On Sunday, 5th October 2025, Syria held its first parliamentary elections since the fall of Bashar Al-Assad. However, these “elections” were a deeply flawed process, and failed to meet even the minimum standards of political participation. Rather than advancing democratic transition, they are part of a broader centralisation of executive power by President Al-Sharaa.

 

The elections took place following Decree No. 143 of 2025, issued by the office of the Transitional President of Syria, Ahmed Al-Sharaa.^[1] This Decree, instead of establishing a transitional parliamentary body, creates a legislature largely under the power of the executive. Under its provisions, the President directly appoints one-third of parliamentarians and selects the members of the High Electoral Committee—a body that both elects the remaining two-thirds of Parliament and oversees elections. Thus, in practice, this “electoral process” is placed entirely within the President’s direct and indirect control.

 

The Decree’s provisions on candidacy likewise do not meet standards for political participation. It allows for the disqualification of candidates under broad, undefined terms such as “a supporter of the former regime” or advocating for “separation, division, or reliance on foreign powers” (Article 21, Paragraph 9).^[2] In practice, this vague language is not applied against affiliates of the former regime who committed human rights violations and other grave crimes. Instead, it permits the executive to disqualify candidates based on political considerations—a tool that can be, and in other countries has been, wielded against opposition parties and government critics.

 

In fact, leading up to the elections, candidates reported that they had been disqualified based on the testimony of anonymous witnesses.^[3] The candidates were denied access to the information upon which the disqualifications were based and were not permitted to appeal the decision.

 

Moreover, the Decree falls short in ensuring adequate representation of women and other marginalised groups. Article 24 sets a minimum 20% quota for women—an insufficient measure to guarantee full equality. Representation of women and other groups, including persons with disabilities and former detainees, is only advisory and non-binding.  The lack of meaningful inclusion undermines efforts to build a truly representative political system under which Syrians can be genuinely represented and further deepens divisions among Syrians.

 

Centralisation by Elections: What Do These Elections Reveal?

 

These problematic “elections” are a transparent effort to further centralise power in the executive. The Constitutional Declaration signed in March 2025 similarly gives President Al-Sharaa wide-reaching authority for a transitional period of five years.^[4] He commands the armed forces and heads the National Security Bureau. He appoints a Cabinet, a Vice President, and ambassadors. He has the power to propose law, the power to appoint each judge on the Supreme Constitutional Court, the right to unilaterally declare a state of emergency, and potentially the ability to exercise emergency powers and suspend human rights in the absence of a formally declared emergency. There is limited capacity on the part of the legislature or judiciary to serve as effective checks on his concentration of power.

 

In this context, it is clear the “elections” held on Sunday were not a true representative process. They were in clear contravention of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2254, which states that “the only sustainable solution…is through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process.”^[5]

 

Less than a year after the fall of the former regime, Syria’s transitional period faces many challenges, making the prospect of holding direct general elections at this stage unrealistic. However, creating the appearance of representative governance through a tightly controlled legislative body is not the solution. Instead, Syria should have set up a transitional parliamentary body with limited jurisdiction to address urgent issues, while it works with the UN to hold “free and fair elections” (S/Res/2254 § 4) within the UN’s proposed timeframe of 18 months.

 

In the meantime, Syria should implement changes to its temporary electoral system. To respect the principle of separation of powers and ensure meaningful checks on executive power, Syria should remove the transitional president’s role in appointing one-third of Parliament, and establish an independent body to oversee elections, one that is not subject to executive influence. More broadly, Syria should place legislative and judicial limits on executive power and reduce the current executive’s influence across the legislative and judicial branches of government.

 

Syria should also implement reforms to prevent political interference in election candidacy. This includes removing its imprecise and restrictive candidacy conditions with clear and objective criteria—such as age and legal capacity. A candidate should only be subject to disqualification under these criteria, rather than through a system without appeal that can be manipulated for political purposes. To protect freedom of expression, Syria should ensure freedom of public campaigning. Similarly, it should repeal its current provision imposing double criminal penalties for electoral offences, particularly where its vague wording could be used to criminalise activities related to legitimate political participation.

 

It is imperative that Syria align both its transitional electoral process and its future electoral arrangements with international standards on human rights. Syria has ratified—and restated its obligation in the Constitutional Declaration—a number of international treaties and agreements guaranteeing equal suffrage and the right to political participation. The elections held on October 5 clearly fail to meet these standards.

 

Moreover, the international community should not turn a blind eye to the political situation in Syria in favor of stability. After decades of dictatorship, Syrians deserve an inclusive political process that represents all Syrians and allows for free and fair political participation. While not immediate, efforts must nonetheless begin towards preparing for presidential, legislative, and local elections via direct vote. Indeed, a return to authoritarian governance would ultimately undermine the goal of a safe and stable Syria.

 

One need only look to failed transitions in the region—such as Iraq’s experience with de-Ba’athification—to understand the dangers of hollowing out political life and civil society under the guise of reform.^[6] To avoid repeating such mistakes, the international community should do its part to push back against President Al-Sharaa’s attempts to consolidate power and should encourage the fledgling government to respect international standards of governance, accountability, and inclusion

 

 

Mohammad Al Abdallah is Director of the Syrian Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC). Al Abdallah is a Syrian human rights lawyer and democracy researcher and activist. He received a Bachelor of Law from the Lebanese University in 2007; in 2014, he received a Master’s of Public Policy from George Mason University with a specialty in governance and international institutions. He previously worked as a researcher for Human Rights Watch in Beirut from where he covered Syria from 2007-2009. Al Abdallah is a former prisoner and survivor of torture who was imprisoned in Syria on two separate occasions for his work defending human rights and lobbying for political reform.

 

Jalal Alhamad is Executive Director of Justice for Life Organization and  researcher in human rights and transitional justice.

 

Riad Ali is a Syrian legal expert and former judge with extensive experience in judicial reform, transitional justice, and international law. He has served as a magistrate in Syria and as a legal consultant for organizations such as Syrians for Truth and Justice, Pell, and The Day After. His research focuses on constitutional law, property rights, and governance in post-conflict contexts.

 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

 

[1] Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, ‘Joint Position Paper Regarding the Temporary Electoral System for the Syrian Parliament’, September 2025, https://syriaaccountability.org/joint-position-paper-regarding-the-temporary-electoral-system-for-the-syrian-parliament/

[2] Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), ‘Presidency, August 2025, https://sana.sy/presidency/2267661/?ref=syriaaccountability.org

[3] Almodon, لماذا يجب إلغاء انتخابات سوريا التشريعية فورا؟, October 2025, https://www.almodon.com/opinion/2025/10/01

[4] Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, ‘A Problematic Constitutional Declaration’, March 2025, https://syriaaccountability.org/a-problematic-constitutional-declaration/

[5] United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 2254 (2015)’, December 2015, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2254.pdf

[6] Middle East Institute, ‘De‑Ba`thification in Iraq: How Not to Pursue Transitional Justice’, January 2014, https://www.mei.edu/publications/de-bathification-iraq-how-not-pursue-transitional-justice