In their first year in power, the Labour Government made several big policy announcements related to national security, defence, and their vision for Britain’s place in the world. As the UK and its allies continue to confront the most dangerous moment for European security since the Cold War, respond to the growing levels of human insecurity in many regions around the world and navigate global economic challenges, a considered strategic approach is clearly needed.

 

Yet, less than a month out from the next Budget, questions continue to mount about the financial feasibility, priorities, and long-term direction of the country’s approach towards ensuring our defence; as well as the relationship between the UK’s evolving soft and hard power strategies. How will the Government reconcile strengthening defence and security with growing pressures at home? What progress has been made on the Government’s stated ambitions?

 

Below is an overview of the recent developments, followed by views from FPC’s experts, including those who contributed to FPC’s 2024 submission to the SDR, and to our most recent report Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy, as to how the UK’s approach to defence and security is evolving in practice, and where gaps remain in implementation, public communication, and whole-of-society readiness.

 

Strategic Defence Review, Soft Power and Aid Cuts

In June 2025, the UK Government outlined a new approach to defence and security, publishing the ‘Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2025’, which contained 62 recommendations.^[1] The SDR outlined a range of strategic goals, including renewed focus on NATO, investment in AI and drone technologies, and discussion of potential UK participation in NATO’s nuclear mission. The Government also committed to an increase in defence spending to “2.5% of GDP by 2027 and 3% in the next Parliament when fiscal and economic conditions allow,” with a view to “help make defence an engine for growth—boosting prosperity, jobs and security for working people across the UK.”

 

The Review was highly anticipated given the context of heightened uncertainty for the Euro-Atlantic alliance, the ongoing war in Ukraine, an unpredictable US administration under President Donald Trump, and shifting security realities in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and beyond. While the SDR contained some significant shifts in posture, there remain considerable concerns about resourcing, prioritisation, and delivery.

 

In January 2025, the Government launched its Soft Power Council, an advisory body to support the development of a ‘soft power’ strategy, which is expected to be released spring of next year. What this will contain and similarly, how it will be implemented is yet to be seen. However, the significant aid cuts the Government announced in February and their impact on the UK’s soft power potential was a key discussion point at every major political party conference in September.

 

The decision by the UK Government to reduce aid from 2027 to 0.3% of gross national income (GNI), in favour of increasing the UK’s defence spending (as outlined above) drew sharp criticism at the time.^[2] Not least because Labour had previously indicated they aimed to restore aid spending to 0.7%, after it was cut to 0.5% of GNI in 2021.

 

While the need to strengthen UK defences is clear, there remains a question as to whether doing so at the expense of aid is the right answer. A recent Chatham House report noted that “the £6 billion saving from aid is unlikely to plug defence gaps,” while “the West’s retreat from aid will leave an obvious opening for revisionist powers to build further influence in developing countries.”^[3] The significant fallout from the closure of The US Agency for International Development (USAID) in July this year, has been notable, and likely destabilising for a number of countries that significantly relied on international support. Last month, the UK Parliament’s International Development Committee launched an inquiry to examine how the UK can continue to deliver high impact international aid and development assistance in the face of a 40% budget cut. Announcing the inquiry, Committee Chair Sarah Champion MP posed the question: “What should drive the Government’s vision for foreign aid; national security, moral duty, international obligations?”.

 

Meanwhile, earlier this year, in response to the funding cuts, former national security adviser, Lord Peter Ricketts, coordinated a letter to the Prime Minister urging him to sustain funding for the British Council.^[4] In comments to The Guardian, he noted: “A lot of defence people will tell you that a small investment in soft power such as the British Council is worth a lot of money on the military side.”^[5] However, neither international aid nor soft power are mentioned in the SDR, despite the clear linkages with national security and defence – a notable omission that reinforces concerns about cross-Whitehall coordination.

 

What do these combined developments mean for our national security? Views from our Experts

 

Dr Andrew Gawthorpe
Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University

 

“The SDR sets out an ambitious agenda for UK defence policy going forward, but there are limits to how much planning is possible in the current international environment. The recent NATO summit in June calmed fears that Donald Trump might announce an immediate withdrawal from the alliance, but it also left all of the major questions dividing the U.S. from Europe, and European countries from each other, unresolved. Later this year the U.S. will likely announce the withdrawal of tens of thousands of soldiers from Eastern Europe, making the continent even harder to defend.”

 

Dr Andrew Gawthorpe also cautions that the UK’s ability to follow through on its defence spending promises and to coordinate effectively with European partners on rearmament, remains uncertain. “Whether the UK government can actually deliver on the necessary spending commitments and whether the UK and the rest of Europe can coordinate rearmament in a smart and effective way remain to be seen. In the meantime, the ultimate direction of U.S. policy remains unclear – and under Trump, basically unpredictable.”

 

Christopher Langton
Head of Independent Conflict and Research Analysis (ICRA)

 

Langton acknowledges the SDR’s attention to innovation but raised two concerns: “The Review highlights the all-important use of AI in defence. However, I wonder if the environmental impact of AI—most notably its water usage—has been considered, particularly amid increasing climate pressures.” But commitments on welfare and personnel are welcome: “The focus on manpower and welfare is a very welcome part of the Review. However, our history on delivering in this area is not good. A firm ring-fenced commitment to fund increases in personnel and expenditure on the defence estate, including housing, would bring confidence to boost recruiting and retention.”

 

Nina Kuryata
Ukraine and Defence Editor, The Observer

 

Regarding the Review’s emphasis on NATO as a strategic priority: “It says ‘NATO first’- but what does it actually mean in terms of measures to be taken? If the UK wants to lead in NATO, it must back that up with clear timelines and funding. At present, there’s a pledge to increase military spending to 2.5% by April 2027, with a “clear ambition” to reach 3% by 2034, would economic conditions allow. This is still far from the 5% that all NATO members committed to reach by 2035.”

 

She also questions some of the more rhetorical claims: “It says we will create a British army which is 10 times more lethal. That would need more development, I think, because it’s not clear what it means – number of soldiers, more deadly weapons or something else.”

 

Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams
Senior Fellows, European Leadership Network

 

“The recommendation  by the Review that the UK commence discussions on enhanced participation in NATO’s nuclear mission constitutes, potentially, a substantial change in the UK nuclear posture. More generally, the SDR leaves many fundamental questions unanswered, relying on the assumption, or hope, that NATO will continue much as it did before Trump.  The military implications for force capabilities and structure of having to operate in a purely European framework or a US-lite NATO framework are not explored. There is, however, a surprising indication that while the UK has always declared the primacy of NATO in strategic and defence terms, in practice, it has not taken its contribution to NATO’s military posture as seriously as it pretended. ”

 

You can read more of Simon and Nicholas’ analysis of enhanced UK participation in NATO’s nuclear mission in their longer piece here.

 

Poppy Ogier

Research and Communications Manager, and author of ‘Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy’, Foreign Policy Centre

 

“A modern defence strategy must recognise the vitality of soft power. Take the BBC World Service, it is the world’s most trusted news provider, reaching over 450 million people each week – and only costs around 5% of what Russia and China are thought to be spending internationally in an age of information warfare. However, its sustained funding is in question – and neither it, nor soft power more broadly, is mentioned in the SDR. The ‘influence’ of others is discussed – Russia’s, China’s and the US’s – without addressing what tools to influence the UK has. Including soft power in a defence review is not an optional extra, it’s a force multiplier for everything else.”

 

Susan Coughtrie

Executive Director, Foreign Policy Centre

 

“While there is a clear need for a shift in how the UK approaches the country’s defence in today’s climate, there are concerns with the current approach. For the implementation of the SDR and the future soft power strategy to be effective, they must recognise the dynamic between domestic and international developments.

 

Encouragingly, the SDR recognises the need for a ‘whole of society approach’ and argues to “Build national resilience to threats below and above the threshold of an armed attack through a concerted, collective effort involving—among others—industry, the finance sector, civil society, academia, education, and communities.” However, the Government should more closely examine the layered threats specifically directed at these groups, including through the use of transnational repression, foreign influence, disinformation and cyber attacks; which are only likely to further increase with more countries sliding towards authoritarianism. The impact of the aid cuts should be examined through this security lens too, to ensure that short-term ‘gains’ do not give way outcomes that will take years to rectify.”

 

Next steps

While the Government’s commitment to increased defence spending is evident, significant tension remains around what this will look like in practice, particularly how it can be delivered without further damaging other critical areas of UK influence, such as soft power and development aid. Key questions persist around resourcing, prioritisation, and whether the Government can protect vital diplomatic, cultural, and development tools while pursuing an ambitious defence agenda.

 

In an era marked by geopolitical changes, strategic uncertainty, and shifting power dynamics, particularly with an unpredictable US administration and evolving threats in the Middle East, the success of the SDR will depend on more than political will and funding. It will require sustained strategic focus, effective implementation, a strong soft power strategy and international coordination. Most importantly, an effective defence strategy calls for an approach that upholds democratic principles, protects human rights, and preserves the UK’s institutional integrity at home and abroad.

 

 

^[1] Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, June 2025 ,https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/683d89f181deb72cce2680a5/The_Strategic_Defence_Review_2025_-_Making_Britain_Safer_-_secure_at_home__strong_abroad.pdf

^[2] House of Commons Debates, Defence and Security vol. 762, February 2025, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-02-25/debates/8BF58F19-B32B-4716-A613-8D5738541A30/DefenceAndSecurity#contribution-DB32B970-42F2-4B1B-A92C-54CA0B28BA41

^[3] Chatham House, First USAID closes, then UK cuts aid: what a Western retreat from foreign aid could mean, March 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/first-usaid-closes-then-uk-cuts-aid-what-western-retreat-foreign-aid-could-mean

^[4] Lord Ricketts, Tweet (@LordRickettsP), April 2025, https://x.com/LordRickettsP/status/1915396877018632373

^[5] The Guardian, British Council ‘may have to close in 60 countries’ amid cuts to aid budget, June 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jun/08/british-council-spending-plans-may-close-in-60-countries