The 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), opening on Tuesday 9 September 2025 in New York, might mark the end of the UN’s human rights pillar as we know it.
The United Nations (UN) is being reshaped: What is unfolding is a strategic campaign to control who gets to speak, what can be said, and which values survive. The withdrawal of the United States (US) from multilateralism has, once again, created space that China is now readily occupying – whilst the UN Secretariat looks the other way. A particular responsibility now rests with France and, notably, the United Kingdom (UK) as permanent members of the Security Council to uphold the values the institution was built up to achieve 80 years ago.
The reorientation of the US involves withdrawing support from key multilateral bodies.[1] This is not the first time the US has distanced itself from the UN system: under President George W. Bush, the US disengaged from climate and human rights mechanisms, while Trump’s first term (2017-2021) saw a more sweeping retreat from multilateralism.[2] His administration withdrew from the Human Rights Council, UNESCO, the WHO, and the Paris Agreement, and repeatedly attacked the legitimacy of the UN itself — reflecting a longstanding hostility toward multilateral institutions within the Republican establishment, exemplified by figures like Ambassador John Bolton.[3]
This exodus created a vacuum each time. This time, China is moving in to fill it — and has, indeed, methodically prepared for this moment through a four-part strategy: fill the void left by US retreat and Western lethargy; weaken independent civil society access; control the narrative through proxies and silence dissent; and escape accountability for mass atrocities.
Firstly, China’s ascent in the UN is about setting new terms of debate. By inserting vague references to ‘mutual respect’, ‘non-interference’, and ‘cultural values’ into UN human rights language, it is eroding the normative clarity of international human rights standards — and facing little resistance from Western states.[4]
Secondly, China is silencing critical civil society voices before they can even enter the room. Independent NGOs struggle to gain or maintain accreditation, while government-organised NGOs — entities that serve as state mouthpieces — are amplified.[5] These proxies praise Beijing’s record, attack critics, and reframe human rights as a matter of development alone. In short, China is ‘choking civil society’ at the United Nations and securing a self-congratulatory performance for itself.[6]
This redefinition of norms and participation cannot succeed without silence. That is why China’s repression is not merely a domestic concern. As recognised by the G7 recently, diaspora communities are monitored, threatened, and harassed. Systematic surveillance and intimidation of Uyghurs and Tibetans by Chinese agents operating under diplomatic cover has become a reality throughout Europe, as the Transnational Repression (TNR) in the UK Working Group also documented in its evidence submitted to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on transnational repression in the UK.[7] China’s surveillance of civil society abroad is codified within its Overseas NGO Law, enacted in 2016, and constitutes an essential component of the silencing of Chinese dissent internationally.[8] China’s targeting of dissent abroad is the third pillar of its strategy to control the narrative on the global stage.
Finally, while reshaping the UN from within and silencing dissent, China simultaneously contributes to undermining the institution’s authority. Nowhere is this clearer than in the response to grave abuses in Xinjiang. In 2022, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a landmark assessment, detailing allegations of arbitrary detention of hundreds of thousands people, torture, sexual violence, forced labour, family separation, and the systemic persecution of Uyghurs and other minorities through a legal and policy framework that enables ongoing persecution.[9] These findings pointed to possible crimes against humanity.[10] Yet the Human Rights Council vote to even debate the Xinjiang report was defeated.[11] Since then, no accountability has been secured.
In this context, the UK has a unique responsibility — and opportunity — to step up as a principled leader on human rights and multilateralism. As the FPC’s recent report underscores, the UK’s credibility depends on consistency: defending universal human rights through policy, diplomacy, and resource allocation.[12] This includes calling out transnational repression, resisting the erosion of civil society access at the UN, and backing concrete reforms that ensure the human rights pillar remains central to the UN’s future.
A group of human rights leaders assembled through Human Rights Compass, recommended the establishment of a cross-regional leadership coalition for human rights, modelled on the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. Driven by states from all regions, the coalition could counterbalance efforts to hijack the system.[13] Given the unique reach of Britain’s diplomatic presence, and the UK’s responsibility and role as permanent member of the Security Council, it could be well placed to lead such an effort at the occasion of the 80th General Assembly.
In this sense, the President of the 80th General Assembly, Annalena Baerbock, has rightly placed human rights at the heart of the UNGA High-Level Week. UNGA80 could serve as the moment where states agree to embed rights-based approaches into peacebuilding, humanitarian response, and sustainable development.
The credibility of the United Nations is being drained, quietly and strategically. A UN that cannot speak freely, include independent voices, or address grave violations is no longer a forum for international law. It becomes a stage for repression, dressed in multilateral clothing.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
Florian Irminger is President of Progress & Change Action Lab and member of the Foreign Policy Centre’s Advisory Council.
[1] The White House, Withdrawing the United States from and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations, February 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-and-ending-funding-to-certain-united-nations-organizations-and-reviewing-united-states-support-to-all-international-organizations/
[2] Rajesh Sahu, The Missing Nexus: A Historical and Contemporary Position of the United States, Journal of Communication, November 2023, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00208817231204663; George W. Bush, White House archives, President Bush Addresses the United Nations General Assembly, September 2007, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070925-4.html
[3] John Bolton, U.S. Ambassador to the UN speech on reform, YouTube, posted by HipHughes, March 2006, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOINBs8eOdk
[4] Vivian Sun, China’s Human Rights Discourse: Reshaping the International Framework – Part One, Human Rights Research Center, November 2024, https://www.humanrightsresearch.org/post/china-s-human-rights-discourse-reshaping-the-international-framework-part-one; UN News, China’s Foreign Minister stresses principle of non‑interference at UN debate, September 2012, https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/09/421682; China (Wang Yi, Minister for Foreign Affairs), Statement at the UN General Assembly General Debate (79th Session), September 2024, https://gadebate.un.org/en/79/china
[5] Devex, For many human rights NGOs, UN access remains out of reach, February 2020, https://www.devex.com/news/for-many-human-rights-ngos-un-access-remains-out-of-reach-96516
[6] Rana Siu Inboden, China at the UN: Choking Civil Society, Journal of Democracy, July 2021, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-at-the-un-choking-civil-society/
[7] Tackling TNR in the UK Working Group, UK Parliament Human Rights Joint Committee, Written evidence submitted by Tackling TNR in the UK Working Group (TRUK0154), September 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/138140/pdf/; Foreign Policy Centre, Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group, August 2025, https://fpc.org.uk/tackling-transnational-repression-in-the-uk-working-group/; G7 (Group of Seven), G7 Leaders’ Statement on Transnational Repression, June 2025, https://g7.canada.ca/en/news-and-media/news/g7-leaders-statement-on-transnational-repression/
[8] U.S.-Asia Law Institute, Securitizing Overseas Nonprofit Work in China: Five years of the Overseas NGO Law framework and its new application to academic institutions, November 2021, https://usali.org/usali-perspectives-blog/securitizing-overseas-nonprofit-work-in-china
[9] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China, August 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchr-assessment-human-rights-concerns-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region
[10] Human Rights Watch, China: UN needs to address crimes against humanity, August 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/08/27/china-un-needs-address-crimes-against-humanity
[11] Amnesty International, China: Xinjiang vote failure betrays core mission of UN Human Rights Council, October 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/10/china-xinjiang-vote-failure-betrays-core-mission-of-un-human-rights-council/
[12] Poppy Ogier, Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy, Foreign Policy Centre, September 2025, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/playing-to-our-strengths-the-future-of-the-uks-soft-power-in-foreign-policy/
[13] Progress & Change Action Lab, Human Rights Compass: Real‑Time Policy Analysis & Advocacy, June 2025, https://progress-change-actionlab.org/human-rights-compass#kpg_209169