What’s Behind Trump’s Upending of the Global Economy?
Yesterday, Donald Trump announced a shift towards protectionism, the likes of which the world has not seen since the Great Depression. For decades, global prosperity has been underpinned by…
Foreign Policy Centre
Research from Past Authors
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[post_content] => Yesterday, Donald Trump announced a shift towards protectionism, the likes of which the world has not seen since the Great Depression.
For decades, global prosperity has been underpinned by a system of open trade without parallel in history. That system has enabled the creation of vast wealth in the Western world and lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in the Global South. It has also arguably contributed to global peace, as countries have more to gain by trading than warring with one another.
At a stroke, Trump brought that system to an end. By signing an executive order last night, he imposed a base tariff of 10% on imports from nearly all nations and additional steep levies on many.[1] The United Kingdom faces only the base rate, but many other countries were not so fortunate. For American allies Taiwan and Israel, the rates are 32% and 17% respectively. For the European Union, the rate is 20%.and for China, 54%. For Vietnam and Cambodia – where many international companies moved production in order to avoid becoming victims of a US-China trade war – the rates are 46% and 49% respectively.[2]
Trump’s moves are just the beginning of what will now become a global trade war. Although the Trump administration has suggested that other countries not retaliate, they surely will – leading to an increase in trade barriers which is likely to be catastrophic for the global economy.[3] In the West, consumer goods will become more expensive, interest rates will rise, and jobs will be lost. Elsewhere in the world, economic models which poorer nations were using to lift themselves up will cease to function. Geopolitical instability is likely to follow in the wake of economic instability, as it so often does.
Why is Trump doing it? There are at least three theories, some more persuasive than others. The first holds that this is simply the opening gambit in an epic negotiation, one that will end with most of these tariffs being swept away. The affected countries will come to the table and offer to reshape their trading relationship in a way that is more favourable to the United States, and the world will go back to (more or less) normal.
There are a few problems with this theory. Firstly, what exactly the administration even wants from other countries is not clear. It claims to have based its tariff rate for each country on the mixture of tariff and non-tariff barriers (for instance, subsidies and taxes) that the country in question imposes on the U.S. This is why Trump calls the tariffs “reciprocal”. But if that is the case, then something as simple as VAT would count towards the administration’s calculation. Unless the European Union and other economies are going to abolish VAT, there’s not much they can do to address the administration’s grievance.
The plot thickens when we examine the numbers more closely.[4] The tariff rate the US has imposed on other countries appears not to be based on any plausible mixture of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers. Instead, the calculation seems to be based on that country’s trade deficit with the United States, meaning that only a complete collapse in its exports to the US could satisfy Trump. Only the complete unstitching of the modern global economy could achieve that. Even if it were possible, it implies a world radically different – and poorer – than the one we now inhabit.
Another problem is that the US government lacks the administrative capacity to engage in this many trade negotiations at once. Even the crude back-of-the-envelope way in which its tariff rates have been calculated betray that. Trump’s rambling, incoherent delivery of his speech at the White House yesterday – which badly misstated numerous facts about the economy and economic history – will also do little to inspire confidence amongst either the markets or US trading partners.[5]
A second theory for why Trump is doing this is that he genuinely is seeking a major rebalance of the world economy. He has stated repeatedly that he wants to see a renaissance of manufacturing in the United States, that he believes trade amounts to other countries ripping America off, and that US consumers should be willing to bear some pain in pursuit of economic rebalancing.[6] During his speech yesterday, he once again raised the idea of tariffs becoming a major source of revenue for the US government, implying that they are here to stay.
This theory has plenty of problems too. The economic pain which would be involved in such an adjustment would be catastrophic for the US and global economies, not just a transient period of a little pain. The resultant trade wars could easily get out of control, depressing global economic activity and destroying trust between the United States and its economic partners. There would also be numerous unintended consequences, the type which have bedevilled state economic planners throughout history.
Trump’s idea to fund the US government through tariffs also makes little sense.[7] In his speech yesterday, Trump decried the government’s shift from funding itself through tariffs to doing so through income taxes, a move which occurred in the early twentieth century. But this move was made for a simple reason: tariffs simply cannot generate enough revenue to fund a modern state. Trump’s vision implies a dramatically smaller US state, one that would not be up to the job of containing the geopolitical instability which results from its trade war.
A third theory of Trump’s motives views this whole affair as a power play. By holding a gun to the head of both the American and global economies, he forces everyone to come to him with their cap in their hands. Both foreign countries and domestic industries will have to grovel for relief, and to receive it they will be forced to pledge their allegiance to him. In this view, tariffs aren’t really about economics. They’re about building the structures of a more autocratic state, one based on blackmail and coercion rather than consent and trust.
Already, many countries around the world are debating whether to band together to resist Trump or try to cut their own separate deals. The United Kingdom received a lower tariff rate than the EU, which UK ministers are touting as a success.[8] But trying to negotiate with Trump separately plays into his hands because each country is weaker individually than they would be if they banded together. Such moves are also corrosive of trust between allies and threaten to plunge the world even further into zero-sum thinking.
Which of these three theories best suits events? Given the chaotic nature of policymaking in the Trump administration, there’s likely some truth in all of them. What the administration does next will depend on the reaction of other countries, and of financial markets. By adopting such a maximalist course, Trump has made it more likely that the blowback will be so intense that he will be forced to adjust. But he has also dramatically raised the potential of a global economic catastrophe if he does not.
Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and author of the newsletter America Explained. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
Photograph courtesy of The White House from Washington, DC, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.
[1] The White House, ‘Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits’, April 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and-persistent-annual-united-states-goods-trade-deficits/
[2] Kayla Epstein, ‘Trump's Tariffs on China, EU and more, at a Glance’, BBC News, April 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1jxrnl9xe2o
[3] Daniel Flatley and Annmarie Hordern, ‘Bussent Urges Against Reliation, says ‘Wait and See’ on Talks’, Bloomberg, April 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-02/bessent-urges-against-retaliation-says-wait-and-see-on-talks
[4] Tony Romm, Ana Swanson and Lazaro Gamio, ‘How Are Trump’s Tariff Rates Calculated?’, The New York Times, April 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/02/business/economy/trump-tariff-rates-calculation.html
[5] Daniel Dale, ‘Fact Check: Trump’s False Claims About Tariffs and Trade’, CNN, April 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/02/politics/fact-check-trump-tariffs-trade/index.html
[6] Jeff Stein and David J. Lynch, ‘Trump Aides Draft Tariff Plans as some Experts Warn of Economic Damage’, The Washington Post, April 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/04/01/trump-tariffs-draft-recession-projection/
[7] Andrew Gawthorpe, ‘On Tariffs, Trump Resurrects 18th Century Economics’, America Explained, November 2024, https://amerex.substack.com/p/on-tariffs-trump-resurrects-18th
[8] Eleni Courea, ‘Why Starmer’s Trade Diplomacy May Still Bear Fruit Despite 10% Tariffs on UK’, BBC News, April 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/apr/02/why-starmers-trade-diplomacy-may-still-bear-fruit-despite-10-tariffs-on-uk
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[post_content] => Three years on from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, John Smith Fellows are focusing on systemic change and are at the forefront of Ukraine’s democratic transformation and recovery.
In 2022, John Smith Fellows were deeply engaged in humanitarian relief – delivering aid to displaced families and coordinating international donations. Today, they are focused on the critical need for long-term solutions.
Fellows now work on legal reform, cultural preservation, emergency response, and community innovation.
Transforming Ukraine through leadership
These efforts are vital for Ukraine’s transformation into a resilient and prosperous democracy, guided by the shared principles of justice, human rights, and equality that underpin democratic world.
Their work not only reflects Ukraine’s commitment to aligning with Western institutions but also highlights the critical role of international collaboration in driving sustainable progress.
Their achievements and projects highlighted in the Fellows profiles below, show how international partnerships can play a vital role in Ukraine’s path towards a better future in NATO and the EU.
Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Response Oksana Romanukha: Empowering Ukraine’s first responders As the Ukraine project manager at FIRE AID, Oksana coordinates the delivery of lifesaving firefighting and rescue equipment to the active hostilities zones. Her work directly supports first responders who face immense challenges amid missile strikes, fires, and collapsing buildings. Why it matters: Emergency services in Ukraine are under overwhelming pressure, with outdated equipment and growing demands due to war-related destruction. Oksana’s efforts are saving lives and maintaining critical infrastructure. What’s next: Oksana seeks additional international donors and partners to secure more equipment and build the capacity of first responders in the whole war-torn country. Oksana says: “While Ukraine has surpassed all expectations, we have little to celebrate as the war passes the three years mark. Nobody wants to end this war more than Ukrainians, but we remain determined to end the war on terms that will allow the next generation to live in peace. This will not be possible without continued international support.”
Education and Legal Reform Artem Shaipov: Shaping the future of Ukraine’s legal system Artem is at the forefront of Ukraine’s push for European integration in the field of rule of law. As an international development professional, he supports strengthening the rule of law and transforming Ukraine's legal education system. By aligning it with international and European standards and good practices, Artem aims to empower new generations of legal professionals to uphold democracy and the rule of law. Artem also works on educating current and future policy professionals so that Ukraine has more people with improved policy implementation skills to address complex development challenges. In collaboration with the Kyiv School of Public Administration, he launched a podcast series, where he and his guests reflect on policy implementation issues in the context of various reforms. Why it matters: Ukraine’s European integration requires a robust legal framework and legal professionals capable of upholding democracy and ensuring the rule of law. A lack of institutional capacity hampers progress. Ukraine needs many people capable of implementing system-level changes necessary for Ukraine to withstand Russia’s full-scale war of aggression, recover, and prosper in the future. What’s next: Artem seeks partnerships with international institutions to enable capacity-building programmes and facilitate experience exchanges. This includes opportunities for learning, and development for policy professionals eager to strengthen their policy implementation skills. Artem says: “I come from Bakhmut, a once-thriving Ukrainian city that Russia has reduced to ruins and now occupies. I long for the day when my home, along with every other occupied town and village, is freed and rebuilt - a testament to Ukraine’s resilience.”
Human rights and social justice Nataliia Bolshova: Advocating for the rights of alienated children and parents in Ukraine Nataliia is a civil rights advocate and a committed member of The Child Has a Right, a national initiative dedicated to addressing the escalating crisis of parental alienation and child abduction in Ukraine. Her advocacy is both professional and deeply personal – despite multiple court rulings in her favor, Nataliia has been unable to see her daughter for over 4.5 years. This is due to systemic inefficiencies, an outdated family law framework, and limited enforcement of court decisions. Ukraine’s challenges in protecting the rights of children and parents have been further exacerbated by Russia’s full-scale war of aggression, which has created a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented scale. Millions of children have been displaced, and thousands have been illegally deported to Russia. Within Ukraine, the war has disrupted countless families, with 30% of children who fled Ukraine with one parent losing all contact with the other parent, and 80% of children whose parents serve in the Armed Forces experiencing minimal or no communication with them. Why this matters: While Russia’s war crimes against Ukrainian children are the root cause of many recent cases of family separation, Ukraine’s family law system is ill-equipped to address the increasing complexities of parental alienation and child abduction. Social services, enforcement agencies, and courts handling family law cases often lack the necessary resources, expertise, and accountability to resolve these issues. This creates a cycle where systemic failures place the burden on alienated children, leading to significant psychological distress. Cases of depression and even suicides among affected children have been documented, underscoring the urgent need for action. What’s next: Nataliia is seeking international partnerships and resources to address these critical issues. Her vision includes:
Community development and innovation Vadim Georgienko: Empowering communities through citizen-led solutions Vadim, co-founder of the Smart Interactions initiative, is revolutionising local governance and community development with the innovative Citizen Token System (CTS). This groundbreaking mechanism empowers citizens to actively participate in decision-making and resource allocation by introducing governance tokens as a tool for transparency and engagement. CTS has already been successfully piloted in four Ukrainian regions, demonstrating its ability to deliver measurable benefits. By rewarding citizen involvement, the system ensures up to 17.5 times greater social impact compared to traditional methods of humanitarian assistance and economic development. This approach bridges gaps in financial inclusion, strengthens local governance, and fosters trust within communities. Why it matters: CTS offers a scalable, effective solution for empowering communities, addressing poverty, and improving governance, especially in challenging and rapidly changing environments. By putting citizens at the center, it creates a new standard for participatory governance. What’s next: Vadim and his team are seeking partners to develop advanced digital tools for CTS and expand its reach across Ukraine and beyond. With your support, CTS can transform how communities in Ukraine and worldwide approach resilience, development, and inclusion. Vadim says: “The future of Ukraine is interconnected with the future of the democratic world. Now, democracy faces a big problem globally. Why did "traditional" programs to support democracy fail? Without a good analysis of the reasons, I'm not sure that using "traditional" approaches will be successful anymore. On the other hand, I have doubts that respected designers of traditional programmes are able to get out of their habitual bubbles. The world changes rapidly, and rethinking the democratic strategy became a global challenge just yesterday.”
Diplomacy and advocacy Serhii Orlov: Countering disinformation and strengthening Ukraine’s voice in Central Asia As a diplomat based in Tajikistan, Serhii is at the forefront of combating Russian propaganda in Central Asia, a region deeply influenced by Kremlin narratives. In his role as counsellor at the Embassy of Ukraine, Serhii leads efforts to counter disinformation, foster bilateral relations between Ukraine and Tajikistan, and amplify Ukraine’s voice in a region often seen as neutral in Russia’s ongoing full-scale war of aggression in Ukraine. Serhii’s work goes beyond traditional diplomacy. He collaborates with local media and international partners to deliver truthful narratives and expose the manipulation of information that undermines democratic values. By supporting independent journalism and leveraging innovative media strategies, such as Telegram groups and widely consumed social media platforms, he ensures Ukraine’s perspective reaches broader audiences, particularly in regions vulnerable to disinformation. Why it matters: Disinformation is one of the most insidious weapons in Russia’s arsenal, destabilising democracies and manipulating public opinion. Central Asia, with its strategic importance and proximity to Russia, is a critical battleground in the fight for truthful narratives. Serhii’s initiatives address this challenge by empowering local media and creating sustainable platforms for unbiased information, ensuring Ukraine’s story is told authentically. What’s next: Serhii emphasizes the urgent need for more targeted and proactive strategies in collaboration with Ukraine’s Western and Eastern partners. Current approaches, while well-intentioned, often fail to account for the complexities of local dynamics, leading to resources unintentionally benefiting pro-Russian entities. To counter this, Serhii advocates for direct support of objective media projects, innovative outreach strategies, and enhanced funding for platforms that combat disinformation effectively. By strengthening alliances and fostering local resilience, Serhii’s vision extends beyond Ukraine’s immediate needs – he sees this as part of a global effort to defend democracy, reduce corruption, and promote transparency. Serhii says: “Impunity always evokes even greater evil. The civilized world must realize that neither a divided Ukraine nor its full conquest will satisfy the aggressor’s appetite. All the states that confront dictatorships now, as well as 'neutral' countries will become targets of hybrid warfare: election interference, support for radical political movements, energy disruptions, stolen databases, assassinations, and sabotage. That’s why we must act together to stop Russia, ensuring its demilitarization and preventing it from threatening global security again.”
Andriy Shevchenko: Uniting the global Ukrainian diaspora against Russian aggression As head of mission in Ukraine for the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC), Andriy is mobilising the 25-million-strong global Ukrainian diaspora to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s full-scale war. Through international advocacy, humanitarian initiatives, and cultural diplomacy, Andriy works to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience and amplify its voice on the world stage. The UWC, recognized by the UN Economic and Social Council, unites over 100 organisations in nearly 50 countries to support Ukraine’s defenders, advance its Euro-integration, rebuild communities, and promote democratic transformation. Under Andriy’s leadership, the UWC is driving efforts to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty and support its recovery. Why it matters: The war has demonstrated the critical importance of global solidarity in defending freedom and democratic values. What’s next: To learn more about UWC’s initiatives, explore ongoing projects, or discover ways to contribute, visit Ukrainian World Congress.
Education and integration for displaced communities Elena Frantskevych: Transforming lives through education and integration Elena is a co-founder of Perlyna, a non-profit center in Riga, Latvia, dedicated to supporting over 100 Ukrainian refugee children daily. The center plays a vital role in ensuring the well-being, education, and integration of children who have faced displacement due to the war in Ukraine. Why it matters: Elena and Perlyna co-founder Anna address critical challenges for displaced children and their families, including the following:
Arts, culture and storytelling Olga Reka: Preserving Ukraine’s cultural identity Through her creative projects, Olga ensures that Ukraine’s cultural narrative is both preserved and reimagined for a global audience. Her recent project, Ukraine and Ukrainians, is a contemporary reissue of Ivan Honchar’s legendary historical-ethnographic art album, brought to life through a collaboration between the Ivan Honchar Museum and Gunia Project, with support from USAID. This edition revisits and expands upon the original work by spotlighting the regions and communities of Ukraine deeply affected by the World Wars, 20th-century technological disasters, and Russia’s ongoing full-scale war of aggression. Olga’s projects not only document Ukraine’s rich cultural history but also offer a powerful testament to resilience, creativity, and hope in the face of adversity, inspiring global audiences to stand with Ukraine. Why it matters: Cultural preservation is a cornerstone of Ukraine’s identity and resistance. Olga’s work bridges past and present, offering stories that underscore the strength of the Ukrainian people amidst unimaginable challenges. What’s next: Olga is seeking funding to further expand her cultural initiatives and to collaborate with international publishers and co-producers, amplifying Ukraine’s voice and cultural heritage on the global stage. Olga says: “The current war has many dimensions; in addition to the events on the battlefield, it has brought about constant terror from the skies, an information war, and a dramatic reduction in opportunities for entrepreneurship and creativity. However, living through this catastrophe has taught us to adapt and refocus in our search for ideas and models of working.”
Varvara Mishyna: Building bridges through theatre Varvara Mishyna, the CEO of a cross-cultural theatre initiative, uses storytelling as a tool to connect Ukrainian and international audiences. Her performances in Scotland not only bring Ukrainian culture to new communities but also foster understanding and solidarity during one of Ukraine’s darkest times. Why it matters: Art and culture play a pivotal role in uniting communities and sharing Ukraine’s message with the world. Varvara’s theatre provides a platform for dialogue and empathy. What’s next: Varvara seeks collaborations with cultural organisations, venues, and donors to expand her initiative’s reach and impact. Vavara says: “Theatre has become a bridge between cultures, preserving Ukrainian identity and resilience in times of war. Art cannot stop a war, but it ensures that Ukraine’s voice is heard, its culture remains vibrant, and its stories of strength and survival reach the world.”
Transforming Ukraine together These are just some of the stories of Ukrainian John Smith Fellows which showcase their remarkable resilience, talent, and dedication. Their efforts are essential to Ukraine’s survival, recovery, and transformation, as well as to strengthening the global democratic community. These Fellows represent a new generation of leaders ready to collaborate with international partners and drive meaningful change. How you can help:
Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Response Oksana Romanukha: Empowering Ukraine’s first responders As the Ukraine project manager at FIRE AID, Oksana coordinates the delivery of lifesaving firefighting and rescue equipment to the active hostilities zones. Her work directly supports first responders who face immense challenges amid missile strikes, fires, and collapsing buildings. Why it matters: Emergency services in Ukraine are under overwhelming pressure, with outdated equipment and growing demands due to war-related destruction. Oksana’s efforts are saving lives and maintaining critical infrastructure. What’s next: Oksana seeks additional international donors and partners to secure more equipment and build the capacity of first responders in the whole war-torn country. Oksana says: “While Ukraine has surpassed all expectations, we have little to celebrate as the war passes the three years mark. Nobody wants to end this war more than Ukrainians, but we remain determined to end the war on terms that will allow the next generation to live in peace. This will not be possible without continued international support.”
Education and Legal Reform Artem Shaipov: Shaping the future of Ukraine’s legal system Artem is at the forefront of Ukraine’s push for European integration in the field of rule of law. As an international development professional, he supports strengthening the rule of law and transforming Ukraine's legal education system. By aligning it with international and European standards and good practices, Artem aims to empower new generations of legal professionals to uphold democracy and the rule of law. Artem also works on educating current and future policy professionals so that Ukraine has more people with improved policy implementation skills to address complex development challenges. In collaboration with the Kyiv School of Public Administration, he launched a podcast series, where he and his guests reflect on policy implementation issues in the context of various reforms. Why it matters: Ukraine’s European integration requires a robust legal framework and legal professionals capable of upholding democracy and ensuring the rule of law. A lack of institutional capacity hampers progress. Ukraine needs many people capable of implementing system-level changes necessary for Ukraine to withstand Russia’s full-scale war of aggression, recover, and prosper in the future. What’s next: Artem seeks partnerships with international institutions to enable capacity-building programmes and facilitate experience exchanges. This includes opportunities for learning, and development for policy professionals eager to strengthen their policy implementation skills. Artem says: “I come from Bakhmut, a once-thriving Ukrainian city that Russia has reduced to ruins and now occupies. I long for the day when my home, along with every other occupied town and village, is freed and rebuilt - a testament to Ukraine’s resilience.”
Human rights and social justice Nataliia Bolshova: Advocating for the rights of alienated children and parents in Ukraine Nataliia is a civil rights advocate and a committed member of The Child Has a Right, a national initiative dedicated to addressing the escalating crisis of parental alienation and child abduction in Ukraine. Her advocacy is both professional and deeply personal – despite multiple court rulings in her favor, Nataliia has been unable to see her daughter for over 4.5 years. This is due to systemic inefficiencies, an outdated family law framework, and limited enforcement of court decisions. Ukraine’s challenges in protecting the rights of children and parents have been further exacerbated by Russia’s full-scale war of aggression, which has created a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented scale. Millions of children have been displaced, and thousands have been illegally deported to Russia. Within Ukraine, the war has disrupted countless families, with 30% of children who fled Ukraine with one parent losing all contact with the other parent, and 80% of children whose parents serve in the Armed Forces experiencing minimal or no communication with them. Why this matters: While Russia’s war crimes against Ukrainian children are the root cause of many recent cases of family separation, Ukraine’s family law system is ill-equipped to address the increasing complexities of parental alienation and child abduction. Social services, enforcement agencies, and courts handling family law cases often lack the necessary resources, expertise, and accountability to resolve these issues. This creates a cycle where systemic failures place the burden on alienated children, leading to significant psychological distress. Cases of depression and even suicides among affected children have been documented, underscoring the urgent need for action. What’s next: Nataliia is seeking international partnerships and resources to address these critical issues. Her vision includes:
- Advocacy for legislative reform: Collaboration with governments and international organisations to support the drafting and enforcement of family law reforms, ensuring that court decisions are not only issued but also effectively implemented.
- Training and expertise: Assistance from experts and institutions to design specialised training programmes for Ukrainian social workers, judges, and law enforcement officials, equipping them with the tools to handle cases of parental alienation empathetically and effectively.
- Support programmes for families: Collaboration with donors and organisations like UNICEF, Eurochild, and the Family Rights Group (UK) to establish comprehensive support systems. These initiatives would include psychological rehabilitation centers for affected children and parents, public awareness campaigns, and legal advocacy programmes.
Community development and innovation Vadim Georgienko: Empowering communities through citizen-led solutions Vadim, co-founder of the Smart Interactions initiative, is revolutionising local governance and community development with the innovative Citizen Token System (CTS). This groundbreaking mechanism empowers citizens to actively participate in decision-making and resource allocation by introducing governance tokens as a tool for transparency and engagement. CTS has already been successfully piloted in four Ukrainian regions, demonstrating its ability to deliver measurable benefits. By rewarding citizen involvement, the system ensures up to 17.5 times greater social impact compared to traditional methods of humanitarian assistance and economic development. This approach bridges gaps in financial inclusion, strengthens local governance, and fosters trust within communities. Why it matters: CTS offers a scalable, effective solution for empowering communities, addressing poverty, and improving governance, especially in challenging and rapidly changing environments. By putting citizens at the center, it creates a new standard for participatory governance. What’s next: Vadim and his team are seeking partners to develop advanced digital tools for CTS and expand its reach across Ukraine and beyond. With your support, CTS can transform how communities in Ukraine and worldwide approach resilience, development, and inclusion. Vadim says: “The future of Ukraine is interconnected with the future of the democratic world. Now, democracy faces a big problem globally. Why did "traditional" programs to support democracy fail? Without a good analysis of the reasons, I'm not sure that using "traditional" approaches will be successful anymore. On the other hand, I have doubts that respected designers of traditional programmes are able to get out of their habitual bubbles. The world changes rapidly, and rethinking the democratic strategy became a global challenge just yesterday.”
Diplomacy and advocacy Serhii Orlov: Countering disinformation and strengthening Ukraine’s voice in Central Asia As a diplomat based in Tajikistan, Serhii is at the forefront of combating Russian propaganda in Central Asia, a region deeply influenced by Kremlin narratives. In his role as counsellor at the Embassy of Ukraine, Serhii leads efforts to counter disinformation, foster bilateral relations between Ukraine and Tajikistan, and amplify Ukraine’s voice in a region often seen as neutral in Russia’s ongoing full-scale war of aggression in Ukraine. Serhii’s work goes beyond traditional diplomacy. He collaborates with local media and international partners to deliver truthful narratives and expose the manipulation of information that undermines democratic values. By supporting independent journalism and leveraging innovative media strategies, such as Telegram groups and widely consumed social media platforms, he ensures Ukraine’s perspective reaches broader audiences, particularly in regions vulnerable to disinformation. Why it matters: Disinformation is one of the most insidious weapons in Russia’s arsenal, destabilising democracies and manipulating public opinion. Central Asia, with its strategic importance and proximity to Russia, is a critical battleground in the fight for truthful narratives. Serhii’s initiatives address this challenge by empowering local media and creating sustainable platforms for unbiased information, ensuring Ukraine’s story is told authentically. What’s next: Serhii emphasizes the urgent need for more targeted and proactive strategies in collaboration with Ukraine’s Western and Eastern partners. Current approaches, while well-intentioned, often fail to account for the complexities of local dynamics, leading to resources unintentionally benefiting pro-Russian entities. To counter this, Serhii advocates for direct support of objective media projects, innovative outreach strategies, and enhanced funding for platforms that combat disinformation effectively. By strengthening alliances and fostering local resilience, Serhii’s vision extends beyond Ukraine’s immediate needs – he sees this as part of a global effort to defend democracy, reduce corruption, and promote transparency. Serhii says: “Impunity always evokes even greater evil. The civilized world must realize that neither a divided Ukraine nor its full conquest will satisfy the aggressor’s appetite. All the states that confront dictatorships now, as well as 'neutral' countries will become targets of hybrid warfare: election interference, support for radical political movements, energy disruptions, stolen databases, assassinations, and sabotage. That’s why we must act together to stop Russia, ensuring its demilitarization and preventing it from threatening global security again.”
Andriy Shevchenko: Uniting the global Ukrainian diaspora against Russian aggression As head of mission in Ukraine for the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC), Andriy is mobilising the 25-million-strong global Ukrainian diaspora to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s full-scale war. Through international advocacy, humanitarian initiatives, and cultural diplomacy, Andriy works to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience and amplify its voice on the world stage. The UWC, recognized by the UN Economic and Social Council, unites over 100 organisations in nearly 50 countries to support Ukraine’s defenders, advance its Euro-integration, rebuild communities, and promote democratic transformation. Under Andriy’s leadership, the UWC is driving efforts to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty and support its recovery. Why it matters: The war has demonstrated the critical importance of global solidarity in defending freedom and democratic values. What’s next: To learn more about UWC’s initiatives, explore ongoing projects, or discover ways to contribute, visit Ukrainian World Congress.
Education and integration for displaced communities Elena Frantskevych: Transforming lives through education and integration Elena is a co-founder of Perlyna, a non-profit center in Riga, Latvia, dedicated to supporting over 100 Ukrainian refugee children daily. The center plays a vital role in ensuring the well-being, education, and integration of children who have faced displacement due to the war in Ukraine. Why it matters: Elena and Perlyna co-founder Anna address critical challenges for displaced children and their families, including the following:
- Education: Assisting children in continuing their studies in both Ukrainian and Latvian curricula, preserving their academic progress and connection to Ukraine.
- Mental health: Providing psychological support to help children and their parents overcome trauma and stress caused by war.
- Cultural integration: Organising art, music, and sports events to help children integrate into their new communities while maintaining their Ukrainian identity.
Arts, culture and storytelling Olga Reka: Preserving Ukraine’s cultural identity Through her creative projects, Olga ensures that Ukraine’s cultural narrative is both preserved and reimagined for a global audience. Her recent project, Ukraine and Ukrainians, is a contemporary reissue of Ivan Honchar’s legendary historical-ethnographic art album, brought to life through a collaboration between the Ivan Honchar Museum and Gunia Project, with support from USAID. This edition revisits and expands upon the original work by spotlighting the regions and communities of Ukraine deeply affected by the World Wars, 20th-century technological disasters, and Russia’s ongoing full-scale war of aggression. Olga’s projects not only document Ukraine’s rich cultural history but also offer a powerful testament to resilience, creativity, and hope in the face of adversity, inspiring global audiences to stand with Ukraine. Why it matters: Cultural preservation is a cornerstone of Ukraine’s identity and resistance. Olga’s work bridges past and present, offering stories that underscore the strength of the Ukrainian people amidst unimaginable challenges. What’s next: Olga is seeking funding to further expand her cultural initiatives and to collaborate with international publishers and co-producers, amplifying Ukraine’s voice and cultural heritage on the global stage. Olga says: “The current war has many dimensions; in addition to the events on the battlefield, it has brought about constant terror from the skies, an information war, and a dramatic reduction in opportunities for entrepreneurship and creativity. However, living through this catastrophe has taught us to adapt and refocus in our search for ideas and models of working.”
Varvara Mishyna: Building bridges through theatre Varvara Mishyna, the CEO of a cross-cultural theatre initiative, uses storytelling as a tool to connect Ukrainian and international audiences. Her performances in Scotland not only bring Ukrainian culture to new communities but also foster understanding and solidarity during one of Ukraine’s darkest times. Why it matters: Art and culture play a pivotal role in uniting communities and sharing Ukraine’s message with the world. Varvara’s theatre provides a platform for dialogue and empathy. What’s next: Varvara seeks collaborations with cultural organisations, venues, and donors to expand her initiative’s reach and impact. Vavara says: “Theatre has become a bridge between cultures, preserving Ukrainian identity and resilience in times of war. Art cannot stop a war, but it ensures that Ukraine’s voice is heard, its culture remains vibrant, and its stories of strength and survival reach the world.”
Transforming Ukraine together These are just some of the stories of Ukrainian John Smith Fellows which showcase their remarkable resilience, talent, and dedication. Their efforts are essential to Ukraine’s survival, recovery, and transformation, as well as to strengthening the global democratic community. These Fellows represent a new generation of leaders ready to collaborate with international partners and drive meaningful change. How you can help:
- Collaborate: Offer expertise or create joint initiatives to scale their impact.
- Advocate: Share their stories with your networks to amplify their voices.
- Donate: Support specific projects through direct funding or by partnering with the John Smith Trust.
- There is no unified system ensuring the protection of children’s rights and the enforcement of court rulings.
- Corruption and bureaucratic inertia often render court decisions unenforceable.
- Family court proceedings can take 2-4 years, by which time a child’s relationship with the alienated parent may already be irreparably damaged.
Geoffrey Swenson is a Reader in International Politics at City, University of London, a Trustee of the British International Studies Association, and was previously a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He completed a PhD in International Relations at Oxford as a Clarendon Scholar, an MA from Queen's University Belfast as a Mitchell Scholar, and a JD from Stanford Law School. He is the author of Contending Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2022), and his work has been published in several leading journals, including International Security, International Studies Quarterly, and World Development.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre [1] Francis Fukuyama, ‘Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy’, London: Profile, 2014. [2] Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law’, St John’s Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-0082, 13 September 2007, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1012051 [3] Paul Kirby and Nick Thorpe, ‘Who is Viktor Orban, Hungarian PM with 14-year grip on power?’, BBC News, 12 February 2024. [4] Roland Janse, ‘A Turn to Legal Pluralism in Rule of Law Promotion?’, Erasmus Law Review 6 (3–4): 181–90, 2013. [5] Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘The Quality of Democracy: Why the Rule of Law Matters’, Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 32-46, October 2004, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-quality-of-democracy-why-the-rule-of-law-matters/ [6] Geoffrey Swenson, ‘Legal Pluralism in Theory and Practice’, International Studies Review, Volume 20, Issue 3, Pages 438–462, September 2018, https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/20/3/438/4817016 [7] Geoffrey Swenson, ‘Contending Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law’, Oxford University Press, 20 October 2022, https://academic.oup.com/book/44455?login=false [8] Geoffrey Swenson, ‘Promoting Law Beyond the State’, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 68, Issue 3, September 2024, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/68/3/sqae102/7708174?login=false [post_title] => Rule of law in crisis: The need for a new approach [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => rule-of-law-in-crisis-the-need-for-a-new-approach [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-01-22 10:27:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-01-22 09:27:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7858 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7822 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-01-20 11:31:11 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-20 10:31:11 [post_content] => Donald Trump’s re-election to the American presidency has sparked serious debates over both the United States’ role in world politics and as the leader of the Liberal International Order.[1] Despite warranted claims about Trump’s unpredictability, volatility and unreliability, he is no “isolationist”. Trump, along with the various forces behind him – corporate, intellectual, and political - remain wedded to US global power but in more unilateralist, nationalist, realist, ways, and are therefore committed to even more aggressive pursuit of US ‘vital interests’. This means the incoming administration broadly rejects liberals’ methodology of regime change, ‘democracy’ promotion, and a liberal international order. However, even post—Cold War liberals, such as those part of the Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations, have been pragmatic, and highly selective, about their commitment to multilateralism and international law. Notably, US military budgets have continued to burgeon throughout the period since 1991. Trump has therefore intensified, broadened and mainstreamed a tendency that has been long in the making. As a ‘blunt instrument’, whose self-concept and vision has clearly sharpened since 2020, Trump falsely projects himself as the anti-war candidate while simultaneously aiming to further strengthen the US military machine under the banner of “peace through strength”. Hence, the challenges Trump offers to traditional US foreign policy will rattle allies and stir up ‘beltway’ national security elites. His Nixonian era ‘mad man’ approach to global messaging is meant to be unsettling but, ultimately, Trump remains rooted in and loyal to the goal of US global predominance – that of an American empire. The US foreign policy establishment in crisis – of destruction and reconstruction With the return of Trump to the White House, the ‘traditional’ US foreign policy establishment is in another one of its periodic crises. However, as Italian revolutionary Antonio Gramsci noted, crises are moments of destruction and reconstruction.[2] Hence, anxious establishmentarians’ debates abound in the hallowed halls of the exclusive think tank, Ivy League university, blue-chip Wall Street corporation, bank and law firm, in the mainstream media ecosystem, and in the American state. The US establishment is seemingly besieged by enemies and critics from within and without. America’s allies worry about what a second Trump administration might do to the G7, NATO, UN, or World Health Organisation. Global South states, particularly China, demand status and recognition, decrying “centuries of [colonial] humiliation”.[3] At home, that establishment is held responsible for ‘endless’ wars, especially since the 1990s, including seemingly intractable conflicts such as Ukraine’s war with Russia.[4] The ‘traditional’ liberal internationalist foreign policy establishment under ‘threat’ The US foreign policy establishment, largely dominant since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, has had 3 major methodological-ideological characteristics that are now in crisis and flux:- Constantly expanding and open markets, broad commitment to freer trade;
- Global economic expansionism organised under the umbrella of US-led liberal international order;
- Above underpinned by that dominant elite’s ideology – American exceptionalism, historic mission of a chosen people to improve the world.
"[The] idea of America continuing its role as a global watchdog is unlikely. This new administration has no appetite for it, and will quickly forfeit any remaining credibility the US has as a force for stability in an increasingly volatile environment."
Andrew Gawthorpe: Foreign policy is high on Trump’s list of policy priorities, but he has a narrower understanding of American goals than many previous presidents and is particularly focused on economic aspects of foreign policy. His planned trade tariffs, even if they are not implemented on as broad of a scale as he has suggested, will quickly become the top bilateral issue between the US and affected countries. Trump’s presidency is not likely to be one in which the US is active in multilateral fora or seeking new cooperative agreements. He is sceptical of many of the things that previous American presidents have viewed as obligations deriving from international treaties or organisations. Instead, Trump likes to deal with countries bilaterally, a situation in which he feels he can better use American power as leverage against weaker nations. Looking more closely at the potential foreign policy approaches of the US under a Trump Presidency, how could his policies affect the UK and Europe, particularly with relation to NATO and defence? Anthony Silberfeld: Let’s start with the good news. I do not see a scenario in which the US withdraws from NATO, or reduces its own defence spending, which currently amounts to approximately two-thirds of the NATO total. Now for the bad news. The Trump administration has already signalled its intent to ask NATO members to increase their defence spending (as a percentage of GDP) beyond their current two percent commitment to as much as five percent. At present, only Poland, Greece and the three Baltic countries are meeting their two percent commitments, so the prospect of all NATO members meeting Trump’s new terms is somewhere between slim and none. How the president-elect will treat those countries that fall below the spending threshold is the key question, notwithstanding America’s obligations under NATO’s Article 5. It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their defence spending obligations, while those that do not are left to fend for themselves. The UK’s current status as a laggard in its NATO spending will draw the unwanted attention of the new regime in Washington, and will surely be an additional point of friction that will test the durability of the special relationship."...It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their [NATO] defence spending obligations, while those that do not are left to fend for themselves."
Andrew Gawthorpe: While an American withdrawal from NATO remains unlikely, Trump could undercut the credibility of the alliance by refusing to endorse the organization’s mutual defence clause, Article V. However, Trump is likely to push European countries for much higher levels of defence spending and to wind down American support for Ukraine. He is likely to be willing to attempt to impose ceasefire terms that many European governments regard as too generous towards Russia. There is also a chance that his chaotic style of policymaking causes negotiations to collapse, potentially leading to further escalation in the conflict. Anthony Silberfeld: Despite assurances from Donald Trump during the campaign that he would end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours upon taking office if not sooner, his envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently recalibrated expectations. The new outlook from Washington remains fluid, but aims for a ceasefire of some kind within 100 days of Trump taking office. How much consultation is done with the UK and European allies (let alone Ukraine itself) will not just determine whether an end to the war is viable, but will also provide an early signal for how this administration will work with its allies going forward. Andrew Gawthorpe: For the UK specifically, Trump’s presidency raises the difficult question of London’s relationship with the European Union. The UK will be much better able to weather both Trump’s trade policy and his impact on the overall strategic situation in Europe through cooperation with the EU. Whereas UK policymakers have tended to assume that the US shares their fundamental commitment to European security and the transatlantic bond, the incoming administration does not. That requires recalibration and looking to like-minded countries on the continent who share the UK’s goals and values."...UK policymakers have tended to assume that the US shares their fundamental commitment to European security and the transatlantic bond, [but] the incoming administration does not."
Elon Musk took an active role in the Trump-Vance campaign, utilising his platform on X in particular, and has been rewarded with a role in the Trump Administration. With Musk repeatedly criticised for his comments on UK developments, how large an impact do you anticipate Musk having on foreign policy? Anthony Silberfeld: Musk’s support for Trump and Republican candidates during the election bought him a seat (and apparently a guest bedroom) at Mar-a-Lago, which he has already used to influence policy and there is no question that Musk will continue to use the influence he purchased to further his own business interests."...there is no question that [Elon] Musk will continue to use the influence he purchased to further his own business interests."
Andrew Gawthorpe: Musk’s position inside the Trump administration is hard to determine. His position is unofficial and advisory, and he has many political disagreements with key segments of Trump’s political coalition. For instance, he favours certain forms of immigration, and is relatively close with the Chinese government. His longevity in Trump’s inner circle is hence not assured, particularly given that Trump has been known to turn on people who he perceives as taking the limelight away from him. However, Musk should be taken seriously. Trump’s “MAGA movement” has often talked about internationalizing its project and trying to support right-wing parties in Europe, but Musk is doing it on a scale unseen in the past. Europe’s mainstream parties could face a pincer movement – Trump hammering them with tariffs and defence spending demands from abroad, and Musk supporting their extremist rivals at home. At its worst, it could appear as de facto foreign intervention in European elections. And Musk can continue to do this, using X and his global bullhorn, even if he parts ways with Trump at some point."Europe’s mainstream parties could face a pincer movement – Trump hammering them with tariffs and defence spending demands from abroad, and [Elon] Musk supporting their extremist rivals at home."
Anthony Silberfeld: The role of corporate influence in the new administration is not limited to Elon Musk. During the transition period there has been a steady parade of corporate CEOs who have made rhetorical, policy and financial contributions to curry favour with the incoming president. Some of the most egregious examples start with Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg scrapping fact-checking on his platforms and contributing one million dollars to Trump’s inaugural fund. Not to be outdone, Amazon’s executive chairman Jeff Bezos donated one million dollars to the same inaugural fund, and ponied up an additional $40 million to produce a Melania Trump biographical documentary. They are not alone, and in each instance, there is a calculation being made about offensive and defensive engagement with this new administration. In other words, how much does a company have to give to get what it wants, or conversely, how much will it cost to avoid being targeted if it runs afoul of the White House. These are real considerations for business leaders as they consider strategy and tactics in the period ahead."The role of corporate influence in the new administration is not limited to Elon Musk."
Given President Trump’s previous actions, can we expect US foreign policy discourse and decisions to be played out through comments made personally by Trump through non-traditional channels, and how can global leaders respond? Anthony Silberfeld: I would make a distinction here between discourse and decisions when it comes to Trump’s foreign policy. As he did in the first term, Trump’s reflexive comments made via social media platforms or at impromptu new conferences will shape the policy discourse, and will force everyone else to react. American policymakers will scramble to determine whether Trump’s latest utterance should be taken figuratively, literally, or in jest. The press will (depending on their political orientation) either amplify Trump’s pronouncement or turn the half-baked screed into a policy analysis that is worthy of debate. But there is often a significant gap between Trump’s rhetoric and reality. Many of the most controversial foreign policy statements made by Trump thus far, such as acquiring the Panama Canal, Greenland and Canada, or the imposition of tariffs, will encounter legal, legislative, and public opinion barriers that may prove to be insurmountable. What we found in the first Trump administration is that his interests in policy initiatives were often transient. In those days, the administration was staffed in part with institutional professionals who still ran into roadblocks that curtailed the president’s worst instincts. This time around, the quality of staff in this administration, combined with the desire to gut the federal workforce through layoffs and loyalty tests is unlikely to result in the efficient implementation of the MAGA agenda. It’s going to be a wild ride for all involved. World leaders would benefit from taking the right lessons from the first iteration of Trump, take a deep breath, and only respond when it becomes clear there is no other alternative."World leaders would benefit from taking the right lessons from the first iteration of Trump, take a deep breath, and only respond when it becomes clear there is no other alternative."
Andrew Gawthorpe: Trump’s incoming chief of staff, Susie Wiles, is supposedly going to ensure that the new administration is more focused and less prone to chaotic policymaking than Trump’s first term. However, it’s unlikely she can persuade Trump to give up his social media habit, and that means he will continue to drive the global agenda in part through this type of personal comment. This creates a tricky situation for world leaders. On the one hand, they feel domestic political pressure to stick up for their country. On the other hand, it’s important to not get too bogged down in the weeds. Trump threatens to do things all the time which he has no intention of doing. And he makes policy through personal relationships, meaning that it’s important for leaders to cultivate good relations with him and stay on his good side, so as better to promote their country’s interests. They cannot let those interests get drowned in a tide of tweets, and so it’s often better to not engage. What does all of this mean for the ‘Special Relationship’ between the US and the UK going forward? Anthony Silberfeld: The latest version of the special relationship will almost certainly get off to a rocky start since Donald Trump is never one to forget a real or perceived slight. Past comments by Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Foreign Secretary David Lammy are going to be difficult for the White House to forgive, in spite of both men’s efforts to walk back those statements.[1] The US is also doing its part to poison the relationship before it begins as Elon Musk, one of President Trump’s closest advisers, is meddling in British domestic politics to undermine the Labour government. Not exactly a recipe for a harmonious marriage, but not all is lost. Trump is, at the end of the day, transactional, so if the United Kingdom can demonstrate the value it can add to the special relationship, it has the potential of living up to that lofty moniker. Meeting the elevated NATO defence spending obligations, and highlighting the importance of UK investment in the US will be a good starting point. Unfortunately, it’s hard to imagine a Thatcher-Reagan or even a Blair-Bush relationship to flourish between Starmer and Trump, so London might be best served by spending its energy on cultivating relationships with members of Congress, state governors and mayors."Trump is, at the end of the day, transactional, so if the United Kingdom can demonstrate the value it can add to the special relationship, it has the potential of living up to that lofty moniker."
Andrew Gawthorpe: The UK government should recognize the importance of personal relationships to Trump and attempt to cultivate ties with people in his inner circle. Then the government needs to use these relationships to put forward the UK’s case for why it is a constructive economic and security actor and not a net drain on American resources. Secondly, the UK also needs to look beyond the “special relationship” and instead think in broader US-European terms. The UK government has to realize that this second election of Trump means that the world is changing. American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore. Europe needs to be prepared to develop its capabilities as a geopolitical actor, and the correct role for the UK is to work alongside Europe in doing that."The UK government has to realize that this second election of Trump means that the world is changing. American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore."
Living our values of democracy and the rule of law means having the capabilities to advance and defend them – something which is particularly important when the US is increasingly deviating from those very values. Dr Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office. Anthony Silberfeld joined the Bertelsmann Foundation as the Director of Transatlantic Relations in April 2014. His research focuses on democratic innovations in cities, and geopolitical competition in space. Anthony arrived at the Foundation after seven years with the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, where he was head of political and public affairs at the British Embassy’s Northern Ireland Bureau in Washington, DC. Prior to his tenure with the British government, Anthony held posts as a foreign policy advisor in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre [1] Albert Toth, From ‘repugnant’ to ‘the closest of allies’: Everything Keir Starmer has said about Donald Trump, The Independent, 06 November 2024, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/us-election-trump-starmer-labour-republican-2024-b2642284.html; Chris Mason and Becky Morton, Lammy dismisses past criticism of Trump as 'old news', BBC, 07 November 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cm2z1zm1pk3o. [post_title] => Trump 2.0: What does the future hold for US foreign policy? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => trump-2-0-what-does-the-future-hold-for-us-foreign-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-01-20 12:49:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-01-20 11:49:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7789 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7644 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-11-08 13:23:12 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-11-08 12:23:12 [post_content] => The votes are still being counted, but it is already clear who is the winner of the US election – Donald Trump. He not only sailed to victory in the Electoral College, but also is likely to end up with more total votes than his opponent, Kamala Harris. Unlike in 2016, Trump is the clear choice of the majority of Americans – or at least of those who voted. How did he do it? Although it takes time for the data to trickle in, we are starting to have a sense of the geography and demographics which drove Trump to victory. The former president won by improving his performance in every single type of locality – urban, suburban, and rural. The biggest swings towards him were in urban areas, a reflection of slightly better performance with non-white voters than he achieved in 2016 or 2020. Harris’ hope of improving her standing in the suburbs, and particularly among women, did not transpire. She actually performed slightly worse with female voters overall than Biden did in 2020. The only demographic group she did better with was highly educated women, but they only make up a small part of the electorate.[1] Postmortems of the Harris campaign have already begun, and the debate over what it could have done differently is likely to continue for years. Her defeat seems to have been mainly due to general malaise in America caused by a period of high inflation and an unpopular incumbent president. There was a fairly uniform swing against the Democrats across all areas of the country and demographic groups, suggesting that it was not some mistake by Harris which turned off a key slice of voters. It was just that the country was ready for a change. There is also no indication that America is headed for an extended period of dominance by Trump or the Republican Party. His ultimate margin in the popular vote, if he wins one at all, will be small. Moreover, in the swing states in which the two candidates actively campaigned, Harris did between 3 and 5% better than in states in which she did not campaign. This suggests that many people were convinced by her message – just not quite enough to overcome the national backlash against her party. In Trump’s first term, his chaotic and offensive behaviour quickly produced a backlash of its own which drove down his popularity and led to subsequent electoral defeat. The same thing is likely to happen again this time, provided he does not do too much damage to American democracy in the meantime. What does it mean? Nevertheless, the implications of the election for the country and the world will be profound. Firstly, this election surely marks the acceptance of Trumpism as a normal, legitimate part of the American political spectrum. It is by no means politically dominant, but nor is it a temporary aberration. Trump won despite making no effort to moderate his racism, misogyny or authoritarian tendencies. Whether voters were really enthusiastically embracing these things is unclear, but a majority of them did not regard them as disqualifying. The exact impact that Trump will have on the stability of democratic institutions and values in the US is hard to predict. He has talked about carrying out a mass deportation of immigrants and weaponising the criminal justice system against his political opponents and the media. The very fact that he will now avoid facing trial for his role in the January 6th insurrection and his broader attempt to overturn the 2020 election also undermines democratic norms. In a worst-case scenario, Trump and his allies might attempt to make more structural changes to the nature of American democracy, for instance through changing the way elections are administered or the way that the media is regulated. Such changes would likely kick off a furious backlash from civil society and be contested in the courts, but this does not mean they will necessarily fail. The hope of everyone must be that the country can make it through to November 2028 with its democracy more or less intact and that another free and fair election can be held. The election also carries consequences for the world at large. The fact that Trumpism still remains a viable electoral force even after his disastrous first term means that it poses a more long-term challenge to Europe and the rest of the world. While America’s traditional internationalism and transatlanticism are by no means dead – they still have the support of the Democratic Party and some Republicans – they now co-exist with a more unilateral, even isolationist view. It is this view that will be ascendant over the next four years. Therefore Britain and Europe can expect less attention from the United States as a result – and the attention that they do get will be of a less benign kind. Trump’s opposition to providing continued support to Ukraine is well known, and he appears to have kept up his friendly relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin while out of office.[2] Trump has also proposed placing 10% tariffs on all imports into the US, a move that economists have warned could plunge the Eurozone into recession and halve economic growth in Britain.[3] The focus of European policymakers in the short term will be on trying to divine whether Trump plans to follow through with these security and economic policies, and how he might be persuaded not to. Trump’s very personalised approach to diplomacy means that foreign leaders will need to attempt to build a friendly rapport with him. This could prove divisive, with leaders vying for his favour and hoping that he directs his tariffs against their neighbours instead. Foreign capitals also need to pay close attention to who Trump takes into the White House with him. In his first term, he often – although not always – placed experienced administrators and experts in charge of key agencies and in White House positions. However, the expectation is that in a second term Trump will be more dependent on figures who are closely associated with his Make America Great Again movement and the right-wing fringes of American politics. It is vital now for European governments to learn who these people are, what drives them, and how to establish a relationship with them. The city on the hill no longer After Trump takes office, Europe will exist in a world in which none of the major global powers – Russia, the United States, or China – has a leadership which is committed to liberal democracy, the rule of law, or the multilateral institutions which make up the international order. Navigating this world while maintaining support for these values at home will require cooperation within Europe, including Great Britain. This requires European countries to develop not only the tools of power and influence, but also new mechanisms for pooling their strength and acting together. The immediate challenge will be in finding ways to aid the defence of Ukraine and fend off the economic harm of Trump’s tariffs. Beyond that, Europe will need to become more serious about charting its own destiny. The continent’s prosperity and security cannot be left to the whim of voters in Michigan any longer. Nor can Europe continue to rely on always having an American leader who more or less shares the continent’s values. It must develop the capacity to champion and defend those values itself. In practical terms, this means a few things. Firstly, it means boosting European defence industries so that the continent has the defence industrial base that it needs to look after itself. This will come too late to enable Ukraine to fight on if Trump pulls the plug on American support, but it would help with the defence of the continent in the future. Secondly, European governments – including the UK – need to do more to stimulate economic growth in order to generate the resources that the continent needs to stand on its own two feet. Finally, there is an urgent need for increased solidarity and coordination between Britain and the European Union, who must pool their resources to meet this moment. Trump’s first term produced four years of talk about “strategic autonomy” in Europe, but far too few concrete steps to realise it. These steps proved to be difficult in part because the first time around, few European leaders wanted to accept that Trump and the movement he represented would be around for long. It was easier to still live in a mental universe in which the US still had a dominant seat at the table, even if that seat was temporarily unoccupied. This time around, Trump seems to want to turn over the table altogether. Europe needs to be prepared to build a new one in its place. Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre Photograph courtesy of Oleg Yunakov via WikiCommons. [1] Kevin Schaul and Kati Perry, How Counties Are Shifting In The 2024 Presidential Election, The Washington Post, November 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/interactive/2024/11/05/compare-2020-2024-presidential-results/; Kaitlin Lewis, CNN Exit Poll Shows Kamala Harris’ One Area Of Growth In Election, Newsweek, October 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/kamala-harris-democrats-election-white-college-voters-1981832. [2] Michael Hirsh, The Enduring Mystery Of Trump’s Relationship With Russia, Foreign Policy, October 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/30/enduring-mystery-trump-relationship-russia/. [3] Larry Elliott, Trump Tariffs Would Halve UK Growth And Push Up Prices, Says Thinktank, The Guardian, November 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/06/donald-trump-tariffs-would-cut-uk-growth-by-half-and-push-up-inflation-thinktank-warns; Piero Cingari, Why Trump’s Plans For Tariffs Could Be Bad For Europe’s Economy, Euronews.com, November 2024, https://www.euronews.com/business/2024/11/04/how-much-could-trumps-tariffs-damage-europes-economy. [post_title] => US Election Aftermath: How Trump won and what it means for the US and the world [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => us-election-aftermath-how-trump-won-and-what-it-means-for-the-us-and-the-world [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-11-08 14:38:54 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-11-08 13:38:54 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7644 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7638 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-11-05 09:00:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-11-05 08:00:00 [post_content] => After what has felt like an endless campaign, today is Election Day in the United States (US). Presuming that counting proceeds smoothly, there’s a good chance that by tomorrow we will know the winner of one of the most consequential elections in modern history. That makes it a good moment to look back on what has happened during the campaign and consider the stakes for the future. The state of the race Let’s start with the current state of the race. As always, the outcome of the election depends on the swing states. Most US states reliably vote the same way every election. By contrast, the swing states are those in which a victory for either candidate is possible and so which will ultimately decide the overall winner. These seven states – Georgia, North Carolina, Nevada, Arizona, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania – have been polled more than ever before, and we also now have early voting data available from all of them. So far, all of this information is inconclusive. The race appears to be a dead heat, with neither candidate enjoying a significant advantage. However, this appearance is based largely on the polls, which have been giving strange and contradictory results. The 2024 election comes at a make-or-break moment for the American polling industry, which badly misread both the 2016 and 2020 elections by underestimating support for Donald Trump. Determined not to make the same mistake again, pollsters have radically changed their methods, and the exact changes have varied from pollster to pollster. Many seem to be suppressing results which suggest a clear victory for either candidate because they fear reputational damage from another drastically wrong call. This could be one reason why the polls appear so abnormally stable and tied.[1] Early voting data is also a poor guide to the outcome of the election. Widespread early voting is a relatively recent phenomenon in U.S. elections, and this year it has been embraced by the Republican Party on a scale unseen in the past. This means that we lack a basis for comparison to previous elections.[2] Not that this has stopped anxious (and sometimes jubilant) members of each party poring over the data looking for signs of an advantage. For instance, Republicans have been buoyed by turnout among seniors, and Democrats have been pleased to see women disproportionately represented among those who have voted early.[3] Yet there is no evidence that this means that younger people or men are less likely to vote on Election Day itself, when their votes will count just as much as those who turned out early. The campaigns Everything, then, hinges on what happens today – who turns out to vote, and who they actually vote for. Here is what the two campaigns will be hoping is going to happen. Kamala Harris has run her campaign with one overriding goal: to appeal to moderate, white swing voters in general and women in particular. She had three reasons for doing this. Firstly, as a woman of colour – not to mention a former senator from California – she realized that her biggest potential liability was being seen by the electorate as too liberal. Secondly, ever since 2016 Democrats have been able to make enormous inroads into America’s formerly Republican-leaning suburban communities as their residents have been repelled by Trump. Harris’ focus on the idea of Trump as a threat to democracy in the final weeks of her campaign is designed to win over more of this group. Thirdly, the overturning of Roe v. Wade – which guaranteed the right to abortion – has galvanized American women against the Republican Party, and Harris has made abortion rights a central part of her message.[4] Victory for Harris hence looks something like this. Firstly, she needs to make sure that her party’s most reliable supporters turn out to vote in significant numbers in large cities like Philadelphia, Milwaukee and Atlanta. Secondly, she needs to peel as many suburban moderates and women away from Trump as possible. Right now, defeat looks most likely to come from a failure of the party’s base to be enthused by her candidacy. If Harris loses, she’ll be criticized for not paying enough attention to voters of colour and working-class whites. Campaigning with former Republicans like Liz Cheney might have appeal in the suburbs, but there’s a chance it turns people off downtown.[5] The Trump campaign is trying to pull off a similar balancing act. In previous elections, Trump has managed to mobilize white rural and working-class voters in large numbers while also maintaining some support in the suburbs. This time around, Trump himself has focused on using divisive and incendiary rhetoric to mobilize his base. While his campaign advertising has focused much more often on messages about inflation and immigration which are designed to appeal more to suburban moderates, it has also featured a heavy attack on transgender rights.[6] Trump has also made an explicit appeal to men a central part of his campaign and has made some moves towards trying to broaden the Republican Party’s appeal with men of colour. The impact of the latter, however, has been blunted by the open racism of his campaign in its final weeks.[7] If they were fielding any other candidate, then this would be the Republican Party’s election to lose. The US has just seen sky-high inflation, a crisis at its southern border, and an unpopular incumbent president having to step down halfway through his own re-election campaign. Virtually every other post-pandemic leader or government which oversaw similar levels of inflation has been ejected from office. The Republicans ought to be leading comfortably in the polls, not locked in an apparent tie. Instead, the party is paying a “Trump Tax” for their candidate’s divisiveness and extremism.[8] If victory comes, it will be because their discontent with the state of the country in the last four years persuaded just enough voters to give the former president another chance anyway. The stakes In a sense, what is on the ballot today is not just who will be president for the next four years – it is whether the country will finally reject Trumpism or accept it as a normal feature of the country’s political landscape. If Trump loses, his political record will be a grim one for Republicans. The former president faced an unpopular opponent in 2016 and won by a tiny margin, and then went on to lead his party to dramatically underperform in the 2020 presidential election and the 2018 and 2022 midterms. Another loss now would present an opportunity for moderate Republicans with respect for the constitution to reclaim their party, and for the US to draw a line under the Trump era. Victory, by contrast, would unleash Trump like never before. Indeed, Trump and his campaign seem to be relishing in divisiveness more openly than ever, meaning that it will be hard to claim that Americans did not know what they were getting themselves in for if they elect him. Trump’s campaign this year has been more overtly racist. He has complained that immigrants have bad “genes” and that they “poison the blood” of the American people.[9] At an event billed as his campaign’s “closing argument”, Trump hosted a comedian well known for making racist remarks – who then proceeded to do just that, sparking a furious backlash from some of the voters of colour who Trump had previously claimed to be trying to win over.[10] Trump has also continued his violent rhetoric and attacks on the democratic process. These have included welcoming violence against journalists, speculating about his political opponents being jailed and shot, and making baseless accusations of election fraud. And that is just in the past week.[11] Something else has hung over the closing days of the campaign – the possibility of violence or divisive legal contests, particularly if Trump loses. The Trump campaign has been ratcheting up its criticism of the electoral process in recent days, and it will almost certainly attempt to use lawsuits and pressure on local election officials to influence the counting process. The result could be chaos – or outbreaks of violence against election officials and offices, such as that which Trump has been criminally charged with orchestrating on January 6th, 2021. All of this means that the stakes are high. It matters a great deal to the rest of the world whether the United States is a country in which this style of politics is accepted by voters and practiced by the nation’s president. What happens today will determine the course of the next four years, and far beyond. Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre Photograph courtesy of Phil Roeder via Wikicommons. [1] Robert Tait, Dead-Heat Poll Results Are Astonishing – And Improbable, These Experts Say, The Guardian, November 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/02/what-polls-mean-so-far-trump-harris-election-voters. [2] Ivan Pereira, Tens Of Millions Of Early Votes Have Been Cast. What Could It Mean For Election Day?, ABC News, November 2024, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/tens-millions-early-votes-cast-election-day/story?id=115272249. [3] Joey Garrison, Women Outpacing Men In Early Voting, Boosting Harris Campaign’s Optimism, USA Today, November 2024, https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/11/01/women-outpacing-men-early-voting-optimism-harris/75990004007/; Ryan King, Trump Camp Touts GOP Early-Voting Gains Over 2020 As Election Comes Down To Wire, The New York Post, November 2024, https://nypost.com/2024/11/03/us-news/trump-camp-touts-gop-early-voting-gains-over-2020-as-election-comes-down-to-wire/. [4] Megan Messerly and Meridith McGraw, Harris Is Courting Moderate Republicans. Liz Cheney Is Helping, Politico, November 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/10/21/harris-liz-cheney-moderate-republicans-00184765; Justine McDaniel, Abortion Rights Gave Democrats Big Wins Post-Roe. Harris Wants A Repeat, The Washington Post, November 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/11/03/kamala-harris-abortion-campaign-voters/. [5] Nicholas Nehamas and Erica L. Green, As Harris Courts Republicans, The Left Grows Wary And Alienated, The New York Times, November 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/24/us/politics/kamala-harris-progressives-democrats.html. [6] Susan Davis, GOP Ads On Transgender Rights Are Dominating Airwaves In The Election’s Closing Days, NPR, November 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/10/19/g-s1-28932/donald-trump-transgender-ads-kamala-harris. [7] Zac Anderson, Crude Talk And The NFL: Trump Doubles Down On His Lead With Male Voters, USA Today, October 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/10/19/g-s1-28932/donald-trump-transgender-ads-kamala-harris; Harry Enten, Trump Was Doing Historically Well With Hispanic Voters Before Madison Square Garden Backlash, CNN, October 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/28/politics/hispanic-voters-trump-election-rally/index.html. [8] Andrew Gawthorpe, Republicans Pay A Trump Taks – Again, America Explained, October 2024, https://amerex.substack.com/p/republicans-pay-a-trump-tax-again. [9] Kate Sullivan, Trump Suggests Undocumented Immigrants Who Commit Murder Have ‘Bad Genes’, CNN, October 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/07/politics/trump-undocumented-immigrants-bad-genes/index.html; Maggie Astor, Trump Doubles Down On Migrants ‘Poisoning’ The Country, The New York Times, March 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/17/us/politics/trump-fox-interview-migrants.html. [10] Jill Colvin and Michelle L. Price, Trump’s Madison Square Garden Event Features Crude And Racist Remarks, The Associated Press, October 2024, https://apnews.com/article/trump-madison-square-garden-new-york-election-fcfe75be7f8281fde7bffa3adb3bba5d. [11] Hannah Knowles and Meryl Kornfield, Trump Says He Doesn’t Mind Someone Shooting At Journalists At Rally, The Washington Post, November 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/2024/11/03/trump-rally-media-shooting/; Michael Gold and Adam Nagourney, Trump Assails Liz Cheney And Imagines Guns ‘Shooting At Her’, The New York Times, November 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/01/us/politics/trump-liz-cheney-tucker-carlson.html; Alexandra Marquez, Jake Traylor and Jillian Frankel, Trump Talks About Shooting At Press, Ramps Up Election Fraud Claims At Pa. Rally, NBC News, November 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-wouldnt-mind-if-someone-shot-media-pa-rally-rcna178573. [post_title] => Today is Election Day in America. Who will win – and what is at stake? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => today-is-election-day-in-america-who-will-win-and-what-is-at-stake [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-11-05 09:57:15 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-11-05 08:57:15 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7638 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7625 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-11-01 18:22:54 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-11-01 17:22:54 [post_content] => Donald Trump regularly claims that his strong leadership prevented the outbreak of war during his presidency. However, it's an argument that doesn't stand up to much scrutiny. Some of the conflicts that have dogged his successor Joe Biden's presidential administration are the direct result of policies put in place during Trump's time in the White House. Not to mention the time Trump's grandstanding almost embroiled the United States (US) in a conflict with North Korea in 2017.[1] The first foreign policy act for which Trump criticised the Biden administration was the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. The fact is that Biden was following the previous administrations’ plan, having been left with little choice but to implement Trump's deal with the Taliban in February 2020.[2] This agreement, done without the involvement of the Afghan government, involved the US committing to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan in return for the Taliban pledging not to attack American forces. There was no corresponding requirement to prevent the Taliban attacking Afghan government forces, no mechanism to enforce this agreement, and the deal sanctioned the release of 5,000 Taliban fighters who soon found themselves back on the front line. The US withdrawal also involved the removal of military protection of US contractors who serviced and maintained Afghan army helicopters and other equipment. Their withdrawal contributed heavily to the rapid defeat of these forces.[3] Mark Esper, Trump’s then defence secretary, criticised the deal for pulling out too many troops, too quickly for nothing in return.[4] H.R. McMaster, Trump’s second national security adviser, went further in calling the deal “a surrender agreement with the Taliban”.[5] So, although Afghanistan was a defeat on Biden’s watch, it was a failure of the Trump administration’s making. Similarly, it can be argued that a contributing factor behind the decision by Hamas to launch its murderous attack on Israel in October 2023 was to derail the normalisation of relations between the Arab world and Israel that the Trump administration initiated through the Abraham Accords.[6] The bilateral agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco is seen as one of, if not the, signature foreign policy achievements of the Trump administration. [7] However, the Accords failed to address the Palestinian question meaning efforts to extend normalisation to Saudi Arabia were perceived by Hamas as the abandonment of their plight. While talks of normalisation paid lip service to the need to address the Palestinian question, Hamas, amongst others, were clearly of the opinion that that framing of the Abraham Accords that Trump set in motion was decidedly and deliberately exclusionary of their interests. That Hamas's plan was a success in this regard was borne out by the subsequent statement in 2024 by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that: "No relations with Israel will be established before progress is made toward establishing a Palestinian state".[8] While Biden could have deviated from Trump’s policies in both Afghanistan and the Middle East there would have been costs associated with doing so. In Afghanistan, it would have required sending huge numbers of American military forces back to the region. In the Middle East, it would have meant unpicking a diplomatic initiative that has already granted Israel diplomatic progress without the requirement to make concessions. That he did not do so does not mean that responsibilities for these debacles lays solely with Biden. These were all policy decisions of which Trump would have reaped the consequences had he won a second term in November 2020. What is most often forgotten about Trump’s years in the White House is how close America came to war with North Korea. In July 2017, Pyongyang developed an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with the capability to reach the continental US, something that candidate Trump vowed would never happen. While the military advised quiet defensive measures and military signalling, Tump took to twitter, calling Kim Young Un “Little rocket man” and promising: “Fire and fury like the world has never seen.”[9] His threats towards North Korea, however, were not confined to escalatory rhetoric. Instead, Trump ordered three carrier battle groups to the region and flew numerous simulated air attacks against the country.[10] Discussion within the White House over a US nuclear attack against Pyongyang’s rocket forces were so advanced that Defence Secretary Jim Mattis was being dropped off at Washington’s National Cathedral on his way home from the Pentagon, in order to pray for guidance as he prepared plans to “incinerate a couple million people.”[11] It was a crisis that could have so easily have escalated had Trump not been seduced by a series of vague promises and the opportunity to meet the North Korean leader in three media-drenched summit meetings. On this occasion Trump’s love of the cameras, the sense of anticipation and the belief that the summits were in themselves substantive, persuaded him to drop the pressure on North Korea and effectively accept the nuclear threat that Kim now presents to America. At the time Trump declared “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea”, with US Senator Chuck Schumer responding: “Saying it doesn’t make it so.” [12] Since this episode US relations with North Korea have only worsened. Trump’s handling of the threat of Iranian nuclear proliferation also brings into question the idea that his return to the White House would be conflict free. In May 2018 Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for Iran – the “Iran Nuclear deal”, without having any alternative plan beyond sanctions of limiting the development of Tehran’s latent nuclear weapons programme.[13] As a result, Iran is much closer to a nuclear weapons capability than ever before. Trump’s response to this is to publicly support the notion that Israel should pre-emptively destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities before they can develop the capacity to reach the United States. [14] In order to be successful such an action would likely require a joint US Israeli attack of considerable scale.[15]Hardly the impression that Trump likes to give of what his second term would be like. How a second Trump administration would deal with threats over Iran, North Korea, the Chinese threat to Taiwan, the war in Ukraine will play out are unknowable. Yet what is certain is that the track record of his first term in office is no guarantee of peace and security for the next four years. David Hastings Dunn is Professor of International Politics at the University of Birmingham, he writes on US and international security issues. Photograph courtesy of The White House from Washington, DC, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [1] James Hohmann, The Washington Post, 16 September 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/16/daily-202-us-came-much-closer-war-with-north-korea-2017-than-public-knew-trump-told-woodward/ [2] David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, Conflict - The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Gaza, 15 October 2024 https://www.harpercollins.com/products/conflict-david-petraeusandrew-roberts?variant=41467744092194 [3] ibid. [4] Amber Philips, The Washington Post, 26 August 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/08/20/trump-peace-deal-taliban [5] Bari Weiss, X, 19 August 2021, https://x.com/bariweiss/status/1428191060791005186 [6] Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Steven Tian and Dan Raviv, Time, 'Why Hamas Tried to Sabotage Arab-Israeli Peace Prospects With a Massive Unprovoked Attack', 08 October 2023, https://time.com/6321671/why-hamas-sabotaged-peace-prospects-israel-attack/ [7] Quint Forgey, Politico, '‘The dawn of a new Middle East’: Trump celebrates Abraham Accords with White House signing ceremony' , 15 September 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/15/trump-abraham-accords-palestinians-peace-deal-415083 [8] Tamir Pardo and Nimrod Novik, The Jerusalem Post, 'Former Mossad chief warns Netanyahu’s ‘curse plan’ endangers Israel’s regional future - opinion', 30 September 2024 https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-822472 [9] Bob Woodward, Rage, Simon & Schuster, 31 May 2021, https://www.simonandschuster.co.uk/books/Rage/Bob-Woodward/9781471197741 [10] ibid. [11] James Hohmann, The Washington Post, 16 September 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/16/daily-202-us-came-much-closer-war-with-north-korea-2017-than-public-knew-trump-told-woodward/ [12] Donald Trump, X, 13 June 2018 https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1006837823469735936 Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, The New York Times, 'Trump Sees End to North Korea Nuclear Threat Despite Unclear Path', 13 June 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/us/politics/trump-north-korea-denuclearization.html [13] Mark Lander, The New York Times, 'Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned' 8 May 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html [14] AFP, The Times of Israel, 'Trump says he thinks Israel should ‘hit’ Iran nuclear facilities', 05 October 2024 https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/trump-says-he-thinks-israel-should-hit-iran-nuclear-facilities/ [15] Doreen Horschig, CSIS, 'Why Striking Iranian Nuclear Facilities Is a Bad Idea', 25 October 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-striking-iranian-nuclear-facilities-bad-idea [post_title] => Op-ed: Would Trump 2.0 mean “No War”? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-would-trump-2-0-mean-no-war [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-11-01 19:55:16 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-11-01 18:55:16 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7625 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [20] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7575 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-10-07 11:00:03 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-10-07 10:00:03 [post_content] => With the US presidential election fast approaching, Ukraine’s allies in the West have been trying to find ways to shore up Kyiv. Further support for Ukraine seems much more uncertain if Donald Trump wins the American presidency, and so the window for the West to act in a more or less unified fashion may be closing. This is the context in which a number of Western countries, led by the UK, recently argued for Ukraine to be given permission to fire long-range missiles provided by the West deeper into Russia.[1] For some time, Western countries – namely the UK, France, and the US – have been providing Ukraine with long-range missiles which are technically capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. At the same time, however, these countries have only given Kyiv permission to use the missiles on Ukrainian territory, fearing that their use in Russia itself might lead to a dramatic escalation of the conflict. Conversely, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has downplayed the risk of escalation this may cause, and instead argued that this restriction is preventing Ukraine from defending itself as effectively as possible.[2] At the time of writing, it appears that the Biden administration is unlikely to approve Ukraine’s request. US intelligence agencies assess that the strategic value of allowing the use of the missiles in this manner is outweighed by the risks of escalation. While they acknowledge that the Ukrainian military would be able to do some damage to Russian supply lines and strike capabilities, they argue that the missiles would not be available to the Ukrainians in sufficient quantity to fundamentally change the course of the conflict.[3] Russia is widely reported to have already prepared for the decision by moving many of its military assets outside of the range of the missiles.[4] It is possible, of course, that the Biden administration will change its mind. Given British Prime Minister Keir Starmer still strongly endorses allowing Ukraine to use long-range missiles within Russia, it is fathomable that the deteriorating position on Ukraine’s eastern front may eventually convince Washington that granting permission has value, even merely as a gesture of diplomatic support. However, the debate over the missiles has also highlighted four issues which will continue to plague the Western alliance, even if Ukraine eventually gets to use the missiles as it wishes. The first is the cumbersome and public process of decision-making. As democracies, the UK and the US – along with other members of NATO – make decisions through building domestic and international consent. This involves allowing wide discussion of a decision before it is taken, which sacrifices surprise and secrecy. The extent to which Russia has adapted its supply lines and the disposition of its forces in anticipation of any missile decision is a testament to how difficult it is for the Western allies to achieve a measure of surprise. The second problem regards escalation of risk. US officials are said to be concerned both about the possibility of sabotage or lethal attacks on military bases in Europe, and that Russia might strike back somewhere else in the world, for instance by providing Yemen’s Houthis with missile technology to strike at American military bases or shipping in the Middle East.[5] The Biden administration desperately wants to avoid entering a cycle of increasing tit-for-tat action with the Kremlin, and for now it seems that Russia has succeeded in deterring it from doing so. Even if permission to use the missiles for deep strikes into Russia is eventually granted, it seems that we are at or very near the limits of Washington’s appetite for taking further risks in order to help Ukraine defend itself. Further steps would raise the likelihood of Russian retaliation. Given that the usage of these missiles to strike deeper into Russia is unlikely to strategically change the course of the conflict, Washington is right to suspect that if it grants permission, the conversation will quickly shift to even riskier proposals – ones which American officials do not want to consider, much less accept. This fact is reinforced by the third point, which is that Ukraine and its allies are beginning to disagree more than ever about what “victory” looks like and how to achieve it. As part of his push for loosening the missile restrictions, Zelensky presented a “victory plan” to US and European officials; however, the plan reportedly left the officials unimpressed. Behind closed doors, fewer and fewer officials outside of Ukraine believe that the country’s goal of regaining all of its lost territory is realistic.[6] With even those supportive of the missile decision conceding that it would not turn the conflict around, there also appears to be no other conceivable decision that Ukraine’s allies could take that would have a large impact on the course of the war at what Washington considers an acceptable level of risk. The disconnect between Ukraine’s goals and what its international supporters are able and willing to do will become a key problem if diplomatic efforts to pause the conflict ramp up after the US presidential election. The fourth problem is just how tenuous Kyiv’s Western lifeline may be. Although the UK and France supported loosening restrictions on the usage of these long-range missiles, the key strategic decisions regarding Western support are ultimately made in one place – the White House. That means that Ukraine is particularly vulnerable to abrupt changes in American policy. Even under the strongly internationalist Biden administration, US support for Ukraine has been deliberative and cautious. With the United States more concerned about the rising threat of China than it is about Russia – and ultimately unwilling to risk war with Russia to defend Ukraine – Kyiv will eventually face pressure to settle the conflict. If Trump wins the presidential election, Ukraine’s support from the US may evaporate entirely. Long-range missiles or not, both Ukraine and its allies will eventually be faced with some agonising choices regarding the kind of end to the conflict that they are willing to accept. Andrew Gawthorpe is a historian of the United States at Leiden University. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office. He writes a newsletter called America Explained. Photograph courtesy of The White House, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [1] Michael D. Shear and David E. Sanger, Meeting With Biden, British Leader Hints at Ukraine Weapon Decision Soon, The New York Times, September 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/13/us/politics/biden-starmer-ukraine-russia-missiles.html. [2] James Marson, Alexander Ward, and Lara Seligman, Zelensky Visited U.S. to Seek War Boost. His Most-Important Ally Shrugged, The Wall Street Journal, September 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/zelensky-visited-u-s-to-seek-war-boost-his-most-important-ally-shrugged-d7ba76e7. [3] Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Intelligence Stresses Risks in Allowing Long-Range Strikes by Ukraine, The New York Times, September 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/26/us/politics/us-ukraine-strikes.html. [4] Clare Sebastian, Ukraine Wants To Fire Western Long-Range Weapons Into Russia. But The Battlefield Gain Is Not Clear-Cut, CNN, September 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/22/europe/ukraine-western-long-range-weapons-russia-intl/index.html. [5] Julian E. Barnes and John Ismay, Alert Level Raised at U.S. Bases in Europe Over Russian Threats, The New York Times, September 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/01/us/politics/us-bases-alert-level-russia.html; Josh Irish, Parisa Hafezi and Jonathan Landay, Exclusive: Iran Brokering Talks To Send Advanced Russian Missiles To Yemen's Houthis, Sources Say, Reuters, September 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-brokering-talks-send-advanced-russian-missiles-yemens-houthis-sources-say-2024-09-24/. [6] Alexander Ward and Lara Seligman, U.S. ‘Unimpressed’ With Ukraine’s Victory Plan Ahead of Biden-Zelensky Meeting, The Wall Street Journal, September 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/u-s-unimpressed-with-ukraines-victory-plan-ahead-of-biden-zelensky-meeting-23e87bff. [post_title] => Op-Ed: Long-range missile debate reveals key problems for Ukraine and its supporters [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-long-range-missile-debate-reveals-key-problems-for-ukraine-and-its-supporters [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-10-07 12:48:59 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-10-07 11:48:59 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7575 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7562 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-09-20 16:12:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-09-20 15:12:48 [post_content] => In Western media, Serbia is often presented as a pawn in Vladimir Putin’s confrontation with his US counterparts. However, the real situation is far more complex. While the Russian state does maintain a significant presence in this Balkan state, its influence has been relatively limited. Furthermore, Putin’s reckless gamble in Ukraine has resulted in a greater decline of Moscow’s ties to Belgrade. In the same vein, while Serbian society has a long history of pro-Russian orientation, a closer look suggests a more nuanced picture that extends beyond simplistic explanations circling around ‘Russophilia’ and ‘Putinomania’. This article analyses the development of Russia’s influence in Serbia under the Progressive Party (SNS), which has been in power since 2012, and outlines the current state of affairs. Power and Russia’s desired outcomes in Serbia In international relations, influence is often conceptualised as power - “the ability to affect the behaviour of others to get what one wants”.[1] It can be exercised through mechanisms that are either hard (coercion and payment) or soft (attraction and persuasion), and the extent of their impact can be judged by the outcomes.[2] A state’s desired outcomes in respect of other states can be determined from the general aims and specific goals codified in its official documents. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, Military Doctrine and National Security Strategy allow insight into the state’s desired outcomes regarding international relations. To date, Serbia has not been mentioned in any past or current versions of this strategy, which suggests its low-priority status for Russia's power elite. Nevertheless, based on the general aims and more region-specific goals articulated by the Russian leadership, their desired outcomes in Serbia have been to: maximise Russia’s security by pushing back against North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), their “main external military danger”; to amass economic and cultural influence by securing the Serbian segment of Russia’s gas and oil supply network and other trade activities; as well as generating pro-Russian attitudes among Serbia’s power elite and public.[3] Security Security cooperation between Russia and Serbia began to advance in 2012, when the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) took over from their more openly Western-oriented predecessors, the Democratic Party. This manifested in the signing of the bilateral Military Cooperation Agreement (MCA) in 2013, providing for information and experience exchange, cooperation in military education, cartography, topography, and peacekeeping.[4] MCA was followed in 2014 by the Military Technical Cooperation Agreement (MTCA), securing Serbia as a client of Russia’s military industry, as well as other agreements on cooperation to combat organised crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.[5] Since 2013, Serbia has also been an observer in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and took part in joint Russian-led military exercises (“Slavic Brotherhood” & “BARS”) between 2014 and 2021.[6] Looking at the bigger picture, however, Russia’s military influence in Serbia peaked in June 1999, when a relatively small Russian military contingent took over the Slatina Airport near Priština in an attempt to prevent NATO’s control over Yugoslavia’s Kosovo & Metohija region. They managed to temporarily block the US-led “Allied Force”. However, due to Russia’s weak position in the global political landscape at that time, the country’s leadership could not secure a supply route for their military contingent. Their risky gambit was over within a few days. Since 1999, NATO, led by the US, has secured its military supremacy in Serbia, which resulted in the construction of the second largest US military base in Europe (Camp Bondsteel, in the southern part of Kosovo) in 1999; the departure of the Russian peacekeepers from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission in 2003; and several agreements signed between NATO and Belgrade. This includes the NATO Transit Agreement, which allowed NATO troops to travel freely through Serbian territory, as well as the establishment of the Serbia-NATO Defence Reform Group and the Partnership for Peace, bringing Serbia even closer to the North Atlantic alliance. This partnership has continued under the SNS, with the previous Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić signing the Individual Partnership Action Plan and an agreement on support and procurement (NSPO), and the current Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić pursuing further cooperation. Serbia has also regularly participated in NATO’s military exercises, which outnumbered their joint manoeuvres with Russia five-to-one. In 2022, in the context of intensifying confrontation between Moscow and Washington over Ukraine, the Serbian government suspended their engagement in military exercises with both sides. However, they have since resumed their participation in US-led military training activities while Russia’s recent military exercises, including “Union Shield 2023”, were marked by the absence of Serbia’s military contingent.[7] Economy Russia’s most significant economic progress in Serbia has been related to energy supply. Following the signing of the Energy Cooperation Framework Agreement between Belgrade and Moscow in 2008, Gazprom Neft acquired the controlling stake of 51% in Serbia’s faltering energy giant Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS). This share was increased to 56.15% in 2011.[8] With oil products and gas accounting for almost half of Serbia’s total energy consumption, and with a quarter of its oil and almost all of its gas coming from Russia, Belgrade has become highly energy-reliant on Moscow.[9] Over the years, Serbia proved to be a reliable partner, accommodating one of Russia’s key pipelines supplying gas to Europe (TurkStream), while buying Russian oil and gas at relatively advantageous rates. In addition to this, the Strategic Partnership Declaration (SPD) signed by the then Serbian President Nikolić in 2013 provided for greater cooperation in business, investment and trade, as well as transport, tourism, and agriculture.[10] Economic ties were further bolstered by a series of bilateral agreements signed by President Vučić in 2019.[11] However, the bigger picture reveals a situation that is not as favourable to the Kremlin. Despite the aforementioned developments, Russia is not the prime mover in Serbia’s economy, trailing behind Germany, other European countries and increasingly China. Furthermore, Serbia’s trade with Russia has fallen significantly over the past two years due to new rounds of US-led sanctions, after Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in 2022.[12] In addition to this, with Serbia’s recent strides towards energy diversification manifested in its recent agreements on natural gas with Azerbaijan and on nuclear energy with France, as well as potential liquified natural gas (LNG) perspectives via Greece and Montenegro, Russia’s influence in the only sector of Serbia’s economy where it had been able to achieve significant success is likely to decrease in the near future. While Gazprom Neft and other companies affiliated with the Kremlin (e.g. Russian Railways) continue to operate in Serbia, albeit under increasing pressure, others (e.g. Sberbank) have left. One may note the recent expansion of Russian IT companies (Yandex in particular) and mushrooming of small Russian enterprises around Belgrade and Novi Sad. However, most of these new arrivals, relokanty (“individuals who have relocated for an indefinite period“), tend to be opponents rather than supporters of Putin and are highly unlikely to facilitate the Russian state’s influence in their newly-found Balkan refuge. At the same time, while Serbia voted for the United Nations’ motion condemning Putin’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, it did not join economic sanctions against Russia despite the pressure from the US. One reason for this is the aforementioned dependence on affordable Russian gas. However, there is more to it. US, Russia and Serbian society In 2008, Priština-based challengers of the central government in Belgrade proclaimed Kosovo’s independence, which was swiftly recognised by Washington. The expectation that a state leader must preserve their country’s territorial integrity and the extant cultural importance of Kosovo to many Serbs meant that accepting its secession would have cost then-president Boris Tadić his political career. Therefore, despite the ruling Democratic Party’s pro-Western stance, Tadić decided to pivot towards Russia while maintaining ties to the US, adopting a neo-Titoist approach of balancing between the West and the East. Hence, in this context, Russia emerged as Serbia’s indispensable ally, using its permanent seat at the UN Security Council to block the full legitimisation of Kosovo’s statehood. Another potential factor underpinning President Vučić’s decision not to join the US-led sanctions against Russia, is the pro-Russian sentiments common in Serbian society. In this respect, any policies perceived as anti-Russian are prone to invoking strong negative reactions from the staunchly pro-Kremlin, Putinist segment of the public and silent disapproval from the moderately Russia-friendly majority. These dynamics can be explained by several cultural and material factors. The majority of Serbs and Russians identify with Orthodox Christianity, which enables a perception of mutual societal similarities, in particular among the practising Orthodox Christians. Furthermore, the closeness between Russian and Serbian clergy and their vocal support for both governments make them efficient public diplomacy agents for the Russian state. Another cultural factor is a shared history, from an earlier, spiritual connection between the two Slavic nations through to Russia emerging as zaštitnica (defender) of Serbs. The latter theme has crystallised as a result of Russia’s role in facilitating Serbia’s independence from the Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia’s survival in the First and Second World Wars and in its conflict with NATO in the late 1990’s. Considering the popularity of national history and reading in Serbian society and the consonance between Russian and Serbian narratives in the aforementioned themes, they have come together as a solid cultural foundation for the Kremlin’s soft power in Serbia. The cultural aspect of Russia’s soft power in Serbia also has a solid material base. For instance, Russia showed high scores and gradual growth (up to 72%) in a series of polls on the general impression of foreign countries among the young adults in Serbia, conducted between 2008 and 2016. This contrasted with the lower perceptions of the US, which did not rise above the 20% mark.[13] Looking more closely, the increases in pro-Russian attitudes demonstrated in this poll appear to have coincided with particular events, such as: the announcement of Russia’s energy projects in Serbia; Putin’s takeover of Crimea; Moscow’s veto of the genocide resolution on Srebrenica at the UN; and Russian Foreign Minister’s visit to Belgrade for an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conference, at which he mentioned the “NATO aggression against Yugoslavia” and the “Kosovo tragedy” themes.[14] Therefore, while pro-Russian attitudes are common in Serbia, they also appear to be influenced by the Kremlin’s diplomatic support for Serbia’s territorial integrity and international reputation. This hypothesis is reinforced by recent polls that feature Russia as the top choice for the country that should be more involved in the talks on Kosovo (29%), a country that Serbia should rely on in international relations (42.1%) and align its foreign policy with (61%).[15] Furthermore, with the perception of the US as the enemy (due to the NATO’s previous military and ongoing political alignment with Bosniaks and Kosovan Albanians against Serbs), any of Russia’s actions against the interests of the US are likely to generate a positive response. This is reinforced by recent research that points to the perception of similarity between Serbia’s and Russia’s negative experiences with the West (economic sanctions and military confrontation) as the reason for the high opposition to sanctions against Russia (74.3%) in Serbian society.[16] Hence, the basis of Russia-friendly attitudes among the majority of Serbian citizens is not only cultural, but also material. Russia’s public diplomacy in Serbia Unsurprisingly, all of the above themes have been systematically promoted by Russia’s Serbian-language online media (e.g. Sputnik Srbija), the Russian House (Kremlin’s cultural diplomacy centre in Belgrade) and other, smaller organisations, through exhibitions, film screenings, concerts and religious events (e.g. Holy Fire). These have often been endorsed by various Serbian political officials looking to reaffirm their respect for their Russian partners and to capitalise on pro-Russian sentiments among the public. It must be noted that Russia’s public diplomacy actors have seldom been able to reach beyond the minority groups of Russophile intellectuals and ultra-conservatives. Nevertheless, certain cultural constructs such as Putin’s strongman persona have travelled through society organically, manifested in various ways, from local bars bearing his name or displaying his portraits to mugs, T-shirts and other Putin paraphernalia. As famously explained by Dragan Vučićević, the owner of the country’s leading tabloid, Informer: “Our usual daily circulation is 120,000… When I have Putin calendars, we sell 250,000… If I had put Catherine Ashton or Juncker on calendar, I don’t think I would sell even 12 copies”.[17] Moreover, Serbia’s own news media, cinemas and other platforms have been fairly accommodating to Russia’s political perspectives and cultural products. At the same time, Serbian media have also platformed pro-Western voices, and the CNN-affiliated channel N1 has taken a prominent spot on Serbia’s television grid. Furthermore, Western films, TV series and music remain far more plentiful and popular in Serbia than the Russian products, especially among young adults. Similarly, English and other West European languages continue to be more popular than Russian.[18] Moreover, despite the extant belief in potential aid from Russia, the perception of Russia as Serbia’s main donor continues to fall behind the European Union (EU) and now also China. The same can be said about the appeal of the Kremlin's state model, overshadowed by Switzerland, Norway and Germany.[19] The latter may have been partially influenced by some of the 370,000 relokanty, recent Russian émigrés many of whom have been vocal about the rise of repression and corruption in their home country.[20] Meanwhile, the EU continues to represent genuine economic opportunities, with a far greater number of Serbian citizens living, working and studying in the EU states than in Russia.[21] There have been recent attempts to revamp Russia’s cultural strategy with the arrival of new, pro-active public diplomacy chiefs on the scene – in particular the new head of Rossotrudnichestvo (Russia’s cultural diplomacy agency) Yevgeniy Primakov Jr and new Russian House director Yevgeniy Baranov. Over the past three years, they have doubled down on youth exchange programmes and social media activities in Serbia. However, whether these efforts will bring any significant results remains to be seen. In the same vein, in 2022, following their banishment from the West, RT finally launched a Serbian-language online portal, but their reach and public engagement remain modest. Russia’s only potential game-changer in this respect would be expanding to television, which remains the dominant news platform in Serbia. If some segments of the Serbian public switch from national channels to one completely dominated by carefully crafted pro-Kremlin frames, Russia’s soft power potential may increase. However, with the launch previously announced for 2024, RT has yet to materialise on Serbian TV screens.[22] Considering the Serbian government’s already precarious situation in the context of the war in Ukraine and the questionable appeal of having another TV channel beyond their control, the prospects for RT appearing on Serbia’s television grid remain uncertain, albeit not unlikely. Conclusion The results of the Russian government’s efforts in Serbia have been relatively modest despite the enabling environment offered by their counterparts in Belgrade. Russia has been long overtaken by the US-led NATO in the military domain, and trails behind European states and China economically, with the exception of the energy sector. Furthermore, Putin’s reckless actions in Ukraine not only jeopardised Moscow’s chances of any further advancement, but they also compromised what the Kremlin had managed to achieve in the previous ten years. Its military cooperation with Belgrade has been reduced and its, once solid, position in the energy sector is now at risk of decline. At the same time, Moscow’s extant power can be evidenced by Belgrade’s refusal to join the US-led sanctions against Russia. Clearly, the Kremlin has been successful in generating some pro-Russian policies from Serbia’s leadership and cultivating pro-Russian attitudes among the Serbian public. This has been enabled by Moscow’s consistent political support for Serbia’s territorial integrity and international reputation, which sits in contrast to Washington’s current policies and previous military actions against Belgrade. Meanwhile, shared religion, history and other cultural aspects continue to provide an organic foundation for Russia’s soft power in Serbia. While a significant percentage of Serbian citizens may collectively look up to Russia as the defender of their state on the global arena, nevertheless, as individuals, many opt for the EU due to the greater economic opportunities it offers and prefer the political models of West European states such as Switzerland, Norway and Germany. Meanwhile, some of the recent 370,000 relokanty from Russia are likely to reinforce and amplify these attitudes by sharing their experiences of growing authoritarianism and corruption in their home country. At the same time, because of the low-cost strategy pursued by Moscow vis-à-vis Serbia in previous years, its public diplomacy capabilities remain limited. Recent signs of reactivation of Kremlin’s cultural actors in Serbia may mean some increase in pro-Russian attitudes in the near future, certainly if they manage to secure their spot on the TV grid. However, if these efforts do not bear any fruit, Moscow’s influence will continue to diminish, overshadowed by Washington, Brussels and Beijing. Dr Ernest A Reid is a Teaching & Development Assistant at Aston University and an Associate Fellow at Advance HE (AFHEA). He was formerly a PhD Scholar at Aston School of Social Sciences and an IMESS Scholar at UCL School of Slavonic & Eastern European Studies (UCL SSEES). His expertise on Russia’s influence in Serbia comes from a research project he had developed and carried out for UCL SSEES, spending nine months in Belgrade and travelling to Moscow to observe and interact with Russian public diplomacy actors. Fluent in Russian, he has also worked as a translator, with former clients including the UK government and law enforcement agencies, as well as IGOs, NGOs and media companies. Photograph courtesy of author. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [1] Joseph Nye, Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power, Foreign Affairs, July 2009, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20699631 [2] Joseph Nye, Hard, soft and smart power, The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, March 2013, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199588862.013.0031 [3] President of Russia, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2008, Kremlin, January 2008, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116; President of Russia, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2013, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Thailand, February 2013, https://thailand.mid.ru/en/o_rossii/vneshnyaya_politika/kontseptsiya_vneshney_politiki_rf/; President of Russia, The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/; President of Russia, Strategiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda, Kremlin, May 2009, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/424 ; President of Russia, Ukaz ‘O strategii Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, December 2015, https://rg.ru/documents/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html; President of Russia, Strategiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, National Security Council of the Russian Federation, July 2021, http://scrf.gov.ru/media/files/file/l4wGRPqJvETSkUTYmhepzRochb1j1jqh.pdf; President of Russia, Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii, National Security Council of the Russian Federation, December 2014, http://scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document129/ [4] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Soglasheniye o voyennom sotrudnichestve, Russian Embassy in Serbia, November 2013, https://serbia.mid.ru/ru/countries/legal_base/mezhpravitelstvennye_dogovory/ [5] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Soglasheniye o voyenno-tehnicheskom sotrudnichestve, Russian Embassy in Serbia, October 2014, https://serbia.mid.ru/ru/countries/legal_base/mezhpravitelstvennye_dogovory/ [6] Rossiya perebrosila na ucheniya v Serbiyu batareyu “Pantsirey”, Interfaks – Agentstvo Voyennyh Novostey, October 2021, https://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=0&nid=558708&lang=RU [7] V Rossii nachalis’ sovmestnye s Belorussiyey ucheniya, Yevraziya, September 2023, https://eurasia.expert/v-rossii-nachalis-sovmestnye-s-belarusyu-ucheniya-shchit-soyuza-2023/ [8] Gazprom Neft buys 5.15 pct of Serbia's NIS, Reuters, March 2011, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/stocks/gazprom-neft-buys-515-pct-of-serbias-nis-idUSLDE72H0UB/ [9] Serbia, International Energy Agency, January 2021, https://www.iea.org/countries/serbia/energy-mix; Michał Paszkowski, Serbia activates natural gas supply efforts, Instytut Europy Środkowej, July 2023, https://ies.lublin.pl/en/comments/serbia-activates-natural-gas-supply-efforts/ [10] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Deklaratsiya o strategicheskom partnyorstve, Kremlin, May 2013, http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/1461 [11] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Dokumenty, podpisannye oficial’nogo visita Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federacii V. Putina v Respubliku Serbiyu, Kremlin, January 2019, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5386 [12] Statistics of external trade 23, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, December 2022, https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2024/PdfE/G20241207.pdf; Statistics of external trade 207, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, June 2024, https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2023/PdfE/G20231023.pdf [13] Ernest Reid, "Moscow’s public diplomacy and Russophilia in Serbia, 2012–2019", FPN Godišnjak, June 2020, https://www.fpn.bg.ac.rs/wp-content/uploads/FPN-Godisnjak-23-2020.pdf [14] Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s Remarks at the 22nd OSCE Ministerial Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2015, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1519569/ [15] Opinion poll report: socio-political views of Serbian citizens in 2023, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, April 2023, https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/wfd_nws_2023_eng_final.pdf ; Political attitudes of citizens of Serbia – Fall 2022, CRTA Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability 2022, December 2022, https://crta.rs/en/opininon-poll-political-attitudes-of-citizens-of-serbia-fall-2022/ [16] Vuk Vuksanovic, Srdjan Cvijic, Maksim Samorukov, Beyond Sputnik & RT: How does Russian soft power in Serbia really work, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, December 2022, https://bezbednost.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/How-does-Russian-soft-power-in-Serbia-really-work.pdf [17] Valerie Hopkins, In Balkans, Britain rejoins battle for influence, Politico, March 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/balkans-bbc-britain-rejoins-battle-for-influence-russia-soft-power/ [18] Ernest Reid, Third Rome or Potemkin village: Analyzing the Extent of Russia’s Power in Serbia, 2012–2019, Nationalities Papers, October 2020, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/abs/third-rome-or-potemkin-village-analyzing-the-extent-of-russias-power-in-serbia-20122019/E8E755F37EB6AA8AB477EAB3FBB3474E [19] Public Opinion Polls, Ministry of European Integration, December 2022, https://www.mei.gov.rs/eng/documents/national-documents/public-opinion-poll/ [20] Broj ruskih firmi u Srbiji od početka rata skočio za 1.000 odsto, Nova Ekonomija, June 2024, https://novaekonomija.rs/vesti-iz-zemlje/broj-ruskih-firmi-u-srbiji-od-pocetka-rata-skocio-za-1-000-odsto [21] Political attitudes of citizens of Serbia – Fall 2022, CRTA Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability 2022, December 2022, https://crta.rs/en/opininon-poll-political-attitudes-of-citizens-of-serbia-fall-2022/ [22] Počeo sa radom portal ruske RT na srpskom jeziku, RTS, November 2022, https://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/poceo-sa-radom-portal-ruske-rt-na-srpskom-jeziku_1391190.html [post_title] => An ambiguous future? Russia’s declining material presence and remaining soft power in Serbia [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => an-ambiguous-future-russias-declining-material-presence-and-remaining-soft-power-in-serbia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-09-23 09:41:35 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-09-23 08:41:35 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7562 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [22] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7547 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-08-21 08:36:17 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-08-21 07:36:17 [post_content] => This week at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Kamala Harris and Tim Walz will formally accept their party’s nomination for president and vice-president. Given the speed and unusual circumstances in which Harris and Walz have emerged as their party’s standard-bearers, observers around the world will be closely watching the convention – as well as the planned protests against United States’ policy towards Gaza taking place on the sidelines – for clues as to the likely foreign policy approach of any future Harris administration. The Harris-Walz campaign has come together quickly, and so far, it has not focused strongly on world affairs. Harris has given no major speech on this topic, and none are currently planned. However, this should not be mistaken for disinterest, or inexperience – in fact, Harris would come to the Oval Office with more executive branch foreign policy experience than any president in decades.[1] By looking at her record both in the Biden administration and as a senator, it’s possible to piece together her worldview and reach cautious conclusions about the direction she might take US foreign policy in an administration of her own. For his part, Walz has less direct experience of foreign affairs – he has never served in the executive branch, and the only federal office he has held is as a member of the House of Representatives. That does not mean he’s a blank slate though. Walz served 24 years in the National Guard, including deployments overseas, and also has a surprising, and long-running, interest in China. If he became vice president, he would bring a distinct populist worldview to the role. Here's a quick guide to what a Harris-Walz foreign policy might look like. General principles and personnel Perhaps the biggest question about a Harris foreign policy is whether it would be mostly a continuation of the approach seen under current President Joe Biden or if it would chart some new course. The answer is probably the former. As vice president, it has been Harris’ job to defend the policies of the administration she was a part of, meaning that any private doubts or disagreements she may have had were buried. Yet little about her record before becoming vice president suggests that Harris would make a fundamental break with this policy either. Like Biden, Harris has always been a committed internationalist who believes that the US should play an active role in world affairs. As vice president, she has chosen mainstream, career diplomats as her key foreign policy aides – first Nancy McEldowney, and then Philip Gordon. She has also enthusiastically embraced multilateral agreements such as the Paris Climate Accords and the Iran nuclear deal and made clear that she values and supports America’s allies. All of this would suggest that, in contrast to Donald Trump, she believes in the need for America to lead groups of like-minded countries in tackling global problems. If she has a major difference of principle with Biden, it’s that she apparently views his tendency to frame global affairs as an ongoing battle between “democracy” and “autocracy” as a misleading over-simplification.[2] This echoes a criticism that has long been made by outside analysts who have pointed out that this narrative makes little sense in a world in which autocratic states like Saudi Arabia and Vietnam are close US partners.[3] Although Harris’ criticism on this point seems to be mostly rhetorical, some foreign policy thinkers in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party are hoping it might be an opportunity for greater influence. Foreign policy progressives – who tend to believe in the need to reduce the U.S. military footprint around the world, dial back conflict with China, and be more consistent on democracy and human rights – would like to see some of their own kind placed in key positions in a future Harris administration.[4] Given that she hails from a younger generation and has risen through the party at a time of greater progressive influence, Harris is likely more sympathetic to these voices than Biden has been. Yet there’s little sign she has fully bought into their worldview, and the youthful, progressive wing lacks leaders with the experience and stature that Harris seems to value. In the end, she’s likely to give second- and third-tier jobs to some while placing career technocrats in more important positions. Perhaps the greatest hope that progressives have for redirecting Harris’ foreign policy comes from Walz, who over time has been more sceptical of military intervention than the average Democrat. He opposed the Iraq troop surge of 2006, Barack Obama’s desire to strike Syria after the country used chemical weapons against civilians in 2013, and US support for Saudi Arabia’s recent war in Yemen. Yet Walz’s distaste for the horrors of war is more that of the soldier than the pacifist. In 2016, he joined Republicans in opposing cuts to the Army, arguing that it needed to be well-funded to face challenges around the world. As a Midwestern populist who served for 24 years in uniform, Walz has a deep appreciation of the costs of war for ordinary Americans – but he’s no dove, either.[5] Europe and NATO In the Biden administration, Harris has been a key spokesperson for the government’s attempt to convene a coalition of countries to oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. She has led the US delegation to the Munich Security Conference three times, met Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky six times, and called the US commitment to NATO “unwavering” and “sacrosanct”.[6] On the other hand, however, she had little prior exposure to the continent before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has been criticized by some European officials for a lack of engagement on other issues.[7] All of this suggests continuity. Harris is firmly committed to the defence of Ukraine, but otherwise seems to agree with the consensus position in US foreign policy circles that Europe is of declining importance in a world in which the locus of global power is moving towards Asia. At the same time, Gordon – Harris’ key national security aide – is a dedicated Europhile who speaks four European languages and is well-known on the continent. If he takes a position in her administration, that ought to calm European leaders who are worried that Harris might leave them behind.[8] The Middle East Few aspects of Harris’ foreign policy views have generated as much comment as those on the Middle East. Whatever its merits, Biden’s unequivocal support of Israel is out of step with his own party – and as a representative of a younger generation, Harris has been widely assumed to have more nuanced views. The actual evidence for this is somewhat thin. Harris has publicly voiced more empathy for Palestinian suffering than Biden, and she is said to have privately advocated that the administration push Israel more forcefully towards either changing the way it conducts the war or ending it.[9] Since becoming the presumptive nominee however, she has neither announced any major policy departure nor wholeheartedly embraced left-wing protesters who oppose the administration’s approach to the region. This has been noted, and protesters are planning to try to disrupt the DNC this week in an attempt to force policy changes.[10] They’ll find little comfort from Harris’ running mate, who has also hewed closely to the Biden administration’s line throughout the conflict.[11] For now, Harris seems to view the Middle East primarily through the lens of politics. She wants to win back left-wing voters critical of the administration without scaring away pro-Israel independent voters. In office, this splitting of the difference would be likely to continue – a consequence both of political necessity and Harris’ pragmatic, non-ideological worldview. Trade and climate Like many Democrats, Harris has been on an interesting journey with regards to trade. She has described herself as “not a protectionist”, but also said she would have voted against both the 1994 North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiated by Obama. This suggests that she does not buy into the old neoliberal consensus around free trade either. In fact, Harris in recent years has sounded more and more sceptical of free trade, and her running mate has always sounded that way. Walz opposed both NAFTA and the TPP as well as a host of smaller bilateral trade agreements during his time in Congress, some on the grounds that they would help to bolster governments with poor human rights records.[12] Most notably, both Harris and Walz opposed the Trump-negotiated United States, Mexico, and Canada Agreement – a replacement for NAFTA – because they said it did not do enough to protect the environment or workers’ rights. This indicates that their administration would double down on the Biden administration’s attempts to use trade as a tool of climate policy, and probably also to promote human rights. It also means that London’s desire for a US trade deal will continue to be frustrated.[13] China and the Indo-Pacific China policy is another area in which Harris seems closely wedded to the Biden administration’s position, which is that the US should attempt to pursue economic and military competition with Beijing while at the same time cooperating on shared challenges such as climate change. Harris has had relatively little exposure to China, having met its President Xi Jinping only once and never having travelled to the country.[14] Hence, there is little indication of how, if at all, she differs from the administration in which she has served. Especially given the strong hawkish consensus towards China which exists in US politics, she is unlikely to bring about any major change of policy. Walz, by contrast, has a long-standing interest in the country which has been reflected in both his private and public life. He first visited the country just after the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 and has gone back over 30 times since, primarily to facilitate trips by American students. He has spoken admiringly of Chinese people but been sharply critical of their government’s human rights abuses, including by meeting with the Dalai Lama. His nuanced view suggests that he understands the importance of dialogue between America and China, but is likely to push for strong criticism of its human rights record.[15] Conclusion A Harris-Walz foreign policy is one which is not likely to see any major departure from Biden’s approach. It will be strongly internationalist, remaining committed to the defence of Ukraine and organizing a coalition of countries to oppose the rise of China. It will likely be more engaged – and honest – about human rights and the environment, but still pragmatic and dominated by technocrats rather than progressive reformers. It will also, of course, be shaped by events which we cannot yet predict – much less understand the implications of – possibly even before US citizens go to the polls on 5th November. Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office. [1] Fred Kaplan, Kamala Harris Has Been Much More Involved In Foreign Policy Than We Realize, Slate, August 2024, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2024/08/kamala-harris-foreign-policy-2024-presidential-election.html. [2] Ibid. [3] Joshua Keating, Biden Promised to Defeat Authoritarianism. Reality Got In The Way, Vox, May 2024, https://www.vox.com/2024/5/20/24159229/biden-democracy-authoritarianism-india-saudi-arabia. [4] Nahal Toosi, Phelim Kine and Joseph Gedeon, Progressives Jostle For Nat Sec Jobs Under Harris, Politico, August 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/13/progressives-harris-foreign-policy-jobs-00173697. [5] Connor O’Brien and Eric Bazail-Eimil, How Tim Walz Could Help Harris Connect With Veterans, Politico, August 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/06/tim-walz-vp-harris-veterans-00172782; Noah Berman and Diana Roy, Issue Guide: Tim Walz On Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, August 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/issue-guide-tim-walz-foreign-policy. [6] The Kamala Harris Doctrine, Foreign Policy, July 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/26/kamala-harris-policy-china-russia-trade-immigration-israel-gaza-india/. [7] Suzanne Lynch and Ben Munster, ‘Invisible’ Kamala Harris Struggles To Win Over Europe, Politico, July 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/kamala-harris-europe-us-election-joe-biden-democratic-party/. [8] Laura Kayali and Clea Caulcutt, Phil Gordon: Europe’s ‘Ally’ on Kamala Harris’ Team, Politico, August 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/philip-gordon-us-politics-kamala-harris-us-elections-europe-joe-biden-emmanuel-macron/. [9] Eugene Daniels and Holly Otterbein, Kamala Harris Pushes White House To Be More Sympathetic Toward Palestinians, Politico, December 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/14/kamala-harris-gaza-palestinians-00131633; Yasmeen Abutaleb and Shane Harris, Harris Created Distance From Biden On Gaza By Emphasizing Palestinian Suffering, The Washington Post, July 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/07/24/harris-gaza-israel/. [10] Tens Of Thousands Of Activists Prepare Protests Over Gaza war At Democratic National Convention, The Guardian, August 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/aug/19/democratic-national-convention-gaza-protests-pro-palestine. [11] Andrew Prokop, Is Tim Walz A Progressive Or A Centrist – Or Both?, Vox, August 2024, https://www.vox.com/2024-elections/366201/tim-walz-record-governor-progressive-agenda. [12] Greg Rosalsky, The Economic Mind of Tim Walz, NPR, August 2024, https://www.npr.org/sections/planet-money/2024/08/13/g-s1-16662/the-economic-mind-of-tim-walz. [13] Ana Swanson, With Kamala Harris, U.S. Free Trade Skepticism May Continue, The New York Times, July 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/26/us/politics/kamala-harris-trade-trump.html. [14] China’s Rulers Are Surprised By Kamala Harris and Tim Walz, The Economist, August 2024, https://www.economist.com/china/2024/08/18/chinas-rulers-are-surprised-by-kamala-harris-and-tim-walz. [15] Paul Musgrave, Tim Walz Has Always Been Consistent On China, Foreign Policy, August 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/12/tim-walz-china-record-us-election-harris-trump/; John Sudworth, Walz Has History With China – It’s More Hawkish Than Critics Claim, BBC, August 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgewpzyd91o. [post_title] => US Presidential Election: What would a Harris-Walz foreign policy look like? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => us-presidential-election-what-would-a-harris-walz-foreign-policy-look-like [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-08-21 08:57:44 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-08-21 07:57:44 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7547 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [23] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7506 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-07-08 11:37:51 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-07-08 10:37:51 [post_content] => Over the past few weeks, two events have dramatically changed the nature of the US presidential race. Joe Biden’s debacle in his debate against Donald Trump threw the Democratic Party into chaos, making it increasingly unclear whether Biden can continue as the party’s nominee. Perhaps even more importantly, a recent decision by the US Supreme Court has granted presidents immunity from prosecution for a wide range of criminal behavior, dramatically raising the stakes of November’s election. The Assassin-in-Chief? The Supreme Court ruling came in response to an attempt by Trump to have the charges against him in the federal January 6th probe thrown out. However, the justices ruled in a way that goes far beyond that narrow case, and in doing so they fundamentally revised the American constitutional order. From now on, presidents have absolute immunity from prosecution for any acts which relate to their “core constitutional responsibilities” and what the court called “presumptive immunity” for any acts related to their “official duties”.[1] Cutting through this legalese is hard, in part because the court has entirely invented much of it. There is no precise definition of “official duties”, “core constitutional responsibilities”, or even “presumptive immunity”. Presumably, these will be defined by future case law. Let’s take a look at one much-discussed example: could the president order the military to assassinate a political rival? The answer seems to be quite clearly that yes, he could. Control of the military is clearly within the president’s core constitutional responsibilities, as set out in Article II of the constitution.[2] Even conservative commentators who have been dismissive of this scenario only do so based on the claim that the president would not be able to find any military personnel willing to carry out the order, and that he would be impeached if he did.[3] Given previous examples of presidential abuse of power involving the military as well as the intense partisanship of current US politics, both of these assumptions are highly questionable. To take another example: the president’s ability to influence the legal process. Both the pardon power and the power to direct the Department of Justice are clearly within the president’s “core constitutional responsibilities”. Henceforth the president can order his political opponents to be prosecuted on false pretenses, and pardon any of his own supporters who commit federal crimes. In the assassination scenario, whoever pulled the trigger would still ordinarily be liable to prosecution – but a rogue president could now simply pardon them without any fear of legal ramifications. Raising the stakes Long-term, the myriad ways in which future presidents might abuse this ruling are hard to predict. In the short-term, however, it is clear that whoever wins in November, they will be handed an office with vastly increased powers. And if the victor in that election is Donald Trump, we already have some idea of how he might use them. Trump has been quite open about his plans for a second term, and even before the immunity decision he did not shy away from spelling out how he would abuse the powers of his office. Among other things, Trump has threatened to have his political opponents prosecuted or subject to military tribunals, laid out plans to deport millions of people in mass immigration sweeps involving the military, and said he will pardon the perpetrators of the January 6th insurrection.[4] The immunity ruling provides him with a menu of other options for using presidential power to advance his personal and political interests, from enriching his family through corruption to suppressing political opposition. In such a scenario, the only potential checks on Trump would be Congress, the federal bureaucracy, and mass protests. However, in today’s hyper-polarized age, impeachment is almost impossible. Members of Congress are not willing to risk the wrath of members of their own party by voting to convict, and the Congressional Republican Party is today more pro-Trump than it has ever been.[5] The federal bureaucracy might provide a check, but Trump’s allies have already formulated plans to reduce the power of civil servants and subject the bureaucracy to much greater political control.[6] Trump has also openly speculated about using the military to suppress protests in a second term.[7] Moreover, while presidents would in theory still face regular elections, they could also use their new powers to subvert them, much as Trump attempted to in 2020. Democratic woes These developments have coincided with the outbreak of complete chaos in the Democratic Party. Biden’s disastrous performance at the presidential debate in Atlanta has brought out into the open long-standing concerns about the president’s age and cognitive abilities. Perhaps even more damaging than the debate itself has been what has happened since. As Biden’s standing in the polls has plummeted, he has appeared to falter in subsequent appearances in which he has been unable to rely on a teleprompter. This has fueled the belief that the president is unable to campaign and sparked rage among other Democratic politicians that the deterioration of his condition has been hidden up to this point. It has not helped that the White House has attacked critics from within the party as “bedwetters” and “hysterical” while also repeatedly changing its story about why Biden appeared so unwell during the debate.[8] With the Supreme Court’s immunity decision focusing the party’s minds on the stakes in November, Vice President Kamala Harris has seen her stock within the party rise dramatically. Attitudes towards her taking the nomination range from resignation to enthusiasm. Even her critics concede that passing her over might alienate sections of the Democratic Party, and they also realize that campaign finance law makes her the only plausible candidate who can maintain access to the Biden campaign’s substantial financial resources.[9] More enthusiastic supporters point out that she is young, energetic, and can be an articulate spokesperson for the party’s case. Over the past year, the Democratic Party has arguably become used to setting its expectations low. Even before the debate, the Biden campaign had decided on a light schedule for its candidate in deference to his age and low energy levels. The theory was that it would not matter if Biden was not particularly visible, because Trump would implode in a cloud of his own legal woes and controversial statements.[10] If that strategy was ever tenable, it is not anymore after the debate, when Biden himself has become the focus of media attention. Democrats desperately need to get the focus back on Trump. Having a much younger and energetic candidate barnstorming the swing states, while highlighting the stakes of a new Trump presidency, might be just the way to do it. If Biden does step down from the campaign, focus is likely to shift to the question of whether it is even tenable for him to remain president for the next seven months in the run up to the election. If his mental condition really has deteriorated as dramatically as it seems, it will be difficult – not to mention distracting – for Harris to continue to justify him remaining in office on the campaign trail. Letting President Harris run, with all of the powers of incumbency, might be the best way forward.[11] These are not easy matters to navigate. American democracy is currently in grave peril, and almost any decision that Biden and others in the party take carries great risks. Yet one thing is clear: absolute focus must be maintained on keeping Trump and the authoritarian forces that he represents out of the White House. There is no time, now, to allow personal egos or long-running intra-party feuds get in the way of what needs to be done. A Democratic presidential candidate needs not only to be able to win the election, but also to engage in the long struggle ahead to put American democracy back on a sustainable footing. When the dangers are this great, anyone who aspires to carry the torch of freedom has to prove that they can bear it – or hand it over to someone else who can. Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office. [1] Supreme Court of the United States, Trump v. United States, July 2024, https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf [2] Quinta Jurecic and Benjamin Wittes, A Decision of Surpassing Recklessness In Dangerous Times, Lawfare, July 2024, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/a-decision-of-surpassing-recklessness-in-dangerous-times [3] The Supreme Court Protects the Presidency In Trump v. US, Wall Street Journal, July 2024, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-v-u-s-supreme-court-presidential-immunity-official-acts-john-roberts-january-6-c4d5eddc; Dan McLaughlin, Actually, Presidents Still Can’t Murder People With Impunity, National Review, July 2024, https://fpc.org.uk/the-transatlantic-partnership-looking-ahead-on-the-impacts-of-trade/ [4] Chris Cameron, Trump Amplifies Calls to Jail Top Elected Officials, Invokes Military Tribunals, The New York Times, July 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/01/us/politics/trump-liz-cheney-treason-jail.html; Zachary B. Wolf, Trump Explains His Militaristic Plan To Deport 15-20 Million People, CNN, May 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/01/politics/trump-immigration-what-matters/index.html; Lauren Aratani, Trump Says Pardoning Capitol Attackers Will Be One Of First Acts If Elected Again, Guardian, March 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/12/trump-january-6-pardons [5] Patrick Svitek and Mariana Alfaro, Trump’s Influence Looms Large Over Congressional Republicans, The Washington Post, April 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/04/12/donald-trump-congress-republicans-mike-johnson-fisa-ukraine-abortion/ [6] Trump’s Schedule F Plan, Explained, Protect Democracy, June 2024, https://protectdemocracy.org/work/trumps-schedule-f-plan-explained [7] Michael Waldman, Trump’s Insurrection Act Threat, Brennan Center for Justice, November 2023, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/trumps-insurrection-act-threat [8] Toluse Olorunnipa, Tyler Page and Michael Scherer, Biden Team Works Furiously To Quell Any Democratic Revolt After Debate, The Washington Post, June 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/06/30/biden-democrats-election/; Alex Thompson, “Freaking The F*** Out”: Turmoil In The White House Over Biden, Axios, July 2024, https://www.axios.com/2024/07/02/biden-white-house-campaign-staff-freaking-out-debate [9] David Dayen, Campaign Finance Laws Give Harris Big Boost in Biden Dropout Scenario, The American Prospect, July 2024, https://prospect.org/power/2024-07-02-campaign-finance-laws-harris-big-boost-biden-dropout-scenario/ [10] Edward-Isaac Dovere, How The Biden Campaign Hopes To Make 2024 Less About Biden And More About A Contrast With Trump, CNN, January 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/02/politics/biden-campaign-strategy-trump-2024/index.html [11] Andrew Gawthorpe, The Case for Biden Resigning Right Now, America Explained, June 2024, https://amerex.substack.com/p/the-case-for-biden-resigning-right [post_title] => Op-Ed: What recent events could mean for the US Presidential race and America’s future [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-what-recent-events-could-mean-for-the-us-presidential-race-and-americas-future [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-07-12 15:00:31 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-07-12 14:00:31 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7506 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [24] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7442 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-05-16 14:54:19 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-05-16 13:54:19 [post_content] => Summary: The lessons which the international community have drawn thus far from Russia's aggression against Ukraine have been dominated by the necessity of measures in the military sphere. However, the war has also exposed weaknesses in the soft power field - such as polarisation along political and geographic boundaries - as well as illuminated the role of exclusion, the underestimation of societies' potential reform, and the domination of neopatriarchy in contemporary politics and international relations. Dr Leila Alieva, an Affiliate of REES, Oxford School for Global and Area Studies (OSGA), shares her analysis of these themes, based on her research and lived experience. Read the author's in depth article here. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Soft power lessons from Russia’s war: How to overcome polarisation and strengthen liberal democracy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => soft-power-lessons-from-russias-war-how-to-overcome-polarisation-and-strengthen-liberal-democracy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-05-17 13:02:32 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-05-17 12:02:32 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7442 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [25] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7420 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-05-07 10:17:38 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-05-07 09:17:38 [post_content] => Over the past decade, international trade has become an increasingly contentious political issue in both the United Kingdom and the United States. Departing from a postwar consensus in favour of liberalising trade, both countries have embraced a more ambiguous and complex attitude towards the issue. Neither country has embraced outright protectionism, but both have sought to manage and redirect trade and investment flows. By doing so, they have moved away from an approach to trade which focuses on maximising economic growth and towards one which involves a blend of political and national security considerations. As both countries approach their next national elections, it is time to take stock of these trends and to consider how they might develop further in the coming years. As a struggle is underway to rewrite the rules of the international economy in regions like the Indo-Pacific, choices taken in Washington and London will have far-reaching impact. At stake are the standards of living, environmental protections, and labour rules affecting billions of people around the world. The new trade policy For different reasons, both the UK and the US have moved away from a pure emphasis on economic efficiency in their recent trade policy. Although supporters often claimed that Brexit was a free trade measure designed to increase the UK’s economic opportunities abroad, its main practical effect has been to make trade between the UK and its largest export market more difficult. This negative effect on trade with the European Union was supposed to be offset by the UK’s ability to negotiate its own free trade agreements with third countries. The results of this were uncertain at the time of Brexit and have mostly proved to be disappointing since. This has particularly been so in the case of a US-UK trade agreement, which many supporters of Brexit touted as a major goal. In effect, Brexit has meant sacrificing a measure of future economic growth in order to “take back control” of other policy areas from Brussels.[1] Over roughly the same period, the US has also backed away from its past support for a liberalising trade agenda. President Trump famously started a trade war with China and pulled out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a sweeping free trade agreement covering much of the Pacific rim. But his successor President Biden has proven to be sceptical of trade as well, imposing new economic sanctions on China, declining to rejoin the TPP, and announcing that expanding market access is no longer a priority of US trade policy. The result has been the emergence of a new and powerful protectionist coalition in American politics. On one side, it comprises economic nationalists, China hawks, and members of Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement, who see trade as weakening the American economy and destroying its manufacturing base. The other side consists firstly of economic progressives who see free trade deals as enriching corporations at the expense of American workers, and secondly of Democrats concerned about winning votes in key industrial Midwestern swing states. This protectionist coalition reached its ascendancy at precisely the wrong moment for the UK, which since 2016 has been seeking a US-UK trade deal. There has been little to no appetite in Washington for expanding the access that the two countries have to the other’s market, which is the key goal of British policymakers. Limited talks over harmonising regulations and addressing other barriers to trade fizzled out late last year amid concerns among Democrats that even appearing to consider a substantive new trade agreement would harm them in November’s election.[2] Even if there were a political appetite for a deal, long-running disagreements over agricultural standards would make one hard to achieve. These political dynamics – both the ascendancy of a protectionist coalition in the United States and the specific barriers to a US-UK agreement – are not likely to improve even after this year’s elections. It is possible that, with the election behind it, a second Biden administration might return to talks on a limited agreement dealing mostly with regulation, but talks on expanding market access are unlikely. Trump, meanwhile, is campaigning on increasingly draconian trade policies, including a flat 10% tariff on all imports.[3] His advisors are also reportedly debating whether to purposefully devalue the dollar, which would make British exports to the United States less competitive.[4] These policies could significantly harm US-UK trade and foreclose the possibility of any constructive new agreement. A whole world of trade Even with US-UK trade arrangements appearing uncertain, both the UK and the United States are involved in setting and influencing the rules of the international economy further afield. As it has moved away from traditional free trade agreements, the Biden administration has not completely lacked a trade policy. It has focused instead on more narrow negotiations which have sought to address non-tariff barriers, but also to persuade partners to raise their environmental and labour standards. Its most notable attempt came in the form of the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), an agreement covering 12 nations containing 2.6 billion people and over a third of the global economy.[5] Although these headline figures sound impressive, the results of IPEF have been limited. Last year, the cooperating nations reached minor agreements on coordinating supply chains and sharing knowledge related to the green energy transition. But the Biden administration walked away from the portion of the agreement related to environmental and labour standards, believing that the other IPEF states – which include India, Japan, and Vietnam – were not willing to do enough to satisfy American opinion.[6] The travails of IPEF revealed the limits of the Biden administration’s approach. Without offering its partners increased access to the US market, the administration gave them little incentive to raise their environmental and labour standards, which would in turn make their products less competitive internationally. But this means that the United States has lost the opportunity to have a strong voice in determining the economic future of the region. This points to there being a strong chance that the initiative will pass to China, which sits at the centre of a growing economic bloc called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – and which does little to raise environmental protections or standards for workers.[7] The UK has taken a different approach. In recent years, it has signed several new bilateral free trade agreements in the region – with New Zealand and Australia – and joined the successor to the TPP, known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The UK Government has not taken a formal position on IPEF, but the UK may try to join it in the future.[8] Although the benefits to the British economy are small, these moves have signalled that the UK remains interested in new trade agreements and wants to play an increased geopolitical role in the region. This looks likely to remain the case regardless of the outcome of the next UK general election. The most contentious international economic issue faced by the two countries in the coming years is likely to be relations with China. Trump has signalled that he is looking to engage in extremely harsh economic policies against China if elected. In this case, the UK will likely find itself caught uncomfortably between Washington and more dovish European countries who want to maintain economic ties with Beijing. Particularly if Trump also engages in new trade measures against European countries – as he did in his first term – it will be extremely difficult for the UK to pursue a liberalising agenda. Instead, the world is likely to be consumed by a new round of trade wars. More harmonious relations can be expected between a second Biden administration and a government led by the Labour Party, which has voiced support for the “new overseas investment and regulatory partnerships” which are at the centre of the Biden administration’s approach.[9] Ultimately, however, UK policymakers who want to pursue an agenda of liberalisation and integration will be at the mercy of sentiment in Washington. The UK economy is simply not big enough for London to drive the process itself. A difficult future Both the UK and the US have identified the Indo-Pacific as a region which is key to the future of global politics and economics. But political reservations in Washington are currently holding both countries back from playing a decisive role in setting the economic rules of the region. The UK’s enthusiasm is not matched by its heft, whereas America’s heft goes to waste without enthusiasm to match. By working together, the two countries could offer a positive, optimistic vision of the international economy – one which prioritises raising environmental and labour standards as well as boosting economic growth. The aftermath of this year’s elections in both countries will be a critical test of whether this is possible, or whether familiar barriers and animosities will lead to another wave of protectionism. Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office. [1] Jonathan Portes, The Impact Of Brexit On The UK Economy: Reviewing The Evidence, VOX EU, July 2023, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/impact-brexit-uk-economy-reviewing-evidence/ [2] Politico, Biden Quietly Shelves Trade Pact With UK Before 2024 Elections, December 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/us-president-joe-biden-shelves-trade-pact-with-uk-2024-election/ [3] Katie Lobosco, Trump Wants More Tariffs. His Earlier Trade Wars Cost Americans $230 Billion To Date, CNN, March 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/18/politics/donald-trump-tariffs-trade-war/index.html [4] Gavin Bade, Trump Trade Advisors Plot Dollar Devaluation, Politico, April 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/15/devaluing-dollar-trump-trade-war-00152009/ [5] World Economics, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), May 2024, https://www.worldeconomics.com/Regions/IPEF/ [6] Gavin Bade, RIP ‘Worker-Centered Trade’: Biden’s Global Economic Agenda Stalls, Politico, January 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/02/bidens-economic-agenda-stalls-00133138 [7] Andrew Gawthorpe, Biden’s Trade Policy Is Missing One Thing: Partners, World Politics Review, March 2024, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/us-free-trade-policy-biden/ [8] Foreign Affairs Committee, Tilting Horizons: The Integrated Review And The Indo-Pacific – Government Response To The Committee’s Eighth Report of Session 2022–23, UK Parliament, March 2024, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5804/cmselect/cmfaff/630/report.html [9] David Lammy, The Case for Progressive Realism: Why Britain Must Chart A New Global Course, Foreign Affairs, April 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-kingdom/case-progressive-realism-david-lammy. See also David Lammy, Britain Reconnected: A Foreign Policy For Security And Prosperity At Home (London, 2023), p. 24. [post_title] => The Transatlantic Partnership: Looking ahead on the impacts of trade [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-transatlantic-partnership-looking-ahead-on-the-impacts-of-trade [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-05-07 10:17:38 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-05-07 09:17:38 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7420 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [26] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7391 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-03-19 00:01:08 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-03-18 23:01:08 [post_content] => The global struggle to protect free speech has reached a new fever pitch. The power of news media to act as a safeguard against tyranny has been critically undermined as the world’s autocracies have grown to outnumber the democracies. The Economist says a global gag on free speech has tightened thanks to “the new censors”.[1] Technology has brought new opportunities to suppress truthful communications, and the coarsening of language has poisoned the well of public debate, affecting us all. Recognising those dangers, 200 leading international lawyers and civil society figures gathered in London in January at the launch of a remarkable initiative aimed to turn back the tide by harnessing the law in the service of free speech. Renowned human rights lawyer Amal Clooney and Lord Neuberger, former President of the UK Supreme Court, have marshalled some of the world’s most authoritative jurists. Their joint publication Freedom of Speech in International Law (OUP) seeks to codify the universal rights to freedom of expression in a single substantial volume for the first time.[2] The book charts the chilling decline in protections for speech in multiple jurisdictions. It also it aims to provide a useable roadmap for governments to comply with the minimum standards in law that they have signed up to. The endeavour is inspired by the belief that the impressive body of international human rights laws that has been developed since 1945 – although much scorned and often flouted – can yet be used by “courts and newsrooms” around the world to win this Manichean contest. Lord Neuberger sounded a personal alarm, telling the meeting he had never before been so keenly aware of the importance and the fragility of international law. When Slobodan Milošević was found guilty of war crimes at the tribunal in The Hague in 1999, he had thought that victory for justice would usher in a new “era of accountability”. Now instead he saw signs of an “age of impunity and apathy”, and declared it to be imperative to halt the slide towards “unreason” or even fascism. Amal Clooney is the project’s moving spirit. In Gaza, journalists are “our eyes and ears”, Clooney said, but more than 70 had been killed in “the deadliest month ever recorded” for journalists in any conflict. In India the authorities’ widespread use of sedition and terrorism laws sends journalists and human rights defenders to jail for years even before a conviction. In the Philippines the Nobel prize-winning journalist Maria Ressa still faces a possible six years in jail after a “false” libel conviction in a corruption case.[3] And in Thailand thousands of citizens have been prosecuted for criticising the King, an offence which carries a penalty of up to 15 years in jail. Western states’ legal provisions that criminalise speech attract equally blunt criticism. Amal Clooney singled out the failure of the USA and the UK to recognise public interest as a defence against harsh anti-terrorism laws, meaning that prosecutions in both jurisdictions can lead to long jail sentences and those laws have a wider “chilling effect” on free speech. Lord Neuberger acknowledged his own embarrassment that not so long ago British judges had backed the use of secret super-injunctions to curtail free speech on important public issues. The authors – seven in all – focus on four categories of laws which they say are being weaponised to silence the press and independent voices: laws regulating political speech, false speech, hate speech, and speech related to official secrets and national security. They recount how new legislative tools are being used by states to quash dissent – not only familiar ones like sedition, treason and criminal defamation laws but increasingly terrorism, ‘false news’ and other vague laws that autocrats use to protect themselves against unflattering press. Hong Kong, for example, has revived sedition laws which have lain dormant for decades with devastating consequences for publisher Jimmy Lai and a host of other critical voices. The building blocks of free speech protection The postwar framework of international human rights, explicitly aimed at preventing a repeat of the Holocaust and carnage of World War Two war, accorded seminal importance to the rights of freedom of expression and opinion from the start. In 1948 the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 19 of the UDHR proclaimed that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes “the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”. A slate of legitimate restrictions on freedom of expression were also identified, in particular with regard to the rights of others, national security, public order, and public health; but enforcement of those restrictions is permissible only if provided for by law, necessary in democratic society, and proportionate. In 1976 the right to free speech was first made legally binding through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which has been ratified by 173 states. Clooney, Neuberger and the other co-authors set out with meticulous clarity and in granular detail how, despite setbacks, the jurisprudence arising from the various international and regional treaties shows broad convergence on key issues. Among them are the principles that restrictions on free speech must be tightly drawn and not vague or overbroad; that freedom of opinion may never be curtailed; and that imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty for speech unless it also involves more serious harms such as incitement to violence. International bodies also broadly agree on the importance of protecting the press. The UN Human Rights Committee, interpreting the ICCPR’s provisions on freedoms of opinion and expression in its 2011 guidance to state authorities, says that “a free, uncensored and unhindered press is essential in any society”;[4] and that the press merits certain particular protections because of its role in enabling and promoting open public debate, without which an informed and engaged citizenry cannot exist. The European Court of Human Rights has strongly endorsed the vital “public watchdog role” of the press, which is accorded the broadest scope of protection in its case law, including with respect to the protection of journalists’ confidential sources. Yet in reality, Amal Clooney says, states have often imposed the harshest possible penalties on journalists to block or curtail their work to keep the public informed. In particular, states weaponise their legal systems by allowing “baseless lawsuits against journalists” that are often prohibitively expensive to defend against. In 2023, the UK Government faced a blizzard of criticism when it was revealed that the government gave permission for sanctioned Russian warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin to sue the founder of Bellingcat, Eliot Higgins, the man who had exposed Prigozhin’s crimes as head of the Wagner group. South African lawyer and academic Dr Dario Milo co-authored the book’s chapter on insulting speech. He called for states to act decisively to end “lawfare”, the widespread and cynical use of vexatious or abusive lawsuits or legal threats by the rich and powerful to harass and silence journalists and activists who report on matters of public interest. The numbers involved are extraordinary. In a 2023 survey of around 500 media workers in over 100 countries, half of the respondents reported that they or their media were facing legal threats.[5] The authors call for legal protections against abuse, including provisions for the early dismissal of frivolous cases, placing the burden proof on the plaintiff, and awarding full legal costs to defendants who are cleared. Misuses and law and the “undoing” of vital protections The book draws on exhaustive research data to show how devastating the real-world consequences of misuses of the law can be. Between 2014 and 2020 over 9000 people were imprisoned in Turkey for insulting President Erdogan. Before she was murdered, Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia faced more than 40 libel claims, many of them from politicians or public officials. As many as 160 states still have criminal defamation laws on their books; and the global census of jailed journalist by the Committee to Protect Journalists found that 320 journalists – close to an all-time record number – were imprisoned as of December 2023. Spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic, governments have enacted a raft of new misinformation laws in the past decade, especially related to speech on the internet. At least 18 states passed legislation against ‘fake information’ or ‘online misinformation’. Many of them apply criminal penalties and have extraterritorial reach. In Hungary, for example, a conviction can lead to a five year prison term. In many cases the institutions of the state – the judiciary, military or the government – have applied those laws to protect their own reputations in ways which, the authors insist, violates international legal standards. Among the book’s standout recommendations is that “false” speech should not be liable to penalties unless real-world harms result from it. The ubiquity of the Internet in people’s lives has landed private companies with a hornet’s nest of responsibilities to take quasi-judicial decisions by the minute about words and images are allowed on their Platforms. The authors propose as a general rule that those companies should recognise international human rights standards as “a floor, not a ceiling, of speech protection”. The scale of the task is extraordinary: Facebook/Meta’s removal of hateful material rose tenfold in two years up to 2020, while TikTok alone removed more than 100 million videos in the first half of that year Big technology and social media companies face fierce criticism from all sides, but this examination of their record shows that leading players have committed to ensuring that their policies are consistent with human rights standards. Meta’s Oversight Board of independent experts is tasked with determining “what to take down, what to leave up and why’. Its task includes holding the company to account to live up to its pledge to comply with international human rights standards. A systemic obstacle to a uniform global code of practice lies in the uneven or contradictory principles enshrined in the major sources of standards on free speech and human rights. Twitter (now known as ‘X’) claims to ground its values in both the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the European Convention, which are “two very different bodies of law”. Meta’s Oversight Board, however, has said it would not apply the First Amendment as it does not govern the conduct of private companies. The field of allowable speech online is fiercely contested. The less than satisfactory conclusion reached here is that there is as yet “no single principle for resolving conflicts of interpretation, nor a hierarchy or avenue of appeal”. A future Research report focusing on Internet shutdowns is promised by members of the same team of legal experts.[6] International law: a launchpad for recovering the lost ground of free speech? The authors also point to important legal and institutional reforms that have recently been launched but which must gather wider political traction and public support if they are to have a decisive impact. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, for example, has issued a strong Recommendation to its 46 member states on countering SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation). Regional human rights courts in Africa and the Americas have delivered landmark judgements – for example, directing state authorities to decriminalise defamation and to honour their obligations to give emergency protection to journalists who face imminent threats of violence. The past decade has seen the birth of some major initiatives in which governments are working in tandem with dynamic civil society and stakeholder organisations as never before. Amal Clooney, David Neuberger and Darius Milo are members of the High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom.[7] The panel is an independent advisory body of the Media Freedom Coalition established by the UK and Canada in 2019.[8] The Coalition now comprises 50 countries, which have made a public commitment to promote and protect a vibrant, free, and independent media. Such innovations reflect the encouraging fact that the stifling of free speech and independent media and its pernicious impact on standards of democratic behaviour have risen sharply up the international policy agenda, often driven by dynamic civil society organisations. The 46 member states of the Council of Europe recently began an unprecedented Europe-wide Journalists matter campaign which will go on until 2027, aimed at improving the safety of journalists, protecting media freedom, and raising wider public awareness of the necessary part journalists play in safeguarding democratic and pluralistic societies.[9] There is also a message for academics here. Engaged academics are committed to advancing the implementation of the UN Action Plan on the Safety of journalists and the Issue of Impunity through collaborative research with local actors in order to develop policies which can strengthen protections and safeguard journalists’ rights.[10] Yet the authors observe that many scholars focus somewhat narrowly on one jurisdiction or type of speech, such as defamation, without demonstrating connections between those findings and the wider picture. The explicit aim of the new publication is to effect change by spurring governments, big tech companies and other duty-bearers to enforce the international standards that exist to protect free speech. Strikingly, the international law experts assert that Article 19 of the ICCPR has achieved the status of “customary international law”, after decades in which the legal standards for protecting freedom of expression have been fought over and refined through a host of decisions in international and domestic courts, The International Court of Justice has already accepted that it has done so. If that were to be generally accepted, then states like China, Myanmar and Saudi Arabia, which have not ratified any of the relevant treaties, can be bound by same rules as the countries that have ratified them. Clooney, Neuberger and their colleagues recognise that it will be a hard slog to embed meaningful reforms and truly hold states accountable. Many are convinced the death in February of Alexei Navalny, like those of Anna Politkovskaya, Jamal Khashoggi, Daphne Caruana Galizia and other charismatic critics of authoritarian rulers, amounts to state-sanctioned murder. Each one of those iconic cases also speaks to the close connection between the fight for free speech and the demand for political freedoms. The authors of this book have lucidly articulated the goal of preventing autocratic regimes and overzealous prosecutors from manipulating the law to silence journalists and protect themselves. As they show only too well, some habitual state practices are “wildly at odds” with what is written in international treaties. But they make a powerful case that international law is not just the best instrument we have to undo the stifling of free speech. It is the only one. William Horsley is co-founder and international director of the Centre for Freedom of the Media (CFOM) at the University of Sheffield and a former BBC foreign correspondent in Europe and Asia. He is the author of the Safety of Journalists Guidebooks published by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and his work for the Association of European Journalists was instrumental in the establishment in 2015 of the Council of Europe’s digital Platform for the Safety of Journalists, a Europe-wide monitoring and response system to counter threats to media freedom and the safety of journalists. He is a member of the UK Advisory Board of RSF (Reporters Without Borders). Photo supplied by: IBA Human Rights Institute. [1] The Economist, The global gag on free speech is tightening, August 2019, https://www.economist.com/international/2019/08/17/the-global-gag-on-free-speech-is-tightening [2] Ms Amal Clooney and Lord David Neuberger, Freedom of Speech in International Law, Oxford University Press, January 2024, https://global.oup.com/academic/product/freedom-of-speech-in-international-law-9780198899372?cc=gb&lang=en& [3] Committee to Protect Journalists, Hold The Line Coalition welcomes acquittal of Maria Ressa and Rappler, calls for dropping of remaining cases, September 2023, https://cpj.org/2023/09/hold-the-line-coalition-welcomes-acquittal-of-maria-ressa-and-rappler-calls-for-all-remaining-cases-to-be-dropped/ [4] United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR/C/GC/34, September 2011, https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf [5] The Foundation, New research exposes global trends in legal attacks facing journalists, Thomas Reuters Foundation, April 2023, https://www.trust.org/i/?id=b68bd251-a405-4dbe-890b-0ed50bc33f8f [6] High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom – Our Reports, Research Reports on International Standards, International Bar Association, https://www.ibanet.org/HRI-Secretariat/Reports#IntStandards [7] International Bar Association, High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom, see: https://www.ibanet.org/IBAHRIsecretariat [8] Media Freedom Coalition, see: https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/ [9] Council of Europe, Journalists Matter: Council of Europe Campaign for the Safety of Journalists, see: https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/safety-of-journalists-campaign [10] UNESCO, UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, https://www.unesco.org/en/safety-journalists/un-plan-action [post_title] => How international law can reverse the global assault on free speech: A review of a new expert guide [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => how-international-law-can-reverse-the-global-assault-on-free-speech-a-review-of-a-new-expert-guide [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-03-18 15:28:04 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-03-18 14:28:04 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7391 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [27] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7382 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-03-06 15:49:42 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-03-06 14:49:42 [post_content] => A lively event in parliament this week discussed how Britain’s PR industry could stop ‘butlering to the world’: serving kleptocrats and some of the most corrupt people around.[1] As the chair Liam Byrne MP noted, this ‘professional enabling’ is an integral part of Britain’s immense dirty money problem, which sees us in the super league of global economic crime. Participants from PR, journalism and civil society discussed what was going wrong and how it could be stopped. But is something more needed to help Britain’s professions kick the butlering habit and the huge fees it generates? PR and kleptocracy: a new report The event marked the launch of an excellent new report: What’s the Risk? PR & Communication Agencies and Kleptocracy.[2] (Disclosure: it was funded by the Joffe Trust and published by the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC).) It was hosted by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Anti-Corruption & Responsible Tax and the FPC in partnership with Curzon PR, The Chartered Institute of Public Relations (CIPR) and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. The report shines a light on how British PR firms have helped kleptocratic regimes, and others involved in grand corruption, to launder their reputations and turn illicit wealth into status, influence and power. In a wide-ranging discussion, participants touched on how some PR firms may not know what harms they are enabling. Others may be more aware, for instance using anonymous social media to attack their clients’ opponents. Michela Wrong’s experience of ‘a tide of vilification’ was sobering.[3] There was general agreement of the need for change. As the CEO of the CIPR, Alistair McCapra, put it: “if we don’t want to become a gangster paradise, we need to act.” So what’s to be done? General regulation of PR as a profession is unlikely to be practical. The solutions suggested included both carrot and stick. Carrots included: raising awareness of the risks & human impact of kleptocracy; and promoting good practices like transparency, client due diligence and reporting suspicious activity to the authorities. Sticks included: more naming and shaming, supported by better resourcing for journalism; investigating PR agencies alongside regulated professions; and better regulation in specific areas such as SLAPPs or on-line harm. There was talk of an overall goal of changing the culture of the PR profession, to take an ethical approach to kleptocracy. Could the next generation of young professionals help drive change? A wider problem PR is only one of Britain’s so-called enabling professions, helping wrong-doers enjoy the ill gotten gains of kleptocracy and corruption at vast social cost. In 2022, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine raised the heat more generally on lawyers, accountants and others. Since then, the Government has put great emphasis on improving the supervision of professions and tackling enablers through the second Economic Crime Plan and two recent Economic Crime Acts. A number of civil society initiatives are also working to drive change, such as The UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition, The Taskforce on Business Ethics and the Legal Profession, Principals with Principles and The UK Anti-Corruption Coalition.[4] But change remains elusive. For now, it seems the wider problem of butlering persists. Many states beyond Russia are seen to be involved, from Saudi Arabia to China. Last month’s evidence to the Business & Trade Committee suggests that the overall problem of economic crime may be getting worse.[5] And every crime needs its enablers. A wider solution? Recent legislation should deliver real improvements in Britain’s defences against economic crime. But the acid test when it comes to professional butlering is: what will change the established culture, in the teeth of ferocious commercial incentives? This could be addressed head on, at the same time as new laws come into force. For example, professional bodies could promote awareness of the risks of tangling with kleptocrats and build associated good practices into their work. However, a crucial link in the chain may be missing. Change will not happen overnight or by itself. The agenda will need to be consistently pushed among professionals and their institutions, alongside all their other priorities. This will probably take several years of consistent work, with creative approaches to build pressure and urgency for reform. It could be done, for instance, by some new specialist initiative, some kind of Kleptocracy Unit, working across professions. It could even be run by and for the next generation of professionals, as an engine of change. Without such an initiative, there is a risk that this new report’s recommendations will gather dust on the shelf. As ever, the heart of the question is not only what should be done, but who is going to make it happen. At the Joffe Trust, we would love to talk about any practical ideas we could support to help the UK’s professions kick the butlering habit, and close the UK’s doors to dirty money. Please don’t hesitate to get in touch. Alex Jacobs has been the executive Director of the Joffe Trust since 2018. He was previously a board member and worked closely with Joel Joffe for 20 years. He has a particular focus on illicit finance and supporting non-profit leaders. (https://joffetrust.org/) [1] Robert Verkaik, Butler to the World by Oliver Bullough review – oligarch’s paradise, The Guardian, March 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2022/mar/17/butler-to-the-world-by-oliver-bullough-review-britain-reliance-russian-dirty-money [2] Thomas Mayne, What’s the Risk? PR & Communication Agencies and Kleptocracy, Foreign Policy Centre, March 2024, https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Whats-the-Risk-report-March-2024.pdf [3] Michela Wrong, I criticised Rwanda’s leader – now I wake up screaming after constant online attacks, The Guardian, January 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/27/i-criticised-rwandas-leader-now-i-wake-up-screaming-after-constant-online-attacks [4] UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition, see: https://antislapp.uk/; Institute of Business Ethics, Taskforce on Business Ethics and the Legal Profession, https://www.ibe.org.uk/knowledge-hub/legal-profession-taskforce.html; Principals with Principles, see: https://principalswithprinciples.wordpress.com/author/tnjnangle/; UK Anti-Corruption Coalition, see: https://www.ukanticorruptioncoalition.org/ [5] Business and Trade Committee, Oral evidence: Implementation of Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, HC 522, House of Commons, February 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/14244/pdf/ Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. Photo credited to Menelik Samuels. [post_title] => Op-Ed: Can The UK’s Professions Stop Butlering to the World? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-can-the-uks-professions-stop-butlering-to-the-world [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-03-08 16:19:37 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-03-08 15:19:37 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7382 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [28] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7368 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-03-02 00:01:14 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-03-01 23:01:14 [post_content] => As 2024 dawned, the world found itself plunged into deeper socio-political upheaval, with ever more tumultuous events dominating global headlines. Overshadowed amongst these was the elections that took place in Belarus last weekend, the first since the fraudulent presidential vote in 2020 and the subsequent mass protests. On 25 February 2024, Belarus elected 12,514 local council deputies and 110 deputies to the House of Representatives of the National Assembly. The outcome was of no surprise, and further reinforces President Alexander Lukashenko's iron grip on power. Meanwhile, Belarusians continue to endure an unprecedented level of repression, which similarly has seen little coverage, since the events of four years ago. Nevertheless, the year 2020 undoubtedly stands as a haunting memory for Lukashenko. In August of that year, thousands of Belarusians took to the streets to defy the dubious official results of the presidential election which secured Lukashenko his sixth consecutive victory. People voiced their strong dissent while waving the historic white-red-white flags: a symbol of a democratic and independent Belarus, later banned by the authorities. Protesters believed that the rightful winner, and thereby the next president, was Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, whose growing popularity became an escalating problem for the regime in the lead up to the elections. As a result, she was threatened, and ultimately forced into exile, where she remains today. The months that followed brought with them mass repression on a scale that the country had not seen before. Many active protesters had to flee the country. Those who did not want to or did not manage to on time, were detained, imprisoned, tortured, or even killed. The experience of the 2020 mass protests made Lukashenko even more ruthless and extremely determined to prevent any future challenges to his power. In February 2022, just a few days after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including from the territory of Belarus, the regime in Minsk conducted a sham constitutional referendum to further consolidate power. The referendum, among other things, served as a tool to remove presidential term limits, give a lifetime immunity to Lukashenko and constitutionalise the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, a body introduced by Lukashenko in the 1990s. Officially, this group of about 1,200 people, selected from among local and national officials, is tasked with providing support to the Government and acting as a voice of ‘the people’. It has the power to declare martial law, initiate the process to remove a president from office, or even overturn presidential election results. The purpose of this group is clear: it has been formed to prepare the ground for when Lukashenko no longer serves as president. In 2023, the regime was able to ban or dissolve most political parties through new regulations that forced all political parties to re-register, under much stricter requirements.[1] Out of the 15 parties previously registered in the country, only four were confirmed in October 2023 by the Ministry of Justice as successfully meeting the new requirements.[2] They were Belaya Rus, the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus, the Communist Party of Belarus, and the Republican Party of Labour and Justice. Not surprisingly, all of them are considered pro-government and support the regime. As a result, the outcome of the February 2024 elections was easy to predict, further reinforced by the opposition forces in exile calling for a boycott of the vote.[3] The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was not invited by Belarusian authorities to conduct impartial election observation.[4] Instead, the regime invited observers from the Advisory Council of Heads of Electoral Bodies of the friendly Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member states.[5] The lack of strong mobilisation by Belarusians against the highly questionable way in which these 2024 February elections have been held, can be explained not only by the call of the opposition in exile to boycott them, but also by the pervasive terror which has persisted inside the country since 2020. The Government of Belarus has stepped up its efforts to excessively hinder people’s ability to speak out or protest by introducing or amending various repressive laws. According to official data, by November 2023, the number of criminal cases on charges related to "extremism" surged to 16,000.[6] As of December 2023, at least 960 NGOs were in the process of forced liquidation.[7] Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus have effectively outlawed human rights work and independent media, criminalising “working on behalf of unregistered or liquidated organisations” and making it punishable by imprisonment.[8] Activists, human rights defenders and journalists have been added to the list of ‘extremists’; currently even a single ‘like’ under a social media post written by those on the list can result in criminal charges. Independent media has reported that Belarus and Russia plan to unify their lists of ‘extremist’ individuals and organisations, allowing coordinated repression of independent voices.[9] Given the level of repression, the courage of Belarusians who actively oppose the regime continues to amaze. A day before the elections, on 24 February, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya reported on X (formerly Twitter) that her address to Belarusians about the anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Lukashenko's sham elections was displayed on 2,000 screens in public spaces throughout the country, an action organised by BELPOL, a coalition of former police & security forces officers.[10] According to the Human Rights Center ‘Viasna’, currently there are 1,411 political prisoners in Belarus.[11] Many of them have faced inhuman treatment, denial of medical care and no access to lawyers. Nasta Lojka, a prominent human rights defender who was sentenced in 2023 to seven years in prison for ‘incitement of racial, national, religious or other social enmity or discord’, reported that she was forced to remain in a courtyard without any outerwear for eight hours in temperatures below ten degrees celsius, after which she fell ill.[12] A few days before the elections, on 20 February 2024, it became known that a 63-year-old political prisoner Ihar Lednik died in the Minsk regional hospital. Such news does not always make headlines in the western media, but it is crucial to highlight that Ledinik is the fifth political prisoner known to have died in Belarus since 2021.[13] Families of many political prisoners have not heard from their loved ones for months, many do not know if they are still alive. This includes Siarhei Tsikhanouski, blogger and husband of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, or Maria Kalesnikava, one of the leaders of the opposition. Many other political prisoners have very little or no opportunity to send and receive letters. With the continuous disbarment of lawyers who can represent the victims, access to any information related to the well-being and condition of political prisoners is increasingly limited. As recently as last month, the security forces have raided homes and detained family members of former and current political prisoners.[14] More than three years after the 2020 protests, the regime continues to do everything in its power, with a vast arsenal of violent means at its disposal, to spread fear and terror among its citizens. In the face of the ongoing repression, the West must strengthen the support for Belarusian civil society, which, despite the mounting challenges, continues to be very active and vibrant. We must continue to show unwavering support to the brave people of Belarus repressed for exercising their fundamental human rights and demand the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners. As Tsikhanouskaya called for recently, sanctions against the regime must be tightened.[15] Thanks to Belarusian and international investigative journalists, we know about the instances of sanctions evasion in the European Union, and the European community must address this as a matter of urgency.[16] Belarus might not be front page news, but the struggle for a free and democratic country continues. Joanna Szymańska is the Acting Head of Europe Office at ARTICLE 19. She has extensive experience of working on freedom of expression issues in Central and Eastern Europe. [1] CSO Meter, Belarus launches campaign of forced liquidation of political parties, July 2023, https://csometer.info/updates/belarus-launches-campaign-forced-liquidation-political-parties [2] Alexandra Boguslavskaya, Ban any opinion: are the authorities of the Republic of Belarus building a party system?, DW, November 2023, https://www.dw.com/ru/zapretit-luboe-mnenie-vlasti-rb-stroat-partijnuu-sistemu/a-67576770 [3] Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya to Belarusians: “This day is for you, not the regime. Spend it wisely!”, February 2024, https://tsikhanouskaya.org/en/news/sviatlana-tsikhanouskaya-to-belarusians-this-day-is-for-you-not-the-regime-spend-it-wisely.html [4] Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections, The OSCE ODIHR regrets that the Belarusian authorities did not invite observers to the upcoming elections, Elections*-2024, February 2024, https://elections2024.spring96.org/en/news/114502 [5] Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections, “Seriously underlines the credibility of this kind of company.” Pavel Sapelka spoke about international elections* monitoring, Elections*-2024, January 2024, https://elections2024.spring96.org/en/news/114036 [6] REFORM.by, The Prosecutor General’s Office has counted more than 16 thousand “extremist” crimes since 2020, Reformation, November 2023, https://reform.by/genprokuratura-naschitala-bolee-16-tysjach-jekstremistskih-prestuplenij-s-2020-goda [7] LAWTREND, Monitoring the situation of freedom of association and civil society organisations in the Republic of Belarus December 2023, https://www.lawtrend.org/english/monitoring-the-situation-of-freedom-of-association-and-civil-society-organisations-in-the-republic-of-belarus-december-2023 [8] OMCT, Belarus: New amendment to the Criminal Code leaves no room for legal human rights activities, January 2022, https://www.omct.org/en/resources/statements/belarus-new-amendment-to-the-criminal-code-leaves-no-room-for-legal-human-rights-activities [9] Maria Yeryoma, Belarus Weekly: Belarus, Russia to unify lists of ‘extremists,’ coordinating repression, The Kyiv Independent, February 2024, https://kyivindependent.com/belarus-weekly-belarus-russia-to-unify-lists-of-extremists-coordinating-repression/ [10] Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Twitter post, Twitter, February 2024, https://twitter.com/Tsihanouskaya/status/1761471246309450116 [11] Viasna, As of February 28 1411 persons in Belarus are considered as political prisoners, https://prisoners.spring96.org/en [12] ARTICLE 19, Belarus: End persecution of human rights defender Nasta Lojka, April 2023, https://www.article19.org/resources/belarus-end-persecution-of-nasta-lojka/ [13] Viasna, Political prisoner Ihar Lednik died. He had health problems, February 2024, https://spring96.org/en/news/114453 [14] European Parliament, New wave of mass arrests in Belarus of opposition activists and their family members, February 2024, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-02-08_EN.html#sdocta1 [15] Todd Prince, Tsikhanouskaya Calls On U.S> To Support Belarusian Opposition, Tighten Sanctions on Lukashenka, RFE/RL, December 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/tsikhanouskaya-us-support-belarusian-opposition-sanctions/32715837.html [16] OCCRP, Lithuania Cracks Down on Sanction Evasion Schemes after OCCRP Investigation, March 2023, https://www.occrp.org/ru/daily/17377-lithuania-cracks-down-on-sanction-evasion-schemes-after-occrp-investigation Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Op Ed: Out of the spotlight Belarusians’ struggle for freedom continues amidst persistent repression [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-out-of-the-spotlight-belarusians-struggle-for-freedom-continues-amidst-persistent-repression [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-03-01 16:09:17 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-03-01 15:09:17 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7368 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [29] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7371 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-03-01 16:07:17 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-03-01 15:07:17 [post_content] => The London-based charity Justice for Journalists Foundation (JFJ), in partnership with the National Union of Journalists in Ukraine, has been collecting open-source evidence and satellite imagery of attacks on media workers during the war in order create better ways to protect journalists heading to the war zone. Maria Ordzhonikide and Valeriya Chudarova from JFJ, explain more about their work and recommendations for journalists working on the frontline. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago, thousands of Ukrainian journalists found themselves becoming frontline correspondents almost overnight. Dozens of foreign journalists also arrived in the country to report on the war. Without these professional and citizen reporters the world would not have been able to understand the extent of the unfolding catastrophe. However, a high toll has already been paid, as according to the National Union of Journalists, at least 16 media workers have died while performing their professional duties, nine media workers have died as a result of collateral damage and at least 54 journalists have died while serving in the armed forces.[1] At JFJ, in partnership with the National Union of Journalists in Ukraine, and with the financial support by UNESCO, we have been collecting open-source evidence and satellite imagery of attacks on media workers during the war in order to create safety recommendations (outlined below), risk assessments and HEFAT training for journalists heading to the war zone. Over the course of the project, we have obtained and processed information about 35 instances of both fatal and non-fatal attacks against media workers in Ukraine, involving at least 55 journalists from countries including Ukraine, Turkey, Czech Republic, the USA, Russia, Ireland, the UK, Italy, France, Japan, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, and Lithuania. Verified data confirms that 12 media workers have died as a result of enemy shelling. This includes six foreign journalists: Arman Soldin, Frédéric Leclerc-Imhoff, Mantas Kvedaravičius, Pierre Zakrzewski, Oksana Baulina, Brent Renault; and four Ukrainian journalists: Oleksandra Kuvshinova, Maks Levin, Bohdan Bitik and Yevheniy Sakun. 2024 has already seen two journalists and one fixer for the Turkish news agency Anadolu injured by Russian shelling on the Park Hotel in Kharkiv. Additionally, a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty camera crew came under mortar fire while working on the front line. Having analysed the collected data and interviewed the victims and witnesses of these attacks, JFJ has identified the key risks journalists were facing while reporting from the war zone and developed preliminary safety recommendations for media workers covering the war in Ukraine. These recommendations do not cover all aspects of journalists’ safety, but will be useful for those who are reporting from Ukraine. While some physical attacks against media workers become public, not all cases are known. In particular, this concerns journalists working for smaller regional publications, freelancers, and fixers. While journalists working for more prominent media outlets routinely receive essential training prior to their trips to war zones, and have both access to the necessary equipment and support, the safety of freelancers and local team members is in their own hands. They often have to deal with costly expenses alone, while also assessing and mitigating their professional risks. JFJ and its partners aim to increase the safety of media workers in Ukraine by creating and maintaining a secure database of evidence related to those attacks and ensuring media workers are aware of their risk mitigation options. Safety Recommendations for Journalists- COMPLETE A HEFAT TRAINING COURSE BEFORE TRAVELLING TO THE WAR ZONE
- CONDUCT RISK ASSESSMENT BEFORE TRAVELLING
- CONDUCT LOCAL RECONNAISSANCE
- CHOOSE ACCOMMODATION CAREFULLY
- PROTECTIVE GEAR
- MARK AND PREPARE YOUR VEHICLE
- BEWARE OF SWITCHING CARS
- HAVE ADDITIONAL CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION
Oleksandra Matviichuk is the Head of the human rights organisation Center for Civil Liberties, which won the Nobel Peace Prize 2022.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Two years on: Breaking the cycle of impunity for Russian war crimes [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => two-years-on-breaking-the-cycle-of-impunity-for-russian-war-crimes [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-02-23 12:37:14 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-02-23 11:37:14 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7349 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [33] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7343 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-02-22 10:52:53 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-02-22 09:52:53 [post_content] => Two years have elapsed since Russia initiated its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, yet the reverberations persist across the European continent. Moldova, standing among the most affected states after Ukraine, grapples with the enduring repercussions of Russia’s hybrid aggression. Amidst these challenges, Moldova has showcased a resilient spirit and an unwavering commitment to fortify its defenses, secure its future, and advance on its path to becoming a member of the European Union (EU). The national aspiration, as set by President Maia Sandu, is for Moldova to be prepared to join by 2030. In April 2023, the EU reaffirmed its support for Moldova by deploying the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM), signaling a robust commitment to bolster the country's crisis management structures and ability to combat hybrid threats, including cyber warfare and foreign information manipulation. Moldova's embrace of this collaborative initiative underscores its determination to safeguard its sovereignty in the face of external pressures and fortify its ties with European allies. The adoption of Moldova's new National Security Strategy in December 2023 marked a pivotal moment in the country's security agenda. President Sandu's vision for Moldova prioritises strengthening democracy, fostering prosperity, and ensuring the protection of all citizens through a modern security sector. Central to this vision is the imperative of building resilience to hybrid threats and modernising Moldova's armed forces and civil security sector. The strategic partnership with the EU emerges as a cornerstone for comprehensive security enhancement, encompassing economic, energy, cyber, and environmental dimensions. In 2023, Moldova faced escalating hybrid aggression from Russia, including attempts to undermine the country's democratic process. Kremlin-backed forces sought to manipulate Moldova's local elections, prompting decisive action to preserve the integrity of the country's democratic institutions. The resilience displayed in the face of external interference underscores Moldova's commitment to upholding democratic values and protecting its national sovereignty. Supported by the EU, the United States, and other Western allies, Moldova has made significant strides towards economic resilience and energy independence. By reducing its dependency on Russian gas, Moldova has charted a path towards self-reliance and sustainability, mitigating vulnerabilities to external pressures and advancing its integration into European networks. As Moldova continues on its European path, the forthcoming constitutional referendum initiated by President Sandu will determine the country's strategic objective of EU accession, solidifying Moldova's commitment to becoming a member of the EU in the next decade. The overwhelming support for European integration reflects the Moldovan people's aspirations for prosperity, stability, and security within the European family of nations. The referendum, slated to coincide with presidential elections, symbolises a pivotal moment in securing the country's future within the Western democratic fold. Two years after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Moldova stands as a testament to resilience and determination. As Moldova charts a path towards a brighter future, its resilience serves as an inspiration for nations striving to uphold democratic values and principles in the face of adversity. Iulian Groza is an expert in international relations, European affairs and good governance. He is a former Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Moldova in charge for European integration and international law. Currently, Groza leads the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE) – a Moldovan think-tank that aims at supporting Moldova’s accession to the EU. Since 2022, Groza is representing Moldovan civil society in the Supreme Security Council and the National Committee for European Integration chaired by the President of the Republic of Moldova. He holds a University Degree in Law. He also did postgraduate European Studies at Birmingham University and NATO Security Studies at SNSPA in Bucharest. He is fluent in English, Russian and Romanian (native) languages. Groza is a career diplomat and holds a diplomatic rank of Minister-Counsellor. He is also an FCO Chevening Scholar. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Two years on: in the face of continued Russian aggression, Moldova is navigating its path towards the West [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => two-years-on-in-the-face-of-continued-russian-aggression-moldova-is-navigating-its-path-towards-the-west [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-02-22 12:01:31 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-02-22 11:01:31 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7343 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [34] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7330 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-02-21 12:53:13 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-02-21 11:53:13 [post_content] => The war in Ukraine has entered its third year with no end in sight. This is not surprising. The future of the Putin regime depends fully on victory and cannot survive a defeat, thus fighting will continue to the bitter end. For Ukraine this is a nightmare scenario. The war is nothing less than a war of destruction, with large swaths of territory totally devastated, towns eradicated, agriculture destroyed for many years to come (if for no other reason than the massive use of landmines and unexploded ordnance), and the country facing a decreased population. About one-fourth of the population are now displaced, either inside the country or abroad. The longer the war lasts, the less likely it is that people will return, and of course those who have the best prospects of building a new life abroad are those with education and knowledge of languages. At the front, the losses of personnel are immense, even though no official data is given. Those who should be on the forefront of rebuilding the country - the young men and women who believe in Ukraine and are willing to sacrifice their lives - are dying. Ukraine will probably emerge from this war devastated, with a greatly reduced population, a destroyed economy and a large number of traumatised people. With over one million Ukrainians under arms and more than 600,000 with front-line experience, we estimate up to 100,000 people will need long-term psychosocial support. However, veteran mental health services in Ukraine are disorganised, highly dependent on volunteers and NGOs, and it is unlikely that the country will have sufficient resources to develop a system in time. Traumatised veterans have families and live in communities, who will also suffer from the inflicted trauma. With millions of refugees eventually returning to Ukraine, mainly women who will have spent time in countries with greater gender balance, higher levels of domestic violence and divorce can be anticipated. Furthermore, while the Ukrainian society is still highly supportive of the military and veterans, we already see a decline. When veterans have outbursts of violence as a result of war-related trauma, this support will gradually change to stigma and fear. This does not bode well for the future. What Ukraine will need is a system of community-based support for those traumatised by war, both military personnel and civilians who provided the vital support at the front by providing food, care, and medical support, and who are now not eligible for any participation in services earmarked for the military. Such a system should be sustainable and based on what Ukraine can really afford, even when Western support gradually disappears and the country will be left to start the long and winding road to recovery and rebuilding a severely affected society. Robert van Voren is Chief Executive of the international foundation Human Rights in Mental Health-FGIP, an international foundation for mental health reform. He is also Executive Director of the Andrei Sakharov Research Center for Democratic Development and Professor at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, Lithuania. Robert van Voren in an Honorary Fellow of the British Royal College of Psychiatrists and Honorary Member of the Ukrainian Psychiatric Association. He has worked in the field of human rights and mental health in Ukraine since 1990. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Two years on: Proactive measures are needed to address the conflict related mental health crisis [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => two-years-on-proactive-measures-are-needed-to-address-the-conflict-related-mental-health-crisis [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-02-21 12:59:45 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-02-21 11:59:45 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7330 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [35] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7326 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-02-21 12:44:35 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-02-21 11:44:35 [post_content] => At the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 I wrote in the British Medical Journal that, based on my experience of the Syrian conflict, I feared for Ukraine’s healthcare workers.[1] Tragically, my predictions have been proved correct. In Syria, where the charity I co-founded has worked since 2012, attacks on healthcare in non-government areas have been a consistent feature of the conflict. Far from being ‘collateral damage’, there is evidence - including cockpit recordings from Russian air force pilots - that healthcare institutions and workers were intentionally targeted.[2] Two years in to the full-scale invasion and the statistics are shocking. The World Health Organisation has verified over 1,000 attacks on health care in Ukraine since February 2022;[3] more than 60% of all attacks against health care worldwide in that period. Citizen researchers at the Centre for Information Resilience have documented attacks on Ukrainian facilities including maternity units and cardiology treatment centres in Kherson, calling them “strikingly reminiscent” of Russian tactics in northwest Syria.[4] Absent a clear link to any military ground operation, the parallel objectives are to create insecurity among the Ukrainian population and demonstrate ongoing determination to secure victory to the Russian public. Attacking civilian infrastructure frays the ties that bind, both between citizens, and citizens and their government. A strong state relies on an active, vibrant civil society and Ukrainians have valiantly resisted attempts to denigrate their national esprit de corps despite the damage wrought to their infrastructure. The weaponisation of healthcare and disruption of essential services harms public health and morale in a way that can test that resilience to breaking point. If the state can no longer provide services, it can prompt the forced displacement of large numbers of people as they seek safety abroad, putting further stress on host nations and in some cases exacerbating social tensions. These actions constitute hybrid warfare tactics, which Ukraine and its allies need to be alert to. To date, there has not been a prosecution or indictment brought for attacking a healthcare institution. A first step toward accountability is gathering evidence which grassroots entities like the Ukrainian Healthcare Centre are doing.[5] In areas close to the frontline, healthcare facilities may also need to consider moving infrastructure underground or changing their location as protection measures. There is every indication that attacks on health will continue to be part of the ongoing conflict, necessitating a full spectrum of practical and legal measures to protect healthcare institutions and workers. Elly Nott is a leader in the humanitarian sector and PhD Candidate, King’s College London. [1] Elly Nott, Ukraine invasion: Why I fear for Ukraine’s healthcare workers, BMJ, March 2022, https://www.bmj.com/content/376/bmj.o605 [2] The New York Times, Russia Tapes: Healthcare and Civilians Under Attack in Syria, https://www.nytimes.com/spotlight/visual-investigations-russia-syria [3] United Nations Ukraine, Attacks on healthcare in Ukraine are a grave violation of international humanitarian law, August 2023, https://ukraine.un.org/en/240605-attacks-health-care-ukraine-are-grave-violation-international-humanitarian-law#:~:text=Since%20the%20escalation%20of%20the,on%20health%20care%20in%20Ukraine. [4] Centre for Information Resilience, Kherson after occupation: Mapping Russian attacks on medical infrastructure, September 2023, https://www.info-res.org/post/kherson-after-occupation-mapping-russian-attacks-on-medical-infrastructure [5] UHC, Annual Report of the Ukrainian Healthcare Center (UHC) in 2023, February 2024, https://uhc.org.ua/en/2024/02/02/annual-report-of-the-ukrainian-healthcare-center-2023/ Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Two years on: Russia continues to weaponise and attack healthcare in Ukraine [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => two-years-on-russia-continues-to-weaponise-and-attack-healthcare-in-ukraine [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-02-21 12:56:45 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-02-21 11:56:45 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7326 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [36] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7322 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-02-20 11:05:51 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-02-20 10:05:51 [post_content] => Soon to enter its third year, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine continues to highlight a stark geopolitical split between the Global North and the Global South. For the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe, which represent the ‘Global North,’ resisting Russian aggression is an existential issue to save humanity from hell. By bringing the full force of sanctions, lawsuits, and military might, they stood together as democracies. However hard it may have been, they were united against the bewildering reality of global disorder brought by the Russian invasion. These Global North states have displayed a steadfast commitment to preserving the rules and norms that define and guide the conduct of states. Many have also revised their foreign and security policies to preserve global order in ways that were simply unimaginable before. Two years into the war, how they articulate and hold these commitments together and stay true to the promises made to fierce Ukrainians poses new challenges. Particularly within the context of emerging democratic crises and changing public opinion on the war within the West. For many Asian, African, Middle Eastern, and Latin American states, making up the majority of the ‘Global South,’ this war is an existential issue but from another reality. It has created food insecurity, rising energy prices, and a supply chain crisis. It led to the weaponisation of the US dollar, which made international borrowing costly. The war has relied on disruptive technologies to spurt out simplified images of supporters and detractors from the non-Western world. Furthermore, the rejection by the West to calls for a ceasefire, not the least in part due to an academic-military-industrial complex which is justifying the war to protect liberalism, has created, and in some places entrenched, mistrust and dissatisfaction. For the Global South states, the approach of countries in the Global North has appeared ever more like a continuation of the established practices of the West, oblivious of the concerns of the rest. For many poor Global South states, Western hypocrisy toward upholding the norms of sovereignty, human rights, and the rule of law is not new. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine only brought these further out in the open. However, many other powerful Southern states have amplified these hypocritical practices to drive their exclusionary nationalism, using the crisis to point out the unfolding of a global disorder. Russia in turn has seized the opportunity to strategically reach out to the Global South, and declaim its association with the West, a move that was simply unimaginable before. At this juncture, there are new challenges facing those seeking to win over the Global South states. Working within new coalitions and blocs, many of them have become emboldened and fastidious about speaking truth to power. Two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Global South and its leaders are more central than ever on the international stage. Dr Sasikumar Sundaram is a Lecturer at the Department of International Politics at City, University of London. His main research interests lie in International Relations Theory and the Global South States, focusing on India, Brazil, and China. His book Rhetorical Powers: How the Global South Asserts Competence in World Politics is forthcoming from Columbia University Press (June 2025). Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Two years on: The ongoing war in Ukraine is further highlighting the ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ divide [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => two-years-on-the-ongoing-war-in-ukraine-is-further-highlighting-the-global-north-and-global-south-divide [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-02-20 11:52:31 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-02-20 10:52:31 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7322 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [37] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7319 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-02-20 11:02:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-02-20 10:02:00 [post_content] => Two years after the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, war weariness has descended on Washington. The initial American reaction to the attack seemed to be a fulfillment of President Joe Biden’s promise that “America is back”.[1] After the chaos of the Trump years, Washington took on its traditional role as the leader of an international coalition of states, in this case coordinating the provision of international assistance to Kyiv. Since then, the United States has provided about $75 billion in aid to Ukraine.[2] Continued American assistance now seems in doubt, mostly due to shifts within the Republican Party, which controls the House of Representatives. The party’s supporters increasingly oppose aid to Ukraine and demand a focus on perceived problems at home. Their leader, Donald Trump, has long sought friendly relations with Vladimir Putin and has promised to end the war in “24 hours” if elected, presumably by pressuring Kyiv to cede territory to Russia.[3] While a new tranche of aid has been approved by the Senate, it looks unlikely to be passed by the House. American support for Ukraine has also been undermined by the poor results of Kyiv’s 2023 offensive, in which a substantial number of American-trained and equipped troops failed to make substantial headway in regaining Ukrainian territory. American military commanders have been critical of the Ukrainian military’s tactics and have begun to concede that further breakthroughs by Kyiv seem unlikely.[4] As a result, the Biden administration has begun to shift its approach and prepare for what it views as inevitable negotiations in which Ukraine will be forced to make territorial concessions to Russia.[5] Barring a sudden Ukrainian military collapse this summer, the next decisive event in the conflict will likely be the US presidential election later this year. The Biden administration may have decided that negotiations are inevitable, but unlike Trump it does not intend to pressure Kyiv into joining them. Meanwhile, Putin is likely to wait for the outcome of the election before entering serious talks, given that he would be able to achieve much better results if Trump were in office.[6] Washington’s fraying support for Ukraine also has broader implications. If isolationist and Russia-friendly Republicans can pull the plug on American support even under a strongly internationalist president, then many other American security guarantees – for instance to NATO or Taiwan – begin to look questionable. As a result, America’s domestic political divisions, which only look set to widen in a contentious election year, may well persuade many other countries that the time has come to reassess whether Washington is still a reliable ally. Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office. [1] Joe Biden, Remarks By President Biden On America’s Place In The World, Whitehouse.gov, February 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/ [2] Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow, How Much Aid Has The U.S. Sent Ukraine? Here Are Six Charts, Council on Foreign Relations, December 2023, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts [3] Jack Forrest, Trump Won’t Commit to Backing Ukraine in War with Russia, CNN, May 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/10/politics/ukraine-russia-putin-trump-town-hall/index.html [4] Washington Post Staff, Miscalculations, Divisions Marked Offensive Planning By U.S., Ukraine, The Washington Post, December 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/; Washington Post Staff, In Ukraine, A War Of Incremental Gains As Counteroffensive Stalls, The Washington Post, December 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-stalled-russia-war-defenses/ [5] Michael Hirsh, The Biden Administration Is Quietly Shifting Its Strategy in Ukraine, Politico, December 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/12/27/biden-endgame-ukraine-00133211 [6] Michael Crowley, U.S. Rejects Putin’s Latest Call for Ukraine Negotiations, The New York Times, February 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/09/us/politics/biden-putin-tucker-carlson-peace.html Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Two years on: Will Washington remain a reliable ally to Ukraine? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => two-years-on-will-washington-remain-a-reliable-ally-to-ukraine [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-02-20 11:06:49 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-02-20 10:06:49 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7319 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [38] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7309 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-02-19 11:58:51 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-02-19 10:58:51 [post_content] => Following ten years of gradual progress towards European Union (EU) integration, driven by the impetus created by the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Ukraine applied for EU membership in the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Many in the EU thought this was only about showing symbolic support to the war-torn country and its brave people, with these sentiments prevailing even after the EU had adopted a lightning-fast decision to grant Ukraine candidate status. While the decision was never seen as symbolic in Ukraine, importantly it is no longer seen this way in the EU either. Over the course of the past two years, Ukraine has demonstrated its unwavering commitment to EU integration, not just with words but with deeds. The European Commission's recommendation to commence accession negotiations, swiftly endorsed by the European Council, reflects an acknowledgement of Ukraine's tangible efforts.[1] The Enlargement Package report of December 2023 reveals a commendable trajectory in Ukraine's transformation, with an overall assessment climbing from 2.15 to 2.2 on a scale of 1 to 5 throughout 2023.[2] This progress becomes even more significant when considering the addition of new indicators; a comparison with the EU annual report of 2022 would show an improvement from 2.15 to 2.28 in 2023.[3] Although the change might seem small, the EU accession process requires fundamental reforms in virtually all public spheres, not to mention close to 30,000 EU legal acts, with which the legislation of the candidate countries has to be eventually aligned. Among the current nine candidate countries, Ukraine stands out as one of the fastest-moving, underscoring the nation's determination despite the most challenging context. Unlike other candidate states, Ukraine is navigating its transformation amid a full-fledged war. In Ukraine, EU integration is seen as a way to secure its geopolitical choice, finally cutting ties with the Russian empire and ceasing to be a buffer zone between the EU and Russia. Moreover, everyone in Ukraine understands that the rebuilding efforts would require new approaches, ones that only a substantial transformation of the country’s economy and all institutions can provide. With EUR 18 billion granted in 2023 and a commitment of an additional EUR 50 billion in the next four years, the EU's support becomes a lifeline for Ukraine's survival and recovery, along with the support coming from the UK and the US. This financial backing underscores the mutual understanding that Ukraine's commitment to democratic and market reforms is not just an internal matter, but a shared responsibility for stability and progress in the region. As Ukraine marks the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion, the narrative extends beyond conflict and resilience. It is also a story of building a future amidst the existential threat to the nation at present, leveraging EU integration as a catalyst for transformation. Although often overlooked in favour of purely military context, Ukraine’s EU integration is a process of profound importance for its success in the war. And if sister democracies are determined to see Ukraine repel the Russian invasion and win the peace, they should also do whatever possible to support and secure its successful accession into the EU. Yuliia Shaipova is a Ukrainian EU integration professional with experience in the governmental, business, and non-governmental sectors. She focuses on the political issues of Ukraine’s EU accession and the comparative studies of other countries' EU integration experiences. Сurrently, Yuliia is an MSt in Diplomatic Studies candidate at the University of Oxford. [1] Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Ukraine Report 2023, European Commission, November 2023, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/ukraine-report-2023_en; General Secretariat of the Council, European Council meeting (14 and 15 December 2023) – Conclusions, European Council, December 2023, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/68967/europeancouncilconclusions-14-15-12-2023-en.pdf [2] Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union, European Commission, June 2022, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/opinion-ukraines-application-membership-european-union_en [3] Commission Staff, Analytical Report following the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, European Commission, Commission Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union, February 2023, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-02/SWD_2023_30_Ukraine.pdf Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Two years on: Ukraine’s integration into the European Union is driving domestic transformations [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => two-years-on-ukraines-integration-into-the-european-union-is-driving-domestic-transformations [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-02-19 12:14:29 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-02-19 11:14:29 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7309 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [39] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7306 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-02-19 11:43:21 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-02-19 10:43:21 [post_content] => As Europe contemplates further support for Ukraine, it glances furtively at what is happening in Washington DC. The internal machinations on Capitol Hill alone are not enough to stop the European Union (EU) and its European allies from continuing support, but they allow those who would prefer an alternative course to make their pitch. Chief amongst those is Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, who shows a distinct lack of support towards Ukraine. The scale of European support for Ukraine to date is huge and largely not understood. The EU has committed nearly 90 billion euro in aid, weaponry, budget support and hosting of millions of Ukrainian refugees. The UK’s 12 billion pounds [14 billion euro] is in addition to this. However, Europe knows that to continue on this scale is increasingly challenging, and will be much more difficult if the USA does not maintain its own commitments. So, how long can European unity last? The most obvious worry is of sweeping gains from the far right in the elections to the European Parliament in June 2024. Nevertheless, a good working assumption is that the European Parliament will maintain a sufficient number of centre left and centre right MEPs to continue support for Ukraine. Yet another concern is that Slovakia’s Robert Fico may decide to join forces with Viktor Orbán. Sending one leader out of the room while a decision is made is a ploy the European Council has used in the past and could use again, but sending two feels like a slippery slope. Despite his rhetoric, Fico has so far tucked in behind major decisions; and the hope in Brussels is that this will last. The recently greenlit package of support for Ukraine, which will make available up to 50 billion euros in grants and loans until 2027, is a positive sign, - but how this will continue year on year will remain to be seen, particularly with Orbán inserting additional review clauses into the deal.[1] More worrying would be Russia taking more ground and higher Ukrainian casualties. In this instance, the concern is not so much that European support would disappear, but that it would morph into support for a negotiated deal. Some might go further and suggest Ukraine should be prepared to make concessions which will effectively mean conceding territory. Either way, Ukraine’s hand would be poorer in such high stakes negotiations. If Ukraine is taken, ripped apart and turned into a part of Russia or a vassal to it, what is the price for the security of Europe? I know wars end messily, with ragged edges; even outright victors must mourn loss and destruction. But wherever this moves, Europe has to stick with it. When the day comes, as it always does, when people sit around a table to work out an ending, Ukraine should feel Europe has its back. Baroness Ashton is the Former High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and former Vice President of the European Commission. [1] EU Commission, EU solidarity with Ukraine, https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/index_en#:~:text=1%20February%202024%20%2D%20EU%20leaders,grants%20and%20loans%20until%202027; Gregorio Sorgi, Barbara Moens and Elisa Braun, EU approves €50B Ukraine aid as Viktor Orbán folders, Politico, February 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-gets-eu-aid-as-orban-folds/#:~:text=European%20Union%20leaders%20on%20Thursday,Orb%C3%A1n%2C%20 to%20 drop%20his%20 veto Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Two years on: Will international support stay sufficiently united behind Ukraine to pay the price for security in Europe? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => two-years-on-will-international-support-stay-sufficiently-united-behind-ukraine-to-pay-the-price-for-security-in-europe [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-02-21 18:15:04 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-02-21 17:15:04 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7306 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) )
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