On Monday, 20th January, Donald Trump will be inaugurated into his second Presidency. With America, and the world, preparing for the next Trump administration, we turned to US experts, and friends of the FPC, Anthony Silberfeld (Bertelsmann Foundation) and Andrew Gawthorpe (Leiden University) to provide us with insights into what this will mean for foreign policy and global relations.
In this interview, Anthony and Andrew discuss what President Trump’s return to the White House means for the US’s role as the ‘global watchdog’, the impact and importance of this administration’s obsession with both social media and its owners, as well as what the future holds for the ‘special relationship’ between the US and the UK.
Where will foreign affairs sit on the list of policy priorities for President Trump, and what does this mean for the US’s traditional role as a ‘global watchdog’?
Anthony Silberfeld: The concept of “policy priorities” in a conventional sense did not exist in Donald Trump’s chaotic first term, and should not be expected in his second. Instead, one should view what’s ahead in two tiers of retribution. The first tier will be action taken against domestic threats, focusing specifically on undocumented immigrants and political enemies. Trump’s incoming border czar, Tom Homan, has committed to rounding up and deporting millions of migrants currently residing in the US. Whether this ends up being more theoretical than practical remains to be seen, but the result will have widespread economic and reputational repercussions for the US, not to mention the human toll it will take on these individuals and their families.
The second tier will take aim at foreign actors who, in Trump’s view, “have treated us unfairly.” This would include any country with which the US has a trade deficit, particular venom is reserved for Germany and China, but the punitive response will be widespread. During the 2024 presidential campaign, Trump threatened a range of tariffs against allies and adversaries alike. Rhetoric is one thing, but higher prices from food, electronics and cars for all Americans is something else. There will surely be announcements of tariffs in the early days of the new administration, but the economic impact of this action may temper much of this initial bluster. Nevertheless, the idea of America continuing its role as a global watchdog is unlikely. This new administration has no appetite for it, and will quickly forfeit any remaining credibility the US has as a force for stability in an increasingly volatile environment.
“[The] idea of America continuing its role as a global watchdog is unlikely. This new administration has no appetite for it, and will quickly forfeit any remaining credibility the US has as a force for stability in an increasingly volatile environment.”
Andrew Gawthorpe: Foreign policy is high on Trump’s list of policy priorities, but he has a narrower understanding of American goals than many previous presidents and is particularly focused on economic aspects of foreign policy. His planned trade tariffs, even if they are not implemented on as broad of a scale as he has suggested, will quickly become the top bilateral issue between the US and affected countries.
Trump’s presidency is not likely to be one in which the US is active in multilateral fora or seeking new cooperative agreements. He is sceptical of many of the things that previous American presidents have viewed as obligations deriving from international treaties or organisations. Instead, Trump likes to deal with countries bilaterally, a situation in which he feels he can better use American power as leverage against weaker nations.
Looking more closely at the potential foreign policy approaches of the US under a Trump Presidency, how could his policies affect the UK and Europe, particularly with relation to NATO and defence?
Anthony Silberfeld: Let’s start with the good news. I do not see a scenario in which the US withdraws from NATO, or reduces its own defence spending, which currently amounts to approximately two-thirds of the NATO total. Now for the bad news. The Trump administration has already signalled its intent to ask NATO members to increase their defence spending (as a percentage of GDP) beyond their current two percent commitment to as much as five percent. At present, only Poland, Greece and the three Baltic countries are meeting their two percent commitments, so the prospect of all NATO members meeting Trump’s new terms is somewhere between slim and none.
How the president-elect will treat those countries that fall below the spending threshold is the key question, notwithstanding America’s obligations under NATO’s Article 5. It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their defence spending obligations, while those that do not are left to fend for themselves. The UK’s current status as a laggard in its NATO spending will draw the unwanted attention of the new regime in Washington, and will surely be an additional point of friction that will test the durability of the special relationship.
“…It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their
[NATO] defence spending obligations,
while those that do not are left to fend for themselves.”
Andrew Gawthorpe: While an American withdrawal from NATO remains unlikely, Trump could undercut the credibility of the alliance by refusing to endorse the organization’s mutual defence clause, Article V. However, Trump is likely to push European countries for much higher levels of defence spending and to wind down American support for Ukraine. He is likely to be willing to attempt to impose ceasefire terms that many European governments regard as too generous towards Russia. There is also a chance that his chaotic style of policymaking causes negotiations to collapse, potentially leading to further escalation in the conflict.
Anthony Silberfeld: Despite assurances from Donald Trump during the campaign that he would end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours upon taking office if not sooner, his envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently recalibrated expectations. The new outlook from Washington remains fluid, but aims for a ceasefire of some kind within 100 days of Trump taking office. How much consultation is done with the UK and European allies (let alone Ukraine itself) will not just determine whether an end to the war is viable, but will also provide an early signal for how this administration will work with its allies going forward.
Andrew Gawthorpe: For the UK specifically, Trump’s presidency raises the difficult question of London’s relationship with the European Union. The UK will be much better able to weather both Trump’s trade policy and his impact on the overall strategic situation in Europe through cooperation with the EU. Whereas UK policymakers have tended to assume that the US shares their fundamental commitment to European security and the transatlantic bond, the incoming administration does not. That requires recalibration and looking to like-minded countries on the continent who share the UK’s goals and values.
“…UK policymakers have tended to assume that the US shares their fundamental commitment to European security and the transatlantic bond, [but] the incoming administration does not.”
Elon Musk took an active role in the Trump-Vance campaign, utilising his platform on X in particular, and has been rewarded with a role in the Trump Administration. With Musk repeatedly criticised for his comments on UK developments, how large an impact do you anticipate Musk having on foreign policy?
Anthony Silberfeld: Musk’s support for Trump and Republican candidates during the election bought him a seat (and apparently a guest bedroom) at Mar-a-Lago, which he has already used to influence policy and there is no question that Musk will continue to use the influence he purchased to further his own business interests.
“…there is no question that [Elon] Musk will continue to use the influence he purchased to further his own business interests.”
Andrew Gawthorpe: Musk’s position inside the Trump administration is hard to determine. His position is unofficial and advisory, and he has many political disagreements with key segments of Trump’s political coalition. For instance, he favours certain forms of immigration, and is relatively close with the Chinese government. His longevity in Trump’s inner circle is hence not assured, particularly given that Trump has been known to turn on people who he perceives as taking the limelight away from him.
However, Musk should be taken seriously. Trump’s “MAGA movement” has often talked about internationalizing its project and trying to support right-wing parties in Europe, but Musk is doing it on a scale unseen in the past. Europe’s mainstream parties could face a pincer movement – Trump hammering them with tariffs and defence spending demands from abroad, and Musk supporting their extremist rivals at home. At its worst, it could appear as de facto foreign intervention in European elections. And Musk can continue to do this, using X and his global bullhorn, even if he parts ways with Trump at some point.
“Europe’s mainstream parties could face a pincer movement – Trump hammering them with tariffs and defence spending demands from abroad, and [Elon] Musk supporting their extremist rivals at home.”
Anthony Silberfeld: The role of corporate influence in the new administration is not limited to Elon Musk. During the transition period there has been a steady parade of corporate CEOs who have made rhetorical, policy and financial contributions to curry favour with the incoming president. Some of the most egregious examples start with Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg scrapping fact-checking on his platforms and contributing one million dollars to Trump’s inaugural fund.
Not to be outdone, Amazon’s executive chairman Jeff Bezos donated one million dollars to the same inaugural fund, and ponied up an additional $40 million to produce a Melania Trump biographical documentary. They are not alone, and in each instance, there is a calculation being made about offensive and defensive engagement with this new administration. In other words, how much does a company have to give to get what it wants, or conversely, how much will it cost to avoid being targeted if it runs afoul of the White House. These are real considerations for business leaders as they consider strategy and tactics in the period ahead.
“The role of corporate influence in the new administration is not limited to Elon Musk.”
Given President Trump’s previous actions, can we expect US foreign policy discourse and decisions to be played out through comments made personally by Trump through non-traditional channels, and how can global leaders respond?
Anthony Silberfeld: I would make a distinction here between discourse and decisions when it comes to Trump’s foreign policy. As he did in the first term, Trump’s reflexive comments made via social media platforms or at impromptu new conferences will shape the policy discourse, and will force everyone else to react. American policymakers will scramble to determine whether Trump’s latest utterance should be taken figuratively, literally, or in jest. The press will (depending on their political orientation) either amplify Trump’s pronouncement or turn the half-baked screed into a policy analysis that is worthy of debate. But there is often a significant gap between Trump’s rhetoric and reality.
Many of the most controversial foreign policy statements made by Trump thus far, such as acquiring the Panama Canal, Greenland and Canada, or the imposition of tariffs, will encounter legal, legislative, and public opinion barriers that may prove to be insurmountable. What we found in the first Trump administration is that his interests in policy initiatives were often transient. In those days, the administration was staffed in part with institutional professionals who still ran into roadblocks that curtailed the president’s worst instincts. This time around, the quality of staff in this administration, combined with the desire to gut the federal workforce through layoffs and loyalty tests is unlikely to result in the efficient implementation of the MAGA agenda. It’s going to be a wild ride for all involved. World leaders would benefit from taking the right lessons from the first iteration of Trump, take a deep breath, and only respond when it becomes clear there is no other alternative.
“World leaders would benefit from taking the right lessons from the first iteration of Trump, take a deep breath, and only respond when it becomes clear there is no other alternative.”
Andrew Gawthorpe: Trump’s incoming chief of staff, Susie Wiles, is supposedly going to ensure that the new administration is more focused and less prone to chaotic policymaking than Trump’s first term. However, it’s unlikely she can persuade Trump to give up his social media habit, and that means he will continue to drive the global agenda in part through this type of personal comment. This creates a tricky situation for world leaders. On the one hand, they feel domestic political pressure to stick up for their country. On the other hand, it’s important to not get too bogged down in the weeds. Trump threatens to do things all the time which he has no intention of doing. And he makes policy through personal relationships, meaning that it’s important for leaders to cultivate good relations with him and stay on his good side, so as better to promote their country’s interests. They cannot let those interests get drowned in a tide of tweets, and so it’s often better to not engage.
What does all of this mean for the ‘Special Relationship’ between the US and the UK going forward?
Anthony Silberfeld: The latest version of the special relationship will almost certainly get off to a rocky start since Donald Trump is never one to forget a real or perceived slight. Past comments by Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Foreign Secretary David Lammy are going to be difficult for the White House to forgive, in spite of both men’s efforts to walk back those statements.[1] The US is also doing its part to poison the relationship before it begins as Elon Musk, one of President Trump’s closest advisers, is meddling in British domestic politics to undermine the Labour government. Not exactly a recipe for a harmonious marriage, but not all is lost.
Trump is, at the end of the day, transactional, so if the United Kingdom can demonstrate the value it can add to the special relationship, it has the potential of living up to that lofty moniker. Meeting the elevated NATO defence spending obligations, and highlighting the importance of UK investment in the US will be a good starting point. Unfortunately, it’s hard to imagine a Thatcher-Reagan or even a Blair-Bush relationship to flourish between Starmer and Trump, so London might be best served by spending its energy on cultivating relationships with members of Congress, state governors and mayors.
“Trump is, at the end of the day, transactional, so if the United Kingdom can demonstrate the value it can add to the special relationship, it has the potential of living up to that lofty moniker.”
Andrew Gawthorpe: The UK government should recognize the importance of personal relationships to Trump and attempt to cultivate ties with people in his inner circle. Then the government needs to use these relationships to put forward the UK’s case for why it is a constructive economic and security actor and not a net drain on American resources. Secondly, the UK also needs to look beyond the “special relationship” and instead think in broader US-European terms. The UK government has to realize that this second election of Trump means that the world is changing. American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore. Europe needs to be prepared to develop its capabilities as a geopolitical actor, and the correct role for the UK is to work alongside Europe in doing that.
“The UK government has to realize that this
second election of Trump means that the world is changing.
American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore.”
Living our values of democracy and the rule of law means having the capabilities to advance and defend them – something which is particularly important when the US is increasingly deviating from those very values.
Dr Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.
Anthony Silberfeld joined the Bertelsmann Foundation as the Director of Transatlantic Relations in April 2014. His research focuses on democratic innovations in cities, and geopolitical competition in space. Anthony arrived at the Foundation after seven years with the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, where he was head of political and public affairs at the British Embassy’s Northern Ireland Bureau in Washington, DC. Prior to his tenure with the British government, Anthony held posts as a foreign policy advisor in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre
[1] Albert Toth, From ‘repugnant’ to ‘the closest of allies’: Everything Keir Starmer has said about Donald Trump, The Independent, 06 November 2024, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/us-election-trump-starmer-labour-republican-2024-b2642284.html; Chris Mason and Becky Morton, Lammy dismisses past criticism of Trump as ‘old news’, BBC, 07 November 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cm2z1zm1pk3o.