Transnational repression, commonly meaning the targeting of political opponents living abroad, is a phenomenon that in recent years has increasingly come to the attention of a global audience.[1] Due to a recent as well as projected increase in cases of transnational repression, as part of what has been called a ‘third wave of autocratisation’, countering practices of transnational repression must become a priority for democratic governments in order to show a real commitment to their democratic principles.[2] The interference of intelligence services of authoritarian countries heavily undermines not only principles of free speech for recent immigrants into democratic countries, but also constitutes a significant breach of sovereignty of the country that the repression takes place in.[3] Thus, this article will be focusing on how democratic governments can counter transnational repression, showing the impact of integration into society, especially for victims of newly emergent methods of transnational repression. It will highlight this through contrasting cases of victims of transnational repression: Russian activists applying for asylum in the West and former Russian intelligence officers.
Background: Aims and practices of transnational repression
Considering aims, there is a clear desire of authoritarian states to return to the original version of Hirschman’s conception of exit and voice, in which these two aspects are mutually exclusive and there can be no voice after exit.[4] Nowadays, in a modern interconnected world with technological advances through which émigrés ‘might raise [their] voice[s] all the louder from the outside’ after their exit, it therefore is in the interest of an authoritarian state to suppress this voice.[5] This takes place through a series of escalating methods that stop when the aim is either achieved or the ‘cost’ for the oppressing country becomes too high.[6]
These methods can be divided into long-standing, and newly emergent methods. The long-standing practices include e.g. assassinations and kidnappings, as well as general harassment and physical attacks both on an activist as well as their family.[7] With advances in technology however came new methods taking repression into the digital realm, creating methods that are low-cost and easy for a country to employ. While these are plentiful, a key aspect to highlight is the use of social media and digital communications against émigrés.[8] Limiting access, spreading disinformation and propaganda via bots alongside targeted hacking attempts are some of the ways activists, depending on their level of integration into society, are targeted and disproportionately affected by.[9] Modern practices of transnational repression have thoroughly ‘challenged the liberating promise of the Internet and social media, demonstrating instead that globalised technologies and networks can facilitate, rather than undermine, authoritarianism’ as Moss describes.[10]
Another aspect connected to the advent of the digital age is the increase in abuse of Interpol ‘Red Notices’.[11] This tool created by Interpol to aid in bringing criminals to justice internationally has been increasingly employed incorrectly by authoritarian governments in order to pursue political opponents after their emigration/escape from the country, especially since the process for setting them up was moved online recently.[12] While ‘Red Notices’ are removed once they have been ruled to be politically motivated, it is important to note that there is no punishment for creating a politically motived Red Notice. They can severely affect a new immigrant’s life before they are deleted, and in some cases even after this, especially in countries that have a negative view of immigration.[13] This can leave an immigrant stranded in a foreign country in many ways should they not be integrated into society in the way e.g. a former intelligence officer is.
Comparative Analysis
Focusing on social media the digital realm first, it is important to note that this used to be seen as a vital tool in preventing ‘network erosion’ after exit but has since been hijacked by authoritarian governments to conduct repression.[14] Generally, activists are putting themselves into a position in which they are unprotected, and easily attacked by their home country without fear of sanctions, since the violations of sovereignty usually associated with transnational repression do not apply in this context.[15] They can become subject to hacking attempts that deface their websites and attempt to access compromising private information, often in an attempt to defame the activist and prevent them from forming networks and becoming part of the society of their new country.[16] For example, a website could be hacked to display opinions that clash with the values of the country the activist has moved into, and therefore assign them a reputation of being an extremist, or hateful, and limiting their reach as people will be less willing to listen to them. Their voice will have been silenced, or severely limited, and the aim of transnational repression achieved. In the case of someone who is better integrated into society, such as the former intelligence officer Oleg Gordievsky, any defamation is less likely to have an effect on the life of the person, as it would be to some extent expected and accusations were less likely to be believed.[17] Further, in the case of Gordievsky he was never in a position in which he was vulnerable to hacking due to operating in protected channels of communication and defamation was limited to within Russia.[18]
Further, another clear danger of the reliance on technology in activism has to be considered. Once someone becomes active in the digital realm, especially when resorting to private social media accounts, there is an immediate danger of hacking of the account and thereby discovering contacts inside the home country, which are then likely to be targeted in acts of coercion-by-proxy.[19] In order to keep their friends and families safe, activists often engage in an act of self-silencing, limiting their own voice to avoid being targeted by hacking attempts and bots, again achieving the key aim of transnational repression.[20] With a stronger integration into society, for example in the way of organisations giving newly-immigrated activist a platform to report on their experiences and conduct their activism away from private social media, their connections within the country are kept secret much better, and activists are less likely to self-silence.
Returning again to the previously mentioned practice of Red Notices, the aspect of vulnerability of recent and lesser-integrated immigrants again has to be highlighted. The mere pressure of being targeted by a Red Notice, and knowledge of the fact that they are often acted on before it can be established that they are political is enough for many immigrants to again silence themselves in an attempt to stay hidden. Further, as can be seen in the case of activist Petr Silaev, the position of being detained naturally impedes the conduct of activism too, if only through the removal of access to e.g. the internet while in detention or being unable to take part in events like in Silaev’s case.[21] In another case of a man pursued by Russia for political reasons, Alexey Kharis, not only did the Red Notice result in lengthy detention, but also led to the removal of his visa and a long delay in the processing of his request for asylum in the US.[22] This is again a very common result of a Red Notice that impedes the articulation of voice, as the immigrant is forced to turn most of their energy to meeting basic needs while not being granted asylum and therefore remaining unable to work in their new country. They are also unlikely to be heard much before at least being awarded refugee status. Despite this being common for immigrants from Russia into the west, someone as well-connected and well-known for their anti-government work as Gordievsky is unaffected by these issues. Red Notices against him would not be taken seriously by any democratic government as they would be immediately assumed to be political and discarded, and as a spy, he was immediately granted asylum in the UK. While there is an obvious difference between this case and that of a well-connected immigrant, there is nonetheless a key advantage to being more integrated into society when a Red Notice is issued: the better the person being targeted is connected, the more resources they have available to fight an unlawful Red Notice, as can be seen between the case of the better-integrated Silaev, who was released after intervention by the UN, and the lesser-integrated Kharis who spent many months in detention.[23]
By addressing the issues that have been discussed through quicker and deeper integration of migrants into society, the low-cost methods of transnational repression that authoritarian governments use regularly are rendered mostly ineffective. The voice of immigrants after exit can then only be limited by physically violent and extreme measures such as kidnapping and assassination, as was attempted in the case of Gordievsky.[24] Considering the case of another former spy, Sergei Skripal, it is apparent that these extreme measures are no sustainable option for the Russian intelligence services though. After he was poisoned in Salisbury in 2018, there was a public outcry alongside a strong government response, resulting in the expulsion of Russian diplomats from multiple European countries, thereby severely impacting relations between the countries.[25]
Recommendations
Thus, the question remains how exactly governments can remove the opportunity of low-cost methods of transnational repression, and raise the cost to a point where it becomes unsustainable for an authoritarian country to pursue. While there is no complete or perfect solution to this, a starting point would be introducing better checks and regulations for Red Notices, potentially including a penalty for submitting an unlawful notice. Working quicker to delete them once they are proven false, as well as ensuring that a Red Notice alone cannot be grounds for asylum denial would also help victims of transnational repression, as for example Kharis would not have had his visa revoked.[26] Further, it would be good practice from democratic countries to be highly critical of Red Notices from authoritarian countries that regularly abuse them, especially if charges for a person have seemingly come out of nowhere and immediately after emigration from the country; giving the accused immigrant the benefit of the doubt over a regime that is known to pursue political opponents in this way.
Further, addressing the digital aspects that have been discussed, a designated and internationally-connected government service for recent immigrants who feel that their activism might put them at risk could be very helpful, both in officially recording that attacks against them are likely as well as signposting them to relevant NGOs that can provide guidance and a platform for them. By including activists in international networks and connecting them to more official channels for their activism they are less likely to have to put themselves in danger of being attacked through e.g. social media and their voice is more likely to be heard. This would also show an increased willingness of governments to uphold their democratic values and counter repression of people in their country, taking a stand against authoritarianism.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it has become apparent in this article that through better inclusion of migrants into society the cost of transnational repression against them is raised for the authoritarian country that pursues them. Through comparing the cases of intelligence officers and activists, it was seen that well-connected intelligence officers face significantly less frequent attacks from their home country than lesser-connected activists do, and that there is a larger pushback when they are attacked since the method of repression is usually more extreme. By countering the low-cost methods of transnational repression that are frequently employed on activists, the cost of transnational repression is raised, as it becomes impossible for an authoritarian regime to silence the voice of an émigré without risking large-scale consequences. While there will always be a risk of transnational repression for activists fleeing an oppressive regime, the key to mitigating it lies in quicker and deeper integration into the society of the democratic country they have moved to.
Sarah Lehmkuehler is a recent graduate from the MA Conflict, Security and Development at the University of Exeter, where she wrote her dissertation on the topic of changes and continuities in practices of transnational repression by the Russian intelligence services. She has a long-standing interest in combining human rights with intelligence studies, inspired by her BA at Aberystwyth University that first introduced her to the topic. She can best be contacted at sl792@exeter.ac.uk.
[1] Cooley, A. ‘The International Dimensions of the New Transnational Repression’, Written Testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe “Tools of Transnational Repression”, September 2019, p.1., https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/COOLEY%20Alex%20-%20Testimony.pdf
[2] V-Dem, Our Work, https://www.v-dem.net/en/our-work/research-projects/v-aut/
[3] For more information on how practices of transnational repression violate principles of sovereignty, see: Garvey, J.I. ‘Repression of the Political Emigre – The Underground to International Law: A Proposal for Remedy’, Yale Law Journal, 90:1 (1980), p.79
[4] Hirschmann describes an individual in a political situation he/she disagrees with as having two options: Exit, meaning emigrating from a country and leaving the situation; or voice, meaning voicing dissenting opinions and attempting to change the situation. For more information on this see: Hirschman, A. Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970)
[5] Hoffman, B. ‘Bringing Hirschman back in: “Exit”, “Voice” and “Loyalty” in the Politics of Transnational Migration’, The Latin Americanist, 54:2 (2010), p.60
[6] ‘Cost’ in this article does not refer to financial cost, but rather consequences such as sanctions or diplomatic incidents with other countries.
[7] For a more complete list, see: Cooley, A. ‘The International Dimensions of the New Transnational Repression’, Written Testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe “Tools of Transnational Repression”, September 2019, p.1., https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/COOLEY%20Alex%20-%20Testimony.pdf
[8] For a more complete description, see: Lucas, E. ‘The Spycraft Revolution’, Foreign Policy, April 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/27/the-spycraft-revolution-espionage-technology/
[9] Moss, D. ‘The ties that bind: Internet communication technologies, networked authoritarianism, and ‘voice’ in the Syrian diaspora’, Globalizations, 15:2 (2018), pp.265-282
[10] Ibid., p.267
[11] A ‘Red Notice‘ is a request submitted by one country for the police forces of other countries to assist in locating, temporarily detaining and extraditing a wanted criminal. See: Interpol, ‘Red Notices’, Interpol online, https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/Red-Notices
[12] Mackinnon, A. ‘The Scourge of the Red Notice: How some countries use Interpol to go after dissidents and debtors.’, Foreign Policy, December 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/03/the-scourge-of-the-red-notice-interpol-uae-russia-china/
[13] For examples and a brief description of this see: Grossman, S. ‘How Abusive Red Notices Affect People in the U.S. Immigration System and Steps That Can Be Taken Within the U.S. and at Interpol to Protect Victims’, Written Testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe “Tools of Transnational Repression, September 2019, p.2., https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/GROSSMAN%20Sandra%20-%20Testimony.pdf; for a more academic approach see: Lemon, E. ‘Weaponizing Interpol’, Journal of Democracy, 30:2 (2019)
[14] Moss, D. ‘The ties that bind: Internet communication technologies, networked authoritarianism, and ‘voice’ in the Syrian diaspora’, Globalizations, 15:2 (2018), p.266
[15] Adamson, F.B.; Tsourapas, G., ‘At Home and Abroad: Coercion-by-Proxy as a Tool of Transnational Repression’, in Perspectives on “Everyday” Transnational Repression in an Age of Globalization, edited by Schenkkan, N.; Linzer, I.; Furstenberg, S.; Heathershaw, J. (Washington D.C., Freedom House, July 2020), p.10., https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/07092020_Transnational_Repression_Globalization_Collection_of_Essays_FINAL_.pdf
[16] Michaelsen, M. Silencing Across Borders: Transnational Repression and Digital Threats against Exiled Activists from Egypt, Syria, and Iran (The Hague, Hivos, February 2020), p.20., https://www.hivos.org/assets/2020/02/SILENCING-ACROSS-BORDERS-Marcus-Michaelsen-Hivos-Report.pdf
[17] Oleg Gordievsky is a former KGB colonel who was an influential double agent for Britain during the Cold War. Much of his most significant work was conducted after his escape/extradition to the West, as his ‘voice’ had a tremendous reach after ‘exit’. For more information, see: Gordievsky, O. Next Stop Execution (London, Lume Books, 2nd edition 2018)
[18] He was tried in absentia in order to be painted in a negative light for Soviet citizens. See: Gordievsky, O. Next Stop Execution (London, Lume Books, 2nd edition 2018), p.392
[19] Adamson, F.B.; Tsourapas, G., ‘At Home and Abroad: Coercion-by-Proxy as a Tool of Transnational Repression’, in Perspectives on “Everyday” Transnational Repression in an Age of Globalization, edited by Schenkkan, N.; Linzer, I.; Furstenberg, S.; Heathershaw, J. (Washington D.C., Freedom House, July 2020), p.10., https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/07092020_Transnational_Repression_Globalization_Collection_of_Essays_FINAL_.pdf
[20] Michaelsen, M. ‘The Digital Transnational Repression Toolkit, and Its Silencing Effects‘, in Perspectives on “Everyday” Transnational Repression in an Age of Globalization, edited by Schenkkan, N.; Linzer, I.; Furstenberg, S.; Heathershaw, J. (Washington D.C., Freedom House, July 2020), p.7., https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/07092020_Transnational_Repression_Globalization_Collection_of_Essays_FINAL_.pdf
[21] Petr Silaev is a Russian anti-government activist who fled Russia after being targeted by the authorities and was granted refugee status in Finland. He was later detained in Spain on grounds of a Red Notice, while being away from his usual networks. See: Fair Trials International, ‘Spotlight: Petr Silaev’, pp.1-2., https://www.fairtrials.org/wp-content/uploads/Spotlight-Petr-Silaev1.pdf; Fair Trials International, Case Study: Petr Silaev, Fair Trials International online, https://www.fairtrials.org/case-study/petr-silaev; He missed events related to his latest book, limiting the reach of it and thereby limiting his voice. See: Fair Trials International, ‘Spotlight: Petr Silaev’, p.2., https://www.fairtrials.org/wp-content/uploads/Spotlight-Petr-Silaev1.pdf
[22] Kharis, A. as quoted in ‘Tools of Transnational Repression: How Autocrats punish dissent overseas’, Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, September 2019, pp.71-72., https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/ToolsOfTransnational.pdf
[23] He missed events related to his latest book, limiting the reach of it and thereby limiting his voice. See: Fair Trials International, ‘Spotlight: Petr Silaev’, p.2., https://www.fairtrials.org/wp-content/uploads/Spotlight-Petr-Silaev1.pdf; Kharis, A. as quoted in ‘Tools of Transnational Repression: How Autocrats punish dissent overseas’, Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 12 September 2019, pp.71-72., https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/ToolsOfTransnational.pdf
[24] Neil, E.; Hendrix, P. ‘Deadly Payback’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 0:1-3 (2020), p.4
[25] Urban, M. The Skripal Files: Putin, Poison, and the new spy war (London, Macmillan Publishers, 2018), pp.198-199
[26] Kharis, A. as quoted in ‘Tools of Transnational Repression: How Autocrats punish dissent overseas’, Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, September 2019, pp.71-72., https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/ToolsOfTransnational.pdf