health Architecture With multiple recent and upcoming processes taking place on global health architecture reform, from the Lusaka agenda (FGHI) to WHO GHA Reform and UN80 Process, the UK has an opportunity to influence decision-making, align international commitments with domestic expertise, and promote coordinated, sustainable approaches.^[2]   Engaging meaningfully across these parallel reform processes is essential to operationalising a truly “together” approach to global health, ensuring that the UK’s research, diplomacy, and investment are mutually reinforcing. By doing so, the UK can help shape a health architecture that is more equitable, resilient, and responsive to emerging challenges. Convening partners, as the UK will do at the May Global Partnerships Conference, is necessary but not sufficient.^[3] True leadership requires sustained engagement and predictable investment; without continued ODA support, the UK risks weakening the very partnerships and multilateral mechanisms that underpin its credibility and impact in global health.   The example of HIV as a model for International Development Looking back over the past two decades of development co-operation, the global HIV response stands out as one of the landmark demonstrations of progress. Among all the SDG targets, many which will not be met by 2030, the target to end AIDS as a public health threat is one of the few that is realistically achievable. As such, looking both back and forward, the HIV response is an arrowhead for demonstrating the power of international development and how it can be reframed and improved for the future.   The HIV response demonstrates that measurable progress requires sustained investment, strong multilateral coordination, and community-led and human rights-centred approaches. Crucially, the HIV response shows what it means in practice to deliver health “together”; aligning global financing, scientific innovation, and community leadership to achieve shared outcomes. However, these principles, of course, extend beyond HIV, providing a framework for advancing broader health outcomes, including maternal and child health, pandemic preparedness, and universal health coverage as well as development at large.   The UK’s domestic ambition to eliminate new HIV transmissions by 2030 is a critical target but one that cannot be separated from the global HIV response. By prioritising HIV within its domestic health agenda as well as its broader development agenda, the UK can show how targeted, evidence-based interventions can have mutually reinforcing benefits both at home and abroad.   Leadership in practice Building on lessons from the HIV response, global health leadership is ultimately a matter of choice. This choice must be clearly articulated and framed within bold political commitment. The UK should build on its existing prioritisation of global health to build a strong shared commitment with partners to ending AIDS as a public health threat globally by 2030. This can be achieved through the upcoming UN High Level Meeting on HIV this year but also even through its leadership of the G20 in 2027   In addition, the UK’s contributions to key global health institutions, such as The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Unitaid, UNAIDS, and the Robert Carr Fund, are essential for sustaining progress in the HIV response, supporting country transitions, and protecting vulnerable populations.^[4] Strategic, predictable investment not only amplifies impact but also reinforces credibility, strengthens partnerships, and underpins the UK’s reputation as a reliable global health actor. Beyond the moral imperative, such investment reflects a commitment to shared global progress, while prevention and early intervention reduce long-term costs, strengthen economies, and protect societies against future health shocks.   By pairing sustained investment with world-class research, the UK can translate funding and influence into tangible health outcomes. Its universities and research institutions, working alongside organisations such as Unitaid, help develop cutting-edge health technologies and interventions, ensuring scientific discoveries are transformed into practical solutions that reach the communities who need them most. This combination of research, innovation, and partnership bridges the gap between scientific breakthroughs and real-world impact, demonstrating leadership in action. By strengthening research capacity, linking evidence to policy and practice, and supporting country-led solutions, the UK can ensure that global health innovation is not only advanced, but shared.   On World Health Day, the UK has a genuine opportunity not only to stand for science but to fully realise what it means to act together to shape the next phase of global health and accelerate progress toward concrete and achievable SDG targets, like ending AIDS as a public health threat. By sustaining investment, leveraging research excellence, and cultivating meaningful partnerships, including with Unitaid and other global health actors, the UK can strengthen health systems, advance equitable landmark outcomes on killer diseases like HIV, and cement its role as a principled and credible leader on the world stage.     Mike Podmore is Chief Executive Officer of STOPAIDS, and Molly Thompson is a Senior Advocacy Advisor at STOPAIDS. STOPAIDS is an HIV, health and human rights advocacy network of civil society organisations working globally to end AIDS and realise all people’s right to health and wellbeing.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] United Nations, 17 Goals, Sustainable Development, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, https://sdgs.un.org/goals ^[2] Future of Global Health Initiatives, The Lusaka Agenda: Conclusions of the Future of Global Health Initiatives Process, https://futureofghis.org/final-outputs/lusaka-agenda/; Director-General, Reform of the global health architecture and the UN80 Initiative, Executive Board, 158th session, Provisional agenda item 29.1, EB158/44, World Health Organization, December 2025, https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB158/B158_44-en.pdf ^[3] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, The Rt Hon Yvette Cooper MP and The Rt Hon Baroness Chapman of Darlington, Global Partnerships Conference to build new international coalitions to tackle shared challenges, Press release, Gov.uk, February 2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/global-partnerships-conference-to-build-new-international-coalitions-to-tackle-shared-challenges ^[4] The Global Fund, https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/; Unitaid, https://unitaid.org/; UNAIDS, https://www.unaids.org/en; Robert Carr Fund, https://robertcarrfund.org/ [post_title] => Op-ed | World Health Day: Reimagining UK Leadership in Global Health [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-world-health-day-reimagining-uk-leadership-in-global-health [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-04-20 09:34:31 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-04-20 08:34:31 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8901 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [13] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8905 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-04-07 09:30:06 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-04-07 08:30:06 [post_content] => This article is co-published by the Foreign Policy Centre and Bond   Examining the devastating consequences of the UK’s complicity in trade-related illicit financial flows New research published by Results UK estimates that the countries most affected by child undernutrition experienced at least $309.8bn in trade-related illicit financial flows (IFFs) in 2024.^[1] Trade-related IFFs, such as those generated through the manipulation of customs invoices, are considered a major component of IFFs as a whole, which the UN defines as ‘financial flows that are illicit in origin, transfer or use, that reflect an exchange of value and that cross country borders’.^[2]   The consequences for the public purse are punishing. The Results UK report, released to mark World Health Day (7 April), estimates that government revenue losses from trade-related IFFs amount to 86% of India’s and 65% of Nigeria’s domestically funded public health spending.^[3] Tackling these and other IFFs would generate substantial funds for low- and middle-income countries, enabling them to address child undernutrition more effectively.   There is much to be gained by tackling IFFs, but the British Government is failing to take action domestically to end the UK’s status as a hotbed for illicit finance. It is also doing far too little to support low- and middle-income countries directly, and at times even undermines them in global forums relating to IFFs.   It is little wonder, then, that the UK is responsible for more tax losses linked to IFFsthan any other nation in the world.^[4] The consequences of these losses are stark: they are estimated to cause 221,580 under-five deaths and 27,290 maternal deaths every decade.^[5]   Addressing the domestic issues that enable illicit finance First and foremost, the British Government must force the UK’s overseas territories and Crown dependencies to publish public registers of beneficial ownership. Such registers disclose the real people who ultimately own and control corporate vehicles.   In recent years, despite promising greater transparency, most of these jurisdictions have done nothing. For example, by the third deadline of June 2025, imposed by the UK Parliament on the country’s 14 overseas territories to establish such registers, only Gibraltar and Montserrat had done so.^[6] It is very odd that the Government continues to call for other overseas territories to establish these registers while simultaneously defending their clear lack of progress..^[7]   The UK also suffers from a massive enforcement gap in relation to professional enablers. These nefarious actors – including lawyers, accountants, estate agents and others – are central to driving IFFs. Last year, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) became the sole anti-money laundering supervisor for professional services. Campaigners welcomed this move as it promises more consistent levels of oversight and enforcement.^[8] Nevertheless, the FCA needs to be adequately resourced if it is to combat the UK’s money laundering problem, estimated to be worth over £100bn a year.^[9]   Another important domestic reform needed relates to sharing information on foreign account holders. Although financial institutions in the UK collect data on all account holders, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) does not receive this data if countries do not implement the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) burdensome standards on the automatic exchange of financial account information between governments.^[10] These countries are almost exclusively low- or middle-income. If HMRC published this data, all such authorities could check whether their taxpayers’ reporting aligns with UK records.^[11]   Transforming international policy on illicit financial flows The British Government has provided direct support to some countries that receive development assistance to strengthen their laws, institutions and processes relating to IFFs. Yet recent cuts to official development assistance do not only risk that people in need of support – including children – will die (something the Government has admitted, albeit in incredibly anodyne language).^[12] Beyond the humanitarian consequences, it also means that funding for work to counter IFFs is in danger.^[13]   Countries like Nigeria, for example, could benefit from investment in digital technologies for customs management and stronger inter-agency collaboration for enforcing laws relating to its own public beneficial ownership register.^[14] But whether it will be able to secure such investment remains to be seen.   The UK has also backed the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative, which seeks to both facilitate the systematic and timely return of corrupt funds and deny safe havens for the proceeds of corruption.^[15] However, by the end of 2023, the UK had returned assets to overseas jurisdictions in only 26 out of 78 cases on the StAR database.^[16] Clearly, the British Government needs to step up its efforts in this sphere, which should include working with low- and middle-income countries to address wider barriers to cross-border cooperation.   The British Government’s performance on tackling IFFs at the global level is similarly dire. The UK was one of only nine states to vote against the UN General Assembly resolution initiating negotiations for a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation.^[17] This treaty could see a legitimate and rights-based entity replace the inequitable and ineffective OECD as the premier global body for tax. It is essential that the Government reverses its position.   Almost as bad is the fact that the British Government is uncritical of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a powerful intergovernmental organisation focusing on money laundering and terrorist financing. Unfortunately, the FATF is unrepresentative of low- and middle-income countries and thus unresponsive to their challenges.^[18]   FATF standards have actually been weaponised by some governments to attack human rights.^[19] The FATF has also failed to tackle IFFs in high-income countries.^[20] As the UK currently holds the FATF vice-presidency, it is well placed to address these concerns.   No excuses for the damage illicit finance causes Of course, properly tackling IFFs would also generate huge sums for the UK, which could be invested in public services at home. That is before even considering the broader benefits of combatting illicit finance, from enhancing financial stability to weakening criminals and despots, which improves the security of all nations.^[21] There are simply no excuses for the UK’s atrocious track record in this area.   The British Government is set to host the Illicit Finance Summit on 23-24 June.^[22] Thanks to lobbying by parliamentarians and civil society, what was originally a very narrow summit agenda has been expanded to include professional enablers and asset recovery – though there are concerns their inclusion is only superficial. Moreover, major issues like beneficial ownership and global governance are currently not on the agenda at all. The summit will fall well short of its ambitions if it does not confront the UK’s key position as a promoter of secrecy and facilitator of theft.   The British Government likes to highlight the assistance it provides to the governments of low- and middle-income countries to increase their tax revenue collection.^[23] But this assistance is completely undermined by the UK’s central role in enabling IFFs. It is akin to extending a hand of solidarity while delivering a knockout blow with the other fist.     Sunit Bagree is a consultant at Results UK and a research associate in international development at the University of Sussex.   Image: Apapa Port Complex in Lagos, Nigeria. Credit: Adedotun Ajibade.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] Results UK, Press release: ‘Trading Hunger’ report, April 2026, https://results.org.uk/2026/04/07/press-release-trading-hunger-report/ ^[2] Lourenco S. Paz, Measuring illicit financial flows: A gravity model approach to estimate international trade misinvoicing, Working Paper 2022/24, UNU-WIDER, 2022, https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/measuring-illicit-financial-flows; UNCTAD and UNODC, Conceptual framework for the statistical measurement of illicit financial flows, October 2020, https://unctad.org/publication/conceptual-framework-statistical-measurement-illicit-financial-flows ^[3] Results UK, Press release: ‘Trading Hunger’ report, April 2026, https://results.org.uk/2026/04/07/press-release-trading-hunger-report/ ^[4] Mark Bou Mansour, World losing half a trillion to tax abuse, largely due to 8 countries blocking UN tax reform, annual report finds, Tax Justice Network, November 2024, https://taxjustice.net/press/world-losing-half-a-trillion-to-tax-abuse-largely-due-to-8-countries-blocking-un-tax-reform-annual-report-finds/ ^[5] University of St Andrews, University of Leicester, and GRADE (Government Revenue and Development Estimation), Policy Brief - #1.3 Case study - United Kingdom: The impact of the United Kingdom’s tax policies on determinants of Health and Mortality rates, https://medicine.st-andrews.ac.uk/grade/wp-content/uploads/sites/39/2021/04/United-Kingdom.pdf ^[6] Mike Lewis, The transparency registers that weren’t, Tax Watch, August 2025, https://www.taxwatchuk.org/the-transparency-registers-that-werent/ ^[7] Stephen Doughty, Implementation of Beneficial Ownership Registers across the Overseas Territories, Statement made on 3 July 2025, UK Parliament, https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2025-07-03/hcws774 ^[8] Izzy Lewis, RELEASE: UKACC members welcome new anti-money laundering powers for regulator to crack down on enablers of crooks and kelptocrats, UK Anti-Corruption Coalition, October 2025, https://www.ukanticorruptioncoalition.org/work/release-ukacc-members-welcome-new-anti-money-laundering-powers-for-regulator-to-crack-down-on-enablers-of-crooks-and-kleptocrats ^[9] National Crime Agency, NCA and FCA publish priorities to combat biggest economic crime threats, July 2025, https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/nca-and-fca-publish-priorities-to-combat-biggest-economic-crime-threats ^[10] Financial Transparency Coalition, Automatic Exchange of Information, https://financialtransparency.org/issues/automatic-tax-information-exchange/ ^[11] Matt Colin, Two Ways the UK Could Fight Illicit Finance Just by Publising More Data, CGD, September 2024, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/two-ways-uk-could-fight-illicit-finance-just-publishing-more-data ^[12] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, FCDO Official Development Assistance programme allocations 2025 to 2026: equality impact assessment, Impact Assessment, Gov.uk, July 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fcdo-official-development-assistance-programme-allocations-2025-to-2026-equality-impact-assessment ^[13] Justin Moore, A strategic investment: The case for continuing governance and anti-corruption aid, Spotlight on Corruption, June 2025, https://www.spotlightcorruption.org/the-case-for-anti-corruption-aid/ ^[14] The Nation, Weighing the strengths, weaknesses of Customs’ B’Odogwu, July 2025, https://thenationonlineng.net/weighing-the-strengths-weaknesses-of-customs-bodogwu/; Naheem Mustapha, Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Under Cama 2020: Balancing Transparency and Privacy, SSRN, June 2025, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5272728 ^[15] Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, https://star.worldbank.org/ ^[16] Aine Clancy, The UK’s Relationship with Overseas Grand Corruption, Chapter 1, Unexplained Wealth Orders and the UK’s Anti-Corruption Regime, November 2025, https://academic.oup.com/book/61638/chapter/539761037?searchresult=1 ^[17] United Nations Digital Library, Promotion of inclusive and effective international tax cooperation at the United Nations: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 2024, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4070016?ln=en ^[18] FACTI Panel, Financial Integrity for Sustainable Development, February 2021, https://factipanel.org/docpdfs/FACTI_Panel_Report.pdf ^[19] Georgios Pavlidis, The dark side of anti-money laundering: Mitigating the unintended consequences of FATF standards, Journal of Economic Criminology, Volume 2, December 2023, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2949791423000404 ^[20] Eyes on FATF, https://eyesonfatf.org/ ^[21] Kathy Nicolaou-Manias, Joelle Traore, and Amelie Ville, Fostering Change: Tax-motivated illicit financial flows, Study on Tax Motivated Illicit Financial Flow, 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/Study%20on%20Tax.pdf ^[22] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon Yvette Cooper MP, Illicit Finance Summit to build international coalition against dirty money, Press release, Gov.uk, December 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/illicit-finance-summit-to-build-international-coalition-against-dirty-money ^[23] Tony Diver, UK to give poor countries advice instead of aid, The Telegraph, September 2025, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2025/09/21/uk-give-poor-countries-advice-instead-aid-jenny-chapman-fco/ [post_title] => Op-ed | How the UK Fuels Child Undernutrition in Low- and Middle-Income Countries by Enabling Illicit Finance [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-how-the-uk-fuels-child-undernutrition-in-low-and-middle-income-countries-by-enabling-illicit-finance [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-04-07 09:33:47 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-04-07 08:33:47 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8905 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [14] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8846 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-03-16 01:00:33 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-03-16 00:00:33 [post_content] => Authoritarian governments are racing to adopt artificial intelligence (AI). While they court international legitimacy by invoking “ethics,” “safety,” and “standards,” the real-world context is marked by systematic violations of human rights. Belarus is a telling example. The authorities are expanding AI across public life, promising high standards on privacy, security and non-discrimination. However, in a political environment marked by authoritarian practices that criminalise dissent and dismantle independent oversight, AI tools are far more likely to reinforce repression than to deliver public benefit.   In this setting, where checks and balances are weak or absent, high-risk technologies tend to be repurposed for control; therefore, it will be the political environment in Belarus that will ultimately shape the real-world use of any advanced data system.   Currently, Belarus’s civic space remains severely restricted. Independent media operate in exile; peaceful critics face prosecution under expansive “extremism” provisions. Civil society organisations have been dismantled, and people are jailed for what they say online and for content found on their phones.^[1] In the past five years, the Human Rights Centre Viasna has documented over 100,000 cases of repression. Currently, over 1,000 political prisoners remain in detention.^[2]   Given longstanding concerns around the Belarusian government's unlawful use of surveillance to curb dissent, their efforts to expand into ever-more invasive AI tech should raise serious red flags.^[3]   Since 2020, Belarusian authorities have used the Kipod, a software developed by Synesis, a local company, previously sanctioned by the EU. This tool allows searching and analysing video, including facial recognition and license plate recognition. The system was allegedly used to identify participants of the anti-government protests of 2020.^[4] Additionally, government smart-city programmes emphasise Internet of Things (IoT) sensors, machine learning and large video-surveillance deployments (“Videokontrol”), tying multiple municipal systems together—traffic, environment, utilities, public security. Authorities say pilot projects are live across multiple cities.^[5]   Officials in Belarus also indicated AI will be implemented “in nearly all sectors of the economy by 2040,” with new management-system standards and a model CIS law prepared by a Belarusian state institute. Authorities also plan to draft a national AI strategy and begin implementing an AI law this year.^[6]   Public discourse surrounding AI development in Belarus – including policy drafts and official statements – frequently references human rights, safety, and non-discrimination. International actors can be tempted to take this at face value, engaging to “help get AI right.”   For example, Belarusian AI ambitions are being supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). As the agency's official webpage said: “With the support of the [UNDP], Belarus is developing a comprehensive regulatory framework for artificial intelligence, drawing on international best practices and rooting in national priorities”.^[7] This particular programme is focusing on helping countries achieve Sustainable Development Goals, and ensure that society will benefit from the implementation of AI. While these goals are important, the overall approach in Belarus omits the human rights situation and allows risks related to expanded surveillance capabilities and more efficient mechanisms of control.   Technologies such as facial recognition in public spaces, large-scale data fusion, and automated content moderation can be framed as service improvements or safety measures while, in practice, they are deterring assembly, suppressing pluralism and entrenching information control. Without independent regulators, free media and access to remedy, harmful or discriminatory outcomes will rarely be detected—let alone corrected.   Another red flag indicating the Belarusian AI approach is not grounded in human rights standards is the fact that Belarus is developing its strategy in alignment with Russia’s push for what it describes as “sovereign” AI, based on “traditional values”.^[8] It implies shared technical baselines, legislation and institutional cooperation, including with law enforcement. Independent research has already shown high levels of political censorship in leading Russian-language models, which routinely avoid sensitive topics or reproduce official state narratives.^[9]If Belarus builds its AI infrastructure on this foundation, censorship is not an aberration to be discovered later; it is a design parameter.   Any AI system that affects people’s rights must be governed by safeguards capable of preventing abuses of human rights law and data protection standards. It should meet basic tests: legality, necessity and proportionality; transparency and traceability; independent oversight; and accessible avenues to contest and remedy harmful decisions. Technologies that are incompatible with human rights protections, such as facial recognition technology, should be banned. While these safeguards represent minimum requirements in any context, in Belarus they are particularly critical.   The principle is simple: no context-blind engagement. Before funding, advising or lending credibility, responsible actors should conduct and publish human-rights impact assessments that map realistic end-uses, end-users and risks. Where risks cannot be mitigated in practice, the appropriate decision is to refrain from engagement.   The approaches and methodologies for such assessment are being actively developed. For example, the Council of Europe created the Methodology for the Risk and Impact Assessment of Artificial Intelligence Systems from the Point of View of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (HUDERIA Methodology).   While supporting governments that impose authoritarian practices with the development of AI systems is risky, there are important ways international actors can help.   Instead of enabling state-driven AI development in authoritarian contexts, international actors should prioritise support that strengthens civil society resilience and protects vulnerable communities. This could include funding digital security for at-risk groups and independent media; documentation of abuses and strategic litigation; invest in a broader education process focusing on media literacy; as well as in access-to-rights services that help people navigate legal aid, asylum or social services without exposing sensitive data to hostile networks.     Maria Guryeva is Senior Regional Campaigner, Eastern Europe Central Asia Region, Amnesty International.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1]  Amnesty International, Belarus 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/eastern-europe-and-central-asia/belarus/report-belarus ^[2] Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus, August 2025, https://spring96.org/en/news/118626 ^[3] Amnesty International, Belarus: “It’s enough for people to feel it exists”: Civil society, secrecy and surveillance in Belarus, July 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur49/4306/2016/en/ ^[4] Katya Pivcevic, Police facial recognition use in Belarus, Greece, Myanmar raises rights, data privacy concerns, Biometric Update, March 2021, https://www.biometricupdate.com/202103/police-facial-recognition-use-in-belarus-greece-myanmar-raises-rights-data-privacy-concern ^[5] Ministry of Communications and Informatization of the Republic of Belarus, Smart cities of Belarus, https://www.mpt.gov.by/ru/smart-cities-belarus? ^[6] Belta, Belarus to implement AI in nearly all sectors of economy by 2040, June 2025, https://eng.belta.by/economics/view/belarus-to-implement-ai-in-nearly-all-sectors-of-economy-by-2040-169138-2025; Interparliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Model codes and laws, https://iacis.ru/baza_dokumentov/modelnie_zakonodatelnie_akti_i_rekomendatcii_mpa_sng/modelnie_kodeksi_i_zakoni ^[7] UNDP, How Belarus is improving the quality of AI services, July 2025, https://www.undp.org/belarus/news/how-belarus-improving-quality-ai-services ^[8] Belta, State Secretary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Our task is to develop our own AI based on traditional values, July 2025, https://belta.by/society/view/gossekretar-sg-nasha-zadacha-razrabotat-sobstvennyj-ii-osnovannyj-na-traditsionnyh-tsennostjah-725782-2025 ^[9] Meduza, ‘Commitment to providing facts without bias’ Russia’s flagship AI chatbot recommends reading Meduza and other ‘foreign agents’, August 2025, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/08/27/commitment-to-providing-facts-without-bias? [post_title] => Op-ed | AI in Authoritarian States: Why Belarus’s AI Push Is a Human Rights Problem – and What International Actors Must Do [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-ai-in-authoritarian-states-why-belaruss-ai-push-is-a-human-rights-problem [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-03-16 09:27:53 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-03-16 08:27:53 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8846 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8848 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-03-12 10:00:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-03-12 09:00:00 [post_content] => In 2023, Professor Martin Scott examined the early performance of the Media Freedom Coalition in an article for the Foreign Policy Centre, reflecting on whether the initiative had achieved the “re-set” recommended in an independent evaluation. As the UK now retakes the Coalition’s co-chairmanship, this article considers what practical steps the government should take to strengthen international support for media freedom.   The UK has just become the new co-chair of the Media Freedom Coalition (MFC), alongside Finland.^[1]   This is a welcome move given the current vacuum in leadership for supporting media freedom on the international stage. However, this new role must be accompanied by demonstrable improvements in both the scale and scope of the UK’s international support for independent journalism.   The MFC is a global partnership of 51 countries working together to promote press freedom both domestically and internationally.   As a G7 country and permanent member of the UN Security Council, the UK’s leadership of the MFC provides an opportunity to bring significant visibility and political weight to its work.   The UK also has a comparatively large diplomatic service making it well placed to strengthen the activities of the MFC’s embassy network – which monitors specific court cases, engages in private diplomacy, and coordinates joint statements.^[2]   In addition, as one of the MFC co-founders in 2019 and an inaugural co-chair until 2022, the UK has valuable institutional knowledge and established relationships with civil society organisations linked to the Coalition.   However, the UK’s recent track record in supporting media freedom internationally is not as strong as that of many other MFC member states. In 2025, the UK was ranked joint 12^th out of 30 on the International Media Freedom Support (IMFS) Index – qualifying for the lowest, ‘bronze’ category.^[3] The IMFS Index evaluates 30 states based on their contributions to diplomatic, financial and safety initiatives that promote media freedom. A fuller discussion of the IMFS Index can be found in a recent FPC article by Martin Scott and Professor Mel Bunce.   Sweden (2^nd), the Netherlands (3^rd), Germany (=5^th), France (=5^th), Canada (8^th) – and even some countries with significantly lower state capacity such as Lithuania (1^st) and Estonia (4^th) – all scored significantly higher than the UK on the 2025 IMFS index.   Given this, the UK must make demonstrable improvements to the scale and scope of its international support for independent journalism if it is to offer credible international leadership on media freedom.   Here are 5 ways the UK can achieve this:  

1. Introduce a dedicated emergency visa scheme that explicitly includes provision for media workers in exile. The MFC’s independent legal advisory arm – the High-Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom – has consistently designated this a priority area and provided MFC states with clear guidance on how to implement a suitable scheme for journalists at risk.^[4] Unfortunately, only five MFC member states – Canada, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – have so far implemented such a scheme. Between them, they have issued over 1,000 visas or residence permits to media workers in exile under these schemes since 2020. Implementing a similar scheme in the UK will require stronger internal collaboration between the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and the Home Office.

 

2. Support a national initiative that promotes the protection and safety of media workers in exile. Journalists at risk require not only legal protection – but also practical support to rebuild their lives and continue their work. Germany, for example – who the UK is replacing as MFC co-chair – supports the Hannah Arendt Initiative, a network of civil society organisations that protects and supports journalists from Afghanistan, Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and elsewhere.^[5] As co-chair of the MFC, the UK should be supporting a similar initiative.

 

3. Increase the proportion of international aid allocated to supporting independent media. In 2023 – the most recent year we have figures for – the UK allocated just 0.1% of its international aid to media development. This is nowhere near the benchmark of 1.0% recommended by the Forum on Information & Democracy and even lower than the average of 0.16% for all 30 states measured in the IMFS Index.^[6] As its aid budget is reduced, support for media development must be retained as a strategic priority if the UK is serious about defending press freedom internationally.

 

4. Ensure consistent, long-term financial support for the BBC World Service. As one of the most trusted international news providers – reaching 435 million people each week – the BBC World Service is one of the most effective instruments in the world for supporting access to reliable information.^[7] Speaking at the UK Media Freedom Forum, Foreign Affairs Select Committee Chair Emily Thornbury highlighted its strategic importance, asking: ‘Why aren’t we tripling funding to the BBC World Service? It should be a major priory for this country… Particularly with the cutbacks we are making on aid… Let’s at least have a really good presence in terms of helping people understand what’s going on in the world’.^[8]

 

5. Contribute to multilateral pooled funds dedicated to supporting international journalism. The UNESCO-administered Global Media Defence Fund (GMDF) and other similar, pooled funds can, in principle, provide an effective way of coordinating resources, providing core support to local entities, reducing the earmarking of contributions, and supporting the principle of multilateralism. ^[9] However, in 2024, the UK only contributed to one such fund – the GMDF. By comparison, in 2024, France awarded funding to all four qualifying multilateral pooled funds and in 2025 hosted a high‑level conference on information integrity and independent media at the Paris Peace Forum – where further financial support was pledged. ^[10]

  According to the 2025 IMFS Index, no country is currently performing consistently well across all three dimensions of support for media freedom: diplomacy, funding and safety.^[11] As MFC co-chair, the UK has the opportunity – and obligation – to fill this gap in international leadership.   Achieving this does not require reinventing the wheel. Just the political will to deliver on existing commitments.   As Chris Elmore, FCDO Minister for Multilateral and Human Rights, recently said, “What I want to see, through us retaking the chair of the Media Freedom Coalition, is a move back to the original pillars of this work to ensure that we have meaningful outcomes”.^[12]   I agree.     Martin Scott is a Professor of Media and Global Development at the University of East Anglia. His publications include, ‘Capturing News, Capturing Democracy’ (2024), ‘Humanitarian Journalists’ (2022), ‘Media and Development’ (2014) and ‘From Entertainment to Citizenship’ (2014).   Image: Johann Wadephul, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany (left), Elina Valtonen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland (centre), and Yvette Cooper British Foreign Secretary (right); credit: Ben Dance / UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     [1] Media Freedom Coalition, Home Page, https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/ [2] Media Freedom Coalition, MFC Embassy Networks, https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/activities/embassy-networks/ [3] Centre for Journalism and Democracy, The Index on international Media Freedom Support (IMFS) 2025, 2025, https://jdem.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/IMFS-full-report.pdf [4] Media Freedom Coalition, High-Level Panel of Experts, N.A., https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/who-is-involved/high-level-panel-of-legal-experts/ [5] Network for the protection of journalists and media worldwide, Hannah Arendt Initiative, https://hannah-arendt-initiative.de/en/hannah-arendt-initiative/ [6] Forum on Information and Democracy, The Forum on Information and Democracy calls for a New Deal for Journalism, June 2021, https://informationdemocracy.org/2021/06/16/the-forum-on-information-and-democracy-calls-for-a-new-deal-for-journalism/ [7] BBC, BBC’s response to global news events drives audience growth, July 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2025/bbc-response-to-global-news-events-drives-audience-growth [8] UK Media Freedom Forum, Home Page, https://mediafreedomforum.co.uk/ [9] UNESCO, Global Media Defence Fund, https://www.unesco.org/en/global-media-defence-fund [10] French Embassy and Consulates General in the UKParis Peace Forum: 29 States commit to information integrity and independent media, November 2025, https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/paris-peace-forum-29-states-commit-information-integrity-and-independent-media [11] Centre for Journalism and Democracy, The Index on international Media Freedom Support (IMFS) 2025, 2025, https://jdem.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/IMFS-full-report.pdf [12] UK Parliament, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Volume 781, March 2026, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2026-03-04/debates/8C008AEB-0F64-4A12-A157-368EA0118C0A/ForeignCommonwealthAndDevelopmentOffice#contribution-490D078B-AA2C-4241-8EE2-3F4DDDF44EF0 [post_title] => Five Priorities for the UK as it Retakes the Chair of the Media Freedom Coalition [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => five-priorities-for-the-uk-as-it-retakes-the-chair-of-the-media-freedom-coalition [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-03-13 12:46:02 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-03-13 11:46:02 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8848 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [16] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8820 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-02-24 01:00:50 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-02-24 00:00:50 [post_content] => Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war’s impact on media and information integrity remains profound. In this anniversary reflection, Sergiy Tomilenko, President of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, examines how journalism has adapted to new battlefield realities and why sustained international support for independent media is essential. As the character of the war evolves, so too does the environment in which Ukrainian journalists operate.   As Ukraine approaches the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the character of the war has changed – and so has the daily work of journalists. Missiles still strike. Artillery still destroys cities. But increasingly, it is the persistent, humming presence of drones above our towns and villages that defines this phase of the war.   Shahed drones fly low over residential areas at night. First-person-view (FPV) drones hunt vehicles near the frontlines. Surveillance drones monitor movement even in places far from the battlefield. For Ukrainian journalists, this has created a new professional reality. The danger is no longer episodic, it is ambient. It hovers.   At the same time, Ukraine is enduring one of its most difficult winters since 2022. Repeated attacks on energy infrastructure have triggered rolling blackouts across major cities. Heating failures have left entire districts without warmth in sub-zero temperatures. Internet and mobile networks periodically collapse when power supply fails.   And yet, journalism continues. Not because it is easy. Not because it is safe. But because it is essential.   Reporting Under Drones In recent months, safety protocols for journalists have evolved once again. Reporters covering frontline regions now routinely carry drone detectors — small handheld devices that warn of incoming unmanned aircraft.   One Ukrainian fixer I recently met works with international correspondents in high-risk zones. He carries such a detector every day. Not long ago, he found himself under shelling after detecting drone activity nearby. Later, when we spoke, he asked me not to publicly describe the incident in detail.   “Please,” he said quietly, “I don’t want my wife to worry.”   That sentence captures the human dimension behind the statistics.   We often speak in numbers – journalists killed, injured, detained, captured. These figures matter. But behind each one is a family, a daily calculation of risk, and a professional decision to continue.   The Russian army does not distinguish between civilian and media targets. Journalists wearing “PRESS” markings remain vulnerable. Media vehicles have been hit. Newsrooms have been damaged. In occupied territories, journalists face detention and torture.   Yet Ukrainian reporters continue to document war crimes, verify information, and provide context in an environment saturated with disinformation and propaganda.   The Harsh Winter  and the Information Vacuum This winter has tested resilience in new ways. Blackouts are not new in Ukraine, but their scale and unpredictability have intensified. In some districts of Kyiv and other cities, electricity follows a fragile schedule — three hours on, seven hours off. In frontline regions, there is no schedule at all.   For journalism, electricity is not a convenience. It means the ability to upload footage, confirm sources, publish missile alerts, verify rumours, and correct false information circulating online.   When power disappears, connectivity follows. LTE signals may appear strong on a smartphone screen, yet nothing loads. Journalists drive to petrol stations to charge batteries. They work from cars, stairwells, and temporary co-working spaces.   In many frontline areas, printed newspapers remain essential.   This may surprise international audiences accustomed to digital-first ecosystems. But where electricity is unstable and internet access unreliable, local printed newspapers are often the most trusted and accessible source of verified information.   Frontline newspapers in regions such as Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, and Kharkiv continue to publish and distribute under extraordinary conditions. Delivery routes pass through areas regularly shelled or monitored by Russian drones. Advertising revenues have collapsed while printing costs rise. Staff members are sometimes mobilised to the armed forces, leaving skeletal editorial teams.   Yet they persist because they understand something fundamental: when the information space collapses, disinformation fills the void.   Russian propaganda adapts quickly. It exploits blackouts and uncertainty. It spreads fabricated narratives through Telegram channels and anonymous accounts. It seeks to undermine morale, inflame divisions, and distort battlefield realities.   Journalism on the ground is the antidote. It sustains communities when uncertainty grows and prevents fear from turning into chaos.   Just as electricity grids and heating systems are critical for survival in winter, reliable information is equally vital.   During missile attacks, verified updates save lives. During evacuations, accurate reporting prevents panic. In de-occupied territories, local media help rebuild trust in institutions and reconnect fragmented communities.   This is not abstract theory. It is visible in daily practice.   Local editors receive calls from elderly readers asking whether evacuation rumors are true. Journalists coordinate with authorities to clarify curfews and safety measures. Reporters debunk fake announcements about chemical threats or mobilisation.   Journalism in wartime requires discipline. It means resisting the temptation to publish unverified information for speed. It requires balancing transparency with operational security. It demands constant ethical judgment.   Over the past four years, Ukraine’s media community has matured significantly. Newsrooms have strengthened verification standards. Journalists collaborate across outlets to counter disinformation. International partnerships have expanded investigative capacity.   Yet the sustainability of this ecosystem remains fragile.   The Role of the Journalists’ Solidarity Centres One of the most important developments since 2022 has been the expansion of the Journalists’ Solidarity Centres, coordinated by the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine with international partners. Located in cities including Kyiv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv, these Centres function as safe hubs for media professionals. They provide protective equipment, stable co-working spaces with electricity and internet, emergency power and Starlink access during blackouts, as well as psychological and legal support. They also assist international correspondents reporting from Ukraine.   During the harshest weeks of this winter, these Centres once again became lifelines. When offices went dark, journalists relocated there to file stories. When regional outlets lacked charging capacity, equipment was shared. When trauma accumulated quietly, conversations provided relief.   Beyond practical assistance, these Centres symbolise solidarity — domestic and international alike.They also demonstrate that press freedom support must adapt to wartime realities. Traditional media development models are insufficient when infrastructure is deliberately targeted and economic stability collapses.   The Human Cost Continues We cannot mark this anniversary without acknowledging the ongoing human cost. Ukrainian journalists remain in Russian captivity. Others are missing. Families wait for news. Sisters, brothers, fathers, mothers, and spouses carry the burden of uncertainty.   Recently, I met the sister of a journalist from Melitopol who remains detained. Her voice did not tremble with anger. It carried a quiet exhaustion — the exhaustion of waiting, of not knowing.   The struggle for press freedom in Ukraine is not only about institutions, it is deeply personal.   Why the World Should Still Care International fatigue is real. The news cycle shifts. Other crises emerge. Yet Ukraine remains a frontline for democratic resilience in Europe.   If Russian aggression succeeds in silencing independent media in Ukraine, the consequences will extend far beyond our borders. It would signal that violence can erase truth.   Conversely, every functioning newsroom in a frontline town is evidence that democratic values endure even under bombardment.   Supporting Ukrainian journalism today is not an act of charity. It is an investment in a broader European security architecture where information integrity matters.   What Is Needed Now The solutions are not complex, but they require sustained commitment.   Local and regional media need predictable emergency funding that does not vanish when headlines shift. Journalists — particularly those working near the front — require long-term support for both physical safety and psychological resilience. Those still held in Russian captivity need consistent international attention, because silence around their cases risks becoming another form of abandonment.   Two additional realities deserve clearer recognition. Disinformation does not stop at borders, and confronting it demands genuine cross-border cooperation. A frontline newspaper serving a shelled town in Zaporizhzhia or Kherson is not a lesser form of journalism; it is as strategically important as any national broadcaster.   Beyond Resilience “Resilience” has become one of the defining words of these four years. Ukrainians are resilient. Ukrainian journalists are resilient.   But resilience should not be romanticised.   Journalists do not aspire to work under drones. Editors do not aspire to plan print runs around artillery strikes. Fixers do not aspire to calculate risk in order to shield their families from anxiety. What Ukrainian journalists aspire to is simple: to work safely, to report truthfully, and to serve their communities.   Until that day arrives, their work will continue.   I still think about that fixer — the way he looked at me before speaking, and then quietly asked that I not describe what had happened. He was not afraid for himself. He was afraid of what his wife would feel if she knew.   Behind every statistic, every damaged newsroom, every equipment list and safety protocol, there are people doing necessary work — and trying to protect those they love from understanding just how dangerous that work has become.   In wartime, truth does not sustain itself automatically. It endures because individuals choose, day after day, to protect it.   And Ukrainian journalists continue to make that choice.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     Sergiy Tomilenko is the President of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU). With over two decades of experience in journalism and media advocacy, Tomilenko has been at the forefront of defending press freedom and journalists' rights in Ukraine.   [post_title] => Four Years On: Journalism Under Drones, Beyond Blackouts [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => four-years-on-journalism-under-drones-beyond-blackouts [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-02-23 18:30:17 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-02-23 17:30:17 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8820 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8782 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-02-05 01:00:39 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-02-05 00:00:39 [post_content] => The German right-wing populist party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) has been at the centre of countless controversies since its formation in 2013, not least regarding its foreign policy. From AfD politicians’ downplaying of Nazi crimes to suspected links to the Russian and Chinese governments, the party is a source of disruption and debate in the media and in the German parliament itself.^[1] This article analyses the AfD’s foreign policy outlook and considers its implications in the context of emerging foreign policy challenges.   Why the AfD’s foreign policy matters Having entered parliament in 2017 and secured the second-highest share of votes in the 2025 federal election, the AfD has rapidly established itself in the German political landscape, and indeed the foreign policy landscape. Regardless of whether the party gains power or remains in opposition in the coming years, it will undoubtedly remain part of the foreign policy conversation in Germany and beyond.   Identifying the party’s core positions and vision of Germany’s role in the world is therefore important, not only to understand the possible foreign policy implications of the AfD being in government, but also to understand how it is already shaping Germany’s relations with partner countries and institutions.   Historical (re)interpretation Foreign policy is inseparable from national history, and there is no better example of this than Germany. For decades, the dominant interpretations shaping German foreign policy have been rooted in guilt, responsibility, and reconciliation in the aftermath of the Nazi regime. The AfD, however, both downplays such narratives and selectively invokes history to offer competing interpretations. For example, AfD parliamentary speeches on Israel and the conflict in Gaza appropriate narratives of historical responsibility to legitimise the party’s anti-Islam agenda. This kind of rhetoric fundamentally disrupts the relative consensus on key foreign policy pillars, challenging other parliamentarians to defend their positions and creating a divide between political elites who uphold existing pillars and those (primarily the AfD) who openly question them.   At the international level, the AfD’s controversial historical interpretations have not gone unnoticed. In Germany’s bilateral relationship with Poland, a central partner and neighbour where historical debates are ongoing, the AfD has the potential to be a highly problematic force. In late 2025, Polish historian and adviser to President Nawrocki, Andrzej Nowak, accepted an invitation from the AfD to speak in the German Bundestag, stating that his aim was to warn AfD politicians against naive positions towards Russia.^[2] Just a few months later, AfD politician Kay Gottschalk stated on X that his first act as Minister for Finance would be to demand 1.3 billion euros in reparations from Poland in response to the attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022.^[3] Uncoincidentally, this is the same sum President Nawrocki has demanded from Germany in war reparations.^[4] Such interactions have the potential to significantly sour relations, particularly given the AfD’s ongoing popularity.   Questioning established cooperation The subversion of historical narratives is part of a wider challenge posed by the AfD to long-standing German partnerships and alliances. This is perhaps most evident – and most subversive – when it comes to the AfD’s stance towards the EU. Membership of the EU and European integration are fundamental pillars of German foreign policy, deeply intertwined with bilateral relations with other member states. While the other German political parties naturally differ regarding specific policy preferences, they are united in the position that EU membership is not only beneficial to Germany, but central to its identity and role in the world.   In contrast, and in line with the populist radical right tendency towards anti-globalisation and anti-establishment views, the AfD accuses the EU of being technocratic, elitist, and threatening to German interests and sovereignty. Following the 2024 European elections, which showed a clear shift to the right, the 14 AfD Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) formed a new far-right parliamentary group named Europe of Sovereign Nations, together with 11 representatives from seven different countries.^[5] The result indicated that the AfD’s scepticism towards the EU and championing of sovereignty over liberal institutionalism resonates beyond the national level.   These positions reflect a wider worldview held by many AfD politicians, in which the international system is understood primarily in terms of power politics and pragmatism. The AfD frequently attacks arguments in favour of interdependence and common values in the German parliament, dismissing these as ideologically driven or detached from political reality. Instead, AfD politicians favour a non-aligned position which resists external influence, even from traditional allies such as the US. A particular source of controversy in this regard is the AfD’s position on Putin’s war against Ukraine, which emphasises the negative impact of sanctions on the German economy, and calls for negotiations with Putin. Such positions are met with widespread rejection in the German parliament and again have the effect of uniting the other parties in their rhetorical commitment to defending international law and the European peace order.   Same positions, new context The AfD’s status as a disruptive force within the German foreign policy discourse is unlikely to diminish as long as it remains in opposition. Whether it would significantly adapt its foreign policy positions if it were to enter government remains uncertain. At the same time, Russia’s war against Ukraine and President Trump’s aggressive and unpredictable foreign policy pose ongoing dilemmas for ruling and opposition parties alike.   In recent years, right-wing populists across Europe and the US have tended to uphold similar foreign policy positions and attitudes towards global security, including the pragmatic prioritisation of national interest, a non-aligned approach towards Russia and China, and a scepticism towards liberal institutions like the EU.^[6] It has also been characteristic of these political actors to cultivate transnational networks of political support. President Trump has frequently served as a point of reference in this regard, from the friendly relationship between Trump and Polish President Karol Nawrocki to Elon Musk’s public backing of the AfD.^[7]   However, Trump’s recent aggressive foreign policy moves towards Venezuela and Greenland may signal the beginning of the decline of this era. Along with other European right-wing parties, AfD leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla condemned Trump’s foreign policy in January 2026.^[8] These developments pose important questions regarding the direction of the AfD’s foreign policy. Will the German right increasingly distance itself from its previously friendly stance towards the Trump administration? And how will AfD advocates of a non-aligned, pragmatic approach respond to attempts to uphold liberal institutions and diversify global cooperation, such as the recent EU trade deals with Mercosur and India?^[9]   The AfD’s stance towards the international system not only has implications for German and European foreign policy. It also resonates within broader debates about the future of the so-called liberal international order. At the World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addressed this discourse, arguing that the so-called rules-based order, and in particular American hegemony, had constructed a myth which has now been ‘ruptured.’^[10] He went on to argue that the solution is not a ‘world of fortresses’ but ‘collective investments in resilience.’ While many parties and governments are rallying around liberal institutions and alliances, the AfD’s foreign policy discourse to date clearly indicates a preference for a ‘world of fortresses.’   This article is based on a recently published original paper by Maximilian Tkocz and Rachel Herring, which can be found here.   Rachel Herring is a PhD researcher at Aston University and the University of Birmingham. Her research focuses on German foreign policy, Germany’s relations with Central Europe, and the role of civil society actors in foreign relations. She was the Think Visegrad Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Prague in 2024 and is currently a visiting researcher at the Jacques Delors Centre, Berlin.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] Deutsche Welle, AfD chief downplays Nazi era as ‘bird shit’, Deutsche Welle, February 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/afds-gauland-plays-down-nazi-era-as-a-bird-shit-in-german-history/a-44055213; Der Spiegel, Maik Baumgärtner et al, How the AfD Became the Long Arm of Russia and China, May 2024, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/afd-spionageaffaere-russland-und-china-im-fokus-neue-enthuellungen-belasten-die-partei-1714480876-a-a1c05e64-b6bc-4c6b-844e-a78a32ec4f91 ^[2] Jan Sternberg, Neue Annäherung zwischen der AfD und der polnischen Rechten, October 2025, https://www.rnd.de/politik/neue-annaeherung-zwischen-afd-und-der-polnischen-rechten-JRUDLEPR45FAZFVVCIEXQWCSKU.html ^[3] Welt, „Wer zuletzt lacht, lacht am besten“ – AfD-Politiker fordert 1,3 Billionen Euro von Polen, January 2026, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article6974fbce707d4aa2075800bf/reparationszahlung-wer-zuletzt-lacht-lacht-am-besten-afd-politiker-fordert-1-3-billionen-euro-von-polen.html ^[4] Tagesschau, Deutschland lehnt Reparationsforderungen erneut ab, September 2025, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/merz-steinmeier-polen-reparationen-100.html ^[5] Francois Hublet, 10 Key Lessons of the 2024 European Parliament Election, 2024, https://geopolitique.eu/en/articles/10-key-lessons-of-the-2024-european-parliament-election/ ^[6] Jeremy Cliffe et al, Rise to the challengers: Europe’s populist parties and its foreign policy future, June 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/rise-to-the-challengers-europes-populist-parties-and-its-foreign-policy-future/ ^[7] Jacek Lepiarz, What does Poland's president hope to achieve in Washington?, February 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/poland-karol-nawrocki-washington-visit-donald-trump-nato-v2/a-73851111; Jessica Parker, Musk interviews German far-right frontwoman, January 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr7errxp5jmo ^[8] Sarah Marsh and Elizabeth Pineau, Europe's far right and populists distance themselves from Trump over Greenland, January 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/europes-far-right-populists-distance-themselves-trump-over-greenland-2026-01-21/; Die Zeit, AfD-Spitze geht auf Distanz zu Trumps Außenpolitik, January 2026, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2026-01/afd-weidel-chrupalla-aussenpolitik-usa ^[9] European Commission, The EU-Mercosur trade agreement, 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/; Roshni Majumdar and Shakeel Sobhan, EU, India clinch historic free trade deal, January 2026, https://www.dw.com/en/india-eu-trade-deal-reached-modi-says/live-75669574 ^[10] World Economic Forum, Davos 2026: Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, January 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/ [post_title] => Long Read | The German Far-Right’s Subversive Foreign Policy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => long-read-the-german-far-rights-subversive-foreign-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-02-03 13:32:23 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-02-03 12:32:23 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8782 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8730 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-01-19 01:00:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-01-19 00:00:48 [post_content] => The capture of Nicolás Maduro by the US military has triggered an immediate and polarised international debate. Questions of sovereignty, legality, and precedent have rightly come to the fore, reviving anxieties about the erosion of the rules-based international order and the risks of unilateral military action.   However, Venezuela’s collapse did not begin on the night of the intervention. It is the result of decades of institutional dismantling, systematic repression, and the hollowing out of democratic accountability. Over time, this internal erosion became entangled with external interests, regional power dynamics, and repeated failures of international engagement. The result is a crisis that is at once legal, political, humanitarian, and geopolitical, and one that resists explanation through any single analytical lens.   This expert analysis brings together four perspectives that speak to different, but interconnected, dimensions of the Venezuelan crisis. Laura Vidal, digital rights researcher and civil society observer, centres the human rights reality inside Venezuela, highlighting that legal debates detached from lived experience risk normalising repression and compounding victimisation. Andrew Gawthorpe, FPC Senior Fellow, analyses the emerging US strategy towards Venezuela, arguing that Washington is moving away from ‘regime change’ towards a more coercive model of ‘regime management’, with uncertain leverage and destabilising consequences. Dame Audrey Glover, FPC’s Chair of Trustees, sets out the international legal implications of the US operation, underscoring the dangers posed by selective adherence to foundational legal norms. Stefan Wolff, FPC Senior Fellow, examines the dilemmas facing Europe as it seeks to reconcile its commitment to a rules-based order with alliance politics and shifting power realities.   Taken together, these contributions expose the risks of selective concern: invoking international law only at moments of crisis, privileging geopolitical stability over accountability, or debating legality while disregarding human suffering. If Venezuela is to be understood and addressed in a meaningful way, these dimensions need to be held together, not treated as competing narratives.   The Human Rights Dimension of Venezuela’s Crisis By Laura Vidal   Any assessment of Venezuela’s current crisis that sidelines human rights is necessarily incomplete. The most visible entry point remains the situation of political prisoners.^[1] Detentions continue to function as a revolving door: individuals are arrested, released under opaque conditions, and replaced by new detainees.^[2] Deaths in custody, enforced disappearances, and prolonged incommunicado detention remain documented practices.^[3] Torture centers continue to operate, and releases are often negotiated, partial, or discretionary rather than grounded in due process or judicial review. The pace of releases has been extremely slow, even as new arrests routinely follow moments of political tension, reinforcing a system based on fear rather than accountability.   This pattern, however, represents only one layer of a much longer process of deterioration. Venezuela’s human rights crisis has unfolded over years through the systematic dismantling of institutions, the erosion of checks and balances, and the capture of the justice system. The result is a complex humanitarian emergency that predates recent geopolitical escalations. Nearly a third of the population has left the country, many under precarious conditions that expose them to exploitation, abuse, and trafficking networks along migration routes. Those who remain face chronic shortages of basic services, including healthcare, electricity, and access to potable water.^[4]   The media landscape has been progressively constrained through closures, licensing pressures, legal harassment, and digital censorship. Accessing information online increasingly requires the use of circumvention tools, exposing users to heightened risks of surveillance and criminalisation. Reporting, documentation, and civic organising have consequently become high-risk activities.^[5]   This reality is often misrepresented as the consequence of international sanctions alone, despite the fact that economic collapse and institutional erosion began years before sectoral sanctions were imposed. Framing the crisis exclusively through sanctions obscures its structural roots and diverts attention from long-standing patterns of repression, impunity, and state failure.^[6] Human rights violations in Venezuela are not episodic; they are systemic, cumulative, and deeply embedded in the country’s governance model.   From Regime Change to Regime Management By Andrew Gawthorpe   The US military operation against Nicolas Maduro represents a novel approach to foreign policy. “Regime change” is out and “regime management” is in. The Trump administration’s intention appears to be to leave the current Venezuelan government formally in place, while coercing it into adopting policies that will benefit US security and economic interests. Washington’s main demands for the government in Caracas include opening up the country’s oil wealth to American investment and control, severing friendly relations with China and Russia, and ending support for the government in Cuba.   Trump’s methods are nakedly imperial – a throwback to the “gunboat diplomacy” of the nineteenth century. It is notable that they even lack the justification, common in previous US military interventions, with the familiar claim that intervention will liberate the Venezuelan people from a dictatorial government. Instead, Washington is proposing to work with that dictatorial government in order to deliver profits for American oil companies.   From the perspective of the Trump administration, this strategy has obvious appeal. It lacks the commitment of resources and potentially lives to a long-term military occupation designed to transform Venezuela’s government, as was attempted in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, it remains unclear whether this approach gives the US enough leverage over the government in Venezuela to achieve its goals.   Venezuela’s new leader, Delcy Rodríguez, has to avoid angering nationalist opinion at home – not least in her country’s military. She cannot go too far in appeasing the US. For their part, American oil companies also have little interest in investing in Venezuela, particularly while the current government remains in place. Meanwhile, President Trump’s attention seems to have wandered, with him now threatening new military action against Iran. As a result, what’s coming next in Venezuela remains highly unclear.   International Law and the Erosion of Legal Restraint By Dame Audrey Glover   Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”   This article, part of the foundation of the post-Second World War international rules-based order, establishes a core principle against aggression, subject only to narrowly defined exceptions: self-defence and UN Security Council authorisation. This provision is binding on all States, regardless of whether they are members of the United Nations.   The action of US Forces entering Venezuela uninvited at night to detain President Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and place them in custody in the US to await trial, constitutes a breach of Article 2(4). Under International law, only an assault on another country by military means qualifies as a trigger for self-defence.   The consequence of the US operation is therefore a violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty, contrary to International Law. Furthermore, the intervention has not resulted in an attempt to restore democratic governance in the country. Maduro has been replaced by his Deputy, Delcy Rodríguez, without an election or consultation of the electorate and opposition– particularly significant given that Maduro himself overturned a prior electoral outcome to retain power. Her appointment undermines any argument that the intervention was undertaken in pursuit of democratic principles.   For his part, President Trump has said he will ‘run’ Venezuela remotely, a proposition that raises serious questions about both feasibility and legitimacy. It also prompts broader concerns regarding regional security and the future of Venezuela’s oil sector, including how it might be rebuilt and governed under such circumstances.   Stephen Miller, an adviser to President Trump, has said: “Forget international law. We live in a world that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power”. Such rhetoric reflects an explicit rejection of the legal norms that underpin international stability.   Recent events including the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, have further imperilled the rules-based international order at the core of which are the principles of individual liberty, intellectual and religious freedom, constitutional democracy and free trade. The most damaging has been the rejection of the principles of international law that the US helped to create. Venezuela stands as the latest example of this deterioration. The time has come to save these principles from extinction.   Europe and the Dilemmas of the Rules-Based Order by Stefan Wolff   The apprehension of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by the US military on the night of 3rd January is the first time in over three decades that the White House has conducted such an operation. The operation reflects Washington’s new national security strategy and its emphasis on hemispheric dominance, even as it sits in clear tension with international law. For Europe, the operation, and how to respond to it, poses multiple dilemmas.   The first dilemma concerns how to reconcile hitherto unwavering European support for a rules-based international order with the need to preserve what is left of the transatlantic alliance. This includes American security guarantees for European allies and continuing support for Ukraine’s war effort. The display of American capability and the meek reactions not only by Europe but also by Russia and China also demonstrated that for all the talk of a multipolar world order, Moscow and Beijing have few credible options to respond to American assertions of power. From a European perspective, this reality is in some respects reassuring, especially in the context of the Kremlin’s apparently insatiable revisionism in eastern Europe.   Closely related is a second dilemma: US ambitions for absolute dominance in the western hemisphere have revived Trump’s designs for Greenland, returning them to the transatlantic agenda where they spell potential for disruption—both in the sense of distracting attention from the actual threat of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and Moscow’s broader hybrid campaign elsewhere on the continent, and of potentially diverting critical resources away from deterring further Russian adventurism in Europe towards Arctic security, an area long neglected by both Europe and the United States.   The third dilemma is that the removal of Maduro from power is in line with long-stated European preferences for a democratic transition in the country, and as such should be welcomed. However, what seems to have resulted from the US operation is at best a face lift at the top of the Venezuelan regime, followed by internal power consolidation and increased external subservience to the demands of the mercurial incumbent of the White House. This dilemma also has wider implications. Europe may lack the hard power to effect regime change, but not the desire to do so. With probably more than half an eye on the situation in Iran, there are likely some figures in Europe’s political class who would not object too loudly or strongly if the US and/or Israel were adopting a more proactive stance on supporting protesters in Tehran and dozens of other cities. Yet externally driven regime change is hardly ever cost- or consequence-free, as the experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, among others, vividly demonstrate.   European equivocation and prevarication in response to the US military operation against Maduro reflects the difficulty of navigating these dilemmas. Such ambivalence is neither a long-term solution nor will it allow Europeans to avoid discussing two equally unpalatable options: submitting to the whims of Trump, or an attempt to act independently in an increasingly hostile and lawless world. As so often, Europe is likely to fall back on muddling through: seeking to placate and flatter President Trump while ignoring the flaws and dangers of his foreign policy, and simultaneously trying to build towards the mythical promise of strategic autonomy. This approach rests on the hope that unconstrained, illiberal great power dominance within distinct spheres of influence does not become the new normal – one in which Europe is permanently downgraded to Washington’s, let alone Moscow’s or Beijing’s vassal.  

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  For a comprehensive examination of the decades-long institutional erosion, systemic human rights abuses, and profound humanitarian crisis that have shaped contemporary Venezuela, see Laura Vidal’s Op-Ed: International law, institutional collapse, and the danger of selective concern, which situates the country’s current situation within a broader history of democratic decay, international inaction, and the human cost.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: Political Prisoners Cut Off From the World, September 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/09/22/venezuela-political-prisoners-cut-off-from-the-world ^[2] Efecto Cocuyo, Efecto Paz #11 – Presos políticos después del 3E, January 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EhV_CpfoBpw&t=2821s ^[3] United Nations News, Venezuela’s National Guard linked to killings, torture and repression, UN probe finds, December 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166565 ^[4] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Venezuela, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/venezuela ^[5] Puyosa, Azpúrua, Suárez Pérez, How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism, Atlantic Council, July 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/how-venezuela-became-a-model-for-digital-authoritarianism/; VE sin Filtro, Censura y represión digital en las elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela, 2025, https://vesinfiltro.org/noticias/2025-03-12-reporte-elecciones-presidenciales/ ^[6] Nizar El Fakih, Aproximación al Régimen de Sanciones Internacionales y al caso de Venezuela, IDB, December 2020, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://publications.iadb.org/en/node/29550&ved=2ahUKEwiWtLq81IiSAxWFVKQEHW0vBnUQFnoECBYQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Ega3sYVRtvTyuCerIVUlw [post_title] => Expert Look | Venezuela in Focus: Human Rights, Geopolitical Dilemmas, and International Law [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => expert-look-venezuela-in-focus [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-01-16 17:20:43 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-01-16 16:20:43 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8730 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8717 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-01-15 10:17:32 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-01-15 09:17:32 [post_content] => In the immediate aftermath of Nicolás Maduro’s military extraction by the United States, protests erupted across major cities in Europe and the Americas calling for respect for Venezuela’s sovereignty. Venezuelans themselves, however, were largely absent from these protests. This contrast is not incidental. It reflects a deeper misalignment in how the crisis is being framed and debated.   For Venezuelans abroad, this moment has triggered yet another cycle of incomprehension. Many are confronted with responses that center almost exclusively on international law and precedent, while leaving aside the humanitarian and human rights crisis that has driven millions into forced migration or exile. This tension mirrors the ambivalent position of the region itself: shaken by a military intervention, yet unable to deny nearly two decades of institutional dismantling under authoritarian rule.   In the days following Maduro’s extraction, expressions of joy and relief within Venezuela circulated widely on social media platforms, often accessed through VPNs. Such reactions, however, carry real risks. Reports indicate that individuals have been detained, had their phones searched, and faced extortion when authorities discovered any reference to the intervention or signs of celebration.^[1]   Critics of the intervention have rightly underscored the gravity of violating territorial integrity and the risks such actions pose to international law. Carolina Sandoval, president of Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), pointed at regional concerns by the precedent being set, particularly given the long history of US military action in the hemisphere.^[2] At the same time, Sandoval also acknowledges a second, unresolved dimension: Venezuela has endured years of systematic repression under an authoritarian and violent government, and the need for accountability and a democratic transition remains urgent.   As political actors reposition themselves and new details emerge, another uncomfortable reality has become harder to ignore. Despite decades of anti-imperialist rhetoric, it appears increasingly evident to many analysts that negotiations with the United States were not imposed from the outside, but actively pursued by actors within the regime itself. This contradiction between discourse and practice further complicates efforts to interpret the moment through clean ideological binaries. Meanwhile, the continued presence of chavismo deeply hurts the hopes of a genuine transition to democracy.   As Atlantic Council senior research fellow Iria Puyosa has noted, key figures within the governing coalition now face an unprecedented challenge: meeting Washington’s demands while preventing internal fracture or a military coup. Those demands include regulatory stability and transparent property frameworks, precisely the institutional environment that chavismo systematically dismantled over years of rule.^[3]   Language also matters in this context. For Venezuelans, particularly victims of human rights violations, an exclusive focus on sovereignty and legal neutrality is not a technical debate but a political act. As journalist and human rights defender Luis Carlos Díaz told me, “framing the crisis solely in terms of territorial violation without acknowledging the criminal capture of the Venezuelan state produces a concrete effect: it normalises and protects those responsible for destroying constitutional order and committing crimes against humanity. From the perspective of victims, this is not neutrality: it is discursive revictimisation”.  

This is not an isolated rupture

Any attempt to understand the current moment collapses if it treats the US intervention as an isolated rupture caused by a single set of actors. Venezuela was not a space free of foreign influence prior to this operation.   Cuban involvement in intelligence and repressive structures has been documented for years, facilitated through political and economic exchanges that included preferential access to oil.^[4] Russian military presence is also well established, including documented operations linked to the Wagner Group.^[5] Venezuela remains deeply indebted to Chinese creditors, owing roughly 20 billion dollars in loans that have shaped economic dependency and constrained policy autonomy. Iran has provided technological support that has translated into tools of repression, including the reported use of drones during demonstrations in 2024.^[6] This record complicates claims that a previously respected red line was suddenly crossed.   Venezuela’s institutional dismantling and democratic struggle did not begin recently. It spans nearly three decades, with the past ten years marking the most intense phase, one in which legal frameworks, state resources, and institutional checks were stretched or eliminated to extinguish meaningful separation of powers. Within this trajectory, the 2024 elections stand out as a critical turning point. For many Venezuelans, they represented the last available democratic mechanism, despite conditions that were neither free nor fair and despite widespread expectations of fraud.   International responses to these elections revealed a familiar pattern. While condemnations were issued, institutional action stalled. In late July 2024, the Organization of American States rejected a resolution calling on the Venezuelan government to provide transparency regarding the election results, with 17 votes in favor, none against, and a notable number of 11 abstentions.^[7] To this day, Maduro’s government has failed to present evidence substantiating its claimed victory.^[8]   None of this justifies violent interventions. It does, however, situate recent events within a longer history of institutional collapse, abandoned justice, and power vacuums already exploited by multiple actors across ideological lines. As the Venezuelan civil society organisation CEPAZ has warned, “the international community now faces one last major opportunity to mitigate a crisis that its own prolonged ineffectiveness helped create”.^[9]  

Human rights cannot be bracketed out

Any analysis of Venezuela that sidelines human rights is analytically incomplete. The situation of political prisoners offers a stark entry point. Detention in Venezuela is constantly referred to by human rights defenders as a “revolving-door” system marked by deaths in custody, forced disappearances, and torture.^[10] So-called “releases” are often conditional, opaque, and reversible, functioning as instruments of control rather than steps toward justice. The pace of releases has been extremely slow, and new detentions are feared.^[11]   These practices are not confined to isolated events.^[12] Nearly a third of the population has fled the country, many under precarious conditions that expose them to exploitation and trafficking networks along migration routes. Inside Venezuela, the humanitarian crisis remains complex and multidimensional, affecting access to food, healthcare, and other basic services. Independent media has been blocked or captured, while transnational repression extends surveillance and intimidation beyond borders.^[13] Internet access is limited, unreliable, and often dangerous.^[14] Vulnerable groups, including Indigenous communities, face persistent attacks despite having once served as a central pillar of the regime’s legitimacy.^[15]   This reality is often misrepresented as the consequence of international sanctions alone, despite the fact that economic collapse and institutional erosion began years before sectorial sanctions came into force.^[16] The persistence of this narrative obscures responsibility and diverts attention from corruption and deliberate policy choices that hollowed out the state.   Amid widespread confusion and the difficulty of making sense of incomplete and often contested data, many of the most reliable sources on Venezuela today are civil society organisations, some of them working in exile. These organisations have been essential in documenting the multiple, overlapping layers that define the crisis, offering analyses that move beyond fixed or binary narratives. They continue to play that role despite operating under constant persecution, threats, and criminalisation inside the country, while simultaneously facing defunding and diminishing support from international partners and allies.  

Weighing what already broke

It is expected that governments, political parties, and institutions interpret events through their own lenses and fears. The rupture represented by a US military extraction is serious, and the concerns it raises regarding its precedent and international law are legitimate. But treating this moment as the beginning of the problem distorts the balance of what is at stake.   The Venezuelan crisis ceased to be solely a domestic problem years ago. It has reshaped migration routes across the hemisphere, strained regional economies, and generated humanitarian emergencies well beyond national borders. It has also been sustained by economic interests and political arrangements in which multiple actors benefited from the regime’s permanence, even as institutions collapsed and accountability disappeared.   Focusing exclusively on the legality of a single act, while ignoring the accumulated damage that made such an act conceivable, risks repeating the same error that has defined international engagement with Venezuela for over a decade: reacting to moments of rupture while tolerating the slow dismantling that precedes them. If international law is to retain meaning, it cannot be invoked only at the point of intervention. It must also reckon with the long record of impunity, complicity, and selective concern that paved the way.     Laura Vidal is a digital rights researcher and civil society observer working across Latin America and international spaces. For nearly two decades, she has followed and documented Venezuela’s crisis from multiple vantage points, with a focus on authoritarianism, technology, and gender. She currently works with IFEX and Digital Action, and her research, analysis, and essays have been published by organisations such as Internews, The Engine Room, Mozilla, APC, EFF, and Global Voices, among others. Her work sits at the intersection of digital power, civic resilience, and the lived experiences of communities navigating repression and displacement.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] Espacio Público, Detienen a cinco ciudadanos por celebrar detención de Maduro, Espacio Público, January 2026, . https://espaciopublico.ong/detienen-a-cinco-ciudadanos-por-celebrar-detencion-de-maduro/ ^[2]In interview with Efecto Cocuyo, Efecto Paz #11 – Presos políticos después del 3E, January 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EhV_CpfoBpw&t=2821s ^[3]Iria Puyosa, Delcy Rodríguez’s untenable balancing act, Atlantic Council, January 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/delcy-rodriguezs-untenable-balancing-act/ ^[4] Angus Berwick, Imported repression: How Cuba taught Venezuela to quash military dissent, Reuters Investigates, August 2019, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/venezuela-cuba-military/; Armando.Info, La bitácora de los tanqueros fantasmas al servicio de la revolución, Armando.Info, April 2020, https://armando.info/la-bitacora-de-los-tanqueros-fantasmas-al-servicio-de-la-revolucion/ ^[5] Silja Thoms, Más allá de Rusia: la actividad del Grupo Wagner en Venezuela, Deutsche Welle, June 2023, https://www.dw.com/es/m%C3%A1s-all%C3%A1-de-rusia-la-actividad-de-grupo-wagner-en-venezuela/a-66048041 ^[6] Conexión Segura y Libre / VE sin Filtro, Censura y represión digital en las elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela, 2025, https://vesinfiltro.org/res/files/informe-presidenciales_2024-VEsinFiltro.pdf; Laura Bicker, Trump’s Venezuela raid has created chaos — and that is a risk for China, BBC News, January 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly92dkxqvko ^[7] Yurani Arciniegas, Fracasa en el Consejo de la OEA resolución que pedía transparencia al Gobierno de Venezuela, France 24, July 2024, https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20240731-%F0%9F%94%B4-en-directo-petro-afirma-que-hay-graves-dudas-sobre-los-comicios-en-venezuela-y-pide-transparencia ^[8] Tiago Rogero, How Venezuela’s opposition proved its election win: ‘A brilliant political move’, The Guardian, August 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/10/gonzalez-proof-win-venezuela-election-vote-tally-maduro ^[9] Centro de Justicia y Paz (CEPAZ), La comunidad internacional tiene una última gran oportunidad en Venezuela de mitigar la crisis que su propia ineficacia ocasionó, January 2026, https://cepaz.org/la-comunidad-internacional-tiene-una-ultima-gran-oportunidad-en-venezuela-de-mitigar-la-crisis-que-su-propia-ineficacia-ocasiono/ ^[10]Deutsche Welle, Muere bajo custodia un policía detenido en Venezuela, November 2026, https://www.dw.com/es/muere-bajo-custodia-un-polic%C3%ADa-detenido-en-venezuela/a-75463951 ^[11] BBC News, “I thought I was going to die”: Jailed Venezuelan activist details brutality of prison life, January 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgz5l6l7k7o ^[12] United Nations News, Venezuela’s National Guard linked to killings, torture and repression, UN probe finds, December 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166565 ^[13] Matt Ford, Colombia: Venezuelan activists attacked in targeted shooting, DW (Reuters/AP), October 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/colombia-venezuelan-activists-attacked-in-targeted-shooting/a-74341871 ^[14] Iria Puyosa, Andrés Azpúrua, Daniel Suárez Pérez, How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism, Atlantic Council, July 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/how-venezuela-became-a-model-for-digital-authoritarianism/ ^[15] FundaRedes, Boletín N.º 47: Grupos armados y Estado venezolano vulneran el derecho a la vida de los pueblos indígenas, FundaRedes, November 2023, https://www.fundaredes.org/2023/11/01/boletin47-grupo-armados-y-estado-venezolano-vulneran-el-derecho-a-la-vida-de-los-pueblos-indigenas/; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Venezuela 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/venezuela ^[16] Nizar El Fakih, Aproximación al Régimen de Sanciones Internacionales y al caso de Venezuela, Discussion Document No. IDB-DP-840, Inter-American Development Bank, December 2020, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://publications.iadb.org/en/node/29550&ved=2ahUKEwiWtLq81IiSAxWFVKQEHW0vBnUQFnoECBYQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Ega3sYVRtvTyuCerIVUlw [post_title] => Op-ed | International law, institutional collapse, and the danger of selective concern [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-international-law-institutional-collapse-and-the-danger-of-selective-concern [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-01-15 10:40:23 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-01-15 09:40:23 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8717 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [20] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8698 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-01-07 01:00:30 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-01-07 00:00:30 [post_content] => For the past four years, only one global superpower has had the capacity and influence to stop the war in Ukraine: China. Yet it has chosen not to - why?   Through a combination of proactive sanctions avoidance, direct military support, and help to keep the Russian economy alive, Beijing has enabled Putin’s war machine to continue long after it should have been exhausted.^[1] Russia might be the junior partner in material terms, but the West needs to understand: Beijing needs Moscow even more than Moscow needs Beijing.   Last month, French President Emmanuel Macron made a direct appeal to Beijing, urging it to exert pressure on the Kremlin to agree to a ceasefire with Ukraine.^[2] German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul made similar efforts, and the same messages have been communicated from the highest levels of EU leadership.^[3] Ursula von der Leyen and EU Council President Antonio Costa travelled to meet with President Xi Jinping in June, specifically to seek Chinese leverage to pressure Russia to end the war.^[4] However, the deeper insight from all of these European efforts is continued miscalculation.   When the continent’s leaders appeal to President Xi Jinping to “pressure Putin” toward a ceasefire, they fundamentally misunderstand Beijing's incentives. They assume China shares an interest in restoring regional stability. It does not. Beijing's interest lies in Western distraction and fracture, and Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine is the perfect tool for this.   China does not support Russia because Moscow is powerful or ideologically aligned - but because it is strategically useful. The asymmetry of the partnership benefits China: it enables Beijing to externalise the costs of confrontation with the West while advancing its geopolitical aims without engaging in direct conflict. What Western leaders fail to understand is that this relationship will continue to deepen and harden. Not despite Ukraine, but because of it - and for three strategic reasons:   1. Russia is Beijing’s Strategic Lever: It Forces the West to Choose China's most sophisticated gain from Russia’s war on Ukraine is that it forces the West to make difficult strategic choices. By enabling Russian aggression across multiple theatres - from Europe to the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific - Beijing has weaponised the Kremlin's instability. This diverts Western focus, fractures strategic coherence, and drains resources from the Indo-Pacific competition, which remains China’s principal concern. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, underscored this point explicitly with his European counterpart, Kaja Kallas.^[5] He warned that China could not accept Russia losing the war, arguing that such an outcome would allow the United States and the West to shift their full attention toward China and the wider Indo-Pacific.   The mechanism is straightforward: Russia creates crises faster than the West can address them simultaneously. European capitals are forced to commit defence budgets to the eastern flank; the US Navy divides its attention between NATO's northern exposure and its forward deployment in the Indo-Pacific. NATO members debate Arctic strategy while China consolidates regional dominance.^[6] Each Russian escalation in Ukraine compounds these trade-offs, forcing alliance members to divide attention and resources between simultaneous threats, rather than focusing efforts in a single direction.   Recent US actions in Venezuela underscore that US power remains decisive but increasingly prioritised by theatre and proximity, reinforcing Beijing’s incentive to sustain the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine as a means of complicating and delaying a complete US strategic concentration on the Indo-Pacific region.   This is where Beijing's force multiplier advantage becomes decisive. Recent joint-bomber patrols near Japan - involving Russian nuclear-capable Tu-95 strategic bombers operating alongside Chinese H-6 bombers - demonstrate the operational principle.^[7] China signals regional resolve and stretches Japanese air-defence responses without incurring the full political cost of independent action. Russia absorbs the diplomatic friction; China gains the strategic benefits.   Critically, this approach works because Russia and China operate on different timescales and objectives. Russia seeks immediate battlefield gains in Ukraine. China, by contrast, is playing the longer game of regional dominance. Russia's urgency becomes China's strategic cover.   2. Ukraine is Beijing’s Spanish Civil War: The Taipei Testing Ground Just as the 1930s War in the Iberian Peninsula was a live test-bed for the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, China is now using Russia and Ukraine as its own military and strategic test-bed. The objective is not to conquer Kyiv, but to understand Chinese efforts to take Taipei as we enter the critical “Davidson Window.”^[8]   Beijing has treated the war in Ukraine as a case study for analysing Russian successes and failures across logistics, air defence, reconnaissance-strike integration, and electronic warfare. It has already translated these lessons into the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine, training, and force development.^[9] The PLA increasingly reflects observations drawn from Russia’s adaptations and failures.^[10] This is most noticeable in integrated air defence, logistics, and information dominance, accelerating joint operations readiness for high-intensity conflict scenarios, including a potential Taiwan contingency.   The Kremlin’s experience under sanctions, such as rewiring its economy, rerouting trade flows, and operating under long-term export controls, allows Beijing to test its own economic resilience and evaluate which sanction mechanisms are effective and how to circumvent them.^[11] Crucially, this learning comes at minimal cost to Beijing, as Russia absorbs the political, economic, and military risks of experimentation while China refines its own preparedness for an anticipated potential Taiwan escalation in the years ahead.   3. Russia is Beijing's Legitimacy: It Accelerates an Alternative Global Order While the West exhausts itself debating the future of Ukraine, Beijing exploits Russia's isolation to accelerate construction of an alternative global economic and political architecture centred not in Washington, but in Beijing. Russia's sanctions experience and forced pivot toward non-Western partners does not weaken this alternative order - it legitimises and accelerates it.   Beijing has weaponised Russia's ostracism to demonstrate that the Western financial system is no longer essential for major powers to thrive. As Russia pivots toward CIPS - the Chinese Cross-Border Payment System - rather than SWIFT, toward bilateral trade settlement rather than dollar-denominated transactions, it becomes a living laboratory proving that economic decoupling from the West is survivable.^[12] When Russia joins Chinese-led technology standards initiatives - such as 5G, semiconductors, and AI - while the West maintains separate ecosystems, it proves that both can function independently and in parallel.^[13]   China does not need to force this transition; Russia's desperation does the work for Beijing. Every successful Russian workaround to sanctions further affirms the viability of Beijing's own alternative infrastructure. More broadly, Russia's defiance has accelerated the expansion of the BRICS forum and other solidarity mechanisms that marginalise Western leverage.^[14] The BRICS+ bloc now encompasses over 30% of global GDP and is growing. Russia's willingness to absorb Western punishment while Beijing remains unblemished positions China as the rational, rising power within this alternative consensus - the partner that benefits from Western overreach without bearing its costs. Russia becomes the test case proving that confronting the West-led order is possible.   Looking Ahead The China-Russia partnership succeeds not because it resembles a traditional alliance, but because it resembles a relationship where the latter does not yet realise it is infected. Moscow absorbs costs across every dimension - military escalation, sanctions pressure, political isolation, diplomatic friction - while Beijing extracts strategic value with minimal risk or exposure. This is not a partnership. It is calculated exploitation disguised as alignment.   Every month that the Kremlin keeps the West locked into European crisis management is a month China gains in the Indo-Pacific with minimal Western involvement. Russia’s willingness to absorb military, diplomatic, and sanctions-related risks enables Beijing to apply cumulative pressure across multiple regions without direct confrontation, stretching US and allied planning capacity while China consolidates military readiness and improves its strategic positioning.   Every NATO defence dollar committed to the eastern flank is a dollar unavailable for contingency planning for Taiwan. Every Western political argument about burden-sharing and allied commitment is an opening for Beijing to consolidate regional dominance without direct confrontation. NATO has spent four years strengthening European deterrence while inadvertently weakening its position in the theatre that will define the 21^st century.   The real question is not why Beijing supports Moscow: it is whether the West will recognise a trade-off it has unknowingly accepted before it becomes irreversible.   The architecture of this asymmetry is likely permanent. As long as Ukraine drags on, Beijing wins. As long as the West divides its attention, China advances. Western leaders who continue to appeal for Chinese restraint are asking Beijing to abandon its most significant strategic advantage at precisely the moment it matters most. As soon as the West recognises this reality, Beijing will accelerate its Taiwan timeline, in order to act before Western unity and coordination can emerge to confront them.     William Dixon is a Senior Associate Fellow of the Royal United Service Institute, specialising in cyber and international security issues.   Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst & writer whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security.      Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] RFE/RL’s Russian Service, EU Finds China Responsible For 80 Percent of Russia Sanctions Avoidance, Says German Report, May 2025, https://www.rferl.org/a/german-report-eu-china-russia-sanctions-avoidance-80-percent/33425633.htm; Seth G. Jones, China And Russia Bolster Their ‘No Limits’ Alliance, WSJ Opinion, December 2025, https://www.wsj.com/opinion/china-and-russia-bolster-their-no-limits-alliance-c6bc6e49; Keith Bradsher, How a Chinese border town keeps Russia’s economy afloat, The Japan Times, July 2025, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/07/25/world/politics/chinese-border-town-russia-economy/; Huileng Tan, Russia’s wartime lifeline from China comes with a price: an ‘embarrassing reversal’ for Moscow, Business Insider, December 2025, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-economy-china-reliance-oil-exports-embarrassing-reversal-2025-12 ^[2] Le Monde with AFP, Macron calls on China to help end war in Ukraine, rebalance trade, Le Monde, December 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/12/04/macron-tells-xi-that-france-and-china-must-overcome-their-differences_6748135_4.html ^[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs China, Wang Yi holds talks with German Foreign Minister Waldfol, December 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202512/t20251208_11768951.shtml ^[4] Zoya Sheftalovich, EU warns China to push Putin to end war as relations hit ‘inflection point’, Politico, July 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-warns-china-push-vladimir-putin-russia-end-ukraine-war-relations-hit-inflection-point-summit/ ^[5] Reuters, Exclusive: Chinese engines, shipped as ‘cooling units’, power Rssian drones used in Ukraine, July 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/chinese-engines-shipped-cooling-units-power-russian-drones-used-ukraine-2025-07-23/ ^[6] Patrik Andersson, China and Russia challenge the Arctic order: But understanding how means looking beyond their partnership, DIIS Policy Brief, July 2025, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/china-and-russia-challenge-the-arctic-order ^[7] Reuters, Russian bombers join Chinese air patrol near Japan as Tokyo-Beijing tensions simmer, CNN World, December 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/12/09/asia/south-korea-japan-china-russia-warplanes-intl-hnk-ml ^[8] Davidson Window signals the period during which senior US defence officials have warned China might attempt military action against Taiwan. ^[9] Colin Christopher, China Accelerates Modernization by Applying Lessons From Russia-Ukraine War, TRADOC Intelligence Post, September 2025, https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/china-accelerates-modernization-by-applying-lessons-from-russia-ukraine-war/ ^[10] Howard Wang and Brett Zakheim, China’s Lessons From the Russia-Ukraine War: Perceived New Strategic Opportunities and an Emerging Model of Hybrid Warfare, RAND, May 2025, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA3100/RRA3141-4/RAND_RRA3141-4.pdf ^[11] Georgi Kantchev and Lingling Wei, China Is Studying Russia’s Sanctions Evasion to Prepare for Taiwan Conflict, The Wall Street Journal, December 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-is-studying-russias-sanctions-evasion-to-prepare-for-taiwan-conflict-5665f508 ^[12] Natalia Chabarovskaya, Going Steady: China and Russia’s Economic Ties are Deeper than Washington Thinks, CEPA, June 2025, https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/going-steady-china-and-russias-economic-ties-are-deeper-than-washington-thinks/; Gleb Bryanski, Darya Korsunskaya, Elena Fabrichnaya and Gleb Stolyarov, Russia eyes China trade revival as Putin prepares for Xi summit, sources say, Reuters, August 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russia-eyes-china-trade-revival-putin-prepares-xi-summit-sources-say-2025-08-28/ ^[13] Daniel Balazs, IP25091 | China-Russia Dual-Use Technology Cooperation: Geopolitical Bifurcation in the Age of Emerging Technologies, September 2025, RSiS, https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/ip25091-china-russia-dual-use-technology-cooperation-geopolitical-bifurcation-in-the-age-of-emerging-technologies/ ^[14] BRICS is an acronym for a bloc of emerging economies including: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. With a further expansion in 2024 to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, it is sometimes referred to as BRICS+. Stewart Patrick et al., BRICS Expansion and the future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants?lang=en [post_title] => Op-ed | The Taiwan Trap: Why Beijing Needs Russia's War in Ukraine [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-the-taiwan-trap-why-beijing-needs-russias-war-in-ukraine [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-01-06 17:25:39 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-01-06 16:25:39 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8698 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8669 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-12-05 01:00:45 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-12-05 00:00:45 [post_content] => The 28th of October 2025, the Foreign Policy Centre and the SEPAD project at Lancaster University co-hosted a public webinar, bringing together leading experts to examine the evolving dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). With particular focus on the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, the ongoing devastation in Gaza following October 7, and a complex web of shifting alliances—including the Beijing-mediated normalisation between Iran and Saudi Arabia—have created a fluid and uncertain political landscape. In the face of these developments, questions surrounding sectarianism, accountability, governance, and regional integration have taken on a renewed urgency.   The discussion titled “Forging New Futures: Looking Ahead at the MENA Region” was chaired by Poppy Ogier, FPC’s Communications and Research Manager, and featured contributions from, Dr Nour Abu-Assab, Co-Founder and Co-Director of the Centre for Transnational Development and Collaboration (CTDC), Dr Sanam Vakil, Director of the MENA Programme at Chatham House, and Professor Simon Mabon, Chair in International Politics at Lancaster University and Director of SEPAD.   The following takeaways emerged during the webinar session:   1. The Middle East post-October 7 One point that was evident before 7 October—and has become even clearer since—is that conflicts in the region are deeply interconnected. Stabilisation and resolution efforts cannot be siloed, but must take a holistic view of the region’s political and security architecture, as the sources of destabilisation are multiple, driven not only by regional actors, but shaped by the broader global landscape in which they operate.   The genocide in Gaza has significantly altered the political calculus of many states. While pre-October 7, regional governments had engaged in normalisation efforts with Israel, the scale of violence and destruction has led to significant public outrage, shifting the focus back to the unresolved Palestinian  question and slowing or even stalling normalisation agreements. While the ceasefire is seen as a positive development, questions remain over the stability of the agreement and the prospects of meaningful conflict resolution. Regional stability can only be possible if Palestinian statehood and sovereignty is supported and achieved.   2. Israel’s military posture is increasingly destabilising Israel’s military actions, particularly the June 2025 war with Iran and the September strikes on Qatar, have significantly reshaped regional perceptions. While Iran has traditionally been viewed as the primary destabilising actor, Israel’s use of military force across multiple fronts has led to a reframing of its role in the region.   The war with Iran revealed the limits of Tehran’s capacity for regional projection, exposing the symbolic nature of much of its deterrent power. Israel, by contrast, demonstrated clear military dominance. These developments have emboldened Israeli strategic postures while simultaneously drawing concern from neighbouring states.   The strike on Qatar further reinforced Israel’s image as a destabiliser. This event, in particular, has been critical in shifting diplomatic and security assessments across the Gulf and beyond, undermining trust in Israel’s role as a partner in regional security.   3. The role of Gulf States as regional stabilisers Gulf states find themselves increasingly forced into a delicate balancing act. The interconnectedness of regional conflicts means that escalation in one area often has spill over effects elsewhere. This interdependence has heightened the strategic stakes for Gulf leaders.   Over the past two years, Gulf states have exhibited growing diplomatic agency. Their proactive efforts to mediate, negotiate ceasefires, and advocate for a political resolution to the Palestinian issue are driven not only by principle but by urgent self-interest. With limited military capacities, Gulf states are relying on diplomacy as their primary tool for regional stability.   Their advocacy for Palestinian self-determination, particularly in the aftermath of Gaza, has also become more vocal, positioning them as both mediators and stakeholders in any future regional order.   4. Integrity of information, justice,  and accountability Accurately describing what is happening in the region matters, not only for activism but for those who have endured this continuum of violence over the years. To do so meaningfully, we must consider regional history and the need for historical reparation. Understanding the root causes of conflict is essential if we are to have any hope of ‘forging new futures’.   In this context, the prospects for accountability take on particular urgency. They must go beyond prosecuting those directly responsible on the ground to include those with the power and influence to shape regional events. This is a responsibility that lies not only with MENA states, but also with Western actors. To move forward, we must look past the narrow confines of media-driven narratives and reflect more deeply on what meaningful accountability could look like in today’s international order.   5. Sectarianism, governance, and the crisis of the State The region is caught between a collapsing old order and an unclear future. In this uncertain interregnum, long-standing political structures are being questioned, and moments of crisis are prompting communities to rethink the relationship between rulers and ruled. Even before 7 October, sectarian identities were under strain. Protests in Lebanon and Iraq (2019–2020) highlighted widespread frustration with sectarian governance. Meanwhile, actions like Houthi attacks in the Red Sea signalled new forms of cross-sectarian solidarity.   At the same time, sectarian divisions continue to be exploited for political purposes, particularly in attempts to reframe the region through an anti-Iran lens. But increasingly, the sharper divide is not sect versus sect, but people versus power—regimes versus citizens.   6. The role of the UK and the international community The UK and international actors have played a long-standing role in shaping the dynamics of the MENA region, often through historical complicity and continued strategic interests. As several speakers noted, the UK’s current posture—marked by alignment with US policy and declining soft power—undermines its credibility. Rebuilding trust requires a shift toward principled engagement, meaningful accountability for harm caused (such as arms sales and extractive partnerships), and a commitment to global norms. The international community must take seriously its responsibilities, not only to uphold the rules-based order but to support regional-led processes for justice, accountability, and sustainable peace.   A full recording of the event is available here: [embed]https://youtu.be/HMyBx10vaog?si=89SuNNX4QWTLD4HX[/embed] [post_title] => Webinar Takeaways | Forging New Futures: Looking Ahead at the MENA Region [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => webinar-takeaways-forging-new-futures-looking-ahead-at-the-mena-region [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-12-04 11:55:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-12-04 10:55:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8669 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [22] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8652 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-12-01 01:00:08 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-12-01 00:00:08 [post_content] => On 11th November 2025, the Foreign Policy Centre convened a parliamentary roundtable on Georgia’s democratic crisis, examining the country’s rapid authoritarian backsliding, the resilience of civil society, and the scope for international support, particularly from the UK.   The event was chaired by Joe Powell MP and featured expert insights from: Eka Gigauri, Executive Director, Transparency International Georgia; Nino Evgenidze, Executive Director, Economic Policy Research Center; and Professor Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham and FPC Senior Fellow.   Speakers reflected on the Georgian Dream regime’s growing alignment with Russian interests, the systematic dismantling of democratic institutions, and the wave of repression facing journalists, protestors, and NGOs. They also examined the impact of targeted sanctions, the limits of EU engagement, and how the UK can leverage financial and diplomatic tools to support those resisting from within.   To explore the key thematic takeaways from this expert discussion, you can download the full briefing here.   [post_title] => Expert briefing | Georgia’s Political Landscape in Focus: A critical point for democracy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => expert-briefing-georgias-political-landscape-in-focus-a-critical-point-for-democracy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-12-01 10:35:25 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-12-01 09:35:25 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8652 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [23] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8620 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-11-21 01:00:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-11-21 00:00:00 [post_content] => Taking over from three Global South presidencies of the G20, South Africa’s (SA) agenda in 2025 built on those of Brazil, India, and Indonesia, while emphasising African concerns as the first African G20 presidency. Its agenda has amplified key developmental concerns requiring international cooperation at a moment when some countries are contesting both development and cooperation.   Although the G20 was originally a grouping of finance ministers, established after the Asian financial crisis of 1998, its agenda has grown since 2008 when it was elevated to heads of state. As global challenges, such as climate, pandemics, and inequality have become more acute, the need to bring development to the forefront has become essential, although not always easy. South Africa’s themes of “Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability” reflect the trend in the Global South presidencies to re-centre development in global discourse.^[1]   South Africa set an ambitious agenda. From tackling the high cost of capital in African economies to ensuring a just energy transition, advancing the Sustainable Development Goals, tackling inequality, promoting women’s empowerment, and ensuring debt sustainability – South Africa has not shied away from issues that are increasingly being contested across the world and in G20 countries.   The complex geopolitical context makes agreement on some of these extremely difficult. However, there have been some wins. A set of voluntary principles on combating illicit financial flows (IFFs) was adopted by the development ministers that recognised the linkage between IFFs and the erosion of domestic resource mobilisation, which has become more urgent in a climate of declining aid. There was also a ministerial statement on debt sustainability, which reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen the Common Framework on Debt treatment, and support for the ongoing review of the debt sustainability frameworks by the IMF and World Bank. During a year where several working groups issued only a chair’s statement, the ability to have a statement on debt was symbolically important even if there was no major innovation on plugging already identified weaknesses regarding the Common Framework.   The spotlighting of debt sustainability has brought renewed attention to the proposals incorporated into the Compromiso de Sevilla, particularly the establishment of a borrowers’ club, around which preparatory work has been undertaken already in New York. The club is likely to be launched in 2026.^[2]   Recognising the crucial role of critical minerals in Africa, especially in contributing to industrialisation, the Summit will likely adopt a G20 Critical Minerals Framework. This framework would mainstream the importance of local beneficiation and value addition at source, while also recognising the asymmetry in exploration capabilities between advanced and developing economies. In parallel, a set of voluntary principles on sustainable industrial policies has been developed, emphasising the link with inclusive economic growth, industrialisation, jobs, and equality.   Yet, the legacy of South Africa’s presidency goes beyond these outcomes documents. There are several issues that SA advocated that have contributed to a more nuanced debate on the challenges of development. This includes the initial proposal for a commission on the cost of capital, intended to address the issue of the African risk premium. While this was not established, this issue received significant coverage in global forums, including in the Fourth Financing for Development conference. Relatedly, SA’s work on combating illicit financial flows was reflected in the Compromiso de Sevilla. While the commission was not established, South Africa appointed an African Expert Panel that focused on the interconnection between growth, debt and development, and issues related to the high cost of capital in Africa. Its recommendations include, among others: launching a new G20 debt financing initiative for low-income and vulnerable countries, and reform of the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) allocation system, which reduces the discretionary and political nature of the current allocation process.   South Africa has also sought to build consensus on the concept of global public goods. While there was only a chair’s statement on a set of principles relating to global public goods, South Africa will be establishing an Ubuntu commission focused on fostering international cooperation for the protection and delivery of global public goods.   The establishment of an expert panel on inequality, chaired by Joe Stiglitz and presented to president Ramaphosa in early November, aimed to synthesise the research on this issue. It proposes the creation of an International Panel on Inequality, modelled on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to function as a technical advisory body.   However, South Africa’s G20 presidency has had to contend with difficult geopolitical headwinds and a fraying bilateral relationship with the US. The US chose to participate only in some of the meetings of the various working groups and task forces, with the Trump administration making it clear that it considered the priorities of the SA presidency as contrary to the interests of the US. In recent weeks, President Trump has made it clear that not only will the US not attend the summit in Johannesburg, it will also oppose the issuing of a Leaders’ Declaration, as the absence of the US would mean that there was no consensus in the group.^[3]   The G20 operates on the basis of consensus, requiring all members to agree on the final text. This approach necessitates compromises by all members so that the outcome reflects a set of common political commitments, even though there is no enforcement mechanism and these are voluntary. However, the position that the US has taken is unprecedented. The underlying assumption for consensus-based decision-making is that countries are willing to negotiate in good faith and make trade-offs so as to arrive at an outcome. When countries eschew this approach because they do not want a Declaration, it raises questions about the principle of consensus; it gives the power to one country to veto the entire process, where member states have spent weeks negotiating the Declaration. It also sets the precedent that other countries can do the same in future if they do not agree with the host country or are opposed to its place within the group. Such an approach would undermine the constructive role that the G20 can play as a forum for fostering understanding and compromise, even in a context of heightened power rivalries.   In an era when many accepted principles of international cooperation are being questioned and undermined, how member states secure the G20 platform as a forum for dialogue and coordination on common challenges, will contribute to the future trajectory of multilateralism.     Elizabeth Sidiropoulos is the chief executive of the South African Institute of International Affairs.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] G20 South Africa, 2025, https://g20.org/ ^[2] United Nations, FFD4 Outcome Document: Sevilla Commitment, July 2025, https://financing.desa.un.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/FFD4%20Outcome%20Booklet%20Final_SP%20-%20pages.pdf ^[3] BBC news, US to boycott G20 in South Africa, Trump says, November 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckgzek4rl8lo [post_title] => Op-ed | Africa's Moment: South Africa's G20 Fight to Centre Development [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-africas-moment-south-africas-g20-fight-to-centre-development [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-20 12:51:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-20 11:51:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8620 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [24] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8609 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-11-17 01:00:55 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-11-17 00:00:55 [post_content] => From the discovery of penicillin to the development of one of the world’s first COVID-19 vaccines, the UK’s contribution to global health has long shaped its diplomatic reach and global standing. For decades, British universities and research institutes have quietly powered global progress – advancing lifesaving science, training generations of health leaders, and shaping equitable access to innovation.   In an era where the use of soft power is all the more important to mitigate growing global conflict, UK science remains one of Britain’s greatest diplomatic assets. However, as funding for global health and research partnerships tightens, the UK’s ability to continue driving progress on the world’s most pressing health challenges is under growing threat.   The UK has a strong heritage of scientific contribution to global health, with an array of prestigious institutions that have shaped the world’s response to infectious diseases, from malaria elimination and vaccine development to the scale-up of HIV prevention and treatment.   The work of UK research institutions and universities does more than deliver scientific breakthroughs. It also creates global public goods through the data, evidence, and tools that underpin public health programmes worldwide. These collaborations, often supported through UK Aid and critical partnerships with organisations such as Unitaid, WHO, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, have enabled millions to access life-saving interventions more affordably and effectively.   The stakes have never been higher. Despite remarkable progress over the past two decades, AIDS remains one of the world’s deadliest diseases.^[1] By the end of 2024, an estimated 40 million people were living with HIV, with 630,000 dying of HIV-related illnesses.^[2]   However, there is hope. A defining moment for the global HIV response came this year with the announcement of a historic price agreement for generic lenacapavir (LEN), a breakthrough long-acting injectable offering six months of HIV prevention with a single injection. Described by many as the closest thing yet to an HIV vaccine, lenacapavir could transform prevention for those facing stigma or limited access to health facilities. Unitaid and the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI), alongside the Gates Foundation, secured two price agreements at just US$40 per year, with earlier commitments also made by the Global Fund and President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to reach two million people within three years.   Behind this milestone lies UK science. Research by the University of Liverpool’s Centre of Excellence for Long-Acting Therapeutics provided the cost-modelling that helped underpin this price; a quiet but powerful example of British influence through evidence.   Beyond lenacapavir, UK research institutions have consistently delivered breakthroughs that have transformed global health. The London School for Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) led the trials and evidence generation for new malaria vaccines, including RTS,S – the first malaria vaccine recommended by WHO – now protecting hundreds of thousands of children in Africa.^[3] The University of Liverpool and Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine have been at the forefront of long-acting HIV therapeutics and helped develop innovative delivery models for injectable PrEP. The Innovative Vector Control Consortium (IVCC) developed next-generation insecticide-treated bed nets that have dramatically reduced malaria transmission across multiple countries.^[4] These examples show how UK science does not just generate knowledge; it saves lives at scale, strengthens health systems, and reinforces the country’s global reputation as a hub for innovation.   Global health collaboration has long been one of the UK’s most effective tools of influence, building lasting relationships of trust. This network of scientific diplomacy enhances the UK’s reputation not just as a funder, but as a partner open to co-creating solutions in global health through science and innovation. The partnerships generated through decades of research collaboration cannot be manufactured and are earned through impact. And at a time when many countries are opting to look inwards, this kind of outward-facing, partnership-driven leadership is precisely what is needed.   However, as the world saw during the COVID-19 pandemic, innovation alone is not enough. While UK institutions helped shape vaccine research and delivery, global access was hampered by inequities in supply, manufacturing, and intellectual property. Ensuring that future breakthroughs, from malaria vaccines to long-acting HIV prevention, are accessible to all must remain a core test of the UK’s global health leadership. In an era when political leaders like Donald Trump are undermining scientific research and multilateral cooperation, the UK has an opportunity to strengthen its soft power by championing equitable, evidence-driven science in genuine partnership with Southern-based institutions. The UK must ensure that publicly funded research delivers public benefit, both at home and abroad, to promote and strengthen equitable global access to innovation.   Drawing on its history of scientific excellence, the UK has made significant and lasting contributions to global health and the fight against infectious diseases ranging from foundational medical breakthroughs to the development of modern vaccines and ongoing research. Yet this form of soft power cannot be taken for granted. Cuts to global health and research funding risk weakening the very partnerships that give the UK global credibility.   To sustain the progress made to date in global health, alongside the UK’s influence, the government must protect funding for global health R&D and strengthen partnerships both with British research institutions and critical multilateral initiatives, such as Unitaid, WHO, and the Global Fund which turn innovation into access. In doing so, Britain can demonstrate that its global health leadership is not only about what it invents, but also about ensuring those innovations reach everyone who needs them.     Molly Thompson is Senior Advocacy Advisor at STOPAIDS. STOPAIDS is an HIV, health and human rights advocacy network of 50 UK international development agencies working globally to end AIDS and realise all people's right to health and wellbeing.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] UN News, AIDS still killing one person every minute as funding cuts stall progress, June 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164111 ^[2] The Global Health Observatory, HIV, https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/hiv-aids ^[3] London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, MRCG at LSHTM’s integral role in the development of the RTS,S malaria vaccine, January 2024, https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/newsevents/news/2024/mrcg-lshtms-integral-role-development-rtss-malaria-vaccine ^[4] Insecticide Treated Nets (ITN), New Nets Project (NNP), IVCC, https://www.ivcc.com/project/new-nets-project [post_title] => Op-ed | Science as Soft Power: How UK Research Institutions Drive Global Health Impact [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-science-as-soft-power-how-uk-research-institutions-drive-global-health-impact [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-13 13:06:20 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-13 12:06:20 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8609 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [25] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8589 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-11-12 01:00:07 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-11-12 00:00:07 [post_content] => In their first year in power, the Labour Government made several big policy announcements related to national security, defence, and their vision for Britain’s place in the world. As the UK and its allies continue to confront the most dangerous moment for European security since the Cold War, respond to the growing levels of human insecurity in many regions around the world and navigate global economic challenges, a considered strategic approach is clearly needed.   Yet, less than a month out from the next Budget, questions continue to mount about the financial feasibility, priorities, and long-term direction of the country’s approach towards ensuring our defence; as well as the relationship between the UK’s evolving soft and hard power strategies. How will the Government reconcile strengthening defence and security with growing pressures at home? What progress has been made on the Government’s stated ambitions?   Below is an overview of the recent developments, followed by views from FPC’s experts, including those who contributed to FPC’s 2024 submission to the SDR, and to our most recent report Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy, as to how the UK’s approach to defence and security is evolving in practice, and where gaps remain in implementation, public communication, and whole-of-society readiness.   Strategic Defence Review, Soft Power and Aid Cuts In June 2025, the UK Government outlined a new approach to defence and security, publishing the ‘Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2025’, which contained 62 recommendations.^[1] The SDR outlined a range of strategic goals, including renewed focus on NATO, investment in AI and drone technologies, and discussion of potential UK participation in NATO’s nuclear mission. The Government also committed to an increase in defence spending to “2.5% of GDP by 2027 and 3% in the next Parliament when fiscal and economic conditions allow,” with a view to “help make defence an engine for growth—boosting prosperity, jobs and security for working people across the UK.”   The Review was highly anticipated given the context of heightened uncertainty for the Euro-Atlantic alliance, the ongoing war in Ukraine, an unpredictable US administration under President Donald Trump, and shifting security realities in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and beyond. While the SDR contained some significant shifts in posture, there remain considerable concerns about resourcing, prioritisation, and delivery.   In January 2025, the Government launched its Soft Power Council, an advisory body to support the development of a ‘soft power’ strategy, which is expected to be released spring of next year. What this will contain and similarly, how it will be implemented is yet to be seen. However, the significant aid cuts the Government announced in February and their impact on the UK’s soft power potential was a key discussion point at every major political party conference in September.   The decision by the UK Government to reduce aid from 2027 to 0.3% of gross national income (GNI), in favour of increasing the UK’s defence spending (as outlined above) drew sharp criticism at the time.^[2] Not least because Labour had previously indicated they aimed to restore aid spending to 0.7%, after it was cut to 0.5% of GNI in 2021.   While the need to strengthen UK defences is clear, there remains a question as to whether doing so at the expense of aid is the right answer. A recent Chatham House report noted that “the £6 billion saving from aid is unlikely to plug defence gaps,” while “the West’s retreat from aid will leave an obvious opening for revisionist powers to build further influence in developing countries.”^[3] The significant fallout from the closure of The US Agency for International Development (USAID) in July this year, has been notable, and likely destabilising for a number of countries that significantly relied on international support. Last month, the UK Parliament’s International Development Committee launched an inquiry to examine how the UK can continue to deliver high impact international aid and development assistance in the face of a 40% budget cut. Announcing the inquiry, Committee Chair Sarah Champion MP posed the question: “What should drive the Government’s vision for foreign aid; national security, moral duty, international obligations?”.   Meanwhile, earlier this year, in response to the funding cuts, former national security adviser, Lord Peter Ricketts, coordinated a letter to the Prime Minister urging him to sustain funding for the British Council.^[4] In comments to The Guardian, he noted: “A lot of defence people will tell you that a small investment in soft power such as the British Council is worth a lot of money on the military side.”^[5] However, neither international aid nor soft power are mentioned in the SDR, despite the clear linkages with national security and defence - a notable omission that reinforces concerns about cross-Whitehall coordination.   What do these combined developments mean for our national security? Views from our Experts   Dr Andrew Gawthorpe Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University   “The SDR sets out an ambitious agenda for UK defence policy going forward, but there are limits to how much planning is possible in the current international environment. The recent NATO summit in June calmed fears that Donald Trump might announce an immediate withdrawal from the alliance, but it also left all of the major questions dividing the U.S. from Europe, and European countries from each other, unresolved. Later this year the U.S. will likely announce the withdrawal of tens of thousands of soldiers from Eastern Europe, making the continent even harder to defend.”   Dr Andrew Gawthorpe also cautions that the UK’s ability to follow through on its defence spending promises and to coordinate effectively with European partners on rearmament, remains uncertain. “Whether the UK government can actually deliver on the necessary spending commitments and whether the UK and the rest of Europe can coordinate rearmament in a smart and effective way remain to be seen. In the meantime, the ultimate direction of U.S. policy remains unclear – and under Trump, basically unpredictable.”   Christopher Langton Head of Independent Conflict and Research Analysis (ICRA)   Langton acknowledges the SDR’s attention to innovation but raised two concerns: “The Review highlights the all-important use of AI in defence. However, I wonder if the environmental impact of AI—most notably its water usage—has been considered, particularly amid increasing climate pressures.” But commitments on welfare and personnel are welcome: “The focus on manpower and welfare is a very welcome part of the Review. However, our history on delivering in this area is not good. A firm ring-fenced commitment to fund increases in personnel and expenditure on the defence estate, including housing, would bring confidence to boost recruiting and retention.”   Nina Kuryata Ukraine and Defence Editor, The Observer   Regarding the Review’s emphasis on NATO as a strategic priority: “It says ‘NATO first’- but what does it actually mean in terms of measures to be taken? If the UK wants to lead in NATO, it must back that up with clear timelines and funding. At present, there’s a pledge to increase military spending to 2.5% by April 2027, with a "clear ambition" to reach 3% by 2034, would economic conditions allow. This is still far from the 5% that all NATO members committed to reach by 2035.”   She also questions some of the more rhetorical claims: “It says we will create a British army which is 10 times more lethal. That would need more development, I think, because it's not clear what it means – number of soldiers, more deadly weapons or something else.”   Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams Senior Fellows, European Leadership Network   “The recommendation  by the Review that the UK commence discussions on enhanced participation in NATO's nuclear mission constitutes, potentially, a substantial change in the UK nuclear posture. More generally, the SDR leaves many fundamental questions unanswered, relying on the assumption, or hope, that NATO will continue much as it did before Trump.  The military implications for force capabilities and structure of having to operate in a purely European framework or a US-lite NATO framework are not explored. There is, however, a surprising indication that while the UK has always declared the primacy of NATO in strategic and defence terms, in practice, it has not taken its contribution to NATO's military posture as seriously as it pretended. ”   You can read more of Simon and Nicholas’ analysis of enhanced UK participation in NATO's nuclear mission in their longer piece here.   Poppy Ogier Research and Communications Manager, and author of ‘Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy’, Foreign Policy Centre   “A modern defence strategy must recognise the vitality of soft power. Take the BBC World Service, it is the world’s most trusted news provider, reaching over 450 million people each week - and only costs around 5% of what Russia and China are thought to be spending internationally in an age of information warfare. However, its sustained funding is in question - and neither it, nor soft power more broadly, is mentioned in the SDR. The ‘influence’ of others is discussed - Russia’s, China’s and the US’s - without addressing what tools to influence the UK has. Including soft power in a defence review is not an optional extra, it’s a force multiplier for everything else.”   Susan Coughtrie Executive Director, Foreign Policy Centre   “While there is a clear need for a shift in how the UK approaches the country’s defence in today’s climate, there are concerns with the current approach. For the implementation of the SDR and the future soft power strategy to be effective, they must recognise the dynamic between domestic and international developments.   Encouragingly, the SDR recognises the need for a ‘whole of society approach’ and argues to “Build national resilience to threats below and above the threshold of an armed attack through a concerted, collective effort involving—among others—industry, the finance sector, civil society, academia, education, and communities.” However, the Government should more closely examine the layered threats specifically directed at these groups, including through the use of transnational repression, foreign influence, disinformation and cyber attacks; which are only likely to further increase with more countries sliding towards authoritarianism. The impact of the aid cuts should be examined through this security lens too, to ensure that short-term ‘gains’ do not give way outcomes that will take years to rectify.”   Next steps While the Government’s commitment to increased defence spending is evident, significant tension remains around what this will look like in practice, particularly how it can be delivered without further damaging other critical areas of UK influence, such as soft power and development aid. Key questions persist around resourcing, prioritisation, and whether the Government can protect vital diplomatic, cultural, and development tools while pursuing an ambitious defence agenda.   In an era marked by geopolitical changes, strategic uncertainty, and shifting power dynamics, particularly with an unpredictable US administration and evolving threats in the Middle East, the success of the SDR will depend on more than political will and funding. It will require sustained strategic focus, effective implementation, a strong soft power strategy and international coordination. Most importantly, an effective defence strategy calls for an approach that upholds democratic principles, protects human rights, and preserves the UK’s institutional integrity at home and abroad.     ^[1] Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, June 2025 ,https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/683d89f181deb72cce2680a5/The_Strategic_Defence_Review_2025_-_Making_Britain_Safer_-_secure_at_home__strong_abroad.pdf ^[2] House of Commons Debates, Defence and Security vol. 762, February 2025, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-02-25/debates/8BF58F19-B32B-4716-A613-8D5738541A30/DefenceAndSecurity#contribution-DB32B970-42F2-4B1B-A92C-54CA0B28BA41 ^[3] Chatham House, First USAID closes, then UK cuts aid: what a Western retreat from foreign aid could mean, March 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/first-usaid-closes-then-uk-cuts-aid-what-western-retreat-foreign-aid-could-mean ^[4] Lord Ricketts, Tweet (@LordRickettsP), April 2025, https://x.com/LordRickettsP/status/1915396877018632373 ^[5] The Guardian, British Council ‘may have to close in 60 countries’ amid cuts to aid budget, June 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jun/08/british-council-spending-plans-may-close-in-60-countries [post_title] => Expert Look: Unanswered questions regarding UK Government’s approach to defence and security [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => expert-look-unanswered-questions-regarding-uk-governments-approach-to-defence-and-security [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-11 13:35:50 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-11 12:35:50 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8589 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [26] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8577 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-11-10 01:00:31 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-11-10 00:00:31 [post_content] => Every year, on 2^nd November, the United Nations and its member states condemn attacks on journalists. In 2025, this “International Day to End Impunity for Crimes Against Journalists” is a particularly sombre occasion – with threats to journalists at an all-time high.   More than 120 journalists were killed in 2024 while doing their work.^[1] Countless others were arbitrarily detained, abused, and threatened both physically and online. News outlets are struggling to develop sustainable business models, and media freedom is at its lowest level globally in at least two decades, according to Reporters Without Borders.^[2]   This matters because a decline in media freedom can contribute to a deeper collapse in the systems that support democracy. As Nobel Prize-winning journalist, Maria Ressa, recently warned: “if journalism dies, democracy dies”.^[3]   Unfortunately, supporting media freedom is not a foreign policy priority for most countries. Multilateral fora – like the Media Freedom Coalition – encourage their member states to take action. However, these fora lack enforcement or accountability mechanisms.   To help address this gap, the Centre for Journalism and Democracy has launched a new annual index to try to hold states to account and encourage them to take action to promote media freedom beyond their borders. The Index for International Media Freedom Support (IMFS) evaluates 30 countries across three key foreign policy areas: diplomacy, funding, and safety/protection.^[4] The results paint a concerning and inconsistent picture – with no state performing strongly across all three categories.     Financial support for media freedom According to the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media, “globally… the first problem to be fixed is the insufficient volume of Official Development Assistance (ODA) that goes to media support”.^[5] On average, the 30 countries assessed in the IMFS Index allocated just 0.16% of their foreign aid to supporting independent journalism in 2023. Thirteen countries awarded less than 0.1%, while three – Latvia, Greece, and Slovenia – reported allocating 0%.   The only country that came close to the benchmark set by the Forum on Information and Democracy of allocating 1.0% of ODA to media support was Sweden – who contributed 0.91%. In 2023, Sweden spent over $51 million supporting initiatives such as rural radio stations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and strengthening environmental reporting across the Asia-Pacific region.^[6] Largely for this reason, Sweden came 2^nd overall in the 2025 IMFS Index.   Support for journalism safety and protection Another group of leading experts – The High-Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom – has consistently advised governments that providing safe refuge to journalists at risk is one of the most effective measures to improve the climate for press freedom around the world.^[7]   The IMFS Index finds that only one country – Latvia (who came 9^th overall) – had both an active emergency visa scheme for at-risk journalists and supported a national scheme promoting the safety of exiled media workers. Twenty-one of the thirty countries in the Index had neither measure in place.   Diplomatic support for media freedom Lithuania was the highest ranked country in the 2025 IMFS Index, largely because of its diplomatic leadership roles in several UN initiatives relating to media freedom and journalist safety. Estonia (4^th overall) also performed well diplomatically, having served as co-chair of the Media Freedom Coalition in 2024, alongside Germany (equal 5^th).   The lowest scoring countries in the ‘diplomatic’ category of the IMFS Index were Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and Switzerland.   Making media freedom a foreign policy priority The results of the 2025 IMFS Index suggests that political will – rather than state capacity – is a country’s greatest barrier to supporting media freedom worldwide.   The Baltic states – Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia – were amongst the smallest – but also the strongest performing. By contrast, four members of the G7 – the United Kingdom (equal 12^th), the United States (equal 12^th), Italy (equal 24^th) and Japan (28^th) – all ranked in the Index’s lowest ‘bronze’ category.   Due to the time lag in data reporting, the Index does not capture recent cuts to foreign aid that occurred in 2025 in the United States, the UK, Germany, France, and elsewhere. Therefore, future versions of the IMFS Index are likely to show an even bigger gap between some countries' public commitments to media freedom and their actual support.   Given this, the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media is right to argue that “what is needed now is not [a] reinvention of the wheel, but a new level of political will and a concerted commitment by governments to invest in what we know works – nationally and internationally.”^[8]   Hopefully, by publicly tracking countries’ performances, this new Index will help to generate more political pressure for meaningful action.     Martin Scott is a Professor of Media and Global Development at the University of East Anglia. His publications include, ‘Capturing News, Capturing Democracy’ (2024), ‘Humanitarian Journalists’ (2022), ‘Media and Development’ (2014) and ‘From Entertainment to Citizenship’ (2014).   Mel Bunce is a Professor of International Journalism and Politics, and the Director of the Centre for Journalism and Democracy at City St George’s, University of London. She was previously the Head of City’s renowned Department of Journalism. Her research focuses on journalism and democracy, crisis reporting, media freedom and international journalism.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     [1] Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024 is deadliest year for journalists in CPJ history, February 2025 https://cpj.org/special-reports/2024-is-deadliest-year-for-journalists-in-cpj-history-almost-70-percent-killed-by-israel/ [2] RSF, World Press Freedom Index 2025: over half the world's population in red zones, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-2025-over-half-worlds-population-red-zones [3] Kathimerini, Maria Ressa warns social media is ‘demolishing democracy’ at Athens forum, October 2025, https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/society-in-depth/1282767/maria-ressa-warns-social-media-is-demolishing-democracy-at-athens-forum/ [4] Centre for Journalism and Democracy, The 2025 Index on International Media Freedom Support, n.d., IMFS Index is published by the Centre for Journalism and Democracy, and is available at https://jdem.org/the-imfs-index/; The 30 states included in the index are members of both the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, and the Media Freedom Coalition (OECD-DAC). [5] Forum on Information and Democracy, Statement of the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media: The Economic Imperative of Investing in Public Interest Media, September 2025, https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Economic-Imperative-of-Investing-in-Public-Interest-Media.pdf [6] Forum on Information and Democracy, “The Forum on Information and Democracy calls for a New Deal for Journalism, June 2021,  https://informationdemocracy.org/2021/06/16/the-forum-on-information-and-democracy-calls-for-a-new-deal-for-journalism/ [7] Media Freedom Coalition, High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom, n.d., https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/who-is-involved/high-level-panel-of-legal-experts/ [8] Forum on Information and Democracy, Statement of the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media: The Economic Imperative of Investing in Public Interest Media, September 2025, https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Economic-Imperative-of-Investing-in-Public-Interest-Media.pdf [post_title] => Who is standing up for media freedom – and who is not? A new Index has some answers [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => who-is-standing-up-for-media-freedom-and-who-is-not [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-07 11:39:25 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-07 10:39:25 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8577 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [27] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8558 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-11-07 01:00:07 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-11-07 00:00:07 [post_content] => COP30 - the 30th Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change - will take place in Belém, Brazil from 10th to 21st November 2025.   The last 10 years have been the hottest on record, and an estimated 3.3-3.6 billion people live in contexts highly vulnerable to climate change. This year, countries were due to publish their updated national climate plans outlining their contribution to cutting global emissions (‘national determined contributions’ or ‘NDCs’). However, plans so far fall well short of what is required to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C.^[1] Therefore, COP30 needs to focus on the further ambition required to close the gap. Yet achieving this greater ambition will not be possible without the large-scale delivery of grant-based climate finance, making finance an equally critical discussion in Belém.   COP30 must deal with climate finance Last year’s COP in Baku agreed to a new global climate finance goal (the so-called NCQG) to deliver at least $300 billion per year by 2035, led by developed countries and directed to developing country parties. However, the agreement lacked both a roadmap and the accountability mechanisms required to ensure that governments pay up. The NCQG also included an even vaguer aspiration to scale up finance to $1.3 trillion per year.   Implementation of the new finance goal is critical, as lower income countries require significant finance to develop their economies cleanly; to adapt to worsening climate impacts; and to pay for the escalating costs of the damage to homes, infrastructure and livelihoods (so-called ‘Loss and Damage’). The impacts of the climate crisis disproportionately affect the most vulnerable and least responsible the hardest, and could push up to 132 million more people into extreme poverty by 2030. African countries contribute just 4% of global carbon emissions but are among the hardest hit, and yet, along with other lower income countries, have thus far received only a small fraction of the finance they need – therefore having to take on most of the financial burden themselves. Indeed, the climate crisis is one of the key drivers of today’s debt crisis, as governments are forced to borrow more simply to recover and rebuild from climate disasters.   In this context, building trust among developing countries that the NCQG will be fulfilled is essential to maintaining a multilateral process capable of limiting temperature rises to safe levels. Delivery of climate finance at scale by developed countries, including the UK, is a well-established principle in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and is a legal obligation, as recently affirmed by the International Court of Justice. It is also a moral responsibility falling upon historically high emitters who bear the greatest responsibility for causing the climate crisis. Any wealthy government that considers itself a principled global actor must, at a very minimum, act in good faith to deliver their fair share of the $300 billion finance goal as a starting point.   Governments responsible for delivering this finance are increasingly putting their eggs in the private finance basket. Yet, while private finance has a key role to play, especially in delivering mitigation initiatives like large scale energy projects, it also has huge limitations. Very little private finance is flowing to the world’s most climate-vulnerable communities, especially for adaptation and ‘Loss and Damage’, and the evidence suggests it is not likely to do so at scale, particularly for the poorest countries. To date less than 50 cents in every $100 of all climate finance has been private finance for adaptation efforts, and only 3% of private climate finance goes to low-income countries.^[2] Moreover, the majority share of climate finance has thus far been provided as repayable loans with interest, which simply adds to the debt burden of those countries which are not responsible for the climate crisis – yet are, in this way, expected to doubly pay for its costs.   The reality is that to meet the needs of the world’s most climate vulnerable communities most of the NCQG finance must be public grant-based finance.   Will the UK Government show moral leadership? When entering power the Labour Government said it wanted to rebuild broken trust with the global South and reestablish the UK as a global climate leader.^[3] While certainly deserving of credit for being the first G7 economy to outline its new strengthened emissions reduction target (the UK launched its NDC at the beginning of the year^[4]), genuine climate leadership requires this government to set out a credible offer on international climate finance too. And it must look beyond aid and private finance to do so.   Despite the UNFCCC principle that climate finance should be “new and additional”, successive governments have so-far drawn the UK’s international climate finance contributions from the aid budget, as have other developed countries. It was one thing to do so while the aid budget was going up. And to its credit, the UK Government was bucking the trend by delivering most of its climate finance as grants not loans. But as the ODA budget began to shrink, taking climate finance from the same pot has become increasingly untenable, so the Government has resorted to creative accounting and a shift towards loans rather than grants.^[5] With the latest aid cuts imposed earlier this year, combined with the greater size of the new global climate finance goal, alternative sources of finance obviously need to be found.   Aware of this, the Government’s narrative is now primarily focused on the idea that private finance will come to the rescue. But, unfortunately too much of this appears based on wishful thinking rather than evidence about where private finance does and does not reach. If the Government truly wants to rebuild trust with Global South governments, honesty is the best policy. It can’t just wish away the evidence because it finds it politically inconvenient at home; it needs to deal in reality not fantasy.   Realistic solutions do exist and the Government should pursue them. The UK could employ new and progressive ways of raising public finances, including through fair ‘polluter pays’ measures, at no cost to the average taxpayer, and use a portion of the revenues raised to deliver on its climate finance responsibilities. Ending fossil fuel producer subsidies in the UK could save around £3.6 billion per year for climate finance. A permanent excess profits tax on fossil fuel producers and/or a Climate Damages Tax on the production of fossil fuels extracted could raise further billions. A reformed financial transaction tax could raise £6.5 billion annually. Meanwhile, a net wealth tax on those with assets over £10 million to the tune of 2% would raise £24 billion a year – part of which could go to climate finance. The UK could also join the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force which recently secured an agreement by eight countries, including France, Spain and Kenya to implement luxury air travel taxes and is building momentum for coordinated action on other revenue raising measures. Why is the UK not part of this?   Polling shows overwhelming public and cross-party support for the polluter pays principle. In a YouGov survey conducted in March 2025, 85% of respondents agreed that those most responsible for pollution should bear the cost of addressing the harm it causes. Another poll in May 2025 found 7 in 10 Reform-leaning voters support higher taxes on oil and gas companies and other high-emitting businesses to fund climate action.   The UK Government can and must turn up to COP30 with a proper plan on international climate finance that is capable of truly delivering for the world’s most marginalised people. That, combined with ambitious net zero plans at home, would give the UK genuine grounds to claim the badge of climate leadership.     Sophie Powell is the Chief of UK Advocacy and Policy at Christian Aid. She currently leads Christian Aid’s engagement with the UK Government on the charity’s advocacy priorities of debt and climate justice. Sophie has worked in the international development field for over 20 years in policy, advocacy and campaigning roles on a wide range of themes - from trade, agriculture, tax and debt, to refugee rights and climate. During her first decade in the sector she worked particularly closely with partners across several African countries, including while working for Oxfam in Kenya for several years, before moving into more UK-facing roles.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     [1] Fiona Harvey, World’s climate plans fall drastically short of action needed, analysis shows, The Guardian, October 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/oct/28/worlds-climate-plans-fall-drastically-short-of-action-needed-analysis-shows [2] Christian Aid, Putting our money where our mouth is, November 2024, https://www.christianaid.org.uk/resources/our-work/putting-our-money-where-our-mouth [3] Labour Party, Britain Reconnected, March 2025, https://labour.org.uk/change/britain-reconnected/ [4] UK Government, UK shows international leadership in tackling climate crisis, November 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-shows-international-leadership-in-tackling-climate-crisis/ [5] Independent Commission for Aid Impact, UK aid’s international climate finance commitments, February 2024, https://icai.independent.gov.uk/review/uk-aids-international-climate-finance-commitments/ [post_title] => At COP30, UK leadership requires paying up on climate finance [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => at-cop30-uk-leadership-requires-paying-up-on-climate-finance [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-05 17:03:51 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-05 16:03:51 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8558 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [28] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8554 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-11-05 12:23:28 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-11-05 11:23:28 [post_content] => Earlier this year the Soft Power Council (SPC) was formed to provide concrete and actionable advice and support in the development and delivery of a UK soft power strategy. Comprising of leading experts from outside of government, spanning the arts, culture, and education as well as foreign policy priorities, the SPC is co-chaired by the Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Lisa Nandy.   Soft power is described by some as the power of attraction; it is a reason why people and other states might be drawn to the UK. Happily, the UK is blessed with many such reasons. Our language alone is a huge advantage globally; UK arts, music, and sport are loved the world over; the BBC (and the BBC World Service) provides us with unique levels of access and influence; Shakespeare, the Beatles, Coldplay are loved by billions; the Premier League is one of the world’s greatest brands, as is our reputation for education, science and technology.   More recently, we have also recognised that the UK’s reputation, expertise and leadership in harder edged fields is not only welcomed by partners around the world but also provides significant additional advantages and opportunities (soft power). Despite what often seems like turbulent and discordant times at home, our reputation for the rule of law and justice, a stable democracy, and military leadership, allows the UK to lead on the international stage, be a partner of choice, and attract inward investment.   So, soft power is already recognised as vital to UK growth, prosperity, and national security – if we want other countries to work with us and support us, we need them to value us, and soft power plays a critical part in achieving that. For evidence of this, one only has to look at the UK’s international successes in the last 12 months – trade deals with the US, the EU, and India; securing a more unified approach to NATO and supporting Ukraine through a coalition of the willing; and forging agreements with France and Germany to work together more effectively on irregular migration.   Crucially, in each of these, the objectives were very clear, and the key decision makers and influencers could be identified. Deep and trusted relationships had to be built, and common ground found and agreed. Undoubtedly, all of this was achieved primarily as a result of intensive, sustained and skilled hard work, commitment, and diplomacy by a host of senior and working level ministers, officials and civil servants – both in London and around the globe. But soft power also played its own vital part. Recognising and understanding that contribution is essential if we are to seize the opportunity presented by the SPC and develop a more strategic and targeted approach to soft power.   Even the most basic understanding of international affairs makes it obvious that, in addition to the intense political and diplomatic work, soft power plays a crucial role in advancing the UK’s interests. For example, President Trump’s second state visit in September (and the PM’s visit to the White House and more) was crucial to securing the US trade deal, support for the West in the face of aggression from Russia, and UK input to discussions re the Gaza ceasefire. That’s classic soft power, delivered by some of our greatest soft power assets: the Royal Family and the office of Prime Minister (and their iconic homes).   Similarly, when President Zelensky was met and photographed on the steps of Downing Street - just 24 hours after his disastrous first visit to the White House, an event that is widely credited as a catalyst for getting US/Ukraine back on track - the event’s staging leveraged soft power. The symbolism of that greeting in Downing Street, is a classic use of that UK soft power asset, as is Sir Keir Starmer and President Macron together at the D-Day celebrations or travelling up the Champs Elysees in a tank. Every visit to Chequers by a European leader tells a similar story: this is who we are, and this is the welcome, the support, the history, and friendship the UK offers.   Of course, these are top-level examples, and given their vital importance to the UK, the attention to, and use of, soft power is carefully considered and planned. And this is how I believe the Soft Power Council can add real value to the next level of UK efforts to deliver growth, prosperity, and enhanced security.   The UK has consistently ranked very highly in global soft power. We have the fantastic GREAT campaign that strategically builds on and amplifies our many strengths. But there is undoubted room for improvement in a more tactical and transactional deployment of our many strengths, as too often, the coordinated use of soft power is a secondary or belated consideration. More generally, coordination across government departments in our engagement with soft power partners could be better joined up. This is precisely where the SPC can help: by ensuring UK efforts are more coherent and joined up, and by acting as a super connector between HMG and the UK’s soft power partners, the SPC can better harness and utilise these many assets. Moreover, the SPC can become a go to soft power hub for the whole of HMG when they are planning how best to deliver hard-edged, specific outcomes.   To do this, we need to work very closely with our government leaders and senior civil servants. Ultimately, the onus is on them to recognise this opportunity, identify their priority objectives, and demand our input. With clear objectives, and briefings, the SPC must then deliver bespoke and targeted soft power – just as effectively as HMG has done on the very highest international priorities. And the best thing about all of this is that it does not have to cost very much at all; it is much more about being better joined up, thinking differently, and acting as a team than about expensive new initiatives. It also allows for us to use what is already in existence rather than reinventing the wheel.   Of course, there is much talk about the reduction in our aid budget and its impact on UK soft power (and inevitably a reduction in spending can negatively impact levels of ambition). But the SPC exists to advise the Government on how best to harness and utilise what we do have, rather than to lament what we do not. So, taking the world as it is, the work of the SPC aligns clearly with the four stated shifts in UK aid support (as set out by Baroness Chapman in her recent essay for the Fabian Society).^[1] These include partnering closely with countries to unlock growth and drive innovative finance and private sector investment; focusing on system support, so that we work alongside countries and move from grants to providing expertise, as they build their own education, health, economic, and legal systems. The UK’s soft power strengths, our world-class universities, and expertise in finance, law, health, and technology, perfectly aligns with this approach, enabling us to support others through partnership and shared expertise.   Working together in this way and demonstrating the SPC’s added value to securing and deploying soft power in a manner that helps HMG deliver on its most important objectives over the next year or so, is the true marker of success. We all know that the UK is ‘Great’, but the challenge is to now use all those things that make us great in a strategic, impact-driven, and focused way.   When we reach the point where, whenever our government partners think about their priority objectives and how to achieve them, and one of their first thoughts is “We need the support of the Soft Power Council”, then we will be able to confidently say that we are delivering on our remit.     Patrick Stevens is Rule of Law Director at International Justice Development. He is an internationally renowned leader in justice development and delivery with two decades of unrivalled experience. After leading some of the UK’s most sensitive and serious terrorism cases in the unprecedented period immediately post 9/11, Patrick helped set up and lead the Crown Prosecution Service’s (CPS) International Division for over a decade. As the CPS’s first International Director, Patrick developed a global network of justice advisors and international engagement that delivered strategic and operational Rule of Law improvement at the heart of the UK’s national security effort worldwide. He now works as a justice development consultant for International Justice Development Ltd and is a member of the UK’s Soft Power Council.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] Fabian Society, Promising development: The future of aid in an uncertain world, September 2025, https://fabians.org.uk/publication/promising-development/ [post_title] => Op-ed | UK Soft Power and the Soft Power Council [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-uk-soft-power-and-the-soft-power-council [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-05 17:06:53 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-05 16:06:53 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8554 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [29] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8539 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-11-03 11:36:15 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-11-03 10:36:15 [post_content] => A dozen years ago, in 2013, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on the safety of journalists which proclaimed 2 November as the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists.^[1] Not the most catchy of names, admittedly, but intended as a line in the sand, and a formal recognition that attacks on journalists cannot go unpunished, because when they do, further violence becomes all the more likely.   The UN was correct in its evaluation: impunity is not just an injustice to the victims of crimes, it is a carte blanche for perpetrators. And when we are talking about crimes against journalists – given the vital role of the press in underpinning democracy – allowing impunity to flourish means accepting that human rights and democratic freedoms are undermined.   What a tragedy, then, that 12 years after that UN resolution, the world has made no progress at all towards ending impunity for crimes against journalists. The data is shocking: according to UNESCO, of the more than 1,700 cases of journalists killed around the world between 2006 and 2024, around 85 per cent never even made it to court. Some estimates are even higher.^[2]   Right now, in 2025, the world is more dangerous for journalists than ever. As Reporters Without Borders (RSF) marked 2 November once again, on our minds were the 546 journalists and media workers imprisoned worldwide, and the 56 who have been killed this year. And beyond physical threats, journalists face rampant harassment online, abusive lawsuits, the pursuit of their families, intrusive surveillance, and a raft of other online and offline tactics used to silence them.^[3] While conflict and authoritarian crackdowns are often the most proximate cause, it is entrenched impunity which emboldens those who attack the press.   There has been no more glaring example of this than Gaza, where, since October 2023, Israeli forces have killed more than 200 journalists, more than 50 of whom were either deliberately targeted or killed while working.^[4] Israel has also denied Gazan journalists vital medical evacuations, spread lies to discredit them, blocked international colleagues from reinforcing them, stopped organisations like RSF from sending protective equipment, and targeted the infrastructure they need to report. All with complete impunity.   Like everything about the war in Gaza, the scale of Israel’s attacks on journalists has defied comprehension – but they did not come out of nowhere. Long before the current war, RSF filed complaints to the International Criminal Court (ICC) about Israeli attacks on journalists: in 2018, after two journalists were killed and 18 wounded; in 2021, following Israeli air strikes on more than 20 media outlets in Gaza; and in 2022 when it supported an Al Jazeera complaint about the fatal shooting of journalist Shireen Abu Akleh.^[5] An investigation by the Committee to Protect Journalists meanwhile found that between 2001-2022, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed at least 20 journalists, 18 of whom were Palestinians.^[6]   The fact that no one was ever held accountable for any of these crimes not only shows how deeply embedded the culture of impunity is, it laid the ground for the subsequent horror unfolding in Gaza. The failure to hold Israel to account was effectively a silent invitation to Israel to do even more of the same. Impunity has far-reaching and devastating consequences.   Gaza may be the most stark example of how entrenched impunity plays out, but it is far from the only one. Across the world, journalists are being killed, detained, tortured, harassed or otherwise attacked, with few consequences for their oppressors. In Mexico, for example, one of the most dangerous countries in which to be a journalist, state failures to ensure the protection of at-risk journalists and the ineffectiveness of prosecutors means few have been brought to justice for the violence which has seen more than 150 journalists murdered since 2000.^[7] In Sudan, those who harass and attack journalists are often protected by the authorities and enjoy total impunity.^[8] Even right here in the UK, justice has yet to be served for the 2001 murder of Sunday World journalist Martin O’Hagan or the killing of investigative journalist Lyra McKee in 2019.^[9] Press freedom worldwide is declining, and impunity incubates that decline.   So what do we do? As UN Secretary-General António Guterres once again used 2 November to call for justice for journalists, international promises ring increasingly hollow. Low public trust in media, economic uncertainty, and turbulent and divided politics provide a depressing backdrop.^[10] But the bottom line is that we cannot afford to give up. Because ultimately, this is not a story about journalists at all: it is a story about our right, as citizens and human beings, to know more of the world around us.   We need to protect journalists, because it is journalists who hold the powerful to account on our behalf, who expose corruption and reveal what is done in all of our names. We need to protect journalists, because good journalism is the antidote to bad governance. Indeed there can be no stronger proof of journalism’s power than the targeting of journalists by those who do not want their wrongdoings exposed.   It is critical therefore that democracies come together to stop those who kill, torture, detain, harass, or otherwise silence journalists. It is not enough for states just to condemn these actions, restate a belief in press freedom, or hide their inertia in statements forgotten as soon as they are heard.   This year, world leaders need to stop talking and start doing: set up a standing International Investigative Task Force, as outlined by the Media Freedom Coalition’s High Level Panel of Legal Experts in 2020, use targeted sanctions, support the ICC, and work together proactively to bring an end to a culture which emboldens hostile actors and chills the press. Investigate, prosecute, and punish. It is time for action, not words. It is time for impunity for crimes against journalists to end.     Fiona O'Brien has been the UK Director of Reporters Without Borders (RSF) since 2023. She started her career as a journalist, working as a foreign correspondent in Africa and the Middle East. She has also worked for the UN as a consultant editor, and ran the MA in Journalism at Kingston University. She is a Fellow of the Higher Education Authority and a member of the Chartered Institute of Editing and Proofreading.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Resolution A/RES/68/163: The Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, December 2013, https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/68/163 ^[2] UN News, 85 per cent of journalist killings go unpunished, November 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1156426 ^[3] Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Press Freedom Barometer, n.d, https://rsf.org/en/barometer ^[4] RSF, RSF files fifth complaint with ICC about Israeli war crimes against journalists in Gaza, September 2025, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-files-fifth-complaint-icc-about-israeli-war-crimes-against-journalists-gaza ^[5] RSF, RSF asks ICC to investigate Israeli sniper fire on Palestinian journalists, May 2018, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-asks-icc-investigate-israeli-sniper-fire-palestinian-journalists; RSF, RSF asks ICC prosecutor to say whether Israeli airstrikes on media in Gaza constitute war crimes, May 2021, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-asks-icc-prosecutor-say-whether-israeli-airstrikes-media-gaza-constitute-war-crimes; RSF, Shireen Abu Akleh’s murder: RSF alongside Al Jazeera to support its complaint before the ICC, September 2022, https://rsf.org/en/shireen-abu-akleh-s-murder-rsf-alongside-al-jazeera-support-its-complaint-icc ^[6] Committee to Protect Journalists, Deadly Pattern: 20 journalists died by Israeli military fire in 22 years. No one has been held accountable, May 2023, https://cpj.org/reports/2023/05/deadly-pattern-20-journalists-died-by-israeli-military-fire-in-22-years-no-one-has-been-held-accountable/ ^[7] RSF, Mexico, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/country/mexico ^[8] RSF, Sudan, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/country/sudan ^[9] RSF, United Kingdom, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/country/united-kingdom ^[10] United Nations Information Service (UNIS), Message for the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists, October 2025, https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2025/unissgsm1542.html [post_title] => Op-ed | If we value Democracy, we have to end impunity for those who kill journalists [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-if-we-value-democracy-we-have-to-end-impunity-for-those-who-kill-journalists [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-03 11:36:15 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-03 10:36:15 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8539 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) )