1. Introduce a dedicated emergency visa scheme that explicitly includes provision for media workers in exile. The MFC’s independent legal advisory arm – the High-Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom – has consistently designated this a priority area and provided MFC states with clear guidance on how to implement a suitable scheme for journalists at risk.[4] Unfortunately, only five MFC member states – Canada, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – have so far implemented such a scheme. Between them, they have issued over 1,000 visas or residence permits to media workers in exile under these schemes since 2020. Implementing a similar scheme in the UK will require stronger internal collaboration between the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and the Home Office.
2. Support a national initiative that promotes the protection and safety of media workers in exile. Journalists at risk require not only legal protection – but also practical support to rebuild their lives and continue their work. Germany, for example – who the UK is replacing as MFC co-chair – supports the Hannah Arendt Initiative, a network of civil society organisations that protects and supports journalists from Afghanistan, Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and elsewhere.[5] As co-chair of the MFC, the UK should be supporting a similar initiative.
3. Increase the proportion of international aid allocated to supporting independent media. In 2023 – the most recent year we have figures for – the UK allocated just 0.1% of its international aid to media development. This is nowhere near the benchmark of 1.0% recommended by the Forum on Information & Democracy and even lower than the average of 0.16% for all 30 states measured in the IMFS Index.[6] As its aid budget is reduced, support for media development must be retained as a strategic priority if the UK is serious about defending press freedom internationally.
4. Ensure consistent, long-term financial support for the BBC World Service. As one of the most trusted international news providers – reaching 435 million people each week – the BBC World Service is one of the most effective instruments in the world for supporting access to reliable information.[7] Speaking at the UK Media Freedom Forum, Foreign Affairs Select Committee Chair Emily Thornbury highlighted its strategic importance, asking: ‘Why aren’t we tripling funding to the BBC World Service? It should be a major priory for this country… Particularly with the cutbacks we are making on aid… Let’s at least have a really good presence in terms of helping people understand what’s going on in the world’.[8]
5. Contribute to multilateral pooled funds dedicated to supporting international journalism. The UNESCO-administered Global Media Defence Fund (GMDF) and other similar, pooled funds can, in principle, provide an effective way of coordinating resources, providing core support to local entities, reducing the earmarking of contributions, and supporting the principle of multilateralism. [9] However, in 2024, the UK only contributed to one such fund – the GMDF. By comparison, in 2024, France awarded funding to all four qualifying multilateral pooled funds and in 2025 hosted a high‑level conference on information integrity and independent media at the Paris Peace Forum – where further financial support was pledged. [10]
According to the 2025 IMFS Index, no country is currently performing consistently well across all three dimensions of support for media freedom: diplomacy, funding and safety.[11] As MFC co-chair, the UK has the opportunity – and obligation – to fill this gap in international leadership. Achieving this does not require reinventing the wheel. Just the political will to deliver on existing commitments. As Chris Elmore, FCDO Minister for Multilateral and Human Rights, recently said, “What I want to see, through us retaking the chair of the Media Freedom Coalition, is a move back to the original pillars of this work to ensure that we have meaningful outcomes”.[12] I agree. Martin Scott is a Professor of Media and Global Development at the University of East Anglia. His publications include, ‘Capturing News, Capturing Democracy’ (2024), ‘Humanitarian Journalists’ (2022), ‘Media and Development’ (2014) and ‘From Entertainment to Citizenship’ (2014). Image: Johann Wadephul, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany (left), Elina Valtonen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland (centre), and Yvette Cooper British Foreign Secretary (right); credit: Ben Dance / UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [1] Media Freedom Coalition, Home Page, https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/ [2] Media Freedom Coalition, MFC Embassy Networks, https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/activities/embassy-networks/ [3] Centre for Journalism and Democracy, The Index on international Media Freedom Support (IMFS) 2025, 2025, https://jdem.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/IMFS-full-report.pdf [4] Media Freedom Coalition, High-Level Panel of Experts, N.A., https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/who-is-involved/high-level-panel-of-legal-experts/ [5] Network for the protection of journalists and media worldwide, Hannah Arendt Initiative, https://hannah-arendt-initiative.de/en/hannah-arendt-initiative/ [6] Forum on Information and Democracy, The Forum on Information and Democracy calls for a New Deal for Journalism, June 2021, https://informationdemocracy.org/2021/06/16/the-forum-on-information-and-democracy-calls-for-a-new-deal-for-journalism/ [7] BBC, BBC’s response to global news events drives audience growth, July 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2025/bbc-response-to-global-news-events-drives-audience-growth [8] UK Media Freedom Forum, Home Page, https://mediafreedomforum.co.uk/ [9] UNESCO, Global Media Defence Fund, https://www.unesco.org/en/global-media-defence-fund [10] French Embassy and Consulates General in the UKParis Peace Forum: 29 States commit to information integrity and independent media, November 2025, https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/paris-peace-forum-29-states-commit-information-integrity-and-independent-media [11] Centre for Journalism and Democracy, The Index on international Media Freedom Support (IMFS) 2025, 2025, https://jdem.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/IMFS-full-report.pdf [12] UK Parliament, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Volume 781, March 2026, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2026-03-04/debates/8C008AEB-0F64-4A12-A157-368EA0118C0A/ForeignCommonwealthAndDevelopmentOffice#contribution-490D078B-AA2C-4241-8EE2-3F4DDDF44EF0 [post_title] => Five Priorities for the UK as it Retakes the Chair of the Media Freedom Coalition [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => five-priorities-for-the-uk-as-it-retakes-the-chair-of-the-media-freedom-coalition [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-03-13 12:46:02 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-03-13 11:46:02 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8848 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [2] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8820 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-02-24 01:00:50 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-02-24 00:00:50 [post_content] => Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war’s impact on media and information integrity remains profound. In this anniversary reflection, Sergiy Tomilenko, President of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, examines how journalism has adapted to new battlefield realities and why sustained international support for independent media is essential. As the character of the war evolves, so too does the environment in which Ukrainian journalists operate. As Ukraine approaches the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the character of the war has changed – and so has the daily work of journalists. Missiles still strike. Artillery still destroys cities. But increasingly, it is the persistent, humming presence of drones above our towns and villages that defines this phase of the war. Shahed drones fly low over residential areas at night. First-person-view (FPV) drones hunt vehicles near the frontlines. Surveillance drones monitor movement even in places far from the battlefield. For Ukrainian journalists, this has created a new professional reality. The danger is no longer episodic, it is ambient. It hovers. At the same time, Ukraine is enduring one of its most difficult winters since 2022. Repeated attacks on energy infrastructure have triggered rolling blackouts across major cities. Heating failures have left entire districts without warmth in sub-zero temperatures. Internet and mobile networks periodically collapse when power supply fails. And yet, journalism continues. Not because it is easy. Not because it is safe. But because it is essential. Reporting Under Drones In recent months, safety protocols for journalists have evolved once again. Reporters covering frontline regions now routinely carry drone detectors — small handheld devices that warn of incoming unmanned aircraft. One Ukrainian fixer I recently met works with international correspondents in high-risk zones. He carries such a detector every day. Not long ago, he found himself under shelling after detecting drone activity nearby. Later, when we spoke, he asked me not to publicly describe the incident in detail. “Please,” he said quietly, “I don’t want my wife to worry.” That sentence captures the human dimension behind the statistics. We often speak in numbers – journalists killed, injured, detained, captured. These figures matter. But behind each one is a family, a daily calculation of risk, and a professional decision to continue. The Russian army does not distinguish between civilian and media targets. Journalists wearing “PRESS” markings remain vulnerable. Media vehicles have been hit. Newsrooms have been damaged. In occupied territories, journalists face detention and torture. Yet Ukrainian reporters continue to document war crimes, verify information, and provide context in an environment saturated with disinformation and propaganda. The Harsh Winter and the Information Vacuum This winter has tested resilience in new ways. Blackouts are not new in Ukraine, but their scale and unpredictability have intensified. In some districts of Kyiv and other cities, electricity follows a fragile schedule — three hours on, seven hours off. In frontline regions, there is no schedule at all. For journalism, electricity is not a convenience. It means the ability to upload footage, confirm sources, publish missile alerts, verify rumours, and correct false information circulating online. When power disappears, connectivity follows. LTE signals may appear strong on a smartphone screen, yet nothing loads. Journalists drive to petrol stations to charge batteries. They work from cars, stairwells, and temporary co-working spaces. In many frontline areas, printed newspapers remain essential. This may surprise international audiences accustomed to digital-first ecosystems. But where electricity is unstable and internet access unreliable, local printed newspapers are often the most trusted and accessible source of verified information. Frontline newspapers in regions such as Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, and Kharkiv continue to publish and distribute under extraordinary conditions. Delivery routes pass through areas regularly shelled or monitored by Russian drones. Advertising revenues have collapsed while printing costs rise. Staff members are sometimes mobilised to the armed forces, leaving skeletal editorial teams. Yet they persist because they understand something fundamental: when the information space collapses, disinformation fills the void. Russian propaganda adapts quickly. It exploits blackouts and uncertainty. It spreads fabricated narratives through Telegram channels and anonymous accounts. It seeks to undermine morale, inflame divisions, and distort battlefield realities. Journalism on the ground is the antidote. It sustains communities when uncertainty grows and prevents fear from turning into chaos. Just as electricity grids and heating systems are critical for survival in winter, reliable information is equally vital. During missile attacks, verified updates save lives. During evacuations, accurate reporting prevents panic. In de-occupied territories, local media help rebuild trust in institutions and reconnect fragmented communities. This is not abstract theory. It is visible in daily practice. Local editors receive calls from elderly readers asking whether evacuation rumors are true. Journalists coordinate with authorities to clarify curfews and safety measures. Reporters debunk fake announcements about chemical threats or mobilisation. Journalism in wartime requires discipline. It means resisting the temptation to publish unverified information for speed. It requires balancing transparency with operational security. It demands constant ethical judgment. Over the past four years, Ukraine’s media community has matured significantly. Newsrooms have strengthened verification standards. Journalists collaborate across outlets to counter disinformation. International partnerships have expanded investigative capacity. Yet the sustainability of this ecosystem remains fragile. The Role of the Journalists’ Solidarity Centres One of the most important developments since 2022 has been the expansion of the Journalists’ Solidarity Centres, coordinated by the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine with international partners. Located in cities including Kyiv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv, these Centres function as safe hubs for media professionals. They provide protective equipment, stable co-working spaces with electricity and internet, emergency power and Starlink access during blackouts, as well as psychological and legal support. They also assist international correspondents reporting from Ukraine. During the harshest weeks of this winter, these Centres once again became lifelines. When offices went dark, journalists relocated there to file stories. When regional outlets lacked charging capacity, equipment was shared. When trauma accumulated quietly, conversations provided relief. Beyond practical assistance, these Centres symbolise solidarity — domestic and international alike.They also demonstrate that press freedom support must adapt to wartime realities. Traditional media development models are insufficient when infrastructure is deliberately targeted and economic stability collapses. The Human Cost Continues We cannot mark this anniversary without acknowledging the ongoing human cost. Ukrainian journalists remain in Russian captivity. Others are missing. Families wait for news. Sisters, brothers, fathers, mothers, and spouses carry the burden of uncertainty. Recently, I met the sister of a journalist from Melitopol who remains detained. Her voice did not tremble with anger. It carried a quiet exhaustion — the exhaustion of waiting, of not knowing. The struggle for press freedom in Ukraine is not only about institutions, it is deeply personal. Why the World Should Still Care International fatigue is real. The news cycle shifts. Other crises emerge. Yet Ukraine remains a frontline for democratic resilience in Europe. If Russian aggression succeeds in silencing independent media in Ukraine, the consequences will extend far beyond our borders. It would signal that violence can erase truth. Conversely, every functioning newsroom in a frontline town is evidence that democratic values endure even under bombardment. Supporting Ukrainian journalism today is not an act of charity. It is an investment in a broader European security architecture where information integrity matters. What Is Needed Now The solutions are not complex, but they require sustained commitment. Local and regional media need predictable emergency funding that does not vanish when headlines shift. Journalists — particularly those working near the front — require long-term support for both physical safety and psychological resilience. Those still held in Russian captivity need consistent international attention, because silence around their cases risks becoming another form of abandonment. Two additional realities deserve clearer recognition. Disinformation does not stop at borders, and confronting it demands genuine cross-border cooperation. A frontline newspaper serving a shelled town in Zaporizhzhia or Kherson is not a lesser form of journalism; it is as strategically important as any national broadcaster. Beyond Resilience “Resilience” has become one of the defining words of these four years. Ukrainians are resilient. Ukrainian journalists are resilient. But resilience should not be romanticised. Journalists do not aspire to work under drones. Editors do not aspire to plan print runs around artillery strikes. Fixers do not aspire to calculate risk in order to shield their families from anxiety. What Ukrainian journalists aspire to is simple: to work safely, to report truthfully, and to serve their communities. Until that day arrives, their work will continue. I still think about that fixer — the way he looked at me before speaking, and then quietly asked that I not describe what had happened. He was not afraid for himself. He was afraid of what his wife would feel if she knew. Behind every statistic, every damaged newsroom, every equipment list and safety protocol, there are people doing necessary work — and trying to protect those they love from understanding just how dangerous that work has become. In wartime, truth does not sustain itself automatically. It endures because individuals choose, day after day, to protect it. And Ukrainian journalists continue to make that choice. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. Sergiy Tomilenko is the President of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU). With over two decades of experience in journalism and media advocacy, Tomilenko has been at the forefront of defending press freedom and journalists' rights in Ukraine. [post_title] => Four Years On: Journalism Under Drones, Beyond Blackouts [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => four-years-on-journalism-under-drones-beyond-blackouts [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-02-23 18:30:17 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-02-23 17:30:17 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8820 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [3] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8782 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-02-05 01:00:39 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-02-05 00:00:39 [post_content] => The German right-wing populist party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) has been at the centre of countless controversies since its formation in 2013, not least regarding its foreign policy. From AfD politicians’ downplaying of Nazi crimes to suspected links to the Russian and Chinese governments, the party is a source of disruption and debate in the media and in the German parliament itself.[1] This article analyses the AfD’s foreign policy outlook and considers its implications in the context of emerging foreign policy challenges. Why the AfD’s foreign policy matters Having entered parliament in 2017 and secured the second-highest share of votes in the 2025 federal election, the AfD has rapidly established itself in the German political landscape, and indeed the foreign policy landscape. Regardless of whether the party gains power or remains in opposition in the coming years, it will undoubtedly remain part of the foreign policy conversation in Germany and beyond. Identifying the party’s core positions and vision of Germany’s role in the world is therefore important, not only to understand the possible foreign policy implications of the AfD being in government, but also to understand how it is already shaping Germany’s relations with partner countries and institutions. Historical (re)interpretation Foreign policy is inseparable from national history, and there is no better example of this than Germany. For decades, the dominant interpretations shaping German foreign policy have been rooted in guilt, responsibility, and reconciliation in the aftermath of the Nazi regime. The AfD, however, both downplays such narratives and selectively invokes history to offer competing interpretations. For example, AfD parliamentary speeches on Israel and the conflict in Gaza appropriate narratives of historical responsibility to legitimise the party’s anti-Islam agenda. This kind of rhetoric fundamentally disrupts the relative consensus on key foreign policy pillars, challenging other parliamentarians to defend their positions and creating a divide between political elites who uphold existing pillars and those (primarily the AfD) who openly question them. At the international level, the AfD’s controversial historical interpretations have not gone unnoticed. In Germany’s bilateral relationship with Poland, a central partner and neighbour where historical debates are ongoing, the AfD has the potential to be a highly problematic force. In late 2025, Polish historian and adviser to President Nawrocki, Andrzej Nowak, accepted an invitation from the AfD to speak in the German Bundestag, stating that his aim was to warn AfD politicians against naive positions towards Russia.[2] Just a few months later, AfD politician Kay Gottschalk stated on X that his first act as Minister for Finance would be to demand 1.3 billion euros in reparations from Poland in response to the attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022.[3] Uncoincidentally, this is the same sum President Nawrocki has demanded from Germany in war reparations.[4] Such interactions have the potential to significantly sour relations, particularly given the AfD’s ongoing popularity. Questioning established cooperation The subversion of historical narratives is part of a wider challenge posed by the AfD to long-standing German partnerships and alliances. This is perhaps most evident – and most subversive – when it comes to the AfD’s stance towards the EU. Membership of the EU and European integration are fundamental pillars of German foreign policy, deeply intertwined with bilateral relations with other member states. While the other German political parties naturally differ regarding specific policy preferences, they are united in the position that EU membership is not only beneficial to Germany, but central to its identity and role in the world. In contrast, and in line with the populist radical right tendency towards anti-globalisation and anti-establishment views, the AfD accuses the EU of being technocratic, elitist, and threatening to German interests and sovereignty. Following the 2024 European elections, which showed a clear shift to the right, the 14 AfD Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) formed a new far-right parliamentary group named Europe of Sovereign Nations, together with 11 representatives from seven different countries.[5] The result indicated that the AfD’s scepticism towards the EU and championing of sovereignty over liberal institutionalism resonates beyond the national level. These positions reflect a wider worldview held by many AfD politicians, in which the international system is understood primarily in terms of power politics and pragmatism. The AfD frequently attacks arguments in favour of interdependence and common values in the German parliament, dismissing these as ideologically driven or detached from political reality. Instead, AfD politicians favour a non-aligned position which resists external influence, even from traditional allies such as the US. A particular source of controversy in this regard is the AfD’s position on Putin’s war against Ukraine, which emphasises the negative impact of sanctions on the German economy, and calls for negotiations with Putin. Such positions are met with widespread rejection in the German parliament and again have the effect of uniting the other parties in their rhetorical commitment to defending international law and the European peace order. Same positions, new context The AfD’s status as a disruptive force within the German foreign policy discourse is unlikely to diminish as long as it remains in opposition. Whether it would significantly adapt its foreign policy positions if it were to enter government remains uncertain. At the same time, Russia’s war against Ukraine and President Trump’s aggressive and unpredictable foreign policy pose ongoing dilemmas for ruling and opposition parties alike. In recent years, right-wing populists across Europe and the US have tended to uphold similar foreign policy positions and attitudes towards global security, including the pragmatic prioritisation of national interest, a non-aligned approach towards Russia and China, and a scepticism towards liberal institutions like the EU.[6] It has also been characteristic of these political actors to cultivate transnational networks of political support. President Trump has frequently served as a point of reference in this regard, from the friendly relationship between Trump and Polish President Karol Nawrocki to Elon Musk’s public backing of the AfD.[7] However, Trump’s recent aggressive foreign policy moves towards Venezuela and Greenland may signal the beginning of the decline of this era. Along with other European right-wing parties, AfD leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla condemned Trump’s foreign policy in January 2026.[8] These developments pose important questions regarding the direction of the AfD’s foreign policy. Will the German right increasingly distance itself from its previously friendly stance towards the Trump administration? And how will AfD advocates of a non-aligned, pragmatic approach respond to attempts to uphold liberal institutions and diversify global cooperation, such as the recent EU trade deals with Mercosur and India?[9] The AfD’s stance towards the international system not only has implications for German and European foreign policy. It also resonates within broader debates about the future of the so-called liberal international order. At the World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addressed this discourse, arguing that the so-called rules-based order, and in particular American hegemony, had constructed a myth which has now been ‘ruptured.’[10] He went on to argue that the solution is not a ‘world of fortresses’ but ‘collective investments in resilience.’ While many parties and governments are rallying around liberal institutions and alliances, the AfD’s foreign policy discourse to date clearly indicates a preference for a ‘world of fortresses.’ This article is based on a recently published original paper by Maximilian Tkocz and Rachel Herring, which can be found here. Rachel Herring is a PhD researcher at Aston University and the University of Birmingham. Her research focuses on German foreign policy, Germany’s relations with Central Europe, and the role of civil society actors in foreign relations. She was the Think Visegrad Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Prague in 2024 and is currently a visiting researcher at the Jacques Delors Centre, Berlin. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [1] Deutsche Welle, AfD chief downplays Nazi era as ‘bird shit’, Deutsche Welle, February 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/afds-gauland-plays-down-nazi-era-as-a-bird-shit-in-german-history/a-44055213; Der Spiegel, Maik Baumgärtner et al, How the AfD Became the Long Arm of Russia and China, May 2024, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/afd-spionageaffaere-russland-und-china-im-fokus-neue-enthuellungen-belasten-die-partei-1714480876-a-a1c05e64-b6bc-4c6b-844e-a78a32ec4f91 [2] Jan Sternberg, Neue Annäherung zwischen der AfD und der polnischen Rechten, October 2025, https://www.rnd.de/politik/neue-annaeherung-zwischen-afd-und-der-polnischen-rechten-JRUDLEPR45FAZFVVCIEXQWCSKU.html [3] Welt, „Wer zuletzt lacht, lacht am besten“ – AfD-Politiker fordert 1,3 Billionen Euro von Polen, January 2026, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article6974fbce707d4aa2075800bf/reparationszahlung-wer-zuletzt-lacht-lacht-am-besten-afd-politiker-fordert-1-3-billionen-euro-von-polen.html [4] Tagesschau, Deutschland lehnt Reparationsforderungen erneut ab, September 2025, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/merz-steinmeier-polen-reparationen-100.html [5] Francois Hublet, 10 Key Lessons of the 2024 European Parliament Election, 2024, https://geopolitique.eu/en/articles/10-key-lessons-of-the-2024-european-parliament-election/ [6] Jeremy Cliffe et al, Rise to the challengers: Europe’s populist parties and its foreign policy future, June 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/rise-to-the-challengers-europes-populist-parties-and-its-foreign-policy-future/ [7] Jacek Lepiarz, What does Poland's president hope to achieve in Washington?, February 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/poland-karol-nawrocki-washington-visit-donald-trump-nato-v2/a-73851111; Jessica Parker, Musk interviews German far-right frontwoman, January 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr7errxp5jmo [8] Sarah Marsh and Elizabeth Pineau, Europe's far right and populists distance themselves from Trump over Greenland, January 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/europes-far-right-populists-distance-themselves-trump-over-greenland-2026-01-21/; Die Zeit, AfD-Spitze geht auf Distanz zu Trumps Außenpolitik, January 2026, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2026-01/afd-weidel-chrupalla-aussenpolitik-usa [9] European Commission, The EU-Mercosur trade agreement, 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/; Roshni Majumdar and Shakeel Sobhan, EU, India clinch historic free trade deal, January 2026, https://www.dw.com/en/india-eu-trade-deal-reached-modi-says/live-75669574 [10] World Economic Forum, Davos 2026: Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, January 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/ [post_title] => Long Read | The German Far-Right’s Subversive Foreign Policy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => long-read-the-german-far-rights-subversive-foreign-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2026-02-03 13:32:23 [post_modified_gmt] => 2026-02-03 12:32:23 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8782 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [4] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8730 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2026-01-19 01:00:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2026-01-19 00:00:48 [post_content] => The capture of Nicolás Maduro by the US military has triggered an immediate and polarised international debate. Questions of sovereignty, legality, and precedent have rightly come to the fore, reviving anxieties about the erosion of the rules-based international order and the risks of unilateral military action. However, Venezuela’s collapse did not begin on the night of the intervention. It is the result of decades of institutional dismantling, systematic repression, and the hollowing out of democratic accountability. Over time, this internal erosion became entangled with external interests, regional power dynamics, and repeated failures of international engagement. The result is a crisis that is at once legal, political, humanitarian, and geopolitical, and one that resists explanation through any single analytical lens. This expert analysis brings together four perspectives that speak to different, but interconnected, dimensions of the Venezuelan crisis. Laura Vidal, digital rights researcher and civil society observer, centres the human rights reality inside Venezuela, highlighting that legal debates detached from lived experience risk normalising repression and compounding victimisation. Andrew Gawthorpe, FPC Senior Fellow, analyses the emerging US strategy towards Venezuela, arguing that Washington is moving away from ‘regime change’ towards a more coercive model of ‘regime management’, with uncertain leverage and destabilising consequences. Dame Audrey Glover, FPC’s Chair of Trustees, sets out the international legal implications of the US operation, underscoring the dangers posed by selective adherence to foundational legal norms. Stefan Wolff, FPC Senior Fellow, examines the dilemmas facing Europe as it seeks to reconcile its commitment to a rules-based order with alliance politics and shifting power realities. Taken together, these contributions expose the risks of selective concern: invoking international law only at moments of crisis, privileging geopolitical stability over accountability, or debating legality while disregarding human suffering. If Venezuela is to be understood and addressed in a meaningful way, these dimensions need to be held together, not treated as competing narratives. The Human Rights Dimension of Venezuela’s Crisis By Laura Vidal Any assessment of Venezuela’s current crisis that sidelines human rights is necessarily incomplete. The most visible entry point remains the situation of political prisoners.[1] Detentions continue to function as a revolving door: individuals are arrested, released under opaque conditions, and replaced by new detainees.[2] Deaths in custody, enforced disappearances, and prolonged incommunicado detention remain documented practices.[3] Torture centers continue to operate, and releases are often negotiated, partial, or discretionary rather than grounded in due process or judicial review. The pace of releases has been extremely slow, even as new arrests routinely follow moments of political tension, reinforcing a system based on fear rather than accountability. This pattern, however, represents only one layer of a much longer process of deterioration. Venezuela’s human rights crisis has unfolded over years through the systematic dismantling of institutions, the erosion of checks and balances, and the capture of the justice system. The result is a complex humanitarian emergency that predates recent geopolitical escalations. Nearly a third of the population has left the country, many under precarious conditions that expose them to exploitation, abuse, and trafficking networks along migration routes. Those who remain face chronic shortages of basic services, including healthcare, electricity, and access to potable water.[4] The media landscape has been progressively constrained through closures, licensing pressures, legal harassment, and digital censorship. Accessing information online increasingly requires the use of circumvention tools, exposing users to heightened risks of surveillance and criminalisation. Reporting, documentation, and civic organising have consequently become high-risk activities.[5] This reality is often misrepresented as the consequence of international sanctions alone, despite the fact that economic collapse and institutional erosion began years before sectoral sanctions were imposed. Framing the crisis exclusively through sanctions obscures its structural roots and diverts attention from long-standing patterns of repression, impunity, and state failure.[6] Human rights violations in Venezuela are not episodic; they are systemic, cumulative, and deeply embedded in the country’s governance model. From Regime Change to Regime Management By Andrew Gawthorpe The US military operation against Nicolas Maduro represents a novel approach to foreign policy. “Regime change” is out and “regime management” is in. The Trump administration’s intention appears to be to leave the current Venezuelan government formally in place, while coercing it into adopting policies that will benefit US security and economic interests. Washington’s main demands for the government in Caracas include opening up the country’s oil wealth to American investment and control, severing friendly relations with China and Russia, and ending support for the government in Cuba. Trump’s methods are nakedly imperial – a throwback to the “gunboat diplomacy” of the nineteenth century. It is notable that they even lack the justification, common in previous US military interventions, with the familiar claim that intervention will liberate the Venezuelan people from a dictatorial government. Instead, Washington is proposing to work with that dictatorial government in order to deliver profits for American oil companies. From the perspective of the Trump administration, this strategy has obvious appeal. It lacks the commitment of resources and potentially lives to a long-term military occupation designed to transform Venezuela’s government, as was attempted in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, it remains unclear whether this approach gives the US enough leverage over the government in Venezuela to achieve its goals. Venezuela’s new leader, Delcy Rodríguez, has to avoid angering nationalist opinion at home – not least in her country’s military. She cannot go too far in appeasing the US. For their part, American oil companies also have little interest in investing in Venezuela, particularly while the current government remains in place. Meanwhile, President Trump’s attention seems to have wandered, with him now threatening new military action against Iran. As a result, what’s coming next in Venezuela remains highly unclear. International Law and the Erosion of Legal Restraint By Dame Audrey Glover Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” This article, part of the foundation of the post-Second World War international rules-based order, establishes a core principle against aggression, subject only to narrowly defined exceptions: self-defence and UN Security Council authorisation. This provision is binding on all States, regardless of whether they are members of the United Nations. The action of US Forces entering Venezuela uninvited at night to detain President Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and place them in custody in the US to await trial, constitutes a breach of Article 2(4). Under International law, only an assault on another country by military means qualifies as a trigger for self-defence. The consequence of the US operation is therefore a violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty, contrary to International Law. Furthermore, the intervention has not resulted in an attempt to restore democratic governance in the country. Maduro has been replaced by his Deputy, Delcy Rodríguez, without an election or consultation of the electorate and opposition– particularly significant given that Maduro himself overturned a prior electoral outcome to retain power. Her appointment undermines any argument that the intervention was undertaken in pursuit of democratic principles. For his part, President Trump has said he will ‘run’ Venezuela remotely, a proposition that raises serious questions about both feasibility and legitimacy. It also prompts broader concerns regarding regional security and the future of Venezuela’s oil sector, including how it might be rebuilt and governed under such circumstances. Stephen Miller, an adviser to President Trump, has said: “Forget international law. We live in a world that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power”. Such rhetoric reflects an explicit rejection of the legal norms that underpin international stability. Recent events including the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, have further imperilled the rules-based international order at the core of which are the principles of individual liberty, intellectual and religious freedom, constitutional democracy and free trade. The most damaging has been the rejection of the principles of international law that the US helped to create. Venezuela stands as the latest example of this deterioration. The time has come to save these principles from extinction. Europe and the Dilemmas of the Rules-Based Order by Stefan Wolff The apprehension of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by the US military on the night of 3rd January is the first time in over three decades that the White House has conducted such an operation. The operation reflects Washington’s new national security strategy and its emphasis on hemispheric dominance, even as it sits in clear tension with international law. For Europe, the operation, and how to respond to it, poses multiple dilemmas. The first dilemma concerns how to reconcile hitherto unwavering European support for a rules-based international order with the need to preserve what is left of the transatlantic alliance. This includes American security guarantees for European allies and continuing support for Ukraine’s war effort. The display of American capability and the meek reactions not only by Europe but also by Russia and China also demonstrated that for all the talk of a multipolar world order, Moscow and Beijing have few credible options to respond to American assertions of power. From a European perspective, this reality is in some respects reassuring, especially in the context of the Kremlin’s apparently insatiable revisionism in eastern Europe. Closely related is a second dilemma: US ambitions for absolute dominance in the western hemisphere have revived Trump’s designs for Greenland, returning them to the transatlantic agenda where they spell potential for disruption—both in the sense of distracting attention from the actual threat of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and Moscow’s broader hybrid campaign elsewhere on the continent, and of potentially diverting critical resources away from deterring further Russian adventurism in Europe towards Arctic security, an area long neglected by both Europe and the United States. The third dilemma is that the removal of Maduro from power is in line with long-stated European preferences for a democratic transition in the country, and as such should be welcomed. However, what seems to have resulted from the US operation is at best a face lift at the top of the Venezuelan regime, followed by internal power consolidation and increased external subservience to the demands of the mercurial incumbent of the White House. This dilemma also has wider implications. Europe may lack the hard power to effect regime change, but not the desire to do so. With probably more than half an eye on the situation in Iran, there are likely some figures in Europe’s political class who would not object too loudly or strongly if the US and/or Israel were adopting a more proactive stance on supporting protesters in Tehran and dozens of other cities. Yet externally driven regime change is hardly ever cost- or consequence-free, as the experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, among others, vividly demonstrate. European equivocation and prevarication in response to the US military operation against Maduro reflects the difficulty of navigating these dilemmas. Such ambivalence is neither a long-term solution nor will it allow Europeans to avoid discussing two equally unpalatable options: submitting to the whims of Trump, or an attempt to act independently in an increasingly hostile and lawless world. As so often, Europe is likely to fall back on muddling through: seeking to placate and flatter President Trump while ignoring the flaws and dangers of his foreign policy, and simultaneously trying to build towards the mythical promise of strategic autonomy. This approach rests on the hope that unconstrained, illiberal great power dominance within distinct spheres of influence does not become the new normal – one in which Europe is permanently downgraded to Washington’s, let alone Moscow’s or Beijing’s vassal.
[post_title] => Expert briefing | Georgia’s Political Landscape in Focus: A critical point for democracy
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[post_content] => Taking over from three Global South presidencies of the G20, South Africa’s (SA) agenda in 2025 built on those of Brazil, India, and Indonesia, while emphasising African concerns as the first African G20 presidency. Its agenda has amplified key developmental concerns requiring international cooperation at a moment when some countries are contesting both development and cooperation.
Although the G20 was originally a grouping of finance ministers, established after the Asian financial crisis of 1998, its agenda has grown since 2008 when it was elevated to heads of state. As global challenges, such as climate, pandemics, and inequality have become more acute, the need to bring development to the forefront has become essential, although not always easy. South Africa’s themes of “Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability” reflect the trend in the Global South presidencies to re-centre development in global discourse.[1]
South Africa set an ambitious agenda. From tackling the high cost of capital in African economies to ensuring a just energy transition, advancing the Sustainable Development Goals, tackling inequality, promoting women’s empowerment, and ensuring debt sustainability – South Africa has not shied away from issues that are increasingly being contested across the world and in G20 countries.
The complex geopolitical context makes agreement on some of these extremely difficult. However, there have been some wins. A set of voluntary principles on combating illicit financial flows (IFFs) was adopted by the development ministers that recognised the linkage between IFFs and the erosion of domestic resource mobilisation, which has become more urgent in a climate of declining aid. There was also a ministerial statement on debt sustainability, which reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen the Common Framework on Debt treatment, and support for the ongoing review of the debt sustainability frameworks by the IMF and World Bank. During a year where several working groups issued only a chair’s statement, the ability to have a statement on debt was symbolically important even if there was no major innovation on plugging already identified weaknesses regarding the Common Framework.
The spotlighting of debt sustainability has brought renewed attention to the proposals incorporated into the Compromiso de Sevilla, particularly the establishment of a borrowers’ club, around which preparatory work has been undertaken already in New York. The club is likely to be launched in 2026.[2]
Recognising the crucial role of critical minerals in Africa, especially in contributing to industrialisation, the Summit will likely adopt a G20 Critical Minerals Framework. This framework would mainstream the importance of local beneficiation and value addition at source, while also recognising the asymmetry in exploration capabilities between advanced and developing economies. In parallel, a set of voluntary principles on sustainable industrial policies has been developed, emphasising the link with inclusive economic growth, industrialisation, jobs, and equality.
Yet, the legacy of South Africa’s presidency goes beyond these outcomes documents. There are several issues that SA advocated that have contributed to a more nuanced debate on the challenges of development. This includes the initial proposal for a commission on the cost of capital, intended to address the issue of the African risk premium. While this was not established, this issue received significant coverage in global forums, including in the Fourth Financing for Development conference. Relatedly, SA’s work on combating illicit financial flows was reflected in the Compromiso de Sevilla. While the commission was not established, South Africa appointed an African Expert Panel that focused on the interconnection between growth, debt and development, and issues related to the high cost of capital in Africa. Its recommendations include, among others: launching a new G20 debt financing initiative for low-income and vulnerable countries, and reform of the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) allocation system, which reduces the discretionary and political nature of the current allocation process.
South Africa has also sought to build consensus on the concept of global public goods. While there was only a chair’s statement on a set of principles relating to global public goods, South Africa will be establishing an Ubuntu commission focused on fostering international cooperation for the protection and delivery of global public goods.
The establishment of an expert panel on inequality, chaired by Joe Stiglitz and presented to president Ramaphosa in early November, aimed to synthesise the research on this issue. It proposes the creation of an International Panel on Inequality, modelled on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to function as a technical advisory body.
However, South Africa’s G20 presidency has had to contend with difficult geopolitical headwinds and a fraying bilateral relationship with the US. The US chose to participate only in some of the meetings of the various working groups and task forces, with the Trump administration making it clear that it considered the priorities of the SA presidency as contrary to the interests of the US. In recent weeks, President Trump has made it clear that not only will the US not attend the summit in Johannesburg, it will also oppose the issuing of a Leaders’ Declaration, as the absence of the US would mean that there was no consensus in the group.[3]
The G20 operates on the basis of consensus, requiring all members to agree on the final text. This approach necessitates compromises by all members so that the outcome reflects a set of common political commitments, even though there is no enforcement mechanism and these are voluntary. However, the position that the US has taken is unprecedented. The underlying assumption for consensus-based decision-making is that countries are willing to negotiate in good faith and make trade-offs so as to arrive at an outcome. When countries eschew this approach because they do not want a Declaration, it raises questions about the principle of consensus; it gives the power to one country to veto the entire process, where member states have spent weeks negotiating the Declaration. It also sets the precedent that other countries can do the same in future if they do not agree with the host country or are opposed to its place within the group. Such an approach would undermine the constructive role that the G20 can play as a forum for fostering understanding and compromise, even in a context of heightened power rivalries.
In an era when many accepted principles of international cooperation are being questioned and undermined, how member states secure the G20 platform as a forum for dialogue and coordination on common challenges, will contribute to the future trajectory of multilateralism.
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos is the chief executive of the South African Institute of International Affairs.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] G20 South Africa, 2025, https://g20.org/
[2] United Nations, FFD4 Outcome Document: Sevilla Commitment, July 2025, https://financing.desa.un.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/FFD4%20Outcome%20Booklet%20Final_SP%20-%20pages.pdf
[3] BBC news, US to boycott G20 in South Africa, Trump says, November 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckgzek4rl8lo
[post_title] => Op-ed | Africa's Moment: South Africa's G20 Fight to Centre Development
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[post_content] => From the discovery of penicillin to the development of one of the world’s first COVID-19 vaccines, the UK’s contribution to global health has long shaped its diplomatic reach and global standing. For decades, British universities and research institutes have quietly powered global progress – advancing lifesaving science, training generations of health leaders, and shaping equitable access to innovation.
In an era where the use of soft power is all the more important to mitigate growing global conflict, UK science remains one of Britain’s greatest diplomatic assets. However, as funding for global health and research partnerships tightens, the UK’s ability to continue driving progress on the world’s most pressing health challenges is under growing threat.
The UK has a strong heritage of scientific contribution to global health, with an array of prestigious institutions that have shaped the world’s response to infectious diseases, from malaria elimination and vaccine development to the scale-up of HIV prevention and treatment.
The work of UK research institutions and universities does more than deliver scientific breakthroughs. It also creates global public goods through the data, evidence, and tools that underpin public health programmes worldwide. These collaborations, often supported through UK Aid and critical partnerships with organisations such as Unitaid, WHO, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, have enabled millions to access life-saving interventions more affordably and effectively.
The stakes have never been higher. Despite remarkable progress over the past two decades, AIDS remains one of the world’s deadliest diseases.[1] By the end of 2024, an estimated 40 million people were living with HIV, with 630,000 dying of HIV-related illnesses.[2]
However, there is hope. A defining moment for the global HIV response came this year with the announcement of a historic price agreement for generic lenacapavir (LEN), a breakthrough long-acting injectable offering six months of HIV prevention with a single injection. Described by many as the closest thing yet to an HIV vaccine, lenacapavir could transform prevention for those facing stigma or limited access to health facilities. Unitaid and the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI), alongside the Gates Foundation, secured two price agreements at just US$40 per year, with earlier commitments also made by the Global Fund and President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to reach two million people within three years.
Behind this milestone lies UK science. Research by the University of Liverpool’s Centre of Excellence for Long-Acting Therapeutics provided the cost-modelling that helped underpin this price; a quiet but powerful example of British influence through evidence.
Beyond lenacapavir, UK research institutions have consistently delivered breakthroughs that have transformed global health. The London School for Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) led the trials and evidence generation for new malaria vaccines, including RTS,S – the first malaria vaccine recommended by WHO – now protecting hundreds of thousands of children in Africa.[3] The University of Liverpool and Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine have been at the forefront of long-acting HIV therapeutics and helped develop innovative delivery models for injectable PrEP. The Innovative Vector Control Consortium (IVCC) developed next-generation insecticide-treated bed nets that have dramatically reduced malaria transmission across multiple countries.[4] These examples show how UK science does not just generate knowledge; it saves lives at scale, strengthens health systems, and reinforces the country’s global reputation as a hub for innovation.
Global health collaboration has long been one of the UK’s most effective tools of influence, building lasting relationships of trust. This network of scientific diplomacy enhances the UK’s reputation not just as a funder, but as a partner open to co-creating solutions in global health through science and innovation. The partnerships generated through decades of research collaboration cannot be manufactured and are earned through impact. And at a time when many countries are opting to look inwards, this kind of outward-facing, partnership-driven leadership is precisely what is needed.
However, as the world saw during the COVID-19 pandemic, innovation alone is not enough. While UK institutions helped shape vaccine research and delivery, global access was hampered by inequities in supply, manufacturing, and intellectual property. Ensuring that future breakthroughs, from malaria vaccines to long-acting HIV prevention, are accessible to all must remain a core test of the UK’s global health leadership. In an era when political leaders like Donald Trump are undermining scientific research and multilateral cooperation, the UK has an opportunity to strengthen its soft power by championing equitable, evidence-driven science in genuine partnership with Southern-based institutions. The UK must ensure that publicly funded research delivers public benefit, both at home and abroad, to promote and strengthen equitable global access to innovation.
Drawing on its history of scientific excellence, the UK has made significant and lasting contributions to global health and the fight against infectious diseases ranging from foundational medical breakthroughs to the development of modern vaccines and ongoing research. Yet this form of soft power cannot be taken for granted. Cuts to global health and research funding risk weakening the very partnerships that give the UK global credibility.
To sustain the progress made to date in global health, alongside the UK’s influence, the government must protect funding for global health R&D and strengthen partnerships both with British research institutions and critical multilateral initiatives, such as Unitaid, WHO, and the Global Fund which turn innovation into access. In doing so, Britain can demonstrate that its global health leadership is not only about what it invents, but also about ensuring those innovations reach everyone who needs them.
Molly Thompson is Senior Advocacy Advisor at STOPAIDS. STOPAIDS is an HIV, health and human rights advocacy network of 50 UK international development agencies working globally to end AIDS and realise all people's right to health and wellbeing.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] UN News, AIDS still killing one person every minute as funding cuts stall progress, June 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164111
[2] The Global Health Observatory, HIV, https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/hiv-aids
[3] London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, MRCG at LSHTM’s integral role in the development of the RTS,S malaria vaccine, January 2024, https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/newsevents/news/2024/mrcg-lshtms-integral-role-development-rtss-malaria-vaccine
[4] Insecticide Treated Nets (ITN), New Nets Project (NNP), IVCC, https://www.ivcc.com/project/new-nets-project
[post_title] => Op-ed | Science as Soft Power: How UK Research Institutions Drive Global Health Impact
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[post_content] => In their first year in power, the Labour Government made several big policy announcements related to national security, defence, and their vision for Britain’s place in the world. As the UK and its allies continue to confront the most dangerous moment for European security since the Cold War, respond to the growing levels of human insecurity in many regions around the world and navigate global economic challenges, a considered strategic approach is clearly needed.
Yet, less than a month out from the next Budget, questions continue to mount about the financial feasibility, priorities, and long-term direction of the country’s approach towards ensuring our defence; as well as the relationship between the UK’s evolving soft and hard power strategies. How will the Government reconcile strengthening defence and security with growing pressures at home? What progress has been made on the Government’s stated ambitions?
Below is an overview of the recent developments, followed by views from FPC’s experts, including those who contributed to FPC’s 2024 submission to the SDR, and to our most recent report Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy, as to how the UK’s approach to defence and security is evolving in practice, and where gaps remain in implementation, public communication, and whole-of-society readiness.
Strategic Defence Review, Soft Power and Aid Cuts
In June 2025, the UK Government outlined a new approach to defence and security, publishing the ‘Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2025’, which contained 62 recommendations.[1] The SDR outlined a range of strategic goals, including renewed focus on NATO, investment in AI and drone technologies, and discussion of potential UK participation in NATO’s nuclear mission. The Government also committed to an increase in defence spending to “2.5% of GDP by 2027 and 3% in the next Parliament when fiscal and economic conditions allow,” with a view to “help make defence an engine for growth—boosting prosperity, jobs and security for working people across the UK.”
The Review was highly anticipated given the context of heightened uncertainty for the Euro-Atlantic alliance, the ongoing war in Ukraine, an unpredictable US administration under President Donald Trump, and shifting security realities in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and beyond. While the SDR contained some significant shifts in posture, there remain considerable concerns about resourcing, prioritisation, and delivery.
In January 2025, the Government launched its Soft Power Council, an advisory body to support the development of a ‘soft power’ strategy, which is expected to be released spring of next year. What this will contain and similarly, how it will be implemented is yet to be seen. However, the significant aid cuts the Government announced in February and their impact on the UK’s soft power potential was a key discussion point at every major political party conference in September.
The decision by the UK Government to reduce aid from 2027 to 0.3% of gross national income (GNI), in favour of increasing the UK’s defence spending (as outlined above) drew sharp criticism at the time.[2] Not least because Labour had previously indicated they aimed to restore aid spending to 0.7%, after it was cut to 0.5% of GNI in 2021.
While the need to strengthen UK defences is clear, there remains a question as to whether doing so at the expense of aid is the right answer. A recent Chatham House report noted that “the £6 billion saving from aid is unlikely to plug defence gaps,” while “the West’s retreat from aid will leave an obvious opening for revisionist powers to build further influence in developing countries.”[3] The significant fallout from the closure of The US Agency for International Development (USAID) in July this year, has been notable, and likely destabilising for a number of countries that significantly relied on international support. Last month, the UK Parliament’s International Development Committee launched an inquiry to examine how the UK can continue to deliver high impact international aid and development assistance in the face of a 40% budget cut. Announcing the inquiry, Committee Chair Sarah Champion MP posed the question: “What should drive the Government’s vision for foreign aid; national security, moral duty, international obligations?”.
Meanwhile, earlier this year, in response to the funding cuts, former national security adviser, Lord Peter Ricketts, coordinated a letter to the Prime Minister urging him to sustain funding for the British Council.[4] In comments to The Guardian, he noted: “A lot of defence people will tell you that a small investment in soft power such as the British Council is worth a lot of money on the military side.”[5] However, neither international aid nor soft power are mentioned in the SDR, despite the clear linkages with national security and defence - a notable omission that reinforces concerns about cross-Whitehall coordination.
What do these combined developments mean for our national security? Views from our Experts
Dr Andrew Gawthorpe
Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University
“The SDR sets out an ambitious agenda for UK defence policy going forward, but there are limits to how much planning is possible in the current international environment. The recent NATO summit in June calmed fears that Donald Trump might announce an immediate withdrawal from the alliance, but it also left all of the major questions dividing the U.S. from Europe, and European countries from each other, unresolved. Later this year the U.S. will likely announce the withdrawal of tens of thousands of soldiers from Eastern Europe, making the continent even harder to defend.”
Dr Andrew Gawthorpe also cautions that the UK’s ability to follow through on its defence spending promises and to coordinate effectively with European partners on rearmament, remains uncertain. “Whether the UK government can actually deliver on the necessary spending commitments and whether the UK and the rest of Europe can coordinate rearmament in a smart and effective way remain to be seen. In the meantime, the ultimate direction of U.S. policy remains unclear – and under Trump, basically unpredictable.”
Christopher Langton
Head of Independent Conflict and Research Analysis (ICRA)
Langton acknowledges the SDR’s attention to innovation but raised two concerns: “The Review highlights the all-important use of AI in defence. However, I wonder if the environmental impact of AI—most notably its water usage—has been considered, particularly amid increasing climate pressures.” But commitments on welfare and personnel are welcome: “The focus on manpower and welfare is a very welcome part of the Review. However, our history on delivering in this area is not good. A firm ring-fenced commitment to fund increases in personnel and expenditure on the defence estate, including housing, would bring confidence to boost recruiting and retention.”
Nina Kuryata
Ukraine and Defence Editor, The Observer
Regarding the Review’s emphasis on NATO as a strategic priority: “It says ‘NATO first’- but what does it actually mean in terms of measures to be taken? If the UK wants to lead in NATO, it must back that up with clear timelines and funding. At present, there’s a pledge to increase military spending to 2.5% by April 2027, with a "clear ambition" to reach 3% by 2034, would economic conditions allow. This is still far from the 5% that all NATO members committed to reach by 2035.”
She also questions some of the more rhetorical claims: “It says we will create a British army which is 10 times more lethal. That would need more development, I think, because it's not clear what it means – number of soldiers, more deadly weapons or something else.”
Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams
Senior Fellows, European Leadership Network
“The recommendation by the Review that the UK commence discussions on enhanced participation in NATO's nuclear mission constitutes, potentially, a substantial change in the UK nuclear posture. More generally, the SDR leaves many fundamental questions unanswered, relying on the assumption, or hope, that NATO will continue much as it did before Trump. The military implications for force capabilities and structure of having to operate in a purely European framework or a US-lite NATO framework are not explored. There is, however, a surprising indication that while the UK has always declared the primacy of NATO in strategic and defence terms, in practice, it has not taken its contribution to NATO's military posture as seriously as it pretended. ”
You can read more of Simon and Nicholas’ analysis of enhanced UK participation in NATO's nuclear mission in their longer piece here.
Poppy Ogier
Research and Communications Manager, and author of ‘Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy’, Foreign Policy Centre
“A modern defence strategy must recognise the vitality of soft power. Take the BBC World Service, it is the world’s most trusted news provider, reaching over 450 million people each week - and only costs around 5% of what Russia and China are thought to be spending internationally in an age of information warfare. However, its sustained funding is in question - and neither it, nor soft power more broadly, is mentioned in the SDR. The ‘influence’ of others is discussed - Russia’s, China’s and the US’s - without addressing what tools to influence the UK has. Including soft power in a defence review is not an optional extra, it’s a force multiplier for everything else.”
Susan Coughtrie
Executive Director, Foreign Policy Centre
“While there is a clear need for a shift in how the UK approaches the country’s defence in today’s climate, there are concerns with the current approach. For the implementation of the SDR and the future soft power strategy to be effective, they must recognise the dynamic between domestic and international developments.
Encouragingly, the SDR recognises the need for a ‘whole of society approach’ and argues to “Build national resilience to threats below and above the threshold of an armed attack through a concerted, collective effort involving—among others—industry, the finance sector, civil society, academia, education, and communities.” However, the Government should more closely examine the layered threats specifically directed at these groups, including through the use of transnational repression, foreign influence, disinformation and cyber attacks; which are only likely to further increase with more countries sliding towards authoritarianism. The impact of the aid cuts should be examined through this security lens too, to ensure that short-term ‘gains’ do not give way outcomes that will take years to rectify.”
Next steps
While the Government’s commitment to increased defence spending is evident, significant tension remains around what this will look like in practice, particularly how it can be delivered without further damaging other critical areas of UK influence, such as soft power and development aid. Key questions persist around resourcing, prioritisation, and whether the Government can protect vital diplomatic, cultural, and development tools while pursuing an ambitious defence agenda.
In an era marked by geopolitical changes, strategic uncertainty, and shifting power dynamics, particularly with an unpredictable US administration and evolving threats in the Middle East, the success of the SDR will depend on more than political will and funding. It will require sustained strategic focus, effective implementation, a strong soft power strategy and international coordination. Most importantly, an effective defence strategy calls for an approach that upholds democratic principles, protects human rights, and preserves the UK’s institutional integrity at home and abroad.
[1] Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, June 2025 ,https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/683d89f181deb72cce2680a5/The_Strategic_Defence_Review_2025_-_Making_Britain_Safer_-_secure_at_home__strong_abroad.pdf
[2] House of Commons Debates, Defence and Security vol. 762, February 2025, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-02-25/debates/8BF58F19-B32B-4716-A613-8D5738541A30/DefenceAndSecurity#contribution-DB32B970-42F2-4B1B-A92C-54CA0B28BA41
[3] Chatham House, First USAID closes, then UK cuts aid: what a Western retreat from foreign aid could mean, March 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/first-usaid-closes-then-uk-cuts-aid-what-western-retreat-foreign-aid-could-mean
[4] Lord Ricketts, Tweet (@LordRickettsP), April 2025, https://x.com/LordRickettsP/status/1915396877018632373
[5] The Guardian, British Council ‘may have to close in 60 countries’ amid cuts to aid budget, June 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jun/08/british-council-spending-plans-may-close-in-60-countries
[post_title] => Expert Look: Unanswered questions regarding UK Government’s approach to defence and security
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[post_date] => 2025-11-10 01:00:31
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[post_content] => Every year, on 2nd November, the United Nations and its member states condemn attacks on journalists. In 2025, this “International Day to End Impunity for Crimes Against Journalists” is a particularly sombre occasion – with threats to journalists at an all-time high.
More than 120 journalists were killed in 2024 while doing their work.[1] Countless others were arbitrarily detained, abused, and threatened both physically and online. News outlets are struggling to develop sustainable business models, and media freedom is at its lowest level globally in at least two decades, according to Reporters Without Borders.[2]
This matters because a decline in media freedom can contribute to a deeper collapse in the systems that support democracy. As Nobel Prize-winning journalist, Maria Ressa, recently warned: “if journalism dies, democracy dies”.[3]
Unfortunately, supporting media freedom is not a foreign policy priority for most countries. Multilateral fora – like the Media Freedom Coalition – encourage their member states to take action. However, these fora lack enforcement or accountability mechanisms.
To help address this gap, the Centre for Journalism and Democracy has launched a new annual index to try to hold states to account and encourage them to take action to promote media freedom beyond their borders. The Index for International Media Freedom Support (IMFS) evaluates 30 countries across three key foreign policy areas: diplomacy, funding, and safety/protection.[4] The results paint a concerning and inconsistent picture – with no state performing strongly across all three categories.
Financial support for media freedom
According to the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media, “globally… the first problem to be fixed is the insufficient volume of Official Development Assistance (ODA) that goes to media support”.[5] On average, the 30 countries assessed in the IMFS Index allocated just 0.16% of their foreign aid to supporting independent journalism in 2023. Thirteen countries awarded less than 0.1%, while three – Latvia, Greece, and Slovenia – reported allocating 0%.
The only country that came close to the benchmark set by the Forum on Information and Democracy of allocating 1.0% of ODA to media support was Sweden – who contributed 0.91%. In 2023, Sweden spent over $51 million supporting initiatives such as rural radio stations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and strengthening environmental reporting across the Asia-Pacific region.[6] Largely for this reason, Sweden came 2nd overall in the 2025 IMFS Index.
Support for journalism safety and protection
Another group of leading experts – The High-Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom – has consistently advised governments that providing safe refuge to journalists at risk is one of the most effective measures to improve the climate for press freedom around the world.[7]
The IMFS Index finds that only one country – Latvia (who came 9th overall) – had both an active emergency visa scheme for at-risk journalists and supported a national scheme promoting the safety of exiled media workers. Twenty-one of the thirty countries in the Index had neither measure in place.
Diplomatic support for media freedom
Lithuania was the highest ranked country in the 2025 IMFS Index, largely because of its diplomatic leadership roles in several UN initiatives relating to media freedom and journalist safety. Estonia (4th overall) also performed well diplomatically, having served as co-chair of the Media Freedom Coalition in 2024, alongside Germany (equal 5th).
The lowest scoring countries in the ‘diplomatic’ category of the IMFS Index were Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and Switzerland.
Making media freedom a foreign policy priority
The results of the 2025 IMFS Index suggests that political will – rather than state capacity – is a country’s greatest barrier to supporting media freedom worldwide.
The Baltic states – Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia – were amongst the smallest – but also the strongest performing. By contrast, four members of the G7 – the United Kingdom (equal 12th), the United States (equal 12th), Italy (equal 24th) and Japan (28th) – all ranked in the Index’s lowest ‘bronze’ category.
Due to the time lag in data reporting, the Index does not capture recent cuts to foreign aid that occurred in 2025 in the United States, the UK, Germany, France, and elsewhere. Therefore, future versions of the IMFS Index are likely to show an even bigger gap between some countries' public commitments to media freedom and their actual support.
Given this, the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media is right to argue that “what is needed now is not [a] reinvention of the wheel, but a new level of political will and a concerted commitment by governments to invest in what we know works – nationally and internationally.”[8]
Hopefully, by publicly tracking countries’ performances, this new Index will help to generate more political pressure for meaningful action.
Martin Scott is a Professor of Media and Global Development at the University of East Anglia. His publications include, ‘Capturing News, Capturing Democracy’ (2024), ‘Humanitarian Journalists’ (2022), ‘Media and Development’ (2014) and ‘From Entertainment to Citizenship’ (2014).
Mel Bunce is a Professor of International Journalism and Politics, and the Director of the Centre for Journalism and Democracy at City St George’s, University of London. She was previously the Head of City’s renowned Department of Journalism. Her research focuses on journalism and democracy, crisis reporting, media freedom and international journalism.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024 is deadliest year for journalists in CPJ history, February 2025 https://cpj.org/special-reports/2024-is-deadliest-year-for-journalists-in-cpj-history-almost-70-percent-killed-by-israel/
[2] RSF, World Press Freedom Index 2025: over half the world's population in red zones, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-2025-over-half-worlds-population-red-zones
[3] Kathimerini, Maria Ressa warns social media is ‘demolishing democracy’ at Athens forum, October 2025, https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/society-in-depth/1282767/maria-ressa-warns-social-media-is-demolishing-democracy-at-athens-forum/
[4] Centre for Journalism and Democracy, The 2025 Index on International Media Freedom Support, n.d., IMFS Index is published by the Centre for Journalism and Democracy, and is available at https://jdem.org/the-imfs-index/; The 30 states included in the index are members of both the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, and the Media Freedom Coalition (OECD-DAC).
[5] Forum on Information and Democracy, Statement of the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media: The Economic Imperative of Investing in Public Interest Media, September 2025, https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Economic-Imperative-of-Investing-in-Public-Interest-Media.pdf
[6] Forum on Information and Democracy, “The Forum on Information and Democracy calls for a New Deal for Journalism, June 2021, https://informationdemocracy.org/2021/06/16/the-forum-on-information-and-democracy-calls-for-a-new-deal-for-journalism/
[7] Media Freedom Coalition, High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom, n.d., https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/who-is-involved/high-level-panel-of-legal-experts/
[8] Forum on Information and Democracy, Statement of the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media: The Economic Imperative of Investing in Public Interest Media, September 2025, https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Economic-Imperative-of-Investing-in-Public-Interest-Media.pdf
[post_title] => Who is standing up for media freedom – and who is not? A new Index has some answers
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[post_content] => COP30 - the 30th Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change - will take place in Belém, Brazil from 10th to 21st November 2025.
The last 10 years have been the hottest on record, and an estimated 3.3-3.6 billion people live in contexts highly vulnerable to climate change. This year, countries were due to publish their updated national climate plans outlining their contribution to cutting global emissions (‘national determined contributions’ or ‘NDCs’). However, plans so far fall well short of what is required to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C.[1] Therefore, COP30 needs to focus on the further ambition required to close the gap. Yet achieving this greater ambition will not be possible without the large-scale delivery of grant-based climate finance, making finance an equally critical discussion in Belém.
COP30 must deal with climate finance
Last year’s COP in Baku agreed to a new global climate finance goal (the so-called NCQG) to deliver at least $300 billion per year by 2035, led by developed countries and directed to developing country parties. However, the agreement lacked both a roadmap and the accountability mechanisms required to ensure that governments pay up. The NCQG also included an even vaguer aspiration to scale up finance to $1.3 trillion per year.
Implementation of the new finance goal is critical, as lower income countries require significant finance to develop their economies cleanly; to adapt to worsening climate impacts; and to pay for the escalating costs of the damage to homes, infrastructure and livelihoods (so-called ‘Loss and Damage’). The impacts of the climate crisis disproportionately affect the most vulnerable and least responsible the hardest, and could push up to 132 million more people into extreme poverty by 2030. African countries contribute just 4% of global carbon emissions but are among the hardest hit, and yet, along with other lower income countries, have thus far received only a small fraction of the finance they need – therefore having to take on most of the financial burden themselves. Indeed, the climate crisis is one of the key drivers of today’s debt crisis, as governments are forced to borrow more simply to recover and rebuild from climate disasters.
In this context, building trust among developing countries that the NCQG will be fulfilled is essential to maintaining a multilateral process capable of limiting temperature rises to safe levels. Delivery of climate finance at scale by developed countries, including the UK, is a well-established principle in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and is a legal obligation, as recently affirmed by the International Court of Justice. It is also a moral responsibility falling upon historically high emitters who bear the greatest responsibility for causing the climate crisis. Any wealthy government that considers itself a principled global actor must, at a very minimum, act in good faith to deliver their fair share of the $300 billion finance goal as a starting point.
Governments responsible for delivering this finance are increasingly putting their eggs in the private finance basket. Yet, while private finance has a key role to play, especially in delivering mitigation initiatives like large scale energy projects, it also has huge limitations. Very little private finance is flowing to the world’s most climate-vulnerable communities, especially for adaptation and ‘Loss and Damage’, and the evidence suggests it is not likely to do so at scale, particularly for the poorest countries. To date less than 50 cents in every $100 of all climate finance has been private finance for adaptation efforts, and only 3% of private climate finance goes to low-income countries.[2] Moreover, the majority share of climate finance has thus far been provided as repayable loans with interest, which simply adds to the debt burden of those countries which are not responsible for the climate crisis – yet are, in this way, expected to doubly pay for its costs.
The reality is that to meet the needs of the world’s most climate vulnerable communities most of the NCQG finance must be public grant-based finance.
Will the UK Government show moral leadership?
When entering power the Labour Government said it wanted to rebuild broken trust with the global South and reestablish the UK as a global climate leader.[3] While certainly deserving of credit for being the first G7 economy to outline its new strengthened emissions reduction target (the UK launched its NDC at the beginning of the year[4]), genuine climate leadership requires this government to set out a credible offer on international climate finance too. And it must look beyond aid and private finance to do so.
Despite the UNFCCC principle that climate finance should be “new and additional”, successive governments have so-far drawn the UK’s international climate finance contributions from the aid budget, as have other developed countries. It was one thing to do so while the aid budget was going up. And to its credit, the UK Government was bucking the trend by delivering most of its climate finance as grants not loans. But as the ODA budget began to shrink, taking climate finance from the same pot has become increasingly untenable, so the Government has resorted to creative accounting and a shift towards loans rather than grants.[5] With the latest aid cuts imposed earlier this year, combined with the greater size of the new global climate finance goal, alternative sources of finance obviously need to be found.
Aware of this, the Government’s narrative is now primarily focused on the idea that private finance will come to the rescue. But, unfortunately too much of this appears based on wishful thinking rather than evidence about where private finance does and does not reach. If the Government truly wants to rebuild trust with Global South governments, honesty is the best policy. It can’t just wish away the evidence because it finds it politically inconvenient at home; it needs to deal in reality not fantasy.
Realistic solutions do exist and the Government should pursue them. The UK could employ new and progressive ways of raising public finances, including through fair ‘polluter pays’ measures, at no cost to the average taxpayer, and use a portion of the revenues raised to deliver on its climate finance responsibilities. Ending fossil fuel producer subsidies in the UK could save around £3.6 billion per year for climate finance. A permanent excess profits tax on fossil fuel producers and/or a Climate Damages Tax on the production of fossil fuels extracted could raise further billions. A reformed financial transaction tax could raise £6.5 billion annually. Meanwhile, a net wealth tax on those with assets over £10 million to the tune of 2% would raise £24 billion a year – part of which could go to climate finance. The UK could also join the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force which recently secured an agreement by eight countries, including France, Spain and Kenya to implement luxury air travel taxes and is building momentum for coordinated action on other revenue raising measures. Why is the UK not part of this?
Polling shows overwhelming public and cross-party support for the polluter pays principle. In a YouGov survey conducted in March 2025, 85% of respondents agreed that those most responsible for pollution should bear the cost of addressing the harm it causes. Another poll in May 2025 found 7 in 10 Reform-leaning voters support higher taxes on oil and gas companies and other high-emitting businesses to fund climate action.
The UK Government can and must turn up to COP30 with a proper plan on international climate finance that is capable of truly delivering for the world’s most marginalised people. That, combined with ambitious net zero plans at home, would give the UK genuine grounds to claim the badge of climate leadership.
Sophie Powell is the Chief of UK Advocacy and Policy at Christian Aid. She currently leads Christian Aid’s engagement with the UK Government on the charity’s advocacy priorities of debt and climate justice. Sophie has worked in the international development field for over 20 years in policy, advocacy and campaigning roles on a wide range of themes - from trade, agriculture, tax and debt, to refugee rights and climate. During her first decade in the sector she worked particularly closely with partners across several African countries, including while working for Oxfam in Kenya for several years, before moving into more UK-facing roles.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] Fiona Harvey, World’s climate plans fall drastically short of action needed, analysis shows, The Guardian, October 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/oct/28/worlds-climate-plans-fall-drastically-short-of-action-needed-analysis-shows
[2] Christian Aid, Putting our money where our mouth is, November 2024, https://www.christianaid.org.uk/resources/our-work/putting-our-money-where-our-mouth
[3] Labour Party, Britain Reconnected, March 2025, https://labour.org.uk/change/britain-reconnected/
[4] UK Government, UK shows international leadership in tackling climate crisis, November 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-shows-international-leadership-in-tackling-climate-crisis/
[5] Independent Commission for Aid Impact, UK aid’s international climate finance commitments, February 2024, https://icai.independent.gov.uk/review/uk-aids-international-climate-finance-commitments/
[post_title] => At COP30, UK leadership requires paying up on climate finance
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[post_content] => Earlier this year the Soft Power Council (SPC) was formed to provide concrete and actionable advice and support in the development and delivery of a UK soft power strategy. Comprising of leading experts from outside of government, spanning the arts, culture, and education as well as foreign policy priorities, the SPC is co-chaired by the Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Lisa Nandy.
Soft power is described by some as the power of attraction; it is a reason why people and other states might be drawn to the UK. Happily, the UK is blessed with many such reasons. Our language alone is a huge advantage globally; UK arts, music, and sport are loved the world over; the BBC (and the BBC World Service) provides us with unique levels of access and influence; Shakespeare, the Beatles, Coldplay are loved by billions; the Premier League is one of the world’s greatest brands, as is our reputation for education, science and technology.
More recently, we have also recognised that the UK’s reputation, expertise and leadership in harder edged fields is not only welcomed by partners around the world but also provides significant additional advantages and opportunities (soft power). Despite what often seems like turbulent and discordant times at home, our reputation for the rule of law and justice, a stable democracy, and military leadership, allows the UK to lead on the international stage, be a partner of choice, and attract inward investment.
So, soft power is already recognised as vital to UK growth, prosperity, and national security – if we want other countries to work with us and support us, we need them to value us, and soft power plays a critical part in achieving that. For evidence of this, one only has to look at the UK’s international successes in the last 12 months – trade deals with the US, the EU, and India; securing a more unified approach to NATO and supporting Ukraine through a coalition of the willing; and forging agreements with France and Germany to work together more effectively on irregular migration.
Crucially, in each of these, the objectives were very clear, and the key decision makers and influencers could be identified. Deep and trusted relationships had to be built, and common ground found and agreed. Undoubtedly, all of this was achieved primarily as a result of intensive, sustained and skilled hard work, commitment, and diplomacy by a host of senior and working level ministers, officials and civil servants – both in London and around the globe. But soft power also played its own vital part. Recognising and understanding that contribution is essential if we are to seize the opportunity presented by the SPC and develop a more strategic and targeted approach to soft power.
Even the most basic understanding of international affairs makes it obvious that, in addition to the intense political and diplomatic work, soft power plays a crucial role in advancing the UK’s interests. For example, President Trump’s second state visit in September (and the PM’s visit to the White House and more) was crucial to securing the US trade deal, support for the West in the face of aggression from Russia, and UK input to discussions re the Gaza ceasefire. That’s classic soft power, delivered by some of our greatest soft power assets: the Royal Family and the office of Prime Minister (and their iconic homes).
Similarly, when President Zelensky was met and photographed on the steps of Downing Street - just 24 hours after his disastrous first visit to the White House, an event that is widely credited as a catalyst for getting US/Ukraine back on track - the event’s staging leveraged soft power. The symbolism of that greeting in Downing Street, is a classic use of that UK soft power asset, as is Sir Keir Starmer and President Macron together at the D-Day celebrations or travelling up the Champs Elysees in a tank. Every visit to Chequers by a European leader tells a similar story: this is who we are, and this is the welcome, the support, the history, and friendship the UK offers.
Of course, these are top-level examples, and given their vital importance to the UK, the attention to, and use of, soft power is carefully considered and planned. And this is how I believe the Soft Power Council can add real value to the next level of UK efforts to deliver growth, prosperity, and enhanced security.
The UK has consistently ranked very highly in global soft power. We have the fantastic GREAT campaign that strategically builds on and amplifies our many strengths. But there is undoubted room for improvement in a more tactical and transactional deployment of our many strengths, as too often, the coordinated use of soft power is a secondary or belated consideration. More generally, coordination across government departments in our engagement with soft power partners could be better joined up. This is precisely where the SPC can help: by ensuring UK efforts are more coherent and joined up, and by acting as a super connector between HMG and the UK’s soft power partners, the SPC can better harness and utilise these many assets. Moreover, the SPC can become a go to soft power hub for the whole of HMG when they are planning how best to deliver hard-edged, specific outcomes.
To do this, we need to work very closely with our government leaders and senior civil servants. Ultimately, the onus is on them to recognise this opportunity, identify their priority objectives, and demand our input. With clear objectives, and briefings, the SPC must then deliver bespoke and targeted soft power – just as effectively as HMG has done on the very highest international priorities. And the best thing about all of this is that it does not have to cost very much at all; it is much more about being better joined up, thinking differently, and acting as a team than about expensive new initiatives. It also allows for us to use what is already in existence rather than reinventing the wheel.
Of course, there is much talk about the reduction in our aid budget and its impact on UK soft power (and inevitably a reduction in spending can negatively impact levels of ambition). But the SPC exists to advise the Government on how best to harness and utilise what we do have, rather than to lament what we do not. So, taking the world as it is, the work of the SPC aligns clearly with the four stated shifts in UK aid support (as set out by Baroness Chapman in her recent essay for the Fabian Society).[1] These include partnering closely with countries to unlock growth and drive innovative finance and private sector investment; focusing on system support, so that we work alongside countries and move from grants to providing expertise, as they build their own education, health, economic, and legal systems. The UK’s soft power strengths, our world-class universities, and expertise in finance, law, health, and technology, perfectly aligns with this approach, enabling us to support others through partnership and shared expertise.
Working together in this way and demonstrating the SPC’s added value to securing and deploying soft power in a manner that helps HMG deliver on its most important objectives over the next year or so, is the true marker of success. We all know that the UK is ‘Great’, but the challenge is to now use all those things that make us great in a strategic, impact-driven, and focused way.
When we reach the point where, whenever our government partners think about their priority objectives and how to achieve them, and one of their first thoughts is “We need the support of the Soft Power Council”, then we will be able to confidently say that we are delivering on our remit.
Patrick Stevens is Rule of Law Director at International Justice Development. He is an internationally renowned leader in justice development and delivery with two decades of unrivalled experience. After leading some of the UK’s most sensitive and serious terrorism cases in the unprecedented period immediately post 9/11, Patrick helped set up and lead the Crown Prosecution Service’s (CPS) International Division for over a decade. As the CPS’s first International Director, Patrick developed a global network of justice advisors and international engagement that delivered strategic and operational Rule of Law improvement at the heart of the UK’s national security effort worldwide. He now works as a justice development consultant for International Justice Development Ltd and is a member of the UK’s Soft Power Council.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] Fabian Society, Promising development: The future of aid in an uncertain world, September 2025, https://fabians.org.uk/publication/promising-development/
[post_title] => Op-ed | UK Soft Power and the Soft Power Council
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[post_content] => A dozen years ago, in 2013, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on the safety of journalists which proclaimed 2 November as the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists.[1] Not the most catchy of names, admittedly, but intended as a line in the sand, and a formal recognition that attacks on journalists cannot go unpunished, because when they do, further violence becomes all the more likely.
The UN was correct in its evaluation: impunity is not just an injustice to the victims of crimes, it is a carte blanche for perpetrators. And when we are talking about crimes against journalists – given the vital role of the press in underpinning democracy – allowing impunity to flourish means accepting that human rights and democratic freedoms are undermined.
What a tragedy, then, that 12 years after that UN resolution, the world has made no progress at all towards ending impunity for crimes against journalists. The data is shocking: according to UNESCO, of the more than 1,700 cases of journalists killed around the world between 2006 and 2024, around 85 per cent never even made it to court. Some estimates are even higher.[2]
Right now, in 2025, the world is more dangerous for journalists than ever. As Reporters Without Borders (RSF) marked 2 November once again, on our minds were the 546 journalists and media workers imprisoned worldwide, and the 56 who have been killed this year. And beyond physical threats, journalists face rampant harassment online, abusive lawsuits, the pursuit of their families, intrusive surveillance, and a raft of other online and offline tactics used to silence them.[3] While conflict and authoritarian crackdowns are often the most proximate cause, it is entrenched impunity which emboldens those who attack the press.
There has been no more glaring example of this than Gaza, where, since October 2023, Israeli forces have killed more than 200 journalists, more than 50 of whom were either deliberately targeted or killed while working.[4] Israel has also denied Gazan journalists vital medical evacuations, spread lies to discredit them, blocked international colleagues from reinforcing them, stopped organisations like RSF from sending protective equipment, and targeted the infrastructure they need to report. All with complete impunity.
Like everything about the war in Gaza, the scale of Israel’s attacks on journalists has defied comprehension – but they did not come out of nowhere. Long before the current war, RSF filed complaints to the International Criminal Court (ICC) about Israeli attacks on journalists: in 2018, after two journalists were killed and 18 wounded; in 2021, following Israeli air strikes on more than 20 media outlets in Gaza; and in 2022 when it supported an Al Jazeera complaint about the fatal shooting of journalist Shireen Abu Akleh.[5] An investigation by the Committee to Protect Journalists meanwhile found that between 2001-2022, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed at least 20 journalists, 18 of whom were Palestinians.[6]
The fact that no one was ever held accountable for any of these crimes not only shows how deeply embedded the culture of impunity is, it laid the ground for the subsequent horror unfolding in Gaza. The failure to hold Israel to account was effectively a silent invitation to Israel to do even more of the same. Impunity has far-reaching and devastating consequences.
Gaza may be the most stark example of how entrenched impunity plays out, but it is far from the only one. Across the world, journalists are being killed, detained, tortured, harassed or otherwise attacked, with few consequences for their oppressors. In Mexico, for example, one of the most dangerous countries in which to be a journalist, state failures to ensure the protection of at-risk journalists and the ineffectiveness of prosecutors means few have been brought to justice for the violence which has seen more than 150 journalists murdered since 2000.[7] In Sudan, those who harass and attack journalists are often protected by the authorities and enjoy total impunity.[8] Even right here in the UK, justice has yet to be served for the 2001 murder of Sunday World journalist Martin O’Hagan or the killing of investigative journalist Lyra McKee in 2019.[9] Press freedom worldwide is declining, and impunity incubates that decline.
So what do we do?
As UN Secretary-General António Guterres once again used 2 November to call for justice for journalists, international promises ring increasingly hollow. Low public trust in media, economic uncertainty, and turbulent and divided politics provide a depressing backdrop.[10] But the bottom line is that we cannot afford to give up. Because ultimately, this is not a story about journalists at all: it is a story about our right, as citizens and human beings, to know more of the world around us.
We need to protect journalists, because it is journalists who hold the powerful to account on our behalf, who expose corruption and reveal what is done in all of our names. We need to protect journalists, because good journalism is the antidote to bad governance. Indeed there can be no stronger proof of journalism’s power than the targeting of journalists by those who do not want their wrongdoings exposed.
It is critical therefore that democracies come together to stop those who kill, torture, detain, harass, or otherwise silence journalists. It is not enough for states just to condemn these actions, restate a belief in press freedom, or hide their inertia in statements forgotten as soon as they are heard.
This year, world leaders need to stop talking and start doing: set up a standing International Investigative Task Force, as outlined by the Media Freedom Coalition’s High Level Panel of Legal Experts in 2020, use targeted sanctions, support the ICC, and work together proactively to bring an end to a culture which emboldens hostile actors and chills the press. Investigate, prosecute, and punish. It is time for action, not words. It is time for impunity for crimes against journalists to end.
Fiona O'Brien has been the UK Director of Reporters Without Borders (RSF) since 2023. She started her career as a journalist, working as a foreign correspondent in Africa and the Middle East. She has also worked for the UN as a consultant editor, and ran the MA in Journalism at Kingston University. She is a Fellow of the Higher Education Authority and a member of the Chartered Institute of Editing and Proofreading.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Resolution A/RES/68/163: The Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, December 2013, https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/68/163
[2] UN News, 85 per cent of journalist killings go unpunished, November 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1156426
[3] Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Press Freedom Barometer, n.d, https://rsf.org/en/barometer
[4] RSF, RSF files fifth complaint with ICC about Israeli war crimes against journalists in Gaza, September 2025, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-files-fifth-complaint-icc-about-israeli-war-crimes-against-journalists-gaza
[5] RSF, RSF asks ICC to investigate Israeli sniper fire on Palestinian journalists, May 2018, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-asks-icc-investigate-israeli-sniper-fire-palestinian-journalists; RSF, RSF asks ICC prosecutor to say whether Israeli airstrikes on media in Gaza constitute war crimes, May 2021, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-asks-icc-prosecutor-say-whether-israeli-airstrikes-media-gaza-constitute-war-crimes; RSF, Shireen Abu Akleh’s murder: RSF alongside Al Jazeera to support its complaint before the ICC, September 2022, https://rsf.org/en/shireen-abu-akleh-s-murder-rsf-alongside-al-jazeera-support-its-complaint-icc
[6] Committee to Protect Journalists, Deadly Pattern: 20 journalists died by Israeli military fire in 22 years. No one has been held accountable, May 2023, https://cpj.org/reports/2023/05/deadly-pattern-20-journalists-died-by-israeli-military-fire-in-22-years-no-one-has-been-held-accountable/
[7] RSF, Mexico, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/country/mexico
[8] RSF, Sudan, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/country/sudan
[9] RSF, United Kingdom, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/country/united-kingdom
[10] United Nations Information Service (UNIS), Message for the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists, October 2025, https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2025/unissgsm1542.html
[post_title] => Op-ed | If we value Democracy, we have to end impunity for those who kill journalists
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[post_content] => On 4th October 2025, Georgia held local elections that will be remembered for many reasons, but not for the actual outcome. These elections broke new ground – only 41% of the population cast their votes, as the majority of the parties decided to boycott the process. Traditionally, local elections in Georgia were never too popular. As a highly centralised state, Georgia has seen repeated – but unsuccessful – attempts by some opposition parties to push for federalisation.
Still, the 4th October elections were different. They were taking place almost a year after Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, had manipulated the results in parliamentary elections that were widely seen as a choice between a pro-Russian and pro-European trajectory. Since then, the ruling party has suspended negotiations with the EU, violently cracked down on protests, and introduced several pieces of repressive legislation. At the time the electoral campaign was announced, Georgia had more than 60 prisoners of conscience in its jails — now it’s closer to 120.
According to the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), the legislative changes to these elections have made the conditions worse than for the previous elections, which were already considered neither free nor fair by the majority of the international observers, the opposition, and Georgia’s 5th President.[1] Georgian Dream scrapped the 40% threshold required for the majoritarian seats, increased the number of majoritarian seats in each city council, and increased the threshold necessary for a party to make it to the local government. These changes meant that statistically, it would be almost impossible for smaller opposition parties to compete.
The recent introduction of the ‘foreign agents law’ and the law that requires all foreign funding to get the government’s approval before it is paid to the beneficiary nonprofits means that observing these elections has become extremely difficult. Further changes introduced have limited the rights of the election observers, effectively giving Georgian Dream an unfair advantage in these and any future elections. Combined with ongoing issues such as vote buying, multiple-voting, and carousels present in Georgia’s elections, the prospect for free or fair elections was diminished.
The opposition faced a choice — boycotting elections and empowering the protest, or participating under a unified candidate. In nonviolent resistance under authoritarian regimes, unity, discipline, and strategic planning are essential. A full boycott would have been a strategic decision — undermining the legitimacy of the process and reinforcing the idea that, after the fiasco of previous parliamentary elections, the electoral way of changing the regime is no longer an option.
However, a unified opposition response was not achieved — the growing authoritarianism, as well as more repressive laws that made it impossible for independent observers to monitor the elections, forced eight opposition parties to boycott the local elections. In contrast, two other parties – ‘Lelo - Strong Georgia’ and ‘Gakharia - For Georgia’ – chose to contest the elections in several municipalities.
The results were not surprising. Incumbent mayor, Kakha Kaladze, got more than 70% of the votes as the majority of the people followed the parties into a boycott. In actual terms, Kaladze got only 20% of the votes from the total population of Tbilisi.
Some groups affiliated with the United National Movement (UNM) scheduled a parallel event on 4th October, announcing a peaceful revolution on the day. The attempt largely failed, with a small group of people attempting to storm the presidential palace, but it was unclear who these people were, as the majority of the protesters had taken to the streets near the Georgian parliament and peacefully protested the elections that they saw as neither free nor fair. Some argue that this was a setup: the government deliberately left access points open, making it easier for a small group of people to enter the garden of the presidential palace, and then cracked down on them afterwards. In the aftermath of 4th October, more than 60 people were prosecuted under the charges of an attempted coup.
The ‘attempted revolution’, as well as the local elections, created a tense reality for both civil society and the opposition. As unity wasn’t achieved prior to the elections, the opposition is risking repeating the mistakes made by their colleagues in Belarus and fragmenting themselves even further. One bloc, the seven parties along with the former President, Salome Zourabichvili, have distanced themselves both from the 4th October attempted revolution and from the local elections. The UNM, meanwhile, is seen as a separate political center in its own right. The parties that decided to participate, on the other hand, have blamed the boycott supporters and proclaimed that they only believe in the change of power through elections. Understandably, mutual blame currently clouds the political landscape, and a challenge remains in moving the resistance movement forward strategically.
The boycott was arguably the right decision. As the Georgian Dream government delegitimised elections, clinging to them for the simulation of the democratic process just prolongs the crisis and wastes resources on battles that are predetermined. Empowering the protest and unifying different factions under the nonviolent resistance umbrella is the only viable solution. At the same time, the fragmented responses harm the common battle, and it is easy to overanalyse the events and find people to blame, with all three segments of the opposition blaming the other two. An important question to ask now is not who was right about 4th October, but what should be done next.
Specific activities are hard to plan, but the overall strategy is simple: unity, strategic planning, and discipline. These three core components can help civic groups and activists in Georgia avoid fragmentation. These same strategies proved effective in Serbia, Ukraine, and in Georgia itself back in 2003 – and are still effective today.[2]
Unity does not mean that all political parties should agree on the same candidate or the same strategy; it means most parties, organisations, and activists agreeing on core principles and distancing themselves from those who undermine them. Strategic planning means focusing on the resources already available rather than on the ones it would like to have – as hard as this can sound. Finally, discipline means directing the limited resources toward the main challenges and identifying potential allies in the new post-4th October reality. Without these three components, any resistance movement is destined to fail.
Davit Jintcharadze is a fellow at Newspeak House and the founder of Freedom Fund, a crowdsourcing initiative to aid the protesters in Georgia. He holds a BA in psychology from New York University and a MA in psychotherapy from the University of Cambridge. Before becoming a member of Georgia's resistance movement, he was researching the psychological factors influencing people's voting behaviours.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] Civil Georgia, ISFED: Election Law changes tilt October 4 vote further toward Georgian Dream, August 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/697904
[2] Centre for Applied NonViolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), 50 Crucial Points: A Strategic Approach to Everyday Tactics, 2006, https://canvasopedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/50-Crucial-Points-web.pdf
[post_title] => Op-ed |Georgian Elections: Unpacking the fallout of 4th October
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[post_content] => Summary
Western sanctions against Russia, designed to isolate and weaken the Kremlin’s war economy, have instead generated a global “sanctions bubble”: an adaptive ecosystem of intermediaries, offshore jurisdictions, and political enablers that convert constraint into profit. At the center of this system stands Georgia, which has evolved from passive circumvention to strategic facilitation, leveraging its geography, financial infrastructure, and political flexibility to become a key node in Russia’s sanctions-evasion network.
Rather than crippling Russia’s capacity to sustain its war effort, successive sanction rounds have redirected trade and capital flows through the Caucasus, Central Asia, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates. These channels have allowed sanctioned goods, funds, and individuals to re-enter global markets through legal, semi-legal, and illicit means. Georgia’s economic and political elite have capitalised on these gaps, transforming re-exports, dual-use technology transfers, and permissive financial regulation into sources of revenue. As a result, the Georgian economy has become structurally dependent on Russian-linked capital inflows, turning sanctions into an instrument of enrichment rather than deterrence.
This dependency has reshaped Georgia’s political and institutional landscape. The influx of Russian money, businesses, and professionals has deepened the capture of state institutions by oligarchic interests aligned with Moscow’s economic sphere. At the same time, the Georgian government has sought to protect these interests through legislative measures that have shielded domestic actors from Western regulatory scrutiny. These developments have coincided with democratic backsliding, the erosion of Euro-Atlantic alignment, and ideological convergence with sovereigntist regimes that promote “peace through neutrality” while shielding their economies from sanction-related costs.
The weaknesses of the Western sanctions regime are both structural and conceptual. By targeting categories of individuals rather than specific financial and corporate networks, the system has blurred legal and moral distinctions, creating opportunities for evasion and undermining its own legitimacy. Fragmentation within the European Union and declining transatlantic coordination have further limited the coherence and effectiveness of enforcement. The result is a sanctions framework that produces symbolic political gains for Western states while enabling material enrichment for those it was intended to constrain.
To address these challenges, a strategic recalibration of the sanctions regime is needed. This includes shifting from broad-based designations toward targeted, precision instruments that isolate key enablers within the global evasion network; strengthening regulatory coordination among willing states; and creating structured pathways for economic and political defection from the Russian sphere of influence. The objective is not punitive isolation but strategic disruption: dismantling the protection economies that sustain kleptocratic governance in both Russia and its partner states.
The Georgian case demonstrates that sanctions, when poorly designed or inconsistently enforced, do not simply fail but transform. They create new centres of power, profit, and dependency. Reversing this dynamic is essential if sanctions are to remain a credible tool of international governance rather than an accelerant of global authoritarian capital.
Read the full piece here.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
Dr Ilya Roubanis (PhD, EUI Florence) is Senior Fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Athens (IDIS) and Research Fellow at the Aletheia Research Institution. His business intelligence work spans energy and security, driven by HUMINT and strategic analysis across Europe and the MENA regions.
[post_title] => Long Read | Dealing with the Sanctions Bubble in Georgia
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[post_content] => Alongside issues such as housing and health care, the key far-right theme of immigration continues to feature high on the political agenda ahead of the Dutch national election on 29th October. In a fragmented political landscape marked by intense competition on the socio-cultural right, mainstream parties are also deliberately choosing to make this issue important in their campaigns.
Just under two years ago, the Netherlands experienced a shock national election result, with Geert Wilders’ far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) becoming the largest party in parliament by a considerable margin (winning almost a quarter of the vote and 37 of the 150 seats).[1]
As is typical for these parties in Europe and beyond, the PVV is known for its vehement opposition to immigration and multiculturalism. There are cultural components to this discourse (focusing on the supposed threat of Islam to Western norms and values, in particular), as well as economic ones (arguing that welfare entitlements should be reserved for the ‘native’ population).
The PVV eventually entered government, despite reservations of its more centrist coalition partners, New Social Contract (NSC) and the Liberals (VVD), concerning the parts of the PVV programme that are at odds with liberal democratic principles such as freedom of religion. The third coalition partner, the agrarian and culturally conservative Farmer Citizen Movement (BBB) expressed fewer concerns.
Government formation took over half a year. The cabinet was led by the non-partisan and previously unknown Prime Minister Dick Schoof. It was marked by poor relationships between the coalition partners and ineffectiveness in terms of policy outcomes. The pugnacious PVV immigration minister Marjolein Faber became known for headline-grabbing policies and controversial statements, but failed to deliver on her promise of the ‘strictest asylum policy ever’ and did nothing to alleviate the clogged-up asylum system.
On June 3rd 2025, less than a year after the installation of the Schoof government, Wilders instigated a cabinet crisis centred on his core issue of migration.[2] He presented his coalition partners with new far-reaching demands they could not agree to. As a result, the PVV left the coalition and the government assumed caretaker (‘demissionary’) status, and new elections were scheduled for 29th October. Notably, the NSC later withdrew from the demissionary cabinet due to disagreements over the government's position towards Israel (NSC favouring further-reaching sanctions than the VVD and BBB).[3]
For understandable reasons, the political chaos and ineffectiveness dented public trust in politics.[4] Remarkably, however, after the cabinet breakdown, Wilders’ PVV has remained the leading party in opinion polls.[5] This indicates that – at least for his supporters – Wilders successfully deflected the blame to his erstwhile coalition partners, claiming these blocked the implementation of the PVV’s desired immigration policies.
Indeed, immigration has remained a key issue in the run-up to the election. In September, violent riots erupted on the back of an anti-immigration protest in The Hague (the ‘political capital’ of the Netherlands).[6] Across the country, further unruly and intimidating protests took place at the sites of asylum centres. What was unprecedented at these events was the unveiled flaunting of extreme-right symbols and chants.
Even though its violence was widely condemned, the rise of the extreme-right at the grassroots level has done little to stop traditional mainstream parties, particularly on the centre-right, from politicising immigration. The debate has focused predominantly on asylum, which is by default framed as a ‘problem’ that needs a solution. Many politicians have furthermore been careful to show sympathy for citizens concerned about the supposed erosion of Dutch cultural identity, and few have challenged the widespread perception that the housing shortage – another salient issue – is connected in large part to asylum seekers receiving priority over native citizens.
Specific party stances differ, of course. While shunning the more apocalyptic rhetoric of the PVV, the centre-right VVD, in particular, but also the Christian Democrats (CDA) have made reducing immigration an important theme in their campaigns. The Liberal Democrats (D66) have also ‘moved to the right’ on socio-cultural issues, including asylum, but have been keener to welcome ‘talented’ migrants that serve the Dutch economy. On the centre-left, the Green-Labour Party coalition (Groenlinks-PvdA) expressed the need to limit labour migration in the name of halting exploitation and social injustice, while taking a more welcoming stance towards refugees.
Yet, overall, arguments in favour of immigration – such as its role in addressing labour market shortages and mitigating the effects of an ageing population – have been largely absent from the campaign. Similarly, any virtues of multiculturalism have been left unmentioned.
As is the case in so many other European countries, the rise of far-right parties in the Netherlands has significantly impacted the political debate. Across the continent, mainstream parties have adopted stricter positions on immigration, as they fear the far right's electoral competition. There is evidence that such a strategy is risky at best: it is, on balance, the far right that tends to benefit from an increased focus on its key themes.[7] The more general effect is the normalisation and legitimisation of the far right's agenda and discourse.
In the Dutch context, it is particularly remarkable how both mainstream parties and many media outlets have facilitated far-right agenda-setting. Far-right actors and sympathisers have been given considerable airtime at televised talk show tables. Geert Wilders himself has been quiet during the early stages of the campaign, citing security threats as reasons for his absence in several radio and televised debates. However, his absence cast a clear shadow over these events where the theme of immigration and asylum took centre stage, irrespectively.
There is also no shortage of other far-right political parties besides the PVV. The BBB has now entered far-right territory with its anti-immigration positions and concerns about radical Islam. The more extreme-right Forum for Democracy (FvD) is likely to win a few seats as well. The more ‘moderate’ JA21 may benefit in particular from the fact that the PVV is not a likely coalition option anymore for most other parties.
Given the highly fragmented nature of Dutch politics, a new government may consist of a broad coalition of parties, thus lacking a clear ideological direction. This may in turn fuel disappointment (and continued support for the radical right) in the longer term. A key lesson for mainstream parties and media elsewhere – and this certainly includes the UK – is not to let the far right set the terms of the debate to the extent it has in the Netherlands.
Stijn van Kessel is Professor of Comparative Politics at Queen Mary University of London. His main research interests are populism and the politics of European integration, with a particular emphasis on radical right parties and Euroscepticism. His latest co-authored book is Populist Radical Right Parties in Action: The Survival of the Mass Party (Oxford University Press, 2025).
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] Stijn van Kessel, The Guardian, 'Geert Wilders’ win shows the far right is being normalised. Mainstream parties must act´, November 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/26/far-right-normalised-mainstream-parties-geert-wilders-dutch
[2] Laura Gozzi and Anna Holligan, BBC News, 'Dutch government collapses after far-right leader quits coalition', June 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0r1x5yyd5wo
[3] Clea Skopeliti, The Guardian, 'Dutch foreign minister quits over failure to secure sanctions against Israel', August 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/23/netherlands-foreign-minister-sanctions-israel-gaza
[4] Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 'Nederlanders machteloos en gefrustreerd over het land en de politiek in aanloop naar de verkiezingen', October 2025, https://www.scp.nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/10/20/nederlanders-machteloos-en-gefrustreerd-over-het-land-en-de-politiek-in-aanloop-naar-de-verkiezingen
[5] See the Dutch ‘poll of polls’: https://peilingwijzer.tomlouwerse.nl/
[6] Stijn van Kessel and Andrej Zaslove, Illiberalism Studies Program, 'What mainstream parties and media should learn from the Dutch extreme‑right riots', September 2025, https://www.illiberalism.org/what-mainstream-parties-and-media-should-learn-from-the-dutch-extreme-right-riots/
[7] Werner Krause, Denis Cohen and Tarik Abou‑Chadi, The Guradian, 'Copying the far right doesn’t help mainstream parties', April 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2022/apr/13/copying-far-right-doesnt-help-mainstream-parties
[post_title] => Op-ed | The enduring relevance of the Far Right ahead of the Dutch National Election on 29th October
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[post_content] => On 9th September 2025, the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC), the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) and the University of Lancaster’s Sectarianism, Proxies and Desectarianisation project (SEPAD) co-hosted a high-level expert roundtable exploring Syria’s transition following the fall of the Assad regime, and the future of justice and accountability in the country.
The event was chaired by Mark Stephens CBE, IBAHRI Co-Chair, and brought together an expert panel including legal and policy experts, academics and civil society leaders: Yumen Hallaq, Senior Researcher at the Syrian Network for Human Rights; Sana Kikhia, Executive Director of the Syrian Legal Development Programme (SLDP); Dr Maria Kastrinou, Senior Lecturer in Anthropology at Brunel, University of London; Alan Haji, Lead for Case Building at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC); Mariana Karkoutly, Co-Founder and Board Member of Huquqyat; and Professor Simon Mabon, Chair in International Politics at Lancaster University and Director of the SEPAD project.
The roundtable provided an opportunity to assess the state of Syria’s political and legal transition nine months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Since the takeover by opposition forces in December 2024, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Syria has been governed by a transitional government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa, operating under a five-year constitutional declaration framework. While the international community has cautiously welcomed these changes and initial commitments to reform, major questions remain about the durability of the transition, the prospects for justice and reconciliation, and the appropriate role for international actors in supporting this process.
In charting a way forward for Syria, justice and accountability must be pursued through mechanisms that foster equal citizenship, political rights and freedoms, and collective trust, rather than reproduce the political processes of division that have fuelled sectarian and gendered violence. Domestic actors, civil society organisations, survivors, and victim’s families should be at the forefront of any accountability, legal or institutional reform. The international community can repeat calls and support processes that recognise the suffering of all victims, ensure accountability for the gravest of crimes, and foster genuine reconciliation and respect for the rule of law. Transitional justice processes must be coupled with long-term initiatives and dialogue to ensure that accountability and guarantees of non-reoccurrence of crimes become a foundation for sustainable truth, justice, and reconciliation. By embedding justice within a broader framework of social healing and inclusive governance, Syria can lay the groundwork for lasting peace in which accountability strengthens unity and helps prevent future cycles of violence.
To explore key themes and insights from the parliamentary roundtable discussion — including legal reform, institutional fragility, humanitarian conditions, and international engagement — you can download the full briefing here.
[post_title] => Expert Briefing: ‘Syria’s transition nine months on: Examining frameworks for international justice and accountability’
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[post_content] => A recently published volume, The Policies and Power of Public Diplomacy – Wilton Park’s Road, based on reports of Wilton Park’s higher level international policy discussions since 1946, provides a concise background to key challenges facing the world today.[1] Wilton Park is an executive agency of the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) focused on facilitating international policy dialogue, convening around 80 strategic discussions a year. Nick Hopkinson, the volume’s Editor, and a former director of Wilton Park (1987-2010), provides his insight into how the power of diplomacy can be used to revive democracy.
Few challenges are as pressing as the need to stop the democratic backsliding seen in many leading nations today, as evidenced by, for example, the increased undermining of independent media and the judiciary, and growing infringements of human rights. Weaknesses in, or the absence of, democracy are often at the root of conflict, whether internal or international. Discussing challenges and ultimately co-operating are cheaper than the heavy cost, both human and financial, of crises and war. Both can be mitigated, perhaps on occasion avoided, through greater international understanding and co-operation nurtured in what are called ‘Track 2 spaces’ for dialogue, such as Wilton Park.[2]
Post-WWII Origins
Initially a ‘re-education camp’ for German officers after World War Two (WW2), Wilton Park was a key part of Sir Winston Churchill’s vision to build a democratic post-war Germany. Since then it has evolved into a first-class international policy forum which has expanded beyond its 16th century country home in West Sussex to work in more than 50 countries. Founded by Sir Heinz Koeppler, Wilton Park established an independent approach to democracy building and international policy dialogue. Koeppler believed strengthening democracy and international understanding could be progressed through talking, debating, eating and living together. The original ‘courses’ evolved into interactive roundtables for ministers, diplomats, officials, academics, businesspeople, journalists and non-governmental opinion formers from countries around the world.
The UK’s model of parliamentary democracy has been discussed regularly at Wilton Park, especially in its early years. Sir Heinz was sensitive to possible accusations that the institution might be regarded as an instrument of government propaganda. To avoid this he crafted an independent, inter-disciplinary, international and interactive method which became widely recognised as a skilful exercise in education, engagement and influencing.
After its original mission was successfully achieved, Wilton Park focused on other topics, sometimes to survive as an institution. It has addressed topical international policy issues and challenges since 1946 including: forging consensus in the transatlantic alliance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; the Cold War; developments in the Former Soviet Union, in particular the Russian Federation; arms control; UK relations with the European Community and the Commonwealth; integration in and enlargement of the European Union; Africa (including ending apartheid); China, and the Middle East.
Post-Cold War Shift
The end of the Cold War resulted in Wilton Park’s greatest expansion of subject coverage, notably transnational challenges such as migration, crime and terrorism, curbing climate change and disease, as well as humanitarian intervention. There was also a renewed emphasis on democracy promotion, this time focused on the developing world.
As transnational challenges grew in salience in the post-war era, tackling them has exposed the limits of the nation state. As former Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of State, Sir Kenneth Younger, argued at Wilton Park in 1973 “none of these modern problems can be solved within the framework of the traditional nation state”[3].In the past dozen years, coverage of developing world issues has come to dwarf European coverage, in part reflecting changing UK government priorities, notably the UK’s — possibly short-lived — pivot away from Europe after Brexit. Most recently, the multi-national response to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates the need for, and benefits of, international co-operation.
The Current Age of Democratic Erosion
A triumph of the liberal order was the spread of prosperity to developing nations, notably China. It was hoped economic liberalisation would lead to the strengthening of democratic practice, but in spite of positive signs in the 1990s, progress in the new millennium has proven limited, and in some cases democratic reforms have been reversed.
The ongoing rise of populism suggests strengthening democracy is needed more than ever, even in the mature democracies which championed it during and after WW2. The recent democratic backsliding can be attributed, inter alia, to low growth after the 2007/8 global financial crisis, the failure of governments to spread the benefits of globalisation fairly, and the inability of nation states to resolve the new transnational challenges to which Sir Kenneth alluded. Furthermore, the revolution in digital technology has resulted in an explosion of media sources and increasing misinformation, leading to a decline in a shared understanding about domestic and global developments. This makes it much more difficult for governments to address problems and to co-operate internationally.
Populism in the digital age appeals to nationalist, isolationist and protectionist sentiment which provide particularly ill-suited solutions to today’s challenges. Today’s performative populist politics is less directed against other states, and rails against an amorphous globalisation and other social groups. The growth of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism and the scapegoating of refugees deflect attention from the real need to tackle growing domestic inequality and under-investment in health, education and infrastructure. If politicians fail to deliver solutions based on evidence and need, the integrity of democratic institutions themselves is further threatened, and authoritarian tendencies are strengthened. To restore faith in the functioning of democracy, citizens, particularly the young, need to be empowered through greater education and digital literacy, especially critical thinking and the ability to assess the veracity of media content.
The growing erosion of democracy has international ramifications. Wilton Park’s discussions since 1946 reflect the rise, consolidation and more recently decline of the post-war liberal ‘Western’ international order. That order can only be effective if democracy continues to function effectively in the countries which have underpinned it. Furthermore, if the US in particular is no longer able to and/or willing to champion the international post-war liberal order it shaped, the perception grows that the order is less relevant.
What Next?
Indeed, today the liberal international order looks less liberal, less international and less ordered. Stasis in the World Trade Organisation and failure to reform the United Nations system are symptomatic of declining international cohesion. Most worryingly, as foreseen in a 2017 Wilton Park conference, the increasing ineffectiveness of global powers and diplomacy means interstate conflict becomes a greater threat. Five years later, Russia invaded Ukraine and conflict rages again in Israel-Palestine. Might has prevailed over right.
As the international order fragments, what can be done? One senior Pakistani diplomat, Malik Azhar Ellahi, noted Track 2 exchanges such as those at Wilton Park can play an important role.
“When existing treaties (are) being junked and ongoing initiatives trashed… the one tempting conclusion is that it makes no difference what goes on in Track 2 exchanges. This in my view will not only be unfair but also unfortunate. I would think that there is a greater need at this time for policy to take into account views and concerns expressed in informal settings so that the divide which has emerged in official fora is not made permanent”. [4]
If democratic governments, opposition parties, non-governmental organisations and citizens do not redouble efforts wherever we can to counter the growing threat of populism, the continuing weakening of democratic checks and balances, and the undermining of international law and institutions, we risk ending up where Wilton Park started after WW2. After another horrific global conflict, ways and structures will again have to be created for nations to co-operate and live together in peace. In the context of the fragmenting post-war global order, democratic backsliding and the growth of misinformation, spaces such as Wilton Park are needed more than ever as forums to exchange and influence policy and opinion through constructive informed dialogue. Sir Heinz’ logo for Wilton Park of a bridge of international understanding remains as apt as ever. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. Nick Hopkinson is a writer on EU and international affairs and is former director of Wilton Park where he served from 1987 to 2010. He posts @nickhopkinson.bsky.social Image: Wiston House. © Wilton Park. Used with permission. [1] Hopkinson, Nick (ed.), The Policies and Power of Public Diplomacy – Wilton Park’s Road. Routledge, London and New York, 2025. A free copy of the volume is available by clicking on the open access button within the following link: https://www.routledge.com/The-Policies-and-Power-of-Public-Diplomacy-Wilton-Parks-Road/Hopkinson/p/book/9781032831251 [2] “Track Two diplomacy consists of informal dialogues among actors such as academics, religious leaders, retired senior officials, and NGO officials that can bring new ideas and new relationships to the official process of diplomacy.” - Peter Jones, Stanford University Press, Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice, September 2015, https://www.sup.org/books/politics/track-two-diplomacy-theory-and-practice [3] Hopkinson, Nick (ed.), The Policies and Power of Public Diplomacy – Wilton Park’s Road. Routledge, London and New York, 2025. A free copy of the volume is available by clicking on the open access button within the following link: https://www.routledge.com/The-Policies-and-Power-of-Public-Diplomacy-Wilton-Parks-Road/Hopkinson/p/book/9781032831251 [4] Ibid. [post_title] => Op-ed | The urgent need to revive democracy and the power of diplomacy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-the-urgent-need-to-revive-democracy-and-the-power-of-diplomacy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-05 11:16:50 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-05 10:16:50 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8341 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8301 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-08-04 08:09:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-08-04 07:09:00 [post_content] => Transnational repression (TNR) is on the rise globally, fuelled by rapidly evolving technology, global democratic- backsliding and the rise of authoritarianism and years of neglect by previous governments. It is a major policy blind spot, resulting in significant constraints on the exercise of fundamental rights in the UK. Repressive actors, including powerful and hostile states, have a growing set of tools to surveil, threaten, harass and attack individuals in the UK, violating their fundamental rights guaranteed under international and domestic laws such as the Human Rights Act 1998. Political dissidents, exiled journalists and human rights defenders have traditionally been the main targets of TNR, but today a broader array of groups and individuals also find themselves subject to transnational human rights violations here in the UK. The UK’s responses to TNR to date have been sparse, incoherent and largely inaccessible to targeted communities and individuals. Law enforcement is an important part of the solution, but the cross-border nature of TNR demands a broader approach to protect the rights of those targeted. The Foreign Policy Centre is a founding member of the Tackling Transnational Repression (TNR) in the UK Working Group. Formed in September 2024, the Tackling TNR Working Group is an informal coalition of individuals and organisations working to address TNR in the UK context. The working group’s steering committee includes: The Foreign Policy Centre, Richardson Institute at Lancaster University, Index on Censorship, Reporters Without Borders, Azadi Network and The Rights Practice. The wider membership also comprises organisations such as Amnesty International UK, ARTICLE 19, the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), China Dissent Network, Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, FairSquare, Hong Kong Democracy Council, Hong Kong Watch, and Iran International, as well as other individual experts and researchers. The aims of the group are to:The Tackling TNR Working Group’s ‘Four Part Approach’ for addressing TNR in the UK
If you are interested to find out more about the working group and/or to enquire about joining, please email: info@fpc.org.uk
[post_title] => Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group
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[post_content] => Bureaucracy still moves at the speed of fax, but exile communities are prototyping governance technologies at the speed of necessity. This opens new possibilities for host countries of those in exile to learn from their innovations, while building democratic values and resilience.
As someone exiled twice – first from Belarus due to political persecution, then from Ukraine due to war – I have come to see home not as a place, but as a protocol, where new digital governance tools enable active citizenship. Diasporas are building these protocols under fire. Displacement breeds innovation: those in exile are not merely adapting to digital governance; they are pioneering it because their old institutions have collapsed.
Diaspora communities should be taken seriously because they have the power to influence change at home. We saw this in action when voters from abroad tipped the scales in Moldova's October 2024 EU accession referendum. The decisive votes were not cast in Chișinău – they came from WhatsApp groups in Italy, community centres in Germany and kitchen tables in Dublin[1]. One in four Moldovans now lives abroad[2]; their ballots turned a domestic stalemate into constitutional change.
The Belarusian diaspora pushed even further, electing a parliament in exile. Despite cyber harassment and threats to relatives, we held block chain audited elections for a Coordination Council in May 2024[3]. Six thousand verified votes out of a million strong diaspora is not regime toppling, but it is a proof of concept that democratic processes can outlive failed states[4].
In the shadow of authoritarianism, new technologies are making democratic engagement possible. Zero knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are one promising approach. Projects like Freedom Tool let citizens prove passport validity without revealing personal data[5].
Zero knowledge voting sounds dystopian until your polling station becomes a prison cell. Then it becomes a tool for building democratic resilience. Early pilots in Russian, Iranian and Georgian contexts suggest the method can scale, even under authoritarian pressure[6]. It deserves rigorous security audits and a clear path to legal recognition.
Policymakers in Western democracies must understand that digital innovations by exile communities are more than fringe experiments – they are stress testing governance under extreme conditions. The UK should observe carefully, not as saviour but as strategic learner.
One quick win is improved administrative efficiency. For example, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office takes weeks to certify official documents, but secure digital credentials could streamline verification. Pilot schemes would surface real world obstacles early.
As authoritarian states weaponise diasporas, the UK could partner with democratic exile networks on standards and sandbox trials, that test new technologies in safe environments[7].
Low-risk pilots could include a sandbox test for diaspora credentials as supplementary evidence for specific visa categories[8]. Think tanks could convene Belarusian, Moldovan, Ukrainian, Hong Kong and Taiwan tech teams with MPs, regulators and the FCA sandbox to swap playbooks.
The government could also fund independent open-source audits of diaspora governance tools to understand security threats and vulnerabilities before deeper institutional engagement.
These technologies might eventually reshape citizenship and belonging. However, the transition from paperwork to digital protocols demands careful navigation. The question is not whether exile communities will innovate, but whether established democracies can learn from their experiments without repeating their mistakes.
Ray Svitla is a Belarus-born entrepreneur, fractional CMO and governance strategist working at the nexus of Web3, civil-society tech and frontier finance. He has mobilised $25 M+ in capital and unlocked $200 K in equity-free grants from USAID, the NEAR Foundation and others. As co-founder of WAKA he scaled the matchmaking platform to 100 000 users at one-tenth typical CAC. He also led a research department producing more than 80 publications that drew tier-1 clients including Blockchain.com. Today he stewards the 404embassy.com network, hosting salons with visionaries such as Vitalik Buterin. A John Smith Trust Fellow, Ray applies value-driven governance insights to build more resilient, inclusive futures.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] Wikipedia, ‘2024 Moldovan European Union membership constitutional referendum’, October 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Moldovan_European_Union_membership_constitutional_referendum
[2] Tiina Kaukvere, Emerging Europe, ‘Is Moldova’s diaspora ready to return home?’, May 2025, https://emerging-europe.com/analysis/is-moldovas-diaspora-ready-to-return-home/
[3] Kamil Kłysiński, OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, ‘Belarus: elections to the opposition parliament’, May 2024, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-05-29/belarus-elections-to-opposition-parliament
[4] Ray Svitla, Embassy.Svit.la, ‘Pavel Liber: Building a New Belarus in Exile (An Interview)’, June 2025, https://embassy.svit.la/p/pavel-liber-building-a-new-belarus
[5] Rarimo, Medium, ‘Introducing Freedom Tool’, February 2024, https://rarimo.medium.com/introducing-freedom-tool-15709e9eaa73; Ray Svitla, Embassy Svit.la, ‘Kitty Horlick (Rarimo): ZKDemocracy & Privacy’s Future’, July 2025, https://embassy.svit.la/p/kitty-horlick-rarimo-zk-democracy
[6] Oleksandr Kurbatov and Lasha Antadze, Medium, ‘Building ZK passport-based voting’, September 2024, https://rarimo.medium.com/building-zk-passport-based-voting-3f6f97ebb445
[7] Citizen Lab, UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Written evidence to UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee – Transnational Repression (TRUK0112)’, 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/138042/html/
[8] Office for Digital Identities and Attributes, GOV.UK, ‘About us’, November 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-for-digital-identities-and-attributes
[post_title] => From paperwork to digital protocols: how exile rewrites citizenship
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[post_content] => Displaced Ukrainians in the UK are highly educated, with strong professional backgrounds and well placed to contribute economically and socially. However, to do this, they need greater certainty about their future in the country.
More than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the UK has provided refuge to over 218,600 displaced Ukrainians under humanitarian visa schemes.
Government data shows 68% of Ukrainian adults are employed or self-employed[1]. Yet only about one-third are working in their original professions, with 20% employed in the hospitality sector, indicating that there are opportunities to make much better use of their skills[2].
Many Ukrainians are also proactively contributing to community life, establishing cultural associations, grassroots organisations, and volunteer initiatives that provide language classes, cultural events, and mental health support.
Last year, I joined the John Smith Trust’s Ukrainian Women’s Leadership programme in Scotland and I met many women who are contributing to the UK economy and whose efforts have strengthened both Ukrainian and local communities.
One Fellow, Hanna Tekliuk, is an active member of the Education Working Group of the CPG on Ukraine. She has also established the Ukrainian St Margaret’s Saturday School for relocated Ukrainian children. These schools are vital for maintaining a deep connection to their heritage.
Anna Kulish is another of the many women and John Smith Fellows making a vital contribution. She is the Secretary of the Scottish Parliament Cross-Party Group on Ukraine and chairs its business and economy working group, which promotes economic ties between Scotland and Ukraine.
With the CPG, she led the first trade visit from Ukraine to Scotland in over a decade, with 60 delegates including community leaders and mayors of Ukrainian cities. They came to Scotland not to ask for aid, but to present investment projects.
However without a clear pathway to permanence in the UK, many displaced Ukrainians face limited opportunities. The three-year visas under the Ukraine schemes are now approaching expiry. The Ukraine permission extension grants an additional 18 months’ stay, offering temporary reassurance. However, this extension does not guarantee indefinite leave to remain, leaving long-term status unresolved.
Career advancement, housing stability, and family planning are all shaped by legal uncertainty. Policy choices now will influence whether integration efforts continue to yield social and economic dividends—or risk stagnation under prolonged precarity.
While some Ukrainians intend to return when conditions allow, most are laying down roots and wish to remain long term[3]. However, a sense of belonging remains constrained.
As one displaced Ukrainian reflected: “We came here to survive, but we’ve built lives. Now we need to know whether we’re staying as guests—or neighbours.”
As the UK navigates this next phase, there is an urgent need for clarity. Policymakers may consider how temporary protection could transition into more secure residency for those who would like to remain, aligning with broader migration and integration objectives.
Ukrainians in the UK have a great deal of untapped potential, with the skills and motivation to contribute more to the economy. Targeted investment in credential recognition, bridging programmes, and language support could address underemployment and better align Ukrainian skills with labour market needs. This is a clear win for both Ukrainians and the UK communities that have welcomed them. Meanwhile, strengthening partnerships with Ukrainian-led organisations could enhance community integration and complement formal support services.
Integration is shaped by opportunity and agency. Policy decisions taken now will influence whether displaced Ukrainians can contribute through work, taxes, and civic engagement or remain constrained by temporary status.
Three years on, the UK faces a pivotal policy moment: whether the welcome extended in 2022 becomes a pathway to belonging or remains a temporary refuge.
Nataliia Danova is a John Smith Trust alumna, currently working for Edinburgh City Council. She is the co-founder of Help Ukraine Scotland, an organisation providing informational support and resources to displaced Ukrainians across Scotland. Nataliia is a creative practitioner, cultural mediator, and advocate for refugee and migrant rights, committed to building pathways for integration and community support through grassroots initiatives.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, ‘Ukrainian migration to the UK’, December 2024, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/ukrainian-migration-to-the-uk/
[2] Chatham House, ‘Ukrainian refugees and their shifting situation’, part of Ukraine’s fight for its people, February 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/02/ukraines-fight-its-people/ukrainian-refugees-and-their-shifting-situation
[3] Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, ‘Ukrainian migration to the UK’, December 2024, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/ukrainian-migration-to-the-uk/
[post_title] => Legal certainty could boost Ukrainians’ economic contribution in the UK
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[post_content] => As global power dynamics shift, Central Asia’s strategic relevance is rising, – but so too is the need for a reset in engagement by international partners. Could a more principled, values-driven approach unlock lasting stability and democratic resilience in the region?
Central Asia stands at a peculiar crossroads. Decades after gaining independence, a common refrain echoes: "Everything has changed, but nothing has changed."
On the surface, new infrastructure rises, economies evolve, and geopolitical alignments shift. Yet, beneath this veneer, the fundamental nature of international engagement often remains stubbornly familiar, characterised by a transactional approach that prioritises short-term gains over long-term partnership. What was once subtly implied is now glaringly apparent: a pervasive lack of genuine interest in the region's holistic development, with compromises frequently driven by the pursuit of trade and resources.
Deepening regional integration is paramount. Initiatives like the Central Asian Summit are fostering greater cooperation among the republics themselves, building a collective identity and reducing reliance on external powers for regional stability. This internal cohesion makes the region a more attractive and reliable partner for others.
To truly move forward, a fundamental shift is required: a transition towards a more principled and value-driven approach to diplomacy. This means moving beyond the immediate gratification of trade deals or security pacts and embracing a long-term vision rooted in genuine partnership.
A key opportunity lies in enhancing regional connectivity and integration. As global supply chains are re-evaluated and diversified, Central Asia's geographic position as a land bridge between East and West becomes even more critical. Investing in modern transport corridors, logistics hubs, and digital infrastructure can transform the region into a vital transit artery, generating substantial transit revenues and stimulating local economies.
Firstly, a principled approach entails consistent investment in human capital and civil society. This includes supporting independent media, educational exchanges, and grassroots initiatives that empower citizens and foster critical thinking. Such investments, though not immediately yielding economic returns, are foundational for resilient societies and accountable governance.
Secondly, diplomacy must be predicated on shared values like the rule of law, transparency, and sustainable development. Instead of overlooking governance issues for the sake of a trade agreement, international partners should consistently advocate for reforms that strengthen institutions and combat corruption. This does not mean imposing Western models, but rather supporting Central Asian efforts to build systems that serve their own people effectively and justly.
Thirdly, fostering regional integration that benefits all citizens, not just elites, should be a priority. Supporting cross-border initiatives in areas like water management, energy, and transport can build trust and interdependence, creating a more stable and prosperous region.
A principled approach is not merely altruistic - it is strategically sound. By investing in the long-term stability and genuine development of Central Asian nations, international partners build more reliable and resilient allies. It counters malign influences by offering a compelling alternative rooted in mutual respect and shared prosperity. It acknowledges that true security and economic growth stem from strong institutions, empowered citizens, and a commitment to universal values.
The time has come to shed the transactional shadows and embrace a brighter, more principled path for diplomacy in Central Asia. Only then can "everything truly change" for the better, fostering a future of genuine partnership and lasting progress.
Ainur Kanafina is a Programme Specialist in Population and Development at United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Regional Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia in Istanbul, Türkiye. Previously, Ainur served at the World Health Organization (WHO) in Amman, Jordan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Kazakhstan. She has also worked at the British Embassy in Astana KAZGUU Higher School of Economics, Global Center for Cooperative Security and the Institute for Strategic Development. Ainur holds a MSc in public policy from University College London and a BSc in information technology and business from Indiana University. She is an alumna of various programmes organised by Council of Europe, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Riga Graduate School of Law and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Academy. Ainur is also a Bolashak scholar and a PMP certified project manager.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[post_title] => Beyond transactions to rebuilding trust with Central Asia
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[post_content] => High unemployment and limited economic opportunities in Central Asian countries have traditionally driven millions of people to migrate to Russia in search of work[1]. Where the region’s historical, cultural and linguistic links with Russia have been a major factor in migrants’ choice of destination, new migration patterns are however emerging, influenced by geopolitical shifts in the region. These present opportunities for Central Asian governments, the receiving countries, and the migrants themselves[2].
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, life has become more difficult for Central Asian migrants who live and work in Russia. Those who hold Russian passports are compelled to join the armed forces, and tens of thousands have been sent to the war zone[3]. Some returned to their home countries to avoid the draft.
Then there are undocumented migrants. Since the terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall by Tajik nationals, Russia’s attitude towards Central Asian migrants has become more hostile[4]. Combined with military mobilisation, this has led to new regulatory frameworks and tools for registering undocumented migrants.
From the perspective of Central Asian countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, whose economies rely heavily on remittances, dependence on a single country as a migration destination is a high-risk strategy[5]. It gives the destination country a disproportionate influence over policies and leaves you vulnerable to changes in theirs.
That is why governments in Central Asia need to pursue a strategy to diversify the migration destinations of their citizens. We are seeing opportunities to expand mutually beneficial agreements on labour migration with countries such as the UK, Germany, Japan and South Korea [6]. These countries offer workers better conditions than Russia, with proper contracts that reduce the risk of exploitation and better legal protections.
The UK’s Seasonal Workers Scheme is a good example[7]. The UK has a quota system, which allocates a specific number of places for each country. In 2024, Great Britain allocated 45,000 seasonal work visas for Central Asia, with approximately 30% going to citizens of Kyrgyzstan[8]. Central Asian migrants view the scheme as a valuable opportunity for legitimate, well-paid and well-regulated work. The scheme benefits the UK by filling a seasonal labour shortage in the agricultural and poultry sectors. The same is true in Japan and South Korea.
For the governments of receiving countries such as the UK, labour migration schemes offer opportunities for cultural exchange and stronger relations in the region[9]. Central Asian governments appreciate the UK’s scheme because it helps them to resolve their unemployment issues. So, if UK policy is to increase its influence in Central Asia, this is received more positively.
The temporary and seasonal nature of these schemes suits Central Asian citizens themselves, as they are not looking to emigrate but to resolve an economic need. For host societies, Central Asian seasonal workers present minimal integration challenges, as their temporary stay avoids long-term social or economic strain. As long as the scheme is well-regulated, everybody wins.
Meder Dastanbekov is the former country director for Winrock International in the Kyrgyz Republic, where he led initiatives to promote safe migration and combat human trafficking in the Kyrgyz Republic and wider Central Asia region. His work addresses the critical challenges faced by migrants, particularly in light of evolving geopolitical dynamics, such as the war in Ukraine and its impact on migration patterns. With extensive experience fostering collaboration between governments, international organisations, and civil society, Meder helps in developing inclusive policies and practices that prioritise human rights and empower vulnerable populations.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] Kommersant, ‘Мы реально не знаем, кто к нам едет’, September 2024, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7166241
[2] University of Central Asia Institute of Public Policy and Administration, How War in Ukraine Has Shaped Migration Flows in Central Asia, policy brief, c. 2023, https://ucentralasia.org/media/psdnh1p1/pbmigration-flow-change-in-central-asia-en.pdf
[3] Kaktus.media, ‘Бастрыкин заявил, что десятки тысяч мигрантов с гражданством РФ находятся на передовой’, May 2025, https://kaktus.media/doc/524105_bastrykin_zaiavil_chto_desiatki_tysiach_migrantov_s_grajdanstvom_rf_nahodiatsia_na_peredovoy.html
[4] BBC News, ‘Ukraine war: US and UK to supply longer‑range missiles to Kyiv’, June 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68665896
[5] Азаттык Радиосу (RFE/RL), ‘Рублдин курсу борбор азиялык мигранттарга кандай таасир этти?’ (How the ruble exchange rate affects Central Asian migrants), April 2025, https://www.azattyk.org/a/33394657.html
[6] Farangis Najibullah, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘Happy To Be In Britain, Central Asian Migrants Want More Work To Cover Expenses’, August 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/britain-central-asia-migrants-more-work-expenses/31997221.html; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘“This Is Not My World”: Central Asian Migrants in Russia Say They Could Never Return Home’, April 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-migrants-centralasia-uzbekistan/33261194.html; and, Akchabar.kg, ‘Kyrgyzstan and Japan deepen cooperation in employment and social projects’, n.d., https://www.akchabar.kg/en/news/kirgizstan-i-yaponiya-uglublyayut-sotrudnichestvo-v-sfere-trudoustrojstva-i-sotsialnikh-proektov-pdhtnmeblegahkmk
[7] Association of Labour Providers, ‘Seasonal Worker Scheme’, n.d., https://www.labourproviders.org.uk/seasonal-worker-scheme/
[8] Akchabar.kg, ‘Великобритания выделяет 45 тысяч квот для сезонных работников из ЦА — 30 получат граждане Киргизстана’ (Britain allocates 45,000 quotas for seasonal workers from Central Asia — 30 will go to Kyrgyzstan citizens), n.d., https://www.akchabar.kg/en/news/velikobritaniya-videlyaet-45-tisyach-kvot-dlya-sezonnikh-rabotnikov-iz-tsa-30-poluchat-grazhdane-kirgizstana-mdphrmumvuomxzgj
[9] The Economist, ‘Why Central Asians are flocking to Britain’, July 2023, https://www.economist.com/britain/2023/07/24/why-central-asians-are-flocking-to-britain
[post_title] => Europe and Central Asia can benefit from changing migration patterns
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[post_content] => When speaking about Russian and Soviet colonialism, the first step is to agree on the terminology. Why do we continue to define the region by referencing that it ‘formerly’ belonged to the Soviet Union more than 30 years ago? To move on from the Soviet identity, we should refer instead to Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
Yet this solution does not reflect the commonality of problems countries in this region face, exactly because of their tumultuous history and present circumstances. Given ‘post-socialist’, ‘post-communist’ or ‘post-anything’, present the same definitional problem as the ‘former soviet union’. One suggestion is to call the region the “Global East”[1]. The second step is to realise that not all countries that were the republics of the Soviet Union and before that parts of the Russian Empire, necessarily agree that they were “colonised”. Some reject the term as degrading and not reflecting the economic and cultural reality they lived in. Some Georgians, for example, prefer to talk about it in terms of an occupation.
We also need to recognise that experiences vary hugely by country. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia kept their cultural identities and language. However, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, due to the influx of Slavic and other non-Asian populations, Russian remains the lingua franca and an official language until this day. In Estonia and Latvia, the large Russian-speaking populations form parallel social structures. In Belarus, Lukashenko’s regime actively promotes russification, and speaking Belarusian is perceived as a sign of being in the opposition.
Ukraine and Kazakhstan suffered starvation under Stalin in the 1930s. In Ukraine, memorialising the Holodomor is one of the foundations of modern Ukrainian identity[2]. Meanwhile, the Kazakh famine (Asharshylyk), which was equally devastating, is less well-remembered and less researched[3].
So, how can we start to shift colonial mindsets? We need to have conversations between different nations and ethnic groups about their experiences, including national minorities from Russia and ethnic Russians. Failing to do so allows propaganda to build. The consequences of failing to challenge false narratives can clearly be seen in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
A good place to start is for decolonial activists from across the region to find spaces where we can share our experiences and build a common understanding. Independent media are ideally placed to support this process. For example, the Kyrgyz podcast O’decolon (English version Yurt Jurt) brings people together from almost all the countries in the region to discuss their experiences[4].
When we are ready to reach a bigger audience, a series in the mainstream media exploring these issues in a more engaging way could be a good way to breakthrough. Just as Adolescence sparked conversations about teenagers, social media and misogyny, a series tackling colonial issues could help shift mindsets on a large scale.
Shifting mindsets within Russian society is an important component too, and not only with the involvement of civil society and independent media in exile. Hundreds of thousands of people fled Russia to avoid being mobilised[5], with many ending up in Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan and other countries of the region.
For those who have left Russia at least, there is an opportunity to see their country from another perspective. It could be the beginning of some overdue reflection on the Soviet legacy and Russian colonialism.
Aigulle Sembaeva is an experienced civil society professional, Aigulle’s area of expertise is in leading and designing education, capacity building and youth participation programmes. Throughout her career she has brought together students, activists, journalists, reformers, and researchers from Central Asia and Eastern Europe to share their experiences and innovative ideas. She is a strong believer in the power of people’s networks to effect change.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] G. John Ikenberry, International Affairs, ‘Three Worlds: the West, East and South and the competition to shape global order’, vol. 100, no. 1, January 2024, pp. 121–138, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad284
[2] National Museum of the Holodomor‑Genocide, ‘The History of the Holodomor’, n.d. https://holodomormuseum.org.ua/en/the-history-of-the-holodomor/
[3] Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, 'Remembering Kazakhstan’s Great Famine of the 1930s', https://ieres.elliott.gwu.edu/project/remembering-kazakhstans-great-famine-of-the-1930s/
[4] Bashтан, Подкаст О’Деколон, YouTube playlist, 43 episodes, last updated 19 December 2024, https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLjI-VRWtNFhNoA45bMJhPzqY82-smpeZF; and, Bashтан, Yurt Jurt, Spotify podcast, hosted by Dr. Diana Kudaibergen, https://open.spotify.com/show/51uxvx3yDWujSSBPykPZYR
[5] The Bell, ‘Russia’s 650,000 wartime emigres’, July 2024, https://en.thebell.io/russias-650-000-wartime-emigres/
[post_title] => How can we start conversations to shift colonial mindsets?
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[post_content] => All societies are diverse, even if some people have got used to thinking that their country should be homogeneous, where everyone looks the same, speaks the same language, and follows the same religion.It is this mindset that enables authoritarian and populist leaders to divide their societies into “us and them”.
Globally we are seeing a pushback against the diversity, equality and inclusion (DEI) agenda, not least of all in the United States under the second Trump administration. Yet DEI is crucial to maintaining a peaceful society.My work, as the national coordinator in Georgia for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe High Commissioner on National Minorities,is mostly about preventing ethnic conflict and promoting a diverse society. Inclusive decision-making is one of the ways to make this happen.
When minorities take part in the decision-making process, they take ownership of those decisions[1]. It gives the process more legitimacy because it represents the interests and needs of the whole society. This is relevant for all groups, whether ethnic, religious minorities or the LGBTQI community.
This is extremely important for democracy, especially today, as politicians all over the world revert to divisive rhetoric , fostering distrust among communities and attempting to manipulate and try to manipulate us.
It’s never easy. You make certain steps forward, but then you must go back and start over again. In Georgia right now, where civil society is under unprecedented pressure from the government, there are fewer opportunities to implement a diversity agenda[2]. When there is a rise in authoritarianism, minorities try to stay silent to weather the storm and survive this pressure. This further alienates them.
Despite this, there is still an opportunity to show people why diversity is important. We can do this by making the connection between diversity and peace. When there is too much pressure on minority communities, people start resisting, and that could lead to tensions and then even conflict. But when you foster diversity, there is less friction and a greater chance of different communities living together peacefully. Thus, exclusion is not an answer; societies need to find their own way to embrace diversity so that it reflects the needs and aspirations of their members.
Diversity matters more than ever because it’s about individual dignity and security for everyone. It’s about creating avenues which enable people to become part of society so that they do not have to fight every single day to get a job, an education, medical help. National governments need to design inclusive policies to address these issues.
In Georgia, I would like us to reach a point where ethnic minorities feel confident and welcome to speak up, not only about their own issues, but also about issues that affect the whole country.
For this to happen, we need inclusive leadership and role models in high-level positions. And we need to see this from our partners in Western democracies. The UK could lead by example, including diversity not only in policies but also in their actions when interacting with Georgian politicians. It sends an important message.
I want society and politicians to understand that diversity is not a danger to our identities. You do not have to build barriers between different groups to keep people safe. Instead, you celebrate diversity and benefit from it. It creates opportunities for us all.
Nino Gogoladze is a national programme coordinator for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE HCNM) in Tbilisi, Georgia. She manages the work of the HCNM in Georgia seeking to prevent ethnic conflict in the country and promote integration of diverse society. Nino previously worked as a project coordinator at the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), a programme coordinator at the Heinrich Boell Foundation, and national anti-trafficking officer for the OSCE Mission to Georgia. She holds an LLM degree from London School of Economics and Political Science; and an MA in international relations and European studies from the Central European University, Budapest.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre nor those of the OSCE HCNM.
[1] OSCE, ‘The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’, September 1999, https://www.osce.org/hcnm/lund-recommendations
[2] Nini Gabritchidze, ‘Georgian Dream’s FARA Takes Effect’, Civil.ge, May 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/684669
[post_title] => We must make the connection between diversity and peace
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[post_content] => Ukraine is not just a battlefield – it is democracy’s most critical frontline. It is misleading to treat war as a regional conflict – the spillover of Russian aggression beyond Ukraine’s borders is not just possible, but likely.
What we are witnessing now is the global shift from a rules-based to a power-based order. The outcome of this confrontation will decide the politics of the future. We have a window of opportunity to create a global alliance based on democratic values and we must not miss it.
The cooperation between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea becomes more strategic than ever, as they prepare to undermine the Western-led, rule-based order. For Europe and the democratic world, it is crucial to break the endless cycle of appeasing the aggressor and to adopt a firm, practical policy of isolating Russia.
While some think about possible concessions to the aggressor, it is important to understand that what is being sacrificed is not only territory but also our values and freedom. Appeasement encourages further aggression. In this context, democracies must show they have the strength and tools to counter authoritarian power. And while we cannot change our existing institutions – such as NATO and the European Union (EU) – overnight, we can adapt.
There are still instruments that have not been fully utilised. Despite Russia’s hybrid aggression and energy blackmail costing hundreds of billions, Europe has hesitated to confiscate Russian assets for Ukraine’s benefit. Seizing the Russian Central Bank’s assets to create a European defence fund would provide crucial resources and demonstrate Europe’s commitment to countering ongoing threats[1]. Building on this, there must be a policy shift towards total economic isolation of Russia by ending all trade with it.
The ‘Coalition of the Willing,’ led by the UK and France, provides the decisive leadership Europe needs[2]. This coalition has the potential to evolve into a broader security mechanism, with existing institutions like the EU taking on a greater role. In this context, the UK can further support a humanitarian operation to protect Ukraine’s airspace over the north-western sector of the Black Sea and western Ukraine.
Building on Ukrainian practical experience of modern warfare with new technologies, the UK could also develop initiatives like Sky Shield[3]. This could protect the sky in Europe and the UK using the Ukrainian example to build air superiority.
Ukrainian military experience is highly beneficial for Europe and NATO because they can better understand what they’re dealing with. Looking beyond our traditional allies, we must make space for new partners and security alliances, such as Japan and South Korea. A values-based alliance is our real strategic advantage.
The partnerships between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are based on mutual benefits and goals but there is no trust. On the contrary, Ukraine is paying with its blood for choosing Europe. That is why our accession to the EU remains a top priority. With Russia watching, it sends a powerful message that Europe supports our aspirations. It’s more than integration. It's about the strategic perspective and common security.
If we stay firm on our common values, we can build greater trust and unity based on a shared vision. A consensus-based approach takes time, and there is a need to move quickly in this fast-changing environment. However, in the long term, it will be more reliable than the transactional-based approach of the autocracies.
Kateryna Musiienko is a Kremenchuk City Council member and deputy head of the Committee for Foreign Relations, Education and Youth. She is a Head of the Foreign Affairs, Strategic Partnerships and Innovations at ANTS NGO. Kateryna was an advisor to a member of the European Parliament and former advisor to the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Ukrainian Parliament. Her educational background is in political science (Passau University) and diplomacy (University of Oxford).
Fellow Photo (c) Sarah Oughton, The John Smith Trust
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] Ukrainian Victory, Confiscation of Russian State-Owned and Affiliated Property in Ukraine: Path to Justice and Recovery, n.d., https://ukrainianvictory.org/wp-content/uploads/Confiscation.pdf
[2] UK Government, ‘Coalition of the Willing: Joint UK–France statement following 10 April meeting’, April 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/coalition-of-the-willing-joint-uk-france-statement-following-10-april-meeting
[3]Dan Sabbagh, The Guardian, ‘European‑led Ukraine air protection plan could halt Russian missile attacks’, March 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/06/european-led-ukraine-air-protection-plan-could-halt-russian-missile-attacks
[post_title] => How democracies can leverage Ukraine’s resistance for a global reset
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We are living through the biggest shift in geopolitical power since the Second World War, accelerated by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, China’s economic ascendency, and the US retreat from guaranteeing Europe’s security.
A new multipolar power-based order is emerging. And in many countries, democracy is under threat as populist leaders exploit false and divisive narratives to gain and maintain power. In these turbulent times, we can see all too clearly that democracy is fragile and precious, and not to be taken for granted. We must have the courage to defend it in the face of growing authoritarianism.
Amid these shifts and crises, it has never been more important for UK policymakers to listen to a wide range of voices and perspectives, especially those we often don’t hear from. And where there are crises, there are also sometimes opportunities if you are willing to look for them and keep an open mind.
In this mini-series, John Smith Fellows from Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia discuss opportunities for transformation and development in their societies. We hear from Fellows in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, as well as Fellows exiled from Belarus and Russia, on topics including changing colonial mindsets, looking beyond traditional alliances, keeping the diversity agenda alive and opportunities for displaced people and local communities to thrive together.
Our Fellows are leaders and changemakers in their fields, who are committed to tolerance, openness and rules-based, people-focused governance. Together, they bring diverse perspectives and embody the value of connection and shared ‘sense-making’ in moments of crisis.
During our 30-year history, the John Smith Trust has built a network of more than 500 Fellows from across the region. This means that together we are well-placed to develop cross-regional and cross-sectoral connections, create space for new ideas and share expertise at a time of increasing polarisation.
The UK still excels at open discussion and respectful disagreement, which our Fellows value highly and take back to their societies. And while hard security cooperation – such as that proposed by the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ – is becoming increasingly important, the UK’s soft power diplomacy approaches are also crucial in the defence of democratic values in Europe and beyond.
For UK policymakers and advisors, it’s well worth spending time exploring emerging opportunities for local action and identifying where there’s potential for new alliances and collaborative relationships.
We can find strength in our shared values and focus on what unites us, not what divides us.
Baroness Suttie is a Member of the House of Lords since October 2013, Alison is currently the Liberal Democrat Northern Ireland Spokesperson in the House of Lords and is also a Party Whip. She served on the EU Select Committee in the House of Lords from 2015-19. She currently is a member of the Constitution Committee.
Alison was Head of the Liberal Democrat Leader’s office from 2006 to 2010 and was Deputy Chief of Staff to the Deputy Prime Minster for the first 18 months of the Coalition Government from 2010 to 2011.
In addition to being a working peer, Alison also works as an independent consultant in developing parliaments around the world. She has worked in Jordan, Iraq, Sudan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tunisia.
Having studied Russian and French at Heriot-Watt university in Edinburgh as well in Voronezh State University in Russia in 1988, she continues to enjoy speaking both languages.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[post_title] => Geopolitical shifts: crisis or opportunity for democracy?
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As war, political instability, and democratic erosion continue to reshape Europe’s trajectory, experts recently gathered in Westminster to examine where Central Europe stands and where it may be heading.
On 24th June 2025, the Aston Centre for Europe, the Foreign Policy Centre and UK in a Changing Europe co-hosted a high-level expert roundtable exploring the current political and geopolitical landscape of Central Europe. The event was chaired by the Rt Hon Anneliese Dodds MP and featured speakers from academia, policy, and journalism: Dr. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, Masaryk University (Czechia); Prof. Aleks Szczerbiak, University of Sussex (Poland); Vladimir Bilčík, Senior Fellow, GLOBSEC (Slovakia); and Alexander Faludy, Journalist (Hungary).
"The geopolitical roles of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have always been important but are even more crucial given the war against Ukraine. It is essential that we develop strong people-to-people bilateral relationships, especially to support and promote democracy and security in the face of threats from illiberal actors."
Rt Hon Anneliese Dodds MP
The panel focused on developments in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia. As war continues in Ukraine and global power dynamics shift, Central Europe has become a frontline for democratic resilience and foreign policy fragmentation. While united in their proximity to the war, the four countries diverge significantly in their internal politics, stance towards Russia, relations with the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), and their approaches to regional cooperation and defence. Included below is a snapshot of the panel’s discussion by country:“Poles have mixed views about Donald Trump, and many are concerned about the possible weakening of the trans-Atlantic alliance, but whatever their views most of them see the US as Poland's only military security guarantor and are wary of any EU defence identity that is separate from NATO.”
Aleks Szczerbiak, Professor of Politics, University of Sussex
“Hungary under Orbán is a headache for EU and NATO partners: a country from which Russian intelligence operates with impunity inside Schengen and which issues residents permits and passports to persons associated with those same intelligence services. The concern is multi-dimensional, given security and nuclear energy agreements with China and Iran.”
Alexander Faludy, Journalist
“The current government in Slovakia is Prime Minister Fico’s weakest and most rudderless government so far. While conditions for democratic political change are still prevailing, a future Slovak government will have to address the most daunting social and economic tasks since EU and NATO accessions in 2004.”
Vladimir Bilčík, Senior Fellow, GLOBSEC
“Czechia might look like the diligent pupil on democracy indices, but beneath the surface, there is growing political volatility and disillusionment. A return of Andrej Babiš would not just reshape domestic politics — it could steer Czechia towards a more transactional, inward-looking foreign policy, marked by greater readiness to play both sides.”
Dr. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, Associate Professor , Masaryk University, Brno
To read the full country analyses and explore key thematic takeaways from this expert discussion, you can download the full briefing here.
[1] Gabriel Gavin, Politico, ‘Hungary, Slovakia stall new Russia energy sanctions over gas ban proposal’, June 2025,https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-slovakia-block-new-russia-energy-sanctions-ukraine-war-invasion-eu-viktor-orban/; International Bar Association, ‘Rule of law: EU blocking €18bn funding to Hungary over legislation concerns’, June 2025, https://www.ibanet.org/Rule-of-law-EU-blocking-18bn-funding-to-Hungary-over-legislation-concerns?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[2] Jan Lopatka, Reuters, ‘PM Fico says neutrality would benefit NATO member Slovakia’, June 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/pm-fico-says-neutrality-would-benefit-nato-member-slovakia-2025-06-17/
[3] Jan Lopatka, Reuters, ‘Czech populist opposition leads as election set for October’, May 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/czech-populist-opposition-leads-election-set-october-2025-05-13/
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Authoritarian governments are racing to adopt artificial intelligence (AI). While they court international legitimacy by invoking “ethics,” “safety,” and “standards,” the real-world context is marked by systematic violations of human…
Article by Maria Guryeva
In 2023, Professor Martin Scott examined the early performance of the Media Freedom Coalition in an article for the Foreign Policy Centre, reflecting on whether the initiative had achieved the…
Article by Martin Scott
Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war’s impact on media and information integrity remains profound. In this anniversary reflection, Sergiy Tomilenko, President of the National Union of…
Article by Sergiy Tomilenko
The German right-wing populist party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) has been at the centre of countless controversies since its formation in 2013, not least regarding its foreign policy. From AfD…
Article by Rachel Herring
The capture of Nicolás Maduro by the US military has triggered an immediate and polarised international debate. Questions of sovereignty, legality, and precedent have rightly come to the fore, reviving…
Article by Foreign Policy Centre
In the immediate aftermath of Nicolás Maduro’s military extraction by the United States, protests erupted across major cities in Europe and the Americas calling for respect for Venezuela’s sovereignty. Venezuelans…
Article by Laura Vidal
For the past four years, only one global superpower has had the capacity and influence to stop the war in Ukraine: China. Yet it has chosen not to - why?…
Article by William Dixon and Maksym Beznosiuk
The 28th of October 2025, the Foreign Policy Centre and the SEPAD project at Lancaster University co-hosted a public webinar, bringing together leading experts to examine the evolving dynamics in…
Article by Foreign Policy Centre
On 11th November 2025, the Foreign Policy Centre convened a parliamentary roundtable on Georgia’s democratic crisis, examining the country’s rapid authoritarian backsliding, the resilience of civil society, and the scope…
Article by Foreign Policy Centre Download PDF
Taking over from three Global South presidencies of the G20, South Africa’s (SA) agenda in 2025 built on those of Brazil, India, and Indonesia, while emphasising African concerns as the…
Article by Elizabeth Sidiropoulos
From the discovery of penicillin to the development of one of the world’s first COVID-19 vaccines, the UK’s contribution to global health has long shaped its diplomatic reach and global…
Article by Molly Thompson
In their first year in power, the Labour Government made several big policy announcements related to national security, defence, and their vision for Britain’s place in the world. As the…
Article by Foreign Policy Centre
Every year, on 2nd November, the United Nations and its member states condemn attacks on journalists. In 2025, this “International Day to End Impunity for Crimes Against Journalists” is a…
Article by Martin Scott and Mel Bunce
COP30 - the 30th Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change - will take place in Belém, Brazil from 10th to 21st November 2025. The…
Article by Sophie Powell
Earlier this year the Soft Power Council (SPC) was formed to provide concrete and actionable advice and support in the development and delivery of a UK soft power strategy. Comprising…
Article by Patrick Stevens
A dozen years ago, in 2013, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on the safety of journalists which proclaimed 2 November as the International Day to End Impunity…
Article by Fiona O'Brien
On 4th October 2025, Georgia held local elections that will be remembered for many reasons, but not for the actual outcome. These elections broke new ground – only 41% of…
Article by Davit Jintcharadze
Summary Western sanctions against Russia, designed to isolate and weaken the Kremlin’s war economy, have instead generated a global “sanctions bubble”: an adaptive ecosystem of intermediaries, offshore jurisdictions, and political…
Article by Ilya Roubanis and Anonymous Co-author Download PDF
Alongside issues such as housing and health care, the key far-right theme of immigration continues to feature high on the political agenda ahead of the Dutch national election on 29th…
Article by Stijn van Kessel
On 9th September 2025, the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC), the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) and the University of Lancaster’s Sectarianism, Proxies and Desectarianisation project (SEPAD) co-hosted a…
Article by Foreign Policy Centre Download PDF
A recently published volume, The Policies and Power of Public Diplomacy – Wilton Park’s Road, based on reports of Wilton Park’s higher level international policy discussions since 1946, provides a…
Article by Nick Hopkinson
Transnational repression (TNR) is on the rise globally, fuelled by rapidly evolving technology, global democratic- backsliding and the rise of authoritarianism and years of neglect by previous governments. It is…
Article by Foreign Policy Centre
Bureaucracy still moves at the speed of fax, but exile communities are prototyping governance technologies at the speed of necessity. This opens new possibilities for host countries of those in…
Article by Ray Svitla
Displaced Ukrainians in the UK are highly educated, with strong professional backgrounds and well placed to contribute economically and socially. However, to do this, they need greater certainty about their…
Article by Nataliia Danova
As global power dynamics shift, Central Asia’s strategic relevance is rising, – but so too is the need for a reset in engagement by international partners. Could a more principled,…
Article by Ainur Kanafina
High unemployment and limited economic opportunities in Central Asian countries have traditionally driven millions of people to migrate to Russia in search of work[1]. Where the region’s historical, cultural and…
Article by Meder Dastanbekov
When speaking about Russian and Soviet colonialism, the first step is to agree on the terminology. Why do we continue to define the region by referencing that it ‘formerly’ belonged…
Article by Aigulle Sembaeva
All societies are diverse, even if some people have got used to thinking that their country should be homogeneous, where everyone looks the same, speaks the same language, and follows…
Article by Nino Gogoladze
Ukraine is not just a battlefield – it is democracy’s most critical frontline. It is misleading to treat war as a regional conflict – the spillover of Russian aggression beyond…
Article by Kateryna Musienko
We are living through the biggest shift in geopolitical power since the Second World War, accelerated by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, China’s economic ascendency, and the US retreat…
Article by Baroness Alison Suttie
As war, political instability, and democratic erosion continue to reshape Europe’s trajectory, experts recently gathered in Westminster to examine where Central Europe stands and where it may be heading.…
Article by Foreign Policy Centre Download PDF
A four-part briefing series from the FPC and SEPAD project.
Crisis or Opportunity for Europe and Central Asia?
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