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Research from Past Authors

Array ( [0] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5951 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-06-30 00:02:01 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-06-29 23:02:01 [post_content] => 2019-жылы ноябрь айында “Азаттык” радиосу (“Эркин Европа” / “Азаттык» радиосунун кыргыз кызматы), Уюшкан кылмыштуулук жана коррупцияны изилдөө борбору (OCCRP) жана анын Кыргызстандагы Kloop.kg өнөктөш борбору Кыргызстандын Бажы кызматындагы кеңири жайылган коррупция боюнча биргелешкен иликтөөсүн жарыялаган эле.[1] Бул иликтөө жарыялангандан кийин Интернетте журналисттерди коркутуулар, кемсинтүүлөр акыркы шайлоолордон бери уланып келе жаткан Кыргызстандагы көз карандысыз ЖМКларга карата жаңы коркутуулар менен опузалар доору башталганынан кабар берет. Бул макалада көз карандысыз журналисттерге жана медиа уюмдарга карата интернеттеги куугунтуктун канчалык күч алгандыгы чагылдырылып, мамлекеттин, социалдык медиа платформалардын жана журналисттердин өздөрүнүн буга жооп мамилеси иликтенип, көйгөйдү чечүү боюнча максаттуу сунуштар берилди.   Оңтойлуу шарттар Кыргызстандагы көз карандысыз ЖМКлар жана алардын журналисттери акыркы кездерде, жалаа жабуу тууралуу көйгөйлүү мыйзамдардан улам, байма-бай куугунтукка алынып жатышат.[2] Мунун көрүнүктүү мисалы – ошол кездеги президент А.Атамбаевдин 2017-жылы март айында көз карандысыз Zanoza.kg онлайн жаңылыктар платформасына (азыркы Кактус Медиа) жана башкаларга каршы миллиондогон долларлык доо койгондогу сот иштери.[3] Бул иш БУУнун Адам укуктары боюнча комитетине жөнөтүлгөн, эми алардын сунуштары күтүлүп жатат. Бирок 2019-жылы ноябрь айында “Aзаттык”, OCCRP жана Kloop.kg’нин материалдары менен иликтөөлөрүнүн жарыяланышы көз карандысыз ЖМКларга карата коркутуулардын жана чабуулдардын мүнөзү өзгөрүп, Интернеттеги куугунтук бир кыйла көбөйө баштаганын айгинелейт. Иликтөөнүн жана кийин башка көз карандысыз маалымат каражаттары тарабынан бул иликтөө менен байланышкан башка макалалардын жарык көрүшү иликтөөгө катышкан журналисттерге тикелей кол салуулардын эле эмес, санариптик чабуулдардын жана интернеттеги куугунтуктун да себепчиси болду.[4] Бул тенденция 2020-жыл бою да уланып, 2020-жылы 4-октябрдагы талаштуу парламенттик шайлоодон кийин жана 2020-жылы 17-ноябрда сунушталган конституциялык реформанын артынан ого бетер күч алды.   Көз карандысыз иликтөөлөр менен алектенген журналисттерди коркутуу Ноябрь айында Kloop.kg’нин иликтөөсү жарыялангандан кийин, Kaktus Media көз карандысыз онлайн маалымат платформасы жана башкалар иликтөөнү сындаган жана ага катышкан журналисттерди куугунтуктаган социалдык медиа троллдор көбөйгөнүн белгилешкен.[5] Бул “троллдордун” аккаунттарда журналисттик иликтөөнү төгүндөгөн, ошондой эле 2019-жылдын 25-ноябрына белгиленген өлкөдөгү коррупцияга каршы тынч нааразычылык акциясына катышууну пландап жаткандарга асылган комментарийлери камтылган. Кыргызстандагы көз карандысыз маалымат каражаттарына кол салуу жаңылык деле эмес. Бирок, 2017-жылы жалаа жабуу боюнча сот процесстеринен көрүнүп тургандай, сын айткан адамдарды коркутуу сыяктуу салтка айланып калган ыкмаларга троллинг жана онлайн куугунтук сыяктуу жаңы ыкмалар кошулду.   Тролддорду тандоо Кыргызстанда 2020-жылы 4-октябрда өткөн парламенттик шайлоодон жана Борбордук шайлоо комиссиясынын жыйынтыктарын жокко чыгаруу чечиминен кийин, көз карандысыз маалымат каражаттарына жана журналисттерге карата интернеттеги коркутуулар көбөйүп, аны менен катар журналисттерге кол салуу учурлары да көп каттала баштады.[6] Учурда “тролл фабрикаларынын” көбөйүшү жана алардын саясий оппоненттерин дагы, ЖМКларды жаманатты кылуу үчүн колдонулушу журналисттерге карата Интернеттен кыянаттык менен пайдалануунун күчөшүнө түрткү болду деп айтылууда.[7]   “Азаттык” радиосуна жасалган чабуулдар Кыргызстандагы башка көз карандысыз ЖМКлар сыяктуу эле, “Азаттык” радиосу коррупцияга тиешелүү иликтөөсүн жарыялай баштаганга чейин эле журналисттери менен бирге саясатчылардын жапырт каралоосуна кабылды.[8] Бирок көптөн бери улантылып келген мындай каралоо жана чабуулдарга салыштырмалуу “Азаттыктын” журналисттери азыр интернетте ого бетер катуу коркутуу жана куугунтук башталганын кабарлады. «Азаттык» радиосу белгилүү саясатчылардын жарыя сөздөрүндө сынга кабылып, бул жаңылыктар платформасына интернеттеги чабуулдардын көбөйүшүнө түрткү берди.[9]   Конституциялык реформага каяша кылгандар сынга кабылды 17-ноябрда Кыргыз Республикасынын Конституциясына өзгөртүүлөрдү киргизүү долбоору жарыяланды. Улуттук жана эл аралык жалпыга маалымдоо каражаттары жана жарандык коом уюмдары, анын ичинде Медиа Полиси Институту жана АРТИКЛЬ 19 уюмдары, колдонуудагы конституцияда белгиленген жана эл аралык укук менен кепилденген укуктар менен эркиндиктерди бузат деп сунушталган түзөтүүлөрдү сынга алышты.[10] Сунушталып жаткан өзгөртүүлөргө каршы чыккан айрым журналисттер, активисттер жана юристтер, айрыкча аялдар онлайн чабуулдарга кабылды. Аларды коркутуп, кемсинтип, каралап турушту.[11] Бул сөз эркиндигине кедерги болуучу, сын-пикирлерди басууга жасалган ачык аракет айрыкча социалдык тармактардын кыргыз тилдүү сегменттеринде байкалды.[12] Медиа Полиси Институту жана медиа коомчулуктун башка өкүлдөрү саясий лидерлерди интернетте аларды сындагандарды коркутууну жана куугунтукту колдобоого жана онлайн чабуулдар тикелей зомбулукка алып келиши мүмкүн экендигин эске алуу менен аларга каршы чара көрүүгө чакырышты.[13]   Коркунучтарга каршы мамлекеттин аракетсиздиги Журналисттер баары бир каралбайт деп Интернеттеги куугунтук жана кыянаттык боюнча укук коргоо органдарына арызданбаганын билдиришти.[14] Бул бир жагынан айрым саясатчылардын журналисттерди интернетте куугунтукка, ушундай чабуулдарга түздөн-түз көкүтүү менен же ал жоруктарды эч айыптабай коюп, жалпы бейбаштыкка шыкак берип жаткандыгы менен байланыштуу болушу мүмкүн.   Журналист аялдарга карата Интернеттеги куугунтукту жана зомбулукту иликтөө боюнча АРТИКЛЬ 19дун жакында жарык көргөн колдонмосунда мамлекеттердин журналисттерди оффлайн жана онлайн режимде коргоо боюнча төмөнкүдөй милдеттенмелери көрсөтүлгөн:[15]
  • Адам укуктары боюнча эл аралык стандарттарга ылайык, мамлекеттер журналисттердин өз ишин көз карандысыз жана жөнү жок кийлигишүүсүз жүргүзүшү үчүн коопсуз жана жагымдуу чөйрөнү камсыз кылуу максатында сөз эркиндигине болгон укукту мыйзам, саясат аркылуу жана иш жүзүндө коргошу керек. Мамлекеттер ошондой эле журналисттердин сөз эркиндигин чектөөгө багытталган кылмыштарга тыюу салынышын, журналисттерге кол салуулардын алдын-алууну, журналисттердин корголушун жана күнөөлүүлөрдүн жоопко тартылышын камсыз кылуу боюнча алгылыктуу милдеттенмелерди аткарууга тийиш.
  • Жеткиликтүү иликтөөлөр көрсөткөндөй, Интернеттеги куугунтук үчүн мыйзамдуу жоопкерчиликти кантип алуу керектиги боюнча так аныктама жок жана бул көбүнчө сөз эркиндигине зыян келтирген жаңы, өтө эле жалпы мыйзамдарды кабыл алууга алып келиши мүмкүн.
  • Сөз эркиндигине болгон укукту чектеген кандай гана токтом болбосун, ЖСУЭПтин 19-беренесинин 3-пунктуна ылайык үч бөлүктүү критерийге жооп бериши кажет; ал эми жазык мыйзамы өзгөчө куугунтук жана Интернеттеги зордук-зомбулук олуттуу зыян келтирүү сыяктуу белгилүү бир деңгээлге жеткен өзгөчө учурларда колдонулушу керек.
  2019-жылы ЕККУнун Интернеттеги журналисттерге карата куугунтук, зордук-зомбулук жана ЖМКлардын эркиндиги боюнча өкүлүнүн баяндамасында: “куугунтук жана онлайн режимдеги зордук-зомбулук олуттуу зыян келтириши мүмкүн болсо, полиция жана прокуратура органдары өз убагында, жигердүү иш алып барышы, ал эми кылмыш жасагандар тийиштүү түрдө жоопко тартылышы зарыл. Мындай реакция толугу менен жабырлануучунун билдирүүсүнөн жана жазаны талап кылуусунан көз каранды болбошу керек, анткени онлайн режимдеги куугунтук журналисттин да, жалпы элдин да сөз эркиндигине болгон укукту бузат (демек, коомдук маселе катары каралууга тийиш)”, – деп белгиленген.[16]   Социалдык медиа платформалардан жооп алуу кыйындыгы Көпчүлүк журналисттер жана медиа уюмдар ири платформалар сунуш кылган ар кандай даттануу механизмдери аркылуу социалдык медиада Интернеттеги куугунтук жана коркутуп-үркүтүүлөргө карата тынчсыздануусун билдиришти. Бирок буга карата эч кандай жооп болгон жок.   Журналист аялдарга асылуу жана зордук-зомбулук жөнүндө акыркы маалымат документинде АРТИКЛЬ 19 социалдык медиа платформаларын куугунтукка жана зомбулукка каршы коомдук стандарттарды жана башка саясатты иштеп чыгуу милдеттенмесине артыкчылык берет.[17] Facebook, Twitter жана YouTube (Google) өздөрүнүн платформаларында куугунтукка жана кордукка жол берилбейт деп билдиришет да, бул шарттардын бузулушуна карата ар кандай ыкмаларды, анын ичинде контентти өчүрүү, белги коюу жана пайдалануучуларды бөгөттөө чараларын колдонушат. Facebook сайтында журналисттерди колдоочу бир катар уюмдар менен биргеликте иштелип чыккан, журналисттерге Интернеттеги коопсуздук боюнча кеңештерди берген атайын бөлүм бар.[18]   Бирок АРТИКЛЬ 19дун документинде социалдык медианын эрежелери көбүнчө жалпы жана бүдөмүк болуп, колдонмолор, тактап айтканда, куугунтукка жана кордукка жооп кылуу, кайрылуулар жана даттануулар, коргоо чаралары же аныктоо механизмдери ырааттуу сакталбай жаткандыгы белгиленет. Эрежелерди сактоону камсыздоо механизмдерин табуу ар дайым эле оңой боло бербейт, ал эми социалдык тармак компанияларынын жооп мамилеси көбүнчө байкалбайт же ыраатсыз жасалууда. Интернеттеги куугунтукка жана кыянаттыктарга жооп катары көрүлүп жаткан иш-аракеттер да, алгоритмдерди колдонуу жана алардын эрежелерине каршы келген контентти белгилөө үчүн машина менен окутуунун колдонулушу да жетиштүү даражада ачык-айкын эмес. Мындан тышкары, Кыргызстандын шартында социалдык тармактардын кыргыз тилдүү сегментинде көзөмөлсүз онлайн куугунтуктун күчөшү орус жана кыргыз тилдүү контенттин адилетсиз тескелип жатканын көрсөтүп турат.   Корутунду Кыргызстандагы маалымат каражаттарына жана журналисттерге онлайн-куугунтуктун күчөшү өзгөчө тынчсыздандырат, анткени бул өлкөдөгү сөз эркиндигине терс таасирин тийгизүүчү өзүн-өзү цензуралоого алып келет. Жакында эле Кыргызстанда “троллдор фабрикасынын” бар экендиги жана алардын онлайн режимде журналисттерге карата кыянаттыкты жайылтуудагы ролу айгинеленди, мунун өзү ушул көйгөйлөрдү бир нече деңгээлде чечүү керектигин дагы бир ирет тастыктап турат. Бул макаладан көрүнүп тургандай, өкмөт, социалдык медиа платформалар жана медиа уюмдар тарабынан жооп чаралар көрүлбөй жатканы Кыргызстандагы абалды курчутууда. Кыргызстандагы көз карандысыз маалымат каражаттарынын жана журналисттердин аброюна шек келтирген жогорку бийлик өкүлдөрүнүн ачык билдирүүлөрү кол салуулардын көбөйүшүнө түрткү болду, ал эми укук коргоо органдары журналисттерди коргоо, атап айтканда, интернеттеги коркутуулардан коргоо боюнча Кыргызстандын позитивдүү милдеттенмелерин аткарбай келет. Журналисттерге, айрыкча социалдык медианын кыргыз тилдүү сегменттерине карата жек көрүү сөздөрүнүн көзөмөлсүз көбөйүшү, кыргыз тилиндеги багыттоонун салыштырмалуу жетишсиздигинен улам келип чыгышы мүмкүн. Мунун айынан ушул платформаларда берилген онлайн куугунтук боюнча арыздарга үн кошкондор өтө аз болду. Мындан тышкары, кол салууга дуушар болгон көз карандысыз маалымат каражаттары жана журналисттер аларды ачык жарыялоону каалабагандай. ЖМК кызматкерлери укук коргоо органдары же социалдык медиа платформалары тарабынан жооп чаралар көрүлбөгөндүктөн, Интернеттеги кыянаттык менен куугунтукту документтештирбейт же ал тууралуу билдиришпейт. Интернеттеги куугунтук “иштин боло жүргөн эле жагы”, ошондуктан ага терикпей эле коюш керек деген пикирлер дагы бар.   Андыктан Полиси Институту жана АРТИКЛЬ 19 ушул актуалдуу көйгөйлөрдү чечүү үчүн Интернеттеги журналист аялдарга карата куугунтук жана зордук-зомбулук боюнча маалымат документтеринде келтирилген сунуштарды, ошондой эле АРТИКЛЬ 19дун адистери тарабынан түзүлгөн ЕККУнун Коопсуздук боюнча маалымдамасында (кыскача #SOFJO) Интернеттеги журналист аялдардын коопсуздугу боюнча төмөнкү сунуштарды беришет.[19]   Кыргызстандын Өкмөтү үчүн:
  • Интернеттеги коопсуздукка жана гендердик аспектке өзгөчө көңүл буруу менен журналисттердин коопсуздугу боюнча улуттук иш-чаралардын планын иштеп чыгуу;[20]
  • Сот жана укук коргоо органдарынын кызматкерлеринин сөз эркиндиги, журналисттердин коопсуздугу, гендердик аспектти эске алуу менен оффлайн жана онлайн түрүндө куугунтук жана кыянат жосундар боюнча тажрыйбаларын өркүндөтүү;[21]
  • Саясий лидерлерди, мамлекеттик кызматкерлерди жана / же бийлик өкүлдөрүн жалпыга маалымдоо каражаттарын, анын ичинде айрым журналисттерди каралоодон, коркутуудан, журналист аялдарга карата туура эмес көз карашты же кандайдыр бир басмырлоочу сөздөрдү колдонуудан, ошондой эле журналисттердин ишенимин жана көз карандысыз журналистиканын баркын төмөндөтүүдөн алыс болууга чакыруу;[22] жана
  • Журналисттерге жана сөз эркиндигине каршы кылмыштарды иликтөөнүн протоколдорун, ыкмаларын жана жол-жоболорун күчөтүү.[23]
  Кыргызстанда иштеп жаткан социалдык медиа платформалар үчүн:[24]
  • Социалдык тармактарды жетектеген компаниялар процессуалдык кепилдиктерди сактоо менен зыянды кенемтелөө механизмдерин өркүндөтүшү керек. Алар компаниялар коомчулугунун стандарттарын бузушу ыктымал куугунтук жана гендердик зомбулук сыяктуу контентти алып салуудан баш тарткан жосунга жооп чара көрүү мүмкүнчүлүгүнө да ээ болушу керек;
  • Социалдык тармактар компаниялары өз чечимдери жөнүндө жабыр тарткан тараптарга кабарлап, айрым контентерге же аккаунттарга карата жасап жаткан иш-аракеттеринин жүйөсүн көрсөтүшү керек. Алар ошондой эле ар кандай ички даттануу механизмдери жөнүндө так маалымат бериши керек; жана дагы
  • Социалдык тармак компаниялары коомдук иш-аракеттерди, анын ичинде куугунтук жана аялдарга зомбулук жаатында коомдук көзөмөлдү күчөтүү үчүн көп тараптуу жөнгө салуучу органдарга, мисалы, социалдык тармактар боюнча кеңештерге кошулуу жөнүндө ойлонушу керек. Атап айтканда, Facebook’тун Байкоочу кеңеши өз ишинде гендердик куугунтукту жана зордук-зомбулукту жоюп, сөз эркиндигинин эл аралык стандарттарына ылайык, бул маселени канткенде жакшыраак жана натыйжалуу чечүү керектиги боюнча тиешелүү сунуштарды бериши керек.
  Кыргызстандагы журналисттер жана ЖМКлар үчүн:[25]
  • Интернеттеги кыянаттык жана куугунтук учурларына байкоо жүргүзүү жана документтештирүү, негизги катышуучулардын билимин арттыруу үчүн бул маалыматты журналисттик макалалар жана иликтөөлөр аркылуу да колдонуу;
  • Интернеттеги зордук-зомбулукка жана куугунтукка кабылган жана мындай кол салууларга кабылышы көбүрөөк ыктымал болгон журналисттерге психологиялык колдоо, анын ичинде бирдей макамдагы тармактар, окутуу жана башка практикалык иш-аракеттер аркылуу колдоо көрсөтүү;
  • Дене-бой, укуктук, психо-социалдык жана санариптик коопсуздукту камтыган коопсуздук саясатын иштеп чыгуу жана натыйжалуу ишке ашыруу; ошондой эле
  • Журналистиканын жогорку сапатын камсыз кылуу үчүн адептик стандарттарды жана журналисттик кодекстерди сактоо.
  Бул басылма Европа Биримдигинин финансылык колдоосу менен которулду. Анын мазмуну үчүн АРТИКЛЬ19 гана жооптуу жана Европа Биримдигинин көз карашын сөзсүз түрдө элечагылдыра бербейт.   Бегайым Үсөнова – учурда Кыргызстандагы Медиа Полис Институтунун директору, бул кызматта 2009-жылдан бери иштеп келет. Медиа Полиси Институту өлкөдөгү көз карандысыз журналисттерге жана медиа уюмдарга эксперттик укуктук талдоо жүргүзүп, колдоо көрсөтөт. Медиа Полиси Институтунда иштеп жүргөндө, Бегайым сөз эркиндиги, жалпыга маалымдоо каражаттарынын эркиндиги, кастык тили, медиа сабаттуулук жана жалпы эле медиа саясат боюнча көптөгөн дарстарды, семинарларды жана тренингдерди өткөрдү. Бегайым Кыргызстандагы ЖМК тууралуу мыйзам долбоорун, медиа сабаттуулукту, кадыр-баркка шек келтирүү, шайлоону чагылдыруу жана экстремизмге каршы мыйзамдарды камтыган бир катар басылмалардын автору жана авторлошу болуп саналат.   АРТИКЛЬ 19 – сөз эркиндиги жана маалымат эркиндигин коргоо жана жайылтуу боюнча дүйнө жүзү боюнча иштеген адам укуктарын коргоочу көз карандысыз уюм. Анын аталышы жана мандаты Адам укуктарынын жалпы декларациясынын сөз эркиндигине кепилдик берген 19-беренеси менен байланышкан. АРТИКЛЬ 19 эл аралык жана салыштырма укук менен алдыӊкы тажрыйбага негизделген ченемдик жана маалыматтык, ошондой эле сөз эркиндигине байланыштуу маселелер боюнча бир катар документтерди даярдады. АРТИКЛЬ 19 эл аралык органдардын жана Интернетти башкаруу органдарынын сөз эркиндигин коргоодогу жана өнүктүрүүдөгү Интернеттеги техникалык стандарттарды белгилөөчү ролун изилдейт.   [1] “Азаттык”, OCCRP, Kloop.kg. Жибек жолундагы кландар, коррупция жана аткезчилик. OCCRP. 2019-ж., ноябрь. https://www.occrp.org/ru/plunder-and-patronage/ [2] АРТИКЛЬ 19. Кыргызстан: “Кыргыз Республикасынын Президентинин ишмердигине кепилдиктер жөнүндө” мыйзам. 2017-ж., август. https://www.article19.org/resources/kyrgyzstan-law-protecting-presidents-honour-and-dignity-should-be-abolished/ [3] АРТИКЛЬ 19. Кыргызстан: Zanoza.kg жаӊылыктар платформасын жана анын журналисттерин мыйзам аркылуу куугунтук токтотулсун. 2017-ж., декабрь. https://www.article19.org/resources/kyrgyzstan-stop-legislative-harassment-of-zanoza-kg-and-its-journalists/ [4] Руслан Харизов. Болот Темировго кол салуу. Factcheck.kg редактору билдирүү менен чыкты. 24.kg. 2020-ж., январь. https://24.kg/obschestvo/140225_napadenie_nabolota_temirova_redaktor_Factcheckkg_vyistupil_szayavleniem/; Аида Жумашова. Матраимовдун аялынын сарптоолору. Factcheck.kg сайтына DDoS чабуул улантылууда. 24.kg. 2019-ж., декабрь. https://24.kg/obschestvo/138321_tratyi_jenyi_matraimova_DDoS-ataka_sayta_Factcheckkg_prodoljaetsya/ [5] Адеим Убакеева. Ачык-айкын. Фейктер жана чыныгы адамдар, алар кимдердин фотолорун уурдап алган. Kloop.kg. 2020-ж, январь. https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/01/22/naglyadno-fejki-i-realnye-lyudi-chi-foto-oni-ukrali/; Айдана Абдуваитова. Троллдор сөз эркиндигин жактаган акцияны гей-парад деп каралагысы келет. Алардын дагы бири Матраимовду мактап жатат. Kaktus Media. 2019-ж., декабрь. https://kaktus.media/doc/402916_trolli_hotiat_vydat_akciu_za_svobody_slova_za_gey_parad._eshe_odin_iz_nih_hvalit_matraimova.html; Александр Шабалин. $700 млн жөнүндөгү иликтөөдөн кийин Матраимовду колдоп чыккан троллдор менен боттордун иши тууралуу. Kaktus Media. 2019-ж, ноябрь. https://kaktus.media/doc/401754_o_rabote_trolley_i_botov_podderjivaushih_matraimova_posle_rassledovaniia_o_700_mln.html [6] Айдай Токоева. Медиа коомчулук саясатчыларды өз тарапташтарынын журналисттерге жана активисттерге опуза кылуусун айыптагыла деп чакырды, Kloop.kg. 2020-ж., декабрь. https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/12/01/mediasoobshhestvo-prizvalo-politikov-osuzhdat-onlajn-ugrozy-zhurnalistam-i-aktivistam-so-storony-svoih-storonnikov/ [7] Камила Ешалиева. “Ар биринин соцтармактарда 200дөй аккаунту болгон”. Кыргызстанда “троллдор фабрикалары кандай курулган. OpenDemocracy. 2020-ж., ноябрь. https://www.opendemocracy.net/ru/fabriki-trollei-v-kyrgyzstane/ [8] 24.kg. Сөз эркиндигине кол салуулар. Оодарылган тырмоо эффекти. 2020-ж., октябрь. https://journalist.kg/ru/analytics/napadki-na-svobodu-slova-effekt-perevernutyh-grablej/; Азамат Тынаев, Кыргызстандык ЖМКлардын эркиндигине болгон эӊ башкы коркунучтар кайсылар? CABAR. 2019-ж., https://cabar.asia/ru/kakovy-glavnye-ugrozy-svobode-kyrgyzstanskih-smi [9] Айдана Абдуваитова. Садыр Жапаров өз тарапташтарынын опузасы жана кысымы жөнүндө түшүндүрмө берди. Kaktus Media. 2020-ж., октябрь. https://kaktus.media/doc/423236_sadyr_japarov_prokommentiroval_ygrozy_i_davlenie_na_jyrnalistov_ot_svoih_storonnikov.html; Айжамал Жаманкулова. Садыр Жапаров өзүнүн сөздөрүнүн маанисин “Азаттык” бурмалап жатат деп билдирди. Медиа коомчулук  президенттин м.а. айыптоолору ЖМКга коркунуч жаратат деп эсептейт. 2020-ж., ноябрь. https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/11/10/sadyr-zhaparov-zayavil-chto-azattyk-iskazhaet-smysl-ego-slov-mediasoobshhestvo-schitaet-obvineniya-i-o-prezidenta-ugrozoj-dlya-smi/ [10] АРТИКЛЬ 19. Кыргызстан: конституциянын долбоору пикир айтуу эркиндигине жана ЖМК эркиндигине коркунуч жаратат. 2020-ж., декабрь. https://www.article19.org/resources/kyrgyzstan-draft-constitution-threatens-freedom-of-expression-and-freedom-of-the-media/ [11] Мирлан Кадыров. Онлайн опузалар демократияга кандай зыян келтирет. “Азаттык”. 2020-ж., декабрь. https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30978025.html [12] Бакыт Төрөгелди. Соцтармактардын кыргыз сегментинде опуза жана коркутуу күч алды. “Азаттык”. 2020-ж., ноябрь. https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30964989.html [13] Институт Медиа Полиси. Кыргызстандын медиа уюмдары президенттин м.а. демократиялык коомдогу эркин ЖМКлардын ролун эл алдында таанып, ырастоого чакырып жатат. 2020-ж., ноябрь. http://media.kg/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/mediaorganizaczii-kyrgyzstana-prizyvayut-i.o.-prezidenta-publichno-priznat-i-podtverdit-rol-svobodnyh-smi-v-demokraticheskom-obshhestve.pdf [14] Мирлан Кадыров. Онлайн опузалар демократияга кандай зыян келтирет. “Азаттык”. 2020-ж., декабрь. https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30978025.html [15] АРТИКЛЬ 19. Журналист аялдарга карата интернеттеги асылуу жана зомбулукту иликтөө. 2020-ж., https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Gender-Paper-Brief-3-.pdf [16] ЕККУ. Журналисттерге интернетте жасалып жаткан куугунтукка жана кыянатчылыкка карата жооп кылуунун укуктук жолдору – Финляндия, Франция жана Ирландиядагы кырдаал. 2019-ж., март. https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/413549 [17] АРТИКЛЬ 19. Журналист аялдарга карата интернеттеги асылуу жана зомбулук жана негизги социалдык тармактар. 2020-ж. https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Gender-Paper-Brief-2.pdf [18] Facebook. Журналисттер үчүн коопсуздук боюнча кеӊештер. https://www.facebook.com/formedia/blog/safety-tips-for-journalists [19] АРТИКЛЬ 19. Журналист аялдарга карата интернеттеги асылуу жана зомбулук. 2020-ж.; https://www.article19.org/onlineharassment/; ЕККУ, Журналист аялдардын интернеттеги коопсуздугу, https://www.osce.org/fom/safety-female-journalists-online [20] Сильвия Чокарро, Сара Кларк, Паулина Гутьеррес, Джуди Тэйнг (АРТИКЛЬ 19). ЖУРНАЛИСТ АЯЛДАРДЫН ИНТЕРНЕТТЕГИ КООПСУЗДУГУ – МААЛЫМДАГЫЧ КОЛДОНМО. #SOFJO, ЕККУ. 2020-ж. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/9/468861_0.pdf [21] Сильвия Чокарро, Сара Кларк, Паулина Гутьеррес, Джуди Тэйнг (АРТИКЛЬ 19). ЖУРНАЛИСТ АЯЛДАРДЫН ИНТЕРНЕТТЕГИ КООПСУЗДУГУ – МААЛЫМДАГЫЧ КОЛДОНМО. #SOFJO, ЕККУ. 2020-ж. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/9/468861_0.pdf [22] БУУнун Башкы Ассамблеясы, Адам укуктары боюнча Кеңеши тарабынан 2020-жылы 6-октябрда кабыл алынган резолюция (45-сессия). 2020-жыл. https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/RES/45/18 [23] Сильвия Чокарро, Сара Кларк, Паулина Гутьеррес, Джуди Тэйнг (АРТИКЛЬ 19). ЖУРНАЛИСТ АЯЛДАРДЫН ИНТЕРНЕТТЕГИ КООПСУЗДУГУ – МААЛЫМДАГЫЧ КОЛДОНМО. #SOFJO, ЕККУ. 2020-ж. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/9/468861_0.pdf [24] АРТИКЛЬ 19. Журналист аялдарга карата интернеттеги асылуу жана зомбулук жана негизги социалдык тармактар. 2020-ж. https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Gender-Paper-Brief-2.pdf [25] АРТИКЛЬ 19. Журналист аялдарга карата интернеттеги асылуу жана зомбулук жана негизги социалдык тармактар. 2020-ж. https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Gender-Paper-Brief-2.pdf [post_title] => Көпүрө астынан: Троллинг жана Кыргызстандагы көз карандысыз маалымат каражаттарынын куугунтукталышы [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => %d0%ba%d3%a9%d0%bf%d2%af%d1%80%d3%a9-%d0%b0%d1%81%d1%82%d1%8b%d0%bd%d0%b0%d0%bd-%d1%82%d1%80%d0%be%d0%bb%d0%bb%d0%b8%d0%bd%d0%b3-%d0%b6%d0%b0%d0%bd%d0%b0-%d0%ba%d1%8b%d1%80%d0%b3%d1%8b%d0%b7%d1%81 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-07-09 12:44:43 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-07-09 11:44:43 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5951 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [1] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6026 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-06-30 00:00:35 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-06-29 23:00:35 [post_content] => Кыскача мазмуну Кыргыз Республикасы эгемендикке жеткенине 20 жылдан ашып өттү. Ал убакта Кыргызстан Борбордук Азиянын “Швейцариясына” айлануу жана өлкөнү жаңы мүмкүнчүлүктөр үчүн ачуу деген амбициялык программасына ээ болуп, базар экономикасын кабыл алып, адам укуктарына сый мамиле жасоо менен сакталышын камсыздаган чыныгы демократияны курууга умтулган.  Бирок, бул баштапкы максаттарга карабастан, адам укуктарынын корголушуна таасирин тийгизип жана жогоруда белгиленген максаттардын иш-жүзүнө ашпай калган тенденцияларды аныктаган үч негизги фактордун айынан чыныгы жана маанилүү реформалар жүргүзүлгөн эмес. Бул үч фактор төмөнкүдөй болгон: бардык жерде сиңген коррупция, саясий эрктин жоктугу жана жазасыздыктын маданияты, б.а. мыйзам үстөмдүгүнө баш ийбегендиги жана башка юридикалык процесстердин тартибин бузганы же көңүлгө албаганы үчүн эч кандай чара көрүлбөстүгүн же бул процесстердин тартибин бузган адамга эч нерсе болбостугун камтыган элдин арасындагы ой-жүгүртүүнү айтса болот. Мындай маселелерди чечүү максатында Кыргызстандын өкмөтү жана эл аралык коомчулук Кыргызстандагы элдин, өзгөчө алсыз болгон жана маргиналдашкан катмардын укугун жогорураак деңгээлде коргоо үчүн жолун табууда бири бири менен бир пикирге келүүсү зарыл. Бул “жолго” жардамдын ири пакетин, финансылык насыяларды же техникалык жардамды алуу үчүн Кыргызстандын өкмөтүнө адам укутарынын сакталышын камсыздоосун талап кылган шартты камтыган эреже киргизилиши шарт. Демек, адам укуктардын жаатындагы күн тартиби ар дайым ички саясаттын чордонунда жайгашып, прогрессти баамдоодо же тышкы саясат боюнча сүйлөшүүлөрдүн жүргүзүлүшүндө негизги максаты болушу керек.   Тарых башталаар алдындагы көйгөйлөр Кыргызстан  деңизге чыгуу жолу жок болгон, Борбордук Азиянын аймагында жайгашып, Казакстандын түштүк тарабы жана батыштан Кытай менен чектелип, Советтер Союзу кулаган соң 1991-жылы көз карандысыздыкка жетип, кичи жер тилкесине ээ болгон бир мамлекет.[1] Кыргызстанда жашаган калкы 6 миллиондон бираз гана ашкан санга тете болуп, көпчүлүгү аймактардын тургундары болуп, калктын жалпы санынан 32%ды жакырчылыкта жашаган эл түзгөн.[2]   Кыргызстан эгемендикке ээ болгон алгачкы жылдарында ар дайым Борбордук Азиянын “Швейцариясы” деп аталып, эл аралык коомчулуктун өлкөгө жана өлкөнүн бул аймакта “демократиянын аралчасына” айланып калуу потенциалына чоң үмүттө болгондугу чагылдырылган.[3] Кыргызстан көптөгөн эл аралык уюмдарга мүчө болуп кирип, адам укуктары боюнча негизги конвенцияларын ратификациялаган.[4] Мисалы, 1992-жылы Кыргызстан Дүйнөлүк Банктын мүчөлүгүнө кирген, 1994-жылы Орто Азия мамлекеттеринин арасында биринчи болуп Адам укуктарынын жалпы декларациясына кошулса, 1998-жылы мурунку советтик республикалардын ичинен алгач болуп Бүткүл дүйнөлүк соода уюумуна мүчө болуп кирген.[5]   Демократиялык өлкөгө айлануу үчүн Кыргызстан мындай кадамдарды жасаса дагы, көп жылдар бою Кыргызстан өкмөтү өзүнүн демократия боюнча берген убадаларына турбай, адам укуктарына сый мамилени курууга, аларга өбөлгө түзгөнү же алардын сакталышына эч кандай аракет жасаган эмес. Freedom House уюмунун “Дүйнө жүзү боюнча эркиндик” аттуу баяндамасында, Кыргызстан жарым жартылай гана эркин мамлекет катары таанылып, 100 балл боюнча 38 баллга гана ээ боло алган.[6] Мамлекет жергиликтүү коррупция менен күрөштү жүргүзүп, Transparency International (“Трэнспэрэнси интернэшнал” – “эл-аралык ачык-айкын”) Коррупцияны кабылдоо Индекси уюму 180 өлкөнүн ичинен Кыргызстанды 126-орунга жайгаштырган.[7] Мыйзам үстөмдүк жаатындагы реформалар туюкка кептелип, Кыргызстанда Адилеттүүлүк боюнча дүйнөлүк долбоордун мыйзам үстөмдүгүнүн индексинин көрсөткүчү 0,48 түзүп же 128 өлкөнүн арасында 87-орунду ээлеген; соттук системасынын көз карандысыздыгы 7 баллдан 3 баллга баамдалып, 2019-жылдын Глобалдык атаандаштыкка жөндөмдүүлүгүнүн индексинде 141 орундан 106-орунга жайгаштырылган. Ошентип, Кыргызстандын адам укуктары жаатында жалпы абалы  начарлап жатат.[8]   Кыргызстандын жетекчилери реформалар менен адам укуктарынан артка кетип жана кайра аларга кайтып келген кейиштүү таанымал айлампасына туш болушкан. Алгачкы президент, Аскар Акаев 1991-жылы шайланган. Башынан эле ал өзүн реформатор жана токтоо мүнөздөгү лидер катары көрсөткөн.[9] Бирок, өз кызматында иштеген акыркы жылдардын ичинде оппозициянын мүчөлөрүнө басым жасоо менен авторитардык башчыга айланып, өзүнүн үй-бүлөсү менен туугандарына жергиликтүү ресурстарына колдорун чыканагына чейин малып алууга уруксат берип жатып коррупцияланган жетекчиге айланып, анын коррупциялык схемаларында басымдуулукту жасай билген эл аралык жана жергиликтүү эрежелерди күчүнөн чыгарууга көбүрөөк даяр болуп калгандай эле.[10] Анын мындай кадамдары 2005-жылдын март айында орун алган “Жоогазын революциясына” алып келип, аягында Акаев төңкөрүштөн бир ай өткөн соң кызматынан кеткен.[11] Экинчи президент, Курманбек Бакиев 2005-жылдын июль айында президенттик кызматына шайланган. Анын баштапкы ак-көңүлдүгүнө карабастан, анын президенттик маалы төмөнкүдөй кайгылуу маселелер менен коштолгон: өлкө экономикасынын кыйрашы, кылмышкерлер менен болгон байланыштар жана парламенттин (Жогорку Кеңештин) бир нече мүчөлөрүнүн өлтүрүүлөрү, коррупция, кирешелүү бизнес үчүн анын үй-бүлөсүнүн жүргүзгөн күрөшү.[12] 2010-жылы болгон кийинки төңкөрүш Бакиевди куугунтукка салып, президенттин убактылуу милдеттерин аткаруучу кызматында Роза Отумбаеванын кыска мөөнөтү аяктаган соң, 2011-жылы декабрь айында акыры бийликке Алмазбек Атамбаев келген. Атамбаевдин президенттик маалы да көйгөйлүү жана тынч эмес болгон. Анын президенттик 6-жылдык мөөнөтүндө кээ бир реформалар жасалып, Баш мыйзамга өзгөртүүлөр киргизилсе да, көптөгөн коррупциялык иштерге тиешелүү болуп, алардын ичинде муниципалдык мүлктү мыйзамсыз жол аркылуу менчиктиштирүүсүнөн баштап инфратүзүмдүк долбоорлордон каражаттарды уурдоого чейин кирген.[13] 2017-жылдын ноябрь айында жаңы шайланып жаткан президент Сооронбай Жээнбеков өлкөдө бийлик демократиялык жол аркылуу  өткөрүп берилип жаткан мезгилде бул жогорку кызматка келген. Бирок, Сооронбай Жээнбековдун президенттиги көпкө узабай, 2020-жылы күмөндүү парламенттик шайлоолордон кийин дагы бир элдик көтөрүлүштүн жыйынтыгында кызматынан кетирилип, бул көтөрүлуштү башка байкоочулар мамлекеттик төңкөрүш деп аташкан.[14]  Жаңы шайланган президент Садыр Жапаровдун администрациясы адам укуктарынын жаатында күн тартибине канчалык деңгээлде колдоо көрсөтөөрү тууралуу бир нерсе деп айтууга али эрте болсо да, ал жана анын тарапташтары бийликке жетүү үчүн колдонуп жаткан ыкмалары тынчсызданууну жаратууда.   Бул убакыттын ичинде адам укуктарынын жаатында жалпы абал начарлаган – аярлуу топтордун, азчылык топтордун, аялдардын жана маргиналдашып калгандардын укуктары сакталбаган бойдон калууда; кыйноолордун практикасы кеңири жайылган; укук коргоочулар, журналисттер жана адвокаттар куугунтукка кабылып, жарандык коомчулуктун ишмердүүлүгүн жүргүзүү шарттары барган сайын татаалдашып жатат.[15]  Адам укуктары жаатында абалды жакшыртууга багытталган өзгөртүүлөр мыйзамга киргизилгенине карабастан, коомдогу гендердик теңсиздик менен кыздардын жана аялдардын укуктарынын бузулушу барган сайын күчөөдө.[16] Аялдарга багытталган зомбулук “кеңири жайылган” кубулуш болуп, аялдар жана кыздар “үй-бүлөдөгү зомбулукка, ала-качууга, кишилерди сатууга, бой жете элек кезде никеге мажбурлап тургузууга жана физикалык зомбулукка” көбүрөөк кабылып, бул мыйзам бузууларга чара көрүү үчүн адилеттүүлүккө болгон жеткиликтүүлүк чектелген эле.[17] Ден-соолугунун мүмкүнчүлүктөрү чектелген адамдар коомчулукка толугу менен аралашпай, дагы деле басмырлоого учурап жатышат.[18] Бул кырдаал медициналык жардамдын жеткиликтүүлүгү, саясатты иштеп чыгуу менен майыптардын маселелери боюнча чечимдерди кабыл алуу процесси сыяктуу саясий ишмердүүлүккө катышуу жөнүндө сөз болгондо өзгөчө байкалып, БУУнун Мүмкүнчүлүгү чектелген адамдардын укуктары жөнүндө Конвенциясы 2019-жылы ратификациялангандан кийин бул жаатта абалдын жакшырып кетүүсүнө чоң үмүттөр бар.[19] Азчылыктардын укуктары, өзгөчө 2010-жылы Кыргызстандын түштүгүндө орун алган улуттар аралык жаңжалдан кийин, коомчулук менен өкмөт үчүн кылдаттыкты талап кылган тема болуп турат.[20] Өзбек улутундагы укук коргоочу жана журналист, Азимжан Аскаров кармалып, кыйноолорго кабылып, жогорудагы белгиленген окуялар өткөн соң жоопкерчиликке тартылган.[21] 2016-жылы БУУнун Адам Укуктары боюнча Комитетинин Аскаровду дароо бошотуусун талап кылган чечимине жана эл аралык коомчулук тарабынан жасалган башка көптөгөн пропагандалоо жана кийлигишүү аракеттерине карабастан, Аскаров 2020-жылы 25-июлда түрмөдө жан берген.[22] Укук коргоо органдарындагы кыйноо практикасы акыркы он жылдын ичинде туруктуу негиздеги чындыкка айланып, “үзгүлтүксүз (системалык) мүнөзгө” ээ болгондой.[23] Мисалы, 2019-жылдын биринчи жарым жылында Кыргызстанда кыйноо боюнча 171 арыз келип түшкөн, бул сандын ичинен 11 учуру боюнча гана прокурорлор кылмыш иштерди козгоп, тергешкен.[24] Сексуалдык ориентация менен жыныстык иденттүүлүктүн белгиси боюнча басмырлоо менен жек көрүүчүлүктүн негизинде кылмыштар жана мыйзам бузуулар “коркунучтуу системалык” мүнөзгө ээ болуп, бүгүнкү күнгө чейин уланып келген кезде, ЛГБТ коомчулугуна тиешелүү адам укуктарынын сакталышы оор абалда калууда.[25]   Мындай начар абал башка көптөгөн факторлор менен шартталса дагы, алардын ичинен адам укуктарын сактоодо жана коргоодо тоскоолдукту жараткан  негизги, эң маанилуүү болгон үчөөнү белгилөөгө мүмкүн, алар: коррупция, саясий эрктин жоктугу жана жазасыздыктын маданияты, б.а. мыйзам үстөмдүгүнө баш ийбегендиги жана адам укуктарына сый мамиле жасалбагандыгы. Бул факторлор адам укуктарына туздөн түз таасирин тийгизет, себеби бул укуктардын маңызы эң аярлуу болгон жана маргиналдашып калган адамдарды коргоого багытталып, коррупциянын бар болушу жана анын терс кесепеттери аярлуу катмарга кирген адамдарды социалдык колдоо, саламаттык сактоо менен билим берүү сымал негизги мамлекеттик кызматтардан жана укук коргоо органдарга, сотторго жана адвокаттарга болгон жеткиликтүулүк сыяктуу юридикалык кызматтардан ажыратып, ошол адамдарга өз залалын тийгизүүдө.[26]   Коррупция Мурунку Советтер Союзуна кирген башка мамлекеттердей эле, Кыргызстан акыркы 20 жылдын ичинде дүйнө жүзү боюнча эң эле коррупцияланган өлкө болгон.[27] Коррупцияга каршы көптөгөн мыйзамдар жана демилгелер кабыл алынганына карабастан, бул терс жагдай дагы деле токтобой созулуп келе жатат.[28] Глобалдык атаандаштыкка жөндөмдүүлүгүнүн индексинде (Global Competitiveness Index) Кыргызстан 100 баллдык система боюнча 29 баллдын көрсөткүчүнө ээ болуу менен, мамлекеттин жалпы өнүгүшүндө негизги жана эң эле татаал маселеси болуп коррупция таанылып, жогоруда айтылгандай мыйзам үстөмдүгүн камсыздоодо дагы негизги жолтоо катары паракорчулук эсептелүүдө.[29]   Кыргыз эли коррупциянын кесепеттүү таасирин өзу эле түшүнүп,  буга каршы чараны көрүүгө далалатын ишке ашырууда. Өкмөттүн ишмердүүлүгү тууралуу суроого жооп бергенде, маанилүүлүгү боюнча саламаттык сактоо (67%) жааты менен  экономикадан(52%) кийин эле коррупция (47%) маселесин үчүнчү орунга жайгаштырган.[30] Коррупция менен уюшкан кылмыштуулукту баяндоо долбоору (OCCRP) 2019-жылы июнь айында Кыргызстандагы бажы кызматкерлери өлкөдөн 700 миллион АКШ доллар каражаттарын кандай жол менен чыгарып кеткенин баяндаган “Борбордук Азиядагы тоноочулук жана жан тартуучулук” аттуу отчетун жарыялагандан кийин эл көчөгө нааразылык акцияларына чыгып, бул иштерге шектелгендерди жоопко тартуу талаптарын билдирген.[31] 2020-жылы октябрда OCCRP долбоору коррупция тууралуу “Матраимовдун падышалыгы” деп аталган дагы бир катар иликтөөлөрүн жарыялап, дал октябрда өтө турчу парламенттик шайлоолордун алдында коомчулукту катуу дүрбөтүп, бул шайлоолор өз алдынча добуштарды сатып алуу боюнча олуттуу шектер менен мүнөздөлгөн.[32] Коррупцияга жана Бишкектеги башка саясий окуяларга каршы нааразычылык акциялары мамлекеттин борбор калаасында эмдигиче уланып келүүдө.[33]   Билим берүү, саламаттык сактоо, шаардык коммуналдык чарбачылык сыяктуу коомчулуктун бардык тармактарында коррупциянын сиңип калган мезгилинде сот адилеттүүлүк тармагындагы паракорчулук адам укуктарынын сакталышына жана корголушуна эң чоң залалын тийгизүүдө. Өкмөт адам укуктар жаатында өз мойнуна алган эл аралык милдеттерин аткарууга жана аларды коргоого жөндөмдүү болуп, айыпталуучулар мамлекеттик же мамлекттик эмес субъекттер болгонуна карабай күнөлүүлөрдү жоопко тартуу үчүн бар болгон мыйзам-укуктук системасына ишенүүсү зарыл.   Мыйзам-укуктук системасы биринчиден өкмөт үчүн соттук процесстин баштапкы баскычтарында натыйжалуу тергөө иштерин жүргүзүүгө шарт түзуп бериши керек. Экинчиден, прокурорлор ишти сотко жөнөтүү үчүн ишенимдүү жана жетиштүү түрдө болгон далилдердин базасына ээ болгон тергөө иштерин жүргүзүшү керек. Үчүнчүдөн, юридикалык жактан негизделген жана калыс чечимдерди чыгаруу максатында компетенттүү, адилеттүү жана эч бир тарапка жан тартпаган угууларды камсыз кылуу үчүн соттор адилеттүү соттук териштирүүнүн стандарттарын сакташы керек.   Иш-жүзүндө паракорчулуктун түйшүктүү кесепеттери жогоруда белгиленген юридикалык процесстин баскычтарында отчеттуулукка жетүүнү өтө татаал жана көйгөйлүү маселеге айлантат. Коррупциянын айынан укук коргоо органдары өздөрүнүн пайдасыздыгы, кесипкөй эместиги, милдеттеринен кыянаттык менен пайдалануусу жана алсыздыгы менен белгилүү болушкан. Эл өзүнүн туугандарын жергиликтүү эле уруулар менен байланыштуу болгон трайбализмдин жергиликтүү маданияты “жумуштун натыйжасыз аткарылышына алып келген жактоочулукка жана кесипкөй эмес жүрүм-турумга” алып келүүдө.[34] Кээ бир жергиликтүү милиционерлер жергиликтүү бийликтеги кызматкерлердин таасиринин алдында болуп, иш тергөө процесси жүрүп жаткан маалда жан тартпоо милдетин аткарылышынын алдында алсыз болуп калууда.[35]  Бир жагынан бардык тармактарга сиңген коррупцияадан улам, экинчи жагынан төмөндө талкуулануучу укуктук маданияттын айынан зомбулукка кабылгандар милиция кызматкерлерине арыздарын каттоого алдырышы дагы көп учурларда кыйнчылыкка жаткан. Мисалы, 2019-жылы үй-булөдөгү кол көтөрүүлөрдүн 9000 учуру катталган. Бунун ичинен 5 456 учуру бийлик тарабынан административдик иштер катары катталса, 784 учур боюнча гана кылмыш иштери козголгон.[36] Укук коргоо органдарындагы паракорлук коррупциянын бир түрү катары тергөө иши менен кылмыш куугунтуктоодон качып кутулуу максатында элдин арасында кеңири кезиккен кубулуш болуп эсептелет.[37]  Респонденттер же алардын бир туугандары мурунку жылы милиция кызматкерлерине байланышканда пара берди беле деген суроого 61 пайызы “ооба” деген жоопту берип,бул кырдаал милиция кызматкерлерине пара берүүсү кадымкидей практикага айланганын ачык айкын көрсөттү.[38] Паракордук менен коррупцияга тыюу салган мыйзамдар иштелип чыгарылса дагы, мыйзамдар негизинен көргөзмө мүнөзгө ээ болуп, бул мыйзамдардын иш-жүзөгө ашырылышы тууралуу иштелген толук кандуу механизмдери даярдалган эмес.[39]   Айыпталуучулар укук коргоо органдары тарабынан негизсиз камакка алуу, кыйноо жана кылмыш куугунтугуна кабылган коркутуулары аркылуу опузаланган учурлары дагы кеңири жайылган кубулуш болуп эсептелет.[40] Мисалы, милиция ЛГБТ-коомчулуктун өкүлдөрүнөн жана маргиналдашып калган адамдардан акча өндүрүү максатында аларды куугунтукташат. Human Rights Watch эл аралык укук коргоо уюмунун отчетуна караганда, милиция кызматкерлери гейлерди кыйнашып, алардан акча опузалоо менен кызматкерлердин үстүнөн эч кандай доо-арыздын түшпөстүгүн камсыздоо үчүн коркутуу-үркүтүүгө алышкан.[41] Мындай учурлардан жабыр тарткандардан бири, Михаил Кудряшов мыйзам-укуктук негизде коргоону талап кылганда, сот анын ишин тергөөдөн баш тартып, аны менен жазасыздыктын маданиятын өрчүшунө жана отчеттуулуктун тартибин бузууга жол берген.[42]   Мындан сырткары, сотторго иш түшкөндө коррупциядан пайда көрүүгө эч кандай мүмкүнчүлүк жок, себеби соттун чечимдерине байланыштуу акчалай төлөмдөр дүйнө жузү боюнча эң жогору болуп саналат.[43] Соттук системадагы кызматкерлердин төмөн айлык акыларынын жана соттордун дайындалышы саясатташып калгандыгынын айынан соттор жана соттук система коррупция маселесинин алдында алсыз болуп калууда.[44]  2010-жылы Сотторду тандоо боюнча жаңы Кеңеш түзүлүп, Президент менен Парламент тарабынан дайындалчу жергиликтүү, Жогорку жана Конституциялык сотуна талапкерлерди тандоо милдети жүктөлгөн. Кеңештин курамына аткаруу бийликтин өкүлдөрү кирбесе дагы, Кеңештин үчтөн эки бөлүгү парламенттеги саясий партиялардын мүчөлөрүнөн туруп, сотторду дайындоо процесси саясий таасирге байланып калуу коркунучу пайда болгон.[45] Сот бийлиги ошондой эле бийликтин аткаруу бутагынан көз каранды, анткени аткаруу бийлиги бюджеттин бөлүштүрүлүшүнө жооптуу болот.[46]   Сот адилеттүүлүктүн системасында коррупцияны жокко чыгаруу жана реформаларды иш-жүзүнө ашыруу боюнча көптөгөн аракеттер жасалган, бирок чектелген эле жыйынтыкка келе алышкан. 2019-жылы Кыргызстандын өкмөтү донорлордун колдоосу менен жергиликтүү мыйзамдарга бир катар өзгөртүүлөрдү кабыл алып, “репрессивдүү ыкмаларды” жоюу аракетинде жана адам укуктарын дагы да жакшыраак корголушун камсыздоо максатында “жаңы ыкмаларды” иштеп чыгуу далалатын жасаган.[47] Өткөрүлгөн реформалар төмөнкүдөгүдөй багыттарда аткарылган: тергөө иштерин жүргүзүу боюнча ыйгарым укуктарды прокуратурадан сотторго өткөрүп берүү, тергөөчү соттун кызматын негиздөө, сот жараяндардын залдарына жана тергөө бөлмөлөрүнө санариптештирүү менен пробациянын жаңы системасын киргизүү менен бирдиктүү реестрди түзүү.[48] Жакшы жакты көздөй көрүнүктүү өзгөрүүлөрдүн орун алгандыгы тууралуу бир нерсе айтууга азырынча абдан эле эрте.   Чет өлкөлүк донорлор тарабынан колдоо көрсөтүлүп келген башка демилгелерге Европа Биримдигинин мыйзам үстөмдүгүнүн камсыздалышына бөлүнгөн 12,2 миллион евро каражаттарын камтыган программалар кирип, алар иш-жүзүнө 2014-жылдан тарта ашырылып келе жатат. Бул программалар “коррупция менен күрөшүүгө жана сот түзүмдөрүнө ишенимди бекемдеп, ачык-айкындыкты камсыздоо аркылуу соттук администрациясынын натыйжалуулугун” жогорулатууга багытталган.[49] Америка Кошмо Штаттардын эл аралык өнүгүү боюнча агенттиги (USIAD) акыркы жылдырдын ичинде Кыргызстандын соттук системасын колдоо боюнча көптөгөн программаларды ишке ашырып, финансылык жактан дагы колдоо көрсөткөн.[50] Мисалы, 2008-2010 жылдары USAID 16 миллион АКШ долларлык Миң жылдык чакырыктардын Корпорациясынын Босого программасын иш жүзүнө ашырып, бул программа соттук системасындагы реформаларды кубаттап, ошондой эле коррупцияга каршы күрөштү жүргүзүү үчүн прокуратура органдарына өзгөртүүлөрдүн киргизилишине колдоо көрсөткөн.[51] Мыйзамдуулукту өнүктүрүү боюнча эл аралык уюму (IDLO-International Development Law Organization) аркылуу электрондук түрдө жүргүзүлгөн сот адилеттүүлүгүнүн программасы ЮСАИД уюму каржылаган демилгелеринин бири болуп, www.sot.kg деген жалпы улуттук порталын түзүүгө өбөлгө түзгөн. Бул портал коомчулукка бардык соттук чечимдердин жеткиликтүүлүгүн санариптештирүү жол аркылуу камсыздоо максатында түзулгөн.[52] ЮСАИД каржылаган эң акыркы долбоору 3,2 миллион АКШ долларга бааланган программа болуп, ал “Соттук системасына бийликтин көз карандысыз бир бутагы катары коомчулуктун ишенимин жаратуусуна” багытталган.[53] Мындай демилгелердин баардыгы керек болуп турса дагы, алар ар дайым эле туруктуу боло бербейт жана гранттарга бөлүнгөн каражаттар түгөнгөн соң толук кандуу ишке ашырылбай калат. Жыйынтыгында, жергиликтүү өкмөт узак-мөөнөттүү өзгөртүүлөрдү киргизүү үчүн эч кандай жоопкерчиликти мойнуна албаганынан белги берет.   Саясий эрктин жоктугу Адам укуктарынын начар сакталганынын экинчи фактору болуп саясий эрктин жок болгондугу эсептелип, бул чечүүчү кызматтарда иштегендердин адам укуктарынын сакталышы боюнча саясий чечимдерди түшүнбөгүндүгүндө, иш жүзүндө укуктарды коргобогондугу менен ишке ашырылгандыгын камсыздабаганында билинет.[54] Кыргызстандын мурунку президенттери, Акаев, Бакиев, Атамбаев, Жээнбеков жана алардын администрациялары керектүү болгон саясий эркине ээ болбой, адам укуктарынын жетиштүү деңгээлде сакталышын камсыздоо максатында керектелген реформаларды жүргүзө алган эмес. Саясий эрктин жоктугунун себептери көп түрдүү жана татаал келет, бирок булардын арасынан коррупция, жеке максаттарды көздөп кызматынан кыянаттык менен пайдалануу, кылмыш дүйнө менен болгон байланыштар жана коррупцияланган жеке пландары бул себептердин тизмегинде алгачкы орундарды ээлегендей.   Кыргызстандын алгачкы президенти, Аскар Акаев мыйзам үстөмдүгүнө эбегейсиз маани берилген жаңы демократиялык жана көз карандысыз мамлекетти куруу боюнча амбициялык пландарын ачык элдин алдында билдирип жаткан маалда, анын мамлекетти башкарып турган мезгили адам укуктарынын жаатындагы программалардын, пландардын, жүргүзгөн саясаттын, каржылоонун жана көрсөтүлгөн колдоонун чектелген даражасы менен мүнөздөлгөн. Аймактардын губернаторлук маанилуү кызматтарында “эски гвардиясын” сактап калууга жана бийликтин башка жогорку эшелондорун тыгыз тууган-уруктук байланыштар менен толтурууга багытталган Акаевдин кадрдык саясаты реформаларга жолтоо болгон, себеби бул жетекчилер аймактарда жаңы саясатты түшүнбөй иш жүзүндө жүргүзүшкөн эмес. Аны менен Акаевдин администрациясынын реформаларга болгон бектиги ийгиликсиздикке дуушар болоору кепилденген.[55]   Бакиев бийликке келеери менен анын үй-бүлөсү жана туугандары бийликти басып алуу, кылмыштуулук менен күрөш жүргүзүү жана кирешелүү контракттар менен бизнести тартып алуу менен алек болуп баштаганда, адам укуктардын жаатындагы күн тартиби экинчи иретте туруп калган. Андан кийинки эки президент Атамбаев менен Жээнбеков ошого окшогон эле жолду басып, алардын администрациялары конкреттүү маселелерди чечүү үчүн керектелген саясий чечимдер тууралуу эч кандай түшүнүк менен ойлорго ээ болбой, кандайдыр бир реформаларды жүргүзүүгө эч кандай умтулуулары жоктой эле.[56] Жогоруда айтылгандай жасалган мамиле албетте реформаларды жүргүзүү процессин бузуп, коомчулукка багытталган негизги мыйзам үстөмдүгүн камсыздоого керек болгон саясий эрктин жок болгондугун ачык эле чагылдырган.   Элдин “укуктук менталитети” - жазасыздыктын маданияты жана элдин мыйзам үстөмдүгүнө баш ийбегендиги Адам укуктарынын сакталбаганына себеп болгон үчүнчү фактор катары элдин “укуктук менталитетин” айтууга мүмкүн, б.а.  жазасыздыктын маданияты жана мыйзам үстөмдүгүнө баш ийбегендиги менен анын түшүнүгү тууралуу кабардардыктын төмөнкү деңгээли.[57] Эгерде эл адам укуктарын коргогон мыйзамдарга ишенбесе, алардын күчүнөн күмөн санаса жана аларды бузганы үчүн эч кандай жоопкерчилик көрүлгөн эмес деген ойдо болсо, албетте адам укуктарынын сакталышын камсыздаган мыйзамдар иш жүзүндө иштебей, ал мыйзамдар аткарылбаган бойдон калат. Натыйжада, элдин мындай ойлору кайдыгер мамилени жаратып, жарандар менен мамлекеттик кызматкерлердин дагы мыйзамдын бузулушу норма катары эсептелген жүрүм-турумдарына алып келет.   Мыйзам үстөмдүгүнүн маданияты иш-жүзүндө татаал жана көп тараптуу түшүнүк болгондуктан, бул тема боюнча көптөгөн кенен маалымат булактары, адабияттар жана нускамалар бар.[58] Кыргызстандагы мыйзам үстөмдүгүнө сый мамиленин төмөңкү деңгээли советтердин доорунда түптөлүп, ал кезде ачык-айкындык, тең укуктуулук жана отчеттуулук адаттан тыш көрүнүш катары эсептелип, маанилүү иштерди “телефон аркылуу” чечүү жолу норма катары кабыл алынган.[59] Кыргызстандын учурдагы шарттарында адвокаттар (соттор менен прокурорлор азыраак) сот залында же анын тышында коомчулуктун мүчөлөрүнүн кол салууларына кабылышып, мындай аггрессиянын себеби алар коргоп жаткан кишилерге байланып калуу менен юридикалык кесиптин ролун түшүнбөгөндүгү, мындай жоруктарга жоопкерчиликтин жана кесепеттеринин жок болгондугу болууда.[60] Ошондой эле, гендердик зомбулуктун курмандыктары бир гана аларга зомбулук көрсөткөн туугандарынын тарабынан куугунтуктоого алынбастан, аларга кеңири коомчулуктун башка мүчөлөрү менен прокурорлор жана укук коргоо органдары дагы кошулуп, мындай кубулуш зомбулуктан жабыр тарткандар мыйзамдарды билбегендиктен жана кеңири таралган аялдарды жаман көрүүчүлүк менен гендердик белги боюнча басмырлоодон улам орун алып жатат.[61]   Мындай укуктук менталитетти мыйзам үстөмдүгүнүн пайдасына буруп, өзгөртүү үчүн коомчулукта керектүү өзгөрүүлөрдү киргизүүгө каалоосу бар болушу керек – бул өкмөткө да жарандык коомго да тиешелүү.[62] 2016-жылы Кыргызстандын өкмөтү бул маселени түшүнгөндөй болуп, 2016-2020 жылдарга Кыргыз Республикасынын калкынын укуктук маданиятын жогорулатуу концепциясы жөнүндө токтомун кабыл алган.[63] Бул концепция “заманбап укуктук маданият менен адатты түзүүнү, укуктук даярдыкты жана калкты маалымдоону камтыган укуктук маданиятты жогорулатууга системалык ыкманы колдонууга киргизүүгө” багытталган.[64] Бул концепция иш аракеттердин планын жана максаттардын тобун аныктап, бул максаттарга жетүү үчүн коомчулуктун кабардарлыгын жогорулатуу, мыйзамдардын сакталышынын маанилүүлүгүн жаш муунга жеткирип берүү максатында бул тармакта билим берүү демилгелерин түзүү чоң мааниге жатып, бул демилгелерди ишке ашырылганын камсыздоодо ылайыктуу коомдук кампанияларды түзүү максатында жергиликтүү ЖМКлар менен иштеп жана мамлекеттик органдар менен иштерди бир ыраатта жүргүзүлүшү маанилүү болгон.  Концепциянын алкагындагы мындай иш аракеттердин планындагы бир мисал катары “тилектештиктин автобусу” деген демилгесин кароого мүмкүн. Бул демилгенин алкагында жергиликтүү юристтердин бир тобу акысыз юридикалык кызматтарын көрсөтүү максатында Ош менен Чүй облустарынын алыскы булуң бурчтарында жайгашкан айылдарга барышкан. 2016-2017 жылдары жалпы жонунан 4145 кишиге кызматтарын көрсөтсө, 2020-жылы бул көрсөткүч 4000 барабар болгон.[65]   Бул максаттарга жетүү үчүн башка маалыматтык-пропагандалык кампаниялар жүргүзүлгөн.  Жогоруда белгиленген Миң жылдыктын чакырыктарынын Корпорациясынын коррупцияга каршы Босого программасы 2008-жылы өлкөгө, анын коомчулуктарына жана үй-бүлөлөргө туура келбеген жана жакшы жүрүм-турум катары эсептелбеген калп айтуучулукту жана жалганчылыкты терс сапаттар катары көрсөткөн адамдык баалуулуктарын баса белгилеп чагылдырган балдар үчүн мультфильмдерди жараткан.[66] Ошондой эле, укуктук менталитетти өстүрүү жана жазасыздыктын маданиятын жоюу максатында 2014-жылы жогорудагыларга окшогон коомчулуктун кабардарлыгын жогорулатуу кампаниялары, сынактар, көркөм көргөзмөлөр менен ар турдүү программалар уюштурулган.[67] Ушундай сыяктуу индивидуалдуу программалар жана иш аракеттер ошол убакта ийгликтүү болсо дагы, мындай аракеттердин туруктуулугу жана бул аракеттер өз ичинде камтыган кабардын ырааттуулугу жетишсиз болгон. Бардык кызыкдар болгон жактар тарабынан керектүү колдоо көрсөтүлбөстөн, жергиликтүү укуктук маданиятында көрүнүктүү өзгөрүүлөрдүн ишке ашырылышына көптөгөн жылдар керектелип калышы ыктымал. Бийликке келген жаңы администрация бул көйгөйдү чечилиши зарыл болгон маселе катары көрөрү же көрбөөсү ачык суроо бойдон турат.   Тыянактар жана сунуштамалар Кыргызстандын алдыга кетүү жолу татаал болуп турат, ошондуктан мыйзам үстөмдүгүнүн сакталышына (аны менен адам укуктарынын дагы сакталышы) жана чыныгы олуттуу реформаларды жүргүзүүгө орчундуу далалаты жасала турган болсо, ал учурда чындап кыйын тандоону жана туура уюштурулган аракеттерди жасоого туура келет. Андай болсо да, чечимди кабыл алуу менен Кыргызстан маанилүү кадамын жасоо алдында турат, анткени мыйзам үстөмдүгү өлкөнү өркүндөп өсүүгө жана эл аралык коомчулук менен интеграциясына алып келет. Бардык жерлерде токтобой, кезигип жаткан коррупция туруксуздукка жана тукулжуроого алып келүүдө. Саясий туруксуздукту да эске алуу менен Кыргызстан үчүн сезилээр реформаларды жүргүзүүгө дагы деле кеч эмес. Бирок, бул реформалардын жүргүзулүшү канчалыкка чоюлуп, артка жыла берсе, ошончолук алардын ишке ашырылышын аяктоо кыйын болот. Кыргызстандагы мыйзам үстөмдүгүнүн төмөн деңгээлин эсепке алуу менен, учурда өмүр сүрүп жаткан системалар бир маалда узак-мөөнөттүү реформаларды талап кылган белгисиздик менен сыздоого чыдабай кетиши мүмкүн. Кыргызстандагы адам укуктарынын жаатындагы абалды жакшыртуу максатында бардык кызыкдар болгон тараптар төмөнкүлөрдү аткаруу менен өздөрүнүн салымын кошуусу мүмкүн:
  • Кыргызстандын өкмөтү адам укуктарына негизделген мамилесин колдонуп, өзүнүн ички саясатын жүргүзүүдө күн тартибинде башкы артыкчылык адам укуктарынын жаатына берүү менен өкмөт бул жаатка маани бергендигин көрсөтүүсү зарыл;
  • Кыргызстандын өкмөтү адам укуктардын жаатында мойнуна алган эл аралык милдеттенмелерин аткарып, коргоп жана сый мамиле жасоого милдеттүү; бул талаптардын аткарылбагандыгы финансылык жана техникалык жардамды алуу шарттарынын бузулушуна алып келиши мүмкүн;
  • Кыргызстандын өкмөтү мыйзам үстөмдүгүн бекемдөөдө, коррупцияга каршы күрөштү жүргүзүүдө чыныгы берилгендигин чагылдырып, саясий эркин көрсөтүүгө тийиш;
  • Кыргызстандын өкмөтү укуктук менталитетти өнүктүрүү жана калкты укуктук нормаларга сый мамиле жасалышы менен мыйзам үстөмдүгүнүн маанилүүлүгү боюнча кабардарлыгын өстүрүү боюнча иш аракеттерин улантуусу зарыл;
  • Жергиликтүү жарандык коом адам укуктардын жаатындагы абалга көзөмөл жүргүзүүсү керектелип, ар бир орун алган бузуулар жөнүндө кабар берип, жериликтүү да эл аралык деңгээлде да абалдан кабардарлыгын жогорулатуу;
  • Ошондой эле, кесипкөй укуктары менен кызыкчылыктарынын корголушу жөнүндө сөз болгондо, жарандык коом көбүрөөк биримдикте болуп, тилектештик маанайды сактоого тийиш, мисалы юристтер, журналисттер, азчылыктар жана маргиналдашып калгандар тууралуу кеп жүргөндө;
  • Эл аралык коомчулук колунда болгон баардык таасирдүү баскычтарын колдонуп, адам укуктары менен мыйзам үстөмдүгүнүн жаатындагы күн тартибинин тизмеге киргизилүүсүн камсыздаган шарттарды коюу менен потенциалдуу насыялар же финансылык жардамдын программалары боюнча сүйлөшүүлөр жүргүзүлгөндө, адам укуктарынын маанилүүлүгү бийликтин жергиликтүү органдары тарабынан эске алынуусу тийиш; жана
  • Реформаларды жүргүзүү жана жакшы жакка карай өзгөртүүлөрдү киргизүү үчүн жергиликтүү коомчулуктардын мүмкүнчүлүктөрүн кеңейтип, жарандык коомдун уюмдарына жана укук коргоочуларга колдоо көрсөтүү аркылуу эл аралык коомчулук менен донорлор талапка ылайык жардамды берүүлөрүн улантуулары зарыл.
  Эсквайэр, Жасмин Кэмерон, Кыргызстанда төрөлүп, АКШда билим алган адам укуктарын коргоо боюнча юристи. Жасмин узак убакыттан бери АКШнын Өкмөтүнө жана бейөкмөт уюмдарга иштеп, көптөгөн жылдар бою чет өлкөдө жашап келет. Европа менен Евразия аймактарында адам укуктары менен мыйзам үстөмдүгү боюнча программаларды иш жүзүнө ашырып жүргөн.   Сүрөт Швейцариядагы Кыргыз Республикасынын өкүлчүлүгү тарабынан камсыздалган.     [1] Борбордук разведка жүргузүү башкармалыгы: Факттардын бүткүл дүйнөлүк китеби, Кыргызстан, Факттардын бүткүл дүйнөлүк китеби, CIA.gov, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/kyrgyzstan/ [2] Ошол эле жакта. [3] The Frontline World, Кыргызстан, Алып качкан колукту, (похищенная невеста), PBS, март 2004, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/kyrgyzstan/facts.html [4]Адам укуктары боюнча БУУнун Жогорку комиссарынын Башкармалыгы (БУУ АУЖКБ) OHCHR, Өлкөлөр же келишимдер боюнча жүргүзүлгөн ратификациялардын статусун көзөмөлдөө, Кыргызстандын ратификациясынын статусу, БУУнун Адам укуктары боюнча келишимдердин аткарылышын байкоого алган органдары, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=93&Lang=EN. 1994-жылы Кыргызстан Жарандык жана саясий укуктары боюнча эл аралык пактты, Экономикалык, социалдык жана маданий укуктар боюнча эл аралык пактты жана Балдардын укугу боюнча конвенцияны ратификациялаган. 1997-жылы болсо Кыргызстан кыйноолорго каршы Конвенциясына жана жазалоо менен катаал мамиленин, мыкаачылыктын жана кемсинтүүнүн жана башка түрлөрүнө каршы болгон келишимдерге кошулган. Алардын арасында Аялдарга карата жасалаган басмырлоонун бардык түрлөрүн жоюу Конвенциясына жана Расалык басмырлоонун бардык түрлөрүн жоюу боюнча эл аралык Конвенцияга кол койгон. 2003-жылы болсо Кыргызстан эмгектенген бардык миграттардын жана алардын үй-бүлө мүчөлөрүнүн укуктарын коргогон Конвенцияга кошулган. Ал эми жакын арада эле, 2019-жылы Кыргызстан Майыптардын укуктары боюнча Конвенцияга кошулган. [5] Ошол эле жакта. Ошондой эле, Дүйнөлүк соода уюмунун сайтына кайрылыңыз, Кыргыз Республикасы Дүйнөлүк соода уюмунун мүчөлүгүнө кирди, октябрь 1998, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres98_e/pr114_e.htm; ошондой эле, БУУнун  Туруктуу өнүгүү боюнча билимдердин платформасы, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26459VNR_2020_Kyrgyzstan_Report_English.pdf [6] Freedom House, Дүйнө жүзү боюнча эркиндиктин 2020-жылкы отчету,  http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/kyrgyzstan/facts.html [7] Transparency International, Жылдык отчет, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kyrgyzstan. Ошондой эле, бул уюм мамлекетибизди 100 баллдык система боюнча (0 балл – коррупциясы жогорку деңгээлде болгон өлкөлөр, 100 балл – коррупциядан таптаза болгон өлкөлөр) 31 баллга баамдап, 2012-жылы Кыргызстан 154 баллга ээ болгонун эскертүү менен бул көрсөткүчтү (31 балл) мурунку жылдардагы абалга караганда, бираз да болсо алдыга жылыш болду деп эсептөөгө мүмкүн. [8] Адилеттүүлүк боюнча дүйнөлүк долбоор (World Justice Project –WJP), 2020-жылдын Мыйзам үстөмдүгүнүн индекси, https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2020; Дүйнөлүк экономикалык форумдун 2019-жылга караштуу Глобалдык атаандыштыкка жөндөмдүулүктүн индекси, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/kyrgyzstan/facts.html; Human Rights Watch, Кыргызстан, 2021-жыл боюнча Бүткүл дүйнөлүк отчет, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan;  Amnesty International, Кыргызстан, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/kyrgyzstan/report-kyrgyzstan/ [9] Реджина А. Спектор,  Кыргызстандын президентинин, Аскар Акаевдин өзгөрүшү, Калифорния университети, Беркли, Spring 2004, https://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/2004_02-spec.pdf [10] RFE/RL, Борбордук Азия боюнча отчет: 22-август, 2002,  RFE/RL, август 2002, https://www.rferl.org/a/1342268.html [11] Эл аралык кризистик тобу, Төңкөрүштөн кийинки Кыргызстан, май 2005, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/09/29/icg_05042005.pdf [12] BBC Жаңылыктары, Кыргызстандын парламентинин өкүлү Бишкекте атылып өлтүрүлдү, май 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4759301.stm; BBC Жаңылыктары, Коррупцияга каршы кыргыздардын митинги, апрель 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4958146.stm [13] Сатина Айдар,  Кыргызстандын мурунку президенти, Алмазбек Атамбаевдин мезгилиндеги элиталардын арасындагы болжолдонгон коррупция тууралуу биз эмнелерди билебиз, октябрь 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/what-we-know-about-alleged-elite-corruption-under-former-kyrgyz-president-almazbek-atambayev/ [14] Владимир Пирогов,  Кыргызстандын оппозициясы бийликке аттанганынан улам мамлекеттик төңкөрүшү күч алууда, “Сидней морнинг геральд” (The Sydney Morning Herald), октябрь 2020, https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/coup-d-etat-under-way-as-kyrgyzstan-opposition-claims-power-20201006-p562lo.html [15] Human Rights Watch, Кыргызстан: 2019-жылдын окуялары, (HRW 2019-жылкы отчету), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan; ошондой эле, Кыргызстан боюнча Amnesty International кайрылыңыз, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/kyrgyzstan/report-kyrgyzstan/; Журналистти коргоо боюнча комитетин дагы караңыз: Кыргызстан  2020, https://cpj.org/europe/kyrgyzstan/2020/; адам укуктардын коргоочуларынын тегерегиндеги абалы тууралуу маалыматты Frontline Defenders уюмунун Кыргызстан боюнча даярдаган материалдардан ала аласыздар, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/kyrgyzstan; юристтердин тегерегиндеги болгон абалы тууралуу маалыматты “Адилет” юридикалык клиникасынын юристтер боюнча дайындаган отчетунан ала аласыздар,  http://www.adilet.kg/en/news/full/415; жана Кыргызстандын адвокаттарынын ассоциациясынын Кыргызстандын президентине адвокаттарга кол салуунун коркунучтуу тенденциялары тууралуу узаткан ачык катына да көңүл буруңуздар, www.advokatura.kg/foto/obrashchenie-k-prezidentu-kyrgyzskoy-respubliki; Азаттык радиосу, Ош: Адвокаттын сөзүнө караганда, ага үчүнчү тараптар аңдуу жүргүзүп, сүйлөшүулөрү тыңшалган. Ноябрь, 2020, https://www.azattyk.org/a/30966296.html [16] Human Rights Watch, Кыргызстан: 2019-жылдын окуялары, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan [17] БУУ Аялдар, Кыргызстан, https://eca.unwomen.org/en/where-we-are/kyrgyzstan; Адвокаттардын Америкалык Ассоциациясы, Адам укуктары боюнча борбору: Кыргызстандагы аялдарга көрсөтүлгөн зомбулук: сот адилеттүүлүгүнүн жеткиликтүүлүгүнө, сот тергөөсүнүн адилеттүү жүргүзүлүшүнө болгон укуктарга жана тынч жыйындарды өткөрүүгө тоскоолдуктар, декабрь 2020, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/reports/violence-against-women-in-kyrgyzstan--barriers-to-accessing-just/;  ; Адвокаттардын Америкалык Ассоциациясы, Адам укуктары боюнча борбору,Сот ишине жүргүзүлгөн байкоо боюнча отчет: Кыргызстан жана Гульжан Пасанова, май 2020, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/reports/kyrgyzstan_vs_Gulzhan_Pasanova1/ [18] Гульмира Казакунова,  Кыргызстандын социалдык коргоо боюнча программалары жана чаралары, БУУ, июнь 2018, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/06/3-1.pdf [19] Amnesty International, Мүмкүнчүлүгү чектелген адамдардын укуктары жөнүндө Конвенциясы ратификациялангандан бир жыл өткөн соң, март 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2020/03/one-year-after-crpd-ratification-in-kyrgyzstan/ [20] Азчылыктардын укуктары боюнча эл аралык тобу, Кыргызстан, https://minorityrights.org/country/kyrgyzstan/. Системалык репрессиялардын, массалык өлтүрүүлөрдүн жана геноциддин потенциалдуу коркунучтарына дуушар болгон жамаатарды аныктаган коркунучтун алдында жашаган элдердин индекси боюнча Кыргызстан 2020-жылы 55-орунду ээлеген. [21] Human rights Watch, Кыргызстан: Укук коргоочу үчүн “адилеттүү сотко” пародия,https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/24/kyrgyzstan-travesty-justice-rights-defender [22] Журналисттерди коргоо боюнча комитет, Азимжан Аскаров, https://cpj.org/campaigns/azimjon-askarov/; Адам укуктары боюнча БУУнун Жогорку комиссарынын Башкармалыгы| БУУнун Адам укуктары боюнча серепчилери Кыргызстанды Азимжан Асксаровду түрмөдөн бошотуу менен анын өкүмүн жокко чыгарууга чакырып жатат, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19853&LangID=E; ошондой эле БУУнун адам укуктары боюнча Комитетинин чыгарган чечимин төмөнкү шилтеме аркылуу өтүп көрө аласыздар https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/116/D/2231/2012&Lang=en ; АКШнын Мамлекеттик департаменти, Foro Penal укук коргоо уюму жана Азимжан Аскаровго 2014-жылдын  “Адам укуктарынын коргоочусу” сыйлыгын тапшыруу жөрөлгөсү, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244903.htm; Human Rights Watch, Азимжан Аскаровдун Кыргызстанда камалганы тууралуу билдирип, биргеликте жазылып БУУга жиберилген кат, ноябрь 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/06/joint-letter-eu-detention-azimjon-askarov-kyrgyzstan [23] Ольга Долженкова жана Александра Василькова, Кыргызстандагы кыйноолордун тарыхы: “Өзүңдү сактап калуу үчүн самбонун ыкмасын колдонгон”, КАБАР, июль 2020, https://longreads.cabar.asia/the-history-of-torture-in-kyrgyzstan [24] АКШнын мамлекеттик департаменти, 2019-жылдын Адам укуктардын жаатындагы жүргүзүлгөн практика боюнча өлкөлөрдүн даярдаган баяндамалар: Кыргыз Республикасы (DOS 2019 HRPR), https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/kyrgyzstan/ [25] Кыргызстан, БУУнун Универсалдык мезгилдүү серебине биргеликте дайындалып берилген отчет: Коомчулуктагы адам укуктарынын бузулушу, ЛГБТ,  https://ilga.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Shadow-report-15.pdf; Human rights Watch, 2019-жылкы Дүйнөлүк отчет, Кыргызстан, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan [26] Люси Кехлин жана Магдалена Сепульведа Кармон, Коррупция жана адам укуктары: өз ара байланышты изилдөө. [27] Роберт Легволд, Коррупция, Глобалдык коопсуздук жана дүйнөлүк тартип, Коррупция, криминалдашкан мамлекет жана пост-советтик өткөөл заманы. [28] Экономикалык кызматташуу жана өнүктүрүү боюнча уюму (OECD-ЭКӨУ), Кыргызстан, Кыргызстандагы коррупцияга каршы реформалар, март 2015, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Kyrgyzstan-Round-3-Monitoring-Report-ENG.pdf [29] Экономикалык кызматташуу жана өнүктүрүү боюнча уюму (OECD-ЭКӨУ), Кыргызстандагы коррупцияга каршы долбоор,  http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/kyrgyzstananti-corruptionproject.htm [30]  Transparency International, Коррупциянын барометри, Кыргызстан боюнча жылдык отчет, 2016 https://www.transparency.kg/files/AnnualReport2016.pdf [31] Коррупция менен уюшкан кылмыштуулукту баяндоо долбоору (OCCRP), Борбордук Азиядагы тоноочулук жана жан тартуучулук, ноябрь 2019, https://www.occrp.org/en/plunder-and-patronage/; АКШ жаңылыктары, Дүйнөлүк жаңылыктары, US News, World News, Кыргызстандагы коррупция боюнча дайындалган отчету боюнча жүздөгөн кишилер нааразылык акцияларына чыгууда, ноябрь 2019, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2019-11-25/hundreds-protest-over-kyrgyz-corruption-report [32] Коррупция менен уюшкан кылмыштуулукту баяндоо долбоору (OCCPR), Матраимовдун падышалыгы, октябрь 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/the-matraimov-kingdom/; ошондой эле, ЕККУ, Демократиялык институттар менен адам укуктары боюнча башкармалыгы, Кыргызстан, Адам укуктары жана демократиялык институттар боюнча Бюросунун Шайлоолордо чектелген байкоо жүргүзүү Миссиясы, октябрь 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/a/472461_0.pdf [33] RFE/RL, Кыргыз кызматы, Кыргыз активисттери коррупцияга каршы митингге чыгууда, февраль 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-activists-rally-against-corruption/31102170.html [34] Тобокелдердин жана талаптарга жооп берүү боюнча порталы (Risk and Compliance Portal), Кыргызстан өлкөсү боюнча отчет, июль 2020, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/kyrgyzstan/ [35] Ошол эле жакта. [36] Human Rights Watch, Кыргызстан  –  2018-жылдын окуялараы, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan#e81181 [37] Тобокелдердин жана талаптарга жооп берүү боюнча порталы (Risk and Compliance Portal), Кыргызстан өлкөсү боюнча отчет, июль 2020, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/kyrgyzstan/ [38] Экономикалык кызматташуу жана өнүктүрүү боюнча уюму (OECD), Кыргызстандагы коррупцияга каршы реформалар, март 2015, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Kyrgyzstan-Round-3-Monitoring-Report-ENG.pdf [39] Ошол эле жерде. [40] АКШнын мамлекеттик департаменти, 2019-жылдын Адам укуктардын жаатындагы жүргүзүлгөн практика боюнча өлкөлөрдүн даярдаган баяндамалары: Кыргыз Республикасы  https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/kyrgyzstan/ [41]Human rights Watch, Кыргызстан: Милиция кызматкерлери бача баздарды кыйноого алууда,  https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/kyrgyzstan [42] Ошол эле жакта. [43] Тобокелдердин жана талаптарга жооп берүү боюнча порталы (Risk and Compliance Portal), Кыргызстан өлкөсү боюнча отчет, июль 2020, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/kyrgyzstan/ [44] Transparency International, Кыргызстан: Коррупция менен коррупцияга каршы жүргүзүлгөн күрөш боюнча сереп, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kyrgyzstan;  ТӨМ (Туруктуу өнүктүрүү максаттары),   ыктыярдыктын негизинде Кыргызстан боюнча дайындалган сереп, 121-бет, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26459VNR_2020_Kyrgyzstan_Report_English.pdf [45] Transparency International, Кыргызстан: Коррупция менен коррупцияга каршы жүргүзүлгөн күрөш боюнча сереп, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kyrgyzstan [46] Ошол эле жакта. [47] ТӨМ (Туруктуу өнүктүрүү максаттары), ыктыярдыктын негизинде Кыргызстан боюнча дайындалган сереп. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26459VNR_2020_Kyrgyzstan_Report_English.pdf [48] Transparency International уюму даярдаган отчетунун 8-бети жана ыктыярдыктын негизинде Кыргызстан боюнча дайындалган серептин 122-бети. 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Окумуштуулардын ойлоруна караганда, “саясий эрк” конкреттүү маселени чечүүдө колдонулган конкреттүү саясий чечимине жетүү максатында башка чечимдерди кабыл алып жаткан маанилүү кишилердин колдоосун чечкиндүү түрдө көрсөткөнүн айтууга болот. Башкача айтканда, күндүн расмий тартибинде белгиленген конкреттүү маселени түшүнүү менен чечимдерди кабыл алып жаткан кишилердин бир тобу жалпы кабыл алынган жана потенциалдуу натыйжалуу делген саясий чечимди кабыл алууга көбүрөөк колдоо көрсөтөт.  Караңыз: Лори А. Пост, Эмбер Н.У. Рэйл жана Эрик Д. Рэйл, “Саясий эрк” түшүнүгүнө аныктама берүү, Мамлекеттик Монтана Университети, август 2010, https://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1/14420/Raile_PoliticsPolicy2010_A1b.pdf;jsessionid=56375A117171857854D2CF29975F8C84?sequence=1 [55] Реджина А. Спектор,  Кыргызстандын президентинин, Аскар Акаевдин өзгөрүшү, Калифорния университети, Беркли, 2004, https://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/2004_02-spec.pdf [56] Сатина Айдар,  Кыргызстандын мурунку президенти, Алмазбек Атамбаевдин мезгилиндеги элиталардын арасындагы болжолдонгон коррупция тууралуу биз эмнелерди билебиз, октябрь, openDemocracy, октябрь 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/what-we-know-about-alleged-elite-corruption-under-former-kyrgyz-president-almazbek-atambayev/;  Бэртёлсмэн Стифтанг, Өзгөрүүнүн (трансформациянын) Индекси, Өлкөлөр боюнча отчет, 2020 Кыргызстан, https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report-KGZ.html#pos15 [57] Бул терминди мен өзүм ойлоп тапкам, ошондуктан көпчүлүктө кезиге бербейт. Бул термин өз жаатында көбүнчө “жазасыздыктын маданияты”  же “укуктук маданияты” деп колдонулат. Бирок, мен “укуктук менталитет” деген терминди колдонууну туура көрдүм, себеби бул термин өз маңызына элдин мыйзам үстөмдүгүнүн маданиятына жасаган мамилесин чагылдырган идеяны камтыйт. [58] БУУ жана Мыйзам үстөмдүгү, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/;  Лиэнн Маккей, “Мыйзам үстөмдүгүнө көздөй жол”, АКШнын Тынчтык институту, 2015, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Toward-a-Rule-of-Law-Culture_Practical-Guide_0.pdf; Мыйзам үстөмдүгүнө окуткан борбор, Билим берүүчү ресурстар (Educational Resources), https://www.thecenterforruleoflaw.org/educational-resources.html [59] Кыргыз Республикасындагы БУӨП, Мыйзамдуулуктун маданияты менден, сенден, бизден жана коомчулуктун ар бир мүчөсүнөн башталат, сентябрь 2020, https://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/presscenter/articles/2020/08/legal-culture-starts-with-every-member-of-society.html;  Кыргыз Республикасынын Юстиция Министрлиги,  “2016-2020 жылдарга Кыргыз Республикасынын калкынын укуктук маданиятын жогорулатуу концепциясы жөнүндө” токтом, http://minjust.gov.kg/en/content/755; Эл аралык кризистик тобу, Кыргызстан:  Соттук реформалардын жүргүзүлүшүнө болгон тоскоолдуктар, апрель  2008, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan-challenge-judicial-reform [60] Lawyers for Lawyers, Юристтердин иштеген шарттарына жүргүзүлгөн сурамжылоолор, https://lawyersforlawyers.org/en/survey-of-working-conditions-lawyers/ [61] Адвокаттардын Америкалык Ассоциациясы, Адам укуктары боюнча Борбор: Сот ишине жүргүзүлгөн байкоо боюнча отчет: Кыргызстан жана Гульжан Пасанова, май 2020, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/reports/kyrgyzstan_vs_Gulzhan_Pasanova1/ [62] Лиэнн Маккей, “Мыйзам үстөмдүгүнө көздөй жол”, АКШнын Тынчтык институту, 2015, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Toward-a-Rule-of-Law-Culture_Practical-Guide_0.pdf [63] Кыргыз Республикасынын Юстиция Министрлиги, “2016-2020 жылдарга Кыргыз Республикасынын калкынын укуктук маданиятын жогорулатуу концепциясы жөнүндө” токтом, http://minjust.gov.kg/en/content/755 [64] Кыргыз Республикасындагы БУӨП, Кыргыз Республикасында юридикалык укуктар менен мүмкүнчүлүктөрүн кеңейтүү үчүн сот адилеттүүлүгүнө болгон туруктуу жеткиликтүүлүктү көздөй жолдо, https://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/projects/towards-a-sustainable-access-to-justice-for-legal-empowerment-in0.html [65] Кыргыз Республикасындагы БУӨП, 4,000 киши 6 күндүн ичинде юридикалык жардам көрүштү,  декабрь 2020, https://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2020/12/fla-decade.html [66] АльЖазира, Кыргызстанда жаратылган мульфильм коррупцияга каршы күрөштү, YouTube, декабрь 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y6-2o4P4TSY. Бул долбоорду иш жүзүнө ашырылышына жана аны башкарууга көрсөткөн кызматыма, бул демилгеге катышканым мен үчүн чоң сыймык болду. [67] Экономикалык кызматташуу жана өнүктүрүү боюнча уюмунун (OECD-ЭКӨУ) отчету, 28-бет. [post_title] => Кыргызстан: Эмне учун Борбордук Азиянын “Швейцариясы” деп эсептелген өлкөдө акыркы 20 жылда адам укуктары басмырланып келе жатат? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => %d0%ba%d1%8b%d1%80%d0%b3%d1%8b%d0%b7%d1%81%d1%82%d0%b0%d0%bd-%d1%8d%d0%bc%d0%bd%d0%b5-%d1%83%d1%87%d1%83%d0%bd-%d0%b1%d0%be%d1%80%d0%b1%d0%be%d1%80%d0%b4%d1%83%d0%ba-%d0%b0%d0%b7%d0%b8%d1%8f%d0%bd [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-07-23 17:43:47 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-07-23 16:43:47 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6026 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [2] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5896 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-06-23 11:30:13 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-06-23 10:30:13 [post_content] => This week Unsafe for Scrutiny’s Project Director, Susan Coughtrie, spoke with Anna Myers, the Executive Director of the Whistleblowing International Network (WIN), about the challenges related to whistleblower protection and how these connect into broader concerns regarding attempts to limit public scrutiny, including through the use of legal intimidation and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) in the UK and beyond. Myers also outlined what action the UK Government should take to improve the protections for whistleblowers at a legislative level as well as what journalists can do to help better protect them as their sources.   Susan Coughtrie (SC): WIN has been an active supporter of civic initiatives to address the issue of SLAPPs at a European level, through the Council of Europe and European Union (EU). Can you explain why this topic is so important for whistleblowers and organisations dedicated to protecting them?   Anna Myers (AM): SLAPPs are another tool used to shut down scrutiny and criticism, as other checks and balances on the powerful have been steadily eroded. The importance of this topic was something that immediately hit me when I saw these anti-SLAPP discussions were starting to happen. Not just because whistleblowers have faced their own SLAPP suits, but also because the world of public interest monitoring that is shared by whistleblowers, journalists, activists as well as the NGOs that support them, has clearly been under attack. We are all being similarly undermined and not just by governments. I have been concerned about the growth of corporate power over the 20 years that I have been working in the field. Governments really seem more beholden to corporations than to their citizens now; money influences policy and elections in ways that have changed where the centres of power lie. Over successive decades strong regulatory bodies have been replaced with ‘light touch’ and self-reporting. The rolling back of unions, which would have supported workers to resolve issues in the past and held business and government to account for some of the structural and exploitation problems we are experiencing now, is also a factor. So the options for where whistleblowers can report issues, how these are addressed, has been significantly reduced.   While whistleblowers are typically individuals, journalists used to be part of larger media organisations. But with the demise of traditional media structures journalists have also become more individualised and therefore more vulnerable to direct attack. In a strange way, whistleblowers and journalists are getting hit together. While not all whistleblowers become journalists' sources, it is absolutely clear that if journalists are not supported against the powers that want to shut down their stories, then this key route for whistleblowers to let the public know what is going on is at risk. So for WIN and its members, adding our voices to the collective call to end the abusive use of the law to silence those who can call the powerful to account was just obvious from the beginning.   SC: In FPC’s global survey of 63 investigative journalists in 41 countries, conducted last year, one of the resources that respondents identified as the most valuable while reporting on financial crime and corruption, but also the most lacking, was whistleblower protections. Why do you think that is?   AM: The relationship between whistleblowers and journalists has been evolving. It seems to me that journalists are coming to realise they cannot operate as well if whistleblowers do not have some protection. And that such protection is part of protecting the wider information ecosystem that ensures independent journalism can flourish. If you turn to some of the ‘muckrakers’ of old - as I understand it - you found your story, you cultivated and protected your sources and whistleblowers were a bit of a pain in the ass. Sure, whistleblowers might come along once in a while and give you gold dust, but they were hard to work with and told you the story they wanted to be told. Actually, on one level they may not even be asking you to investigate very much. Therefore, the impression was that journalists in the past considered them more trouble than they were worth.   Nowadays there are media platforms asking whistleblowers to ‘please tell us your story’. In part, this may be because journalists do not have the resources they used to have; setting up reporting platforms to receive tips and get information can be a shortcut to a story. Journalists may still prefer the anonymous tip that would allow them to craft their own investigation but I think there is greater understanding, particularly amongst the younger generation of journalists, that some stories are just so complicated and sometimes involve such a vast amount of data that it is impossible to do it alone. There is a natural need for journalists and sources, including whistleblowers to work together and often across borders.   As part of that journalists perhaps see more clearly that they are often the only source of protection for a whistleblower - whether it is in how they tell the story or even when they choose to release it - and that is an enormous responsibility. Stories can and have been told in ways that can really harm the whistleblower. For example, if their identities are revealed too soon or in a way that they can not easily cope with, especially in places where there are few employment or other legal protections. I think more journalists are taking whistleblower protection seriously. Even if whistleblowers are not their sources now, one day they might be.   SC: What are the main concerns and challenges for whistleblowers when it comes to interacting with investigative journalists and sharing their information? And what can investigative journalists do to better improve the protection of those whistleblowers they work with?   AM: Certainly journalists can and should ensure their communication channels are strong, encrypted and safe. However, at the core of it, I think, are old-fashioned analogue skills - how do you reassure the whistleblower and guarantee that you will not reveal their identity without their consent? How do you build trust and confidence? Most whistleblowers will want to cooperate fully if they feel like something is going to happen. After all, the aim behind blowing the whistle is to change something that is going wrong, but they will need some time to work that out and to trust the journalist will take an independent view. Most whistleblowers are not doing those big data leaks, most are people who need reassurance and classic handling. I think it is really important for journalists to see them as experts, not just as a source of information. Whistleblowers can help provide the other pieces of the puzzle and can be very helpful to journalists in really pulling the whole story together.   Approaching whistleblower protection organisations, like WIN’s members, can help journalists to support their whistleblowers, to understand their responsibilities but also to share the duty of care. It is far too late if you've already got close to publishing a story to suddenly go - Oh god, I might be putting somebody at risk! We do get a lot of enquiries, mostly from younger, freelance journalists. They are perhaps not getting the same ‘source handling’ training of old, and do most of their research online, so it's only later they might become worried they may be putting that whistleblower or source in jeopardy. Ultimately, it's about understanding the importance of confidentiality, being really clear about what your duties and obligations are to your source, and doing some of that research ahead of time.   SC: Amongst the pledges made by the UK Government at the 2016 London Anti-Corruption Summit was to review the effectiveness and transparency of whistleblower protections in the UK. Seven years later this commitment has not been met. Why do you think the UK Government has not taken more action on whistleblowers?   AM: A lot has changed since 2016 in the UK, there has been Brexit, and a change of government and rising awareness globally of the serious damage wrought by corruption, climate change and now the pandemic. However, whistleblowing is still a topic that can attract a lot of high-profile attention without much long-term commitment for change. It can appear to some to be a topic that gets complicated quickly, especially if you are in a position of power and can foresee how your own decision-making might get called into account. And that is true for any organisation or institution. So there is always some reluctance, or at least some lack of urgency to take the issue much further.   In the UK, it is worth remembering that the Public Interest Disclosure Act (1998) was a Private Members’ Bill and part of the reason it passed was because there were no government pledges for monetary funding. No one in the Government really took responsibility for it. As whistleblowing and the legal protection for whistleblowers have evolved it’s better understood that there does need to be some resources behind it and  that organisational accountability for failing to protect whistleblowers needs to be built into the legislation. If organisations continue to only get into trouble for retaliating against one whistleblower at a time, it reinforces the idea that it is just about that one individual. Laws are being adopted, in Australia for example, and in the new EU Directive on Whistleblowing, that are starting to place the onus on the organisation - i.e. that the organisation has a duty of care not only to its workforce but to the public as well.   The Government has already been criticised for not bringing forward a previously promised review of the last employment reforms, made in 2013, into this parliamentary session. There is also an All-Party Parliamentary Group on Whistleblowing that is very strong on reforming the law. But as I said earlier, if governments and most businesses had their way, they would just continue to kick it into the long grass. They need to feel the heat from civil society. It's like the Freedom of Information Act, they will let it sit there until people get really cross about it and then they might act.   SC: So much has happened with the Julian Assange case in recent years, do you think this has had an impact on the Government’s reluctance to act, as well as, perhaps the public’s understanding of whistleblowing?   AM: I am sure the Julian Assange case is one that the UK Government wishes would go away and they have handled it very badly. He is still stuck in jail, having won his fight against extradition, and it’s terrible. The human toll on him is so high. However, there is a much greater understanding now, if not in the wider public, then at least beyond the ‘expert’ community that Assange is a publisher and that the whistleblowers are people like Chelsea Manning who went to WikiLeaks. Assange changed the face of publishing and was on the cusp of major changes in journalism, he was both feted and condemned by traditional media and it was hard to work out where the traditional lines of whistleblowing, journalism and publishing started and ended. I think we are still grappling with that now. But the attack on Julian Assange is an attack on freedom of expression and a risk to us all.   I’ve always said to colleagues that if it wasn’t Julian it would have been someone else. He arrived at just the right time, when digital technology was changing the face of data sharing and collection, and he challenged government secrecy in a very impressive and public way. Since then we’ve gone through massive technological change, which has impacted the value of  information - who owns it and who should control it. Again this is why so many people are being SLAPPed with these lawsuits - many are those who are not in traditional fields of journalism or publishing, they are bloggers, digital activists, etc. We are even starting to see SLAPPs used as a wholesale strategy to shut down all scrutiny, a tactic that law firms are suggesting to their clients, and casting an ever-widening net of people who should be targeted.   SC: Do you think whistleblowing suffers sometimes from an image problem, with the puritanical idea that whistleblowers must somehow be perfect people in order to be the ones that can blow the whistle?   AM: I think it is obvious why one would want to protect an individual that speaks up for others but the trick is not to over-individualise the risk of speaking up. Part of WIN’s goal is to help build the civil society capacity to make the collective case very quickly, to ensure that the whistleblower is not the only messenger of the public interest message they have delivered. It is much easier to shut down and discredit a single whistleblower than a whole community that agrees with them.   What was evident during the development of the EU Directive on Whistleblowing, is an increase in the number of active groups working alongside whistleblowing advocates to push for greater protections, this includes unions, anti-corruption advocates and independent media protection organisations. To me, this shared understanding is incredibly advanced compared to where we were ten years ago in the NGO world and the same collaboration is evident around the issue of SLAPPs. We all share the same ecosystem and need to work together to defend against shared threats.   This makes networks so important. A good example of how it can work in practice arose with the work of WIN’s associate, the Platform for the Protection of Whistleblowers in Africa (PPLAAF). PPLAAF teamed up with Global Witness to do an anti-corruption investigation in the Democractic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with the cooperation of two local banking whistleblowers. All of them, plus some journalists in Paris and Israel have been subject to legal suits in different jurisdictions. So while the starting point is mining in the Congo, you actually have an international story about corruption with journalists publishing information in different regions, trying to protect their sources until their sources feel able to come out. In fact the two DRC banking whistleblowers did come forward and discovered that in absentia they had been sentenced to death by a DRC court. The idea that if you blow the whistle on suspicions of money laundering you could face a death sentence feels way out there. But from a WIN perspective all of those players are important and ultimately they are all connected. So we have joined forces with our membership to support PPLAAF and Global Witness as well as the two whistleblowers - to highlight the threats they face and show public solidarity for their efforts.   SC: Last week, WIN together with 20 other organisations released a statement condemning the legal tactics utilised by the Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Limited (ENRC), a privately-owned Kazakh multinational mining company, in what appear to be deliberate attempts to escape public scrutiny. What are WIN’s concerns regarding this case?   AM: The questions the UK Government should be asking itself is ‘Are we being used? And at what point does this threaten the UK’s credibility as an upholder of the rule of law?’ Or at least, recognise  that the outrageous nature of these suits has a real impact. It's similar to the idea that reputational damage can be claimed at the whiff of bad news, and an exaggerated form of what we have all experienced with SLAPPs. That the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) can be sued in this way strikes at the capacity of any law enforcement authority to do its job. To me, the ENRC’s actions should be laughed out of court on all counts, not just against the SFO. However, the problem is that we in the UK have let this get to the point that using the legal system in this way is somehow acceptable. Not only that, but by allowing such claims to go ahead - no matter how lacking in substance - everyone thinks twice about even trying to shine the light on wrongdoing committed by anyone with deep pockets.   It should be obvious that the UK has let the powerful run riot without any appropriate checks and balances. We must ask ourselves, are such legal challenges, such as those put forward by ENRC, a credible response, or merely a distraction tactic from the alleged wrongdoing? Unless we take a ‘public interest’ moment to look at the facts beneath the surface, we miss it. The UK is not doing enough to challenge such abuses of the legal system here in the UK and internationally - especially on the corruption side. Take the Jonathan Taylor case for instance.[1] He is an off-shore oil industry whistleblower stuck in Croatia facing extradition to Monaco after he cooperated with the SFO. Yet the UK Government is not standing up for him by making the connection between the ongoing retaliation against him as a whistleblower and their own credibility as a global leader in the fight against corruption.     SC: What action would WIN and its members like to see from the UK Government to better improve protection for whistleblowers?   AM: Firstly, legal protection against SLAPPs is essential. If we can’t get our act together nationally in law enforcement, especially to deal with cross border criminality and wrongdoing, then we should at least be protecting those people who are doing the work to reveal the facts. Acknowledging that these civil society players - whistleblowers, journalists and human rights defenders - are fulfilling a vital public interest watchdog role that fully complements and enhances the enforcement role that the SFO, the National Crime Agency and others are meant to be fulfilling is an important first step. In the end we can share the information publicly and call for that accountability, but it is law enforcement that needs to take action to prosecute and stop the wrongdoers. So these agencies and the UK Government should view anti-SLAPP measures as an important check on power that protects the environment in which they get the information they need to act.   Secondly, the Public Interest Disclosure Act does need to be refreshed. It did a great job of putting whistleblower protection into the legal framework in a way that I still think is really advanced in some areas. For example, it included protection against gagging clauses, and protected the right to go directly to the party legally responsible for any harm done, whether or not that was the employer. However, much more needs to be done to ensure organisations are doing right by the workforce as well as to the broader public interest. We need to incorporate some of the elements that have found (and are finding) their way into law in Australia and the EU. In particular, that ensures there is accountability for how organisations are operating their whistleblowing systems that is separate from whether or not they breached their legal duties to one particular whistleblower. It should matter to organisations that they learn about problems early enough to do something about it. They shouldn’t wait until they hear it in the press or have to explain what happened because a whistleblower has taken them to court.   Anna Myers is the founding Executive Director of WIN. She has worked in the field of whistleblowing for 20 years - advising individual whistleblowers, employers of all sizes and sectors, and national and international policy makers. Previously the Deputy Director of Public Concern at Work (now called Protect), Anna has also worked at the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and at the Government Accountability Project in Washington DC.   [1] WIN, Open Letter to Croatian Minister of Justice: Halt extradition of whistleblower Jonathan Taylor, May 2021, https://whistleblowingnetwork.org/News-Events/News/News-Archive/Open-Letter-to-Croatian-Minister-of-Justice-Extra   This piece was produced as part of the Unsafe for Scrutiny project, which is kindly funded by the Justice for Journalists Foundation. [post_title] => Whistleblowers, like journalists, must be protected as part of the public interest ecosystem [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => whistleblowers-like-journalists-must-be-protected-as-part-of-the-public-interest-ecosystem [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-06-23 11:24:04 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-06-23 10:24:04 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5896 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 1 [filter] => raw ) [3] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5889 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-06-18 10:30:53 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-06-18 09:30:53 [post_content] => Ten years on since Syrians rose up against the oppressive Assad regime, a resolution to the devastating conflict that followed does not seem near. The US and the EU continue to back the UN-led political process bringing about a power-sharing settlement as the primary way out of the crisis. This approach has not worked to date; and even if it should bear fruit, it carries dangerous implications. A new way forward is needed to break the deadlock and address the urgent humanitarian, economic and security crises being intensified by the conflict’s continuation.   Power-sharing amid the status quo in Syria In 2012, responding to growing protests and violence, the US, Russia and other major world powers agreed on a roadmap for a political transition to resolve the Syrian crisis. The Final Communiqué of the Action Group for Syria (Geneva Communiqué) stipulated a negotiated settlement under the UN’s auspices between the regime and the opposition to establish a transitional governing body that would pave the way for a national dialogue, followed by a new constitution and elections.[1] Endorsed later in UNSCR 2254, this roadmap clearly committed to the “non-sectarian” character of Syria’s future and stressed that any solution be the result of a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process.   Almost a decade on, this vision for a transition to a new democratic political system seems more distant than ever. The Assad regime, emboldened by the gains it has made with help from its Russian and Iranian backers, has continuously obstructed the UN-led process. Refusing to concede political ground, it is instead promoting a deluded victory narrative in its efforts to re-legitimise itself internationally, including with its latest staged presidential elections.[2] Even if it does eventually agree to share power, including through the latest workings of the UN-led Constitutional Committee, it is likely to be symbolic and will fail to achieve just, inclusive and sustainable peace.[3]   The interventions of the US, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Israel and the Gulf countries have significantly complicated the search for a solution. Through funding, mainstream media coverage, arms supplies and sponsorship of certain political groups and proxy militias, these powers have stolen the will of the Syrian people to determine their future.   To further their agendas, they have actively exploited identity tensions in Syria, effecting political, social and economic transformations in their respective spheres of influence that have contributed to the sectarianisation of the conflict.[4] Russia has propagated the Syrian regime’s discourse of a ‘war on terror’, playing on the fear of minorities.[5] It is pulling all the strings and has complete control over political matters and economic sectors in regime-controlled Syria. Iran has mobilised its sectarian militias on the same grounds, gaining significant social presence and economic interests in various parts of the country. Turkish, Qatari and Saudi support strengthened the conservative and Islamist elements of the opposition, encouraging an anti-Iran (and, more broadly, anti-Shia) discourse. Turkish-supported armed opposition groups are now concentrated in Northern Aleppo, an area under de facto Turkish administration and growing closer socio-economically to Turkey. Turkey’s instrumentalisation of these groups in its conflict with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (branded “terrorist separatists”[6]) has also aggravated Arab/Kurdish tensions in oil-rich North-East Syria where the US military is present.   In order to retain their influence and maintain identity tensions that serve their geopolitical objectives, these countries, as sponsors of any future power-sharing arrangement, share an interest in preserving this sectarianised context. Their official discourses point in that direction. Russian President Putin ignored the cross-sectarian uprising against Assad’s rule and instead suggested a sectarian framing in his diagnosis of the Syrian conflict in 2013: “Syria is not witnessing a battle for democracy, but an armed conflict between government and opposition in a multireligious country.”[7] In recent interviews with Saudi-owned media outlets, former US special envoy to Syria, James Jeffrey, justified his disapproval of Arab countries’ possible readmittance of the Assad regime back to the Arab League by emphasising Assad’s violence against the Sunni population, again connecting sectarian dynamics in Syria to Arab Gulf countries’ geopolitical rivalry with Iran which the US supports.[8] A US State Department official was also quoted saying Syria's post-conflict political system would be "a power sharing arrangement just like we ended up with in Iraq […] there's going to be Alawite presence, there's going to be Sunni representation […]”.[9]   While an outright ethno-religious power-sharing system as in Lebanon or Iraq is unlikely, power-sharing for Syria will probably carry some ethno-religious elements that risk cementing the politicisation of such identities. An example of what this might look like is contained in Russia’s suggested constitution for Syria that it drafted in 2017 which allocated ministerial positions based on proportionate ethnic/religious representation.[10]   A new approach Given the survival of the authoritarian Assad regime, the sectarianisation of the conflict and the hegemony of external interests, it is hard to see how any power-sharing arrangement for Syria could address the root causes and drivers of conflict. Power-sharing systems in Lebanon and Iraq offer stark warnings. The recent uprisings in both countries have highlighted how their power-sharing systems have upheld the class interests of the ruling sectarian elites over the cross-sectarian interests of the general population.[11]   Despite the flaws of such a power-sharing settlement, and the dim prospects of a breakthrough, the US and Europe continue to go along with Russia on achieving it. Russia has proved to be either unable or unwilling to persuade the Assad regime to cooperate with the political process. Western countries’ preferred strategies of imposing sanctions and withholding reconstruction funds are unlikely alone to force the regime to negotiate or destabilise it from within, let alone instigate another uprising against it. And competing interests from the Arab world, Iran, Israel, Turkey, Russia and the US remain stumbling blocks to a common international supporting role.   Meanwhile, the country has been devastated. Around half a million Syrians have been unjustly killed, tens of thousands of Syrians remain detained or have been forcibly disappeared, and half the population are displaced from their homes. The whole country is exhausted, the current economic crisis and the impact of COVID-19 has only added to the suffering of the Syrian people. Absent of any new tools or initiatives to break the deadlock, the scale of the humanitarian crisis and the risk of resurging violence will only intensify.   ‘More of the same’ of waiting for a political solution to materialise is simply not good enough – it’s time for the US and Europe to adopt a new approach. One that jettisons the top-down method and instead actively interacts with existing realities to shape new alternatives, transform power dynamics and open up more ground for a viable solution. But what could that approach look like?   First, instead of rushing to launch formal negotiations for a final settlement, a new approach could start by addressing the most pressing causes of continued suffering. The West has always maintained conditions for the relief of sanctions and economic support on the Syrian regime’s cooperation with the political process, yet that ‘cooperation’ has always remained vaguely defined. They could instead stagger sanctions relief and economic support based on tangible steps that the regime can take to alleviate the current economic crisis; such as the release of detainees, a mechanism for the safe return of refugees in neighbouring countries, and allowing aid agencies and local civil society organisations to independently distribute aid without obstruction.   Second, the US and Europe could explore how to support spaces for civil society and political dissent inside regime areas. They could offer economic recovery support to regime-held areas under the condition that it goes through local civil society organisations and community-based groups. They could also remove sanctions obstacles for diasporas to support community initiatives and forms of organising in places like Dara’a, al-Tal and Suweida among others. These communities have been relying on themselves to address essential governance services, such as repairing infrastructure and rehabilitating schools, which challenges the regime’s authority.[12] Supporting decentralised governance structures and civil society spaces in non-regime-controlled areas could also serve as an added source of pressure against the regime if people living under Assad start to see living conditions, political freedoms, spaces for youth and women, and access to public services improve for those living outside the regime’s control.   Third, with its military presence inside Syria, the US could develop a mechanism with Russia and Turkey for facilitating the movement of goods and people internally across different areas of control. Reopening the country in this way could have many benefits: reconnecting communities across conflict lines, rebuilding economic interdependence, encouraging civil society cooperation and exchanges of lived experiences, and linking coordination of governance services in different areas of control. Currently, smuggling goods and people through internal crossings at checkpoints generates huge income for warlords. Disrupting this could undermine the interests of powerful figures in both the regime and its opposing parties. This would weaken them and allow space for new power dynamics to emerge within the opposing camps.   Fourth, instead of watching Arab countries slowly readmit the Assad regime back to the Arab League (with Russian backing) in return for nothing, the US and Europe could incentivise Arab countries to link that process with wider regional security understandings between Arab countries and Iran as part of the renegotiation of the nuclear deal with the latter. This could encourage regional agreements on Syria involving Iran’s withdrawal of its funded militias, and it can build on the recent de-escalation talks in Iraq between Saudi Arabia and Iran on the conflict in Yemen.[13] It can also open doors for constructive cooperation between the US and Russia in the Middle East if done within the framework of the P5+1.   These measures combined could create new local, national and international realities that establish a framework for a political process based on those transformed dynamics. Ultimately, the solution will not come simply from a peace deal, a new constitution or some new institutional arrangement (power-sharing or otherwise). A transformation must first take place that re-establishes people’s rights to go back home and live in safety, rebuilds trust and confidence between people, gives space to heal and recover from trauma, and recovers people’s livelihoods. There also needs to be space for Syrian political actors, within and across conflict camps, to have dialogues that are connected to the needs of local communities that could then shape an inclusive political process. Formal negotiations on new governance arrangements can build on such transformations. But change cannot come from a select group of actors and international powers, each with their own vested interests. Instead, to honour the commitments that the US, Europe, Russia and other countries have made towards a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition, they must explore tools that transform the dynamics of power and generate a sustainable political solution that is more relevant to people’s lived realities. In endorsing the Geneva Communiqué and UNSCR 2254, these countries must remember they did not commit to just any political settlement, but one that meets “the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people”.   Bilal Sukkar is a Project Manager at the UK-based conflict prevention and peacebuilding organisation Saferworld. His work involves supporting civil society organisations and communities in Yemen and Sudan to build inclusive and just peace. Previously, he worked with an international NGO on the humanitarian response in Syria, and with Syrian campaign groups on formulating policy and advocacy on Syria in the UK. He has conducted research on Syria looking at the UN-mediated political process and the role of youth in the uprising. Bilal has an MA in Conflict Resolution in Divided Societies from King’s College London with a scholarship from Chevening.   Image by Beshr Abdulhadi under (CC).   [1] Action Group for Syria, Final Communiqué of the Action Group for Syria, UN Peacemaker, June 2012, https://peacemaker.un.org/node/1581 [2] Bethan McKernan, Civil war, ruin, raging poverty... but Assad is guaranteed to win Syria’s fake election, The Guardian, May 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/23/civil-war-ruin-raging-poverty-but-assad-is-guaranteed-to-win-syrias-fake-election [3] Syrians for Truth & Justice, The Formation and Responsibilities of the Syrian Constitutional Committee, May 2021, https://stj-sy.org/en/the-formation-and-responsibilities-of-the-syrian-constitutional-committee/; Steven Heydemann, The Syrian Conflict: Proxy War, Pyrrhic Victory, and Power-Sharing Agreements, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 20, no. 2: 153-160, October 2020, https://doi.org/10.1111/sena.12331 [4] Sami Hadaya, Sectarianisation in Syria: the disintegration of a popular struggle, Conflict, Security & Development 20, no. 5: 607-629, January 2021, https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2020.1833520 [5] Yomn Al-Kaisi, Yara Al Najjar and Miriam Puttick, In the Name of Protection: Minorities and identity in the Syrian conflict, Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights, June 2021, https://www.ceasefire.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/CFR_Syria_EN_May21.pdf [6] Andrew Parasiliti, The Takeaway: Syrian-Kurdish fault line intensifies as Erdogan vows to crush ‘separatist terror’, Al-Monitor, December 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/12/takeaway-syrian-kurdish-fault-line-erdogan-pkk-sdf-biden.html#ixzz6xTjRYP49 [7] Vladimir V Putin, “A Plea for Caution From Russia,” The New York Times, September 11, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html [8] James Jeffrey, Russia Is Aware What Kind of Ally It Has in Syria, interview by Ibrahim Hamidi, Asharq Al-Awsat, May 2020, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2263981/jeffrey-asharq-al-awsat-russia-aware-what-kind-ally-it-has-syria; ibid., interview, Al Hadath, YouTube, April 12, 2021, https://youtu.be/RYeEB3XSAS0?t=444 [9] AFP, IS in fierce fightback to rescue last Syrian urban bastion, France 24, November 2017, https://www.france24.com/en/20171111-fierce-fightback-rescue-last-syrian-urban-bastion [10] Syrian Arab Republic's Draft Constitution of 2017, Presented by Russian officials at Syrian peace negotiations, Draft of January 2017, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Syria_2017D.pdf?lang=en [11] Ibrahim Halawi, Consociational Power-Sharing in the Arab World as Counter-Revolution, Studies in Ethnicity & Nationalism 20, no.2: 128-136, October 2020, https://doi.org/10.1111/sena.12328 [12] Reem Salahi, Bridging the Gap: Local Governance Committees in ‘Reconciled’ Areas of Syria, Chatham House, April 2020, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/bridging-the-gap-in-reconciled-areas-of-syria; For more examples of supporting local community structures, see PAX’s program supporting local peace committees in Iraq: Mosul: Peacebuilding After ISIS, PAX Iraq Alert IV, October 2016, https://paxvoorvrede.nl/media/download/pax-iraq-alert-iv.pdf; and Saferworld’s program supporting community action groups in Yemen: Yemeni civil society organisations support peacebuilding work of community groups, Saferworld, April 2020, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/870-yemeni-civil-society-organisations-support-peacebuilding-work-of-community-groups- [13] Suadad al-Salhy, Iran-Saudi Arabia talks: Lebanon and Yemen are top priorities, Middle East Eye, April 2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-saudi-arabia-lebanon-yemen-priorities-talks [post_title] => Look beyond power-sharing to start building peace in Syria [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => look-beyond-power-sharing-to-start-building-peace-in-syria [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-06-18 15:17:49 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-06-18 14:17:49 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5889 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [4] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5860 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-06-02 00:00:39 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-06-01 23:00:39 [post_content] => Two weeks ago, on 14 May 2021, the UK Government gave its consent to a Private Member’s Bill introducing defamation law reform in Northern Ireland, welcoming it as a step “to put Northern Ireland in line with the rest of the United Kingdom”.[1] It is an important development, not least because it clears the procedural obstacles that had been used to block previous attempts to introduce reform in the province. The stage is now set for Northern Ireland’s elected representatives to finally debate the question in the open and considered manner it deserves.   Of course, it would be a mistake to simply adopt a carbon copy of the Defamation Act 2013, which applies in England and Wales, without first having consideration of some of the unique characteristics of Northern Ireland. This includes the history of conflict and the particular nature of the media sector here. Pandering to sectarian division, for example, has led to some conservatism in reporting here. Moreover, much of the broadcast and print media in the province are owned by parent companies located in Dublin, London, or other parts of the UK. Somewhat remote from the Northern Irish public, they have not been encouraged to take their chances with a complex and ambiguous body of common law in the Northern Irish courts. Such conditions even make it difficult to measure with any certainty the extent to which lack of reform in Northern Ireland has so far caused a chilling effect on free speech—although, it can be safely assumed that it has had some such effect.[2]   This is not to say that Northern Ireland should not legislate to reform defamation law. Not at all. The unique characteristics of Northern Ireland make the need for reform here all the more pressing. In particular, the Assembly must take action to ensure better protection of ‘public interest’ speech in Northern Ireland.   In recent years, Sam McBride, Political Editor of the Belfast News Letter, and Ed Moloney, a journalist and author who has written extensively about the IRA and the Troubles, have both spoken out about the legal threats they have received, which ultimately were withdrawn. The cost of defending such threats can be high. Just last month, the media outlet openDemocracy published an article about how they spent two years fighting off legal threats from the Democratic Unionist Party politician Jeffery Donaldson “burning through thousands of pounds and precious time that would otherwise have been spent on our journalism.”[3] The case never reached the court, and was only dropped when the legal time limit for Donaldson to proceed the case ran out. Certainly, the court records show that defendants in Northern Ireland have little confidence in the so called ‘Reynolds defence’ that aimed to protect such speech at common law.[4] Since the appeal courts in England and Wales now have little use for it, after the 2013 reform, the common law defence will be starved of any further development in a less active Northern Irish court system.   Yet, public interest speech is as vital to Northern Ireland as it is to any other part of the world. The political structures that were established as part of the peace process in Northern Ireland mean that its citizens rely heavily on the conduct of government and public administration. At the same time, peace was only secured by power-sharing between two extremes of sectarian division, and the political system is still prone to the factious, guarded and hidden arrangements that sectarianism begets. On top of this, Brexit also revealed in stark terms Northern Ireland’s central location in a complex web of international governance. Decisions taken in the Northern Irish political system can and do have important consequence not just for the public here, but for a public beyond its borders.   Admittedly defamation law reform now presents some challenges that were not as prevalent when England and Wales adopted the Defamation Act in 2013. The growth of social media has provided greater opportunity for publication injurious to reputation, without necessarily pertaining to public interest, or meeting standards of responsible journalism. Any legislature considering reform today will find the margin of error has increased, and that it has become more challenging to strike the proper target of protecting free speech in the public interest, without promoting low-value speech that unjustly interferes with reputation. However, Scotland wrestled with these complexities in its own reform, the Defamation and Malicious Publication Bill, and after considered debate managed to pass a Bill in 2021, which strikes a fine balance between freedom of expression and right to reputation.   The responsibility now falls on Northern Ireland’s elected representatives. Whether they will answer it remains to be seen. The Member of the Legislative Assembly who developed the Bill, Mike Nesbitt, has informed the Speaker of the Secretary of State’s consent, and now waits for formal approval to introduce the Bill to the Assembly. Time is of the essence, however. The Assembly’s legislative mandate expires April 2022, and the schedule for the remaining year is already quite busy. There is, however, some basis for cautious optimism. The DUP—the party who historically were most opposed to defamation law reform—have recently undergone a restructuring and change in leadership, and perhaps the new leadership may be less opposed to reform. Moreover, Brexit, and the resulting severance of Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK, has left Unionism in crisis. Perhaps Unionists will recognise that bringing defamation law in line with the rest of the UK will achieve at least some regulatory alignment. Sinn Féin on the other hand, if the party is committed to democracy, justice and equal rights for all, should also support reform of defamation law in Northern Ireland.   The next year will tell the story. Ultimately, regardless of party or sectarian allegiance, if Northern Ireland’s elected representatives deny again the opportunity to reform defamation law and better promote free speech, that in itself will raise a question of significant public interest.   Dr Mark Hanna is a Lecturer at the School of Law at Queen’s University Belfast. His research focuses on defamation and privacy law. He has produced two podcasts on the subject of libel law reform in Northern Ireland, one with journalists, lawyers and civil society representatives (http://lawpod.org/?name=2020-11-30_defamation-ni.mp3 ), the other with leading academics (http://lawpod.org/?name=2021-03-30_defamation-law-reform-ni.mp3).   [1] Sam McBride, Nine years after DUP secretly blocked libel reform, NIO clears way for bill to protect free speech, News Letter, May 2021, https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/politics/nine-years-after-dup-secretly-blocked-libel-reform-nio-clears-way-for-bill-to-protect-free-speech-3243327 [2] Gillian Halliday, RHI: DUP threatened me with legal action, says author McBride of book about boiler scandal, Belfast Telegraph, October 2019, https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/rhi-scandal/rhi-dup-threatened-me-with-legal-action-says-author-mcbride-of-book-about-boiler-scandal-38599506.html; Jessica Ní Mhainín, The UK and media freedom: An urgent need to lead by example, FPC, December 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/the-uk-and-media-freedom-an-urgent-need-to-lead-by-example/ [3] Peter Geoghegan and Mary Fitzgerald, Jeffrey Donaldson sued us. Here’s why we’re going public, openDemocracy, May 2021, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/jeffrey-donaldson-sued-us-heres-why-were-going-public/ [4] Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127. There the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords held that publications on matters relating to the public life of the community and/or the conduct of government (i.e., ‘public interest’) were privileged and that the requisite standard was ‘responsible journalism’. This was codified by section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013, which jettisoned the ‘baggage’ of the qualified privilege and simplified the defence to avoid some of the ambiguity of the judicial pronouncement in Reynolds.   This piece was produced as part of the Unsafe for Scrutiny project, which is kindly funded by the Justice for Journalists Foundation. [post_title] => A New Moment for Defamation Law Reform in Northern Ireland? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => a-new-moment-for-defamation-law-reform-in-northern-ireland [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-06-03 14:50:58 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-06-03 13:50:58 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5860 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [5] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5803 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-05-17 00:09:47 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-05-16 23:09:47 [post_content] => As the COVID-19 virus spread in Eurasia in early 2020, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon and his government chose to deny the crisis for more than four months, then acknowledged on April 30th only a very limited presence of the virus, according to the official data, of 15 cases. This low figure was at odds with the numerous local testimonies about people with symptoms of COVID-19 and the difficulties they were having in accessing medical care due to the lack of infrastructure and equipment. In addition, there were reports of hospitals refusing to admit patients with symptoms of COVID-19 due to unofficial instructions from some government officials to lower the number of reported cases.   Tajikistan’s controversial management of the COVID-19 crisis goes well beyond the undeniable difficulty for any government to react to the unforeseen consequences of a pandemic. Rather, it is part of a deep and long-lasting crisis in the Tajikistani medical sector which has a variety of causes. First, the Tajikistani medical system has been weakened by the poor economic situation of the country, which undermined investment in the social welfare sector. Second, the lack of investment has also resulted from the kleptocratic and neo-patrimonial practices of the regime, where funding for the health sector has collided with protection of the economic and financial interests of the political elites and with securing the survival of the authoritarian political regime.   Government denial and censorship Until April 30th 2020, the eve of the visit of the World Health Organization (WHO) to Tajikistan, the Government had systematically denied registering any coronavirus infections, and instead criticised journalists who were trying to disseminate information on this topic, accusing them of provoking panic among the population. After they recognised the presence of COVID-19, the political authorities, however, have continued to downplay the impact of the pandemic, registering only 52 deaths by the end of June 2020.[1] Finally, at the end of January 2021, the Government declared that the country was virus free. Since early January, the country's coronavirus count has not changed, with, according to official statistics, 13,308 infections and 90 fatalities.[2]   The official statements and figures go against even official state data. According to an annual digest produced by the State Statistics Agency, more than 41,700 people died in Tajikistan in 2020, about 8,650 more than in 2019, amounting to a 26 per cent increase over the average number of deaths recorded annually between 2015 and 2019; at the same time, Dushanbe recorded a 38 per cent surge in deaths.[3]   This contrast has been further questioned by local testimonies, including from medical staff. Local doctors have reported about the difficulties of getting a reliable coronavirus diagnosis. Tajikistani medical services have not received the necessary equipment for widespread testing of the population, and hospitals have not received test kits to verify the diagnosis, making a reliable assessment of COVID-19 infections highly unlikely, as well as of COVID-19 deaths.[4]   Second, the Government has kept tight control over the circulation of information about the spread of the disease, including by censoring the media, by exerting pressure on the population through fines on people deemed guilty of spreading ‘fake news’ on the pandemic for things like questioning the official statistics, and by pressuring medical staff to discharge patients with COVID-19 symptoms, such as high fever, in order to reduce the statistics, especially prior to the visit of the WHO delegation.[5] These measures have sparked controversy among medical staff and resulted in resignations, for example of a hospital manager in the Sughd Regional Hospital in Khujand.[6] Some doctors, with condition of anonymity, have reported that patients who died from symptoms of COVID-19 were instead recorded as having died of pneumonia, tuberculosis or Swine flu, and hospitals refused to return the bodies of people who supposedly died of pneumonia to their families and they were instead buried by medical workers dressed in hazmat suits.[7]   The impact of a weakened healthcare system The Government's difficulty in managing the COVID-19 crisis resulted primarily from a long-standing crisis. Since independence, the Government claimed to have committed to rebuild and modernise the health system by means of several reforms and programmes and the construction of hospital infrastructure. The most recent ‘Programme of State Guarantees to Provide the Population With Medical and Sanitary Assistance for 2017-2019’ envisaged the construction of hospitals and health centers throughout the country.[8] The announced improvements contained in multiple programmes discussed in government-controlled state media, however, have contrasted considerably with the experience of patients with the healthcare system of the country, which has been weakened by the accumulation of infrastructural and political factors.   After independence, the Tajikistani regime had to respond to the economic and social crisis caused by the sudden loss of Soviet Union subsidies which had been an essential support to the local social welfare system, and by the civil war which significantly damaged the country's economy. Despite some economic progress, in particular a notable increase in GDP and a decrease in poverty since the 2000s, some organisations have pointed out some root causes of the slow and limited improvement of the healthcare system, in particular low spending by the state on health at only $17 per capita.[9]   Due to the lack of investment, an overwhelming majority of medical facilities, which were built between the 1930s and late 1970s, have deteriorated significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite government declarations to the contrary, many medical facilities still have outdated or dysfunctional equipment, lack medicines and a reliable supply of electricity, water, and heating, or a proper sewage system. The dilapidation of medical facilities and the disengagement of political authorities has led residents of some smaller cities and villagers to take repair or reconstruction into their own hands.[10]   Medical facilities in rural areas are in worse shape than those in more urban areas. Most rural hospitals are staffed with only one doctor, and other medical facilities are generally staffed with young, inexperienced nurses and lack basic medicine. Hence, many patients prefer to avoid the physicians and local health centers which are supposed to provide primary care and go instead to the larger city hospitals that are more specialised for secondary and tertiary care. This, however, leads to an overcrowding of these facilities, which themselves are insufficiently staffed and equipped, and negatively impacts the quality of their services.   In a mountainous and poor country, access to medical facilities can be difficult. Many Tajikistanis live tens of kilometers away from medical centers. This isolation, although not specific to Tajikistan, is made significantly worse by a faulty road system impacted by harsh winter climatic conditions, as well as by the deterioration of the public transport system since the fall of the USSR, resulting in few connections to cities.[11]   Access to hospitals in emergency situations is particularly critical. The ambulance fleet is old and insufficient, including in large cities. Private transport by unofficial taxis is therefore the essential means to reach medical centers, including in case of severe symptoms such as heart failure or stroke. Worryingly, a significant part of the population, 30 per cent of which live under the national poverty line, cannot afford a private taxi service.[12] This leads residents of regions such as the GBAO to rely on understaffed and underequipped local health centers even in serious health situations.[13]   Lack of preparedness and corruption in the Tajikistani administration Difficulties in addressing issues related to the national healthcare system is certainly not specific to Tajikistan. Many countries around the world, including in Eurasia, have struggled to reform and improve their healthcare systems. However, Tajikistan’s difficulties have been exacerbated by the neo-patrimonial nature of its political regime, in which the political and economic elites are closely interconnected, and sometimes are even the same, and where part of the way the medical system is managed has been based less on prioritised health needs and more on corruption and enrichment schemes for the elites.   The well-documented misappropriation of the profits of the country's scarce resources, especially those of the state aluminum company and biggest national export-earner Talco, by the President’s family and closest circles have gutted investment in social welfare, including in the health sector. As reported more than ten years ago by a former US ambassador, the “people of Tajikistan effectively subsidise Talco, by living without adequate health services, education or electricity”.[14] Since then, the President has strengthened his grip on the country's resources and made Tajikistan essentially a family run state, resulting in further deterioration of the social welfare system.[15]   Second, the medical sector itself has been a source of income for the presidential family, which has also had an impact on its management and development. For example, the construction of some medical or hospital centers have resulted more from corruption than from a strategic healthcare objective. According to local doctors and several other testimonies, businessmen without experience in medical management have been authorised to open medical structures by paying bribes to the presidential family.[16] Moreover, the pharmaceutical sector is largely under the control of presidential family members. Two of the companies which dominate Tajikistan’s pharmaceutical market, Sifat Pharm and Orion-Pharm, are owned respectively by the President’s daughter, Parvina, and his son, Rustam Emomali.[17] This has enabled Rahmon’s family and close allies to limit competition in the pharmaceutical sector and sell drugs at inflated prices, including during the COVID-19 crisis when the price of medications for mild forms of the disease increased seven fold, making it a source of income for the Rahmon family while also increasing the difficulty for poor families to access medical treatment.[18]   Third, management of the medical sector has been heavily impacted by President Rahmon’s efforts to secure his political regime and a potential dynastic transition to his son Rustam Emomali. To this end, Rahmon has combined authoritarianism and repression against opposition together with conveying an image of himself as the guardian of citizens’ welfare; he has also striven to counter portrayals of degradation in the social welfare system in local testimonies or in the limited opposition media. In this context, the rationale behind investing in medical facilities has been less a matter of improvement and balanced development than of political authorities laundering their reputations. This has been reflected in the repeated announcements of improvements in medical infrastructure which have not been implemented.  For example, notwithstanding some achievements of the ‘Programme of State Guarantees to Provide the Population With Medical and Sanitary Assistance for 2017-2019’, information is vague concerning the location and opening dates for the planned 560 medical facilities.[19] Surprisingly, those facilities that were built have received very little press coverage in a country where achievements in the social welfare sector are usually widely celebrated by the state-controlled media. Actually, most new medical facilities reported on in the press in the last three years were not part of this programme, but instead the result of foreign aid coming inter alia from the Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, the Russian Federation, Japan, or the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA).   This is also demonstrated by the geographic concentration of new medical constructions, which are mainly in the capital, where they are more visible than in remote regions, and in Khatlon, Rahmon’s birthplace, where seven out of eight medical centers under the 2017-2019 programme were built. This focus on Khatlon is also part of the President’s strategy to secure the loyalism of the elites of this region, on whom he had heavily relied since the end of the civil war, but whose political unity has been undermined by dwindling money and resources.[20] Despite the legitimate importance of developing infrastructure in the capital or in Khatlon, the geographical concentration of limited funds has undermined the development of infrastructure in the provinces and even led residents of some towns or villages to build or repair medical centers with their own money, including on the basis of Hashar-collective labour as noted in Lolazor-2, a village in Vakhsh district in the region of Khatlon.[21]   COVID-19 versus regime security Rahmon’s prioritisation of the security of his political regime at the expense of the health of the population has been clearly illustrated by the Government’s management of the COVID-19 crisis. Recognising a large scale spread of the virus on the Tajik territory, and consequently imposing a lockdown like most countries in the world, posed a significant economic and social risk likely to further threaten the legitimacy and security of the regime. It therefore happened only belatedly and in a limited way.   Tajikistan has been going through a social and financial crisis for several years. The extent of economic progress, growth of GDP and decrease in poverty that has been proclaimed by the Government has been widely disputed by independent observers.[22] Moreover, as described by the World Bank, Tajikistan’s economy remains vulnerable to external shocks.[23] While the remittances sent back by up to one million Tajikistani migrant workers in Russia had been an essential contribution to economy of the country and hence to the survival of the regime for at least the last 15 years, restricting the circulation and hence the migrations of Tajikistanis would have increased unemployment.   The weakening and even unavoidable bankruptcy of many of the small and medium-sized businesses with a lockdown of the country would have further impacted the local labour market, and hence increased the risk of social unrest. Moreover, this was likely to impact the rentier system of Rahmon and the elites. Small and medium-sized enterprises bear a large share of the tax burden in Tajikistan, and significantly reducing their activities would have cut down income for the state budget and might have made it more difficult for the Government to reduce the tax allowances granted to big companies controlled by Rahmon and regional political elites, and which constitute an essential rentier source.[24]   Finally, the intersection of the country's health policy with the neo-patrimonial and authoritarian policies has been intensified by the timing of events. The COVID-19 crisis intersected with the 2020 presidential election, which was held in November and which OSCE observers found “took place within an environment tightly controlled by state authorities and characterized by long-standing restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms… no genuine political alternative … (and) lacked credibility and transparency.” Even if President Rahmon has kept tight authoritarian control over the administrative machine and the electoral process to prevent the emergence of any opposition, the crisis resulting from the COVID-19 could have undermined his official narrative portraying himself as the guarantor of economic progress in the country and of the supposed well-being of the population.   Impact on the population The logic of prioritising policy at the expense of health, combined with authoritarianism, impacts the health of the Tajikistani population. By first refusing to recognise and then minimising the COVID-19 crisis, as well as preventing a lockdown, the Tajik Government has bet on the development of herd immunity, as have bet some other countries, such as Sweden, thereby hoping to reduce the economic and political risks brought by the health crisis. The Swedish strategy, however, has been criticised.[25] Moreover, unlike the well-developed Swedish healthcare system, the Tajikistani health system is weak and has been unable to address the epidemic; the Government’s assertion disseminated in the state media that the country had the necessary capacity to respond to the crisis has been contradicted by the testimonies of hospital workers from several different regions who have spoken out about the severe shortage of personal-protection equipment (PPE) for medics as well as other supplies, including those for treating patients.   In addition, the lack of acknowledgement of the crisis slowed down dissemination of guidelines, instructions and treatment related to COVID-19. Temporary guidelines for the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of the infection were approved by Minister of Health Olimzod only on April 13th. Hence, doctors did not receive protocols for the diagnosis and treatment of the disease until at least four months after the outbreak of the virus. Although international aid has since contributed to improving the situation, the initial denial of the crisis led to a significant and risky lack of equipment, as reported in the southern district of Muminobod, where only one ventilator was been made available, at the main hospital, for a region of more than 72,000 inhabitants.[26]   Moreover, the Government’s denial of the continued spread of the virus in the country led part of the population to not take seriously the risks of the disease or the necessary precautions to prevent its spread. This is likely to have been worsened by the WHO’s endorsement on April 20th 2020 of Rahmon's narrative that no case of COVID-19 had been identified in the country, despite local testimonies, which was subsequently widely circulated in the controlled state media.[27]   Finally, the COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated the difficulties the population already had in accessing medicine due to the underdeveloped and overly expensive pharmaceutical sector, as well as the control of the pharmaceutical market by the elites and the presidential family. Despite repeated official statements that there would be free medical services, including by Minister of Health Jamoliddin Abdullozoda in February 2021, patients have been charged around $200 USD for treatment of mild illnesses, and $400-700 for treatment of severe illnesses, including COVID-19. In 2020, nearly two-thirds of health expenditures came from out-of-pocket spending.[28] The high cost of drugs and medical treatment has made it inaccessible for a part of the population whose average salary is $150 USD.[29] Larger and poorer families were particularly affected, resulting in increased debt to finance treatment. Overall, the crisis has further highlighted a significant disparity between wealthy elites who have access to the few well-equipped hospitals and the majority of the population.   Conclusion  While lack of proper healthcare has become one of the main grievances of the population towards the regime, the policy conducted by the Government has raised many questions and has been further illustrated by the management of the COVID-19 crisis. President Rahmon's initial denial and then underestimation of coronavirus infections despite a growing number of suspicious deaths is likely to have further eroded people's trust in the regime.[30] While most of the rest of the world faced the crisis and sounded warnings about the spread of the disease, and despite the WHO's March 16th recommendations about the need to avoid mass gatherings, President Rahmon continued large celebrations and events during the electoral campaign to promote his regime and his son Emomali, such as the pompous Navruz celebrations, the Tulip Festival, and others.   Despite the Government’s propaganda efforts and suppression of information, much of the population nevertheless is aware of the problems and contrasts the current failing health system with the free and relatively effective system it had been accustomed to under the Soviet regime. This has left many Tajikistani citizens dissatisfied with their current situation. While healthcare experts and economists have demonstrated an inextricable link between poor health, poverty, and under-development, Tajikistan’s emphasis on regime security and kleptocratic interests over healthcare is likely to have long-term negative impacts on this sector and on the country’s development.[31]   Despite the complexity of providing assistance to authoritarian and corrupt regimes, international donors could make a real difference, even taking into account that many today have only modest investment capacities, including through targeted, smaller assistance programmes that contribute to the development of local medical structures, especially outside the capital; by improving access to health facilities, including by helping to develop emergency transport services such as ambulances; by supporting the development of civil society organisations which contribute to accountability in the medical sector but whose activities are currently restricted; and by raising visibility about the state of the medical sector in Tajikistan internationally.   Sebastien Peyrouse, PhD, is a research professor at the Central Asia Program in the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (George Washington University). His main areas of expertise are political systems in Central Asia, economic and social issues, Islam and religious minorities, and Central Asia’s geopolitical positioning toward China, Russia, India and South Asia. He has authored or co-authored several books on Central Asia such as Turkmenistan. Strategies of Power, Dilemmas of Development (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe) and published many articles, including in Europe Asia Studies, Nationalities Papers, China Perspectives, Religion, State & Society, Journal of Church and State.   Image by Ninara under (CC).   [1] RFE/RL Investigation Finds, Tajikistan's Official Coronavirus Stats Don't Reflect Reality, RFE/RL, June 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-official-coronavirus-stats-don-t-reflect-reality-rfe-rl-investigation-finds/30692651.html [2] RFE/RL, Tajik Mosques Reopen as Government Claims No New Coronavirus Cases, February 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-mosques-reopen-as-government-claims-no-new-coronavirus-cases/31080795.html [3] Eurasianet, Tajikistan’s excess mortality data belie COVID-19 denialism, February 2021, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistans-excess-mortality-data-belie-covid-19-denialism [4] RFE/RL Investigation Finds, Tajikistan's Official Coronavirus Stats Don't Reflect Reality, RFE/RL, June 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-official-coronavirus-stats-don-t-reflect-reality-rfe-rl-investigation-finds/30692651.html [5] Tajikistan’s excess mortality data belie COVID-19 denialism. [6] Farangis Najibullah, As Coronavirus Infections Go From Zero To Hundreds In Days, Tajikistan's Hospitals Can't Keep Up, RFE/RL, May 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/overcrowded-hospitals-in-tajikistan-as-coronavirus-infections-go-from-zero-to-hundreds-in-days/30597899.html [7] Radio Ozodi, Zhertvy COVID -19 v Tadzhikistane. Rassledovanie June 2020, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30690777.html; RFE/RL Investigation Finds, Tajikistan's Official Coronavirus Stats Don't Reflect Reality, RFE/RL, June 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-official-coronavirus-stats-don-t-reflect-reality-rfe-rl-investigation-finds/30692651.html [8] Sebastien Peyrouse, The Alarming State of the Healthcare System in Tajikistan, IPHR, July 2020, https://www.iphronline.org/new-report-the-alarming-state-of-the-healthcare-system-in-tajikistan.html [9] See the World Bank website: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/overview [10] Eelco Jacobs and Claudia Baez Camargo, Local health governance in Tajikistan: accountability and power relations at the district level, International Journal for Equity in Health, 19, 30 (2020). [11] Hursand Hurramov, "V bol'nicu za 40 km". Zhiteli tadzhikskih glubinok ne imejut dostupa k medicine, Radio Ozodi, June 2019, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/29976795.html [12] Sam Bhutia, How economic growth in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan masks the plight of their poorest, Eurasianet, December 2019, https://eurasianet.org/how-economic-growth-in-tajikistan-and-kyrgyzstan-masks-the-plight-of-their-poorest [13] Eelco Jacobs and Claudia Baez Camargo, Local health governance in Tajikistan: accountability and power relations at the district level, International Journal for Equity in Health, 19, 30 (2020). [14]  Alexander A. Cooley and John Heathershaw. 2017. Dictators Without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia. New Heaven and London: Yale University Press. [15] John Heathershaw and Parviz Mullojonov, Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Tajikistan Case Study, Stabilization Unit, February 2018. [16] Ariana, M. Dzhonmahmadov: Tadzhikskaia еkonomika – jeto semeinoe predpriiatie docherei Е.Rahmona, July 2012, https://ariana.su/?S=0.1207241307 [17] Elena Korotkova, Emomali Rahmona obvinjajut v nazhive na epidemii koronavirusa v Tadzhikistane, News Asia, June 2020, http://www.news-asia.ru/view/13889; Eurasianet, Tajikistan: Coronavirus panic puts sufferers of other illnesses in grave danger, May 2020, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-coronavirus-panic-puts-sufferers-of-other-illnesses-in-grave-danger [18] RFE/RL, In Tajikistan, COVID-19 Patients, Families Scoff at Pledge Of 'Free Treatment', February 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-covid-19-coronavirus-free-treatment-scam-big-bills/31112946.html [19] TAJ News, S nachala goda v Tadzhikistane postroili 7 medpunktov, December 2018, http://news.taj.su/?p=24897 [20] Lawrence Markowitz, Tajikistan: authoritarian reaction in a postwar state, Democratization, vol. 19, no. 1, 2012, pp. 98-119. [21] Cabar Asia, Tajikistan: Rural Residents Complain About Poor Conditions of the Healthcare Centers, October 8, 2020, https://cabar.asia/en/tajikistan-rural-residents-complain-about-poor-conditions-of-the-healthcare-centers-photoreport [22] Cabar Asia, The great discrepancy of Tajikistan: the rhetoric of poverty and the practice of state festivities, January 2021, https://cabar.asia/en/the-great-discrepancy-of-tajikistan-the-rhetoric-of-poverty-and-the-practice-of-state-festivities [23] See the World Bank website: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/overview [24] Azia Plus, Koronavirus v Tadzhikistane est'. Tak schitaet tadzhikskij politolog i ob’’jasnjaet, pochemu molchat vlasti, April 2020,  https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/opinion/20200416/koronavirus-v-tadzhikistane-est-tak-schitaet-tadzhikskii-politolog-i-obyasnyaet-pochemu-molchat-vlasti [25]  Kelly Bjorklund, Andrew Ewing The Swedish COVID-19 Response Is a Disaster. It Shouldn’t Be a Model for the Rest of the World, Time, October 2020, https://time.com/5899432/sweden-coronovirus-disaster/ [26] Farangis Najibullah As Coronavirus Infections Go From Zero To Hundreds In Days, Tajikistan's Hospitals Can't Keep Up.

[27] Koronavirus v Tadzhikistane est'. Tak schitaet tadzhikskij politolog i ob’’jasnjaet, pochemu molchat vlasti.

[28] See the World Bank, Project Information Document, March 2020, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/274761585067722387/pdf/Project-Information-Document-Tajikistan-Emergency-COVID-19-Project-P173765.pdf [29] Elena Korotkova, Еmomali Rahmona obvinjajut v nazhive na jepidemii koronavirusa v Tadzhikistane, Asia News, June 2020, http://www.news-asia.ru/view/13889;  In Tajikistan, COVID-19 Patients, Families Scoff At Pledge Of 'Free Treatment' [30] Tajikistan’s excess mortality data belie COVID-19 denialism. [31] J W Lynch, G D Smith, G A Kaplan and J S House, Income inequality and mortality: importance to health of individual income, psychosocial environment, or material conditions, BMJ, vol. 320, April 2000. [post_title] => Stuck between underinvestment, government authoritarianism and corruption: The healthcare system in Tajikistan and the risks for the population [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => stuck-between-underinvestment-government-authoritarianism-and-corruption-the-healthcare-system-in-tajikistan-and-the-risks-for-the-population [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-05-16 21:12:35 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-05-16 20:12:35 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5803 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [6] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5800 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-05-17 00:08:49 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-05-16 23:08:49 [post_content] => In 2020 and 2021, COVID-19 and the economic crisis have brought a whole range of new phenomena and events into society, the significance and consequences of which we have yet to understand. The revitalisation of civil society and volunteer movement observed in many countries during the pandemic is also a manifestation of this new social phenomenon. This phenomenon is not something new and unusual for Western democratic countries, but the sudden increase in activities of the non-governmental sector looks quite unusual for developing countries with economies in transition. A similar phenomenon was observed also other post-Soviet countries with authoritarian or  hybrid regimes, such as Belarus where the Government’s denial policy and revitalisation of civil society eventually led the country to a large-scale ant-government uprising. Moreover, the scale of this civic revival looks especially considerable in authoritarian states, where civic activity seemed to be long gone or did not exist at all. Accordingly, a completely natural question arises – to what extent will the current revival of civil institutions be lasting, and how serious can be its impact on modern society – both globally and in certain regions and states.   This question could be also fully attributed to the Tajik society, where during the pandemic the same level of the revival of civic activism is observed. Until very recently the Tajik non-governmental sector seemed to be gone into a deep crisis, completely unable to regain its former influence – as it was during its rise in the mid-2000s. The question is, will the current upsurge be a temporary phenomenon, after which everything will return to the pre-pandemic situation, or will it lead to a range of considerable and systemic changes in the structure and nature of Tajik civil society? Moreover, again, in this case, we are talking not only about Tajikistan but also about changes of a more global order that have been brewing for a long time, while the pandemic has only spurred their development.   Tajik civil society during the pandemic - Key trends and tendencies There are many definitions of civil society – but it is most commonly understood as the entire space beyond the Government and official institutions – that is, de facto the whole area between an individual and the Government. Accordingly, civil society includes NGOs, community and political organisations, independent media, informal associations of citizens, and so on. Some researchers also include in civil society the private enterprises, primarily the small business sector.[1] Thus, civic institutions play the role of a mediator between citizens and political power, protecting their rights and representing their interests on the decision-making level.   In times of crisis and social upheaval, when the authorities and official bodies are often not able to cover the whole spectrum of problems and challenges, civil society, as a rule, becomes active, filling the vacuum. Thus, civic institutions not only help the authorities but even take on some of their functions to satisfy the needs and requirements of the population affected by the crisis.   This is precisely what is happening during the pandemic around the world, starting from the Western democracies and to the developing world and CIS countries. Today even the most developed economies proved to be less prepared for the pandemic, and even the most effective governments are struggling to cope with its consequences. Under these conditions, the growth of civic activity is expressed in the rapid growth of the volunteer movement, which is engaged in the collection and distribution of humanitarian aid, funds for the purchase of food and medicine, assistance to doctors and hospitals, and so on. Almost everywhere, civil society intensifies and strengthens public control over the activities of both local governments and international organisations involved in the fight against the pandemic.   Today we can talk about a fundamental difference between the current crisis and all previous ones (for example, the last global crisis of 2008) – namely, a completely new level of information technology, online and Internet space, and social networks. It also implies a completely different level of self-organisation of civil society that was clearly demonstrated during the pandemic.   Moreover, it seems that COVID-19 will give a new impetus to the development of online technologies, significantly accelerating the tendencies and trends that have been developing secretly in this area over the past decades. We are talking about speeding up the process of digitalisation of most areas of public life – economy, education, culture, medicine, and the transition of a significant part of information and business services to the online space, etc. Accordingly, in many countries – especially in authoritarian states – one can expect a new round of confrontation between political authority and civil society. On one hand, the reviving civic institutions will try to improve their positions in society and to increase their influence on the decision-making process. On the other hand, the authorities will always try to bring back the civil society under its strict control and reduce the space for social mobilisation and discourse.   This trend towards a new round of confrontation and competition between the political power and civil society is observed today by both individual experts and leading international organisations. As one of the UN experts stated in this regard: “No country or government can overcome this health crisis alone, and I am worried about the alarming trends and limitations reported by civil society representatives around the world, including associated with their ability to support the effective fight against COVID-19.”[2]   New realities - Revitalisation of civil society in Tajikistan Tajikistan is one of the most striking examples of the new phenomenon – today we are witnessing a revival of Tajik civil society that until recently seemed to be almost impossible. First of all, due to the very nature of the development of the pandemic situation in the country – the Government has denied for far too long the presence of coronavirus in the country, which exacerbated the growth of the pandemic and increased the number of infected people in the country. Besides, as it turned out, the Tajik economy, healthcare, and social welfare systems were completely unprepared for the crisis.   As a result, in the conditions of the apparent failure of the official anti-crisis programme, the Tajik civil society has considerably intensified its activities, assuming some the state functions and services. This process of revitalisation of civic institutions could be relatively divided into three main stages:   The first stage mainly affected the information space – where a sharp and first increase in civic activities was observed already by March – April 2020, when the Government was still vehemently denying the presence of the coronavirus in the country. Against the background of slurred and unconvincing official statistics, the Tajik segment of the Internet, independent media, and online social networks have launched a broad discussion of the state strategy and approaches to combating the pandemic. Special groups appeared in social networks (both closed and open) initiating heated discussions, doubting the official statistics, and offering a range of alternative facts and data.   Thus, it was the policy of the authorities on hiding reliable information that has caused the first wave of the revitalisation of the Tajik non-governmental sector. At this stage, it was mainly about initiating a public discourse in the Internet sector, which remains beyond government control. And the more it became clear that the Government is suppressing the truth, the higher was the level of criticism both in public discourse and in the society as a whole.   The second stage, namely, the intensification of volunteer activities, begins already after the first outbreak of the disease both in Tajikistan itself and in Russia, where the majority of Tajik migrants reside. During this period various groups of citizens started to engage in more practical and public actions – against the backdrop of a deepening collapse and the apparent perplexity of the Tajik official agencies, primarily the Ministry of Health. The process of self-organisation of civil society began in the form of the formation of a volunteer movement – a new phenomenon for the country that was not observed even during the civil war. Moreover, today we are talking about the self-organisation of citizens, most of whom have never been affiliated with political parties either, but in general, have not taken part in public activities.   The process of society’s self-organisation from the very beginning went beyond the circle of professional NGOs that have played mainly a catalyst role for many civic initiatives. In Tajikistan the most civic initiatives were organised via Facebook and YouTube, which are traditionally the most popular platforms among Tajik intelligentsia and civic activists. Later on, various groups of volunteers began to gather and set up around these initiatives, and they began to collect products and personal protective equipment for doctors and ordinary citizens. The rapidly growing groups and associations of volunteers were engaged in cooking and purchasing food for doctors, raising funds to pay for medical services for the poorest and most vulnerable families, providing home care, etc. Some volunteers’ groups have already attempted to register as new NGOs – for example, in Khujand, the ‘Okean Iz Kapel’ (Ocean of Drops) charity foundation created based on such a group has managed eventually to consolidate a part of this movement in the city.   In Dushanbe, a number of NGOs and new civic associations stood at the head of the volunteer movement, among them are the Civil Liberties Office, ‘Mozhesh – Pomogi’ (If You Can, Help), ‘SIZ Dushanbe’ (PPE Dushanbe) and ‘Peshraft’. Thus, the Civil Liberties Office has launched a special QR code to raise funds for those in need during the coronavirus pandemic. They raised $2,000 in a month and helped 300 people with food and medicine - an initiative copied by tens and hundreds of volunteer groups.[3] In Dushanbe, groups of volunteers and ordinary citizens launched a fundraising campaign for the outlined regions of the country. They rented vehicles and cars to send medicines and products to physicians and those in need in the regions. The civil associations of Dushanbe and volunteer groups in the regions have developed a set of joint initiatives. Thus, central NGOs gathered food and medicines based on the lists prepared by volunteers in the regions; when transported to the regions that required the items they were distributed by local activists among the most needed groups of the population. Moreover, volunteer groups have created their system of transparency and accountability, which looks especially attractive against the backdrop of the practice and working style of the relevant official agencies. In most cases, the civic groups carry out the fundraising and distribution activities as open as possible; thus, they have introduced a practice of disseminating special online reports and photos on the spent funds and distributed products.   The volunteer movement has proved to be especially successful and widespread among the Tajik labour migrants, who have found themselves in a very difficult situation due to the onset of quarantine and the economic crisis in Russia. Several local migrant organisations – such as the Center for Tajiks in Moscow led by Izzat Amon, a Tajik lawyer –  have launched a set of large-scale fundraising and humanitarian campaigns to assist labour migrants and their families throughout Russia. Also, for the first time, volunteers who have never been engaged in social activities before, are taking part in this movement – among them are students and ordinary migrants, many of whom already have Russian citizenship. As in Tajikistan, the intensification of civic activities of the Tajik diaspora in Russia takes place against the backdrop of the passivity of the Tajik Government and diplomats that causes sharp criticism from society.   The system of online appeals of volunteer organisations to the Government has also come into practice – for example, with a demand to assist migrant workers who remained outside the country during the COVID-19 pandemic, physicians and small businesses, and vulnerable groups of the population.   Government response Therefore, since 2020, Tajikistan and the Tajik diasporas abroad have faced a largely unprecedented phenomenon of the rapid revitalisation of civil society and the formation of the volunteer movement. The Tajik Government proved to be completely unprepared for this new social movement, especially in the context of a deepening economic crisis. Initially, the Government did not know how to respond to such a ‘purely humanitarian’ and non-political nature of civic activism. This ‘confusion’ was because a significant part of the social and civic activism is manifested in the sectors beyond the Government’s control – namely, in the Internet and online space, as well as among migrant workers and foreign diasporas.   Later, the Government developed a set of response measures aimed at reducing the level and influence of the volunteer movement. The new strategy includes the following set of measures:   First, the Government has launched a counter-narrative information campaign. On one hand, the authorities tried to hush up the achievements of the volunteer groups. On the other hand, as a counterbalance, the official media launched an information campaign to popularise the Government humanitarian aid provided by large companies, officials, and state agencies.   On the other hand, the Tajik authorities have strengthened their efforts to limit civic activism by putting pressure on the most critically-minded commentators, blocking websites, introducing provisions on “punishment for false information”, “escalating panic” and so on. The most striking and typical example of such pressure is a campaign directed against legally registered media – primarily 'Radio Ozodi' (Liberty), which disseminated information about the first cases of COVID-19 in Tajikistan, publicly casting doubt on official statistics. The confrontation with 'Radio Ozodi' in April 2020 reached an international level, causing serious criticism of the Government from the international community, including several statements made by a group of leading US senators and public figures.[4]   Second, the Tajik law enforcement and security bodies have enhanced their activities abroad to neutralise the political opposition that took refuge in several EU countries. Besides this, they targeted several major NGOs and civic organisations specialised in defending migrants’ rights in Russia. Special attention is given to the critically-minded bloggers and owners of private YouTube channels, who criticised the official counter-pandemic strategy. In the last several years a wide network of independent online TV channels and video blogs appeared in the Tajik segment of the Internet. The majority of these private media are owned by migrants and non-professional journalists specialised mostly in the issues of the Tajik diasporas abroad. According to independent media sources, Tajik law enforcement tries to limit the criticism of the critically-minded video-bloggers by exerting pressure on their relatives residing in Tajikistan. The Government also undertakes a set of measures to control access to independent online media within the country. Since 2018, Tajik authorities carried out a consistent policy of making Internet access and mobile communication services more expensive and strengthening government control over the country’s telecommunications sector. In particular, the Government introduced a strict limitation on the number of SIM cards a user could have. As a result, by October 2019 the number of Internet users in the country declined to 2.9 million, while the number of mobile phone users went down to 6.2 million, of that number, only 4.5 million users were considered active subscribers.[5]   Third, since 2017, the Tajik Government has been waging a campaign of arrests and detentions of the most critically minded online bloggers, civic activists, and opposition members – apparently to neutralise perceived dissident voices ahead of the 2020 presidential elections and during the pandemic. Some of the civic activists were arrested in Russia by local police to be later deported to Tajikistan. Thus, according to media, in the last several years, Russian authorities have cooperated with Dushanbe on the return of several prominent civic activists and opposition figures, including: Shobuddin Badalov (2020, detained in Nizhny Novgorod); Sharofiddin Gadoev (2019, kidnapped from Moscow); Naimjon Samiev (2018, detained in Grozny); and Karomatullo Sharipov (migrants’ rights defender, 2017). The most recent and notorious case is the detention and deportation of Izzat Amon, Head of the Center for Tajiks of Moscow -- an organisation that has helped Tajik citizens properly register with Russian authorities, as well as to find places to live and work. Izzat Amon has doubled his popularity among the Tajik diaspora during the pandemic when he organised a wide and effective network of providing food and medicines for unemployed migrants in Moscow. As in other similar cases, in a hastily convened hearing before his deportation, a Russian court deprived him of his Russian citizenship.   Besides, intending to limit the potential rise of dissident movement inside the country, the Government proceeded with police investigations and arrests of locally-based critically-minded civic and religious figures. Thus, during 2020 around 70 to 100 people have been charged with membership of the Muslim Brotherhood – a banned organisation, whose presence was never reported before in the country.[6] Most recently, in April 2021, several well-known religious figures were detained and questions after giving a speech on the funeral ceremony of one of the most prominent Sufi leaders in the country.   This suppressive policy negatively affected the international rating of the country. In 2019, Reporters Without Borders, a non-governmental human rights organisation, ranked Tajikistan as 161st in its annual 2019 World Press Freedom Index. Therefore, Tajikistan went 12 spots down compared to 2018, when the country was ranked 149th among 180 countries.[7]   Civil society after the pandemic: its politicisation and future prospects One of the most puzzling questions today is how the relationship between the revitalised civil society and the Government will develop after the pandemic – a question that is relevant not only for Tajikistan. Thus, today many authoritarian governments already exert significant efforts to bring civil society back under control. However, along this path, the Tajik Government will certainly face a range of serious obstacles and new challenges, such as:   Firstly, the pandemic and related socio-economic consequences is a long-term phenomenon – in other words, the effect of the pandemic will last quite a long time. Accordingly, the more difficult the socio-economic situation in the country will be, the more active civil society will be and the more difficult it will be for the Government to drive it into the old framework.   Secondly, the level of public criticism of the Government is also unprecedented and it rapidly assumes a political character. The first manifestations of politicisation of civic protest could be observed already several years ago – during the first phase of the economic crisis (2014-2017) caused by the shrinking of the Russian labour market and the corresponding drop in migrants’ remittances. The public discontent gradually accumulated to be unleashed recently after the above-mentioned arrest and deportation of Izzat Amon, Head of the Center for Tajiks in Moscow. The arrest caused a series of protests, including several attempts to organise demonstrations and pickets in front of the Tajik embassy in Moscow.[8] The opposition online media (Isloh.tj, Group-24, Minbari Muhojir/Tribune of Migrant) suddenly received tens of thousands of new followers and subscribers. Today, each online streaming devoted to Izzat Amon and other related issues attracts at least six to ten thousand viewers plus around 40-50 thousand people view each programme later.   The future scale and degree of politicisation of public protest depends on the Government itself, or rather, on what tactics and strategy the authorities will choose to resolve the social and economic crisis. Most likely, a certain part of civil society, which mostly has a critical attitude towards the authorities, will be anyway politicised to one degree or another. The question is whether the growing politicisation trend would involve a considerable part of the population that for many years stayed out of politics.   However, there is another serious challenge for the Tajik authorities here – even if they manage to hamper the ongoing process of politicisation of civil society, it will be much more difficult to reduce the activity of civic groups and institutions. Of course, in the near future, the authorities would be able to limit civic activity offline within Tajikistan; however, this will not be enough to prevent a possible politicisation of social and public protest in the Tajik society as a whole.   The fact is that, as mentioned above, the mobilisation of civil society today takes place mainly in the online space, uniting various social groups and diasporas among themselves both in Tajikistan and beyond. All this space is beyond the control of the Government, which is unable to influence the processes taking place in it. Moreover, the growing process of transition of public discourse, media, and business structures to the online space and the Tajik segment of Internet began long before the pandemic.   Thus, the pandemic only spurred and accelerated these processes. Today, it is hard to say how serious the changes will be in the structure and nature of Tajik civil society, the level of its activity, and the politicisation of social protest after the pandemic. However, in any case, it is quite possible that in a fairly short time the political elite of the country, as well as the Tajik society as a whole may deal with a new political and social reality.   Recommendations to the Government:
  • To conduct close monitoring, research and analysis of the pandemic situation in the country and to ensure the dissemination of reliable information on its further development;
  • To ensure transparency and monitoring on the distribution of humanitarian aid, medical equipment among the healthcare employees and ordinary citizens;
  • To develop a set of advantages and additional incentives for the healthcare workers engaged in the COVID prevention activities and programmes. This set of incentives must include corresponding supplements to the employees' salaries, providing them with additional paid vacations, awards, job promotions, etc.; and
  • To involve the newly appeared volunteer and civic groups in the Government anti-pandemic projects and initiatives, such as monitoring of the situation, distribution of humanitarian aid, rendering support to socially vulnerable groups of the population.
  Parviz Mullojonov, (Mullojanov) Ph.D., a political scientist, and historian, senior adviser to the International Alert office in Tajikistan and visiting researcher at the EHESS, Paris and former visiting researcher at the University of Uppsala, Sweden. He is former Chairman of the Board of the Tajik branch of the Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation); and former member of the EUCAM (EU and Central Asia Monitoring) research group. He is a former visiting professor at Whitman College (USA) and research fellow and at the Kettering Foundation (USA) and visiting scholar at the University of Exeter (UK), University of Heidelberg (Germany), and School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences – EHESS (Paris). Parviz Mullojonov worked for various international agencies and organisations such as Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, UNCHR, UNDP, ADB, Soros Foundation, and International Alert. Parviz Mullojanov received his Ph.D. in Islamic studies at the University of Basel (Switzerland).   [1] See: David Mathews “Politics for People: Finding a Responsible Public Voice”, University of Illinois Press, 1999 [2] Bez uchastia grazhdanskogo obshestva pravitelstva e spravyatsya s pandemieqi (Without participation of civic society the government would fail to deal with pandemic), UN News, April 2020, https://news.un.org/ru/story/2020/04/1376052 [3] Muslimbek Buriev, Silver Lining of Pandemic: Redefining Civil Society in Tajikistan, CABAR Asia, August 2020, https://cabar.asia/en/silver-lining-of-pandemic-redefining-civil-society-in-tajikistan [4] Marco Rubio, Rubio, Risch, Menendez, Casey Send Letter to Tajikistan President Regarding Harassment of Tajik Journalists, October 2019, https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/10/rubio-risch-menendez-casey-send-letter-to-tajikistan-president-regarding-harassment-of-tajik-journalists [5] Regnum, Tajikistan reveals the number of Internet and mobile telephony users, Regnum, November 2019, https://regnum.ru/news/economy/2784254.html [6] Eurasianet, Tajikistan sees mass arrests ahead of elections, January 2020, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-sees-mass-arrests-ahead-of-elections [7] Mumin Ahmadi, Reporters Without Borders: In Tajikistan, the situation with the freedom of speech is worse than in Uzbekistan, Radio Ozodi, April 2019, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/29889466.html [8] Reuters, Dozens Detained in Moscow in Rare Migrant Rights Protest - Human Rights Group, April 2021, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-04-02/dozens-detained-in-moscow-in-rare-migrant-rights-protest-human-rights-group [post_title] => Tajik civil society during and after the pandemic: Main challenges and development prospects [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => tajik-civil-society-during-and-after-the-pandemic-main-challenges-and-development-prospects [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-05-16 21:08:10 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-05-16 20:08:10 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5800 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [7] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5785 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-05-17 00:06:12 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-05-16 23:06:12 [post_content] => In the past ten years, almost every Central Asian republic has been demonstrating its sovereignty and independence through redevelopment of the architectural image of its capital city and the creation of the new architectural symbols of freedom. Such a tendency of complete destruction of the old is neither unusual, nor unexpected to say goodbye to the Soviet past and many tangible objects associated with it. Indeed, Nursultan Nazarbayev redeveloped Nur-Sultan (previously Astana) as a presidential city with plenty of monuments which are the landmarks of the contemporary Kazakh futuristic architecture. The old city of Bishkek contains plenty of buildings built during the Soviet-era, however, most of them have been left dilapidated, and by now, no revival is expected for them. Ashgabat, ‘the City of White Marble’, is widely known as an embodiment of the broad ambitions of its presidents, where out of the post-Soviet Ashgabat Saparmurat Niyazov and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov created the monumental city which suppresses the consciousness’s of its citizens. Under the rule of Islam Karimov, Tashkent faced great demolitions and dramatic reconstructions of the Soviet-era buildings, and the current president is also committed to further transformation of Tashkent into a modern business mecca. As for Dushanbe, a great number of Soviet-era buildings were already demolished, as they are the exact Soviet tangible objects which were ‘easy to reach’ to erase the legacy of the former generations, and to be replaced by other monuments which would belong to the generations living under the rule of Emomali Rahmon. While appealing again and again to the Tajik Government about the preservation of Soviet-era buildings it is like ‘trying to pour water into a sieve’. However, it is useful to consider and analyse the current situation, as well as to make further suggestions to the Government and other stakeholders for their further consideration and to put it into practice.   Construction sector and COVID-19 Currently in the time of COVID-19, it might be interesting to consider how the Government of Tajikistan copes with the new reality and how it lets the construction sector function in it. In Tajikistan, the official acknowledgement of the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic took place on April 30th 2020, i.e. just ahead of an official visit of a World Health Organization (WHO) team to the country to investigate whether the previous official denial of the absence of the virus was based on evidence. By the end of January 2021, Rahmon announced that there was no coronavirus in the country any more.   Considering the rapid flattening of the curve of cases and deaths, one could think about the earliness of this announcement.[1] It seems that the Government would like to lift most of the restrictions connected to the battle with COVID-19. However, this should not influence the sector of construction in Dushanbe greatly, as during the pandemic forced evictions continued, and there was only a partial stop of some construction activities.[2] For instance, in the beginning of the pandemic in Tajikistan, the reconstruction of Korvon Bazaar (a market in Dushanbe) was closed only for three months. Later, all construction activities were resumed.   The image of the Tajik capital is still being transformed, and there are many more destructions and redevelopments to come. Most of them include further demolitions of the Soviet buildings, and construction of new governmental buildings, new residencies for the heads of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s member states along with several new posh hotels, ordinary residential buildings, outdoor water parks, bazaars, monuments, etc.   Residency registration system Most of the changes in the image of the Tajik capital are connected not only with the demolitions of substantial historical and unhistorical buildings, but also with the issue of forced evictions which becomes more intense because of the holdover of the Soviet system called propiska. This residency registration system is common for all post-Soviet Central Asia, but in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan its name varies.   In Tajikistan, propiska is used to control internal and external migration and the way Tajik citizens fulfil their duties to the state.[3] It is inscribed in the passports of the Tajik citizens. However, even in present days there is a large number of those living without any identification documents and, as a result, without any propiska. This is a repercussion of the civil war (1992-1997), and in many cases it happens because of the legal illiteracy of a large part of the population, economic difficulties, and/or the absence of an official permission to live in the country which is mostly actual for ethnic Uzbeks and Afghans, who have been living in the border areas between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for many years.[4] The exact number of those living without passports is not defined, and Kevin Allen, UNHCR Representative in Tajikistan remarks that “[…] many people avoid appealing to the Government entities, as they are afraid of deportation and administrative punishment.”[5]   Having no propiska means violation of people’s rights in terms of access to such basic rights as: the right to housing, the right to health protection, the right to education, the right to appeal and information, the right to participate in public life, the right to vote, the right to labour, the right of ownership, etc. Moreover, the absence of propiska leads to unemployment, poverty, fraud, and other consequences (including getting any kind of social support from the state). Having no propiska makes people vulnerable against the state and those who use the illegal status of this part of the population for their own benefit. According to the Article 469 of the Code of Administrative Violations of the Republic of Tajikistan, there is an administrative punishment for living without propiska.[6] Moreover, there is a designated period of 15 days set for getting propiska.   In general, Tajik officials do not restrict the number of people who can get propiska to live in Dushanbe or other Tajik towns. This system is mostly used as a generic form of state control over the population. Thus, not registered people of Tajikistan either live without propiska, or in order to benefit from getting social support from the state and/or enjoy all basic rights mentioned above, they try to find alternative ways to make it. For instance, if a person does not have his or her own housing, he or she tries to find an alternative housing where it will be possible to get propiska. In many cases, people pay to the owners of the housing where propiska is made. In such situations, it is impossible to get birth certificates and passports, and claim pensions, etc.   However, there are cases when the state realises the impossibility of getting any propiska, but nothing is made to improve the situation. This is happening with orphans when they are 16 years old or older, and are of the legal age of majority to leave children’s homes. Such children are not provided with any kind of housing, and as a result, these children are not able to register anywhere and get any propiska at all. According to Navruz Odinaev, the Lawyer and Head of the Himoya legal company, “the owners of the temporary housing where orphans live refuse to register their guests very often.”[7]   The disadvantaged and underprivileged people are another segment of population that suffers from the imperfection of the state system. These people do not have any possibility to purchase housing and as a result, to make propiska legally. For instance, a case of Elvira Tumarova, a Tajik citizen who as a migrant worker went to Russia with her mother, but because of the expired documents was deported back to Tajikistan.[8] Elvira does not have a place to live, and she suffers from epilepsy. Because of her disease and the absence of propiska she is not able to work legally, to survive she gathers pinecones in one of the city’s parks and sells them as kindling. Once because of the absence of the passport and propiska, Elvira spent 48 hours in a temporary detention facility – this is the exact reason why this woman does not search for any kind of support from the Government any more. Now, the only thing she has to rely on is herself.   Those people, who like Elvira’s mother sold their housing and after facing troubles were left without any money, and/or purchased new apartments in new constructions which did not pass the state commissioning even after the completion of constructions, are also not able to get propiska.   Moreover, the absence of registration can lead to the fact that if any woman without propiska is pregnant, she will not be able to give birth in a maternity clinic, but in a department of infectious disease. Additionally, people with the absence of propiska are not able to get a driving license and/or will not be able to purchase a sim card, and by the Government’s request to register with the IMEIs (International Mobile Equipment Identifier) in the future.[9]   After getting an official request from the Himoya legal company, Tajik Ministry of Internal Affairs recognised that they “allow the issue of passports with the possibility of registration in the reception centers”.[10] However, it is unclear whether people are informed about this opportunity and whether it is used in practice.   Additionally, it is worth noting that the issue of propiska brings difficulties even to those who have it. This is the case of those who have double citizenship with the Russian Federation. There are more than 250,000 people in Tajikistan who have such a double citizenship, and these people have to choose in which country to register.[11] According to the Russian and Tajik legislations, one should be permanently registered only in one place; and it might be troublesome to get a temporary propiska in Tajikistan in case one owns an apartment in Russia and an apartment in Tajikistan.   Demolitions and forced evictions      Current house demolitions in Dushanbe are undertaken by the state against the old solid two-, three-, and four-deckers built in the Soviet period and mainly located in the downtown of the city. In 2020 alone, a general number of demolished residential buildings totaled 422.[12] Among them, there are the first three-decker with three big and beautiful amphoras which dress the front façade of the Stalin-era house ever built in Dushanbe, two- and three-deckers with oriental stucco moldings, and a two-decker where Nikolay Voinovich, a famous Soviet journalist, Vladimir Voinovich, a famous Russian novelist, poet and playwright, Nikolay Akimov, an artistic director of the Leningrad Theatre of Comedy, George Millyar, a People’s Artist of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), and Evgeniy Shvarc, a famous Soviet story-teller, all lived. All these and many other Soviet-era buildings are being replaced with the new multistoried residential buildings predominantly of poor quality.   The authorities justify the construction of residential houses between nine- and 18-storeys and the construction of administration buildings between 25- and 30-storeys by cost-effectiveness and space-saving.[13] However, many areas in the suburbs remain built-up by the slum dwellings, and no information about demolition of such dwellings and/or their replacement by the new constructions is available. For instance, this is a case in the Yuzhnyi neighbourhood, the Pervyi Sovetskyi district, the Chehovskaya mahallya [neighbourhood], the Borbad neighbourhood, the Avtovokzal neighbourhood, etc. However, nowadays, despite developing the suburbs with slum dwellings, the authorities continue ‘improving’ the downtown and are also considering building new constructions in the eastern part of Dushanbe.[14] At the same time, they ‘forgot’ that this part of Dushanbe is not suitable for constructions because of the loose soil. Due to this, it is in the list of ten areas which are dangerous for any kind of construction – especially the construction of multistory buildings.[15]   Tajikistan is a mountainous country experiencing earthquakes on an ongoing basis, and all constructions made in the Soviet period were designed according to the seismic categories existing in the country. During the Soviet period, not every part of Dushanbe was built-up. According to Gafur Shermatov, a famous Tajik historian, and many former tenants of demolished Soviet-era buildings, the usefulness of almost all Soviet-era buildings demolished in the downtown and those under demolition could be prolonged; and due to the high quality of their constructions, they could accommodate many other future generations of Tajik citizens.[16] However, no chance was left for these buildings, and the state did not consider any possibility of renovation of Soviet-era buildings (including historical) or their restoration. The authorities deny any value and solidness of old buildings, they mostly do not go into any kind of dialogue with the general population and insist stubbornly that Dushanbe is a young city without any particular influence of the Soviets on the history of the capital, which should be built-up all over again.[17]   Additionally, they report that the construction activities of 46 new residential buildings will be finalised by the 30th anniversary of the independence of Tajikistan, which will be celebrated on September 9th 2021.[18] However, this rush, the embezzlement of funds, and the use of construction materials of low-quality lead to the cases where the constructions did not go through the official state commissioning process.[19] That is why at the end of 2020, Rustam Emomali, a Mayor of Dushanbe, claimed that he would seek the improvement of these “disadvantages and defects in constructions” by the provision of the most experienced construction companies, personnel and construction materials.[20] However, back in 2017, the Mayor had already started to control the construction activities in Dushanbe and he already raised the issue of faulty construction at one of the cabinet councils.[21] Thus, as the situation has remained unchanged, and as only few months have passed since the Mayor’s most recent declaration, the same questions about the quality of works, the possibility of fire evacuations, and about whether the authorities pay any attention to the geographical peculiarities of the area being developed remain.   All these changes in the construction sector of Dushanbe indicated in the final version of the not publicly known and not publicly discussed municipal redevelopment plans of Dushanbe (General plans) caused the emergence of the issue of forced evictions.[22] Those who had been forcibly evicted already faced and continue facing many challenges connected to the unwillingness of real estate developers to pay lucrative compensations for the housing, withholding of rent, and different kinds of fraud from the side of the real estate developers.   According to the 2020 Valuation Act of the Republic of Tajikistan, the real estate developers are responsible for making notarial deed contracts on compensations with forcibly evicted.[23] The same law states that the property under demolition should be appraised by a real estate appraiser. And if a property owner does not agree with the conducted real estate appraisal, he or she might hire another independent real estate appraiser who is able to provide his or her expertise on the property under question. Simultaneously, the owner of the property can go to the court and demand a recall of the real estate appraisal made by the real estate developer. However, not every forcibly evicted in Tajikistan is aware about his or her legal rights, and this leads to the fact that the right for housing is greatly violated in Tajikistan.   Because of the inaction of authorities and their unwillingness to consider people’s opinion, the forcibly evicted have to seek justice through insubordination to authorities’ decisions, media coverage, appeals to court and the Prosecutor-General’s Office, and appeals to the public organisation - Independent Center for Human Rights’ Protection. In some cases, persistence by the forcibly evicted have already paid off, in other cases further action is required.   For instance, the case of the tenement #74 on Tursunzade Street gained the attention of mass media because of the unwillingness of its tenants to accept low levels of reimbursement for the evicted housing set by the real estate developer.[24] Several families of the tenants of this tenement refused to move out, and the authorities had to start demolition of the roof with these families living in the building. This demolition led to the tenants’ property damage caused by the rainy weather. To seek justice, the tenants had to unsuccessfully appeal to the court and the Prosecutor-General’s Office. The real help was received from the Independent Center for Human Rights’ Protection which provided the tenants with an experienced lawyer. And after more than 23 months, the issue, with lucrative compensation for the housing, was solved; and currently, the last tenants are in the process of signing a new contract with the real estate developer.   A similar case is happening with the tenants of the tenement located on 49 Bukhoro Street, who faced the illegal demolition of half of their tenement by the real estate developer Pulodi Plaza. Without having a building demolition permit, the real estate developer demolished the roof and windows of part of the building which had been left by the tenants. Another part of the building was still inhabited by those tenants who decided not to move out. Later, the real estate developer invited the representatives of the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense to recognise the tenement as unsafe. The tenants of the building appealed to the Mayor, court and the President of the Republic of Tajikistan. However, the situation with the demolition of the tenement remain unchanged, and the real estate developer still does not guarantee sufficient compensation for the rehousing of the tenants of 49 Bukhoro Street. The chronicle of events is registered by the tenants in the Facebook group ‘Dom Buhoro 49’.[25]   Dushanbe is full of similar cases of real estate developers trying not to fulfil their duties to the forcibly evicted.[26] Moreover, there are other cases of different examples of fraud made by real estate developers in the construction sector, such as: (i) Dushanbe real estate developers issued contracts which did not contain real dates for the end of construction;[27] (ii) they issued contracts which did not contain any dates for provision of documents of entitlement for new housing;[28] (iii) they issued contracts which contained false information, as they intentionally decreased the overall area of the demolished housing;[29] and (iv) they issued contracts which contained false information on the overall area of the new housing, as they intentionally decreased it, and included no information on the terms for providing additional accommodation in case if the overall area of the new housing was smaller.[30] Additionally, many real estate developers do not pay the rent of the forcibly evicted.[31]   Currently, the real estate developers continue making money out of thin air by suppressing the tenants of the Soviet-era buildings, forcibly evicting them from their houses and issuing illegal contracts. In return, the forcibly evicted continue their fight with the real estate developers and insist on the real estate developers to statutorily pay for their leases, as well as suing real estate developers and possibly getting appropriate compensation for their loss.   Money in the construction sector and ties to the family Historically, the construction sector is one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption. The constant presence of the same people in power can weaken this sector’s functionality and lead to imperfections in its structure. The closure of the political system allows those in the system to overstep and make good use of the office and power for their own ends. Additionally, the situation with the money in the construction sector of Tajikistan worsens because of the shortage of public information as the state authorities provide only general information about money spent in the sector, but almost no details. In most of the cases, it is extremely difficult to trace money spent in one of the chosen industries.   If we consider the state budget of Tajikistan, we will see that most of the parts of its budget data are unofficially hidden from the population. In many cases, only summary data on defined sectors of the state budget is publicly available. The published law ‘On State Budget – 2020’ and the ‘Citizens’ Budget of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2020’ provide only limited information.[32] Thus currently, without having all the numbers and data from the state budget, one can only try to analyse and understand how the money of taxpayers is spent in the construction sector of Tajikistan.   There, one can find that in 2020, the state budget revenues made more than TJS 3,170,000,000 (approx. $278.34 million).[33] These revenues were composed of the tax and non-tax revenues, grants (budget support), loans (public investment), grants (public investment), and revenues of budget organisations. According to the information in mass media about the report ‘Economic and Social Status of the Republic of Tajikistan’ prepared by the Statistical Agency, the investments in the construction sector between January and September 2020 comprised TJS 7,616,200,000 ($740 million).[34] However, currently the text of this report and other similar reports which should contain data on the rest of the months of the year are not publicly available.   Additionally, according to mass media more than TJS 2,000,000,000 ($194 million) was allocated to the construction sector of Dushanbe out of different sources in 2020.[35] Again, due to the unavailability of the report ‘Economic and Social Status of the Republic of Tajikistan’ it was not possible to check the data on what exact sources had been considered by the Statistical Agency. Additionally, the Government preliminary planned that the expenditures of the state budget of the Republic of Tajikistan in 2020 in ‘the Industry and Construction’ sector would comprise TJS 232,400,000 ($22,542,800).[36] However in the beginning of 2021, the Government informed that all construction activities used more than TJS 11,600,000,000 ($1.1252bn) of all kind of investments in 2020.[37]   Tajikistan depends on foreign credit a lot, and the following countries are among the main external creditors of the state: China, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, France, and Germany.[38] International organisations providing their credit to the state are: the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, the Eurasian Economic Union Anti-Crisis Fund, and the International Monetary Fund. The state provides no information on how exactly this money is spent in the housing sector.[39] And according to the investors’ reports, the biggest part of the foreign money is spent on the construction of power facilities, roads, the Rogun hydropower plant and in the sectors of education, agriculture, health, water supply, etc.[40]   As for the local people and companies involved in the construction sector of Dushanbe, one should note that it is the real estate developers close to the policy elite of the state and/or associated with the family of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan who are undertaking the largest projects. In most of the cases this information is also hidden by the state, but behind-the-scenes almost every citizen of Tajikistan is aware that it is almost impossible ‘to survive’ in the sector of construction without any support from or connection to the state authorities.   For instance, one of the biggest real estate developers greatly redeveloping Dushanbe is a limited liability company (LLC) Elit-Stroy-Servis (Elite Build Service).[41] This company was established in 2007, and since that time, it has built one 13-storey residential building in Khujand, four 12-storey residential buildings in Dushanbe, two nine-storey residential properties in Dushanbe, and one five-storey residential building in Dushanbe.[42] This company belongs to Izzat Davlatov, a son of Nusratullo Davlatzoda, the head of the Tax Committee of the Republic of Tajikistan.[43]   An example of how an affinity with the President’s family could be more profitable is the case of Beg Sabur, the head of the Communication Service of Tajikistan and relative by marriage of Emomali Rahmon.[44] He was selling apartments in Dushanbe which had been constructed by the LLC Komil 2010, owned by Siyovush Zuhurov, his son. After the high-profile journalist investigation about such a profitable business of Beg Sabur, the head of the Communication Service became unavailable for the journalists and common population, though after every journalist’s request to provide information about Beg Sabur’s presence at work the state authorities continued insisting that Sabur is on a field trip.[45]   In February 2021, the authorities reported that the license of Komil 2010 (its office is located in the building of the Communication Service; and according to the experts, the owner of Komil 2010 is Beg Sabur as such) and Niagara, another real estate development company owned by Beg Sabur, would be revoked after delivering the rest of construction projects he was involved in.[46] Additionally, because of the poor quality of the constructions built by both companies, it is planned that the rest of residential buildings built by Komil 2010 would be checked by the state quality control. Moreover, apart from the numerous violations in the quality of all constructions, for the last eight years the owners of the apartments located in Zarafshon district of Dushanbe did not have any documents for their property. The authorities are aware of this situation, but seek for public understanding and ask to stop criticising Sabur, as “he was very active in this case”.[47] Currently, because of the poor quality of its constructions, Niagara and Komil 2010 are on the black list of real estate development companies.[48]   Apart from the involvement of the family members of government officials in the sector of construction of residential buildings, other private persons also largely built in Tajikistan. It was in June 2020 that the Government reported about 16 private persons building in the sector of construction.[49] Previously, this number reached 20. However, earlier in February 2020, the authorities stated that since 2018 building permission had not been provided to private persons. Previously, private persons could construct tenements even without having a construction license. For instance, a case of construction of a five-storey tenement located on N. Karabaeva St. resulted in people who had purchased apartments in that tenement not being able to get their documents proving entitlement of ownership from the real estate developer.[50] Currently, the general number of construction companies working in Tajikistan reach 2,113, out of which 80 companies are foreign.   The above described involvement of private persons and politicians’ family members in different money earning schemes indicate the lack of transparency and the conflict of interests which currently exist in the construction sector of Tajikistan. The closeness of political system to people coming from ‘another world’ and the indulgence to violations made by the officials are likely to encourage numerous violations in the sector and corruption-related crime. In 2020, the Agency for State Financial Control and Combating Corruption of the Republic of Tajikistan informed journalists about only three crimes in the sector of architecture and construction, despite the great number of violations in the construction sector recorded by mass media and other different sources, such low figure raises a lot of questions.[51] Thus, it is high time to start working towards transparency and the lack of conflict of interests in the sector of construction of Tajikistan. However, currently one can only suggest that as the state continues to pursue the quasi-legal schemes of money-making and the non-criticism policy similar to the one used in the case of Beg Sabur.   Conclusion and recommendations to the Tajik authorities Though the state already decided on the future of Tajikistan and its capital respectively, it is never too late to think better of it, consider the public opinion and improve the existing situation. The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan should remember that the most advanced economies honour their histories and tend to preserve the harmony in the appearance of their states which they received from their ancestors. Therefore, to keep the soul of Tajikistan alive and ensure the wellbeing of its society, Tajik authorities should organise public hearings on the reconstruction and redevelopment of the Tajik capital and other towns and ensure that civil society has access to the General Plans of Dushanbe and other towns respectively. Additionally, the state should stop all demolitions and forced evictions in Dushanbe, perform additional expert analysis of old buildings, consider the opinion of the majority of civil society, and learn the history of Tajikistan and its capital to preserve the rest of the Soviet-era historical buildings for future generations. Moreover, the state should consider abolishing the system of propiska, to minimise its consequences which make the life of Tajik citizens more complicated, and bring transparency and accountability to the sector of construction in Tajikistan.   More precise recommendations to the Tajik Government are below:
  • Involve civil society in discussion of General Plans of Dushanbe and other Tajik towns;
  • Preserve the soul of Dushanbe and make renovations and restorations to what’s left of the Soviet-era historical buildings of architectural merit;
  • Arrange the registration of people and issuing of passports in reception centers;
  • Provide social housing to the orphan and homeless;
  • Ensure the provision of adequate housing and/or payment to the forcibly evicted;
  • Secure fraud protection by using the existing regulatory framework and ensuring compliance with the contracts’ terms and conditions;
  • Gain transparency and make information on the money available and spent in the construction sector publically available; and
  • Provide effective control of all construction works and stop excusing all violations in this sector.
  Xeniya Mironova is an independent scholar, translator and writer with research interest in Central Asia. She has been researching the Soviet-era architecture of Central Asian countries for the past six years.    Image by Ninara under (CC).   [1] National Coronavirus Portal (COVID-19) – see website: https://covid.tj/ [2] ICHRP, CA countries: How is the right to housing respected during a pandemic?, August 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/strany-ca-kak-soblyudaetsya-pravo-na-zhilishche-v-period-pandemii [3] Valentina Kasymbekova, How does a residence permit violate the rights of citizens, and why is it still not removed?, ASIA-Plus, November 2019, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20191109/kak-propiska-narushaet-prava-grazhdan-i-pochemu-eyo-do-sih-por-ne-uberut [4] Anora Sarkorova, Tajikistan: the invisible fates of invisible people, BBC Russian Service, May 2015, https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2015/05/150430_tajikistan_no_citizenship [5] Ibid. [6] Kodeks Respubliki Tadzhikistan Ob Administrativnyh Pravonarusheniyah, https://eurasiangroup.org/files/Legislation_RUS/Tadjikiston/supervision/4/KODEKS_RESPUBLIKI_TADZHIKISTAN_OB_ADMINISTRATIVNYH_PRAVONARUSHENIYAH.pdf [7] Valentina Kasymbekova, How does a residence permit violate the rights of citizens, and why is it still not removed?, ASIA-Plus, November 2019, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20191109/kak-propiska-narushaet-prava-grazhdan-i-pochemu-eyo-do-sih-por-ne-uberut [8] Anna Miftakhova, Elvira, 28, from Proletarsk, lives in the park. To feed, she has to collect cones, ASIA-Plus, February 2021, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20210202/28-letnyaya-elvira-iz-proletarska-zhivet-v-parke-chtobi-prokormitsya-ei-prihoditsya-sobirat-shishki [9] Bakhmaner Nadirov, “Where is Beg Sabur?” What questions did the journalists ask the Communication Service of Tajikistan?, ASIA-Plus, February 2021, https://www.asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/20210201/gde-beg-sabur-kakie-voprosi-sluzhbe-svyazi-tadzhikistana-zadali-zhurnalisti [10] Valentina Kasymbekova, How does a residence permit violate the rights of citizens, and why is it still not removed?, ASIA-Plus, November 2019, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20191109/kak-propiska-narushaet-prava-grazhdan-i-pochemu-eyo-do-sih-por-ne-uberut [11] Chiromon Bacosoda, Russia simplifies the procedure for obtaining citizenship for highly qualified specialists, Radio Ozodi, October 2019, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30207086.html [12] Sharif Sami, In the metropolitan area of I. Somoni, 422 residential buildings were demolished in 2020, ICHRP, February 2021, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/sharif-sami-v-stolichnom-rayone-i-somoni-v-2020-godu-sneseno-422-zhilyh-doma [13] IA Krasnaya Vesna, Social War: Infrastructure of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Rossa Primavera, November 2020, https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/faf2d448?fbclid=IwAR35z2w4Ykq2vfa7slYW7agtUJ5mu8jXIv-VR0tFb3WtfUX-Ff9lqMIPPxo; ICHRP, Main architecture of Tajikistan: High-rise buildings in the country are being built in order to save land, November 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/glavarhitektura-tadzhikistana-vysotki-v-strane-stroyatsya-v-celyah-ekonomii-zemel; Glavgosexpertiza of Russia, General plans for reconstruction of 90% of cities and regional centers approved in Tajikistan, November 2020, https://gge.ru/press-center/news/v-tadzhikistane-utverzhdeny-generalnye-plany-rekonstruktsii-90-gorodov-i-rayonnykh-tsentrov/ [14] Fergana News, The score rules there: Will new buildings in Dushanbe survive a strong earthquake?, August 2019, https://fergana.agency/articles/109703/ [15] Rustam Nazarzoda, In 2020, 141 residential buildings were damaged by natural disasters in Tajikistan, ICHRP, February 2021, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/rustam-nazarzoda-v-tadzhikistane-v-2020-godu-ot-stihiynyh-bedstviy-postradalo-141-zhiloe [16] Gafur Shermatov, Facebook Post, Facebook, February 2021, https://www.facebook.com/100005181610729/videos/1673723899476981/ [17] Ibid. [18] Sharif Sami, In the metropolitan area of I. Somoni, 422 residential buildings were demolished in 2020, ICHRP, February 2021, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/sharif-sami-v-stolichnom-rayone-i-somoni-v-2020-godu-sneseno-422-zhilyh-doma [19] Fergana News, The score rules here: Will new buildings in Dushanbe survive a strong earthquake?, August 2019, https://fergana.agency/articles/109703/ [20] ICHRP, The chairman of the city of Dushanbe expressed concern about the presence of shortcomings and shortcomings in the construction sector of the capital, December 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/predsedatel-goroda-dushanbe-vyrazil-obespokoennost-nalichiem-nedostatkov-i-nedochyotov-v [21] Cabar Asia, Dushanbe: new buildings for the elite, April 2018, https://cabar.asia/ru/dushanbe-novostrojki-dlya-izbrannyh [22] VoicesOnCentralAsia.org, Destructing Soviet Architecture in Central Asia, December 2019, https://voicesoncentralasia.org/destructing-soviet-architecture-in-central-asia/ [23] ЗАКОН РЕСПУБЛИКИ ТАДЖИКИСТАН ОБ ОЦЕНОЧНОЙ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ, http://ncz.tj/system/files/Legislation/1720_ru.pdf [24] ICHRP, Tursunzade-74: All the dots above the ‘I’ are p[laced, the house is ready for demolition, February 2021, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/tursunzade-74-vse-tochki-nad-i-rasstavleny-dom-gotov-k-snosu [25] Buhoro 49, Facebook Community, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/buhoro49 [26] ICHRP, Not everything is gold that is built, June 2019, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/ne-vsyo-zoloto-chto-stroitsya [27] ICHRP, The developer listened to the hopes of the residents of the demolished two-story building, November 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/zastroyshchik-prislushalsya-k-upovaniyam-zhiteley-snosimoy-dvuhetazhki [28] Ibid. [29] ICHRP, Alternative solution to a disputable situation: Conclusion of a new agreements, November 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/alternativnoe-reshenie-spornoy-situacii-zaklyuchenie-novogo-dogovora [30] ICHRP, The developer listened to the hopes of the residents of the demolished two-story building, November 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/zastroyshchik-prislushalsya-k-upovaniyam-zhiteley-snosimoy-dvuhetazhki [31] ICHRP, The developer has not paid rent for the fourth year…, January 2021, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/zastroyshchik-chetvertyy-god-ne-platit-arendnuyu-platu [32] Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan and Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On the State Budget for 2020”, Citizen’s Budget 2020, http://minfin.tj/downloads/citizens'%20budget-en.pdf; Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan and Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On the State Budget for 2020”, Citizen’s Budget 2020, http://minfin.tj/downloads/citizens'%20budget-en.pdf [33] Avaz Yuldashev, Dushanbe’s budget to be over 3 billion somoni, ASIA-Plus, December 2019, https://www.asiaplustj.info/news/tajikistan/society/20191224/byudzhet-dushanbe-sostavit-bolee-3-milliardov-somoni [34] Ibid; Statistics Agency under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, The report “Socio-economic situation of the Republic of Tajikistan” for January-September 2020 was released, https://www.stat.tj/ru/news/publications/the-publication-social-economic-situation-in-tajikistan-for-january-september-2020-was-released [35] Sputnik News, It became known how much money was spent in 2020 on the construction sector, October 2020, https://tj.sputniknews.ru/country/20201020/1032120338/stroitelstvo-statistika-tajikistan.html [36] Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan and Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On the State Budget for 2020”, Citizen’s Budget 2020, http://minfin.tj/downloads/citizens'%20budget-en.pdf [37] Payrav Chorshanbiev, More than $1.1 billion of investments allocated for construction in Tajikistan in 2020, ASIA-Plus, February 2021, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20210205/v-tadzhikistane-na-stroitelstvo-v-2020-godu-napravleno-investitsii-na-bolee-11-mlrd [38] Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan and Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On the State Budget for 2020”, Citizen’s Budget 2020, http://minfin.tj/downloads/citizens'%20budget-en.pdf [39] Map Invest Com, see website: https://map.investcom.tj/ [40] Invest Com, Information about current state investment projects, September 2019, https://investcom.tj/ru/invest/vneshnjaja-pomosch/102-investicionnye-proekty.html [41] Elite Story Service, see website: https://ess.tj/company/index.php [42] ASIA-Plus, Top 5 construction companies in Dushanbe that are rebuilding the city, August 2019, https://www.asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20190816/top-5-stroitelnih-kompanii-dushanbe-kotorie-perestraivayut-gorod [43] Safar Jamoliddini, Tajik businessmen flee corruption abroad, Komsomolskaya Pravda, December 2016, https://www.msk.kp.ru/daily/26619/3637026/; Tax Committee under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, Manual, https://andoz.tj/Kumita/rohbariyat?culture=ru-RU [44] Y. Halimov, The Houses That Beg Built, Cabar Asia, March 2019, https://cabar.asia/en/the-houses-that-beg-built [45] Ibid; Alisher Zarifi and Amriddin Olim, Beg’s son Sabur’s company may lose its license to build high-rise buildings?, Radio Ozodi, January 2020, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30410198.html; Bakhmaner Nadirov, “Where is Beg Sabur?” What questions did the journalists ask the Communication Service of Tajikistan?, ASIA-Plus, February 2021, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20210201/gde-beg-sabur-kakie-voprosi-sluzhbe-svyazi-tadzhikistana-zadali-zhurnalisti [46] Sputnik News, Two construction companies, owned by the head of the Communications Service, Beg Sabur, will have their licenses for the construction of buildings revoked after they hand over the old objects, February 2021, https://tj.sputniknews.ru/country/20210205/1032764027/kompanii-beg-sabura-zanesli-chernyy-spisok-dushanbe.html [47] Ibid. [48] The Asia Times, Construction companies of Bega Sabur hit black list in Tajikistan, February 2021, https://asia-times.org/glavnaya/10687-v-tadzhikistane-stroitelnye-kompanii-bega-sabura-popali-v-chernyy-spisok.html [49] ICHRP, 2113 construction companies work in Tajikistan, July 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/v-tadzhikistane-rabotayut-2113-stroitelnyh-kompaniy [50] Mahmadsaid Zuvaydzoda, Building permits are not issued to individuals, ICHRP, December 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/mahmadsaid-zuvaydzoda-chastnym-licam-razreshenie-na-stroitelstvo-ne-vydaetsya [51] ICHRP, More than 1.2 thousand corruption crimes detected in Tajikistan in six months, July 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/v-tadzhikistane-za-polgoda-vyyavleno-bolee-12-tys-korrupcionnyh-prestupleniy [post_title] => Loss of harmony: The rise of a new Tajikistan and the fall of old aspirations for the better [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => loss-of-harmony-the-rise-of-a-new-tajikistan-and-the-fall-of-old-aspirations-for-the-better [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-05-16 20:53:40 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-05-16 19:53:40 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5785 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [8] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5781 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-05-17 00:05:45 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-05-16 23:05:45 [post_content] => The authorities in Tajikistan have taken George Orwell’s words to the letter, as they have increasingly come to regard media outlets and independent journalists who ask probing questions, attempt to promote transparency and create space for public debate as a threat to their hold on power.[1] Government officials frequently invoke painful memories of violence and turmoil during the 1992-1997 civil war in Tajikistan to justify restrictions on media and other fundamental freedoms and to emphasise the image of the current regime as a guarantor of stability and national security. The colour revolutions in the former Soviet space and the Arab spring further exacerbated the authorities’ fears of the public exposure of government wrongdoings, corruption or human rights violations, all of which, they are afraid could push societal grievances to a tipping point beyond their control.   During a research mission on media freedom in Tajikistan in November 2019, a human rights activist told us: “When a journalist writes something critical about a government policy the authorities think he is being critical of the entire government. They see him as a traitor even if he is a journalist who goes about his work as a professional and has no ideological agenda at all!”   In today’s Tajikistan journalists have limited possibilities to provide information to the public on issues deemed ‘sensitive’ by the authorities without endangering their own safety or that of family members; to contribute to an informed public debate through news reporting and analysis; and to influence political decision-making. When asked about ‘sensitive’ issues many journalists we spoke to agreed that these included criticising President Emomali Rahmon, his family and their business affairs; the cult of personality; nepotism, corruption and privileges those in power enjoy; and reports about the fate of imprisoned members of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), their relatives and IRPT activities abroad.   The muzzling of independent media outlets and journalists that do not toe the Government line forms part of a broader trend of increased authoritarianism in Tajikistan, which followed the banning of the opposition IRPT in 2015 and that has been reflected in increasing pressure on civil society groups and freedom of expression more generally.   Many independent newspapers, electronic media outlets and news agencies such as Khafta, Nigoh, Nuri zindagi, Ozodagon, Paykon and TojNews have had to close down over the past decade for reasons including government interference with editorial policy, excessive tax inspections, and economic challenges. In 2020, the Prague-based news site akhbor.com, that had provided independent media content for four years, discontinued its work after the Supreme Court had added it to the list of prohibited sites in February last year. According to the Court, the news outlet, which had routinely quoted emigrants representing opposition groups such as the banned IRPT and Group-24 (among many other activists, analysts and experts), had offered a platform to “terrorists and extremists”. Those remaining privately-owned Tajikistani media outlets that aim to maintain an independent editorial policy (such as ASIA-Plus and Avesta) and journalists working for international media outlets with offices in Tajikistan such as Radio Ozodi, are forced to negotiate a path between restrictive legislation, pressure from the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) and other government agencies, and the desire to adhere to professional ethics. Most other media outlets are state-controlled and follow the Government line.   Providing information: a risky mission Many independent journalists we spoke to in Tajikistan told us about their commitment to provide balanced information to the public in order to facilitate an informed public debate on various issues including politics and human rights. Some wished the authorities would see their work as of service to the country, as a way to identify and address societal problems and grievances. “Instead of promoting transparent reporting, the authorities increase the capacity of the State Committee for National Security to spy on citizens in order to understand what’s going on in society”, one interlocutor told us.   The last few years have seen a quickening exodus from Tajikistan of dozens of journalists and editors following the 2015 banning of the IRPT. While some were supportive of the IRPT movement, others were forced into exile as a punishment for their independent reporting. Others face the choice of remaining in the country but giving up their profession or ceding to the demands of the SCNS. Many now make ends meet by doing odd jobs. In this way, Tajikistan lost many of its experienced journalists.   The few independent-minded journalists who continue to work in Tajikistan told us that the atmosphere has changed. Government agencies routinely put pressure on the remaining independent journalists and media representatives and have succeeded in sowing mistrust and dividing the journalistic community. “We used to discuss things in the kitchen in the past, but we don’t trust anyone anymore. If something happens to a journalist the others won’t show solidarity, he can only count on his closest friends”, a journalist told us on condition of anonymity. Most of the independent journalists who talked about the limitations of media freedom in Tajikistan asked us not to publish their names and several journalists and members of their families chose not to meet with us for fear of reprisals.   Local human rights and media groups have repeatedly drawn attention to the plight of independent journalists in Tajikistan and have called on the authorities to bring their practices in line with their international human rights obligations.   Surviving 2020 and new challenges ahead When we visited Tajikistan in November 2019, there was a sense among independent journalists and media outlets of needing “to survive the next year”, as both Parliamentary and Presidential elections took place in 2020. “We understand that the authorities have all the necessary measures at their disposal to silence us. Many readers are unhappy about self-censorship, but we have to make sure we can survive the period of the elections in 2020”, one journalist said on condition of anonymity.   Then the COVID-19 pandemic hit, bringing additional challenges for independent journalists in Tajikistan. Throughout March and April 2020 the Tajikistani authorities denied that the virus had spread to Tajikistan despite media reports and social media accounts indicating that the pandemic was already progressing rapidly across the country. The authorities refuted a transparent approach and rebutted journalists’ questions. On April 18th 2020, Jamshed Shohidon, the Deputy Health Minister, blamed the spike in ‘pneumonia’ cases on exceptionally rainy weather conditions.   Instead of welcoming media reports about the first suspected cases of COVID-19 and using the media as a tool to raise awareness and slow the spread of the virus, the authorities warned the bearers of bad news that they would be “held to account”. On April 24th 2020, a little less than a week before the authorities admitted there were cases of coronavirus in Tajikistan, the Ministry of Health criticised journalists for reporting cases of death with COVID-19 like symptoms. It blamed them for “escalating the situation, leading to conflict and distrust in the Government and the Ministry”, according to a statement posted on the Ministry’s website. The statement concluded with the threat that “any media outlet, private individual or reporter who publishes incorrect and false information about the coronavirus will be brought to account.”   Even after the authorities announced the first officially confirmed infections of coronavirus on April 30th, they continued to blame the media for its coverage of the pandemic. According to the Government news agency Khovar.tj, on May 7th 2020, the Prosecutor General’s Office press department warned that “legal measures will be taken against anybody who sows panic in the country”.[2]   Since then, the authorities have continued to play down the scale of the pandemic and the number of officially confirmed deaths has been consistently lower than civil society estimates. During a press conference in January 2021, Justice Minister Muzaffar Ashuriyon stated “that there were no deaths in Tajik prisons as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic”.[3]   After the Presidential elections on October 11th 2020, Emomali Rahmon was re-elected for a fifth term, receiving over 90 per cent of the vote with a turnout of some 85 per cent. According to the Election Assessment Mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the elections “took place within an environment tightly controlled by state authorities and characterised by long-standing restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms, including of association, assembly, expression, media, and harassment and intimidation of dissenting voices”.[4] Election observers added that there “was no genuine political alternative offered to voters, with only contrived debate between formal candidates and lack of independent media covering the campaign.”   Unfortunately, the New Year did not bring calm after the storm. In early 2021, pressure has intensified on independent journalists and those defending media freedom.   Methods to silence independent journalism Although the Constitution of Tajikistan safeguards media freedom, national laws fail to provide sufficient protection to journalists and media outlets and the authorities use an array of methods to keep media outlets on their toes, discourage critical reporting and force journalists into silence or cooperation. These repressive measures have led to a high degree of self-censorship among journalists, deeply regretted by many as diametrically opposed to their core convictions about the role of a journalist.   For example, in order to discourage critical reporting authorities typically refrain from providing journalists with information on issues of public interest that they regard as ‘sensitive’ claiming that the information is ‘secret’, respond with such a delay that the issue is no longer topical, or exclude independent journalists from official press briefings. When journalists tried to obtain official information and clarification in connection with allegations of coronavirus infections last spring, they quickly hit a wall. In a letter to Sirojiddin Muhriddin, the Foreign Minister of Tajikistan, dated March 30th 2020, Jamie Fly, President of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), deplored attempts by the Tajikistani authorities to interfere with Radio Ozodi, RFE/RL’s Tajik Service’s coverage of the pandemic, stating that “Officials with the Health Ministry, the Anti-Epidemic Commission, and your own ministry have refused to speak with Ozodi correspondents […] and have excluded them from press briefings.”[5] In another example, ASIA-Plus sent 15 questions about the COVID-19 pandemic to the Ministry of Health on August 7th 2020. Three weeks later, on August 28th, ASIA-Plus received replies to only four of the questions. Among others, the Ministry did not respond to questions of how many patients were hospitalised with coronavirus at the time, how many medical professionals had been infected with coronavirus and how many had died since the beginning of the pandemic.[6]   Licensing requirements for Tajikistani radio and TV broadcasters and accreditation of journalists working for foreign media outlets are frequently used as a tool to put pressure on journalists and media outlets. Local human rights groups and media watchdogs have called on the authorities to abolish the accreditation requirement, which is so often misused to influence media content.  A 2018 law provides that local journalists wanting to cover elections have to obtain an additional permit from the Central Election Committee. In 2020, six Radio Ozodi journalists and several ASIA-Plus journalists were denied the permit on technicalities.   Officials with the SCNS frequently initiate so-called ‘prophylactic conversations’; they invite journalists or representatives of media outlets for a ‘conversation’ without an official summons, urge them to follow a pro-government editorial policy, to refrain from covering certain issues, or to publish materials drafted by the authorities. Warnings to media outlets typically include that failure to comply will lead to a revocation of their media licence and extraordinary tax checks. Threats to fabricate criminal charges or harm family members are also common. Journalists told us that officials were often surprisingly well-informed about their private lives, their families and loved ones and appeared to have meticulously gathered information in order to find effective ways to threaten and scare them into compliance.   Targeting family members is a strategy not only used to put pressure on journalists inside Tajikistan but also to silence those exiled Tajikistani journalists who continue to write about ‘sensitive’ topics from abroad.   Charges contained in the Administrative and Criminal Codes that can be used to punish the legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression hang over journalists’ heads like Damocles’ sword. Although in 2012 defamation was partially decriminalised with the repeal of Criminal Code Articles 135 (“defamation”) and 136 (“insult”), Articles 137 and 330 were retained, punishing “public insult or defamation of the President of Tajikistan” and “insult of a public official” by fines or imprisonment of up to five or two years, respectively. In October 2016, amendments to the Criminal Code created a new offence seeking to shield the President from criticism - Article 137, part 1 criminalises “insulting the Leader of the Nation through the media through print, online or other media”, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.[7] These amendments run contrary to international human rights standards, which are clear that public officials should be prepared to tolerate more, rather than less, criticism, given the importance of allowing effective public scrutiny of government actions.   Journalists and bloggers who speak out critically about state policies or practices are also at risk of being charged with articles that are worded so broadly and imprecisely that they grant overly wide discretion to authorities in their interpretation and application, leading to arbitrariness. Examples include provisions relating to restrictions on terrorism and extremism as well as Article 189 which punishes “inciting national, racial, local or religious discord”.   In addition to discouraging the production and publication of critical media reports, authorities also limit their distribution. In recent years several local and foreign media websites have been blocked or completely disabled.[8] Prosecutions and sentences of prison terms for ‘liking’ and ‘sharing’ posts that the authorities deemed to be of ‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’ content have scared internet users and many are believed to have since refrained from accessing, reading and sharing media material for fear of reprisals.   Conclusion As long as the Tajikistani authorities continue to pursue an authoritarian agenda, fundamental policy change toward strengthened civil and political freedoms including freedoms of expression and media freedom is unlikely. Therefore, it is all the more important that the international community fully uses its leverage through bi-lateral and multilateral channels, e.g. in the framework of any GSP+ negotiations, in order to protect individuals at risk and support Tajikistani human rights and media freedom organisations. International stakeholders should also persistently call on Tajikistan to comply with its international human rights obligations, particularly as a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and implement the important recommendations on media freedom that the UN Human Rights Committee issued to Tajikistan in 2019.[9]   For further information, refer to the report ‘The price of silence vs. the cost of speaking out. Media freedom in Tajikistan’, which was published jointly by International Partnership for Human Rights and Article 19 in July 2020.[10]   Anne Sunder-Plassmann and Rachel Gasowski work as human rights researchers and editors at International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR). From 1999 to 2014, prior to joining IPHR, Anne worked for Amnesty International as campaigner, then researcher on several countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. She holds a master’s degree in Eastern European History and Slavonic Studies from Hamburg University. Anne carried out field research on topics including torture, persecution of dissidents, human rights violations affecting LGBT people, domestic violence and the death penalty. Rachel joined IPHR in 2015. Before that she worked as Researcher for Amnesty International, and also for the European Council for Refugees and Exiles. She has experience of researching and writing publications on topics including torture and ill-treatment, prison conditions and juvenile justice, fundamental rights, domestic violence, persecution of human rights defenders and the death penalty.She holds a Russian degree from Bristol University.   [1] As set out in the title of this essay “In a time of universal deceit telling the truth is a revolutionary act.” [2] Khovar, Are you not provided with the necessary medical care? Are prices for medicines increased in pharmacies? Call the General Prosecutor’s Office of Tajikistan, May 2020, https://khovar.tj/rus/2020/05/vam-ne-okazyvayut-neobhodimuyu-meditsinskuyu-pomoshh-v-aptekah-zavysheny-tseny-na-lekarstva-pozvonite-v-generalnuyu-prokuraturu-tadzhikistana/ [3] Sarvinoz Ruhullo and Amriddin Olim, Head of the Ministry of Justice: not a single case of death from COVID-19 in the prisons of Tajikistan was recorded, Radio Ozodi, February 2021, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31080502.html [4] OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan – Presidential Election 11 October 2020, ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/6/477019.pdf [5] RFE/RL, RFE/RL President Jamie Fly’s Letter to Tajik Minister of Foreign Affairs Sirojiddin Muhriddin, March 2020, https://pressroom.rferl.org/a/rferl-president-jamie-fly-letter-to-tajik-minister-of-foreign-affairs-sirojiddin-muhriddin/30520646.html [6] ASIA-Plus, How much did Tajikistan spend on the fight against COVID-19, September 2020, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20200908/kto-poluchil-koronavirusnie-nadbavki [7] The title of ‘Leader of the Nation’ was conferred on President Rahmon in December 2015 and is a life-long title. [8] For example, in recent years the websites of news outlets ASIA-Plus and Radio Ozodi, of social media and online platforms such as Facebook, Viber, Instagram and Youtube have been arbitrarily blocked on several occasions. At the time of writing the sites of ASIA-Plus, Avesto and Radio Ozodi were fully or partially blocked in Tajikistan. [9] UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Tajikistan, 22 August 2019, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fTJK%2fCO%2f3&Lang=en [10] IPHR, The price of silence vs. the cost of speaking out, Media freedom in Tajikistan, July 2020, https://www.iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ENG-Media-Report-TJ.pdf [post_title] => “In a time of universal deceit telling the truth is a revolutionary act” – The challenges facing free media in Tajikistan [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => 6-in-a-time-of-universal-deceit-telling-the-truth-is-a-revolutionary-act-the-challenges-facing-free-media-in-tajikistan [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-05-17 00:14:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-05-16 23:14:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5781 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [9] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5778 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-05-17 00:04:04 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-05-16 23:04:04 [post_content] => On March 3rd 2021, presidential aide, Abdujabbor Rahmonzoda, called on intellectuals to wage an ‘information war’ on the opposition.[1] A month earlier, the Government of Tajikistan had issued a directive stating that government employees could only write PhD dissertations on topics pre-approved by the country’s president Emomali Rahmon.[2] The first of these signs of the Government’s tightening grip on academic freedom in the country came two months after Tajikistan celebrated President’s Day on November 16th. On that day in 1992, at the height of the country’s civil war, Rahmon was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet and therefore head of state. State-controlled media was abuzz with articles and interviews, with officials praising the ‘Leader of the Nation’, a title Rahmon has held since 2015. Among those paying homage to the President were a number of professors and researchers. Saltanat Salmonova from the Avicenna Tajik State Medical University, in an article entitled, ‘Our Leader, Our Pride’, stated that “today all the achievements and progress we see are due to the merits of this selfless person.”[3] Another article by an academic claimed the President “saved Tajikistan from disintegration.”[4] These two examples point to the ways in which academics have come under the control of the Government, incorporated into the state narrative legitimising the country’s authoritarian regime, and repressed should they be too critical.   Universities should be spaces where academics and students can debate and discuss contentious issues without fear of reprisal. UNESCO established a number of tenets of academic freedom in its ‘Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel’, published in 1997.[5] These include freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof; freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work; freedom from institutional censorship; freedom of teaching and discussion; and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies. Universities develop critical thinking and independent thought. This creates a cadre of skilled technocrats and experts who can serve the regime. But it also facilitates the creation of a pool of potential opposition members.[6] Authoritarian governments around the world take considerable lengths to restrict academic freedom. This essay develops a typology of measures to restrict academic freedom in Tajikistan. We examine the ways in which the Government has suppressed academics by punishing those that dissent, forced others to acquiesce through self-censorship and incorporated academics into the narrative supporting the regime.   Soviet legacies The Soviet period continues to cast its long shadow over higher education in the country. It was during the Soviet period that the first universities in the country were opened. At the time of Tajikistan’s independence, there were ten institutions with 65,586 students.[7] Academics in the Soviet Union occupied a position of relative prestige, with access to significant salaries, resources and networks. But at the same time, academics were supposed to serve the interests of the state with 70 per cent of research directed toward defense, economic, or ideological ‘production’.[8] Rather than being independent, universities and research institutions were subordinated to the Party Politburo. The Academy of Science, which coordinated most research, worked closely with the KGB to restrict research activities and international travel for academics.   Not only did the Soviet Government utilise the technical expertise of academics but it also viewed academics as a potential threat. Academics were the basis of the samizdat movement and played crucial roles in the eventual collapse of communism. In Tajikistan, the openings of glasnost gave academics an opportunity to form new social movements calling for reform. For example, Rastokhez, formed in 1989 by a group of academics, called for a revival of the Tajik language. Its leader, Tohir Abdujabbor, was a Candidate of Science in Economics who worked with the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences.[9] Rastokhez would organise one of the first protests in the country and later join the opposition forces during the country’s civil war.   Academic freedom in independent Tajikistan While the Marxist-Leninist baggage of Soviet academia has been removed and replaced with a new national ideology centred on the importance of stability and peace guaranteed by President Rahmon, many of the strategies of cooptation and control have been resurrected or have continued since independence. Sources of funding for higher education rapidly declined following independence, with the total budget for all forms of education declining from 11.6 per cent of GDP in 1989 to just 2.3 per cent in 2000.[10] Despite these budget cuts, the higher education sector has developed since independence, at least quantitatively, and there are currently 40 institutions of higher education in Tajikistan, employing 12,484 individuals in teaching and research capacities in Tajikistan, 4,359 of whom are women. Currently, there are 227,026 students in the country, 83,557 of whom are women.[11]   Suppressing independent voices Suppression involves practices to repress academic freedom, through intimidation, physical attacks, arrests, removal of academics from their positions, and closure of dissenting institutions.   Arrests A number of academics have been arrested in the country. The most well-known case is of Alexander Sodiqov, a PhD student at the University of Toronto, who was detained by the security services in Khorog in 2014 and accused of espionage and treason.[12] Following an international advocacy campaign, Sodiqov was released on July 22nd 2014, but the case against him was not dropped. His case is not an isolated incident.   In January 2020, 113 individuals were detained on charges of being members of the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned organisation in the country. Among them were 20 professors, including Ikromshokh Sattorov, a senior lecturer at the Institute of Languages, Tojiddin Yakubov, head of the department of philology the Tajik National University, and poet Ismoil Kakhkhorov. A number of those arrested had links to the opposition, including the nephew of the former leader of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party, Said Abdullah Nuri, and Ismoil Qahhorov, the husband of cleric Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda's sister.[13] More recently, the Government has detained at least 50 students who studied in Iran, accusing them of extremism, terrorism and espionage for Tehran.[14]   At the same time as the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, journalist and academic Daler Sharipov was arrested on charges of “inciting religious accord” and “extremism.” Following his arrest, the General Prosecutor’s Office released a statement about Sharipov, saying that “in the period 2013-2019 he published more than 200 articles and notes of extremist content aimed at inciting religious hatred” and in June 2019, he illegally produced 100 copies of a dissertation entitled ‘The Prophet Muhammad and Terrorism’. The Prosecutor General claimed that a religious expert found that the dissertation “was developed in the context of the Muslim Brotherhood movement.”[15] In April 2020, Sharipov was sentenced to one year in prison and later released on January 29, 2021.   Travel restrictions The Government of Tajikistan has adopted various measures to restrict access to foreign education and to stop academics from travelling to attend conferences and collaborating with foreign scholars. Up until 2010, approximately 2,500 Tajik citizens were studying Islam abroad mostly in Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Pakistan.[16] But in August 2010, President Rahmon made a speech accusing foreign madrassas of training “terrorists” and calling on them to return.[17] A year later, the Committee on Religious Affairs claimed that 1,950 of these students had returned home, with just 129 of them continuing their religious education.[18]   In May 2018, the Ministry of Education published a regulation requiring academics to seek permission from the Ministry before leaving the country to attend conferences, providing details about the event and an outline of their presentation.[19] An additional directive published in August 2018 requires students planning to study abroad or participate in internships overseas to seek permission from the Ministry of Education. In justifying the move, the Government claimed it was “to protect young people from the influence of terrorism propaganda.”[20]   Closure With the exception of the Aga Khan Foundation-funded University of Central Asia in Khorog, no independent universities exist within the country. Efforts to establish independent, private universities have been prevented by the Government. One such effort was the Institute of Technical Innovations and Communications, founded in 2003, and known by various names, including the University of International Relations. Established by Tajik-American citizen Sadriddin Akramov, the institute employed a number of opposition figures, including Social Democrat Party leaders Rahmatillo Zoirov and Shokirdjon Hakimov and the leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party, Muhiddin Kabiri. After years of pressure, in September 2009, the Ministry of Education demanded its closure for three months for ‘technical reasons’ to check its documents and activities. The Minister of Education described the university as “a hotbed of anti-government propaganda and political opposition” in a letter to President Rahmon.[21] The university was closed in 2010.   Exile Some researchers have been forced to leave the country. At least eight academics have left the country in recent years according to our figures. Hafiz Boboyorov left the country in 2015. An employee of the Academy of Sciences since 1998, in 2014, he founded the Center for the Study of Contemporary Processes and Future Planning at the Academy of Sciences. But he lost this position in 2015 after he criticised the move by Parliament to make Rahmon ‘Leader of the Nation’, and thus able to rule the country indefinitely.[22] He left the country shortly afterwards. These estimates are likely an underestimate as academics do not usually announce their departure abroad and use pen names even after departing.   Surveillance and intimidation Academics in the country are subject to surveillance and threatened not to voice independent opinions. A Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for National Security overseas academic publications by both local and foreign researchers, monitoring them for criticism of the Government. Employees of the security services are embedded in each of the 40 higher education institutions to report on the activities of employees and students there.   Acquiescence to Regime In Tajikistan, there is a pattern of ‘educated acquiescence’, with academics complying with the Government in exchange for the benefits conferred upon them by the state.[23]   Institutional autonomy The legal environment related to academic freedom in Tajikistan includes articles of the Constitution of Tajikistan, laws ‘On Education’ (2004) and ‘On Higher and Postgraduate Vocational Education’ (2009).   In accordance with Article 40 of the Constitution of Tajikistan “everyone has the right to free participation in the cultural life of society, artistic, scientific and technical creativity and to use their achievements. Cultural and spiritual values ​​are protected by the state. Intellectual property is protected by law." Students and instructors are given ‘academic freedoms’ defined in Tajikistan as “freedom of delivering the content of learning in one’s own way – within the learning programmes” and “a freedom of those who study [students] to acquire knowledge in accordance with their own inclinations – within the learning programmes.”   Yet in reality, legislators have guaranteed that the state controls universities and they have no autonomy. This is evidenced by paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the law ‘On Higher and Postgraduate Vocational Education’ which gives a special right to "the President and the Government, without competition, to appoint a rector in state universities." This effectively places the state above universities. Rectors retain a great deal of power within the university system, managing budgets, the hiring of staff and controls what research can be conducted. All rectors in the country are members of the ruling People’s Democratic Party. 15 of the 40 are from Khatlon region, with four coming from Danghara district, where the President was born. The Soviet-era Accreditation Commission and its Councils of Scientists control the accreditation academics, preventing critical engagement by Tajik scholars. The Academy of Sciences is organisationally considered a government department. Rectors are appointed and dismissed from their positions by the Government.   Self-censorship Many academics engage in self-censorship as a means to preserve their positions. Critical engagement with politically and socially sensitive subjects, such as politics, corruption and extremism, remains risky and most chose to avoid these subjects. Another serious problem is access to data and statistics. Critical and independent scholars face additional challenges in gaining government permission to conduct fieldwork and research projects. It forces local scholars to limit their criticism and to conform to official narratives in their studies. In many cases, local respondents refuse to participate in the studies conducted by independent scholars fearing for their safety and security.   Incorporation into the Government discourse Intellectuals are crucial to the formation of policies, even in authoritarian contexts. They also form a crucial source of ruling class hegemony.   Factory of answers As well as controlling the state media and disseminating its narrative, the Government has also taken steps to distort the opposition’s discourse, a process known as the fabrikai javob (‘the factory of answers’).[24] This refers to efforts by the security services to re­spond to criticism on social media and deploys the ‘truth’ via various individuals, including teachers, professors and government employees. The Government has enlisted the support of ‘volunteers’ in its mission to police the web.[25]   Given their authority, academics are integral to the fabrikai javob. A Radio Ozodi investigation identified at least five people working in the structures of the Ministry of Education and Science of Tajikistan who also worked at a government ‘troll factory’, creating fake accounts on social networks, praising the Government and criticising the opposition.[26] The investigation estimated that at least 400 members are involved in the troll factory, or ‘Analytical Information Group’ within the Ministry of Education.   Academics are called on to praise the President and assert that he is responsible for all the supposed progress in the country. Kholmakhmad Samiev, Dean of the Faculty of International Relations at the Tajik National University, penned a piece in April 2015 proposing that Rahmon be made ‘Leader of the Nation’, a title he gained later that year.[27] They are also pressured into criticising the opposition, calling them “extremists,” “traitors” whose actions threaten unity and stability. Each week, the security services circulate lists of topics they would like to see academics write about. In many cases, the security services write the pieces and then force academics to add their name to them. Combined, these strategies incorporate scholars into narratives legitimising the Government.   Conclusion From suppressing independent academics to coopting scholars to re-enforce the state narrative that legitimates Tajikistan’s authoritarian regime, academic freedom is under attack in Tajikistan. Reports by Human Rights Watch, Freedom House and the State Department documenting a litany of abuses in other spheres but have largely neglected issues of academic freedom. When John Heathershaw and Edward Schatz penned an essay in openDemocracy exploring different options for external partners, ranging from boycotts to blacklists, they sparked a debate about the harm that could come from further isolating Tajik academics and the role that Western researchers have played in endangering Tajik colleagues.[28] These debates are important and should continue.   We believe that academic freedom in Tajikistan is imperiled and this should not be ignored. The reasons for this are driven by the behaviour of international partners, but more importantly the Government of Tajikistan itself. We concur with Hafiz Boboyorov, Schatz and Heathershaw that “critical engagement” is the best strategy for international partners.[29] Rather than boycotting Tajik academia wholesale, this would involve making financial and other forms of cooperation between foreign bodies and academic institutions in the country, such as the Erasmus+ and World Bank’s Tajikistan Higher Education Project, conditional upon the involvement of independent scholars, think tanks and NGOs. Partners should raise concerns about academic freedom and the abuses of human rights during research collaborations. Through these measures, we could start to open the space for greater academic freedom in Tajikistan.   Oleg Antonov is a guest researcher at the Department of Global Political Studies and Russia and the Caucasus Regional Research at Malmö University. He was previously a visiting scholar at the Södertörn University. His research focuses on education in Tajikistan and authoritarianism in Eurasia.   Edward Lemon is Research Assistant Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, Washington DC Teaching Site. He was previously at the Wilson Center and Columbia University. His research examines issues of authoritarianism, international relations and security in Central Asia.   Parviz Mullojonov, (Mullojanov) Ph.D., a political scientist, and historian, senior adviser to the International Alert office in Tajikistan and visiting researcher at the EHESS, Paris and former visiting researcher at the University of Uppsala, Sweden. He is former Chairman of the Board of the Tajik branch of the Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation); and former member of the EUCAM (EU and Central Asia Monitoring) research group. He is a former visiting professor at Whitman College (USA) and research fellow and at the Kettering Foundation (USA) and visiting scholar at the University of Exeter (UK), University of Heidelberg (Germany), and School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences – EHESS (Paris). Parviz Mullojonov worked for various international agencies and organisations such as Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, UNCHR, UNDP, ADB, Soros Foundation, and International Alert. Parviz Mullojanov received his Ph.D. in Islamic studies at the University of Basel (Switzerland).   Image by Алишер Курбоналиев under (CC).   [1] Rahmonzoda Ziyoiyoni Tojikro ba ”Jangi Ittilooti”- i ziddi Muholifon Da’vat Kard [Rahmonzoda called on Tajik intellectuals to wage an "information war" against the opposition], Radio Ozodi, March 2021, https://www.ozodi.org/a/31143080.html [2] V Tadzhikistane goschinovniki smogut zashchitit' dissertatsii tol'ko s razresheniya prezidenta [In Tajikistan, government officials will be able to defend dissertations only with the permission of the president], Radio Ozodi, February 2021, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31082130.html [3] Jumhuriyat, Saltanat Salmonova, Peshvoi Mo - Iftihori Mo [Our Leader, Our Pride], November 2020, http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=42496 [4] Jumhuriyat, Havasmoh Sohibnazarova, Marifat. Vaqte Rohbar Khiradi Azali Dorad... [Enlightenment. When a Leader has Eternal Wisdom], November 2020, http://jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=42497 [5] UNESCO, Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel (Recommendation), 1997, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13144&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html [6] Bueno de Mesquita, Bruno. and Downs, George. 2005. “Democracy and Development,” Foreign Affairs, September/October. [7] Kataeva, Zukhra. and DeYoung, Alan. 2018. Faculty Challenges and Barriers for Research and Publication in Tajik Higher Education. European Education: 252. [8] Ibid. [9] See: Scarborough, Isaac. 2018. The Extremes it Takes to Survive: Tajikistan and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985-1992, PhD Diss: LSE, London. [10] Kataeva, Zukhra. and DeYoung, Alan. 2018. Faculty Challenges and Barriers for Research and Publication in Tajik Higher Education. European Education 50: 250. [11] Ministry of Education. 2020. Ministerstvo obrazovaniya i nauki Respubliki Tadzhikistan. Statisticheskiy sbornik sfery obrazovaniya Respubliki Tadzhikistan na 2019-2020 gg [Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Tajikistan. Statistics of the education sector of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2019-2020] Dushanbe. [12] Katya Kumkova, Canadian Researcher Released after Five Weeks in Tajikistan Jail. The Guardian, July 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/24/canada-alexander-sodiqov-released-tajikistan [13] Akhbor, Ismi 18 Bozdoshtshuda dar Parvandai Ikhvon ul Muslimin Ma’lum Shud (Video) [Name of 18 Detained People Revealed (Video)], January 2020, http://akhbor.com/-p10989-120.htm [14] Radio Ozodi, Tadzhikskiye studenty zayavili o zaderzhaniyakh i doprosakh posle obucheniya v Irane [Tajik students report detentions and interrogations after studying in Iran], February 2021, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31120888.html [15] Khovar, Zayavleniye press-tsentra General'noy prokuratury Respubliki Tadzhikistan [Statement by the press center of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Tajikistan], February 2020, https://khovar.tj/rus/2020/02/zayavlenie-press-tsentra-generalnoj-prokuratury-respubliki-tadzhikistan/ [16] Abramson, David. 2010. Foreign Religious Education and the Central Asian Islamic Revival: Impact and Prospects for Stability. Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. [17] See: Lemon, Edward. 2014. Mediating the Conflict in the Rasht Valley, Tajikistan: The Hegemonic Narrative and Anti-Hegemonic Challenges, Central Asian Affairs 1 (2): 247-272. [18] ASIA-Plus, 1,950 Tajik Students Have Returned Home from Islamic Schools Abroad, September 2011, http://www.news.tj/en/news/1950-tajik-students-have-returned-home-islamic-schools-abroad [19] Grazhdanskoye obshchestvo Genprokurature RT: Minobrnauki popirayet Konstitutsiyu strany. VIDEO [Civil society to the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Tajikistan: The Ministry of Education and Science violates the Constitution of the country. VIDEO], Radio Ozodi, June 2018, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/29320645.html [20] Dar boroi tasdiki tartibi firostodani ta’limgirandagon boroi tahsil ba khoriji kishvar [On approval of the order of sending trainees for study abroad], Ministry of Education, September 2018, https://maorif.tj/storage/Dokument's/Baynalmilali/ef57cbe070df4e832f80d6b92bedd790.pdf [21] RFE/RL, Tajikistan's Sole Private University Files Lawsuit Against Education Minister, August 2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/Tajikistans_Sole_Private_University_Files_Lawsuit_Against_Education_Minister/2119875.html [22] RFE/RL, Tajik Scholar, Government Critic Leaves Country, October 2016, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-scholar/28770973.html [23] Perry, Elizabeth. 2020. Educated Acquiescence: How Academia Sustains Authoritarianism in China. Theory and Society 49: 1-22. [24] See: Roche, Sophie. 2018. The Fabric of Answer: Constructing a National Facade. Central Asian Affairs 5 (2): 93–110. [25] Shafiev, Abdufattoh. and Miles, Marintha. 2015. Friends, Foes, and Facebook: Blocking the Internet in Tajikistan, Demokratizatsiya 23 (3): 297-319. [26] «Fabrika trolley» Tadzhikistana: glavnyye litsa i ispolniteli. Rassledovaniye Radio Ozodi popirayet Konstitutsiyu strany. VIDEO ["Troll Factory" of Tajikistan: key figures and performers. Investigation by Radio Ozodi shows this violates the country's constitution. VIDEO], Radio Ozodi, May 2019, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/29926413.html [27] Hamovozi va maqolai «Peshvoi millat» [Echoes of the article "Leader of the Nation"], Sughd, May 2014,  www.hakikati-sugd.tj/index.php/politics/2678-amovoz-ba-ma-olai-peshvoi-millat-to-ikiston-13-az-2-04-2015-s-nosir-on-salim-va-khola-mad-same [28] John Heathershaw and Edward Schatz, Academic freedom in Tajikistan endangered: what is to be done? openDemocracy, February 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/academic-freedom-in-tajikistan-endangered/; Karolina Kluczewska, Academic freedom in Tajikistan: western researchers need to look at themselves, too, openDemocracy, February 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/academic-freedom-in-tajikistan/ ; Malika Bahovadinova, Academic freedom in Tajikistan: why boycotts and blacklists are the wrong response. openDemocracy, February 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/academic-freedom-in-tajikistan-boycotts/ [29] Hafiz Boboyorov, Critical engagement and endangered academic freedom in Tajikistan, openDemocracy, March 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/critical-engagement-and-endangered-academic-freedom-in-tajikistan/ [post_title] => Academic freedom in Tajikistan: From suppression of scholars to incorporation into Rahmon’s regime [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => academic-freedom-in-tajikistan-from-suppression-of-scholars-to-incorporation-into-rahmons-regime [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-05-16 20:46:02 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-05-16 19:46:02 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5778 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [10] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5774 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-05-17 00:03:55 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-05-16 23:03:55 [post_content] => Over the past decade, the Coalition of Civil Society against Torture and Impunity in Tajikistan has documented numerous cases indicating that women and girls in Tajikistan are regularly victims of torture, sexual coercion, insults, humiliation, beatings, and other inhumane treatment by police and law enforcement officials.[1] Between January 1st and December 31st 2020, the Coalition documented 37 cases of torture and ill-treatment, nine of which involved women and two minors.[2]   Nevertheless, in the Tajik context, where patriarchal culture prevails, women and girls who are victims of torture and ill-treatment face particular discrimination when applying to the competent authorities. Often such complaints are either not registered or women have to go through exhausting and often costly procedures to verify the occurrence of violence. As a result, criminals enjoyed almost absolute impunity, while the State preferred to hide the problem. Furthermore, there is almost no research conducted in this sphere and there is no comprehensive official statistics about the scope of this problem in the country.   Tajikistan is a state party to CEDAW since 1993 and on July 22nd 2014 the country also acceded to Optional Protocol to the CEDAW. In its concluding observations, the CEDAW Committee repeatedly recommended Tajikistan to prioritise its measures for eliminating violence against women and ensure that women and girls who are victims of violence have access to immediate means of redress and protection, and perpetrators are prosecuted and adequately punished.”[3] However, despite the high level of violence against women, both domestic and custodial, to date no complaints have been submitted to the Committee.   Police abuse Violence against women in detention very often includes rape and other forms of sexual violence, such as threats of rape, touching, being stripped naked, insults, and humiliation of a sexual nature. Victims of police abuse and brutality usually include young, poorly educated and underprivileged women, which leads to their further marginalisation. As it was stated by the UN Special Rapporteur on torture “in addition to the physical trauma, the mental pain and suffering inflicted on victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence are often long-lasting, in particular as a result of subsequent stigmatisation and isolation.”[4] Therefore, in most of the reported cases, women, especially in rural areas did not report such violence for fear of social stigmatisation or because the police had failed to take appropriate action in previous cases, and because of possible reprisals by abusers.   The few victims who were brave enough to report the violence to the Coalition Legal Aid Unit constitute a small percentage, while in most cases women prefer not to speak openly about the humiliation they have suffered.   In summer 2019, the Coalition Legal Aid Group registered the case of a 24-year-old resident of Vakhsh district, N.B., who had been subjected to ill-treatment and violence by the district internal affairs officers. A young woman was brought in on suspicion of theft and detained for almost two days, during which police officers used various forms of humiliation to force her to confess to a crime, including insults, threats and torture. According to the victim, she was blindfolded and forced to flee quickly along a narrow corridor of the office, causing her to run into the wall several times and fall. She was also beaten repeatedly, which caused her severe pain. She was later given an injection, which partially paralysed her as she could not feel her arms and legs. Taking advantage of her condition and helplessness, she was raped by a police officer.   Despite the best efforts of the lawyers, to date no police officers responsible have been brought to justice. In the presence of the lawyer, the victim indicted at one of the duty officers of the Vakhsh District Department of Internal Affairs, however, the management refused to inform the lawyer of his name.   For about a year now, a complaint of torture against the victim has been examined by the competent authorities at various levels, from the Office of the Procurator-General, the Office of the Procurator-General of Vakhsh district, the District Court of Vakhsh and the District Procurator’s Office of Khatlon, but N.B. has been awaiting a response to her complaints to date.   Rape and sexual harassment by the hands of law enforcement officers  It’s widely recognised that rape "carried out by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of public officials" constitutes torture and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.[5] However, there are cases when women and young girls become victims of sexual violence while addressing the law enforcement agencies with complaints.   In October 2018, a resident of the village of Pakhtakor, Pyanj district, S.H. turned to a local police officer, with a complaint against the unlawful actions of her neighbour. In spite of registering the complaint and taking appropriate measures, the officer locked the door of his office and raped the woman. According to the victim, the police officer threatened that if the incident became known, he would cripple her and make her as disabled as her mother, who has been paralysed and bedridden for years. However, according to the victim, she would not have been able to tell anyone without these threats, as it would have been a disgrace to her and her family.   Taking advantage of her weakness and his own impunity, the police officer continued to harass the young woman for more than eight months, raping and beating her until she had the courage to call a medical expert to record the beatings. The medical examination documented the victim's beatings, including a broken arm, nose, as well as injuries to his ribs and chest. The victim filed complaints against the police officer to the Department of Internal Affairs of Khatlon province. However, the beatings and threats did not stop there, to the extent that the police officer attacked her with a knife, injuring her seven-year-old son who stood up to defend his mother.   As a result, the police officer was fired from the internal affairs agencies, but was not prosecuted. To the date his victim does not give up hope for justice. In January 2020, when she repeatedly addressed the General Prosecutor's Office with her complaint, she was told that an investigation was being conducted, however, no additional information was provided.   Torture and ill-treatment against female relatives of the suspect and detained persons In addition, female relatives of suspects and detainees are also among the victims of violence in places of detention. There are cases where suspects confess to a crime under duress, including threats of rape against their mother, wife or daughter.   Case of Hasan Yodgorov In the autumn of 2017, internal affairs officers in Tursunzade arrested Hasan Yodgorov on suspicion of murder. Immediately after his arrest, a video was shown on central television in which Yodgorov confessed to the murder. However, nine months later, Yodgorov was released after the real killer was apprehended. After his release, Yodgorov told that the confession was made under torture and ill-treatment, to which his mother, his wife and even his eight-year-old daughter were also subjected.   Sharofat Narzykulova, Yodgorov’s mother, was subjected to ill-treatment from the first days of her son’s detention. When attempting to enter the police station, the person on duty abruptly closed the door and slammed her hand, so she stood for 20 minutes, after which random passers-by helped push the door and free the woman’s hand. When her son was charged with murder, Narzykulova herself was tried as an accomplice, allegedly hiding a stolen bracelet and the deceased’s phone. For two weeks, she was summoned daily for extended questioning. During the interrogation, the woman was insulted, called a "thief" and "mother of the murderer" in front of her son, who could not even say a word in defence of his mother and only cried in silence. During one of the interrogations, his son was forced to kneel and ask his mother for money. According to S.Narzykulova, she was asked for $6,000. The son, on his knees, begged the mother to find the money to stop the abuse they were both experiencing.   Tojinissiso Izatullo, Yodgorov's wife and his eight-year-old daughter were also subjected to the brutality of law enforcement: the woman was constantly harassed, insulted and humiliated, and threatened that if her husband did not confess the crime the child would be sent to an orphanage. As a result of constant interrogations, the child suffered a great deal of psychological trauma and developed nervous enuresis (urinary incontinence).   Based on the received information, a criminal case was initiated against officers of the Tursunzade Internal Affairs Department Sherali Azizov, Saadi Davlatmurodzoda, Eradj Naimov, for using torture and ill-treatment against Yedgorov and his family members. The first trial was held in July 2019 in the Supreme Court of Tajikistan. Nevertheless, on January 16th 2020, the judge decided to return the case for additional investigation due to the fact that "... there were a number of flaws and violations of procedural norms..." In particular, the judge stated that the criminal investigation should be initiated not only against the police officers who had committed the torture, but also against the judge in Tursunzade city court, who had tried the case of administrative detention, the leadership of the Internal Affairs Department and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who have failed to exercise proper control over the actions of their officers.[6]   To the date there is no information about the course of the investigation.   Case of Mastona Zainiddionva and Mariam Sodikova On December 16th 2017, officers of the Internal Affairs Department of the Shohmansoor district of Dushanbe detained Mariam Sodikova and two of her minor children, in connection with the search for Sodikova’s husband, accused of stealing a large sum of money. According to the woman, she was subjected to electric shocks in an attempt to obtain information about her husband’s whereabouts. The torture continued for three days, during which the children were held at the police station and allowed to sleep on chairs. In addition, the police also detained Mastonа Zainiddinova, wife of the suspect's brother, with her and she was also subjected to beatings and humiliation.   One year later, the General Procurator's Office initiated criminal proceedings against Shohmansur district police officer Nurhonov F. and other persons under six articles of the Criminal Code, including the use of torture.   On December 16th 2019, the Dushanbe court handed down a verdict in which the defendants were found guilty on all charges and received the following punishment: Nurhonov F. - 17 years' imprisonment, Sabzaev A.- 9 years' imprisonment, Wakhobov U. - 7.5 years of imprisonment, and Ikroriddin Akhliddin - 9 years of imprisonment.[7]   Violence against female sex-workers In addition, female sex workers are often victims of abuse by law enforcement agencies. Under article 130 of the Code of Administrative Offences, prostitution was only an administrative offence and was punishable by a fine or administrative detention for ten to 15 days. However, the police have used various methods of pressure against sex workers, including verbal abuse, inhuman and degrading treatment and arbitrary detention. At the same time, police officers visit sex workers and demand free sexual services, using their position, violence and blackmail.[8]   Social and family stigmatisation Often, the suffering caused by sexual violence by public officials goes ‘beyond the suffering caused by classical torture’, as victims usually find no support from either society or family members, which often leads to her isolation.[9] In the context of Tajik society, very often families, including parents and husbands, abandon victims of sexual violence, condemning them to destitution and poverty.   Victims of sexual violence face a high level of stigma. It can take place at the individual level as well as within the family or community and at the institutional level, including the judiciary. Guilt and shame, fueled by traditional prejudices, often discourage victims from talking about their experiences.   The cases, mentioned above clearly demonstrate lack of support from the state and judicial bodies. Women who are victims of torture face a number of difficulties. According to the national legislation, they must independently prove that they are victims of torture, which includes various expert examinations, the gathering of evidence, the filing of complaints and many others, which is almost impossible without the qualified assistance of a lawyer, which is not always available, especially in rural areas. Moreover, female detainees who are victims of rape face major obstacles when seeking justice. The procedures required to pursue a complaint can often lead to the re-traumatisation of the victim.   In addition, complaints about torture and ill-treatment are often not investigated effectively because the investigating institutions are not sufficiently independent. No separate and independent mechanisms capable of carrying out effective criminal investigations and prosecutions have been set up in Tajikistan despite recommendations by the CAT, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the Special Rapporteur on torture.   In Tajik society, there is special discrimination against women who are single parents or divorced women. Often victims of violence complain of rough treatment, even in the prosecution system, where she is branded ‘beva’ (divorced or widowed), which gives an excuse to treat her roughly and/or impolitely. In colloquial speech, the word is used for the purpose of humiliation.   In addition, victims of torture are usually criminal suspects, which creates negative social attitudes towards them. Unfortunately, the presumption of innocence is often forgotten, and a detained or suspected citizen is already subjected to negative treatment and may be subjected to cruel treatment for the purpose of punishment.   Coalition’s efforts to fight against torture and impunity Since 2011, the Coalition has documented over 1,000 cases of torture. While most victims of torture are still waiting for justice and perpetrators enjoy impunity, the Coalition and its lawyers sometimes are the only hope for the victims of torture and their family members. Apart from the legal consultations, the Coalition also represents the victims and their relatives in the courts for claiming compensation for the physical and moral harm and as a result of Coalition's litigation in court, financial compensation was provided to nine of victims. The Coalition helped change laws and increase levels of public awareness about the responsibilities of the state and the rights of victims. The Coalition also engaged in dialogue with authorities on improving conditions in closed institutions, including prisons, psychiatric institutions and military units. Members of the Coalition, together with the Ombudsman carry out human rights monitoring in the penitentiary facilities - in light of there being no independent access for the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Coalition also engaged in meaningful process with the state on improving the quality of forensic examination of allegations of torture. Furthermore, the Coalition is promoting rehabilitation services for victims, including psychological assistance. While these are all positive trends towards breaking the cycle of silence by victims, non-action by state actors and impunity for the perpetrators, a lot remains to be done to remove some of the most persistent obstacles to end torture in Tajikistan.   Conclusion According to Oynihol Bobonazarova, one of the prominent human rights activist in Tajikistan and a member of the Coalition of Civil Society against Torture and Impunity in Tajikistan, the widespread use of torture is "a consequence of the failure to combat torture in a country where, in most cases, perpetrators of torture enjoy impunity. This gives investigators a sense of untouchability and permissiveness."[10] It was therefore necessary to constantly promote a policy of zero tolerance for torture in the country and to ensure that all perpetrators were brought to justice.   The Coalition welcomes recent positive developments in which Tajikistan's courts have begun to draw attention to investigative shortcomings as well as broadening the circle of those responsible for torture and ill-treatment (Yodogorov case). However, there is also a need to ensure that criminal investigations and trials address all forms of violence and ill-treatment against women and girls, including through the lens of gender discrimination.   Recommendations for the Government of Tajikistan:
  1. Various strategic documents in the area of human rights and freedom from torture, including the National Human Rights Strategy until 2030 and its Action Plan for 2021-2023, and the Draft Law on Non-Discrimination, are currently being developed. It is very important to take a gender perspective in the development of any strategies.
  2. There is also a need to conduct educational activities for investigative bodies on the specifics of conducting criminal cases against women victims of torture and ill-treatment.
  3. A State programme for the rehabilitation of torture victims, with a special focus on women, should be developed, as well as rehabilitation centres where women victims of torture could receive psychological assistance and rehabilitation.
  Favziya Nazarova is Director of Public Foundation Notabene (http://www.notabene.tj/). She has over 15 years of experience in protection and human rights advocacy in Tajikistan, with a focus on civil society development, torture and ill-treatment and non-discrimination issues.   Nigina Bakhrieva is the Founder of Notabene with human rights experience over 20 years. She is a regional Expert on the issues of freedom from torture and other fundamental human rights and the protection of human rights in the United Nations system.   The information is based on the cases, documented by the Coalition from 2017 to 2020.   Image by Ninara under (CC).   [1] Freedom From Torture: the Coalition of Civil Society against Torture and Impunity in Tajikistan, https://notorturetj.org/en [2] Civil Society Coalition against tortur’s Annual report 2020, https://notorturetj.org/sites/default/files/articles/2021/files/rezultaty_deyatelnosti_za_2020_g._koaliciya_protiv_pytok_i_beznakazannosti_v_tadzhikistane_1.pdf [3] CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/3, 2007, para 22. [4] UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Gender perspectives on torture (A/HRC/31/57), para. 51. [5] Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, A/HRC/7/3, para 34. [6] Freedom from Torture, Press Release, August 2019, https://notorturetj.org/news/press-reliz-0 [7] Radio Ozodi, Policemen accused of torture received from 7 to 17 years in prison, December 2019, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30328153.html [8] Shah-Aiym Network NGO and Apeyron NGO, Joint submission for the Pre-sessional Working Group for the 71st session of the CEDAW Committee to generate list of issues to the Sixth Periodic Report of the Republic of Tajikistan, Condition of sex workers in Tajikistan, CEDAW, January 2018, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/TJK/INT_CEDAW_NGO_TJK_30029_E.pdf [9] Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, A/HRC/7/3, para 36. [10] Evening, Abuse and Torture Against Women: What Women Choose to Stay silent about, Vecherka, April 2020, https://vecherka.tj/archives/42131 [post_title] => Ill-treatment and torture: Something about which women choose to remain silent [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => ill-treatment-and-torture-something-about-which-women-choose-to-remain-silent [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-05-16 20:42:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-05-16 19:42:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5774 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [11] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5771 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-05-17 00:02:43 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-05-16 23:02:43 [post_content] => Setting the scene: gender (in)equality in Tajikistan Among Central Asian countries, Tajikistan rates lowest in internationally comparable indices of gender equality. With the score of 0.626 in the Global Gender Gap ranking of the World Economic Forum (WEF) Tajikistan ranked 137 of 153 countries in 2020.[1] This index is a composite measure of four dimensions: economic participation and opportunity; educational attainment; health and survival; and political empowerment. Tajikistan ranks highest in health and survival (72 of 153 countries) followed by educational attainment (123 of 153 countries). In political empowerment, Tajikistan ranks 128.[2] The lowest of the four sub-indices is the dimension of economic participation and opportunity, where Tajikistan ranks 134 of 153 countries.[3] In socio-economic development indicators, which make up the Gender Development Index (GDI), the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) ranking of human development, values for the Human Development Index (HDI) of women and men differ substantially. In 2019, the HDI value for men was 0.712 and 0.586 for women showing particular gaps in expected years of schooling (12.6 years for men and 10.7 years for women); mean years of schooling (11.3 years for men and 10.2 years for women) and Gross National Income (GNI). Women’s GNI of $1,440 USD is four and half times lower than for men whose GNI in 2019 was $6,427.[4]   These rankings, while not exhaustive, demonstrate that in Tajikistan women lag behind men in all spheres, including education, economic participation, health and political participation. Women in Tajikistan experience various forms of discrimination in merely all spheres, including Violence Against Women (VAW) as one of the extreme examples and many others. The legislation of Tajikistan does not yet address comprehensively discrimination in all forms and does not prohibit discrimination on all possible grounds in line with the international human rights obligations that Tajikistan voluntarily acceded to, especially the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).   Legal gaps in protection from discrimination in all forms and on all grounds in Tajikistan resulting in gender neutral legislation on women’s political participation[5] Tajikistan as a signatory to a number of international human rights treaties, including CEDAW established in its Constitution in Article 17 guarantees equality of all before the law and the courts. Human rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed by the State for all without distinction based on nationality, race, sex, language, religion, political convictions, and education, social or material status. It also stipulates that men and women have equal rights. Such provisions are replicated in the numerous codes and laws of Tajikistan.   In terms of discrimination based on sex, Tajikistan has adopted the special Law on the State Guarantees of Equal Rights of Men and Women and Equal Opportunities of their Enjoyment (hereinafter, referred to as Gender Equality Law) in 2005. This is the only Law that defines the notion of discrimination. It is defined as any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition of equal rights of men and women in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. The notion is not inclusive of direct and indirect discrimination and the Law does not protect from intersectional discrimination.[6] Besides, the Law has several critical gaps: it fails to prohibit workplace discrimination; introduce temporary special measures and prohibit violence against women as a form of gender-based discrimination.[7] It has no measures on elimination of existing social and cultural patterns on role of women that perpetuate discrimination against women.   The Article 17 of the Constitution as well as definition of discrimination established by Gender Equality Law are not compliant with the CEDAW intersectionality concept that links discrimination based on sex and gender with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste and sexual orientation and gender identity.[8] While the text of CEDAW adopted in 1979 referred to sex-based discrimination, in 2010 the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women explained that Article 1 of the CEDAW (on discrimination) when read together with Articles 2 (f) and 5 (a) covers gender-based discrimination, thus, calling state parties for explicit legal recognition of intersecting forms of discrimination and their prohibition.[9] In Tajikistan, Lesbian, Gay, By-sexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex (LGBTQI) rights are not recognised.[10] So as the rights of disadvantaged groups of women and girls such as refugee women, migrant women, women left behind by male migrants, widows of male migrants, stateless women, women and girls with disabilities, women living with HIV/AIDS, women in prison and former women inmates, and rural women are not fully considered in legislation.[11]   The Constitution stipulates that any citizen who reached the age of 18 has a right to participate in the political life and administration of the state directly or through representatives, they have a right to vote and be elected upon reaching eligible age (Article 27). Similar equality guarantees are provided in the constitutional laws and laws establishing a right to participate in elections to parliament and local municipalities, civil service and judiciary.   Tajikistan has a bi-cameral Parliament, Majlisi Oli. The Lower Chamber (Majlisi namoyandagon) is directly elected for a five-year term. Nationals of Tajikistan who reached 30 years and have a higher education have a right to run for the post of the member of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament (Article 49). The elections are administered by the Central Commission on Election and Referenda which supervises district election commissions and precinct election commissions. Elections are conducted in accordance with the Constitutional Law on Elections to Majlisi Oli (High Assembly) that in line with Article 17 of the Constitution ensures the right to vote regardless of ethnicity, race, sex, language, beliefs, political convictions, social status, education and property (Article 4). There are two requirements for running for elections: 1) an election deposit that has to be paid by candidates during registration process, and 2) higher education. Both are gender neutral requirements, but in fact they place women into disadvantaged position compared to men.[12] The deposit shall be paid from the personal means of the candidates and it equals to ten units used for calculation (in 2020, the deposit amount was 5,800 Tajik Somoni or USD $600). The deposit is returned if candidate obtains at least ten per cent of votes. The Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women recommended to withdraw a deposit fee for women to increase their political participation.[13] In general, the deposit fee is too high given Tajikistan economic situation and poverty levels, especially for women, whose economic activity is much lower compared to men and the gender wage gap in Tajikistan.[14] OSCE regards that a requirement of a higher education is overly restrictive and recommends to fully remove it for both male and female candidates. So as the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women considers that such a requirement contravenes the CEDAW even if applied to both women and men, because it may have a disproportionate impact on women.[15] In Tajikistan, where women have a restricted access to higher education such a requirement places women in more disadvantaged position compared to men.   Do women equally enjoy rights to political participation in Tajikistan? Back in 1995, the Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA) noted that despite a call of UN Economic and Social Council to reach 30 per cent target of women’s political participation by 1995 that is also termed as “critical mass”, the progress to achieve it was modest.[16] The BPfA called for a balanced political participation and power-sharing between women and men in decision-making as internationally agreed target.[17] Statistical data on women’s participation in politics and decision-making demonstrates that 1995 target of 30 per cent is out of reach in 2021 in Tajikistan.   In the Parliament, despite progress compared to 2015 elections (when women made up 14.5 per cent of all members of the Upper Chamber and 19 per cent of all members in the Lower Chamber), in the 2020 elections, in the Upper Chamber (where members are appointed) women made up 25.8 per cent and in the Lower Chamber women made up 23.8 per cent of all members.[18] Currently, two of the nine committees of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament are chaired by women.[19] One of the three deputy chairmen of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament is a woman. There are no special measures to promote women candidates in political parties.[20] In Tajikistan, there is no any women’s fraction or coalition of women members of Parliament.[21]   At the decision-making level, 30 per cent representation is out of reach. As to high level positions, women are usually appointed to posts of ministers responsible for social issues. Recent appointments in the Government resulted in appointment of a woman on a post of the Deputy Prime Minister on social affairs. Among 18 Ministers, women hold two posts: the Minister of Labour, Employment and Migration, and the Minister of Culture.   In the civil service, the share of women among civil servants decreased from 35.2 per cent in 2013 to 23.8 per cent in 2019. As to senior level in the civil service, women made up 19.1 per cent of all managers in 2020. At the local level, women made up 26.7 per cent of all civil servants and 21.5 per cent of all managers. Three women were chairing districts (equivalent to head of local government at the district level).[22] In 2017 the amendment was introduced to Decree of the President on Procedure of Competitive Recruitment for the Positions of Civil Service that provided women participating in the competitive recruitment for positions of civil service for the first time with additional three scores during exams.[23] This measure is aimed at encouraging young women to enter the civil service. However, the analysis of impact of this measure has not been conducted as yet.   Since its independence, Tajikistan did not have any female President, Prime Minister, governors of provinces, ambassadors or representatives of Tajikistan to international bodies. As to the defence and security sector, share of women working in law enforcement bodies: office of the Prosecutor General, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Agency on Anti-Corruption and Financial Control, Drug Control Agency, State Committee on National Security, and Customs Service, is not disclosed. Women have not been appointed to the positions of Ministers or Chairpersons of these bodies in Tajikistan.   While one woman was appointed to the position of the Chairperson of the Supreme Economic Court, share of women among judges is far below 30 per cent target. In the Constitutional Court, only one position of the seven posts of judges is occupied by a woman. In the economic courts, women make up 15.8 per cent of all judges. In the courts of general jurisdiction, women hold 19 per cent of all posts of judge.   Another (good) law: will the political participation of women improve? Tajikistan did not establish an environment conducive for improvement of participation of women in political life and decision-making and it does not establish neither in law nor in practice temporary special measures to remedy the situation. In 2018, Government established a working group to draft a comprehensive anti-discrimination law in line with the recommendations it received during two cycles of the Universal Periodic Review on Human Rights (UPR) and respective National Action Plans (NAPs) adopted to implement these recommendations. The draft law was prepared in 2020 and was submitted to the Government for the review. The draft law establishes a comprehensive definition of discrimination and includes list of grounds upon which discrimination may take place, including sex, sexual orientation and gender identity and covers all spheres where discrimination may occur. It further defines direct and indirect discrimination and calls for adoption of positive measures, including temporary special measures. Would this law if adopted be a solution to currently low political participation of women? Most probably not, because exclusion of women from political participation is a result of combination of factors, including social and political discourses; political structures and institutions; and socio-cultural and functional constraints that limit women’s individual and collective agency.[24]   Since 1999 Tajikistan has taken a strong strand in ensuring gender equality when the President adopted a Decree on advancement of the role of women in Tajikistan that was followed by the adoption of the State Programme ‘On Main Directions of National Policy on Provision of Equal Rights and Opportunities of Men and Women in the Republic of Tajikistan for 2001-2009’ (hereinafter, the State Programme) in 2001 and the Gender Equality Law in 2005. However, the rhetoric on gender equality, especially, on political participation of women was declarative, because some of the measures institutionalised a ‘glass ceiling’. The 1999 Decree while focused on the promotion of women to senior management positions in government at the national and local levels, judiciary, prosecutor’s bodies, and educational institutions, it explicitly restricted such appointment to the positions of only Deputy Minister and excluded their appointment to the positions of Deputy Ministers of Defense and Internal Affairs.[25] Since 2000, the Government adopted a targeted state programme to promote women in leadership. It is called a State Programmes on Education, Selection and Appointment of Talented Women and Girls to Management Positions that initially covered the period of 2007-2016 and, then, 2017-2022. The programme has an ambition of 30 per cent representation of women in public bodies. However, the fulfilment of such an ambition remains out of reach.   Since 2009, Tajikistan further rolled back in conceptualising gender equality when the International Women’s Day celebrated on March 8th was renamed to the Mother’s Day using explicitly nationalist and anti-feminist explanations. The Mother’s Day was proclaimed to praise a woman mother, creator of life, educator of generations, mentor of young boys and youth on kind path, and sustainable founder of the family.[26] It was further linked to the three thousand-old tradition of Aryan men to honour mothers and wives during spring season. In majority of his annual addresses to the Parliament, the President underlines the role of women in implementation of social policy, their role as mothers and educators of daughters as main guardians of families and traditions.[27] These narratives are particularly disempowering for women and girls given the already prevalent perception in the Tajikistan’s society about the role of woman as a wife and a mother and, respective, high burden of unpaid care work.[28] The nationwide time use survey was not conducted in Tajikistan to assess engagement of women in unpaid care work. However, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) conducted in 2016 clearly demonstrated that women regardless of their economic activity and employment status are extensively engaged in unpaid work related to household duties; care after sick and disabled members of the family.[29] Besides, families in Tajikistan are still an extended family with several generations sharing one household and young women – daughters, including daughters-in-law – holding the lowest position in family hierarchy with restricted agency to making decisions over their access to education; health, including reproductive health and rights; marriage and their engagement to public domains.[30]   Thus, ideologically, Tajikistan’s political landscape is not supportive of the meaningful political participation of women and approaches towards gender equality are contradictory. The legislation on elections while gender neutral, in reality, imposes excessive requirements for women preventing them from political participation and does not take into account their low economic and educational status compared to men. Strong gender stereotypes that put women in subordinate position compared to men prevent women from playing more active roles in public domains and gaining necessary networking and social capital required for running for elections and promotion of their careers.   While adoption of anti-discrimination law will be an important step in recognising intersectional discrimination in all forms and in all spheres of life, it is unlikely that law alone will remedy current low participation of women in political life in Tajikistan. To amplify the impact of the adoption of anti-discrimination law the following considerations should be taken into account to boost the political participation of women:
  • Introduce quotas for political participation of women as a fast-track strategy to improve political participation of women in all branches of state power;
  • Narrow gaps in economic participation and opportunities of women and educational attainment, especially at the level of higher education;
  • Implement large scale communication, information and education campaigns to change gender stereotypes and promote women’s participation in public domains; and
  Establish a caucus of current and former women in power (covering all branches of state power) for the purpose of networking and building collective power and agency of women, and link them with younger generations of women, promote leadership and role models among young women.   Dilbar Turakhanova is an independent consultant with over 15 years of extensive experience in researching gender equality issues in Tajikistan (native country), Central Asia, South Caucasus and others. Dilbar has several academic and non-academic publications in the areas of gender, migration, gender-based violence. Her research interests include gender, migration, Central Asia.   Image UNDP in Europe and CIS by under (CC).   [1] World Economic Forum. 2020. Global Gender Gap Report. P.329 [2] World Economic Forum. 2020. Global Gender Gap Report. P.329 [3] World Economic Forum. 2020. Global Gender Gap Report. P.329 [4] UNDP.2020. Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century Briefing note for countries on the 2019 Human Development Report Tajikistan, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TJK [5] While Article 7 of CEDAW regards political participation of women as a right: (a) to vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies; (b) to participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government; (c) to participate in non-governmental organisations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country, in this article only the following rights are assessed: (a) right to be elected and (b) right to participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government. [6] CEDAW. Concluding observations on Tajikistan 2018. CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/6, paragraph 11 (a). [7] CEDAW in its General Recommendation No.25 noted that such measures are a wide variety of legislative, executive, administrative and other regulatory instruments, policies and practices, such as outreach or support programmes; allocation and/or reallocation of resources; preferential treatment; targeted recruitment, hiring and promotion; numerical goals connected with time frames; and quota systems. (paragraph 22) [8] CEDAW, General Recommendation No.28 on the core obligations of States parties under Article 2 of the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW/C/GC/28, paragraph 18, 2010,  https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/711350?ln=en [9] Ibid. [10] CEDAW. Concluding observations on Tajikistan 2018, CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/6, paragraphs 11 (b), 39 (c), (e). [11] CEDAW. Concluding observations on Tajikistan 2018, CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/6, paragraph 12 (c). [12] OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan Parliamentary Elections 1 March 2015 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report p.11, 2015, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/6/158081.pdf [13] CEDAW, Concluding observations on Tajikistan 2007, CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/3, paragraph 26. [14] OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan Parliamentary Elections 1 March 2020 ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report, p.7, 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/9/443983.pdf [15] CEDAW, General Recommendation No.23: Political and Public Life, paragraph 23, 1997, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/INT_CEDAW_GEC_4736_E.pdf [16] Ibid, paragraph 16. [17] United Nations. 1995. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Critical Area G, “Women, Power and Decision-Making”. [18] According to data of the Committee on Women’s and Family Affairs under the Government of Tajikistan published in 2021. [19] Both women MPs head the  traditional for women areas: one of the two committees deals with education, health, culture and youth policy and another one focuses on social issues, family and protection of health; available at: https://parlament.tj/ru/kumitaho [20] IPU Parline, Tajikistan, House of Representatives, https://data.ipu.org/node/169/data-on-women?chamber_id=13538 [21] Mamadazimov, A and Kuvatova, A. 2011. Political Party Regulations and Women’s Participation in Political Life of Tajikistan, National Association of Political Scientists of Tajikistan, p. 46. [22] Committee on Women’s and Family Affairs under the Government of Tajikistan. 2021. Analysis of Implementation of the National Strategy on Advancement of Role of Women for 2011-2020. [23] European Union. 2018. European Union – Tajikistan Civil Society Seminar on Practical Implementation of the Gender Equality Principles in Tajikistan, Seminar Report, p.17 [24] Bari, Farzana. 2005. Women’s Political Participation: Issues and Challenges. p.3. [25] Kasymova, S. 2007. Transformation of Gender Order in Tajik Society, p.51. [26] Decree of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Mother’s Day” adopted on 6 March 2009, No.632, http://www.adlia.tj/show_doc.fwx?Rgn=14361 [27] President of the Republic of Tajikistan, see website: http://president.tj/ru/taxonomy/term/5/69 [28] Kasymova, S. 2007. Transformation of Gender Order in Tajik Society, p.52. [29] Agency of Statistics under the President of Tajikistan. 2017. Situation in the Labour Market in the Republic of Tajikistan (Report on findings of the labour force survey conducted from 20 July to 20 August, 2016), p.94; 96. [30] Temkina,  A.2006. Subordination to Older vs. Deconstruction of Patriarchy: Women’s Sexuality in Marriage (North of Tajikistan), Journal of Social Policy Studies, 4 (4), p.446. [post_title] => Low women’s political participation in Tajikistan: Will the anti-discrimination law be a solution? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => low-womens-political-participation-in-tajikistan-will-the-anti-discrimination-law-be-a-solution [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-05-16 20:38:19 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-05-16 19:38:19 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5771 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [12] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5767 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-05-17 00:01:56 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-05-16 23:01:56 [post_content] => HIV is a disease that affects various spheres of people's life, including healthcare, legal, labour and other aspects. Tajikistan, being a rule of law based secular and social state, adopted development programmes to address priority problems in the legal and social sphere. To address HIV-related issues, the Government of Tajikistan periodically adopts relevant National Programs every three years.   In 2020, the Government of Tajikistan approved the National Programme to Combat the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (hereinafter HIV) and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (hereinafter AIDS) Epidemic in the Republic of Tajikistan 2021 - 2025, along with the overall budget and Action Plan which includes the SDGs and other international human rights and HIV instruments.[1]   According to the data presented in the National Program, the total number of officially registered HIV cases in the country is 11,986, of which 7,698 people (64.1 per cent) are men and 4,288 people (35.8 per cent) are women. However, it is estimated that the number of people living with HIV could be 13,000.   In 2019, 1,320 new cases of HIV infection (adults and children) were registered in Tajikistan, which roughly corresponds to the number of cases in 2018 and 2017 (101 cases less than in 2018 and 115 cases more than in 2017). Of these new HIV cases registered in 2019, 772 were men (58.5 per cent) and 548 women (41.5 per cent). In recent years, there has been a general trend towards an increase in the proportion of women among all new HIV infections, from 30.9 per cent in 2011 to 41.5 per cent in 2019. Overall, the cases in the country amount to 14.5 per 100,000 population.   The Constitution of Tajikistan enshrines the fundamental human and civil rights and freedoms that are equally binding for all persons living in Tajikistan, with some exceptions for foreign citizens and stateless persons.[2] Persons living with HIV, based on the principle of non-discrimination, have all the rights and freedoms provided for all in Chapter Two of the Constitution - the right to life, judicial protection, education, physical and mental health and social protection, information, privacy and others.   In 2016, Tajikistan ratified the ‘Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS: speeding up the fight against HIV and ending the AIDS epidemic by 2030’. In 2017, the Health Code was adopted, which in Chapter 24 pays attention to the issues of HIV treatment and prevention, and prohibits discrimination against people living with HIV (PLHIV) in all fields of life. It defines the rights of PLHIV in receiving free qualified and specialised medical care, including medication, in public healthcare institutions, and recognises the principle of voluntary HIV treatment, as well as confidential and voluntary medical examinations for HIV. PLHIV, upon disclosing their medical diagnosis of HIV, have the right to compensation for moral and material damage. Children with HIV under the age of 16 receive a food allowance, and parents or legal representatives of children born to mothers infected with HIV have the right to receive breast milk substitutes from the moment they are born until the time they are finally diagnosed with HIV, with the aim of further reducing risk of HIV infection.   Despite these progressive provisions in Tajik legislation, practice has shown that PLHIV unfortunately continue to be discriminated against in all spheres of life. The reasons for such discrimination are different, ranging from: false ideas/knowledge of the disease; low qualifications of doctors, judges, and law enforcement officers; low legal awareness in the general population including PLHIV themselves; gender stereotypes; contradictions between healthcare laws and criminal and administrative legislation; discriminatory provisions of the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences; new discriminatory by-laws adopted, which are better implemented in practice than laws; and generally weak law enforcement.[3]   The new National Programme also underlines the existence of barriers for creating an enabling environment to support the development of programmes for counteracting the epidemic, including the need for legislation to mitigate the high level of stigma and discrimination against people living with HIV and other key populations. Unfortunately, there is currently no single and comprehensive anti-discrimination law in Tajikistan.   The Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan has a separate corpus delicti for HIV infections. In accordance with Article 125 of the Criminal Code, criminal liability is provided for the infecting of someone with HIV/AIDS, as well as for knowingly leaving someone at risk of being infected with HIV. At the same time, the legislation does not take into account exceptions in the form of informed consent of the other sexual partner (regardless of whether there was the risk of HIV infection), or whether the virus carrier is taking precautions.[4] In addition, the legislation does not define the form of warning a partner should take about their status. Thus, all persons living with HIV who have sexual intercourse can be prosecuted, thereby violating their right to sexual health. When a criminal case is initiated under this Article, the status of both the suspect and the victim is simultaneously opened.   Thus, the wording of 125 of the Criminal Code leads to the situation whereby law enforcement agencies initiate criminal cases only on the basis of endangering HIV infection and HIV infection. Article 125 has already become a ‘routine Article’ for law enforcement agencies. In 2018, and for four months of 2019, law enforcement agencies identified 138 cases of deliberate infection of people by HIV-infected persons. 33 criminal cases were initiated against 26 HIV-infected persons therein in 2018, and 39 criminal cases were initiated against 32 HIV-infected persons in 2019.   In addition, Article 162 of the Health Code gives doctors the right to disclose the status of HIV patients at a simple request from the investigating authorities without providing a justification for it. Some criminal cases under Part 1 of Article 125 were initiated after the AIDS Center disclosed information on HIV to law enforcement agencies. During the investigation and trial, the accused’s right to confidentiality over their HIV status is not ensured because the investigators, officers, court clerks and judges are able to request medical information under provisions of the health code without conditions.   At a roundtable organised by the Public Organisation Human Rights Center (PO HRC) on December 1st 2020, dedicated to the problem of HIV criminalisation, one of the representatives of the PLHIV community in Tajikistan stated: "One gets the impression that law enforcement agencies are fighting not the infection, but rather the PLHIV."   Amendments to the Family Code, adopted as a Government Decree on August 23rd 2016 (No.374), violate the right of PLHIV to voluntariness and confidentiality of HIV testing. In particular, the amended Article 14 now requires every future spouse to submit to a compulsory medical examination as a mandatory condition for marriage, and this was. The rules indicate that the examination includes, among other things, an enzyme-linked immunosorbent test (HIV/AIDS) and the couples must be familiarised with the results of each other's examination. Without a medical document proving such examinations, the registry office does not have the right to register a marriage.[5] This requirement violates the right to privacy of everyone who wishes to marry. For PLHIV and other persons who have the disease Hepatitis B, C, drug addiction, in case of refusal to voluntarily disclose information about their disease to a partner, a medical certificate is not issued, so the marriage shall not be registered. A medical certificate is also not issued to persons who have drug addiction, Hepatitis B and C, mental illness, until they are cured and pose a threat to the life and health of another person who is getting married. Treatment is carried out at the expense of patients and after treatment they must undergo a repeated examination.   In turn, Articles 119 and 120 of the Code of Administrative Responsibility of the Republic of Tajikistan provide for an administrative penalty in the form of a fine for refusing to have mandatory medical examinations and HIV treatment, as well as for concealing the source of HIV infection, which is a significant barrier for PLHIV to receive ARV therapy.   There is a free legal hotline for these groups at the PO HRC. Over the period from November 2018 to December 2019, 167 calls were received by the hotline, of which 67 were from men and 100 from women. From January to December 2020, 415 calls were received, 163 from men, 214 from women, and 38 from government agencies. The calls were associated with various violations of rights against PLHIV.   In 2019 to 2020, legal assistance was provided for cases such as:
  • 11 initiated criminal cases under Part One of Article 125 (deliberate exposure to the risk of HIV infection);
  • Two criminal cases under Part Two of Article 125; and
  • Three criminal cases under Part Three of Article 125.
  Most of the criminal cases were brought against women. Many of the calls to the hotline are by the employees of public organisations who work directly with communities. They complain that police officers detain them, demanding them to disclose the status of all their beneficiaries with whom they work on adherence to HIV treatment, and threaten to initiate a criminal case against them under Part One of Article 125 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan. They also demand to write receipts stating that they undertake not to infect HIV, which means for them not to have an intimate relationship.   In 2019, the PO HRC conducted an analysis of the criminal procedure legislation of Tajikistan. Within the framework of this analysis, law enforcement practice was also taken into account in connection with which 13 criminal cases under Article 125 were covered. The analysis revealed the following problems:  
  • When considering cases under Part One of Article 125, there is a lack of direct evidence. The accusation is based not on facts, but on the words of a person, which are often impossible to verify. As a rule, the court takes the side of the one who was put at risk.
  • Another difficulty comes from prejudice and poor awareness. For example, in Tajikistan, representatives of the local judicial system do not yet have a complete understanding of the characteristics of the disease, and regularly do not distinguish HIV from AIDS. There is no Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court on such categories of cases that would explain to the courts what is meant by putting under the risk of HIV. Guidelines for these categories of cases to prosecutors have not been adopted.
  • At the first medical examination for HIV after determining a positive diagnosis in accordance with the guidelines for diagnosis, treatment and dispensary observation for HIV infection (for adults and adolescents) requires infected persons to sign a paper stating that they have been warned of criminal liability for infecting another person with HIV. The fact that a person is aware of their HIV infection does not necessarily imply that they are also aware of the ways of passing of the virus. As PLHIV themselves note, in practice they are faced with low quality of information before and after the test consultation, or lack of it. As a rule, the signing of documents often occurs after people learn about their incurable disease for the first time when they are in state of confusion or shock. The issue of adapting a HIV-positive person to their own diagnosis is very acute. In other countries, there is practice on how to show the partner their HIV-positive status. Among the proposed forms are a statement, a verbal announcement in the presence of witnesses or a doctor, in a self-help group. At the same time, these recommendations are not stipulated anywhere in the legislation of Tajikistan, and their implementation is difficult due to psychological barriers. Psychological services are not provided free of charge at HIV/AIDS centers.
  • The right to receive documents (resolution on the initiation of a criminal case, indictment, sentence and others) of criminal proceedings in a language accessible to the accused and convicted, in particular in Russian and Uzbek, is violated. The right to testify in an accessible language for Russian-speaking and Uzbek-speaking suspects and detainees is also being violated. Translators are not present during the inquiry, and the suspects are forced to sign explanations recorded from their words in Tajik on their behalf. The indictment is not served in a language accessible to the accused in accordance with Part One of Article 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Tajikistan.
  • State lawyers who are involved by investigators in fulfilling their duties to protect PLHIV are reluctant, or because of ignorance of HIV, and they overlook many important points.
  • Most cases under Part One of Article 125 are initiated according to the data of the HIV/AIDS centers without signs of a crime, but only on the basis of information about the HIV disease. Patients with HIV are called to the interrogator, and they are openly asked: "Who are you sleeping with?" This is also facilitated by Article 162 of the Health Code, which allows doctors to disclose a patient’s HIV diagnosis at the request of the investigating authorities without any conditions.
  • Attention is drawn to the fact that only two criminal cases out of 13 were initiated on the basis of the victims' statements. Eight out of 13 criminal cases are private prosecution cases under Part One of Article 125, which are initiated in the presence of claims from victims. The study of all 13 sentences showed that under Part One of Article 125, nine victims and under Part Two of of Article 3 of the victims had no claims against the convicted. In 2018, there were no criminal cases terminated by the courts on the basis of Articles 72-75 of the Criminal Code (exemption from criminal liability in connection with reconciliation with the victim, sincere repentance, etc.), which is provided by the Criminal Procedure Code for Part One of Article 125. Despite the fact that in one of the cases the so-called victim in court declared: "I have no complaints against the defendant, I love her, please set her free." As a result, the court pronounces a sentence of one year and two months in prison. The cassation and supervisory instance courts did not find any irregularities or omissions in the trial.
  • According to Part Three of Article 24 of the Criminal Procedure Code, cases under Part One of Article 125 are initiated upon the claim of a person who has suffered from a crime. In the event of reconciliation of the person who suffered from the crime with the accused, and compensation for the harm caused to the victim, the proceedings are terminated. According to Article 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code if the case is of particular public importance or if the victim is in a helpless state, dependent on the accused or for other reasons is unable to defend their rights and legitimate interests, the prosecutor has the right to initiate a criminal case even in the absence of a victim's statement. But unfortunately, the legislation does not provide an explanation of the wording ‘special public importance’ and the prosecutors interpret it based on their personal understanding. There were cases when criminal cases were initiated under Part One of Article 125 by the police without a victim's statement, and the courts did not pay attention to this.
  • Complaints against the verdict of the first instance in accordance with the norms of the Criminal Procedure Code are submitted through the court of first instance, and the judge who passed the verdict, who is appealed, prepares the case and the complaint and sends it to the higher cassation court. The supervisory appeal is considered by the same court as the cassation appeal, only in a different composition of judges, but in essence it is the same court. Accordingly, there is a risk that the court will not be objective in this matter and will not take a positive decision on the complaint against itself. In this connection, lawyers repeatedly apply in a supervisory manner to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tajikistan, which delays the consideration of complaints.
  • There is a lack of coordination between the doctors of HIV/AIDS centers and temporary detention centers, which leads to the fact that PLHIV do not have access to Antiretroviral Therapy (ARVT) drugs, which entails a violation of their right to health.
  • In cases involving people who inject drugs, and at the same time have been participants in the opioid substitution therapy programme for many years, the courts additionally prescribe compulsory drug addiction treatment under Article 101 of the Criminal Procedure Code, without clarifying how it can harm the convict and what is opioid substitution therapy. According to Article 194 of the Health Code, substitution therapy is considered to be one of the types of assistance, and Article 101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also contradicts the Article 203 Health Code. It states that compulsory treatment is applied by a court verdict to persons who have committed a crime, including persons who have committed administrative offenses and who at the same time need treatment for a confirmed neurological illness, when they refuse voluntary treatment. But in our case, our beneficiaries do not refuse substitution therapy, which is an alternative treatment, as it is stated in Articles 194 and 197 of the Health Code.
  • Attention is drawn to the fact that in Tajikistan there are more children infected with HIV via an unknown route than children infected with HIV via the vertical route. Moreover, the Ministry of Health is not taking the necessary measures to find out how children are infected. When a child is diagnosed, when both parents are healthy, doctors at HIV/AIDS centers do not send information to prosecutors for proper investigation. Moreover, in the proceedings of the PO HRC there is a case where a lawyer defends the interests of a girl, currently ten years old, who was infected when she was 20 months old. The case has already been initiated for several times and terminated due to lack of evidence. The lawyer petitioned for a re-examination, request for information about the donor, the plasma that was transfused to the girl, and other investigative actions that enable a high-quality investigation. But this petition was never approved, and the case was again terminated. Unfortunately, the judicial practice does not have any positive precedents yet. But if the fact of HIV infection in state medical institutions is proven, the state will be obliged to pay benefits to PLHIV for a lifetime, as well as compensate for material and moral damage, and provide them with housing.
  In addition to problems with access to justice in the criminalisation of HIV, PLHIV also face social problems, which can be expressed in the absence of implementation of the principle of rule of law.   Thus, the Health Code provides for the right for parents of children born to mothers with HIV to receive breast milk substitutes from the moment of their birth until the time they are finally diagnosed with HIV. Statistics show that cases of HIV detection among children born to HIV-infected mothers in 2017 were 60 children, 53 children in 2018, and 45 children in 2019.[6] There is also a problem with the realisation of this right, when not all parents of children born to mothers with HIV have access to breast milk substitutes. This is due to the fact that the mechanism for implementing this norm has not yet been developed, funding is not provided in the state budget, and funds for these needs are not always allocated from the local budget.   Government Resolution No. 232 dated May 10th 2010 provides for the issuance of benefits for children with HIV up to 16 years of age. There are bureaucratic mechanisms for granting benefits, from the moment of filing an application until its permission, which can take more than a year, the parents of children are forced to provide information to local authorities that the children are alive and while the information is being checked the issuance of benefits is suspended.   Resolution No. 475, dated September 25th 2018, defines the List of Diseases, which subsequently does not give people living with HIV the right to study in educational medical institutions, nor the right to adopt a child, be their guardian or custodian.   The Health Code provides for free treatment and examination of all types of medical and drug assistance in public health institutions. However, in practice, except for ARV therapy, all other services are paid for by patients, and in practice this norm practically does not work.   A HIV test is also required for employment, even when opening a retail outlet for small entrepreneurs, and there is a practice of refusing to hire a HIV-positive person. PLHIV do not appeal against this illegal practice for fear of disclosing their status, since PLHIV mostly live in small areas, villages where everyone knows each other and it is impossible to keep information about the disease a secret.   In labour relations, when hiring and subsequently when working, according to the Labour Code and other by-laws of the Republic of Tajikistan, an HIV test is required only for medical workers in the surgical field (including surgeons, dentists, obstetrician-gynecologists, etc.); those working in blood transfusion services; specialists in infectious diseases; and departments in which there is an increased risk of infections.   In practice, this requirement is not observed and the HIV test in particular, and the results of medical examinations in general, is demanded in the hiring process for any type of work and position, even when opening a retail outlet for small entrepreneurs. There are cases of refusal to hire a HIV-positive person. PLHIV do no appeal against this illegal practice for fear of disclosing their status, since they mainly live in small settlements, where everyone knows each other and it is difficult to keep information about the disease a secret.   In 2019, the Government tested children for HIV in schools in pilot districts. The testing took place while parents were not present, mandatory consulting was not provided before and after the test, and the result was disclosed to the school administration. There were even statements regarding the exclusion of a child from school due to their positive HIV status.   Representatives of civil society regularly communicate with various state bodies to improve the situation with the rights of PLHIV in Tajikistan. Civil society has proposed amendments to the new Criminal Code, which is currently being developed by a working group approved by the decree of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan. The proposals are aimed at decriminalising the first part of Article 125 of the Criminal Code. The good news is that the working group on the development of the new Criminal Code has included a footnote to Article 125, which provides for the exemption from criminal liability of HIV-positive people in the case of the informed consent of the sexual partner.   In addition, within the framework of advocacy activities, work is underway to develop a draft Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tajikistan on the consideration of cases related to the criminal prosecution of PLHIV, including an explanation of Article 125. The Supreme Court has already analysed about 100 court cases, which were considered over the period 2018-2020.   Also, as it was noted above, the National Programme was adopted and it has already been approved by the Resolution of the Government No. 50 (dated November 27th 2020). According to the recommendations of the civil society, all the problems mentioned above were also included in this programme. We hope that all the initiatives undertaken by the civil society will result to an improvement in the situation with the observance of the rights of PLHIV in Tajikistan.   In this connection, the following recommendations for solving problems are offered:   On the criminalisation of HIV:
  • To decriminalise Article 125, and to criminalise and prosecute only for intentional HIV infection within the framework of the general article causing harm to health of moderate severity;
  • To people living with HIV in cases related to HIV infection, to provide obligatory participation of a lawyer in criminal cases at the expense of the state;
  • It is advisable to clarify the issue of protecting the confidentiality of the diagnosis and provide that in order to obtain data on the state of health and HIV status, a petition from the prosecutor and a court order is required. For this, appropriate amendments should be made to the Law on Operational-Investigative Activities and Articles 49 and 162 of the Health Code, expressly indicating that data constituting a medical secret can be disclosed to the bodies of inquiry or investigation only with the approval of the court;
  • Exclude compulsory treatment for PWID as an additional measure of punishment, amend the Criminal Code with the possibility of prescribing alternative treatment for PWID, instead of compulsory treatment. Include in the Criminal Code or Criminal Procedure Code the concept of alternative treatment and the procedure for its appointment;
  • Given that there are many myths and stigmatising attitudes regarding HIV, people living with HIV and those affected by the epidemic, it is imperative to ensure regular training of police officers, prosecutors and judges on HIV, including the latest scientific and medical data on HIV infection as a chronic disease, risk of transmission, effects of antiretroviral therapy and precautions, etc., and the importance of maintaining confidentiality of diagnosis and privacy;
  • To develop and adopt the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court on cases related to Article 125, taking into account modern scientific advances in HIV treatment before the abolition of this article; and
  • For investigative bodies and prosecutors to develop instructions for conducting criminal cases under Article 125, as well as oversight in HIV prevention.
  For voluntary HIV testing:
  • Given the concentrated nature of the HIV epidemic in Tajikistan, replace the mandatory medical examination for HIV of persons entering into marriage with voluntary and confidential HIV testing, and with the provision of pre- and post-test consulting;
  • To reform all legislation, taking into account the observance and non-discrimination of the rights of PLHIV; and
  • To strengthen the responsibility of doctors, medical personnel, and government officials, who have access to information on the presence of HIV, regarding the disclosing of confidential information without any connection with aggravating consequences and for refusing medical care and services.
  On issues of violation of other rights of PLHIV:
  • Adopt the Government Resolution on the issue of infant formula for children born to HIV-infected mothers, and provide funding for these purposes, both in the local budgets of Tajikistan and at the state level in the case of subsidised financing of subsidised districts;
  • Simplify the procedure for granting benefits to children with HIV and amend the Health Code, increasing the age of children eligible for benefits to 18 years old;
  • To terminate the widespread practice of HIV testing upon admission to school, vocational educational institutions and upon employment in all types of work; and
  • The Ministry of Labour will strengthen its work with employers on the observance of safety measures at the workplace, including clarifications on HIV prevention and prohibition of discrimination against PLHIV.
  Larisa Alexandrova is an expert on gender, human rights and HIV. Since 2011, it has been advocating for women’s rights in access to justice for victims of domestic violence and other women’s rights. Author of guidelines for conducting a gender analysis of legislative acts for State bodies, as well as an assessment of the legal and regulatory environment in the area of HIV/AIDS in the Republic of Tajikistan, and a gender and anti-discrimination analysis of the draft law "Protection against Discrimination" and other laws concerning the rights of women living with HIV.   Image by USAID in Central Asia under (CC).   [1] The National Program to Combat the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Epidemic in the Republic of Tajikistan 2021 - 2025. This programme was approved by the decree of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan No. 50 dated November 27, 2020. [2] Article 16 of the Constitution [3] HRC, Assessment of the legal and regulatory environment in the field of HIV/AIDS in the Republic of Tajikistan, February 2020, https://hrc.tj/archives/325; Е. Maron, L. Aleksandrova. "Assessment of the Legal and Regulatory Environment in the Field of HIV/AIDS in the Republic of Tajikistan. Dushanbe. 2019г. [4] Such as wearing a condom. [5] REPORT FOR THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW FROM THE NGO RULE OF LAW AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE NETWORK. 39th session of the UPR Working Group, October-November 2021 [6] The national programme to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic for the period 2021-2025 was approved by Government Decision 50 of 27 November 2020. [post_title] => Human rights of people living with HIV in Tajikistan [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => human-rights-of-people-living-with-hiv-in-tajikistan [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-05-16 20:34:36 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-05-16 19:34:36 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5767 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [13] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5740 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-05-07 00:00:24 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-05-06 23:00:24 [post_content] => The publication of the Integrated Review (IR) in March 2021 marked the most detailed account yet of the Government’s vision of a post-Brexit ‘Global’ Britain. A vision of foreign policy as flexible and dynamic, yet committed to established partnerships, and both a defender of values and dedicated to the pursuit of national interest. Familiar tensions within UK foreign policy have remained evident, and the Review makes an obvious effort to please segments of both the Conservative Party and the electorate with very different views on Britain’s role in the world.   However, there is also much to welcome within the Review. It makes clear commitments to the ‘values’ component of UK foreign policy – support for democracy, human rights and international development. Despite the markedly nativist politics of Brexit, it seems that UK foreign policy itself has not swung decisively in this direction. However, problems can also be seen in the instrumental use of values as a stick with which to poke authoritarian states, and the corrosive impact of failing to embody these values in domestic British political life.   The IR marks a less radical shift in the UK’s international priorities than may have been anticipated, given Britain’s departure from the EU and the nativist pull of populist nationalism. These influences are certainly evident in the repeated emphasis on Britain as an independent sovereign state and its new-found flexibility as a ‘buccaneering free trader’.[1] Indeed, Dominic Raab’s description of the UK as “a creative disrupter”, reflects more than a passing hint of Trumpian rhetoric.[2]   Nevertheless, there is an important and encouraging continuity in the UK’s commitment to a ‘values’ component in its foreign policy. Indeed, the Review and Raab’s recent speeches make liberal use of the claim that Global Britain is to be a ‘force for good’ in the world. The Review marks the most assertive foregrounding of moral commitments in UK foreign policy since the similar use of ‘force for good’ nomenclature in New Labour’s foreign policy during the 1990s. The Review’s ‘force for good’ agenda maintains commitments to the promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and international development, as core drivers of UK foreign policy. The Review also pushes the values agenda somewhat further, committing to support the expansion of democratic values, human rights and responsible state behaviour into the ‘future frontiers’ of cyberspace. Whilst Britain’s actual conduct of international affairs is highly unlikely to mirror its professed values at all times, their continued presence in the language of UK foreign policy is an important means of holding the Government to account for the ethical choices they make.   The Review also demonstrates a healthy degree of realism regarding the challenges faced by the liberal international order, and its fragmentation into a more polarised and competitive system. The enthusiasm for the promotion of values in foreign policy is pitched against the rise of authoritarian challengers. The familiar antagonists of North Korea and Iran are highlighted by the Review, alongside the more direct inclusion of Russia as a major security threat. The authoritarian challenge posed by China is implied, though is stated deliberately ambiguously given its importance as a trading partner. Although the fragmentation of the liberal international order is disconcerting for advocates of human rights and democratisation, the recognition of these limitations is conversely a positive development.   Assumptions about the onward march of democracy and the universal validity of liberal values have been at the heart of a range of miscalculations in Western foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. Such assumptions were latent in Western responses to the Arab Spring. In Libya, this manifested itself in excessive faith about the solidity of the National Transitional Council and the democratic trajectory in a post-Gaddafi era. In Syria, significant errors were made in assuming the inevitable demise of Bashar al-Assad and underestimating the potential of Russia as a powerful and decisive counter-revolutionary force.   The IR more openly recognises the frailty of the liberal international order and the plurality of interests and worldviews. As a strategic guide for action, this recognition provides openings for more creative and nuanced approaches to UK foreign policy. Rather than assuming a linear path to a more democratic and cooperative world order, the onus is on practitioners of British foreign policy to work pragmatically within the constraints of the present.   Within this context, the Review positions the UK in an entrepreneurial role, ‘shaping the open order of the future’, as Raab put it ‘a disruptor for stability’.[3] History has not ended, authoritarianism is not vanquished, and Western democracies must work to create the international order in which they’d like to reside.   Although the IR’s ‘force for good agenda’ keeps values firmly on the radar of British foreign policy, it also reveals a more troubling direction. Global Britain as a ‘force for good’ is quite clearly positioned in opposition to nefarious authoritarian forces, who seek to target the vulnerabilities of democratic societies and undermine social cohesion within them. The Review positions the UK in a binary struggle between rival political systems as authoritarian states seek to expand their zones of influence. Britain’s commitment to human rights, open societies, democracy and the rule of law as defining features of its ‘force for good’, are by extension polarised against the ‘forces for bad’. The IR moves beyond acknowledging the diversity of worldviews and orientates British foreign policy towards a much more direct ideological conflict.   In this context, the values around which Britain seeks to shape its foreign policy risk becoming instrumentalised in this international struggle, as tools to challenge rival powers, rather than ends in themselves. This instrumentalisation of the values component is reflected in the recent decision to more closely link development aid to national interest priorities, with the merger of the FCO and DFID.[4] Placed into the context of a global political struggle against authoritarianism, the risk is that development aid will become similarly instrumentalised and directed to allied ‘frontline states’, rather than those most in need of developmental assistance.   The IR is noteworthy for making some acknowledgment of the domestic context within the UK and its relationship to foreign policy. It recognises that ‘freedom must start at home’ – that domestic populations must be convinced of the benefits of openness and protected from the negative impacts of globalisation. The Conservative Government’s new-found popularity amongst ‘Red Wall’ voters in the economically depressed former Labour heartlands adds a new optic to this. Having myself previously argued for greater focus on the domestic foundations of UK foreign policy, I do see this recognition as a positive development.[5]   However, it is on this point that fissures in the ‘force for good agenda’ begin to emerge. The nod towards the domestic context and the steadfast commitment to values in UK foreign policy sits awkwardly with a contradictory direction in some of the Government’s domestic policies. Elements of the Government’s domestic agenda appear to undermine sources of UK soft power, threatening core values, and in certain cases suggest echoes of democratic backsliding.   The IR is explicit that democratic values, the UK legal system and ‘large and diverse diasporic communities’ are central facets of British soft power. Yet in each case, recent domestic policy approaches have worked against this.   In terms of democratic values and human rights, the Policing, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, currently passing through Parliament, will impose significant restrictions on public protests and the traditional way of life of Gypsy and Traveller communities. This legislation has already met with fierce resistance from human rights and civil society groups.[6] For foreign policy practitioners, challenging crackdowns on pro-democracy protestors in Hong Kong, Belarus or Russia, becomes significantly more difficult when democratic norms on protest are under threat at home.   Along similar lines, the IR’s aspirations to infuse democratic values and human rights into the future frontiers of cyberspace, also run into tension with recent UK legislation eroding rights to privacy and enhancing the surveillance powers of the state. Enhanced powers for security agencies to intercept electronic communications and allow blanket access to internet connection records were established in the 2016 Investigatory Powers Act. End-to-end encryption remains a target of legislation.   Domestic approaches to immigration also pose an intersecting threat to human rights and the ‘people to people links’ emphasised in the Review. Ending freedom of movement and limiting immigration were central planks of the Brexit campaign and the Conservatives 2019 election manifesto, indicating that the future trajectory is to constrict, rather than expand person to person links through immigration.[7] The ‘Migration and Mobility Partnership’ agreement between India and the UK, signed in May 2021, does suggest that the search for new trade deals in the post-Brexit may demand a softening of the anti-immigration platform. At the same time, a significant component of the UK-India deal is also aimed at constraining irregular migration.[8] Positioned alongside a largely anti-immigration narrative, the Government’s enthusiasm for ‘people to people links’ is thus likely to be limited to narrow categories of outsiders who are deemed economically useful.   The ‘hostile environment’ policies that emerged from the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts and culminated in the Windrush Scandal, are emblematic of the human rights implications of the UK’s anti-migrant domestic policies. The Acts simplified deportation processes for irregular migrants and increased border everyday immigration surveillance powers in housing, banking and public services.   This domestic anti-immigration trajectory appears set to continue with the Government’s proposed overhaul of the UK asylum system, a move at odds with its commitments to human rights, civilian protection and international law.[9] The proposal to reduce entitlements for asylum seekers who entered Britain through ‘illegal’ means runs against the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which explicitly prohibit penalising asylum seekers due to their mode of entry to the country.[10]   Finally, domestic inconsistencies are also emergent with respect to the rule of law and the power of the judiciary. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling against the 2019 prorogation of Parliament during the EU withdrawal process, the Government’s response has been to review the power of the courts to challenge decisions by the executive.[11] Although this has not yet been translated into any formal limitations on judicial review, it does carry with it unpleasant echoes of democratic backsliding in Poland and the stripping back of judicial checks on government power.   As an agenda for future UK foreign policy, the IR thus provides cause for optimism in its foregrounding of a values-based agenda. However, there are important questions about the role values will play and inconsistencies in the depth of commitment across different spheres of state activity. The growth of authoritarianism certainly does not provide an encouraging environment within which human rights and democracy might flourish internationally. However, weaponising these values to stoke an ideological conflict with authoritarian powers is also unlikely to foster wider consensus on human rights norms and democratic development.   Similarly, erosion of human rights and democratic norms within Britain has the potential to reduce UK soft power and suggests that the promotion of these values in its foreign policy has a hollow core. If Britain wishes to defend human rights and democracy internationally against rising authoritarianism, it must embody these values domestically. Without doing so, it risks being charged with hypocrisy in attempting to shape values-based norms internationally, whilst presiding over their decline at home.   Dr Jonathan Gilmore is a Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Manchester. His expertise centre on British foreign policy, global ethics, humanitarian intervention and comparative defence and security practices. His research has featured in major international academic journals and his book 'The Cosmopolitan Military' was published in 2015.   [1] The Rt Hon Dominic Raab MP, Global Britain is leading the world as a force for good, The Sunday Telegraph, September 2019. [2] FCDO and The Rt Hon Dominic Raab MP, A force for good: Global Britain in a competitive age, Aspen Security Conference, Gov.uk, March 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-force-for-good-in-a-competitive-age-foreign-secretary-speech-at-the-aspen-security-conference [3] Ibid. [4] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Merging success: Bringing together the FCO and DFID, Sixth Special Report of Session 2019-21, House of Commons, September 2020, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/2704/documents/26878/default/ [5] Jonathan Gilmore, Developing domestic foundations for a values-based UK foreign policy, The Foreign Policy Centre, September 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/developing-domestic-foundations-for-a-values-based-uk-foreign-policy/ [6] Liberty, Leading Organisations Join Condemnation of Policing Bill, March 2021, https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/leading-organisations-join-condemnation-of-policing-bill/ [7] The Conservative Party, Get Brexit Done: Unleash Britain’s Potential: The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2019, London: The Conservative Party, 2019, p. 20. [8] Home Office, MoU on the migration and mobility partnership between India and the United Kingdom, Gov.uk, May 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/migration-and-mobility-partnership/mou-on-migration-and-mobility-partnership-between-india-and-the-united-kingdom [9] BBC News, Priti Patel pledges overhaul of asylum seeker rules, March 2021, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-56500680 [10] Article 31(1) of the 1951 Convention. [11] Independent Review of Administrative Law, Gov.uk, January 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/independent-review-of-administrative-law [post_title] => Being the values you want to see in the world? Global Britain, domestic trajectories and the Integrated Review [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => being-the-values-you-want-to-see-in-the-world-global-britain-domestic-trajectories-and-the-integrated-review [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-05-06 13:00:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-05-06 12:00:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5740 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [14] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5650 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-24 00:00:41 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-03-23 23:00:41 [post_content] => This week Unsafe for Scrutiny’s Project Director, Susan Coughtrie, spoke with Casey Michel, a US based investigative journalist, and author of the upcoming book American Kleptocracy, to get his insights into recent, promising anti-corruption developments in the US and what impact he expects these to have on the global fight on corruption as well as the work of journalists like him who play a critical role in uncovering it.   Susan Coughtrie (SC): President Biden’s entry into the White House appears to have come hand in hand with renewed interest in the US stepping up its efforts in the global fight against corruption, with his administration declaring it a ‘core national security interest’. What do you think have been the driving factors behind these latest developments?   Casey Michel (CM): From my vantage point, there are two primary drivers behind this increasing interest in and focus on addressing, corruption, kleptocracy and the enablers that allow it to operate. The first, specific to the American context, is our experience under the previous president, Donald Trump. We have witnessed how these corrupt, kleptocratic networks, which initially helped propel Trump into power, took full advantage of having a figure like him in the White House. It was, speaking frankly, a horrible four years - dispiriting, depressing, and inordinately challenging - but a silver lining was it brought all of these concerns around dark money networks and the tools they use, such as anonymous shell companies and real estate purchases, to the fore. It forced so many Americans, and their allies, to closely examine the links between transnational corruption and the potential dismantling of the broader liberal democratic project, including national security and electoral security. That is the legacy that we are seeing the Biden administration’s reacting to now, having witnessed what could potentially happen if we continue to ignore these corrupt, kleptocratic elements operating within our society.   The second driver is the broader growing international awareness of kleptocracy and transnational corruption over the past few years. Both through the release of large scale journalistic investigations, such as the Panama Papers and Paradise Papers, as well as a number of reports coming from high level bodies, including the United Nations and the European Union. Awareness has grown as to the magnitude of these offshoring systems used by kleptocratic networks as well as the wider societal impact they can have on, for example, wealth inequality or geopolitical instability. What we have seen on the American side of things is a kind of microcosm of what has been taking place internationally - including examining the kinds of policy proposals that are going to be required to unwind the impact these networks have already had.   SC: The passing of the US Congress of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) on 1 January 2021 has been described by anti-corruption campaigners as ‘historic’. Amongst other measures, the CTA introduces requirements that will put an end to the practice of anonymous shell companies operating inside the country. As someone who has written extensively about corruption facilitated through shell companies in US jurisdictions, what impact do you think this legislation will have? Is it as positive as it sounds?   CM: This is a remarkable piece of legislation and it is difficult to understate just how important it is. There has been an effort to ban the formation of US anonymous shell companies since at least 2008, with a very clear through line of bi-partisan support, however for a number of reasons it did not happen. The US for years and years has been the capital of anonymous shell company formation thanks to states like Delaware, Nevada and Wyoming, which sold anonymous shell companies to anybody who wanted them – drugs or arms traffickers, oligarchs or dictators’ families -  all and sundry could get an anonymous American shell company in 15 minutes for $100, if that. So thousands and thousands of these anonymous shell companies were being created every single year, and it was impossible to track back who is running them, who is profiting from them, who was taking advantage of them, but now because of this legislation it will.   This is an instance of the US following others’ lead. The UK for example passed similar legislation a few years ago, which means you can go to Companies House’s website and plug in the company you want and find information about who the person of significant control (PSC) is for it. The American variant is not going to be public, its entries are only going to be accessible to American law enforcement authorities and other foreign governmental officials or bodies that file the proper paperwork to request information. So journalists like myself, or researchers are not going to be able to access information, but that is fine for right now. We will get there at some point, some day. The fact of the matter remains that, at long last, the US is no longer the global capital of anonymous shell company formation.   SC: One of the problems that has faced the UK has been implementation and enforcement. There have been criticisms of Companies House, which is currently going through another review, but at least there has been a level of transparency. Do you have concerns about that from the US point of view, given that it is going to be a closed book and as a journalist you are not going to be able to check that what was promised is being done?   CM: I do, and not least because if there is one lesson to be taken from the UK example from the past few years, it is that enforcement is just as key as the actual passage of legislation. There are any number of journalists who have done fantastic work looking through just how porous the UK system of beneficial ownership information collection remains. At the end of day, even though the legislation exists, even though there is information on file, that does not mean that it is accurate and it does not guarantee that the person listed is the beneficial owner or the proper address has been given etc. Enforcement for any comparable pieces of legislation is always going to be a concern and even more so in the US now that it is private and there is not the possibility to have journalists like myself, researchers or major media outlets looking through as a non-governmental check to make sure that information is accurate. So the US has taken one giant step forward, there is still more work to do, but the US is moving in the right direction. If anything under the new administration the momentum will only continue and this legislation is an excellent platform upon which to build.   SC: What effect do you think the US’s renewed anti-corruption efforts are going to have on the country’s foreign policy? Particularly when dealing with countries in which the political elites have reputations for laundering their money in the West?   CM: From my end, there are two responses to that. There will be a restoration of American leadership on issues such as good governance, pro-transparency and anti-corruption reforms that the US has put forth for decades. For example, we are now four and half decades after the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed in the US, which really set the bar for legislation that we see elsewhere, whether that is the EU or the UK. On the one hand, this low hanging fruit – American leadership in this space should never have been abdicated - on the other hand the current administration's efforts in this area are likely to be welcomed by many abroad. The flip to that, is how is it going to affect American foreign policy with those who have benefitted under the last four years? The short answer is I do not know, and I am excited to see. However, what comes to mind is the numerous instances of oligarchic figures in places like Ukraine, Russia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey using the tools of financial secrecy to wheedle their way into the levers of American power, that is to say access those close to or in fact in the White House. Influencing American foreign policy decisions over the past four years followed the line of ‘the deeper your pockets, the easier it is’. And to a certain extent that is true for every administration – but there were elements which made it grotesquely and ludicrously easy for those with dirty money, those involved in kleptocratic networks, who will not be able to achieve the same level of success as they did over the last four years. One of the figures that I am writing about in my book, which will come out later this year, is a Ukrainian oligarch called Igor Kolomoisky. Widely considered the most powerful oligarch in Ukraine – who has a very lengthy and sometimes concerning relationship with the Ukrainian President Zelensky. Ukraine has been going through fits and starts of ‘de-oligarchisation’ for years and years now, encompassing two revolutions. Obviously the previous administration did not care one bit about that, but in just the first two months of the current administration sanctions have been introduced against Kolomoisky. It was very much a shot across the bow to convince Ukraine that now is the time, the US is here to support you, in order to take the necessary steps to remove the remaining influence of the oligarchs in the country. So that is already one manifestation of the kinds of new policies out of the current US administration, which certainly I and many others who work in this space are very grateful for.   SC: What have the biggest challenges been for you as a US-based investigative journalist uncovering financial crime and corruption? Do you anticipate those becoming more or less challenging in light of the recent developments?   CM: Fortunately I have never experienced or had to deal with any serious threats to my safety and security, and much of that has to do with the fact that I am based in the US. Although I know that journalists have died in the EU in the past few years, working on similar topics, so it is not anything that I take for granted. Particularly  given the way the last US President had no qualms about whipping up his supporters to incite violence and threats against the personal safety of journalists.   The challenges I face are twofold - access to information and legal pressure. Firstly, these kleptocratic networks rely on secrecy and anonymity and have built in defences to throw off investigative journalists like myself and other researchers, whether in the American context or elsewhere. That is a structural challenge in and of itself, which is not going away any time soon despite the new legislation. Secondly, there are the legal threats and pressures, underpinned by lawyers as well as reputation management and PR companies who work in tandem for their clients, which have only been increasing in recent years.   SC: As part of FPC’s Unsafe for Scrutiny project we have been documenting cases of journalists facing vexatious legal threats emanating from the UK, sometimes accompanied by smear campaigns and forms of harassment orchestrated by reputation management companies. Do you perceive a parallel in the US?   CM: Yes, this is a manifestation of a pattern that we have seen in the UK already. Obviously there are different legal structures and different elements at play, but at a 10,000 ft. level there are similar dynamics that are moving in a very concerning direction. There are structural issues within the media, the decreasing budgets, decreasing willingness to push back against some of these figures, increasing concerns, understandably about being taken to court and not being able to succeed, or even to bankroll the defence of some of these pieces of coverage. A few months ago I submitted a story to an outlet and the editor got back to me to say this is great, nothing is factually incorrect, but we are just going to cut a lot of the case studies, which I had included, because we don’t want to deal with the lawyers that are going to be involved with this. It was a quick look into the internal discussions that take place in American media regarding concerns about threats from lawyers working at the behest of these transnational oligarchic and kleptocratic figures. Most concerning is that they do not even have to file lawsuits or email or call the media. They have done it enough already that the editors are now less willing to go through with publishing these details, which are accurate and pertinent but would cause problems.   There is every reason to think that if there is not a very concerted effort to stop the direction the US is going in, we will end up in the same position that the UK is in right now, pertaining to these legal threats, pertaining to these backroom conversations that prevent information from ever even being published, let alone being published and then seeing a lawsuit thereafter.   SC: Do you think it is the internal financial considerations and the declining revenues that is the missing element stopping media from fighting back or is it something more than that?   CM: I think the resourcing is one of the primary, if not the primary, issues; it’s certainly not illogical to foresee the constraints for news outlets and journalists, and why there is going to be a greater reticence to fight some of these threats. At the same token it’s almost a reinforcing dynamic, in so far as the less that these outlets are willing to fight back the greater the temerity, the greater the aggression these figures, networks, lawyers, and PR teams will employ to push as far as they possibly can. They know that these outlets' backs are up against the wall. This is the thing: They do not even have to file the lawsuits, they do not even have to go to court, all they have to do is make a phone call, email or whatever it might be or as I experienced a few months ago – they just have to have their reputations already in the editors’ minds to convince the outlet to say, ‘Well, the article is perfectly accurate but we just do not want to deal with these lawyers, with these figures, we do not want to tangle with them, so we are going to forego including some details in there.’   SC: Whereas those figures on the other side who want to hide their wrongdoing are presumably well resourced and motivated?   CM: Absolutely, there is no limitation on their funds. This is why what you and your colleagues, as well as some of the other civil society organisations, are doing is so necessary to raise awareness that this dynamic is at play. As well as highlighting what the logical extension and outcomes of this dynamic will be. This is the beauty and the horror of the last four years in the US, is that it has allowed the current administration to propel itself and these anti-corruption reforms forward. But it is just by the hair of our chins that we dodged far more bullets than we would have ever anticipated. We came so close, far closer than I think we are really aware of, to just how dark things could have gotten if Trump won re-election. To say nothing of whether he wins in four years time or not. When you have high level people in the US administration declaring the press ‘the enemy of the people’ and Supreme Court Justices saying we need to revisit basic First Amendment protection for the press. All this tilts that balance even further in the favour of those corrupt figures.   SC: What else would you like to see change to improve the safety of investigative journalists investigating financial crime and corruption based in the US or elsewhere? For example, do you think greater recognition of their work in official initiatives, like the sanction regimes, provides a form of protection?   CM: I have been involved in some of the conversations from the civil society side with US government officials about sanctions list and I do frankly think that is an absolute boon to the scope of Global Magnitsky, and the efficacy of sanction programmes like this, to have journalists and civil society involvement. That input is absolutely a benefit to what these programmes stand for and how they should be successfully implemented. Certainly anything that can increase the scope and capacity of those conversations, of that flow of expertise and flow of recommendations to government bodies is something I could absolutely get behind.   In terms of recognition, the reports that FPC has already issued, including the survey findings etc., regarding this topic are a necessity. When you think about it, especially on the American side, and I'm sure on the British side as well, these media outlets are already showing themselves less than willing to push as far as they should, uncover as much as they should and stand by as much as the findings as they should. There is no reason to think that outlets will then also highlight how many pressures they are facing, how many threats they are facing. Those considerations are working on two different trajectories, at which point civil society needs to step into the breach. Someone else other than the media needs to detail and analyse and publicise these issues facing them, so that policy platforms can be implemented. Civil society has a different role from journalists, but at the end of the day they are moving in similar directions and can work in tandem with one another.   SC: The UK has previously sought to position itself as a global leader in tackling corruption, however arguably it now appears to be falling behind. The most recent FinCEN Files investigation, released in September 2020, brought to light that the US Treasury refers to the UK as a ‘higher risk jurisdiction’ - do you perceive any changes in the US - UK relationship as a result of this apparent widening gap in anti-corruption efforts?   CM: In the short term no, I do not think that this is going to shift anything in terms of the core pillars of the relationship. There was concern amongst some of the anti-corruption reformers regarding Brexit, which was that unmoored from EU regulations the UK would undercut some of the existing anti-corruption and pro-transparency protocols. Certainly some developments in the past few months in the UK feed directly into those concerns.   In the long term, and a lot can change in a decade or two, my sense is the relationship is strong enough to weather any number of crises. One potential fault line that could emerge however would be over the overseas territories. The British Virgin Island (BVI) beneficial ownership registry is supposed to be coming, as is the Caymans registry, but they’ve punted it down the line already and if the rest of the world continues creating beneficial ownership registers and BVI and Caymans are still lagging– at what point does the US or Brussels or whomever come forward and say enough is enough and this will begin impacting trade policies.   A key message to get across to policy makers – to say nothing of the broader public in the West – is the falsity of the notion that corruption, kleptocracy and authoritarianism, and the realities and trajectories that make them happen, take place over ‘there’ – i.e. in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia. But in reality, it is the Western service providers, the Western enablers – lawyers, PR firms, non-profits, company service providers – that are propelling these networks and are allowing these corrupt influences to integrate themselves into Western politics, British politics, US politics. We need to upend these antiquated notions that it is something that is happening elsewhere, because it's not. It is right here and it's been here for years and years, but thankfully in the US we are starting to see some change.   Casey Michel is a writer, analyst, and investigative journalist working on topics ranging from kleptocracy, illicit finance, and foreign interference to developments in the post-Soviet space and dark money financing networks. His upcoming book American Kleptocracy will be published in October 2021 (available for pre-order here). Michel is also a member of the Advisory Council for the Hudson Institute's Kleptocracy Initiative, where he helps co-host the “MAKING A KILLING” podcast on corruption and kleptocracy.   Michel will be speaking at the Foreign Policy Centre’s upcoming event on 20 April -  Investigating Corruption: US versus UK – A Widening Transatlantic Divide? - alongside Tom Burgis, Investigations Correspondent at The Financial Times and author of Kleptopia: How Dirty Money Is Conquering the World’, Dr Sue Hawley, Executive Director of Spotlight on Corruption and Dr Tena Prelec, Research Fellow with the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, and part of the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Project.   Full details of the event and registration is available here.   This interview was produced as part of the Unsafe for Scrutiny project, which is kindly funded by the Justice for Journalists Foundation. [post_title] => Is the US pulling ahead in the global fight against corruption and what does this mean for investigative journalists? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => is-the-us-pulling-ahead-in-the-global-fight-against-corruption-and-what-does-this-mean-for-investigative-journalists [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-03-23 18:42:53 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-03-23 17:42:53 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5650 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5642 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-18 10:55:08 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-03-18 09:55:08 [post_content] => There is a lot to digest in the much awaited publication of the Prime Minister’s Integrated Review (IR) of UK international policy. It is a weighty enough document of over 100 pages and there is more evidence of strategic thinking than sceptics projected but inevitably there are more top lines than details. That’s the nature of these documents – a vision that sounds great on paper but how these shifts in understanding, prioritisation and implementation evolve will be the real measure of the IR’s success. Or, as the outcomes paper says itself, ‘what Global Britain means in practice is best defined by actions rather than words.’   I called in various forums and submissions to the IR, including in an article for the Foreign Policy Centre, for atrocity prevention to be integrated at the heard of UK foreign policy and for the narrow approach to conflict to be broken open.[1] I wasn’t alone in these recommendations; the Foreign Affairs Select Committee suggested the IR prioritise mediation, conflict resolution and atrocity prevention and the UK Atrocity Prevention Working Group called for a national strategy.[2]   While the outcomes paper falls short of committing to a comprehensive strategy on mass atrocities, it does promise greater emphasis on atrocity prevention. And to be fair to the authors, it is perhaps not a great surprise that more was not fleshed out in the one page dedicated to the UK’s approach to conflict and stability within the new strategic framework. As the various sub-strategies are drawn up and the merger of the FCDO is finalised, we should expect to see this commitment built out across the new architectures of government, properly integrated throughout new UK policy and training, and the creation of new positions of appropriate seniority in the FCDO and other relevant departments.   The new framework also sets out a prioritisation of 'grievances, political marginalisation and criminal economies’ as part of ‘a more integrated approach to government work on conflict and instability.’ This signals a critical and very welcome shift in the understanding of where much modern violence comes from. The UK approach to conflict was always too conceptually narrow and programmatically disjointed to meet the complex challenges posed by the rising incidence of genocide, crimes against humanity and other mass atrocity crimes.[3] The false but common assumption that such acts follow on from armed conflict meant that the propellants of identity-based violence and atrocities – namely grievances, discrimination, and marginalisation – were too often absent from UK development priorities and prevailing HMG conceptualisation of where complex violent contexts come from.   The focus on criminal economies is also good news. We know that modern atrocities and conflict are commonly accompanied – and at times waged by – organised criminal networks and yet UK conflict prevention has rarely prioritised strategies that address organised crime, corruption and the petty criminality that perceived immunity breeds in the lead up to, during, and in the wake of organised violence. In bringing these dynamics to the forefront of UK thinking, a spectrum of preventative interventions opens up for the UK and its networks, from a more creative use of the new sanctions regime to programme design that seeks to interrupt the recruitment of potential perpetrators. I would like to see this priority area being joined up with the UK’s approach to serious and organised crime, bringing in the services of the intelligence agencies and the mapping exercises that track and trace the networks of non-state actors, smuggling routes, illicit cash flows, and so on. Modern atrocities, particularly those that are identity-based, can very often be understood best as a type of organised crime and many of the principles of prevention and response are transferable.   Another welcome shift in the approach to conflict is the commitment to ‘focus on political approaches to conflict resolution’, again something that has for so long been absent in how the UK responds to violence, with DFID often preferring instead to focus almost entirely on the humanitarian consequences. If this new focus does indeed signal a willingness to get into the political reasons why modern conflicts and atrocities occur, we should expect to see a much needed investment in the diplomatic corps, analysts, civil society relationships, and a willingness to be more creative with the tools and levers at the UK’s disposal. The FCDO merger, while posing a real risk to some of DFID’s more longstanding (and crucial) contributions, does pose a genuine opportunity to develop a coordinated approach to conflict and atrocities, and which rightly puts a political response to violence at the heart.   Perhaps the most important indication the paper gives of a change in approach is the prevention-first framing and a focus in earlier ‘upstream’ priorities, which connect strongly with the central thread throughout the whole document of resilience. The UK’s overriding approach to conflict and mass atrocities has been one of response, of firefighting, and consequently has often resulted in missing opportunities to help mitigate risks. Whether in Rakhine in Myanmar in 2017, in Central African Republic in 2014, or Syria in 2011 those windows where risks against populations could still be mitigated or stemmed slipped by before the UK had properly recognised the trajectory of violence.   Throughout, the IR promises an integrated approach to national security ‘that covers the full lifecycle of risk: anticipation, prevention, preparation, response and recovery’. This has the potential to bring together policy threads that are usually seen as being disparate or unrelated. The promise of deeper integration across government builds on the Fusion Doctrine introduced in the 2018 National Security Capability Review, which encouraged more effective and joined up approaches to threats like serious and organised crime. The potential gains are significant: ‘A more integrated approach supports faster decision-making, more effective policy-making and more coherent implementation by bringing together defence, diplomacy, development, intelligence and security, trade and aspects of domestic policy in pursuit of cross-government, national objectives.’ If this big promise can be properly built in to how the UK monitors, mitigates, and prepares for violent crises, and if Government fully commits to ‘acting upstream to tackle risks at source’ – from mass atrocities to climate action as well as efforts to disrupt transnational organised crime groups, this prevention-first approach to policy thinking will save lives, money and political capital.   And so even in the brief outlines of a new approach to conflict and resilience we can see the influence of the principles of atrocity prevention, not only in recognising grievances, marginalisation and criminal economies as priority areas, but also in the commitment to invest in political approaches to disputes (something parts of DFID always pushed back against), and the overall emphasis on prevention and resilience (something that was never enough pronounced in DFID and something FCO never thought was their responsibility).   But the success of this new approach to conflict will depend on political leadership at the ministerial level and within the civil service, the development of clear-eyed sub strategies, and the extent to which an understanding of grievance and marginalisation is embedded across HMG. Much of this will be down to the new Conflict Centre within the FCDO that promises will ‘draw on expertise from across government and beyond to develop and lead a strategic conflict agenda, harnessing the breadth of conflict and stability capabilities and working with partners to increase our impact in preventing, managing and resolving conflict in priority regions.’   Within this new Conflict Centre we’ll want to see a fully integrated architecture that houses new atrocity prevention systems and capabilities but coordinates implementation beyond the conflict corps and across government. This new approach to violence prevention and civilian protection should look to integrate currently overlapping – but not coordinated – agendas such as Women Peace and Security, Protection of Civilians, Human Rights (including sexual orientation and gender identity, freedom of religious belief, and media freedom), peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and counter terrorism/counterinsurgency, Preventing Violent Extremism, and Organised Crime.   Preventing and responding to modern atrocities and conflict requires a holistic, integrated approach, which is what the IR promises on paper but ultimately it will be actions that determine the extent to which this comes to life. Already there are concerns that the words of the Integrated Review do not match the deeds of government.[4] The steep cuts that have already been announced jar with many of the promises laid out in the IR. A commitment to tighten focus on the cross-government Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) by prioritising its resources on the foundational link between stability, resilience and security is only welcome if it is matched by a commitment to invest in a wider breadth of civil society organisations and move away from the large contracts with private enterprises that lack the fundamental understanding of the very root causes the new approach to conflict promises to tackle. It seems natural that the Government needs to go back to community building and away, finally, from strategic communications-based interventions that take up so much of the CSSF budget.   The creation of an Open Societies directorate within FCDO should be an additional forum where the new commitment to address grievances and marginalisation could be embedded; certainly if the UK’s new emphasis on  atrocity prevention does not sit across Open Societies as well as the new Conflict Centre, the FCDO will risk replicating the cracks between DFID and FCO, between which the implementation of the atrocity prevention and human rights – rather than their superficial promotion – so often fell.   It is important that upholding human rights has been retained as a core principle of continuation but it’s far harder to see what is new or bold here. There are hints at what this change in approach towards conflict and human rights might look like, including the recognition of the 'increasingly blurring the boundaries between war and peace’ and the recognition that conflict and instability will remain prevalent and likely increase ‘unless concerted action is taken to address underlying political, social, economic and environmental drivers, especially in fragile states.’ The relationship between a commitment to confront marginalisation and prioritise political approaches to resolution will inevitably require frameworks of human rights, identity-based violence, and atrocity prevention; if this work does not become better integrated the impact of both the Conflict Centre and the Open Societies Directorate will be stymied from the beginning.   The promise that the thematic priority of open societies will be ‘characterised by effective governance and resilience at home’ signals a generational shift we’ve seen in recent years in the ways in an increasing number of NGOs and politicians in global north democracies have come to articulate the impact of climate change, conflict, and threats to democracy, finally recognising the extent to which these crises are felt ‘at home’, not only ‘abroad’.  But the ‘whole-of-government approach to protecting democracy in the UK’ must be just that, recognising that a good governance agenda – whether here in the UK or in fragile states – requires an understanding of grievance and marginalisation that assesses who is included and who is excluded from democratic processes and trust-building activities. (Who does introducing voter ID hit hardest?) And if the Government is serious about narrowing the conceptual and practical disconnect between its domestic and foreign policies it must learn to prize consistency over political interests. (Does the UK champion international law or undermine it?) It will be important to watch what it means for the FCDO and the UK’s domestically facing departments as this commitment to more closely link domestic and international action is implemented.   This commitment to build resilience at home and abroad, and the changes in thinking around modern conflict will necessarily come together in the creation of a cross-government Situation Centre in the Cabinet Office, intended to 'anticipate and respond to crises’. This has the potential to centre prevention-thinking in the heart of government. Knowing what to look for, how to analyse the information and how to ‘raise the alarm’ are crucial steps for successful early warning and early action. Let’s hope this new Situation Centre includes a much needed early warning system, capable of monitoring and analysing threats to national and global security. The absence of an internal prevention analysis system, incorporating indicators of grievance, trust, and resilience, and capable of reporting on real-time trends of exclusion and violence (and other threats) has inhibited UK thinking and policy but the IR promises to address these gaps.   Perhaps the big bump in funds for the intelligence services could facilitate a more integrated relationship between MI5, MI6 and UK prevention thinking at home and abroad? Whoever undertakes the work, the current analysis gap the Situation and Conflict Centres have the potential to bridge require human expertise and bureaucratic coordination rather than big data, statistical modelling. The good news is that doesn’t require big budgets   Overall there is a lot to welcome. The dominant threads of resilience and prevention promise a genuine shift from the prevailing policy. Emphasis on building trusted governance, government capabilities, social cohesion, and resilience while confronting marginalisation and grievances signals a new logic is informing the new approach.   That is not to say that there are not gaps that will need to be addressed. Colleagues in the development sector will not be reassured by what was published this week. The biggest tension in UK foreign policy between values and trade was left unaddressed and unresolved. The paper sets out a siloed approach that contradicts its fundamental vision of an integrated international policy.   The paragraphs on China are some of the weakest in the whole document. Acknowledging that the UK has responded ‘to China’s human rights violations in Xinjiang through measures to ensure that British organisations are neither complicit in nor profiting from them’, while simultaneously committing to pursuing a state-level economic relationship that would risk the UK Government becoming complicit in or profiting from CCP atrocities undermines what is strongest about the new vision for the UK in the world.   How can the UK 'continue to pursue a positive trade and investment relationship with China, while ensuring our national security and values are protected’? It is difficult to see how HMG ‘will not hesitate to stand up for our values’ while also committing to pursuing a trade deal. It’s a fundamental hypocrisy that will need to be interrogated. China is difficult for the UK and there are disagreement within government as well as in the Conservative party as to how to navigate the relationship. As Paul Goodman wrote in Conservative Home some weeks ago, HMG needs a strategy on China, a strategy on modern mass atrocities, and needs to understand how and when the two come together.[5]   The UK deserves an international policy capable of predicting and preventing crises as well as responding to them, fit to meet challenges it cannot yet foresee as well as those it can. If properly built out, this new vision has the potential to establish a prevention-first policy mindset as well as policy coherence across currently highly diffused agendas. I have long argued that prevention – of atrocities and of all global threats – is a matter of both national security and national interest for all States, and therefore requires state-level as well as multilateral commitment: the outcomes of the IR suggest just such a pivot in how the UK will prepare for, predict, prevent, and respond to threats. But it will require radical shifts in thinking, hiring, and coordination within the bureaucracy of government.   As COVID-19’s economic and political consequences deepen, climate events become more common, and identity politics worsen, widespread and systematic identity-based violence, including mass atrocities, will become increasingly frequent. The same nexus will drive large-scale population movements, which will continue to drive exclusionary populism in developed and developing democracies. The relevance of this complex threat nexus, as emblematic of international policy, will become increasingly evident to changing electorates. The outcomes of the Integrated Review and the changes brought by the FCDO merger to the Government architecture indicate a commitment to embed the capabilities and systems to meet this projected increase in identity-based violence and mass atrocities but there is a long way to go.   The new approach to conflict and resilience has the potential to be transformative not just for UK policy but in the reform of how likeminded states approach the drivers and propellants of violence. Of today’s major and emerging crises, the vast majority – including Syria, Yemen, Libya, Myanmar, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Venezuela, and Xinjiang – are driven, at least in part, by the deliberate violent targeting of civilian groups by political elites. Systematic or widespread discrimination against people because of their race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, political affiliation, age, disability or class has not become a challenge of the past but a common phenomenon of our modern world. Identity-based violence occurs in some form or another in all societies and as such, its prevention is something needed everywhere all of the time. The IR now promises that better understanding of where this violence comes from and how the UK and its networks can contribute to its prevention will be fully integrated across the composite parts of government.   The coming weeks and months will therefore be critical and I hope that it will see the Government, finally, opening up again after a period of exceptionally closed civil society relations to ensure the full breadth of expertise is able to help shape this new prevention-first era of UK international policy.   Dr Kate Ferguson is a foreign policy expert driving a new approach to preventing identity-based violence in the UK and internationally. In 2014 she co-founded Protection Approaches where she is Co-Executive Director and which works with communities, civil society and governments to transform how identity-based violence is understood and prevented. In 2017 Protection Approaches established and now convenes the UK Atrocity Prevention Working Group, a network of some 25 NGOs, research institutions and experts. Kate is Chair of Policy at the European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Honorary Research Fellow at the University of East Anglia. Her book Architectures of Violence: The Command Structures of Modern Atrocities will be published by Hurst and Oxford University Press later this year. She tweets @WordsAreDeeds.   [1] Protection Approaches and United Nations Association – UK: Written evidence to Foreign Affairs Select Committee (INR0087), https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/10640/html/; Dr Kate Ferguson, Putting atrocity prevention at the heart of British foreign policy, FPC, September 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/putting-atrocity-prevention-at-the-heart-of-british-foreign-policy/ [2] Foreign Affairs Committee, A brave new Britain? The future of the UK’s international policy, Fourth Report of Session 2019-21, House of Commons, October 2020, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/3133/documents/40215/default/; Protection Approaches, Submission to the Integrated Review of UK international policy, August 2020, https://protectionapproaches.org/news/f/submission-to-the-integrated-review-of-uk-international-policy [3] Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Britain: The Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention, House of Commons, September 2018, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/1719/171902.htm [4] Catherine Philp, Ignore human rights and strike trade deals, Dominic Raab told officials, The Times, March 2021, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ignore-human-rights-and-strike-trade-deals-dominic-raab-told-officials-w2l8rm5rc [5] Paul Goodman, Who’s in charge of the Government’s clattering China train? It’s heading for a crash., Conservative Home, February 2021, https://www.conservativehome.com/thetorydiary/2021/02/whos-in-charge-of-the-governments-clattering-china-train-its-heading-for-a-crash.html [post_title] => A response to the Integrated Review [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => a-response-to-the-integrated-review [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-03-26 11:41:29 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-03-26 10:41:29 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5642 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [16] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5625 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-10 00:00:38 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-03-09 23:00:38 [post_content] => This spring, the UK’s Foreign Secretary is set to announce a new stand-alone corruption sanctions regime which will give the Government power to impose visa bans and asset freezes on corrupt officials and their related entities.[1]   This regime will complement the Global Human Rights (Magnitsky) Sanctions regime introduced last summer, which currently lists 68 individuals. These range from those implicated in the murder of Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer and tax advisor who exposed corruption in Russia, and the murder of Saudi Arabian journalist Jamal Khashoggi, to the former President of The Gambia, Yahya Jammeh and his wife, and the current President of Belarus. At the same time, the UK has rolled over 27 ‘geographic’ or country specific regimes, some of them introduced on human rights’ grounds, from the European Union sanctions regime.[2] These allow it to impose sanctions on individuals and entities in countries including Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Lebanon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, Guinea, and Venezuela among others.[3]   The new corruption sanctions regime will bring the UK more in line with its US and Canadian counterpart ‘Magnitsky’ regimes, which both include corruption as a grounds for imposing visa bans and asset freezes. It will also put pressure on the EU whose new global human rights sanctions regime introduced in December 2020 does not.[4]   Major opportunity, real challenges The introduction of corruption as a grounds for sanctions in the UK is a significant opportunity in the fight against kleptocracy and dirty money globally for various reasons:
  •     The UK has long been a magnet for dirty money. An effective regime could help shut corrupt actors out of the UK and deprive them of the ability to enjoy their stolen wealth;
  •     Given the challenges that face UK law enforcement, including the length of time it takes, to bring criminal and civil enforcement action against corrupt wealth in the UK, corruption sanctions could offer a swift and powerful way of sending a strong message that corrupt actors cannot act with impunity;
  •     Corruption sanctions will be “given effect” in the British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies.[5] How robustly this will happen remains to be seen but this could have a major impact on the access that kleptocrats have to global financial services through these jurisdictions, which have featured heavily in all major money laundering scandals;[6]
  •     The UK will be able to act in concert on corruption sanctions with the US, Canada and other allies developing similar regimes, adding to the global impact of these sanctions; and
  •     It will signal that the current UK government is seeking to maintain a global leadership role in the fight against corruption, as part of its proposed “force for good” agenda.[7]
  At the same time, it is important to be realistic about how much impact the regime will have. The UK is at a vulnerable stage in economic terms as it seeks to negotiate new trade deals around the world. Realpolitik means that there is a danger that the corruption sanctions regime may be skewed towards ‘weaker partners’ or countries where the UK has little economic or political interest. At worst, it may be applied primarily against those with no connection to the UK, leaving the sanctions purely symbolic in value. Meanwhile, the expected significant cuts in the UK’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) budget may well reduce the UK’s standing and leverage in countries[8] where it wishes to impose sanctions, thus undermining their effectiveness.   At the same time, the UK regime has significantly more legal safeguards built in for those being sanctioned than the US regime. Given the significant amounts of money that kleptocrats have at their disposal to defend their assets and reputations and the difficulties of proving corruption, ‘designations’ to the corruption regime may be heavily contested. This could make the Government risk averse in who it chooses to put on the list.   And finally, the sanctions regime in the UK is significantly less well funded and staffed than the US regime, meaning less capacity in the civil service to process potential designations, and less law enforcement capacity to enforce violations. This could result in relatively few designations for corruption. Additionally, as law enforcement already faces serious resource constraints, which may well be further exacerbated by cuts to the Overseas Development Aid budget that funds international corruption work, this could result sanctions being poorly enforced reducing their effectiveness.   Significance for journalists Given their role in investigating and exposing corruption, the introduction of the regime is a major opportunity for journalists to achieve real impact with those investigations. Working in collaboration with UK and international NGOs, there is genuine opportunity here for journalists to contribute their evidence on corruption to get corrupt actors sanctioned in the UK.   Journalists will also play a key role in communicating news about sanction designations in local contexts. Coverage of when and why corruption sanctions have been imposed increases pressure for action to be taken domestically against corrupt actors and those who enable their corruption.   And finally, there may be opportunities for the sanctions regime to be used more effectively, or even extended, to protect journalists targeted for their corruption investigations and media freedom. The February 2020 report by a High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom convened by the UK and Canadian Governments urged governments to use sanctions against those who murder or imprison journalists and restrict freedom of the media.[9] The UK’s current global human rights sanctions regime expressly prioritises media freedom, and those who commit human rights abuses against civil society, journalists and whistleblowers.[10] Those sanctioned, particularly on geographical sanctions lists, include officials and entities who have engaged in intimidation and violence against journalists, including, for example, judges in Belarus who have made politically motivated rulings against journalists, as well as those who have engaged in state propaganda.   However, there is certainly scope for the UK’s sanctions regime to go further and make clear, as the High Level Panel recommended, that arbitrary detention of journalists is an explicit ground for sanctions. And it would send a powerful message if the Foreign Secretary emphasises, when he announces the new corruption regime, that those who seek to intimidate, harass, and imprison journalists and civil society activists who expose corruption will face a serious risk of being sanctioned too.   Dr Susan Hawley is the Executive Director of Spotlight on Corruption. She is an anti-corruption specialist who has worked on anti-corruption issues in the UK for nearly two decades. She has expertise in policy and research in UK anti-corruption enforcement. Previously Susan was a founder and Policy Director of Corruption Watch UK, where she led the work on monitoring court trials, tracking UK enforcement and pushing for greater court transparency.   [1] Lisa Nandy, Topical Questions, FCDO – in House of Commons on 2nd March 2021, TheyWorkForYou, March 2021, https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2021-03-02b.111.1&s=sanctions#g111.6 [2] Global Legal Monitor, European Union: Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime Enters into Force, Library of Congress, January 2021, https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/european-union-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime-enters-into-force/ [3] FCDO, Collection – UK sanctions regimes, Part of Brexit, Gov.uk, January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-sanctions-regimes-under-the-sanctions-act [4] Council of the EU, EU adopts a global human rights sanctions regime, December 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/07/eu-adopts-a-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime/ [5] FCO & FCDO, Guidance – UK sanctions, Part of Brexit, Gov.uk, August 2019, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-sanctions [6] Transparency International UK, The Cost of Secrecy, December 2018, https://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/cost-of-secrecy/ [7] FCO and The Rt Hon Dominic Raab MP, Global Britain is leading the world as a force for good: article by Dominic Raab, Part of Brexit, Gov.uk, September 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/global-britain-is-leading-the-world-as-a-force-for-good-article-by-dominic-raab [8] Peter Geoghegan, UK government accused of ‘grotesque betrayal’ as full foreign aid cuts revealed, Open Democracy, 5th March 2021, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/uk-government-accused-of-grotesque-betrayal-as-full-foreign-aid-cuts-revealed/ [9] International Bar Association, New report urges nations to use targeted sanctions to protect journalists, February 2020, https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=77561bf1-ef89-4df1-97e5-549f5929ddb3 [10] FCO & FCDO, Policy Paper – Global Human Rights Sanctions: consideration of designations, Gov.uk, July 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-human-rights-sanctions-factors-in-designating-people-involved-in-human-rights-violations/global-human-rights-sanctions-consideration-of-targets   This article was produced as part of the Unsafe for Scrutiny project, which is kindly funded by the Justice for Journalists Foundation. [post_title] => The UK’s new corruption sanctions regime – Can it help end the UK’s role as a global money laundering centre and what role will journalists play? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-uks-new-corruption-sanctions-regime-can-it-help-end-the-uks-role-as-a-global-money-laundering-centre-and-what-role-will-journalists-play [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-03-10 14:55:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-03-10 13:55:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5625 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5605 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-01 00:12:50 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-28 23:12:50 [post_content] => On October 5th 2020, several thousand Kyrgyz citizens poured in the main square of the capital Bishkek to denounce fraudulent elections. By the late evening of that day, this unexpected mobilisation led to the storming of the White House and to the beginning of a cloudy process that resulted in the removal of the incumbent president from office.[1]   With this recent round of events, this post-socialist state has witnessed the third violent change of government since its independence in 1991. There are many structural conditions that led the country to a permanent state of instability, not the least of which is the breakdown of the economy since the collapse of the USSR, which were never given priority by elites amidst incessant struggles for power.   Focusing on the political, this essay looks at the conditions that have enabled such frequent uprisings. In particular, it is argued that the constitutional design of 2010 did not only temper temptations to abuse office by the president but also led to the increasing oligarchisation of politics and a still divided opposition. These factors contributed to public frustrations about corruption and distrust towards the political establishment amidst devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.[2] On the other hand, the emergent party system had further implications for the balance within the state-oligarchy relationship, which still stands to shape politics in Kyrgyzstan for the foreseeable future.   October 2020: Murky change of government against the background of a genuine citizen mobilisation With the October events of 2020, Kyrgyzstan experienced the third violent change of government via a popular uprising. Although every uprising of 2005, 2010, and 2020 is unique, one element is central to all of them: citizens and political opposition challenged the usurpation of power by presidents, which they deemed illegitimate. This time around, the regime of Sooronbay Jeenbekov grew unpopular because of the combined factors of mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic, corruption, the usurpation of power over the legislature, and the President’s perceived weak charisma. In August 2020, prior to the parliamentary elections, 53 per cent of the Kyrgyz population thought that the country was heading in the wrong direction, whereas only 41 per cent saw it going in the right direction.[3]   These perceptions and negative sentiments did not grow out of nowhere. In 2019, a consortium of independent mass media published a series of investigations unravelling massive corruption schemes that involved the then former deputy head of the State Customs Service, Raiymbek Matraimov, whose illegal business helped him to allegedly take $700 million out of the country.[4] These investigations did not only expose the involvement of state bodies in transnational corruption but also stressed the connection between Matraimov and the highest echelons of power, including President Jeenbekov himself. These publications spurred a series of citizen protests called ‘Reaksia!’ (from Russian – ‘Reaction!’) calling on authorities to launch an official investigation into these corruption schemes.[5] Despite the multiple pressures coming from liberal civil society, the President kept denying Matraimov’s involvement in corruption and even went as far as supporting Matraimov’s political party ‘Mekenim Kırgızstan’ to run in the parliamentary election. Following the election outcomes, three ‘parties of power’, including ‘Mekenim Kırgızstan’, won 107 out of the 120 seats thanks to massive electoral manipulations involving the use of ‘administrative resource’, vote buying, and others means.[6] The orchestrated victory of the three parties of power left opposition forces such as ‘Bütün Kyrgyzstan’, ‘Mekenchil’, ‘Reforma’, and ‘Ata-Meken’ outside of the system. Within the context of the devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on citizens’ livelihoods, such usurpation of power by the ruling regime-oligarchic tandem led to powerful anti-elite sentiments. While struggling with economic hardships and COVID-19-related issues on their own, people observed flagrant corruption among the elites and highest echelons of power. Ordinary citizens traced these inequalities back to the excesses of the post-revolutionary party system.[7]   However, the peaceful protesters who gathered on the next day of the parliamentary election, October 5th, did not demand the President’s immediate resignation. In addition, most ‘system’ elites were not in the position to contest Jeenbekov’s grip on power as many of them were co-opted into the ‘parties of power’ on the eve of the parliamentary election. Moreover, the regime’s opponents who rallied next to the protesters to contest the election outcome, and who were competing with Sadyr Japarov for public support, did not seek the President’s removal as it was feared such a move could lead to a major destabilisation along the North/South cleavage and ethnic clashes like in the aftermath of the ‘April Revolution’ of 2010.[8] Finally, the international community recognised President Jeenbekov as the only legitimate authority to remain in power and prevent the country from falling into abyss.[9] Having the majority elite loyalty, President Jeenbekov could have, perhaps, avoided his deposing by swiftly conceding to protesters’ demands and cancelling the election outcomes, for example. Without the manpower, the street opposition would not be able to contest the regime. But while he lost the momentum, the citizen mobilisation around two opposition camps has acquired its own dynamics in parallel to the dynamics of regime contestation.   The competition emerged between political forces that were illegally released from prison on the night of October 5th and who sought to capitalise on popular mobilisation. Two opposing groups were formed in the days after the start of the peaceful demonstration: a nationalist group under Japarov’s leadership and an amalgam of ‘liberal’ forces including the former president Almazbek Atambayev.[10] While the Japarov’s group has quickly and skilfully moved to consolidate protesters around their claims for power by framing the uprising as anti-regime and anti-elite, the liberals were slow and hesitant to adopt similar muscular strategies. The struggle for power between the two groups grew out of control when representatives of the liberal camp were ousted from the main public square, some of them were attacked and people allegedly close to Japarov shot at Atambayev’s departing car.[11] Facing the risk of destabilisation, President Jeenbekov sought to negotiate his own remaining in power by granting legitimacy to one of these camps. The choice was not complicated: his lasting rivalry with Atambayev, whom he sacked and imprisoned after being brought to power by him, determined his option for Sadyr Japarov. On the other hand, leaving the liberal camp to win over Japarov would entail the President’s certain demise. The deal between the President and the ‘newcomer’ Japarov was even sealed by Putin’s deputy head of administration, Dmitry Kozak, who flew to Bishkek in order to facilitate the peaceful maintenance of the regime.[12] However, neither the President nor the Russians expected that the group he had helped to legitimise would breach the agreement and force him to resign soon after. Several members of parliament and public figures hinted to the pressures exerted by organised crime, whose alleged collusion with Japarov was decisive in the president’s removal and takeover of power.[13] Further research is required in order to shed light on these obscure dynamics and the regime fragility.   ‘Post-revolutionary’ constitutional reform 2010: Parliamentarism by discourse, money, and further oligarchisation of politics Authors of the post-revolutionary constitutional reform of 2010 claimed the new design would put an end to strong presidentialism by giving more powers to political parties and the parliament. However, the supposed increase in political pluralism increased the fragmentation of power hence propelling the role of a central mediator in return. Despite constitutionally diminished powers, President Atambayev managed to control the defence and special security forces, the general prosecutor and the courts. In the past, access to these institutions had allowed the authoritarian regimes to suppress the opposition and civil society.[14] President Atambayev gradually fell in line when he successfully attempted to first craft a loyal parliament via national elections of 2015 and then, second, to appoint a political heir via the presidential elections in 2017.[15] By mobilising the state apparatus, he succeeded to bring to power a formerly unknown politician, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, who only three per cent of a spring 2017 poll respondents said they trusted most against the well-established businessman-cum-politician Omurbek Babanov, who had 35 per cent of the popularity in the same survey.[16] Jeenbekov continued this tradition by seeking to fill the parliament with three pro-presidential parties, excluding the opposition, weakening the party system, and further eroding the relationship between the electorate and elites.   The creeping usurpation of power by the presidency is one reason for increased popular frustration, but it is not the only one. The new constitutional design did not foresee that the emerging party system would further strengthen the oligarchisation of politics, bearing real implications for the regime stability.[17] The new constitutional design suddenly bestowed political parties with the power to control the government and make important appointments. However, to participate in highly competitive parliamentary elections, parties faced an acute problem of funding. Sponsorship by businessmen and oligarchs quickly became sine qua non for managing electoral campaigns. In practice it is believed that this was often done by selling seats in electoral party lists, with the first top ten to 20 seats believed to be worth between $500,000 thousand and $1 million in a country with only a GDP of $8.5 billion in 2019.[18] The newly elected parliamentary groups viewed the system as a way to access the state and use it for rent-seeking.[19] Employing their new constitutional powers, the parliamentary groups appointed their ministers and this way ‘divided’ the state among themselves. Oligarchs who had entered this system began employing their access to the state to return their prior investments in the election.[20]   Although the oligarchisation of Kyrgyz politics began in the 90s and was part of the state building, Jeenbekov’s recent regime had allowed for a certain degree of incorporation of oligarchs into the state system, which became a risk for regime stability. By summer 2020, according to elite claims oligarchic power had succeeded in infiltrating major state institutions including the special security forces, prosecution, and the courts. By placing loyal people inside the state bodies and relying on the power of money, the Matraimov family allegedly used the state to advance their own and their clients’ interests. By getting things done for a growing number of elite members, they earned the reputation of effective doers in contrast to the ‘indecisive’ and ‘slow’ President Jeenbekov.[21] As the electoral outcome of October elections shows, their party ‘Mekenim Kırgızstan’ was just 0.71 per cent behind the presidential party ‘Birimdik’ contesting the president’s monopoly to form the majority and control the future legislature.[22]   Violent change of government 2020: An intra-elite contestation? No, populism! Given the above account of state-oligarchy competition, it could be implied that Jeenbekov’s removal from office was a result of the changing state-oligarchy relationship. We do not know what would have become of this relationship if the parliamentary elections were not annulled and if Jeenbekov were to face an increased competition within the newly elected oligarchic parliament. However, such a changing of balance cannot explain the unexpected emergence of populist leader Sadyr Japarov.[23] Two and half months later, Sadyr Japarov not only has won the presidential election, but has succeeded in carrying out a referendum with the goal of returning to a system of strong presidentialism. At the time of writing this essay, another referendum was scheduled to take place on April 11th to vote for a new constitution in which the president becomes the head of the executive, the electoral system goes back to a mixed one and the number of deputies is reduced from 120 to 90.[24] The rise of a populist leader, even if it conceals an important informal process of oligarchisation that would have erupted into a major elite contestation, testifies to fundamental crises. One is the crisis of representative government, in which the emergent party system detached the elites even further from the people. By supporting Japarov’s idea of strong presidentialism people seek, paradoxically, a better accountability of the political system because it is easier to hold one person accountable rather than shallow political parties, frequently changing government ministers and the oligarchy-serving parliament. The following saying “We have brought Japarov to power and we will depose him if necessary” is currently a favourite tale one can hear in public places, bazaars and transportation. A tale that hints to the desires of the ordinary people, of the poor, who helped the populist leader to seize power, to see their own importance, to have their voices finally heard. Capitalising on people’s deep-seated frustrations and anger about elite corruption, the ineffective party system and the oligarchisation of politics, Japarov has surprisingly easily effected a constitutional coup.   Recommendations As the October violent change of government has shown, there are multiple crises at work in Kyrgyzstan. The first is the crisis of representative government and the party system which led to deepening of popular distrust towards the elites. Early popular support for nationalist Sadyr Japarov in detriment to a coalition of well-established politicians such as Babanov, Atambayev and Madumarov (despite their representation of diverse social strata and geographic constituencies) also demonstrates low trust in the establishment. Yet within the corrupt system, new leaders with real programmatic visions have no chance to emerge. The party system failed to become a source of new leadership paving the way to populism to take over. In such conditions, the donor community should reconsider its past support to political parties and parliamentarism. The current crisis of the party system shows that the past programmes aimed at enhancing exchanges between MPs and their constituencies, exchanges between Kyrgyz PMs and other world parties have severe limits. Support to political parties should acquire a new dimension in the light of the new constitution which, if adopted on April 11th, will shift to a mixed system and less power to parties.   Programmes aimed at developing and supporting liberal civil society which produce similar artificial results should be also reconsidered towards a better analysis where the real sources of authority and change are located. As the COVID-19 pandemic has shown, citizens of all avenues were quickly mobilising to step in where the state was missing or failing. From youth engagement in voluntary movements, to religious charity activities, to female solidarity groups, to business structures, to migrant safety nets, these mobilisations demonstrated existence of other sources of change and resilience. The donor aid should better understand these dynamics and work towards helping to sustain these safety nets and resilience.   It is important to understand that under the present conditions liberal NGOs and independent mass media are discredited in public eyes and enjoy a construed reputation of Western agents. Promoting these actors further will not help neither the liberal society nor the image of the international community. The focus on human rights, including the LGBT rights, has worsened considerably the Western image and consequently diminished the degree of influence of Western ideals and projects on local politics. To redress these negative images against the background of anti-Westernism prevalent in Kyrgyzstan, Western partners should work to promote other human rights images than of themselves.   As international practice shows, one of the dangers of nationalist populism in times of unaddressed economic hardships is a possible mobilisation of nationalism against vulnerable groups. In the Kyrgyz context, these traditionally include ethnic minorities, women, and LGBT people. Attacks on these groups have been frequently accompanying political changes in the country’s short history of independence. Therefore, one of the donor’s priorities should be focused on monitoring and preventing possible violence against these groups.   Most importantly, since current populism has economic roots, it is absolutely vital to pay more attention to people’s economic security and in particular to education. Half of the country’s population is less than 25 years old and their education and prospects of employment will determine the future political system of the country. There are multiple and diverse possibilities of improving the primary education which suffers from decades of underinvestment and neglect, which yet could become the motor of economic development and democratisation. One possibility is to support the teachers’ education and curriculum development in rural areas. Another possibility is to promote the idea that migrant remittances should be invested in children’s education and not in consumption culture. Children who suffer from the absence of migrant parents should receive extra psychological and educational council.   Finally, the donor community could help by investing in more research and public opinion polls as the primary and fundamental way of understanding societal processes that lead to populism, nationalism and right wing politics. The political system cannot know which policies to adopt if it lacks key knowledge about which policies which social groups would benefit from.   Dr. Asel Doolotkeldieva is a Senior Lecturer at the OSCE Academy (Bishkek). She holds her PhD from the University of Exeter and she previously was a Visiting Fellow at College Mondial, FMSH. Her academic interests include social mobilisations, regime transition and democratisation, post-socialism, political economy of resource extraction in Central Asia.   Image by Matthias Buehler under (CC).   [1] The White House is a seat of the President and Parliament of Kyrgyzstan. [2] IRI, Public Opinion Poll Residents of Kyrgyzstan, December 2020, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/iri_kyrgyzstan_poll_dec_2020_eng.pdf: Unemployment, corruption and high costs of living remain at the top three concerns the Kyrgyz population have had in the past decade. [3] Ibid. [4] Radio Azattyk, How hundreds of millions of dollars were exited from Kyrgyzstan, November 2019, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30285881.html; Radio Azattyk, Kloop, and OCCRP, The story of Ayerken Saimati, who laundered 700 millions of dollars via Kyrgyzstan, Radio Azattyk, November 2019, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan-azattyk-occrp-kloop-joint-investigation/30286844.html; Bakyt Toregeldi, Traces of millions of dollars: facts and reaction, Radio Azattyk, July 2020, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30702217.html [5] Evgeniya Mikhaylidi, In Bishkek, but not only: “Re:Action” of Kyrgyz citizens in other cities of the world, Kloop, November 2019, https://kloop.kg/blog/2019/11/25/v-bishkeke-i-ne-tolko-re-aktsiya-kyrgyzstantsev-v-drugih-gorodah-mira/; Zhamilya Zhakypbekova, Protest #ReAction 2:0 in Bishkek. How it was, 24.kg, December 2019, https://24.kg/obschestvo/138362_miting_REaktsiya_20v_bishkeke_kak_eto_byilo/; Aibek Biybosunov, ReAction 3:0: The public awaits the authorities’ reaction, Radio Azattyk, July 2020, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30699889.html [6] Kaktus Media, Preliminary list of deputies of the VII convocation of the Jogorku Kenesh, October 2020, https://kaktus.media/doc/422474_predvaritelnyy_spisok_depytatov_vii_sozyva_jogorky_kenesha.html. The post-revolutionary constitution imposes a limit on the parliamentary majority capped at 65 seats. This measure was designed to prevent any political party – in Kyrgyzstan’s context of authoritarian past; it concerns primarily the ‘party of power’ - from usurping power (Interview with MP Omurbek Tekebaev, one of the main authors of the constitution 2010). However, as other countries and Kyrgyzstan demonstrate, the regimes succeed to bypass this constitutional constraint by propelling loyal political parties that allow forming an overwhelming majority and keeping the parliament at bay. [7] Ordinary citizens who took part in peaceful protests in the aftermath of the parliamentary election, told to the author that their mobilisation was motivated by their indignation with irresponsible elite behaviour during the COVID-19 pandemic, corruption, and regime’s usurpation of power. See: Asel Doolotkeldieva, Power and space in social mobilisations: preliminary thoughts about protests that led to a change of government in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020, CAP papers (in Russian), forthcoming. [8] Interviews with representatives of ‘Reforma’ and ‘Ata-Meken’ political parties, and civic activists. [9] Fergana News,  European Union calls President Jeenbekov “the only legitimate institution in Kyrgyzstan”, October 2020, https://fergana.site/news/121128/ [10] The term ‘liberal’ is used here as a relative denomination of a rather heterogenous group of opposition leaders and parties who were compelled to cooperate in the face of their main competitor, populist leader Sadyr Japarov. This group has gathered liberal right-wing parties ‘Bir-Bol’, ‘Reforma’, and Respublica’ on the one hand, oldest political parties claiming socialist leaning ‘Ata-Meken’ and ‘SDPK’, and pro-nationalist parties ‘Bütün Kyrgyzstan’ and ‘Zamandash’ on the other hand. In public discourses, the generic term ‘liberal’ was applied to this group, in contrast to populist Sadyr Japarov because of the main distinction between them on the question of the country’s future political development along the strong presidentialism or party system. The temporary and unnatural consolidation of liberals was slow and ineffective. While these leaders lost the moment due to an internal competition for power and legitimisation along identity politics, they ended up mobilising around the former Prime Minister and oligarch Omurbek Babanov and the former president Almazbek Atambayev as the only politicians capable to withstand Japarov. The week after the parliamentary election in which the liberals and Japarov fought for power was decisive and as a public opinion poll shows Omurbek Babanov had a real chance to take over as he was as twice popular (16 per cent) than Sadyr Japarov (eight per cent) in August 2020. His popularity fell to three per cent in contrast to Japarov’s 51 per cent in December 2020. See IRI, Public Opinion Poll Residents of Kyrgyzstan, December 2020, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/iri_kyrgyzstan_poll_dec_2020_eng.pdf [11] Kommersant, Ex-President Atambayev’s car was shot in Bishkek, October 20, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4528272 [12] Kommersant, Kozak met with President of Kyrgyzstan in Bishkek, October 2020, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4530007 [13] Kaktus media, Aida Kasymalieva about what happened in the state residence and who gave commands to the deputies, October 2020, https://kaktus.media/doc/423280_aida_kasymalieva_o_tom_chto_proishodilo_v_gosrezidencii_i_kto_daval_komandy_depytatam.html [14] On Kyrgyzstan’s semi-presidentialism see: Eugene Huskey, “Eurasian Semi-Presidentialism: The Development of Kyrgyzstan's Model of Government” in Robert Elgie & S. Moestrup, Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe A Comparative Study, 2011, Routledge; Matteo Fumagalli, Semi-presidentialism in Kyrgyzstan, in Robert Elgie & S. Moestrup, Semi-Presidentialism in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 2016, Palgrave Macmillan. [15] Asel Doolotkeldieva & Alexander Wolters, Uncertainty Perpetuated? The Pitfalls of a Weakly Institutionalised Party System in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Affairs, 4 (2017) 26-50. [16] IRI, Public Opinion Survey Residents of Kyrgyzstan, February-March 2017, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/kyrgyzstan_february-march_2017_-_public.pdf [17] Oligarchic power is a global historical norm (J. Winters, Oligarchy, Cambridge University Press, 2012) and post-soviet states were particularly exposed to this type of politics with the emergence of a new capitalist class on the ruins of the Soviet economy (see Scott Radnitz’s Weapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite-Led Protests in Central Asia, Cornell University Press, 2012 on the role of oligarchic opposition in ousting Kyrgyzstan’s first president. See also Balihar Sanghera & E. Satybaldieva’s recent investigation of the rentier class in Central Asia, “The other road to serfdom: The rise of the rentier class in post-Soviet economies”, Social Science Information 2020, vol. 59 (3), 505-536). Incorporation of these important actors was necessary for the state-building processes in the 90s, and subsequent regimes have defined differently the state-oligarchy relationships. [18] Zhibek Begalieva and Azat Yntymakov, These ‘tariffs’ were publicly exposed and widely discussed by public: 500 thousand dollars to become an MP. Who buys parliamentary seats in Kyrgyzstan?, Current Time, October 2019, https://www.currenttime.tv/a/parliament-seats-on-sale/30219729.html [19] See also Johan Engvall, The State as Investment Market. Kyrgyzstan in Comparative Perspective, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016. [20] According to informants inside the Government and political parties, Matraimov’s family has allegedly financed electoral campaigns of several political parties in 2015 and the presidential campaign of Jeenbekov in 2017. [21] Informal interviews with members of parliament. [22] Official website of the State Commission for Elections, https://newess.shailoo.gov.kg/ru/election/11098/ballot-count?type=NW_ROOT [23] The space does not allow to develop on Japarov’s skillful strategies to grab power, offset other street opposition leaders, to pressure on the court justice to write off his criminal records that would prohibit him from running as a presidential candidate. [24] To date, the draft project of the constitution remains secretive and several deputies are proposing to skip the public hearings over the project. [post_title] => Violent change of government in Kyrgyzstan amidst COVID-19 pandemic: Patronal presidentialism, oligarchisation of politics, and public indignation with corruption and rigged elections [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => violent-change-of-government-in-kyrgyzstan-amidst-covid-19-pandemic-patronal-presidentialism-oligarchisation-of-politics-and-public-indignation-with-corruption-and-rigged-elections [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-28 22:45:31 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-28 21:45:31 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5605 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5602 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-01 00:11:51 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-28 23:11:51 [post_content] => As I queue to cast my vote at a local polling station in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, I am all eyes and ears. I hope to catch anything irregular on the presidential election and national referendum day, January 10th. Nothing unusual happens in this residential district of Bishkek though: there are no celebrity voters, no (explicit) electoral fraud, and nobody is willing to try and buy my vote. Tired voters quietly trickle to the polling station, queue to have their fingerprints checked and vote for the political future of Kyrgyzstan.   Revolution 3.0 and the future of Kyrgyz democracy “Absolute power corrupts absolutely” - John Dalberg-Acton, 1857   The future of Kyrgyz democracy might be bleak as populist strongman Sadyr Japarov wins a landslide victory at the presidential election and secures himself unrestrained presidential powers through the referendum. The Central Electoral Committee (CEC) sealed his victory on January 20th, having declared the election and the referendum results final and legitimate. Two CEC members refused to support this statement citing considerable irregularities during the entire electoral cycle in favour of Japarov.[1]   Their concerns are not unfounded. The legality and legitimacy of the election and the referendum are highly questionable as the process of launching both has been rushed.[2] The return to a strong presidential rule might be detrimental for the new Kyrgyz leadership. Three out of five Kyrgyz presidents to date have lost their seats in the course of public protests. More often than not, the protests would be sparked by the presidents’ attempt to increase their powers. Both the first Kyrgyz revolution of 2005 and the second Kyrgyz revolution of 2010 were largely caused by the ruling elites’ oppressive tactics and attempts to grab more power.[3] The third Kyrgyz revolution of 2020 was sparked by blatantly fraudulent parliamentary election that would have resulted in a very compliant parliament with only two factions: the pro-presidential political party Birimdik (‘Unity’) and the pro-presidential Mekenim Kırgızstan (‘Kyrgyzstan my homeland’).[4]   The third Kyrgyz revolution has been stolen from those who walked out at the Ala-Too Square to protest the unfair and unfree elections. The protesters on October 5th represented a very broad political spectrum, from the liberal progressive party Reforma to the conservative nationalist party Chon Kazat. 16 political parties ran for parliament, and 14 of them were not happy with the outcomes.[5] While leaders of numerous political groups negotiated fickle alliances and plans in the chaos of revolution, Sadyr Japarov’s supporters took over the protests and snatched the power from the hands of hesitant political groups. President Sooronbay Jeenbekov resigned on October 15th, under pressure mounted by Japarov’s foot soldiers, who quite literally besieged the Presidential Residence and the locations used by the Parliament for their extraordinary sessions.[6]   The Parliament, which by the October events had completed its term, had been forced out from its hiding and ‘encouraged’ to vote a new speaker, a Japarov ally, and to appoint an acting prime minister and acting president. Both positions were offered to Japarov. Some members of the Parliament reported threats and peer pressure.[7] In a similar manner, the Parliament voted to run a presidential election and a referendum on the political system.   The post-revolution events unfolded with a mind-boggling speed and, before the country knew it, Kyrgyz citizens were at the polling stations choosing the sixth president and returning to the presidential system. The CEC registered some irregularities, including 60 complaints about the use of administrative resources and vote buying.[8] Compared to the widespread use of administrative resources and blatant vote buying at the parliamentary election in October 2020 (to the extent that the CEC had to cancel the election outcome altogether), this election seems to reflect the voters’ preferences in a reasonably fair way.[9] As to why Japarov has not used his resources as extensively as his predecessor, it is difficult to judge, but a combination of factors might be involved. First, Japarov might have felt no need to engage in mass scale vote buying as his work and his appointee’s work between the October revolution and the election day in January 2021 has already mobilised enough administrative resources to ensure his victory. Second, all available resources for vote buying have been spent back in October, and there was simply nothing left to invest in this election. Third, Japarov might be adding to his public image as a tireless anti-corruption advocate.   As flawed as these election and referendum were, the outcomes are here to stay as Japarov won almost 80 per cent of the votes and gathered 81 per cent in the presidential system.[10] Given the return of a strong presidential rule, it is now important to understand the new president and what his rule might mean for Kyrgyzstan and its international partners.   From prison to presidency: The curious case of Sadyr Japarov “Why repeat those mistakes? I’m going to rule fairly” - Sadyr Japarov, January 2021[11]   Amidst the chaos of the October 5-6th protests, several people were freed from prisons and temporary detention centres by their supporters. The majority were ultimately brought back by the police. Two returned voluntarily, one managed to leave the country and request political asylum, and one became the sixth president of Kyrgyzstan.   While Western observers and local liberals are terrified of the advent of a populist leader fresh out of prison, Sadyr Japarov is a highly revered figure around Kyrgyzstan. Enthused with his populist nationalist rhetoric, Japarov’s supporters see him as a ‘fresh promise’ and last hope.[12] However, his political past is highly controversial.   Japarov first appeared on the Kyrgyz political scene in 2005 as a member of parliament from the pro-presidential Ak-Jol (‘Light path’) party. As President Bakiyev’s ally Sadyr Japarov led the notoriously useless National Corruption Prevention Agency.[13] After Bakiyev’s departure from the country, Japarov joined the nationalist Ata-Jurt (‘Homeland’) party. He got his first prison sentence when he attempted to climb over the White House fence with his supporters Kamchybek Tashiev (now the head of the National Security Committee) and Talant Mamytov (acting President during the last presidential campaign) at a protest action.[14] His second sentence was issued in 2013, when Japarov led a protest against Kumtor gold-mining company, and the Governor of Issyk-Kul region was taken hostage by protestors. Japarov fled Kyrgyzstan but was caught at the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border in 2017 and imprisoned.[15] He was one third of the way through serving his term, when a group of supporters freed him from the prison in October 2020 and launched his ascent to power.   While it is early to judge what Japarov’s rule would bring to Kyrgyzstan, his stunning victory might tell us about the state of affairs in Kyrgyzstan. First, the phenomenon of Japarov is not unique. His political persona seems to fit into the profile of populist nationalist strongmen around the globe, like Hungarian Victor Orbán or the US’s Donald Trump.[16] In this sense, Kyrgyzstan could be analysed within the context of this global trend.   Second, the cult of Japarov stems from the frustrations of disenfranchised groups of people. His current political party Mekenchil (‘Compatriot’) targets the rural population and labour migrants in Russia, i.e. large groups of population, who have been marginalised and abandoned by the state. Sadyr Japarov’s anti-elitist rhetoric, his life full of personal tragedies and a prison sentence for defending the interests of the common folk appeal to Kyrgyz everyman.[17] There is an increasing polarisation between the capital and the regions, between the urban, globalised middle class in Bishkek and the Kyrgyz-speaking rural population in the provinces. Unequal access to healthcare, education, information, job opportunities, as well as general disregard of regional development in the last 30 years have resulted in the emergence of two parallel worlds. This poses certain difficulties for international observers, who tend to approach the urban liberal world of local experts rather than the population in regions.   Third, there are legitimate concerns about Japarov’s ties to organised crime and exiled corrupt officials that should be taken into account by international partners.[18] Japarov is still seen as an ally of the ousted and exiled President Bakiyev. Japarov’s sister is accused of helping President Bakiyev’s younger son, Maxim Bakiyev, launder money in Europe. Maxim Bakiyev currently lives quite comfortably in Kent, UK.[19] These connections are difficult to trace, but, if true, they might potentially facilitate further expansion of corruption and organised crime in Kyrgyzstan.   Japarov is currently the choice of the Kyrgyz people. However, he has a lot to prove to his supporters. Japarov steps into this position at the hardest of times, when the country is severely cash-strapped, exhausted by the pandemic, and lacking basic services to the public. Kyrgyzstan’s international position is far from ideal too, after three revolutions, continuous instability and incompetent use of public resources.   Implications for international partners It is possible to group the nations that are engaged in Kyrgyzstan into two camps: pro-democracy camp (such as the US and the EU) and regional authoritarian powers (China and Russia). The pro-democracy camp has been engaged in the promotion of democracy, rule of law and other similar values in Kyrgyzstan for decades. The election of a populist nationalist leader and the return to a strong presidential rule could potentially affect how they shape their future policies in the country.   The EU has been cautious in its reaction to the election. Dr. Chiara Pierobon, a European researcher, noted that the EU respects Kyrgyz sovereignty and the voters’ decision.[20] The EU would be more concerned with electoral processes and procedures that allows elections to be free and fair. For Dr. Pierobon, the reasons for the low voter turnout should be investigated in more detail and these findings should be taken into account in future EU democracy assistance initiatives addressed to civil society.   The EU Spokesperson’s statement indeed highlights the importance of adhering to free and fair electoral standard and calls the new leadership to fully respect democratic principles.[21] Professor Fabienne Bossuyt of Ghent University noted that the EU understands its limitations to promote democracy and its approach to democracy promotion is up for review. Democracy needs to come from within, and the EU will need to accommodate local forms and understandings of democracy.   The US Embassy in Bishkek issued a cautious statement congratulating the people and acknowledging Japarov as the newly elected president. However, the statement went in length to highlight the widely reported procedural irregularities, disproportionate financial means, misuse of administrative resources, and allegations of voter intimidation.[22] Nevertheless, the US would have to wait and see how the new President and his administration would treat the fragile Kyrgyz democracy. Dr. Shairbek Juraev, President of Crossroads Central Asia, a Bishkek-based think tank, does not think the political system generally would change Western donors’ attitude to Kyrgyzstan.[23] They would be more concerned about the new leadership’s adherence to freedom of speech, human rights, rule of law and political pluralism, as well as their policies on the matters that concern Western partners the most.   As to the regional authoritarian powers, their views and policies towards Kyrgyzstan are even more difficult to evaluate. There are reports that President Jeenbekov’s resignation was a strong disappointment for the Kremlin.[24] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak travelled to Kyrgyzstan a few days before Jeenbekov’s resignation and attempted to facilitate negotiations between key Kyrgyz political forces. Another sign of Russia’s disappointment was its suspension of its financial assistance to Kyrgyzstan until the political situation stabilises. However, this could be a simple pragmatic measure to ensure Russia’s assistance goes to a legitimate government.   China’s approach to Kyrgyzstan is a very pragmatic one. As Bishkek-based researcher Niva Yau noted China’s top two interests in Kyrgyzstan are its stability given the proximity to Xinjiang province and its potential role as a pivot for China’s land-based trade routes.[25] However, China might have certain concerns about Japarov’s nationalist rhetoric, which has been directed against foreign investors and border delimitation deals with neighbouring countries.   Overall, all international actors might have their concerns about Japarov’s presidency, but their actions will depend on his policies in the areas of their concern. Japarov inherits a country in dire straits with plenty of international commitments. If he is able to address the most urgent needs of people and demonstrate adherence to Kyrgyzstan’s international commitments, his presidency would last and leave a decent legacy. However, if he is unable to deliver to both domestic and international partners, he might follow the fate of his predecessors.   Recommendations Based on the research in this publication there are several suggestions for possible action.   For the Governments of Kyrgyzstan’s international partners:
  • Instigate an independent investigation into the corruption schemes, where Kyrgyz corrupt officials freely launder the money stolen from Kyrgyzstan in third countries, including Western nations that are engaged in democracy promotion in Kyrgyzstan. This information is vital for the Kyrgyz public to understand domestic processes and make decisions.
  • Ensure that organised crime and corrupt officials do not seek money-laundering services in your countries. Western laundromats undermine any efforts to promote democracy and rule of law and devalue the achievements of your own political systems. This could be done through introducing and expanding such programmes as the UK National Crime Agency’s unexplained wealth order.
  • If you are involved in promotion of democracy and rule of law, revise your engagement strategies on the ground. There is a clear gap between Western educated urban expert communities and the large mass of rural populations. Widen your pool of experts and include the non-liberal, non-democratic, non-Western-minded ones too as this might help you build your engagement strategies on a more accurate foundation. Principles of democracy and liberalism are sometimes perceived as largely Western alien concept. It is important to challenge this narrative, which often portrays civil society, liberals, human rights defenders and many other proactive members of society as ‘foreign agents’ and ‘grant-eaters’. In order to challenge this narrative, it is required to relate the principles of democracy and liberalism to local values.
  For the new Kyrgyz leadership:
  • Ensure that the Constitution drafting process strictly follows all legal procedures and is fair and transparent. Any more legal and political irregularities associated with the Constitution drafting and adoption process will undermine the public trust in the main legal document of the country.
  • Revise the current mode of operation of the Constitutional Council to increase the transparency of the process. The Council does not share the crucial details of what has been changed so far. In addition, there seems to be no information on next steps, i.e. whether the draft will be given a round of evaluation by independent experts, and if it would be submitted to the Venice Commission for their professional feedback. The lack of transparency and clarity about the process will undermine the public trust to the new Constitution and leave many legal loopholes to challenge its legitimacy, which might cause further instability.
  • Ensure a system of checks and balances within the governance structure. A strong presidential rule has never worked for Kyrgyzstan.
  Dr. Aijan Sharshenova is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. Dr. Sharshenova holds a PhD in Politics awarded by the University of Leeds. Prior to joining the OSCE Academy, Dr. Sharshenova has worked at the UN and UNDP country offices in the Middle East and in international development projects in Kyrgyzstan. Her research interests include democratisation and democracy promotion, post-Soviet authoritarianism, and international development. Currently, Dr. Sharshenova works on a research project on Russia’s influence on the Kyrgyz Republic. Dr. Sharshenova has recently published her book ‘The European Union’s Democracy Promotion in Central Asia’.   Image by Official website of the Presidency of Kyrgyzstan.   [1] Munduzbek Kalykov, Japarov had no right to run for presidency: Two CEC members refuse to acknowledge the election results, Kloop, January 2021, https://kloop.kg/blog/2021/01/21/zhaparov-ne-imel-prava-ballotirovatsya-v-prezidenty-dva-chlena-tsik-ne-priznali-itogi-vyborov/ [2]These legal and political irregularities are well covered by Bruce Pannier, Questions arise with ex-fugitive Japarov, the favourite in Kyrgyz presidential race, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-presidential-election-japarov-questions-constitution-controversy-qishloq-ovoz/31038709.html [3] Temirkulov, Azamat. 2010. Kyrgyz “revolutions” in 2005 and 2010: comparative analysis of mass mobilization. The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol.38 (5): 589-600 [4] Isabelle Khurshudyan, After Kyrgyzstan’s third uprising in 15 years, a nationalist who was sprung from prison is elected president, Washington Post, January 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/after-kyrgyzstans-third-uprising-in-15-years-a-nationalist-who-was-sprung-from-prison-is-elected-president/2021/01/11/1ed36db8-503c-11eb-a1f5-fdaf28cfca90_story.html [5] Election 2020: The list of parties, Azattyk, October 2020, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30828971.html [6] Kyrgyzstan election: President Jeenbekov resigns after protests, BBC News, October 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54553173 [7] Vyacheslav Polovinko, Freedom, equality, bros: Kyrgyz President resigned and opened path to power to the local underworld, Novaya Gazeta, October 2020, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/10/15/87529-svoboda-ravenstvo-bratva [8] Nationalist politician wins Kyrgyz presidential election, set to get sweeping powers, Azattyk, January 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/japarov-kyrgyzstan-presidential-election-referendum-/31040110.html [9] Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, Permanent Mission of the Kyrgyz Republic to the United Nations, October 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/japarov-kyrgyzstan-presidential-election-referendum-/31040110.html [10] The CEC approved the outcomes of the early presidential election of the Kyrgyz Republic, Central Electoral Commission’s website, January 2021, https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/news/4383/; The CEC declared the referendum on the political system of the Kyrgyz Republic completed, Central Electoral Commission’s website, January 2021, https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/news/4384/ [11] As cited in Joanna Lillis, Sadyr Japarov is elected president of Kyrgyzstan in a landslide, The Economist, January 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/01/11/sadyr-japarov-is-elected-president-of-kyrgyzstan-in-a-landslide [12] Aizirek Imanalieva, Kyrgyzstan: Japarov, last hope or populist menace?, Eurasianet, January 2021, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-japarov-last-hope-or-populist-menace [13] The last two years of President Bakiyev’s rule were riddled with increased corruption cases, political assassinations, and all-pervasive nepotism. [14] Aizirek Imanalieva, Kyrgyzstan: Japarov, last hope or populist menace?, Eurasianet, January 2021, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-japarov-last-hope-or-populist-menace [15] Anna Kapushenko, Ex convict, a banker, several MPs and a national security officer: Who is running for presidency?, Kloop, January 2021, [16] Georgy Mamedov, Japarov is our Trump, Open Democracy, January 2021, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/japarov-is-our-trump-kyrgyzstan-is-the-future-of-global-politics/ [17] While serving his prison sentence Japarov has lost his both parents and his oldest son to diseases and a car accident, source: Aruuke Uran kyzy, From prison to presidency: Sadyr Japarov’s victory, The Diplomat, January 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/from-prison-to-presidency-sadyr-japarovs-victory/; See more about his life in Aruuke Uran kyzy, From prison to presidency: Sadyr Japarov’s victory, The Diplomat, January 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/from-prison-to-presidency-sadyr-japarovs-victory/ [18] Ivan Nechepurenko, Populist, prisoner, president: A convicted kidnapper wins Kyrgyzstan election, New York Times, January 2021, https://nyti.ms/2LBCM4W [19] Chris Rickleton, Kyrgyzstan’s former first son living the high life in UK, Eurasianet, 2015, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstans-former-first-son-living-the-high-life-in-uk-report; See also Global Witness, Surrey Mansion Used To Hide Suspect Funds, March 2015, https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/surrey-mansion-used-hide-suspect-funds/ [20] Interview with Dr. Chiara Pierobon, January 2021. [21] Paul Stano, Kyrgyz Republic: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Presidential Elections and on the referendum on the future political system, European External Action Service, January 2021, [22] U.S. Embassy Statement on 2021 Kyrgyz Presidential Elections, January 2021, https://kg.usembassy.gov/u-s-embassy-statement-on-2021-kyrgyz-presidential-elections/ [23] Interview with Dr. Shairbek Juraev, January 2021. [24] Vyacheslav Polovinko, Freedom, equality, bros: Kyrgyz President resigned and opened path to power to the local underworld, Novaya Gazeta, October 2020, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/10/15/87529-svoboda-ravenstvo-bratva [25] Interview with Niva Tsz Yau, January 2021. [post_title] => Kyrgyzstan elects a potential strongman: Implications for international partners and the future of Kyrgyz democracy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => kyrgyzstan-elects-a-potential-strongman-implications-for-international-partners-and-the-future-of-kyrgyz-democracy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-28 22:40:43 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-28 21:40:43 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5602 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5590 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-01 00:10:38 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-28 23:10:38 [post_content] => Nationalist populism and online political mobilisation The rising illiberal populism that imperils even established democracies including the US, Brazil, the UK, Turkey, and many European countries, has become a favourite political tool for many autocratically inclined politicians. Until recently, countries of the post-soviet region, where local authoritarian leaders prefer to rule with the help of traditional administrative methods of suppression, had been mostly spared from this phenomenon. But the recent political dynamics in Kyrgyzstan shows that leading political actors increasingly adopt populist language, nationalist discourses and polarising strategies to gain political power.   Looking at the recent Kyrgyz political realm, this essay discusses how nationalist populism has become a dominant political force in Kyrgyzstan. As we see today’s global populism is also associated with the power of social media platforms.[1] Skilfully promoted through the Kyrgyz-speaking social media platforms by the newly elected president Sadyr Japarov, a pro-Japarov populist movement has gained political momentum in the aftermath of popular uprising against the then president Sooronbay Jeenbekov. On January 10th, Sadyr Japarov won the presidential elections. This happened only three months after he had been released from the prison by street protestors following rigged parliamentary elections on October 4th 2020 and popular uprising that deposed the regime of President Jeenbekov.   A campaign banner of Sadyr Japarov (January 2021): ‘Sadyr Japarov. Serving the Future!’   Sadyr Japarov, a new president and currently the most powerful political figure who was just recently in prison, successfully employs populist behaviour by producing divisive and hostile language. Japarov represents the image of a new type of populist politician who knows how to use social media in his favour to influence people. His power derives from, and popularity is based on, an unusually high number of followers on social media. Very much like Trump, who used Twitter to have direct appeal to his supporters, Japarov personally administers several large social media groups. He admitted in his interview that he used all kinds of social media networks, created 50 groups and managed them even while in prison: “In prison you are a free person for 24 hours, you have free time.”[2]   A screenshot from Sadyr Japarov’s biggest Facebook group (177K) which shows a list of the admins and moderators.[3] The one written in Latin Alphabet as Sadyr Japarov is his personal account which was created in 2012.[4]   Online mobilisation impacts real-world mobilisation, turning it into a crucial element of Japarov’s strategy that has de facto secured him a strategic advantage (winning the street during the initial protests and subsequently) and then the presidency. Our interviews with people in various localities indicate that Japarov’s followers often mobilised by creating local WhatsApp groups, which were then used to coordinate their actions, including travel to Bishkek to join forces with other supporters in the city’s Old Square.   The online mobilisation in the wake of the October post-electoral crisis that turned into actual street mobilisation and the physical presence of pro-Japarov groups in the Old Square in the post-election crisis period, was crucial to the successful rise of Japarov.[5] Hundreds of his supporters gathered to support and protect the populist politician following his nomination to the post of interim Prime Minister on October 6th. At the same time, supporters of a broad coalition of opposition politicians including former president Atambayev along with liberal youths gathered on the central Ala-Too square just a mile away. On October 9th, Japarov’s supporters attacked and chased their opponents on the Ala-Too square.[6] That clash became a critical juncture that determined the fate of political power struggle. From that moment, Japarov emerged as the most powerful actor in a political scene.   Background to social media populism With the growing access to the internet and the availability of smartphones in recent years, the Kyrgyz speaking population has been increasingly exposed to online news content. Kyrgyz online nationalist groups are a relatively new phenomenon in Kyrgyzstan’s social domain. According to the data report for 2020 the number of internet users in Kyrgyzstan increased by 55 thousand (+1.8 per cent) between 2019 and 2020.[7]There were 3.06 million internet users in Kyrgyzstan in January 2020 and 2.5 million use social networks. In Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz-speaking social media users usually come from traditional rural backgrounds as opposed to urban dwellers, consumers of social media content in Russian language, including the content that comes from the Russian Federation’s media space.   Why now and why social media? Mobile internet provides rural people with great opportunities in expanding social communication networks through social media platforms. For many of them, news circulated in and through social media has replaced traditional newspapers and TV programmes as a primary source of getting information and entertainment. People in rural areas tended to trust the content in newspapers, so, not surprisingly, when the news circulated in social media came to replace traditional newspapers, people readily took for granted the reliability of the online content, especially if it is spread through trusted networks.   Emergence of nationalist groups and social media manipulation However, despite this, in the pre-October period, the influence of Japarov’s social groups on public opinion was rather limited. Before 2020, nationalist groups were not highly visible on online platforms, mostly appearing to the public during controversial events such as anti-corruption demonstrations, the ReAction 1.0 and 2.0, the March 8th feminist march, and the Femminale art exhibition. Those events were used as focal points and windows of opportunity for nationalist groups to showcase their strength and public presence. The strong connection between these high-publicity events and the emergence of nationalist groups signaled the first signs of social media manipulation of the nationalist mobilisation.   In particular, the organisation of the ReAction 2.0 on December 18th was countered by an unprecedented level of sophisticated informational attacks against anti-corruption activists organised by pro-regime trolls supposedly financed by a controversial figure, Raiymbek Matraimov, popularly known as ‘Raiym Million’ for his alleged wealth.[8] Several edited videos and images emerged in social media several days before the ReAction 2.0 demonstration targeting anti-corruption activists. These mounted videos and edited images stated that the forthcoming demonstration was organised by LGBT groups and western agents. The pictures of some anti-corruption activists were placed next to images and video-footage of sexually explicit gay scenes and images of LGBT activists. In other images, taken from the demonstration, some participants were randomly outlined as ‘western agents’. The supposed aim of those falsified information attacks was to activate yet another societal cleavage – between conservative-nationalist and liberal groups – to shift away from the anti-corruption discourse to cause societal outrage against ReAction 2.0 exploiting homophobic and anti-western sentiments that are dominant in Kyrgyzstan’s largely conservative society. The troll attacks skillfully build on recent controversies around feminist events such as the Femminale art exhibition and the March 8th feminist march in Bishkek that was joined by some LGBT activists. These events caused huge outrage among conservative groups. Several female activists were attacked by aggressive men from nationalist groups, some of them allegedly linked to Kyrk Choro (Forty Knights) - one of the first conservative-nationalist groups, also infamous for their vigilante raids against prostitutes and brothels, that later was co-opted by Japarov’s populist movement. Their appearance at the controversial events was an indicator of growing polarisation between liberal and conservative groups.[9]   Populist manipulation Currently, pro-Japarov online groups are the most numerous and influential in the Kyrgyz-speaking social media domain. The membership significantly multiplied and the number of groups supporting Japarov mushroomed since he claimed political power last October. In the pre-October 2020 period, being probably the only politician who realised a high potential of social networks for political mobilisation, Japarov actively worked from the prison to create his support base on social media platforms. As Japarov himself claims: “More than a hundred people whom I worked with were released while I was still in prison. They started working for me, spreading the word that I was a good man. When I got out, they were all at rallies, supporting me. That is the whole secret of the third revolution.”[10] He continues in his interview after the election: “In jail, I wasn't just wasting time, I was working with the people through social media.[11] For three and a half years, I communicated directly with ordinary people. I created groups on Odnoklassniki, on Facebook, on Instagram. I collected people's contacts on WhatsApp and created more than 50 groups there: one group holds 256 contacts. Through these groups I spread information about Kumtor, about my work. That's how I reached all the people in three and a half years.”   Japarov’s popularity and influence sky-rocketed after he was released from the prison and nominated for the position of interim prime minister by a group of MPs with close ties to the then president Sooronbay Jeenbekov and a powerful Matraimov’s clan. His overwhelming dominance in Kyrgyz social media became obvious thanks to the work of hundreds of aggressive trolls who attacked not only Japarov’s political opponents, but also ordinary people with dissident and opposition views.[12] Their favourite target was liberal or opposition female activists whom trolls and then-ordinary users threatened with sexual violence.[13] The hate speech incited by online trolls, and even Japarov himself, created an atmosphere of impunity exacerbated by the inaction of state authorities, Facebook administration, and moderators of social media groups run by or affiliated with Japarov and his close associates. Such impunity further emboldened or incited ordinary users to make attacks and open death threats against the opponents of their icon. Japarov’s divisive language sent clear signals to his supporters designating ‘enemies of the people’. Our monitoring of social media content and interviews with prominent opponents and civic activists reveal that the intensity of online threats and hate attacks would often increase after Japarov’s divisive speeches. Typically, trolls would label prominent human rights activists and opposition leaders, as ‘western agents, gays, and spies’. Another critical factor is new exposure to online manipulation. The absolute absence of experience among people to deal with fake news played a crucial role in the rapid spread of populist messages and manipulation of public opinion through fake news. Massive exposure to fake news and hate speech made inexperienced ordinary social media users sincerely believe the fake content of troll factories.[14]   On December 12 2020, a protest by young males was held in Bishkek.[15] The organisers explained that they are against any protests in Bishkek. The banners read: “Ï am a patriot of my country. I want peace in my city”, “By organising a protest of 10 people, don’t claim your rights!”, and “I am against the destabilisation in my country”. Some internet users compared them to a new version of a conservative ‘Kyrk Choro’ group of men. The head of this movement against protests, as they call themselves druzhinniki (vigilantes), is Marat Mamraliev. He is a young politician and entrepreneur who is developing a security agency, the rapid response group ‘Division’.   Virtually all nationalist groups and social media trolls rely on anti-western and anti-liberal discourse propagandised by the Kremlin as ready-to-use templates for nationalist actors to manipulate public opinion. High legitimacy of the Kremlin’s anti-liberal discourse among Kyrgyzstan’s general population provided political actors with a valuable tool to manipulate public opinion. Presidents, especially Atambayev, have willingly exploited this high legitimacy discourse in their political interests. Japarov fully employed this strategy against his political opponents. What Japarov added to the existing discourse frames is an anti-establishment discourse that he has splendidly promoted through numerous social media groups that he personally controls. For example, he personally administers his biggest Facebook group, which has 180,000 members.[16] In general, there are more than ten big pro-Japarov groups on Facebook and Instagram. During the pre-election period, between November 19th 2020 - January 1st 2021, his Facebook groups created 49,500 posts. Japarov related groups produced more than a half of all posts generated by the biggest political Facebook groups taken together. This is much more than even groups with news information content, as the figure shows.   The army of trolls has been a crucial factor to bringing Japarov success. The hate-filled comments defending Japarov and attacking his opponents have been traced not only on Facebook and Instagram but also on YouTube. One of the authors of this paper, Gulzat Baialieva, together with Janeta Jakypova, conducted a textual data-analysis of two mostly watched videos where Japarov and his opponent Tekebaev talk about constitutional reforms.[17] They have scraped all 6,799 commentaries to examine how the referendum and changes to the Constitution were discussed on YouTube. Among 100 of the most frequently used words (excluding pronouns) there is no mention of ‘law’, ‘referendum’ or ‘constitution’. As the cloud of words shows, the comments refer to these two politicians, Japarov and Tekebaev (used shortly by the users as a derogatory name ‘Teke’ meaning goat).  After these two names, the other most frequently used words are ‘people’ and ‘God’.   Cloud of words used under YouTube videos related to referendum and Constitution.   Sadyr Japarov’s groups made 49,500 posts in the pre-election period. Source: Center for Media Development.   Japarov’s populist message fell on favourable ground. It came when the fatigue for the corrupted system and politicians among ordinary people reached a high point, after years of rampant corruption among politicians and officials in practically all levels of state institutions. Japarov efficiently used the people’s fatigue and their distrust towards politicians. Many of his political decisions contain populist references to the ‘people’s will’. What we observe now is the overwhelming popularity of Japarov in mostly rural regions of Kyrgyzstan.   Performance during the pre-electoral campaign in Karakol on December 29 2020. The scene from the local genealogy of the seven saints ‘Jeti Ake’. The saints are blessing and initiating the presidential candidate Japarov blessed into the eighth saint warrior!   Liberal groups did not manage to effectively neutralise the populist message promoted by Japarov. Nor had they an effective plan to counteract his aggressive strategy. The main weakness is the lack of grassroot connections amongst the predominantly Russophone liberal groups with Kyrgyz-speaking social segments. They tend to adapt liberal ideas from western liberal discourse with little or no attempt to convert it into plain language that could be acceptable and comprehensible to the most traditional and rural segments of society. Abstract ideas that have little to do with the prosaic reality of everyday life of ordinary rural dwellers strongly contradict their traditional views and values. Attempts by Russophone liberals to ‘educate’ or ‘civilise’ fail to take into account the context and cultural values of rural people. Therefore, when liberal groups tried to resist Japarov's illiberal constitutional reforms only appealing to the breach of constitutional procedures, his rural supporters simply did not buy those arguments. For Japarov’s supporters, the breach, even if they recognised it, did not make any sense because the constitution was violated so many times by Japarov’s predecessors for the personal benefit, so then why their political favourite could not do the same especially because he wanted it to work ‘in the interests of the people’?   Similarly, Kyrgyz and Russophone segments independently exist in parallel lives in social media networks rarely intersect in everyday life. But when they intersect to reflect high-publicity and controversial political and social events, the debates produce ideological cleavages and acute conflict. On the contrary, Japarov often personally engages in discussions with social media users in a simple popular language clearly understandable to many ordinary people. This informal direct contact that strikingly contrasts with the behaviour of traditional politicians appeals to many people who consider Japarov ‘our guy’.   Photo from Sadyr Japarov’s Facebook group. Pre-election campaign in Karakol, December 29 2020.   The following examples demonstrate his direct involvement in online discussions. Sadyr Japarov wrote a post on his personal Facebook account to respond to a critical publication about his endless promises: “Were you born as a nine-months-old? Or were you born premature? Please be patient, my brother. All in good time. There is so much you don't know…”[18] Japarov’s public posts against his opponents contain a patronising, accusing and discriminative language. Japarov does not hesitate to blame his critics for fake news and uses religious articulation: “How do you tell such lies? Have you no faith and morals?”, called the opposing groups “bastards” and wrote hate-filled posts “Go to hell those who cry out for their own interests!”.   Some populist measures have even seemingly caught sympathies of liberal middle-class urbanites. Anti-corruption discourse ‘kusturabyz’ (we make corrupt officials throw up what they stole) or the so-called economic amnesty is another effective populist move.   Conclusion Japarov’s anti-establishment and anti-liberal rhetoric is framed as ‘the people’s voice’ and is characteristic to many populist leaders across the world. He skillfully manipulates rising inequality in Kyrgyz society to shift blame on old elites, liberal activists, and independent media – whom he calls as ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘traitors’. His blaming strategy and a reputation of a national hero and a victim of the corrupt and unjust system that he carefully constructed over years, allowed him to get a tight grip on ordinary people making him the most popular and powerful actor in Kyrgyzstan’s political scene. Sensing his power and popularity, Japarov has taken a successful gamble on changing the constitution that would dismantle democratic institutions and grant a new president with an unprecedented level of power. A huge popularity for Japarov among ordinary people provided him with high potential to push through anti-democratic constitutional reforms that threaten to transform the country into deep authoritarianism.   We suggest that key elements of Japarov’s populism, such as ‘eldin talaby’ (popular will) and ‘eski sayasatchylar’ (the corrupt elite), the direct appeal via social media and his political imprisonment with tragic personal consequences have been activated by context. The factors that led people to vote for President Japarov, including concerns about the country’s growing economic inequality, corrupt judicial system and foreign influence, were not new in 2021. The difference was the ways in which Japarov communicated about these issues. His provocative statements, rhetoric and social media trolling increased the intensity and polarised the society. Japarov and his political team attacked opponents and the independent media, presenting them as the “enemy”, “western influence” and “threat” to Kyrgyz unity and identity. Japarov was refashioned into a ‘uluttuk lider’ (national hero). We do not suggest one silver bullet to mitigate the negative effects of populism, especially when the societies are dismantled from within. Yet, we highlight several important considerations to respond to the effects of populism:  
  • Avoid efforts to ‘enlighten’ and ‘educate’ the ‘other side’ which aggravates polarisation: Simply exposing people to ‘the real facts’, ‘true story’ or to break down pre-existing beliefs are ineffective and can accentuate polarisation. They are especially ineffective when they are communicated by untrusted actors or messengers, which leads people to stay even more closely to their own group-congruent beliefs.
  • Focus on shaping people’s perceptions of norms: As research on combating populism suggests people’s behaviour is shaped by individual attitudes and normative context. So rather than seeking to ‘educate’ and to change attitudes, which more likely have developed over a long period of time, liberal actors should focus on shaping norms.
  • Create unifying beliefs, values and narratives: Japarov focused greatly on the ‘us versus them’ narrative, a typical tactic used by populists and authoritarian leaders. The liberal forces should avoid using their divisive language. They should create their brand of inclusive narratives and highlight unifying beliefs and values.
  Gulzat Baialieva is a PhD candidate at the Social Anthropology Department, University of Tübingen. She holds a Master’s degree in Political Science (Comparative Politics) from Central European University and a graduate diploma in European Civilisations from Bishkek Humanities University. She has been teaching at the Social Anthropology Department, University of Tübingen and previously at Bishkek Humanities University. Her research interests include populism, environmental anthropology, post-socialist transformations, water use in Central Asia and digital ethnography.   Joldon Kutmanaliev is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Tübingen. He received his doctoral degree in political science from the European University Institute in Florence and MA in political science from the Central European University. Previously, he taught at the University of Tübingen and the Bishkek Humanities University for many years. He is an author of a forthcoming book ‘Intercommunal Warfare and Ethnic Peacemaking: The Dynamics of Urban Violence in Central Asia’, to be published with the McGill-Queens University Press.   Image by Etienne Combier under (CC).   [1] Flew T, Iosifidis P. 2020. Populism, globalisation and social media. International Communication Gazette, 82(1):7-25. doi:10.1177/1748048519880721 [2] Kommersant, “In prison you are a free man 24 hours a day”, January 2021, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4639707 [3] Sadyr Japarov, Facebook Public Group, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/groups/1412264215689407 [4] Sadyr Japarov, Facebook Personal Account, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/japarov.sadyr [5] Gulzat Baialieva and Joldon Kutmanaliev, How Kyrgyz social media backed an imprisoned politician’s meteoric rise to power, openDemocracy, October 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/how-kyrgyz-social-media-backed-an-imprisoned-politicians-meteoric-rise-to-power/ [6] Kyrgyzstan election: Fresh clashes as state of emergency comes into force, BBC News, October 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-54481063 [7] Simon Kemp Digital 2020: Kyrgyzstan, DataRePortal, February 2020, https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-kyrgyzstan [8] Raiym Matraimov, a former head deputy of the Customs, was a main target of the ReAction anti-corruption campaign for his involvement in high-level corruption schemes in transborder trade with China and his involvement in the assassination of Aierken Saimaiti, a whistleblower murdered by hired killers in Istanbul. Matraimov’s clan founded a Mekenim Kyrgyzstan (‘Homeland Kyrgyzstan’) party that ran in the parliamentary elections on October 4th 2020. His party gained a majority of seats along with a pro-presidential Birimdik (‘Unity’) party in what independent observers called highly fraud and rigged elections that caused outraged and popular protests. [9] Joldon Kutmanaliev and Gulzat Baialieva, Polarisation grows as Kyrgyzstan tackles controversial corruption issues, openDemocracy, December 2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/polarisation-grows-kyrgyzstan-tackles-controversial-corruption-issues/ [10] Kommersant, “In prison you are a free man 24 hours a day”, January 2021, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4639707 [11] Ibid. [12] Gulzat Baialieva and Joldon Kutmanaliev, In Kyrgyzstan, social media hate goes unchecked, openDemocracy, December 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/kyrgyzstan-social-media-hate-goes-unchecked/ [13] Ibid. [14] Kamila Eshaliyeva, Real fakes: how Kyrgyzstan’s troll factories work, openDemocracy, November 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/troll-factories-kyrgyzstan/?source=in-article-related-story [15] Barakelde, Anti-protest rally took place on Ala-Too Square, December 2020, https://barakelde.org/news:419961 [16] Sadyr Japarov, Facebook Public Group, Facebook https://www.facebook.com/groups/1412264215689407/members/admins [17] Gulzat Bayalieva and Janetta Zhakypova, Social Networks: Discussion or Disruption, RFE/RL, December 2020, https://www.azattyk.org/a/31013907.html?fbclid=IwAR2ZjGvoKqTpWB_Eh6bny0LCnBGc6LNTsmNTRCJXEcZAgyYb6-IqQs-jINI [18] Sadyr Japarov, Facebook Post, Facebook, December 2020, https://www.facebook.com/japarov.sadyr/posts/1754338344741087 [post_title] => Social media mobilisation and the rise of populism in Kyrgyzstan [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => social-media-mobilisation-and-the-rise-of-populism-in-kyrgyzstan [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-03-01 13:06:17 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-03-01 12:06:17 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5590 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [20] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5587 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-01 00:09:03 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-28 23:09:03 [post_content] => On the morning of October 6th 2020, Sadyr Japarov was in jail, serving an 11-year sentence for kidnapping the Governor of Kyrgyzstan’s Issyk Kul region. Ten days later Japarov was anointed President, capping an extraordinary ten days of street protests and dubious legal procedures that saw one of Kyrgyzstan’s most prominent convicts catapulted to Kyrgyzstan’s most prominent political office. Rule of law in Kyrgyzstan is weak. It is the passions of the street – sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse – that shape both political fortunes and human rights in Kyrgyzstan.   Three decades after the Soviet collapse, Kyrgyzstan finds itself in a catch-22. Kyrgyz state capacity is weak and, as a result, political chaos is frequent. There is an upside, however, to chaos. Whereas other Central Asian governments, most notably Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have proven able to systematically target the political opposition, religious groups, and ethnic minorities, Kyrgyz state repression of human rights has been piecemeal and fleeting. The downside of Kyrgyz chaos, particularly from the perspective of vulnerable populations, is that guarantees of basic human rights are non-existent. Rather than rule-of-law ensured protections, it is society’s preferences, the state executive’s perception of threat, and the political elites’ on-again, off-again desire to maintain Kyrgyzstan’s international reputation as Central Asia’s only post-Soviet democracy that provide some modicum of human rights protection.   Society preferences Most striking about Kyrgyz politics is that, despite the persistent chaos of national politics, everyday local life is, with a few important exceptions, peaceful. Unlike Uzbekistan, where the past three decades have seen sustained persecution of devout Muslims, and unlike Turkmenistan where the political opposition is routinely silenced and jailed, Kyrgyz citizens are comparatively free to worship as they wish and to criticise local, regional, and state elites. Kyrgyz citizens and Kyrgyzstan observers offer multiple wellsprings for these comparative freedoms: the enduring celebration of country’s nomadic history, western donors’ enthusiastic support of Kyrgyz NGOs in the decade following the Soviet collapse, and the can-do/must-do mentality that developed among local communities as the Kyrgyz welfare state steadily eroded in the years of post-Soviet independence.[1]   Regardless the origins of local communities’ power, what is clear is how local communities have harnessed this power to effect public goods, including the public good of human rights. Tablighi travelers, Muslim revivalists who seek to spread Islamic knowledge, are welcomed in local communities throughout Kyrgyzstan whereas similar revivalist movements are violently repressed in neighbouring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.[2] Opposition to the central government similarly thrives at the local level. Kyrgyz communities challenge central government contracts with international mining companies, neighbourhood organisations join together to block the destruction of parks and building of roads, and citizens across the country bind to gather to protest state attempts to raise the price of everyday necessities like natural gas. Local social networks are often the foundations upon which Kyrgyz political opposition is built and secured.   Societal preferences, critically however, do not invariably favour human rights for all. Just as we can identify systemic bias, for example, white privilege in the US or Han Chinese privilege in Xinjiang, so too does Kyrgyz society elevate the rights of some while concomitantly undermining the rights of others.[3] Vulnerable classes in Kyrgyzstan include ethnic minorities, particularly the Uzbek minority, members of the LGBTQ+ community, and women. Animus toward ethnic Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan has deep, Soviet-era roots. Bias against sexual minorities and women also has deep roots yet has grown in recent years as more and more political elites champion a return to ‘traditional society’.   Throughout the Soviet period, ethnic Uzbeks figured prominently in the economies of southern Kyrgyz cities. Soviet leaders, most notably Brezhnev, sought to minimise ethnic Kyrgyz economic grievances by increasing titular control over local political and administrative offices. This ‘nativisation’ of power, a process which has only accelerated since Kyrgyz independence, has produced a combustible situation in which political control rests squarely with ethnic Kyrgyz while ethnic Uzbeks have remained central to Kyrgyzstan’s southern urban economies. During periods of political instability, most notably in June 1990 and in June 2010, economic grievance has boiled over into deadly ethnic conflict. Uzbeks were disproportionately the victims of these ethnic conflicts. Thus, of the 470 who died in the 2010 conflict, nearly three-fourths were ethnic Uzbeks.[4] Ethnic Uzbeks, moreover, were disproportionately faulted for instigating the 2010 violence, this despite independent documentation that Kyrgyz police and the military did little to prevent and, at times, were complicit in violent attacks on Uzbek communities.[5]   Emblematic of the injustices ethnic Uzbeks have endured is the case of Azimjan Askarov, an ethnic Uzbek human rights defender, whom Kyrgyz courts found guilty of fomenting the 2010 violence. The United Nations Human Rights Committee concluded in May 2016 that Askarov’s ‘detention was not in accordance with domestic law, had no legitimate purpose, and was motivated by his role as a human rights defender and by his ethnicity.’[6] The Kyrgyz Government rejected the UN committee’s conclusion and Askarov, lamentably, died in prison in July 2020.   Whereas economic grievances have fomented anti-Uzbek sentiment in southern Kyrgyzstan, a revival of supposedly ‘traditional’ Kyrgyz values has led to increased gender discrimination and imperiled Kyrgyzstan’s LGBTQ+ community. On March 8th 2020—International Women’s Day—a group of masked men wearing Ak-kalpaks, traditional Kyrgyz hats, attacked a group of activists who had gathered on Victory Square to highlight the persistence and acceptance of widespread domestic violence, bride kidnapping, and rape.[7] Revealingly, while the violent attackers were not detained, 50 women’s rights activists were arrested.[8]   Self-appointed defenders of Kyrgyz traditional society similarly, albeit less violently, opposed the Women’s Day march the previous year. Members of the nationalist group, Kyrk Choro, demanded Bishkek city authorities be dismissed for allowing the 2019 Women’s Day march to turn into a “gay parade.” Kyrk Choro also demanded legal action be taken against the march organisers “who have trampled on (Kyrgyz) national values ​​and pride.”[9] Kyrk Choro nationalists has woven a narrative that feminists and homosexuals are in league with ‘foreign specialists’ and are actively seeking to undermine traditional Kyrgyz culture.[10] This narrative presents challenges for those in the international community who do seek to support LGBTQ+ rights. International support for Kyrgyzstan’s LGBTQ+ community feeds into Kyrk Choro’s nationalist message that western governments are in league against Central Asian traditional values. At the same time, were donors to abandon the LGBTQ+ community, LGBTQ+ rights in Kyrgyzstan would become even more imperiled.   Kyrk Choro, it should be stressed, should not be dismissed as merely a fringe element of Kyrgyz society. Kyrgyz parliamentarians voice similar homophobic beliefs. MP Jyldyz Musabekova said of the March 2019 marchers, “the men who do not want to have children and the girls who do not want to pour tea...must not only be cursed, they must be beaten.”[11] While Kyrgyzstan has yet to pass an anti-LGBTQ+ law like the one adopted in Russia in 2013, draft laws strikingly similar to the Russian legislation and that focus on punishing those who spread ‘propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations’ have consistently received overwhelming support in the Kyrgyz parliament.[12] International donors would do well to recognise the sensitivity surrounding LGBTQ+ rights in Kyrgyzstan. Donors must not ignore this critically vulnerable population. At the same time, donors must acknowledge that bias against the LGBTQ+ community is, lamentably, widespread the world over. Just as politicians in Europe and the US have been slow to ensure LGBTQ+ protections, so too do Kyrgyz political elites hesitate to press LGBTQ+ rights out of a fear of alienating key constituencies.   Executive perceptions of threat It is striking that, despite Kyrgyz MPs enthusiasm for anti-LGBTQ+ legislation, this legislation has yet to be formally adopted and passed into law. This is not to say that LGBTQ+ rights are robust in Kyrgyzstan; they are not. Members of the LGBTQ+ community are regularly the targets of violence and perpetrators of this violence rarely are brought to justice.[13] To date, though, presidents along with members of parliament have been content to propound homophobic rhetoric rather than legislate against and thereby criminalise Kyrgyzstan’s embattled LGBTQ+ community. The same cannot be said for members of the Uzbek minority or the political opposition. These groups, in that they either directly or indirectly pose what ruling elites perceive to be real threats, have suffered and will continue to suffer human rights violations at the hands of the Kyrgyz state.   There is no evidence, it must be emphasised, that Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic Uzbek minority has ever sought to undermine state power either at the national or local level. This reality, though, has not stopped Kyrgyz nationalists from advancing narratives suggesting minority Uzbeks are a fifth column. The former mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakhmetov, used anti-Uzbek xenophobia to build a devoted political following. Although the central Kyrgyz government eventually dethroned Myrzakhmetov from his mayoral seat in 2013, no Kyrgyz leader has sought to challenge Myrzakhmetov’s—or any other Kyrgyz nationalist’s—one-sided narrative of the 2010 ethnic violence. To challenge this narrative would be political suicide. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that, to this day, no Kyrgyz executive has sought to reverse the Kyrgyz judiciary’s gross miscarriage of justice conducted against ethnic Uzbeks in the aftermath of the 2010 riots. Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic Uzbeks, though the threat they pose to the state is imagined rather than real, will continue to be deprived full restitution of rights as long as Kyrgyz elites perceive weak nationalist bona fides will make them vulnerable to political attacks.   Political attacks, be they based on nationalist credentials, real or alleged corruption, or charges of incompetence, are frequent in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz presidents are always on guard to defend against these attacks and, despite Kyrgyzstan’s outward trappings of democracy, Kyrgyz executives have proven more than willing to use the judiciary as well as other ‘administrative’ means to minimise real and perceived threats from opponents. The current Kyrgyz President, Sadyr Japarov, was jailed in 2017 during the leadership of President Atambayev. Atambayev himself was placed under house arrest by his successor, President Jeenbekov. Jeenbekov, ousted by Japarov in October 2020, has thus far avoided arrest, assiduously avoiding confrontation knowing well how a sitting president can use the courts to silence political threats. This march of executives between prison and the presidency and the presidency to prison is clear illustration of how Kyrgyzstan’s political opposition can be silenced. Election monitoring reports from the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights are replete with examples of how the Kyrgyz executive systematically uses administrative resources, most notably the judiciary, to eliminate political threats. Indeed, it is precisely because political rights are so insecure that we see Kyrgyz politics so frequently devolve into street protests and putsches.   International reputation Western governments, particularly the US Government, have viewed these protests and putsches more through the lens of democratic transition rather than unrestrained populism. US State Department Spokesman Adam Ereli was repeatedly pushed in March 2005, just days after a street protests led to the overthrow of Kyrgyzstan’s first president, Askar Akayev, if the US Government considered what happened in Kyrgyzstan to be a coup. Ereli responded, “we will continue to work to support the efforts of the Kyrgyz people as they endeavor to build a stable democracy.”[14] Following the putsch that led to Akayev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, fleeing to Kazakhstan, US Assistant Secretary of State Philip Crowley assured that the US Government would be “working with Kyrgyzstan to try to move it along on a path to democracy and economic prosperity.”[15] And in November 2020, just weeks after street protesters secured Sadyr Japarov’s release from jail and installation as acting president, the US Embassy in Bishkek announced it was renewing its ‘commitment to assist the Kyrgyz Government, its people, and civil society groups composed of ordinary citizens, to protect democratic institutions, support human rights, and conduct free and fair elections.’[16]   Although leaders like Japarov no doubt see through the sanguine outward facing pronouncements of the US Government, international exhortations of support for Kyrgyz democracy likely do have a net positive effect on human rights in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan depends heavily on foreign aid and receives more aid per capita from the two largest international donors—the European Union and the US Government—than any other Central Asian country.[17] To engage in widespread and systematic human rights repression—repression the likes of which we see in Turkmenistan today or we saw in Uzbekistan during President Karimov’s nearly three decades of terror—would jeopardise this much needed aid.   Kyrgyz presidents, including the recently-elected Japarov, consistently articulate support for human rights. Thus, Japarov pledged that “freedom of speech and the media will continue to be an inviolable value,” and that his administration would build “a model judicial system.”[18] It is also notable, however, that Japarov, in his January 10th 2021 victory speech, issued a warning to the press: “While I will defend the media, I ask you not to distort my words or the words of politicians and officials, not to take our statements out of context. Do this and there won’t be any prosecutions.”[19] These are the worlds of a leader who perceives an overwhelmingly populist—though not necessarily democratically-won—mandate. This distinction is important and one that has not always informed how international partners engage Kyrgyz governments. Eliding populism and democracy, as international observers of Kyrgyz politics frequently do, is to celebrate political contestation but often at the expense of rule of law.   Japarov’s mixed messaging is an apt metaphor for the state of human rights in Kyrgyzstan. While rights violations are not systematic, neither are human rights guaranteed. Kyrgyz have long practiced robust local rule and this deep institutionalisation of local self-governance acts as a break to what might otherwise be the central government’s trampling of fundamental rights. Kyrgyz leaders’ desire to maintain an outward image as the one democracy in post-Soviet Central Asia, moreover, also acts as a check on human rights violations. At the same time, though, neither Kyrgyz leaders nor Kyrgyz society are invariably pro-human rights in orientation. Kyrgyzstan is not exceptional in this regard. The violent mob attack on the US capitol in January 2021 illustrates that western governments—the same states that are pushing countries like Kyrgyzstan to guarantee human rights—are themselves vulnerable to the autocratic leanings of their leaders and to the illiberal sentiments within their societies.   Kyrgyzstan’s great fortune, and its curse, is that no single party, no one force, has an uncontested upper hand in Kyrgyz politics. While it may seem that Japarov today is ascendent, past Kyrgyz presidents similarly received overwhelming waves of popular support only to be chased out of the country by angry protesters several years later. The political scientist Dankwart Rustow argued that what was necessary for democracy was not consensus, but rather, a “hot family feud.”[20] This Kyrgyzstan has in abundance. Rustow also cautioned, however, “many things can go wrong” during family feuds. Neither democracy nor human rights are the assured outcome of Kyrgyzstan’s protracted political contestation. Absent the institutionalisation of rule of law and democracy—and here national consensus is necessary—pressure on human rights will continue in Kyrgyzstan.   This essay partly draws on research undertaken as part of the project Russian, Chinese, Militant, and Ideologically Extremist Messaging Effects on United States Favorability Perceptions in Central Asia, funded by the US Department of Defense and the US Army Research Office/Army Research Laboratory under the Minerva Research Initiative, award W911-NF-17-1-0028. The views expressed here are those of the author and should not be attributed to the US Department of Defense or the US Army Research Office/Army Research Laboratory.   Eric McGlinchey is Associate Professor of Politics and Government in George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government. McGlinchey received his PhD from Princeton University and is the author of Chaos, Violence, Dynasty: Politics and Islam in Central Asia (2011). Grants from the Minerva Research Initiative, the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, the International Research & Exchanges Board, the Social Science Research Council, and the US Department of State have funded his research. McGlinchey writes for academic journals, the popular press, and think tanks. You can find Professor McGlinchey's most recent publications through his university website: http://mcglinchey.gmu.edu/.   Image by Paul Schumacher under (CC).   [1] On the enduring influence of Kyrgyz nomadic identity, see: Judith Beyer, Revitalisation, Invention and Continued Existence of the Kyrgyz Aksakal Courts: Listening to Pluralistic Accounts of History, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 38, no. 53–54: 141–76, 2006, https://doi.org/10.1080/07329113.2006.10756601; and Ali Igmen. 2012. Speaking Soviet with an Accent: Culture and Power in Kyrgyzstan. University of Pittsburgh Pre. On the influence of western foreign aid, see: Erica Marat. 2005. Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan before, During and after the March 24 Revolution. Helsinki Monitor 16, no. 4: 267–77. On the role of local organisation to provide public goods, see: Eric McGlinchey. 2011. Chaos, Violence, Dynasty: Politics and Islam in Central Asia. University of Pittsburgh Pre. [2] Emil Nasritdinov, Spiritual Nomadism and Central Asian Tablighi Travelers, Ab Imperio, no. 2: 145–67, 2012, https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2012.0062 [3] Ta-Nehisi Coates. 2015. Between the World and Me. 1st edition. New York: One World; Joanne N. Smith, Making Culture Matter: Symbolic, Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese, Asian Ethnicity 3, no. 2: 153–74, September 2002, https://doi.org/10.1080/14631360220132718 [4] RFE/RL, Understanding The Truth: Chief Investigator Of Deadly Kyrgyz-Uzbek Clashes Reflects 10 Years Later, June 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/chief-investigator-of-deadly-kyrgyz-uzbek-clashes-reflects-10-years-later-osh/30662610.html [5] ReliefWeb, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 - Kyrgyzstan, May 2011, https://reliefweb.int/report/kyrgyzstan/report-independent-international-commission-inquiry-events-southern-kyrgyzstan [6] International Covenant on and Civil and Political Rights, “Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 2231/2012” (United Nations Human Rights Committee, May 11, 2016). [7] For more on the symbolism of the Ak-kalpak, see: Ak-Kalpak Craftsmanship, Traditional Knowledge and Skills in Making and Wearing Kyrgyz Men’s Headwear, Intangible Cultural heritage, UNESCO, https://ich.unesco.org/en/lists [8] Women’s Rights Rally Held in Kyrgyz Capital, BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 2020, https://advance-lexis-com.mutex.gmu.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5YD2-42T1-DYRV-33TC-00000-00&context=1516831 [9] Bermet Ulanova, Miting ‘Kyrk Choro’ i tri ikh glavnikh trebovaniya vlastyam, Kaktus Media, March 2019, https://kaktus.media/doc/388158_miting_kyrk_choro_i_tri_ih_glavnyh_trebovaniia_vlastiam._videotransliaciia.html [10] Ulanova. [11] Pete Baumgartner, Rainbow Rage: Kyrgyz Rail Against LGBT Community After Central Asia’s ‘First’ Gay-Pride March, RFE/RL, March 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/rainbow-rage-kyrgyz-rail-against-lgbt-after-central-asia-s-first-gay-pride-march/29825158.html [12] Anna Lelik, Kyrgyzstan: Anti-LGBT Bill Hits the Buffers, Eurasianet, May 2016, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-anti-lgbt-bill-hits-buffers [13] Katie Arnold, All of Us Will Be Victims at Some Point: Why Bishkek’s Only Gay Club Closed, The Guardian, October 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/oct/19/victims-closure-bishkek-only-lgbt-club-kyrgyzstan [14] State Department Briefing, States News Service, March 2005, https://advance-lexis-com.mutex.gmu.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4G2X-RRT0-00RY-942K-00000-00&context=1516831 [15] State Department Press Briefing April 15; Assistant Secretary Philip Crowley Briefs the Press on a Range of Topics, State Department Documents and Publications, April 2010, https://advance-lexis-com.mutex.gmu.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:7Y81-18R0-Y9R0-J29T-00000-00&context=1516831 [16] United States Announces Funding to Support Upcoming Elections in the Kyrgyz Republic, US Embassy in The Kyrgyz Republic, November 2020, http://kg.usembassy.gov/united-states-announces-funding-to-support-upcoming-elections-in-the-kyrgyz-republic/ [17] EU Aid Explorer - European Commission, https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/; US Foreign Aid by Country, https://explorer.usaid.gov/ [18] Highlights from Central Asian Press, Websites 12 Jan 21, BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, January 2021, https://advance-lexis-com.mutex.gmu.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:61RP-B2W1-JC8S-C51G-00000-00&context=1516831 [19] Aidai Tokoyeva, Ya prizyvayu opponentov obedinit’sya, menshestvo dolzhno podchinit’sya bolshinstvu--Zhaparov, KLOOP.KG - Новости Кыргызстана, January 2021, https://kloop.kg/blog/2021/01/10/ya-prizyvayu-opponentov-obedinitsya-menshinstvo-dolzhno-podchinitsya-bolshinstvu-zhaparov/ [20] D. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, Comparative Politics 2 (1970): 355. [post_title] => The populist and nationalist threat to human rights in Kyrgyzstan [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-populist-and-nationalist-threat-to-human-rights-in-kyrgyzstan [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-28 21:50:04 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-28 20:50:04 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5587 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5585 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-01 00:08:55 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-28 23:08:55 [post_content] => Kyrgyzstan has been nation-building for the last 30 years and it is seen as one of the most politically dynamic post-soviet countries. Kyrgyzstan has an ethnically diverse population, with minorities constituting about 26.3 per cent of the total population.[1] Meanwhile, the country’s recent history shows that political destabilisation effects minorities, who are among the most vulnerable in relation to accessing political power and exercising full citizenship. The current political leadership stands for equality and interethnic harmony. The political platform of the newly elected President Sadyr Japarov, ‘Serving the Future’ (‘Kelechekke Kyzmat’), provides that the citizens of Kyrgyzstan may be of different ethnic roots, but they all share love for Kyrgyzstan and responsibility for its ancient history and faith in its future.[2] The post conflict situation after the tragic June 2010 ethnic conflict in the Southern Kyrgyzstan distanced minorities from political activism. Today, Kyrgyzstan needs to take significant steps on peacebuilding interventions and comprehensive political reform in interethnic relations. The argument goes that it would be inevitable to increase level of minority participation and representation in public life, including in elected positions if Kyrgyzstan endorses 21st century nation-building.   On the eve of October 5th 2020, the world witnessed how allegations of widespread irregularities, during parliamentary elections triggered street protests in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, which eventually ended up storming the main government building, the Parliament, the Jogorku Kenesh, and the President’s administration.[3] The building briefly caught fire before emergency services put out the blaze and debris from inside, including government papers, and office furniture was strewn outside. In addition, on the same day, groups of protesters were able to unlawfully release high-profile political figures from prison. The political crisis created the power vacuum and paralysed the functioning of state institutions, which were not able to observe the constitutional order. Kyrgyzstan's Central Election Commission (CEC) later annulled the results of the elections amid political unrest. On October 9th 2020, the President declared a state of emergency in Bishkek to stabilise the situation. However, the taken measure did not stop protestors pressuring the President to resign. The situation became hot and the political leadership, including President Sooronbay Jeenbekov, the Prime Minister and other top officials, stepped down in order to provide a ‘peaceful transit of the power’ to Sadyr Japarov. Sadyr Japarov, a former parliamentarian who was imprisoned for 11 and a half years and whom was freed on October 6th 2020, assumed power and became the de facto country’s first person. Soon afterwards, the Supreme Court acquitted Japarov in a hasty trial and opened the way for him to become the interim Prime Minister and the country’s acting President.   The events of October 5th were not only about controversial elections results, but were triggered by the incompetent response of the Government to the COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19-related lockdown weakened the county’s social-economic situation and dramatically increased the level of unemployment. As the UN CERD pointed out, the COVID-19 pandemic has been having significant adverse impacts on the enjoyment of human rights, in particular on the right to non-discrimination and to equality.[4] In this regard, COVID-19 remains a potential source of further social tensions, which would also affect interethnic relations in post political crisis Kyrgyzstan.   For Kyrgyzstan this is the third uprising that overthrew ruling presidents in the last 15 years. Both the 2005 and 2010 uprisings also featured political and economic crises, and caused property and power redistributions throughout the country. However, this time the Kyrgyz society managed to build up a tolerance against division. Yet, the sensitive question on ‘who is the true owner of the country?’ has the potential to escalate and endanger public safety and security. For example, Kyrgyzstan’s recent history has been marred by interethnic conflict, predominantly between ethnic Kyrgyz (71.7 per cent of the population) and ethnic Uzbeks (14.3 per cent of the population), with large-scale clashes taking place in June 2010. The causes of these conflicts are complex with their roots in the historical and cultural differences between the two groups, state policies, and actual and perceived socio-economic and political inequality between the two groups.[5] The official State narrative of so-called ‘separatism’ supported by nationalistic political rhetoric has made it easier to paint the ethnic minorities as solely responsible for the June violence, and has given license to law enforcement and security bodies to target them for arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment. As a result, the selective investigations and prosecutions, which have since been conducted, have disproportionately targeted Uzbeks and resulted in few prosecutions of anyone else.[6]   The UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Fernand de Varennes, during his visit to Kyrgyzstan in December 2019 described the interethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan as fragile, in particular the relations between the majority ethnic Kyrgyz and the Uzbek minority following the 2010 events in Osh. The Special Rapporteur identified several factors that could bring the level of interethnic tension to a breaking point, such as the underrepresentation of minorities; the issue of minority languages in education and public service provision; cases of claimed unfair treatment by law enforcement and in the provision of public services; and issues relating to resource management, including water and land.[7]   The legal framework of Kyrgyzstan states that everyone is equal before the law and recognises the need for the adoption of special measures promoting the rights of minority communities to ensure that everyone participates in society on an equal basis with others. However, in reality, national minorities, who make up 26.3 per cent of the population, remain underrepresented in both elected and appointed government positions, particularly Russians and Uzbeks the two largest ethnic minority groups. The participation of minorities in public life in Kyrgyzstan is extremely limited compared to the proportion of these minorities to the total population of the country. Even though the Government of Kyrgyzstan has acknowledged that the legal framework provides electoral quotas for political representation of the different ethnic groups, the objectives of the law are not achieved and all quota requirements not fully enforced.[8] In fact, out of the 120 members of parliament, only ten belonged to a national minority.[9] In addition, national minorities are generally underrepresented in government positions or local administrations. A particularly acute problem is the low rate of representation of ethnic minorities in law enforcement bodies in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan. Representation of ethnic minorities in public life has deteriorated dramatically since June 2010. The lack of programmes to promote the recruitment of national minorities affects their representation in different public bodies, including law enforcement. According to the de Varennes, the “disproportionate presence of minorities, or more accurately the near exclusion of minorities, has been linked in part to a language barrier as one of the main reasons explaining the low representation of minorities in public life.”[10]   Following the events of 2010, the Government adopted the Concept on Strengthening National Unity and Interethnic Relations in 2013, which underlines the commitment of all relevant stakeholders in the country to ensuring everyone’s equal rights and opportunities regardless of ethnicity. The body responsible to implement this Concept and to develop strategies for conflict prevention is the State Agency for Local Self-Government and Interethnic Relations (GAMSUMO), which was created also in 2013. However, there has been some criticism about the efficiency of GAMSUMO and the state concepts on interethnic relations. For example, a number of concerns were expressed in relation to a new concept of citizenship put forward by the Government which may be perceived as being centred around Kyrgyz ethnicity rather than a national citizenship of all members of the country’s population.   In other words, the policy framework focused on creating a national identity that did not explicitly include all ethnicities and may tend to reignite past tensions by symbolically and concretely ‘leaving out’ minorities from that view of the nation, despite their demographic weight.[11] As it was indicated by the UN Special Rapporteur, the state initiatives deals more with awareness-raising activities such as on combating racial discrimination and intolerance, and does not directly address issues such as education in minority languages or the under-representation of minorities in most areas of public life.   The October 4th 2020 parliamentary elections have opened a new page in the sensitive interethnic relations. According to the ODIHR Election Observation ethnic minority candidates actively campaigned in areas where they comprise a substantial part of the population. Fierce competition within the Uzbek minority has caused a lot of anxiety among members of the community and contributed to their sense of insecurity. There were a mass brawl between supporters of leading political parties in the Aravan district of Osh, resulting in the deregistration of two ethnic Uzbek candidates.[12] In a separate development, a criminal investigation has been launched over the alleged vote-buying by two ethnic Uzbek candidates representing a leading party in Jalalabad. Reportedly, their supporters and relatives were subject to pressure by the local authorities and law enforcement bodies to testify against them. Following these incidents, there were cases of hateful rhetoric targeting the Uzbek community on social media.[13]   After October 5th 2020, minorities were frustrated when they were able to secure relatively recognisable seats in Parliament, but the events of October 5th nullified all their efforts, including financial resources. At the same time, the political crisis provided opportunities for some politicians who support nationalistic rhetoric to get access to political power. For example, Kamchybek Tashiev, leader of the nationalistic Mekenchil party, who formerly said: “I should say openly, and let people not be offended, that the head of government should be a pure-blooded Kyrgyz, who will actually be rooting for the interests of the country”, has been appointed as the Head of the State Committee for National Security.[14] In addition, Melis Myrzakhmetov, the former mayor of Osh, returned to Kyrgyzstan after seven years in ‘exile’ and has started actively participating in the country’s political life again.[15]   One of the notable events after October 5th that directly related to interethnic relations was the returning of the column on ‘ethnicity’ in the passports of Kyrgyz citizens. The changes were introduced on October 16th 2020 after the decisions of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court that recognised the absence of the ‘ethnicity’ column in the ID-passport of a citizen as contrary to Article 38 of the Constitution. In 2017, the controversial column on ‘ethnicity’ was removed from the new passports and installed into a special chip of the ID-card. From now, citizens, if they wish, can indicate their nationality in the ID-card. However, it may be argued that accentuating ethnic origin may also serve to undermine people’s sense of belonging to a cohesive and unified nation.   Japarov alongside his presidential campaign made a demonstrative move to initiate new constitutional order and organised the Constitutional Conference, which worked on the draft of the new Constitution even before the referendum on the form of government in the country took place.[16] On January 10th 2021, early presidential elections and a referendum on the form of government were held in Kyrgyzstan. According to the Central Election Commission Japarov received more than 79 per cent of the vote and more than 80 per cent of voters supported a presidential rule. Right after the presidential inauguration, the Constitutional Conference provided its ‘product’ which has drawn criticism from the legal society. For example, compared to the existing Constitution the draft does not state that every person has the right to freely determine his/her ethnicity nor establish a direct prohibition on coercion to determine and indicate his/her ethnicity. The exclusion of these guarantees from the draft Constitution makes it possible to establish at the legislative level the obligation of citizens to indicate their ethnicity, of which certain sanctions may be imposed for non-observance.[17] For example, according to the current legislation, citizens who refuse to provide their biometric data are deprived of the right to vote in elections and referendums. In the long term, such provisions can lay the foundation for increased manifestations of discrimination against ethnic minorities, as well as other violations of human rights and freedoms, which are prohibited by international law Currently, the draft of the Constitution is under scrutiny of deputies who are still holding their mandate. However, it is expected that the final draft, which solidifies presidential power, will pass with only slight changes.   Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan has for three decades tried to establish nation-building through cultural and historical propaganda on praising national heroes through reincarnating from mythic to real, and ancient to contemporary. The current state-building processes and developing national consciousness include the legends of a nation’s ‘great history’ and grand national ideological projects.[18]   For example, the Manas epic, the world’s longest oral narration, is seen as the main for a national ideological framework. However, without development of a common civic identity, multilingual education and respect for diversity and minority rights it will not achieve consolidated and united statehood. In this regards, the calls of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues upon the Government of Kyrgyzstan to adopt a comprehensive anti-discrimination framework that would address all grounds of discrimination, as well as more comprehensive legislation to protect the human rights of minorities become urgent. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur suggested that the existing efforts of the Government of Kyrgyzstan to ensure the effective participation and representation of minorities in public life must be strengthened, including in relation to the operation of quotas in the country’s Parliament. To address the apparently increasingly low levels of employment of minorities in the civil service of the country, including in the police and the judiciary, affirmative action programmes should be in place to increase the hiring of minorities to more closely reflect their proportion in the population. If these measures would take place, there is a high chance that the Kyrgyzstani people will build a strong national identity.   Sardorbek Abdukhalilov is an attorney at-law at Spavediivost Human Rights Organization in Jalal-Abad, Kyrgyzstan. Spravedlivost for its outstanding work in improving the position of national minorities was awarded the OSCE Max van der Stoel Award 2014. Sardorbek has more than 15 years of experience in law with specialisation on Human Rights. Sardorbek is 2018 Fellow of the United Nations OHCHR’s Minorities Fellowship.   Image by Ben Paarmann under (CC).   [1] National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, "Kyrgyzstan" brief statistical handbook, April 2020, http://stat.kg/en/publications/kratkij-statisticheskij-spravochnik-kyrgyzstan/ [2] The political platform "Serving the Future" ("Kelechekke Kyzmat"), https://zhaparov.kg/platforma/ [3] The Associated Press, Violent Protests in Kyrgyzstan Over Results of Election Marred by Vote Buying, The New York Times, October 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/05/world/asia/kyrgyzstan-election-protests.html [4] Statement on the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and its implications under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. [5] Reliefweb, According to the findings of the Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, June 2010 (see para. 228-230), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_490.pdf [6] Ibid. [7] Fernand de Varennes, United Nations Special Rapporteur on minority rights, Visit to Kyrgyzstan, 6-17 December 2019, End of mission statement, OHCHR, December 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25422&LangID=E [8] According to Article 60 of the Constitutional Law “on elections of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic and the deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic ” in making the nomination list of candidates, a political party should take into account the representation of at least 15 per cent of candidates of different ethnic affiliation, with at least five of them to be included in the list of the first 65 candidates: https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/vybory-oktyabr-2020_/constitutional-law-kyrgyz-republic-elections-president-kyrgyz-republic-and-deputies-jogorku-kenesh-kyrgyz-republic/ [9]In the Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh), 91 per cent of members are ethnic Kyrgyz. Russians have three members, Dungans have two members of parliament, whereas Kazakhs, Tatars and Uighur have one member each. While Uzbeks represent more than 14 per cent of the population, only three members of parliament are members of the Uzbek minority: http://kenesh.kg/ru/deputy/list/35 [10]  Fernand de Varennes, End of mission statement  of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Visit to Kyrgyzstan, OHCHR, 6-17 December 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25422&LangID=E [11] Ibid. [12] Bruce Pannier, Brawls And All, Kyrgyz Parliamentary Campaigning Enters The Home Stretch, RFE/RL, September 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-parliament-election-campaigning-analysis/30858185.html [13] ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report, Kyrgyz Republic: Parliamentary Elections 4 October 2020, OSCE, December 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/a/472461.pdf [14] Minority Rights Group International, State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2013 – Kyrgyzstan, refworld, September 2013, https://www.refworld.org/docid/526fb7415.html [15] Melis Myrzakhmetov was mayor of Osh city from 2009 to 2013. He was mayor during the violent 2010 ethnic conflict and he has a genuine following, especially among ethnic Kyrgyz drawn to his nationalistic views. A criminal case was opened against him under the Article «Abuse of official position» of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic. After the start of the criminal prosecution, he fled the republic. In 2015, the Osh City Court, chaired by Sheraly Kamchybekov, found the former head of the southern capital guilty and sentenced him to seven years in prison in absentia. The ex-mayor was put on the wanted list. RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, Former Mayor Of Osh Returns To Kyrgyzstan, Says Country Is In ‘Dangerous Situation’, RFE/RL, October 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/former-mayor-of-osh-returns-to-kyrgyzstan-says-country-is-in-dangerous-situation-/30879647.html [16] Radio Azattyk, Kubanychbek Zholdoshev, Constitutional Conference: Doesn't Wait Until Referendum?, December 2020, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30991457.html [17] Adilet, Analysis of the draft Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, February 2021, https://adilet.kg/tpost/2i09a01nu1-analiz-proekta-konstitutsii-kirgizskoi-r [18] Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, National Ideology and State-building in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 2008 https://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2008_01_SRP_Marat_National-Ideology.pdf [post_title] => Political crisis: Interethnic relations must be protected [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => political-crisis-interethnic-relations-must-be-protected [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-28 21:42:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-28 20:42:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5585 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [22] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5583 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-01 00:07:12 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-28 23:07:12 [post_content] => Following the parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan on October 4th 2020, a coup d'état took place on October 5th as a result of popular discontent with the results of parliamentary elections. There were young political groups and several established politicians from different opposition parties who played an important role in the protests.[1] However, this change of power in Kyrgyzstan has ‘deeper and more structural causes than a mere power struggle’.[2]   Along with many other groups and individuals, supporters of Sadyr Japarov came out in force - the new rulers (Sadyr Japarov, Kamchy Tashiev, Talant Mamytov) being seen as ‘patriots’ by their supporters, and as ‘nationalists’ by many of the ethnic minorities, as well as by smaller more liberal or cosmopolitan elements in the Kyrgyz population. During the course of October 6th when Japarov was released from prison, he managed to be acquitted by the Supreme Court and become Prime Minister, before subsequently becoming acting President. During his 40 days in government, he managed to put his supporters in key positions (The State Committee for National Security, Speaker of Parliament, Prosecutor General and later acting President, after Japarov resigned in order to be a president, etc.).   However, instead of holding new parliamentary elections, Japarov pushed for parliament to decide on presidential elections and a referendum on the form of government.[3] He also initiated the drafting of a new constitution of the republic and established a council to draft the constitution. These actions divided society into two camps.[4] Throughout these political dramas and subsequent discussions about the political situation in Kyrgyzstan, the situation of ethnic minorities was largely ignored.   There is a paradox in current Kyrgyz politics: Why is Japarov popular despite his complete disregard for the rule of law and the constitution? As I mentioned in previous research, the popularity of Japarov among the Kyrgyz citizens is that of a ‘native son’ (өz bala).[5] He is seen as a ‘simple man’ with several hats, who seeks authoritarian power, but promotes his legitimacy as national leader through his perceived personal suffering (his imprisonment) and his successful use of kinship, familiarity with Kyrgyzstan’s criminal elements, apparent commitment to ending corruption, ‘native son’ status, ritual symbols and genealogy - values that many ordinary people identify with.[6] This essay puts forward an analysis of the situation of ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan and provides their views based on my previous research as well as recent follow-up interviews via telephone. The essay discusses the interethnic patronage networks of Kyrgyz state authorities and Uzbek businessmen and seeks to understand their vision of the future.   Ethnic minorities and business Ethnic Kyrgyz comprise 72 per cent of the population in Kyrgyzstan. The largest minority are the Uzbeks, comprising 14.6 per cent of the population, concentrated mainly in southern Kyrgyzstan near the border with Uzbekistan. More specifically, they are located mainly in the city of Osh and around Osh and Zhalal-Abad provinces in the Fergana Valley. Kyrgyz and Uzbeks reside in roughly equal proportions in southern Kyrgyzstan. For example, in 2009 the population of Osh city (total 258,000) was almost equally divided between Uzbeks (48 per cent) and Kyrgyz (43 per cent), while other ethnic groups made up the remaining nine per cent.[7]   Historically, the two ethnic groups have lived side by side, in constant contact with each other through a state-business ‘symbiosis’.[8] More specifically, Uzbeks have dominated business activities – trading in the bazaar, working as shopkeepers, café owners and drivers – while Kyrgyz have tended to occupy local government structures.[9] However, the conflict of 2010 drastically changed and destroyed this symbiosis, and with it threatened the Uzbek business sector.   The conflict between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz that erupted in the city of Osh in the summer of 2010 was the worst the region had seen in years. On June 10th 2010 intercommunal clashes erupted as a result of political crisis in the country. Nationalism intensified in the country after the summer’s deadly clashes, and a decade later a common discourse promotes Kyrgyzstan as ‘the land of Kyrgyz and the rest, i.e. the ethnic minorities, are guests’. This remains a strongly held view not only among the youth, but also among the older generation in the South.[10] There is greater poverty in the south. Aspects of nationalisation, ethnic strife, and migration contributed to or created a sense of the Uzbeks being an ethnic minority, and have clearly sharpened the divisions between communities.   Many Uzbeks face a number of challenges on a daily basis. The main difficulties affect the economically active, who suffer constant pressure and intimidation from the state authorities and criminals alike. As a result, businesspeople have resorted to finding different kinds of creative strategies to keep their businesses secure. Measures include moving trading from the bazaar to the mahallas (neighbourhoods), using mobile phones for taking passenger bookings from the bus station and the airport, and avoiding selling to, or serving, potentially ‘suspicious’ clients. Uzbeks do not openly avoid developing businesses within their economic niches; rather they have tried to turn their existing niches into safer places by using practices that are not visible to the Kyrgyz community, and in this manner, safeguarding their businesses. Some businesses have been turned into ‘safe’ social projects, such as a school, hospital and madrasa. They have created ethnically exclusive zones as well as developed public services that are less likely to be targeted out of distrust.   Respondents to my research also try to use avoidance and concealment of businesses and identities, as well as using video cameras and social networks to evade contact with criminal networks. These securityscapes have developed as a reaction to different ‘anticipations’: the realities are experienced as physical violence, harassment and the seizure of Uzbek businesses.[11] According to von Boemcken et al. “securityscapes can be understood as ‘imagined worlds’ of security and insecurity that goad and structure the lives of people as they go about their daily business.”[12] Thus, securityscapes are based on inter-subjectively enacted social practices and emphasise the individual agency of actors in seeking security – which is especially evident if these actors do not and cannot rely on state authorities. Below I would like to discuss three cases to show how people experience and create securityscapes: 1) Against Suyun Omurzakov’s network; 2) against corruption and the system of ‘dolya’ (share, cut); and 3) balance between ‘low’ nationalism and ‘high’ nationalism.   Searching for security I: Against Suyun Omurzakov’s network Police Major General Suyun Omurzakov, First Deputy Minister of Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic is the owner of several sport clubs in Osh, where local sportsmen train. He has a low respect and prestige among local businessmen in Osh even though he enjoys higher authority in the law enforcement agencies.   On September 12th 2018, Radio Azattyk's journalists conducted an investigation into crimes in which sportsmen from Suyun Omurzakov’s club were implicated. They also investigated the Omurzakov family. They reported that Ulukbek Omurzakov, an employee of the Osh regional prosecutor’s office, and brother of Suyun Omurzakov, was involved.[13]   This was supported by the findings of another investigative report entitled ‘Are Omurzakov's sportsmen enjoying immunity in Osh?’ that confirmed that local businessmen complained about the Omurzakovs’ extortion rackets in Osh.[14] It was reported that after the events were publicised, Ulukbek Omurzakov threatened the businessmen and tried to force them to withdraw their statements. When this failed a criminal case was opened against the businessmen to silence them.[15]   In November 2020, officers of the State Committee for National Security detained Ulukbek Omurzakov in Osh. He was suspected of organising a raid on the coal mining company Zhol-Chirak. Together with the prosecutor, the law enforcers also detained four people from the Mukhammed-Umar sports club who it is reported were found to have ‘seized special equipment, illegally mined and sold more than 82 million soms worth of coal without making the appropriate tax and social payments.’[16] During a meeting with Japarov, local residents revealed that the Omurzakov family had ‘taken over’ the entire southern capital.[17]   In a zoom interview, Aftandil, a local resident, claimed that Omurzakov was linked to President Jeenbekov: “Jeenbekov and Omurzakov belong to the same ‘mafia’, because both come from the Kara-Kulja district. Omurzakov is a millionaire, so he used to share his ‘dolya’ (profit) with Jeenbekov's Kara-Kulja fund. They are related and Jeenbekov has protected Omurzakov all these years.”   One of the owners of an Uzbek restaurant, Muhammed, told me on the phone that Suyun Omurzakov has been extorting money from the businessmen. “I was threatened by sportsmen and militia because they asked me to sell my restaurant in the city center [to them].” In his view, “Sadyr has ‘courage’ and is not afraid of Omurzakov (i.e. as proof, Uluk Omurzakov was imprisoned).” He comments, “it is acceptable if Sadyr is illiterate, even if he does not know Russian, even if he is a bandit, because he displayed strong courage (‘dukh’). Entrepreneurs just need stability in the government. The criminals are being arrested. Order seems to be coming here. But we have to see how things will go further.”   The arrest of Suyun Omurzakov's younger brother was seen as a sign of strength and stimulated early confidence in Japarov for many Uzbeks. Locals say that for the safety of the restaurant owners, the arrest was a sign that he could take on Omurzakov’s network. However, things got more complicated later on because Suyun Omurzakov worked hard during the presidential elections to get more votes from the south by mobilising his people in an attempt to save his younger brother from prison.   On January 30th 2021, right after Japarov’s inauguration, Ulukbek Omurzakov was released. A decision was made to release him under house arrest by the Bishkek Pervomaiskiy District Court and it was agreed that Omurzakov should pay 20 million som to the state budget according to his lawyer, Ikramidin Aitkulov.[18]   Another Uzbek respondent confirmed this saying, “See! Jeenbekov was neither meat nor fish; he did not have ‘dukh’ (courage). He did not even say anything to Matraimov [the notorious corrupt customs official]. Instead, Japarov said ‘kusturam’ [‘vomit’, i.e., cough up the extorted money], and he forced Matraimov to bring two billion som. Now Uluk has paid 20 million som to the government.” Whether there has been some negotiation here between Suyun Omurzakov and Japarov’s team is still uncertain; it may be that his younger brother was released because Omurzakov proved that he could be loyal to Japarov.   Searching for security II: Against corruption, ‘dolya’ (share) The owner of several cafés, Akbar, supported and voted for Japarov because Japarov said that he would fight corruption, in particular he said that he would eliminate the system of ‘dolya’ (the practice by which shares of business profits are given to corrupt state authorities as well as to criminal groups). Akbar also said that Japarov had been in prison and had experienced injustice through his skin (jon terisi menen otkorgon) and (understood) the difficulties of life. Considering the situation of the Uzbek businessmen, Akbar further commented, “we have to follow what the Government says to protect our business. We would not go against the Government.”   When I asked the question as to whether there had been any changes since Japarov’s presidency, Akbar responded positively. According to him, “The younger brother of Kadyr Aliev [pseudonym], one of the important state authorities in Osh, used to be the head of police of Oron [pseudonym]district. He used to collect ‘dolya’ even from sunflower seed (semechki) sellers. [i.e. from small traders such as car washing services, small garages, food services, catering, shops, etc]. When Aliev’s younger brother first came to power, he would invite each businessman into his office (at the request of the precinct officer) and openly tell them that they should share their profits (dolya suragan) as a way to ‘congratulate him on his new position’ (kuttuktap).”   Akbar gave him 2,000 som, saying that he only had that amount of money to give. The businessmen were also required to provide their telephone numbers. Depending on Aliev’s brother’s needs, they would then be called. For example, Albek Ormonov would demand two kilos of meat regularly, and once a month he would order ash (pilaf) for six to seven friends from the restaurateur gratis. Other precinct officers would also come and order the café owners to provide them with catering services. This official would threaten not only local businessmen, but even state officials, saying “I heard you won the tender, where is my share (dolya)? Fortunately, this person has now been fired, and the current new appointee seems to be a trustworthy state official (taza bala eken).”   Another businessman, Alisher, talked about the complexities of the electricity grid: "I have electric service limited to 20 kilowatts for my restaurant, for which I paid 120,000 som, but in winter usage goes beyond 20 kilowatts because I need to heat the premises and have other additional needs. In summer, I have to cool ice cream and other products. So in winter or summer we exceed usage of 20 kilowatts and an electricity inspector immediately comes to me and asks for additional money (dolya). The electricity inspector gives me the option of either paying the full fine to the government or half the fine to him. Of course, I choose to pay half the fine to the inspector.”   Apparently, it is not possible to obtain a 30 or 40 kilowatts supply; if it were available the state authorities would lose the chance to extract their dolya. Instead, they allow only 20 kilowatts and the inspectors ‘deal’ with the violations in their own ways. For a supply of over 30 kilowatts, the state requires the restaurant owner to get a transformer, which would cost 500,000 som. In addition, one also needs to get permissions from an architect, a technical inspector, the village head and finally the public's consent. It is not easy to get a transformer, so the businessmen have to stay within the 20 kilowatts permitted usage and pay for additional supplies used with dolya.   Another Uzbek respondent told me that the police are considered locally to be even more arrogant (nahalnyi) than criminals, and do not understand the situation of businesspeople. Criminals impose stricter controls than the official laws. According to the respondent you can ‘buy off’ the police, but it is very difficult to ‘buy off’ criminals. Uzbek businessmen have to give ‘dolya’ for the street boys/criminal networks (köchö baldar) and collect ‘grev’ (a remittance or a package sent to a prisoner) for convicts, especially for the ‘bratva’ (criminal leaders). Businessmen donate a small amount of money (for food, cigarettes, soap) to the prisoners. The state budget has very limited funds for prisoners. Apparently, the names of all cafés and restaurants are acknowledged by prisoners, in a practice known as otmetka. Business people describe criminals as less shameless (oni ne naglye) and say they understand that if their business is not doing well that they might have to wait a while for payment.   Three of my respondents told me that the ‘nahalyni’ police had not come to them recently, which is already good news. Nevertheless, we will have to wait and see how things develop - at the moment there is a change of power. This period is called a ‘waiting state’ (sostojina ojidanija) by many businesspeople.   Searching for security III: Balance between ‘low’ nationalism and ‘high’ nationalism Japarov's main opponent was a southerner, Madumarov, who is known as a ‘ethnic’ nationalist because of his advocacy against the Uzbek mass media when he was the first Secretary of State.[19] Madumarov got ten per cent of the vote in Osh oblast, whereas Japarov got 82 per cent, so Madumarov was a distant second.[20] However, he is also considered a nationalist by more than just ethnic minority groups. He is still remembered by many representatives of ethnic minorities for his divisive statement of 2007 (made when he was the State Secretary of Kyrgyzstan) when he opined that "Kyrgyzstan is indeed our common home, but other nations here are tenants".[21]   Most ethnic minorities habitually vote for a northern presidential candidate or party whose leader is a northerner. As such, every Kyrgyz politician tries to win votes from ethnic minorities, particularly Uzbeks. During the elections, Kyrgyz politicians used to win the support of ethnic minorities by recruiting influential people of non-titular ethnicity to their electoral teams. According to Ilias, another Uzbek businessman, Japarov has 'dukh' (courage, in Kyrgyz as “erki bar eken”) and is from the north of Kyrgyzstan. “Since Soviet times, we have supported someone from the north”, says one of my respondents. Furthermore, Ilias says “It is easy to deal with state authorities from the north. Northerners, unlike southerners, have very little nationalist thinking. They can also openly protest against criminals. Because of this trust and sympathy, the Southern Uzbeks prefer the Northern Kyrgyz authorities because they have not forgotten the conflicts in Osh of 2010 when the Uzbek community was targeted.”[22] It is important to see distinction between Japarov’s economic populism and cultural conservativism/nationalism, which differs from a more ethnic nationalist like Madumarov.   A strategy was officially adopted to form a civil identity of ‘Kyrgyzstani’ in 2013, not based on ethnicity. Later, on the basis of this decision, the column indicating a citizen's ethnicity in the national passport was abolished. However, after Japarov came to power, he re-introduced this field by decree in response to a Supreme Court decision based on the current constitution. The ‘ethnicity’ column will again appear in the passports of Kyrgyz citizens. This began to worry ethnic minorities, particularly the Uzbeks who were particularly affected by the June 2010 events. Yet, the indication of ethnicity is voluntary, so they should not have to declare it if they do not want to.[23]   Concluding remarks To understand why people support Japarov despite his violations of the rule of law, it is important to look at the security strategies of Uzbek businessmen. They have put their trust in someone who is a ‘controversial’ figure, but who also is perceived as having personally experienced the injustice of the law, and is able to show his strength against other strong ‘mafia’ networks. The boundaries of state, business, and criminal have been blurred in the context of Kyrgyzstan.[24] Despite this, we see how many ordinary people want an end to the absurd levels of corruption. Sadly, however, it is quite difficult to avoid having police and others with power trying to extract bribes and dolya in the current environment. [25] As the above examples show, the police, judges and prosecutors are highly corrupt, as the process of reforming law enforcement agencies has consistently failed to meet the expectations of donor organisations and members of civil society due to existing authoritarian political regimes and weak local governance.[26]   People's personalities and difficulties tend to coincide with the head of the potential state power they want. People are attracted to politicians who reflect their values. In the case of Japarov, people began to identify with him due to shared experiences, ‘dukh’ (courage), and his identity as a ‘northerner with ‘low’ nationalist ideals’. All these aspects contributed to people’s mobilisation.   In times when the rule of law does not work and people are tired of judiciary injustice and do not trust the state anymore, they start supporting ‘controversial’ figures, such as Japarov, despite his violations of the rule of law, as the ways to search for justice and hope for change. At the same time, businessmen describe their situation as the ‘waiting state’, by claiming that we will see how things will develop.   Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova is a research fellow at the Leibniz-Zentrum-Moderner Orient (ZMO). Her research work focuses on kinship, ethnicity, patronage, conflict and gender in Kyrgyzstan. Her monograph Blood Ties and the Native Son: Poetics of Patronage in Kyrgyzstan was published by Indiana University Press in 2017.   Image by Andrea Kirkby under (CC).   [1] Aksana Ismailbekova, Intergenerational Conflict at the Core of Kyrgyzstan’s Turmoil, The Diplomat, October 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/intergenerational-conflict-at-the-core-of-kyrgyzstans-turmoil/ [2] Azamat Temirkulov, Kyrgyzskaya mechta i chudo Sadyra Zhaparova, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Central Asia, Medium, January 2021, https://rosaluxca.medium.com/ [3] Mahabat Sadyrbek, Präsidentschaftswahl und Referendum in Kirgistan. Zwei Schritte zurück im kirgisischen »Demokratie-Experiment«?, Zentralasien-Analysen, 145, January 2021, https://laender-analysen.de/zentralasien-analysen/145/praesidentschaftswahl-und-referendum-in-kirgistan-zwei-schritte-zurueck-im-kirgisischen-demokratie-experiment/ [4] Gulzat Baialieva and Joldon Kutmanaliev, How Kyrgyz social media backed an imprisoned politician’s meteoric rise to power, openDemocracy, October 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/how-kyrgyz-social-media-backed-animprisoned-politicians-meteoric-rise-to-power/ [5] Ismailbekova, Aksana. 2017. Blood Ties and the Native Son: Poetics of Patronage in Kyrgyzstan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [6] Aksana Ismailbekova, Native son: the rise of Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov, openDemocracy, January 2021, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/native-son-the-rise-of-sadyr-japarov-kyrgyzstan/ [7] NSC, 2009. Population and Housing Census of the Kyrgyz Republic of 2009. Book 1. National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek. [8] Liu, Morgan. 2012. Under Solomon’s Throne. Uzbek Visions of Renewal in Osh. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; Megoran, Nick. 2013. Shared Space, Divided Space: Narrating Ethnic Histories of Osh. Environment and Planning A 45(4), pp. 892–907. [9] Ibid. [10] Sergei Abashin, Natsionalnoe stroitelstvo v Kyrgzystane i problema uzbekskogo menshin-stva, Fergana News, March 2012, http://www.fergananews.com/article.php?id=7126 [11] Ismailbekova, Aksana. 2018. Secure and Insecure Spaces for Uzbek Businesspeople in Southern Kyrgyzstan. IQAS Vol. 49 / 2018 1–2, pp. 41–60. [12] Marc Von Boemcken, Conrad Schetter, Hafiz Boboyorov, Nina Bagdasarova, and Joomart Sulaimanov, Local Security-Making in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Production of Securityscapes by Everyday Practices, BICC Working Paper 5/2016, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), May 2016, https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/working_paper5-1_01.pdf [13] Ydyrs Isakov, Bandytskyi Osh, Radio Azattyk, September 2018, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/29491208.html#player-set-time=4.259495 [14] Ernist Nurmatov, Sportsmeny Omurzakova pol'zuyutsya neprikosnovennost'yu v Oshe?, Radio Azattyk, July 2016, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/27881112.html [15] Ibid. [16] Elgezit, Zaderjan prokuror Uluk Omurzakov — brat zamglavı MVD Suyunbeka Omurzakova, November 2020, https://elgezit.kg/2020/11/12/zaderzhan-prokuror-ulukbek-omurzakov/ [17] Today.kg, Advokat schitayet bezosnovatel'nym soderzhaniye v SIZO Ulukbeka Omurzakova, January 2021, https://today.kg/news/411336/ [18] Radio Azattyk, Zaderzhannyy po podozreniyu v reyderstve prokuror Omurzakov vyshel na svobodu, RFE/RL, January 2021, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/zaderzhannyy-po-podozreniyu-v-reyderstve-prokuror-omurzakov-vyshel-na-svobodu/31078504.html; Sputnik.kg Vyplatil 20 mln — brata zamglavy MVD KR otpustili pod domashniy arrest, February 2021 https://m.ru.sputnik.kg/society/20210201/1051299107/ulukbek-omurzakov-domashnij-arest.html?mobile_return=no [19] Interview with my informant in Osh, Zoom, 07.02.2021 [20] President, Referendum 2021, Itogovye dannye ZIK posle ruchnogo podscheta, AKI Press, https://akipress.org/elections/president2021/?hl=ru#region-2 [21] Erica Marat, Kyrgyzstan: perspektivy pluralizma, Global Centre for Pluralism, November 2017, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ericamarat_prospectsforpluralism_RU.pdf [22] Aksana Ismailbekova and Philipp Lottholz, The Conflict in South Kyrgyzstan Ten Years on: Perspectives, Consequences, Actions, Central Asia Program, July 2020, https://centralasiaprogram.org/archives/16380?fbclid=IwAR2UZqrzfKRXotQtGjgpKWxbQHnhdkoy79xxd7vg-4l2RxWVg6t3di3J774 [23] 24.kg, V pasportakh kyrgyzstantsev vnov' poyavitsya grafa «natsional'nost'», October 2020, https://24.kg/vlast/169312_vpasportah_kyirgyizstantsev_vnov_poyavitsya_grafa_natsionalnost/ [24] Erica Marat, The State-Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organized Crime, and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, October 2006, https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2006_marat_the-state-crime-nexus-in-central-asia.pdf [25] I would like to thank Nathan Light for this comment during the Roundtable "Society and Politics in the 2019-2020 Elections and Constitutional Revisions in Kyrgyzstan" Organised by Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies (IRES),  February 2021. [26] Erica Marat, OSCE Police Reform Programmes in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: Past Constraints and Future Opportunities, EUCAM, October 2012, https://eucentralasia.eu/2012/10/osce-police-reform-programmes-in-kyrgyzstan-and-tajikistan-past-constraints-and-future-opportunities/; more about The Politics of Police Reform of Erica Marat, can be found here: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/book-talk-the-politics-police-reform [post_title] => A new big boss? Interethnic patronage networks in Kyrgyzstan [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => a-new-big-boss-interethnic-patronage-networks-in-kyrgyzstan [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-28 21:36:02 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-28 20:36:02 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5583 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 1 [filter] => raw ) [23] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5578 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-01 00:06:47 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-28 23:06:47 [post_content] => COVID-19’s impact on the global community revealed many inefficiencies in how the countries responded to the spread of the pandemic across borders. While some states have achieved promising results, others have struggled with response measures due to healthcare capacity limitations. In certain cases, capacity is not the only concern which contributed to the public health crisis. Kyrgyzstan is one of the examples where the country's corruption record has exacerbated the Kyrgyz Government’s response measures to contain COVID-19. The Central Asian nation's corruption perception index in 2019 was scored 30 out 100 by global watchdog Transparency International, finding itself next to the countries, such as Djibouti, Ukraine and Azerbaijan, that have similar records.[1]   Widespread corruption in the state institutions, including healthcare, is one of the primary triggers of political instability in Kyrgyzstan, where governments have been overthrown on three occasions since 2005.[2] Conceivably, the Kyrgyz Government has come under criticism during the COVID-19 crisis for a lack of transparency and oversight of the donations, ‘grants and loans’ from its own citizens and international organisations, including IMF, ADB, KfW, AIIB, IDB, WB and the EU.[3] Meanwhile, Amnesty International lambasted the country's authorities for forcing medics to work long hours during the pandemic without extra pay for service in "prison-like" conditions.[4]   However, a dysfunctional healthcare is only one of the primary worries in the country, which was outlined by the USAID funded International Republican Institute's nationwide poll in Kyrgyzstan's seven regions and two largest cities ahead of the controversial parliamentary election on October 4th 2020.[5] The Kyrgyz Government's response to COVID-19, corruption and healthcare were named as the most important problems in the nation, according to a survey.[6] Endemic corruption was also addressed by the World Health Organization's (WHO) report on Kyrgyzstan's two decades-long health financing reform, pointing out as recently as 2019 the "conflict of interest" tendencies among state officials including the country's presidential administration.[7] WHO's recommendations to the Kyrgyz authorities stated:   "Where it is not possible to avoid having some members with a conflict of interest, clear policies on declaration and recording of conflicts at council/committee meetings, and procedural rules for handling situations of conflict of interest (e.g. recusal rules from some discussions and decisions), should be developed and adopted by the appropriate ministries."[8]   Despite consistent guidance from international organisations, the Kyrgyz Government failed to sustain transparency policy when spending $645 million on COVID-19 emergency response during the pandemic in 2020. The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) platform scrutinised the country's accountability mechanism which has "offering no detailed information on where the funds" were going.[9] The OCCRP report indicated that the Kyrgyz authorities "did not have the resources to track down the spending". Similarly, cases of corruption in rural medical clinics and hospitals highlight a deeply entrenched culture of bribery and impunity. In one such case, medics and personnel of the southern Leilek district hospital in Batken region were appealing to the country's former president and chief prosecutor in the middle of the COVID-19 public health emergency for assistance with addressing burgeoning corruption at the hospital.[10] Protesting medics complained that the hospital director "turned work in the hospital into a business. He opens extra vacancies and hires freelancers. Everyone who gets a job gives from 10,000 to 20,000 soms ($120-$230) to the head nurse of the hospital... Some people say that they gave the money personally to the director".   Likewise, the country's former Minister of Health, Kosmosbek Cholponabyev, was arrested and taken into custody in September 2020 for abuse of power while in office and organising a corruption scheme, which inflicted financial "damage to the state budget in the amount of nearly nine million soms" ($106,000).[11] Previously, the Security Council of Kyrgyzstan stated that there are eight corruption risks in the national Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF) relating to the transfer, redistribution of compulsory health insurance funds and collusion with pharmaceutical companies.[12]   The World Bank's assessment of the Kyrgyz primary healthcare improvement programme indicated that MHIF is a "single purchaser of health services" in the country "managing 80% of the domestic public financing for health, contracting with 261 health institutions and providing health care services at all levels."[13]   Source: Primary Health Care Quality Improvement Programme, World Bank, 2017   Kyrgyz media repeatedly raised the subject of corruption incidences in the MHIF, which is ultimately a result of its twisted legislative foundation.[14] MHIF is the single payer institution in the country’s health sector with “responsibility for pooling health funds and purchasing health services” under the law "On health insurance of citizens in the Kyrgyz Republic" and regulation on the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic.[15] In addition to having a defective legal base, MHIF conducts its own internal audit of expenditure and it is in charge of "supplying, distributing, storing, purchasing goods and services, and financing healthcare organisations". Essentially, corruption risks in MHIF are consorted with a lack of clear regulations and weak oversight. WHO's Regional Office for Europe working report in 2018 stated that “external assessment and inspection by the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund and by the Medical Accreditation Commission exercise central control but provide little support for organisational development, benchmarking, improving performance or public accountability”.[16] WHO’s regional office also shared similar concerns regarding the country's "governance, monitoring and inspection of public-sector healthcare organisations" that are "fragmented, weak and ineffective".[17]   However, a bribery case involving MHIF officials in January 2020 reignited public debate when one of its top department employees was arrested for extorting a 143,000-som ($1,686) bribe in the nation's capital Bishkek.[18]   Source: Public Opinion Poll Residents of Kyrgyzstan, IRI, 6-15 August 2020   Subsequently, Kyrgyz journalists from the investigative group ‘PolitKlinika’ online publication released in early July 2020 their investigation into public procurement involving the country's health authorities in February 2020 prior to the COVID-19 crisis. The report revealed that the prices for personal protective equipment (PPE) and medical masks were over inflated and excessive for certain items.[19] For example, protective suits with a market price tag of 2,000 soms ($23) per unit in Bishkek city were purchased for 6,000 soms ($70) per suit. The same for respiratory masks that were purchased for 300-400 soms ($3.5-$4.7) per item when the local market prices for the very same masks ranged from 30 to 150 soms ($0.3-$1.7). Public outrage resulted in a criminal investigation launched on July 10th by the country's Financial Police on former Kyrgyz president's directive to probe health officials responsible for a corrupt procurement scheme.[20]   Whether PPE and medical masks were properly distributed during the initial COVID-19 crisis in the country's poorly funded hospitals and clinics remains debatable after a public scandal in the Bishkek city hospital following personnel complaints regarding PPE shortage.[21] Similarly, ADB and UNDP assessments on the impacts of COVID-19 stated that by "29 June 2020, 783 Kyrgyz Republic health workers had been diagnosed with COVID-19 (15% of all confirmed cases in the country to this date). This very high proportion raises questions about the supply of personal protective equipment (PPE) for health professionals and highlights the need for additional training of health workers on infection prevention and control. Part of the aid received by the government might need to be channelled towards establishing sufficient domestic stores and/or production of affordable yet high-quality PPE."[22]   Concurrently, the Ministry of Health and the local authorities were scrutinised by the country's Interim officials after a change of government following the political crisis in October 2020.[23] Deputy Prime Minister Elvira Surabaldieva criticised the lack of transparency for medical and humanitarian aid that was donated to the country during the initial COVID-19 emergency. Simultaneously, a lack of adequate supply of PPE and medical masks steered complaints from the outspoken Kyrgyz health workers who took their criticism of authorities online, sharing their struggle experiences and frustrations on social media.[24] In one instance, a young medic wrote on his Twitter account: "The media write that doctors are provided with personal protective equipment. In fact, I was given a mask with holes on my duty today that is unlikely to protect me from being infected with coronavirus. And then they wonder why doctors are infected with COVID-19.”[25]    However, the outspoken medic later complained he was reprimanded for posting a message online and deleted his Twitter account. His next public appearance was shown on the country's TV network when he apologised for spreading false information earlier. The International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) regional watchdog later concluded that the Kyrgyz State Committee on National Security was detaining whistle blowers to "hold ‘preventive’ discussions with them, threatened them with criminal prosecution and released them after they publicly ‘apologised’ and ‘repented’. Many of those targeted were accused of disseminating incorrect information about the spread of COVID-19 in different parts of Kyrgyzstan, while some were medical professionals who had highlighted problems relating to the pandemic (such as the lack of means of protection) at hospitals or other health care facilities."[26]   Source: Public Opinion Poll Residents of Kyrgyzstan, IRI, 6-15 August 2020   The Kyrgyz Government’s response to COVID-19 pandemic left the majority of the country’s poverty-stricken nation dissatisfied with nearly 70 per cent of the population expressing disapproval of how the Kyrgyz authorities handled the public health crisis, according to an IRI poll. It appears that public tension in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis was not in favour of the now overthrown government of former President Sooronbay Jeenbekov who was also ultimately toppled following a controversial parliamentary election on October 4th. The latest political disturbances in Kyrgyzstan are increasingly indicative of the urgent need for healthcare reform based on realistic goals rather than status quo. Kyrgyz public health professionals believe that endemic corruption in the country's ailing healthcare is not the only issue. Dr. Rakhman Toichuev of the National Academy of Science told the author that a lack of competent officials in the Ministry of Health and the imperfect legislative basis for the health system are perhaps the most significant concerns.   However, the healthcare crisis amid the first and second waves of COVID-19 sparked a fresh round of public debates in the country regarding reform of the health services. There are various views as to how to move forward from corruption-prone and stagnant healthcare to transparent and efficient service provider. Kyrgyz health officials and lawmakers seem to favour integration of MHIF and Ministry of Health after the Interim government announced a sweeping reform of the state bodies.[27] Contrarily, experts disagree that such intermediary steps will bring results thus leading to negative outcomes since the country scores poorly on reforms overall. Bermet Baryktabasova, an expert on evidence-based medicine, argues that “everyone works as much as the level of development of the country as a whole allows. One cannot expect ideal work from the Ministry of Health, the MHIF, when the work of all other state bodies, the government, and so on is imperfect.” [28]   The latest ADB and UNDP policy study paper in response to the COVID-19 crisis recommended the Kyrgyz authorities “reduce or abolish financial contribution (e.g., co-payments) and administrative barriers (e.g., requirements concerning proof of residence, legal identification, etc.) to quality health services; and invest in mobile solutions and digitalisation” which would contribute to more transparency in healthcare.[29] Global development groups also advised the country’s Government to “strengthen health information systems with emphasis on mapping essential service lists against resource requirements and available budgets; mapping public and private pharmacies and suppliers, identifying regional and spatial disparities (including informal peri-urban settlements); and strengthening inventory and procurement management.”[30]   Certainly, it is true that Kyrgyzstan has not done more to improve standards of living for the country's poverty-stricken population since gaining independence in 1991, let alone eradicating deeply entrenched bribery and corruption in the Government including healthcare. It has been widely known among domestic healthcare experts that corruption risks occur in the system of procurement, namely in the procurement of PCR tests, in laboratories and the procurement of PPE and other medical drugs.[31] Critics argue that a lack of control over purchases paves way for corruption. Therefore, addressing these concerns must be on the Kyrgyz Government’s priority list for improvement-oriented goals in healthcare. However, it is unlikely that the country's healthcare will have drastic changes in the nearest terms due to unresolved structured issues within the Kyrgyz state.   Ryskeldi Satke is a regional editor for Central Asia at the Third Pole multilingual web platform. Follow him on Twitter @RyskeldiSatke.   Image by Official website of Bishkek City Hall.   [1] Anti-Corruption Research Center Transparency International Kyrgyzstan, Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kyrgyzstan [2] Another revolution in Kyrgyzstan?, European Parliament, October 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2020/659300/EPRS_ATA(2020)659300_EN.pdf [3] Alexandra Li, No Transparency in Kyrgyzstan’s Coronavirus Spending, OCCRP, June 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/coronavirus/no-transparency-in-kyrgyzstans-coronavirus-spending; Olga Ruslanova, How Much Will COVID-19 Cost for Kyrgyzstan?, CABAR, June 2020, https://cabar.asia/en/how-much-will-covid-19-cost-for-kyrgyzstan [4] Kyrgyzstan: Medics suffer rights violations, pay high personal price during COVID-19 pandemic, Amnesty International, September 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/kyrgyzstan-medics-suffer-rights-violations-pay-high-personal-price-during-covid19-pandemic/ [5] Kyrgyzstan Poll Suggests High Voter Intent Ahead of Parliamentary Elections, IRI, September 2020, https://www.iri.org/resource/kyrgyzstan-poll-suggests-high-voter-intent-ahead-parliamentary-elections [6] Ibid. [7] WHO – Regional Office for Europe, Governance of health financing and strategic purchasing of services in Kyrgyzstan, 2019, https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/412654/GHF_SPS_KGZ_-11-09-2019_WEB.pdf [8] Ibid. [9] Alexandra Li, No Transparency in Kyrgyzstan’s Coronavirus Spending, OCCRP, June 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/coronavirus/no-transparency-in-kyrgyzstans-coronavirus-spending [10] Jazgul Masalieva, Medical workers of Leilek complain to President of corruption, 24kg, May 2020, https://24.kg/english/152640_Medical_workers_of_Leilek_complain_to_President_of_corruption/ [11] Aida Dzhumashova, Kosmosbek Cholponbaev placed in pretrial detention center 1 in Bishkek, 24kg, September 2020, https://24.kg/english/165584_Kosmosbek_Cholponbaev_placed_in_pretrial_detention_center_1_in_Bishkek/ [12] President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Security Council Information, http://www.president.kg/ru/apparat_prezidenta/sovety_pri_prezidente/informaciya_soveta_bezopasnosti [13] The World Bank, Technical Assessment: Kyrgyz Republic – Primary Health Care Quality Improvement Program (P167598), http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/278311557237004060/pdf/Final-Technical-Assessment-Primary-Health-Care-Quality-Improvement-Program-P167598.pdf [14] Kaktus Media, 8 corruption risks in the MHIF. Will eradicate, December 2016, https://kaktus.media/doc/348575_8_korrypcionnyh_riskov_v_foms._bydyt_iskoreniat.html [15] Ainura Ibraimova, Baktygul Akkazieva, Aibek Ibraimov, Elina Manzhieva and Bernd Rechel, Kyrgyzstan: Health system review, Health Systems in Transition, Vol. 13 No. 3 2011, European Observatory, https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/142613/e95045.pdf; Law of the Kyrgyz Republic: About health insurance of citizens in the Kyrgyz Republic, Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic, October 1999 No. 112, http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/275?cl=ru-ru; Regulations on the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic, September 2018 No. 420, http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/93506 [16] Quality of care review in Kyrgyzstan, Working document, WHO – Regional Office for Europe, September 2018, https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/383890/kgz-qoc-eng.pdf?ua=1 [17] Kyrgyzstan - Governance of health financing and strategic purchasing of services in Kyrgyzstan (2019), WHO – Regional Office for Europe, https://www.euro.who.int/en/countries/kyrgyzstan/publications/governance-of-health-financing-and-strategic-purchasing-of-services-in-kyrgyzstan-2019 [18] Tatyana Kudreyavtseva, Director of Bishkek branch of CMIF arrested for bribe extortion, 24.kg, January 2020, https://24.kg/english/142116_Director_of_Bishkek_branch_of_CMIF_arrested_for_bribe_extortion/ [19] Making money from coronavirus: A simple mask costs 25 soms, protective clothing costs 6000 soms (Longrid), pk.kg, July 2020, https://pk.kg/news/19017 [20] Kyrgyzstan: fight against COVID-19 could denigrate into a corruption scandal, Acca, July 2020, https://acca.media/en/kyrgyzstan-fight-against-covid-19-could-degenerate-into-a-corruption-scandal/ [21] Guliza Avazova, The head doctor of the hospital No. 1 in Bishkek was fired after the scandal with PPE, Kaktus Media, August 2020, https://kaktus.media/doc/418313_glavvracha_bolnicy_1_v_bishkeke_yvolili_posle_skandala_s_sizami.html [22] COVID-19 in the Kyrgyz Republic: Socioeconomic and Vulnerability Impact Assessment and Policy Response, Institutional Document, ADB, August 2020, https://www.adb.org/documents/covid-19-kyrgyz-republic-socioeconomic-vulnerability-impact [23] Dina Maslova, Elvira Surabaldieva criticised the Ministry of Health and local authorities for reports on humanitarian aid, Kaktus Media, December 2020, https://kaktus.media/doc/427174_elvira_syrabaldieva_raskritikovala_minzdrav_i_mestnye_organy_za_otchety_po_gympomoshi.html [24] Robin Forestier-Walker, Kyrgyzstan gov’t faces backlash over doctor’s ‘forced confession’, Al Jazeera, April 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/videos/2020/4/20/kyrgyzstan-govt-faces-backlash-over-doctors-forced-confession [25] In Kyrgyzstan, medical staff is afraid to complain about poor working conditions, Acca, April 2020, https://acca.media/en/in-kyrgyzstan-medical-staff-is-afraid-to-complain-about-poor-working-conditions/ [26] Human rights impact assessment of the COVID-19 response in Kyrgyzstan, IPHR, July 2020, https://www.iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Covid-19-KYZ-final.pdf [27] Kyrgyzstan plans to cut number of civil servants by 10%, Kabar, November 2020, http://en.kabar.kg/news/kyrgyzstan-plans-to-cut-number-of-civil-servants-by-10/ [28] Maria Orlova, Itching to reform. When you need to measure seven times, 24.kg, November 2020, https://24.kg/obschestvo/173665_zud_reformirovaniya_kogda_nado_sem_raz_otmerit_/ [29] COVID-19 in the Kyrgyz Republic: Socioeconomic and Vulnerability Impact Assessment and Policy Response, ADB, Institutional Document, August 2020, https://www.adb.org/documents/covid-19-kyrgyz-republic-socioeconomic-vulnerability-impact [30] Asian Development Bank, COVID-19 in the Kyrgyz Republic: Socioeconomic and Vulnerability Impact Assessment and Policy Response, August 2020, https://www.adb.org/documents/covid-19-kyrgyz-republic-socioeconomic-vulnerability-impact [31] Marat Uraliev, Bermet Baryktabasova demanded to quickly develop a unified register of distribution of humanitarian aid, Kaktus Media, December 2020, https://kaktus.media/doc/427677_bermet_baryktabasova_potrebovala_bystree_razrabotat_edinyy_reestr_raspredeleniia_gympomoshi.html [post_title] => Corruption in Kyrgyzstan healthcare blamed for disastrous response to COVID-19 [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => corruption-in-kyrgyzstan-healthcare-blamed-for-disastrous-response-to-covid-19 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-28 21:31:44 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-28 20:31:44 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5578 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [24] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5572 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-01 00:05:50 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-28 23:05:50 [post_content] => Fighting corruption ad nauseam For more than a quarter of a century, a number of Kyrgyz politicians have been using democracy as an ideological play to bamboozle and win the support of the West. At the same time, corruption and kleptocracy grew as fast as the promises of democracy by the ruling elite. Despite the fact that accusations of corruption have implicated most of the presidents that have lead the country since its independence, decades of constant fight against corruption have brought no results.   This is despite the fact, that Kyrgyzstan joined a number of international organisations and ratified number of treaties (the UNCAC in 2005, OECD’s Istanbul Anti- Corruption Action Plan, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2007 and joined the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2017), Kyrgyzstan still ranks among the most corrupt states in the world (The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Kyrgyzstan 124 out of the 180 countries as per 2020. Its score is 31 out of 100).[1] The international community has been continuously reassured with promises of democratic change by the Kyrgyz authorities and it has provided and continues to provide loans to fight corruption and provide institutional recommendations, but corruption is still the only constant in Kyrgyzstan.   UMUT 2020, a people's movement against the corrupt political elite, kleptocracy and nepotism, demanded transparency and further evolution of applied democracy in Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 2019. The people's movement stormed the political discourse with a series of investigative videos that launched a powerful, viral effect, succeeding in ‘waking’ the people, despite political repressions that culminated in GKNB surveillance of activists and the unlawful detention of my husband undertaken by the secret police of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. He was consequently held in prison for close to a year in retaliation against the movement’s activism. Based on the case of UMUT 2020’s Matraimov campaign, an analysis of the political processes has localised certain hotspots that have been often overlooked and need to be reckoned with if Kyrgyzstan is to have success at restoration and sustainability of justice.   RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz service (Azattyk), Kloop and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) in May 2019 released an investigative piece divulging a large-scale corruption scheme in Kyrgyzstan that facilitated money-laundering, providing access to a legitimate financial system for dirty money coming out of Kyrgyzstan (Annex 1: ‘The 700-Million Dollar Man’) in May, 2019. UMUT 2020 demanded that the authorities give a legal assessment of the information aired in this joint investigation that exposed allegations of a smuggling ring headed by Matraimov who had covertly overtaken the customs system. Despite the demands for clarification, or for any kind of reaction from our government, the authorities of Kyrgyzstan chose to ignore the demands of the public concerning the Matraimov investigations. Having exhausted all possible and legal ways to appeal to the Government with no results, UMUT 2020 decided to further the campaign by taking part in peaceful protest rallies, which took place in Bishkek in November and December 2019.   Kyrgyz authorities did finally detain Matraimov, an ally of former President Sooronbay Jeenbekov, earlier in October 2020 as part of a corruption investigation, but only after the dramatic events and the fall of President Jeenbekov. He was however released the same day based due to his promises to compensate the state for his crimes. A second attempt to detain Matraimov has recently been ordered by the court of law for a period of two months after public discontent.   Matraimov’s case epitomises the failure of the anti-corruption struggle in Kyrgyzstan that has plagued the country for decades. As is reflected in the volume of the shadow economy in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, according to various estimates, is estimated from 23.6 per cent to 53.5 per cent.[2] According to the latest study of the SHADOW project, the level of the shadow economy in Kyrgyzstan is 42 per cent of GDP as per 2018.[3]   Smuggling is believed to be the largest part of the shadow economy. In recent years, according to Chinese data, Kyrgyzstan receives $5.5 billion USD a year from China’s exports. However, Kyrgyzstan’s statistics show the official volume of imports from China to be $1.9 billion. A difference of $3.6 billion is not a small discrepancy.[4] Neighbouring Kazakhstan has also announced the unreliability of customs statistics of Kyrgyzstan as well.[5] This says a lot about the shrinking possibility for building a fair society in Kyrgyzstan, as is the case in practically all developing countries.   Real democracy or ‘façade' democracy? Billions of US dollars of foreign aid and investments enriched the Kyrgyz ruling class that pillaged state funds and created nepotistic opportunities for illegal enrichment of their extended families, while the majority of the people were reduced to having to having someone leave behind their families in order to find employment in Russia.   Not only was democracy taken hostage and cheaply exploited by Kyrgyz government officials but they soon figured out that while half the population is employed overseas as migrant laborers and sends money for subsistence from abroad to their families, it’s very convenient to keep pillaging and letting the state run on financial aid from our democratic allies. No need to improve the economy, no need to create jobs, no need to create tolerable living conditions for Kyrgyz citizens when all you need to do is present yourself correctly before the West and call yourself a ‘democrat’.   A surprisingly overlooked political analyst by the international academia is Alymbek Biialinov, who had warned of the superficiality of the Kyrgyz variant of democratisation, describing the process as the “coloring in” of the existing Soviet system of management and governance with insignificant additions of hollow democratic institutions such as the free market institutions.[6] All too often Kyrgyz democratisation was limited to renaming or changing signs on existing ministries and government departments which at closer look had very little to do with switching to a true market economy.   Under the veneer of a façade democracy, Kyrgyzstan was left with ghost institutions of a bygone Soviet system with the same centralised management in which the state strictly controls the economy and the life of citizens and where the courts and law enforcement agencies are punitive bodies in the hands of the state that gladly wreck lives instead of defending the rights and freedoms of our citizens. The state administration apparatus interferes in the activities of private businesses in order to extort money and seize property. And to this day, our government agencies refuse to recognise the inviolability of private property rights.   The recent events of October 2020, when political upheaval in Kyrgyzstan resulted in the collapse of the Government of now-former President Sooronbay Jeenbekov and the rise of Sadyr Japarov, a “former convict” as the New York Times has so condescendingly labeled him, to the position of president-elect.[7]  Knowing the Kyrgyz judicial system first hand after the arrest of my husband, any one of us is literally a step away from becoming a convict in a country with no human rights and no justice. But what gave rise to these changes? And who brought the leader whom many are quick to label a populist out of a prison cell and walked him to the throne? Could it be that Kyrgyz fake democrats have unwittingly aided in their own exposure and subsequent loss of political influence?   Democracy has lost its luster in Kyrgyzstan, having become a word that resonates with irony, a word that has lost most of its meaning for our impoverished nation. Like children raised in institutions, the Kyrgyz Government has learnt no skills to succeed in this world - it simply grew used to relying on others. If before we asked Moscow for handouts, nowadays we ask all countries. Not much has changed in terms of taking on responsibility by our political leaders.   Why did façade democracy turn out to be more dangerous even than authoritarianism? Façade democracy in Kyrgyzstan did not pave the road to more democracy or better democracy - it only paved the road to authoritarianism. After all, a veneer of democracy can be easily and swiftly removed and painted over if need be. Contrary to the hopes of international allies, façade democracy did not gradually turn into true democracy if one is to analyse the failure to thrive of the seeds of democracy on Kyrgyz soil as demonstrated in the backsliding that the nation gladly chose during the recent elections.   Well, of course, those nice pseudo democratic leaders are more pleasant to deal with than complete tyrants, moreover some of them speak English and have learnt to say the right things to get more treats. And do not forget that, it’s mostly children of former government officials (like myself) who have benefitted first, studying abroad after the collapse of the Soviet Union, creating a whole ‘mafia’ of local staff within international organisations, hiring their friends and relatives, deciding which local organisations are to receive financing and which do not. These international organisation royalty, for reasons unbeknownst, are never frowned upon by the Western headquarter administrations that claim to carry the bright torch of democracy into the dark of the developing world.   Speaking English sadly does not make one a better person, a better professional, nor a democrat. Façade democracy erodes the importance of the rights guaranteed in the Constitution, which through inconsistent application of democratic values by fake democratic leaders, snowballed towards an ultimate crisis of complete discrediting of democracy as is demonstrative in the events that have unfolded in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020.   Since the only democracy that the people of Kyrgyzstan had experienced personally was fake, inconsistent, and useful only for the elite and their families, the majority of the people would rather accept reality as is, a familiar construct will do and the majority have chosen to embrace a less democratic and a more centralised system of governance.   Façade democracy, incites a reaction similar to the reaction of the human body to substandard antibiotics when may cause antibiotic resistance and even failure of treatment. This is especially risky in critical situations when antibiotic resistance can often be the cause of preventable mortality – façade democracy or substandard democracy has masked the infection of corruption and nepotism until this faux bubble burst. It has now been laid bare that a fairy sprinkle of democracy that landed on the surface of the existing political construct failed to transform it into a magic carriage.   What is the use of these anti-corruption, anti-kleptocratic detailed plans, programs and strategies, if their implementation is entrusted to the same ‘façade' leaders under whom corruption flourishes in the hollow and impotent institutions entrusted to them?   Transnational criminal organisations, supported by ‘façade' democratic leaders continue to prosper, trafficking drugs and other types of contraband across the country’s borders which goes to show that official anti-corruption efforts are often for show and are often politically motivated.   Before the eyes of the whole world, impoverished and tiny Kyrgyzstan has defied injustice once again. But, with what outcome and what cost? Developments in Kyrgyzstan in the next few years will determine whether democracy regains its footing, or whether the shift towards authoritarianism and/or Islamisation accelerates. It remains to be seen whether the new Government’s apparent political resolve to fight corruption will translate into real changes in the country.   Shirin Aitmatova is a former MP from Kyrgyzstan who lead UMUT 2020 - a people's movement against corruption. Aitmatova is a polemicist, an investigator who has collaborated with RFE/RL, Kloop.kg, Bellingcat and The Guardian. As a legislator and an activist her iconoclastic political work has shaken up Kyrgyzstan more than once. Aitmatova studied at Downe House School, Bryn Mawr College, The New School and Sarah Lawrence College. Currently she is working on a tell-all book about growing up as the daughter of the most famous Central Asian author, her decisive role in contemporary Kyrgyz politics and the page-turner story of leading UMUT 2020.   Image by Matthias Buehler under (CC).   [1] United Nations: Office on Drugs and Crime, Signature and Ratification Status, February 2020, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/ratification-status.html; OECD, CAN – Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Istanbul anti-corruption action plan: Third round of monitoring – Kyrgyzstan – Progress update, September 2017, https://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/OECD-ACN-Kyrgyzstan-Progress-Update-September-2017-ENG.pdf; EITI, Kyrgyz Republic, https://eiti.org/kyrgyz-republic; Open Government Partnership, Kyrgyz Republic – Member Since 2017 – Action Plan 1, https://www.opengovpartnership.org/members/kyrgyz-republic/; Transparency International, Anti-Corruption Research Center Transparency International Kyrgyzstan, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kyrgyzstan [2] National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Dynamics and parameters of the non-observed economy in the Kyrgyz Republic, April 2019, http://www.stat.kg/ru/news/dinamika-i-parametry-nenablyudaemoj-ekonomiki-v-kyrgyzskoj-respublike/; Ivallo Izvorski, et al. Kyrgyz Republic: Country Economic Memorandum, World Bank Group, 2020, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/679681585289928309/pdf/Main-Report.pdf [3] IBC Members’ News, Results of a research of the international SHADOW project presented in Bishkek, December 2020, http://ibc.kg/en/news/members/4807_results_of_a_research_of_the_international_shadow_project_presented_in_bishkek [4] Greater Europe Archives, http://greater-europe.org/archives/7725 [5] Ivan Zuenko, The Eurasian Gap: Winners and Losers of the Economic Union, Carnegie Moscow Center, November 2016, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=65114 [6] Alymbek Biyalinov o Mnenie Akipress, http://mnenie.akipress.org/find/?query=Алымбек%20биялинов&place=crosstop [7] Andrew Higgins, A Convicted Kidnapper Is Chosen to Lead Government of Kyrgyzstan, The New York Times, October 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/10/world/asia/kidnapper-kyrgyzstan-prime-minister.html [post_title] => Corruption – the only constant of Kyrgyzstan’s faux democracy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => corruption-the-only-constant-of-kyrgyzstans-faux-democracy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-28 21:24:39 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-28 20:24:39 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5572 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 1 [filter] => raw ) [25] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5573 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-01 00:04:32 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-28 23:04:32 [post_content] => You may struggle to find a country that praises civil society sector and persecutes it simultaneously as much as Kyrgyzstan; where non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are needed most to cover up the dilettante state’s lack of coherence and responsiveness.   The human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan has been deteriorating for years and the foreign support of the civil society sector has been gradually fading away due to financial crises, rising nationalism in the donor countries, eroding democratic principles, deadly conflicts emerging worldwide, and the current pandemic.   Kyrgyz civil society, especially human rights defenders, feel betrayed by its state. There might be many indicators of this, such as anti-NGO law initiatives or persecution of particular leaders, but one is the heaviest – the Osh violence in 2010. It is the most enduring pain for many who tried to do their best to overcome the artificially promoted post-colonial differences the state persistently focuses on, atrocities of the law enforcement authorities, and the excessively triumphal behaviour of the Government in the aftermath of the conflict.   The Government and its proxies long-pursued NGOs and civil leaders to release themselves from ‘a burden’ of control. By sentencing Azimjan Askarov, the state reached several targets – ‘winning’ the war against the ‘enemy of the state’; the civil society ‘exposed’ as a ‘fifth column’; and ethnic Uzbeks considered as ‘diaspora’, not ‘a rooted’ community in Kyrgyzstan despite historical evidence. It was a victory over the non-governmental sector, which fiercely pushed for peacebuilding and rule of law. The government’s contempt for NGO’s relative independence amid the outcry over the imprisonment of ethnic Uzbek human rights defender extended to the denial of the privileged status of USAID aid programme.[1] And, it can be considered as a point defining further policies.   Some Kyrgyz scholars when abroad abstain from criticising the Government about its ethnic policy in the presence of public officials. They do not insist on the widely publicised findings even in a secure environment with Chatham House rules. The tragedy of the ethnic violence in 2010 and the consequent harassment, abuse, and asset stripping of ethnic Uzbeks might no longer cause discomfort to those who had not sustained any losses in the conflict, but survivors still live in continuous fear.   However, the Kyrgyz Government’s revised policy towards the development aid organisations and its own civil society seems not to be reactive, emotional or independent – it too served the interests of the expanding Eurasian Economic Union led by Russia. In 2014, Kyrgyzstan adopted more harsh policies towards its human rights defenders following the condemnation of the civil sector by Russian media and diplomacy. Kyrgyzstan backed the annexation of Crimea, ousted the US military base, and received significant financial support from Russia.[2] The state-funded media of Kyrgyzstan continued condemning the civil leaders over their critics of the Russian activity in Ukraine throughout the year.   It seems that the Kyrgyz government found 2014 perfect timing for a crackdown of the active critics among the NGO leaders. Many factors were leading to this moment, one of which was related to the influence of the US support of the civil sector in Kyrgyzstan, the US military base stationing near Bishkek in response to the global terroristic threat, and the international condemnation of the state’s response on the ethnic violence in 2010. President Atambayev proposed Russia to establish another military base later.[3]   When the UN describes human rights defenders, they emphasise that everyone promoting or protecting human rights can call themselves human rights defenders.[4] Amnesty names human rights defenders as ‘some of the bravest people in the world’.[5] In Kyrgyzstan, defending human rights has become a profession like any job in the civil society sector supported by the international community. The financial independence of civil society increased tensions with civil servants and the state media pushed myths about high salaries of the former increasing the cleavage further. Indeed, individuals involved in the activism and capable of promoting the values essential for every citizen can apply for financial support from abroad and rely on it. This has been the case for years.     Cases  There were plenty of facts speaking about the increasingly hostile environment for human rights activists and the most publicised case of late Azimjan Askarov is eloquent enough. As one famous civil society leader commented, “I have no hope [left] after the death of Azimjan Askarov and therefore I left the human rights activity”.[6] The penitentiary agency known as ‘GSIN’ that represents the Kyrgyz state and is responsible for the care of its inmates did not prevent the death of a prominent and awarded human rights defender Azimjan Askarov in July 2020.   While the judges did everything possible to keep Askarov imprisoned, GSIN continued to withhold medical assistance despite pleadings from all over the world to release the venerable man until he fell completely ill. GSIN then hospitalised him in its penitentiary premises only when his health deteriorated irreversibly.[7] Askarov died the same night after being admitted to hospital. The official cause of his death was given as ‘pneumonia’.[8] It is no doubt that the Kyrgyz state is responsible for this crime against humanity leaving the late Askarov with no professional medical help in the turmoil of the COVID pandemic. Other crimes included blatant violations of human rights during the investigation, judicial hearings and re-trials of his case after the UN Human Rights Committee decision that called for his release.[9]   The sudden and untimely departure of the most persecuted, and well-known abroad, human rights defender and the final post-mortem result worsens the state’s position that they were ‘impartial’ towards Azimjan Askarov. To conclude, the Kyrgyz authorities saw no purpose of keeping Askarov healthy and alive, while applying the norms of early or temporary release selectively to other prisoners.   The penitentiary authority issued unescorted ‘furlough’ orders during the unrest in October 2020 to release prisoners including the former president and prime minister, who had been sentenced for grave crimes. The fairness of their trials is also questionable. However, such speedy decisions benefiting individuals backed by political groups mar the claims of the Government about their impartiality.   For ten years since 2010, human rights defenders have remained as outcasts for the authorities and political groups. There are few doubts left about the whole state system, even the President’s office under every President tried to undermine the independent role of the civil sector, and persecution of individual leaders has often been politically ‘expedient’. While the international media summarises harassment and persecution of civil activists well enough the details of many cases appear to be largely opaque for many and local news outlets barely cover them.   Local police in Issyk-Kul province irritated by anti-torture activist Kamil Ruziev threatened him in 2015 and consequentially he diminished his public activity.[10] The GKNB (the special service overlooking national security) then started criminal proceedings against Ruziev, detaining him in 2020.[11] He was released following the public outcry but not all the charges were dropped.   The nationalists and law enforcers threatened and tried to assault human rights lawyer Nurbek Toktakunov when he represented Azimjan Askarov in 2010 and 2011. He continued to litigate in high-profile cases but fell victim to smear campaigns involving intrusive surveillance and fake exposures by media sympathetic to the Government.[12]   President Atambayev sued prominent human rights lawyer Cholpon Djakupova for her criticism of his incumbency in 2017.[13] The lawyer reported on continuous surveillance in the aftermath of the October 2020 change of power.[14]   Another prominent human rights journalist, Ulugbek Babakulov, after the vilification by the then president Atambayev and threats by nationalists fled Kyrgyzstan days before GKNB charged him with a crime.[15] Later, France granted him asylum.   Membership of Aziza Abdirasulova and Tolekan Ismailova in the council on interethnic policies under President Atambayev ended prematurely because of vilification by the then incumbent president.[16] Abdirasulova also found out she was under close surveillance by the GKNB.[17] Both civil leaders unsuccessfully attempted to sue President Atambayev for moral damage.   Dinara Oshurahunova, Burul Makenbayeva, former NGO leader Gulnara Djurabayeva, and former Supreme Court Judge Klara Sooronkulova found that unknown individuals were following, photographing, and recording their conversations.[18] The law enforcement authorities formally investigated the case with no suspects or feasible explanation to why.   The GKNB targeted whole human rights organisations during the period when Kyrgyzstan started the integration process into the Eurasian Economic Union - called Customs’ Union at the time - and led by Russia. In 2015, they raided the offices of the Human Rights Advocacy Centre and Bir Duino in Osh, while searching the houses of the lawyers of the organisation.[19]   Leading human rights advocates, including the author, founded a Council of Human Rights Defenders, initially under the Ombudsman of Kyrgyzstan in 2008, to serve as an informal platform to raise awareness about human rights and the rule of law, and warn the state and the public about systemic issues when the formal institutions failed to do so. The platform also used its resources and outreach to public figures as a conflict resolution mechanism.   One of the most significant achievements of the Council was an amnesty for the Nookat 2008 disturbance participants, although the human rights defenders demanded a full acquittal.[20] Almost all the defendants were ethnic Uzbeks who had been sentenced for extremism in a process full of procedural violations and torture. Another instrument of conflict resolution became possible at that time. This is how the foundation was laid for councils under future presidents.   The annexation of Crimea in 2014 highlighted the specifics of the relationship between Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The Council of human rights defenders fiercely criticised the Russian hostility towards Ukraine and denounced the Kyrgyz Government siding with the Kremlin. It was no surprise that the media backing the Russian and Kyrgyz government reviled this group of independent individuals.[21] The Council of Human Rights Defenders ceased to exist that same year.   The downfall of the Council as a conflict resolution mechanism became a signal that the pressure is increasing and that it would jeopardise such a resource, leaving a vacuum for radical and latent activity.   The Collective Security Treaty Organisation, also led by Russia and including some former Soviet republics, criticised the Government of Kyrgyzstan hinting that numerous NGOs in the country cause a threat to its sovereignty.[22] An initiative to impose more intrusive controls over the activity of NGOs via a draft law on foreign agents or additional reporting almost reached its goal in 2016 before being dropped under pressure from civil society and Western donors, but the toxic environment created by the debate became another contributing factor to the hostile environment for human rights activists.[23]   Many of those mentioned or not mentioned civil leaders or human rights lawyers and activists would not share widely their stories about more dangerous harassment by law enforcement or proxies. These abuses would include numerous attempts to cause accidental injury or even death, arrest for deeds not associated with their activity – such as alleged drink driving or consumption of controlled drugs – that would not be publicly approved.   It is quite understandable that some civil leaders accept national awards to keep their activity public and exercise some sort of protection from abuse.[24] When the national authorities refrain from honoring human rights activists the foreign democracies and international organisations step up to raise awareness about how dangerous human rights profession is.[25]   Activism as a response to COVID-19 Kyrgyzstan experienced a reaction to the COVID-19 related situation also witnessed in other developing countries with persistent corruption too. Mass activism of volunteers, including from the civil sector, supported by individuals and entrepreneurs, helped the country to alleviate a weak and unprofessional response by the Government to the coronavirus outbreak. Even political activists, with their party finances associated with corrupt officials, were not so efficient.   Activism itself is filling the gaps but it should also be able to form a civil society not merely civil sector delivering services sometimes substituting the state. In Kyrgyzstan, it would possess expertise the state agencies lack. It is not a coincidence that one of the leading universities in Central Asia is in Bishkek – the American University of Central Asia – with its numerous alumni having international exposure it comes as a benefit for the society.   The GKNB under President Atambayev tracked down his critics on Facebook and it expanded their work under his successor.[26] Along with the Ministry of Interior, they were revealing dissent on social media regarding the poor performance of the Government on the COVID-19 pandemic, visiting the homes of critics and demanding to deny their words publicly, sometimes leading to arrests and convictions.[27] Suspicions of the public about the misuse of the huge amount of international aid directed to the fight against the pandemic have consequentially only further contributed to unresolved grievances about the political changes that almost never worked.[28]   This might have become one of the triggers that created the mass online activism and gave birth to the first crowdfunded political party consisted of activists, volunteers, and young politicians called ‘Reforma’.[29] Some of the volunteers have since joined the mainstream political parties.   Revolutions have never been complete in Kyrgyzstan and they have remained a tool of violent power change, benefiting only the rise of one political group over others, the sponsors of the presidency, and have been the reason for the deaths of many innocent civilians.   Politicians, unlike civil activists, are backed by their constituency, political groups and financial supporters. Partially, therefore, when in demise, politicians prefer to risk being unlawfully tried and imprisoned, thus accumulating political gains accounting for early release, after power change.   It was the activists, mainly from Bishkek, who first protested against the mass violations in the parliamentary elections and consequently led to a standoff with law enforcement authorities. However, experienced politicians with support from the provinces seized the momentum – released the political prisoners, started forming an interim government and drafting a new constitution. Later, after winning the January 2021 presidential election, Sadyr Japarov ‘revealed’ that he planned the October 2020 revolution while in prison.[30]   There are many ‘ifs’ for the future of human rights activities in Kyrgyzstan – if there would be continuous financial and moral support of it by the international institutions and foreign donors; if there would be enough legal space for human rights activism; if the state would refrain from imposing pressure on human rights defenders; and if there would be no persistently growing impunity against those who seek to restrict basic human rights and freedoms.   The old diplomatic approach by leading democracies of imposing sanctions (such as against former Sudanese President Al-Bashir over Darfur) against human rights abusers would barely affect them in Kyrgyzstan, now morally standing by Russia. Or, probably, it would have the same inconsistent or unsustainable effect as with the case of Azimjan Askarov, where the names of perpetrators were well-known starting from the local police officer torturing the human rights defender up to Prosecutor General that oversaw his case.[31]   Stable financial support is essential for any activity seeking sustainable goals. Who knows, maybe the private sector would start sponsoring local or national human rights activism to promote human rights and freedoms like it did when the pandemic hit Kyrgyzstan? In the meantime, some lawyers are already catching up on the defence of human rights, whether by representing individual cases or litigating on a strategic level.   Although foreign or international missions stationed in Bishkek represent donors, their influence on the Kyrgyz authorities is weak and bound by much anticipated and largely technical outcomes of their joint projects. Decision-makers in the governments or headquarters sponsoring reforms in Kyrgyzstan should demand bigger results from its government. The aid directed on democratic development should be conditional on the results and satisfaction of the Kyrgyz civil sector.   The established democracies should not limit themselves with merely raising their concern over rule of law issues but make sure their voices over the respect of human rights and freedoms heard. This is how the value of the taxpayers’ money brought to the Kyrgyz people would start to improve, and, Kyrgyzstan may stop persecuting own human rights activists.   Ernest Zhanaev, a human rights writer and consultant based in the UK since 2014. He was instrumental in making the Kyrgyzstan parliament adopt the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and latterly to pass legislation for greater financial transparency in electoral law. Also, he edited English news for the independent Fergana News covering developments in Central Asia. Now consultant for international organisations and think tanks Ernest researches human rights issues in post-Soviet countries specialising on freedom of speech, social and political development. He is currently also a postgraduate student at University of St Andrews.   Image by UN Women in Europe and Central Asia under (CC).   [1] Olga Dzyubenko, Defiant Kyrgyzstan says canceled treaty will hit U.S. aid agency, Reuters, July 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-kyrgyzstan-idUSKCN0PW0QA20150722 [2] RFE/RL, Kyrgyzstan Says Crimea Referendum 'Legitimate', March 2014, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-recognition-crimea-referendum-ukraine-russia/25304439.html; Stephanie Ott, Russia tightens control over Kyrgyzstan, The Guardian, September 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/18/russia-tightens-control-over-kyrgyzstan [3] Bruce Pannier, Kyrgyzstan's President Wants Another Russian Military Base, RFE/RL, June 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-new-russian-base-atambaev-putin-afghanistan/28583538.html [4] OHCHR, Who is a defender, https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/srhrdefenders/pages/defender.aspx [5] Amnesty International UK, Human rights defenders – some of the bravest people in the world, January 2018, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/human-rights-defenders-what-are-hrds [6] Abdumomun Mamaraimov, Facebook, December 2020, https://www.facebook.com/abdumomun.mamaraimov/posts/10208073977203607 [7] OHCHR, Kyrgyzstan must uphold its human rights obligations and release human rights defender Azimjan Askarov, says UN expert, May 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25872&LangID=E [8] OHCHR, Kyrgyzstan: Death of human rights defender Azimjan Askarov a stain on country’s reputation, says UN expert, July 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26138 [9] CCPR/C/116/D/2231/2012, The United Nations Human Rights Committee, May 2016, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/116/D/2231/2012&Lang=en [10] Aleksandra Li, Активист заявляет о преследовании и угрозах за правозащитную деятельность ['Activist states about persecution and threats for human rights activity'], Voice of Freedom of Central Asia, February 2015, http://vof.kg/?p=18578 [11] Ayzirek Imanaliyeva, Kyrgyzstan: Fresh arrest shows how screws are tightening on civil society, Eurasianet, June 2020, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-fresh-arrest-shows-how-screws-are-tightening-on-civil-society?fbclid=IwAR1wQg92Ojqch4pDSqWguQv_LKlJ9SkqdNfdYQv-66O0gZzlU8O3U5KAerY [12] RFE/RL, Former Kyrgyz PM's Defense Lawyer Says Targeted By Smear Campaign, February 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/former-kyrgyz-pm-s-defense-lawyer-says-targeted-by-smear-campaign/29785685.html [13] Edliyar Arykbayev, Эмоции, оскорбления, ирония и сарказм: За что судят правозащитницу Чолпон Джакупову? [‘Emotions, insults, irony and sarcasm: Why the human rights defender is being tried’], Kloop, May 2017, https://kloop.kg/blog/2017/05/02/oskorbleniyaemotsiiironiyaisarkazmzachtosudyatpravozashhitnitsucholpondzhakupovu/ [14] Cholpon Djakupova, Facebook Post, Facebook, October 2020, https://www.facebook.com/cholpon.djakupova/posts/3370862356329938 [15] RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service, Kyrgyz Journalist 'Given Political Asylum' In France, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-journalist-who-denies-hate-incitement-charge-says-given-political-asylum-in-france/29791479.html [16] Abdumomun Mamaraimov, Азиза Абдирасулова: "Парламент Кыргызстана совершил преступление против государства" ['Aziza Abdirasulova: Kyrgyzstan parliament committed crime against state'], Fergana Agency, February 2019, https://fergana.news/articles/105294/ [17] Alina Pak, Правозащитница Азиза Абдирасулова заявила, что за ней следят ['Human rights defender Aziza Abdirasulova says she is followed'], Kloop, December 2016, http://kloop.kg/blog/2016/12/08/pravozashhitnitsaazizaabdirasulovazayavilachtozanejsledyat/ [18] Fergana Agency, Киргизские правозащитницы пожаловались на прослушку ['Kyrgyz human rights defenders complained about wiretapping'], September 2018, http://www.fergananews.com/news/32607 [19] Justin Burke, Kyrgyzstan: Criminal Probe Has Rights Activists on Alert, Eurasianet, November 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70846; Chris Rickleton, Kyrgyzstan’s Security Agents Intimidating Uzbek Minority, Activists Say, Eurasianet, April 2015, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstans-security-agents-intimidating-uzbek-minority-activists-say [20] David Trilling, Evaluating Kyrgyzstan’s Impact on the Islamic Militant Threat in Central Asia, Eurasianet, June 2010, https://eurasianet.org/evaluating-kyrgyzstans-impact-on-the-islamic-militant-threat-in-central-asia [21] StanRadar.com, "Совет правозащитников Кыргызстана" ангажированность или беспристрастность? (анализ обращений за 6 лет) ['Council of human rights defenders' bias or impartiality? (analysis of statements for 6 years], July 2014, http://www.stanradar.com/news/full/10870sovetpravozaschitnikovkyrgyzstanaangazhirovannostilibespristrastnostanalizobraschenijza6let.html [22] Eleonora Beyshenbek kyzy, НПО Кыргызстана в поле зрения ОДКБ ['Kyrgyzstan NGOs in sight of CSTO'], RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service, March 2015, http://rus.azattyk.org/a/26890889.html [23] Anna Lelik, Kyrgyzstan: Foreign Agent Bill Nixed, NGOs Rejoice, Eurasianet, May 2016, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-foreign-agent-bill-nixed-ngos-rejoice; Ayzirek Imanaliyeva, Kyrgyzstan: Draft bill threatens to drive NGOs against the wall, Eurasianet, May 2020, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-draft-bill-threatens-to-drive-ngos-against-the-wall [24] President of the Kyrgyz Republic website, 'О награждении государственными наградами Кыргызской Республики' ['On State Awards of the Kyrgyz Republic'], November 2017, http://www.president.kg/files/docs/award/ukaz_noyabr_russ.pdf [25] US Department of State, 2014 Human Rights Defender Award Ceremony for Azimjan Askarov and Foro Penal, July 2015, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244903.htm [26] Nurjamal Djanibekova, 'Спецслужбы проверяют критиков Атамбаева в "Фэйсбуке"' ['Special services scrutinise critics of Atambayev on Facebook'], Kloop, January 2017, http://kloop.kg/blog/2017/01/10/spetssluzhbyproveryayutkritikovatambaevavfejsbuke/ [27] Kloop, 'Тот, кого нельзя называть. Как кыргызстанцев преследуют за критику президента' ['He Who Must Not Be Named. How Kyrgyzstani Persecuted for Criticising President'], July 2020, https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/07/31/tot-kogo-nelzya-nazyvat-kak-kyrgyzstantsev-presleduyut-za-kritiku-prezidenta/ [28] Aleksandra Li, Кыргызстан тратит миллионы долларов на борьбу с коронавирусом, но власти скрывают как расходуются деньги', ['Kyrgyzstan spends millions of dollars to fight coronavirus but authorities conceals how money is spent'], Kloop, June 2020, https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/06/24/milliony-na-covid/ [29] Bruce Pannier, Who's Who In Kyrgyzstan After The Latest Tumultuous Uprising?, RFE/RL, October 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/who-is-who-in-kyrgyzstan-after-the-latest-tumultuous-uprising/30882154.html [30] Vladimir Soloviev, В тюрьме ты 24 часа в сутки свободный человек ['You are a free man in prison 24 hours a day '], Kommersant, January 2021, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4639707?from=main_1#id1957426 [31] Front Line Defenders, Case of Azimjan Askarov, July 2020, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/azimjan-askarov-sentenced-life-imprisonment [post_title] => Down from human rights activity to activism in Kyrgyzstan [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => down-from-human-rights-activity-to-activism-in-kyrgyzstan [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-28 21:17:14 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-28 20:17:14 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5573 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 1 [filter] => raw ) [26] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5570 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-01 00:03:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-28 23:03:48 [post_content] => The media system of Kyrgyzstan Andrei Richter, now the Director of the OSCE Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, categorises the key commonalities in the media systems of Central Asia and some other post-Soviet nations as being: the authorities’ informal circulation of guidance to the press; the inability of the opposition and independent media to receive services from the state and state-controlled media infrastructures; denying ‘disloyal’ media access to advertising and information; the abuse of state monopolies and subsidies; misuse of libel laws; promoting a culture of self-censorship; and illegal pressure, including violence against journalists.[1] Despite country-by-country differences, the commonalities of their systems predominate. They also include honor-and-dignity’ laws that threaten journalists with prison and media outlets with bankruptcy; little or no market support for self-sustaining media organisations; public distrust of the press; unethical behaviour by some journalists; control over licensing, airwaves and internet service providers; and physical attacks on and harassment of journalists.[2] Nevertheless, national perspectives vary widely on, for example, what constitutes a conflict of interest and what duty – if any – journalists owe to support development of national identity and statehood, particularly in a comparatively young country such as Kyrgyzstan without a history or tradition of national identity.[3]   After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan’s media have, with some exceptions, enjoyed greater freedom than journalists in neighbouring Kazakhstan have.[4] Freedom House ranks Kyrgyzstan in number 38 out of 100 countries in terms of press freedom and defines it as partly free, as the country consistently demonstrates the highest scores on freedom of speech and expression in Central Asia, including in sections on media independence and the expression of political views.[5]   At the same time, the media system has preserved many recognisable features from the Soviet times. For example, many Kyrgyz journalists serve the state sponsored nationalist ideology the same way they served the Communist Party.[6]   According to the journalist and academic Eric Freedman, in Central Asia, the western concept of ‘independent’ press is often confused with ‘anti-regime press’, and news organisations that describe themselves as ‘independent’ are often, in reality, allied with and subsidised by an opposition party and in some instances subsidised by individual office holders or office-seekers.[7]   Under the assessment of progress against the freedom of speech objective in its Media Sustainability Index, the NGO IREX asserts that the legal framework in Kyrgyzstan, including the constitution, guarantees freedom of the press and freedom of speech. Nevertheless, they show how the authorities kept up their prosecution of media outlets, journalists, and human rights activists; denied several journalists access to public meetings; and did not always honor their obligation to release official information upon request.[8]   According to a Reporters Without Borders Report in 2019, the pluralism of the Kyrgyz media is exceptional in Central Asia, but the polarisation of Kyrgyz society is reflected in the media and in the environment journalists work in.[9]   According to Freedman, there was only slow movement towards privatising state-owned media.[10] Independent and oppositional media also remained in financial peril due to the country’s weak economy and high poverty level.   At the same time, the corruption that pervades much of government and business infects journalism in the country. Some journalists and news outlets demand under-the-table payments – ‘envelope journalism’ – either to report or not to report on a topic. In part, that practice reflects the low salaries for journalists and salary stagnation at a time of rapidly rising costs of living.[11]   According to Freedman, the weak national economy also made a market-supported media system unobtainable and unsustainable, with non-state media continuing to rely on the financial goodwill of foreign governments and multinational agencies, NGOs and foreign investors.[12]   Media economics and media ownership in Kyrgyzstan At the beginning of 2020, according to the Unified State Register of Statistical Units, there were 1.8 thousand economic entities registered as mass media on the territory of the republic, and over the past five years their number has increased by almost 18 per cent. Among them are the newspapers ‘Kyrgyz Tuusu’, ‘Slovo Kirgizstana’, ‘Erkin-Too’, ‘Vecherniy Bishkek’, ‘Kutbilim’, ‘Super-Info’, ‘Avtogid’ and other publications.   In Kyrgyzstan there are 126 independent broadcasters, including the ‘National Radio Television Centre’, broadcasting company ‘New Television Network’, broadcasting company ‘Independent Bishkek Television’, the radio center ‘Pyramid’, radio station ‘Europe’ and others.   There were 9.73 million mobile connections in Kyrgyzstan in January 2020.[13]   Challenges to media in Kyrgyzstan include the still-potent practices of the Soviet press system in which ideology trumped media independence; low salaries for journalists in Kyrgyzstan; patriotism; and a wobbly economic foundation for a prospective market-based media system. Furthermore, many journalists worry about media economics and ownership as the viability of independent media remains in doubt. Although state subsidies underwrote government-affiliated publications and broadcasters during this period, a limited advertising market existed to sustain independent outlets, with the government as the main source of the limited advertising revenue available. Later, outside advertising increased, thus reducing government’s ability to use advertising to influence the media, yet oppositional press still generally depended on the deep pockets of politically motivated sponsors. Besides the understanding of local media as businesses, in Kyrgyzstan they are also seen as the ideological tools of state and nation building by allowing state propaganda on public service media outlets.   According to the IREX 2019 Media Sustainability Report, private media outlets are understaffed and underfunded, making it difficult for them to produce their own content.[14] The outcome is ‘press release journalism’, when media materials heavily rely on the opinions of politicians and press releases shared by state institutions. The same finding was revealed in my research for the IWPR which found that press releases (76.7 per cent) are still the major information source for journalists’ news reports in the country followed by websites (39.5 per cent).[15] The IWPR report also found that the main barriers and threats for high quality journalism in Kyrgyzstan are “insufficient financial resources” and “weak professional ethics”.   With the trend toward online outlets, newspaper circulation has decreased by 30–35 per cent over the past few years. The mass media law requires print media to state its readership circulation on every publication, but many newspapers fail to do so, making it difficult for the public to assess the scale of print media consumption. Subsidies from obscure owners constitute the main source of income of private media outlets. While experts involved in the IREX 2019 Media Sustainability Report believe that advertising is scarce, other experts suggested that the market for digital advertising is growing.[16]   Currently, 60 channels compete for a fairly small advertising market, which has led to widespread dumping prices and further deflation of the market. According to the Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting, half of the content broadcast between 7:00 am and 10:00 am and between 6:00 pm and 11 pm must be locally produced. However, according to the Expert Consulting Agency study, on average, the 20 monitored channels broadcast only 31 per cent local content—42 per cent of the content is in Russian and another 25 per cent is foreign.[17] Outside of those time slots, some channels significantly decrease the broadcasting of local content, and others broadcast none at all. Only a few channels, such as KTR, KTR-sport, KTR-Music, NTS, and ElTR meet the standards required by the law.   In Kyrgyzstan, the migration of advertising from local media to global platforms and online media is impacting the sustainability of local media. The cost-cutting strategies of local media in Kyrgyzstan and the poor salaries of journalist employed in local media impact editorial quality.   There are still no developed models for the development of media in Kyrgyzstan, and the search for a way to develop it is still ongoing.   A Struggle to adapt to the new media landscape The media landscape in Kyrgyzstan represents a diverse and rapidly changing media sector. The media in Kyrgyzstan has struggled to adapt to the new media landscape, which emerged after transition to Digital Broadcasting. New local TV Channels were launched both on regional and national level which compete for audiences in regions. Online local and global news agencies are also providing content for regional audiences along with regional news agencies. Media outlets in Kyrgyzstan are using new digital technologies such as developing mobile applications and doing live streaming and podcasts. However, sustainability is still an issue when it comes to financial matters. The public service media is still depending on government subsidies and private media on advertisement and individual sponsors, mainly politicians and business people.   The weakness of the professional culture and the strength of other external pressures local journalists feel (e.g., poor pay, government subsidies and pressure, a weak market and lagging local business interest, generational fragmentation, and now a fragmented digital and print production environment) leads to a fragmented professional culture and fragmented work practices. These journalists are pushed in varying directions while still seeking purpose and autonomy in their daily work, and there is little professional coherence to offer them shared purpose and practice.   Young people in Kyrgyzstan are especially flexible in adopting digital tools in their daily lives and practices such as political and social activism and as a tool to express their identity and personal views.[18]   In August 2020, a contradictory law was proposed by the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Manipulating Information,” which specifically targets online speech that authorities allege interferes with the conduct of politics in the country.[19] This law emerged as the Government’s response to combat false information and fake news about COVID-19, but the motivation behind the legislation is much deeper.[20] This law has a potential to restrict political expression online and to have detrimental effects on online political participation and freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan. This law demonstrates the contemporary global struggle over fake news, misinformation, and the need to balance facts and perspectives. The law was not signed by the President of that time, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, and was sent back to Parliament for second reading.   Challenges related to COVID-19   Access to information The advertising market has decreased further due to the economic crisis in Central Asian countries and due to the increase of social media and Google advertising market in the region. The decrease in advertising revenues of media outlets may lead to further financial difficulties and dependency. The safety of journalists was an issue during pandemic. Outdoor reporting and filming by all private media outlets was stopped due to the lockdowns. Only state media outlets were able to function during lockdowns in Kyrgyzstan. The functioning of private media outlets was limited by the Government who required special permissions to work during lockdowns which caused problems in access to information. Investigative journalism was not possible due to the limited access to information sources during lockdowns. Interviewing public, getting information from state organisations and ministries was limited. Coordination Crisis Centers provided very scarce information on the situation to journalists. Speaking about the impact of the coronavirus on the work of journalists, focus group participants noted that female journalists had the most difficult time during the pandemic. With traditional roles still entrenched, especially during COVID, looking after the children, helping them complete tasks, cooking food for the whole family, and at the same time trying to find time to do their journalistic work is a physically and mentally draining challenge to keep up with. For this reason, some journalists stated they had experienced psychological stress. The same opinion was expressed by journalists and experts during an online survey.[21]   Misinformation and Fake News as a threat During the pandemic fake news and misinformation about COVID-19 was spread in Central Asia through social media and some local media outlets. Conspiracy theories, memes, and fake information were widely spread causing panic and fear in the region. Hate Speech, online harassment and online attacks on journalists, activists and opposition politicians in Kyrgyzstan increased after the October 2020 events.   The role of social media’s impact on democratic discourse is widely acknowledged, however each context is unique, especially so in the post-soviet Central Asian space where the media landscape varies enormously from closed spaces to relatively open and in the case of Kyrgyzstan thriving. Social media plays an important role in opening and closing democratic spaces, especially in post-authoritarian and low-income countries like Kyrgyzstan with a robust media landscape and its potential to inciting political and social conflict.   Another phenomenon which has been associated with social media is an increasing activity of ‘troll factories’, which are not just engaging in spreading misinformation online but also have an impact on political life of the country. These ‘troll factories’ create and efficiently run fake accounts for high profile politicians such as Kyrgyzstan’s ex-president Sooronbay Jeenbekov and Almazbek Atambayev, and support of Sadyr Japarov.[22] The coordinated actions of fake accounts and trolls online, combined with online harassment and hostility by supporters of Sadyr Japarov, who took over as interim leader in October 2020 after the post-election protests, are causing polarisation in Kyrgyz society. Trolls and fake accounts of Japarov’s supporters are using online abuse and offense to attack and silence activists, journalists and oppositional politicians during and after the October 2020 events in Kyrgyzstan. According to a recent article on openDemocracy about fakes and troll factories in Kyrgyzstan, they are offering a service to politicians and prominent figures who want to manipulate public opinion and paid-for ‘troll factories’ have become increasingly common on Kyrgyzstani social media. These troll factories run networks of fake accounts, using them to burnish their clients’ images and to denigrate opponents by flooding pages and websites with ‘likes’ and comments.[23] The press service of the State Security Committee announced on November 28th 2020 a "Call on everyone to cooperate in the interests of peace in the country", as reports of "Provocative nature that various kinds of threats and posts of aggressive content allegedly from supporters of Sadyr Japarov are received through fake accounts in social networks" have become more frequent.[24] Politician Bektur Asanov (candidate in the January 2021 presidential elections) recorded a video message on November 26th 2020 where he spoke about the threats that he and his supporters receive on social networks from obscure accounts. After that, he turned to Japarov with a demand that he calms his supporters down. The day before, the Civil Control Committee called on law enforcement agencies to unite in the fight against the "aggression and threats" of Japarov's supporters.[25] Activists noticed a flurry of aggression and threats, including death threats and threats of terrorism against individual politicians who criticise Sadyr Japarov.   According to Ashiraliev, the OTRK (Public TV and Radio Channel) and the Ala-Too 24 TV channel in Kyrgyzstan, which was opened under it, turned into a propaganda and agitation channel of the three branches of government, especially the President, and did not become a public channel as was originally intended.[26]   One of the features of the current Kyrgyz journalism is a strong reduction in analytical content. According to Ashiraliev, journalists and media have noted that this particular area had many requirements and a lot of questions accumulated.[27] The situation was criticised when there are almost no analytical programmes in state official newspapers, mass media or TV channels, and if there are any, their number is negligible. This problem brings us back to the question: does society have a need for good quality, in-depth journalism and commentary? In any case, it is probably time for journalists to start producing more analytical content so that the people will have a need for it.[28]   Although much has been done in terms of promoting media literacy in Central Asia, there is still a gap in strengthening critical thinking and media literacy in the wider public of Central Asian states. Because of a lack of critical thinking and media literacy, the ‘infodemic’ and misinformation was huge during pandemic in Central Asia.[29] There is also a growing tendency of using social media to manipulate public opinion especially during elections and political events in Central Asia. As the case of Kyrgyzstan during the October 2020 events has shown, massive online attacks of trolls and fake accounts on journalists, activists and oppositional politicians are growing and silencing them. That is why there is a need to promote critical thinking and media literacy among the general public in Central Asia.   Recommendations for the international community:
  • To help Kyrgyz media master new development models of media; and
  • Promote the development of high quality regional media through capacity-building, including training on investigative training, generative advertising revenue, crowd funding and other skills.
  Fighting misinformation in Central Asia:
  • Civil society organisations can play a role in monitoring social media and providing systematic reporting in relevant timeframes. An evidence-based understanding of the threats and vulnerabilities can be the basis of effective solutions;
  • Provide access to correct information about COVID-19;
  • To train local journalists on science-based journalism to help them report on the pandemic;
  • To launch a new course on science-based journalism in the Journalism Departments of Universities to teach journalism students how to do science-reporting;
  • To launch MOOCS (Massive Open Online Courses) that are free online courses available for anyone to enroll on ‘Journalism and Pandemic’ for journalism students and journalists in the region;
  • To develop video-lessons and game based learning platforms on reporting the pandemic;
  • To support local media research on the coverage of COVID-19 by local media and the spread of misinformation and disinformation in Central Asia;
  • To support information campaigns against the ‘infodemic’ and misinformation;
  • To develop manuals and toolkits for local journalists in their local languages on how to reporting on COVID-19 and pandemic;
  • To use digital technologies, such as fact-checking software programmes and the detection of fake accounts and bots on social media, in the fight against misinformation and disinformation, and build capacity for journalists and media in Central Asia;
  • To assist in improving the professional knowledge of journalists (quality of education, outlook, and worldview);
  • To promote the qualitative development of the regional media;
  • To convey to journalists such basic values of journalism as the Code of Ethics, how to transmit reliable information, and tell the truth;
  • To train media organisations to conduct audience analysis and based on its results, achieve the trust of the people, and develop a model of how to operate based on audience funding;
  • To create fair competition among the media; and
  • To establish and distribute industry journalism that will cover other important aspects of life (medicine, economy, tourism, agriculture, scientific and technological achievements).
  Capacity-building for journalism education in Central Asia:
  • To update the curriculum;
  • To train teachers about how to use online teaching;
  • To translate journalism books into the Kyrgyz language and to support media research at universities;
  • To support development of course materials such as course books, course readers and other educational resources;
  • To support the launch of online courses and video-lessons on journalism and media in local languages; and
  • To link journalism teachers and students in Central Asia up with European counterparts through exchange programmes.
  Strengthening media literacy in Central Asia:
  • To promote development of the media literacy curriculum, pedagogical staff training and the development of teaching aids through the organisation of exchange visits to countries with well-established programmes in media literacy and media education;
  • To consider funding of a fact-checking platform or another technological know-how to debunk misleading information, information manipulation and fake news through regular monitoring and verification of information which represents public interest; and
  • To raise awareness about the public role of media, media regulation and the dissemination of information, the right to freedom of speech and expression and responsibility it comes with.
  Support for media in promoting gender equality in Central Asia:
  • Train journalists on how to report on violence against women and girls;
  • Train journalists on how to report on gender equality;
  • Develop gender-sensitive editorial policies for media outlets;
  • Train editors and producers on how to be gender-sensitive in monitoring their reports; and
  • To support media monitoring on gender-sensitive reporting by independent monitoring agencies.
  Support for media during elections:
  • Train journalists how to cover elections.
  Supporting media in fighting radicalisation in Central Asia:
  • Train media outlets and journalists in Central Asia on how to provide conflict-sensitive coverage of news and topics on religion and radicalisation.
  Dr. Elira Turdubaeva has a PhD degree in Media and Communications from Kyrgyzstan-Turkey Manas University. She worked at several universities, including a prior appointment as Department Head of Journalism and Mass Communications at American University of Central Asia. Currently she is a Senior Researcher on Network Analysis and Social Media at Graduate Studies Department of University of Central Asia. Her research focuses on media uses, political participation and media, election campaign analysis, protests and social media, social media uses, network analysis, new media studies, ICT and youth, propaganda analysis, representations of gender, journalism education, media and migration, media and activism, surveillance technologies and privacy in Central Asia, hate speech and social media, etc. She is also a founder and president of a new start-up Online University in Kyrgyzstan and Association of Communicators of Kyrgyzstan.   Image by Etienne Combier under (CC).   [1] Richter, A. 2008. Post-Soviet Perspective On Censorship and Freedom of the Media: An Overview, International Communication Gazette 70(5):307-324, https://journals.sagepub.com/action/doSearch?target=default&ContribAuthorStored=Richter%2C+Andrei& [2] Despite Kyrgyzstan’s higher position of freedom of speech compared to other Central Asian countries, journalists can be detained, warned, blacklisted and attacked in Kyrgyzstan and especially face regular threats for covering sensitive issues and/ or criticising public figures (Kurambayev, 2016).  Kurambayev, B. (2016). Journalism and democracy in Kyrgyzstan: the impact of victimizations of the media practitioners. Media Asia, 43(2), 102-111. [3] Freedman, E. 2009. When a democratic revolution isn’t democratic or revolutionary. Journalism 10(6): 843–861. [4] Junisbai et.al., 2018. Are Youth Different? The Nazarbayev Generation and Public Opinion in Kazakhstan, Problems of Post-Communism. [5] Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2020, Kyrgyzstan, https://freedomhouse.org/country/kyrgyzstan/freedom-world/2020 [6] Freedman, E. 2011. Theoretical foundations for researching the roles of the press in today’s Central Asia, in edited volume by Freedman and Shafer, After the czars and commissars: Journalism in authoritarian post-soviet Central Asia, pages 1-16, Michigan State University Press. [7] Freedman, E. 2009. When a democratic revolution isn’t democratic or revolutionary. Journalism 10(6): 843–861. [8] IREX, Europe & Eurasia, Media Sustainability Index 2019, https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/pdf/media-sustainability-index-europe-eurasia-2019-full.pdf [9] Reporters Without Borders, Detailed methodology, https://rsf.org/en/detailed-methodology [10] Freedman, E. 2012. Deepening shadows: The eclipse of press rights in Kyrgyzstan, Global Media and Communication 8 (1), 47-64. [11] Ibid; Freedman, E. 2007. ‘After the Tulip Revolution: Journalism Education in Kyrgyzstan’, Paper presented at the World Journalism Education Congress, Singapore. [12] Freedman, E. 2012. Deepening shadows: The eclipse of press rights in Kyrgyzstan, Global Media and Communication 8 (1), 47-64. [13] Simon Kemp, Digital 2020: Kyrgyzstan, DataReportal, February 2020, https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-kyrgyzstan [14] IREX, Europe & Eurasia, Media Sustainability Index 2019, https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/pdf/media-sustainability-index-europe-eurasia-2019-full.pdf [15] Turdubaeva et.al., The status of media and the role of social media in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, IWPR, November 2018, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/print-publications/status-media-and-role-social-media-kazakhstan-kyrgyzstan [16] IREX, Europe & Eurasia, Media Sustainability Index 2019, https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/pdf/media-sustainability-index-europe-eurasia-2019-full.pdf [17] Media Research of Kyrgyzstan, M-Vector Research and Consulting Group (2018), 2018, www.m-vector.com [18] Zhunushova, S. O. 2017. The role of mass media as the main factor of transformation of social identity of youth in Kyrgyzstan under modern conditions. Роль СМИ как основного фактора трансформации социальной идентичности молодежи Кыргызстана в современных условиях. Проблемы современной науки и образования, (11 (93)).; Nasimova, G., Kilybaeva, Sh., Smagulov, K., & Basygarieva, Zh. 2019. Political Activity of the youth Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: a comparative analysis. ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ АКТИВНОСТЬ МОЛОДЕЖИ КАЗАХСТАНА И КЫРГЫЗСТАНА: СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ. Центральная Азия и Кавказ, 22(1), 68-83.; Richter, A. 2008. Post-Soviet Perspective On Censorship and Freedom of the Media: An Overview, International Communication Gazette 70(5):307-324. [19] NetBlocks, Internet disrupted in Kyrgyzstan as protests break out over alleged vote rigging, October 2020, https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-kyrgyzstan-as-protests-break-out-over-alleged-vote-rigging-JBQp0YAo [20] Natalie Simpson, Fake News, Real Censorship: A New Bill Threatens Freedom of Speech in Kyrgyzstan, FPRI, July 2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/07/fake-news-real-censorship-a-new-bill-threatens-freedom-of-speech-in-kyrgyzstan/ [21] Ashiraliev, E. 2020. What is the current state of Kyrgyz Journalism?, Public Foundation Journalists. [22] Alexander Shabalin, "Troll Factory" by Matraimovs and Zheenbekovs started working for Sadyr Japarov- "Фабрика троллей" Матраимовых и Жээнбековых начала работать на Садыра Жапарова, Kaktus Media, October 2020, https://kaktus.media/doc/423035_fabrika_trolley_matraimovyh_i_jeenbekovyh_nachala_rabotat_na_sadyra_japarova.html; Kamila Eshaliyeva, Real fakes: How Kyrgyzstan's troll factories work, openDemocracy, November 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/troll-factories-kyrgyzstan/ [23] Ibid. [24] Aigerim Ryskulbekova, GKNB considers reports of threats from fakes as “proactive”, Kloop, November 2020, https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/11/28/gknb-schitaet-soobshheniya-ob-ugrozah-so-storony-fejkov-provokatsionnymi/ [25] Ibid. [26] Ashiraliev, E. 2020. What is the current state of Kyrgyz Journalism?, Public Foundation Journalists. [27] Ibid. [28] Ibid. [29] An infodemic is too much information including false or misleading information in digital and physical environments during a disease outbreak. It causes confusion and risk-taking behaviours that can harm health. It also leads to mistrust in health authorities and undermines the public health response (WHO, 2020) Infodemic (who.int) [post_title] => Media landscape in Kyrgyzstan: Caught between elite capture and control of political and business interests [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => media-landscape-in-kyrgyzstan-caught-between-elite-capture-and-control-of-political-and-business-interests [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-28 21:09:44 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-28 20:09:44 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5570 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [27] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5566 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-01 00:02:40 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-28 23:02:40 [post_content] => In November 2019, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Radio Azattyk, the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and its Kyrgyz member centre, Kloop.kg, published their joint investigation into widespread corruption in Kyrgyzstan’s customs service.[1] The online harassment and abuse of journalists following this investigation marked the beginning of a new era in the intimidation of Kyrgyzstan’s independent media, which has continued throughout the recent election period. This article charts the development of online harassment of independent journalists and media organisations, exploring the responses of the state, social media platforms and journalists themselves and making targeted recommendations to address this issue.   Background Independent media in Kyrgyzstan and their journalists have been regularly harassed in recent years, particularly through problematic defamation legislation.[2] An important example of this is the multi-million-som lawsuits brought against independent online news platform, Zanoza.kg (now Kaktus Media), and others in March 2017 by then-president Atambaev.[3] The case has been referred to the UN Human Rights Committee and is awaiting their recommendations. However, the publication in November 2019 of the Azattyk, OCCRP and Kloop.kg and investigation marks a change in the nature of threats and attacks against independent media and the beginning of a significant increase in online harassment. The publication of the investigation and follow-up reporting by other independent media led not only to other physical attacks, but also digital attacks, and online harassment of journalists involved in the investigation.[4] This trend continued throughout 2020, further intensifying following the disputed parliamentary elections on October 4th 2020 and the proposed constitutional reform, initially proposed on November 17th 2020.   Intimidating investigative journalists Following the publication of the investigation in November, Kloop.kg, independent online news platform, Kaktus Media, and others noted the increased presence of ‘trolls’ on social media networks, criticising the investigation and harassing those journalists involved.[5] The accounts of these ‘trolls’ posted comments discrediting the journalistic investigation as well as attacking those who planned to attend a peaceful protest against the corrupt practices revealed in the country planned for November 25th 2019. Attacks on independent media in Kyrgyzstan is not a new development. However the traditional methods of intimidating and silencing critical voices exemplified by the 2017 defamation lawsuits have been augmented by the new tools of trolling and online harassment.   Election of the trolls Following Kyrgyzstan’s October 4th 2020 parliamentary elections and the Central Election Commission’s decision to annul the results, online threats directed towards independent media and journalists increased, alongside physical violence against journalists.[6] The rise of ‘troll factories’ at this time and their use to discredit both political opponents and media coverage is thought to have contributed to the significant increase online abuse received by journalists at this time.[7]   Targeting Azattyk Together with other independent media in Kyrgyzstan, Azattyk has long faced criticism and attack from politicians at the highest level, with concerted attempts to discredit the media organisation and its journalists beginning even in advance of the publication of the corruption investigation.[8] However, even despite this long history of criticism and attack, Azattyk’s journalists current report facing unprecedented levels of online intimidation and harassment. Public statements by leading politicians singled out Azattyk, potentially contributing to the increase in online attacks against the news platform.[9]   Criticised for challenging constitutional reform On November 17th, draft amendments to the constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic were announced. National and international media and civil society organisations, including the Media Policy Institute (MPI) and ARTICLE 19, criticised the proposed amendments, which threatened to violate the rights and freedoms inherent in the existing constitution and guaranteed by international law.[10] Individual journalists, activists and lawyers, particularly women, who spoke out against the proposed changes became particular targets of online attacks. There were personally threatened, intimidated, insulted and discredited.[11] This clear attempt to stifle critical voices, with a potential chilling effect on freedom of expression was particularly notable on Kyrgyz-language segments of social media platforms.[12] MPI and other representatives of the media community have called on political leaders not to support online intimidation and harassment of critical voices and to take action against online attacks, particularly given the risk that these may prove the foundation for physical violence.[13]   State inaction to address threats Journalists say that they do not report online harassment and abuse to Law Enforcement Agencies, believing that their concerns will not be addressed.[14] This may be in part because certain political actors have played a facilitating role in the online harassment of journalists: either by directly provoking or failing to condemn such attacks and thereby contributing to a general climate of impunity.   ARTICLE 19’s recent guidelines on investigating online harassment and abuse of women journalists set out States’ obligations to protect journalists, both offline and online, as follows: [15]  
  • Under international human rights standards, States must protect the right to freedom of expression in law, policy and practice, to ensure a safe and enabling environment for journalists to carry out their work independent and without undue interference. States also have a positive obligation to ensure that crimes designed to silence journalists and freedom of expression are prohibited, attacks on journalists prevented, journalists are protected and instigators of attacks are prosecuted.
  • Available research shows that there is a lack of clarity about how best to pursue legal accountability for online harassment and this can often lead to the adoption of new, overly broad laws that harm freedom of expression.
  • Any regulation restricting or limiting the right to freedom of expression should comply with the three-part test under Article 19 para 3 of the ICCPR; while criminal law should be used in exceptional circumstances when online harassment and abuse reaches certain severity, such as causing serious harm.
  In 2019, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media’s report on online harassment or abuse of journalists recommended that in cases when online harassment and abuse ‘is likely to cause serious harm, the police and prosecuting authorities must proactively and vigorously investigate the harassment or abuse in a timely fashion, and perpetrators should be prosecuted accordingly. Such a response should not be wholly dependent on the victim’s coming forward and calling for the punishment of the perpetrators since the online harassment interferes with the right to freedom of expression of both the journalist and the public at large (and should, therefore be treated as a public matter).’[16]   Social media platforms struggle to respond Many journalists and media organisations have also addressed their concerns about online harassment and intimidation to social media platforms through the various reporting mechanisms larger platforms provide. However, individuals have not received responses to their complaints.   In a recent briefing looking specifically at online harassment and abuse against women journalists, ARTICLE 19 acknowledges the attempts by social media platforms to develop community standards and other policies to challenge harassment and abuse.[17] Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (Google) all state that harassment and abuse are not tolerated on their platforms and address violations of these terms and conditions in a number of ways, including content removal, labelling and user suspension. Facebook has a dedicated section on its website, co-developed with a number journalist support organisations, which provides guidance on how journalists can stay safe online.[18]   However, the briefing goes on to point out that these terms and conditions are often broad and vague, and guidelines are not enforced consistently, in particularly with regard to reporting or identification mechanisms, appeals and complaints of harassment and abuse, and remedies. Enforcement mechanisms are not always easy to find and companies’ responses are often lacking or inconsistent. There is a lack of transparency over the action taken in response to online harassment and abuse and the use of algorithms and machine learning to flag content in violation of their terms and conditions. In addition, in the context of Kyrgyzstan, the rise of unchecked online harassment on the Kyrgyz-language segment of social media platforms suggests that there is inequitable moderation of Russian- and Kyrgyz-language content.   Conclusion The rise in online harassment against media organisations and journalists in Kyrgyzstan is extremely concerning, leading to self-censorship with a chilling effect on freedom of expression in the country. The recent revelation of the presence of troll factories in Kyrgyzstan and their role in delivering online abuse against journalists further emphasises the need to address these issues at multiple levels. As we have evidenced through this article, the situation in Kyrgyzstan is exacerbated by insufficient responses on the part of the Government of Kyrgyzstan, social media platforms and media organisations themselves. Public expressions denigrating independent media and journalists in Kyrgyzstan by those at the highest level of government have fuelled the rise of attacks and law enforcement do not uphold Kyrgyzstan’s positive obligations to protect journalists, including against online threats. The unchecked rise of hate speech against journalists, particularly on Kyrgyz-language segments of social media platform, may be linked to a relative lack of Kyrgyz-language moderation, and reporting of online harassment through these platforms has met with limited responses. In addition, independent media organisations and journalists experiencing these attacks appear reluctant to report these publicly. Media workers do not consistently document and report on online harassment abuse, assuming lack of response from law enforcement agencies or social media platforms. There is also a perception that online harassment is ‘part of the job’ and should be tolerated as such.   MPI and ARTICLE 19 therefore put forward the following recommendations to address these emerging challenges, adapting those presented in ARTICLE 19’s recent briefings on online abuse and harassment against women journalists, and the OSCE’s Safety of Female Journalists Online – A #SOFJO Resource Guide, authored by ARTICLE 19.[19]   For the Government of Kyrgyzstan:
  • Establish a national action plan on the safety of journalists with particularly reference to online safety and gender responsive approach;[20]
  • Increase expertise among judicial personnel and law enforcement on issues of freedom of expression, safety of journalists and harassment and abuse, offline and online, with a gender-responsive approach;[21]
  • Urges political leaders, public officials and/or authorities to refrain from denigrating, intimidating or threatening the media, including individual journalists, or using misogynist or any discriminatory language towards women journalists, thereby undermining trust in the credibility of journalists and respect for the importance of independent journalism;[22] and
  • Strengthen protocols, methods and procedures to investigate crimes against journalists and freedom of expression.[23]
  For social media platforms operating in Kyrgyzstan:[24]
  • Social media companies should improve their internal redress mechanisms, respecting due process safeguards. These should also be able to address any refusal to remove content, such as gender-based harassment and abuse, that is arguably in breach of the companies’ community standards;
  • Social media companies should notify their decisions to affected parties and give sufficiently detailed reasons for the actions they take against particular content or accounts. They should also provide clear information about any internal complaints mechanisms; and
  • Social media companies should consider joining multi-stakeholder regulatory bodies such as social media councils that would allow better public oversight of their practices, including in the area of gender-based harassment and abuse. In particular, the Facebook Oversight Board should consider gender harassment and abuse cases in their case work and provide the appropriate guidance on how better and more effectively address this issue, in line with international freedom of expression standards.
  For journalists and media organisations in Kyrgyzstan:[25]
  • Monitor and document online abuse and harassment and use information to raise awareness among key actors, including through journalistic articles and investigations;
  • Ensure support to journalists, including psychosocial, to those who are facing online abuse and harassment, and those who are at higher risk of experiencing such attacks, including through peer-to-peer networks, training and other practical support;
  • Develop and effectively implement safety policies that include a holistic approach towards safety and security, including physical, legal, psychosocial and digital security; and
  • Uphold ethical standards and journalistic codes to ensure the highest quality of journalism.
  Begaim Usenova is currently the Director of the Media Policy Institute in Kyrgyzstan, a role which she has held since 2009. Media Policy Institute (MPI) provides expert legal analysis and support to independent journalists and media organisations in the country. Through her work with the Media Policy Institute, Begaim has conducted numerous lectures, workshops and training on freedom of expression, freedom of the media, hate speech, media literacy and media policy more broadly. Begaim has authored and co-authored a number of publications on the development of media law in Kyrgyzstan, media literacy, defamation, election coverage and anti-extremism legislation amongst others.   ARTICLE 19 is an independent human rights organisation that works around the world to protect and promote the rights to freedom of expression and information. It takes its name and mandate from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which guarantees the right to freedom of expression. ARTICLE 19 has produced a number of standard-setting documents and policy briefs based on international and comparative law and best practice on issues concerning the right to freedom of expression. Increasingly, ARTICLE 19 is also examining the role of international internet technical standard-setting bodies and internet governance bodies in protecting and promoting freedom of expression.   [1] RFE/RL Radio Azattyk, OCCRP, Kloop.kg, Plunder and Patronage in Central Asia, OCCRP, November 2019 https://www.occrp.org/en/plunder-and-patronage/ [2] ARTICLE 19, Kyrgyzstan: Law protecting President’s “honour and dignity” should be abolished, August 2017,  https://www.article19.org/resources/kyrgyzstan-law-protecting-presidents-honour-and-dignity-should-be-abolished/ [3] ARTICLE 19, Kyrgyzstan: Stop legislative harassment of Zanoza.kg and its journalists, December 2017, https://www.article19.org/resources/kyrgyzstan-stop-legislative-harassment-of-zanoza-kg-and-its-journalists/ [4] Ruslan Kharizov, Нападение на Болота Темирова. Редактор Factcheck.kg выступил с заявлением, 24.kg, January 2020, https://24.kg/obschestvo/140225_napadenie_nabolota_temirova_redaktor_Factcheckkg_vyistupil_szayavleniem/; Aida Dzhumashova, Траты жены Матраимова. DDoS-атака сайта Factcheck.kg продолжается, 24.kg, December 2019, https://24.kg/obschestvo/138321_tratyi_jenyi_matraimova_DDoS-ataka_sayta_Factcheckkg_prodoljaetsya/ [5] Adeim Ubakeeva, Наглядно. Фейки и реальные люди, чьи фото они украли, Kloop.kg, January 2020 https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/01/22/naglyadno-fejki-i-realnye-lyudi-chi-foto-oni-ukrali/; Aidana Abduvaitova, Тролли хотят выдать акцию за свободу слова за гей-парад. Еще один из них хвалит Матраимова, Kaktus Media, December 2019, https://kaktus.media/doc/402916_trolli_hotiat_vydat_akciu_za_svobody_slova_za_gey_parad._eshe_odin_iz_nih_hvalit_matraimova.html; Aleksandr Shabalin, О работе троллей и ботов, поддерживающих Матраимова после расследования о $700 млн, Kaktus Media, November 2019, https://kaktus.media/doc/401754_o_rabote_trolley_i_botov_podderjivaushih_matraimova_posle_rassledovaniia_o_700_mln.html [6] Aidai Tokoyeva, Медиасообщество призвало политиков осуждать онлайн-угрозы журналистам и активистам со стороны своих сторонников, Kloop.kg, December 2020, https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/12/01/mediasoobshhestvo-prizvalo-politikov-osuzhdat-onlajn-ugrozy-zhurnalistam-i-aktivistam-so-storony-svoih-storonnikov/ [7] Kamila Yeshaleyeva, "У каждого было около 200 аккаунтов в соцсетях". Как устроены "фабрики троллей" в Кыргызстане, OpenDemocracy, November 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ru/fabriki-trollei-v-kyrgyzstane/ [8] 24.kg, Нападки на свободу слова. Эффект перевернутых граблей, October 2020, https://journalist.kg/ru/analytics/napadki-na-svobodu-slova-effekt-perevernutyh-grablej/; Azamat Tynaev, Каковы главные угрозы свободе кыргызстанских СМИ?, CABAR, December 2019, https://cabar.asia/ru/kakovy-glavnye-ugrozy-svobode-kyrgyzstanskih-smi [9] Aidana Abduvaitova, Садыр Жапаров прокомментировал угрозы и давление на журналистов от своих сторонников Kaktus Media, October 2020, https://kaktus.media/doc/423236_sadyr_japarov_prokommentiroval_ygrozy_i_davlenie_na_jyrnalistov_ot_svoih_storonnikov.html; Aizhamal Dzhamankulova, Садыр Жапаров заявил, что «Азаттык» искажает смысл его слов. Медиасообщество считает обвинения и.о. президента угрозой для СМИ, November 2020, https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/11/10/sadyr-zhaparov-zayavil-chto-azattyk-iskazhaet-smysl-ego-slov-mediasoobshhestvo-schitaet-obvineniya-i-o-prezidenta-ugrozoj-dlya-smi/ [10] ARTICLE 19, Kyrgyzstan: Draft Constitution threatens freedom of expression and freedom of the media, December 2020, https://www.article19.org/resources/kyrgyzstan-draft-constitution-threatens-freedom-of-expression-and-freedom-of-the-media/ [11] Mirlan Kadyrov, Как онлайн-угрозы подрывают демократию, RFE/RL Radio Azattyk, December 2020, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30978025.html [12] Bakyt Toregeldi, В соцсетях кыргызстанского сегмента участились угрозы и запугивания, RFE/RL Radio Azattyk, November 2020, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30964989.html [13] Media Policy Institute, Медиаорганизации Кыргызстана призывают и.о. президента публично признать и подтвердить роль свободных СМИ в демократическом обществе, November 2020, http://media.kg/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/mediaorganizaczii-kyrgyzstana-prizyvayut-i.o.-prezidenta-publichno-priznat-i-podtverdit-rol-svobodnyh-smi-v-demokraticheskom-obshhestve.pdf [14] Mirlan Kadyrov, Как онлайн-угрозы подрывают демократию, RFE/RL Radio Azattyk, December 2020, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30978025.html [15] ARTICLE 19, Investigating online harassment and abuse of women journalists, 2020, https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Gender-Paper-Brief-3-.pdf [16] OSCE, Legal Responses to Online Harassment and Abuse of Journalists: Perspectives from Finland, France and Ireland, March 2019, https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/413549 [17] ARTICLE 19, Online harassment and abuse against women journalists and major social media platforms, 2020, https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Gender-Paper-Brief-2.pdf [18] Facebook, Safety tips for journalists, https://www.facebook.com/formedia/blog/safety-tips-for-journalists [19] ARTICLE 19, Online abuse and harassment against women journalists, 2020, https://www.article19.org/onlineharassment/; OSCE, Safety of Female Journalists Online, https://www.osce.org/fom/safety-female-journalists-online [20] Silvia Chocarro, Sarah Clarke, Paulina Gutiérrez, Judy Taing (ARTICLE 19), SAFETY OF FEMALE JOURNALISTS ONLINE - A #SOFJO Resource Guide, OSCE, 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/9/468861_0.pdf [21] Silvia Chocarro, Sarah Clarke, Paulina Gutiérrez, Judy Taing (ARTICLE 19), SAFETY OF FEMALE JOURNALISTS ONLINE - A #SOFJO Resource Guide, OSCE, 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/9/468861_0.pdf [22] UN General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 6 October 2020 (Forty-fifth session), October 2020, https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/RES/45/18 [23] Silvia Chocarro, Sarah Clarke, Paulina Gutiérrez, Judy Taing (ARTICLE 19), SAFETY OF FEMALE JOURNALISTS ONLINE - A #SOFJO Resource Guide, OSCE, 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/9/468861_0.pdf [24] ARTICLE 19, Online harassment and abuse against women journalists and major social media platforms, 2020, https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Gender-Paper-Brief-2.pdf [25] Silvia Chocarro, Sarah Clarke, Paulina Gutiérrez, Judy Taing (ARTICLE 19), SAFETY OF FEMALE JOURNALISTS ONLINE - A #SOFJO Resource Guide, OSCE, 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/9/468861_0.pdf [post_title] => Out from under the bridge: Trolling and harassment of independent media in Kyrgyzstan [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => out-from-under-the-bridge-trolling-and-harassment-of-independent-media-in-kyrgyzstan [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-28 21:13:53 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-28 20:13:53 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5566 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [28] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5563 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-03-01 00:01:58 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-28 23:01:58 [post_content] => Summary It has been more than two decades since the Kyrgyz Republic became independent.  At that time, Kyrgyzstan had an ambitious agenda to become a ‘Switzerland’ of Central Asia and open up the country to new opportunities, embrace the market economy and become a true democracy where human rights are respected and protected. However, despite these initial goals, true and meaningful reforms never took place because of the three main factors that have driven these trends and directly impacting the protection and implementation of human rights. The factors are: the endemic corruption, the lack of political will and the culture of impunity, or ‘legal mentality’, a mindset where people believe that there will be no consequences for ignoring or subverting the legal process, and lack of respect for the rule of law. In order to overcome these obstacles, the Government of Kyrgyzstan as well as the international community must agree on a road map on how to better protect the rights of the people of Kyrgyzstan and especially the vulnerable and marginalised. The road map should include a conditionality rule that requires the Government to protect human rights in order to receive large aid packages or financial loans or technical assistance. In other words, the human rights agenda should always be front and center of the internal policies, and be a main objective during the external negotiations or evaluations of progress.   Background Kyrgyzstan is a small landlocked country in Central Asia, located south of Kazakhstan and west of China, which gained its independence in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[1] The population of the country is slightly over six million people, with the majority of people living in rural areas and 32 per cent of the population living under the poverty line.[2]   In the earlier stages of independence, Kyrgyzstan was consistently called the ‘Switzerland’ of Central Asia, illustrating the international community’s hopes for the country and its potential to become an ‘island of democracy’ in the region.[3] Kyrgyzstan joined many international organisations and ratified the main human rights conventions.[4] For example, in 1992, Kyrgyzstan became the member of the World Bank, in 1994, Kyrgyzstan was the first among Central Asian republics to accede to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in 1998 was the first country of the former Soviet republics to join the World Trade Organization.[5]   Although the country took these important steps to become a democracy, through the years the Government of Kyrgyzstan has not respected, promoted, protected, and fulfilled its human rights obligations or its democratic promise. The country is considered to be only partially free by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report, with a score of 38/100.[6] It is battling endemic corruption and was placed at 126th out of 180 on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI).[7] The rule of law reforms have stalled and the 2020 WJP rule of law index was at 0.48 or 87th place out of 128 countries; judicial independence remains elusive with the score of three out of seven, placing it at 106th out of 141 in the 2019 Global Competitiveness Index; and the country’s overall human rights record is worsening.[8]   The leaders of Kyrgyzstan fell into a disappointingly familiar cycle of retrenchment and backsliding on human rights and reforms. The first President, Askar Akayev, was elected in October 1991. Initially he positioned himself as a reformer and a moderate leader.[9] However, in his later years in office, he became more authoritarian by suppressing opposition members, more corrupt by allowing his family and others become enriched on local resources, and more willing to let lapse those international and local rules that might have reigned in his corruption.[10] This behaviour led to the ‘Tulip’ revolution in March 2005, and Akayev resigned a month later.[11] The second President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected in July 2005. Despite initial optimism, his presidency was marred by many problems including a failing economy, ties to criminals and the killings of several Members of Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh), corruption and his family’s battles over lucrative businesses.[12] In 2010, another revolution forced Bakiyev to flee and President Atambayev eventually took power in December 2011, following a short stint by Rosa Otunbayeva as interim President. Atambaev’s presidency was also troubled and problematic. While some reforms took place and new amendments to the constitution were adopted during his one six-year term in office, he was connected with many corruption cases ‘ranging from the illegal privatisation of municipal property to the embezzlement of funds from infrastructure projects.’[13] In November 2017, new President Sooronbay Jeenbekov became President, in the so-called first democratic transfer of power in the country. Jeenbekov was not president for long, however, and in 2020, after contested Parliamentary elections he was forced out in another revolution, that many observers called a coup d’état.[14] While it is too early to rule on how sincerely the most recent president Sadyr Japarov’s administration will support a human rights agenda, the methods used by him and his supporters to achieve power are concerning.   During this period, the overall human rights record deteriorated - the rights of the vulnerable, minority, women and marginalised groups remain unprotected; torture practices are common; human rights defenders, journalists and lawyers are harassed, and the environment for the civil society to operate is becoming more difficult.[15] The gender inequality in society and violations against the rights of women and girls have been getting worse in spite of recent legislative amendments aimed at improving the situation.[16] Violence against women is “wide-spread” and women are subject to “domestic violence, bride kidnapping, trafficking, early marriages and physical abuse” with limited access to justice to remedy such violations.[17] The situation with the rights of people with disabilities remains to be “unsatisfactory”.[18] People with disabilities continue to be discriminated against and isolated from the community especially when it comes to the access to medical care, political participation in decision-making on disability issues and the policy-making processes, though hopes are high for improvements after the 2019 CRPD ratification.[19] The rights of minorities continue to remain a sensitive topic for the Government and society especially in the aftermath of the 2010 inter-ethnic conflict in the south of Kyrgyzstan.[20] An Uzbek minority human rights defender and journalist Azimjan Askarov was detained, tortured and prosecuted after these events.[21] Askarov passed away in prison on July 25th 2020, in spite of the 2016 UN Human Rights Committee’s decision demanding his immediate release and many other interventions and advocacy efforts by the international community.[22] The torture practices by the law enforcement bodies have been an on-going reality for the past decades and appear to be “systematic”.[23] For example, in the first half of 2019, there were 171 allegations of torture registered in Kyrgyzstan and only in 11 cases prosecutors opened and investigated the cases.[24] The situation of human rights of the LGBTQ people remains challenging when violations, hate crimes and discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation are “menacingly systematic” and continuing.[25]   While many factors could account for these failures, the three most relevant reasons hindering the protection and enforcement of human rights are corruption, the lack of political will to protect human rights and the culture of impunity, i.e. legal mentality that allows a continuing culture of disrespect for the rule of law and human rights. These reasons affect human rights directly because the core of these human rights lie in protection of the most vulnerable and marginalised people, thus the existence of corruption and its repugnant effects harm the vulnerable people by denying them essential government services such as social support, health services, education, as well as legal services such as access to lawyers, courts and law enforcement.[26]   Corruption In the last two decades, Kyrgyzstan, just like many other countries of the former Soviet Union, was one of the most corrupt countries in the world.[27] Though many anti-corruption laws and initiatives were enacted, this negative trend endures.[28] Kyrgyzstan’s corruption continues to be one of the most challenging obstacles in its overall development with a score of 29/100 in the Global Competitiveness Index and remains to be a barrier for rule of law implementation as indicated above.[29]   The Kyrgyz people themselves recognise and react to the detrimental effects of corruption. When asked about government performance, they indicated corruption as the third most important concern (47 per cent) after health (67 per cent) and the economy (52 per cent).[30] After the June 2019 Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s (OCCRP) reporting, ‘Plunder and Patronage in the Heart of Central Asia’, on Kyrgyzstan’s customs officials’ funneling $700 million out of the country, people took to the streets and demanded accountability and investigation into these allegations.[31] In October 2020, another series of reporting on corruption by the OCCPR called ‘The Matraimov Kingdom’ was published and caused a strong public reaction right before the October parliamentary elections, which themselves were characterised as having serious allegations of vote buying.[32] The protests against corruption and other political events in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, have been on-going since.[33]   While corruption exists in many areas of society including education, health care, city utilities, the corruption in the justice system has the most detrimental effect on the implementation and enforcement of human rights. The Government should be able to protect and fulfil its international human rights obligations and rely on the legal system in place to hold perpetrators accountable whether they are state or non-state actors. A legal system should allow for the Government to, first, conduct effective investigations at the initial stages of the legal process. Second, prosecutors should establish cases with sufficient and sound evidentiary basis to send to court. Third, the courts must comply with the fair trial standards to ensure impartial, competent and fair hearings to deliver just and legally sound decisions.   In practice, the insidious effects of corruption make reaching accountability during these legal steps a very bumpy and problematic process. Due to corruption, the law enforcement bodies are known for being ineffective, unprofessional, abusive and weak. The local culture of tribalism -- where people support their relatives affiliated with the same local tribes – leads to “nepotism and unprofessional conduct, which in turns leads to operational inefficiencies.”[34] Some local police districts are influenced by local government officials making them vulnerable to partiality when investigating cases.[35] Victims often have a difficult time convincing police officers to even register complaints in part because of the pervasive corruption and, in part, because of the legal culture discussed below. For example, in 2019, there were 9,000 cases of domestic violence. Of those, approximately 5,456 cases were registered with the authorities as administrative cases, and only around 784 were registered as criminal.[36] Bribery, as a form of corruption, of law enforcement bodies remains common among citizens in order to avoid investigation or prosecution.[37] When asked if respondents or members of their families paid a bribe to police in the previous year when they came into contact with the service, 61 per cent replied positively which indicates that bribing police officials is a common practice.[38] While legislation exists to prohibit corruption including bribery, the laws overall have mostly declarative nature and do not envision detailed mechanisms of implementation.[39]   Extortion by law enforcement officers of those accused in the form of threatened arbitrary arrests, torture and the potential criminal prosecution is also quite common.[40] For example, police targets the members of the marginalised community and LGBT people to extort money from them. The Human Rights Watch reported that police tortured and extorted money from gay men and threaten them not to seek accountability.[41] When one of such victims, Mikhail Kudryashov, tried to demand remedies, the court did not adjudicate his case, thus, contributing to the culture of impunity and lack of accountability.[42]   Further, there is no relief from corruption when a case gets to the courts - the bribes and cash payments in relation to judicial decisions are among the highest in the world.[43] The judges and judiciary in general are vulnerable to corruption in part because of the politicised system of judicial appointments and low salaries for judicial personnel.[44] In 2010, a new Council for the Selection of judges was introduced and was tasked with the selection of candidates for the judges to the Constitutional, Supreme and local courts to be appointed by the President and the Parliament. Although the council did not include any representatives from the executive brunch, the two-third of the council consisted of the members of the political parties in parliament making the appointment process vulnerable to political influence.[45] The judicial branch is also dependent on the executive branch because the executive is responsible for the budget allocation.[46]   Many attempts have been made to reform and eradicate corruption in the justice system, but with limited success. In 2019, the Kyrgyz Government, with the support of donors, adopted a number of changes to the local laws attempting to eliminate “repressive measures” and develop “new methods” to better protection of human rights.[47] The reforms aimed to, among other things, shift the authority in investigative actions from prosecutors to courts, create an office of investigative judge, introduce a new system of probation, digitise courtrooms and investigative offices, and create a unified register.[48] It is still too early to see any marked improvements.   Other initiatives also supported by foreign donors include the EU’s 12.2 million euro rule of law programmes that have been running since 2014 and are focusing to increase the “effectiveness of judicial administration by creating transparency and credibility within judicial and court structures and fighting corruption.”[49] The United States Agency for International Development (USIAD) funded and implemented numerous programmes over the past years to support the Kyrgyz judiciary.[50] For example, in 2008-2010, USAID administered the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) Threshold programme of $16 million, which supported reforms in the judiciary, as well as in prosecutorial services, to fight corruption.[51] The e-justice programme implemented through the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) was another USAID-funded initiative which assisted with the creation of a country-wide portal www.sot.kg that aims to make all court decisions available to the public by digitising them.[52] The most recent project funded by the USAID is a $3.2 million programme to “increase public trust in the Judiciary as an independent branch of power”.[53] While all these initiatives are very much needed, they are not always sustainable nor fully implemented once the grants money runs out, meaning that ultimately the local government is not held accountable for delivering long-term change.   Lack of political will power The second factor that contributes to poor human rights protection is the lack of political will when the key decision makers fail to understand, implement and ensure that the policy solutions for human rights protections are carried out.[54] Former Presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Akayev, Bakiyev, Atambaev, Jeenbekov, and their administrations all lacked the necessary political will and failed to deliver and implement needed reforms to ensure sufficient protection of human rights. The reasons for this lack of political will are multifaced and complex, but corruption, abuse of office for personal gain, ties to the criminal world, and corrupt personal agenda seem to top the list.   While the first President Akayev was publicly outlining ambitious plans to build a new democratic and independent country where the rule of law prevailed, his era was characterised by limited support, funding and follow-through of human rights policies, plans and programmes. Akayev’s personnel policy of keeping the ‘old guard’ at the important regional governor positions as well as to staff other top seats of power with a close tribal network did not promote reform, as those leaders did not understand, implement and enforce the new policies in the regions, ensuring that his administration’s commitment to reform would fail.[55]   With President Bakiyev, the human rights agenda took a back seat when his close circle engaged in power grabs, dealing with criminal elements, and dividing lucrative contracts and businesses. The next two presidents, Atambaev and Jeenbekov, had followed similar patterns where their administrations did not have either true commitment to reform, nor had clear ideas or understanding of the policy solutions require to implement and deliver solutions to specific problems.[56] Such approaches certainly undermined the reform process and demonstrated the lack of political will to deliver basic rule of law to the public.   People’s ‘legal mentality’ - the culture of impunity and disrespect for the rule of law The third issue responsible for the poor record of human rights is people’s ‘legal mentality’, i.e. the culture of impunity and the low level of respect and understanding of the concepts of the rule of law.[57] The laws protecting human rights are not implemented and do not work in practice if people do not believe in those laws, do not trust them and do not think there is accountability for violating them. As a result, such beliefs ultimately shape the attitudes and lead to behaviours where violating the law becomes a norm for both state-actors and citizens.   The culture of the rule of law is a complex and multifaceted concept in practice and there are vast resources, literature and manuals exist on the topic.[58] In Kyrgyzstan, the low culture of respect for the rule of law has its origins from the Soviet culture, where transparency, equality and accountability were an uncommon practice and ‘telephone justice’ was a norm.[59] In the current conditions of Kyrgyzstan, for example, lawyers (less so judges and prosecutors) are assaulted in or outside the courtroom by the members of the community because of the lack of understanding of the role of the legal profession as the lawyers are often identified with their clients and because of the lack of the accountability and consequences for such behaviour.[60] Similarly, the victims of gender violence would often be harassed not only by the perpetrator’s family, but also by the members of the larger community, as well as law enforcement and prosecutors because of their ignorance of the laws and wide-spread misogyny and sexism.[61]   To change this legal mentality towards the rule of law, there should be a desire from the community to make appropriate changes – both the Government and civil society.[62] In 2016, the Kyrgyz Government seemingly understood the problem and adopted a resolution on the Concept of Increasing of Legal Culture of the Population of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2016-2020 (Concept).[63] The concept aimed to “introduce a systematic approach to improve the legal culture, including legal training and education of the population, formation of modern legal culture and behaviour.”[64] The concept outlined a set of objectives and an action plan to reach those goals by raising awareness among the public and setting up educational initiatives to inform young generation about the importance of following the laws, by working with the local media to create relevant public campaigns, and by coordinating with the government agencies to ensure the implementation of these objectives. For example, one of such activity under this Concept was the ‘bus of solidarity’ initiative where a group of local lawyers traveled to remote areas of Chui and Osh regions to provide free legal advice, servicing 4,145 people in 2016-2017 and approximately 4,000 people in 2020.[65]   Other advocacy campaigns took place to achieve these goals. In 2008, the above mentioned MCC Threshold anti-corruption programme created cartoons for children highlighting human values that stealing, lying and cheating are not good behaviours and are not acceptable by their families, their community and the country.[66] In 2014, similar public awareness campaigns, competitions, art exhibits, and programmes also took place to improve the legal culture and to fight the culture of impunity.[67] While such individual programmes and actions may have been a success at that time, the consistency of the message and sustainability of such efforts is lacking. Without appropriate support from all stakeholders, it will likely take years to make a measurable difference in local legal culture. It remains an open question if the new administration will see this as a problem worth addressing.   Conclusion and Recommendations The path forward for Kyrgyzstan is a challenging one and difficult choices and coordinated action must be made if there will be a serious attempt to bring real reform and respect for rule of law, and thus providing for better protection for human rights. That said, Kyrgyzstan faces an important decision point – rule of law leads to greater prosperity and integration with the international community. Continued endemic corruption leads to stagnation and instability. It is not too late for Kyrgyzstan to pursue tangible reforms even in times of political instability. That said, the longer these reforms are delayed, the more difficult they will be to bring to conclusion. Given Kyrgyzstan’s low culture of rule of law, at a certain point, existing systems will not be able to bear the pain and uncertainty that long-term reforms necessitate. In order to improve the situation for the protection of human rights in Kyrgyzstan, all stakeholders have a role to play:  
  • The Kyrgyz Government have to demonstrate commitment and put the human rights agenda front and center into their internal policies using a human rights-based approach;
  • The Kyrgyz Government has to respect, promote, protect and fulfil its international human rights obligations, failure to do so may trigger conditions of the financial and technical assistance;
  • The Kyrgyz Government have to show political will and true commitment to combat corruption and improve the rule of law;
  • The Kyrgyz Government should continue its work on improving the legal mentality and educating the population on the importance of the rule of law and respect for the legal norms;
  • Local civil society should continue to monitor the human rights situation, report on any violations and raise awareness both locally and with the international community;
  • Local civil society should also be more unified and show more solidarity when it comes to the protecting their professional rights and their interests, for example, for the lawyers, journalists, minorities, and marginalised groups;
  • The international community should use their leverage and put conditions that the human rights agenda and rule of law are included and are addressed by the local government when negotiating for potential loans or financial assistance programs; and
  • The international community and donors should continue to provide assistance in a demand driven way supporting the human rights defenders, civils society organisations and empowering local communities to continue the reforms and make changes for the better.
  Jasmine Cameron, Esq., is a US-trained human rights lawyer, originally from Kyrgyzstan. Jasmine has been working for the US Government and non-profit organizations and living overseas for many years. She was implementing the rule of law and human rights programs in the regions of Europe and Eurasia.   Image by Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic to Switzerland.   [1] CIA: The World Fact Book, Kyrgyzstan, The World Factbook, CIA.gov, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/kyrgyzstan/ [2] Ibid. [3] The Frontline World, Kyrgyzstan, The Kidnapped Bride, PBS, March 2004, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/kyrgyzstan/facts.html [4] OHCHR, View the ratification status by country or by treaty, Ratification Status for Kyrgyzstan, United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=93&Lang=EN. In 1994, Kyrgyzstan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (CESSR), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). In 1997, it joined the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), as well as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). In 2003, Kyrgyzstan joined the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW). Most recently, in 2019, Kyrgyzstan joined the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). [5] Ibid. See also World Trade Organization, Kyrgyz Republic to become WTO member, October 1998, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres98_e/pr114_e.htm; see also United Nations, Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26459VNR_2020_Kyrgyzstan_Report_English.pdf [6] Freedom House, 2020 Freedom in the World Report, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/kyrgyzstan/facts.html [7] Transparency International, Annual Report, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kyrgyzstan. It also gives the score of 31 out of 100 (0 - highly corrupt and 100 - very clean), though this score is an improvement from the years before, for example, in 2012 Kyrgyzstan had the score of 154. [8] World Justice Project, WJP 2020 Rule of Law Index, https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2020; World Economic Forum’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Index, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/kyrgyzstan/facts.html; Human Rights Watch, 2021 World Report Kyrgyzstan, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan;  Amnesty International, Kyrgyzstan, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/kyrgyzstan/report-kyrgyzstan/ [9] Regine A. Spector, The Transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan, University of California, Berkeley, Spring 2004, https://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/2004_02-spec.pdf [10] RFE/RL, Central Asia Report: August 22, 2002, RFE/RL, August 2002, https://www.rferl.org/a/1342268.html [11] International Crisis Group, Kyrgyzstan After the Revolution, May 2005, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/09/29/icg_05042005.pdf [12] BBC NEWS, Kyrgyz MP shot dead in Bishkek, May 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4759301.stm; BBC NEWS, Kyrgyz rally against corruption, April 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4958146.stm [13] Satina Aidar, What we know about alleged elite corruption under former Kyrgyz president Almazbek Atambayev, openDemocracy, October 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/what-we-know-about-alleged-elite-corruption-under-former-kyrgyz-president-almazbek-atambayev/ [14] Vladimir Pirogov, Coup d'etat 'under way' as Kyrgyzstan opposition claims power, The Sydney Morning Herald, October 2020, https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/coup-d-etat-under-way-as-kyrgyzstan-opposition-claims-power-20201006-p562lo.html [15] Human Rights Watch, Kyrgyzstan: Events of 2019, (HRW 2019 Report), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan; see also Amnesty International, Kyrgyzstan, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/kyrgyzstan/report-kyrgyzstan/; see also Committee to Protect Journalist (CPJ): Kyrgyzstan, 2020, https://cpj.org/europe/kyrgyzstan/2020/; see situation with human rights defenders at Frontline Defenders, Kyrgyzstan, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/kyrgyzstan; see also the situation with lawyers Legal Clinic Adilet’s Report on Lawyers, http://www.adilet.kg/en/news/full/415; see also Kyrgyzstan’s Bar Association’s Public Letter to the Kyrgyz President on concerning trends of attacks on lawyers, www.advokatura.kg/foto/obrashchenie-k-prezidentu-kyrgyzskoy-respubliki; Radio Azattyk, Osh: The lawyer says that he was under surveillance and eavesdropping, November 2020, https://www.azattyk.org/a/30966296.html [16] Human Rights Watch, Kyrgyzstan: Events of 2019, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan [17] UN Women, Kyrgyzstan, https://eca.unwomen.org/en/where-we-are/kyrgyzstan; see also American Bar Association, Center for Human Rights: Violence against Women in Kyrgyzstan: Barriers to Accessing Justice, Fair Trial Rights, and the Right of Peaceful Assembly, December 2020, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/reports/violence-against-women-in-kyrgyzstan--barriers-to-accessing-just/; see also American Bar Association, Center for Human Rights, Trial Observation Report: Kyrgyzstan vs. Gulzhan Pasanova, May 2020, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/reports/kyrgyzstan_vs_Gulzhan_Pasanova1/ [18] Gulmira Kazakunova, Kyrgyzstan’s Social Protection Measures and Programmes, United Nations, June 2018, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/06/3-1.pdf [19] Amnesty International, One year after CRPD ratification in Kyrgyzstan, March 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2020/03/one-year-after-crpd-ratification-in-kyrgyzstan/ [20] Minority Rights Group International, Kyrgyzstan, https://minorityrights.org/country/kyrgyzstan/. Kyrgyzstan also got a 55 place in 2020 on the people under threat index that identifies communities facing potential threats of genocide, mass killing, or systematic repressions. [21] Human rights Watch, Kyrgyzstan: Travesty of Justice for Rights Defender, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/24/kyrgyzstan-travesty-justice-rights-defender [22] Committee to Protect Journalists,  Azimjan Askarov, https://cpj.org/campaigns/azimjon-askarov/; also see,  OHCHR | Release Azimjan Askarov and quash his conviction, UN human rights experts urge Kyrgyzstan, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19853&LangID=E; see the UN Human Rights Committee’s decision at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/116/D/2231/2012&Lang=en ; US State Department, 2014 Human Rights Defender Award Ceremony for Azimjan Askarov and Foro Penal, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244903.htm; Human Rights Watch, Joint Letter to the EU on Detention of Azimjan Askarov in Kyrgyzstan, November 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/06/joint-letter-eu-detention-azimjon-askarov-kyrgyzstan [23] Olga Dolzhenkova and Alexandra Vasilkova, The History Of Torture In Kyrgyzstan: "Used Combat Sambo Techniques To Protect Oneself", CABAR, July 2020, https://longreads.cabar.asia/the-history-of-torture-in-kyrgyzstan [24] US Department of State, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kyrgyz Republic (DOS 2019 HRPR), https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/kyrgyzstan/ [25] Joint submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review, Kyrgyzstan: Human Rights Violations Of LGBT, https://ilga.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Shadow-report-15.pdf; Human rights Watch, 2019 World Report, Kyrgyzstan, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan [26] Lucy Koechlin and Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmon, Corruption and human rights: exploring the connection. [27] Robert Legvold, Corruption, Global Security, and World Order, Corruption, the Criminalized State and Post-Soviet Transition. [28] OECD, Kyrgyzstan, Anti-Corruption Reforms in Kyrgyzstan, March 2015, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Kyrgyzstan-Round-3-Monitoring-Report-ENG.pdf [29] OECD, Kyrgyzstan anti-corruption project, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/kyrgyzstananti-corruptionproject.htm [30]  Transparency International, Corruption Barometer, Annual Report Kyrgyzstan, 2016 https://www.transparency.kg/files/AnnualReport2016.pdf [31] OCCRP, Plunder and Patronage in the Heart of Central Asia, November 2019, https://www.occrp.org/en/plunder-and-patronage/; US News, World News, Hundreds Protest Over Kyrgyz Corruption Report, November 2019, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2019-11-25/hundreds-protest-over-kyrgyz-corruption-report [32] OCCPR, The Matraimov Kingdom, October 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/the-matraimov-kingdom/; see also, OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Kyrgyzstan, ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission, October 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/a/472461_0.pdf [33] RFE/RL, Kyrgyz Activists Rally Against Corruption, February 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-activists-rally-against-corruption/31102170.html [34] Risk and Compliance Portal, Kyrgyzstan Country Report, July 2020, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/kyrgyzstan/ [35] Ibid. [36] Human Rights Watch, Kyrgyzstan – Events of 2018, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan#e81181 [37] Risk and Compliance Portal, Kyrgyzstan Country Report, July 2020, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/kyrgyzstan/ [38] OECD, Kyrgyzstan, Anti-Corruption Reforms in Kyrgyzstan, March 2015, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Kyrgyzstan-Round-3-Monitoring-Report-ENG.pdf [39] Ibid [40] U.S. Department of State, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kyrgyz Republic, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/kyrgyzstan/ [41]Human rights Watch, Kyrgyzstan: Police torture gay men, https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/kyrgyzstan [42] Ibid. [43] Risk and Compliance Portal, Kyrgyzstan Country Report, July 2020, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/kyrgyzstan/ [44] Transparency International, Kyrgyzstan: Overview of Corruption and anti-corruption, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kyrgyzstan;  see also Sustainable Development Goals, Voluntary Review of the Kyrgyz Republic, p. 121, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26459VNR_2020_Kyrgyzstan_Report_English.pdf [45] Transparency International, Kyrgyzstan: Overview of Corruption and anti-corruption, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kyrgyzstan [46] Ibid. [47] Sustainable Development Goals, Voluntary Review of the Kyrgyz Republic, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26459VNR_2020_Kyrgyzstan_Report_English.pdf [48] TI Report, at p. 8 and Voluntary Review, at p. 122. [49] IRZ, Kyrgyzstan: The Rule of Law Programme in the Kyrgyz Republic – 2nd phase (ROLPRO2), April 2020, https://www.irz.de/index.php/en/projects/74-kirgisistan-eu-projekte/1771-kyrgyzstan-the-rule-of-law-programme-in-the-kyrgyz-republic [50] USAID, U.S. Foreign Aid by Country, https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/KGZ?fiscal_year=2021&measure=Obligations [51] Millennium Challenge Corporation, Kyrgyz Republic Threshold Program, https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/kyrgyz-republic-threshold-program [52] International Development Legal Organization, E-Nabling Sustainable Development: Lessons From E-Justice Programming In Kyrgyzstan, December 2018, https://www.idlo.int/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/IDLO%20-%20LLB%20-%20E-Justice%20-%20December2018.pdf [53] USAID, Trusted Judiciary, Fact Sheet, Kyrgyz Republic, https://www.usaid.gov/kyrgyz-republic/fact-sheets/trusted-judiciary [54] Since the 2000s, a term of political will has been defined, measured and mapped, and applied to many scenarios in the newly created states of the former Soviet states. The scholars define the political will as the extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem. In other words, a set of decision-makers with a common understanding of a particular problem on the formal agenda is committed to supporting – a commonly perceived, potentially effective policy solution. See: Lori A. Post, Amber N. W. Raile, and Eric D. Raile, Defining Political Will, Montana State University, August 2010, https://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1/14420/Raile_PoliticsPolicy2010_A1b.pdf;jsessionid=56375A117171857854D2CF29975F8C84?sequence=1 [55] Regine A. Spector, "The Transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan, University of California, Berkeley, 2004, https://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/2004_02-spec.pdf [56] Satina Aidar, What we know about alleged elite corruption under former Kyrgyz president Almazbek Atambayev, openDemocracy, October 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/what-we-know-about-alleged-elite-corruption-under-former-kyrgyz-president-almazbek-atambayev/; see also Bertelsmann Stiftung, Transformation Index, Country Report 2020 Kyrgyzstan, https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report-KGZ.html#pos15 [57] This is a self-made term and is not commonly used, in the relevant literature it’s more likely referred to as the culture of impunity or legal culture. However, I prefer to use the term of ‘legal mentality’, as the term incorporates the idea of people’s mindset towards the rule of law culture. [58] United Nations and the Rule of Law, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/; see also Leanne McKay, Toward-a-Rule-of-Law-Culture, United States Institute of Peace, 2015, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Toward-a-Rule-of-Law-Culture_Practical-Guide_0.pdf; see also Center for Teaching the Rule of Law, Educational Resources, https://www.thecenterforruleoflaw.org/educational-resources.html [59] UNDP in Kyrgyz Republic, The legal culture starts from me, from you, from us, from each member of the society, September 2020, https://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/presscenter/articles/2020/08/legal-culture-starts-with-every-member-of-society.html; see also Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic, On approval of the Concept of increasing the legal culture of the population of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2016–2020, http://minjust.gov.kg/en/content/755; See also International Crises Group, Kyrgyzstan: The Challenge of Judicial Reform, April 2008, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan-challenge-judicial-reform [60] Lawyers for Lawyers, Surveys of Working Conditions Lawyers, https://lawyersforlawyers.org/en/survey-of-working-conditions-lawyers/ [61] American Bar Association, Center for Human Rights, Trial Observation Report: Kyrgyzstan vs. Gulzhan Pasanova, May 2020, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/reports/kyrgyzstan_vs_Gulzhan_Pasanova1/ [62] Leanne McKay, Toward-a-Rule-of-Law-Culture,  United States Institute of Peace, 2015, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Toward-a-Rule-of-Law-Culture_Practical-Guide_0.pdf [63] Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic, On approval of the Concept of increasing the legal culture of the population of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2016–2020, http://minjust.gov.kg/en/content/755 [64] UNDP in Kyrgyz Republic, Towards a sustainable access to justice for legal empowerment in the Kyrgyz Republic, https://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/projects/towards-a-sustainable-access-to-justice-for-legal-empowerment-in0.html [65] UNDP in Kyrgyz Republic, 4,000 People Received Legal Aid Within Six Days, December 2020, https://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2020/12/fla-decade.html [66] Aljazeera, Kyrgyzstan cartoon takes aims at corruption, YouTube, December 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y6-2o4P4TSY. I was honored to be part of this initiative by helping to create and manage this project. [67] OECD Report, p. 28. [post_title] => Kyrgyzstan: Why human rights have been declining over the last 20 years and what happened to the ‘Switzerland’ of Central Asia? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => kyrgyzstan-why-human-rights-have-been-declining-over-the-last-20-years-and-what-happened-to-the-switzerland-of-central-asia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-28 20:59:31 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-28 19:59:31 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5563 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [29] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5511 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-02-24 00:00:16 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-23 23:00:16 [post_content] => Jimmy Savile was first reported to the police in the 1980s.   Harvey Weinstein’s first alleged act of rape was in 1993.   Lance Armstrong faced his first doping allegations in 1998.   It would be comforting to conclude from the above that we've got better over time at holding the powerful to account. That journalists have got more incisive, activists have got more organised, whistleblowers have got more discrete.   The painful reality, however, is that it can take decades to hold the rich and powerful to account, even when evidence is plentiful and the crimes in question are considered “open secrets”.[1]   The many victims of benighted “national treasure” Jimmy Savile, of course, were still awaiting accountability when his 7ft gold coffin was being lowered into the ground in November 2011.[2] A lot has been written about how Savile was able to block efforts throughout his life to expose him: his cosy relationship with the political establishment, the seductive power of his celebrity, or his ability to “hide in plain sight”.[3] Those who knew Saville best, however, attribute his ability to evade accountability to a more traditional psychological barrier: fear.   As a former semi-pro wrestler, Jimmy Savile knew a thing or two about inspiring fear in people. As a transcript of a 2009 police interview makes clear, however, Savile didn’t need to rely on his physical presence to intimidate his critics into silence.[4] In the interview, Savile spoke about his “policy” towards those who accused him of sexual abuse: to respond to the allegations with lawsuits. Savile boasted that he had threatened newspapers which had published accusations against him “and not one of them wanted to finish up in court with me so they all settled out of court”. As Savile noted, very few cases actually ever made it to court; most of the time all it took was a legal threat for his accusers to “run away and say ‘shush pay him up’”.   What Savile was describing was something we would now recognise as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs): abusive lawsuits designed to shut down critical speech. Chances are you’ve never heard of a SLAPP, but you’ll almost certainly be familiar with the way they operate. If you’ve ever watched a documentary, listened to a podcast, or read an essay on large-scale institutional abuse – and the subsequent efforts to expose that abuse - then you’ll recognise the part of the story in which the abuser uses lawsuits to block accountability. It might be the NXIVM cult, the Paradise Papers, child sexual abuse by Catholic priests, or Scientology (L. Ron Hubbard himself once advised that “the law can be used very easily to harass, and enough harassment on somebody… will generally be sufficient to cause his professional decease”).[5] It might be a sexual predator such as Weinstein or a serial cheat such as Armstrong, both of whom used legal threats and lawsuits to block reporting on their wrongdoing (the Sunday Times, which had first raised questions about Armstrong's performance in 1999, recovered a £300,000 settlement he had taken from the paper in 2004 after Armstrong publicly admitted to doping in 2013).[6]   Whatever abuse of power you choose to look at, the same rule holds true: its exposure is generally preceded by years – and sometimes decades - of legal intimidation.   Of course, most people accept that public participation is an indispensable component of any functioning democracy. How then are those who use SLAPP able to get away with these tactics?   There are three main reasons for the enduring success of SLAPPs, a full understanding of which can help inform the way we respond and build resilience to their use.   First of all, few people know what a ‘SLAPP’ is. When hearing about a civil lawsuit targeting acts of public participation, most people are therefore unlikely to associate this with human rights. In fact, if we’re being honest, they’re most likely to hear the words ‘civil lawsuit’ and switch off altogether. Without an understanding of the implications of SLAPPs on free speech and assembly rights, it is easy for SLAPP filers to frame their legal attack as a bog-standard civil dispute between two ideologically opposing parties.   Second of all, as Savile himself said in the quote above – most of the time, SLAPP filers never actually have to go to court. SLAPPs work by exploiting the imbalance of power between the plaintiff and the defendant. Most of those targeted don’t have the resources, the time, or the legal knowledge to fight off the legal attack. More often than not, therefore, the SLAPP victim will retract the criticism and issue an apology before the matter ever reaches court.   Third of all, SLAPP filers will often take steps to marginalise and discredit their target. Large-scale legal assaults on public watchdogs are frequently accompanied by PR offensives designed to undermine the credibility of the victim. In doing so, the SLAPP filer can attack their target without fear of public backlash. It’s one thing for a corporation to sue an activist or a journalist, for example – it’s quite another thing to sue an ecoterrorist or a propagator of fake news.   If SLAPPs work by isolating the target, however, there’s a straightforward way they can be countered: by building solidarity across civil society. By responding vigorously to the use of SLAPPs against public watchdogs, irrespective of who’s being targeted, NGOs and media organisations can make it clear that such efforts to divide and fragment civil society will not be possible. In the process, civil society groups can work together to address the other two factors underpinning the success of SLAPPs: they can raise awareness of SLAPPs, thereby stripping away the façade of legitimacy the legal process can create, and they can embolden recipients of legal threats to take a stand and resist efforts to bully them into silence.   That’s why anti-SLAPP coalitions have emerged in the USA, France, South Africa – and now continental Europe. In the USA, the Protect the Protest coalition appropriated the old NATO slogan, “an attack on one is an attack on all”, to signal the willingness of coalition members to take action when another coalition member is attacked. We have shamelessly used the same slogan on the front page of our new European coalition website, which will be launched in an online event on 26 March.   Around the world the fortunes of legal bullies are declining in the face of the ever-strengthening solidarity of civil society. If you would like to join the fight, or if you have yourself been victimised by these legal intimidation tactics, the Coalition Against SLAPPs in Europe (CASE) would love to hear from you.   The Coalition Against SLAPPs in Europe (CASE), a new anti-SLAPP website, has now been launched. You can access it here.   Charlie Holt is Legal Counsel for Campaigns at Greenpeace International (GPI). He advises on legal strategy to advance Greenpeace campaign goals and leads the development of GPI's anti-SLAPP strategy, with a particular focus on SLAPP resilience in the USA and Europe. Greenpeace International is one of over 25 organisations that have formed the Coalition Against SLAPPs in Europe (CASE). Amongst other initiatives, the coalition’s members have drafted a proposed an EU Anti-SLAPP Directive, which was published in December 2020.   [1] Jimmy Savile’s behaviour was ‘open secret’ as early as 1973, The Irish Times, February 2015, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/jimmy-savile-s-behaviour-was-open-secret-as-early-as-1973-1.2118376#:~:text=Evidence%20from%20Savile's%20victims%20at,monitoring%20or%20supervision%20in%20place%E2%80%9D [2] David Gilbert, Jimmy Saville: National treasure in life, reviled ‘sex abuser’ in death, CNN, January 2013, https://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/23/world/europe/jimmy-savile-profile/index.html [3] Saville used his celebrity to ‘hide in plain sight’, itv News, January 2013, https://www.itv.com/news/update/2013-01-11/savile-used-celebrity-to-hide-in-plain-sight/#:~:text=A%20senior%20police%20officer%20today,a%20scale%20never%20seen%20before. [4] Ben Quinn, Jimmy Saville: transcripts reveals ‘policy’ used to halt abuse claims, The Guardian, October 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/15/jimmy-savile-boasted-police-abuse [5] Sarah Berman, What It’s Like to Be Surveilled and Sued by MXIVM, Vice, June 2019, https://www.vice.com/en/article/j5wk88/what-its-like-to-be-surveilled-and-sued-by-nxivm; Business & Human Rights Resources Centre, Appleby lawsuit against BBC & The Guardian (re Paradise Papers), September 2018, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/appleby-lawsuit-against-bbc-the-guardian-re-paradise-papers; Deena Yellin, ‘I felt abaonded’: Catholic priests turn to defamation lawsuits to fight sex abuse claims, northjersey.com, February 2021, https://eu.northjersey.com/story/news/local/2021/02/09/catholic-priests-turn-defamation-lawsuits-fight-sex-abuse-claims/4163290001/; Edward Helmore, TV ‘exposure’ of Scientology halted by UK libel law split, The Guardian, April 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/18/scientology-tv-exposure-halted-uk-libel-law-split-going-clear; Hugh B. Urban, The Church of Scientology: A History of a New Religion, Princeton University Press, 2011, [6] Reuters Staff, Harvey Weinstein threatens to sue New York Times over harassment story, Reuters, October 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-people-harvey-weinstein-idUKKBN1CA2JX; Lance Armstrong ‘agrees Sunday Times settlement’, BBC Sport, August 2013, https://www.bbc.com/sport/cycling/23830777; Richard Sandomir, Armstrong is suing accuser, New York Times, June 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/16/sports/cycling-armstrong-is-suing-accuser.html   This article was produced as part of the Unsafe for Scrutiny project, which is kindly funded by the Justice for Journalists Foundation. [post_title] => How abusive lawsuits block accountability - and what we can do to fight back [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => how-abusive-lawsuits-block-accountability-and-what-we-can-do-to-fight-back [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-03-26 11:40:43 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-03-26 10:40:43 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5511 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [30] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5473 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-02-08 11:20:36 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-02-08 10:20:36 [post_content] => On January 31st 2021, Britain marked one full year of its first-known case of COVID-19. Since then, both the economy and key industries, including aviation have been decimated.   From February 2020, a number of countries began the slow march to restrict or close their borders, although Europe would take only limited action during the first wave between March-May. The EU would eventually impose a cross-member state approach, allowing in travellers from just eight countries without the need for quarantine. Britain then brought in border measures in June by way of its ‘travel corridor’ list: – a ‘green list’ and ‘red list’ of countries where the former allowed for leisure travel and the latter resulted in a mandatory quarantine, apart from key workers.   Border control: from slow burn to radical measures From mid-January 2021, these measures have been radically stepped up by the British Government. At this point, the British Government requires a negative test 72 hours prior to arriving for all travellers arriving from all countries.[1] Travellers – whether UK citizens or not - arriving from ‘red list’ countries (primarily southern Africa, South America and Portugal) will be routed to mandatory hotel quarantine from February 15th.[2]   The recent tightening of measures by the British Government, echoed by governments across Europe as well as Canada and the USA, is not necessarily a reflection of lessons learned, but rather a hurried response to the emergence of a host of new variants of the COVID-19 virus now threatening to increase the burden on already overstretched healthcare systems. It is worth highlighting that the travel restrictions recently adopted by many Western nations including Britain have been in use for nearly a year in parts of Asia and Oceania that have achieved ‘COVID zero’ – the near-elimination of the prevalence of the virus through initially strict restrictions and long-term border closures. Australia and New Zealand are exemplars in this respect. Yet, for European nations including Britain, wholesale travel restrictions such as these are still a relatively new tool in the anti-COVID arsenal.   Aviation woes For the global aviation industry, a bruising year of 2020 now threatens to turn cataclysmic. In the UK, projections by Heathrow Airport predicted a scenario in which fully half of the estimated 135,000 employees that rely on the output of this unique economic municipality would lose their jobs in 2021.[3] Gatwick Airport announced plans to reduce its workforce by around a third in the summer of 2020, with over 80 per cent of staff on furlough in July 2020.[4] Yet, these predictions and announcement were made in September 2020, prior to the introduction of mandatory testing on arrival and hotel quarantines.   These and other acute pressures on the sector are only increasing and if 2020 can be considered disastrous, 2021 threatens to be cataclysmic the longer these restrictions are maintained. Whilst the UK Government has extended measures to assist businesses of all kind including the furlough scheme and various forms of financial support (mainly in the form of loans and grants), it is clear that the aviation sector will require its own unique measures if it is to survive. There have been suggestions of suspending business rates on airports and Passenger Air Duty as a means of alleviating some pressure and creating the potential for growth.[5]   Vaccine corridors Of course, the stringent travel measures recently introduced in January 2021 are ironically part of the evolving landscape of recovery in which the hope of slow but steady nation-wide vaccine rollout has begun. On January 29th, the fifth vaccine ordered by the UK – manufactured by Johnson and Johnson - revealed positive efficacy results on its one-jab application, further increasing hope that the UK will achieve its objective of vaccinating the entire adult population by September 2021.[6] The UK has already achieved some success with its existing vaccine rollout, heavily dependent on Pfizer and AstraZeneca. The Government’s goal is to achieve (or at least come very close) to vaccinating the four most vulnerable categories by February 15th 2021, an estimated 15 million individuals who will have a high degree of immunity to the virus from the first of two jabs.[7]   In the EU, the region-wide rollout has descended from turf wars between the European Commission and the 27 Member States to an outright cage fight, with AstraZeneca initially announcing it would deliver around 31 million dosages when compared to the pre-contracted 80 million doses promised  in the first quarter of 2021. The AstraZeneca announcement came hard on the heels of Pfizer’s own announcement of a temporary reduction in output of its long-term production capacity and delays from Moderna. The EU - already lagging behind the UK, the USA and Canada in approving these three vaccines – was under severe pressure. It attempted to take the initiative with an export register that would force companies to inform the European Commission of the amount of vaccine dosages leaving the bloc.   This threatened to backfire spectacularly when at the end of January Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen hastily announced the EU would resort to Article 16 of the EU-UK trade deal and impose a de facto vaccine border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Within hours, Von Der Leyen was forced into a humiliating U-turn as criticism poured in from across the EU, as well as the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, as well as the British Government. Slowly, as tempers subsided, positives began to emerge, with AstraZeneca confirming it will deliver around nine million dosages more than it its initial forecast, and Pfizer confirming an additional 75 million dosages in the second quarter.   Across the Atlantic, the new Biden administration has promised to deliver at least 100 million jabs in 100 days in the USA, whilst Israel looks set to be the first country in the world to fully vaccinate its adult population. As vaccine immunity grows slowly in each country, in particular amongst those most susceptible to the virus, comes the hope that travel restrictions could lessen. Unfortunately, the dangers of new and potential virus variants mean that a complete revocation is unlikely, especially as most of Africa and parts of Asia look unlikely to be able to carry out any meaningful vaccinations this year.   Yet, for states that have carried out sufficient vaccination comes the prospect of vaccine corridors. In essence, this would build on the UK Government’s travel corridors concept launched in June and requires both of the ‘corridor nations’ to be sufficiently protected from COVID-19 to the extent that travellers would not be a health risk as they currently may be. This would likely involve a common approach to managing borders, namely in the shape of uniform and severe restrictions on third countries that have not been vaccinated, or are struggling with high cases, or where a new variant has provably emerged. This unanimity in external border measures has been found wanting in this last year both between and within states, but the vaccination programme presents a new hope.   In practice, these travel corridors would likely involve a small number of countries forming a collective bubble to allow some ‘normality’ of travel to return this summer. It would likely be comprised of mostly Western nations, such as the EU member states, the UK, USA, Canada and parts of the Middle East, with the eventual possibility of opening up to more countries as the vaccine rollout accelerates.   Implemented intelligently, things may begin to change, albeit slowly. For the aviation industry, any change is surely welcome, allowing airports to revive and plan to start flying again. For some ports and carriers, it may all come too late. For others, vaccine corridors may well alleviate the acute economic crisis or the sector and catalyse the path to a post-COVID world. However, the sheer organisation involved requires far more, and far better cooperation and partnership between governments, something that vaccine nationalism has unfortunately thrown into reverse, even if the production of COVID vaccines is testament to the cooperative qualities of transnational research. Operable and effective vaccine corridors will most importantly involve sacrifice, requires common-sense and demand robust protocols that are stringent and nimble in application. At a time when so little hope has prevailed, these options promise a return to mobility – a freedom that we all have taken for granted until very recently.   Professor Amelia Hadfield is the Head of the Department of Politics at the University of Surrey, and Co-Director of the Jean Monnet Centre for Britain and Europe (CBE), as well as Dean International.   Christian Turner is a graduate of Canterbury Christ Church University and the University of Kent, and a Junior Fellow of the CBE working on EU-UK foreign and security issues.   Image by U.S. Secretary of Defense under (CC).   [1] Department for Transport and Robert Courts MP, International travel update, 11 January 2021, Gov.uk, January 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/international-travel-update-11-january-2021 [2] Erenie Mullens-Burgess and Sarah Nickson, Hotel quarantine, Institute for Government, February 2021, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/hotel-quarantine [3] Charting Surrey’s Post-COVID Rescue, Recovery and Growth, University of Surrey, November 2020, p.148, https://www.surrey.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-11/charting-surreys-post-covid-rescue-recovery-and-growth.pdf [4] Ibid p.140 [5] Ibid, p.203 [6] The other vaccines as ordered by the United Kingdom that have reported phase 3 trial results are Pfizer/BioNTech, AstraZeneca/University of Oxford, Moderna and Novavax. [7] UK COVID-19 vaccines delivery plan, Department of Health & Social Care, January 2021, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/951928/uk-covid-19-vaccines-delivery-plan-final.pdf; These four groups are residents and workers in care homes; those over the age of 80 and frontline workers; those over the age of 75; and those over the age of 70 and clinically extremely vulnerable individuals. [post_title] => Saving the Red-eye to Ibiza: How vaccine corridors can open up travel again [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => saving-the-red-eye-to-ibiza-how-vaccine-corridors-can-open-up-travel-again [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-08 11:20:36 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-08 10:20:36 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5473 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 2 [filter] => raw ) [31] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5393 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-16 00:10:29 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-15 23:10:29 [post_content] => 2020 will be remembered for the Coronavirus pandemic, the end of Donald Trump’s US Presidency, and the year in which Britain finally left the EU. It was also the year in which London and Brussels missed the opportunity to lay the foundations for continued cooperation on foreign policy because of the unfolding of Brexit politics on both sides of the Channel.   Looking at the past year from its tail end, with the imminent arrival of a staunch Transatlanticist at the White House and the world in disarray, a framework to support UK-US-EU cooperation on global challenges would have energised the optimism about a different steer to international politics after four years of roller-coasting uncertainty.   Instead, in 2021 the conversation between the UK and the EU on foreign policy will have to start from scratch. Whereas the British Government led by Theresa May had expressed an interest in working with the EU on foreign and security matters which was reflected in the Political Declaration, the negotiating team of the Johnson Government showed no interest in the subject matter.[1] Throughout the year, negotiations wilfully ignored any foreign and security issue.   What does Britain want? Throughout 2020, the signs coming from the UK Government suggested that the politics of Brexit and the affirmation of British sovereignty included a deliberate detachment from any appearance of cooperation with Brussels on foreign and security policy; also for public consumption. The UK wants to move out of its European circle and take a worldwide horizon. As Boris Johnson himself put it, “we have the newly recaptured powers, we know where we want to go, and that is out into the world.”[2]   This is underscored by both the rhetoric and the poverty of practical collaboration on matters of common concern. But the rhetoric on Britain’s vision of its place in the world is still confused and confusing. The ideas circulating include the ambitions of Global Britain, the group of ten democracies, even a revival of the Five Eyes group as a political forum.[3]   To give substance to the vision of Global Britain, the Government launched an unprecedented wide-ranging Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, the results of which are still to be published. Yet the signs that Britain’s foreign policy of the next four years will be driven by ideology are strong. Ahead of the publication of the Integrated Review, the Prime Minister announced a massive investment in defence spending and a cut in overseas development aid, abandoning its international commitment of spending 0.7 per cent of GNI on development aid, a choice widely criticised as undermining the UK’s credibility as an international player.[4]   Events on the other side of the Atlantic, however, ruffled up the British Government’s feathers, which had hedged its bets on transactionalist and divisive international politics. President-elect Joe Biden’s reiteration that the US would not support any agreement with the EU that would undermine the Good Friday Agreement and his repeated insistence on reaching out to allies, with a strong emphasis on the EU, does not bode well for the UK’s Brexit-driven ideology. Since then Johnson has been playing ‘catch up’ to reach out to Washington.[5] A US Administration focused on rebuilding international cooperation will create a context more favourable to rebuilding EU-UK relations.   Haphazard EU-UK coordination Brexit politics imposed a policy of minimal and inconspicuous cooperation outside the public eye with the partners with whom the UK until recently consulted or coordinated large parts of its foreign and security policy. Private and informal conversations and information exchanges still take place at the level of practitioners, but public statements are geared towards giving the appearance of an autonomous British foreign policy and selective engagement with partners – with the EU as the least favoured, as the Brexit-driven public discourse imposes.   Recent instances show a marked preference for ad hoc cooperation only if necessary and convenient, with few key states and within formats other than the EU. On sanctions, for example, coordination has been haphazard. With respect to Belarus, the UK (with Canada) issued negative measures against individuals in Minsk before the EU (and the US) had agreed on their packages.[6] The EU and US coordinated their respective measures, but the EU was then blocked and delayed due to its own internal divisions[7] – a case in which EU internal shortcomings affect its international credibility. By contrast, the response to the poisoning of Alexei Navalny saw the two sides coordinate their responses, following the blueprint of the Skripal case of 2018.[8]   Britain once was deeply involved with the EU on crafting policy towards Libya and Turkey. With France, it led the military intervention in Libya in 2011; with respect to Turkey, it was among the architects of the EU-Turkey relations that have been in freefall for the past few years. Today, cooperation on Libya and Turkey is ostensibly confined respectively to the UN and NATO formats.   The only European format in which the UK has continued its engagement since the 2016 referendum is the E3 group formed by the France, Germany and the UK, which has continued to meet and issue joint statement regardless of Brexit negotiations. Originally formed to engage in talks with Iran, and still focused mostly on JCPOA-related matters, the group has gradually started to discuss broader issues, including since the Brexit referendum, and may be seen as an embryonic European Security Council as proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron.[9]   The view from Brussels Seen from Brussels, the struggling talks have led to a progressive loss of trust in the UK as a future partner and a hardening of the EU’s position. From the very start of Brexit talks, the EU coalesced around an unexpectedly strong defence of the Single Market and of Ireland’s sovereignty, fending off every attempt from London to undermine the unity among the member states. These have only served the purpose of bringing the EU closer together in ways that are rarely seen in other matters and that could help the EU ‘bounce back’.[10] Until the very end, the EU refused to grant the Prime Minister access to his peers to discuss the negotiations and was forced to engage with the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen.[11]   The biggest hit to trust in the UK was the Internal Market Bill and its breach of good faith obligation of the Withdrawal Agreement with respect to the solutions found to protect the integrity of the Good Friday Agreement. Eventually, following the launch of legal procedures, the EU and the UK solved their differences, but the loss of trust in the UK’s commitment to international law will take time to rebuild.[12]   In the EU, so long as the negotiations were ongoing, the debate on how to cooperate with Britain on foreign and security policy was frozen. The unit to deal with the UK was created in the directorate dealing with Western Europe, the Western Balkans, Turkey and the UK of the European External Action Service – the EU’s diplomatic arm – but crafting a policy and rebuilding the relationship, even at an operational level was put on hold pending the outcome of the negotiations. British diplomats stationed in Brussels do entertain informal channels for dialogue, also with officials of EU member states’ representations, but there is no official protocol or method for engagement.   The case for rebuilding relations UK-EU relations The erosion of trust between the two sides casts a dark shadow over the future of cooperation between them. The UK, determined it can do better without the chains of the EU, has taken every opportunity to prove so; the EU has sought comfort in the notion that without Britain it can move ahead more easily. The case for turning the page after these difficult years of negotiations is harder to build but is still compelling. Cooperation is in dire need at a time of great international turbulence. Joe Biden’s victory in the US Presidential elections present a unique opportunity. His Administration will insist on bringing allies closer together and on strengthening US dialogue with the EU.   From the point of view of the EU’s security policy, the departure of one of the two European countries with meaningful defence and military capacity is a net loss. And on foreign policy, the UK was a key player in shaping EU foreign policy, thanks to its global network of relations and diplomats.   But even from the point of view of the UK, cooperation with the EU can provide benefits. However, Global Britain’s ambitions, Europe’s neighbourhood is also Britain’s neighbourhood. Britain’s preferences with respect to Russia, for example, will benefit from cooperation with both the US and the EU—on sanctions and intelligence sharing, on fighting money laundering and organised crime, and on countering foreign interference in domestic politics.   The global balance of power has been shifting towards rising actors which position themselves in adversarial contrast to a shrinking ‘West’ and giving space to actors promoting disorder and confusion on regional scales. The return of the US to global governance and to the politics of alliances is a unique opportunity to strengthen the international values Britain claims to hold dear and strengthen the ‘West’. Doing so will require working with the EU.   What can be done? Prior to the abysmal negotiating year of 2020, there were plenty of pragmatic proposals to keep the UK involved and even associated to EU foreign and security policy through formal and informal procedures and solutions.[13] The time for those ideas has gone. EU needs to forego, for now, the hope that the UK will participate in any institutionalised arrangement. The foreign policy of the British Government is ideologically driven; EU action is heavily process-driven. The gap between the two is one of the causes of Brexit. But this does not exclude the possibility of ad hoc cooperation where principles and interests converge.   Still, there are plenty of other areas where the UK and European counterparts can re-engage, especially under the rubric of resetting the Transatlantic relationship. Europeans will be expected to lean heavily into supporting the Washington’s return to the JCPoA. Here France, Germany and the UK have an uninterrupted history of cooperation at the level of the E3 in which the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was present as a key negotiator vis-à-vis Iran.   At the multilateral level, the EU and the US are likely to work in tandem on health, vaccine distribution, and reform of the World Health Organization.[14] The UK should join these efforts as a natural partner and avoid the temptation of competing with peers on vaccines. WTO reform, trade issues, taxation of digital revenue flows, and fighting the climate crisis are all areas where there could be joint action, especially in 2021 when the UK will chair the G7 and COP26 conferences. If such cooperation is framed under the aegis of the Transatlantic relationship, the UK Government may avoid giving the impression that it is working with Brussels.   The EU recently approved the rules to engage third parties in defence cooperation.[15] The UK is highly unlikely to be interested, but other forms of engaging the UK on security and military affairs can be found through NATO. NATO-EU cooperation has been an achievement of recent years and is likely to be strengthened.[16] This could provide a venue for the European NATO members and the UK to engage. It will then be a responsibility for the EU to bring the EU non-NATO members up to speed on security policy – as well as on all matters of EU relevance conducted outside the EU format, such as the E3 talks.   Sanctions and human rights, now that the EU too has caught up with the US and the UK in giving more teeth to its sanctions toolbox, could offer other opportunities for cooperation.[17] Here, however, the EU will need to show its worth as it often lags behind its partners in condemning human rights abuses as well as following up with policy.   Even if the current British Government will evade any appearance of institutionalised cooperation with Brussels, dialogue can restart at the operational level to share information and exchange views of emerging challenges and approaches to solve them. In particular, the EU Delegations working in third countries and international institutions can find ways to engage systematically with British representatives alongside the EU-27. Cooperation in the field, a daily feature of the work of diplomatic staff posted abroad, is a strong vehicle for rebuilding trust bottom-up and could be helpful in recreating formats from which the UK is excluded because of Brexit.   The EU too needs to learn its lessons from Brexit. The EU’s preference for process and institutionalisation, which is one of its strengths, also has its downsides. It is unattractive and burdensome to engage with third parties – and in this case the third party is allergic to it. In the likelihood of a new investment on rebuilding transatlantic and multilateral alliances, the EU needs to be flexible in how it presents itself to the world and facilitate engagement in various forms. Once trust is rebuilt, the time will have come to make sure those new relations between the EU and the UK are anchored to a firmer ground.   Rosa Balfour is director of Carnegie Europe. Her fields of expertise include European politics, institutions, and foreign and security policy. Her current research focuses on the relationship between domestic politics and Europe’s global role. She has researched and published widely for academia, think tanks, and the international press on issues relating to European politics and international relations, especially on the Mediterranean region, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, EU enlargement, international support for civil society, and human rights and democracy. Balfour is also a member of the steering committee of Women in International Security Brussels (WIIS-Brussels) and an associate fellow at LSE IDEAS. In 2018 and 2019, she was awarded a fellowship on the Europe’s Futures program at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. Prior to joining Carnegie Europe, Balfour was a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. She was also director of the Europe in the World program at the European Policy Centre in Brussels and has worked as a researcher in Rome and London.   [1] Political Declaration Setting out the Framework for the Future Relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom, HM Government, October 2019,  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/840656/Political_Declaration_setting_out_the_framework_for_the_future_relationship_between_the_European_Union_and_the_United_Kingdom.pdf [2] Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street and The Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP, PM Speech in Greenwich: 3 February 2020, Gov.uk, February 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-in-greenwich-3-february-2020 [3] Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Global Britain: delivering on our international ambition, Gov.uk, September 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/global-britain-delivering-on-our-international-ambition; Lucy Fisher, Downing Street plans new 5G club of democracies, The Times, May 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/downing-street-plans-new-5g-club-of-democracies-bfnd5wj57; Peter Martin, Kitty Donaldson and Kait Bolongaro, In Echo of Cold War, the West's 'Five Eyes' spy alliance focuses on China, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 2020. https://www.post-gazette.com/news/insight/2020/10/25/In-echo-of-Cold-War-the-West-s-Five-Eyes-spy-alliance-focuses-on-China/stories/202010250036; Following a coordinated statement of Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand and the United States warning China against repression in Hong Kong – Joint Statement on Hong Kong, US Department of State, November 2020, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-hong-kong-2/ [4] Prime Minister's Office and 10 Downing Street, PM to announce largest military investment in 30 Years, Gov.uk, November 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-to-announce-largest-military-investment-in-30-years; Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon Dominic Raab MP, Changes to the UK's aid budget in the Spending Review, Gov.uk November 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/changes-to-the-uks-aid-budget-in-the-spending-review; Paul F. Webster, The Observer View on the role of 'global Britain', The Guardian, November 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/nov/22/the-observer-view-on-the-role-of-global-britain [5] James Landale, US Election: What a Biden presidency means for the UK, BBC News, November 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-54863576 [6] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and the Rt Hon Dominic Raab MP, Belarus: UK sanctions 8 members of regime, including Alexander Lukashenko, Gov.uk, September 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/belarus-uk-sanctions-eight-members-of-regime-including-alexander-lukashenko [7] Council of the EU, Belarus: Alexandr Lukashenko and 14 other officials sanctioned over ongoing repression, Consilium, November 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/11/06/belarus-alexandr-lukashenko-and-14-other-officials-sanctioned-over-ongoing-repression/ [8] Laurenz Gehrke, EU Sanctions Senior Russians over Navalny Poisoning, POLITICO, October 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-agrees-to-sanction-six-russians-over-alexei-navalny-poisoning/ [9] Erik Brattberg, The E3, the EU, and the Post-Brexit Diplomatic Landscape, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/18/e3-eu-and-post-brexit-diplomatic-landscape-pub-82095; Emmanuel Macron, For European renewal, Élysée, March 2019, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/03/04/for-european-renewal.en [10] Michel Barnier, Speech by Michel Barnier at the EPC Breakfast, Brussels, European Commission, April 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/speech-michel-barnier-epc-breakfast-brussels_en [11] Chris Giles, High Stakes as Boris Johnson Heads for Dinner-Time Showdown in Brussels, Financial Times, December 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/1f60d3eb-4c45-461c-9f4a-f65a90555a0a [12] Joint Statement by the Co-Chairs of the EU-UK Joint Committee, European Commission, December 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_2346 [13] Sophia Besch, Ian Bond, and Camino Mortera-Martinez, Plugging in the British: Completing the Circuit, Centre for European Reform, June 2018, https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/report/2018/plugging-british-completing-circuit [14] Join Communication to the EP, the EC and the Council: A New EU-US Agenda for Global Change, European Commission, December 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/joint-communication-eu-us-agenda_en.pdf [15] Council of the EU, EU Defence Cooperation: Council Sets Conditions for Third-State Participation in PESCO Projects, Consilium, November 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/11/05/eu-defence-cooperation-council-sets-conditions-for-third-state-participation-in-pesco-projects/ [16] NATO 2030 Reflection Group, NATO 2030: United for a New Era, NATO, November 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf [17] Council of the EU, EU Adopts a Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, Consilium, December 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/07/eu-adopts-a-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime/ [post_title] => After Brexit: Recasting a UK-EU dialogue on foreign policy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => after-brexit-recasting-a-uk-eu-dialogue-on-foreign-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:19:13 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:19:13 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5393 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [32] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5391 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-16 00:09:11 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-15 23:09:11 [post_content] => During her time as British Prime Minister handling Brexit, Theresa May was fond of pointing out that “the UK is leaving the European Union but it is not leaving Europe”.[1] How could it be otherwise? UK security and defence policies have always been tied to the premise of not allowing a hostile (or a single power for that matter) to dominate the continent or to disrupt the “tranquillity of the European balance of power” (as the Congress of Vienna put it). Britain tended to achieve this in the past, not by entering into permanent alliances with continental powers, but by concluding shorter-term arrangements as needs dictated. Its participation in five out of the seven coalitions against Napoleon and later in the Crimean War and two world wars is a case in point. Wherever possible Britain tried to pay others to restore the balance of power on its behalf or it offered preferential trading agreements. Where necessary, it dispatched an army to the continent to provide a helping hand. Unsurprisingly in the world wars this was known as the British Expeditionary Force, which nicely conveyed the impression that once the troublemaker had been defeated, and following a short period of occupation to ensure compliance with the terms of peace, the force would be withdrawn. Britain sought no permanent role on the European continent but saw itself as the ‘offshore balancer’. In this role, Britain fought against most of the major European powers, and against some of the smaller ones as well, at one time or another.   It is worth recalling this tradition of continental disengagement as once again the UK renounces a European commitment and looks again to the deep blue sea rather than the Channel (although lasting for 47 years this latest European entanglement has had a larger impact on Britain’s domestic politics, economy and society than the previous, mostly military ones). This time round, the withdrawal is in the area of economics and politics rather than in security and defence. So it is the mirror image of Britain’s traditional foreign policy which was to achieve precisely the opposite. It is also only a partial reorientation. The UK is leaving the EU but not NATO. Indeed UK ministers have been at pains to reassure their allies in central and Eastern Europe that the UK’s permanent military commitment to the collective defence of their territories will not change as the result of Brexit. It is a commitment ultimately backed by the British strategic nuclear deterrent, which is included in NATO’s nuclear planning (contrary to that of France). The UK has doubled down on NATO to underline this policy continuity. It is one of only seven European allies to meet the NATO target of spending of at least two per cent of GDP on defence. Indeed it was, together with Greece, the first to do so after NATO took this collective decision back in 2014. It is one of four allies to lead a multinational battalion in Eastern Europe as part of the alliance’s forward deployment to deter Russia. The UK contributes significant forces to NATO’s major exercises and regularly  sends fighter aircraft to the Baltic States and Romania for air policing duties.   The UK has also over the years played a key role in all of the alliance’s operations, sending large contingents and occasionally assuming command, as in Kosovo or Afghanistan. Indeed two of NATO’s most controversial missions post-Cold War, the air campaigns in Kosovo and Libya, largely happened not because of American but British leadership. Tony Blair rallied NATO into action over Kosovo and David Cameron over Libya. On both occasions, the US was rather reluctant. The UK also hosts NATO’s maritime command (Marcom) at Northwood and a number of US air and naval bases too. In short imagining NATO without the UK role and contribution would be like trying to imagine the EU without Germany. Even in the years when the UK was a happier and more enthusiastic member of the EU (for instance working on the internal market in the 1980s or enlargement policy in the 1990s), it was always sceptical about the added value of an EU role in security and defence. NATO was there already to ensure US participation and a strong Article 5 collective defence guarantee. Consequently, the alliance’s proven mechanisms of joint commands, integrated defence planning and multinational operations would only be fragmented - and thus fatally weakened - by any attempt by the EU to muscle in on the NATO success story. The fact that the EU’s aspirations for security and defence cooperation at this time seemed to London to be driven more by motives of closer political integration and international profile than by any hard security needs or insufficiencies in the workings of NATO made the UK doubly sceptical.   The British could not stop the EU going ahead with setting up its own defence structures (such as a Military Committee and planning staff or an EU Defence Agency) nor from launching its first missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, London did put on the brakes by trying to limit duplication with NATO and to hold up the establishment of an EU operational headquarters, which for London seemed redundant given the presence of thousands of NATO military planners at SHAPE. Under the so-called ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements worked out in the 1990s these planners would be available to assist the EU with its own  missions and NATO could supply the British Deputy Supreme Allied Commande4 (DSACEUR) to function as the coordinator between the two institutions  So why the need for expensive additional EU planners? The UK has rarely adopted positions based on ideology rather than pragmatism. It commanded the EU naval counter-piracy operation (Atalanta) in 2012, given its concern to keep vital maritime trade routes open. It was also happy to participate in any European (or EU financed) technology and capability programme that offered real value, as in the Tornado and Eurofighter jet aircraft, the European Space Agency or the Galileo satellite development. Yet this said the UK saw the new EU security and defence policy more as an example of over-reach by the EU and a threat to its sovereignty than as an opportunity to have an extra and more versatile instrument than that offered by NATO for Europe to defend its interests in the neighbourhood. In addition to these political aspects, London also expressed constant scepticism that the Europeans were ever likely to come up with the common strategic vision, resources and capabilities to achieve real ‘strategic autonomy’. So why invest in something that was unlikely to take off in the first place?   The UK was fortified in its opposition to a high level of ambition for the EU’s security and defence policy by the enlargement of the EU in the early years of this century. It brought into the EU countries from Central and Eastern Europe who historically have been suspicious of Russia and doubtful of the validity of purely European security guarantees. These countries have looked overwhelmingly to the US and NATO for their security and have been wary of additional solidarity burdens that the CSDP and Brussels would be put on them (for instance in joining French forces in the Sahel or having to take an expansive view of the solidarity commitments under Articles 42.7 and 222 of the EU’s 2010 Lisbon Treaty).[2] This said, it has been easy for these central and Eastern European countries to hide behind the UK in the past so as to not unduly upset Paris or Berlin in their joint ventures to take the CSDP to the next step. Brexit will make this balancing act less comfortable for them. They may not want to send troops to Mali but they will certainly be interested in drawing the financial and technology benefits from participating in the new EU funded capability programmes like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund. Yet one thing is clear. The departure of the UK from the EU is both an opportunity and a risk for greater EU efforts in security and defence. On the one hand, it lifts the UK brake and allows the remaining EU members to move forward - if that is indeed what they are resolved to do. On the other hand, it takes out of the EU defence equation a major military power with a global reach and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The UK has currently around 25 per cent of overall EU spending and would contribute 20 per cent of its overall capabilities, particularly at the more combat related, high end of the spectrum where electronic and cyber capabilities and intelligence, reconnaissance and space based communications are ever more important.[3]   Some observers have predicted a declining UK military power post-Brexit due to the six per cent contraction in the UK economy that leaving the EU even with a minimal trade deal is forecasted to cause. Sooner or later the defence budget would be cut and the armed forces subject to a severe spending review. The break-up of the UK if Scotland becomes independent has also been invoked as it would lead to the potential loss of military bases, shipyards and the Scottish regiments that have been the backbone of the British army for centuries. Yet, at least for now, these prognosticators of UK military decline have been contradicted by the defence spending plans of the current Conservative Government. Despite massive borrowing to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic, it recently announced an extra £16.5 billion for defence over the next five years with the building of 13 new frigates for the Royal Navy, the establishment of a Space Command and a rocket launch in 2022, an AI agency and a National Cyber Force. According to Prime Minister Johnson, this major spending effort “ends the era of retreat” for Britain’s power projection capabilities.[4]   Of course, the Government had made generous spending promises to a large number of stakeholders (particularly in the new Conservative constituencies in the north of England). With the bulging COVID driven deficits there is no guarantee that the defence commitments will be honoured. Moreover already the legally binding commitment to devote 0.7 per cent of GDP to overseas aid has been jettisoned (cut to 0.5 per cent) which suggests that the Government sees the future of ‘Global Britain’ more in terms of its ability to send its new Queen Elisabeth 2 aircraft carrier to the South China Sea than to profile itself as a development aid superpower. Yet, if the Conservative Government stays in power for the next few years and is able to modernise and upscale the UK armed forces the loss of all this extra capability to the EU CSDP will make it even harder for the remaining 27 EU countries to project the EU as a geo-political heavyweight on the world stage. Particularly when it comes to a military role and presence in a demanding operation beyond the immediate periphery of EU territory. EU credibility is not helped by the fact that, with Brexit, 80 per cent of NATO spending will be done by the non-EU members of the alliance, even though together they represent only a third of NATO’s current membership of 30 countries.   So the military minus to the EU of Brexit is clear. Yet where does this leave the UK in terms of its future relationship with Europe in security and defence? Is a minus for Brussels automatically a plus for London? What does the UK stand to gain or lose?   In the short term the UK’s stepped up defence efforts (already welcomed by the incoming Biden administration) will increase the weight of the UK as Washington’s primary global ally. During the Obama years, there was talk of the US transferring this role to France as it took on new counterterrorism roles in the Sahel and Syria often alongside US special forces. France could project some (limited) power to the Asia-Pacific - where it retains territory - and was willing and able to engage elsewhere in Africa and the Middle East (Djibouti and the UAE) at a time when the intervention weary UK was pulling back from Afghanistan and Iraq. The talk - no matter how vague - about ‘Global Britain’ backed up by the new forces should help to make London the first place that Washington calls when crises loom. A strong Washington-London axis increases the UK’s weight in NATO as it reassures the allies in central and Eastern Europe (and Scandinavia as well) that they have a European partner who can lobby for their interests in Washington while at the same time helping to drive forward within the alliance reforms that the US wants to see; such as meeting the two per cent spending target, focusing more on disruptive technologies and standards and putting China on the table at the North Atlantic Council.   The question here for the UK is: how does it see the future of NATO? In the past the UK has sometimes had an ambivalent attitude towards the alliance.  While in public it has always been a loyal supporter, in private it has questioned the effectiveness of the NATO bureaucracy, the relevance of its defence planning process, the transparency and accountability of its financial management and its ability to quickly adjust to new security threats and challenges. The UK has always kept the option of working through smaller groups and coalitions of the willing. So its perception of NATO’s role and relevance today will determine its own ambition for the alliance and the amount of resources and effort it is ready to put in. Does it see NATO largely in its traditional role as a watching and waiting collective defence organisation keeping a check on Russian assertiveness? One which gives the UK considerable strategic influence in Europe, even if it is no longer in the EU, as well as in Washington, and allows it to conduct a large number of diplomatic relationships via NATO both bilaterally and multilaterally? For instance by being part of the informal Quad in the alliance, alongside the US, Germany and France, or a valued member of other smaller and influential groupings, such as the Group of Experts which the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, has set up to advise allies on how to improve the political functioning of the alliance. Or will the UK have a much higher level of ambition for NATO? In recent years, the UK has been at the forefront of efforts to turn NATO into a much more comprehensive security organisation doing much more than simply collective defence. It has put cyberattacks, hybrid warfare scenarios, disruptive technologies, space as a fifth domain of military operations and most recently climate change on the alliance’s agenda. It has pushed for NATO to extend its relationships with like-minded democracies in the Asia-Pacific, and has advocated the Open Door of continued NATO enlargement to countries in the Balkans at a time when some of the European allies (such as France and the Netherlands) have gotten cold feet. At the moment, and given the rising awareness of the systemic challenge posed by China particularly in the area of tech sovereignty, there is interest in both London and Washington in a ‘D10’, a new alignment of the major democracies to uphold liberal values and the rules based form of multilateralism. Could NATO, with its new focus on broader security and tech issues and its network of partnerships, be associated with this emerging order or even be the hub where the dialogue of the democracies is structured and coordinated? Will Johnson and Biden see eye to eye in transforming NATO to take on this greater political role as the venue for the transatlantic strategic dialogue, and to enshrine this in the alliance’s new Strategic Concept, which should be updated in 2021?   Many former NATO Secretary Generals have called for NATO to be given a more political dimension but so far without success. Allies have gone their own ways (most recently Turkey) with little prior consultation or warning. The US for its part preferred to work bilaterally with individual capitals or with an emerging EU superpower as an extension of the US-EU trade talks or the G7. But now there is a new opportunity to reposition the alliance and Stoltenberg has already invited Biden to attend a NATO summit soon after his inauguration in January. How will London try to shape these developments and can it put NATO rather than the EU in the driving seat? The EU has produced its own strategy paper calling for an EU-US alliance on global issues and offering to defuse transatlantic trade disputes. It is also looking for an early summit with Biden who has more sympathy for both sides of the Brussels institutional jigsaw than his predecessor, Trump. So which way will the cookie crumble? President Macron and Chancellor Merkel will clearly welcome a more vocal US commitment to NATO (and in the case of Merkel a decision by Biden to overturn the withdrawal of 12,000 US troops from Germany that President Trump announced suddenly last summer).[5] Yet they are also committed to the goal of EU Strategic Autonomy and military self-reliance even with a more EU and NATO friendly occupant in the White House. They have seen Americans elect a nationalist-populist once and come close to doing it a second time. So they know that this was not a blip or an aberration but a sign of a changing US where the Trumpian America First course of a superpower gone rogue could be resumed in four years’ time.   Consequently, France and Germany are likely to want to promote the EU as the European pillar of the transatlantic dialogue. They will argue that it handles the current agenda of trade, supply chains, pandemics, tech security and data and norms in a way that NATO does not. It was ironically Macron who started the debate on NATO ‘s future when he called NATO ‘brain dead’ last year in his interview with The Economist.[6] Yet nether Macron nor Merkel will want to see big global issues decided in a forum where the US has a majority of supporters and the EU has no caucus or common position - even if EU leaders attend NATO meetings more frequently these days to brief on their activities. They will try to convince Biden to support overtly the goal of EU Strategic Autonomy as the only way to have effective European burden-sharing and more responsibility in stabilising the EU’s neighbourhood at a time when the US will inevitably be pivoting more towards the Asia- Pacific and China. Beyond demonstrating that it is still in the military big league, the political question is how does the UK position itself in this emerging EU-NATO tussle in a way that it keeps its credibility with both sides but is not reduced to a simple go-between?  Will the UK derive the diplomatic influence and strategic leverage from all the extra cash and capabilities that it is now putting into NATO?   There are two other aspects to the UK’s future role in security and defence that will make this a continuing and difficult issue post-Brexit.   The first is the fact that the EU institutions are not going to go away. They will suffer from the UK’s departure but they are already moving on. The EU has set up its Battlegroups, its annual defence review process (CARD), its Strategic Compass threat assessment exercise, its crisis response cells and its airlift and logistics commands. The EU is currently running 16 CSDP operations and EU member states are heeding the calls from Paris for more solidarity - as the despatch of special forces from Estonia, Denmark and the Czech Republic to join the French in the Sahel has shown. The EU is now putting serious if still insufficient funding into its multinational capabilities programmes and military mobility to move forces across Europe. The European Defence Agency reports that it has a capability programme now up and running to cover all the shortfall areas identified in its Capability Action Plan. The strong advocates of EU Strategic Autonomy would no doubt like to go faster but the direction of travel is clear. Step-by-step the EU is developing into a security union and gradually gaining control of its technology, data and critical supply chains.   The UK has once again chosen to ignore these developments or to play down their significance. Yet EU institutions have a habit of grinding down the differences among its member states, and the sense that the EU is now living in a far more carnivorous world where it needs hard power and to be comfortable in using it is gaining hold across the bloc. So do not bet against the EU. The UK had the opportunity even from outside the EU to associate itself with these developments when it concluded the Political Declaration on the Future Relationship at the same time as the Withdrawal Agreement.[7] The Declaration opened up many prospects for cooperation on terrorism, intelligence and data exchange, UK participation in CSDP missions, observer status at some EU foreign and defence ministers meetings and European Councils and third party access to certain EU capabilities programmes where it has something to contribute. The Political Declaration is a non-binding document and the UK Government has so far chosen to ignore it. It sees Brexit as giving it equality of status with the EU and therefore will not accept to be a non-voting participant or observer at EU meetings. Instead of a structured institutional relationship, with defined obligations and benefits, it much prefers an ad hoc and topic driven dialogue where it sees value in joining EU initiatives. It also prefers bilateral arrangements as part of ad hoc coalitions of the willing stemming from its multiple existing partnership frameworks. These include close cooperation with the Scandinavians in the Northern Group, with France as part of the Lancaster House treaties and its joint expeditionary force or with the Netherlands and the combined amphibious brigade. For some time already, the UK has pursued European defence integration through these bilateral and regional frameworks outside the EU institutions and often building on practical cooperation achieved in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans.   EU leaders have tried to accommodate the UK’s desire for informal cooperation. President Macron has established a European Intervention Initiative to pool experience and undertake joint planning for operations in Africa and other counter-insurgency zones. The EU has also invited the UK to be a third party participant in its PESCO and European Defence Fund (EDF) projects. Some former EU leaders have proposed a European Security Council where France. Germany, the UK and the NATO Secretary General and EU Council President could gather to coordinate grand strategy or manage breaking crises.[8] So far, the UK has not picked up on these ideas although it is sending 250 soldiers to reinforce the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali. Where the UK has had to withdraw from EU capability projects it has begun work on its own national alternatives, such as for the Galileo military encrypted signal or its sixth generation Tempest fighter aircraft project (together with Sweden and Italy). Yet as more and more European security and defence activity is pulled into the formal EU structures, and the EU exerts its geo-political weight, the UK’s own security interests are bound to be impacted by what the EU does or does not do. Over time, the bilateral and regional frameworks will count for less and the UK may well regret passing up on the Political Declaration and the opportunity to negotiate a position of influence with the EU while it still had maximum negotiating leverage as a departing member. Ultimately, influence can come only from being within formal decision-making circles. There will be one in Washington and one in Brussels and the UK will not be in either. It will be a medium sized power with good intelligence, insights and useful pragmatic advice; but it will not be able to play the role of transatlantic inter-connector as it could when it was part of the EU.   The second challenge concerns the future NATO-EU relationship. As NATO takes on new security tasks it is becoming more reliant on EU expertise and resources. This is true in terms of exchanging data real time during big cyberattacks like WannaCry, or medical information on the COVID-19 pandemic, or on the vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure like telecoms and power grids on which NATO relies for its military operations and exercises. The EU is due to spend €1.5 billion on upgrading its long distance road and rail transport links between Western and Eastern Europe and this will enhance also the alliance’s military mobility. The EU and NATO are also cooperating actively on spotting and countering hybrid warfare campaigns. They have set up units to work together to track and rebut fake news and disinformation and they are now organising parallel crisis management exercises to harmonise their procedures and operational cultures.   Based on two Joint Declarations, the NATO-EU relationship now embraces 74 areas of practical cooperation. As the overlap between the two institutions intensifies, the major influence will clearly go to those countries which are members of both the EU and NATO and which can steer the harmonisation process from both sides of Brussels. Given the shocks it has faced in recent years from terrorism, cyberattacks, pandemics, chemical weapons attacks, illegal migration and power outages, the UK has a special interest in these homeland defence and resilience issues that are now the driving force of the NATO-EU rapprochement. Yet the problem here is that the EU is far less forthcoming than NATO when it comes to giving third party partner countries a special status in its security debates. Whereas NATO has granted EU members Sweden and Finland a high degree of access to its political consultations, force planning and exercises, the EU has offered no reciprocal arrangement to the non-EU allies. This has long been a bone of contention in its relationship with Turkey. Ankara has expressed its displeasure by limiting the scope of NATO-EU talks in the past to military operations in the Western Balkans. The EU has argued that due to its legal treaties and pillar structure it has less flexibility in blurring the lines between member and non-member states. At least Turkey can stake its claim to greater participation rights in the CSDP based on its membership application to the EU and the ongoing (if stuttering) accession negotiations. The UK, leaving the EU, has less leverage here. So the big question for the UK post-Brexit is does it encourage more NATO-EU overlap in order to foster a common approach to resilience and perhaps other issues such as how to stabilise the European neighbourhood? Or does it try to keep the EU and NATO permanently apart in order to avoid the constitution of an EU caucus or pillar within the alliance that would supplant the old Quad? By asserting the primacy of NATO in defence the UK preserves its own leading role, particularly at a moment when the EU has just proposed to the incoming Biden administration the formation of a new EU-US Council on Security and Defence. Yet at the same time would it be putting its politics of sovereignty and freedom of manoeuvre ahead of its security interests, which lie in a more cost-effective synergy of EU and NATO resources and efforts?  There needs to be a debate here   Finally, we come to Global Britain. It remains an idea in search of a concept. It is all very well building more military capabilities to project power beyond Europe and the North Atlantic. Yet for what purpose? During the 19th century the Royal Navy protected Britain’s global trading routes. It had a network of ports and coaling stations across the globe and was ready to intervene to prevent challenges or disruptions to the global trading system. But in an age when data is transmitted globally within seconds from screen to screen, and wealth is based on knowledge more than goods, there is no need to go back to policing the oceans. UK deployments will no doubt be part of coalitions, but who will be the partners here and for which contingencies? Mainly humanitarian and disaster relief or for geo-political roles as well? Is the UK giving up a European commitment to take on new commitments elsewhere, for instance in the Middle East or Asia? Is it going to try to acquire bases in these regions and return to an ‘East of Suez’ posture, for example by having one of its carriers and a naval or air task group deployed east at any one time? Woody Allen once said that “ninety percent of success in life is just showing up.” Yet what is needed as part of the ‘Global Britain’ debate is a serious political consideration of what the UK’s security and defence interests are beyond Europe and its neighbourhood; and how military power projection can support its diplomatic goals and counter threats beyond the immediate satisfaction of nurturing partnerships or showing the flag.   In the final analysis, the UK’s security priorities today are still overwhelmingly focused on Europe. It is Russia that carries out chemical attacks in Salisbury; illegal migrants arrive from Calais; Russia flies its planes close to British airspace; terrorists from Libya strike a concert hall in Manchester; and foreign fighters returning from ISIS criss-cross Europe on their way home. The key roles for the armed forces still lie in defending NATO allies in Eastern Europe and keeping the lines of communication across the North Atlantic open. Despite Brexit and the rhetoric of ‘taking back control’, the UK has continued to rely on Europol for vital information on terrorism and organised crime. It appreciated the solidarity of its EU partners in collectively expelling Russian diplomats after the Salisbury Novichok attack. Moreover, on issues like Belarus, the Russian incursion into the Donbas, the Iran nuclear deal, the Arab-Israeli peace process, handling China or advancing climate change goals at the upcoming COP26 in Glasgow, or working through the WTO and other multilateral bodies, the UK has found itself more aligned with EU positions than the US during the Trump years. In conclusion, Europe is losing the UK in terms of its grand project of political unity. But the UK cannot afford to lose Europe as it tried to do in the past. Its security and defence interests are now too bound up with those of its European neighbours for a redefinition, let alone a clean break to be feasible.   The years since the Brexit referendum have been spent talking about the terms of separation and divorce, about regaining sovereignty and setting off in totally new directions. The drama of the new has compensated for its vagueness. Yet eventually politics have to re-align with core security interests, particularly those that are most shared in common with neighbours. The UK can best tackle the challenges of a more dangerous world in alliance with the Europeans and working closely with the EU as well as NATO. Going it alone in a world of big power blocs and rising geo-political rivalries risks a dispersal of resources and energy for little strategic gain. After the years of throwing off its EU shackles and minimising its involvement, there will come a time of reconstruction and a more sober minded appraisal of the UK’s interests and priorities. Public opinion does not stay the same, governments change and political debates can be led for good, as well as bad. The time is not far off when the UK will have mature discussions about Europe. It will not rejoin the EU after all that has happened but it can still have a close relationship with it. After all, we are talking about European Strategic Autonomy and European security and defence rather than just the EU here. So these are issues for all the Europeans working together. The mistake is to think that the objective can be achieved without putting the EU at the centre - and working only around it.   Jamie Shea is a former NATO official and now visiting professor at the University of Exeter as well as President of the Centre for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. He is a frequent speaker and panellist on NATO and European security issues.   Image by NATO under (CC).   [1] Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street and Rt Hon Theresa May MP, We have voted to leave the EU, but not Europe: article by Theresa May, Gov.uk, February 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/we-have-voted-to-leave-the-eu-but-not-europe-article-by-theresa-may [2] Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, March 2010, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3AC2010%2F083%2F01 [3]  See the annual Military Balance report of the London based International Institute of Strategic Studies. (IISS).   Also the annual Global Military Expenditures report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Annual Report of the European Defence Agency. [4] Helen Warrell and George Parker, Boris Johnson promises biggest UK defence investment for 30 years, Financial Times, November 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/684a9881-c964-478b-b87b-84aa697810f2 [5] Trump announced this withdrawal on Twitter last June.  It was subsequently confirmed by the Pentagon. However the funding for the withdrawal and relocation of the US troops has not been included in the current Defence Authorisation Act that Congress has approved. This makes some European policymakers hopeful that the incoming Biden administration will not go through with it. [6] Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead, The Economist, November 2019, https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead [7] European Commission, The EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/european-union-and-united-kingdom-forging-new-partnership/eu-uk-withdrawal-agreement_en [8] Decision of the EU Council on third party participation in EU defence collaborative programmes, October 2020. The conditions attached to this participation are that the EU decision must be unanimous and the invited third party country must share the EU’s values and have something concrete to contribute. The European Security Council was first proposed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and has been much debated in Brussels since. [post_title] => The UK and European defence: Will NATO be enough? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-uk-and-european-defence-will-nato-be-enough [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:18:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:18:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5391 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 2 [filter] => raw ) [33] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5388 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-16 00:08:21 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-15 23:08:21 [post_content] => The UK’s relationship with the Council of Europe presents a paradox. In many ways, the UK is an exemplar within this organisation of 47 states. The UK was a founding member of the Council of Europe in 1949 and an early signatory of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950—leading the effort to unify a war-shattered continent on the three pillars of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It was British lawyers who, from the 1970s, pioneered litigation before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, shaping its early and most influential case law. The UK is one of the five largest financial contributors to the Council of Europe.[1] The UK’s own human rights record is comparatively strong: the Court finds violations in only a handful of UK cases annually (on average, six per year since 2010), and, with the notable exception of prisoner voting, those judgments are complied with.[2] The parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (the JCHR) is regarded as a model across Europe.[3]   Yet, this record is clouded by the negative and sometimes intemperate discourse surrounding the UK’s relationship with Strasbourg; indeed, no mature democracy has done more to destabilise the Council of Europe in recent years than the UK. Calls by judicial figures and politicians for the UK to resist the authority of the Court and even consider leaving the Convention, based on the perception that judges tie the hands of elected politicians, mark the nadir of this debate.[4] The Brexit vote took Strasbourg out of the firing line—and continued adherence to the Convention is a red line for Brussels in its negotiations with the UK.[5] Yet, the damage is already done. Mere discussion of rupture with the Council of Europe emboldens states such as Russia to flout their human rights obligations; for example, the UK’s protracted refusal to implement prisoner voting judgments was cited in the Duma as a basis for Russia to do the same, and paved the way for a Russian law which empowers the Constitutional Court to declare rulings of any international human rights body ‘impossible to implement’.[6]   Not only that, but Conservative MPs who are delegates to the Council of Europe’s deliberative arm, the Parliamentary Assembly, have used it as a venue to mount an ideological defence of illiberal rule in, inter alia, Turkey, Hungary and Poland—and to scupper (successfully in Hungary’s case) attempts to intensify scrutiny on these states by means of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure.[7]   In the post-Brexit era, the time is ripe for the UK to reset its relationship with the Council of Europe and reclaim the moral and political leadership that it once showed. The UK’s relinquishing of its formerly exemplary role is not only corrosive of the organisation and its values, but also weakens the UK’s ability to use the Council of Europe as an alternative forum within which to engage with 46 other European member states—including those within strategically important geopolitical regions such as the former Soviet states and Turkey. The organisation’s inter-governmental arm, the Committee of Ministers, as well as the Court and the Parliamentary Assembly, each provide opportunities to further the UK’s foreign policy objectives of strengthening national and international security and supporting the development of open societies.   The crucial intergovernmental work of the Council of Europe  A range of Council of Europe entities are carrying out essential work, on an inter-governmental basis, on issues which are key areas of focus for the UK, including media freedom, LGBTI rights and gender-based violence. Established in 2014, the Platform for the Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists acts as an early warning system and protective network to address threats to the media. Its latest annual report describes 2019 as ‘as an intense and often dangerous battleground for press freedom and freedom of expression’ in Europe, including physical attacks, detention and harassment.[8] This threat has only escalated with laws that suppress free expression being enacted under the guise of emergency responses to COVID-19.[9] Meanwhile, the Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity unit of the Council of Europe showcases the work being done, for example, to combat discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, to counter the particular threats created by COVID-19, and to support the policing of hate crimes against the LGBTI community and the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships.[10]   The UK espouses a strong commitment to tackling violence against women and girls, and has established cross-party support on the issue, but it is the only western European state that has not yet ratified the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention, often described as a ‘gold standard’ of treaties on gender-based violence and domestic violence.[11] Eight country reports have been produced since its inception in 2014 by the Council of Europe’s watchdog, GREVIO, propelling this issue to the forefront of public debate, increasing societal awareness of the urgent need to combat it and leading to improved legislation and policies.[12] Engagement at the Council of Europe level, having ratified the Istanbul Convention, would undoubtedly enhance the important work being done on this at the national level in the UK. There are, in addition, many other vital areas of work within the Council of Europe which the UK should be supporting, and learning from, including how artificial intelligence can be used to counter the threat of COVID-19, the ways in which human rights law can be used to protect the environment, and combatting human trafficking.[13]   The European Court of Human Rights - a bastion of judicial independence The most well-known Council of Europe institution is the European Court of Human Rights, which is arguably also the most effective single human rights body across the globe. Given the Court’s position at the fulcrum of legal systems across the 47 Council of Europe states, the UK should grasp the opportunity to bolster it as a bastion of judicial independence for the continent, especially at a time when such independence is under serious threat in EU states including Poland and Hungary. The continued engagement of the highest UK courts in the Superior Courts Network (which includes 93 courts from 40 states) ensures a healthy dialogue between national courts about the effective application of the European Convention at the national level.[14]   When the European Court issues its judgments, it is the Committee of Ministers which supervises their implementation in a peer-to-peer based system that operates largely behind closed doors. This is the body which needs strengthened engagement from the UK (and indeed concerted effort with other states), so that judgments on key issues and from particular regions can be enforced more quickly. Focusing on the implementation, for example, of cases relating to gross abuses by the Russian security forces in Chechnya, or cases brought by the victims of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, would serve to shore up security in those regions, and internationally.[15] In doing so, there would also be a synergy with the UK’s new Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations, introduced last year, whose priorities include protecting the right to life and the prohibition of torture.[16] It would also be in line with the Foreign Affairs Committee’s call for the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office to prioritise mediation, conflict resolution, and atrocity prevention.[17] The failure to date to take resolute action on abuses in Chechnya has led to a prevailing climate of impunity in that region, which the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre and Human Rights Watch have argued, has led to their perpetuation amongst an ever-widening circle of victims, including the LGBTI community.[18]   Similarly, the UK’s goal of giving succour to open societies would be enhanced by its promotion of judgments highlighting, for example, the political prosecution of opposition politicians in Russia and Turkey, and human rights defenders and journalists in Azerbaijan.[19] Also on its radar, for the same reasons, should be the case in Strasbourg challenging the notorious ‘foreign agents’ law’ in Russia, which continues to have such detrimental effects for civil society in that country.[20] The fact that a number of these judgments have directly led to the applicants being freed from imprisonment or having their convictions quashed, demonstrates that these mechanisms have real teeth, and further engagement and leverage from states like the UK would lead to more far-reaching impacts in a broader range of cases.[21]   There is also the opportunity for the UK to lead in utilising the machinery available within the Court system that is rarely, if ever, invoked. This includes the infringement procedure (to take a recalcitrant state back before the Court if it refuses to rectify violations); third party interventions (whereby the UK could assist the Court in its adjudications by providing information in non-UK cases), and the possibility of bringing inter-state proceedings (as, for example, the Netherlands did recently against Russia in respect of the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014).[22]   The Parliamentary Assembly - a diminished body in need of leadership                 The Parliamentary Assembly, comprising 324 national parliamentarians from the 47 states (18 from the UK Parliament) has a proud history of achievements such as the de facto abolition of the death penalty across Europe.[23] The Assembly has, however, had a tempestuous decade. The low point was the revelation that Assembly members had been bribed to work in favour of the Azerbaijani government—a long-held suspicion confirmed in 2018 by an independent investigation established by the Assembly itself.[24]   The enfeeblement of the Assembly is regrettable. Not only does it have important powers, such as electing judges of the Court, but also, through its deliberations in quarterly sessions in Strasbourg and the work of specialised committees, it underpins the democratic legitimacy of the Council of Europe. The Assembly’s monitoring procedure is, moreover, one of the main political tools that the Council of Europe has to confront states engaged in rule of law backsliding. Assembly debates and resolutions, in turn, frequently rely on opinions of the Venice Commission (an expert body within the Council of Europe that advises member states on constitutional matters)—and may result in recommendations for action by the Committee of Ministers. In this way, synergy can be achieved between multiple arms of the Council of Europe to resist the erosion of the rule of law and human rights and foster the development of open societies.   As noted above, UK Conservative delegates, as members of the conservative group in the Assembly known as EC/DA (European Conservatives Group and Democratic Alliance), have consistently defended illiberal regimes. Analysis of verbatim records of Assembly debates suggest that delegates from other UK parties are largely invisible in Strasbourg, perhaps reflecting the low prestige assigned to membership of the parliamentary delegation.[25] We suggest that this is a missed opportunity to advance agendas that are conducive to the UK’s professed goals.   Individual parliamentarians can exercise significant influence by seizing the initiative within the Assembly. For example, the Swiss Senator Dick Marty did so in his pioneering investigation into CIA rendition and secret detention operations in Europe, a process of accountability-seeking that ultimately drew in all the main organs of the Council of Europe, including the Court, the Committee of Ministers, the Venice Commission and the Commissioner for Human Rights.[26] We suggest, too, that the work of the Council of Europe could achieve greater recognition in Parliament if the procedure for selecting the UK delegation were to be changed from the present system of Prime Ministerial appointment to a more transparent and accountable means, i.e. direct election by MPs, as happens for most House of Commons select committees.[27] It would also be beneficial if some overlap could be guaranteed between membership of the Assembly delegation and the JCHR, in order to ensure greater coordination within Parliament on human rights matters.   Conclusion - championing a rules-based order The Foreign Affairs Committee recently concluded that, as competition between nations intensifies, it falls on democratic nations to uphold the rules-based international system, including democracy, human rights and free trade. The Committee was urged by numerous contributors to its inquiry on the Integrated Review to exhort the UK Government to articulate the universal values at the heart of its international policy.[28] The UK needs to show greater ambition, the Committee concluded, if it is to effectively challenge ‘revisionist’ powers that seek to subvert the international system and weaken rights. As the UK moves decisively into the post-Brexit era, the Council of Europe is the preeminent means for the UK to exercise ‘soft power’ influence across the continent, in the direction recommended both by the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Integrated Review itself. The Chair of the JCHR, Harriet Harman, has called on the UK to lead by example.[29] This requires a fundamental recalibration of relations with Strasbourg. Damaging rhetoric that has done so much to undermine the Council of Europe must cease and the UK must, as the Foreign Affairs Committee implores, put itself back on the right side of the battle between the competing visions of autocracies and those that champion a rules-based order at home and abroad.   Dr Alice Donald is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Law at Middlesex University, London. She is co-author with Philip Leach of Parliaments and the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2016). Alice's research interests include the relationship between human rights and democratic governance and matters related to human rights implementation. She is an invited expert at the Council of Europe and has experience of training parliamentarians across Europe on behalf of the Parliamentary Assembly.    Philip Leach is Professor of Human Rights Law at Middlesex University, a solicitor, and Director of the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (EHRAC: ehrac.org.uk), also based at Middlesex University, London. He has extensive experience of representing applicants before the European Court of Human Rights, in particular from the former Soviet region, as well as the UK and Turkey. He researches and publishes widely in the field of international human rights law.   Image by High Contrast under (CC).   [1] The UK, France, Germany, Italy and the Russian Federation each pay an annual contribution of almost €33.5 million, calculated on the basis of population and Gross Domestic Product; see: Council of Europe Programme and Budget 2020-2021, Committee of Ministers, December 2019, https://rm.coe.int/1680994ffd#page=184 [2] Figures taken from Annual Reports of the European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2019, https://echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/annualreports&c=; As a snapshot, on 31 December 2019, the UK was responsible for only 0.3 per cent of cases (16 out of 5,231) pending before the Committee of Ministers, i.e. judgments whose implementation was still being monitored (see Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers, 2019, p. 62, https://rm.coe.int/annual-report-2019/16809ec315). [3] Donald, Alice and Leach, Philip. 2016. Parliaments and the European Court of Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 7. [4] See, e.g., Jonathan Sumption, The Reith Lectures 2019, Lecture 3: Human Rights and Wrongs, June 2019, http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2019/Reith_2019_Sumption_lecture_3.pdf; see, e.g., Theresa May, Speech on Brexit: full text, Conservative Home, April 2016, https://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/04/theresa-mays-speech-on-brexit-full-text.html [5] European Commission, Draft text of the Agreement on the New Partnership with the United Kingdom, Article 136, March 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/200318-draft-agreement-gen.pdf [6] Philip Leach and Alice Donald, Russia defies Strasbourg: is contagion spreading?, EJIL Talk, December 2015, https://www.ejiltalk.org/russia-defies-strasbourg-is-contagion-spreading/ [7] Donald, Alice and Speck, Anne-Katrin. Forthcoming 2021. ‘Time for the Gloves to Come Off? The response by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to rule of law backsliding. ECHR Law Review. [8] HANDS OFF PRESS FREEDOM: ATTACKS ON MEDIA IN EUROPE MUST NOT BECOME A NEW NORMAL, 2020 Annual Report by the partner organisations to the Council of Europe Platform to Promote the Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists, https://rm.coe.int/annual-report-final-en/16809f03a9 [9] See, e.g., Kriszta  Kovács, Hungary’s Orbánistan: A Complete Arsenal of Emergency Powers, Verfassungsblog, April 2020, https://verfassungsblog.de/hungarys-orbanistan-a-complete-arsenal-of-emergency-powers/ [10] See further: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, Council of Europe Portal, https://www.coe.int/en/web/sogi [11] See: Istanbul Convention Ratification: 2019 Report on Progress Statement made on 31 October 2019, https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2019-10-31/HCWS58; For example: Angela Crawley MP, The most progressive international treaty for women's rights remains unratified by the UK, The House, March 2020, https://www.politicshome.com/thehouse/article/the-most-progressive-international-treaty-for-womens-rights-remains-unratified-by-the-uk [12] See: 1st GENERAL REPORT ON GREVIO’S ACTIVITIES, April 2020, https://rm.coe.int/1st-general-report-on-grevio-s-activities/16809cd382. The Istanbul Convention has been signed but not ratified by the UK. [13] See further: Council of Europe and Artificial Intelligence, Council of Europe Portal, https://www.coe.int/en/web/artificial-intelligence/home; See further: Protecting the environment using human rights law, Council of Europe, https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/human-rights-environment, and Video – Human Rights for the Planet, Council of Europe, https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/programme-human-rights-for-the-planet; See further: Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, Council of Europe, https://www.coe.int/en/web/anti-human-trafficking [14] See further: Superior Courts Network, ECHR, https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/dialoguecourts/network&c= [15] See, for example, the two European Court Grand Chamber judgments from 2015 which remain unimplemented: Chiragov v Armenia and Sargsyan v Azerbaijan. [16] See further: FCO and FCDO, UK global human rights sanctions, Gov.uk, July 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-global-human-rights-sanctions [17] Foreign Affairs Committee, A brave new Britain? The future of the UK’s international policy, Fourth Report of Session 2019-21, October 2020, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/3133/documents/29251/default/ [18] See the joint third party intervention of the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre and Human Rights Watch in the case of Lapunov v Russia, July 2020, https://ehrac.org.uk/news/ehrac-and-hrw-intervene-in-chechnya-lgbti-crackdown-case/ [19] Navalnyy v Russia; Selahattin Demirtaş v Turkey; Rasul Jafarov v Azerbaijan and Khadija Ismayilova v Azerbaijan. [20] See, for example, Amnesty International: Russia: New ‘foreign agents’ bill further erodes freedom of expression and association, November 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/russia-new-foreign-agents-bill-further-erodes-freedom-of-expression-and-association/ [21] See, for example, the decision of the Committee of Ministers in the Mammadli group of cases of 3 September 2020, https://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng#%7B%22EXECIdentifier%22:%5B%22CM/Del/Dec(2020)1377bis/H46-3E%22%5D%7D [22] Netherlands Government: The Netherlands brings MH17 case against Russia before European Court of Human Rights, July 2020, https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2020/07/10/the-netherlands-brings-mh17-case-against-russia-before-european-court-of-human-rights [23] See the membership of the UK delegation: https://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/offices/delegations/coe2/membership1/ [24] Council of Europe, Report of the Independent Investigation Body on the allegations of corruption within the Parliamentary Assembly, April 2018, http://assembly.coe.int/Communication/IBAC/IBAC-GIAC-Report-EN.pdf [25] See above no.8. [26] See for a chronology of developments: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/FeaturesManager-View-EN.asp?ID=362 [27] As recommended by the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Appointment of the UK’s delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Second Report of Session 2015–16, January 2016, para 25, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmpubadm/658/658.pdf [28] See above no.18, para 4. [29] Correspondence with William Cash MP, 20 April 2020, available here: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/747/documents/4376/default/ [post_title] => Engaging with Europe after Brexit: Time to reset the UK’s relationship with the Council of Europe [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => engaging-with-europe-after-brexit-time-to-reset-the-uks-relationship-with-the-council-of-europe [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:18:01 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:18:01 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5388 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [34] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5381 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-16 00:06:01 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-15 23:06:01 [post_content] => With the COVID-19 pandemic battering the world socially and economically, both the Director General of the World Health Organization, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, António Guterres, cautioned against the damage being done to human rights across the globe. In separate but similar statements, they sounded the alarm on attacks on human rights and fundamental freedoms, the targeting of the marginalised and most vulnerable, parallel pandemics of gender and child violence, and the abuse of governmental power.   Dr. Ghebreyesus poignantly painted a stark picture of the reality so many have witnessed over the past year: “The pandemic has brought out the best – and worst – of humanity…[it] exposes the fault lines, inequalities, injustices and contradictions of our modern world. It has highlighted our strengths, and our vulnerabilities.”[1] According to Mr. Guterres, “...in many places around the world, participation is being denied and civic space is being crushed. A global pushback on human rights has placed participation in its crosshairs.” [2]   Despite these and other warnings by international leaders, we continue to see adverse effects on human rights that have been amplified by economic contraction, as well as social inequalities and instability. The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), an international NGO with offices in New Delhi, London, and Accra, has been monitoring many of the human rights implications of the pandemic. The Commonwealth, a diverse group of 54 nations, has seen extensive direct and indirect adverse impacts of either indifference or acute prejudice by State or non-State actors on vulnerable, voiceless, and virtually invisible groups. CHRI’s research, engagement and advocacy work in the areas of access to justice, contemporary forms of slavery, and access to information throughout the world has revealed key challenges for Commonwealth countries.   The UK has the responsibility to act as a strong international leader on core areas of protection of and support to human rights and the imperiled open, participative civic spaces of which Guterres spoke. Since the start of the pandemic, CHRI has monitored many of the emerging human rights situations throughout the Commonwealth. Rights violations were extensive under restrictive conditions, with serious punishments meted out for breaching regulations.   In Bangladesh, enforced disappearances continue to take place even during the COVID-19 pandemic, targeting opposition political activists and individuals who are critical of the Government’s response to the pandemic. Nationwide lockdowns and severe punishments in numerous countries for breaking restrictions allowed law enforcement agencies to act with impunity. Enforcement came at the cost of rising police brutality in many countries. In response to vivid accounts of police violence and arbitrariness across India during the initial months of a nationwide lockdown, CHRI framed a set of guidelines to assist police departments to enforce the restrictions with care and within the Constitutional framework.[3]   Across the world, outrage and demonstrations against police abuses surged after the brutal killing of George Floyd, an African-American man, by a police officer in Minneapolis, US. Among these agitations is the #EndSARS protests in Nigeria, against a special police unit known for arbitrary violence.   In addition, COVID-19 has caused major, visible disruptions in criminal justice mechanisms as courts and legal systems struggled to minimise physical contact. The alternative of video conferencing has been slow to develop in many countries as a result of creaky infrastructure and poor connectivity. Consequently, there are fewer recourse options in the face of human rights violations and abuses. Yet, there is hope in the pioneering role of pro-active higher courts such as India’s Supreme Court, which has ruled positively on issues of same sex relations and the need to video record conditions at police stations.[4]   Human rights assaults against highly vulnerable groups have persisted. Economic hardship, lockdowns, border closures and increased government authority have worsened the situation. In many countries, the rights of migrants have been largely ignored during the pandemic. Border shutdowns, travel restrictions, quarantine measures and lack of access to services in host countries have placed migrants and their families in conditions of great risk. COVID-19 has also highlighted gaps in protection such as lack of access to sick leave or health care, forcing migrant workers to choose between making a living or going to work while ill.   In May 2020, a member of the Commonwealth 8.7 Network in Bangladesh found that undocumented migrants were at risk of being deported and also reported high infection rates among migrant workers.[5] Restrictions on movement have also increased the vulnerability of migrants to trafficking and exploitative smugglers. In the UK, recent months have seen an increase in dangerous Channel crossings; reports of abuse at the hands of smugglers are widespread.[6]   Among those facing the greatest harm as a result of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic are over 40 million men, women and children worldwide who live in conditions of contemporary forms of slavery, including people who are vulnerable to human trafficking.[7] The Global Slavery Index reports that 40 per cent of those living in conditions of modern slavery reside in the Commonwealth, yet not nearly enough is being done to identify, assist and protect victims and survivors.   Exploitation and conditions of slavery within supply chains have been significantly exacerbated and highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Increased demand for the production of certain goods such as personal protective equipment and hand sanitisers has resulted in workers being forced to work longer hours without adequate physical distancing measures and other protections against the virus. Conditions of slavery have recently been brought to light in the production of PPE sourced by the UK from China.[8] In sectors such as the garment industry, workers have been left without income as large retailers such as British-owned Primark have cancelled orders and refused to honour payments for goods that have already been produced.[9]   Lack of regulation of labour risks in supply chains have made conditions worse. Only the UK and three other Commonwealth countries have laws or policies in place to address the risk of modern slavery within public procurement or business supply chains.[10] No Commonwealth country has yet enacted legislation imposing a mandatory human rights due diligence requirement on businesses.[11] The British Government must lead by example by better regulating international supply chains and addressing potential risk. The UK has an opportunity to use its position within the Commonwealth and its soft power as a global leader for human rights to press for further supply chain regulations abroad and hold countries to account.   Indeed, the UK as current Commonwealth Chair-in-Office should press for the implementation of all commitments previously made by Commonwealth States to uphold human rights. At the 2018 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), States reinforced their commitment to achieve SDG Target 8.7 to take effective measures to eradicate modern slavery and human trafficking.[12] Yet, for the most part, very little has been done across the Commonwealth to implement these promises.[13]   In addition to working with foreign governments to protect human rights, the UK must also do more to support civil society both at home and abroad. CIVICUS, a global research collaboration that rates and tracks respect for fundamental freedoms in 196 countries, has found that in 2020 there has been a contraction of civil society freedoms.[14] Government travel restrictions, border closures, localised lockdowns and curfews have been obstacles to civil society organisations (CSOs) from delivering vital services and have restricted their operations when their services are most in need. CSOs and service providers are having to quickly learn to respond to issues in their new working circumstances. Due to physical distancing and the reprioritisation of public resources, these organisations and services are facing challenges in the provision of essential care. Disappointingly, the majority of governments have failed to provide direct financial assistance to CSOs to enable them to continue providing essential support services and continue their effort to protect human rights. Funding cuts and budget deficits that will extend far beyond the end of the pandemic will further undermine human rights across the world by weakening the CSO networks which depend upon them.   In this time of COVID-19, the free flow of accurate and reliable information is more essential than ever, as well as a need to ensure journalists and the media can perform their professional duties to exchange vital information and support open dialogue, without fear or intimidation. Yet, journalists on the frontline face restrictions from both state and non-state actors while going about their daily work. These pressures include arrests, detentions and criminal investigations; restrictions on access to information; censorship of COVID-19 news; excessive fake news regulation; and direct verbal or even physical attacks.[15] The culture of transparency and access to information has been eroded and the struggle to contain ‘fake news’ has legitimised measures used to stifle independent media and critical journalism.   While restrictions on human rights and freedoms were imposed in the name of public health, many human rights violations have resulted from the deliberate opportunistic use of the pandemic as a cover to restrict human rights and freedoms. Thus, it is critical for the UK to support the promotion of human rights everywhere by taking a stronger leadership role at the Commonwealth and through UN mechanisms. Though the Commonwealth is a collective and voluntary association of states, the Queen and the UK Prime Minister both currently serve in key governance roles as the Head of the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth Chair-in-Office, respectively.   To fulfil its duties to the Commonwealth, the UK must not only lead by example, but actively advocate for protection of human rights and freedoms. Raising awareness of human rights at meetings of Heads of Governments and Ministerial Groups, and agreeing joint action is a start. Pushing for implementation of commitments and action plans, and follow up is vital to ensure that intentions do not remain only on paper. There is an urgent need for the creation and resourcing of a monitoring mechanism at the Commonwealth Secretariat to ensure implementation of commitments to uphold human rights in accordance with Commonwealth and international frameworks. This too is a key area where leadership must be demonstrated. These are essential steps if we are to make progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030 to which all nations have committed.   As the UK wraps up its technical leadership of the Commonwealth and hands over to Rwanda at the Kigali Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), it is incumbent upon it to address these issues on a time bound basis for all Commonwealth members. The UK must flag its determination to pursue these goals and raise them, even if inconvenient to fellow members - for human rights are not hemmed in by national boundaries. They are fundamental to enable hundreds of millions of ordinary people to live with and in dignity.   Sanjoy Hazarika is International Director of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, based in New Delhi.   Sneh Aurora is Director of CHRI’s London office. The authors would like to thank Willow Ross, Research and Advocacy Intern at the CHRI London office, for her contribution to this article.   Image by FCDO (CC).   [1] Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the World Health Assembly, WHO, May 2020, https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-world-health-assembly [2] Antonio Guterres, We are all in this Together: Human Rights and COVID-19 Response and Recovery, UN, April 2020, https://www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team/we-are-all-together-human-rights-and-covid-19-response-and [3] Respecting Human Rights while Enforcing the Lockdown: Guidelines for Police, CHRI, March 2020, https://humanrightsinitiative.org/download/CHRI%20Guidelines%20to%20the%20Police_Lockdown_31%20Mar2020.pdf [4] India court legalises gay sex in landmark ruling, BBC News, September 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-45429664; India Legal, Supreme Court directs installation of CCTVs in all police stations and Central probe agencies [Read Judgement], India Legal, December 2020, https://www.indialegallive.com/top-news-of-the-day/news/supreme-court-directs-installation-of-cctvs-in-all-police-stations-and-central-probe-agencies/ [5] Founded by CHRI, the Commonwealth 8.7 Network is a group of 60+ civil society organisations that share a common vision to eradicate contemporary forms of slavery and human trafficking. Commonwealth 8.7 Network - https://www.commonwealth-87.org/ [6] Alan McGuinness, Channel migrants brought ashore in UK for unprecedented 10th day in a row, Sky News, August 2020, https://news.sky.com/story/channel-migrants-brought-ashore-in-uk-for-unprecedented-10th-day-in-a-row-12048280 [7] More specifically, the Global Estimates of Modern Slavery and the Global Slavery Index states that there are 40,293,000 people living in modern slavery, with 15,710,000 of those living in Commonwealth countries. [8] Pete Pattisson, Ifang Bremer and Annie Kelly, UK sourced PPE from factories secretly using North Korean slave labour, The Guardian, November 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/nov/20/uk-sourced-ppe-from-factories-secretly-using-north-korean-slave-labour [9] Annie Kelly, Primark and Matalan among retailers allegedly cancelling £2.4bn orders in ‘catastrophic’ move for Bangladesh, The Guardian April 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/apr/02/fashion-brands-cancellations-of-24bn-orders-catastrophic-for-bangladesh [10] Eradicating Modern Slavery: An assessment of Commonwealth governments’ progress on achieving SDG Target 8.7, CHRI, July 2020, https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publication/eradicating-modern-slavery-an-assessment-of-commonwealth-government-progress-on-achieving-sdg-target-87 [11] Ibid. [12] Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting Communiqué “Towards a Common Future, The Commonwealth, April 2018, https://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/commonwealth-heads-government-meeting-communique-towards-common-future [13] Eradicating Modern Slavery: An assessment of Commonwealth governments’ progress on achieving SDG Target 8.7, CHRI, July 2020, https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publication/eradicating-modern-slavery-an-assessment-of-commonwealth-government-progress-on-achieving-sdg-target-87 [14] CIVICUS, ‘People Power Under Attack 2020’, December 2020. [15] International Press Institute, https://ipi.media/covid19-media-freedom-monitoring/ [post_title] => The UK and the Commonwealth: Leading the rights path [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-uk-and-the-commonwealth-leading-the-rights-path [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:17:17 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:17:17 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5381 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [35] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5379 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-16 00:05:13 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-15 23:05:13 [post_content] => Following the 2016 Brexit referendum, successive governments have been keen to emphasise that Britain’s withdrawal from the EU is not a rejection of international institutions and cooperation more broadly. Advocates of ‘Global Britain’ have highlighted UK’s role as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and as an influential player in the UN more generally, as an example of London’s leadership role in multilateralism. This contribution discusses and tries to answer some of the key questions about the UK’s role at the UN.   How has the UK performed at the UN in the eleven months since Brexit? The most striking feature of UK diplomacy in New York this year has been the high degree of continuity with Britain’s approach to the UN prior to Brexit. There has been quite a lot of speculation that, once outside the EU, the UK would shift much closer to the Americans on many issues. But instead we have seen the UK stay quite close to its former EU partners, especially France and Germany in the ‘E3’ format. This was particularly clear in the summer, when the US attempted to re-impose UN sanctions on Iran, basing its approach on a disputed reading of the 2015 nuclear deal. At the start of the year, European officials were quite worried that the UK would support the American approach. But the British were very firm in standing with the E3 and rejecting the US approach, which ran out of steam quickly.   The UK has also had a notably good relationship with Germany in the Security Council. The Germans were on the Council for a two-year term starting in January 2019, and I think both Berlin and London were keen to show they would keep working together through Brexit. To emphasise that, they agreed to act as co-leads in the Council on Libya and Sudan, and their day-to-day cooperation seems to have been very good. Ironically, the Germans have actually found it harder to coordinate with the French, who worry that Berlin wants them to sacrifice their national privileges as a permanent council member, and establish an EU Council seat.   More generally, European diplomats in New York say that they have been pleasantly surprised by how well relations with the UK have turned out to date. The British are outside EU formal coordination structures, but there is a lot of quiet sharing of information and ideas. Obviously, it helps that British diplomats and their counterparts from the EU27 have personal ties that pre-date Brexit, so everybody has a good idea who to call and where people stand on specific issues. It is possible that these relationships will weaken with time, as the current generation of European diplomats in New York move on. But overall, the UK and the EU27 have common priorities on most UN issues, whether its finances or human rights, so it’s natural to stay close.   One European diplomat told me that he thought COVID had also had an impact on the UK’s options, as UN missions have spent a lot of the year just trying to keep the wheels of diplomacy turning, and there has not been much space for radical new policies. Very few officials in London and other capitals have had the bandwidth to propose new initiatives at the UN, except on COVID itself. And on COVID itself, the UK has been among the leaders of the multilateral response to the crisis – along with France and the EU institutions – and has again taken a very different approach to the Trump administration’s unilateralist stances.   How has the UK worked with other groups, such as CANZ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand)? UK diplomats had good relations with their counterparts from Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and that seems to have continued. But I can only think of one case in which the UK prominently adopted a ‘CANZ plus UK’ identity in UN debates in 2020, and that involved negotiations on a declaration to celebrate the UN’s seventy-fifth anniversary in the summer.   Sweden and Qatar has led the process of drafting this declaration – a big non-binding commitment to multilateralism—and at the last moment the UK blocked consensus on the document because China wanted to include some language based on ‘Xi Jinping thought’ in the text. The CANZ countries and US (in other words the Five Eyes intelligence community) backed the British position, but the EU did not. This was once case where European diplomats noted that the British were adopting a firmer line than they might have done before Brexit, although in the end a compromise was found and it all proved to be a bit of a flash in the pan.   More broadly though, I don’t see the UK shifting away from its old EU partners to an alternative bloc with CANZ at the UN. To be honest, it is not an idea that makes sense in the UN context for the simple reason that eight or nine times out of ten the UK, CANZ and EU are on roughly the same page on policy problems in New York. So it’s not a meaningful distinction.   How does China’s power at the UN play into UK calculations in New York? China has gained a lot of leverage at the UN in the last five years in particular, and Western countries (and in fact many non-Western countries too) are worried about the spread of its influence. After Brexit, some UN watchers thought that the British would have to tread softly with the Chinese for trade reasons. But British officials have been prominent in criticising Beijing for its treatment of the Uighurs and, unsurprisingly, Hong Kong in UN forums. As the story about the UN75 declaration suggests, the UK and Europeans sometimes differ on how firm to be with Beijing but most EU members have been tough over the Uighurs in particular.   That said, both the UK and most of its allies (including EU and CANZ members) felt that the Trump administration went too far in its attacks on China over COVID-19 this year. We saw this during the virtual high-level session of the UN General Assembly in September this year, when President Trump attacked China in fierce terms, but Boris Johnson gave quite a measured call for clarity about the origins of the pandemic, without mentioning China by name. Overall, I think UK diplomats want to establish that they can be firm with China in multilateral institutions, but also to avoid a ‘new Cold War’ logic by which everything that happens at the UN is framed as a zero-sum game between the US and China and their allies.   How will the arrival of the Biden administration affect the UK’s positon at the UN? The Biden administration is good news for the UK in the multilateral sphere. It validates the UK decision to stand up to Trump over Iran alongside the E3, for example, and it is clear that the US is going to want the COP26 climate talks in Glasgow next year to be a big success. It is not clear how Biden will approach the Chinese at the UN – although he is likely to be quite a bit subtler than Trump has been – but overall the UK and US should get along nicely.   In a funny way, having Biden in the White House could actually complicate UK-EU relations at the UN. On a lot of topics in 2020, Trump’s lines at the UN were so outrageous that it was only common sense for the UK to align with the EU. With Biden in office, the US is likely to be much less disruptive, but the British may also feel more of a pull to stand with the Americans in those cases where there are transatlantic divergences. That said, the UK has always tried to stay as close as it can to the US in the UN as it can, so this is not exactly new.   Will the UK decision to revoke its commitment of 0.7% of GNI to aid affect its standing at the UN? The UK decision on 0.7 per cent will come back to bite it in UN debates. It gives diplomats from developing countries (and indeed big non-Western UN members like China and India) an easy line of attack in debates about economic issues. That said, I suspect that we will sadly see a lot of major aid donors having to make similar choices so the UK won’t be alone in this.   I argued after Brexit that the UK should stick with the 0.7 per cent goal as a flagship example of its commitment to multilateralism, and I am sorry it has slipped. I think that London can try to compensate for that by doubling down on other areas of cooperation, like making COP26 work out.  Overall, I have been impressed by the way the UK has navigated a difficult diplomatic 11 months at the UN since Brexit, but there are still a lot of challenges ahead.   Richard Gowan is the New York-based UN Director for the International Crisis Group and a former researcher at the Foreign Policy Centre, works closely with Security Council members and UN officials. In this interview contribution, he gives a personal perspective on the UK-UN relationship in 2020.   Image by FCDO under (CC). [post_title] => Brexit Britain at the United Nations [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => brexit-britain-at-the-united-nations [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:19:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:19:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5379 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [36] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5377 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-16 00:04:33 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-15 23:04:33 [post_content] => The global order is changing: traditional champions of international cooperation work to undermine the system of rules they helped build and multilateral organisations face a crisis of legitimacy at the time we need them the most.[1] Britain’s place within this order and its systems is changing too; as the House of Lords International Affairs Committee warned in 2019 - the UK’s influence in the world cannot be taken for granted.[2]   In light of this, the UK’s role within international organisations - particularly the UN - must be a foreign policy priority. The UK should in turn recommit fully to multilateralism and, with due consideration to its capacities, play its part in strengthening and upgrading our global institutions. By ensuring it is a model member state and upholding the principles it espouses, the UK will strengthen its position at the UN. It will also create opportunities for the new alliances that will enable the UK to bolster its position at the UN General Assembly. By forging new cross-regional alliances, the UK will also help progress efforts to reform the UN and positively lend its support to the multilateral action needed to tackle global challenges.[3]   UK’s position in the world today ‘Global Britain’ has been the banner under which the UK has branded its foreign policy in recent years. From the inception of the UN, the UK has held a leading role which it has maintained, perhaps disproportionately, through its privilege in being a permanent member of the Security Council, and has been a longstanding proponent of an international rules-based system.   The UK continues to invest in this system. It is a strong supporter of UN Peacekeeping, both politically and financially. Its support as a troop contributor has waxed and waned over the years, but UNA-UK has welcomed the Government’s confirmation that the recent increases in contribution will continue beyond 2020 and will be upgraded in the years to come.[4] Moreover, we applauded Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s announcement at the General Assembly in September that the UK would become the largest single state funder of the World Health Organisation, committing £541 million in funding to COVAX, a new initiative to ensure the COVID-19 vaccine is distributed to all countries of the world, and ending all tariffs and export controls on medical supplies for COVID-19.[5] The UK also stepped up to host COP26, the UN’s climate summit, which has been rescheduled for November 2021. Global leadership of this form maintains the UK’s position as one of the key stakeholders of the international system.   However, a number of recent developments have raised the concern that the UK is pivoting towards a more unilateralist and exceptionalist foreign policy strategy.[6] One example is the decision to reduce overseas development assistance and reverse the 0.7 per cent pledge enshrined in UK law.   Last year, UNA-UK commissioned research on the potential impacts of exiting the EU on the UK’s position at the UN.[7] A key recommendation from the report was “Maintaining resolutely the UK’s 0.7% commitment to foreign aid – a major source of soft power and influence.”[8] The report, which drew on interviews with current and former British and international diplomats and civil servants, also noted growing resentment around its permanent Security Council seat and a perceived sense of entitlement, concerns about its commitment to allies and to international law, and the gaps between its rhetoric and actions.   In light of these challenges, UNA-UK has long called on the UK to set out a clear strategy for the UN within its wider foreign, development and defence policy.[9] Earlier this year, the UK Government committed to the largest review of the UK’s foreign, defence, security and development policy since the end of the Cold War. The Integrated Review offered an opportunity for the Government to define its contribution to multilateralism in this fast-changing world, as well as to engage with a range of stakeholders on approaches for the future of partnerships for UK foreign policy.[10] Crucially, it presented an opportunity for the public to provide input. Public support for foreign policy is essential for national security. An informed and engaged public can support ‘resilience’ at the community level - the ability of the public to resist misinformation and extremism, and actively participate in shaping a nation better able to achieve its objectives on the world stage.   It appears however that this review has been rendered moot, as government has prematurely taken many of the major decisions that will shape the future of UK foreign policy, such as the merger of the FCO and DFID and injection of £14 billion for defence spending over the next four years, in advance of the review’s findings.   Becoming a model member state The UK can seek to offset these factors by ensuring that it is a model Member State and a model permanent member on the Security Council. The UK already has a longstanding principled objection to the use of the veto and has not used it in the last 31 years. It could build upon this by listening to and representing the voices of states that do not have a permanent seat. In addition, the UK could support changes to the Security Council’s working methods to strengthen the role of elected members and advocate for greater transparency and inclusion (building on its role in securing changes to the Secretary-General selection process, for instance).[11]   A model member state is a self-reflective member state. We have seen that a failure to thoroughly scrutinise the application of the UK’s own policies, despite the continuing demand of civil society to do so, has undermined commitments to international treaties and weakened its perception in the eyes of the global community.[12] Britain’s arms exports and its wider relationship with Saudi Arabia is just one, but a totemic example of the wider review that urgently needs to take place.[13] The UK has faced repeated calls to reconsider its role as ‘penholder’ on Yemen at the Security Council. Since the conflict began in 2015, the UK has licenced over £4.5 billion worth of arms exports to Saudi Arabia, despite calls from UNA-UK and other civil society organisations to halt arms exports to all parties to the conflict.[14] Britain’s claim to operate one of the most robust defence export control regimes in the world was discredited when the UK Court of Appeal ruled in 2019 that such exports were unlawful.[15]   New, principled alliances More broadly, the UK will also need to put more effort into forging wider alliances, especially those that cut across traditional lines. This approach will open up opportunities for effective partnership to tackle global challenges, and enable the UK to ensure it is not wedded to traditional alliances that could potentially undermine its principles where the attitude of allies and the UK do not align.   Recent debates around Hinkley Point power plant and Huawei have led some senior parliamentarians to call for an alliance of democracies to counter Beijing’s influence and more broadly the influence of those who share different values to the UK.[16] While on certain issues, notably human rights, it is right for the UK to convene allies to counter pressures to the UK’s agenda, a blanket attitude will not serve the UK or UN well, and could play into a cold war dynamic - a dynamic that has historically been very damaging to international institutions. Dividing the world into an ‘us’ and a ‘them’ is likely to exacerbate diplomatic impasses at the United Nations, and risk creating a ‘two speed’ global governance. Furthermore, many issues cross traditional lines of alliance; the allies of the UK on an issue like human rights are not the same as the allies of the UK on an issue like climate change.   As the 2019 House of Lords report UK Foreign Policy in a Shifting World outlined “a more agile, active and flexible approach to foreign policy must now be developed.”[17] A foreign policy centred around issues, rather than actors, strategic partnerships rather than de facto alliances, will counter the prevailing risks of compromising the UK’s positions on key issues such as gender equality and women’s empowerment, human rights, climate change, disarmament and atrocity prevention that the UK could then build into core elements of a principled foreign policy. And these fresh partnerships could help strengthen the UK’s networks in places where it is currently weak, notably the UN General Assembly, and counter the loss of the diplomatic network that will come from no longer being a member of the EU.   One such example could be through caucusing progressive states such as the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) coalition. In doing so, Britain could lead from behind in pursuit of policies and stimulate positive cross-regional action. The UK could even convene such coalitions itself. For example, as we recently suggested in evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the UK should work to encourage states to defend funding for human rights mechanisms within the UN system, particularly at the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly.[18]   Recommitting to multilateralism In recent months, we have seen a renewed interest in ‘minilateralism’ or smaller sub-UN coalitions of the like-minded on the part of a number of pundits such as Richard Haas, the Government, and other politicians such as the Shadow Foreign Secretary.[19] Such coalitions can be powerful tools for increasing UK influence at the UN, and increasing the level of ambition states show - we may not have had a Paris Climate Agreement worth the name without the ‘High Ambition Coalition’.[20]   However, minilateralism cannot take the place of multilateralism, or of the UN. It leaves too many people behind, at a time when it is vital that our global system reach out to include those who currently feel excluded by it. Despite the challenges it faces, the UN still holds unmatched legitimacy and universality, and remains the global platform through which international norms and standards are agreed.[21] It is vital, therefore, that Britain recommits to multilateralism and looks to strengthen both its position within the UN and the UN itself, by being an exemplary and principled part of the global system, willing to work with any and all in order to pursue a values driven foreign policy agenda.   Enyseh Teimory is the Communications Officer at the United Nations Association – UK.   [1] Louis Charbonneau, Biden Administration Should End US Assault on United Nations, Human Rights Watch, November 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/12/biden-administration-should-end-us-assault-united-nations; United Nations, Report of the UN75 Office, September 2020, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un75report_september_final_english.pdf [2] House of Lords, UK foreign policy in a shifting world order, December 2018, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldintrel/250/250.pdf [3] Stewart Patrick, The New “New Multilateralism”: Minilateral Cooperation, but at What Cost?, Global Summitry, Volume 1, Issue 2, Winter 2015, Pages 115–134, https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv008 [4] United Nations Association – UK, UNA-UK welcomes the UK’s continued commitment to UN Peacekeeping, August 2019, https://www.una.org.uk/news/una-uk-welcomes-uk%E2%80%99s-continued-commitment-un-peacekeeping; UNA-UK, UNA-UK’s statement on the UK’s budget, November 2020, https://www.una.org.uk/news/una-uk-statement-uk%e2%80%99s-budget [5] Speech by the PM to the UN General Assembly 2020, September 2020, https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20200926/49thYJTCPljx/8zNwskE9k2qa_en.pdf [6] UNA-UK, UNA-UK's statement on the future of the Integrated Review, una.org.uk, October 2020, https://www.una.org.uk/news/una-uks-statement-future-integrated-review [7] Jess Gifkins, Samuel Jarvis, Jason Ralph, Global Britain in the United Nations,  una.org.uk, February 2019, https://www.una.org.uk/sites/default/files/UNA-UK_GlobalBritain_20190207d.pdf [8] Ibid, page 4. [9] UNA-UK, Written evidence submitted by United Nations Association – UK, committees.parliament.uk, August 2020, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/10639/pdf/ [10] UNA-UK, UNA-UK’s statement on the future of the Integrated Review, una.org,uk, October 2020, https://una.org.uk/news/una-uks-statement-future-integrated-review [11] While the UK hasn’t officially used the veto since 1989 the threat of use of veto can also shape negotiations on outputs. [12] Kate Ferguson, Putting atrocity prevention at the heart of British foreign policy, fpc.org.uk, September 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/putting-atrocity-prevention-at-the-heart-of-british-foreign-policy/ [13] UNA-UK, UNA-UK statement on UK-Saudi relations, una.org.uk, February 2019,  https://una.org.uk/news/una-uk-statement-uk-saudi-relations [14] Noel Dempsey, UK Defence Industry Exports, House of Commons Library, August 2020, https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8310 [15] Export Licences: High Court Judgement – Volume 662: debated on Thursday 20 June 2019, Hansard, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-06-20/debates/D9BD8C37-E5A0-4A7E-9959-AC40A0DEE622/ExportLicencesHighCourtJudgment [16] Harry Dempsey and David Sheppard, Ministers challenged on future of UK nuclear energy, Financial Times, July 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/3c3658e0-27f5-49a5-b948-3986da3e5bcd; Lisa Nandy, A moment of reckoning, Fabians Society, September 2020,  https://fabians.org.uk/a-moment-of-reckonining/ [17] House of Lords, UK foreign policy in a shifting world order, page 4, December 2018, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldintrel/250/250.pdf [18] UNA-UK, UNA-UK gives evidence on multilateral institutions to parliament, una.org.uk, October 2020 https://www.una.org.uk/news/una-uk-gives-evidence-multilateral-institutions-parliament [19] Richard Haass, The UN’s Unhappy Birthday, Project-Syndicate, September 2020, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/united-nations-75th-anniversary-little-to-celebrate-by-richard-haass-2020-09?barrier=accesspaylog; Lucy Fisher, Downing Street plans new 5G club of democracies, The Times, May 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/downing-street-plans-new-5g-club-of-democracies-bfnd5wj57; Lisa Nandy, A moment of reckoning, Fabians Society, September 2020,  https://fabians.org.uk/a-moment-of-reckonining/ [20] Ed King, Paris ‘high ambition coalition’ to tackle unfinished business, Climate Home News, July 2016, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/07/22/paris-high-ambition-coalition-to-tackle-unfinished-business/#:~:text=Born%20at%20the%202015%20Paris,%2C%20Mexico%2C%20Canada%20and%20Brazil. [21] United Nations, UN75 Office Press Kit, UN.org, https://www.un.org/en/un75/presskit [post_title] => Recommitting the UK to multilateralism through the United Nations [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => recommitting-the-uk-to-multilateralism-through-the-united-nations [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:14:40 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:14:40 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5377 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [37] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5374 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-16 00:03:41 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-15 23:03:41 [post_content] => In December 2016, in a speech at Chatham House, then UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson talked about the promise of a post-Brexit UK “to be more outward-looking and more engaged with the world than ever before.”[1] He stressed that as “Global Britain, our range is not confined to the immediate European hinterland as we see the rise of new powers.” The past four years have provided a taste that assuming the role of ‘Global Britain’ may not be quite the liberating moment Johnson promised it to be. Much of the UK’s energy has been absorbed by negotiating its economic relationship with the EU while trying to secure favorable trade deals with the rest of the world. The negotiations between Britain and the EU have created little positive energy. And the focus has been too little on what the UK and Europe can do together.   In 2021, the UK and the EU will open a new chapter in their relationship, a chapter that will no longer be dominated by negotiations over a Brexit agreement. That gives the UK and the EU a chance to focus more on what they can do together in order to shape global order. Here the UK’s and the EU’s outlooks are remarkably similar. For all the cozying up to US President Donald Trump, now UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson never embraced the assault on multilateralism pursued by Trump. With regard to the EU, Johnson peddled the sovereigntist slogan of ‘taking back control’, painting the EU as a threat to British democracy. But Johnson never applied that sovereigntist vision to global agreements. He never raged against the Paris Agreement on climate change, the International Criminal Court or other UN bodies the way his supposed populist kindred spirit in the White House did. And, yes, a post-Brexit Britain will invest a lot in shoring up its bilateral relations with the US, Japan, Australia, Canada and others. But there is a lot that Britain and the EU can do together to strengthen multilateralism where they share a similar analysis of the challenges at hand.   In the ‘Global Britain’ speech, Johnson looked back at the failure of the efforts to ‘globalise’ the liberal international order after the end of the Cold War:   “We stood together, with our west European allies, throughout the cold war and when that cold war ended 26 years ago we hoped that our rules-based liberal order would catch on and embrace the whole world. Alas, that vision has not really come to pass.” Johnson then issued a call to arms to defend international institutions and a warning: “If we fail, then we risk reverting to an older and more brutal system where the strong are free to bully or devour the weak. Where might is always right and the rules and institutions we have so painstakingly built fade away into irrelevance. We cannot allow this to happen.”   This reveals that in fact it is the EU and the UK who are kindred spirits when it comes to multilateralism. Johnson’s thinking matches exactly the thinking of democratic middle powers like many of the EU members (especially Germany). Democratic middle powers have a lot at stake in terms of the health of multilateralism, a lot more at least than great powers that can much more afford a ‘might is right’ attitude – or as German chancellor Merkel put it, rely on the ​‘rule of the stronger’ (Recht des Stärkeren) instead of the ​‘rule of law’ (Herrschaft des Rechts). Therefore, they have a strong incentive to invest in multilateral institutions since they generally see them as serving their interests. Middle powers also have significant ability to invest in multilateralism. They can do agenda-setting, start new initiatives, defend rules and laws against attacks, and mobilise support for global public goods.   That is exactly the approach of the Alliance for Multilateralism, a French-German initiative that was born out of the crisis of multilateralism following the election of Donald Trump.[2] It is not a formal alliance, rather a flexible platform to strengthen multilateralism. That pragmatic approach should sit well with the UK. Britain has already supported several of the Alliance’ initiatives, such as the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, Principles for lethal autonomous weapons systems, the Partnership for information and democracy, and the joint position on climate and security. The Alliance for Multilateralism therefore would be a good platform for the UK to flexibly engage with European partners in strengthening multilateralism. The door is very much open for this. The German Government has not made it a secret that it would very much welcome continuing close cooperation with the UK post-Brexit.   The Alliance last met at ministerial level on the occasion of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 2020, one year after the presentation of the Alliance for Multilateralism during the UNGA ministerial week in 2019. This latest Alliance meeting brought together 70 participants from across the world at Ministerial level.   The Alliance concentrates on three broad goals:
  • To protect, preserve and advance international law and internationally agreed norms, agreements and institutions when they come under pressure or are attacked;
  • To reform and to update existing international institutions, in order to make them more representative, agile and effective; and
  • To advance multilateral initiatives in new or underregulated areas.
  In each of these areas, the UK can make a distinct contribution to advance the work of the Alliance for Multilateralism.   In terms of protecting and defending international norms and law, strong cooperation of democracies is critical. The UK can bring this push to the Alliance, reinforcing the efforts of President Biden who as candidate vowed to convene a ‘Global Summit for Democracy’. The UK has also supported the idea of a ​‘Democratic 10‘ (D10) made up of the G7 members (including EU) plus Australia, India and South Korea as a format to better coordinate multilateral policies among the world’s strongest democratic economies. This can be a basis of a democratic core of the Alliance for Multilateralism, which the UK can help to strengthen. Especially after shedding ‘Golden Era’ delusions about cooperation with Beijing, the UK can get the Alliance to push back against Beijing’s economic and political coercion and violations of human rights and international law (such as in Hong Kong). Beijing has not paid nearly enough of a political price for its brazen decision to take Canadian citizens Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor as hostages in order to bully Ottawa into releasing Meng Wanzhou, the daughter of Huawei’s founder, who Canada arrested at the request of the US. There is also too little of a concerted pushback against Beijing’s acts of economic coercion for example against Australia.   With regard to reforming existing international institutions the UK has long advocated strengthening global health governance and can very much add to the Alliance for Multilateralism’s efforts to reform the WHO and to strengthen new public-private ventures such as GAVI and CEPI that have proved crucial in dealing with the corona pandemic.[3] Together with EU members, the UK can convince the US to join the COVAX facility to ensure global access to corona vaccines. The UK can also work with Europe to hold Beijing to its commitment to not use access to corona vaccines as a lever in bilateral relations with poorer countries. At the same time, the UK can also encourage Europe to let go of some overcome privileges such as holding on the IMF’s top job. After Brexit, the European candidate for IMF managing director will unlikely be a UK citizen. Therefore, it is easier for the UK Government to tell Europeans that this sends a fatal message to countries like Argentina, Mexico, South Kora or South Africa; Europeans want to hold on to their privileges as long as possible, and they will fiercely defend them. But the buy-in of these countries that are not traditional members of what used to be the ‘West’ is exactly what is needed for successful coalitions to advance multilateralism.   The work on principles for autonomous lethal weapons and against disinformation that the Alliance for Multilateralism has undertaken is also something the UK can align with. As Boris Johnson stated in 2016: “We work on security with our European friends – and as I have said before, our role is to be a flying buttress, supportive of the EU project, but outside the main body of the church.” In this spirit, in addition to the work of the Alliance for Multilateralism the UK and European partners can also continue the work of the E3 on Iran and other international security matters.   In 2021, the UK will assume the G7 presidency and also host the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow. This gives the post-Brexit UK a chance to leave its mark on the multilateral stage. It will be good for the UK to have EU partners by its side in this endeavor. And it will be good for EU members to be able to count on the UK as a partner in the efforts to strengthen multilateralism.   Thorsten Benner is Co-founder and Director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin. He also teaches at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. He is a member of the Global Board of Directors of More in Common.    [1] Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP, Global Britain: UK Foreign Policy in the Era of Brexit, Chatham House, December 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/events/special/2016-12-02-Boris-Johnson.pdf [2] Alliance for Multilateralism – see: https://multilateralism.org/ [3] GAVI: The Vaccine Alliance – see: https://www.gavi.org/; CEPI – see: https://cepi.net/ [post_title] => Kindred spirits: How a post-Brexit Britain and the EU can work together to strengthen multilateralism [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => kindred-spirits-how-a-post-brexit-britain-and-the-eu-can-work-together-to-strengthen-multilateralism [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:15:08 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:15:08 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5374 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [38] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5372 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-16 00:02:47 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-15 23:02:47 [post_content] => The contemporary world of international relations is marked by two major countervailing trends. First, is a number of complicated existential threats, like climate change and pandemics, which require earnest international coordination and collaboration to address. Second, is a trend in the opposite direction toward isolationism and nationalism, with the quintessential examples being Brexit and ‘America First’.   On top of these trend lines, with COVID-19, we have seen cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns launched by adversarial state actors; the domestic deployment of the Canadian and Australian militaries, among other national forces, to protect vulnerable populations; the disruption and vulnerability of just-in-time global supply chains; worrying domestic political tensions and fractures in many states; and an erosion of international cooperation. All of this is taking place amid ongoing tectonic geopolitical shifts, bookended by an overdue discussion about data, tracking, commercial surveillance and the attention economy.   Given this, there are two key and congruent lessons to be learned from COVID-19. First, is the urgent need to reconceptualise doctrines of national security. Second, is to develop a better appreciation of where alliances with likeminded states can be found in the tumultuous sea of global affairs.   A notable feature of existing national security doctrine is the willingness to identify pandemics as a national security threat, without building a sufficient response capability, and while largely decoupling this threat from a traditional understanding of the role and functions of security and intelligence systems. In our view, this needs to change, and change needs to be driven by exchanges among like-minded states and, ultimately, by public debate.   One important forum for discussions of a new approach to national security is the Five Eyes alliance (comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the United States). The Five Eyes partnership has, over the past decade, expanded its scope beyond intelligence sharing to incorporate dialogue on key geopolitical and economic concerns. While it is a small and tight club of ‘Anglosphere’ states, it could serve as an important sounding board.   Within this context, it is important to note that the UK produced its first national security strategy in March 2008, which took a quite broad view of national security.[1] It set out a new understanding of national security for the UK, explained in this way: “In the past, the state was the traditional focus of foreign, defence and security policies, and national security was understood as dealing with the protection of the state and its vital interests from attacks by other states. Over recent decades, our view of national security has broadened to include threats to individual citizens and to our way of life, as well as to the integrity and interests of the state. That is why this strategy deals with transnational crime, pandemics and flooding — not part of the traditional idea of national security, but clearly challenges that can affect large numbers of our citizens and which demand some of the same responses as more traditional security threats, including terrorism.”   This was a bold statement. It elevated the understanding of the threats posed by pandemics and climate change impacts to a high level and, just as important, argued that the approach to these non-traditional security threats contained many elements similar to those deployed against more traditional concerns, including terrorism. These elements included monitoring (intelligence collection) and risk assessment, the development of response capabilities and the inculcation of societal resilience. Subsequent iterations of the British national security strategy suggest the bold new outlook never fully took hold. The most recent update to the British national security strategy was produced in 2018.[2] Pandemics were included in a general category of national security threats, labelled “diseases and natural hazards affecting the UK.” Discussion of specific responses to pandemic threats was off-loaded to a separate biosecurity review, produced in July 2018.[3]   The UK Biological Security Strategy extolled the capabilities and systems available within the UK while calling for greater integration of effort, sustained attention to the threat and support for developing countries to help improve their capabilities. Disease outbreaks were identified as a major globalised threat to society while accidental release of a virus or deliberate biological attacks were seen as less likely (high impact but low probability). The UK strategy maintained a traditional distinction between the role of intelligence services in collecting information regarding deliberate threats (largely from malicious state actors), and the conduct of epidemiological intelligence by civilian public health authorities and experts in Britain and through international partnerships. The key role played by the WHO’s Health Emergencies Programme was acknowledged alongside Britain’s financial contribution to it.[4] The WHO was described as having “a world leading surveillance and information network filtering 5000 disease signals a month looking for outbreaks of pandemic potential.”   It is safe to say that key assumptions built into the 2018 UK Biological Security Strategy, such as the distinction between state-sponsored biological threats and naturally occurring pandemics, and the singular reliance on the WHO for global surveillance, have been made dangerously obsolete by COVID-19. The creation of a new Joint Biosecurity Centre in May 2020 to act as an intelligence fusion and response mechanism is one early indicator of new thinking.[5]   Where does Canada fit? The answer is: on the margins. Canada has never produced an overarching biosecurity strategy, unlike Britain and the United States. Its one attempt at a national security strategy was produced 16 years ago and has been forgotten. The 2004 Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy deserved a better fate.[6] It might have served as a useful construct if it had been sustained and adapted to a changing national security environment. Its emphasis on an ‘all-hazards’ understanding of national security threats, its identification of intelligence as the country’s first line of defence against all manner of threats, its attention to public health threats in the aftermath of the severe acute respiratory syndrome epidemic, and its call for closer integration of public health and national security were all important attributes. But this concept of national security withered away, to be replaced by more sectoral attention to individual threats posed by terrorism, cyberattacks and violent extremism.   A long-overdue reappraisal of Canadian strategic approaches to national security will have to emerge in a post-COVID-19 environment. The groundwork needs to be laid in a clear-eyed appraisal of the Canadian Government’s response to the pandemic and the nature of the role played by security and intelligence agencies, which has been largely obscured by doctrines of secrecy, failures of transparency and glib political messaging. Canada should not be content to continue to sit on the margins of strategic thinking about national security. As Canada revamps its own approach to national security, there are things it can learn from efforts by its Five Eyes partners – and the UK in particular.   There is also an opportunity to build on the long history between the UK and Canada, as both push into an increasingly uncertain and unstable world. At risk of stating the obvious, states do not have ‘friends’, they have interests. But, if they did – Canada and the UK would be the best of friends. They have a common language. A similar culture. Plus, a range of shared experiences.   However, more pointedly, they also have a number of comparable interests in the conduct of global affairs. Both Canada and the UK are too small to throw their weight around, like China and the United States. Both benefit from a stable rules-based global order and from certainty within international institutions (as much as that is possible). During this period of upheaval, it will be imperative for countries like the UK and Canada to work together to advance their mutual interests in a range of international fora, from the G20 to the ITU. After all, in tough times, it is nice to know who your friends are.   Aaron Shull is CIGI’s managing director and general counsel, acts as a strategic liaison between CIGI’s research initiatives and other departments while managing CIGI’s legal affairs and advising senior management on a range of legal, operational and policy matters. Aaron is an expert on cyber security issues. He coordinated the CIGI essay series Governing Cyberspace during a Crisis in Trust. Prior to joining CIGI, Aaron practised law for a number of organizations, focusing on international, regulatory and environmental law. He has taught courses at the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and was previously a staff editor for the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law.   Wesley Wark is a CIGI senior fellow and an adjunct professor at the University of Ottawa's Centre on Public Management and Policy, where he teaches professional courses on security and intelligence topics. He recently retired from the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, where he had taught since 1988. He served two terms on the prime minister of Canada’s Advisory Council on National Security (2005–2009) and on the Advisory Committee to the President of the Canada Border Services Agency from 2006 to 2010. More recently, he provided advice to the minister of public safety on national security legislation and policy. He has appeared on numerous occasions before parliamentary committees and comments regularly for the media on national security issues.   Image by FCDO under (CC).   [1] The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world, Cabinet Office, March 2008, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228539/7291.pdf [2] National Security Capability Review, HM Government, March 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf [3] UK Biological Security Strategy, HM Government, July 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/730213/2018_UK_Biological_Security_Strategy.pdf [4] WHO in emergencies, World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/emergencies/en/ [5] Joint Biosecurity Centre, Gov.uk, May 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/joint-biosecurity-centre [6] Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, Public Safety Canada, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/scrng-en.aspx [post_title] => The UK and Canada: National Security and collaboration in uncertain times [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-uk-and-canada-national-security-and-collaboration-in-uncertain-times [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:20:19 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:20:19 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5372 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [39] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5368 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-16 00:01:50 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-15 23:01:50 [post_content] => Every few years, Western leaders raise the idea of democracies working in 'alliance' or 'concert' on global challenges. The late US Senator John McCain, an esteemed supporter of transatlantic cooperation, included a 'League of Democracies' in his 2008 presidential campaign platform.[1] And President-Elect Joe Biden ran for office in 2020 with a written pledge to convene a 'Summit of Democracy' in his first term.[2]   When American President Donald Trump suggested including Russia in the G7 this year, the UK proposed instead a ‘D10’ gathering of democracies.[3] This suggestion of adding Australia, India, and the Republic of Korea to form a group of ten democratic nations turned attention again to relevance of values-based multilateral groups.   Close cooperation between democracies is especially urgent. For years, Russia and China have been seeking to export their authoritarian model of governance around the globe. Moscow’s ongoing violation of Ukraine’s sovereign borders and Beijing’s deployment of ‘warrior wolf’ diplomacy finds expression in undiplomatic behaviour and aggressive actions.[4] During the COVID-19 pandemic, they have argued that only complete state control over personal liberty and democratic freedoms can successfully solve problems like a global health crisis.   Their disregard of the global rules-based order serves as a stark reminder for UK diplomats and foreign policymakers of the need for strengthened ties with other democracies. Whether the democratic model of governance can prevail over its authoritarian rivals will have profound implications for the international order for the rest of the 21st Century.   For two decades, the UK has engaged with a multilateral coalition of democracies committed to defending the rule of law, human rights, and democratic values: The Community of Democracies.   Towards a Community of Democracies 20 years ago, the UK joined 106 other nations in Poland in what was then the largest gathering of countries identifying as electoral democracies. The gathering produced an historic 19-point statement called the Warsaw Declaration, named after its host city, that committed participants to the protection of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy; such explicit support for the essential values of democracy had seldom been so central in previous international agreements.[5]   The Warsaw Declaration is a 'checklist' for established democracies to ensure adherence to fundamental democratic principles while also providing transitioning political systems a 'roadmap' to democracy.   Principle One of the declaration states that the will of the people for its government is to be expressed through regular, free, and fair elections. The right of every person to equal access to education forms Principle Six. Principle Seven supports freedom of the press to collect, report, and disseminate information, news, and opinions subject only to legal restrictions in a democratic society. Other principles in the Warsaw Declaration address freedom of peaceful assembly, equal protection of the law for minorities, independent judiciaries, and the right of those elected to form a government.   But the Warsaw Declaration, and the Community of Democracies (CoD) that emerged from the gathering in Poland, almost didn’t happen. Some thought it wholly unnecessary.   In the three decades before the year 2000, electoral democracies had risen in number from 30 primarily Western-based governments to nearly 120 nations spread across every region on earth.   In foreign ministries around the world, diplomats asked, ‘Why do we need a summit about democracy?’ ‘Aren’t democracies ascendant, especially following the dissolution of the Soviet Union?’ Regional-based bureaus expressed concern a membership body of democracies would cause more problems than it was worth. Would there be friction as a result of creating a new ‘club’ of nations that invited some countries but excluded others? And would governments truly commit to democracy as an overriding principle if their specific interests failed to benefit?   Months of planning by meeting organisers, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, sought to address these concerns. In the end, the states in attendance represented a generously broad array of political systems, from the established parliamentary democracy of the UK, to the Russian Federation and Indonesia only two years after emerging from decades of one-person rule. The diversity of democracy, as represented in the three-day conference, was widely acknowledged. The generally held assumption was that participants might be at different places along the democratic path but the worldwide direction towards representative government was a linear process.   Publicly, Geremek tempered the celebratory atmosphere of the year 2000 by cautioning that ‘democracy doesn't only move from triumph to triumph,’ but would face ongoing and new challenges.[6] Indeed, the notion of an inevitable path of democracy as the ideal global governance system has cracked. Today, Russia, Egypt, and other countries have turned away from democracy and even well-established democracies are struggling with serious governing challenges.   That the conference produced the Warsaw Declaration was an immense achievement. Despite the variety of states in attendance, participants agreed that certain unalienable principles had to be present for any political system to claim the label of democracy. For Foreign Minister Geremek, a noted intellectual and Solidarity activist, it was personally important to connect the name of the city he loved with a community of democracies, overcoming its previous association with Soviet totalitarianism (the Warsaw Pact).[7]   Role of the UK If you Google the UK’s foreign policy statements over the past several years, the word ‘democracy’ shows up often. There is also official and regular acknowledgement by UK diplomats of the vital role of civil society in fostering and maintaining democracy. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO- now Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office FCDO since September 2020) has been a consistent participant in the Community of Democracies Ministerial Conferences since its inception.   British policymakers recognise the role the group can play as part of its multilateral efforts. While the UK sees the value of universal membership-based bodies such as the UN and its agencies like the WHO, it also recognises the importance of a values-based coalition like the Community of Democracies to defend human rights and democracy.   “In a world where democratic values are under attack on many fronts, the countries which believe in those values must stand together and resist the forces that threaten them,” said then FCO Minister for Human Rights Baroness Anelay of St. John’s DBE in 2016 when the UK sought to expand its role with the Community of Democracies by applying for membership to its 28-member Governing Council.[8] Three months later, the UK application was unanimously approved, and it joined the council as a member state. The FCDO’s Human Rights and Democracy unit serves as the primary interlocutor between Whitehall and the Community of Democracies.   Former Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt once said the UK should be part of an “invisible chain, linking the world’s democracies.”[9] An example of the UK’s engagement with the Community of Democracies is the work to advance democratic consolidation in transitioning countries such as The Gambia. This year, CoD partnered with the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, another pro-democracy organisation supported by the FCO, in a virtual training program in Banjul for women’s empowerment. The FCO has joined its diplomats to Community of Democracy high-level delegations, and funded a CoD publication on ‘Best Practice in Community of Democracies' Member States' Engagement with and Protection of Civil Society.’   The UK has much to share with other democracies about its own experience. As Baroness Anelay has said, the UK and others must “work to perfect our own democracies—for there is always work to be done at home.”   During the UK’s six-month chairmanship of the Community of Democracies, an FCO-hosted Governing Council meeting in London in 2019 was briefed about how the process of devolution, for example in regard to Wales, is a route to increasing democratic participation. Lessons learned were shared by experts of the Constitution Group of the Cabinet Office. The Minister for the Constitution, Chloe Smith MP, spoke to the best practices and the work still to be done of ensuring all citizens eligible to vote were able to vote.   The FCO host illustrated another essential issue—democratic resiliency—with a presentation by the Maldives’ Foreign Minister Abdullah Shahid, who discussed his country’s return to elected and constitutional government through peaceful means. Shahid was joined by the Minister for Africa, Harriett Baldwin MP, who spoke about the human rights aspect of UK foreign assistance.   A significant change to CoD practice was introduced by the UK host, that of adopting an Outcome Statement in twice-annual Governing Council meetings. Previous ‘declarations’ occurred in bi-annual Ministerial Conferences but at the 29th Governing Council the FCO guided a Statement on Media Freedom and Violence against Journalists to adoption by the Governing Council.[10] This Statement was designed to complement FCO work in other multilateral venues on the issue.   Renewed commitment Of the many multilateral bodies in which the UK participates, the Community of Democracies is unique in significant ways. Unlike the Commonwealth, or NATO, or the G7, the membership of the intergovernmental body is not based upon economic, regional, linguistic, or historic criteria, but on the universal human rights and democratic values of the Warsaw Declaration. And, although composed of an intergovernmental coalition of like-minded nations, the Community of Democracies differs from related-bodies in its substantial inclusion of civil society in its operations.   A recent example of the mutually beneficial relationship between the UK and Community of Democracies is the Bucharest Anniversary Statement, which provides the member states’ view on the COVID-19 pandemic.[11] The statement articulates that the response to the global health crisis must not be worse than the virus itself; authoritarian regimes should not use the pandemic as an excuse to consolidate power, punish political enemies, and restrict basic human rights.   Rather, it recognises that “Times of crisis can also be an impetus for change. The mobilization of civil society, innovations to democratic processes, and demands for reformed institutions and increased accountability point to opportunities for positive developments emerging from the pandemic.”   As a values-based organisation, the Community of Democracies provides additional opportunities for the newly-configured Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office to continue to declare and defend its support of human rights and the rule of law. The Community of Democracies welcomes the UK’s involvement with its democratic allies to confront ongoing global challenges to democracy.   Thomas E. Garrett has worked in politics and advocacy for more than three decades. Elected Secretary General of the Community of Democracies in September 2017, he was re-appointed to a second three-year mandate as Secretary General in September 2020. Prior to the Community of Democracies, for 23 years he supported democratic transitions for the US-based International Republican Institute, in the field as chief of party in Ukraine, Mongolia and Indonesia and in the Washington, DC headquarters as director of Middle East programs and then vice president for global programs. Garrett holds a bachelor’s degree in political science and a master’s degree in international relations.   Image by FCDO under (CC).   [1] John McCain, An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom, November/December 2007, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2007-11-01articles/enduring-peace-built-freedom [2]Joseph R. Biden, Why America Must Lead Again, March/April 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again [3] Tim Montgomerie, How a new alliance of democracies could counter Russia and China, September 2020, https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2020/09/how-new-alliance-democracies-could-counter-russia-and-china [4] Zhiqun Zhu, Interpreting China’s ‘Warrior-Wolf’ Diplomacy, May 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/interpreting-chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomacy [5] The Warsaw Declaration, October 2016, https://community-democracies.org/app/uploads/2016/10/2000-Warsaw-Declaration-ENG.pdf [6] John Lancaster, Democracy Assembly Convenes in Warsaw, June 2000, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/06/27/democracy-assembly-convenes-in-warsaw/1063c09b-f6d5-408f-bb5e-85b42547eed8 [7] Madeleine Albright speech, Tribute to Bronislaw Geremek, September 2008, https://www.ned.org/docs/geremek_tributes.pdf [8] Rt. Honorable Baroness Anelay of St. Johns DBE, speech to the 22nd Meeting of the Governing Council of the Community of Democracies [9] Rt.  Honorable Jeremy Hunt MP speech, October 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/an-invisible-chain-speech-by-the-foreign-secretary [10] Outcome Statement on Media freedom and Violence against Journalists, January 2019, https://community-democracies.org/outcome-statement-of-the-29th-meeting-of-the-cod-governing-council [11] 20th Anniversary Bucharest Statement, June 2020, https://community-democracies.org/app/uploads/2020/06/20th-Anniversary-Bucharest-Statement-.pdf [post_title] => Another look at values-based multilateralism [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => another-look-at-values-based-multilateralism [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:20:32 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:20:32 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5368 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) )
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