Expert Look | Venezuela in Focus: Human Rights, Geopolitical Dilemmas, and International Law

January 19, 2026

The capture of Nicolás Maduro by the US military has triggered an immediate and polarised international debate. Questions of sovereignty, legality, and precedent have rightly come to the fore, reviving anxieties about the erosion of the rules-based international order and the risks of unilateral military action.

However, Venezuela’s collapse did not begin on the night of the intervention. It is the result of decades of institutional dismantling, systematic repression, and the hollowing out of democratic accountability. Over time, this internal erosion became entangled with external interests, regional power dynamics, and repeated failures of international engagement. The result is a crisis that is at once legal, political, humanitarian, and geopolitical, and one that resists explanation through any single analytical lens.

This expert analysis brings together four perspectives that speak to different, but interconnected, dimensions of the Venezuelan crisis. Laura Vidal, digital rights researcher and civil society observer, centres the human rights reality inside Venezuela, highlighting that legal debates detached from lived experience risk normalising repression and compounding victimisation. Andrew Gawthorpe, FPC Senior Fellow, analyses the emerging US strategy towards Venezuela, arguing that Washington is moving away from ‘regime change’ towards a more coercive model of ‘regime management’, with uncertain leverage and destabilising consequences. Dame Audrey Glover, FPC’s Chair of Trustees, sets out the international legal implications of the US operation, underscoring the dangers posed by selective adherence to foundational legal norms. Stefan Wolff, FPC Senior Fellow, examines the dilemmas facing Europe as it seeks to reconcile its commitment to a rules-based order with alliance politics and shifting power realities.

Taken together, these contributions expose the risks of selective concern: invoking international law only at moments of crisis, privileging geopolitical stability over accountability, or debating legality while disregarding human suffering. If Venezuela is to be understood and addressed in a meaningful way, these dimensions need to be held together, not treated as competing narratives.

The Human Rights Dimension of Venezuela’s Crisis

By Laura Vidal

Any assessment of Venezuela’s current crisis that sidelines human rights is necessarily incomplete. The most visible entry point remains the situation of political prisoners.^[1] Detentions continue to function as a revolving door: individuals are arrested, released under opaque conditions, and replaced by new detainees.^[2] Deaths in custody, enforced disappearances, and prolonged incommunicado detention remain documented practices.^[3] Torture centers continue to operate, and releases are often negotiated, partial, or discretionary rather than grounded in due process or judicial review. The pace of releases has been extremely slow, even as new arrests routinely follow moments of political tension, reinforcing a system based on fear rather than accountability.

This pattern, however, represents only one layer of a much longer process of deterioration. Venezuela’s human rights crisis has unfolded over years through the systematic dismantling of institutions, the erosion of checks and balances, and the capture of the justice system. The result is a complex humanitarian emergency that predates recent geopolitical escalations. Nearly a third of the population has left the country, many under precarious conditions that expose them to exploitation, abuse, and trafficking networks along migration routes. Those who remain face chronic shortages of basic services, including healthcare, electricity, and access to potable water.^[4]

The media landscape has been progressively constrained through closures, licensing pressures, legal harassment, and digital censorship. Accessing information online increasingly requires the use of circumvention tools, exposing users to heightened risks of surveillance and criminalisation. Reporting, documentation, and civic organising have consequently become high-risk activities.^[5]

This reality is often misrepresented as the consequence of international sanctions alone, despite the fact that economic collapse and institutional erosion began years before sectoral sanctions were imposed. Framing the crisis exclusively through sanctions obscures its structural roots and diverts attention from long-standing patterns of repression, impunity, and state failure.^[6] Human rights violations in Venezuela are not episodic; they are systemic, cumulative, and deeply embedded in the country’s governance model.

From Regime Change to Regime Management

By Andrew Gawthorpe

The US military operation against Nicolas Maduro represents a novel approach to foreign policy. “Regime change” is out and “regime management” is in. The Trump administration’s intention appears to be to leave the current Venezuelan government formally in place, while coercing it into adopting policies that will benefit US security and economic interests. Washington’s main demands for the government in Caracas include opening up the country’s oil wealth to American investment and control, severing friendly relations with China and Russia, and ending support for the government in Cuba.

Trump’s methods are nakedly imperial – a throwback to the “gunboat diplomacy” of the nineteenth century. It is notable that they even lack the justification, common in previous US military interventions, with the familiar claim that intervention will liberate the Venezuelan people from a dictatorial government. Instead, Washington is proposing to work with that dictatorial government in order to deliver profits for American oil companies.

From the perspective of the Trump administration, this strategy has obvious appeal. It lacks the commitment of resources and potentially lives to a long-term military occupation designed to transform Venezuela’s government, as was attempted in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, it remains unclear whether this approach gives the US enough leverage over the government in Venezuela to achieve its goals.

Venezuela’s new leader, Delcy Rodríguez, has to avoid angering nationalist opinion at home – not least in her country’s military. She cannot go too far in appeasing the US. For their part, American oil companies also have little interest in investing in Venezuela, particularly while the current government remains in place. Meanwhile, President Trump’s attention seems to have wandered, with him now threatening new military action against Iran. As a result, what’s coming next in Venezuela remains highly unclear.

International Law and the Erosion of Legal Restraint

By Dame Audrey Glover

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states:

“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

This article, part of the foundation of the post-Second World War international rules-based order, establishes a core principle against aggression, subject only to narrowly defined exceptions: self-defence and UN Security Council authorisation. This provision is binding on all States, regardless of whether they are members of the United Nations.

The action of US Forces entering Venezuela uninvited at night to detain President Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and place them in custody in the US to await trial, constitutes a breach of Article 2(4). Under International law, only an assault on another country by military means qualifies as a trigger for self-defence.

The consequence of the US operation is therefore a violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty, contrary to International Law. Furthermore, the intervention has not resulted in an attempt to restore democratic governance in the country. Maduro has been replaced by his Deputy, Delcy Rodríguez, without an election or consultation of the electorate and opposition– particularly significant given that Maduro himself overturned a prior electoral outcome to retain power. Her appointment undermines any argument that the intervention was undertaken in pursuit of democratic principles.

For his part, President Trump has said he will ‘run’ Venezuela remotely, a proposition that raises serious questions about both feasibility and legitimacy. It also prompts broader concerns regarding regional security and the future of Venezuela’s oil sector, including how it might be rebuilt and governed under such circumstances.

Stephen Miller, an adviser to President Trump, has said: “Forget international law. We live in a world that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power”. Such rhetoric reflects an explicit rejection of the legal norms that underpin international stability.

Recent events including the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, have further imperilled the rules-based international order at the core of which are the principles of individual liberty, intellectual and religious freedom, constitutional democracy and free trade. The most damaging has been the rejection of the principles of international law that the US helped to create. Venezuela stands as the latest example of this deterioration. The time has come to save these principles from extinction.

Europe and the Dilemmas of the Rules-Based Order

by Stefan Wolff

The apprehension of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by the US military on the night of 3rd January is the first time in over three decades that the White House has conducted such an operation. The operation reflects Washington’s new national security strategy and its emphasis on hemispheric dominance, even as it sits in clear tension with international law. For Europe, the operation, and how to respond to it, poses multiple dilemmas.

The first dilemma concerns how to reconcile hitherto unwavering European support for a rules-based international order with the need to preserve what is left of the transatlantic alliance. This includes American security guarantees for European allies and continuing support for Ukraine’s war effort. The display of American capability and the meek reactions not only by Europe but also by Russia and China also demonstrated that for all the talk of a multipolar world order, Moscow and Beijing have few credible options to respond to American assertions of power. From a European perspective, this reality is in some respects reassuring, especially in the context of the Kremlin’s apparently insatiable revisionism in eastern Europe.

Closely related is a second dilemma: US ambitions for absolute dominance in the western hemisphere have revived Trump’s designs for Greenland, returning them to the transatlantic agenda where they spell potential for disruption—both in the sense of distracting attention from the actual threat of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and Moscow’s broader hybrid campaign elsewhere on the continent, and of potentially diverting critical resources away from deterring further Russian adventurism in Europe towards Arctic security, an area long neglected by both Europe and the United States.

The third dilemma is that the removal of Maduro from power is in line with long-stated European preferences for a democratic transition in the country, and as such should be welcomed. However, what seems to have resulted from the US operation is at best a face lift at the top of the Venezuelan regime, followed by internal power consolidation and increased external subservience to the demands of the mercurial incumbent of the White House. This dilemma also has wider implications. Europe may lack the hard power to effect regime change, but not the desire to do so. With probably more than half an eye on the situation in Iran, there are likely some figures in Europe’s political class who would not object too loudly or strongly if the US and/or Israel were adopting a more proactive stance on supporting protesters in Tehran and dozens of other cities. Yet externally driven regime change is hardly ever cost- or consequence-free, as the experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, among others, vividly demonstrate.

European equivocation and prevarication in response to the US military operation against Maduro reflects the difficulty of navigating these dilemmas. Such ambivalence is neither a long-term solution nor will it allow Europeans to avoid discussing two equally unpalatable options: submitting to the whims of Trump, or an attempt to act independently in an increasingly hostile and lawless world. As so often, Europe is likely to fall back on muddling through: seeking to placate and flatter President Trump while ignoring the flaws and dangers of his foreign policy, and simultaneously trying to build towards the mythical promise of strategic autonomy. This approach rests on the hope that unconstrained, illiberal great power dominance within distinct spheres of influence does not become the new normal – one in which Europe is permanently downgraded to Washington’s, let alone Moscow’s or Beijing’s vassal.

For a comprehensive examination of the decades-long institutional erosion, systemic human rights abuses, and profound humanitarian crisis that have shaped contemporary Venezuela, see Laura Vidal’s Op-Ed: International law, institutional collapse, and the danger of selective concern, which situates the country’s current situation within a broader history of democratic decay, international inaction, and the human cost.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: Political Prisoners Cut Off From the World, September 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/09/22/venezuela-political-prisoners-cut-off-from-the-world

^[2] Efecto Cocuyo, Efecto Paz #11 – Presos políticos después del 3E, January 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EhV_CpfoBpw&t=2821s

^[3] United Nations News, Venezuela’s National Guard linked to killings, torture and repression, UN probe finds, December 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166565

^[4] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Venezuela, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/venezuela

^[5] Puyosa, Azpúrua, Suárez Pérez, How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism, Atlantic Council, July 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/how-venezuela-became-a-model-for-digital-authoritarianism/; VE sin Filtro, Censura y represión digital en las elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela, 2025, https://vesinfiltro.org/noticias/2025-03-12-reporte-elecciones-presidenciales/

^[6] Nizar El Fakih, Aproximación al Régimen de Sanciones Internacionales y al caso de Venezuela, IDB, December 2020, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://publications.iadb.org/en/node/29550&ved=2ahUKEwiWtLq81IiSAxWFVKQEHW0vBnUQFnoECBYQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Ega3sYVRtvTyuCerIVUlw

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United States

Op-ed | International law, institutional collapse, and the danger of selective concern

Article by Laura Vidal

January 15, 2026

Op-ed | International law, institutional collapse, and the danger of selective concern

In the immediate aftermath of Nicolás Maduro’s military extraction by the United States, protests erupted across major cities in Europe and the Americas calling for respect for Venezuela’s sovereignty. Venezuelans themselves, however, were largely absent from these protests. This contrast is not incidental. It reflects a deeper misalignment in how the crisis is being framed and debated.

For Venezuelans abroad, this moment has triggered yet another cycle of incomprehension. Many are confronted with responses that center almost exclusively on international law and precedent, while leaving aside the humanitarian and human rights crisis that has driven millions into forced migration or exile. This tension mirrors the ambivalent position of the region itself: shaken by a military intervention, yet unable to deny nearly two decades of institutional dismantling under authoritarian rule.

In the days following Maduro’s extraction, expressions of joy and relief within Venezuela circulated widely on social media platforms, often accessed through VPNs. Such reactions, however, carry real risks. Reports indicate that individuals have been detained, had their phones searched, and faced extortion when authorities discovered any reference to the intervention or signs of celebration.^[1]

Critics of the intervention have rightly underscored the gravity of violating territorial integrity and the risks such actions pose to international law. Carolina Sandoval, president of Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), pointed at regional concerns by the precedent being set, particularly given the long history of US military action in the hemisphere.^[2] At the same time, Sandoval also acknowledges a second, unresolved dimension: Venezuela has endured years of systematic repression under an authoritarian and violent government, and the need for accountability and a democratic transition remains urgent.

As political actors reposition themselves and new details emerge, another uncomfortable reality has become harder to ignore. Despite decades of anti-imperialist rhetoric, it appears increasingly evident to many analysts that negotiations with the United States were not imposed from the outside, but actively pursued by actors within the regime itself. This contradiction between discourse and practice further complicates efforts to interpret the moment through clean ideological binaries. Meanwhile, the continued presence of chavismo deeply hurts the hopes of a genuine transition to democracy.

As Atlantic Council senior research fellow Iria Puyosa has noted, key figures within the governing coalition now face an unprecedented challenge: meeting Washington’s demands while preventing internal fracture or a military coup. Those demands include regulatory stability and transparent property frameworks, precisely the institutional environment that chavismo systematically dismantled over years of rule.^[3]

Language also matters in this context. For Venezuelans, particularly victims of human rights violations, an exclusive focus on sovereignty and legal neutrality is not a technical debate but a political act. As journalist and human rights defender Luis Carlos Díaz told me, “framing the crisis solely in terms of territorial violation without acknowledging the criminal capture of the Venezuelan state produces a concrete effect: it normalises and protects those responsible for destroying constitutional order and committing crimes against humanity. From the perspective of victims, this is not neutrality: it is discursive revictimisation”.

This is not an isolated rupture

Any attempt to understand the current moment collapses if it treats the US intervention as an isolated rupture caused by a single set of actors. Venezuela was not a space free of foreign influence prior to this operation.

Cuban involvement in intelligence and repressive structures has been documented for years, facilitated through political and economic exchanges that included preferential access to oil.^[4] Russian military presence is also well established, including documented operations linked to the Wagner Group.^[5] Venezuela remains deeply indebted to Chinese creditors, owing roughly 20 billion dollars in loans that have shaped economic dependency and constrained policy autonomy. Iran has provided technological support that has translated into tools of repression, including the reported use of drones during demonstrations in 2024.^[6] This record complicates claims that a previously respected red line was suddenly crossed.

Venezuela’s institutional dismantling and democratic struggle did not begin recently. It spans nearly three decades, with the past ten years marking the most intense phase, one in which legal frameworks, state resources, and institutional checks were stretched or eliminated to extinguish meaningful separation of powers. Within this trajectory, the 2024 elections stand out as a critical turning point. For many Venezuelans, they represented the last available democratic mechanism, despite conditions that were neither free nor fair and despite widespread expectations of fraud.

International responses to these elections revealed a familiar pattern. While condemnations were issued, institutional action stalled. In late July 2024, the Organization of American States rejected a resolution calling on the Venezuelan government to provide transparency regarding the election results, with 17 votes in favor, none against, and a notable number of 11 abstentions.^[7] To this day, Maduro’s government has failed to present evidence substantiating its claimed victory.^[8]

None of this justifies violent interventions. It does, however, situate recent events within a longer history of institutional collapse, abandoned justice, and power vacuums already exploited by multiple actors across ideological lines. As the Venezuelan civil society organisation CEPAZ has warned, “the international community now faces one last major opportunity to mitigate a crisis that its own prolonged ineffectiveness helped create”.^[9]

Human rights cannot be bracketed out

Any analysis of Venezuela that sidelines human rights is analytically incomplete. The situation of political prisoners offers a stark entry point. Detention in Venezuela is constantly referred to by human rights defenders as a “revolving-door” system marked by deaths in custody, forced disappearances, and torture.^[10] So-called “releases” are often conditional, opaque, and reversible, functioning as instruments of control rather than steps toward justice. The pace of releases has been extremely slow, and new detentions are feared.^[11]

These practices are not confined to isolated events.^[12] Nearly a third of the population has fled the country, many under precarious conditions that expose them to exploitation and trafficking networks along migration routes. Inside Venezuela, the humanitarian crisis remains complex and multidimensional, affecting access to food, healthcare, and other basic services. Independent media has been blocked or captured, while transnational repression extends surveillance and intimidation beyond borders.^[13] Internet access is limited, unreliable, and often dangerous.^[14] Vulnerable groups, including Indigenous communities, face persistent attacks despite having once served as a central pillar of the regime’s legitimacy.^[15]

This reality is often misrepresented as the consequence of international sanctions alone, despite the fact that economic collapse and institutional erosion began years before sectorial sanctions came into force.^[16] The persistence of this narrative obscures responsibility and diverts attention from corruption and deliberate policy choices that hollowed out the state.

Amid widespread confusion and the difficulty of making sense of incomplete and often contested data, many of the most reliable sources on Venezuela today are civil society organisations, some of them working in exile. These organisations have been essential in documenting the multiple, overlapping layers that define the crisis, offering analyses that move beyond fixed or binary narratives. They continue to play that role despite operating under constant persecution, threats, and criminalisation inside the country, while simultaneously facing defunding and diminishing support from international partners and allies.

Weighing what already broke

It is expected that governments, political parties, and institutions interpret events through their own lenses and fears. The rupture represented by a US military extraction is serious, and the concerns it raises regarding its precedent and international law are legitimate. But treating this moment as the beginning of the problem distorts the balance of what is at stake.

The Venezuelan crisis ceased to be solely a domestic problem years ago. It has reshaped migration routes across the hemisphere, strained regional economies, and generated humanitarian emergencies well beyond national borders. It has also been sustained by economic interests and political arrangements in which multiple actors benefited from the regime’s permanence, even as institutions collapsed and accountability disappeared.

Focusing exclusively on the legality of a single act, while ignoring the accumulated damage that made such an act conceivable, risks repeating the same error that has defined international engagement with Venezuela for over a decade: reacting to moments of rupture while tolerating the slow dismantling that precedes them. If international law is to retain meaning, it cannot be invoked only at the point of intervention. It must also reckon with the long record of impunity, complicity, and selective concern that paved the way.

Laura Vidal is a digital rights researcher and civil society observer working across Latin America and international spaces. For nearly two decades, she has followed and documented Venezuela’s crisis from multiple vantage points, with a focus on authoritarianism, technology, and gender. She currently works with IFEX and Digital Action, and her research, analysis, and essays have been published by organisations such as Internews, The Engine Room, Mozilla, APC, EFF, and Global Voices, among others. Her work sits at the intersection of digital power, civic resilience, and the lived experiences of communities navigating repression and displacement.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Espacio Público, Detienen a cinco ciudadanos por celebrar detención de Maduro, Espacio Público, January 2026, . https://espaciopublico.ong/detienen-a-cinco-ciudadanos-por-celebrar-detencion-de-maduro/

^[2]In interview with Efecto Cocuyo, Efecto Paz #11 – Presos políticos después del 3E, January 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EhV_CpfoBpw&t=2821s

^[3]Iria Puyosa, Delcy Rodríguez’s untenable balancing act, Atlantic Council, January 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/delcy-rodriguezs-untenable-balancing-act/

^[4] Angus Berwick, Imported repression: How Cuba taught Venezuela to quash military dissent, Reuters Investigates, August 2019, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/venezuela-cuba-military/; Armando.Info, La bitácora de los tanqueros fantasmas al servicio de la revolución, Armando.Info, April 2020, https://armando.info/la-bitacora-de-los-tanqueros-fantasmas-al-servicio-de-la-revolucion/

^[5] Silja Thoms, Más allá de Rusia: la actividad del Grupo Wagner en Venezuela, Deutsche Welle, June 2023, https://www.dw.com/es/m%C3%A1s-all%C3%A1-de-rusia-la-actividad-de-grupo-wagner-en-venezuela/a-66048041

^[6] Conexión Segura y Libre / VE sin Filtro, Censura y represión digital en las elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela, 2025, https://vesinfiltro.org/res/files/informe-presidenciales_2024-VEsinFiltro.pdf; Laura Bicker, Trump’s Venezuela raid has created chaos — and that is a risk for China, BBC News, January 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly92dkxqvko

^[7] Yurani Arciniegas, Fracasa en el Consejo de la OEA resolución que pedía transparencia al Gobierno de Venezuela, France 24, July 2024, https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20240731-%F0%9F%94%B4-en-directo-petro-afirma-que-hay-graves-dudas-sobre-los-comicios-en-venezuela-y-pide-transparencia

^[8] Tiago Rogero, How Venezuela’s opposition proved its election win: ‘A brilliant political move’, The Guardian, August 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/10/gonzalez-proof-win-venezuela-election-vote-tally-maduro

^[9] Centro de Justicia y Paz (CEPAZ), La comunidad internacional tiene una última gran oportunidad en Venezuela de mitigar la crisis que su propia ineficacia ocasionó, January 2026, https://cepaz.org/la-comunidad-internacional-tiene-una-ultima-gran-oportunidad-en-venezuela-de-mitigar-la-crisis-que-su-propia-ineficacia-ocasiono/

^[10]Deutsche Welle, Muere bajo custodia un policía detenido en Venezuela, November 2026, https://www.dw.com/es/muere-bajo-custodia-un-polic%C3%ADa-detenido-en-venezuela/a-75463951

^[11] BBC News, “I thought I was going to die”: Jailed Venezuelan activist details brutality of prison life, January 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgz5l6l7k7o

^[12] United Nations News, Venezuela’s National Guard linked to killings, torture and repression, UN probe finds, December 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166565

^[13] Matt Ford, Colombia: Venezuelan activists attacked in targeted shooting, DW (Reuters/AP), October 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/colombia-venezuelan-activists-attacked-in-targeted-shooting/a-74341871

^[14] Iria Puyosa, Andrés Azpúrua, Daniel Suárez Pérez, How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism, Atlantic Council, July 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/how-venezuela-became-a-model-for-digital-authoritarianism/

^[15] FundaRedes, Boletín N.º 47: Grupos armados y Estado venezolano vulneran el derecho a la vida de los pueblos indígenas, FundaRedes, November 2023, https://www.fundaredes.org/2023/11/01/boletin47-grupo-armados-y-estado-venezolano-vulneran-el-derecho-a-la-vida-de-los-pueblos-indigenas/; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Venezuela 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/venezuela

^[16] Nizar El Fakih, Aproximación al Régimen de Sanciones Internacionales y al caso de Venezuela, Discussion Document No. IDB-DP-840, Inter-American Development Bank, December 2020, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://publications.iadb.org/en/node/29550&ved=2ahUKEwiWtLq81IiSAxWFVKQEHW0vBnUQFnoECBYQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Ega3sYVRtvTyuCerIVUlw

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Civil Society

Human Rights

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Latin America

Webinar Takeaways | Forging New Futures: Looking Ahead at the MENA Region

Article by Foreign Policy Centre

December 5, 2025

Webinar Takeaways | Forging New Futures: Looking Ahead at the MENA Region

The 28th of October 2025, the Foreign Policy Centre and the SEPAD project at Lancaster University co-hosted a public webinar, bringing together leading experts to examine the evolving dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). With particular focus on the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, the ongoing devastation in Gaza following October 7, and a complex web of shifting alliances—including the Beijing-mediated normalisation between Iran and Saudi Arabia—have created a fluid and uncertain political landscape. In the face of these developments, questions surrounding sectarianism, accountability, governance, and regional integration have taken on a renewed urgency.

The discussion titled “Forging New Futures: Looking Ahead at the MENA Region” was chaired by Poppy Ogier, FPC’s Communications and Research Manager, and featured contributions from, Dr Nour Abu-Assab, Co-Founder and Co-Director of the Centre for Transnational Development and Collaboration (CTDC), Dr Sanam Vakil, Director of the MENA Programme at Chatham House, and Professor Simon Mabon, Chair in International Politics at Lancaster University and Director of SEPAD.

The following takeaways emerged during the webinar session:

1. The Middle East post-October 7

One point that was evident before 7 October—and has become even clearer since—is that conflicts in the region are deeply interconnected. Stabilisation and resolution efforts cannot be siloed, but must take a holistic view of the region’s political and security architecture, as the sources of destabilisation are multiple, driven not only by regional actors, but shaped by the broader global landscape in which they operate.

The genocide in Gaza has significantly altered the political calculus of many states. While pre-October 7, regional governments had engaged in normalisation efforts with Israel, the scale of violence and destruction has led to significant public outrage, shifting the focus back to the unresolved Palestinian question and slowing or even stalling normalisation agreements. While the ceasefire is seen as a positive development, questions remain over the stability of the agreement and the prospects of meaningful conflict resolution. Regional stability can only be possible if Palestinian statehood and sovereignty is supported and achieved.

2. Israel’s military posture is increasingly destabilising

Israel’s military actions, particularly the June 2025 war with Iran and the September strikes on Qatar, have significantly reshaped regional perceptions. While Iran has traditionally been viewed as the primary destabilising actor, Israel’s use of military force across multiple fronts has led to a reframing of its role in the region.

The war with Iran revealed the limits of Tehran’s capacity for regional projection, exposing the symbolic nature of much of its deterrent power. Israel, by contrast, demonstrated clear military dominance. These developments have emboldened Israeli strategic postures while simultaneously drawing concern from neighbouring states.

The strike on Qatar further reinforced Israel’s image as a destabiliser. This event, in particular, has been critical in shifting diplomatic and security assessments across the Gulf and beyond, undermining trust in Israel’s role as a partner in regional security.

3. The role of Gulf States as regional stabilisers

Gulf states find themselves increasingly forced into a delicate balancing act. The interconnectedness of regional conflicts means that escalation in one area often has spill over effects elsewhere. This interdependence has heightened the strategic stakes for Gulf leaders.

Over the past two years, Gulf states have exhibited growing diplomatic agency. Their proactive efforts to mediate, negotiate ceasefires, and advocate for a political resolution to the Palestinian issue are driven not only by principle but by urgent self-interest. With limited military capacities, Gulf states are relying on diplomacy as their primary tool for regional stability.

Their advocacy for Palestinian self-determination, particularly in the aftermath of Gaza, has also become more vocal, positioning them as both mediators and stakeholders in any future regional order.

4. Integrity of information, justice, and accountability

Accurately describing what is happening in the region matters, not only for activism but for those who have endured this continuum of violence over the years. To do so meaningfully, we must consider regional history and the need for historical reparation. Understanding the root causes of conflict is essential if we are to have any hope of ‘forging new futures’.

In this context, the prospects for accountability take on particular urgency. They must go beyond prosecuting those directly responsible on the ground to include those with the power and influence to shape regional events. This is a responsibility that lies not only with MENA states, but also with Western actors. To move forward, we must look past the narrow confines of media-driven narratives and reflect more deeply on what meaningful accountability could look like in today’s international order.

5. Sectarianism, governance, and the crisis of the State

The region is caught between a collapsing old order and an unclear future. In this uncertain interregnum, long-standing political structures are being questioned, and moments of crisis are prompting communities to rethink the relationship between rulers and ruled. Even before 7 October, sectarian identities were under strain. Protests in Lebanon and Iraq (2019–2020) highlighted widespread frustration with sectarian governance. Meanwhile, actions like Houthi attacks in the Red Sea signalled new forms of cross-sectarian solidarity.

At the same time, sectarian divisions continue to be exploited for political purposes, particularly in attempts to reframe the region through an anti-Iran lens. But increasingly, the sharper divide is not sect versus sect, but people versus power—regimes versus citizens.

6. The role of the UK and the international community

The UK and international actors have played a long-standing role in shaping the dynamics of the MENA region, often through historical complicity and continued strategic interests. As several speakers noted, the UK’s current posture—marked by alignment with US policy and declining soft power—undermines its credibility. Rebuilding trust requires a shift toward principled engagement, meaningful accountability for harm caused (such as arms sales and extractive partnerships), and a commitment to global norms. The international community must take seriously its responsibilities, not only to uphold the rules-based order but to support regional-led processes for justice, accountability, and sustainable peace.

A full recording of the event is available here:

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Conflict Resolution and Security

Regions

Middle East and North Africa

Who is standing up for media freedom – and who is not? A new Index has some answers

Article by Martin Scott and Mel Bunce

November 10, 2025

Who is standing up for media freedom – and who is not? A new Index has some answers

Every year, on 2^ndNovember, the United Nations and its member states condemn attacks on journalists. In 2025, this “International Day to End Impunity for Crimes Against Journalists” is a particularly sombre occasion – with threats to journalists at an all-time high.

More than 120 journalists were killed in 2024 while doing their work.^[1] Countless others were arbitrarily detained, abused, and threatened both physically and online. News outlets are struggling to develop sustainable business models, and media freedom is at its lowest level globally in at least two decades, according to Reporters Without Borders.^[2]

This matters because a decline in media freedom can contribute to a deeper collapse in the systems that support democracy. As Nobel Prize-winning journalist, Maria Ressa, recently warned: “if journalism dies, democracy dies”.^[3]

Unfortunately, supporting media freedom is not a foreign policy priority for most countries. Multilateral fora – like the Media Freedom Coalition – encourage their member states to take action. However, these fora lack enforcement or accountability mechanisms.

To help address this gap, the Centre for Journalism and Democracy has launched a new annual index to try to hold states to account and encourage them to take action to promote media freedom beyond their borders. The Index for International Media Freedom Support (IMFS) evaluates 30 countries across three key foreign policy areas: diplomacy, funding, and safety/protection.^[4] The results paint a concerning and inconsistent picture – with no state performing strongly across all three categories.

Financial support for media freedom

According to the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media, “globally… the first problem to be fixed is the insufficient volume of Official Development Assistance (ODA) that goes to media support”.^[5] On average, the 30 countries assessed in the IMFS Index allocated just 0.16% of their foreign aid to supporting independent journalism in 2023. Thirteen countries awarded less than 0.1%, while three – Latvia, Greece, and Slovenia – reported allocating 0%.

The only country that came close to the benchmark set by the Forum on Information and Democracy of allocating 1.0% of ODA to media support was Sweden – who contributed 0.91%. In 2023, Sweden spent over $51 million supporting initiatives such as rural radio stations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and strengthening environmental reporting across the Asia-Pacific region.^[6] Largely for this reason, Sweden came 2^nd overall in the 2025 IMFS Index.

Support for journalism safety and protection

Another group of leading experts – The High-Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom – has consistently advised governments that providing safe refuge to journalists at risk is one of the most effective measures to improve the climate for press freedom around the world.^[7]

The IMFS Index finds that only one country – Latvia (who came 9^thoverall) – had both an active emergency visa scheme for at-risk journalists and supported a national scheme promoting the safety of exiled media workers. Twenty-one of the thirty countries in the Index had neither measure in place.

Diplomatic support for media freedom

Lithuania was the highest ranked country in the 2025 IMFS Index, largely because of its diplomatic leadership roles in several UN initiatives relating to media freedom and journalist safety. Estonia (4^th overall) also performed well diplomatically, having served as co-chair of the Media Freedom Coalition in 2024, alongside Germany (equal 5^th).

The lowest scoring countries in the ‘diplomatic’ category of the IMFS Index were Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and Switzerland.

Making media freedom a foreign policy priority

The results of the 2025 IMFS Index suggests that political will – rather than state capacity – is a country’s greatest barrier to supporting media freedom worldwide.

The Baltic states – Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia – were amongst the smallest – but also the strongest performing. By contrast, four members of the G7 – the United Kingdom (equal 12^th), the United States (equal 12^th), Italy (equal 24^th) and Japan (28^th) – all ranked in the Index’s lowest ‘bronze’ category.

Due to the time lag in data reporting, the Index does not capture recent cuts to foreign aid that occurred in 2025 in the United States, the UK, Germany, France, and elsewhere. Therefore, future versions of the IMFS Index are likely to show an even bigger gap between some countries’ public commitments to media freedom and their actual support.

Given this, the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media is right to argue that “what is needed now is not [a] reinvention of the wheel, but a new level of political will and a concerted commitment by governments to invest in what we know works – nationally and internationally.”^[8]

Hopefully, by publicly tracking countries’ performances, this new Index will help to generate more political pressure for meaningful action.

Martin Scott is a Professor of Media and Global Development at the University of East Anglia. His publications include, ‘Capturing News, Capturing Democracy’ (2024), ‘Humanitarian Journalists’ (2022), ‘Media and Development’ (2014) and ‘From Entertainment to Citizenship’ (2014).

Mel Bunce is a Professor of International Journalism and Politics, and the Director of the Centre for Journalism and Democracy at City St George’s, University of London. She was previously the Head of City’s renowned Department of Journalism. Her research focuses on journalism and democracy, crisis reporting, media freedom and international journalism.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024 is deadliest year for journalists in CPJ history, February 2025 https://cpj.org/special-reports/2024-is-deadliest-year-for-journalists-in-cpj-history-almost-70-percent-killed-by-israel/

[2] RSF, World Press Freedom Index 2025: over half the world’s population in red zones, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-2025-over-half-worlds-population-red-zones

[3] Kathimerini, Maria Ressa warns social media is ‘demolishing democracy’ at Athens forum, October 2025, https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/society-in-depth/1282767/maria-ressa-warns-social-media-is-demolishing-democracy-at-athens-forum/

[4] Centre for Journalism and Democracy, The 2025 Index on International Media Freedom Support, n.d., IMFS Index is published by the Centre for Journalism and Democracy, and is available at https://jdem.org/the-imfs-index/; The 30 states included in the index are members of both the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, and the Media Freedom Coalition (OECD-DAC).

[5] Forum on Information and Democracy, Statement of the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media: The Economic Imperative of Investing in Public Interest Media, September 2025, https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Economic-Imperative-of-Investing-in-Public-Interest-Media.pdf

[6] Forum on Information and Democracy, “The Forum on Information and Democracy calls for a New Deal for Journalism, June 2021, https://informationdemocracy.org/2021/06/16/the-forum-on-information-and-democracy-calls-for-a-new-deal-for-journalism/

[7] Media Freedom Coalition, High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom, n.d., https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/who-is-involved/high-level-panel-of-legal-experts/

[8] Forum on Information and Democracy, Statement of the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media: The Economic Imperative of Investing in Public Interest Media, September 2025, https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Economic-Imperative-of-Investing-in-Public-Interest-Media.pdf

Topics

Human Rights

Media and Online Freedom

Back to the Future – Why a Human Rights-Focused Foreign Policy must keep up with Technology

Article by Helen Goodman MP

October 9, 2019

Back to the Future – Why a Human Rights-Focused Foreign Policy must keep up with Technology

“Technology is, of course, a double edged sword. Fire can cook our food but also burn us.”

Jason Silva, the Venezuelan-American filmmaker and public speaker

Last year marked the 70^th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The values and guiding principles underpinning this declaration may not have changed in 70 years, but the threats to human rights have. For those of us who still believe in the sanctity of human rights, we have to adapt to these threats.

One such threat is technology. Technology and human rights have always been intricately intertwined. From the mastering of civilian bugging in the 1970s and 80s, to the mass expansion of CCTV in the 1990s and early 2000s, to contemporary concerns over data mining and privacy rights we see today; technology has carved open an entire new dimension to human rights concerns in the past 30 years or so.

However, we are only really scratching the surface of the deepening complexities and growing capabilities of modern technology, and the seismic implications for human rights are only just becoming clear.

A case in point is the plight of the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang Province, West China. The Uighurs are an ethnic Turkic peoples originating from East and Central Asia who form the majority ethnic group in Xinjiang, numbering approximately 11 million. Unlike the Han Chinese – who constitute the predominant ethnic group in mainland China – the Uighur population is primarily Muslim and culturally distinct from the rest of China’s population.

Since at least 1949, the Uighur community has been subject to systematic discrimination by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However in the past four years, following a series of riots and sporadic violent attacks by Uighur Islamist and separatist groups, state persecution of the Uighurs and other ethnic Turkic groups has intensified – according to Human Rights Watch – to ‘a scope and scale not seen in China since the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution’.^[1] The purported reason for this intensification is the ‘de-extremification’ of the region.

This repression has involved the mass surveillance of the Uighur population and the reported internment of over one million Uighurs in ‘re-education camps’.[2] Where, according to detailed testimonies from former inmates, detainees are forced to undergo psychological indoctrination programmes designed to erase Uighur cultural and religious identity and foster loyalty to the Chinese state – including memorising CCP propaganda, giving thanks to President Xi Jinping and learning Mandarin.^[3]

State-of-the-art technology has been fundamental to the disturbing effectiveness of this state repression. Facial-recognition surveillance technology capable of identifying individuals by their ethnicity, supplied by surveillance giants Hikvision and Dahua, has been embedded ubiquitously across Xinjiang (and, incidentally, Tibet), including in gas stations and in hundreds of mosques. The Chinese government is also forcing Uighurs to download an app that monitors the content on their smart phones and searches for ‘illegal’ images,[4] and according to Human Rights Watch, is using ‘Wi-Fi sniffers’ that collect the unique identifying addresses of computers, smartphones, and other networked devices.[5]

The data obtained from such ‘sensors’ is being fed into a predictive policing program called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), which has been fully implemented for the first time in Xinjiang.[6] This platform uses Big Data to analyse the movements and activities of the Uighur population and make predictive judgements on the threat level of individuals. Often after evaluation of IJOP data, individuals are detained and sent straight to re-education centres.[7]

In short, technology has augmented a reality whereby the Chinese state has near Orwellian levels of omniscience and control over certain ethnic minorities. In Xinjiang, we are seeing just how long a shadow technology can cast over human rights.

It is not all bad news however. Technology also has enormous potential to defend human rights.

As the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) surmises, ‘Digital technologies are opening up numerous new possibilities to identify, analyse and remedy human rights risks.’[8] They identify a number of areas where technology is being harnessed to safeguard human rights. Data and information collection, for instance, has enormous potential. Satellites, drones, balloons and smart sensors like radio-frequency identification (RFID) can monitor and analyse land, ecosystems, movement of materials and product commodity chains to determine whether people’s land property rights are being violated, and whether products come from verified suppliers.[9] Apps and chatbots can also be employed to give workers a voice to express their concerns and report human rights abuses either directly to their own employers, to government authorities or to third parties.

An innovative best practice example of this is Global Fishing Watch (GFW). GFW is using data obtained from satellite technologies and cloud computing to produce immense datasets that identify fishing patterns and produce highly detailed visual maps and infographics that are shared online. This information equips authorities and stakeholders to tackle human rights abuses in the fishing industry, such as spotting vessels that have been at sea for extended periods of time and are therefore denying their crew a break from work and violating their working rights.

Furthermore, rather than being used for predictive policing and mass violations of privacy, the ‘Big Data’ generated by such technologies can feed into the business decision-making procedures and activities of private companies; enhancing the capacity of transnational corporations to identify and respond to human rights issues in their operations and commodity chains and make more human rights-centred decisions.[10]

Again, several examples are emerging of such practice. Once such example is Laborlink – a mobile app that allows factory workers to report workplace abuses and provide general feedback – either identified or anonymously.[11] Over one million workers in 16 countries have so far utilised the app, resulting in a vast improvement in workplace rights. For example in Bangladesh, through the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, Laborlink partnered with ELEVATE to build a first-of-its-kind technology-driven helpline that receives calls on over 500 issues a month, including complaints about wages and benefits and fire dangers inside and outside factories.[12]

A similar app, WorkIt, has been instrumental in securing significant victories for Walmart workers in the United States – including substantially better corporate-wide pay and leave policies – through a campaign orchestrated by United for Respect.[13]

Consequently, as well as posing a threat to human rights, technology provides a considerable arsenal that concerned governments, corporations and NGOs can – and must – utilise. However we cannot just fight fire with fire. Policy and legislation must also keep up with the technological dimension of human rights. Governments and legislators must therefore review the options available to them to abate human rights abuses made possible by technology. But just what options are available? The answer is several.

An emerging legal vehicle that will have a crucial role to play is the Magnitsky powers. Leading for the Labour Party, I managed to secure the inclusion of Magnitsky clauses in the UK Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act in Spring 2018 Magnitsky legislation grants government ministers the power to issue sanctions and other punitive measures against individuals or entities engaging in human rights abuses. Crucially, this includes private companies.

On formally leaving the European Union, the UK will be able to autonomously apply sanctions using the Magnitsky clause more easily[14], and will therefore possess a much needed lever with which to target companies selling technologies being used to violate human rights for entering into contracts with the perpetrators. Like, for example, Hikvision – a move that is already being considered by the United States owing to their operations in Xinjiang. And Hikvision is just the tip of the iceberg.

A second lever available to states is export controls – a policy initiative encouraged by Human Rights Watch in the context of the Uighur crisis.[15] Identifying appropriate export control mechanisms to deny human rights abusing states from gaining access to the technology being used to violate basic rights is critical, and Labour has committed to strengthening export controls as part of our human rights-focussed foreign policy. By taking this simple step, concerned onlookers will stop unwittingly equipping the very human rights abusers they are condemning.

Thirdly, governments must engage with the technology sector. Technology companies need to be made aware of the human rights risk that their business operations can and do contribute to, and assurances must be sought that they will not enter into contracts with government authorities or any other organisation that is committing gross human rights abuses. If necessary, new regulations should be introduced to facilitate this. A bad reputation is bad for business, so encouraging leading tech sector giants to recalibrate their business models and tender policies in line with human rights realities could prove an effective tool in mitigating the detrimental impact technology can have on human rights, and hopefully others will follow their example.

Fourthly, governments’ need to cooperate to introduce a clear international legal framework for internet governance. Currently the free for all resembles the 16^th Century law of the sea as pirates abound – there are no shared controls on terrorism, child protection, intellectual property or tax and as more and more economic activity moves to the web more and more human activity takes place in an anarchic value free vacuum. As long as such a gap exists in the legal architecture, human rights abusers using the web to commit their crimes will continue to find dark corners to hide in.

As we enter the third decade of the 21^st century, the inexorable advance of technology will continue apace. We are entering the era of 5G (as we know all too well from the Huawei issue), artificial intelligence and potentially even commercial flights into space. If we are to realise the grand and noble vision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights expounded 70 years ago democratic governments, civil society, human rights activists and other entities engaged in the global struggle for human rights must adapt to the new reality technology is presenting us. We must therefore recognise and respond to the deeply disturbing implications for human rights posed by technology, but also harness its enormous potential to take the fight to the worst perpetrators.

Failure to do either may render the era since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights a mere footnote in history, rather than a blueprint of a future reality for the millions being oppressed in the present.

Helen Goodman MP is a Shadow Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

[1] Human Rights Watch, Eradicating Ideological Viruses: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims (Human Rights Watch, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs

[2] Adrian Zenz, New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang China Brief, vol. 18, issue 10, May 15, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang (accessed 2019)

[3] Malik, ‘Muslim inmates in China detention camp forced to eat pork, drink alcohol and physically tortured as some commit suicide’

[4] Adam Lynch, App targeting Uighur population censors content, lacks basic security, Open Tech, August 2018, https://www.opentech.fund/news/app-targeting-uyghur-population-censors-content-lacks-basic-security/

[5] Human Rights Watch, China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region, February 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuels-crackdown-minority-region

[6] Ibid (footnote 5)

[7] Ibid (footnote 5)

[8] Davide Fiedler, Is technology a game-changer for human rights in corporate value chains?, WBCSD, November 2018, https://www.wbcsd.org/Overview/Panorama/Articles/Is-technology-a-game-changer-for-human-rights-in-corporate-value-chains

[9] Ibid (footnote 8)

[10] Ibid (footnote 8)

[11] Ibid (footnote 8)

[12] Good World Solutions, https://goodworldsolutions.org/

[13] Teke Wiggin, Labour Organizers Look To Apps To Reach Wider Audiences, Huffington Post, July 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/labor-organizers-apps-audiences_us_5b47a609e4b022fdcc577a47?ri18n=true

[14] According to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee the FCO has been equivocating on the extent to which sanctions under the 2018 Act can be applied whilst the UK is still a member of the EU, particularly in relation to elements related to trade. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have their own Magnitsky legislation whilst being members of the EU https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/1703/170305.htm

[15] https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web2.pdf

Topics

Civil Society

Democracy and Elections

Freedom from Torture and Ill-treatment

Human Rights

International Relations and Geopolitics

Media and Online Freedom

Regions

United Kingdom

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