Array ( [0] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8629 [post_author] => 109 [post_date] => 2025-11-24 10:00:56 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-11-24 09:00:56 [post_content] => The BBC has apologised to President Donald Trump after an episode of Panorama which aired last year misleadingly spliced together two parts of a speech that Trump gave on the day of the January 6^th Capitol riots. But for the US president, an apology is not enough. Trump is now threatening to sue the BBC for between one and five billion dollars, a figure which could cripple the broadcaster.   The BBC undoubtedly erred with this broadcast, combining excerpts in a way that implied he had directly incited violence. The programme portrayed him saying: "We're going to walk down to the Capitol... and I'll be there with you. And we fight. We fight like hell”. In fact, Trump said "We're going to walk down to the Capitol, and we're going to cheer on our brave senators and congressmen and women,” only adding the exhortation to “fight like hell” 50 minutes later.^[1] Even though many analysts and academics think that Trump’s rhetoric did encourage violence that day, even if only tacitly, the edited segment was still a misleading way to present that specific speech.^[2]   Trump and the media Trump’s threat to sue the BBC fits a broader pattern in which the US president uses financial threats and public pressure campaigns to attempt to cow media outlets who carry messages that he dislikes. In the past year, he has sued a range of media outlets for defamation – claiming that they knowingly lied about him in order to hurt his reputation. His targets have included TV companies such as ABC News and CNN, and newspapers including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and Iowa-based Des Moines Register.   Trump’s hostility to the media is long standing. Shortly after he was elected in 2016, he referred to the media as “the enemy of the people”.^[3] According to Trump, many forms of mass media are systematically biased against him because they are staffed by people he considers to hold liberal political views. Because he views large sections of the media as engaged in an unjust campaign against him, he and his supporters see retaliation efforts to push back against critical media coverage as legitimate. Hence, Trump has used not only these lawsuits but also various instruments of state power to attempt to punish or marginalise professionally run media outlets. For instance, he has downgraded the status of traditional media in White House briefings, inviting friendly podcasters and social media influencers to ask questions instead.^[4]   The favourable treatment that Trump has shown towards right-wing media – especially Fox News, the flagship outlet of conservative news – shows that it is not media per se that he objects to. Rather, he objects to media outlets that give him negative coverage – and he is willing to use the tools at his disposal to punish such coverage. Such steps not only please many of his supporters, who likewise see large parts of the media as an enemy which does not represent their values. It also serves to have a chilling effect on other journalists. Be careful how you cover Trump, the message is – or you might find yourself facing a $5bn lawsuit.   And that is exactly where the BBC now finds itself.   Unlikely to succeed One curious aspect of Trump’s lawsuits against media outlets is that, legally at least, they rest on extremely shaky ground. Their intent should hence be understood as political – and on those terms, they can be much more successful.   The legal vehicle that Trump has used in previous lawsuits, and which he wants now to wield against the BBC, is defamation. The modern framework of defamation law in the United States was created in 1964 by a Supreme Court ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a case in which Southern segregationists sued The New York Times for printing what it said were defamatory lies by supporters of civil rights campaigner Martin Luther King Jr.   In the case, the Supreme Court established an extremely high bar for any official holding public office to win a defamation case against a media outlet. The court declared – unanimously – that winning such a case must involve showing that untrue statements were made with “actual malice” or “reckless disregard”. Put differently, that means that the claimant must prove that the media outlet knew the statement was false or at least had serious doubts about its accuracy. Furthermore, officials bringing defamation cases have to prove that the statement is false, rather than placing the burden of proof on the defendant.   This legal precedent is commonly understood as making it extremely difficult for public officials to win defamation cases – which was the entire point behind the Supreme Court’s ruling. The court reasoned that robust public debate must involve strong protections for media outlets criticising public officials, and they created them accordingly. No US president has ever brought a defamation lawsuit against a media outlet in the modern era, partly because they knew they would be likely to lose. Trump is likely to lose too.   There are other reasons why Trump would likely find the case against the BBC difficult to win. Defamation cases hinge on whether or not untrue statements cause damages – emotional, financial, or in some other category. Trump would presumably argue that the Panorama documentary harmed his political career, but that is difficult to prove. Firstly, the episode never even aired in the United States, and he has no political career in Britain. Secondly, Trump went on to win re-election as President of the United States just over a week after it aired, suggesting that any damage to his reputation was not particularly grave. Thirdly, Trump and lawyers seem to not even have noticed that the documentary existed until British media brought it to light just a few weeks ago.   Trump might argue that he suffered commercial damages, but this again would be difficult to prove. He remains an incredibly wealthy man and continues to strike business deals all over the world. Any damage to his UK business interests cannot have been particularly severe if he did not even notice it at the time.   This is why most legal observers consider that Trump’s lawsuit against the BBC is unlikely to succeed in court.^[5] But that may not be the point.   Victory of another kind Despite the difficulties of winning a defamation case, Trump has already shown how such cases can result in a positive outcome for him. When he sued ABC News over a defamatory statement allegedly made by anchor George Stephanoupolus, the legal consensus was that the case would be very difficult to win. But ABC News never even let the case get to court, instead admitting fault and settling for $15m.^[6]   The reason for ABC to do this was simple: it avoided becoming embroiled in a lengthy court battle that could suck up the network’s time and resources and perhaps harm the business interests of its parent company, Disney. The settlement also allowed the network to get into the good graces of the Trump administration, which has other regulatory tools that it can use to harm the interests of US-based media outlets.   In the ABC News case, making a legally dubious claim worked to Trump’s advantage because it boxed his adversary into a political corner. But not every case has worked out this way. The New York Times, for instance, has fought back against Trump’s defamation allegations, the first version of which was subsequently dismissed by the court. Since then, Trump has refiled a new claim, and the NYT plans to fight that too.^[7] Even though Trump looks unlikely to get a settlement from the NYT, he still likely relishes his ability to suck its time and resources into a distracting court battle.   These tactics suggest that Trump does not actually need to win his court cases for them to damage media organisations and have a chilling effect on media freedom. This brings us back to the BBC.   So far, the BBC insists that it will not reach a settlement with Trump. This is understandable – after all, Trump is unlikely to win the case in court, and any settlement would essentially be paid with British taxpayers’ money. But the episode can still do the broadcaster considerable damage. Firstly, it makes it vulnerable to political criticism at home, aiding a long-running campaign by its commercial rivals to undercut its influence. Secondly, the heightened scrutiny means that the BBC will have to be much more careful in how it presents controversial topics, particularly relating to Trump, which is likely to make it more cautious in its coverage.   Nor is the damage likely to be limited to the BBC. Trump’s extraordinary decision to sue a foreign broadcaster serves as another example of the lengths to which he is willing to go to quash speech that he dislikes. By breaking previous norms of presidential behaviour, Trump constantly keeps media outlets guessing about what he might do next. The result is a chilling effect on press freedom, even if Trump never has a successful day in court.     Andrew Gawthorpe is an FPC Research Fellow and expert on US politics and foreign policy at Leiden University in The Netherlands and the creator of the newsletter America Explained. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     [1] Noor Nanji, BBC Apologises to Trump Over Panorama Edit but Refuses to pay Compensation, BBC News, November 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c874nw4g2zzo. [2] Capitol Riots: Did Trump’s Words at Rally Incite Violence?, BBC News, February 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55640437 ; Evangelos Ntonis et al., A Warrant for Violence? An Analysis of Donald Trump’s Speech before the US Capitol Attack, British Journal of Social Psychology (2023), https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/bjso.12679. [3] Marvin Kalb, Enemy of the People: Trump’s War on the Press, the New McCarthyism, and the Threat to American Democracy. Brookings Institution Press, 2018. [4] Liam Scott, White House to Open Media Access to Podcasters, Influencers, Voice of America, January 2025, https://www.voanews.com/a/white-house-to-open-media-access-to-podcasters-influencers/7953761.html. [5] Rebecca Moosavian, Trump v the BBC: A Legal Expert Explains how the Case Could Play Out, The Conversation, November 2025, https://theconversation.com/trump-v-the-bbc-a-legal-expert-explains-how-the-case-could-play-out-269551. [6] Michael R. Sisak, ABC Agrees to Give $15 Million to Donald Trump’s Presidential Library to Settle Defamation Lawsuit, Associated Press, December 2024, https://apnews.com/article/abc-trump-lawsuit-defamation-stephanopoulos-04aea8663310af39ae2a85f4c1a56d68. [7] Jenna Amatulli and George Chidi, Trump Files Amended $15bn Defamation Complaint against New York Times, The Guardian, October 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/oct/16/trump-new-york-times-defamation-complaint. [post_title] => Op-ed | What Trump Hopes to Gain by Taking on the BBC [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-what-trump-hopes-to-gain-by-taking-on-the-bbc [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-24 10:59:27 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-24 09:59:27 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8629 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [1] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7789 [post_author] => 109 [post_date] => 2025-01-16 11:59:08 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-16 10:59:08 [post_content] => On Monday, 20th January, Donald Trump will be inaugurated into his second Presidency. With America, and the world, preparing for the next Trump administration, we turned to US experts, and friends of the FPC, Anthony Silberfeld (Bertelsmann Foundation) and Andrew Gawthorpe (Leiden University) to provide us with insights into what this will mean for foreign policy and global relations.   In this interview, Anthony and Andrew discuss what President Trump’s return to the White House means for the US’s role as the ‘global watchdog’, the impact and importance of this administration's obsession with both social media and its owners, as well as what the future holds for the ‘special relationship’ between the US and the UK.     Where will foreign affairs sit on the list of policy priorities for President Trump, and what does this mean for the US’s traditional role as a ‘global watchdog’?   Anthony Silberfeld: The concept of “policy priorities” in a conventional sense did not exist in Donald Trump’s chaotic first term, and should not be expected in his second.  Instead, one should view what’s ahead in two tiers of retribution. The first tier will be action taken against domestic threats, focusing specifically on undocumented immigrants and political enemies. Trump’s incoming border czar, Tom Homan, has committed to rounding up and deporting millions of migrants currently residing in the US. Whether this ends up being more theoretical than practical remains to be seen, but the result will have widespread economic and reputational repercussions for the US, not to mention the human toll it will take on these individuals and their families.   The second tier will take aim at foreign actors who, in Trump’s view, “have treated us unfairly.” This would include any country with which the US has a trade deficit, particular venom is reserved for Germany and China, but the punitive response will be widespread. During the 2024 presidential campaign, Trump threatened a range of tariffs against allies and adversaries alike. Rhetoric is one thing, but higher prices from food, electronics and cars for all Americans is something else. There will surely be announcements of tariffs in the early days of the new administration, but the economic impact of this action may temper much of this initial bluster. Nevertheless, the idea of America continuing its role as a global watchdog is unlikely.  This new administration has no appetite for it, and will quickly forfeit any remaining credibility the US has as a force for stability in an increasingly volatile environment.

"[The] idea of America continuing its role as a global watchdog is unlikely.  This new administration has no appetite for it, and will quickly forfeit any remaining credibility the US has as a force for stability in an increasingly volatile environment."

  Andrew Gawthorpe: Foreign policy is high on Trump’s list of policy priorities, but he has a narrower understanding of American goals than many previous presidents and is particularly focused on economic aspects of foreign policy. His planned trade tariffs, even if they are not implemented on as broad of a scale as he has suggested, will quickly become the top bilateral issue between the US and affected countries.   Trump’s presidency is not likely to be one in which the US is active in multilateral fora or seeking new cooperative agreements. He is sceptical of many of the things that previous American presidents have viewed as obligations deriving from international treaties or organisations. Instead, Trump likes to deal with countries bilaterally, a situation in which he feels he can better use American power as leverage against weaker nations.   Looking more closely at the potential foreign policy approaches of the US under a Trump Presidency, how could his policies affect the UK and Europe, particularly with relation to NATO and defence?   Anthony Silberfeld: Let’s start with the good news. I do not see a scenario in which the US withdraws from NATO, or reduces its own defence spending, which currently amounts to approximately two-thirds of the NATO total. Now for the bad news. The Trump administration has already signalled its intent to ask NATO members to increase their defence spending (as a percentage of GDP) beyond their current two percent commitment to as much as five percent. At present, only Poland, Greece and the three Baltic countries are meeting their two percent commitments, so the prospect of all NATO members meeting Trump’s new terms is somewhere between slim and none.   How the president-elect will treat those countries that fall below the spending threshold is the key question, notwithstanding America’s obligations under NATO’s Article 5. It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their defence spending obligations, while those that do not are left to fend for themselves. The UK’s current status as a laggard in its NATO spending will draw the unwanted attention of the new regime in Washington, and will surely be an additional point of friction that will test the durability of the special relationship.

"...It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their [NATO] defence spending obligations, while those that do not are left to fend for themselves."

  Andrew Gawthorpe: While an American withdrawal from NATO remains unlikely, Trump could undercut the credibility of the alliance by refusing to endorse the organization’s mutual defence clause, Article V. However, Trump is likely to push European countries for much higher levels of defence spending and to wind down American support for Ukraine. He is likely to be willing to attempt to impose ceasefire terms that many European governments regard as too generous towards Russia. There is also a chance that his chaotic style of policymaking causes negotiations to collapse, potentially leading to further escalation in the conflict.   Anthony Silberfeld:  Despite assurances from Donald Trump during the campaign that he would end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours upon taking office if not sooner, his envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently recalibrated expectations. The new outlook from Washington remains fluid, but aims for a ceasefire of some kind within 100 days of Trump taking office. How much consultation is done with the UK and European allies (let alone Ukraine itself) will not just determine whether an end to the war is viable, but will also provide an early signal for how this administration will work with its allies going forward.   Andrew Gawthorpe: For the UK specifically, Trump’s presidency raises the difficult question of London’s relationship with the European Union. The UK will be much better able to weather both Trump’s trade policy and his impact on the overall strategic situation in Europe through cooperation with the EU. Whereas UK policymakers have tended to assume that the US shares their fundamental commitment to European security and the transatlantic bond, the incoming administration does not. That requires recalibration and looking to like-minded countries on the continent who share the UK’s goals and values.

 "...UK policymakers have tended to assume that the US shares their fundamental commitment to European security and the transatlantic bond, [but] the incoming administration does not."

  Elon Musk took an active role in the Trump-Vance campaign, utilising his platform on X in particular, and has been rewarded with a role in the Trump Administration. With Musk repeatedly criticised for his comments on UK developments, how large an impact do you anticipate Musk having on foreign policy?   Anthony Silberfeld: Musk’s support for Trump and Republican candidates during the election  bought him a seat (and apparently a guest bedroom) at Mar-a-Lago, which he has already used to influence policy and there is no question that Musk will continue to use the influence he purchased to further his own business interests.

"...there is no question that [Elon] Musk will continue to use the influence he purchased to further his own business interests." 

  Andrew Gawthorpe: Musk’s position inside the Trump administration is hard to determine. His position is unofficial and advisory, and he has many political disagreements with key segments of Trump’s political coalition. For instance, he favours certain forms of immigration, and is relatively close with the Chinese government. His longevity in Trump’s inner circle is hence not assured, particularly given that Trump has been known to turn on people who he perceives as taking the limelight away from him.   However, Musk should be taken seriously. Trump’s “MAGA movement” has often talked about internationalizing its project and trying to support right-wing parties in Europe, but Musk is doing it on a scale unseen in the past. Europe’s mainstream parties could face a pincer movement – Trump hammering them with tariffs and defence spending demands from abroad, and Musk supporting their extremist rivals at home. At its worst, it could appear as de facto foreign intervention in European elections. And Musk can continue to do this, using X and his global bullhorn, even if he parts ways with Trump at some point.

"Europe’s mainstream parties could face a pincer movement – Trump hammering them with tariffs and defence spending demands from abroad, and [Elon] Musk supporting their extremist rivals at home."

  Anthony Silberfeld: The role of corporate influence in the new administration is not limited to Elon Musk. During the transition period there has been a steady parade of corporate CEOs who have made rhetorical, policy and financial contributions to curry favour with the incoming president. Some of the most egregious examples start with Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg scrapping fact-checking on his platforms and contributing one million dollars to Trump’s inaugural fund.   Not to be outdone, Amazon’s executive chairman Jeff Bezos donated one million dollars to the same inaugural fund, and ponied up an additional $40 million to produce a Melania Trump biographical documentary. They are not alone, and in each instance, there is a calculation being made about offensive and defensive engagement with this new administration. In other words, how much does a company have to give to get what it wants, or conversely, how much will it cost to avoid being targeted if it runs afoul of the White House. These are real considerations for business leaders as they consider strategy and tactics in the period ahead.

"The role of corporate influence in the new administration is not limited to Elon Musk."

  Given President Trump’s previous actions, can we expect US foreign policy discourse and decisions to be played out through comments made personally by Trump through non-traditional channels, and how can global leaders respond?   Anthony Silberfeld: I would make a distinction here between discourse and decisions when it comes to Trump’s foreign policy. As he did in the first term, Trump’s reflexive comments made via social media platforms or at impromptu new conferences will shape the policy discourse, and will force everyone else to react. American policymakers will scramble to determine whether Trump’s latest utterance should be taken figuratively, literally, or in jest. The press will (depending on their political orientation) either amplify Trump’s pronouncement or turn the half-baked screed into a policy analysis that is worthy of debate. But there is often a significant gap between Trump’s rhetoric and reality.   Many of the most controversial foreign policy statements made by Trump thus far, such as acquiring the Panama Canal, Greenland and Canada, or the imposition of tariffs, will encounter legal, legislative, and public opinion barriers that may prove to be insurmountable. What we found in the first Trump administration is that his interests in policy initiatives were often transient. In those days, the administration was staffed in part with institutional professionals who still ran into roadblocks that curtailed the president’s worst instincts. This time around, the quality of staff in this administration, combined with the desire to gut the federal workforce through layoffs and loyalty tests is unlikely to result in the efficient implementation of the MAGA agenda. It’s going to be a wild ride for all involved. World leaders would benefit from taking the right lessons from the first iteration of Trump, take a deep breath, and only respond when it becomes clear there is no other alternative.  

"World leaders would benefit from taking the right lessons from the first iteration of Trump, take a deep breath, and only respond when it becomes clear there is no other alternative."

  Andrew Gawthorpe: Trump’s incoming chief of staff, Susie Wiles, is supposedly going to ensure that the new administration is more focused and less prone to chaotic policymaking than Trump’s first term. However, it’s unlikely she can persuade Trump to give up his social media habit, and that means he will continue to drive the global agenda in part through this type of personal comment. This creates a tricky situation for world leaders. On the one hand, they feel domestic political pressure to stick up for their country. On the other hand, it’s important to not get too bogged down in the weeds. Trump threatens to do things all the time which he has no intention of doing. And he makes policy through personal relationships, meaning that it’s important for leaders to cultivate good relations with him and stay on his good side, so as better to promote their country’s interests. They cannot let those interests get drowned in a tide of tweets, and so it’s often better to not engage.   What does all of this mean for the ‘Special Relationship’ between the US and the UK going forward?   Anthony Silberfeld: The latest version of the special relationship will almost certainly get off to a rocky start since Donald Trump is never one to forget a real or perceived slight. Past comments by Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Foreign Secretary David Lammy are going to be difficult for the White House to forgive, in spite of both men’s efforts to walk back those statements.[1] The US is also doing its part to poison the relationship before it begins as Elon Musk, one of President Trump’s closest advisers, is meddling in British domestic politics to undermine the Labour government. Not exactly a recipe for a harmonious marriage, but not all is lost.   Trump is, at the end of the day, transactional, so if the United Kingdom can demonstrate the value it can add to the special relationship, it has the potential of living up to that lofty moniker. Meeting the elevated NATO defence spending obligations, and highlighting the importance of UK investment in the US will be a good starting point. Unfortunately, it’s hard to imagine a Thatcher-Reagan or even a Blair-Bush relationship to flourish between Starmer and Trump, so London might be best served by spending its energy on cultivating relationships with members of Congress, state governors and mayors.

"Trump is, at the end of the day, transactional, so if the United Kingdom can demonstrate the value it can add to the special relationship, it has the potential of living up to that lofty moniker."

  Andrew Gawthorpe:  The UK government should recognize the importance of personal relationships to Trump and attempt to cultivate ties with people in his inner circle. Then the government needs to use these relationships to put forward the UK’s case for why it is a constructive economic and security actor and not a net drain on American resources. Secondly, the UK also needs to look beyond the “special relationship” and instead think in broader US-European terms. The UK government has to realize that this second election of Trump means that the world is changing. American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore. Europe needs to be prepared to develop its capabilities as a geopolitical actor, and the correct role for the UK is to work alongside Europe in doing that.

"The UK government has to realize that this second election of Trump means that the world is changing. American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore."

  Living our values of democracy and the rule of law means having the capabilities to advance and defend them – something which is particularly important when the US is increasingly deviating from those very values.     Dr Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   Anthony Silberfeld joined the Bertelsmann Foundation as the Director of Transatlantic Relations in April 2014. His research focuses on democratic innovations in cities, and geopolitical competition in space. Anthony arrived at the Foundation after seven years with the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, where he was head of political and public affairs at the British Embassy’s Northern Ireland Bureau in Washington, DC. Prior to his tenure with the British government, Anthony held posts as a foreign policy advisor in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre   [1] Albert Toth, From ‘repugnant’ to ‘the closest of allies’: Everything Keir Starmer has said about Donald Trump, The Independent, 06 November 2024, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/us-election-trump-starmer-labour-republican-2024-b2642284.html; Chris Mason and Becky Morton, Lammy dismisses past criticism of Trump as 'old news', BBC, 07 November 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cm2z1zm1pk3o. [post_title] => Trump 2.0: What does the future hold for US foreign policy? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => trump-2-0-what-does-the-future-hold-for-us-foreign-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-24 11:00:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-24 10:00:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7789 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [2] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7272 [post_author] => 109 [post_date] => 2023-12-19 11:58:33 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-12-19 10:58:33 [post_content] => This year’s United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28), held from 30 November to 12 December 2023 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), got off to a rocky start. Hosting the conference in the UAE, a country where fossil fuels make up 30% of the economy, was always going to be controversial, as was the decision to pick as President of the Summit Sultan Al Jaber, the CEO of the country’s state oil company.[1] When audio emerged of Al Jaber recently claiming that there is “no science” to indicate that a phase-out of fossil fuels is necessary for the world to meet its climate targets, many analysts were ready to write the conference off entirely.[2]   Especially when judged against such low expectations, the final results of the conference are best described as ‘limited but positive.’ For the first time ever, a UN climate summit ended with a declaration that explicitly mentioned the need to “transition away from” fossil fuels.[3] Traditionally such a statement has been opposed by, among others, China, India, Saudi Arabia, and sometimes the United States (US). On the other hand, the Summit’s final text has been criticised for containing numerous loopholes and for doing little to provide low-income countries with the financing that they need to transition away from fossil fuels.[4]   The outcomes of UN climate summits are profoundly influenced by geopolitical and political trends unfolding in the world at large. In particular, the attitudes of China and the US have often played a key role in determining whether progress can be made. The two countries are the world’s largest emitters, key green energy innovation hubs, and potential sources of climate finance for less developed countries. They also have a fiercely antagonistic relationship, one which has, at times, threatened to extinguish the possibility of climate cooperation altogether.   The climate and US-Chinese competition In recent years, climate policy itself has become a key arena of US-Chinese competition. Both countries want to be the global leader in green energy technology, to ensure a sustainable energy transition at home as well as to enhance their influence abroad. China has been heavily subsidising its renewables industry for decades, with the result being that the West is now heavily reliant on China for a number of technologies vital to the green transition, such as solar panels and electric vehicle batteries. In response, US President Biden’s administration has unveiled expansive subsidies for American green energy companies and placed a number of trade sanctions on China. These moves were denounced by China, which sees them as an attempt to suppress the rise of the Chinese economy.[5]   This has coincided with a general downturn in US-Chinese relations prompted by former Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in August 2022 and the Chinese spy balloon caught floating over the United States earlier this year. Beijing cancelled ongoing climate talks with Washington after Pelosi’s trip, raising fears that the two countries’ climate envoys would not even be talking to each other in the run up to this year’s COP28 Summit.   The talks finally restarted in the summer of 2023, just in time to begin preparations for COP28.[6] Although this reopening of dialogue did not represent any major underlying improvement in the relationship between the two countries, it did indicate that both see the climate issue as having significance beyond their own bilateral relationship. The leadership in both countries recognise the need to address climate change and that failing to do so will harm their diplomatic standing among the nations which stand to suffer from unchecked global warming the most. Crucially, this summer also coincided with a renewed push in Beijing to improve its relations with the US as the Chinese economy experiences unprecedented difficulties.[7]   With this, the stage was set. One of the great virtues of the UN climate summit system is that it creates periodic bursts of pressure on world leaders to come up with new commitments to tackle climate change. For the US and China particularly, there is a powerful incentive not to be seen as a spoiler. This has enabled – or forced – Washington and Beijing to come together to enable important breakthroughs in the past; as they did in the run-up to the Paris Climate Summit in 2015 and the Glasgow Summit in 2021, which saw a breakthrough on methane reduction. Once again, in the run-up to COP28, this system worked – but it also exposed the ways in which geopolitics continues to shape and limit the extent to which progress can be made.   The key issues at COP28 At COP28, the two main issues facing delegates were the phasing out fossil fuels and the provision of climate finance to developing nations. Both required US-Chinese cooperation to come to fruition, but in the end only one of them did.   The phase-out of fossil fuels has traditionally been a point of major contention at UN climate summits. Although the entire edifice of international climate diplomacy is premised on a transition away from greenhouse gas-emitting fuels and towards renewable energy sources, actually explicitly calling for fossil fuels to be abandoned has proved a step too far for many countries. Producing countries like Saudi Arabia have an obvious reason for refusing to denounce their major source of revenue. However, less-developed countries like India and various African nations have also been wary of abandoning the only affordable source of energy they have access to.   In the past, China has aligned itself with the less-developed countries, claiming that it is unfair for developed nations to now deny others a cheap source of energy after using it to get rich themselves.[8] The Trump administration was also opposed to endorsing a phase-out of fossil fuels, particularly as America was undergoing an oil and gas boom, which has now transformed it into the world’s largest producer.[9]   China’s decision at COP28 to endorse a “transition away from” fossil fuels will hence be remembered as a key moment in international climate diplomacy. Although the decision-making of the Government in Beijing is notoriously opaque, one reason for the shift may be that China’s energy mix is increasingly starting to look like that of a developed rather than a developing country. In 2023 alone, China built enough renewable energy capacity to power all of France.[10] As the global center of production for many of the technologies, which will power the green transition, China also stands to benefit as the world becomes increasingly reliant on those technologies.   In the end, the Summit declaration’s language on fossil fuels was agreed between the US and Chinese delegations, highlighting once again the importance of their cooperation.[11] Yet on the other key issue at the Summit – finance – no breakthrough was found.   Developing nations require trillions of dollars annually to keep the global green transition on track.[12] Where this money should come from is a key point of contention. China argues that the developed countries that have benefited the most from past greenhouse gas emissions should cover it, whereas the United States and other Western countries thinks China – and also India – should pay.[13] However, the West’s position is undermined by the fact that it has often not even fulfilled its own pledge of paying $100bn annually. With an election looming in the United States next year, there was little chance that the Biden administration would make any new commitments in this area, and the deadlock encountered at past summits remained.   The limits of progress Overall, the outcome of COP28 shows that while progress can be achieved when the interests of the world’s most powerful countries align, the battle against climate change remains dependent, at least to some measure, on geopolitical harmony. In their written submissions to the conference, many countries – including China – warned that rising trade and technology protectionism was a threat to global climate cooperation.[14] Yet there seems little chance that either the US or China will bow out of the race to dominate the green sector anytime soon. Moreover, a major blow-up in some other aspect of the relationship – say, over Taiwan – could derail progress entirely.   The world therefore finds itself in an uncomfortable position, with any future progress on climate change dependent on stability in what is a heavily contentious bilateral relationship. With the US Presidential election looming next November, there is also the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the White House, a development that is likely to result in the US abdicating itself once more from its global responsibilities.   Amid these swirling geopolitical and political currents, all progress on the climate is fragile and reversible. COP28, at least, turned out somewhat better than expected. We must hope that the same can be said of future summits too.   Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   [1] United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE Economy, undated, https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/Missions/Paris/The-UAE/UAE-Economy [2] Damian Carrington and Ben Stockton, Cop28 President Says There Is ‘No Science’ Behind Demands for Phase-Out Of Fossil Fuels, The Guardian, December 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/03/back-into-caves-cop28-president-dismisses-phase-out-of-fossil-fuels [3] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, First Global Stocktake, December 2023, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2023_L17_adv.pdf [4] Damian Carrington, Failure of Cop28 On Fossil Fuel Phase-Out Is ‘Devastating’, Say Scientists, The Guardian, December 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/14/failure-cop28-fossil-fuel-phase-out-devastating-say-scientists [5] Andrew Gawthorpe, U.S.-China Competition Is Weaponizing The Green Transition, World Politics Review, September 2023, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/us-china-climate-change/ [6] Aime Williams and Demetri Sevastopulo, John Kerry Visits Beijing To Restart Stalled US-China Climate Talks, Financial Times, July 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/87efbae8-0217-4045-b4f1-e348f4ca7466 [7] Laura He, Beijing Is Ready To Improve Ties With US, Says Chinese Vice-President, CNN, November 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/08/business/china-us-ties-biden-xi-meeting-intl-hnk/index.html [8] Andrew Freedman, Top Emitter China Says No To Fossil Fuel “Phase Out” Language At Cop28, Axios, September 2023, https://www.axios.com/2023/09/25/china-us-climate-talks-cop28 [9] Lindsay Maizland and Anshu Siripurapu, How The U.S. Oil And Gas Industry Works, Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-us-oil-and-gas-industry-works [10] Xu Yi-chong, COP28: Why China’s Clean Energy Boom Matters for Global Climate Action, The Conversation, December 2023, https://theconversation.com/cop28-why-chinas-clean-energy-boom-matters-for-global-climate-action-218825 [11] Maha El Dahan, David Stanway and Valerie Volcovici, How The World Agreed To Move Away From Fossil Fuels At COP28, Reuters, December 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/how-world-agreed-move-away-fossil-fuels-cop28-2023-12-14/ [12] News Wires, Developing Countries Need ‘Radical’ Investment To Fight Climate Change, UN Says, France24, November 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/environment/20231129-un-says-developing-countries-need-radical-surge-in-investments [13] Navin Singh Khadka, COP28: Should India and China Benefit From A Climate Change Fund?, BBC News, December 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-67610621 [14] COP28, China’s Submission On The Elements For the Consideration Of Outputs Component Of The Global Stocktake, undated, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202309201411---China%20-%20Submission%20on%20the%20Elements%20for%20the%20Consideration%20of%20Outputs%20Component%20of%20Global%20Stocktake.pdf [post_title] => The geopolitics of international climate diplomacy: A read-out from COP28 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-geopolitics-of-international-climate-diplomacy-a-read-out-from-cop28 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-24 11:02:07 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-24 10:02:07 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7272 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [3] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7169 [post_author] => 109 [post_date] => 2023-11-06 12:24:17 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-11-06 11:24:17 [post_content] => Barring some unforeseen event, or unexpected late addition to the race, the next US presidential election is shaping up to be a contest between Joe Biden and Donald Trump. With a year to go until the election, it’s far too early to say who will be the winner. But it’s not too early to think about what the consequences of a victory by either candidate might mean. Biden and Trump offer sharply divergent views on American foreign policy, the future of the international order, and the fate of global democracy. For the world outside of the United States, this means that the stakes of the coming election are unusually high.   Let’s start with Biden. After winning the 2020 election, Biden declared that “America is back”.^[1] During the campaign he pledged to restore multilateralism and democracy to the heart of American foreign policy, and he has taken many initiatives in this direction. He re-joined the Paris Climate Accords and the World Health Organization and stopped treating the United Nations and European Union (EU) as enemy combatants. He has frequently framed American foreign policy as a contest between democracy and autocracy – one which will define the coming century and in which America must be firmly on the side of democracy.^[2]   A Biden victory in 2024 would therefore deliver predictability and stability in American foreign policy. We could expect the administration to stay engaged with multilateral institutions, prioritise relations with America’s traditional allies, and keep attempting to construct coalitions to contain Russia and China. Biden’s experience and basic competence at both diplomacy and governing – two things sorely lacked by Trump – mean that America would continue to fill the leadership role that much of the world has come to expect of it. America would indeed be back.   On the other hand, it’s important not to get too carried away by Biden’s own rhetoric. The administration’s policy has also been marked by contradictions which make a simple story of multilateralism and democracy misleading.   In particular, Biden has been willing to bend his principles abroad if he deemed it necessary to protect American democracy at home. Early on, the administration promised to run a “foreign policy for the middle class” which would deflate the appeal of Trumpian populism by putting the economic interests of American citizens first.^[3] This has sometimes come into conflict with the administration’s commitment to democracy and human rights abroad, for instance when Biden abruptly reversed his decision to isolate Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman in a quest for lower oil prices – despite the latter’s brutal murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.^[4]   More broadly, the administration has sought a quiet transformation of the international economy which would continue to reverberate into a second Biden term. Believing that globalisation has empowered populism, the Biden administration has refused to negotiate new multilateral free trade agreements or even increased market access with individual allies. New trade agreements are so politically toxic in the United States that there’s little reason to expect that this would change even in a second Biden term.   The administration has even declared the death of the “Washington consensus” of pro-market policies which has been central to the international economy for decades.^[5] Worried about economic competition with China, the administration has sought to build a new system of managed trade and investment which concentrates the supply chains for key sectors in the United States. At the same time, the policy risks fragmenting the world into competing economic blocs and leaving many regions – from the EU to developing nations – behind.^[6] In a second Biden term, other countries will continue having to scramble to adapt.

"...Biden offers: strong American leadership which places a priority on democracy and alliances but which also puts US interests first, even if they conflict with those other values."

This, then, is what Biden offers: strong American leadership which places a priority on democracy and alliances but which also puts US interests first, even if they conflict with those other values. Compared to what’s on offer from Donald Trump, that’s not such a bad deal.   During his first term, Trump distinguished himself from every other modern president in the severity of his hostility to multilateralism, his disdain for democracy both at home and abroad, and his approval of foreign autocrats. He described the EU as a “foe” while speaking glowing words about Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.^[7] He withdrew from the Paris Climate Accords, the Iranian nuclear deal, and even from the World Health Organization amid a deadly global pandemic. He started trade wars not just with China, but also with the EU and the United Kingdom. And he has hinted that in a second term, he would do all this again and more.^[8]   Pinning down Trump’s precise foreign policy views is somewhat tricky. He is often described as an isolationist, but in his first term at least, this wasn’t really true – he proved willing to use American military force against Syria and Iran, and even his trade wars had the ostensible purpose of rebalancing international trade in the favour of the United States, not ending it entirely. It’s more fruitful to see Trump as part of an American tradition of unilateralism – the belief that the United States is powerful and righteous enough to do whatever it wants without the help of others, and that US allies are free riders looking for a handout rather than force multipliers who help Washington achieve its goals.

“It’s more fruitful to see Trump as part of an American tradition of unilateralism – the belief that the United States is powerful and righteous enough to do whatever it wants without the help of others.”

  There are at least three reasons to think that this worldview would make Trump especially dangerous in a second term. Firstly, the world is confronting multiple serious crises that require American leadership of a bloc of nations rather than America acting alone. Some of these crises are global – such as climate change – whereas others afflict regions, such as Ukraine and the Middle East. Trump shows no appetite for leading on the former and on the latter, his instinct is to accommodate local strongmen. For instance, he has suggested that he would pressure Ukraine to settle its conflict on terms favourable to Russia, and it’s clear that his vision for the future of the Middle East involves no accommodation of Palestinian aspirations.^[9]   Secondly, Trump’s second term is likely to be even more chaotic and unconstrained than his first. Not only is he now advancing more radical ideas – such as invading Mexico or placing a 10% tariff on all US imports – but he would also face far fewer institutional restraints.^[10] Trump’s allies are developing plans to gut the civil service and place America Firsters in control of the foreign policy bureaucracy, and the “axis of adults” – experienced officials who helped contain Trump’s worst impulses in his first term – are unlikely to return.^[11] If he returns to power having survived two impeachments and multiple criminal indictments, Trump is also likely to feel able to get away with almost anything.   But perhaps the most serious consequence of a Trump second term is what its very possibility says about the future of American democracy – and, by extension, democracy around the world. After losing the 2020 presidential election, Trump embarked on a campaign to overturn the result, culminating in the deadly insurrection on January 6th. If he were to overcome both the legal and political consequences of this and return to power regardless, the entire future of democracy in America would be in question.   This is especially the case because it seems likely that Trump would accelerate his attacks on democracy at home during any second term. He has said that he would seek to use his office to shield himself from accountability for his past actions while politicising law enforcement agencies and persecuting his political opponents.^[12] Whilst, he would surely once again seek to interfere with the functioning of America’s electoral process, casting doubt on its outcomes and using the powers of his office to tilt the results in his favour.   This matters to the world not only because it would plunge America into political and constitutional chaos, making any stable foreign policy difficult to maintain, but also because of the precedent it would set for other countries. Political trends which begin in the United States rarely stay there, and a crisis of democracy at the heart of the Western alliance would likely weaken the commitment to democratic and legal norms throughout the rest of the world.

 “An America that could elect Donald Trump once might be redeemable  –  one which elects him twice, perhaps not."

The result would be a far cry from Biden’s vision of a global struggle between democracy and autocracy – if anything, what Trump is offering is more of a case of autocracy versus autocracy. Faced with such a world, America’s democratic allies would have to consider the possibility that American leadership and commitment to international rules, however merely aspirational the latter might sometimes be, is a thing of the past. An America that could elect Donald Trump once might be redeemable – one which elects him twice, perhaps not. In a world of rising challenges to democracy, both at home and abroad, such a future would look very bleak indeed.   Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   Image by Emma Kaden under (CC).   ^[1] The White House, Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World, February 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world ^[2] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf ^[3] Andrew Gawthorpe, Taking US Foreign Policy for the Middle Class Seriously, The Washington Quarterly, 45:1, 57-75, April 2022,https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A3285186/view ^[4] MJ Lee and Kevin Liptak, ‘There Is Only So Much Patience One Can Have’: Biden Appears To Back Off Vow to Punish Saudi Arabia, CNN, February 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/03/politics/joe-biden-saudi-arabia-opec/index.html ^[5] The White House, Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership at the Brookings Institution, April 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/04/27/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-renewing-american-economic-leadership-at-the-brookings-institution/ ^[6] Andrew Gawthorpe, Biden’s ‘New Washington Consensus’ is Weaponizing Trade, World Politics Review, May 2023, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/us-china-trade-war-globalized-united-states-economy-policy-biden/ ^[7] Andrew Roth, David Smith, et. al., Trump calls European Union a ‘foe’ – ahead of Russia and China, The Guardian, July 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/15/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-helsinki-russia-indictments ^[8] Daniel W. Drezner, Bracing for Trump 2.0, Foreign Affairs, September 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/bracing-trump-possible-return-allies-rivals; Joseph S. Ny, If Trump Returns, Project Syndicate, May 2023, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-2024-election-us-foreign-policy-by-joseph-s-nye-2023-05 ^[9] Jack Forrest, Trump won’t Commit to Backing Ukraine in War with Russia, CNN, May 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/10/politics/ukraine-russia-putin-trump-town-hall/index.html; Aron Heller and Matthew Lee, Trump Peace Plan Delights Israelis, Enrages Palestinians, AP, January 2020, https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-ap-top-news-international-news-jerusalem-politics-f7d36b9023309ce4b1e423b02abf52c6 ^[10] Asawin Suebsaeng and Adam Rawnsley, Trump Asks Advisers for ‘Battle Plans’ to ‘Attack Mexico’ if Reelected, Rolling Stone, March 2023, https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/donald-trump-mexico-military-cartels-war-on-drugs-1234705804/; Jeff Stein, Trump vows Massive new Tariffs if Elected, Risking Global Economic War, Washington Post, August 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/08/22/trump-trade-tariffs/ ^[11] Allan Smith, Trump Zeroes in on Key Target of his ‘Retribution’ Agenda: Government Workers, NBC News, April 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-retribution-agenda-government-workers-schedule-f-rcna78785 ^[12] Maggie Haberman and Shane Goldmacher, Trump, Vowing ‘Retribution’, Foretells a Second Term of Spite, The New York Times, March 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/07/us/politics/trump-2024-president.html [post_title] => 2024 US Presidential Elections: A fork in the road for the future of American foreign policy? 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