Op-ed | Armenia’s 2026 Parliamentary Election and the Future of the South Caucasus

Article by James Stanley and Stefan Wolff

June 4, 2026

Op-ed | Armenia’s 2026 Parliamentary Election and the Future of the South Caucasus

The upcoming Armenian elections are often framed as a choice between Russia and the West. In reality, the outcome will shape the country’s evolving relationship with Russia, the West, and its neighbours in the strategically important South Caucasus. This article forms part of the Foreign Policy Centre’s work on democracy and elections.

In the shadow of war in the Middle East and Russia’s ongoing war waged against Ukraine, Armenia is heading into parliamentary elections on 7 June that will not only be critical for the country’s own direction but are also likely to have an impact for the wider South Caucasus region; itself of broader geopolitical significance at a crucial north-south and east-west crossroads.

At stake is first of all the future of incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party government, which came to power in 2018 after the Velvet Revolution. The movement ousted the government of long-term leader Serzh Sarkisian, who had tried to prolong his stay in power “by moving from the office of president to that of prime minister”.^[1] This triggered nation-wide protests propelling Pashinyan to the premiership that May and to electoral victory in December.

Under Pashinyan, who was re-elected in 2021, Armenia has generally gravitated towards the European Union and away from Russia.^[2] The latter is mostly a result of Russia’s failure to support Armenia during the Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. The offensive resulted in Azerbaijan retaking control over the territory, which Armenia had illegally occupied since the first Karabakh war in the early 1990s – causing the displacement of around 100,000 Armenians from the region. These events unfolded in the presence of Russian ‘peacekeepers’ deployed under the terms of a cease fire agreement that ended the second Karabakh war in 2020.^[3]

Armenia’s election on 7 June therefore marks an important milestone not only domestically, but also for the wider region. Pashinyan campaigns on a platform “to reopen the country’s borders, lower dependence on Russia, and diversify its foreign and economic profile by normalising relations with traditional adversaries Azerbaijan and Turkey”.^[4] If Pashinyan secures another term, this would give him the mandate to carry out a major shift in Armenia’s foreign policy orientation, and in this sense, the elections are also a “strategic referendum on Armenia’s geopolitical orientation.”^[5]

A popular endorsement of Pashinyan’s agenda would enable the continuation of three important trends in the region: first, the gradual emergence of regional ties between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan; second, further declining Russian influence in a region where Moscow once was the undisputed hegemonic power; and third, a strengthening foothold for the EU and the US in a region that is a strategic land bridge towards Central Asia and China.

The relationship between Moscow and Yerevan has steadily deteriorated over the past decade.^[6] Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the weight and significance of Russia in the region has clearly diminished, but this has been a gradual process, rather than an abrupt rupture.^[7]

While Russia retains significant influence in Georgia, and the Georgian Dream government in Tbilisi is, for now, seemingly more closely aligned with Moscow than with either Brussels or Washington, it is also trying to balance its relationship more carefully between Russia and the West. This includes forging closer ties with Azerbaijan and Türkiye.^[8] A victory for Pashinyan and his pro-Western agenda is likely to reinforce the trend towards the geopolitical re-orientation of the region, but this will remain a more careful multi-vector balancing act – with a mixture of political, economic, and cultural relationships to different actors outside the region – rather than a more one-directional pivot towards the West.^[9]

Although Russian influence may be declining, Moscow’s strategic interests in the South Caucasus, including in Armenia, remain strong. Russia is poised to use whatever tools and leverage it still has to prevent a further decline of its role as erstwhile regional hegemon, including by using cultural and religious channels of influence.^[10] Economically, Russia remains Armenia’s most important trade partner and energy supplier.^[11] Many opposition forces also remain closely aligned with Russia, including the Strong Armenia bloc led by billionaire Samvel Karapetyan.^[12] Most Armenians favour diversification of relations rather than an outright rejection of Russia. According to recent polling, 43% see Moscow as the country’s most important partner, compared to 42% who think of Washington in that way, and 29% who think of Brussels.^[13]

The geopolitical dynamics in and around Armenia are therefore more complex and nuanced than the political rhetoric accompanying them. Yet, Russia’s capacity to exercise real influence effectively – and comparably to its previous dominance – is more constrained than ever. For example, Armenia has completely shifted away from Moscow as a security provider not only rhetorically but also in terms of who now supplies most of its arms: where Russia once accounted for over 90% of Armenia’s weapons purchases, its share has now dropped to somewhere between 5% and 10%, while France and India have become Armenia’s primary defence partners.^[14]

Armenia, thus, has not, and most likely will not, replace its close alignment with Russia with one that solely relies on the West. However, the change in foreign policy direction under Pashinyan has clearly shifted away from Russia and towards Brussels and Washington. On the European side, this has been reciprocated with the back-to-back European Political Community summit and first bilateral Armenia-EU summit held in Yerevan in May 2026.^[15]

The United States under President Donald Trump has also demonstrated a continuing interest in the region, which is most evident in Trump’s engagement in trying to broker a permanent peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While this has yet to be achieved, several pieces of this puzzle have been put in place, including, most recently, a bilateral framework agreement on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).^[16] Given the transactional and erratic nature of much of Trump’s foreign policy, this is unlikely to be a pivotal game changer either for peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan or for long-term US commitment to the country or the region, but it is part of the broader picture of the geopolitical importance of Armenia and the South Caucasus – and the opportunities that this may create for Pashinyan’s agenda.

A careful balance therefore needs to be struck between dismissing Armenia’s parliamentary elections as the continuation of Armenia’s historic dependence on Russia, and exclusively reorienting strategic alignment in the much bigger geopolitical game surrounding the South Caucasus. The outcome of the elections will be important for the country’s direction, and speed of travel: whoever forms the next government in Yerevan will still have a range of pre-existing problems to resolve in an environment where external support is neither certain nor dependably benign.

James Stanley is an M.A. International Relations student at the University of Birmingham. He has experience in policy research and public engagement, including contributing to the Helios exhibition at The Exchange. His research interests include Russia, European security, and the wider Eurasian region.

Stefan Wolff is Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre and Professor of International Security in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Birmingham. A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts, in post-conflict state-building in deeply divided and war-torn societies, and in contemporary geopolitics and great-power rivalry. Wolff has extensive expertise in the post-Soviet space and has also worked on a wide range of other conflicts elsewhere, including in the Middle East and North Africa, in Central Asia, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Wolff holds degrees from the University of Leipzig (Erstes Staatsexamen), the University of Cambridge (M.Phil.), and the LSE (Ph.D.).

Image: © European Union 2026 – Source : EP

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Miriam Lanskoy and Elspeth Suthers, Armenia’s Velvet Revolution. Journal of Democracy, April 2019, https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0027

^[2] Council of the European Union, EU Relations with Armenia, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/armenia/

^[3] Michael Ertl, Nagorno-Karabakh: Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenians explained, BBC News,September 2023, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66852070

^[4] Thomas de Waal, Armenia’s Election Is a Foreign Affair, Strategic Europe, November 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2025/11/armenias-election-is-a-foreign-affair

^[5] Robert Lansing Institute, Armenia’s Parliamentary Elections 2026: A Battle for the State’s Geopolitical Future,May 2026, https://lansinginstitute.org/2026/05/18/armenias-parliamentary-elections-2026-a-battle-for-the-states-geopolitical-future/

^[6] Ulviyya Asadzade, Russia’s Grip Weakens In The South Caucasus, Opening Doors To New Players, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 2025, https://www.rferl.org/a/south-caucasus-russia-losing-influence-armenia-azerbaijan/33475018.html

^[7] Emil Avdaliani, “Russian Influence Drains Away in the South Caucasus”, Center for European Policy Analysis, 22 May 2026, https://cepa.org/article/russian-influence-drains-away-in-the-south-caucasus/

^[8] Mark Temnycky, Caught Between NATO And Russia, Georgia Turns To The South Caucasus, Forbes, December 2025, https://www.forbes.com/sites/marktemnycky/2025/12/13/caught-between-nato-and-russia-georgia-turns-to-the-south-caucasus/

^[9] Laurence Broers, Armenia’s election: Voters to decide on Pashinyan’s peace agenda”, Chatham House, May 2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/05/armenias-election-voters-decide-pashinyans-peace-agenda

^[10] Mikayel Zolyan, “Russia Won’t Give Up Its Influence in Armenia Without a Fight”, Carnegie Politika, 3 February 2026, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/01/armenia-russia-drifting-apart; Davit Gasparyan, Russian Religious Networks and Armenia’s Church-State Confrontation, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, March 2026, https://substack.com/home/post/p-188618614

^[11] SpecialEurasia, Trade as Leverage: Russia’s Enduring Economic Role in Armenia, March 2026, https://www.specialeurasia.com/2026/03/11/trade-russia-armenia-leverage/

^[12] Sergey Kanev, Grabbing him by the ‘Beard’: The Insider identifies the FSB, GRU, and SVR agents Russia sent to Armenia to take on PM Nikol Pashinyan, The Insider, May 2026, https://theins.press/en/inv/292740

^[13] International Republican Institute, Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Armenia, February 2026, March 2026, https://www.iri.org/resources/public-opinion-survey-residents-of-armenia-february-2026/

^[14] Leonid Nersisyan and Sergei Melkonian, Escaping Russia’s Backyard: Armenia’s Strategic Defense Shift, War on the Rocks, November 2024, https://warontherocks.com/escaping-russias-backyard-armenias-strategic-defense-shift/

^[15] Rayhan Demytrie, European leaders converge on Armenia as Russia looks on, BBC News, May 2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cgkp1124y3yo

^[16] Office of the Spokesperson, The United States and Armenia Announce the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) Framework Agreement and Sign the Strategic Partnership Charter and Critical Minerals Memorandum of Understanding, US Department of State, May 2026, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/05/the-united-states-and-armenia-announce-tripp-framwork-agreement-and-sign-the-strategic-partnership-charter-and-critical-minerals-mou/

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Regions

Armenia

South Caucasus

Op-ed | International law, institutional collapse, and the danger of selective concern

Article by Laura Vidal

January 15, 2026

Op-ed | International law, institutional collapse, and the danger of selective concern

In the immediate aftermath of Nicolás Maduro’s military extraction by the United States, protests erupted across major cities in Europe and the Americas calling for respect for Venezuela’s sovereignty. Venezuelans themselves, however, were largely absent from these protests. This contrast is not incidental. It reflects a deeper misalignment in how the crisis is being framed and debated.

For Venezuelans abroad, this moment has triggered yet another cycle of incomprehension. Many are confronted with responses that center almost exclusively on international law and precedent, while leaving aside the humanitarian and human rights crisis that has driven millions into forced migration or exile. This tension mirrors the ambivalent position of the region itself: shaken by a military intervention, yet unable to deny nearly two decades of institutional dismantling under authoritarian rule.

In the days following Maduro’s extraction, expressions of joy and relief within Venezuela circulated widely on social media platforms, often accessed through VPNs. Such reactions, however, carry real risks. Reports indicate that individuals have been detained, had their phones searched, and faced extortion when authorities discovered any reference to the intervention or signs of celebration.^[1]

Critics of the intervention have rightly underscored the gravity of violating territorial integrity and the risks such actions pose to international law. Carolina Sandoval, president of Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), pointed at regional concerns by the precedent being set, particularly given the long history of US military action in the hemisphere.^[2] At the same time, Sandoval also acknowledges a second, unresolved dimension: Venezuela has endured years of systematic repression under an authoritarian and violent government, and the need for accountability and a democratic transition remains urgent.

As political actors reposition themselves and new details emerge, another uncomfortable reality has become harder to ignore. Despite decades of anti-imperialist rhetoric, it appears increasingly evident to many analysts that negotiations with the United States were not imposed from the outside, but actively pursued by actors within the regime itself. This contradiction between discourse and practice further complicates efforts to interpret the moment through clean ideological binaries. Meanwhile, the continued presence of chavismo deeply hurts the hopes of a genuine transition to democracy.

As Atlantic Council senior research fellow Iria Puyosa has noted, key figures within the governing coalition now face an unprecedented challenge: meeting Washington’s demands while preventing internal fracture or a military coup. Those demands include regulatory stability and transparent property frameworks, precisely the institutional environment that chavismo systematically dismantled over years of rule.^[3]

Language also matters in this context. For Venezuelans, particularly victims of human rights violations, an exclusive focus on sovereignty and legal neutrality is not a technical debate but a political act. As journalist and human rights defender Luis Carlos Díaz told me, “framing the crisis solely in terms of territorial violation without acknowledging the criminal capture of the Venezuelan state produces a concrete effect: it normalises and protects those responsible for destroying constitutional order and committing crimes against humanity. From the perspective of victims, this is not neutrality: it is discursive revictimisation”.

This is not an isolated rupture

Any attempt to understand the current moment collapses if it treats the US intervention as an isolated rupture caused by a single set of actors. Venezuela was not a space free of foreign influence prior to this operation.

Cuban involvement in intelligence and repressive structures has been documented for years, facilitated through political and economic exchanges that included preferential access to oil.^[4] Russian military presence is also well established, including documented operations linked to the Wagner Group.^[5] Venezuela remains deeply indebted to Chinese creditors, owing roughly 20 billion dollars in loans that have shaped economic dependency and constrained policy autonomy. Iran has provided technological support that has translated into tools of repression, including the reported use of drones during demonstrations in 2024.^[6] This record complicates claims that a previously respected red line was suddenly crossed.

Venezuela’s institutional dismantling and democratic struggle did not begin recently. It spans nearly three decades, with the past ten years marking the most intense phase, one in which legal frameworks, state resources, and institutional checks were stretched or eliminated to extinguish meaningful separation of powers. Within this trajectory, the 2024 elections stand out as a critical turning point. For many Venezuelans, they represented the last available democratic mechanism, despite conditions that were neither free nor fair and despite widespread expectations of fraud.

International responses to these elections revealed a familiar pattern. While condemnations were issued, institutional action stalled. In late July 2024, the Organization of American States rejected a resolution calling on the Venezuelan government to provide transparency regarding the election results, with 17 votes in favor, none against, and a notable number of 11 abstentions.^[7] To this day, Maduro’s government has failed to present evidence substantiating its claimed victory.^[8]

None of this justifies violent interventions. It does, however, situate recent events within a longer history of institutional collapse, abandoned justice, and power vacuums already exploited by multiple actors across ideological lines. As the Venezuelan civil society organisation CEPAZ has warned, “the international community now faces one last major opportunity to mitigate a crisis that its own prolonged ineffectiveness helped create”.^[9]

Human rights cannot be bracketed out

Any analysis of Venezuela that sidelines human rights is analytically incomplete. The situation of political prisoners offers a stark entry point. Detention in Venezuela is constantly referred to by human rights defenders as a “revolving-door” system marked by deaths in custody, forced disappearances, and torture.^[10] So-called “releases” are often conditional, opaque, and reversible, functioning as instruments of control rather than steps toward justice. The pace of releases has been extremely slow, and new detentions are feared.^[11]

These practices are not confined to isolated events.^[12] Nearly a third of the population has fled the country, many under precarious conditions that expose them to exploitation and trafficking networks along migration routes. Inside Venezuela, the humanitarian crisis remains complex and multidimensional, affecting access to food, healthcare, and other basic services. Independent media has been blocked or captured, while transnational repression extends surveillance and intimidation beyond borders.^[13] Internet access is limited, unreliable, and often dangerous.^[14] Vulnerable groups, including Indigenous communities, face persistent attacks despite having once served as a central pillar of the regime’s legitimacy.^[15]

This reality is often misrepresented as the consequence of international sanctions alone, despite the fact that economic collapse and institutional erosion began years before sectorial sanctions came into force.^[16] The persistence of this narrative obscures responsibility and diverts attention from corruption and deliberate policy choices that hollowed out the state.

Amid widespread confusion and the difficulty of making sense of incomplete and often contested data, many of the most reliable sources on Venezuela today are civil society organisations, some of them working in exile. These organisations have been essential in documenting the multiple, overlapping layers that define the crisis, offering analyses that move beyond fixed or binary narratives. They continue to play that role despite operating under constant persecution, threats, and criminalisation inside the country, while simultaneously facing defunding and diminishing support from international partners and allies.

Weighing what already broke

It is expected that governments, political parties, and institutions interpret events through their own lenses and fears. The rupture represented by a US military extraction is serious, and the concerns it raises regarding its precedent and international law are legitimate. But treating this moment as the beginning of the problem distorts the balance of what is at stake.

The Venezuelan crisis ceased to be solely a domestic problem years ago. It has reshaped migration routes across the hemisphere, strained regional economies, and generated humanitarian emergencies well beyond national borders. It has also been sustained by economic interests and political arrangements in which multiple actors benefited from the regime’s permanence, even as institutions collapsed and accountability disappeared.

Focusing exclusively on the legality of a single act, while ignoring the accumulated damage that made such an act conceivable, risks repeating the same error that has defined international engagement with Venezuela for over a decade: reacting to moments of rupture while tolerating the slow dismantling that precedes them. If international law is to retain meaning, it cannot be invoked only at the point of intervention. It must also reckon with the long record of impunity, complicity, and selective concern that paved the way.

Laura Vidal is a digital rights researcher and civil society observer working across Latin America and international spaces. For nearly two decades, she has followed and documented Venezuela’s crisis from multiple vantage points, with a focus on authoritarianism, technology, and gender. She currently works with IFEX and Digital Action, and her research, analysis, and essays have been published by organisations such as Internews, The Engine Room, Mozilla, APC, EFF, and Global Voices, among others. Her work sits at the intersection of digital power, civic resilience, and the lived experiences of communities navigating repression and displacement.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Espacio Público, Detienen a cinco ciudadanos por celebrar detención de Maduro, Espacio Público, January 2026, . https://espaciopublico.ong/detienen-a-cinco-ciudadanos-por-celebrar-detencion-de-maduro/

^[2]In interview with Efecto Cocuyo, Efecto Paz #11 – Presos políticos después del 3E, January 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EhV_CpfoBpw&t=2821s

^[3]Iria Puyosa, Delcy Rodríguez’s untenable balancing act, Atlantic Council, January 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/delcy-rodriguezs-untenable-balancing-act/

^[4] Angus Berwick, Imported repression: How Cuba taught Venezuela to quash military dissent, Reuters Investigates, August 2019, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/venezuela-cuba-military/; Armando.Info, La bitácora de los tanqueros fantasmas al servicio de la revolución, Armando.Info, April 2020, https://armando.info/la-bitacora-de-los-tanqueros-fantasmas-al-servicio-de-la-revolucion/

^[5] Silja Thoms, Más allá de Rusia: la actividad del Grupo Wagner en Venezuela, Deutsche Welle, June 2023, https://www.dw.com/es/m%C3%A1s-all%C3%A1-de-rusia-la-actividad-de-grupo-wagner-en-venezuela/a-66048041

^[6] Conexión Segura y Libre / VE sin Filtro, Censura y represión digital en las elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela, 2025, https://vesinfiltro.org/res/files/informe-presidenciales_2024-VEsinFiltro.pdf; Laura Bicker, Trump’s Venezuela raid has created chaos — and that is a risk for China, BBC News, January 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly92dkxqvko

^[7] Yurani Arciniegas, Fracasa en el Consejo de la OEA resolución que pedía transparencia al Gobierno de Venezuela, France 24, July 2024, https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20240731-%F0%9F%94%B4-en-directo-petro-afirma-que-hay-graves-dudas-sobre-los-comicios-en-venezuela-y-pide-transparencia

^[8] Tiago Rogero, How Venezuela’s opposition proved its election win: ‘A brilliant political move’, The Guardian, August 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/10/gonzalez-proof-win-venezuela-election-vote-tally-maduro

^[9] Centro de Justicia y Paz (CEPAZ), La comunidad internacional tiene una última gran oportunidad en Venezuela de mitigar la crisis que su propia ineficacia ocasionó, January 2026, https://cepaz.org/la-comunidad-internacional-tiene-una-ultima-gran-oportunidad-en-venezuela-de-mitigar-la-crisis-que-su-propia-ineficacia-ocasiono/

^[10]Deutsche Welle, Muere bajo custodia un policía detenido en Venezuela, November 2026, https://www.dw.com/es/muere-bajo-custodia-un-polic%C3%ADa-detenido-en-venezuela/a-75463951

^[11] BBC News, “I thought I was going to die”: Jailed Venezuelan activist details brutality of prison life, January 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgz5l6l7k7o

^[12] United Nations News, Venezuela’s National Guard linked to killings, torture and repression, UN probe finds, December 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166565

^[13] Matt Ford, Colombia: Venezuelan activists attacked in targeted shooting, DW (Reuters/AP), October 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/colombia-venezuelan-activists-attacked-in-targeted-shooting/a-74341871

^[14] Iria Puyosa, Andrés Azpúrua, Daniel Suárez Pérez, How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism, Atlantic Council, July 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/how-venezuela-became-a-model-for-digital-authoritarianism/

^[15] FundaRedes, Boletín N.º 47: Grupos armados y Estado venezolano vulneran el derecho a la vida de los pueblos indígenas, FundaRedes, November 2023, https://www.fundaredes.org/2023/11/01/boletin47-grupo-armados-y-estado-venezolano-vulneran-el-derecho-a-la-vida-de-los-pueblos-indigenas/; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Venezuela 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/venezuela

^[16] Nizar El Fakih, Aproximación al Régimen de Sanciones Internacionales y al caso de Venezuela, Discussion Document No. IDB-DP-840, Inter-American Development Bank, December 2020, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://publications.iadb.org/en/node/29550&ved=2ahUKEwiWtLq81IiSAxWFVKQEHW0vBnUQFnoECBYQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Ega3sYVRtvTyuCerIVUlw

Topics

Civil Society

Human Rights

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Latin America

Op-ed | Armenia’s 2026 Parliamentary Election and the Future of the South Caucasus

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Op-ed | International law, institutional collapse, and the danger of selective concern

This is not an isolated rupture

Human rights cannot be bracketed out

Weighing what already broke

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