Religion and Forced Displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World

Edited by Lucian N. Leustean
Executive Summary

By Lucian N. Leustean

This Policy Report examines the relationship between religion-state relations, forced displacement, religious diplomacy and human security in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, with a focus on eight countries in the region, Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine. It engages with four areas: 1) the circulation of ideas on human security between religious and secular courts, monastic settlements, pilgrimage sites and educational establishments; 2) religious strategies in relation to violence, tolerance, transitory environments and resettlement; 3) religious support, protection and mechanisms towards displaced populations, and 4) channels of religious diplomacy advancing human security.

The Policy Report summarises the findings of two British Academy projects running at Aston University that have collected a dataset on ‘Eastern Orthodoxy and Human Security’ composed of 70 interviews with officials in Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine belonging to three main categories, namely: 1) religious practitioners (lay people, lower and higher clergy) in charge of humanitarian programmes; 2) governmental and civil society organisations; and 3) academics working in national universities and academies of sciences. Findings from the interviews have been included in this collection.

This publication seeks to answer a number of important questions:

1. What happens when states fail to support migrants and forcibly displaced populations? How do religious actors (national churches, religious institutions, national and internationally affiliated organisations) and state bodies engage with human security in Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine?
2. What are the mechanisms of Orthodox support towards forcibly displaced communities in these countries? How does displacement impact upon religious practices, values and political structures?
3. How does Orthodox diplomacy impact upon state relations in Eastern Europe and Eurasia and, most importantly, between Eastern and Western Europe?

The publication finds that:

1. First, European Union (EU) migration policies and forced migration are highly contentious and have been politicised in predominantly Orthodox countries, entailing a long-term impact on East-West relations. At times, the EU’s approach to migration has been presented as a sign of an ideological clash between East and West.

2. Second, when states fail to offer support for populations affected by violence, religious communities have been one of the first actors to take over state functions and act as providers of human security. In the first months of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Christian and Muslim communities crossed the faith divide mobilised themselves nationally in support of internally displaced people before the Ukrainian government issued a national strategy. In Serbia,
based organisations supported Syrian refugees following the Balkan route by working with local authorities and the government before an organised policy response had been implemented. In many cases, authorities turned to religious communities to provide support for migrants as the state did not have the necessary mechanisms to address humanitarian emergencies.

3. Third, in the Donbass region, the ‘buffer zone’ is not just one between military forces but a spiritual and geographical space between religions not only generating violence but also supporting tolerance and reconciliation. In Ukraine, competing Orthodox churches have their own humanitarian networks supporting local populations and displaced population. One of them, the local Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), regards the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a civil war and has been involved in the release of prisoners of war.

4. Fourth, the competition between Orthodox churches continues to reverberate, having an impact not only on relations between religious communities but also directly affecting state support and engagement with human security. The rivalry between the national Orthodox churches in Ukraine, the support of the Ukrainian government for religious independence outside Moscow, and the increasing anti-Westernism of Orthodox clergy faced by a dramatic number of Syrian migrants and migrant camps along the Balkan route, are directly linked to the ways in which state structures address and manage violence, security and social cohesion.

5. The topic of forced displacement is highly contentious not only in countries directly affected by the refugee crisis but also in others in the region. The refugee crisis has led to an internationally-linked Orthodox conservatism characterised by five components: defending a mythical past; fostering close relations with state authorities; anti-Westernism; building conservative networks at local, national and geopolitical levels; and, presenting Orthodox churches as alternative governance structures. For example, in Bulgaria, the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church, the highest religious authority in the country, stood out as the first religious body in the region to publicly challenge the government’s policy towards refugees. In Moldova, during debates in the run up to the presidential elections, the Orthodox Church endorsed the fake news that 30,000 Syrians were about to arrive in the country affecting the balance between the pro-Russian and pro-EU candidates.

6. The exact figures of forcibly displaced populations remain unclear. In many cases, people in need refuse to register with state bodies due to fears of violence and deportation, and they find the means of support from other civil society sources. Contradictory figures are provided by a wide range of national and international organisations, for example, in Greece, Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine.

7. Religious diversity remains one of the most challenging issues in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states. It is without doubt that many religious communities have provided support to populations in need, particularly at local level. However, fear of the ‘other’ and proselytism remain dominant and characterise the ways in which religious communities have responded to humanitarian crises. Religion-state relations are different for each country in the region going back to the role of religious communities in the establishment of modern nation states. Understanding the intricacies of religion-state relations is fundamental to the ways in which religious communities and state authorities support each other in times of both ‘peace’ and ‘crisis’.

8. As a general rule, Eastern Christian churches do not publicise their social activities, putting forward theological arguments that humanitarian activities should not be made public. The

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2 Findings 1-4 stem from the first British Academy project (2018) which focused on Serbia and Ukraine.
transparency of funds used in social programmes has been linked to the social and political legitimacy of each religious confession. This has been particularly poignant in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, with the lack of large-scale humanitarian programmes linked to the ways in which religion-state relations have evolved after the fall of communism.

Based on these findings the publication makes a number of policy recommendations:

1. Religious literacy among political elites in Europe would help counter the politicisation of religion. There should be wider public and policy awareness of the ways in which political messages are delivered by religious channels of communication. The politicisation of religion in the Eastern Orthodox world will continue to shape relations between Russia and the EU. The ongoing conflict in Donbass and increasing regional instability will lead to further employment of religious symbols.

2. There is no (or in a number of cases, very limited) dialogue between Orthodox churches and their social departments working on humanitarian issues. A refugee entering a country on the Balkan route or one of the former Soviet states experiences varied levels of religious and state solidarity and humanitarian support. Cooperation between religious communities (as for example, the support of people in need by religious practitioners from the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church) has produced a tangible result for the migrants in state-run camps. Inter-religious cooperation on humanitarian issues should be encouraged and followed up not only internationally, but also at the national level. External funding to humanitarian programmes should include a wide range of religious actors, not only favouring the predominant religious confession in the country.

3. Religious education in this region should include more references to and examples of both violence and reconciliation. Many clergy depict the EU as an ideological bloc opposing Orthodox values. Opportunities should be funded encouraging religious practitioners and students of theology/religion to travel and study in the EU, which would lead to greater openness and understanding among not only religious leaders but also, and more importantly, within local communities affected by conflict.

4. Religious communities remain key to both violence and reconciliation. Policy makers should be aware of the potential of religious communities to aggravate violence. They should work with both local and top-level religious leaders to generate greater cooperation between state and religious structures benefiting populations in need. For example, the high degree of support since 2014 among the Ukrainian population for the former Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate, now mostly incorporated into the new Orthodox Church of Ukraine, was not only due to the church leadership’s welcoming of European values but also due to its support for Ukraine’s military forces in Donbass. The numbers of military chaplains accompanying the troops has been reflected by the population’s trust in the Kyiv Patriarchate at the expense of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).

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3 Findings 5-8 are based the second British Academy project (2018-2020) which focused on Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia and Moldova.
4 Most of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate has merged with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, to create the Orthodox Church of Ukraine following the Tomos (decree) of autocephaly (decree of ecclesial independence) by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in Istanbul on January 5th 2019. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate was subsequently revived in 2019 by former UOC (KP) Patriarch Filaret (following the election of Epiphanius I as Metropolitan of the new church).
What the authors say:

The Policy Report includes eight chapters on the countries under investigation (Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine) written by scholars with linguistic proficiency and access to material in national languages. Each chapter follows the same format to provide a short overview of religion, ethnicity and population, the key areas of religion-state relations and religion and forced displacement and a number of policy recommendations pertinent to each country.

Jasmine Dum-Tragut examines the ways in which the concept of the ‘other’ has been present in the social mobilisation of religious communities in the Republic of Armenia. She argues that state authorities and the Armenian Apostolic Church, the predominant religious confession, could benefit from the experience of religious minorities in addressing humanitarian issues.

Daniela Kalkandjieva argues that the anti-migration attitude of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has been linked to the ways in which the concepts of national identity and state sovereignty are imagined and integrated in Bulgarian society. Labelling refugees exclusively on religious terms has led to an increase in xenophobic discourses and right-wing nationalism.

Tornike Metreveli focuses on religion-state relations in Georgia and argues that competition between the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Church and the Muslim community have had an impact on state involvement with humanitarian programmes. The Georgian case stands out as the country experienced three waves of internal forced displacement. Each wave has shown that religious identity and state building processes have been interlinked.

Georgios E. Trantas and Eleni D. Tseligka investigate the social mobilisation of the Orthodox Church of Greece towards the European refugee crisis. They argue that the arrival of asylum seekers and refugees has represented a challenge for local religious and state structures. They write that Greece, as one of the key entry points, and the EU experienced the rise of populist discourses with a direct impact upon populations in need.

Andrei Avram examines competing narratives on migration among the two Orthodox churches in the Republic of Moldova (under Russian and Romanian jurisdictions). He shows that the massive emigration of Moldovan population has been reflected in the ways in which both churches tackled humanitarian programmes. Top clergy under Moscow jurisdiction have condemned the refugee crisis appealing to local population and influencing party politics.

Roman Lunkin argues that the Soviet legacy of church-state relations has had an impact on the ways in which religious communities engaged with migrants. He focuses on the humanitarian programmes run by the Russian Orthodox Church with state support and in collaboration with other religious organisations. He points out that a wide range of religious communities are involved in humanitarian programmes advancing religious and ethnic identification and having an impact on religious diversity.

Aleksandra Đurić-Milovanović and Marko Veković examine the humanitarian mobilisation of Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant and Muslim communities towards displaced populations in Serbia. They argue that in the aftermath of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, inter-religious dialogue has enabled religious communities to engage with and support displaced populations.

Dmytro Vovk focuses on the interplay between religious mobilisation and forced displacement as a result of the 2014 Russia-Ukraine conflict. He shows that the religious factor has been present in two
ways: first, religious communities have provided support for internally displaced persons; and second, religious discourses have regularly been politicised. The chapter on Ukraine should be read together with the chapter on Russia to understand similarities and differences among the ways in which religious and state authorities engaged with populations in need. For example, the exact number of displaced populations and currently present on the territory of both countries remains controversial with parallel figures advanced by state authorities and international organisations.
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1. Religion and Forced Displacement in the Republic of Armenia

By Jasmine Dum-Tragut

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and its newly gained independence in 1991, the Republic of Armenia (RA) underwent profound demographic changes. Since the late 1980s, the country has experienced waves of migration caused by the devastating earthquake of 1988 and the armed conflict with neighbouring Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) region, which resulted in border blockades and harsh economic conditions. Since then, Armenia has been characterised by one of the highest migration rates worldwide, as more than one third of the population lives permanently outside the country. From 2008 to 2012, Armenia was one of the main countries of origin of asylum seekers and economic refugees entering the European Union (EU). The emigration of an estimated one million Armenians since 1988 has been offset by the influx of ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and NK, and, in the last five to six years, from Iraq, Iran and Syria. In
addition, repatriated diaspora Armenians have started to return home. In addition, a relatively small proportion of incomers is formed by non-ethnic Armenians, such as refugees from Ukraine, the Far East and a number of African states.

Religion, ethnicity and population
As part of the Soviet Union, Armenia was the smallest (29,800 km²) but ethnically most homogenous republic. In the last Soviet census in 1989, Armenia, having already been affected by the 1988 earthquake, had a de jure population of 3,304,776 million, of whom two thirds were urban and one third rural. Ethnic Armenians represented the majority of the population (93.5 per cent), followed by Azerbaijanis, Kurds and Yezidis. After independence, the first Armenian census in 2001 already reflected drastic demographic changes with a population of 3,213,011, composed of 97.9 per cent Armenians with Yezidis as the largest ethnic minority (1.2 per cent). The Azerbaijanis had left or been expelled from the country. After 2001, even greater demographic homogenisation was caused by the emigration of Russian-speaking Armenians and ethnic minorities as a consequence of strict language policies, and a wave of repatriation on the part of incoming diaspora Armenians. The census of 2011 counted 3,018,854 inhabitants, of whom 98.1 per cent were ethnic Armenians, followed by 1.1 per cent Yezidis and 0.3 per cent Russians. In both censuses, the answer to the optional question of ethnic affiliation was recorded according to the respondent’s self-identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Census 1989</td>
<td>3,304,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Census 2001</td>
<td>3,213,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Census 2011</td>
<td>3,018,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Armenia October 2019</td>
<td>2,957,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Population decrease in the Republic of Armenia, total numbers

Armenia is also labelled the last Christian bulwark in this region. The oldest Christian state in the world looks, at least in terms of official figures and statistics, to have a predominantly Christian population, with more than 90 per cent belonging to the Armenian Apostolic Church. In the census of 2011, the population was asked about its faith and religious affiliation for the first time after 70 years of Soviet atheist indoctrination. 95.97 per cent of the population described themselves as believers, with 96.55 per cent of these belonging to the Armenian Apostolic Church, the national church of Armenia. The next largest religious groups with 1.01 per cent were the Evangelicals and with 0.87 per cent the followers of Shar-fadin (Yezidism).

The question of religious affiliation was again based on self-identification with a religion or religious denomination, and cannot not be equated with official membership in the respective religious or denominational community or with active practicing of the given faith.

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Table 2: Religious affiliation in the Republic of Armenia, Census 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Apostolic Church</td>
<td>2,797,187</td>
<td>96.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>29,280</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shar-fadin (Yezidism)</td>
<td>23,374</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>13,996</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehovah’s Witnesses</td>
<td>8,695</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>7,587</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagan</td>
<td>5,416</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molokan (Russian Old Ritualists)</td>
<td>2,874</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assyrian</td>
<td>1,733</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mormon</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5,299</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,018,854</strong></td>
<td><strong>95.97%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, there is some doubt about the official population figures of Armenia. Due to population movements, mainly from Armenia (caused by both significant labour migration to Russia and Turkey and ongoing emigration), and to a much lesser extent also to Armenia (repatriation or naturalisation of diaspora Armenians), the number of people residing permanently in Armenia appears to be much smaller than the stated figures. The declining birth rate also contributes to the ongoing population decline.12

The figures reflecting population distribution in terms of ethnicity, mother tongue and religious affiliation should also be critically examined. Information provided by representatives and associations of the respective ethnic and religious groups differ significantly from the census data.

Religion-state relations

At various times in the history of Armenia, the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) clearly held the position of national leader, and was strongly committed to preserving national culture and values. In the 1980s, the AAC was also involved in the movement towards regaining independence for Armenia and for the liberation of NK. With the country having achieved independence, the leadership of the republic had to redefine the balance of power in the state, and to formulate internationally recognised legislation concerning religion and religious groups. The 1988 earthquake provided fertile grounds for various ‘foreign’ religious organisations, with some arriving bearing humanitarian aid, and some regarding post-Soviet Armenia as a suitable market place for Evangelisation. Thus, even before the adoption of the first post-Soviet constitution in 1995, the law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations (FCRO) was passed on June 17th 1991 and amended in 1997, 2001 and 2011.13 This law, the RA Constitution of July 5th 1995, amended in 2005 and 2015, and the Law regarding the relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church (RAHAAC) of February 2nd 2007, form the most relevant legal documents regulating the

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11 Ibid.
12 After a short-term increase in 2013-2014, the crude birth rate has been dropping annually over the last five years, down to 12.3 births per 1,000 capita of population in 2018. For more information see https://www.ceicdata.com/en/armenia/vital-statistics/vital-statistics-crude-birth-rate-per-1000-population. The de jure population in 2018 was estimated at 2,927,700 inhabitants according to the demographic yearbook of the Armenian Statistical Bureau, The Demographic Yearbook of Armenia, 2018 https://www.populationof.net/armenia/
Religious affairs of the republic. They also address the distribution of power between state and church, while also emphasising the role of AAC for the Armenian people:

- The FCRO begins declaring the AAC as the "national Church of the Armenian people" and "an important bulwark for the edification of its spiritual life and national preservation", but establishes in Article 6.17 the separation of church and state.
- Article 18 of the Armenian Constitution provides for the separation of church and state, but also defines the "exclusive historical mission" of the AAC.
- The RAHAAC 2007 recognises in Article 2 the special relationship between the AAC and the state and the AAC as national church, as "an important and indivisible part of the foundation of the national identity".

The new government following the ‘velvet revolution’ of 2018 declared on various occasions the strict separation between state and government and its will not to interfere in church matters regarding religions minorities. It suspended, however the process of adopting a new draft of the law on religious freedom.

Religion and forced displacement

The Republic of Armenia is generally regarded as a traditional emigration country. The figures for the last 30 years indicate a continuing trend. This high level of emigration was initially a consequence of the 1988 earthquake, the armed conflict over NK in the 1990s, and economic factors ongoing since independence, and only to a limited extent due to discrimination or persecution based on political, religious or sexual orientation.

The displaced population in RA consists largely of ethnic Armenians, and is composed only of a relatively small proportion of non-Armenian refugees and asylum seekers. In the early 1990s, the young republic was already overwhelmed by the mass influx of 360,000 ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan as a consequence of the NK conflict between 1988 and 1992. Since 2004, Armenia has welcomed hundreds of ethnic Armenian refugees from Iraq, as well as small numbers of ‘alien’ asylum seekers and refugees from the Middle East and Asia. The conflict in the Ukraine has led to a noticeable wave of arrivals since 2014. Since 2012, however, the most significant influx has come

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15 ‘Being cognizant of the Armenian Apostolic Church as the national Church of the Armenian people and as an important bulwark for the edification of its spiritual life and national preservation’, available at https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5744/file/Armenia_law_freedom_conscience_religious_orgs_1991_am2011_en.pdf
16 Article 18 of the Armenian Constitution states that "The Armenian Apostolic Holy Church. 1. The Republic of Armenia shall recognise the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church as the national Church of the Armenian people, in the development of their national culture and preservation of their national identity. 2. The relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church may be regulated by law". https://www.president.am/en/constitution-2015/ The wording of the first version of 1991 ‘unique mission’ was changed in the amendment as response to the criticism of the Council of Europe.
17 Article 2 – Holy Armenian Apostolic Church, 1. The Republic of Armenia recognizes the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church as the national church, with the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin as its headquarters and its hierarchal sees of the Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia and the Armenian Patriarchates of Holy Jerusalem and Constantinople; and the exceptional mission of the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church in the spiritual life of the Armenian people, their national cultural development and preservation of their national identity. [...] Article IV – Legislation Regulating the Relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church. The regulating principles of the relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church are delineated by the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia; its general relationship as delineated by the RA law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" and other laws and international agreements; and its special relationship — as a relationship between the state and national church recognized by the state — as delineated by this law.
from Syria. Some 20,000 people sought shelter in Armenia, mainly ethnic Armenians, and by 2018 about 15,000 of them remained in the country. Following a short escalation of the conflict in NK in April 2016, about 2000 people were displaced from the NK villages of Talish and Mataghis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Asylum seekers</th>
<th>Status granted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Total number of asylum applications in the Republic of Armenia, 1999-2018

The Armenian authorities have reacted to the growing issue of displaced persons (DPs) and refugees by implementing corresponding laws and international agreements. In addition, Armenia quickly adopted various regulations to facilitate the status of ethnic Armenian DPs. Nevertheless, the majority of displaced ethnic Armenians, who came mainly from NK, Iraq and Syria, chose the administratively simpler and socially more prestigious residence permit or citizenship. Thus, while more than 15,000 displaced Armenians from Syria had received Armenian citizenship by 2015, just a few of them actually registered officially as asylum seekers or have the status of refugee. Nevertheless, the majority of ethnic Armenians with residence or citizenship status live in refugee-like conditions. Officially, there are 18,085 refugees and asylum seekers registered in Armenia, among them 14,718 from Syria, 1,354 from Azerbaijan, 1092 from Iraq and 573 from NK.

Table 4: Citizenships of asylum seekers arriving in the Republic of Armenia, 2014-18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Total per country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>1,021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relevant legal framework is mainly provided in the Armenian Law on Refugees and Asylum and in the law ‘On the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia’ of 1995 and amended in 2011, laws providing legislation for refugees from Azerbaijan and for ‘foreigners’ in general.23 The State Migration Service, the National Security Service, Border Guards Troops, the Passport and Visa Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the office of the president of the RA and others are the primary responsible governmental entities.

It is challenging to briefly summarise the role and position of the AAC on the DP issue. The AAC, which for centuries was the most important supporter of displaced Armenians in the diaspora, has significant difficulties in maintaining this function in the RA. Whereas until the early 2000s the precarious economic situation and the deficit of priests were cited as the main causes of inadequate humanitarian aid to DPs, in recent decades serious efforts by individual church NGOs and organisations have been repeatedly hampered due to ‘hunting for souls’ – proselytism – on the part of other churches. The AAC feels threatened in its role as national church by many religious groups, but above all by those who could win numerous ethnic Armenians for their religious communities, according to the AAC, mainly thanks to humanitarian aid campaigns and the active support of both internally displaced persons (IDPs) and DPs who crossed national borders. The mass influx of Syrian Armenians demonstrated that the AAC in Armenia is not prepared for far-reaching humanitarian programs, but still has to rely on both the financial help and the organisational experience of the AAC in the diaspora.

Due to the dearth of coverage of AAC-initiated efforts for DPs in the media and on social media, many of the AAC’s successful refugee projects were and are simply not perceived - either by governmental organisations or by the average Armenian citizen. For example, the efforts of the Armenia Inter-Church Charitable Round Table Foundation (ART), an ecumenical organisation collaborating closely with churches and NGOs with the aim of actively involving the church in social work, are almost unknown.24 Furthermore, there are many other, smaller NGOs and private initiatives of AAC priests and members that are engaged in supporting displaced Armenians from Syria, but likewise suffer from a lack of public awareness.


24 The website of the Armenia Inter-Church Charitable Round Table Foundation is available at http://www.roundtable-act.am/en/
Thus, in public opinion, the AAC is involved neither in supporting DPs, IDPs and returnees, nor does it maintain any cooperation with governmental institutions on refugee issues. Allegedly there is also a lack of clear statements by the AAC regarding DPs. The AAC also seems to barely cooperate with foreign, religious NGOs or organisations (e.g. CARITAS), but rather tries to compete with them. This may be due to the fact that in recent years the AAC has claimed to be the sole church of every ethnic Armenian, and that ‘apostates’ are often perceived as less truly Armenian. Thus, while the Armenian state, being bound by international treaties and laws, seeks to treat all DPs equally regardless of ethnic origin or religion, the behavior of the AAC tends to share widespread xenophobia with the population of the RA paired with nationalistic narrowmindedness.

**Policy perspectives**

Despite the variety of activities directed at migration and DPs in Armenia, migration policy and above all humanitarian aid are characterised by a lack of coherence, a dearth of accessible information and limited cooperation, particularly regarding interaction between the state and church, or church organisations.

The strict separation between church and state, strongly propagated by the post-revolutionary government of Nikol Pashinyan, should better be limited to political issues in foreign and domestic policy, national security and decisions in education and science, but should not refer to issues of universal human rights, tolerance and humanitarian support for ALL persons living in Armenia. Better information exchange as well as targeted, joint programmes for refugee and DP aid must be ensured.

In addition to fighting poverty and preventing further large-scale emigration, the support of DPs in Armenia should also be an important issue and priority for the AAC. This help must also reach all DPs, regardless of their origin, religion, language or cultural values. The Church should not fight a battle against proselytism at the expense of the needy; rather clerics must make every effort to support those in need of help and offer them an open ear. This would without doubt also strengthen the position of the AAC in Armenian society, showing that Christian humanitarian action is not limited to one’s own people, but also to strangers and followers of other religions.

Thus, the demand for better coherence, information flow and joint programmes also applies to the AAC and other religious organisations. The AAC should reconsider its opinion about relations with those ‘other’ churches and religious communities in the country, particularly with regard to those which have also committed themselves to helping refugees and DPs in Armenia. The AAC, which has not established comparable humanitarian programmes in its history and pastoral activities, can only profit and learn from the long humanitarian experience of these ‘others’. Though the Armenian saying “Armenians rescue Armenians first and foremost” was very true of Armenian history in the 20th century, it should not prove so not in the history of 21st century Armenia, which is an increasingly multicultural, multi-religious and highly diverse society, in which mutual respect and tolerance are the most important attributes.

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25 Nikol Pashinyan assumed the office as the 16th Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia on May 8th 2018.
2. Religion and Forced Displacement in Bulgaria

By Daniela Kalkandjieva

Introduction
The modern Bulgarian state emerged on the map of Europe in 1878. Since then, it has experienced a series of forced displacement acts, either as the receiving state or as the country of origin. Yet whereas the political and economic aspects of these displacements have attracted serious scholarly attention, the religious ones remain unexplored. This knowledge gap is largely the result of the militant atheism that until recently dominated in Bulgarian social sciences. Although the collapse of communism triggered a growing interest in religion, researchers continued to neglect its role in cases of forced migration. The situation changed in 2015 when the influx of thousands of migrants to Bulgaria provoked intense public debates centred on the religious identity of newcomers. Careful reading reveals that the host society is inclined to approach this identity through the prism of historical memories about the experience of its traditional religious communities rather than through the lens of abstract theology. Furthermore, Bulgarian citizens, living in a globalised world, have also been influenced by images and notions stirred by the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the more recent Islamist terrorist acts in Europe.

Religion, ethnicity and population
The modern Bulgarian state was created as a tributary principality of the Ottoman Empire, with the population of two million inhabiting a territory of 64,000 square kilometres situated between the Danube River and the Balkan mountain range. In 1885, the Principality of Bulgaria united with Eastern Rumelia—an Ottoman autonomous province where the majority of the population was also Bulgarian. This act augmented the territory of Bulgaria to 95,704.5 square kilometres and its population to 3,154,375.27 Later, the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the First World War (1914-1918), the Treaty of Craiova (1940), and the Paris Peace Treaty (1947) caused further modifications to the state borders. Today, Bulgaria has a territory of 110,371.8 square kilometres and is inhabited by a population of 7,000,000.28

The territorial changes were not the only factor determining the dynamics of Bulgaria’s religious and ethnic demography. No less important were the minority policies of the national governments as well as those of neighbouring states towards the Bulgarian minorities there. All these factors have left their imprint on the development of the ethnic and religious composition of modern Bulgaria (Tables 1 and 2). Interpretation of the numbers presented, however, needs to take into account the specific methodologies used in the date gathering. Until 1905, the censuses did not register the ethnic profile of citizens, but only their religious affiliation and mother tongue, e.g., as it used to be under the censuses conducted by the Ottoman authorities. In its turn, the communist regime excluded information about religion from the census. Finally, the 1992 Census introduced the collection of such data but approached religion as ‘a historically determined belonging of a citizen or that of his/her parents and ancestors to a given group with a specific religious worldview’. Therefore, it is unclear whether the figures registered reflect the family background or the personal religious identity of citizens. In 2001, the census methodology was harmonised with European Union (EU) legislation, and Bulgarians were no longer obliged to register their ethnicity, mother tongue, or religion. Due to the insufficient publicity given to this new situation, however, they took advantage of this right only in 2011, when 21.8 per cent of them declined to answer the questions concerning religion in the census questionnaire. At the same time, Bulgarian citizens were much more open to declaring their ethnicity and mother tongue; less than ten per cent of them omitted the corresponding sections in the questionnaire.29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>6,073,124</td>
<td>7,271,185</td>
<td>6,655,210</td>
<td>5,664,624</td>
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<td>3,408</td>
<td>1379</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 The 1887 Census did not collect data related to ethnicity but only about the mother tongue.
Religion and Forced Displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World

Table 1. Ethnic Demography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>2,424,371</td>
<td>3,344,790</td>
<td>4,568,773</td>
<td>5,967,992</td>
<td>7,274,592</td>
<td>6,552,751</td>
<td>4,374,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>676,215</td>
<td>603,867</td>
<td>789,269</td>
<td>938,418</td>
<td>1,110,295</td>
<td>966,978</td>
<td>577,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>24,352</td>
<td>37,656</td>
<td>46,431</td>
<td>43,335</td>
<td>2,580</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>706</td>
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<td>25,402</td>
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<td>9,672</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>1,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,154,375</td>
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<td>5,483,125</td>
<td>7,029,349</td>
<td>8,487,317</td>
<td>7,928,901</td>
<td>7,364,570</td>
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</table>

Table 2. Religious Demography

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<td>7,364,570</td>
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Church-state relations

The role of religion in acts of forced displacement has varied throughout the history of modern Bulgaria, just as the status of local religious traditions and their institutions altered under the successive political regimes. An essential factor in social life after the Liberation of 1878 but suppressed under communism (1944-1989), religion has been gradually regaining its position in society after the fall of the atheist regime. If pre-communist legislation distinguished explicitly between the majority and minority faiths by granting the status of ‘dominant religion’ to Eastern Orthodoxy (1879 Constitution, Article 37), post-communist law-making has adopted a different approach. It expresses a respect for religious freedoms (1991 Constitution, Articles 13.1 & 37), while considering Eastern Orthodoxy as the ‘traditional religion’ of Bulgaria (Article 13.3). In this regard, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) deserves special attention as the local institutional representative of this religious tradition. Before the communist takeover, its holy synod had exceptional authority in not only within its community of believers, but also generally in the religious affairs of the Bulgarian Kingdom (1879 Constitution, Article 39). Although the communist regime introduced the constitutional separation of the church and state (1947 Constitution, Article 78; 1971 Constitution, Article 53.2), it defined the local Orthodox church as a body linked with the

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32 Table 2 uses the same sources as Table 1.

33 Daniela Kalkandjieva, ‘The Bulgarian Orthodox Church: Authoring New Visions About the Orthodox Church’s Role in Contemporary Bulgarian Society’ in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), Orthodox Churches and Politics in Southeastern Europe: Nationalism, Conservativism, and Intolerance, London: Palgrave, 2019, pp. 53-83.
history and traditional faith of the Bulgarian people (1949 Law on Religions, Article 3). This vision underwent a further development in 2002 when the newly adopted Religious Denominations Act emphasised ‘the special and traditional role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the history of Bulgaria to establish and develop its spirituality and culture’ in its preamble. Moreover, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was granted \textit{ex lege} the status of judicial entity (2002 Religious Denominations Act, Article 10.1), while other religious minorities can obtain this status only via court registration (Articles 14-20).

The new legal status allows the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to act as a partner of the state in the sphere of social policies. The position of this religious institution in society is additionally enhanced by its image as the saviour of the Bulgarian people throughout history, especially during the five-century Ottoman rule. This new capacity became evident during the recent refugee crisis when the call of the BOC’s holy synod to stop incoming migrants, who were framed as a threat to Bulgarian national identity and state sovereignty, found broad support in society. The BOC has also emerged as an essential player when it comes to shaping the attitudes of people on issues linked with legislation on family affairs, and played a substantial role in blocking the ratification of the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence by the National Assembly of Bulgaria.

\textbf{Religion and forced displacement}

An analysis of the role of religion in forced displacement would be incomplete without taking into consideration the previous experience of Bulgarian society. Between 1878 and 1945, 806,000 people found asylum in Bulgaria; 698,000 of them were ethnic Bulgarians who had remained outside the borders of their kin state upon the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{34} Initially, they continued living in their settlements in the hope that these territories would be unified with Bulgaria in the future. Later on, however, they abandoned their homes due to persecution or military conflicts. As national refugees, all of them were granted Bulgarian citizenship and received significant material support from the Bulgarian state. In its turn, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church took care of their spiritual needs. If they belonged to a different faith, however, they often became subjects of attempts at forceful conversion to Orthodoxy.

This division of labour between church and state was also used in the case of foreign refugees. They consisted mostly of Armenians and Russians. The former sought asylum in Bulgaria after the massacres initiated by the Ottoman authorities in the mid-1890s and the early 1920s, while the latter fled the Bolshevik regime established in Russia. Both were met with empathy by Bulgarian society: the former shared a similar destiny with Bulgarians as victims of Ottoman rule, while the latter were exiles from Orthodox Russia that had liberated Bulgaria from that rule and was now suffering under the godless Bolsheviks.

The Bulgarian state also reached out to help these incomers. It assisted them in receiving Nansen passports (internationally recognised travel documents issued to stateless refugees by the League of Nations from 1922 to 1938). It also offered them the opportunity to obtain Bulgarian citizenship. At the same time, the diverse profile of these refugees resulted in different policies targeting the various groups. The Armenians had generally emigrated with their families and often with their neighbours and priests, and were thus able to establish self-reliant parish-based communities. Their members additionally benefited from the financial support of Armenian diaspora organisations and the Armenian Apostolic Church. They were also skilful craftsmen, who easily found a place in the domestic economy.

The Russians presented a different case: two-thirds of them were former military personnel who lacked the skills necessary for integration in a predominantly agrarian society. Their survival became possible thanks to annual subsidies secured by the Bulgarian state. The money was transferred to such organisations as the Russian Red Cross and the Union of Russian Military Veterans, which in turn distributed this aid among their members in the form of free soup kitchens, medical and educational services, housing and accommodation, etc. After having been defeated in World War I, however, Bulgaria was no longer able to provide the necessary financial support to the hundreds of thousands of refugees who were arriving. Thus, many Russians and Armenians continued to the west to settle in the wealthier victorious states.

In its turn, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church provided moral and material support to both groups of foreign refugees, even though the Armenians belonged to a different branch of Christianity. At the same time, due to its schismatic status, the BOC was not able to offer pastoral care to Orthodox Russians. Therefore, it allowed them to establish a parallel network of parishes under the jurisdiction of the Russian Synod Abroad, which had been set up in interwar Yugoslavia. Additionally, the Bulgarian Church provided them with the churches and monasteries necessary for their religious life.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events provoking displacement</th>
<th>Refugee waves</th>
<th>Bulgarian refugees</th>
<th>Armenian refugees</th>
<th>Russian refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kresna &amp; Razlog Uprising</td>
<td>1878-79</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamidian Massacres of Armenians</td>
<td>1894-96</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkan Wars</td>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>1914-18</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Genocide</td>
<td>1920-22</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian refugees</td>
<td>1920-23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3. Major Immigration Waves (1878-1945)**

Another type of forced migration appeared as a result of the bilateral population exchange agreements which Bulgaria had concluded with Turkey (1913), Greece (1919, 1927) and Romania (1940). They were facilitated by the reciprocal presence of Turkish, Greek, and Romanian minorities in Bulgaria, and of minorities of the corresponding countries in Bulgaria. As a result, the ethnic and religious profile of the displaced persons had a twofold effect: it facilitated their integration in the host state and increased the ethnoreligious homogeneity of its population. In the case of the Orthodox displaced persons (DPs), this exchange also allowed them to leave the jurisdiction of an ‘alien’ Orthodox Church and to join the national one, where they were able to attend liturgy in a familiar language. A no less noteworthy feature of this type of displacement is the settlement of the DPs alongside the state border that was closest to their previous homes.

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Religion and Forced Displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World

The next form of forced displacement was influenced by the anti-Semitic policy of the Nazi regime. As an ally of Hitlerite Germany, Bulgaria was involved in the deportation of Jews to extermination camps. During World War II, Bulgarian citizens of Jewish origin were taken from their homes, although their deportation was blocked by the active opposition of the Orthodox Church and many Bulgarians. Unfortunately, this resistance did not prevent the deportation of 11,343 Jews from the areas under Bulgarian occupation (Aegean Thrace, Vardar Macedonia, and Eastern Serbia).

Finally, religion also played a role in cases of forced emigration. According to Bulgarian scholars, about 954,000 people left Bulgaria from 1878 to 1945; about 574,000 of them were Muslims who sought a better standard of living, first in the Ottoman Empire and later in the Turkish republic. Initially motivated by the disadvantageous change in their social status, their exodus continued over the next years for various reasons (discrimination, war, and population exchange), causing constant annual flows amounting to several to tens of thousands of DPs. Most of these émigrés were Turks, but there were also many Tatars, Circassians, Pomaks and Roma. After the Treaty of Neuilly (1919), however, the Bulgarian state started limiting the emigration of Pomaks (Bulgarian speaking Muslims), and took measures to integrate them by means of education. In parallel, the Orthodox Church abandoned its previous policy of forceful conversion of Pomaks to Orthodoxy and focused its efforts on diminishing the influence of Islam on them.

Despite subscribing to a different ideology, the communist regime continued the policies of previous Bulgarian governments towards the Turkish minority, which it regarded as threatening state sovereignty. The Cold War closure of the Bulgarian-Turkish border did not stop Turkish emigration but replaced the annual flows with several big refugee waves. The last of them occurred in the mid-1980s when Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin were forced to adopt Bulgarian names. Officially justified as a means to recover of some alleged Bulgarian roots of this minority, the so-called ‘revival process’ aimed at the assimilation of this group. As a result, in the summer of 1989, 320,000 Turks left Bulgaria; half of them returned after the fall of communism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1878-1912</td>
<td>Turks, Tatars, Circassians, Pomaks, Roma</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-1925</td>
<td>Turks (and Pomaks)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-1944</td>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>155,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-78</td>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 (Summer)</td>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>320,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Major Waves of Turkish Minority Emigration and Forceful Displacement

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37 Mintchev, p. 125.
38 Data collected from Valeri Stoyanov, Turskoto naselenie v Balgariya mezhdu polyusite na etnicheskata politika [Turkish population in Bulgaria between the poles of ethnic policy], Sofia: Lik, 1998.
The fall of communism stimulated a new type of emigration from Bulgaria. In the last 30 years, about 1,300,000 citizens of working age (20-59 years) have left Bulgaria, mostly for economic reasons.\(^{39}\) This high level of net emigration has caused a serious demographic imbalance, which has affected the age profile of the population and its labour force potential. Thus, the quality of immigrants to Bulgaria has become a burning issue. In this regard, special attention is paid to such potential resources for solving the demographic crisis as the post-1989 Bulgarian emigrants, the historical Bulgarian diaspora (especially from Ukraine, Moldova, and North Macedonia), and highly skilled third-country nationals.\(^{40}\)

From this perspective, the educational level of refugees is far from optimal. According to the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees, in 2016 only 23 per cent of migrants over the age of 14 had secondary or higher education.\(^{41}\) Also, they regard Bulgaria as a transit country. Until 2012, there was a low influx of migrants, and the annual number of asylum applications was below 1,000. In 2013, however, the refugee crisis caused a rapid growth in the number of asylum seekers, which reached 20,391 applications in 2015. Under these circumstances, Bulgaria’s responsibility as a country that has an external EU border grew as well. The change had a significant impact on the local political elite, shifting its attention to the security aspects of the migration pressure rather than the humanitarian ones. It also stimulated the spread of anti-immigrant rhetoric: initially used by the populists to expand their influence on society, it was soon adopted by mainstream parties as well. Meanwhile, the drop in the migration levels to the pre-crisis ones in the last three years has not stopped the misuse of the refugee issue for political ends.\(^{42}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year: Asylum Seekers</th>
<th>Year: Asylum Seekers</th>
<th>Year: Asylum Seekers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999: 1,349</td>
<td>2008: 746</td>
<td>2017: 3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001: 2,428</td>
<td>2010: 1025</td>
<td>2019: 2,152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The recent refugee crisis also pointed to a return of religion as a factor in forced displacement. On the one hand, the statements issued by the BOC’s holy synod and individual bishops between 2015 and 2017, played a substantial role in shaping a reserved, and even hostile, attitude towards refugees in Bulgarian society.\(^{44}\) In particular, the church’s call to close the state borders to migrants from the Middle East and North Africa as religiously alien people who could present a threat to the

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\(^{43}\) The presented data is announced by the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria on its official website at http://www.aref.government.bg/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/2020-01/Charts-website-bg_12.pdf

\(^{44}\) D. Kalkandjieva, ‘The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Refugee Crisis’, p. 243.
national identity and state sovereignty of Bulgarians found significant support in society. The impact of this vision was increased by the intertwining of the historical memory of Bulgarians about the five-century subjection of their forefathers to the Ottoman Empire with more recent impressions of the acts of Islamic terrorism in Europe and other parts of the world.

At the same time, the Bulgarian case reveals an alternative involvement of religion in the recent refugee crisis, which was motivated by the ethos of Christian hospitality. It was associated mostly with minority religious communities. Especially active was the Catholic community, where the priests, believers, and religion-based structures such as Caritas played an active part in alleviating the suffering of refugees by providing humanitarian aid. Furthermore, the migrants received moral and material support from non-religious civil society structures such as the Council of Refugee Women in Bulgaria or local branches of international organisations such as the UN Refugee Agency.

Policy perspectives
The analysis of the role played by religion in forced displacement acts throughout the history of modern Bulgaria outlines three major patterns: pre-communist, communist, and post-communist. The first of them took shape between 1878 and 1945 when the incoming and outgoing flows of refugees in the Balkans emerged as after-effects of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of young independent states whose governments pursued the creation of ethnically and religiously homogenous nations. As a rule, these processes of migration affected neighbouring states and concerned communities whose centuries-old coexistence had brought about specific modes of collaboration as well as of religious tensions. Besides, the discussed displacements often embraced entire parish/mosque-based neighbourhoods. As a result, their members were able to reproduce their religious and social infrastructure in their new settlements. The fact that most refugees were agrarians who moved together with their families from one rural society to another allowed them to establish self-reliant communities which thus needed less support from the host state and/or international organisations. The refugees from Bolshevik Russia presented the main deviance from this pattern.

From a comparative perspective, the experience described might offer new insights into the understanding of post-Cold War migration as an outcome of the decolonisation process and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Tito’s Yugoslavia. In this regard, the Bulgarian experience points to new directions of research linked with: a) the potential of refugee religious structures to assist or impede the sustainable socialisation of asylum seekers in the host society; b) the role of the institution(s) of the majority faith in the host country as a factor shaping public attitudes towards the newcomers; and c) the division of labour between the state and the religious authorities in dealing with refugees.

Furthermore, while the previous cohorts of refugees contributed towards greater ethno-religious homogeneity of Bulgarian society, the new ones would increase its diversity. This new phenomenon presents a serious challenge to many Eastern European societies, whose pluralist traditions were uprooted under communism. At the same time, the post-1989 democratisation and EU membership of Bulgaria have established a new balance between the local majority and minority religions, thus allowing the development of alternative responses to the refugee challenge.

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Religion and Forced Displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World

3. Religion and Forced Displacement in Georgia

By Tornike Metreveli

Introduction
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia has witnessed three large waves of internal forced migration as a result of armed conflicts. The armed conflicts in the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia (1992–93) and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia (1991–2 and 2008) resulted in the displacement of 273,411 people, overwhelmingly ethnic Georgians, from South Ossetia and Abkhazia to Georgian administered territory. In addition to the history of internal displacement, as a result of its location at the geographical crossroad of Europe and Asia, and its experience of domination under the Ottoman and Russian empires, Georgia’s religious field has evolved in the context of a fusion between religious and ethnic identities. In the course of its interactions with political power structures, the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) managed to normatively intertwine the concept of nationhood ‘being Georgian’ with the religious identity of ‘being Orthodox Christian’. Hence, what might seem like a contradiction of the universalism of Christian theology became gradually entrenched through church’s collaboration with the state. Ethnic and religious minorities were excluded from the church’s national project. The two largest minority religious organisations in Georgia, namely the Islamic community and the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), struggled to compete for fundamental rights and liberties. With major religious organisations busy with


IDPs figures’, Ministry of IDPs issues, available at www.mra.gov.ge/geo/static/55. All websites were accessed on 9 November 2019.
advancing their organisational interests or challenging existing power relations, internally displaced persons (IDPs) were marginalised in the ongoing process of Georgia’s major economic, social, political transition.

Given Georgia’s situation in the early 1990s, with crumbling state institutions and a dysfunctional state apparatus, the integration or even accommodation of IDPs was not a priority area of policy-making for the Georgian government. This manifested itself in the non-existence of a state integration strategy to address the issues posed by the significant internal population displacement. Only in 2007, by the 47th Decree of the Government of Georgia was the first ‘State Strategy towards IDPs’ adopted. It outlined the mechanisms and objectives of the Georgian state with regard to the integration of IDPs in Georgia’s socio-political life, as well the approach to facilitating dignified living conditions for the internally displaced.

After escaping the two wars of the early 1990s, most IDPs ended up living in so-called IDP settlements, which were often regular schools, old Soviet hotels and kindergartens that had been repurposed to accommodate them. Due to endemic corruption at state-level, the aid programmes designed for Georgian IDPs often failed to reach their target audience. The involuntary character of their migration resulted in an impoverished and socio-politically disengaged population of IDPs in the new settlements. In 2008, however, after the war with Russia, the new IDP population of Georgia received considerable assistance from both Georgian state institutions and from external donors such as USAID and the European Union (EU). The scale of these two waves of internal displacement, as well as their respective proximity to armed conflicts differed significantly. If the Abkhazian war of the early 1990s led to the displacement of (by various estimates) between 200,000 and 230,000 people, the more recent armed conflict in Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia forced 26,885 Georgian citizens to flee their homes in the conflict zone. Lastly, internal displacement and armed conflicts affected all major religious organisations in Georgia in terms of limiting access to their canonical territories (eparchies) and their ability to conduct pastoral duties in the breakaway territories.

Religion, ethnicity and population

According to the most recent census conducted in Georgia in November 2014, the population of the country is 3.71 million. 57.2 per cent of the population lives in urban areas. Ethnic Georgians constitute the dominant group with a majority of 86.8 per cent. 6.3 per cent of the population are Azerbaijani and 4.5 per cent Armenian, while other ethnic groups (e.g. Russians, Ossetians, Yezidis, Ukrainians, Kists, Greeks, Assyrians and Jews) constitute 2.4 per cent of the total population. The census states that 83.4 per cent of the Georgian population adheres to the Orthodox denomination of Christianity represented by the Georgian Orthodox Church.51 Muslims are the second largest religious group constituting 10.7 per cent of the total population, while 2.9 per cent of the population belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC).52 It is essential to map the ethno-religious composition of the capital of Georgia, Tbilisi, which is the largest and most populous city of the state and also accounts for the largest share of IDPs (105,956 people), who live across nine districts of the capital.53 89.9 per cent of the population of Tbilisi are ethnic Georgians. Armenians constitute the second largest ethnic group with 4.8 per cent, while Azerbaijanis rank as the third most significant ethnic group of the capital with 1.4 per cent of the total population.

49 Metreveli, 2016.
53 ‘IDPs figures’, Ministry of IDPs issues, available at www.mra.gov.ge/geo/static/55
Due to several historical and geographical factors, the majority of the Muslim population of Georgia is distributed predominantly among two regions; the Autonomous Republic of Adjara (hereafter Adjara) and Kvemo Kartli. Adjara, in western Georgia, borders Turkey and has a historical pattern of migration and higher conversion rates to Islam compared to the rest of Georgia. Unlike Kvemo Kartli, where Islam is represented predominantly by Azerbaijani minorities, in Adjara, the majority of the Muslim population are ethnic Georgians. According to the latest census, the total ethnic composition of Adjara is overwhelmingly ethnic Georgian (96 per cent). However, the religious composition is not similarly homogenous. For example, Orthodox Christians constitute 54.5 per cent of Adjara residents, whereas 39.8 per cent are (Georgian) Muslims. The majority of residents of Batumi, the largest city of Adjara, identified as Orthodox (68.7 per cent) or Muslim (25.4 per cent). However, four out of five municipalities in Adjara have a majority Muslim population; specifically Keda (62.1 per cent Muslims versus 31.3 per cent Orthodox), Shuakhevi (74.4 per cent Muslim vs 23.5 per cent Orthodox), Khelvachauri (56.3 per cent Muslim vs 36.4 per cent Orthodox) and Khulo (94.6 per cent Muslim vs 4.1 per cent Orthodox). In terms of the IDP population, Adjara region has 6,830 IDP residents. Kvemo Kartli, which borders both Armenia and Azerbaijan, has the most significant religious minority population of Muslims at 43 per cent, compared with 51.4 per cent Orthodox. Unlike in the mountainous Adjara region, where adherence to Islam does not translate into Turkish or Azerbaijani ethnic belonging, in Kvemo Kartli, ethnic and religious identities are firmly fused with each other. Ethnic Azerbaijanis constitute 41.8 per cent of region's population, whereas Georgians represent 51.3 per cent. The region’s religious composition is mostly Orthodox Christian (51.4 per cent), compared with 43 per cent Muslim. Another region with a significant Muslim population is Kakheti region in eastern Georgia, where 85.7 per cent profess Orthodox Christianity and 12.1 per cent adhere to Islam, while three municipalities have both a Muslim and Armenian presence. Georgia’s only region where ethnic Georgians are in the minority is Samtske-Javakheti with 50.5 per cent ethnic Armenians compared with 48.3 per cent Georgians. Orthodox Christians constitute the majority with 45.2 per cent of the population, although 40 per cent of residents belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church.

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**Table 1. Numbers of IDPs in Georgia.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of IDPs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adjara</td>
<td>6830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guria</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tbilisi</td>
<td>105,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imereti</td>
<td>26,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakheti</td>
<td>1534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtskheta-Mtianeti</td>
<td>11,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racha-Lechkhum-Kvemo Svaneti</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samgrelo-Zemo Svaneti</td>
<td>87,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samtskhe-Javakheti</td>
<td>2414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvemo-Kartli</td>
<td>13,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shida-Kartli</td>
<td>17,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>273,411</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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54 Ibid.
56 ‘IDPs figures’, 2019.
57 Ibid, p. 281.
Religion-state relations
The Constitution refers to the Georgian Orthodox Church and defines the relationship between the Georgian state (not the Georgian government) and the church in Article 9 on the relationship between the state and the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia. According to the Constitution adopted by the Parliament in 1995, Paragraph 1 of Article 9 states that “the State declares full freedom of belief and religion, and also recognises the special role of the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia in the history of Georgia and its independence from the State”. Here, a seemingly standard normative text of the Constitution moves in the direction of religious particularism by codifying the special status of the church in Georgian history through the Constitution. Paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Constitution determines the nature of church-state relations:

The relationship between the state of Georgia and the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia shall be determined by a constitutional agreement, which shall be in full compliance with the universally recognised principles and norms of international law in the area of human rights and freedoms.

The same agreement is recognised as a normative act and in line with Law of Georgia on Normative Acts. According to the Law of Georgia on Normative Acts, Article 7 in Paragraph 4 states that the constitutional agreement “…take[s] precedence over any other normative act, unless it contradicts the Constitution of Georgia and the Constitutional Law of Georgia.” This legal framework has shaped Georgia’s religious field ever since the adoption of the Constitutional Agreement in 2002. The ‘constitutional’ status of the agreement gave it priority over other domestic legislation.

In 2011, the Georgian government under President Mikheil Saakashvili (2004-2013) initiated an amendment to the Civil Code of Georgia granting other religious organisations the right to registration. This entitled other religious organisations with the legal status of either LEPL or non-profit (non-commercial) legal entity, and gave them a legal status equal to that of the Orthodox Church. This legal change was accompanied by a massive rally led by the Georgian Orthodox Church.

Among the major issues of disagreement between the three main religions in Georgia is the ownership of churches, and responses to ambivalent funding practices. If one examines the Georgian government’s funding practices concerning religious organisations between 2004-2013 (Table 2), it is clear that the GOC has overwhelming privilege compared to the AAC and the Islamic community.

58 Websites of Religious Organizations: The official website of the Georgian Orthodox Church http://patriarchate.ge/geo/; The official website of the Primate of the Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Georgia Apostolic Church https://armenianchurch.ge/en/; The official website of the Division of Muslims of All Georgia/Department of Muslim Affairs http://www.amag.ge/

59 Art. 9, Paragraph 1.
60 Ibid, Art. 9.
Table 2. State Funding of the Georgian Orthodox Church after the Rose Revolution

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEL</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>12.93</td>
<td>26.39</td>
<td>25.68</td>
<td>24.39</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The increase in the GOC’s funding coincides with a major political crisis, which the Georgian government has undergone since 2007. If one compares the total combined funding that was allocated to the Georgian Patriarchate during the presidency of Saakashvili with the funding available to other religious denominations, one sees a significant difference. Between 2004 and 2013, the GOC received 149,190,000 (GBP 48,438,311), while, for example, the Armenian Church received financial assistance amounting to only 35,624 GEL (GBP 11,566) from 2009 to 2012, although it is the second biggest Christian organisation in Georgia, and the third largest religious minority group. The disproportional trend continued under the Georgian Dream government. In partial and symbolic compensation for the damage to religious communities during the Soviet regime, the Islamic community of Georgia received GEL 1.1 million (GBP 357,142) in 2014 whereas in 2015 this amount to GEL 2.2 million (GBP 714,284). Furthermore, the State Agency for Religious Issues recommended the transfer to the Islamic community of 44 mosques currently in the possession of the Division of Muslims of All Georgia (aka the Department of Muslim Affairs) which the Georgian government created in 2011.

Religion and forced displacement

To examine how GOC approaches the IDP problematic, it worth reflecting on the critical document that represents GOC’s vision and priorities. The so-called pastoral letters which this section will analyse are annual documents read by the close affiliates of Patriarch Ilia, the spiritual leader of the GOC, at Easter and Christmas. The whole process of reading a pastoral letter is transmitted live by the Georgian Public Broadcaster and the Georgian patriarchate’s TV channel. The official known author of the pastoral letters is Patriarch Ilia himself. The letters constitute the official position of the church on the most important societal themes. A close reading of the Easter and Christmas pastoral letters of the past 40 years since the enthronement of Patriarch Ilia II (1978–2018) reveals that forced migration/IDP themes are referred to considerably less frequently than general themes of human security. The prevalent issues discussed in the pastoral letters alongside territorial questions are abortion, demography and drug abuse.

Overarching themes of solicitude and empathy towards the internally displaced are expressed in his 1994 Christmas pastoral letter, in which the patriarch encourages IDPs from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to ‘not lose faith, hope and love’ and to ‘not be stumbled and pray’. In the same letter, the patriarch refers to the IDPs as refugees, which raises the question of whether the IDPs were referred to in the context of ‘our refugees’ thus distinguishing the internally displaced from ‘us, Georgians’? Or was the patriarch’s refugee reference a terminological insensitivity pointing to the GOC’s position of othering the new migrant groups who had been forcibly displaced? One can only speculate whether or not this reference constitutes an essential feature of the GOC’s vision of nationhood. Similarly, in the 1995 Easter pastoral letter, Patriarch Ilia refers to the restoration of territorial

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64 1 GBP equalled an average 3.08 Georgian Lari (GEL) according to the National Bank of Georgia’s official exchange rate between 2001–2018. The daily exchange rates of Lari against foreign currencies between 2001-2018 are available at https://www.nb.g.gov.ge/index.php?m=582&lng=eng
66 For a detailed analysis of political events and their context see Metreveli (2016).
67 Ibid, p. 11.
integrity and expresses his hopes and prayers for ‘refugees’. This is yet another dimension of how the GOC connects the concepts of fragmented territoriality with the narrative of the victimisation of IDPs.

No publicly available data shows how the GOC engages with IDPs from an institutional perspective. For example, the GOC’s office runs 90 education and social institutions (seminaries, schools and kindergartens) with 2,000 employees and approximately 18,000 children attending them.70 Also, the GOC operates between seven and nine orphanages, which house between 1,200 to 1,500 children. The Patriarchate of the GOC has 16 charity and development foundations, ten of which focus on charity, education, and the construction and restoration of churches. Data becomes untraceable due to the constitutional agreement between the Georgian state and the GOC, as a result of which the state institutions have no access to church organisations, and the GOC is not obliged to report their activities71.

The Armenian Apostolic Church receives considerably less funding than the GOC. Hence, relatively little is known about its activities. From the content analysis of the statements of clerics, and the websites of diocesan departments and cultural centres run by the AAC in Georgia, the primary mission and objective of the AAC’s Department of Youth Affairs is to ‘unite the Armenian youth of Georgia around the Church, to promote Armenian education and inculcate a sense of commitment to the lofty ideals of preservation of national identity’.72 In addition to helping the academic progress of the ethnic Armenian population of Georgia, the objectives of the department also list the ‘civic education of the youth’ as its primary objective. Along the lines of civic education, the church sees itself as a promoter of human rights education in order to ‘help [the Armenian population] to integrate into Georgian civil society’.73 The AAC organises various pilgrimages and visits to historical places in Armenia and ‘Artsakh’, which is internationally recognised as Nagorno-Karabakh.

Further activities of the church with youth groups serve what it calls ‘the unification of the Armenian youth studying at different universities’. The mission statement concludes with reference to the patriotic duty incumbent upon this department of the AAC: ‘the patriotic duty of the youth organisation is to take care of the Tbilisi Pantheon of the Armenian Writers and Public Figures ‘Khojivanq’(the Armenia Pantheon of Tbilisi). Voluntary groups of young people organise clean-up activities, plant trees, [and] take care of the Pantheon.’

Institutionally and legally codified strategies diverge from the actual practice and implementation of those action plans. The government is either unable or unwilling to ensure the consistent execution of those integrative strategies. The Georgian Muslim community in Adjara continue to face ‘othering discourses,’ which manifest themselves in public pressures on the practising of their religion. The fusion of Orthodox Christian identity and the concept of Georgianness is strong enough to occasionally legitimise the practice of enforced conversion to Christianity and other discriminatory practices.74 The official publicly available report on activity between 2013 and 2018 of the Division of Muslims of All Georgia has no reference to forced migration. The report mostly focuses on achievements with regard to advancing the popularity of Islam in Georgia which manifested in:

_Fifteen new mosques, over 170 amortised mosques have been repaired...dozens of mosques were provided with the necessary equipment...4 websites owned by the Muslim Division_

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71 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
Religion and Forced Displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World

and two internet TV stations...up to 1,000 TV shows. One hundred fifty kinds of books, newspapers, posters and magazines of various kinds have been published in large circulation...more than 50 conferences, 70 seminars...50 trainings.75

Due to the lack of access to the internal ruling and policy documents of the GOC, the AAC and the Division of Muslims of All Georgia, the policy paper relies on the available information from the pastoral letters, official websites and annual reports. These institutionalist accounts do not exclude individual humanitarian practices by various priests or imams. However, without ethnographic research, documentation of those practices remains challenging.

Policy perspectives
As a result of three armed conflicts, Georgia experienced waves of internal displacement. The first two armed conflicts in 1990s coincided with the weakening (if not failure) of Georgian state institutions, a polarised post-war political climate and no real accommodationist state strategy to address new challenges of large-scale displacement. In 2007, almost 15 years after the first large-scale waves of internal displacement, the Georgian government attempted to create a systematic strategy and plan for the IDPs. Following the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, although the scale of internal migration was considerably lower, the government still demonstrated more readiness to act than in the 1990s.

For their part, Georgia’s religious organisations underwent the processes of transformation and institution-building in parallel with the state itself. The competition between the three most significant religious groups - Orthodox Christians, Muslims and Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Christians – manifested itself in disagreements over property rights, funding policies and the overall status of religious organisations in society. This was met by fierce criticism from the GOC leadership and led to protests against the government. Despite the significant financial advantages, which the church maintained along with the clientelist government practices under Saakashvili’s presidency, the status of other religions was something that the GOC claimed to find threatening and challenging to its dominant position on the religious market place. In parallel with liberal inertia that allowed the religious minorities to register and exercise similar legal rights, the Georgian state wittingly or unwittingly engaged in ethno-religious particularism as reflected in the selection of national symbols in general and the flag in particular. Not only did the government ignore the possible preferences of Muslim Georgians with regard to the use of Christian symbols of the national flag, it also completely ignored the Islamic theme in the design of the new flag in the Muslim-Georgian inhabited region of Adjara.

With the secular identity of the Georgian state still in the making, IDPs are little different from other minorities when it comes to integration and accommodation. The ethno-religious markers of distinction are still robust pillars of identity claim-making. Whether one is an IDP, a Georgian Muslim or an ethnic Armenian, the binary category of ‘Georgian therefore Orthodox’ still finds expression in symbols, funding practices and in the execution of the law. Whether, and in which direction this can or will unfold remains to be seen, but minorities – ethno-religious or the internally displaced – continue to challenge the normative status quo in order not to become Georgia’s forgotten ones.

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, Greece, until then a country of emigration, became a receiving country for immigrants primarily from the Balkan region. This migratory inflow diversified in the 2000s, with an increase in irregular migrants from Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Yet the country was met with the most notable humanitarian challenge in 2015, during the largest migration and refugee crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War. The Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) and its non-governmental organisations (NGOs) made a significant contribution to dealing with the increased arrivals of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular immigrants. The influx, albeit fluctuant, still constitutes a challenge today as the numbers continue to rise. Moreover, all institutions involved must be sure to provide relief while improving their efficiency, which requires the solidarity of the European Union (EU) and its Member States. At the same time, Greece is called upon to respond to the challenges while taking into account both the humanitarian aspect, and its

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Eleni Tseligka is a Teaching Associate in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom. Her latest publications include From Gastarbeiter to European Expatriates (Peter Lang, 2020) and ‘Greek Diaspora in Germany: Church as the Ecclesia’s Forerunner and Point of Reference’ in Giuseppe Giordan and Sinisa Zrinščak (eds.), Global Eastern Orthodoxy: Politics, Religion, and Human Rights (Springer, 2020).
obligation to safeguard the external borders of the EU in light of Europe’s populist resurgence. This report suggests that within the framework of deeper European collaboration, Greece will on the one hand have to prioritise the needs of refugees and other vulnerable groups, by definition a task for the OCG, while on the other hand effectively controlling irregular migration.

Religion, ethnicity and population

The latest census conducted in Greece in 2011 by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) found that the country’s total resident population is 10,816,286, of which 91.6 per cent are Greek citizens, 1.8 per cent are citizens of another EU state, 6.5 per cent come from third countries, and 0.04 per cent are of unspecified citizenship or stateless persons. The census did not collect data on religious affiliation amongst Greek residents, but according to a PEW Forum quantitative study in 2016 on the Religious Landscape of Central and Eastern Europe, 90 per cent of Greeks identify as Orthodox Christians, four per cent identify with one of the other Christian denominations including Catholicism, two per cent identify as Muslims, while another four per cent were recorded as unaffiliated. However, in another report of the PEW Forum, also in 2016, the percentage of Muslims in Greece appears to be 5.7 per cent, following the 2015 peak of the refugee crisis. The United States’ government estimates that the percentage of Orthodox Christians in Greece ranges between 81 per cent and 90 per cent percent, while four per cent to 15 per cent are atheists and two per cent are Muslims. A remaining three per cent to five per cent of Greece’s total population, includes Orthodox Old Calendarists, Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, members of Ancient Greek polytheistic religions, Scientologists, Bahá’í, Mormons, Sikhs, Buddhists and members of the Hare Krishna movement.

The lack of concrete, reliable quantitative data on the size of all religious communities that comprise the entirety of Greece’s population makes the study of corresponding social groups difficult. This issue also concerns the lack of qualitative data on what constitute essentially unknown parts of the general population, which hinders the drafting of necessary policies. It follows, that because Greece is not a destination but rather a transit country for refugees and immigrants – although it is not uncommon for them to remain in host structures, reception centres and hotspots indefinitely – the numbers concerning their demographic data are merely estimates. Keeping a tally of migrants is particularly difficult since they tend to move around the country in their search for ways out of Greece and into Central and Northern Europe via the Balkan Route, or because of the poor living conditions in host structures. Furthermore, when their applications for asylum are rejected, they tend to disappear under the radar of the authorities. Limitations also apply because the capacity of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) tracking systems does not always measure up to the size of the migratory movement. Furthermore, the relevant authorities have inadequate access to and information about routes taken by migrants, who do not always cooperate with efforts to count and register them. Data collection can be particularly challenging when dealing with clandestine irregular migration that occurs alongside refugee movement. In sum, any census and statistical study can only account for the permanent, registered andtraceable residents of the country. Moreover, the last census took place in 2011, well before the refugee and migrant crisis that peaked in 2015 and continues to date, while the inflows fluctuate in terms of their volume and demographic composition. Indicatively, according to the

UNHCR, since 2015 a significant drop has occurred, with the number of arrivals falling from 861,630 in 2015, 177,234 in 2016 and 36,310 in 2017. Yet, a rise in numbers was observed in 2018 with 50,508 arrivals, followed by 71,368 by December 15th 2019.82

Religion-state relations

The centrality of religion for the Orthodox communities of Southeastern Europe predates the notion of the nation-state itself, whereby, with the emergence of national entities in the region, Orthodoxy was identified with the Greek nation and its psyche, and ultimately became part of its self-image as a collectively perceived constituent element of identity within the context of the Helleno-Christian construct, as part of the nation-building process. It follows that the Greek state has been closely linked to the Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) ever since the founding of the latter (1833), and abides by this special relationship to date, notwithstanding the ideological orientation of consecutive governments.

In turn, the OCG considers its close relationship with the state a *sine qua non* and as legitimated, both by history and by its own formative contribution to the Greek-Orthodox particularity. Moreover, the well-being of the state and its people, the safeguarding of the national interest and the preservation of the Hellenic-Orthodox identity is for the OCG a *raison d’être*.83 It enjoys, directly or indirectly, the widespread social acceptance and sway required to have a role and a say in the socio-political affairs of the state.

One year after the fall of the junta regime (1974), the 1952 constitution, which was adopted as an interim solution, was replaced by that of 1975. Within its broader context of reviews, revisions and amendments, it repositioned church–state relations, inclining them towards a more secularist direction. For example, the prerequisite that the president be Orthodox and swear to safeguard the creed was removed. Reference to proselytism was omitted from Article 3 and was inserted in Article 13 as a prohibition of ‘proselytism against any faith’ instead. The revised Article 3 guaranteed freedom of worship while acknowledging Orthodoxy as the ‘prevailing faith’, thus constitutionally rendering the OCG an established church instead of a state institution.84

The constitution of 1975 is of particular significance as it marked the ushering in of the Third Hellenic Republic and the shift to a democratic polity, and it is still in force. It has been amended three times since its adoption; in 1986, 2001 and 2008. Although no changes have been made as regards religious affairs, it is worth noting that the amendment of 2001 was adopted with extensive parliamentary consensus – four fifths of the Members of Parliament – and introduced new fundamental individual rights. Namely, it is stated that ‘everyone has the right...to the protection of one’s genetic identity’, as well as to ‘participation in the Information Community’ and to the electronically produced, exchanged and disseminated information thereof (Article 5 and 5A).85 As regards church–state relations, Article 3 still defines Eastern Orthodoxy as the prevailing faith by declaring that the ‘predominant religion in Greece is the religion of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ’, while Article 13 on religious freedom, guarantees that ‘the freedom of religious conscience is inviolable’ and that ‘every known religion is free’ and its worship is ‘practiced unobstructed under the protection of the law’, while ‘proselytism is forbidden’.86

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86 Ibid., pp.19; 26.
Recent discussions and suggestions at parliamentary level regarding the constitutional amendment and revision of Article 3, leading to the separation of church and state, have not yielded fruit so far. Any expectations that the required parliamentary consensus might be reached to that end in the foreseeable future would be misplaced, considering how unpopular such an initiative would likely be, particularly in light of the pronounced linkage between Orthodoxy and the broadly perceived notions of Modern Greek identity and particularity. Indeed, the amendment proposal of SYRIZA in late 2018, when the party was still in government under Alexis Tsipras, suggested that Article 3, among others, should be revised in order to explicitly declare the neutrality of the state towards religion while acknowledging Orthodoxy as the predominant faith, albeit without that constituting its recognition as an official state religion. However, constitutional amendments require the vote of at least 180 of the 300 Members of Parliament, and a consensus as such was not reached as regards Articles 3, 13, 33 and 59, which pertain to the religious neutrality of the state, the religious oath and the discrete separation between church and state. These proposed amendments failed to gain, in particular, the support of New Democracy, the current ruling party, which countered that the constitution is already equipped to guarantee all those principles.

Religion and forced displacement

Concerning incoming refugees, there were no formal or regular structures to administer the necessary services to the forcefully displaced Greek population of Asia Minor, with the involvement of the Refugee Relief Fund (RRF), Save the Children Fund and the Red Cross, being merely an ad hoc arrangement following the Greek Catastrophe in Asia Minor (1922) and the subsequent Lausanne Convention of January 30th 1923. The aftermath of the defeat of Greek forces in Asia Minor caused an unprecedented refugee flight from Turkey. Their exact number is difficult to estimate; their volume, combined with the hasty nature of their displacement and ensuing lack of coordination did not allow them to be properly registered upon arrival. However, according to the general population census of May 5th 1928, they amounted to 1,221,849 persons, in a population of approximately five million in total. According to the League of Nations the number of refugees who entered Greece at the time was much higher, probably 1.4 million, but between 1922 and 1928 75,000 died due to extreme poverty and a further 66,000 managed to emigrate to Egypt, parts of Western Europe and the United States.

The Second World War brought forth another catastrophe, via the displacement of the Jewish Greeks and the Holocaust that eradicated Greek Jewry almost in its entirety. Although the demographic information is not precise, there is a scholarly consensus as regards the estimates. Before the Nazi occupation, the Greek-Jewish population amounted to approximately 80,000 people; during the Nazi occupation, between 60,000 and 65,000 Greek Jews were deported to Auschwitz, with only 2,500 surviving the ordeal. The Jewish community of Thessaloniki, for instance, which numbered approximately 56,000 in 1939, was almost completely obliterated along with its social and cultural life, with only 500 surviving, primarily due to their Spanish citizenship.

87 The ‘Coalition of the Radical Left’ (Synapismos Rizospastikēs Aristeras, Gr.: Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς); Protasē tou Proedrou kai Voulētōn tēs K.O. tou SYRIZA gia tēn anatheorēsē diataxeōn tou Syntagmatos, symfona me ta arthra 110 tou Syntagmatos kai 119 tou Kanonismou tēs Voulēs (Suggestion of the President and Members of Parliament of SYRIZA for the amendment of constitutional laws, in accordance with articles 110 of the constitution and 119 of the Parliament Regulation, Protocol No.: 4636, Date: 2/11/2018, available at https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/c8827c35-4399-4fbf-8ea6-aebdc768f4f7/%CE%B8%CE%B3%CE%BF%CE%B1%CE%B1%CF%86%CE%BF%CE%B1%CF%80%CE%A3%CE%B1%CF%81%CF%89%CF%84%CE%AE%20(215135).pdf
88 The oath taken by the members of newly appointed governments ‘in the name of the Holy and Cosubstantial and Indivisible Trinity’. Likewise, heterodox or believers of other creeds take the oath as is customary in their own faiths, while a secular oath is also permitted in the existing constitutional and legal framework; Nea Dimokratia, Gr.: Νέα Δημοκρατία.
89 Tameion Prostrasiās Prosofōn, Gr.: Ταμείον Προστασίας Προσφών; Concerned strictly with the population exchange, not to be confused with the Peace Treaty of July 24th 1923.
tragedy was slightly mitigated in Athens, where Archbishop Damaskinos and the Chief of Police, Angelos Evert, provided several members of the Jewish community with false certificates of baptism and identity cards. Moreover, the community there had an Athenian accent and could thus blend in more with the local population, which also tended to be more sympathetic as compared with that of Thessaloniki, hence, 45 per cent of Athenian Jews, i.e. 3,500 people, survived.\textsuperscript{91} Greece’s post-WWII Jewish population was estimated at approximately 10,000.\textsuperscript{92}

Up until the fall of the Iron Curtain, Greece was predominantly a country of emigration, particularly since the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, and then during the interwar period, followed by a peak in emigration in the post-WWII era, which lasted until the mid-1970s. It is estimated that between 1961 and 1974 two million people emigrated from Greece to seek employment abroad; this number corresponds to one fifth of the country’s total population in 1974.\textsuperscript{93} The main destinations were the USA, Australia and Germany. With the repatriation of the Greek Gastarbeiter (guest-workers), and the lack of reintegration provisions on the part of the state, the OCG established the Integration Centre for Migrant Workers (ICMW) in 1978, with the aim of supporting returnees from German-speaking countries.\textsuperscript{94}

Post 1989, the migratory paradigm shifted and western-aligned Greece became a refuge for ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union, with Kazakhstan and Georgia being the main countries of origin. Approximately 160,000 Pontic Greeks entered the country between 1990 and 1993.\textsuperscript{95} To exempt the diasporic repatriates from the restrictions on work and residency imposed by law on immigrants of foreign descent, they were acknowledged with the term omogeneis (people of the same lineage) – also known as palinostountes i.e. ‘returnees of Greek descent’ – and thus differentiated from the allogeneis (people of different lineage), under a law passed in 1991.\textsuperscript{96} State structures proved inadequate in dealing with this humanitarian crisis. In addition, irregular migration from Albania in the 1990s constituted the most notable population movement, with the estimates amounting to approximately 600,000 people. The fall of the communist regime in Albania brought forth an interruption in industrial production and the loss of thousands of jobs in the public sector. In 1989, 20 per cent of the Albanian population was between the ages of 15 and 24 and the increased unemployment and economic instability of the state made emigration to the West very attractive for many young Albanians. Greece, as a member of the European Economic Community and later the EU, was the first country of choice for Albanian migrants due to the shared land border, which made crossing safer compared to passage to Italy that required travelling by sea.\textsuperscript{97} Furthermore, Greece maintained an open door policy for ethnic Greeks of Albanian nationality, who were treated as omogeneis under the above-mentioned 1991 law, and became the first links of chain migration from Albania.\textsuperscript{98} The integration of such numbers, albeit not unproblematic due to the initial lack of social and institutional preparation and planning, happened organically and

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\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{98} Chain migration is defined as ‘that movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment arranged by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants’. See John S. MacDonald and Leatrice D. MacDonald, ‘Chain Migration, Ethnic Neighbourhood Formation and Social Networks’, The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, (42) 1, (1964), pp. 82-97.
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successfully, which is attested by how inconspicuous the Albanian community is among the general population, regardless of religious creed.\textsuperscript{99}

The character of migratory trends has gradually shifted since the beginning of the 2000s, when an increase in arrivals from Africa, Asia and the Middle East has been observable, alongside an influx from the Balkans. By 2005, the total number of international migrants in Greece amounted to approximately one million, with 200,000 being undocumented.\textsuperscript{100} A significant increase in the number of asylum seekers and irregular migrants, particularly from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq and Afghanistan was noted from 2007 onwards, with most arrivals coming by boat through the Aegean Sea. A shift in that pattern was observed from 2010, demonstrated by an increased inflow of irregular migrants from Asia and Africa seeking passage to other EU destinations, and crossing into Greek territory via the land border with Turkey, especially at the river Evros border and constituting approximately 85 per cent of all detected illegal border crossings at EU level. The shift to entry by land resulted from the assistance Greece received from FRONTEX, the EU border and coastguard agency, in patrolling its sea borders.

Greece sought to cope with the large influx of immigrants with new legislation. Law 3536/2007, ‘Determining matters in migration policy and other issues falling into the competence of the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization’ was introduced as a revision of the main legislative instrument on migration, Law 3386/2005, on the ‘Entry, residence and social integration of third country nationals into the Greek territory’, regulating the unification of residence and work permits, as well as introducing the ‘reflection period’ for victims of trafficking. However, according to data from FRONTEX, Greece remained the major gateway of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers from Africa and Asia. In 2011, the European Court of Justice found that 90 per cent of all irregular entries into the EU had passed through Greek borders. Law 3907/2011 represents a further attempt by the Greek state to establish a realistic migration management system through the independent Asylum Service, the operation of First Reception Centres and the adaptation of Greek legislation to Community Directive 2008/115/EC on the return of irregular migrants.\textsuperscript{101}

In 2015, as the first country of entry to the EU for the majority of these incomers, Greece became the epicentre of the biggest migration and refugee crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War. According to the National Authorities of IOM in Greece, the total number of entries from January 1\textsuperscript{st} 2015 to November 26\textsuperscript{th} 2019 was 1,181,827 persons.\textsuperscript{102} While for many migrants Greece remains a transit country en route to Central and Northern Europe, there is still a significant percentage for which Greece is the destination country. In 2018, 11 per cent of EU’s total first-time applications for asylum were submitted in Greece, making the country the third most popular destination in the EU after Germany and France. Syrian nationals remain the largest population group of asylum seekers in Europe since 2013. In 2018, asylum applications submitted by Syrians in the EU constituted 13.9 per cent of total applications, followed by those submitted by Afghan (7.1 per cent), Iraqi (6.8 per cent) and Pakistani (4.3 per cent) citizens. In 2018, Greece received nearly 65,000 new applications, of which 13,145 were submitted by Syrians, 11,820 by Afghans, 9,640 by Iraqis, 7,185 by Pakistanis and the remaining by various other nationalities.\textsuperscript{103} The emergent pattern from the yearly sum of new arrivals to Greece between 2014 and 2019 shows a gradual increase


\textsuperscript{100} Ruby Gropas and Anna Triandafyllidou, Migration in Greece at a Glance, Athens: ELIAMEP – Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, October 2005, p.7.


\textsuperscript{102} International Organisation of Migration (IOM), ‘Flow Monitoring Europe Arrivals to Greece’, (2019), available from https://migration.iom.int/europe?type=arrivals

since 2017 when the numbers were significantly down on the previous years (see Table 1 below).\footnote{104} A new peak, like that of 2015–16, can prove immensely challenging from a humanitarian and logistical perspective, not to mention the political dimension for all actors involved, directly and indirectly, including the EU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sea Arrivals</th>
<th>Land Arrivals</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>57,056</td>
<td>14,312</td>
<td>71,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>32,494</td>
<td>18,014</td>
<td>50,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>29,718</td>
<td>6,592</td>
<td>36,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>173,450</td>
<td>3,784</td>
<td>177,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>856,723</td>
<td>4,907</td>
<td>861,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>41,038</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>43,318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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\textbf{Table 1. Refugee numbers in Greece, 2014-19}

The OCG, through its own NGOs, has been heavily involved in dealing with the humanitarian aspect of the problem, even before the peak of the Syrian refugee crisis. It did so initially through its existing organisation and structures, which were intended to serve other purposes. For instance, the ICMW, which has been active since 1978 to assist former Greek guest-workers, and \textit{Apostoli}, (‘Mission’), founded in 2010 to deal with the social problems of the Greek debt crisis.\footnote{105} Notably, \textit{Apostoli} collaborates with the UNHCR within the framework of the ESTIA accommodation scheme and mostly focuses on unaccompanied minors and the vulnerable.\footnote{106} Initially its main purposes related to dealing with social problems pertaining to poverty, but its resources and \textit{foci} were diverted in order to deal with the mounting issues of migrants. In 2012, the OCG founded a new structure, which succeeded the ICMW, under the name Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme (ICMW-ERP), and focuses on asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants.\footnote{107} It is funded, among other sources, by the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Greece, the UNHCR and \textit{Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe}.\footnote{108} In summary, its services range from legal assistance, translation, social support, family reunification to international collaborative initiatives, including inter-eclesiastical programmes.\footnote{109}

As of 2002 the ICMW has been involved in combating human trafficking via its participation in a programme led by the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) and in cooperation with Caritas Europe. It also took part in the STOP programme, as well as in the actions that succeeded it, known as Christian Action and Networking against Trafficking (CAT).\footnote{110} In this framework, the ICWM focused on the collaboration with state structures in combating trafficking.
and slavery, supporting the victims of and forced prostitution.\(^ {111}\) Notably, the ICMW identified the inadequacy of knowledge and insight on the part of the state with regard to Muslim immigrants in Athens, and criticised this as a root cause of the lack of policies and integration strategies. Moreover, it conducted its own research in order to identify and document informal places of worship as well as the denominational, linguistic, ethnic, national and other qualitative characteristics therein.\(^ {112}\)

However, following its restructure and rebranding in 2012, which coincided chronologically with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, as stated above, the ICMW-ERP repositioned its purposes and scope. Although special emphasis is placed on the vulnerable groups eligible for international protection and the socially vulnerable, i.e. unaccompanied minors, single-parent families, pregnant women, and persons of poor health etc.\(^ {113}\) According to its statute, its primary target groups are, besides Greek migrant returnees, refugees, asylum seekers and those groups that adhere to a humanitarian legal regime and are eligible for international protection, and those eligible for legalisation.\(^ {114}\)

Recent examples of the involvement of ICMW-ERP initiatives and cooperation include the programme ‘Rebuild our Lives - Legal Aid for Refugees in Athens’, with the support of Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe, the purpose of which was to provide legal and social support to those eligible for international protection.\(^ {115}\) Also, with the support of the UNHCR, the programme ‘Bringing Families Together 2018 – Legal Counselling / Assistance for Family Reunification of Persons of Concern with Specific Needs’ was realised. Its main purpose was to provide information, legal advice and assistance, translation services, as well as psychological and social support to asylum seekers who wish to be reunified with their families in the framework of Dublin III.\(^ {116}\) Particular emphasis was placed on unaccompanied minors and single-parent families.\(^ {117}\) Moreover, the Federation of Protestant Churches of Switzerland contributed, via the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME), to the ‘Legal Aid for Backlog Cases of Ecumenical Refugee Programme’ that focused on processing long-standing reunification applications, via legal advice and representation of recognised refugees.\(^ {118}\) In addition, the ICMW-ERP, with the help of the Evangelical Church in the Rheinland (Evangelische Kirche im Rheinland) has provided legal and psychosocial support to particularly vulnerable cases.\(^ {119}\)


\(^ {113}\) Orthodox Church of Greece, ‘Kferkro Symparastaseos Palinnostountōn kai Metanastōn – Οικουμενικό Πρόγραμμα Προσφύγων, Ομάδες Στοχου’ (Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme” Target Groups) on the Official Website of the Church of Greece, available at http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/koinonia/kspm_omades.html


According to the UNHCR ‘Risks that give rise to a need for international protection classically include those of persecution, threats to life, freedom or physical integrity arising from armed conflict, serious public disorder, or different situations of violence. Other risks may stem from: famine linked to situations of armed conflict; natural or man-made disasters; as well as being stateless’. See UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Persons in Need of International Protection’, (2017), available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/596787734.html. Also, see the 2011 directive of the European Commission, ‘Who Qualifies for International Protection’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/refugee-status.en.


It must be noted that the need for successful, essential programmes has been recognised, and hence, alternative funding has secured their continuation. For instance, the Swiss Embassy intervened and secured the funding of legal and psychosocial support for vulnerable cases in relation to family reunification.\textsuperscript{120} The same applies to the aforementioned programme ‘Rebuild our Lives’, which is now supported by Bread for the World, a sister organisation of \textit{Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe}.\textsuperscript{121} There is a range of similar examples that denote the role of the OCG in dealing with the refugee and migrant crisis, which is indicative but not exhaustive of its role and initiatives.

**Policy perspectives**

The OCG and its NGOs, as stated above, have made a valuable contribution in dealing with the influx of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular immigrants. This has been attested by its participation in international programmes and the acknowledgement of its crucial role by the Greek government. However, the ongoing immigration and refugee crisis cannot be dealt with by the church and its collaborating organisations alone. It is not even a solely Greek problem, but rather a European one. However, being the entry point to Europe and a hub on the Balkan route, Greece has more complicated responsibilities, while concurrently dealing with the consequences of the debt-crisis, notwithstanding the improvement of economic figures.

First and foremost, Greece, as an effective humanitarian refuge and in keeping with EU principles and values, has the inevitable duty to provide those in need with legal representation, translation services, safe and dignified lodgings, allowances for initial expenses, regular medical care and emotional support, access to education, language courses and training, as well as opportunities of integration. In tandem with the state, the OCG has been at the forefront of Greece’s response to these tasks, and will continue to be, but such services are certainly demanding in resources. In order to reduce the long backlog, apart from additional funding and the recruitment of trained staff to speed up the processing of cases, the church, in collaboration with the state, will need to continue to prioritise those in need, comprising, among others, vulnerable groups such as unaccompanied minors, families, victims of human trafficking, refugees and generally cases that constitute a humanitarian emergency. This essentially means applying a two-tier system, which distinguishes between vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups at the first reception stage. This distinction is essential as irregular migration burdens the overwhelmed system and its structures at the expense of those genuinely in need, or eligible to apply for asylum.

For the OCG, dealing with migration as a whole would be an impossible task, which is best left to the state. The church and its NGOs are better versed, structured, equipped and experienced to take the lead on the humanitarian aspect, while prioritising vulnerable groups. Hence, the qualitative division of labour should best be maintained. However, both the ICMW-ERP and \textit{Apostoli} will have to be reinforced with additional staff and funding so as to reduce the backlog. In order to deal with the humanitarian challenges logistically, the state will need to better monitor the influx, residence and outflow of refugees and immigrants, keep a reliable and up-to-date register and database of this information, and make it available to the church and the corresponding international institutions.

Furthermore, irregular migration, while not the main cause, has been a catalyst in the resurgence of populism, which erodes support for European integration.\textsuperscript{122} Therefore, Greece, as an EU Member State, must help counter populism in Europe by disproving arguments about an open-door policy, and show itself to be in control, by containing \textit{en masse} irregular migrant movement and thereby its political utilisation and mediatisation. By extension, it must help preserve EU freedom of movement.

a privilege often weakened by intra-EU and Schengen border controls and prevent the future suspension of a fundamental EU freedom as such. This entails guarding the national and external EU borders more effectively with the reinforcement of FRONTEX in the Aegean Sea and Thrace. In the same vein, it must coordinate its efforts with other EU Member States in order to speed up the repatriation of those whose asylum application has been rejected and collectively exert unitary pressure on the safe countries of origin to cooperate. Finally, the OCG and the relevant state ministries must insist on the reform or replacement of the Dublin Convention with a more pertinent framework, and insist on EU solidarity as a principle stemming from the equality between Member States.
Introduction
Large-scale emigration has represented the single most important social - and even existential - challenge to the Republic of Moldova since the country proclaimed its independence in August 1991. Between 1989, when the last Soviet census was carried out, and 2018, the population of the young state decreased by almost one million citizens, from 3,657,665 to an estimated 2,681,735 by the end of 2018, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. A similar trend can be noticed in the breakaway region of Transnistria, which counted only 475,100 inhabitants in 2015; a decrease of

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124 Unless otherwise specified, figures regarding the Republic of Moldova refer to the territory controlled by the central government in Chișinău and do not include the breakaway region of Transnistria, which is referred to separately; ‘Population with usual residence in Republic of Moldova, by sex and age groups, at the beginning of 2019’, National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, available at http://statistica.gov.md/newsview.php?l=en&id= 6416&icd=168. All websites were accessed on 20 October 2019.
over 200,000 compared to 1989. The process of migration overwhelmed both state institutions and Moldovan society at large; leaving them faced with the concomitant tasks of democratic state-building and the transformation from a Soviet-style command economy to a market-based system. It was against this backdrop that religious life in the country, especially the majority Orthodox Christian faith, experienced an almost spectacular revival, while also having to respond to the most pressing social issues, including the consequences of migration both within the country and in the ever-growing diaspora.

Religion, ethnicity and population
The religious demographics of the Republic of Moldova is dominated by Orthodox Christianity, which could have (had) the potential to serve as a unifying factor in the ethnically diverse society, which has been divided almost evenly between supporters of European integration and those who would prefer closer ties with Russia. However, the Orthodox faith has become embedded in societal debates regarding the identity of the Republic of Moldova, which has since 1992 been the venue of competing Orthodox churches, namely the Metropolis of Chişinău and All Moldova, subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Metropolis of Bessarabia, subordinate to the Romanian Orthodox Church. The latter represented the reinstatement of a similar structure that existed in the inter-war period when the historical province of Bessarabia (which comprises most of today’s Republic of Moldova, except for Transnistria) had been part of Romania and has been promoting a pan-Romanian identity based on the view that Moldovans are, in fact, Romanians and that the Moldovan nation is a construct from Soviet times. The former takes a more inclusive view of its Moldovan flock, which comprises not only the majority Romanian-speaking population, but also the sizeable, mainly Russian-speaking ethnic minorities. It has also been promoting the worldview of the Russian Orthodox Church, which considers itself to be entrusted with the safekeeping of the identity of the former Tsarist Empire, which included Bessarabia.

According to the latest Moldovan census of 2014, 90.1 per cent of the population is Orthodox Christian. A more recent survey from January 2019 gives an even higher figure, finding that 91.4 per cent of respondents were faithful of the Metropolis of Chişinău and All Moldova and 3.7 per cent of the Metropolis of Bessarabia. Moreover, the degree of religiosity is also significant. In a survey carried out in 2014, 31.3 per cent of respondents stated that they went to church either often or at least once a month, a figure that was higher than a decade earlier, when it stood at 22.6 per cent. Furthermore, the proportion of those who never went to church decreased from 25 per cent in 2003 to only 10.3 per cent in 2014. Among religious minorities, only the Baptist faith has a following of more than 1 per cent of the population.

The diverging views on identity are also reflected in the statistics regarding the ethnic structure of the country. Thus, 73.7 per cent of respondents declared themselves to be Moldovans in the 2014 census. This reflects the Moldovan nation as being constructed from Soviet times as a construct from the ethnic majority of Moldovans, which consider the country to be the venue of a separate Moldovan identity, separate from the majority Romanian identity of Romania. The census results also provide a more nuanced picture of the religious demographics of the country, with the Orthodox faith being the dominant religion, but also other minority faiths being represented, including the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish faiths.

127 https://www.iom.md/sites/default/files/publications/docs/Raport%20ROM.pdf
129 A complete overview of the census results can be found at http://recensamant.statistica.md/en
census, with a further 6.9 per cent stating they were Romanian. Ethnic minorities include Ukrainians (6.5 per cent), Russians (4 per cent), Gagauz (4.5 per cent) and Bulgarians (1.8 per cent). While the religious demography of the internationally unrecognised, so-called Prîndesrîovian Moldavian Republic (known internationally as Transnistria) is similar to that of Moldova as a whole, with approximately 90 per cent of the population belonging to the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova130 (albeit with no parishes of the Metropolis of Bessarabia), its ethnic fabric is significantly different, with only 28.6 per cent Moldovans, and with Russians comprising 29.1 per cent and Ukrainians 22.9 per cent of the population.131

Religion-state relations
Although the law on religious groups adopted by parliament in May 2007 stipulates both the equality of all religions before the law and public authorities (article 15, paragraph 1), and the principle of state non-intervention in religious affairs (article 15, paragraph 2), the same legal act contains a provision highlighting that the state ‘recognises the significant importance and the primordial role of the Christian Orthodox religion and, respectively, of the Orthodox Church of Moldova in the life, history and culture of the people of the Republic of Moldova’ (article 15, paragraph 5).132 A similar provision exists in the corresponding Transnistrian ‘law’, albeit only mentioning the role of Orthodoxy and not of the Moldovan church.133 This may reflect the fact that although the Eparchy of Tiraspol and Dubăsari is subordinate to the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, it is known to have a de facto special status, having been founded as a compromise between the Transnistrian authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church in light of the unrecognised status of the region.134

The Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova has at times been said to have benefitted from preferential treatment regarding taxation and donations of public property upon which to build churches; allegations which the Moldovan Orthodox Church has consistently denied.135 The dominant position of the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova is also reflected in its close cooperation with state bodies. Thus, it has concluded several cooperation agreements with institutions such as the Ministry of Labour, Social Protection and Family,136 the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Justice. In coordination with the Ministry of Labour, for instance, the Metropolis has developed a network of social services, including day-care centers and shelters within churches and monasteries, while the church also provides spiritual guidance to army personnel and police officers, as well as prison inmates.137

According to its website, the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova has specialised departments for religious education, pastoral work in the army and in the sector of internal affairs, youth work, social and charity work, cultural relations, spiritual work in hospitals and pastoral work in prisons.138 A

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132 The full version of the law (in Romanian) is available at http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view &view =doc&id=324889&lang=1
133 The full version of the law (in Russian) is available at http://www.vspmr.org/file.xp?file=58405
136 Although the law on religious groups adopted by parliament in May 2007 stipulates both the equality of all religions before the law and public authorities (article 15, paragraph 1), and the principle of state non-intervention in religious affairs (article 15, paragraph 2), the same legal act contains a provision highlighting that the state ‘recognises the significant importance and the primordial role of the Christian Orthodox religion and, respectively, of the Orthodox Church of Moldova in the life, history and culture of the people of the Republic of Moldova’ (article 15, paragraph 5). A similar provision exists in the corresponding Transnistrian ‘law’, albeit only mentioning the role of Orthodoxy and not of the Moldovan church. This may reflect the fact that although the Eparchy of Tiraspol and Dubăsari is subordinate to the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, it is known to have a de facto special status, having been founded as a compromise between the Transnistrian authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church in light of the unrecognised status of the region. The Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova has at times been said to have benefitted from preferential treatment regarding taxation and donations of public property upon which to build churches; allegations which the Moldovan Orthodox Church has consistently denied. The dominant position of the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova is also reflected in its close cooperation with state bodies. Thus, it has concluded several cooperation agreements with institutions such as the Ministry of Labour, Social Protection and Family, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Justice. In coordination with the Ministry of Labour, for instance, the Metropolis has developed a network of social services, including day-care centers and shelters within churches and monasteries, while the church also provides spiritual guidance to army personnel and police officers, as well as prison inmates.
137 According to its website, the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova has specialised departments for religious education, pastoral work in the army and in the sector of internal affairs, youth work, social and charity work, cultural relations, spiritual work in hospitals and pastoral work in prisons.
138 A...
similar organisational structure exists within the Eparchy of Tiraspol and Dubăsari. The homepage of the Moldovan Orthodox Church also lists six subordinate social-philanthropic institutions, including an orphanage and social centers. It is not church policy to provide information on social work carried out in individual parishes and eparchies. However, the Metropolis highlights the importance of individual parish social and charity work, as well as the need for cooperation with social, health and educational workers in each community. The media has in the past noted critically that the activity reports of the above-mentioned structures are not published on the official website of the Moldovan Orthodox Church. The Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, while publishing press releases on individual social activities, maintains that it does not wish to praise its acts of charity.

The Metropolis of Bessarabia has not as yet been in a position to conclude cooperation agreements with state institutions, yet it is active in the social field. It channels most of its charity work through the Diaconia Social Mission, which in 2018 had an annual budget of 459,000 euro. Key social projects include support for vulnerable families and single mothers, food and clothing donations, assistance for the integration of orphans, canteens for elderly citizens, children’s and youth camps etc. Notably, Diaconia cooperates with the (small) Roman Catholic community – and Caritas Vienna and Ambrosiana are among the international donors of the organisation. Unlike the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, which has its own Theological Academy in the capital, most future priests of the Metropolis of Bessarabia study in Romania.

Religion and forced displacement
The first significant wave of migration in the Republic of Moldova took place in 1992, when, during (March – July) and in the immediate aftermath of the short, yet bloody civil war between Chișinău and Transnistria, approximately 100,000 people fled to third countries and 51,289 were registered internally displaced persons (IDPs) on territory controlled by the constitutional authorities. A significant proportion of IDPs settled in the capital, where some were provided with housing. However, after the end of hostilities the majority of IDPs returned to the Transnistrian region, with only 200 IDP families remaining on the right bank of the Dniester as of 2012. Furthermore, almost all people who had fled to Ukraine (60,000) also returned to their homes.
The process of mass emigration from the Republic of Moldova started in 1993 against the background of worsening economic conditions. Indeed, by the end of the 1990s, the country’s GDP had dropped to one third of its pre-independence level, and a World Bank study estimated that in 1999 about 80 per cent of the population were living below the poverty line.\textsuperscript{152} Destination countries were mainly Russia and, initially to a somewhat lesser extent, European Union (EU) member states. By 2004, the country had lost almost 300,000 residents compared with 1989 figures. The process of emigration subsequently intensified, reaching an annual figure of approximately 50-60,000 persons.\textsuperscript{153} In 2018, remittances constituted 16.2 per cent of the country’s GDP; the 11\textsuperscript{th} highest proportion in the world and the third highest among CIS countries.\textsuperscript{154} Notably, whereas in the 1990s migration had been largely a male phenomenon, the intensification of the process of migration and especially the possibility of migration to EU countries, where care workers were sought after, led to a ‘feminisation’ of migration.\textsuperscript{155} By 2017, the majority of Moldovan emigrants were women.\textsuperscript{156} Moreover, Moldovan emigrants have a relatively high level of education, with 28 per cent being university graduates.

The demographic structure of Moldovan emigration has had serious consequences. In a country in which traditionally women were responsible for raising children and caring for elderly relatives, the ‘feminisation’ of migration has generated a wide range of social problems. Furthermore, data provided in 2017 by the Ministry of Education puts the figure of children with one parent abroad at over 77,000.\textsuperscript{157} Also, the compound effect of the high level of education of emigrants and the growing number of women leaving the Republic of Moldova has led to staff shortages in the education and healthcare sectors.\textsuperscript{158}

Moldovan authorities were unprepared for the challenges associated with managing the consequences of emigration at home, and with systematically engaging with the country’s new diaspora. During the early 1990s, a Department of Migration did exist within the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, but the lack of efficiency thereof led to the creation of the State Service of Migration in 2001, the priorities of which were the preparation of a legislative framework on migration management, as well as drafting agreements with other countries regulating the status of Moldovan migrant workers.\textsuperscript{159} In 2002, the first such document was concluded between the Republic of Moldova and Italy, and by 2006 a total of 19 similar bilateral agreements had been signed.\textsuperscript{160} By comparison, until 2001 such agreements had only existed with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.\textsuperscript{161} However, the State Service of Migration was subsequently dissolved and diaspora


\textsuperscript{153} Roșca, ‘Integrierea’ (The integration), 52.

\textsuperscript{154} The full dataset is available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?most_recent_value_desc=false.

\textsuperscript{155} Elena Vaculovschi and Dorin Vaculovschi, ‘Aspecete de gen ale migrației de muncă din Republica Moldova’ (Gender aspects of work migration from the Republic of Moldova), Administrarea Publică, 2018, 1 (97), pp. 94-97.


\textsuperscript{158} Nelly Filip and Natalia Coșelev, ‘Migrația ca problemă globală și națională’ (Migration as a global and national issue) in Grigore Belostecin et al. (eds.) Culegere de articole selective ale Conferinței Științifice Internaționale „Competitivitatea și inovarea în Economia Cunoașterii” (Collection of selected articles of the International Scientific Conference Competitiveness and Innovation in the Knowledge Economy) Chișinău: Academia de Științe Economice a Moldovei, 2017, 259.


\textsuperscript{161} Loghin, Republica Moldova și fenomenul migrației (The Republic of Moldova and the phenomenon of migration), 2.
engagement was – rather strangely – placed under the authority of the Bureau of Interethnic Relations (which is also responsible for national minority policies), before the Bureau for Diaspora Relations was operationalised within the State Chancellery of the Prime Minister in 2013.¹⁶²

The Bureau for Diaspora Relations is responsible for coordinating state policies towards the diaspora. Yet despite this role, it has never truly had exclusive competence in this regard, requiring coordination with several ministries, including the departments responsible for labour and social policy, health, education, foreign affairs and internal affairs.¹⁶³ The ‘Diaspora 2025’ National Strategy, adopted in 2016, lists six ministries besides the Bureau for Diaspora Relations as having competencies in drafting and implementing policies related to migration.¹⁶⁴ Institutional volatility and the need for complex processes of coordination between various agencies represent one of the challenges in calibrating policies on diaspora engagement, especially since Moldovan administrative culture does not entail loyal cooperation between state bodies. In fact, different state institutions use different methodologies to determine the number of Moldovans abroad, leading to divergent data sets. Furthermore, there appears to be no systematic coordination between what has been the declared objective of Moldovan diaspora policy, namely fostering the return of emigrant workers, and domestic economic, social and labour policies and strategies. The International Organization for Migration notes, for instance, that there are no national assessments of the effects of emigration on the labour market and only sporadic research into the effects on social security.¹⁶⁵

A special note should be made regarding the lack of reliable statistics on the Moldovan diaspora. The difficulty in establishing the number of Moldovan migrants abroad has two main reasons. First of all, the vast majority of Moldovan emigrants still maintain official residency status in Moldova, meaning that more approximate methods of calculating their number are necessary. The most recent methodology, which was presented by the National Bureau of Statistics in July 2019, defines an emigrant as a person who over the past 12 months has spent a total of 9 months outside the country, after having spent 9 months over the past 12 months in the Republic of Moldova.¹⁶⁶ Based on this system of determining the population, the ‘realistic’ number of people living in the country was estimated at 2,681,735¹⁶⁷ - and thus almost one million (!) fewer than in 1989. These numbers also offer only a partial picture, since circular migration represents a significant characteristic of Moldovan emigration patterns. For instance, in 2017 about 160,000 people left the Republic of Moldova, while almost 110,000 returned.¹⁶⁸

A more significant problem is determining the number of Moldovan citizens by country of destination. The main reason for this is the high number of Moldovans who have taken the citizenship of other states. Notably, according to official Romanian statistics, between 2002 and March 30th 2018, 521,025 Moldovan citizens had obtained Romanian citizenship.¹⁶⁹ Since Moldovan

¹⁶² Haruța, ‘Relația statului de origine cu migranții’ (The relationship of the state of origin with migrants), 37.
¹⁶³ Ibid, p. 28.
¹⁶⁸ The latter number also includes foreigners establishing residence in the Republic of Moldova. However, in 2017 only 3,712 foreign citizens were registered as having immigrated to the country. See: Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, Compendiul Statistic (Statistical Compendium), 15.
citizens cannot work without a permit in the EU and therefore use their Romanian passports when settling in Western Europe, they cannot be statistically separated from Romanian citizens from Romania. Thus, the discrepancies between registered Moldovan citizens and the actual number thereof are quite high. For instance, in 2016 the Italian Ministry of Labour quoted a figure of about 150,000 Moldovan citizens registered in the country, which is the second most popular destination for Moldovan emigrants, whereas expert estimates put their actual number at almost 240,000. In other countries, the proportion of Moldovans registered as such by the authorities is even lower. In Germany, for instance, the 15,000 Moldovan citizens recorded in 2015 are estimated to represent only between 25 and 30 per cent of their true number, whereas in the United Kingdom about 90 to 95 per cent are in possession of EU passports.170

Even outside the EU it is hard to pinpoint the number of Moldovan emigrants. In Russia, which remains the single most important destination country, official data from 2016 provided a figure of 487,911 Moldovan citizens residing in the country.171 Yet since 2006, when Russia introduced a so-called repatriation program, Moldovan citizens, including those who were not of Russian descent, have made use of this path to emigrate, and once having obtained Russian citizenship no longer appear in the respective statistics. This also holds true of Transnistrians, who have facilitated access to Russian citizenship.172 Their emigration from the region to Russia therefore does not count as immigration from the point of view of the Russian authorities.

Despite being overwhelmed by the consequences of mass emigration, Moldovan state institutions do not appear to have systematically engaged with religious communities in order to jointly address the social consequences of emigration, both with regard to its impact on domestic affairs, and when it comes to engaging diaspora communities. In fact, the ‘Diaspora 2025’ National Strategy makes no mention of churches at all. This is especially paradoxical, since one stated objective is related to the consolidation of associations of Moldovans abroad, and in many countries, such as Russia, Italy or Portugal, the first such associations were centered around parishes where Moldovan emigrants converged.173

Notably, there has not been a systematic, centrally coordinated process of setting up Moldovan Orthodox churches abroad. Rather, individual Moldovan priests settled in Western European countries have over time established new parishes in countries such as Italy, France or Belgium.174 Only later did the Moldovan Orthodox church start to systematically send priests abroad.175 For canonical reasons, these cannot be subordinated to the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, but are included in the structure of the Patriarchal Exarchate in Western Europe, which is under the direct jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church. It is only in Italy that in May 2019 the creation of a Moldovan Vicariate under the authority of said Exarchate was authorised by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, thus placing the 37 Moldovan churches in Italy under the authority of the Moldovan bishop Ambrozie of Bogorodsk for the first time.176 As for the Metropolis of Bessarabia, its


171 Moșneaga, Cartografierea (Mapping), 45.

172 Ostavnaia, Cartografierea diaspirei (Mapping the diaspora), 19.

173 Moșneaga, Cartografierea (Mapping), 127.

174 Interview with a think tank official, Chișinău, February, 2019.

175 Metropolitan Vladimir, ‘Interviul acordat de Mitropolitul Vladimir al Chișinăului și al Întregii Moldove portalului ortodox ’Pravoslavie i mir’’ (Interview granted by Metropolitan Vladimir of Chișinău and All Moldova to the Orthodox portal ‘Pravoslavie i mir’), interview by Maria Seniculova, Pravoslavie i mir (translated into Romanian and published on mitropolia.md), April 14th 2011, https://mitropolia.md/interviu-acordat-de-mitropolitul-vladimir-al-chisinaului-si-al-intregii-moldove-portalului-ortodox-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%BB%D0%BA%D0%BB-%D0%B8-%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%BD%D1%80/.

faithful in the diaspora are known to join Romanian parishes established by the Romanian Metropolises abroad, e.g. the Romanian Orthodox Metropolis of Western and Southern Europe or the Metropolis of Germany and Central Europe. To a certain extent, the division of Moldovan Orthodoxy at home is thus reflected in the European diaspora as well, although this should not necessarily be overstated since some Moldovans may visit Romanian churches, which exist in a much higher number of places abroad. By contrast, in Russia Moldovans tend to visit local churches of the Russian Orthodox Church, although the building of the first Romanian-speaking church in the Siberian city of Surgut was blessed by Metropolitan Vladimir of Moldova in 2015. Furthermore, since 2015 a church in Moscow – the Church of the Blessed Virgin Mary – has functioned as the Representation of the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova in Russia.

Moldovan churches in Western Europe play an important role in maintaining the culture and identity of parishioners, although there seems to be no systematic approach to the engagement of the local diaspora, with activities appearing to be the result of the initiatives of the local priest or community. Among the most widespread activities hosted or organised by Moldovan churches are Sunday or parish schools (e.g. in Mestre, Padua, Turin and Parma in Italy or Faro in Portugal), Romanian-language classes (e.g. in Montreuil in France and Padua in Italy), and the celebration of Moldovan holidays (e.g. Independence Day in Faro). In 2015, Moldovan churches in Italy also organised the Week of the Orthodox Diaspora, although this appears to have been a one-off event, whereas the Romanian Orthodox Church introduced the celebration of the Sunday of Romanian migrants on the first Sunday after August 15th in 2009, which is observed by churches both at home and abroad, and thus also by the Metropolis of Bessarabia.

Notably, support for Sunday schools abroad was also included in the programme of the Moldovan government adopted in autumn 2015, with the Bureau for Diaspora Relations sending Romanian-language textbooks to Moldovan associations abroad which provided Romanian classes within the framework of Sunday schools at churches frequented by diaspora citizens. Also, the Bureau for Diaspora Relations, with the financial support of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), has in the past offered grants to associations for so-called Educational Centers, with Moldovan religious communities numbering among the beneficiaries. To a somewhat lesser extent, Moldovan churches also offer social services in order to help migrants adapt to their host country. One example is the church in Montreuil, which offers French classes, as well as other forms of support. However, the social role of Moldovan churches abroad appears to remain limited, with

177 Official communication from the Metropolis of Bessarabia, in possession of the author, September 2019.
178 Interview with a think tank official, Chișinău, February, 2019; Biroul Relații cu Diaspora, ‘Diaspora moldovenească din Surgut, Federația Rusă’ (The Moldovan diaspora in Surgut, Russian Federation), Moldova de on ure, no. 2 (December 2016), 67.
180 Examples of activities carried out by Moldovan Sunday schools in Italy can be found at: https://brd.gov.md/sites/default/files/document/attachments/02_impactul_activitatii_scolilor_duminicale_in_italia_aliona_purci_0.pdf. Examples of activities carried out by Moldovan churches in Western Europe can be found, inter alia, at https://brd.gov.md/sites/default/files/pro_diaspora_kids_2016.pdf
181 The full programme of the event (in Romanian) can be found at http://piacenza.cerkov.ru/2015/11/03/saptamana-diaspo-rei-ortodoxe-a-republicii-moldova-in-italia/
184 ‘Căștigătorii granturilor de 3500 $ pentru Centrele Educaționale din Diaspora’ (The winners of 3500 $ grants for Educational Centres in Diaspora), Biroul Relații cu Diaspora, available at https://brd.gov.md/ro/content/castigatorii-granturilor-de-3500-pentru-centrele-educationale-din-diaspora
less than 20 per cent of emigrants seeking their church’s help when faced with problems. Paradoxically, in Italy, for instance, Moldovan migrants have appealed to the Catholic Church for support in the social sphere.

While information on the activities of Moldovan churches is not available systematically, it is even more difficult to identify specific measures targeted at those left behind in the Republic of Moldova. The above-mentioned approach of the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova regarding the non-publicising of its social activities impedes more in-depth research in this regard. Nevertheless, since it is church policy to support those in need, it can be assumed that the beneficiaries of its social activities include elderly people left behind by their emigrant children, single mothers left behind by emigrant male partners, children left in the care of elderly relatives or other socially vulnerable categories. The church basically compensates for the ineffectiveness of state institutions, which, especially in rural areas, lack the capacity to respond to the consequences of the mass emigration of working-age adults. At an individual level, parishes abroad have also been involved in the collection of goods to be distributed to vulnerable families at home.

More systematic information is available regarding the Metropolis of Bessarabia, which supports the families of children whose parents have left the country in search for work, leaving their offspring in the care of grandparents (or other relatives). One Diaconia project even focuses on the creation of ‘a mechanism by which all the community actors (the tutelage authority, religious community, the school, social assistance) could work together to provide assistance to parents who plan to work abroad, [including] consulting services to the person who shall be taking care of the child, and informing children about protection against any form of violence.’ At present, about 1,500 children are monitored within the framework of the project. Through its parishes, which number almost 200, the Metropolis of Bessarabia also provides material and spiritual support, as well as psychological counseling, on an individual case basis, through direct contact with the children and the relatives taking care of them in the absence of their parents.

A final mention should be made of the fact that because of the dire socio-economic situation, the Republic of Moldova has not been on the receiving end of migration. According to official information, in 2014 and 2015, a total of 257 Ukrainians and 116 Syrians claimed asylum in the country. Moreover, among the mixed Syrian-Moldovan families that repatriated due to the conflict in the Middle East, the majority subsequently left the Republic of Moldova for Western European countries. This did not prevent the issue of a perceived threat of Muslim immigration from being misused during electoral campaigns for the presidential election (2016) and the local election in Chișinău (2018), with fake news being actively promoted by certain segments of the media, including the possibility of 30,000 Syrian immigrants entering the country should the opposition candidate Maia Sandu become head of state. This approach was possible given the latent Islamophobia in a country in which at least certain segments of the Orthodox Church had protested against the registration of the Islamic League in 2011.

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186 Moșneaga, Cartografierea diasporei (Mapping the diaspora), 35.
187 Ibid, 78.
188 Interview with an Orthodox Church official, Chișinău, February, 2019.
189 Misiunea “Diaconia”, Asistăm (We assist), 13.
190 Official communication from the Metropolis of Bessarabia, in possession of the author, September 2019.
192 Interview with a Muslim community official, Chișinău, February, 2019.
Policy perspectives

Given the impact of emigration as well as the important role Orthodoxy plays in Moldovan society, a case could be made for a more specific partnership between state institutions and both Orthodox churches regarding both diaspora engagement as well as managing the needs of the people affected by emigration at home. A more systematic division of labour, enshrined or at least included as an option in a future legal framework on migration management, could generate synergy effects especially with a view to conserving the culture and identity of Moldovans abroad, including in particular knowledge of the Romanian language and making use of the expanding network of Moldovan religious communities in the diaspora. It would also be of great use to identify parishes of the Romanian Orthodox Church with significant numbers of believers from the Republic of Moldova. This network could also be a partner of the Moldovan state in providing social assistance for citizens abroad. In order to develop optimal policies, the collection of more systematic information on activities already carried out by diaspora communities centred around churches abroad appears essential.

At home, the collection of systematic information on relatives of emigrant citizens left behind is essential. The fact that different institutions provide sometimes significantly different numbers impedes the development of a holistic approach regarding the social needs of the people most affected by emigration. In this sphere it may also be useful to establish, a more specific division of labour between state institutions and religious entities, possibly based on the precedent of existing cooperation agreements between the Moldovan church and state ministries. Furthermore, there should be a more inclusive approach on the part of the Moldovan state towards engaging systematically with other religious communities providing social services, including in particular the Metropolis of Bessarabia, which has a wide-ranging network of projects but without state support, as well as other smaller religious groups active in the Republic of Moldova. Although the latter represent only a small fraction of the country’s population, they do provide social services as well and should be encouraged to share their expertise and best practices. Given the past privileged relationship with the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, the extent to which the current or future Moldovan authorities would be inclined towards a more inclusive approach in this regard remains to be seen, and will depend on the geopolitical orientation shaping government policies regarding its general approach to religious communities in the country.
Introduction
The Russian Federation is a unique example of a country where changes in society’s cultural atmosphere and religious consciousness depended more on forced displacement than on inner natural changes. The specifics of the religious situation in Russia include the combination of two historical factors: 1) the unprecedented migration waves that affected the territory of the present-day Russian Federation during the twentieth century, both before and after the revolution of 1917, and 2) the anti-religious campaigns that were more devastating on Russian territory than in the other republics of the Soviet Union.

Waves of forced migration, the deportation of entire nations under Stalin, and the migration and emigration of the 1990s all directly affected the religious landscape of Russia. First of all, the ethnic composition of many faiths has changed. For example, the ethnic composition of the Lutheran and Catholic communities changed and became more Russian. Whereas at the beginning of the 20th century it was mainly the German, Polish and Finnish populations that identified as Lutheran and

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By Roman Lunkin

Catholic, from the 1990s ethnic Russians came to make up a larger proportion of adherents to these groups, because of conversions due to the weakness of Orthodoxy, the emigration of Germans, decreasing numbers of Poles and Finns, and, in general, because of the growing interest of Russians in other confessions.

During the Soviet period, all faiths were under pressure due to the state’s anti-religious policy. However, the period after perestroika and especially the 1990s was a time of religious growth, and it became evident that the Russian Orthodox Church had lost its monopoly position. One of the manifestations of the new social role of Christian churches in civil society was their active work with immigrants (refugees and labour migrants). As in the European Union during the immigration crisis of 2015-2018, the position of Russian churches regarding immigrants strengthened their role in the public space and in politics, and spurred the development of their social work.

### Religion, ethnicity and population

According to the preamble of the Federal Law on the Freedom of Consciousness and Religious Associations (1997), the state recognises the historical significance of Orthodox Christianity in Russian history and culture, and gives special respect to Christianity and certain other religions, namely Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. The Russian authorities divide II faiths into ‘traditional’ and ‘nontraditional’. This concept, while absent from the Russian Law on Religious Freedom, has been advanced by the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Rus’ since 2009. Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism are deemed ‘traditional religions’, while even Old Believers, Catholics, various Protestant denominations, and many others are not.

The concept of traditional religions not only pits worshippers against each other, it also ignores the religious diversity of Russia. Today there are between five and 15 million practicing Orthodox believers in Russia, ten million Muslims, three million Protestants, 500,000 Buddhists, 200,000 Jews, 150,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses (their organisation was recognised as extremist and banned in 2017), 100,000 Hindus, and 100,000 followers of other religious faiths (e.g., there are about 10,000 Mormons in Russia). Thus, Russia corresponds with the average European level of religiosity among its population, with about 20 per cent participating to some degree in the activity of religious organisations in a country of more than 140 million inhabitants.

The ROC has laid claim to the exclusive right to a close relationship with the government, and accuses Catholics and Protestants of proselytising in the canonical territory that it considers its own. According to the Russian Ministry of Justice, ROC organisations are the most numerous in the country: among a total of 31,473 registered religious organisations, there are 19,471 different ROC organisations (dioceses, monasteries and communities), 3479 Protestant and 5340 Muslim organisations. However, field research published by the Keston Institute in 2010s shows that

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155 ‘Vladimir Putin zayavlyayet, chto v Rossi tradicionnye religii mogut raschityvat’ na podderzhku gosudarstva’ (Putin claims that in Russia traditional religions could rely on the support of the state), 17 December 2001, RIA Novosti, available at https://ria.ru/20011217/36496.html. All websites were accessed on 23 December 2019.


158 The Information portal on the activity of non-commercial organisations of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, the list of registered organisations on December 23rd 2019, http://unro.minjust.ru
Protestants and Muslims may be twice as numerous as the official figures suggest.\textsuperscript{199} For example, evangelicals are now the second largest Christian denomination in Russia after Orthodox Christians in terms of the numbers of practicing believers and presence throughout the country (five to 15 million Orthodox and three million Evangelicals).\textsuperscript{200} In fact, in many regions of Siberia and the Far East, the number of Protestant communities and active parishioners is higher than the number of Practicing Orthodox believers.

The concept of ‘traditional religions’ is based on the fact that each ethnic group has its own culture and its own religion, but this statement contradicts the ethnic composition of modern religious organisations. In Russia, parishioners of the Russian Orthodox Church are mainly ethnic Russians, although Ukrainians and Belarusians, fellow Slavic peoples, also tend to follow Eastern Orthodoxy. At the same time, there are also other, indigenous peoples of Russia that are historically Orthodox (some coming to the faith in the Middle Ages, others in the 19th century). An important factor is that the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, regularly declares that Russian Orthodoxy is a multinational faith, and is not limited only to Russia, but also includes churches in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, the Baltic countries, Orthodox in Central Asia, Western Europe, the USA, Japan, Southeast Asia and Latin America.

Consequently, the Russian Orthodox Church cannot declare itself to be either the only religion of ethnic Russians, or exclusively a religion for ethnic Russians. The Russian Orthodox Church adapted itself to the concept of the ‘Russian world’ after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine crisis in 2014 due to the extreme politicisation of this term that became associated with ‘Russian aggression’ in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{201}

**Religion-state relations**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian legislation on religion was gradually tightened. Until 1997, there was a law on the freedom of conscience, which was adopted under Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990. Article 5 of this law proclaimed the separation of the church (religious organisations) from the state, and that the ‘state doesn’t interfere in the activity of the religious organisations’, ‘the state doesn’t finance religious organisations and the activity for the propaganda of atheism’. Article 8 gives permission for the activity of every religious community without registration.\textsuperscript{202} There were no significant restrictions on the registration and missionary activities of religious associations. They could exist in two forms, either as a registered organisation or as a religious group that could operate freely without registration. In 1997, a new version of the law on the freedom of conscience was adopted, which proclaimed a special respect for the four traditional religions (Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism) and introduced a moratorium on new religious organisations, which could henceforth receive full rights as a legal entity only 15 years after their registration as a community. However, most of the new religions (Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, Falun Gong, Mormons, etc.) had already registered in the early 1990s. In addition, numerous new local branches of established Protestant communities circumvented this issue by claiming registration within the framework of their central organisation, and thus acquired the rights of a legal entity without delay.


\textsuperscript{201} ‘Patriarh prizval ne politizirovat’ ponятиe “russkij mir’” (Patriarch call not to politicize the notion “Russian world”), 20 July 2015, RIA Novosti, https://ria.ru/20150720/1137980877.html

The legislation was furthered tightened with the adoption in 2016 of a package of laws, better known as Yarovaya Law (the official name: The Federal Law of July 6th 2016 no. 374-FZ ‘On amendments to Federal Law ‘On countering with terrorism’ and other legal acts of the Russian Federation in the parts that constitutes the additional measures in countering terrorism and providing societal security’). The regulation of missionary activity (with ‘mission’ defined in the broadest of terms) and penalties for religious organisations preaching in public places without permission were introduced. Religious groups were henceforth obliged to provide information about themselves to local authorities, which has become a form of quasi-registration.

Anti-extremist legislation is also directly related to religious policy in Russia. The law on countering extremist activity was adopted in 2002. It contains the broadest possible definition of extremist activity, allowing law enforcement agencies to apply this law to almost any religious movement. Most of all, this law has affected Muslim communities and movements (the Hizb-ut-Tahrir movement, the followers of Said Nursi, etc. are prohibited on the territory of Russia). In 2017, all organisations of Jehovah's Witnesses were banned under this law, and many of their books and magazines, along with many Islamic ones, were included in the Federal List of Extremist Materials which is available on the website of the Ministry of Justice. The reason for the prohibition of Jehovah's Witnesses is that they proclaim their religion to be true and criticise representatives of other faiths. The decision to ban them and confiscate their property was an act of intimidation against all other non-Orthodox churches.

The social partnership between ‘traditional religions’ and the state was supported in 2009 by President Dmitry Medvedev, who oversaw the introduction of military chaplains in the army, courses on the basics of different religions in schools, and the approval of the discipline of theology in higher education. 2010 saw the adoption of the law on the transfer of religious property to religious organisations, according to which churches can demand the transfer of ownership or use of buildings that were previously (mainly before the 1917 revolution) used for religious purpose; not only for worship, but also as outbuildings in monasteries. The ROC was the main beneficiary of these initiatives. The most successful projects implemented were the introduction of modules about Russia’s ‘traditional religions’ in state schools, the introduction of theology as an academic programme in universities, as well as the large-scale restitution of property to the ROC.

Religion and forced displacement
There were waves of the Christian migration from outside Russia, such as, firstly, the Lutherans that became the part of Russian society in the 16th century and, secondly, the evangelical groups from Germany that arrived in Russia from the end of the 18th century. The phenomenon of emigration touched the lives of many in Russia from the beginning of the twentieth century. Members of Russian evangelical sects and Old Believers emigrated to Canada, Latin America, and the USA until the late 1980s. The third type of the migration were Stalin’s deportations to Central Asia. The main focus of this study is the impact of these migratory waves on Russian Orthodoxy, which experienced several types of change.

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Table 1. Number of immigrants. Total number of people living in a country or union republic in which they were not born, by year.

203 The official list on website of Ministry of Justice, available at https://minjust.ru/ru/extremist-materials
205 Source: Pew Research Center. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/15/international-migration-key-findings-from-the-u-s-europe-and-the-world/
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Immigration wave and number of people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emigration of the late Soviet period of Perestroika; from 1987 to 1991</td>
<td>134,000 people moved from Russia to Israel, 102,000 to Germany, 15,000 to the United States, and about 20,000 to other countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Russians and Russian speakers of other ethnic groups</td>
<td>1.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration to Russia from other former Soviet Republics</td>
<td>7.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People that born in Russia but live abroad on 2015</td>
<td>10.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People acquired Russian citizenship from 1992 to 2015</td>
<td>8.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The main countries of birth of international migrants in 2010</td>
<td>Ukraine (about 3 million people, or 26 per cent of all migrants), Kazakhstan (2.5 million, 22 per cent), Uzbekistan (1.1 million, 10 per cent), and Belarus and Azerbaijan (740,000, or 6.6 per cent each)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>The Collective Security Treaty Organization:</strong> February 2016: 1.5 million**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>The UN Refugee Agency:</strong> November 2017: 427,240 IDPs**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe:</strong> January 2015: over 524,000**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table 2. Migration waves in Russia in 1991-2016

The first change concerns the fragmentation of Orthodoxy into official Orthodoxy and Orthodoxy of the Old Rite (Old Believers that separated from official Orthodoxy in the 17th century), which periodically caused waves of migrations from the end of the 17th century to the beginning of the 20th

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207 Russia, Belarus undertake exhaustive measures to host Ukrainian refugees — CSTO official. TASS. 5 FEB 2016. Available at: [https://tass.com/world/854794](https://tass.com/world/854794)


century because of the persecution of the ‘old faith’. Old Believers fled to Moldova, Romania, Poland, and, within Russia, to Siberia and the Far East. Many Old Believers came to China and Latin America, whence they fled from communist China. On January 9th 2018, the Fond podderzhki i sodeistviya staroobryadchestvu ‘Pravda Russkaya’ (Foundation of support and promotion of the Old Rite ‘Russian Truth’) was established. The establishment of this foundation was also undertaken with the support of the authorities. Through this foundation, the authorities intend to actively help Old Believers in Russia. There is also a programme for the resettlement of Old Believers from Latin America and, if desired, from Australia and Canada, on preferential terms in Siberia and the Far East. About 130 families have already moved to the Far East, while several families from Latin America have been granted Russian citizenship by President Vladimir Putin. The appeal to Old Believers has become a symbol of ‘return to the roots’, but an alternative to the ROC.

Secondly, the migration waves deprived official Orthodoxy of human and intellectual strength. During the Soviet persecutions after 1917, the best priests, theologians, and the most active believers were killed or left the country. They settled in France, to a lesser extent in other European countries and in the United States. In 1943, a war-time initiative under Stalin to raise patriotic spirits lead to the revival of the former state church of the Russian Empire but as the Moscow Patriarchate, whose activity was necessarily overseen by Stalin and controlled by the Soviet state. Furthermore, during the Soviet period, the Russian Church did not have the right to conduct social projects or to help people publicly in other ways, and Sunday schools were also prohibited.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 brought about a division in Russian Orthodoxy as members of the ‘White’ movement, including intellectuals, emigrated from ‘red’ Bolshevik Russia. The Russian diaspora established the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad that remained an irreconcilable critic of Soviet Russia. The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad unified with the Moscow Patriarchate (MP) in 2007, and most communities of the Russian Archdiocese of the parishes of Russian tradition (about 80 parishes in France, Britain, Germany and Italy) entered the structure of the MP in 2019. This was a key event in the restoration of the Russian World, which, in the view of the ROC, refers to the spiritual identity community including Russia itself and the Russian diaspora abroad. The spiritual and cultural (and canonical after the above-mentioned reunifications) ties with Orthodox of Russian tradition objectively help the Moscow Patriarchate to overcome the Soviet legacy and build church democracy from the inside.

Thirdly, migration, deportations and Soviet atheist policies dramatically changed the ethnic character of Christianity, and showed both the ROC and Russian society as a whole that Russians could be Christians outside the framework of the Moscow Patriarchate. Before the 1917 revolution, non-Orthodox Christian churches were virtually inaccessible to the Russian population. At the moment of the collapse of the USSR, Luthers and Catholics in Russia existed as separate disparate communities in Siberia. The deportations of the Stalin period became a consistent element of national policy, as did the ‘preventive deportations’ during WWII period. About 2.75 million people (Germans, Finns, Greeks, Romanians, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks and others suspected of collaboration or collaboration with the Nazi army) were deported during and after WWII. Although the Lutheran and Catholic communities were formally revived in the early 1990s on the basis of Polish or German cultural societies, or by gathering people with Polish, Lithuanian, etc. roots, these churches quickly became predominantly Russian in terms of the ethnicity of their parishioners. German Lutheranism

212 pravda-russkaya.ru
213 The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad appeared in the 1920s, and by 2007 had about 400 parishes in the USA, Australia, Britain and Germany.
was also negatively affected by the mass migration of Russian Germans to Germany in the 1990s (about 500,000 Russian Germans and 25,000 Pentecostalists emigrated),\textsuperscript{215} so that by the early 2000s the church in Russia was in deep crisis. The beginning of 1990s and early 2000s became the heyday of the evangelical movement throughout Russia, despite the continued emigration of pastors and their families. Many Christian denominations or movements that were only for foreign citizens before 1917, such as the Salvation Army, the Reformed Church and the Methodist Church, disappeared in Soviet times and were revived as Russian churches in the 1990s. The religious boom of 1990s also saw the immigration to Russia of thousands of Ukrainian evangelical missionaries who became Russian citizens, (unlike the evangelists from the USA who mainly left Russia) and came to represent the majority of the pastors of the big Protestant churches in Russia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>1989 Census of RSFSR\textsuperscript{216}</th>
<th>2002 Census</th>
<th>2010 Census</th>
<th>Christian denominations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>119,865,946</td>
<td>115,889,107</td>
<td>111,016,896</td>
<td>Orthodox, Catholic, Lutheran, Evangelical\textsuperscript{217}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>4,362,872</td>
<td>2,942,961</td>
<td>1,927,988</td>
<td>Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Evangelical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>1,206,222</td>
<td>807,970</td>
<td>521,443</td>
<td>Orthodox, Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>70,427</td>
<td>45,569</td>
<td>31,377</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>46,829</td>
<td>28,520</td>
<td>18,979</td>
<td>Orthodox, Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>46,390</td>
<td>28,113</td>
<td>17,875</td>
<td>Orthodox, Lutheran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>842,295</td>
<td>597,212</td>
<td>394,138</td>
<td>Orthodox, Catholic, Lutheran, Evangelical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>94,594</td>
<td>73,001</td>
<td>47,125</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finns</td>
<td>47,102</td>
<td>34,050</td>
<td>20,267</td>
<td>Lutheran</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Selected ethnicities and Christian churches in Russia\textsuperscript{218}

Social work among various categories of migrants has become a clear manifestation of the internal development of the Russian Orthodox Church and the need to be more active in a competitive


\textsuperscript{216} Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic as a part of USSR.

\textsuperscript{217} Evangelicals indicates the Protestant churches that formed as a legacy of the Reformation between the 17th and 19th centuries (Methodism, Baptism, the Salvation Army, Holiness churches) and evangelical movements of the twentieth century (Pentecostalism, Charismatics).

\textsuperscript{218} The choice of nationalities in Table 1 is based mainly on the focus of that article, and is not an exhaustive list of all nationalities living in Russia. Consequently, it excludes native peoples of Russia that belong to the Orthodox tradition but have not taken part in migration processes. Also, certainly, the decreasing number of Ukrainians and Belarussians in Russia is a separate issue that awaits scholarly attention. The non-Russian native peoples of Russia following Orthodoxy include Ossetians (originating from the territory of the Russian federal subject of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and South Ossetia; an unrecognised republic that separated from Georgia in 1991), Udmurts, some Chuvashs living in the Volga region, Finno-Ugric peoples of Russia; Erzya, Moksha, Mari, as well as Komi and Karelians in North-West Russia, etc. Data collected from the 1989 census: http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_nac_89.php Official site of the 2002 census: www.perepis2002.ru; Official site of the 2010 census: https://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm
Religion and Forced Displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World

environment among churches that offer their own interpretations of ‘Russian patriotism’, detracting from the monopoly aspired to the Moscow Patriarchate. The evolution of the worldview of the Russian Orthodox Church has led to a convergence in the views of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Catholic Church on the problems of migration and adaptation, which are generally common to all categories of immigrants (both churches cooperated in helping Christians in the Middle East and helping immigrants integrate in Russia and the EU). In 2016, a joint Orthodox-Catholic humanitarian mission with the support of the Catholic Foundation ‘Kirche in Not’ visited Syria and Lebanon, and in 2017 the head of the Department of External Relations of the ROC, Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk, accompanied the humanitarian mission in Lebanon within the framework of dialogue with the Catholic Church.219 Pentecostals and Baptists in Russia combine social work with evangelism and conversion, which remain as objectives when attracting the needy to church activities.

The difference between the situation in Russia and in the countries of the European Union (particularly Western Europe) is that in Russia, national communities are a part of larger Russian-speaking churches that include refugees from Ukraine or people from Caucasus and Central Asia, while in Europe over the past ten to 15 years independent national churches of immigrants from Africa and the Middle East, Turkey and Latin America have appeared, where native Europeans represent a smaller part of the converts. Many social projects, such as volunteer groups at parish level appeared when the ROC helped the refugees from Ukraine: in 2014-2015 donations amounting to 128 million Russian roubles were collected, and 22,000 refugees received direct help, while in 2015-2016 a joint project of ROC and the Billy Graham Association was undertaken to support refugees in southern regions of Russia.220 The Orthodox church was the most active institution in the social work among displaced people, but evangelicals (Pentecostals and Baptists) also established special centers221.

Policy perspectives

Religious organisations provide a variety of tools to effectively solve social problems, including problems associated with migration. Some churches are able to implement large-scale projects, others are focused on targeted volunteer work. The liberal, secular part of society reacted with disbelief to the work of European churches during the migration crisis, doubting that they could radically change the situation and bring benefit to society. Critics of the ROC also exists in Russia, which is partly a consequence of the Soviet atheist rule, a kind of analogue to European secularisation, in terms of the displacement of religion from public space, politics and the everyday life of people. At the same time, the academic community, politicians, officials and journalists need to take into account the reality of the new role of religious institutions in society and their social activity. Among the recommendations related to the social work of churches are:

First, religious organisations need an individual approach to assessing their capabilities. In this case, grants or state support for the efforts of churches to work with refugees and all those in need will be much more successful in achieving their goals and helping the victims.

Second, public authorities, human rights organisations and non-profit organisations working with migrants should establish cooperation with religious institutions. Moreover, the priority should be partnership not so much at the official level, but within specific parishes and communities, and in relation to specific initiatives.

Third, the support and strengthening of religious pluralism in society constitutes a de facto recognition of the changed situation in the post-Soviet space. However, overcoming religious xenophobia and stereotypes associated with ethnic religiosity (if you are Russian, then you are inevitably Orthodox, or if Tatar, then only Muslim) remains a problem. For instance, campaigns railing against sects are organised in the mass media, while society knows little about other faiths besides Orthodoxy, and information about Islam or Buddhism is widely distributed only in the corresponding national republics of Russia (in Bashkortostan about Islam, and in Buryatia about Buddhism and shamanism, etc.).

Fourth, a significant negative factor in Russia and in the Central Asian republics is the strict control of religious activities, in particular, mission, preaching and the distribution of religious literature. Due to strict legislation and constant checks by security forces, most communities refuse to register, and exist in a semi-underground situation. Such rules do not contribute to the active inclusion of religious institutions in civil society, let alone in social projects. In this case, the state refuses to use even the potential of quite loyal registered associations, although it is unclear what harm they could bring. The regulation of missionary activity and fines cause a latent fear of any preaching and the word of God. The Soviet legacy is reflected in officials’ fear of any religion, as well as the emigration of the most active believers in the 1980s and 90s to Russia from Central Asia, and from Russia on to the West. The liberalisation of legislation in the sphere of freedom of conscience and social partnership between the state and religious associations has become an urgent task that should be solved.
Religion and Forced Displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World

7. Religion and Forced Displacement in Serbia

By Aleksandra Đurić-Milovanović and Marko Veković

Introduction

The civil war (1992 – 1995) which followed the dissolution of communist Yugoslavia had significant political, economic, and social consequences for the region. One of the most important social consequences was the forced displacement of people, which resulted in nearly three million people from the former Yugoslavia being forced to leave their homes. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and particularly Serbia, has been widely affected by this process. According to the Yugoslav 1996 census data on refugees, over 650,000 people (mostly from Bosnia and Herzegovina

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222 Aleksandra Đurić-Milovanović is an anthropologist working as an Associate Research Professor at the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Her publications include, Distinctive Aspects of the Religion and Ethnicity of Romanians in Vojvodina (Institute for Balkan Studies SASA, 2015), Orthodox Christian Renewal Movements in Eastern Europe (co-editor with Radmila Radic; Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) and The Romanian Orthodox Church in the Yugoslav Banat between Two World Wars (co-author with Mircea Maran; Cluj University Press 2019).


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and Croatia) have been forcibly displaced to Serbia. Due to the fact that the capacity of the state to help the population in need was very limited, a wide range of civil society actors helped the refugees. Religious communities and, particularly, religiously based humanitarian organisations dealt with this issue in a significant manner. For example, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), as the dominant religious actor in the country, responded to this crisis mostly through its local network of parishes, and its humanitarian organisation Čovekoljublje (Philanthropy). Other religious communities were also very active in helping the population in need. For example, Caritas Serbia, ADRA, or the Bread of Life. However, their work has been widely affected by the socio-economic situation in Serbia, hyperinflation, and the problem of securing funds for their activities.

Religion, ethnicity and population
According to the latest census data (2011), the total population of the Republic of Serbia is 7,186,862, without Kosovo and Metohija. When it comes to the religious and ethnic composition, Serbia is a predominately homogenous country, even though the data shows a wide range of religions represented, as well as various ethnicities. Regarding the religious composition, 6,079,396 people (84.6 per cent) are affiliated with Orthodox Christianity. Serbia’s religious composition also includes Roman Catholicism (five per cent), Islam (three per cent), followed by Protestantism (one per cent), Eastern religions (0.1 per cent), and 578 Jews. The 2011 census also shows a number of atheists (1.1 per cent), and a relatively significant number of people who did not want to indicate their religious affiliation (three per cent). The dominant religious community is the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC). Meanwhile, the ethnic composition of the country is as follows: Serbs represent the vast majority of population (83.32 per cent), followed by Hungarians (3.53 per cent), Romas (2.05 per cent), Bosnians (2.02 per cent), Croatians (0.81 per cent) and Slovaks (0.73 per cent). The next census will be conducted in April 2021.

Studies show that there is a strong correlation between religion and ethnicity in the Western Balkan region. Thus, ethnicity in Serbia is closely related to religious affiliation. Even though it does not imply that a person cannot be a Serb if he/she is not affiliated with Orthodox Christianity, it is highly likely that affiliation with Orthodox Christianity corresponds with a Serbian ethnic background. However, recent surveys also show a low level of religiosity and religious activities within the Serbian population. That is why the religious pattern in Serbia can be explained through the formula of ‘belonging without believing,’ as the majority of the population claims to identify with the SOC, yet shows a low level of religious activity. However, in their recent article Veković and Đogatović lament the paucity of scholarship about religion’s political significance in the Balkan states since the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Religion-state relations
The dissolution of the communist regimes across Eastern Europe has been followed by a process of religious resurgence. This was also the case in Serbia, where the SOC offered itself as the ‘traditional bastion of national security and the centre of national life, as evidenced by its centuries-long role as

225 In 2011 Census there were no conditions on the territory of the south Serbian province for the conduction of a census, just like in the 2002 Census. The 1991 Census was boycotted by the majority of the Albanian population.
228 Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe.
the single institution that ‘never in history betrayed the Serbian people’. The religious life of Serbia has been regulated by the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, and particularly in Article 41, paragraph one, proclaims the freedom of religion, which includes the freedom of beliefs, confession of faith, and the freedom to perform religious rites. Paragraph two of the same article adopted the secular concept of the state, and acknowledges that religious communities are free to organise their affairs and perform religious rites and activities. Moreover, paragraph three states that religious communities are free to organise religious schools and humanitarian organisations, while paragraph four asserts that the state can fund religious communities. Religion-state relations during the regime of Slobodan Milošević (1991 – 2000) were dominated by the role of the SOC and its two main requests to the state: the introduction of religious education in schools, and the returning of property confiscated by the former communist regime. Both demands were denied by the state on multiple occasions. Moreover, church-state relations became even more complicated after the forced displacement of populations from Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina to Serbia in 1992 – 1995. After the democratic revolution and the fall of Milošević’s regime in 2000, church-state relations in Serbia entered a new phase. The Serbian post–2000 regime was more positively inclined towards the SOC, and thus they supported the SOC’s main requests: religious education was introduced in schools in 2001 through the law on the ‘Regulation on Organization and Implementation of Religious Education and Teaching Alternative Courses in elementary and secondary Schools’. Furthermore, in 2006 the state adopted the ‘Law on the Restoration (Restitution) of Property to the Churches and Religious Communities’. Consequently, the social engagement activities of religious communities increased, particularly in the case of the SOC. However, the most important change in religion-state relations in post-communist Serbia has been the introduction of the ‘Law on Churches and Religious communities’ in 2006. According to Veković, this law was necessary for several reasons, including but not limited to the ‘complexity of religious mosaic in Serbia, issue of returning of the expropriated property by the former communist regime, State’s support for clergy’s pension insurance, and the introduction of the religious education in Serbian school system’. Yet, as Vukomanović pointed out, the 2006 Law led to the ‘fetatisation of the Church’. One of the key characteristics of this law is the introduction of a distinction between traditional churches and religious communities and confessional communities, and other religious organisations (Article 4). Article 10, paragraph one, of this law lists the traditional religious communities in this order: the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church, the Reformed Christian Church, the Evangelical Christian Church, the Islamic community and the Jewish community. The argument of the law is that traditional religious communities deserves a special legal status due to their historical importance and previous legal status (Article 10, paragraph two), as these communities were legally recognised by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia prior to 1945. Moreover, Article 17 introduced the ‘Register of churches and religious communities’. This register was organised by the Ministry of Faith of the Republic of Serbia until 2012, when this ministry ceased to exist. Since then, the ‘Register of churches and religious communities’ has been conducted by the Directorate for Cooperation with Churches and Religious

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232 Ibid, Article 41, Paragraphs 1-4.
233 ‘Uredba o organizovanju i ostvarivanju verske nastave i nastave alternativnog predmeta u osnovnoj i srednjoj školi’ (Regulation on Organization and Implementation of Religious Education and Teaching Alternative Courses in elementary and secondary Schools), Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije (Constitution of Republic of Serbia), br. 46, 27 July 2001.
234 ‘Zakon o vraćanju (restituciji) imovine crkvama i verskim zajednicama’ (Law on the Restoration (Restitution) of Property to the Churches and Religious Communities), Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije (Constitution of Republic of Serbia), br. 46/2006.
237 ‘Zakon o crkvama i verskim zajednicama’ (Law on Churches and religious communities), Službeni glasnik, br. 36/2006, Beograd.
Communities within the Ministry of Justice. The introduction of the ‘Law on Churches and Religious Communities’ was strongly criticised by several Serbian civil society organisations. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia received four motions to determine the constitutionality of the 2006 law, as well as two initiatives for determining the constitutionality of several articles of the law. In 2013, the constitutional court decided to reject all proposals and initiatives.

Religion and forced displacement
The dissolution of communist Yugoslavia, followed by the civil war (1992 – 1995), which also had significant religious background, triggered mass population movements in the region. This conflict resulted in nearly three million people from the former Yugoslavia being forced to leave their homes. Serbia, at that time a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), was greatly affected by the population movement, mainly from Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to relevant sources, by December 1995 over 650,000 people had been displaced from Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia and the FRY as a whole. It was ‘the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War,’ and as Helton argued, ‘the conflict in the former Yugoslavia became synonymous with a generation of refugees and displaced persons’. Moreover, the Kosovo and Metohija conflict from 1999 resulted in about 200,000 displaced people. The majority of the displaced population moved to the capital city of Belgrade.

The first census of refugees and forcibly displaced people was done in June 1996. The census registered a total of 566,275 refugees and forcibly displaced persons. Most of them, 550,920, as stated in Table 1, had come from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, while others hailed from other former Yugoslav republics, or did not want to answer the question concerning their place of origin. The majority of the population movement occurred in two major waves. The first wave was in 1992, while the second wave happened in late 1995. According to the 1996 census, 91.1 per cent of the people who moved to Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the period 1991 – 1995 were Serbs. Although there are no data on the religious affiliation of displaced population arriving in Serbia, it is highly likely that the majority of them were Orthodox Christians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>7,797</td>
<td>35,560</td>
<td>43,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>107,213</td>
<td>24,893</td>
<td>132,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>21,495</td>
<td>10,133</td>
<td>31,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>16,667</td>
<td>6,852</td>
<td>23,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>66,417</td>
<td>207,131</td>
<td>273,548</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

240 ‘Odluka o odbijanju predloga za ocenu ustavnosti/zakonitosti’ (Decision to reject the motions for review of constitutionality), Ustavni sud Republike Srbije, Predmet: V/3-455/2011, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 23/2013.
Table 1. Forced displacement of people from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia, 1991 – 1996.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of People Displaced</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>30,895</td>
<td>11,428</td>
<td>42,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2,893</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>5,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>253,377</strong></td>
<td><strong>297,543</strong></td>
<td><strong>550,920</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of forcibly displaced people significantly declined in the post-1997 period, mostly due to the fact that majority of them were naturalised, and received Serbian citizenship. Out of the total of 566,275 people registered in the 1996 census, more than 60 per cent indicated that they wanted to receive the citizenship of the Republic of Serbia and stay there. On the other hand, only nine per cent declared that they wanted to return to their homes, while over 50,000 people stated that they wanted to move to a third country.

In the aftermath of the civil war, Serbia was a war-torn country characterised by a high level of hyperinflation, and social and political instability. The population increase of roughly ten per cent as a consequence of the forced displacement represented a big challenge for the state. The needs of this section of the population included, but were not limited to, solving the main existential questions and thus the development of social and economic infrastructure. Even though the state tried to respond to these needs, its capacities were very limited. That is why one the key actors in providing support to the population in need were actually religious communities, and particularly religiously based humanitarian organisations. According to Stojić-Mitrović and Đurić-Milovanović, ‘During the 1990s, the activities of faith-based organisations were concentrated on the direct provision of humanitarian aid to refugees and internally-displaced people as victims of wars in Yugoslavia’. As the dominant religious actor in Serbia, and as the institution representing the dominant religious affiliation of the displaced population, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) was the most active religious institution in this regard. The first response of the SOC to the crisis was the founding of the charity and humanitarian organisation Philanthropy. Providing humanitarian help was the key activity of Philanthropy during the 1990s. On the other hand, it should be noted that the work of this organisation was highly dependent on donations and state support, which were not sufficient to meet all the needs of the displaced population. In the post-2000 period, this organisation focused on developing and implementing various development programs for marginalised and endangered groups within Serbia. The SOC also used its far-reaching network of parishes in order to help the population in need. However, it should be also said that the even though the SOC was the dominant religious actor, the years under the Yugoslav communist regime (1945 – 1990) left significant consequences on its material base for social engagement and activities. Moreover, it should be also stated that the majority of other Orthodox Christian Churches were also undergoing a post-communist transition process, and were therefore unable to offer any significant material support. At the same time, the state and the regime of Slobodan Milošević were not particularly interested in religion, and consequently in the needs of the SOC. These are the main reasons why the SOC did not engage more in helping the displaced population, even though it did all that was possible at that time and given the political context. At this time, other religious communities were also very active in helping the displaced population. Among others, the Belgrade Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church and the Adventist Development Relief Agency, the global humanitarian organisation of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, were very active in helping the displaced population. When it comes to the Belgrade Archdiocese, the main activities were

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245 Popis izbeglica i drugih ratom ugroženih lica u Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji (Census of Refugees and other war-affected persons in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), UNHCR, Komesarjat za izbeglice Republike Srbije, Komesarjat za raseljena lica Crne Gore (UNHCR, Commissariat for Refugee of Republic of Serbia, Commissariat for displaced persons of Montenegro), 1996.

246 Ibid, pp. 9-10.


organised through the Serbian branch of the Caritas organisation (founded in 1995). By using the support of its strong international network, this organisation was very engaged in meeting the needs of the displaced population in Serbia. According to their data, they provided food, fuel and shelter to thousands of people in the 1990s. By the end of 2000, their estimates suggest that they reached over two million people in different ways.249 The Serbian branch of the ADRA (the global humanitarian organisation of the Seventh-day Adventist Church) was founded in 1990, and was very active in helping the displaced population. Even though this organisation came to prominence during the siege of Sarajevo, when they managed to bring the humanitarian help into the city, they were also very active in the FRY, and particularly Serbia.250 Lastly, a humanitarian organisation called ‘Bread for Life’, jointly founded in 1992 in Belgrade by the Protestant evangelical church and the Baptist church, responded very actively to the needs of the population. Their activities were focused on providing such things as material aid, self-support programmes, psychosocial support, medical assistance and Christmas presents for children.251

**Policy perspectives**

The best responses on the part of religious communities to the forced displacement of people came as a result of cooperation between state actors on one side, and the religious communities on the other. However, even though the state of Serbia adopted a law on refugees in 1992 and formed a body entitled the ‘Commissariat for Refugees’, the level of cooperation was rather very low.252 The state did not have neither the capacity to support the activities of religious communities, nor the ability to leverage their huge potential, as their cooperation was under the influence of the wider socio-political context. The potential of religious communities to help the population in need was based in their widespread network of parishes (particularly of the SOC), as well as strong ties with international humanitarian networks (particularly in the case of the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches). That is why the religious communities have been left alone to deal with this issue. If the Commissariat for Refugees had responded by forming a special institution for cooperation with religious communities with regard to dealing with people in need, had helped them reach international support and the funds, and had then used their local network of parishes to disseminate aid, it is likely that the outcome of their work would have been much better. On the other hand, the state could also have used the local networks of parishes to disseminate their own funds to help displaced people without any additional costs. The problem of the displaced population should be also tackled through a bottom-up approach, particularly now, more than 20 years after the civil war. The needs of the displaced population today should be carefully surveyed, analysed and identified, and joint programs between the state and all interested religious communities should be developed in accordance with the findings. Lastly, the population in need would benefit greatly from joint programmes organised by different religious communities. Yet, this sort of cooperation and collaboration between religious communities should be also encouraged and supported by the state, since it did not occur spontaneously in the 1990s.

However, even without any significant state support, the level of engagement of Serbia’s religious communities in dealing with populations in need was quite considerable. The Roman Catholic Church, as well as numerous Protestant communities, used their international humanitarian networks to provide help for the displaced population, while the SOC used its humanitarian organisation Philanthropy, as well as its local network of parishes to meet the population’s needs.

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249 ‘Caritas Serbia’ organization at https://caritas.rs
250 ‘ADRA Serbia’ organization at https://adra.org.rs
251 ‘Bread of Life’ organization at http://www.breadoflife.org.rs/en/about.php
252 ‘Zakon o izbeglicama (Law on Refugees), Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, God. XLVII, No. 18, 1992.”
This paper examines how Ukrainian religious associations have addressed the forced displacement caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict that started in 2014. At the outset there will be a brief explanation of the religious and ethnic landscape of Ukraine as well as a short description of church-state relations in the country that emphasises the social engagement of religions. Next, the paper describes how religious associations contribute to counteracting the problems connected with forced displacement by raising awareness of the associated issues within state structures and among members of the public, providing for the basic needs for the most vulnerable categories of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and facilitating the social integration of IDPs into their host communities. Finally, this paper outlines several areas where religious communities and the government can further cooperate in order to resolve the problems arising as a consequence of forced displacement going forward.

Religion, ethnicity and population
According to the latest census conducted in 2001, the population of Ukraine included 77.8 per cent ethnic Ukrainians and 17.3 per cent Russians. Other ethnic groups (Belarussians, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Tatars, Roma, etc.) did not exceed 0.6 per cent each. Recent public opinion polls have recorded an increase in the number of citizens of Ukraine who identify themselves as Ukrainians. In a 2018 study by the Razumkov Center that asked the question, ‘To which national identity do you consider yourself to belong?’, 85.7 per cent of respondents said they considered themselves to be Ukrainian, in contrast to 11 per cent who indicated Russian, 2.1 per cent who gave another nationality, and 1.2 per cent who provided no answer. The discrepancy between the census and sociological research data can be explained by several factors. Since 2014, sociological surveys have not been conducted in Crimea or in the parts of the Donets and Lugansk regions that are not controlled by the Ukrainian government, territories where a significant part of the Russian minority lived. Also, respondents may perceive their ‘nationality’ differently. Although in Ukrainian and Russian the term is usually associated with ethnicity and national origin, respondents can also identify themselves as political Ukrainians who do not want to affiliate themselves in any way with Russia during war.

The religious landscape of Ukraine is diverse. According to one recent study, 64.9 per cent of Ukrainians consider themselves to be Orthodox, 9.5 per cent Greek Catholic, 1.6 per cent Roman Catholic, and 1.8 per cent Protestant. Other religions, such as Judaism and Islam make up no more than 0.1 per cent each. Another eight per cent of Ukrainians consider themselves to be ‘just Christians’, and 12.8 per cent do not affiliate themselves with any religion. Orthodox Christians are divided into several large groups. 13.2 per cent of Ukrainians affiliate themselves with the newly established Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) that was created in 2018, whereas 7.7 per cent of Ukrainians are affiliated with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), the status of which is currently undefined, 10.6 per cent of respondents are believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), and another 30.3 per cent consider themselves ‘just Orthodox’, thereby comprising the largest group of Orthodox Ukrainians.

However, an institutional analysis of the Ukrainian religious landscape reveals a slightly different picture. According to data from the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, 32,719 religious communities were operating in the country as of January 1st 2019. The largest religious association was the UOC-MP with 12,122 communities. The OCU had 5,994 communities, which included the total number of UOC-KP and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church communities. In addition, according to unofficial data, about 500 UOC-MP communities have joined the OCU since its establishment in December 2018, although the legal recognition of the transition of these communities is still in progress. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church included 3,365 communities,

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257 In December 2018, the OCU was established by uniting the UOC-KP, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and several clerics of the UOC-MP. Metropolitan Epiphany, a former right-hand man of the UOC-KP head Patriarch Filaret, was elected as the Primate of the OCU. However, in July 2019, Filaret announced the withdrawal of the UOC-KP from the OCU, although the latter continues the process of legal liquidation of the UOC-KP as its predecessor. Today it is not clear how many (if any) communities want to stay with Filaret, but as the above-mentioned opinion poll shows, at least some Ukrainians continue to identify themselves with the UOC-KP, and not with the OCU.
259 RISU. (2019). Karta peryhodiv do Pravoslavnoyi Tserkvy Ukrainy [Map of communities’ switches to the OCU]. Retrieved from https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1XQR05sHFFiXYGiiVq1mNy0j9FFPdnh&ll=50.37875869902123
concentrated mostly in Western Ukraine, while 897 communities belonged to the Roman Catholic Church.

In addition, there were 8,450 Protestant communities in Ukraine. Thus, Protestants made up a quarter of the total number of religious organisations in the country, yet the number of believers affiliated with Protestant denominations, as has already been noted, did not exceed two per cent. That gap can be explained by the fact that although almost 90 per cent of Ukrainians associate themselves with a particular religion or denomination, only about two per cent of Ukrainians claim to be members of certain religious communities or associations.\(^{260}\) Unlike the vast majority of Orthodox Christians, for whom religiosity is a matter of belonging and self-identification rather than everyday practices and regular involvement in a community’s activities, Protestant religiosity is almost always institutionalised: they are registered as members of their community, are financially and organisationally involved in its life, and regularly attend church meetings.\(^{261}\) Therefore, a small Protestant minority forms a significant, socially active part of the religious landscape of Ukraine.

The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCRCRO) unites religions and represents more than 90 per cent of believers in the country.\(^{262}\) The AUCRCRO serves as a platform for inter-religious dialogue and religious communication with the state, as well as for the coordination of each group’s positions on various social and political issues.

**Religion-state relations**

Article 35 of the Constitution of Ukraine protects the full range of religious rights, and proclaims the separation of church and state. The 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (the Religious Law) states that all religions enjoy equal legal status (Article 5), and, in contrast to other post-Soviet Orthodox-majority states, there are no officially recognised or unofficially endorsed ‘traditional religions’ in Ukraine. The registration of religious organisations is simple and not obligatory for arranging religious activities (Article 8). Further, the Religious Law emphasises that the state shall not interfere in internal religious affairs and prohibits religions from being involved in political life (Article 5).

However, in reality the Ukrainian model of religion-state relations has evolved in a more cooperative direction. Since independence in 1991, religions have gradually strengthened their presence in the public sphere, including in politics, public education, religious freedom advocacy, and social services. The rapprochement between the government and religious bodies has accelerated since 2014, when the state faced Russian aggression in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The main Ukrainian religions, with the exception of the UOC-MP, have strongly supported the Ukrainian government in the conflict with Russia, and promote it both within Ukraine and abroad, particularly in European Union (EU) institutions and European countries. Considering religion a matter of national security, the Ukrainian government was deeply involved in the creation of the new Orthodox Church of Ukraine and negotiated the recognition of this church by the Ecumenical Patriarchate that granted autocephaly (ecclesiastical independence) to the new church in January 2019. The state also disfavoured the

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\(^{262}\) According to the AUCRO’s website, members of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations are the All-Ukrainian Union of Churches of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Ukraine, the Transcarpathian Reformed Church, the German Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Ukraine, the Union of Jewish Religious Organizations of Ukraine, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Evangelical Church, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, the Ukrainian Church of Christians of Evangelical Faith, the Ukrainian Eparchy of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Ukrainian Lutheran Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (associated with the Moscow Patriarchate), the Ukrainian Union Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, the Ukrainian Christian Evangelical Church, and the Ukrainian Biblical Society. See at: http://vrciro.org.ua/ua/council/members
UOC-MP in Law No. 2662-VIII (2018) and Law No. 2673-VIII (2019), which aimed to force the UOC-MP to change its official name to declare its affiliation with the Russian Orthodox Church, banned UOC-MP priests from military chaplaincy, and simplified the transition process for UOC-MP communities seeking to join the OCU.263

In 2014 the state adopted legal regulations on military chaplaincy and prison chaplaincy.264 Chaplains were initially employed by the army in 2017; most are affiliated with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Currently Ukrainian churches are negotiating with the state concerning the possibility of establishing chaplaincy services in the police and medical institutions.

In 2015 Ukrainian religions obtained the right to create general educational institutions, including kindergartens, secondary schools, and universities.265 According to current official data, there are sixteen religiously affiliated (Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Roman Catholic, Protestant and Jewish) private secondary schools in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Catholic University, affiliated with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, is one of the most prestigious institutions of higher education in the country. In public education, the state permits voluntary religious education classes. Sometimes religious leaders and priests (usually Orthodox or Greek Catholics) are invited to public schools to give lectures and blessings, and to conduct religious services. Several incidents have been reported in the media where these events became de facto compulsory for the students.

Regarding proselytism, in line with international standards, the state does not disproportionately restrict the missionary activities of Ukrainian religions, or interfere with their usual social support services to vulnerable population groups, such as soup kitchens or services for children and families in need, including projects funded or supported from abroad. Such services are managed both by religions and religious charities, sometimes in cooperation with local authorities.

Finally, mainstream Ukrainian religious associations actively participate in public debates on human rights issues. As in many other post-Soviet countries, they promote the non-recognition of same-sex marriages, the strengthening of state support for traditional families, the banning of abortions, the rejection of fluid gender identities, and the broad right to conscientious objection for public servants, medical employees, businessmen, etc., with respect to anti-discrimination measures implemented by the state.

**Religion and forced displacement**

In contrast to several other post-Soviet republics, Ukraine had not been involved in wars or experienced violent, large-scale civil conflicts prior to 2014. Also, the country did not attract significant numbers of labour migrants or refugees particularly because the state was and is reluctant to grant the status of refugee and most applicants were usually deported from Ukraine. Thus, forced displacement was not a major focus of public discourse or state policies in Ukraine until things changed in 2014. The Russia-Ukraine conflict, including the military conflict in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, forced a huge wave of internally displaced people (IDPs) to flee from Donbass to other regions of Ukraine and to other countries (Russia, EU countries, the USA, etc.).266

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266 Figures of IDPs from Donbas remain contradictory. In August 2016 the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine listed 1,705,363 IDPs (Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine. (August 30th 2016). Oblikovano 1,705,363 pereselentsi [1,705,363 IDPs are listed]. Retrieved from https://www.msp.gov.ua/ua/news/8449.html). However, as of December 2019 the Ministry listed only 1,428,919 IDPs (Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine. (December 9th 2019). Oblivovano 1,428,919 pereselentsi [1,428,919 IDPs are listed]. Retrieved from https://www.msp.gov.ua/ua/news/17989.html). While some IDPs returned home, the number of registered IDPs has been mostly decreased...
The main faith groups in Ukraine, as well as its many minority religions have responded to the issue of forced displacement by highlighting this problem, recording violations of religious freedom that provoke forced displacement, providing accommodation and other basic needs to the most vulnerable categories of IDPs, and supporting their social integration. Below are a few examples.

1. **Focus on IDPs and their problems.** Religions have repeatedly highlighted this issue and brought it before the state and the public. The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations raised the issue of protecting IDPs in its statements of 2014 and 2015 and encouraged both the state and private charities to provide humanitarian aid.267 In 2017 the AUCCRO Commission of Social Services adopted the Strategy of Ukrainian Religious’ Participation in Peacebuilding ‘Ukraine is Our Common Home’, which, in particular, aims to successfully integrate IDPs into new communities by means of reconciliation, avoiding new conflicts, and counteracting stereotypes against individuals or groups.268 In 2015 the Council of Churches and Religious Organizations under the governor of the Transcarpathian Oblast called on all believers to support IDPs from Eastern Ukraine.269

2. **Recording violations of religious freedom that cause forced displacement.** Several Christian and pro-religious human rights organisations, such as the Institute of Religious Freedom, Christian Emergency Services, and the Association of Ukrainian Christian Lawyers, etc., participate in initiatives to document violations of religious freedom in the so-called Donets and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR/LPR) and in Crimea that have forced many believers to move to other regions of Ukraine.270

3. Providing shelter for IDPs and refugees. The Jesuit Agency for Refugees, in affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church, organised a house for IDPs and refugees in Lviv to provide temporary accommodation for up to three months for IDPs and up to six months for refugees. During these periods they are expected to find housing and jobs. Depaul Ukraine, a charity with a partly Catholic background, established day centers and shelters for homeless people, including IDPs, in Kharkiv and Odesa, where they are provided with relief, humanitarian and legal support, and medical aid. Until funds ran out, Caritas Kharkiv operated a centre for IDP single mothers and their children, where they could stay after escaping Donbass. The Ukrainian Jewish community built housing called ‘Anateyevka’ near Kyiv for 150 Jews from Donbass. The project was initiated by the Chief Rabbi of Kyiv of the All-Ukrainian Congress of Jewish Communities and supported by international sponsors. Since 2014 the UOC-MP Sviatohirsk Lavra (cave monastery) in the Donetsk Oblast has temporarily accommodated up to 800 IDPs.

4. Meeting the basic needs of IDPs. Many Ukrainian religions have supported IDPs in need, both occasionally and permanently by establishing their own initiatives and contributing to projects operated by secular charities and NGOs like the Ukrainian Red Cross Society or the Centre ‘Help Dnipro,’ as well as international donors like UNICEF, USAID, etc. Many religions, such as the UOC-MP, the OCU and, before its creation, the UOC-KP, the Ukrainian Church of the Rome Catholic Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, Baptists, Pentecostals, Muslims, and other communities and their affiliated NGOs, have provided IDPs with food packages, hygiene products, heaters, firewood and briquettes, blankets, clothes, child-care materials, books and toys. In 2014 the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints donated $1.5 million to the United Nations Development Program to support IDPs from Donbass and those who stayed in the region. From 2016 to 2018 the Roman Catholic Church raised almost €16 million through the ‘Pope for Ukraine’ initiative and funded several projects for IDPs and those living in the combat zone, which provided mobile health clinics, repaired houses destroyed by the war and installed thermal insulation, and provided food vouchers, and psychological help for adults and minors. In cooperation with the local police department, the UOC-KP provided meals for IDPs in Luhansk Oblast. The UOC-MP, the UGCC, and branches of Caritas Ukraine serve lunches in Kyiv, Mariupol, and other cities.

The UOC-KP

References:

271 U Lvovi yezuyty prezentenuvaly sviy dosvid dopomogy bizhentsym v pereselentsiyam [In Lviv Jews present their expertise in providing care for refugees and displaced persons]. [2017, March 22]. RISU. Retrieved from: https://risu.org.ua ua/index/all_news/community/charity/66446

272 Vidkrytta dennoho tsentru ta prytulu diya ymvushenyh pereselentsiv v Odesi [A day centre and a shelter for displaced persons was opened in Odesa]. [September 29th, 2018]. Retrieved from the Archdiocese of Lviv of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine’s website: http://www.rck.lviv.ua/news_view/7054


274 The name was taken from Shalom Aleichem’s novels.


276 Bezhentsy v Svyatogorsky Lavre [Refugees in the Svyatohirsk Lavra]. [August 22nd, 2014]. Retrieved from the Svyatohirsk Lavra’s website: https://svlavra.church.ua/2014/08/22/bezhenci-v-svyatogorskij-lavre/. The Monastery continues to host IDPs and permanently raise funds for their needs. The alleged involvement of the Svyatohirsk Lavra clergy in separatism and supporting unlawful military groups in Donbas, reported by Ukrainian media and NGOs, is beyond the scope of this paper.

277 Mormons’ka Tserkva vydilyaye 1.5 mln. dolary na dopomohu pereselentsyam z Donbasu [Mormon Church donates $1.5 million for humanitarian aid to displaced persons from Donbass]. (October 25th, 2014). Retrieved from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in Ukraine’s website: https://www.mormonnews.org.ua/%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BD%D1%88%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BC


280 See e.g.: Odesa Yelpirhiya rehulyarno dopomahaye sotnyam pereselentsiv, yaki meshkayut’ v Odesi ta tymy’skikh naselennyh punktakh [Odesa Eparchy supports on a regular basis hundreds of displaced persons in Odesa and Odesa area] [2016, February 11]. Synodal
organised a St. Nicholas Day celebration for the children of IDPs, and the Pentecostal Church ‘Philadelphia’ invited IDPs residing in Kyiv to celebrate Christmas.281

5. Integrating IDPs into host communities. Caritas Ukraine and its regional branches have established several projects to help IDPs start a new life in new places, including a job search website, centres for psychological and legal aid in several Ukrainian cities, classes on personal finances, short-term business classes and grants for starting a business, programmes to support mutual understanding between IDPs and locals, and family and youth centres.282 Depaul Ukraine Charity has opened offices offering pro bono legal aid in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa. Lawyers of these offices represent IDPs in court, help replace their passports and other documents, secure their right to a pension, and register for or confirm social welfare.283 With the support of Western donors, Eleos Ukraine, an NGO run by an OCU priest, implemented the project ‘I know you can!’ which aims to provide female IDPs from Donbass and Crimea with the knowledge and skills to start new businesses.284 The NGO also established the youth centre ‘TeenClub’ in Kyiv and the all-Ukrainian programme called ‘Backpack of Goodness’ to help school-aged orphans and the children of IDPs, the military, and people living in the combat zone, to get school supplies.285 Similar initiatives, such as ‘School Backpack’ and ‘First Backpack,’ have been implemented by Caritas Ukraine and its branch in Ivano-Frankivsk.286

281 Daruvaty dobro prosto! [It is easy to do good to others!]. (December 26th 2016). Retrieved from the Dnipro Eparchy of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine’s website: http://cerkva.dp.ua/daruvati-dobro-prosto/; Yevanhelichna seminariya ta Tserkva “Filadelfiya” organizuvaly svyato Rizda dlya malen’kykh perselentsiv zi Shodu Ukrayiny. [The Evangelical theologian seminary and the Church “Philadelphia” hosted a Christmas party for minors displaced from Eastern Ukraine]. (December 28th 2016). Retrieved from http://www.chve.org.ua/ets-roydestvo-29-12-16/
Policy perspectives

Forced displacement caused by the Russia-Ukraine military conflict remains a serious humanitarian, political, economic, and social challenge for the Ukrainian state. In 2017 the Ukrainian cabinet of ministers adopted the Strategy for Integrating Internally Displaced Persons. The strategy aims to offer and implement long-term solutions, with a view to providing IDPs with housing and employment and ensuring their social integration. However, due to a lack of institutional and economic resources, the state is unable to provide housing for IDPs and support their integration into host communities. Thus, it is extremely important for the national government and local authorities to cooperate with civil society organisations, both religious and secular, to address these problems. Because they have significant experience and high levels of public trust, Ukrainian religions may have significant strengths to offer collaborative projects assisting IDPs with social integration, and strengthening their ability to start a new life after being forcibly displaced.

First, religious associations can be employed to fight stereotypes and prejudices against IDPs and prevent their isolation on the margins of host communities. Such stereotypes and prejudices, which can have a political nature or, particularly in the case of Crimean Tatar IDPs, an ethnic and religious character, can provoke discrimination against IDPs, such as denial of employment or refusal to accept them as tenants. Religions could effectively raise their voices against these stereotypes not only on a political level by encouraging the state to protect IDPs from discrimination, but also among believers. The 2017 AUCCRO Strategy ‘Ukraine Is Our Common Home’ could be a helpful framework for religions to discourage stereotypes.

Second, religious associations can effectively coordinate with the state on their educational and other projects with a focus on the social integration of IDPs into host communities. For example, if provided with information about these projects, local state employment divisions could disseminate it among IDPs. They are also well placed to facilitate dialogue between religious institutions and employers in order to figure out what training and educational programs would be the most relevant in particular regions.

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287 Refugees here are persons who were granted with the status of refugee in Ukraine. Most of refugees and asylum-seekers came to Ukraine from Afghanistan and Syria (see at https://www.unhcr.org/ukraine.html)
289 UNHCR data is available here: https://www.unhcr.org/ua/11846-2
290 According to the 2001 Ukrainian Law on Immigration, immigrants are foreigners and stateless persons who have obtained an immigration permit and live in Ukraine permanently. Most immigrants are from post-Soviet countries.
292 The up-to-date number of individuals officially registered as IDPs can be found here: https://www.msp.gov.ua/news/17989.html
Third, although the state is legally prohibited from funding religious projects directly, and some religious minorities might prefer to avoid accepting state funding in order to retain their right to spread their religious messages among IDPs, the state can accumulate and disseminate information on the social services provided by religious charities. Making these services easily accessible on and offline will facilitate the meeting of basic needs, and the provision of legal and physiological support, and shelter to the most vulnerable categories of IDP (children, single parents, persons with disability, homeless persons, etc.).

Fourth, the state can turn to religious communities as a source of information about the violation of religious freedoms in Crimea and the DPR/LPR, including those resulting in the forced displacement of their believers. Further, prosecuting both state and non-state perpetrators of religious persecution should be an important part of transitional justice after the Ukrainian state has restored control over these territories.

Yet, there are several things that Ukrainian religious organisations should do to make their work with IDPs more effective. First, they should continue developing inter-religious dialogue in this sphere. Currently, most religious social initiatives focusing on forced displacement are operated by one religious group or a charity affiliated with one religion, even though they usually provide services to IDPs on a non-confessional basis. Expanding religious collaboration in supporting IDPs can potentially result in accumulating more resources than an individual religious groups could on their own. The same logic applies to cooperation between religions and secular human rights organisations, which sometimes must overcome a tradition of mutual suspicion.

Finally, religious organisations should expand their focus to long-term solutions. Currently, they mostly concentrate on providing services to the most vulnerable categories of IDP. Long-term education and social integration projects such as those implemented by Caritas Ukraine and Eleos Ukraine, which are few and far between, should become the norm. As commentators observe, ‘IDP programs must reinforce IDPs’ positive, proactive outlooks and identify community spaces for displaced persons and community members to interact.’ Of course, this outlook presupposes serious institutional efforts and systematic work with donors, but the potential effect of these projects would be life-changing.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the authors included in the report for their expertise on countries in Southeastern Europe and the former Soviet states. I am grateful to local scholars, religious practitioners and policy makers interviewed as part of the British Academy projects. I am also grateful to Adam Hug for his thoughts, Dr Victoria Hudson for her feedback and careful proofreading, and Poppy Ogier for her editing and formatting of the publication.

First published in July 2020 by The Foreign Policy Centre (FPC Think Tank Ltd) www.fpc.org.uk

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**Suggested Readings**


**Armenia:**


UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Armenia, 1995, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6560.html


Bulgaria:


Religion and Forced Displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World


Georgia:


Greece:


Moldova:


**Russia:**


Serbia:


Ukraine:


