This collection of essays has sought to provide a platform for a
range of different views about some of the most challenging debates in human
rights and peace building. It does not make any claim to be exhaustive or
definitive, indeed there are many important perspectives that will need to be
part of future work, but it does attempt to be a starting point for
conversations about the competing rights and responsibilities at play in this
challenging area. It also seeks to remind all parties to the conflicts and the
international community at large that all people have human rights irrespective
of where they live.
Neither the editors of this publication nor their
respective organisations, the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) and the Norwegian
Helsinki Committee (NHC), are endorsing any views on the intractable issues of
status set out by a number of the other essay contributors. However, it is
important that local voices are heard, while recognising and understanding that
their positions can be painful to hear for those from the states from whom they
are trying to formally separate and particularly for those from internally
displaced persons’ (IDP) communities whose lives have been changed irrevocably
by the conflicts that forced them to flee. Nevertheless, the issues around
status remain intractable at an intergovernmental level and the subject of much
substantive research by peacebuilders and academics that we do not attempt to
replicate here. It is with that in mind that the conclusions that we attempt to
draw here and the suggested recommendations for action look to proceed as much
as is possible, given the challenges of doing so, from a status-neutral
position.
At the heart of this debate is the question of whether and how the
international community should engage with the de facto authorities, local civil society and civil society.
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine in particular[1]
robustly defend against any initiatives that would be seen to lend credibility
to the de facto authorities or their
policies. As a result, engagement on these issues by international governments
and institutions from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) to the European Union (EU) is couched in terms of reiterating and
reinforcing the parent state’s position on territorial integrity. The de facto authorities in turn similarly
robustly defend their own claims to independence and regularly reject
initiatives and attempts at international monitoring that seek to assess the
situation in the breakaway regions formally as part of the international
community’s work in the parent state. For example, efforts by the United
Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and special rapporteurs to visit Abkhazia and
South Ossetia as part of their mandate investigating the situation in Georgia
have been rejected a number of times.
Recent efforts to change facts on the ground that only create further challenges
on the issue of status, such as the attempts at ‘borderisation’ through barbed
wire fences and other means, between both South Ossetia and Georgia and between
Abkhazia and Georgia, risk undermining the human rights of people living in or
near the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs). Such changes create specific
challenges for members of the two disputed territories’ Georgian communities
and those living in Georgian controlled territories. Stopping ordinary people
from physically crossing the ABLs or making it more difficult for them to
travel by preventing them from getting the relevant documents both impinges on
their human rights and undermines efforts at confidence building that would be
a necessary part of any path to conflict resolution. The Government of Georgia
may also want to consider however that particularly in Abkhazia the inability
of the de facto authorities to build
their own capacity, partially as a result of international pressure, has led to
an expansion in Russian control and influence beyond what would have been
desired by many in the local power elites.
In this essay collection a number of different authors make suggestions
for engagement to address both human rights challenges and to build local
capacity to address every day needs, some of which are more status neutral than
others. While these are all worth considering on their own merits the editors
wish to narrow the focus of our conclusions overall to three areas: engagement
with civil society such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), journalists,
lawyers and other non-state actors; access to international law; and the rights
of national minorities and IDPs.
Civil
Society
This collection has made clear that finding ways to engage with and
support local NGOs, journalists and lawyers to learn, strengthen and push back
against those that would curtail their activities are central to efforts to
improve human rights in unrecognised states. International NGOs and donors can
face a significant challenge in making contact with their counterparts in de facto states through a mixture of
bureaucratic hurdles, political pressure and legal restrictions or sanctions by
both status conscious ‘parent’ states and wary de facto authorities. Physically getting access to de facto states can be challenging,
particularly for those seeking to do so in a manner that doesn’t antagonise the
parent states (accessing the de facto states
from Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine rather than the quicker routes via Armenia
and Russia). Azerbaijan has been known to blacklist people that have visited
Nagorno-Karabakh via Armenia without permission and organisations that do not
follow the procedures set out by Georgia and Ukraine will face a significant
backlash that would create problems for their work in those countries. In his
essay Anton Nemlyuk specifically called on Ukraine to find ways to request
permission to access Crimea remotely and if possible find ways to allow permission
for access via Russia rather than Ukraine’s land border, while the NHC and
others have called for greater flexibility from all parties to facilitate
people-to-people contact both to allow status-neutral field research and to
work directly with local counterparts.
Access issues include attempts to restrict the international funding of
NGOs by the South Ossetian (and of course Russian) foreign agents laws,
Transnistrian legislation on reporting requirements and funding approval by the
Coordination Council of Technical Aid[2],
as well as other official and unofficial pressures from the parent state
against local NGOs collaborating with international groups. The precarious
legal and security situation facing the de
facto authorities, as well as Russian pressure in a number of cases, is a
key factor in the wariness towards international collaboration. However, given
that these de facto administrations
regularly call for international engagement, the EU and international governments
need to be proactive in defending the right of international civil society to
gain access. Efforts at improving access for human rights NGOs will of course
sit alongside similar efforts to defend Track-2 peacebuilding initiatives, with
efforts to improve human rights potentially creating more space for honest and
open dialogue on conflict issues.
A range of different types of civil society engagement that would be
beneficial have been suggested throughout this publication. These include
supporting independent reporting and newsgathering efforts to draw attention to
the activities of the de facto authorities,
improving awareness and accountability amongst the residents of the de facto states, within the public and
elites of their metropolitan state patrons, ‘parent’ states and to the
international community. There are also calls to back efforts that bring
together lawyers, journalists and NGOs to encourage collaboration. Such
collaboration is believed to be important in addressing human rights issues,
disseminating knowledge about human rights and building pressure on authorities
(de facto and de jure) to address issues. This work could be through joint
trainings, ad hoc collaboration or assisting with the development of more
structured, though still informal, associations to help build networks and
trust.
Donors, whether philanthropic or governmental, need to be clear that
though targeted funding at groups unlikely to receive local support can be
helpful, skill sharing and helping give a platform for local voices is also important.
This is because particularly in the cases of South Ossetia, Abkhazia,
Transnistria and to a lesser extent for Nagorno-Karabakh any financial or
economic incentives the international community might be able to bring to the
table will be dwarfed by the scale of financial transfers being provided by
Russia or to some extent by Armenia and its diaspora communities. As Thomas De
Waal points out, as part of a recent study of a number of unrecognised
entities, in Abkhazia ‘Moscow’s spending on pensions alone was more than ten
times the EU’s aid program in 2008–2016.’[3]
Efforts to directly improve the performance of the de facto human rights ombudspeople, while potentially beneficial,
would face significant hurdles for international governments or international
institutions. There may however be space to strengthen the capacity of local
NGOs and lawyers to improve their abilities to influence and where necessary
push back against de facto agencies
and bodies, empowering people and reducing the power imbalance between them and
the de facto institutions rather than
empowering the institutions themselves.
A number of contributors have argued in favour of finding ways to
improve the provision of public goods such as health care, education, social
services, youth provision, and housing to improve the wellbeing of local
people. However, if the de facto authorities
are the ones providing the service there is a significant challenge that
capacity building efforts even in these areas would be seen as enhancing their
capacity to govern and therefore not be status neutral. A possible alternative might
be to find ways to expand the capacity of local civil society to deliver such
services, so that in theory such provision could continue irrespective of who
controlled the area.
Accessing
international law
The second main dimension for protecting people’s rights is through
international law, and while international bodies may set challenges for the de facto authorities[4]
ultimately the rights and duties flow through and reinforce the importance of
the recognised states who are signatories to the relevant treaties. A number of
essays but particularly that by Ilya Nuzov show the importance of applying
international law, particularly the European Convention on Human Rights to
abuses committed in the breakaway entities. As set out above improving capacity
of local lawyers working on the ground in the de facto states and in the border and IDP communities impacted by
the conflicts, improving technical expertise and legal knowledge is a vital
first step. However, it is also essential to help support lawyers in the
metropolitan states (Georgia, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Moldova)
who are able to take cases of abuse and seek remedies through the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
Both improved legal documentation and other information gathering
efforts may open up opportunities for ‘Global Magnitsky’ type legislation in a
number of important international jurisdictions including the US, UK and the
Baltic states that could target the international assets of local human rights
abusers and their enablers in the governments of occupying powers. Similarly,
such documentation may help facilitate cases in third country courts operating
under universal jurisdiction to holder abusers to account. Donors need to
consider how they can best assist with supporting efforts to access the ECtHR,
courts of universal jurisdiction and to trigger international sanctions.
As the NHC have set out in their essay earlier in this publication both
the patron and the parent state as well as de
facto authorities have a responsibility to respect, protect and fulfil
human rights to the extent that they have effective control over a territory.
They should co-operate in facilitating access to international human rights
mechanisms and in the implementation of international decisions. While ‘parent
states’ can be challenged over ways in which they may be inflexible in their
approach, the ultimate responsibility for allowing access by international
human rights mechanisms lies with the de
facto authorities and their international patrons. Failure to provide
access to monitoring by UN, OSCE and Council of Europe human rights mechanisms
will continue to be seen as a sign of defensiveness about local standards,
undermining international perceptions of the
de facto authorities’ capacity to effectively provide governance to the
areas under their control.
Minorities
and IDPs
Protecting the
human rights of minority communities within the areas controlled by de facto authorities is not only one of
the most important areas for improving human rights standards in these areas
but will be an essential component for any future peace process or discussions
on status. Whether future paths on status lead towards reunification,
independence, annexation[5] or
perpetual limbo, the credibility of the de facto authorities and occupying powers will be judged by
the international community by how they treat minority groups who live in the
territories they control. In the case of Abkhazia, however one defines the
issue of status, the challenges facing members of the Georgian community
in the Gali region will continue to be particularly sensitive and practical
steps to improve the situation for the local population are urgently
needed.
The IDP
dimension has been less of a focus for this publication given other work in
this area but it remains no less important. There is more that the
international community can do to raise awareness of the continuing plight of
IDPs in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, particularly those whose future remains
uncertain. This can include more concerted efforts to improve financial and
technical support through the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and other mechanisms, and ensuring that issues around protecting the
property rights of IDPs pending any agreed peace settlement remain a core
dimension of any international dialogue with the de facto authorities.
Recommendations
To the de facto authorities and recognised
state governments
Abide by all relevant European and UN human
rights standards irrespective of status as a formal signatory to these
statutes;
Remove onerous official and unofficial
pressures on NGO activity including those on international funding;
Protect the rights and welfare of IDPs and
minority groups;
Facilitate access by UN, OSCE, Council of
Europe and other international human rights mechanisms irrespective of the
status under which they operate; and
Reduce bureaucratic hurdles for independent
human rights groups, NGOs, lawyers and activists to gain access to disputed territories
without fear for their future ability to work elsewhere in the region.
To the
International Community and Global Civil Society
Ensure that human rights issues are a central part of any dialogue with the de facto authorities and the state parties to the conflicts;
Support capacity-building and information sharing, both technically and financially, for civil society in unrecognised states;
Support independent reporting and newsgathering efforts about the activities of the de facto authorities;
Assist local lawyers to develop their capabilities within local de facto legal systems and to build partnerships with NGOs and journalists;
Work both locally and internationally to build cases that can be brought to international legal mechanisms such as the ECtHR and courts of universal jurisdiction;
Utilise sanctions, including Global Magnitsky type provisions, against both individuals and entities involved in carrying out or enabling human rights abuses in unrecognised territories;
Submit amicus curae communications to international enforcement mechanisms expressing the need for clearer delineation of obligations and responsibilities between de facto and de jure authorities; and
Improve support for IDP communities both in terms of living conditions and defending their rights.
Authors' bios:
Gunnar M. Ekeløve-Slydal is Deputy Secretary General, Norwegian Helsinki Committee, and a Lecturer at the University of South East Norway. He studied philosophy at the University of Oslo and worked for many years for the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights at the University of Oslo and as Editor of the Nordic Journal on Human Rights. He has written extensively on human rights, international institutions, and philosophical themes, including textbooks, reports, and articles.
Adam Hug became Director of the Foreign Policy Centre in November 2017. He had previously been the Policy Director at the Foreign Policy Centre from 2008-2017. His research focuses on human rights and governance issues particularly in the former Soviet Union. He also writes on UK foreign policy and EU issues.
Ana Pashalishvili is a lawyer with a broad spectrum of expertise in international law and human rights. She joined the NHC in April 2014 and since then has been actively working on topics related to human rights, international public and criminal law as well as data privacy, documentation and project management.
Inna Sangadzhieva is a Senior Advisor at the Norwegian Helsinki Committee (NHC). She is a linguist from the Kalmyk State University (Russia) and has MA at political science from the University of Oslo. Inna has been working at the NHC for 15 years, she is an author of several articles and reports, mostly regarding the political and human rights situation in Russia and the former Soviet Union.
Photo by Lene Wetteland, Norwegian Helsinki Committee
[1] The Moldova-Transnistria situation is somewhat more fluid
and flexible, albeit that status issues do still pose major challenges.
[4] For example as noted by Ilya Nusov ‘Resolution 2240 on access to ‘grey zones’ by CoE and UN human rights monitoring bodies, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (PACE) considers that: the exercise of de facto authority brings with it a duty to respect the rights of all inhabitants of the territory in question, as those rights would otherwise be respected by the authorities of the State of which the territory in question is a part; even illegitimate assumption of powers of the State must be accompanied by assumption of the corresponding responsibilities of the State towards its inhabitants.’ http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=25168&lang=en
[5] In the case of Crimea Russia has already taken this step
but at present it seems unlikely that the international community is willing to
acquiesce to Russian demands for recognition of its annexation in the near
future.
Brexit is an attempt to tackle
domestic problems by altering our relationship with our European neighbours. Some
feel that this is doomed to fail because our economy and security is so
integrated with our neighbours and we should therefore concentrate on avoiding
it or getting the least-worst option while tackling with renewed vigour the
discontents – about housing, unstable jobs and incomes, and rapid cultural
change which brought this populist wave. Others believe that through the
projection of a ‘Global Britain’ we can rebuild our prestige and renew our
international relationships. But what if the domestic discontents are part of
the unfolding of international developments?
After all, Britain is not the
only European country facing tough economic competition from the Far East; or
large-scale immigration; or the pressure on its youth from an apparently
ungovernable internet and social media. And if this is the case, what does it
mean for the way we conduct our foreign policy?
This essay aims to look at three things: the nature of the modern world, what we want to achieve in it and thirdly at the levers we can pull and the resources we can bring to bear to achieve our aims.
The Modern World
Interconnectedness beyond
national boundaries is not a new phenomenon. Once England was part of the Roman
Empire, then we were ruled from Scandinavia; even as the Kingdom united and
grew we were part of the Roman Catholic Church. Later we became a phenomenally
successful trading nation with an Empire which stretched across the globe
bringing cultural as well as financial exchange.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
proportion of our economy which is traded remained constant between 1900 and
2000. In 1900 exports constituted 24.9 per cent of the economy and in 2000 it
was back at 24.9 per cent. But the degree of interconnectedness today seems far
more immediate and intense – at the click of a button we can be in touch with
people thousands of miles away; huge movements of people flow – some motivated
by economic opportunities, others forced by war, desperation and climate
change.
We in the UK are fortunate for
the last 75 years to have lived in a largely peaceful and prosperous environment.
This is frequently attributed to the very successful institution-building in
the immediate aftermath of the Second World War (WWII), in which we played a
significant part: the United Nations (UN), the UN Declaration of Human Rights, North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the economic institutions – the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) (to which we had recourse ourselves in 1976), the World
Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT) which developed into the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) - and, of course, the European Union (EU).
One of the high points in this
period came on 9th November 1989. I can remember watching the TV
coverage of the crowds breaking the Berlin Wall and writing in my diary – “this
is the most important day of my life.” Those were heady days, to be young was very
heaven. It felt like the completion of the liberation of May 1945. The bipolar
world and the threat of nuclear war, which that had meant, was lifted. We were
certain we could be safer, and some of us on the Left looked forward
optimistically to the development of new economic models, negotiating a path
that would take seriously the Eastern European commitment to equality and the
West’s enterprise and openness. Russia was invited to the G7 meetings in London.
We discussed the possibility of using co-ops and the Yugoslav model.
However Yugoslavia was the first
country in the 1990s to collapse in a bloody and violent war; refugees from its
horrors began arriving in London and we were shaken from our optimism.
The political right claimed
victory – market liberalism was declared to be the both the cause and the
destination of this new world – the alpha and the omega – even in China Deng Xiaoping was following its tenets.
Again, of course, their confidence was overblown. The rise of religious
fundamentalism – of Islam as a political force in the Middle East and Christian
Evangelicals in the US – pushed back against the idea or possibility of one
totalising ideology.
The advent of climate change and the collapse of the markets in 2008 show
both that we have not achieved a secure and sustainable way of life and that
developments across the globe affect our day to day lives. Badly regulated US
mortgage markets means queues outside Northern Rock; the destruction of the
Amazon rainforest brings floods in Cumbria.
Following the Brexit vote, there has been a lot of soul searching about the
failures of domestic policy – why were those outside the major cities feeling
particularly disempowered? Why were some of those with the most to lose from
rupturing economic relationships with Europe amongst some of the most inclined
to vote Leave? But not so much attention has been paid to international policy.
The fact is that the world in 2019 is not as it was in 1945 – or indeed
1913 or 1989. Yes, we are not in a bipolar world, but nor are we in a world
which can be dominated by the Americans.
The biggest international story is the rise of China. Forty years ago, China was a struggling
middle-sized power with a poor, inefficient and stagnant economy. Since the
implementation of major economic reforms in 1979, it has experienced a staggering
economic transformation. According to the World Bank, China’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) growth has
averaged nearly 10 per cent a year—the fastest sustained expansion by a major
economy in history.[1] It is now the
world’s second largest economy as
measured by nominal GDP and has established itself as a geopolitical
superpower.
The other big story is the emergence of the other
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). First conceived of in
2001 by Goldman Sachs during an economic forecasting exercise, the BRICS
together contain three billion people – over one third of the world’s
population – and account for between 25-30 per cent of global GDP.[2] The grouping has evolved from a popular
concept to a formal grouping – holding their first summit in 2009 – and present
a direct challenge to the hegemony of the G7 nations.
Progress on human well-being paints a mixed
picture. On the one hand, we have seen a discernible improvement in people’s
lives over the past three decades. According to the UN Development Programme
(UNDP) data, between 1990 and 2017 nearly every country in the world (with a
few notable exceptions, such as Syria and Yemen) has seen a net increase in
their Human Development Index (HDI) scores and life expectancy.[3] World
Bank Data also indicates a continued (albeit slowing) decrease in poverty
levels, with the percentage of people living in extreme poverty globally falling to a
new low of 10 per cent in 2015.[4]
On the other hand, there is plenty to overshadow
this progress. According to the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, the number of people fleeing war, persecution
and conflict exceeded 70 million in 2018.[5] This
is the highest level that UNHCR has seen in its almost 70 years. There is also still
plenty to be done on human rights and democracy. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights turned 70 in 2018, yet in the past two years alone, we have seen nearly
700,000 Rohingya Muslims forced to flee state oppression in Myanmar, over one
million Uighur Muslims detained in re-education camps in Xinjiang and over 300
human rights defenders have been murdered.[6] According
to Freedom House, 37 per cent of the world’s population live in countries
categorised as ‘not free’, and out of a possible score of 100, two thirds of
countries scored less than 50 on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI).[7]
Britain may have thefifth largest economy today, but the inexorable rise of the emerging
economies with larger populations could see us drop down to 10th in
2050, behind Indonesia and Mexico.[8]
This is simply not under our control. This is not to say we cannot adopt both
domestic and foreign policy stances which are positive and constructive - we
can. But as the psychotherapists say: the art of growing up is coming to terms
with the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.
These big prospective changes also explain why countries beyond the victors of the Second World War are discontent with the governance arrangements of the existing institutions – why, for example, China set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to rival the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD- part of the World Bank Group) and why there are calls to expand the UN Security Council.
But it’s not just a question of whether the right people are sitting at the
table. An even bigger question is whether we have the right institutions
tackling the right problems.
The Bretton Woods institutions were far sighted and strong, but they were
established to tackle the world’s problems in 1945 and as we have seen, these
are changing. Let me give some examples: the internet; climate change; the
impact transnational corporations have on human rights; drugs; migration and the
rights of refugees.
We are often enjoined to defend
the rules-based international order and explain its benefits and virtues. This
is usually in response to a populist attack from President Donald Trump. President
Trump is particularly irritating, because he is good at identifying actual
weaknesses – Chinese theft of intellectual property or European countries’
failure to pay a fair share of NATO costs – which no one can deny, while at the
same time proposing solutions which are totally counterproductive: a trade war
or US disengagement from a shared defence alliance.
So it is true that the UN has
been much stronger than the League of Nations in providing a forum for
resolving disputes peacefully and that the WTO has, up until now, prevented the
‘beggar thy neighbour’ policies which dogged economies in the 1930s, but it’s
also true that big issues like how to govern the internet and tackle climate
change effectively have not been cracked. And that, especially post-2008, a
sense of insecurity has brought to the fore strong men – Trump, Putin and Ji
and right-wing populists – Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orban whose proposals are
to build up walls, whether physical, legal or metaphorical, against outsiders.
Brexit is our own special
national brand of populism. This then is the hostile environment in which we
are seeking to tackle our problems.
What do we want to achieve in our Foreign Policy?
Citizens regard the first duty of government as being to provide security and stability. This does not of course mean that foreign policy needs to be an exercise in crude nationalism such as ‘America First.’ There is a huge appetite for policies which bring security and stability but are also socially responsible.
Two points are worth making here. Firstly, security and social responsibility are not necessarily in conflict. We can afford to spend two per cent of our national income on defence and 0.7 per cent on overseas aid; we can share our intelligence resources with our NATO allies and run a BBC World Service which broadcasts truthful fact-based news into closed countries like North Korea. We can do both. Secondly – and it flows from this socially responsible policy framework – promoting development and tackling climate change effectively will increase our security, because they will increase the security of others and promote a shared worldview.
Emily Thornberry spoke at length
about this to the Institute for Government recently: “[We should] champion certain values as well as commercial interests”
and “by putting values back at the heart
of our diplomacy [we will] help to transform what Britain is seen to stand for
as a country.”
And Jeremy Corbyn has said “Labour
will speak for democratic values and human rights” and “will be driven
by progressive values and international solidarity”[9]
Whatever the rights or wrongs of
the misadventure of Iraq – it clearly did not make the British people more
secure.
So we want to pursue security,
stability and social responsibility.
The prime security alliance the
UK enjoys is through NATO – itself based on shared interests and values.
Key to this for us has been the
US-UK ‘special relationship’, and this has been put under considerable pressure
lately. Firstly by revulsion among the public at the aftermath of the Iraq War;
then by the election of Trump who seems to embody most of what the British Left
dislikes about the US and little of what it does like, and finally by Brexit –
which potentially means that when the US want to contact Europe the first phone
they ring is no longer going to be the one in King Charles Street.
What this tells us is not that we
no longer share objective interests with the US or that our strong cultural and
historic ties are worthless – but that, perhaps like a marriage that’s gone
through a bad patch, the relationship needs a bit of work. It’s not going to be
what it was, so we need to find a new balance. An interesting study recently
published by the UN Association[10]
looking at international perceptions of the UK found that a relationship in which
the two countries are seen as too close reduces our prestige. If we
merely follow the US – there’s no point in anyone asking for our help in
influencing them.
Labour is committed to NATO
membership and the two per cent and this essay is not about defence policy but
refashioning the relationship so it is positive without being subservient on
trade (chlorinated chicken) or culture (our children shouldn’t be exposed to
bad cartoons. Britain has much higher standards for children’s television than
the US, with less violence and more rounded and diverse characters. The US film
moguls would like to swamp our TV stations). This is not about Brexit, but it
is worth noting that the current government as part of its Brexit preparations
has increased the number of diplomatic positions in European countries by 50.
This of course is part of a more
general re-focussing which will be required if we leave the EU. An assessment
and review of the impact and significance of the change means working that bit
harder to be heard elsewhere.
Individual bilateral
relationships matter. But I hope just two examples will illustrate that alone
they cannot deliver our aims.
China is a global power and as we have noted it is growing rapidly. But the truth is we are conflicted. We want and need the trading opportunities offered, this will help our economic stability, but this is tempered by our concerns over Chinese political culture and human rights record. We look for opportunities to co-operate – like climate change - but sometimes the conflicts become sharp - as when we look at developments in Hong Kong or investment from Huawei. These bring into relief, as it were, the dilemma. Could we hope to persuade the Chinese that if they are to move from global power to global leadership, they need to adopt more liberal global norms?
Simply to pose the questions is
to invite a negative answer. Britain is no longer big enough to effect major
change through a series of bilateral relationships. This may even be true with
small and middle-sized countries like say Vietnam. Relatively speaking, we may
have more leverage, but they too are tied in to regional organisations and
power structures – Associate of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China in the case of Vietnam.
In other words, given the UK’s
place in the world the way to make Britain safer and more stable is to
contribute to the development of a safer and more secure international
environment through the introduction of new norms, better international legal
frameworks and institutions which do tackle at source underlying causes of
power imbalances.
Furthermore, this is not just a question of relations between nation states: it is also about preventing a big beast jungle where private actors – banks, new technology firms, extractive industries – ride roughshod over countries and their citizens.
It is important to have a
positive and proactive stance in order to avoid foreign policy descending into
endlessly reactive crisis management.
What are the levers we can pull and the resources we can bring to bear
to achieve our aims?
The UK has significant resources
- it is the fifth largest economy in the world. Our ranking is projected to fall to 10th in 2050, but
we’ll still be a wealthy country in the top quartile.
We have considerable military strength. The UK has the largest military budget in the EU, has a navy bigger than the French, Italian and German Navies combined – and possesses the fifth largest military stockpile of nuclear warheads.[11] There is an argument to be had about whether we devote too much or too little resource to our military and what the balance should be between conventional, nuclear and cyber resources. For the purposes of this analysis I am going to assume a steady state.
Our soft power is remarkable, and our history has given us positional power in key institutions: permanent member of the UN Security Council; executive directorships in the IMF and IBRD; a key role for the Governor of the Bank of England in the Bank for International Settlements.
We
also have strong alliances through NATO and the Anglosphere. The Joint
Intelligence Committee (on which I served in humble capacity as a junior civil
servant during the 1983 Iran-Iraq War) still relies on shared intelligence with
the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the UK.
Perhaps
the most important is the English language – spoken by approximately 20 per cent of the world’s population.[12] World class universities such as Oxford,
Cambridge and the London universities attract students from across the world.
The UK has renowned cultural resources and media influence through the BBC
World Service.
Under
Labour, some sources of soft power were enhanced significantly and consequently
we are well respected for our overseas aid programme, our debt forgiveness
initiative and climate change leadership. We have a large and highly regarded
diplomatic service, the power of connectivity and the network of Commonwealth
nations.
But our history is also a liability. Almost every former colony has resentments as well as warm memories. The tension between this chequered colonial past and how we move beyond it is played out in unusual context: the Commonwealth.
For some, the Commonwealth will
never be able to shake off its colonial roots and is therefore dismissed as a
relic that is not fit for modern times. Others see such criticism as unfair and
argue that the Commonwealth is a very different institution to what it was in
the 1970s. The Commonwealth gives us an opportunity to express what Lord
Rickets called “convening power”[13].
The Commonwealth consists of 53 countries and contains 2.4 billion people[14] –
one third of the earth’s population – of which more than 60 per cent are under
the age of 29. As of 2017, the combined GDP of the Commonwealth was US$10.4
trillion and bilateral intra-Commonwealth trading costs are on average 19 per cent
less than those between non-member countries.[15]
The Commonwealth boasts five G20 economies (Australia, Canada, India, South
Africa and the UK) and four out of five of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance
are Commonwealth Members (Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the UK). And of
course, members of the Commonwealth club also populate the other major
international institutions, such as the UN General Assembly.
The Commonwealth Charter lists
human rights, international peace and security, democracy, sustainable
development and gender equality as among its core values. While it certainly
has its limitations and baggage, if approached as an equal and voluntary
association of states rather than a post-colonial toy, the Commonwealth’s vast
network and sheer size can act an important network within which we can build
progressive alliances and networks.
Conclusion
In this environment, the idea of
Global Britain – a Britain reaching out across the world to influence events
seems to be a throwback to the 1950s – an idea constructed on the fantasy of
England as a seafaring nation almost entirely for the backward-looking domestic
audience whose support the Government fears losing to Nigel Farage.
Instead I think we should start a
grown-up discussion about the modernisation of international institutions to
tackle 21st Century problems. These are inherently shared and they
are not amenable to national solutions. The current framework is biased towards
protecting free trade and financial investments at the expense of people and
the environment.
These are the items I would put
at the top of the agenda:
Strengthening the legal obligations on nation
states to meet the Climate Change objective of temperature rise limited to two
degrees Celsius and – critically – making trade obligations in the WTO
subservient to this, rather than as at present having a ‘trade override’.
Introducing a clear international legal
framework for internet governance. Currently the free for all resembles the 16th
Century law of the sea as pirates abound – there are no shared controls on
terrorism, child protection, IP or tax and as more and more economic activity
moves to the web more and more human activity takes place in an anarchic value
free vacuum.
Tackling financial crime; money laundering; tax
evasion; bribery and corruption needs more than the current voluntary approach
as exemplified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
codes
Strengthening the enforcement mechanisms of the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) and Human Rights Council and introducing new norms
for the protection of migrants.
Introducing a UN Binding Treaty of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations. This would go further than Prime Minister May’s
– very welcome – initiative on modern slavery and protect the rights of
indigenous people whose land is stolen and exploited, with recourse to an
international tribunal. This could also provide for environmental protection.
Building international institutions takes time and it is a shared enterprise. But we should be inspired by the example of those who went to Bretton Woods in 1944 before WWII was over. It is never too soon to begin. Let us not leave it until it’s too late.
The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or position of the Foreign Policy Centre. The essay was developed from a speech given at the In Defence of Multilateralism event with Helen Goodman MP, Lord Ricketts, Dr Marina Prentoulis and Steve Bloomfield. This was part of an occasional series exploring Britain’s role in the world and follows on from the Global Britain: Myths, Reality and Post-Brexit Foreign Policy event with Rt Hon John Whittingdale MP, Dr Judi Atkins, Dr Andrew Glencross and Henry Mance earlier this year.
Photo by Rob, published under Creative Commons with changes made.
The seizure of U.K. flagged tanker Stena Imperio by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Strait of Hormuz in apparent retaliation for Gibraltar’s detention of Grace 1 has unsurprisingly given rise to considerable press reaction. A recurrent theme in news reports is whether the action taken by Gibraltar was legal. Some press reports suggest that the Governments of Gibraltar and the UK were lured into action by the US and have been co-opted into supporting President Trump’s desire to put further pressure on Iran’s economy by squeezing Iranian oil exports. While it may be the case that the US provided the intelligence about the movements and cargo of Grace 1, the Government of Gibraltar was quick to state that there had been “no political request at any time from any Government” to act and that the detention was made “as a direct result only of the Government having reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was acting in breach of established EU sanctions against Syria”.[1]
So was the detention of Grace 1 legal?
There has been a suggestion that the detention was not legal because the vessel was not owned or controlled by EU persons and because the EU doesn’t impose its sanctions on others outside the Union. However, a closer look at the legislation involved shows that there was a legal basis for the detention and that the origins of that legislation were put in place as early as March this year.
First, in March 2019 Gibraltar enacted the Sanctions Act 2019. That Act provides at Article 6(1) for the automatic recognition and enforcement of ‘international sanctions’. ‘International sanctions’ is defined to include, amongst others, UN sanctions; EU sanctions; and, various restrictive measures imposed by UK.[2] It was intended, according to a newsletter published by The National Coordinator for Anti-Money Laundering and the Combatting of Terrorist Financing of the Government of Gibraltar in April 2019, to ensure that any restrictive measures imposed by both the EU and UK will have effect without the need for further implementing legislation and specifically refers to restrictive measures that may be imposed by the UK under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 .[3]
Subsequently on the 3rd July Gibraltar published the Sanctions Regulations 2019 which specifically give power to the Chief Minister, under Article 5(3) (a), to designate a ship as a ‘Specified Ship’ and to then detain it where the Chief Minister ‘has reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship he has designated in the Notice as a Specified Ship is, has been, or is likely to be, involved in a breach of the EU Regulation…..’.[4] The EU Regulation in question is defined to be EU Regulation No. 36 of 2012 as amended (the ‘EU Syrian sanctions’) which sets out the EU’s restrictive measures against Syria.[5]
Pursuant to EU Syrian Sanctions a number of Syrian persons and entities were listed as designated including, Baniyas Refinery in Syria which was listed in 2014. The intelligence provided to the Government of Gibraltar indicated that Grace 1 was heading to Baniyas Refinery with a full cargo of oil.
The next question that arises is on what basis it can be said that the EU sanctions would have been breached where there was no obvious EU connection in terms of the vessel’s owners or flag state? The answer to that can be found in the EU Syrian sanctions which, like most EU restrictive measures, sets out their scope.
(a) within the territory of the Union, including its airspace; (b) on board any aircraft or vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State; (c) to any natural person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State; (d) to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State; (e) to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union.
While the precise background to the detention has not been explained by the Government of Gibraltar, subsection (e) is very broad. It applies to ‘any person, entity or body’. There is no requirement here that it must be an EU person or entity. It applies ‘in respect of any business’, again this is very wide – shipment of goods is no doubt a type of business that is covered. Finally, it applies where that business is ‘done in whole or in part within the Union’ and as such, a shipment carrying goods to a designated entity would only have to pass through EU waters to be caught. Against this background, Grace 1 loaded with cargo on her way to a designated refinery in Syria would fall within EU sanctions jurisdiction once she entered EU waters.
Under the Sanctions Regulations 2019 a Specified Ship ‘must be detained if it is in BGTW (British Gibralter Territorial Waters);’ and ‘may not leave BGTW unless permitted to do so by an order of the court or where the notice designating the ship as a Specified Ship has been revoked’. It would therefore appear that there was a legal basis for the detention and the Sanctions Regulations 2019 specifically give the Government of Gibraltar power to detain vessels suspected of being involved, or likely to be involved, in breaching the EU Syrian sanctions.
The power to detain vessels given by the Gibraltarian regulations are in contrast to the usual penalties applicable for a breach of EU sanctions. Pursuant to the EU Syrian sanctions, each Member State is required to lay down the penalties that are applicable for breach of the restrictive measures which must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”. The penalties vary from Member State to Member State. In the UK, there is a civil penalty regime administered by the UK Treasury’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) that gives a scale of penalties of up to £1 million or 50% of the breach, whichever is higher and/or there can be criminal fines or imprisonment. There is currently no power under the UK’s (or other Member States’) Syrian sanctions implementing legislation to detain vessels, however, the UK’s Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act which was passed in May 2018 gave the UK Government power to make sanctions regulations including shipping sanctions.[7] Pursuant to that Act, the UK’s Syrian (Sanctions)(EU Exit) Regulations 2019 were laid before Parliament on 5 April which will take effect after the UK leaves the EU will give power to maritime enforcement officers in certain circumstances to stop and board a ship if the officer has ‘reasonable grounds to suspect that a relevant ship is carrying prohibited goods or relevant goods’.[8]
The crew of Stena Imperio and their families will take little comfort from the fact that there appears to have been a legal basis for the detention of Grace 1. They and many others will no doubt continue to question the political decision-making that lead to the detention given the inherent risk it posed to UK shipping.
Michelle Linderman is a partner at Crowell & Moring’s International Trade Group, in the firm’s London office. An English qualified solicitor with over 20 years of experience, Michelle advises clients – such as international businesses, traders, ship owners, charterers, insurers, financial institutions, and energy companies – on U.K.-specific and cross-border sanctions, including matters that concern national and international trade and financial sanctions. Before joining Crowell & Moring, Michelle was a partner and the Global Head of Sanctions at Ince & Co’s London office. She was seconded to Ince & Co's Hong Kong office from 2001 to 2004.
[post_title] => Seizure of Stena Imperio by Iran raises questions about legality of Gibraltar’s detention of Grace 1
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On June 5th 2019 in Turkmenistan’s capital
Ashgabat, dozens of people lined up outside a state store where they heard
there was sugar for sale.[1]
Four years ago, there were no lines outside state stores. Now there are lines
for almost everything, and it is worse outside the capital.
The folly of depending on exports of natural
gas for revenues is evident now in Turkmenistan, though it has not stopped the
government from its profligate spending on projects that seem to be of little,
if any, value to the people of the country. The people of Turkmenistan
increasingly bear the burden of trying to keep the regime of President
Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov financially afloat, awhile they live through the
worst period in Turkmenistan’s nearly 28 years as an independent country.
Alongside the decreases in the standards of living, Turkmenistan’s people face
increases in restrictions.
The price of natural gas in 2014 averaged about
US $350 per 1,000 cubic metres. By 2016, the price was closer to US $200. Turkmenistan’s
system is opaque and such figures, which the state provides, are often suspect.
It is believed between 70 and 80 per cent of Turkmenistan’s revenue comes from
the sale of natural gas. Turkmenistan lost Russia as a customer at the start of
2016, and Iran as a customer at the start of 2017, leaving China as the only
country currently purchasing any large volumes of Turkmen gas.
Toward the end of 2016, information started
leaking out of Turkmenistan, suggesting shortages of basic food items in some
areas of the country. In September 2016, in the northern Dashoguz Province
there was a shortage of flour. Of nine districts in the province, only one (Gorogly
district) had flour and that was at the flour mill.[2]
More than one million people live in Dashoguz Province, some residing 200
kilometres from the Gorogly district. One Dashoguz resident said the line
outside the flour plant was “so long it can take three to five days. People
sleep in front of the mill“.[3]
There was a limit of one 50-kilogram sack of flour per family, but the price at
the mill was about 50 manat (a bit more than US $14) while the other option,
flour from neighbouring Kazakhstan, cost 190 manat (more than US $50). By
December, there were reports many state stores in Dashoguz were short of sugar
and cooking oil. People wishing to purchase such items often had to put their
names on waiting lists, and the wait could be as long as four to five weeks.[4]
In December 2017, high quality flour had
practically disappeared from many parts of Turkmenistan. In Ashgabat, and in
the Mary and Lebap provinces, the price had reportedly risen from 50 manat per
sack of flour to 100 manat.[5]
In February 2018, people seeking to purchase bread in Dashoguz were reportedly
required to prove they had paid their gas and electric bills.[6]
By the end of that month flour was being rationed to one five-kilogram sack per
customer in Dashoguz. In Mary Province flour was limited to one sack (still 50
kilograms) per family and it had to be pre-ordered.[7]
Even in Ashgabat, there was a limit of one one-kilogram bag of flour and a half
kilogram of sugar per customer. It had previously been five kilograms of flour
and one kilogram of sugar per customer.[8]
In November 2018, the Hronika Turkmenistana website posted a video, said to be
filmed in Ashgabat, showing people waiting for a bread truck to arrive at the
local state store and being limited to no more than two loaves of bread (the
flat bread that Turkmen call ‘chorek’).[9]
Despite a report from a television channel in Kazakhstan that said Turkmenistan
had imported some 100,000 tons of grain from Kazakhstan.[10]
Goods such as sugar, flour, and cooking oil are
available at private stores and at bazaars, but the price can be anywhere from
three to 10 times what it would be at a state store, so many people chose to
wait. There were reports in October
2018 that people from the regions were coming to Ashgabat hoping to buy bread,
flour, and cooking oil and that police were stopping and inspecting cars with
license plates from the regions looking for food. Those caught taking food out
of Ashgabat were fined.[11] It became
increasingly difficult to enter Ashgabat. By February 2019, vehicles from the
regions were forced to halt anywhere from five to 25 kilometres outside
Ashgabat’s city limits.[12]
Money, actual cash, is in short supply in
Turkmenistan. The government attempted to make Turkmenistan a cashless country
by issuing bank cards to citizens and directly depositing salaries, pensions,
and other social benefit payments into bank accounts. But many stores still do
not have the necessary machines to accept card payments. Bazaars certainly are
not set up for accepting bank cards. So, people take money out of automated
teller machines (ATMs). These ATMs are not regularly stocked with cash,
especially in the regions. When an ATM is replenished, word quickly spreads and
lines form, everybody hoping the machine will still have cash when their turn
comes to make a withdrawal. Security forces and police often watch lines
outsides banks now since scuffles have broken out in lines and, on occasions,
people have complained loudly about the government and the president.[13]
Even when there is money, there are limits as to the amount of cash that can be
withdrawn. Exchange bureaus in Turkmenistan stopped selling hard foreign
currency in January 2016.[14]
The rate of the manat on the black market at that time was between 4 to 4.2
manat to US $1. The official rate was and remains 3.5 manat to U.S. $1, but as
of the start of June 2019, the black market rate is between 18.5 to 19 manat to
US $1.
Unemployment is high. Turkmen authorities have
never released figures for unemployment, but it is estimated 60 to 70 per cent
of the eligible workforce is unemployed or underemployed. The last four years
have seen layoffs in almost every sector of the country, from state employees
to workers in the key gas and oil industry.
Turkmen authorities have gradually tightened
restrictions for those wishing to fly out of Turkmenistan. In April 2018, there
were reports authorities at the Ashgabat airport, the only airport in
Turkmenistan with international flights, were preventing people under 30 years
of age from boarding international flights.[15]
By late June 2018, the age restriction had reportedly increased to people under
40.[16]
Women’s rights have diminished since 2016. In
October 2016, women were forbidden from buying cigarettes. This restriction was
eased into force in Turkmenbashi City so only women with notes from doctors
saying they were addicted to tobacco could purchase cigarettes.[17]
In May 2018, a dress code was introduced for non-Turkmen women in Ashgabat,
obligating them to wear traditional long Turkmen dresses. Later a ban on miniskirts
was introduced.[18] In February 2019, there were reports police in
Ashgabat were confiscating drivers’ licenses from women.[19] And in June 2019, there was a report authorities
were refusing to renew the expired drivers’ licenses of women.[20]
Students studying abroad are required to return
to Turkmenistan during school breaks. Also, when they are studying abroad
students from Turkmenistan have limited access to funding from home. In July
2017, parents back in Turkmenistan were limited to sending only 1,050 manat (US
$300 at the official rate) per month through Western Union.[21]
Some Turkmen students in Belarus, Russia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan
were forced to withdraw from universities because they did not receive money in
time to pay tuition.[22]
Allotments of water, gas, and electricity that
the government has provided for free to the population since shortly after
independence, were reduced starting in 2017, then totally canceled at the start
of 2019. Residents were expected to pay for the installation of metres to
measure their household usage of gas and water. The cost of sending children to
kindergarten has also increased. In October 2017, the cost of kindergarten in
Dashoguz increased from eight to 80 manat per month, with increases across
Turkmenistan.[23] A
group of outraged mothers went to the city administration building to complain,
an act that just a few years ago would have been unthinkable. The special
police unit OMON was called to the scene. The deputy head of municipal
education came out and told the women he could not do anything for them, and
recommended they take their concerns to the mayor’s office, which they did.
Later the same day, the deputy education head was arrested and charged with
calling for an overthrow of the government.[24]
To listen to Berdimuhamedov and state media,
one would get the impression Turkmenistan was a paradise, the envy of countries
around the world. Despite a deepening economic crisis with the accompanying
shortages affecting the country’s people so much, Turkmen authorities continued
spending money on projects of questionable benefit.
In December 2010, Turkmenistan was chosen to
host the 2017 Asian Indoor Martial Arts Games (AIMAG). When Turkmenistan was
selected as the AIMAG host, the country was exporting gas to Russia, Iran, and
had just completed two (of four planned) gas pipelines to China. Gas prices
were rising on global markets. By 2015, gas was half the 2010 price.
Authorities had approved construction of a US $2.3 billion airport outside
Ashgabat for AIMAG. The cost of construction for the AIMAG facilities,
including a circular five-kilometre monorail system, was estimated at more than
US $5 billion. As gas revenues fell, the government started garnishing workers’
wages as ‘voluntary donations’ for AIMAG.[25]
Non-residents of Ashgabat, many of whom had been there to help build the AIMAG
facilities, were chased from Ashgabat before the games opened on September 17th,
2017. Thousands of citizens were organised as volunteers to help with AIMAG or
as spectators to keep event halls full so that media coverage, especially
foreign media, showed images of packed stadiums and indoor gyms.
20 days after AIMAG ended, Turkmenistan’s first
golf course opened in Ashgabat, despite the fact few in Turkmenistan know
anything about the game, and Turkmenistan is nearly 90 per cent covered by
desert, so water is scarce. In May 2018, the Caspian port in Turkmenbashi City
reopened after US $1.5 billion in renovation and modernization work. In July
2018, Turkmen authorities announced the completion of a 170-hectare artificial
island in the shape of a crescent off Turkmenistan’s Caspian coast.[26]
When state media is not boasting about these
achievements, it often covers President Berdimuhamedov’s exploits. Berdimuhamedov
claims to have authored more than 40 books on topics ranging from tea to the
native Akhal Teke horse, as well as books such as ‘Arkadag’s Doctrine. The
basis for health and inspiration.’ State television shows Berdimuhamedov riding
bicycles, horses, lifting weights, playing guitar or piano, singing songs,
etc., sometimes with his grandsons. Among state television’s recent favourites
are clips showing the president twisting and turning expensive automobiles
around racetracks and in the desert, or dressing in military fatigues to
participate in military drills, and sometimes demonstrating how to fire weapons
and throw knives.[27]
Small wonder some of Turkmenistan’s citizens
have chosen to leave the country. According to a recent report, some 1.9
million people, more than one-third of Turkmenistan’s population, might have
already left in the last decade.[28]
It is difficult to know if this is true. Turkmenistan never released the
results of its last census in 2009. But it is known that many thousands of
Turkmenistan’s citizens have left for Turkey, Cyprus, Russia, and other
countries looking for work and they have not returned to Turkmenistan.
[1] Radio Azatlyk, В
Ашхабаде продолжается дефицит продуктов, сохраняются очереди за сахаром (The
deficit of products continues in Ashgabat, the lines for sugar are still
there), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 2019, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/29982598.html
[5] Radio Azatlyk, В
Туркменистане наблюдается дефицит муки (Turkmenistan is witnessing a flour
shortage), RFE/RL, December 2017, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/28894201.html
[6] Radio Azatlyk, В
Туркменистане для покупки муки требуют справку об отсутствии задолжности за газ
и электричество (To purchase bread in Turkmenistan one must bring a form
showing they have no debts for gas and electricity), RFE/RL, February 2018, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/29043406.html
[7] Radio Azatlyk, В
Дашогузе на одного взрослого члена семьи можно купить 5 килограмм муки, а в
Мары нужно отстоять долгую очередь (In Dashoguz one adult family member can
purchase 5 kilogram of flour, and in Mary one must wait in long lines), RFE/RL,
February 2018, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/29063701.html
[8] Туркменистан:
Продовольственный кризис добрался до столицы (Food crisis reaches the
capital), Turkmen.news (formerly the Alternative News of Turkmenistan), March
2018, https://habartm.org/archives/8729
[9] В Ашхабаде по-прежнему
наблюдаются очереди за хлебом (As previously, there are queues in Ashgabat
for bread), Hronika Turkmenistana, November 2018,
https://www.hronikatm.com/2018/11/v-ashhabade-po-prezhnemu-nablyudayutsya-ocheredi-za-hlebom/
[10] Казахстан отправил на
экспорт более 5 млн тонн зерна (Kazakhstan exported more than 5 million tonnes
of grain), Khabar 24 TV, September 2018,
https://24.kz/ru/news/economyc/item/264623-kazakhstan-otpravil-na-eksport-bolee-5-mln-tonn-zerna
[11] Полицейские штрафуют
водителей за вывоз продуктов из Ашхабада в регионы (Police are fining drivers
for taking food from Ashgabat to the regions), Hronika Turkmenistana, October
2018,
https://www.hronikatm.com/2018/10/politseyskie-shtrafuyut-voditeley-za-vyivoz-produktov-iz-ashhabada-v-regionyi/
[12] В Ашхабад по-прежнему
не пропускают машины из регионов (They are still not allowing vehicles from
regions into Ashgabat), Hronika Turkmenistana, February 2019,
https://www.hronikatm.com/2019/02/ashhabad-po-prezhnemu-zakryt-dlya-inogorodnego-transporta/
[14] Olzhas Auyezov,
Turkmenistan exchange bureaus stop selling foreign currency, Reuters, January
2016,
https://www.reuters.com/article/turkmenistan-forex/turkmenistan-exchange-bureaus-stop-selling-foreign-currency-idUSL8N14W2XY20160112
[15] В Туркменистане с международных
рейсов снимают молодых людей (Young people are being taken off international
flights in Turkmenistan), Hronika Turkmenistana, April 2018,
https://www.hronikatm.com/2018/04/v-turkmenistane-s-mezhdunarodnyih-reysov-snimayut-molodyih-lyudey/
[16] Radio Azatlyk, Из
Туркменистана не выпускают граждан моложе 40 лет (They are not allowing people
under 40 to leave Turkmenistan), RFE/RL, June 2018, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/29323179.html
[17] Туркменбаши: Женщинам
продают сигареты по справке из наркологии (Turkmenbashi: Cigarettes are sold to
women if they have a note from narcology), Alternative News of Turkmenistan, January
2017, https://habartm.org/archives/6282
[18] Radio Azatlyk, В Ашхабаде от женщин не туркменской национальности
требуют носить длинные платья. (In Ashgabat women who are not of Turkmen nationality are required to
wear long dresses), RFE/RL, May 2018, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/29261043.html
[19] Radio Azatlyk,
Ашхабадская полиция отбирает водительские права у женщин (Ashgabat police
confiscating drivers’ licenses from women), RFE/RL, February 2019,
https://rus.azathabar.com/a/29776458.html
[20] Radio Azatlyk, В
Туркменистане женщинам не продлевают водительские удостоверения (They are not
prolonging drivers’ licenses for women), RFE/RL, June 2019,
https://rus.azathabar.com/a/29978517.html
[22] Azatlyk, Родители студентов, отчисленных из-за неуплаты по вине туркменских банков, не могут вернуть свои деньги (Parents of students who were expelled for not paying tuition because of Turkmen banks cannot get their money back), RFE/RL, July 2018, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/29360779.html
[23] Radio Azatlyk, В Дашогузе 10-кратное увеличение оплаты детсада
вызвало стихийную акцию протеста. (A 10-time increase in the cost for kindergarten sparks spontaneous
action), RFE/RL, October 2017, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/28791955.html
[24] Radio Azatlyk, После
протеста против повышения оплаты детского сада чиновника в Дашогузе обвиняют в
«призыве к восстанию против власти» (After the protest against the increase in
fees for kindergarten, an official is charged with “calling for the overthrow
of the government”), RFE/RL, October 2017,
https://rus.azathabar.com/a/28802325.html
[25] Qishloq Ovozi, Milking
Turkmenistan's People To Pay For The Games, RFE/RL, March 2017,
https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-milking-turkmen-people-pay-for-games/28403657.html
[26] Turkmenistan creates
artificial island near Caspian coast, Trend, July 2018, https://www.azernews.az/region/134953.html
[27] Президент Туркменистана
принял участие в военных учениях (The president of Turkmenistan took part in
military exercises), Hronika Turkmenistana, August 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OtLxYyf8K8I
[28] Radio Azatlyk,
Источник: За 10 лет из Туркменистана выехало почти 1,9 миллиона человек
(Source: During the last 10 years almost 1.9 million people have left
Turkmenistan), RFE/RL, May 2019, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/29969698.html
Turkmenistan is a complex and opaque destination for investment. The
business climate is characterised by structural economic problems and general
economic mismanagement, with the prioritisation of vanity projects over core
investment and a near-total absence of checks and balances on presidential
decision-making. This facilitates endemic corruption and the influence of opaque
but powerful vested interests over all aspects of the economy and business
environment.
All
talk
Turkmenistan’s economy has undergone few structural reforms since
independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. It retains key hallmarks
of the post-Soviet economy, remaining overwhelmingly dependent on the oil and
gas sector for growth. The Turkmenistan authorities regularly express their
desire to drive economic growth and diversification through foreign investment.
Since the economic slowdown began in late 2014, President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov
has courted multiple countries, especially a number of Middle East and Gulf
states, with offers of economic co-operation.
However, such statements can mostly and fairly be assessed as hollow
platitudes. The vast majority of the economy remains firmly in the hands of
either the state, or those of opaque companies that are largely understood to
trace their beneficial ownership back to prominent politically connected
figures. While there is almost never a paper trail to confirm such links,
investigative journalists, and due diligence enquiries into Turkmenistani
entities, routinely find indications among human sources close to the relevant
sectors of companies’ beneficial ownership tracing back to prominent
individuals, often in the president’s family.[1]
There is a distinct lack of will at the highest political level to facilitate
foreign investment in an indiscriminate manner, given the competition that this
is perceived to pose to the carefully controlled division of state assets and
economic sectors among a select few people close to the political centre.
This aversion to opening up the economy is evidenced by the fact that
the period since the downturn that began in late 2014 has been accompanied by no
improvement in the multitude of informal barriers to existing and new
investment activity. The major structural impediments to a transparent, fair
and competitive business environment remain firmly in place.
Protectionist
instincts
There are relatively few formal barriers to foreign investment
activity. However, those that exist markedly affect the country’s most
prominent and attractive sector for overseas investment activity, oil and gas.
Turkmenistan’s long-standing policy of granting only service contracts to
foreign companies for major onshore gas projects is the main example of this
approach. More commercially attractive production-sharing agreements (PSAs) are
almost always granted only for offshore field development. The only company to
have secured an onshore PSA for a major gas field (in 2007) is the state-owned
Chinese company China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). Two European
companies have PSAs for onshore oil fields, but these are minor reserves in the
country’s west and represent an anomaly in the broader policy of not granting
such contracts.
The authorities have made no move whatsoever towards relaxing these
restrictions in the past few years, despite the fact that it is probably the
most obvious way to drive fresh investment and counter the lost revenue from
the economic slowdown and loss of key gas export contracts (with the loss of
Russia and Iran as customers) since 2015. Instead, the authorities when facing
increasing pressure on budget revenues and macro-economic stability show a
tendency towards reinforcing protectionist instincts.
Vested
interests and informal requirements create risks for investors
The handful of laws that set out the terms under which foreign
companies can enter into joint ventures with the state are relatively clear and
well drafted. However, the top-down nature of decision-making means that
legislation generally is enacted without consultation or any formal
parliamentary oversight. Its enforcement is highly irregular, and a range of
informal practices trump legal provisions.
Perhaps the best example of this is the enormous informal power
understood to be wielded by an opaque body known as the Union of Industrialists
and Entrepreneurs (UIE). Lawyers in the country firmly attest to the absence of
any legal requirement for prospective investors to be members of – or to liaise
with – the UIE to secure investment in the country, and a review of the law
confirms no such requirement.
However, sources on the ground and information from foreign businesses
who have approached the Turkmenistan market strongly suggests that membership
of the UIE and co-ordination of prospective investment activities with its
chair, the influential local businessman Alexander Dadayev, is seen as a de facto requirement in order to gain
access to certain contracts or state loans, especially any state tenders. This
arrangement allows Dadayev, who is understood to be close to the government and
president, to control which foreign entities gain access to the economy, and to
exclude them where the authorities wish to reward locally connected companies
with contracts or commercial opportunities.
Corruption
Both high-level and low-level corruption are pervasive and endemic.
They are likely to touch domestic and foreign business alike. The scale of the
perceived extent of bribery and graft is captured in Transparency
International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index. Turkmenistan is consistently
among the worst performing nations surveyed by TI globally, and the worst
performing of all the former Soviet states. It has scored between 18 and 20
points since 2015, where 100 points signifies a ‘very clean’ country and 1 a
‘very corrupt’ one. Ranked against 179 other countries in 2018, Turkmenistan
came 161st (where first is the country perceived to be the least corrupt).[2]
These consistently poor scores highlight the entrenched nature of both
high-level and low-level corruption over many years.
What does this mean for business activity? At the higher level, family
ties and political loyalty are the main factors that determine the awarding of
contracts. Traditionally privilege and access to commercial opportunities
extended to a group of people around the president, appointed to cabinet and
other senior state positions, most of whom are not direct relatives of the
president. In recent years there are growing indications that Berdimuhamedov’s
family are now increasingly in control of many key sectors, and that the elite
circle enjoying dividends from the country’s industry is narrowing.[3] In such a climate, foreign businesses without
their own nepotistic ties to prominent figures face little chance of securing a
contract, regardless of their objective value to the economy or ability to
service a requirement.
At a lower level, companies are likely to find that officials – even up
to ministerial level – expect bribes or favours (such as employing their
relatives) in return for progress with administrative decisions or the issuing
of licences.
The government made much of a new anti-corruption campaign in 2017 and
2018. However, this served primarily as a smoke screen for politically
motivated prosecutions. Corruption among senior officials is likely to be
overlooked; those high-profile corruption-related investigations and dismissals
that do take place are likely to target individuals who have fallen out of
favour with the president. The president’s dismissal in 2017 of the Prosecutor
General on corruption charges, alongside public reprimands of the Minister of
Interior and other officials on charges of failing to investigate and punish
bribe solicitation, are examples of this. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s
Turkmen service reported that anonymous sources had informed it that those
individuals had been targeted because the president was frustrated with their
failure to attract funds for the Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games (AIMAG),
being hosted in the capital, Ashgabat, later that year. The same sources
reported that a number of local businesses people were also arrested after
failing to pay informal contributions to the government towards the games.[4]
Lower-level officials are prosecuted largely at random, probably by regional
officials eager to please the president.
There is limited prospect of these challenges receding in the next
year. Persistent economic difficulties increase the government’s willingness to
employ improper tactics to raise budget revenues. Furthermore, endemic
corruption is bound up in the highly centralised and authoritarian political
system which relies on graft and nepotism. Without some liberalisation of the
political environment – of which there is no sign – meaningful efforts to
tackle corruption are highly unlikely.
Restrictions
on currency flows
The economic slowdown has increased the prevalence of capital controls,
as the authorities seek to control the movement of currency – both foreign and
domestic – in and out the country amid cash flow shortages. These shortages
reflect a combination of a reduction in foreign currency revenue linked to the
loss of a number of important gas export contracts, and general mismanagement
of the banking sector. The restrictions directly affect investors seeking to
repatriate profits or move capital. Progressively more onerous capital controls
have been introduced since 2015. There is a limit on the amount of US dollars
that can be purchased each month and a waiting list system for foreign-currency
transactions. There are ongoing restrictions on obtaining Western Union wire
transfers. In 2017 and 2018, there were reports of limits on the volume of
foreign currency that businesses could convert. The authorities’ failure to
communicate or acknowledge publicly any of these restrictions exacerbates the
difficulties they pose to business operations.
Lack
of contract sanctity
There is a persistent, high threat of contract repudiation by the
government in dealings with foreign companies. For telecoms companies, for
example, this has manifested in the government suspending licences, increasing
the state’s share of profits, or simply shutting down infrastructure.[5]
A number of Turkish companies have also seen their assets shut down or
expropriated in recent years, even while in possession of necessary licences,
and without any due process or compensation.
An associated risk is non-payment, driven by the same systemic and
economic problems. There are numerous reported examples of this risk. For
example, a Turkish construction company in October 2018 filed a claim with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) following the authorities’ failure to pay for
residential and school building work that the company had performed, while a
German company the same month filed a claim over the lack of payment for the
construction of grain elevators.[6]
International law firm CIS Debt Recovery Solutions in December 2017 told an
independent Turkmenistan news outlet that Turkmenistan’s state-owned oil and
gas sector was defaulting on its debt, including on US $8.5 million owed to one
client for equipment supplied three years earlier.[7]
Lack
of recourse to domestic justice
A lack of recourse to justice within Turkmenistan compounds these
problems. The judiciary does not uphold contract sanctity. Judges are subject
to pressure and direction from the executive, and are likely to rule in favour
of the government rather than a foreign entity in almost all instances.
Furthermore, limited understanding of commercial law undermines their ability
to properly judge a commercial dispute.
Personnel
turnover
Strong personal relationships with influential officials are all but
essential in order to engage in business activity in Turkmenistan. However,
forming such relationships is significantly complicated by the high degree of
turnover in personnel. The president regularly uses government ministries,
ministers and agencies as scapegoats for setbacks in the economy or in specific
sectors. This tactic typically involves a ministry undergoing a large
reshuffle. Rather than improving performance at the ministry in question or
driving accountability, personnel changes of this kind serve primarily to
deflect attention from the president for the industry’s poor performance. Where
ministers are being used as scapegoats, they are typically simply moved into
less prominent positions. Only in the rare cases where they have launched a
challenge to the president in some form are they likely to be removed entirely
from the senior political and public administration scene.
Furthermore, identifying the relevant department or official
responsible for an industry or regulatory regime, obtaining information and
maintaining regular contact are all labour-intensive tasks. Government
officials are unlikely to provide transparent or consistent reasons for
decisions. Officials are frequently reshuffled, and there is little sense of continuity
of office; a new minister is liable to scrap deals signed by a predecessor, if
only to obtain bribes for replacements. Furthermore, many officials do not have
the requisite training, and delays are as likely to arise from incompetence and
paralysis in the decision-making process as from corruption.
Rising
reputational concerns
Pervasive human rights abuses and the lack of any genuine democratic
competition create considerable reputational threats that businesses engaging
in Turkmenistan should bear in mind.
Berdimuhamedov’s personality cult, state-funded vanity projects and the
country’s poor human rights record have gained more international attention
since 2015. The US $7.3 billion Asian and Indoor Martial Arts Games hosted in
Ashgabat in September 2017, though intended as a positive advert for the
country, increased international awareness and scrutiny of the restrictive
political environment and the president’s flamboyant, eccentric behaviour.
There are also sector-specific threats linked to child labour. The
cotton industry is a particular source of reputational threat. The Cotton
Campaign, which brings together business associations, companies and NGO
groups, has long contended that all cotton production in Turkmenistan involves
forced labour. Specifically, cotton farmers must meet state-dictated production
quotas under threat of penalty, while state employees are forced to harvest the
crop. The Responsible Sourcing Network NGO in June 2018 launched a campaign to
encourage an organised boycott of Turkmenistani cotton, similar to a boycott in
place against cotton from neighbouring Uzbekistan.[8]
66 companies had signed up to the boycott as of May 2019. Turkmenistan’s cotton
is likely to be in the spotlight increasingly over the next two years as
Western governments’ attention to supply chain risk continues to grow.
Conclusion
In sum, Turkmenistan presents a
challenging environment for international businesses. Most of these challenges
directly stem from the highly controlled political environment and the
predominance of informal approaches to regulation and economic decision-making,
features of the landscape that show little sign of lessening in the years ahead.
Photo by Kalpak Travel, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.
[1] Freedom House’s 2017 and 2018 Nations in Transit reports on
Turkmenistan summarise findings by investigative journalists at the
Vienna-based Chronicles of Turkmenistan and Turkmen Yurt TV news outlets that
the president’s family controls various sectors of the economy. His nephews,
for example, are cited as controlling financial operations, a shopping mall,
and Turkmen telecom, the monopoly communications provider, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/turkmenistan;
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2017/turkmenistan
[4] Radio Azatlyk, Генпрокурор
Халлыев был уволен за невыполнение указа президента собрать деньги на Азиаду
(Prosecutor General Khallyev was dismissed for failure to comply with the
presidential decree to raise money for the Asian Games), RFE/RL, May 2017, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/prosecutor-fired-for-not-collecting-money-for-Asian-games/28478272.html
[7] Alternative News of Turkmenistan, “В связи с временными трудностями”. ГК “Туркменнефть” 4 года не выплачивает долг в $8,5 млн (“Due to
temporary difficulties.” GC “Turkmenneft” 4 years does not pay the debt of $8.5
million), November 2017,https://habartm.org/archives/8016
On 23rd February 2018, the leaders of Turkmenistan and
Afghanistan, alongside top government representatives from Pakistan and India,
gathered in Herat to inaugurate the Afghan sector of the
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India [TAPI] natural gas pipeline.[1] This
large-scale infrastructure project, to be powered exclusively by Turkmenistan’s
reserves, pursued the establishment and eventual integration of a substantive
natural gas market connecting partners across the Central/South Asia divide.[2] The
advancement of construction works in the pipeline’s Turkmen sector, announced
with propagandistic pomp by Turkmenistan’s official media, represented the
event that led members from the four governments to meet in Herat to celebrate
the opening of a new phase for this project.[3]
TAPI offers a very telling microcosm to analyse Turkmenistan’s
idiosyncratic external relations and their uneasy relationship with the energy
policy pursued by the regime headed by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. To date,
there is no confirmation that the works in the pipeline’s Turkmen sector have
actually started, and no photographic evidence of their advancement can be
found; more widely, there is no definitive information on the consortium’s
financial viability and profit structure. TAPI is nevertheless presented as a
top foreign policy priority by the Turkmen government, which persistently
argues about the project’s centrality vis-à-vis Turkmenistan’s energy
policy framework.[4]
As the Turkmen economy continues to be dominated by the gas sector—which
accounted in 2014 for 35 per cent of Turkmenistan’s GDP, 90 per cent of total
exports, and 80 per cent of fiscal revenues—the promotion of Turkmenistan’s
energy policy agenda has to be seen as a vital component in the viability of
the Turkmen economy at large.[5] The
virtual nature of TAPI’s progress, in this sense, points to the crystallisation
of a fundamental inconsistency within the mechanisms whereby the Turkmen regime
endeavours to translate its statements into actual policy.
This short essay intends to unveil some of the idiosyncrasies that
regulate the foreign policy/energy policy nexus in Turkmenistan, arguing that Berdimuhamedov’s
perpetuation of rentier economics in Turkmenistan has constrained foreign
policy-making to the goal of merely achieving security of energy demand.[6] Turkmen
diplomacy became in this sense instrumental to the identification, construction
and opening of export routes, with energy infrastructure development emerging
as the central international concern of the Turkmen state. The placement of
energy policy at the epicentre of the survival agenda of the elites in Ashgabat
instigated in turn two destabilising mechanisms, which will be investigated in
conjunction here: the enhancement of Turkmenistan’s international isolation on
the one hand, and the progressive increase of energy insecurity across the
Turkmen territory on the other.
From Gazprom to CNPC: Turkmenistan’s gas trade between two monopolies
Protracted infrastructural dependency on the centre of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) represented one of the most draining economic legacies that the Soviet dissolution bequeathed to independent Turkmenistan. Independence transformed intra-Union trade into a matter of international affairs: while it presented on the one hand Turkmenistan with a revenue bonanza through the adjustment of Soviet commodity prices to international standards, it continued on the other to enforce Russia’s transit monopoly over the commercialisation of Turkmen gas.[7]Throughout the long presidency of Saparmurat A. Niyazov, who ruled from independence until his sudden death in December 2006, Turkmen gas trade was predominantly conducted through the Central Asia-Centre pipeline, built in the Soviet era to integrate Central Asian gas reserves into the pipeline network of the Ukraine SSR and, most importantly, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The opening of two short pipelines connecting Turkmen fields with Iran—regulated by a wider gas-swap deal—could dilute only in part Gazprom’s control over the terms of Turkmenistan’s gas trade.[8] As part of policies seeking to establish and maintain a relationship of controlled political and economic disentanglement from Russia, the reduction of this transit monopoly represented a key objective pursued by Turkmen diplomacy after the adoption, in December 1995, of a UN-recognised neutral foreign policy course.[9] At domestic level, however, the Niyazov regime ignored the entrenchment of a further dependency, namely that which predicated Turkmenistan’s economy viability on the availability of natural gas revenues. Throughout the 1990s and until the death of Turkmenistan’s first president, the regime in Ashgabat failed to introduce any meaningful reform to domestic production structures, cementing even further the rentier nature of Turkmenistan’s post-Soviet economy.
The early Berdimuhamedov era saw the operationalisation of a major
natural gas pipeline connecting the Bagtyýarlyk contract area in eastern
Turkmenistan with the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in western China, and
then onto the Chinese gas pipeline network. There are two immediate features
that identify the completion of this pipeline—entered into line in December
2009—as an important watershed in the development of Eurasian gas trade. To
begin with, the Central Asia-China pipeline has to be seen as the first
large-scale infrastructural project completed in the post-Soviet era that
challenged Gazprom’s monopoly over the transit of Eurasian gas.[10]
Secondly, its ownership structure, in which China National Petroleum Company
(CNPC) acquired upstream stakes in the Bagtyýarlyk contract area, innovated on
the Turkmen energy practice inasmuch as it allowed, for the first time since
independence, the participation of a foreign energy company in the development
of Turkmenistan’s onshore gas reserves.[11]
In the medium-term, however, the entry into line of this pipeline
substituted Turkmenistan’s over-reliance on Russian gas purchases with an even
more damaging dependency framework, wherein gas trade with China rose to become
the single most important entry in the whole Turkmen stage budget. Gazprom’s
withdrawal from the Central Asian gas market—underpinned by ongoing price
disputes with local partners and, most importantly, the rise of China as a key
customer for the Russian company—and the periodic instability that
characterised its energy ties with Iran, left China as Turkmenistan’s de
facto only gas customer. The consistently monopsonistic nature of
Turkmenistan’s natural gas trade is captured graphically by the following
figure, which illustrates the transition from nearly total dependency on
Russian purchases (87.2 per cent of overall quotas traded in 2009) to reliance
on energy commerce with China, which amounted to a staggering 94.6 per cent of
total gas traded by Turkmenistan in 2018.[12]
The unsustainability of the commercial outlook evidenced in the figure
becomes even more apparent when considering the legislative framework
regulating Sino-Turkmen gas trade. As part of the produce-or-pay agreement
finalised in the late 2000s, Turkmenistan was committed to direct to China
increasingly substantive gas quotas at heavily discounted prices, in order to
repay the US$10 billion debt it contracted during the construction works of the
Central Asia-China pipeline.[13] The
figure suggests that gas trade with China increased ten times in absolute size
between 2010 and 2018, while total volumes of gas exported by Turkmenistan
decreased rather significantly throughout the same timeframe. In this context,
Turkmenistan economic viability became the function of its trade with China.
The logic of debt repayment, as a consequence, pushed the Turkmen
economy on the brink of collapse, as confirmed by media reports of periodic
eruption of food insecurity across the Turkmen territory, the continuous
restructure of the Turkmen public sector and, most importantly, the termination
of the generous system of state subsidies in place since the Niyazov era.[14]
A combination of short-term (allow onshore exploration rights to
foreign companies) or longer-term (economic diversification away from
hydrocarbons) measures is required to alter Turkmenistan’s current economic
predicament. However, the Berdimuhamedov regime is refusing to even consider
these alternatives: Turkmenistan’s crisis can in this sense be addressed
through unimaginative solutions, which all connect to one economic mantra:
selling more gas through more export routes.
TCGP and TAPI: The future of Turkmenistan’s gas exports between myth and reality
As the Berdimuhamedov regime proved to be impervious to the logic of economic opening intrinsic to globalisation and, most notably, continued to manage in absolutely not transparent fashion its revenues flows—the Turkmen government has not established a sovereign wealth fund to administer the capital derived from energy exports—the rudimentary version of rentier economics crystallised in Turkmenistan proved essential to ensure regime stability at a time of economic crisis.[15]
There is therefore very limited prospect for a concerted abandonment
of rentier economic strategies in Turkmenistan; the construction of new
pipelines has to be regarded in this sense as an inevitable development to
ensure Turkmenistan’s economic survival in the short run. At the time of
writing, the Berdimuhamedov regime has reportedly committed to explore two
possible routes to expand the export options available to the Turkmen natural
gas industry: either connecting Turkmenistan with Western markets through the
construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline or, alternatively, reaching out to
customers located in the Indian subcontinent through the operationalisation of
the TAPI pipeline project.
Despite its size and expected export capacity, TAPI remains a virtual
pipeline, the relevance of which seems to be exclusively linked to its
discursive importance rather than to the effective contribution it can make to
trans-regional energy trade.[16]
Notwithstanding its limited financial resources and marginal experience in the
management of mega-projects, Türkmengaz—Turkmenistan’s natural gas state
concern—emerged in 2015 as the leader of the consortium established to deliver
TAPI.[17]Türkmengaz’s limited input into project
delivery has so far impeded the identification of financial backers for the
very expensive pipeline and, most notably, resulted in a series of logistic
blunders associated with the completion of the Turkmen sector of the pipeline
project.[18]
The finalisation of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian
Sea in August 2018 injected new life in a series of infrastructure projects
intending to export natural gas extracted in Turkmenistan to European markets.
Robert Cutler correctly remarked that the current iteration of the
Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) project seems to be somewhat more feasible
than its predecessor.[19] The
current consortium has recognised that this pipeline—the financial suitability
of which does however remain elusive to say the least—will not be
producer-built due to Turkmenistan’s refusal to offer production-sharing agreements’ (PSA) rights to onshore
developments and that the TCGP demand structure needs to be re-modulated
through the identification of two access points for Turkmen gas. The new
legislative environment set up by the 2018 Convention reduced some of the
obstacles that so far obstructed the advancement of cooperation between
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan vis-à-vis the construction of a
trans-Caspian pipeline.[20] At the
same time, however, the convention subjected the ultimate advancement of any
shared project to any environmental concern expressed by the other Caspian
states.[21] The
Russian Federation, in this sense, may continue to have a final say over
trans-Caspian gas transit.
As the preservation of Turkmen authoritarianism continues to be
predicated upon the persistence of rentier economics, the state’s economic
foreign policy will continue to be linked, at least in the immediate future,
with the identification of new export routes for Turkmen gas. Reconciling the foreign
policy priorities of a regime that has so far thrived on isolationism with the
economic imperatives of an autarkic
state poorly integrated with the global economy has to be in this sense as the
most daunting challenge faced by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov and his associates.
Photo by Peretz Partensky, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.
[3] See, for instance,
the report on the TAPI Steering Committee meeting held in Mary (Turkmenistan)
in early 2018, in which the participant congratulated Turkmenistan in the
advancement of the construction works in its own sector, V Mary sostoyalos’
zasedanie Rukovodyashchego Komiteta po proekty gazoprovoda TAPI, Turkmenistan Segodnya, February 2018,
http://tdh.gov.tm/news/articles.aspx&article11441&cat14
[4] See for instance,
Turkmenistan uchastok TAPI postroyat za dva goda (Turkmen section TAPI will be
built in 2 years), Türkmenistanyň
Nebitgaz, November 2015, http://www.oilgas.gov.tm/blog/40/
[6] In Hossein
Mahdavy’s classic definition, rentier economies ‘receive on a regular basis
substantial amounts of external rents […] paid by foreign governments, concerns
or individuals’ (Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier
States: The Case of Iran. In: Cook, M.A. (ed.) Studies in the Economic
History of the Middle East. London: Routledge 1970, p. 428). In addition to
the externality of the rent, it is the modality of its domestic use that
characterises this typology of economic structure. Hazem Beblawi identifies the
government and its ancillary institutions of a rentier state as the principal
recipient of the external rent (‘The Rentier State in the Arab World’. Arab
Studies Quarterly 9 (4) 1987: 385). While no currently existing state
presents all the features included in scholarly description of the rentier
model, post-Soviet Turkmenistan represents a particularly relevant case of
post-Soviet rentierism. Its economic development has been shaped by a visibly
rentier logic, heavily dependent on the rent generated by natural gas
controlled kleptocratically by the regime in Ashgabat and featuring at the same
time an over-inflated public sector and, until a few years ago, an extensive
system of subsidies for the larger population.
[7] Tarr, David G.
1994. The terms-of-trade effects of moving to world prices on countries of the
Former Soviet Union’. Journal of Comparative Economics 18 (1): 1-24.
[8] Brill Olcott,
Martha. 2006. International gas trade in Central Asia: Turkmenistan, Iran,
Russia and Afghanistan. In Victor, David G., Jaffe, Amy M. and Hayes, Mark H.
(eds.): Natural Gas and Geopolitics from 1970 to 2040. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 202-33.
[9] Anceschi, Luca.
2009. Turkmenistan’ Foreign Policy.
Positive Neutrality and the Consolidation of the Turkmen Regime.
Abingdon: Routledge.
[10] For more on
Russia-Turkmen energy relations, see: Øverland, Indra. 2009. Natural Gas and
Russia–Turkmenistan Relations. Russian Analytical Digest, 56.
[11] Emirati energy
company Dragon Oil has long explored, under PSA conditions, numerous gas
fields, part of the Cheleken contract area, in the Turkmen sector of the
Caspian Sea.
[12] Data for the
2006-2016 series replicate those illustrated in my 2017 Central Asian Survey
article (see footnote 17 below). Data for 2017 and 2018 are taken from the 67th
and 68th editions of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy,
respectively published in 2018 and 2019.
[13] Kuchins, Andrew,
Mankoff, Jeffrey and Backes, Oliver, 2015. Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia – Turkmenistan’s Evolving
Foreign Economic and Security Interest. Washington, DC: CSIS Report, p.
13.
[15] An interesting
discussion of current modalities of rentier economic development is presented
in: Gray, Matthew. 2011. A Theory of
“Late Rentierism”in the Arab States of the Gulf. Center for
International and Regional Studies Occasional Paper 7, Georgetown University
School of Foreign Service.
[16] The TAPI pipeline—with
an estimated total cost of US$ 10 billion— is expected to carry annually no
fewer than 33 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas over a 1078 km route.
All of the project’s gas is to be supplied by the Galkynysh field (south-east
Turkmenistan), with a distribution of volumes traded determined as follows:
Afghanistan will buy 0.5–1.5 bcm per year, while India and Pakistan will each
receive annual volumes of 14–16 bcm; Anceschi, Luca. 2017. Turkmenistan and the
virtual politics of Eurasian energy: the case of the TAPI pipeline project. Central
Asian Survey 36 (4): 409-29.
[21] Anceschi, Luca. 2019. Caspian Energy in the Aftermath of the 2018
Convention: The View from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Russian Analytical
Digest, N° 235.
[post_title] => A tale of four pipelines: The international politics of Turkmen natural gas
[post_excerpt] =>
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With democracy and liberalism in decline, and pro-active autocrats dominating the international community, the resilience of the political models based on democratic principles, human rights and freedoms is increasingly being tested. The external threats posed by powers like Russia, coupled with domestic political trends of xenophobia and illiberalism manifesting in growing far right movements, are threatening democratic institutions and values, such as freedom of expression. Instead of being met with unity these challenges are faced with fractious responses from the Euro-Atlantic states, with Brexit being a prime example of this fault lined response. These responses are leading many democratic sceptics and passive conformists with autocratic regimes to justify their positions by asking: if, in this current international landscape, there is a difference between Russia and the Western powers when it comes to their foreign policies? Between the recent foreign policy actions of Europe and the United States (US) and the news shared about them, ‘true’ and ‘fake’, on the digital informational space, including social networks, how can the Euro-Atlantic states preserve their democratic political models? And, whilst doing so, also delegitimise autocrats’ foreign policies?
In our more interrelated,
globalised and ‘transparent’ world, people are better informed, or better misinformed, and they can judge on issues
which were previously hidden. This is particularly evident about the foreign
policies adopted by different states. Wherein domestic policies can still be
strongly influenced by ‘fake news’ and autocratic regimes internal propaganda
mechanisms, states’ foreign policies are more open to scrutiny. A higher level
of public observation reveals the domination of realpolitik to a wider
audience. A term created by Ludwig von Rochau, ‘realpolitik’ is deemed to be
‘the law of power [that] governs the world of states just as the law of gravity
governs the physical world’. [1]
The logic behind realpolitik is
that foreign policies are driven by the interests or pragmatism of the state,
or a group of states and alliances, rather than idealistic, value-driven
considerations. However, at this stage of global interconnectedness the values
and interests of a state, or group of states, are not easily separated and the
survival of states’ democratic political systems and identities are increasing
linked to how they conduct themselves in relation to other states. The
contemporary threats to states, and/or a group of states, range from
traditional hard power threats to the soft power ones of autocratic states,
such as ‘fake news’, propaganda, corruption, etc. The latter threats require
even greater attention, as they may be less tangible, but are in no way less
aggressive in nature. And most importantly – the autocrats can and do promote
them pro-actively.
Despite the risks to democratic
states’ systems there is a prevalence of realpolitik today, which aids
autocrats in justifying their adjustments’ not to the liberal order and formal
international law, but to the rules of the powerful and self-interest. Putin
sees this dynamic clearly. He does not believe in the ‘value-driven’ policies promulgated
by the Western states, but views the world in purely realpolitik terms.
As he perceives it, Putin is ‘copying’
the West by getting involved in various geographic areas; to either establish Russia’s
military presence, help incumbent regimes, use secessionist conflicts to
preserve Russia’s influence, establish its peacekeeping forces or border troops,
or dragging states, where possible, into the Russia-led regional organisations.
In this venture he tries to drag
the West into ‘power’ competitions for influence on his own terms and in his
understanding. The involvement of the established democracies in such cases would
also look natural – for example, the small states in Russia’s underbelly cannot
protect themselves and need external assistance. Putin knew, for instance, that
once he was in Ukraine, he would get the West’s attention and he would get NATO
advancements in response. By creating a vicious circle of increasing Western
involvement in a competition governed by the ‘rules of the powerful’, it gives
him greater legitimisation of his own policies. Since the annexation of Crimea,
all international crisis ridden areas like Syria or Venezuela have served his
justification of realpolitik, while at the same time increasing his domestic
grip on power. Moreover, the annexation of Crimea increased sensitivities in
the Baltic States, especially in their reactions to Russia’s war games, Zapad,
in 2017, which led to them urging NATO’s unity in response.
The West’s engagement with Putin
gives him yet another argument to those who sees no difference between the two’s
foreign policy agendas; these agendas being defined as cynical neo-colonialist
policies that act in accordance to the idea of divisions of spheres of
influence. In the case of Crimea, it was Putin’s argument that the US, not the
people, made the coup d’états in Ukraine that overturned the state’s corrupt leader
which ‘legitimised’ his own involvement in Donetsk, or annexation of Crimea.
This perception of the West’s realpolitik – with or without a foundation – was
perfectly described by Hill in his recent publication, reviewed by Thomas De
Waal. [2]
The former secretary general of
NATO, Rasmussen last year stated that not granting MAP to Georgia and Ukraine in
2008 was a mistake. [3]
In fact, the hesitance of the Western organisations and states to respond
positively to the expressed interest of the small states near Russia has been
often driven by the same logic – ‘we respect the sphere of influence of Russia
and do not want to irritate it by getting too close’. This was the case with
the European Neighbourhood Policy, and then later with the Eastern Partnership (EaP)
program, where the perspective of membership has never been stated in the
European Union (EU) documents. At the 10th anniversary of the EaP
the uneven result thus was noted. While the partnership and association agreements
were signed with four of the six states, the most impressive achievements so
far where in the area of trade and people-to-people contacts, leaving the areas
of deep and substantial reforms behind. This led to the missed opportunities
for the West and emboldened the behaviour of Russia in the region.
But the West can turn a ‘military
victory’ by Putin into a moral defeat, by behaving contrary to his expectations
– depriving him of status and attention, and offering the societies a way to
reach a better political model. This may express itself in addressing the
structural obstacles to reform within the EaP states, such as the Soviet institutional
legacies, weakness of post-colonial institutions, political economy of rentier
states, lack of sense of interdependency blocking development of common
strategy, and tactics in countering external threats and conducting domestic
reforms; thus contributing to building of their resilience to the threats.
On the other hand, as Arjun
Appadurai stresses, there is a tension between the logic of the ‘state’ and the
‘globalised world’. [4] Indeed, there are clearly processes, which can be
contained within, and by, the state, and at the same time those which transcend
borders.
The reactive policies and
responses to the international challenges deprive democratic states of the capacity
to project their own qualitatively different ‘power’. Diplomatically, the West
loses opportunities to outsmart the autocrats, by being dragged into the hard
power competitions and races for influence. In fact, the unity of Europe and
the US in application of sanctions against Russia in the face of the Ukrainian
conflict, is already outsmarting the autocrats, who are anticipating their
capacity to split the West due to its pragmatism, vested interests and
realpolitik. The political and moral effects of unity and consistency of the
Euro-Atlantic community in reaction to Russia’s policy in Ukraine is in fact
even more important than the economic ones, as it sends the signal that Putin
miscalculated. Yet, the recent tweets by Trump that “getting along with Russia
is a good thing” might undermine the perception of consistency. [5]
The unity demonstrated in the case of Ukraine can, and should, still be
achieved in other cases to show the autocrats the ‘red lines’ when breaking the
norms.
Autocrats do not get confused by the
complexities of international relations, as in their dealings with external
actors they rely on structural predictability of behaviour and the priorities
of the politicians, which they learnt quickly. They rely on peculiarities of
pragmatism, which they utilise as weakness, when cracking the unity in the
Western position and foreign policies by offering lucrative interests.
Most importantly, being dragged
into power competitions, particularly in the field of hard power, in various
geographic areas with autocrats at this stage of international relations
undermines democratic states positions and values. By trying to replace ‘patrons’,
and ‘recognising legitimate sphere of interests/or influence of Russia’ the
established democracies devalue the sense of independence and the interdependency
of those states under threat, diminishing their sense of responsibility in
sorting out relations in the region through cooperation and boosting their own
power.
So the demand and the peculiarity
of this stage of international relations would require not making Russia arm itself
in competition, but rather ‘disarm’, both figuratively and literally. By
offering unusual solutions and unexpected responses by Western powers this can
be achieved, such as through unity of action, encouraging greater normative
behaviour, and depriving the ‘winner’ of the rewards in getting its share of
influence and control in contested parts of the world through the use of hard
power. Another potential solution is to help Russia identify its possible value
added contribution in helping the states to consolidate their independence
rather than establish and enforce its influence over them.
These solutions and approaches require
a serious reconsideration of the nature and substance of power, and the ways in
which to recognise it in the system of international relations in the
contemporary world. In a reconsidered world order, one would see the smaller
states as equal to the big states, where their will and voice is equally
respected in practice, and their power is not in the size of territory or
military forces but in their capacity to be creative and develop effective and
environmentally sound technologies, or to develop high culture and comfortable
conditions for human lives. In the current world order, the small states can
boost their power vis-à-vis the ambitions of, and non-compliance with, the
liberal order powers via various measures – either by joining the existing unions
or creating regional alliances to counteract the attempts of regional powers to
dominate their sovereignty. But at the same time this world order is where the
political trends are not contained within the national borders, and become a
universal competition between – illiberalism and liberalism, xenophobic and
exclusion versus open-mindedness and inclusion, authoritarian versus
democratic, kleptocracy versus transparency.
What can the West do? The most
reliable way is to restore its role as a normative power, or be more consistent
and clear in its value-driven policies. As the Belarussian opposition leader in
exile Andrei Sannikov recently noted in a Facebook post before the presidential
elections in Ukraine: “By inviting both Ukrainian presidential candidates to
Paris, Macron stressed an importance of the election itself, rather than the
specific candidate, thus teaching a lesson to Russia.” [6]
It is important not to justify the
‘predictability’ of the West’s behaviour by compromising on this goal for the
sake of pragmatic interests, but rather demonstrate integrity, unity and
consistency. Listed are various suggestions to demonstrate thus:
The West’s policies should be pro-active rather
than reactive, as it happened with opening the doors for Eastern and Central
Europe along with Baltic republics in the post-cold war period through EU and
NATO enlargement. While not suggesting the membership option for the other former
Soviet Union (FSU) states was a missed chance, the early direct support for
civil society in Georgia, Ukraine and various other states of the FSU has
prepared a foundation for future reforms.
The substance of these policies should be an alternative
to the autocrats’ policies – contrary to autocrats intimidating – supporting
and strengthening the state’s independent decision-making by supporting the
institutions rather than particular forces. In areas torn by conflict, such as
the South Caucasus, where the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict is the major
dividing one in the region, promoting a sense of interdependency through
awareness of individual responsibility for creating a safe and friendly
environment, and respect for international norms should be encouraged. The
geopolitical agendas, such as energy resources, should not influence the
integrity of assessment of standards of democracy in rentier and oil rich
states.
Normative certainty should be brought to the ‘grey’
areas, such as those dominated by secessionist conflicts, where international
law is being violated, but no consequences are followed or enforced. By avoiding
an immediate imposition of sanctions against the violators of the international
borders, regardless of who they are, in both the NK and Georgian conflicts the
West did not act as the normative power. Moreover in case of the NK conflict, one
of the participants of the conflict, Russia, was awarded the co-chairman’s
position in the mediating process, not with immediate sanctions for violating
Georgia’s borders. Similarly, the Minsk Process is characterised by normative
uncertainty, leaving the sides to negotiate according to their perceived
bargaining powers.
Support for regional organisations, initiated by
the states themselves. One such example was GUAM, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan
and Moldova for Democracy and Economic Development, which had an appealing
concept at the core of it – the development of norms of relations between the
states, but which did not get the deserved attention and recognition of the
West.
The West needs to use more actively the
attractive power of its democratic model, which has a universal nature and can
appeal to people’s hearts and minds, including those under the rule of
autocrats. The power of links was proved in the case of Ukraine and Armenia,
where communication with the West through visa liberalisation and Diasporas fuelled
the motivation to conduct changes in these states.
Western powers need to be united in application
of all measures enforcing international law and responsible behaviour. This may
be achieved regionally through greater inclusion of the European neighbours
into the debates related to European affairs and its future, as they will bring
external perspectives on the consequences of a weaker and disunited Europe,
which is currently visibly lacking in the ongoing debates about the future of
Europe and (liberal) democracy.
Dr Leila Alieva is a Senior Common Room member of St. Antony’s College
at Oxford University, where she previously was an academic visitor and a fellow
of Council for At-Risk Academics (CARA)/Scholars Rescue Fund (SRF). In 2018 she
was a research fellow at the Institute Fur Kulturwissenschaften (IFK) in
Vienna, Austria. Until 2014 she was founder and President of the independent
policy research/ think tank the Center for National and International Studies
in Baku. Since late 80s her research focus was on conflict analysis and
resolution, as well as area studies - Azerbaijan, Caucasus, Former Soviet
Union; Russia, as well as energy security, democratization and civil society in
the oil rich states, regional and EU and NATO integration. She has been a
resident research associate at a range of different institutions including the
Russia and Eurasia Center at Uppsala University, the NATO Defense College (NDC)
and the National Endowment for Democracy.
Photo by Patrick Gruban, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.
[2] Thomas De Waal, Book Review:
No Place for Russia – What would it take to make Russia more comfortable with
its neighbours, the EU, and NATO?, Carnegie Europe, January 2019, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/78229
[3] First Channel News, Anders Fogh
Rasmussen: NATO sent @the wrong signal@ to Vladimir Putin by not granting
Georgia and Ukraine Map in 2008, First Channel, November 2018,https://1tv.ge/en/news/anders-fogh-rasmussen-nato-sent-wrong-signal-vladimir-putin-not-granting-georgia-ukraine-map-2008/
[4] Appadurai, A. 1990. Disjuncture and Difference in
the Global Cultural Economy. Theory, Culture & Society, 7(2),
295-310
[post_title] => How realpolitik and the predictability of the West’s weaknesses helps autocrats legitimise their foreign policies
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The Fezzan is a strategic southwestern region
of Libya. Its stability is vital for Europe's security and that of the wider
Mediterranean area. The region is home to two of the most important oil fields
of North Africa and is a hub for human smuggling and organised crime, whose
networks extend to Mali, Niger, Chad and southern Europe. While most of the
international community’s attention is on the current conflict between
Tripoli's militias and the Libyan National Army (LNA), the Fezzan region’s role
in the wider geopolitics is underestimated. It is
often represented as a zone of systemic insecurity, far and disconnected from
the political issues in northern Libya. Its importance, however, is crucial for
national stabilisation and regional security in Sahel as Fezzan has become a
key hub for transnational migrant smuggling networks, as well as oil, weapons,
drug and gold trafficking across Africa and the Middle East.
A Precarious Social and Economic
Condition
Since
the 2011 revolution, the Fezzan region has suffered from a lack of central
authorities with the capability to impose order and develop licit economies.
Tribal fights have impeded the development of any state authority and, until
last January when the LNA occupied the region peacefully, militias based in
Tripolitania and Cirenaica had been unable to take control over the area.
Members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Daesh have exploited the
increasing lawlessness to develop their strongholds and logistical hubs in
southern Libya.
Post-2011
revolution, security issues which have affected the northern parts of the
country have involved the South as well. Institutional weakness, lack of
municipal governance and few sources for local economic growth are some of the
South’s most pressing challenges. There are also ethnic-based conflicts which
involve identity, authenticity and citizenship. These conflicts are due in part
to the legacy of Qaddafi’s divide-and-rule policies, as well as tribal
rivalries. Qaddafi cynically manipulated the ‘right to citizenship’ to garner
the support of southern tribes like the Tebu, one of the most important tribes
in Libya, which
has suffered systematic marginalisation as a non-Arab community. In particular,
Qaddafi promised the Tebu full citizenship in exchange for service in his
security forces, but he never kept the promise. Since 2014, the tribe has been
attempting to reclaim citizenship. [1]
Combined
with significant structural economic issues and the collapse of the
institutional order, this legacy of conflict between the southern tribes in
Libya has proven to be a key driver of conflict. Furthermore, the rivalries
fostered by Qaddafi have made these tribes adverse to any central authority,
especially one based in Tripoli.
The Role of Sabha and Ubari
Despite
the localised conflicts and social tensions in many parts of the South, two
main cities have developed to play key roles in the region. This is in part due
to their capabilities to draw in social and political actors from across the
wider region. These cities are: Sabha and Ubari. Both places are ethnically and
tribally diverse, and both are affected by the lack of a centralised
governance, especially when it comes to security and justice. The local
economies of these two cities are mostly based on smuggling routes and oil
fields.
Sabha is a strategically very important city, not only because it is the provincial capital of the South but also because it is a historic hub in North-South supply routes. Post-2011 revolution it plays a huge role in migrant smuggling. The city also represents the emblem of porosity of the southern border. It is a hub of black market labour in which Sahelian migrants stay before moving northward. Migrants work as day labourers in impoverished neighbourhoods like Ghurda, where they are accommodated by the dozens into single room, trying to save 30 dinars to be able to move northward; migrants from other regions and countries cannot avoid forced labour or prostitution. Once they can move to the next step of their journey, they are packed into cargo trucks; facing violent abuse, sexual assault and abandonment; ‘If you faint or fall off, they leave you. The drivers beat us with long wooden sticks.’ [2, 3]
Ubari is another strategic city located near the Algerian-Nigerien border and has major oil fields. Most of the population are Arabised Africans, the so-called ‘Ahali’, who descend from sub-Saharan slaves. The Tuareg are the second largest group while the Tebu are a minority. The revolution’s aftermath devastated the local economy. Local competition over power, assets, and alternative livelihoods emerged, increasing discontent among the town’s impoverished and disenfranchised communities and cross-border smuggling increased.
When it comes to border control with Niger and Chad, this has always been problematic. Qaddafi could not exercise full control over the area because he wanted to secure the tribes’ support. To gain the support this meant letting lucrative smuggling routes flourish and for the governance of the city to be held by the local tribes. As the money generated from licit economies was not enough to provide sufficient local income, illicit trade from and to Niger and Chad became a structural feature of the Ubari’s socioeconomic framework just like in other parts of the region. The South’s security actors are often involved in these illicit trade routes, and other attempts to fight it often fail because of a lack of equipment and trained personnel. This situation has created two types of smuggling. One related to arms, narcotics and militants, which are sometimes intercepted, and fuel, subsidised food, cigarettes and illegal migrants, which pass through by paying a fee.
The international community is incapable to implement strategies for
countering organised crime and smuggling in South Libya because local
municipalities share power with informal security providers and criminalised
power structures.
Overall the international community continues to underestimate the Fezzan. Efforts for stabilisation are focused on North Libya where most of the urbanisation and economic activities are. However, without stabilising the Fezzan, no peace process can fully take place. Factions competing for national control (the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army) are supported by militias and tribes, some more than others, involved in smuggling. Drugs, weapons, oil and human trafficking operations come from Niger and Chad, and due to porous borders enter South Libya, and have established strategic hubs in Sabha and Ubari. This represents a profitable business for the major Libyan local actors and they are not willing to change that. Breaking the nexus between organised crime and instability must be a priority for the international community. Otherwise no peace plan can be successful.
The international community should support more common dialogue in the region. It is crucial to avoid a Somalisation of Libya, which could bring about long-term violence. Although the Fezzan has very complex tribal dynamics usually impeding foreign efforts for stabilisation, the Italian government and the Italian Sant’Egidio community have started a mediation dialogue with local tribes to find local solutions to the main problems. [4] This initiative is hard to implement but necessary and the international community should support it rather than diverging on how to deal with Libya. If local actors are given the opportunity to negotiate to find solutions to their own problems, this could be the first step for local reconciliation. However, the dialogue needs to be structured so that past tribal conflicts are not obstacles and so they can also be focused on redistribution of oil revenues.
Tribes, who control routes and hubs for smuggling, are unlikely to agree to fight profitable criminal activities and to develop licit economies, unless there is an equally profitable source of income. Redistribution of oil revenues could be this source of income, and be the economic foundation for reconciliation, the development of licit economies and the restoration of public basic services. In order to reduce corruption, redistribution should be supervised by international financial institutions. Currently, oil revenues go from the National Oil Company to the Central Bank of Libya, instead of being redistributed across local municipalities and this enables dirty money to be the main source of income.
Porous Border
Control
According to Frederic Wehrey, the Fezzan region is characterised by key border-control deficiencies stemming from a lack of municipal governance capacity. But there are no particular capacity building initiatives in place to face this problem. It is too dangerous and logistically difficult to deploy capacity building missions in the Fezzan. What the international community should do is to implement common dialogue among tribes (including discussions on the redistribution of oil revenue) along with capacity building initiatives in Chad and Niger, where there is a safer and securer environment, and where important transnational criminal hubs are located. France and Italy have started missions in those countries (i.e. MISIN) to train local security forces, but the effectiveness of these missions is debated among experts. Training security forces and developing border police forces can be a good start in fighting criminal networks and break the nexus between criminality and instability. However, the presence of further elements of instability (i.e. terrorism, climate change) have a deep impact on efforts for stabilisation in Sahel.
The city of Ghat is a key example of border control deficiency. Ghat’s local leadership controls the Libyan border from Algeria to Niger. After the closure of the Algerian border, Ghat became isolated with no supply chains and got involved in clashes with neighbouring city Ubari. The leader of a local border armed group, Katiba 411, declared that ‘he was forced to patrol a 230-kilometre stretch of border with Algeria with just 230 men.’ [5] Since the Algerian border closed, smuggling has moved to the Nigerien border and into Gatrun, exploiting a Tebu-controlled route. Ghat’s leaders have often and unsuccessfully requested the support of the Government of National Accord and the EU for direct assistance in reinstating Algerian cross-border trade routes for Libya’s border towns. “We asked the Europeans to pressure Algeria to open the border to relieve our suffering” a municipal council member referred, criticising the fact that the Tuareg, living in the area, did not have access to medical care and basic goods coming from Algeria. [6] However, the EU did not intervene on this.
The situation in Ghat is just one
example amongst many. As long as local institutions and neighbouring governments, with the support of
regional and international actors, will not face illicit trafficking properly
black economies will remain the most important source of local income, and any
law enforcement, technical and bureaucratic improvements will probably fail.
The Government of Niger has begun to work on the issue
and has introduced ‘more stringent document control, vehicle search and
seizure’, along with repressive measures ‘for those caught smuggling, resulting
in a net decrease in migration out flow’. [7] Although these actions are a step
forward in the right direction, it is not enough.
The smuggling routes and the struggle for resources
are part of deeper socioeconomic issues. [8] Recently, the EU has started to
address some of these problems in the Fezzan and across the border with Chad,
providing funds to local councils to build migrant detention centres for the
councils to manage the flow of migration. However, many mayors rejected the
plan because it does not address the key and structural features of migrant
flows and smuggling (i.e. the absence of a licit local economy). Moreover, due
to the lack of strong governance and supervision, human rights violations by
local militias and managers of such facilities could easily take place.
The role of the EU in addressing security and
insurgency issues in the Fezzan is limited due to internal divisions among the
EU member states in dealing with the Libyan conflict. Italy supports
Al-Sarraj's government in Tripoli, while France supports Haftar's Libyan
National Army in Benghazi. As the two most important EU member states in the
Mediterranean diverge, it is difficult for the EU to act as a bloc and find a
common approach to stabilise Libya.
The European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), a civilian mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy, is aimed at supporting the Tripoli-based authorities disrupting organised criminal networks, like human trafficking, drug and oil smuggling, and terrorism. One of the task is developing the security of the country’s borders. However, EUBAM presence in the Fezzan is very limited, if it even exists. Also, due to fragmentation of power and the lack of inclusive military command structure, national police and armed forces are no longer operational since the 2011 revolution. Diverse armed actors have become integral to security arrangements, mostly informal, and have basically acquired the legitimate status as local authorities need protection. This has affected the effectiveness of the EU integrated border management assistance mission in Libya.
Conclusion
Despite the recent LNA occupation of the region, and ongoing ceasefire
arrangements between groups once at war, Fezzan remains affected by social,
economic, political and security issues.
Regional and international actors support diverging and opposing sides (Italy, the UN, Qatar and Turkey support Al-Sarraj, while France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Russia support Haftar). All of them have different and competing interests. For example, the main French oil company Total competes with the main Italian oil company ENI to gain control over key oil fields in Libya. Since 2017, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have no diplomatic relations after the embargo against Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Riyadh and Doha are financing two opposing sides in the Libyan conflict. These diverging interests intersect with very complex local dynamics and impede the international community from adopting a common strategy to solve the conflict As a consequence, the fight against criminal networks is minimal and restoring the circulation of clean money remains a distant long-term objective. Informal economies have spread across southern Libya and, just like in other regions, it affects efforts for stabilisation. As the local economies mostly consist of smuggling and trafficking, tribes and militias in the region will remain involved because it is a lucrative market.
Although a national peace and capacity building program aimed at restoring basic services and security forces to fight criminalised power structures would be necessary, there are not the conditions on-the-ground to implement such a program. Italy has tried to promote dialogue between the southern tribes but this is not enough. The recent LNA occupation of the Fezzan and the current fight to occupy Tripoli have changed the political landscape, a common approach that takes this into account, as well as the complex context in the Fezzan, needs to be adopted by the international community.
Paolo Zucconi is a Research Fellow at the Global Center for Security Studies in Brussels. He is an independent geopolitical analyst and contributor for The Journal of International Security (Intersec), Global Security Review, and Geopolitical Monitor. He writes for journals and reviews based in the UK, USA, Canada, Australia and Italy on topics related to the MENA region's security and geopolitical affairs.
Photo by Franzfoto, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.
[1] Ben Lamma M. 2017. ‘The Tribal Structure in Libya: Factor for fragmentation or cohesion?’. Observatoire
du Monde Arabo-Musulman et du Sahel.
[2] F. Wehrey. 2017. ‘Insecurity and Governance Challenges in Shouthern Libya’.
Carnegie Endowement for International Peace: Washington D.C.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Comunità di
Sant'Egidio. 2016. ‘Libia, Accordo a
Sant'Egidio fra le Tribù del Sud per la Pacificazione dela città di Sebha’.
Sant'Egidio Website News.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] International Organization for Migration. 2016. ‘Migration Crisis Operational
Framework 2017-2019’. Libya Country Office.
[8] I. Kohl. 2015. ‘Terminal
Sahara: Sub-Saharan Migrants and Tuareg Stuck in the Desert’.
Stichproben: Vienna Journal of African Studies 28, no. 15, 55–81
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The
grisly terror onslaught against Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday that took 253 lives could
well have been avoided if a deeply divided government had not failed to act on
intelligence provided by the United States (US) and India. [1]
Tragically for this idyllic island
nation, the political rift has also made it vulnerable to external influences.
The terror strikes were perpetrated against the backdrop of superpower rivalry
where the Indo-Pacific powers of the US, India and Japan are striving to
counterbalance the overarching dominance that China has gained over the island
and the region. The three partner countries have been increasingly concerned by
China’s enlarging presence in the maritime proximity to India and its new-found
access to a crucial commercial and military waterway that has deepened its
influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
The
series of eight coordinated suicide bomb blasts by radical Islamists tragically
brought the spectre of strife and unrest back to Sri Lanka that was to have
celebrated a decade of peace on 18 May. That day in 2009 had marked the end of
the 26-year civil war by the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
that is estimated to have taken a toll of over 100,000 civilians and 50,000
fighters. [2]
The
Easter Sunday attacks could well have been the route to derail this path to
peace and to bring ethnic strife back to centre-stage in this ‘Emerald Isle of
Asia’, also known as the Land of Spices and Tea. Already, fearing further
attacks, the government has declared a state of emergency that empowers the
police and military to detain and interrogate suspects without court orders.
Armed pickets have been deployed outside churches, mosques, hotels and other
public spaces, suspects have been rounded up and radical literature and
explosive material seized in a series of raids as Sri Lankans hunker down to a
looming period of uncertainty.
US and
Indian intelligence agencies had repeatedly warned Colombo about weapons,
explosives and detonators being stockpiled, with moves afoot to target churches
and even the Indian High Commission. Among the 39 foreign tourists from at
least 12 countries who perished in the blasts in three churches and three
luxury hotels were 11 Indians and four Americans, as also one Japanese and one
Chinese. [3]
This
grievous lapse in acting on credible intelligence inputs betrays the political
divide in Sri Lanka. The 25,330 square mile teardrop-shaped country of 22
million was plunged into turmoil last October when President Maithripala
Sirisena ousted his former political ally and sitting Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe “because of his arrogance”, and replaced him with his
rival-turned-friend and ex-President Mahinda Rajapaksa. The consequent power
struggle virtually shut the government down. Sirisena discounted two confidence
votes Wickremesinghe won in Parliament, acquiescing only seven weeks later when
the Supreme Court rebuked him and sought Wickremesinghe’s reinstatement.
However, in a message
fraught with grim forebodings, Sirisena said there was no change in his
“personal position” that he would not work with Wickremesinghe even if all 225
Parliament members backed him. Thus, a divided government overlooked the
warnings on the Easter offensive, with both
the President and Prime Minister astonishingly and separately informing their
countrymen that they were not privy to the incoming intelligence.
The fallout between
Wickremesinghe and Rajapaksa has also reflected menacingly on national
developments where the former has been disposed towards India, while Rajapaksa has toed the Chinese line.
Strategically-located Sri Lanka
lies off the southeastern tip of India just across the 33-mile wide Palk
Strait. Its vantage location accords it strategic access to the Indian Ocean,
which is the third largest ocean on earth, after the Pacific and Atlantic, and
which covers a fifth of the total ocean area of the planet, drawing its
boundaries with Asia to its north, Africa to its west, Australia to its east
and Southern Ocean (or Antarctic or Austral Ocean) to its south.
Together, the Indian and Pacific Oceans cover
two-thirds of the earth’s total water surface, and an increasingly assertive China’s economic and military rise has been
having a profound impact on the balance of power in this maritime region.
While the US has provided some $2 billion in total
assistance to Sri Lanka in areas such as agriculture, energy and natural
resources, education, healthcare and humanitarian activities, Chinese companies
completed infrastructure projects there worth $15 billion by the end of 2017. [4, 5] As part of its Bay
of Bengal Initiative, the US has also granted $39 million to Sri Lanka to
support maritime security, freedom of navigation, and maritime domain awareness.
[6]
In 2016, China overtook India as
Sri Lanka’s largest trading partner, with its $4.43 billion worth of bilateral
trade surpassing India-Sri Lanka’s $4.37 billion, according to one study. [7] Both India and China
enjoy vast trade surpluses with Sri Lanka, but the US has a gross deficit. The
study notes that the US is Sri Lanka’s foremost export destination, accounting
for a quarter of all its exports in the 2012-16 period, and India, the third
largest destination with a 5.6 percent share. China was, however, only the 10th
largest destination, with a 1.8 percent share. Moreover, while China finances
its projects in Sri Lanka largely through repayable loans, India’s financial
aid to Sri Lanka is normally in a ratio of 70 percent loans to 30 percent
outright grants. Japan too had a three-fourth trade surplus with Sri Lanka in
their bilateral trade worth $1 billion in 2016.
Beijing’s
strategic outreach into the IOR and its claims of sovereignty over almost the
entire South China and East China seas have unsettled the Indo-Pacific
littoral. This has not been lost on the US, which had historically been the security
guarantor for this expanse and beyond. But while Washington is keen on
retaining, and reclaiming, its presence across the critical sea lanes, it now
finds worth in forging regional partnerships in this pursuit with other like-minded countries like India and Japan in an effort
to cut down costs and delegate responsibility.
A critical question that arises is
whether this policy shift in American strategy has actually been a policy drift
and has fallen behind China’s sharply focused overseas
infrastructure investment and lending program called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI,
previously, One Belt One Road, or OBOR) that was kick started in 2013. BRI,
also known as the maritime silk route, is a $1 trillion sequence of
infrastructure projects spanning 70 countries. [8]
Though
Beijing insists the BRI is largely a commercial rather than a military
initiative, naval basing appears very much part of an unspoken agenda.
Releasing the National Security Strategy last December, US President
Donald Trump described a new era of “great power competition” where “foreign
nations” have begun to “reassert their influence regionally and globally” and
contest “[America’s] geopolitical advantages and trying to change the
international order in their favor.” He, however, revealed the US’s new
approach to China that is grounded in fairness, reciprocity, and respect for
sovereignty.
China
has lavished generous loans on many countries as part of the BRI enterprise,
only to assume control over the infrastructure created by it by way of
compensation in case of defaults on repayments. Speaking on his administration’s policy towards China at the Hudson Institute
in October 2018, US Vice President Mike Pence blamed
Beijing for using “debt diplomacy” to expand its influence, leaving
opaque the terms of its loans so that benefits flow overwhelmingly to it. [9] “Just ask Sri Lanka, which took
on massive debt to let Chinese state companies build a port with questionable commercial
value,” he noted. “Two years ago, that country could no longer afford its
payments – so Beijing pressured Sri Lanka to deliver the new port directly into
Chinese hands. It may soon become a forward military base for China’s growing
blue-water navy.”
When
Sri Lanka defaulted on its $1.12 billion deal with China to develop its
southern seaport of Hambantota, Beijing deemed it more opportune to take over
the port it created rather than relax the repayment norms that Colombo pleaded
for. [10] Consequently, in December 2017, Colombo handed over the port to Beijing
on a 99-year lease. [11] Though China insists it has solely commercial interest in
Hambantota, Sri Lankan authorities reportedly indicated that intelligence and
strategic possibilities of the port’s location had been part of the
negotiations. Indeed, within weeks of Sri Lanka’s announcement in June 2018
that it would be shifting its southern naval headquarters to
Hambantota port, Beijing declared it would be donating a frigate to the
Sri Lankan Navy. [12] The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is also creating
facilities at the Sri Lanka Military Academy,
the country’s premier army training establishment.
Speaking
at the Pathfinder Panel Discussion in Colombo in February, Acting Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Vajda felt that transactions based
on “naked commercial self-interest and hidden agendas that mortgage the future”
undermine the long-term stability of the region. [13]
In Sri
Lanka, China is expanding from Hambantota to the Colombo port as well. In the
single largest ever Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Sri Lanka, China
Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), a subsidiary of state-owned China
Communications Construction Company (CCCC), is creating the $1.4 billion
Colombo International Financial City (CIFC) on 269 hectares or 660 acres of
land reclaimed from the sea. [14]
This ‘city-within-the-city’
is expected to be a major financial hub rivalling Singapore and Dubai that will
boost the economy and maritime trade of the island country. The project
was launched in 2014 by Chinese President Xi Jinping and then Sri Lanka’s
President Rajapaksa, its marine part, including construction of the breakwater,
to be commissioned in June 2019. China is also investing $1 billion in
constructing three 60-storey buildings at this site adjacent to the country’s
main port of Colombo, the deepest container terminal in South Asia. [15]
India
is particularly stressed by these developments in its vicinity, having had
tumultuous encounters with China along its northern frontiers where both
countries maintain high military vigil. When the current Wickremasinghe
government came to power in January 2015, New Delhi managed to convince it to
halt the project, but CCCC pressed for an agreement renewal and work resumed in
August 2016, much to India’s chagrin.
Washington
too is disquieted by these happenings, especially as the Hambantota issue came
to a head in 2018 that happened to be the 70th anniversary year
of US-Sri Lankan diplomatic relations. While unveiling additional financial
help for the Indo-Pacific region late last year, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
said: “We’re convinced that American engagement in the Indo-Pacific benefits
all the nations in that region. [16] We want it to be free, we want it to be open. We’re not
looking for dominance. We’re looking for partnerships.”
Testifying
at the February hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Philip
Davidson, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), maintained that
the transfer last year of an excess US Coast Guard cutter, along with
additional platforms from Japan and India, have augmented the maritime domain
awareness of the Sri Lankan Navy, which is a well-trained and professional force
with the potential to contribute to multilateral maritime interoperability in
the Indian Ocean. [17]
Terming Sri Lanka “a significant
strategic opportunity in the Indian Ocean”, Davidson said that increasing the bilateral navy-to-navy
engagement will be a USINDOPACOM focus in 2019. Indicating that the US’s other regional
partners like India, Japan, France, Australia and New Zealand share a common
aspiration for a free and open Indo-Pacific, he noted, “USINDOPACOM depends
upon the collective capabilities of our allies and partners to address the
challenges to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”
Home to half of the 20 fastest
growing economies that account for over a third of global GDP, the Indo-Pacific
will have unrivaled purchasing power when 65 percent of the world’s middle
class will be inhabiting the region by 2030. [18] In 2017 and 2018 alone, American businesses invested $61
billion in more than 1,500 projects across the region, according to US
Ambassador to Vietnam Daniel Kritenbrink. [19] “US total investment in the Indo-Pacific is now
more than $1.4 trillion, which is more than that from China, Japan and South
Korea combined,” he added.
However, China’s grand strategy for
the Indo-Pacific envisages its foray into the IOR through its ‘string of pearls’
blueprint. Alongside Hambantota and Colombo, the blueprint delineates a chain
of ports through Sonadia, in Bangladesh, Kyaukpyu, in Myanmar, and Laamu Atoll,
in the Maldives. The Sonadia deal was to be signed during Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina’s China visit in 2014, but was aborted on speculation that the
initiative was blocked by India. However, it could be revived, with Hasina
lauding China for being “a key-development partner” with Bangladesh’s 2017
purchase of two Chinese-made Type 035G Ming Class submarines worth $204
million that upgraded its navy into a “three-dimensional force.” [20]
To heighten its presence in the Bay
of Bengal on India’s eastern seaboard, China concluded a $1.3 billion (initial
phase) deal with Myanmar last November to develop a deep-sea port in Kyaukpyu
in the western state of Rakhine. [21] Part of a special
economic zone (SEZ), the port will lie across the Bay where India is developing
a nuclear submarine base codenamed Project Varsha near the Eastern Naval
Command at Visakhapatnam. The project was initially worth $7 billion, but was
reduced appreciably following Myanmar’s fears of a debt-trap. [22]
As with
Sri Lanka, where China friend Rajapaksa signed the Hambantota and other deals
with Beijing before being succeeded by India friend Wickremesinghe, the
Maldives was drawn to China under former President Abdulla Yameen, while
Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, who succeeded him in November 2018, is inclined towards
India. The Yameen government had in March 2018 admitted that China had expressed
interest in building a port in Laamu Atoll to the south. It had also borrowed
heavily from China to build bridges and housing as part of Beijing’s
BRI initiative and reportedly even handed over some islands to China. [23]
A month
after Solih assumed power, India, evidently anxious to forestall any Chinese
naval bases on this Indian Ocean island territory 623 km or 388 miles off its southernmost tip of Kanyakumari,
offered $1.4 billion aid to the Maldives to help it pay off its debt to
China on condition that it distances itself from Beijing. [24] As part of its policy of ‘Neighborhood First’ to
support the island country’s socio-economic development, New Delhi also sought stronger security ties with Male that would
involve permanent deployment of Indian military personnel.
China, however, is hemming India in
with another of its overseas ports, this time in Pakistan, India’s longstanding
foe across the border with which it has gone to war four times, in 1947, 1965, 1971
and 1999. The Gwadar port it is building in Pakistan’s largest province of
Baluchistan will link to Kashgar in China’s far western region of Xinjiang via
the $46 billion China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) that both the partners hail as the “great monument of Pakistan-China
friendship” and which is now a flagship component of the BRI. [25] Gwadar will gain China
a maritime gateway to the Arabian Sea on India’s west and on to the Indian
Ocean, Persian Gulf and the gulfs of Oman and Aden.
India opposes the CPEC, as the
project runs through Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) that
are disputed by India. The CPEC incidentally
obliges Pakistan to pay $40 billion to China over 20 years by way of debt
repayments and dividends. [26] India has also snubbed China twice on the BRI issue, when it boycotted
the BRI Forum meetings held in Beijing in 2017 and last April.
Ironically, while China helps the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan – which, with a population of over 200 million
Muslims, designates Islam as its state religion and is also referred to as the
‘global center of political Islam’ - in Xinjiang, the Communist Party has
imprisoned a million native Muslim Uyghurs in government camps. [27] Survivors recount
being indoctrinated in these camps in an authoritarian effort to subjugate
Uyghur culture and quash the Muslim faith in China.
China may prospectively use Gwadar,
and Hambantota, as PLA Navy bases, in order to bolster its maritime profile in the Indo-Pacific. In August 2017, Pakistan
announced the purchase from China of four modified Type 041 Yuan Class SSKs and
technology transfer for the assembly of four more in the port city of Karachi,
in a deal estimated at $5 billion. [28] The first four submarines were to be delivered by 2023, and the
succeeding four, by 2028, this fleet designated to form the core of Pakistan’s
offshore nuclear second-strike triad.
With regard to the Colombo port, New Delhi is anxious about Beijing’s influence over it.
The port is considered vital for India, which lacks a transshipment port. Colombo fulfils that
requirement, handling a staggering 48 percent of India’s international cargo. [29] The two other regional transshipment hubs for India
fall far behind Colombo, with Singapore accounting for 22 percent and
Malaysia’s Port Klang, 10 percent of India’s international cargo. [30, 31]
The US has hitherto sought to safeguard the Colombo
port. Its Customs and Border Protection Agency, through its Container Security
Initiative, has worked alongside the Sri Lankan Customs Central Intelligence
Unit since 2005 to jointly target high-risk shipments destined for the
US. The port also participates in the Department of Energy’s second line
of defense Megaport Initiative that helps Sri Lanka detect radiological
materials so as to prevent the spread of radiological weapons.
Sri Lanka has tried to compensate India for the Colombo
and Hambantota ports coming under Chinese control by offering a controlling
stake to the Airports Authority of India in Mattala Rajapaksa International
Airport (MRIA), located 15 km from Hambantota. Opened in 2013, at a cost of
$210 million and funded through high interest Chinese commercial loans, MRIA is
Sri Lanka’s second international airport after Colombo’s Bandaranaike
International Airport (BIA). [32] It is, however,
running into losses owing to low demand for which it has been dubbed ‘the
world’s emptiest airport’ and it is perhaps because of this that there has been
no progress on the proposal with India. [33]
The Indian government has, however, extended financial assistance of over $45 million for upgrading Kankesanthurai harbour in the Jaffna district to a full-fledged commercial port towards Sri Lanka’s efforts to become a regional maritime hub. [34] The harbour and its berthing piers had been wrecked by the tsunami in 2004 and cyclone Nisha in 2008.
Also, in a stunning move that
challenges China and smothers its hitherto single largest FDI into Sri Lanka
(of the $1.4 billion Colombo financial city), India’s Accord Group recently
signed a $3.8 billion deal with the Sultanate of Oman’s Ministry of Oil and Gas
to build an oil refinery in Sri Lanka. [35] Ironically, the 585-acre facility will come up
close to the Hambantota port from where it will be exporting the 9 million
tonnes of refined products it will be producing annually upon its commissioning
in 44 months. While the Chennai-based Accord Group will control 70 percent of
the joint venture, the Omani ministry will hold the rest. However, Oman’s oil ministry subsequently
denied its participation, leading Sri
Lankan Board of Investment Director
General Champika Malalgoda to reportedly affirm that the deal was “still going
ahead”. [36]
Reacting to the media’s question on the proposed
refinery, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang maintained that
Beijing had an “open attitude” regarding India’s investments in the island
nation. [37] “While we make our
contribution to the development of Sri Lanka, China is not as narrow minded as
you thought,” he added.
Colombo
and New Delhi have also agreed to a 50-year lease agreement to jointly operate
a strategic World War II-era oil facility in the Trincomalee harbour. It has
been widely reported – but debunked officially - that the US, Japan and India
are seeking to jointly develop Trincomalee port - which had been an Indian
Ocean base for the Allied Forces - as a logistics hub for South Asia so as to counterbalance China’s presence in Hambantota and Colombo. [38] All three countries have sent ships to the Trincomalee harbor, in
north-eastern Sri Lanka, on goodwill visits and India has stationed a naval
officer there.
It will actually be a collaborative
effort between Japan, India and Sri Lanka to
expand this strategically-located port, at a cost between $90 million and $117
million. [39] Trincomalee is one of the three regional ports – the others being Dawei in Myanmar and Matarbari in Bangladesh – that Japan
plans to develop, through yen loans, as part of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s
‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’.
A Japanese Maritime
Self-Defense Force destroyer was in the
Trincomalee harbor when Japan’s Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera was visiting
it, in what was the
first such visit to Sri Lanka by a Japanese defense minister, and this was soon followed by USS Anchorage and embarked MEU. Sri
Lanka’s navy also participated last August for the first time in Rim of the
Pacific (RIMPAC), the
world’s largest US Pacific Fleet-led international maritime warfare exercise, while Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), which too is
conducted by the US Pacific Fleet, was held at Trincomalee also for the first
time in October 2017. [40, 41]
It has
been reported that 450 naval vessels from 28 countries have called on Sri Lanka
between 2008 and 2017, with Indian warships topping the list with 90 visits,
followed by 65 from Japan and 30 from China. [42]
The US Navy has conducted three iterations aimed at promoting Sri Lanka as a regional hub for logistics and commerce. [43] Following two such initiatives at Colombo’s Bandaranaike airport and at Trincomalee last August, and at the airport last December, the US Navy performed the third such iteration for over a week last December at the Bandaranaike airport. Washington paid about $140,000 for the last cargo transfer. [44]
The iterations involve several US naval aircraft bringing in a variety of non-lethal supplies to the commercial airport. January saw the supplies being transferred between planes and then flown to the nuclear-powered supercarrier, USS John C. Stennis, at sea. These operations ensure that no cargo, military equipment or personnel remain in Sri Lanka after the completion of the cargo transfers.
A subsequent statement by the 7th Fleet maintained: “Taking advantage of a growing naval partnership with Sri Lanka, the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis established a logistics hub in Sri Lanka to receive support, supplies and services at sea. [45] A C-2 Greyhound carrier onboard delivery aircraft accessed the hub’s strategic location before bringing supplies to John C. Stennis. Established on a temporary basis in the island nation, the hub provides logistics support to US Navy ships operating in the Indian Ocean.”
Lt. Bryan Ortiz, John C. Stennis’ stock control division officer,
pointed out that the primary purpose of the operation was to provide
mission-critical supplies and services to US Navy ships transiting through and
operating in the Indian Ocean. “The secondary purpose is to demonstrate the US
Navy’s ability to establish a temporary logistics hub ashore where no enduring
US Navy logistics footprint exists,” he added.
In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Davidson
mentioned that USINDOPACOM would “regain the
advantage” by positioning theater infrastructure that supported expeditionary
capability that was agile and resilient and would serve as dynamic basing for
the US maritime and air forces. [46]
Questions have been raised in Sri
Lanka’s Parliament on the security impact of the use of the country’s
commercial ports to conduct cargo transfers by the US military. An MP asked whether
Colombo was contemplating signing a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with
Washington. [47] There were also
references to the US’s $480 million grant
assistance to Sri Lanka from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) for infrastructure
development projects. [48] Both the US Embassy in Colombo and the Sri Lankan
government have, however, specified that the two countries had not indicated
any “interest, wish or desire to establish a base in Trincomalee, the Eastern
Province, or any other part of Sri Lanka”. [49]
The developments in Sri Lanka and the littoral
underscore the economic, political and strategic significance of the IOR that
is traversed by major maritime trade routes that stretch from the Strait of
Hormuz to the west to the Strait of Malacca in the east and freight a third of
the world’s maritime cargo, two thirds of global oil and half the world’s
container traffic. [50]
Over half the world’s oil and gas deposits are said to
be located in this maritime expanse, which also accounts for all of India’s
sea-borne trade, 80 percent of Japan’s oil supplies and 60 percent of China’s.
[51] A US Naval War
College-sponsored study cited IOR replacing the North Atlantic as the central
artery of world commerce. [52] The region is also
replete with nuclear-powered states, failed states, as well as those wracked by
poverty, piracy, terrorism and fundamentalism.
Sri Lanka’s worth in this region is exemplified by
Bethesda-based Small Wars Journal that cites its location as the most central
maritime route between the Persian Gulf and Indonesia. [53] The country is
additionally ideally positioned to access troubled spots throughout the IOR, as
it can readily support operations in the Middle East, Afghanistan or South East
Asia; evidenced by the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in South Asia choosing
Sri Lanka to locate his headquarters during World War II. The
island nation, now weakened by terrorism and the unfortunate political divide, continues
to sustain global interest, a victim of its own strategic allure.
Sarosh Bana is the Executive Editor of India's oldest and most widely read national fortnightly on business, Business India, published out of Mumbai. He writes extensively on defense and security, policy, strategy, politics, foreign affairs, cyber security, space, energy, environment, food and agriculture, shipping and ports, and urban and rural development. He is also a frequent speaker on defense and security, foreign affairs and strategy, and his writings have been published in some of the leading publications, journals and think tanks across the world.
Photo by Dan Lundberg, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.
[17] Admiral Philip S.
Davidson, ‘Statement of Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command Before The Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command Posture 12 February 2019’, Senate Armed Services
Committee, February 2019, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_02-12-19.pdf
[49]
FT Sri Lanka, ‘Government rejects reports of moves to set up US military base
in Sri Lanka’, FT Sri Lanka, January 2019, http://www.ft.lk/front-page/Government-rejects-reports-of-moves-to-set-up-US--military-base-in-Sri-Lanka/44-671699
[post_title] => FPC Briefing: Exploiting an idyll - US, Indian and Japanese efforts to counterbalance China in Sri Lanka
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[post_content] => As the Brexit process appears to be drawing to an uncertain close, there are still lessons to be learned from the past three years for the United Kingdom and the European Union. The polarisation of political attitudes toward the Union – particularly in the Eurosceptic movement, a phenomenon many now associate exclusively with far-right ideology and nationalism – makes for uneasy reconciliations between opposing viewpoints competing over the Union’s future post-Brexit. But what is Euroscepticism? In the United Kingdom, Euroscepticism now seems to be synonymous with the desire to leave the European Union. However, this was not always the case, nor is it currently the case where Eurosceptic sentiment is concerned elsewhere in the European Union; indeed, the broadening of the term ‘Eurosceptic’ risks lumping together a myriad of distinct political ideologies and (sometimes contrasting) views on European membership, not all of whom are expressly in favour of dissolving or departing the Union, rather reforming it, minimising the centralisation of European government and, crucially, safeguarding Member State sovereignty.[1]
In short, not all Eurosceptic movements need necessarily lead to a departure from the Union; indeed, as this article shall argue, a strand of sensible Euroscepticism may represent a healthy balance for the Union’s political composition. Remembering that the Eurosceptic movement was not always defined by the most extreme voices within it may be the key to reclaiming the ‘middle ground’ – and to encouraging a more moderate form of politics which allow for better international cooperation than before.
2016 was a seminal year in European politics; with the advent of Brexit and a surge of far-right nationalism across Europe, fears abounded in Western European policy circles that the departure of the United Kingdom might herald an existential crisis for the European Union as a whole.[2] Certainly the entire Brexit process has ultimately compelled greater introspection within the European institutions than has previously been the case. With populism and right-wing political parties now firmly entrenched in mainstream European politics, there is now more than ever a clear need for the European Union to improve, for want of a better phrase, its marketability in the eyes of its constituent Member States. Not only must it prove its worth to those Member States where anti-Union sentiments run high, it must acknowledge – and find a means to deal with – the fact that it has not always succeeded in making its citizens feel represented at the highest level. By not doing so, it will continue to (however unwittingly) provide fuel for anti-Union sentiment to grow and develop, and for disinformation to permeate, to the detriment of the Union as a whole.
These are not easy-fix problems with an immediate answer. There are clear lessons to be learned from Brexit, for the European Union, its Member States, and regional allies. The risk, however, is that not all of them are fully understood in time to prevent another membership crisis. In fact, it may take another membership crisis within the Union to fully understand the circumstances which allowed Brexit to unfold as far as it has done. The roots of Brexit lie in the growth of Eurosceptic sentiment within the United Kingdom and the replacement of moderate politics by polarised ideologies vehemently opposed to European integration and fearful of the spectre of overbearing Union interference in domestic policies. So far, the Union has not done much to provide a positive counter-message to these fears; nor has it adequately tackled the surfeit of misinformation fuelling them.[3] As distasteful as such Eurosceptic views may be to the European elite, it is absolutely essential that they are not wholly ignored – many within the Eurosceptic camp (inside and outside the UK) were driven to such extremes of ideology by perceived failures of the Union to adequately assess the mood of its citizens, such as the Union’s tone-deaf response to the European migrant crisis in 2015 and its attempt to enforce migrant quotas upon Member States.[4] A surge in Eurosceptic sentiment in the Central European nations directly followed, and in the governments of Austria and the Visegrad Four, and restricting migration remains fundamental to many political manifestos today.[5]
Although the unpredictable and chaotic way in which Brexit has developed may, by way of example, have discouraged another membership crisis in the short term – as Member States with high levels of Eurosceptic sentiment closely watch how events unfold in Britain – the Union still has some way to go to win back approval in the troubled Central European states, and even still faces significant Eurosceptic sentiment closer to home in France and Italy. Such sentiment seems chiefly to represent a lack of trust in the Union and its intentions, particularly in Central Europe. As of autumn 2018, Eurobarometer notes that negative images of the European Union still persist in Greece, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Italy and France, with a majority of residents of the Visegrad nations (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia) displaying a significant lack of trust in the European institutions.[6]The Danger of Complacency
Although it is unlikely we will see another membership crisis in the near future, there is still a strong argument to tackle Eurosceptic sentiment within the Union more intelligently and constructively than has previously been the case. In the immediate wake of the British referendum in 2016, it was posited that other Member States might follow suit and attempt to depart the Union. ‘Czexit’, ‘Grexit’ and even ‘Frexit’ suddenly became buzzwords stirring up panic in European circles over the potential consequences of British departure, with some fearing a domino effect of Member States queuing to leave.[7] In Danish politics, the Brexit process was keenly observed with a view toward treating it as a blueprint for a similar campaign toward a referendum on Danish membership. Perhaps unsurprisingly in hindsight – given the chaos and uncertainty into which Brexit has now devolved – no such referendum took place in Denmark.[8] Neither did a domino effect across the Union unfold, nor in fact have there been serious rumblings since 2017 of Member States gearing up for the level of internal debate that might result in referenda on Union membership.
One might be forgiven, therefore, for believing that the entire Brexit situation was an aberration, whether brought on by the mishandling of the 2016 referendum by the incumbent government or by domestic party politics and internecine warfare within the Conservative Party in the UK; that it was somehow unique to the United Kingdom and the British way of thinking. Whilst it is true that Brexit, as-is, could only have happened in the UK, it is dangerously out of tune with the reality of political sentiment across broad swathes of Europe over the past three years to dismiss the possibility of another membership crisis occurring elsewhere once the chaos of Brexit has diminished and the severity of the situation has faded over time.
Indeed, one of the prime causes of Brexit is a situation that is closely mirrored elsewhere, particularly in the Central European states where Eurosceptic sentiment traditionally runs highest in the Union. The situation is thus: a perceived disconnect from ‘Europe’ – whether by historical and geographical separation, as is the case in the UK, or by linguistic and political history, as is the case in the Central European states – is then galvanised into stronger sentiments by domestic actors scapegoating internal woes, whether economic or societal, upon interference and overbearing legislation by the European Union’s governing institutions. In the United Kingdom and wider Europe this is readily verifiable by the adoption of increasingly right-wing policies and sentiment in both mainstream and fringe political parties.[9] Similarly, the migration crisis of 2015 and the global financial crisis of 2008 both severely damaged European Union integrity in the eyes of relatively new Member States from the Central European region. The ‘Visegrad Four’ – the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary – became particularly united on the issue of migration, fiercely resisting the concept of a compulsory EU-wide mechanism for relocating refugees during the peak of the 2015 crisis.[10] Indeed, resistance to quotas seen widely as being imposed by Brussels became a common theme in Central European national political campaigns and contributed greatly to Central European mistrust of the Union’s governing institutions. Euroscepticism remains a common theme in all four Visegrad nations today, although to varying degrees.[11]
However, attempts thus far to counter the spread of Euroscepticism have been strangely slow and apparently poorly formed. It is telling that in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 UK referendum, nationalism, populism and Euroscepticism were instantly lumped together as a global, seemingly unstoppable phenomenon by those scrambling to unpick the situation.[12] This was a mistake, and one that would be repeated elsewhere; the myriad motivations behind Leave voters in the UK, Front National voters in France in 2017 and (more recently) Matteo Salvini supporters in Italy were not adequately dissected, instead being thrown into the same basket, lumping together themes like racism, nationalism, anti-migration rhetoric, anti-corruption and voter dissatisfaction with mainstream political parties under the blanket term ‘populism’, with those who pandered to such tastes labelled demagogues.[13] An opportunity to correct misinformed voters, counter disinformation campaigns and bring the Union closer to its own citizens was lost by the then-centre ground. Instead, such populist movements and their leaders captured great chunks of dissatisfied voters and shifted the balance of power in European politics; a trend that may well be set to continue in the European Parliamentary elections forthcoming in May 2019. Indeed, with the departure of the United Kingdom from the Union, a much more radical shift to the right may be apparent in the composition of the Parliament.
Retaking the Middle Ground
The way in which Eurosceptic views have been handled in the academic and political worlds therefore leaves much to be desired. Within pro-European academia there is a striking tendency to equate Euroscepticism with far-right political tendencies, a susceptibility to misinformation (intentional or accidental) and nationalism and xenophobia. This is often, although not always, mirrored in political expression. Although it has not perhaps become fully apparent, the danger of ‘lumping together’ mild Euroscepticism with hardline nationalism and far-right ideology is significant.
Why? For two reasons – firstly, politically, that it risks polarising the ‘mild’ Eurosceptics further. By being categorised alongside much more extreme viewpoints, those who hold honest and reasonable doubts over Union membership – benefits for citizens, the accountability of its leaders and fair representation in the European institutions – may feel marginalised and quietly cut off from a means of expressing their concerns, and may therefore be driven into greater extremes of dissatisfaction from which they are vulnerable to far-right demagoguery and targeted disinformation campaigns preying upon existing fears. It is therefore not in the Union’s interest to polarise Eurosceptic sentiment further; the fact that it has so far failed to win over much of this ‘middle ground’ of mild Euroscepticism speaks to its failure in marketing itself adequately to its own citizens. It is no surprise that nationalism and populism has surged across Europe, not just the United Kingdom, in recent years.
Secondly, and subsequently, Euroscepticism may be of value to the Union in a way that has not been fully appreciated. Eurosceptic sentiment, properly represented in the European Parliament by elected Members, should represent a check or balance on the Union’s activities, particularly regarding third countries on the fringes of Union membership or on issues splitting opinion, such as the controversial debate over common European defense. On these issues, it is Eurosceptic sentiment that represents a counterbalance to what may be seen as overbearing or hasty Union behaviour either internally or with foreign powers, and – crucially – mild Eurosceptic politicians have historically been outspoken in arguing for the integrity of Member State sovereignty and the preservation of national competencies. Certainly Eurosceptic politicians are not the only ones to speak in favour of preserving national sovereignties; however, by challenging the establishment of the European institutions and presenting the public face for Member State independence, they are uniquely able to appeal to a voter base which might otherwise be absorbed by more extreme political movements. Were the Eurosceptic voice within the European institutions to be better internalised, therefore, and the issues raised by Eurosceptics tackled by more open engagement of the Union with its citizens, the Union would appear more self-aware and better equipped to respond to concerns and fears held by its own citizens and by third countries wavering between closer orientation with the European Union or alignment with other foreign powers.
Therefore, Eurosceptics may, perhaps counter-intuitively, be of value to the European Union’s future. Theirs may be a difficult voice for pro-federalists to hear but it is one that must be heard nonetheless. Ahead of the elections for the European Parliament in May 2019, the political pendulum may be swinging back to the centre ground, but it will be a centre that has shifted far further to the right than ever before. The battle for European hearts and minds, so to speak, is one that will continue long into the future, and if the Union wishes to adequately represent its citizens’ views and maintain the support of its populace it must take a much longer view of its own future. The European Union needs to respect the Eurosceptic voice – but not pander to it – in order to rebalance itself and ensure its survival into the distant future.
Louis Cox-Brusseau is a political analyst focused on the Visegrad Group of countries.Photo by Klara ovc, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.[1]Laure Neumayer, ‘Euroscepticism in Central Europe’ Central European History and the European Union, January 2007, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304727668_Euroscepticism_in_Central_Europe[2] Lianna Brinded, ‘Brexit will be the domino effect for more referendums’ Business Insider, May 2016, https://static2.businessinsider.com/ipsos-mori-eu-referendum-poll-brexit-impact-on-more-referendums-2016-5[3] Centre for European Reform, ‘What is Europe doing to fight disinformation?’, November 2018, https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2018/what-europe-doing-fight-disinformation[4] BBC News, ‘Migrant crisis: Opponents furious over new quotas’, September 2015, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34331126 and The Federalist,
‘Why The EU’s Court Win Over Migrant Quotas May Be A Pyrrhic Victory’, September 2017, https://thefederalist.com/2017/09/11/eus-court-win-migrant-quotas-may-pyrrhic-victory/[5] Visegrad Post, ‘Immigration: Merkel Finally Agrees With The Visegrad Group’, Visegrad Post, February 2019, https://visegradpost.com/en/2019/02/08/immigration-merkel-finally-agrees-with-the-visegrad-group/[6] ‘Standard Eurobarometer 90: Autumn 2018: Public opinion in the European Union’ European Commission November 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2215[7] Jon Henley, ‘Could Brexit trigger a domino effect in Europe?’ The Guardian, June 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/10/brexit-domino-effect-europe-eu-referendum-uk[8] The Local, ‘Danish support for EU at record high’ The Local, January 2019, https://www.thelocal.dk/20190104/danish-eu-support-at-record-high-poll[9] Ashley Kirk, ‘How the rise of the populist far-Right has swept through Europe in 2017’, The Telegraph, October 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2017/10/24/rise-populist-far-right-has-swept-europe-2017/[10] Aneta Zachová, Edit Zgut, Karolina Zbytniewska, Michał Strzałkowski and Zuzana Gabrizova, ‘Visegrad nations united against mandatory relocation quotas’ Euractiv, July 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/visegrad-nations-united-against-mandatory-relocation-quotas/[11] Louis-Cox Brusseau, ‘Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic: A Central European disaster waiting to happen, or hot air?’, Global Risk Insights, August 2018, https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/08/euroscepticism-czech-republic-central-european-disaster-waiting-happen-hot-air/[12] George Friedman, ‘3 Reasons Brits Voted for Brexit’ Forbes, July 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2016/07/05/3-reasons-brits-voted-for-brexit/[13] Ian Bremmer, ‘These 5 Countries Show How the European Far-Right Is Growing in Power’, Time Online, September 2018, http://time.com/5395444/europe-far-right-italy-salvini-sweden-france-germany/
[post_title] => Lessons from Brexit: (Re)balancing Euroscepticism
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[post_content] => As Islamic State faces its demise as a territorial unit in the Middle East it is worth considering why it was so attractive to so many Central AsiansThe spate of attacks by Central Asians overseas in 2017 and the spectre of ISIS emerging in the region after the attack on four foreign cyclists in Tajikistan in July 2018, have generated alarm about Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) and other jihadist groups in a region with historically very low levels of terrorist attacks. Analysts have sought to identify ‘root causes’ in the region such as the rise of radical or non-traditional Islam, increasing poverty since the end of the Soviet Union coupled with domestic authoritarianism and repression. However, such observations although important need be to unpacked as the reality is more complex.
Conditions for radicalization: routes not roots
A report from the International Crisis Group in 2015 argued that state repression alongside poverty leads to radicalisation.[1] While these factors may offer a foil for explaining why many of Central Asia’s extremists have left the region for Iraq and Syria, they fail to take into account a range of other conditions that explain radicalisation, both psychological and social.
Assessing the psychological processes of the individual might help to shed light on their motivations to terrorist involvements. As seen in the terror attacks in Stockholm and New York, the perpetrators left the country a decade ago.[2] None of them showed tendencies towards extremist or religious behaviours in their home countries. It appears, instead, that they developed such views whilst being abroad. Available research suggests that the large majority of fighters who decide to travel to Syria are labour migrants in Russia and have often been recruited by Chechens in Moscow.[3]
This means that we need to look beyond domestic political and economic grievances and look more in-depth into the personal stories of the individuals to understand why Central Asians become terrorists. In Central Asia local and regional identities are more important than national identities. As pointed out by many experts such as Ed Lemon and Noah Tucker, when individuals leave their local communities to travel to Russia for work purposes, they are often cut-off from their familiar communities and network. Disassociated to some degree from home their transcendent identity as Muslims comes to the fore,[4] and may be hardened by the experience of discrimination.[5]
When Central Asian migrants move to Russia, they are often faced with socio-economic struggles such as poor living conditions, exploitation, uncertainty regarding their documentation, and physical and racial abuse. Faced with these difficulties, some individuals experience personal crisis and are drawn to the margins of society, becoming more vulnerable to the external influences of terrorist recruiters. Extremist groups recognised this opportunity. As Noah Tuckers highlights, ‘it is clear that both AQ-affiliated groups and ISIS devoted specific recruiting resources to ethnic Uzbeks working in Russia, both online and in real life’.
The role of Islam: more complex than one might think
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 hugely accelerated an ongoing process of the revival of Islam in the region. The reinvention and restriction of Islam in the late Soviet period, also meant that in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the level of Islamic literacy in the region was very low. The switch from Arabic script in 1926 made Central Asian scholars lose their ability to read the Arabic religious scripts and isolated the region from the Muslim world.
The rebirth of Islam in the region offers new opportunities, but also creates new risks. The new connections with the Islamic world brought more extreme interpretations of the faith from abroad, such as Salafism from the Middle East and the North Caucasus. Moreover, Islam has often been viewed as an important social mobilising force challenging the region’s authoritarian leadership. In this regard, radical Islamist activism is perceived as a serious threat to the internal stability of these countries and to the survival of Central Asian secular regimes.
The Soviet legacy of atheism means that the new generation of Central Asians didn’t grow up with strong religious traditional education that could form a counterweight to extremism. Yet as argued by Heathershaw and Montgomery there is little evidence that socially conservative Muslims are more likely to be politically radical than more secularised Muslims.[6] As the profile of Akbarjon Jalilov, the suspect in the St Petersburg terrorist attack demonstrates, few Central Asian terrorists are pious or followed a religious education. Most of the Central Asian perpetrators adopted religion (discovered Islam) while being abroad often in a very short period of time.
Such observations point out that religion perhaps has little to do with the suicidal attacks but rather is the specific narrative framework within which the recruits could identify and fulfil their aspirations that matter. In this sense, as observed by Oliver Roy, while reflecting in the case of the European jihadists recruits to Islamic State, ‘terrorism does not arise from the radicalisation of Islam, but from the Islamisation of radicalisation’, religious ideology plays very little role here.[7]The response from state authorities: potential cure or proximate cause?
In response to terrorist threats, Central Asian governments adopted a series of counterterrorism programs and laws to combat terrorism and religious extremism, often curtailing human rights and the rule of law. Central Asian governments have also been taking advantage of the perceived security threats posed by Muslim radicals to enforce repressive policies domestically. States have repeatedly played the ‘Islamic terrorism’ card to reinforce and legitimate their repressive measures against actors presumed to be a terrorist menace.
In Tajikistan the regime banned the only legal Islamic political party (IRPT), in Central Asia in September 2015, naming them as a ‘terrorist organization’. Similarly, in Kazakhstan the regime has designated Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, a political opposition movement led by former regime insider, Mukhtar Ablyazov, as an extremist organization.[8] Further as the Central Asia Political Exiles Database demonstrates, the regimes target political enemies by labelling them as ‘terrorists’.[9] A similar rationale is applied in the regime’s abuse of the Interpol’s notice system to persecute national human rights defenders, moderate Islamic believers, civil society activists and critical journalists.
Under the pretext of religious extremism, states have further portrayed violence linked to local political struggles as ‘terrorists’ attacks. The incidents in Aktobe, in the Western oil rich part of Kazakhstan in 2011 and 2016 have revealed the rising socioeconomic grievances among the population against the government.[10]Both incidents targeted law enforcement agencies. As the incidents demonstrate, the government’s failure to respond to political and economic injustices have affected citizens' inclination to commit violent acts as protests against the government’s policies. The START Database further validates these observations.[11] As the data below illustrates, most of the attacks in Central Asia are targeting government and law enforcement agencies.
START Database 2000-2017 Central Asian Terrorist target attacks (%)[12]
The terrorist threat in Central Asia needs to be taken seriously and demands broader engagement in the region. However, as the article illustrates, in Central Asia the ‘threat’ has often been manipulated and exaggerated by state actors to pursue strategic domestic policies and increase regime’s legitimacy. We need to reflect more in-depth on the contested and political nature of terrorism in Central Asia.
[1] International Crisis Group, Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia, January 2015, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/syria-calling-radicalisation-central-asia[2] David Gauthier-Villars and Drew Hinshaw, Stockholm Attack Puts Focus on Terrorists From Central Asia, Wall Street Journal, April 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/stockholm-attack-puts-focus-on-terrorists-from-central-asia-1491764083 and BBC, New York truck attack: Sayfullo Saipov pleads not guilty, November 2017, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-42161549?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/cggpe1p9dwqt/new-york-truck-attack&link_location=live-reporting-story[3] Daniil Turovsky, How Isis is recruiting migrant workers in Moscow to join the fighting in Syria, Guardian, May 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/isis-russia-syria-islamic-extremism[4] Noah Tucker, What Happens When Your Town Becomes an ISIS Recruiting Ground?, Central Asia Program, July 2018, http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Tucker-CAP-Paper-July-2018.pdf[5] Arne Seifert, The problems of Central Asian migration to Russia, January 2018, https://doc-research.org/2018/01/the-problems-of-central-asian-migration-to-russia/[6] John Heathershaw and David W Montgomery, The Myth of Post-Soviet Muslim Radicalization in the Central Asian Republics, Chatham House, November 2014, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/myth-post-soviet-muslim-radicalization-central-asian-republics[7] Olivier Roy, Who are the new jihadis?, The Guardian, April 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/apr/13/who-are-the-new-jihadis[8] Eurasianet, Kazakhstan: Court Dubs Opposition Movement Extremist, March 2013, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-court-dubs-opposition-movement-extremist[9] For more on the Central Asian Political Exiles Database see here: https://excas.net/projects/political-exiles/[10] United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 – Kazakhstan, July 2017, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e43413.html[11] The Global Terrorism Database (START) https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/[12] Based on author’s own calculation
[post_title] => The state of Islamic threat in Central Asia: assessing the threat of terrorism from Central Asia
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[post_content] => This report finds that recent changes in EU border management have limited refugees’ movement across Europe, and as such, have resulted in outsourcing of refugee settlement and care to states previously described as ‘transit’ countries along the Balkan Route(s): Serbia, Greece and Bosnia. This report analyses the problems related to refugee provisions and accommodation in these countries and along the Balkan Route(s) towards Western Europe. It highlights the disparity of refugee services, housing and living conditions across the region, and acute and ongoing humanitarian crises. The report discusses the key factors affecting poor living conditions for refugees, including: overcrowding, fragmentation of services along the routes, and a lack of consistency in camp management. Subsequently, the report discusses a range of other refugee housing options existing in transit countries - including informal and makeshift camps, squats, hotels and UN-supported housing schemes known as ‘urban shelters’ - and notes the strengths and weaknesses of each. The findings are based on the authors’ field research in Serbia, mainland Greece and the islands of Lesvos, Samos, Chios and Kos, between 2017 and 2019.
A number of key conclusions can be drawn from the report:
(1) Population size and levels of overcrowding are one of the fundamental factors affecting provisions and quality of life in all types of refugee housing. Mainland camps and informal housing provision such as squats, are able to control the number of residents they have whereas island reception centres have far less control.
(2) Relationships between camps, reception centres and third sector provision plays a key role in determining access to healthcare, sanitation, psycho-social support and community spaces and whether these are provided inside or outside of accommodation spaces.
(3) Lack of clarity and transparency surrounding asylum procedures leads to increased anxiety about the process.
(4) Different forms of housing support are dependent on individual circumstances; however, provision lacks flexibility, particularly surrounding vulnerable cases where a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not suitable.
(5) Refugees are driven towards informal housing such as squats and makeshift settlements for two main reasons: poor camp conditions or overcrowding, and uncertainty over the asylum process, including long waits for asylum interviews in Greece.
(6) There is a lack of formal support for people living in informal accommodation, particularly healthcare, food and sanitation.
The report makes a number of recommendations for policy change:
(1) The urgent need to manage the numbers of people living in the island reception centres, by increasing the number of transfers to mainland Greece or elsewhere in Europe; and improving mainland living conditions and provision.
(2) The need for greater transparency and increased dialogue between some reception centres and third sector provision.
(3) Urgent increase in capacity to process asylum registrations in Greece and thus reduce current waiting times and overcrowding in reception centres. More, and better quality of information provided to refugees in the early stages of the asylum process, about each stage, predicted waiting times and what each stage means; to reduce anxiety for people living in reception centres.
(4) Greater flexibility is required in the provision of housing, especially for vulnerable cases where the needs of individuals differ greatly. To achieve this greater resource is required.
(5) Increased funding and support for the UN ‘Urban Shelter’ scheme which transfers refugees from camps and settles them in apartments. Increased capacity of non-camp housing, and creation of incentives for local authorities reluctant to cooperate with the scheme.
Introduction
This report focuses on refugee housing and welfare provision along the key hotspots along the Balkan Route(s). The report draws on field research[1] carried out between 2017 and 2019 in:
Belgrade
Thessaloniki
Athens
The Aegean Islands:
Lesvos
Chios
Samos
Kos
The report assesses the current welfare and housing provision for refugees in this geographical region, analysing the strengths and weaknesses of both formal (municipality, state and international) and informal (NGO and informal collectives) provision and highlighting key areas for improvement. It also makes reference to funding usage and the gaps in the system (including, but not exclusively: treatment of vulnerable people and minors). It is broken down into four key themes to highlight specific areas of concern in the region:
The disparity of refugee accommodation and provision along the route
The limited continuity of provision and availability of information between geographical regions
Squats, informal housing, and makeshift camps
‘Urban shelters’ and apartments
Each area is further broken down into three sections. First, a problem is identified and described. The problem is then situated in the findings. Finally, a recommendation is given.
This report is based on the work of four researchers:
Dr Amanda Russell Beattie (Aston University)
Dr Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik (Aston University)
Dr Patrycja Rozbicka (Aston University)
Dr Gemma Bird (The University of Liverpool).
The report’s findings are based on primary research including: interviews with NGOs and their beneficiaries, European Union officials, local and national government staff dealing with migration (Serbia, Greece), informal and formal housing providers, social workers, housing officers, aid organisations (MSF and UNHCR), as well as insights gained from longer periods of time spent in the region working with the third sector.
The disparity in accommodation and service quality across transit regions The main differences in reception centre or camp conditions are caused by 4 identifiable variables:
Camp management
The physical space repurposed into a camp
Population size relative to number of spaces available
Presence of third-sector providers
Type of Space
The conditions in Reception Centres (RICs) on the islands of Lesvos, Chios and Samos vary considerably from the rest of the region. All three reception centres visited are re-purposed military bases and struggle to adequately deal with the current influx of refugees. A majority of the RICs are overcrowded with a disproportional number of refugees living outside the Centre’s delimited borders. The ad hoc accommodation is provided in containers, tents, and makeshift shelters, which are not suitable for the local weather conditions (too hot in summer and not providing enough protection from the cold and rain in winter). They are permeable and rain, snow, and vermin easily penetrate the fabric of the makeshift homes.
For example, on the island of Samos, there are currently (January 2019) over 4000 refugees accommodated in Vathy RIC with an official capacity of 700 and an overflow space referred to as ‘The Jungle’. Similarly, on Lesvos Moria RIC which has its own overflow space, ‘The Olive Grove’. In July 2017, the population of the RIC plus the ‘Olive Grove’ was approximately 7467 individuals, rising to 9000 in 2018 (New York Times, 2018). In January 2019 a single tent, housing 50 individuals, burnt down. While no one was killed in this incident it did reveal the unsuitable nature of the ad hoc shelters resulting from overcrowding (AYS Daily Digest 2019).
Third Sector Provision/Support
The support offered by the third sector differs between the various areas investigated, as does the relationships between camp or reception centre officials, local and national government, and third sector providers. For instance, MSF had a strong presence on Lesvos and Chios. In November 2018 they undertook a vaccination program for all children in the RICs. However, their involvement on Samos is limited as they are unable to carry out these programmes inside the RIC. Whilst the vaccination programme will go ahead it happens outside of the RIC on Samos. Their lack of access to the RIC limits them to working with and supporting volunteer networks and providing funding to smaller grassroots NGOs.
The variations in service availability and quality is evident when comparing Lesvos and Samos. There are more than 40 NGOs working on Lesvos to support the refugee population with some having access to Moria RIC and others working in the neighbouring town of Mytilene and with nearby Kera Tepe and Pikpa camps. Conversely, on Samos, there were until recently fewer than 10 registered NGOs. Against a backdrop of a rapid increase in the size of the refugee population on Samos and a clear need for additional support for provision of basic needs and services (i.e. access to toilets, medical attention, laundry and legal support) this number is increasing. For example, between 2 January – 24 January 2019 the NGO Refugees 4 Refugees set up a distribution centre for women and children while Attika Human Support began distributing clothing to men.
Similar variations in NGOs’ access to official camps exist across the Balkan Route(s). Two official reception centres in the vicinity of Belgrade have completely different arrangements with NGOs. Whilst the Krnjaca Reception Centre hosts multiple local and international NGOs providing a range of services, the Obrenovac Reception Centre with a much larger population, allows access to far fewer NGOs. Authorities claim that access is controlled so as to avoid duplication of services. However, NGOs do also act as watchdogs of camp conditions. Across the region, there is evidence that third party access seems to be more restricted in camps known for poorer conditions.
NGOs need to remain flexible and responsive to changing needs. NGO Samos Volunteers, for instance, is facing over-crowding in its social centre and their basic English language classes have waiting lists. They are not granted access to the RIC. They support the refugee population within ‘The Jungle’. Interviews with Reception and Identification Service officials suggest the reticence for a strong working relationship with NGOs is to ensure that the refugee population are not provided with false hopes from the NGO/volunteer sector about the asylum process. Yet this message is not consistent with those of refugee camps in Athens, for example, which rely on NGO support to deliver mother and baby spaces, community centres, sewing rooms and English lessons.
NGO and support networks are in constant flux, partly as they rely on volunteers. For instance, in July 2018, the voluntary support network on Kos had disintegrated. In January 2019, a number of NGOs including groups from Chios, Lesvos and even further afield in Calais, have put out calls for additional volunteers, since refugees continue to arrive but organisations tend to be understaffed in winter and spring, with most volunteers arriving in the summer.
Population Size
There are significant differences in living conditions in overcrowded camps, as compared to those functioning at or below capacity. Skaramagas, a refugee camp just outside Athens, and the Krnjaca centre in Serbia are seen by residents and NGOs as ‘better’ than many other camps. In Skaramagas, the containers used for the accommodation have heating and air conditioning and the camp offers a range of support and activities, such as mother and baby sessions. The residents are also able to build chicken coops and sell eggs in the camp. The camp has a population of 2000 with around half being under 18. Similarly, the Krnjaca centre outside Belgrade hosted 300 people in 2018, though it has capacity for around 1000 people. This allows minimum camp standards to be met, services not to be overloaded and stretched, and staff to get know most of the residents personally and respond to issues in a timely and more informed manner. The lower populations of camps in Serbia and mainland Greece are often the result of border management policies which mean that fewer people are managing to leave the islands (whilst arrivals continue) and move northwards, as well as through constant changes in the route. The Krnjaca camp ‘emptied’ as the route moved towards Bosnia. Whilst the Krnjaca camp is under capacity, several thousand people are now living in makeshift camps in Bosnia, particularly around the Croatian border.
RECOMMENDATION: Alleviate overcrowding of island camps by increasing transfers to the mainland. Improve all camp conditions to ensure that minimum standards can be met. The limited continuity of provision and availability of information between geographical regionsManagement of refugee camps and reception centres
One of the most significant factors in camp conditions is management. There is a multitude of actors involved: including the military, private sector companies and municipalities, with overall responsibility for camps as a system delegated to relevant national Ministries. The Moria reception centre is run by the First Reception and Identification Services and the Ministry of Migration Policy. The nearby, Kara Tepe, is a refugee camp housing women, children, and vulnerable people, and is run by the Municipality of Lesvos. Pikpa, a ‘community-based space’, is organised by Lesvos Solidarity and offers an alternative to RIC’s and refugee camps. It is built on the principles of solidarity, empowerment and active participation and provides a variety of activities for residents. Both Pikpa and Kera Tepe are widely thought to offer superior forms of accommodation and support in comparison to the far more overcrowded Moria.
Who runs the camp has a direct impact on the lines of communication within the structure itself. Interviews with RIC officials discussed the confusion of the population surrounding their roles: they manage and are the outward facing representative, of the reception centre, but are also viewed by residents as representing the Asylum Services and the Ministry of Migration. Yet they are unable to communicate the decisions of these bodies and have little impact on them. Consequently, there is confusion on the part of the refugee population stemming from inconsistent information, case scheduling and outcomes, the awarding of open cards, and the cancelling of meetings. This in turn, has contributed to a lack of transparency and accountability within the spaces governed by First Reception.
Limited Lines of CommunicationThere is a lack of effective and efficient communication within and between governing bodies themselves, between governing bodies and NGOs, as well as NGOs and the wider third sector, and, importantly, to the refugee population, particularly on the islands of Lesvos Chios and Samos. This has consequences for the delivery of refugee support.
Refugees are in a precarious position when waiting for a decision to be reached about their ‘open card’ (document allowing travel off of the island hot spots). In the first instance they are informed that their papers are ineligible for renewal. This means one of two things, a rejection or an open card. The time period for confirmation is variable and generates a high level of uncertainty and fear for those awaiting a decision. A quicker process and clearer information would reduce anxiety.
Once an individual is given an open card, there are also concerns about what happens next. Whilst NGO’s such as refugee.info provide certain amounts of information to populations, they are often underserved by UNHCR and First Reception with regards to information sharing. The time and location of the transfer from the RICs are provided but little else. Refugees rely on social media and formal and informal online resources to learn details of their next location.
There is a heavy reliance on rumours and often unreliable information, compounded by inconsistencies in rules of accommodation in different regions. People given a space in mainland Greek camps lose the space if absent for twenty four hours or more. This is less the case in Serbia where it appears that camp residents do not lose their allocated place due to absence (usually attempts to cross borders) even though rules stipulate this should be done. This is again due to under-capacity, but does have a stabilising effect in that refugees are not left destitute and in a precarious situation once they fail to cross borders and return to Serbia.
Unaccompanied minors
A lack of consistent information has a particular effect on unaccompanied minors (UAM), who grow accustomed to the independence of the RICs. Unaccompanied minors leaving the Aegean Islands are given limited information about the next stages of their journey, other than from third sector organisations. As a result many find themselves leaving the NGO support network of the islands and entering major cities of Athens or Thessaloniki with a limited support package in place. Housing provision for UAMs on the mainland relies on a UNHCR system of shelters and apartments run on the ground by a number of different organisations including Caritas and Praksis; partially funded by the European Union. The influence of multiple organisations means that UAMs often fall through the gaps of a heavily bureaucratic system finding themselves, as interviews suggest, struggling with drugs, prostitution and crime. As of December 2018 there were 552 unaccompanied minors reported as homeless in Greece and a further 203 with no reported location, this is a large percentage of 3741 currently known to be in Greece (EKKA, 2018).
In contrast, in Serbia, UAMs have more stable and regular access to a dedicated social worker than in Greece, even when they arrive into Serbia ‘irregularly’. For instance, the NGO network in Belgrade is able to quickly identify and meet UAMs soon after they arrive, and refer them to social workers contracted specifically for UAM protection, who then see them through the registration ad settlement into a centre. Again, the system works better than in Greece due to smaller numbers but even so, there are gaps in UAM protection (particularly outside of ‘office hours’) and each social worker has a high case load.
RECOMMENDATION: Clearer information provided to those seeking asylum. A transparent system for how to communicate and ask for support from officials to better understand the process. Squats, informal housing, and makeshift camps
Large numbers of refugees have ended up in informal housing and makeshift camps. Reasons include, but are not limited to: poor camp conditions, difficulty accessing camps, not wishing to register in a transit country, or transiting a country without a functional or adequate camp infrastructure (currently, Bosnia, but also Serbia and Greece in 2015).
Informal housing includes squats (occupied or repurposed derelict buildings, often supported by grassroots networks) and makeshift camps and ‘tent cities’ often along country borders. Informal housing sets up more quickly than formal camps or other NGO initiatives, all of which are subject to multiple levels of regulation and governance. Most makeshift camps and settlements have no facilities and rely on volunteers for basic services, but in some cases, local authorities indirectly support them through a lack of intervention or providing additional services such as waste disposal.
Informal housing allows a degree of flexibility, but there are limitations. Despite some informal housing being relatively well established and tolerated by the authorities particularly in Athens, some services (healthcare, tax) do not accept squat addresses as a ‘proper’ address for registration and access to that service. Residents of squats also have no access to services that refugees would normally have when they are registered with the asylum service, such as financial support for food. Conditions in squats vary but many urban squats have sewage, heating or structural problems, and rely on volunteers or residents with carpentry or plumbing skills to resolve them.
Photo ‘Informal Housing’ here, caption: Informal refugee housing (squat) in central Athens.
Makeshift camps often form out of necessity, but are inadequate. Multiple makeshift camps have formed along the Balkan Route(s) as the route shifted – Idomeni in Greece, camps along the Serbia-Hungary border, and more recently, along the Bosnia-Croatia border. The makeshift camps generally have no running water or electricity, nor adequate shelter, food, waste disposal or facilities of any kind other than aid provided by small volunteer groups – local and national governments tend to discourage aid provision on these sites as they claim it creates a ‘pull factor’. Multiple problems exist: smugglers can sometimes ‘seize’ a makeshift camp, or a part of it, and ‘rent’ it out to refugees. Poor or non-existent infrastructure make it difficult for volunteers to provide services such as hot food, and individuals helping near the sites are criminalised or penalised by local authorities.
Makeshift camps and ad hoc informal support (whether organised by refugees themselves or aid providers) are vulnerable as they are ‘unregulated’ or informal. Authorities can invoke any number of regulations to shut them down: evictions, sanitation inspections, or ad hoc restrictions on volunteers. Restrictions on aid near informal sites are also linked to EU funding: for local authorities in transit countries, funding is channelled primarily to camps, border management and the formal sector, meaning that thousands of refugees living informally outside of it, are entirely reliant on volunteer and NGO aid.
RECOMMENDATION: Recognition of residents of informal spaces when registering for healthcare provision and refugee support. Greater support for NGOs and services they provide in informal housing. ‘Urban shelters’ and apartments The UNHCR ESTIA programme (Emergency Support To Integration and Accommodation) managed to relocate around 27,000 vulnerable people (as of 31st December 2018)[2] from camps in to ‘urban shelters’: apartments that are not only located in cities, but also in some rural areas and islands such as Crete. The programme is run a cooperation between UNHCR, municipalities and third sector providers – the overall responsibility is now being transferred to the Greek national authorities.
Once refugees are identified as vulnerable and relocated out of a camp to an apartment, they are assigned a team which includes a social worker, housing officer and translator, and from whom they receive regular visits. The team meets with residents in their home and helps with issues like liaising with landlords or referring residents to relevant services. Each social worker is assigned a group of apartments/cases to look after and they work exclusively in the ESTIA context (not local social services more generally), meaning that they often get to know individual residents well and can respond to their needs.
Whilst some parts of the scheme work well – apartments are well provisioned, for instance, and the social workers are well trained and responsive – there are issues, however, mostly related to resources.
Not all refugees can be relocated out of camps into apartments as there is no capacity for this. There are not enough suitable apartments as not all municipalities in a city sign up to the scheme, or support it. The limited resources also mean that normally, two families or groups of single men/women, have to share a single apartment.
Apartment sharing has proven at times to be problematic when cohabitants are torture victims, traumatised or have psychiatric issues.
Currently the scheme is open only to vulnerable people. UNHCR and camp managers identify who is ‘vulnerable enough’ to be transferred. Consequently the system puts large responsibility on the camp managers who are not always engaged and/or fully aware of individual situations (especially in large, overcrowded camps).
The apartment scheme highlights the complex needs of vulnerable populations. Gathered evidence concludes that this system can only work if it is well resourced and thus able to find appropriate apartments and provide ongoing psychosocial support.
RECOMMENDATION: Increased resource and flexibility in support packages provided by ESTIA programme. Implementation of the scheme across transit countries. Conclusions(1) Population size and levels of overcrowding are one of the fundamental factors affecting provisions and quality of life in all types of refugee housing. Mainland camps and informal housing provision such as squats, are able to control the number of residents they have whereas island reception centres have far less control.
(2) Relationships between camps, reception centres and third sector provision plays a key role in determining access to healthcare, sanitation, psycho-social support and community spaces and whether these are provided inside or outside of accommodation spaces.
(3) Lack of clarity and transparency surrounding asylum procedures leads to increased anxiety about the process.
(4) Different forms of housing support are dependent on individual circumstances; however, provision lacks flexibility, particularly surrounding vulnerable cases where a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not suitable.
(5) Refugees are driven towards informal housing such as squats and makeshift settlements for two main reasons: poor camp conditions or overcrowding, and uncertainty over the asylum process, including long waits for asylum interviews in Greece.
(6) There is a lack of formal support for people living in informal accommodation, particularly healthcare, food and sanitation.
Authors:
Gemma Bird, Lecturer in politics and International Relations at The University of Liverpool.
Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Aston University, Birmingham.
Amanda Russell Beattie, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, Birmingham.
Patrycja Rozbicka, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, Birmingham.
The report is a part of the authors’ larger project, IR Aesthetics, @IR_Aesthetics, which focuses on refugee journeys across the Balkan Route.
This report is based on primary research carried out by the authors, and funded by the Aston Centre for Europe, Aston University, and a University of Liverpool Early Career Researcher Grant.
[1] Funding for this research has been provided by the Aston Centre for Europe and a University of Liverpool Early Career Researcher Grant (https://www2.aston.ac.uk/lss/research/lss-research/aston-centre-europe/index).
[2]http://estia.unhcr.gr/en/home/
[post_title] => Rethinking Refugee Support: Responding to the Crisis in South East Europe
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[post_content] => Governments across Europe regularly invoke the threat of terrorism to limit freedom of expression beyond what is permitted under international law. Journalists, activists and ordinary social media users are subject to arbitrary restrictions in relation to their online expression. There is little evidence of the success of such restrictions in preventing terrorist attacks, while their chilling effect on freedom of expression is widely documented.[1]
And yet terrorism remains a very real threat, both in Europe and globally. Terrorist attacks, of various ideological, political or religious motivations, have increased across Europe over the past decade.[2] This has been accompanied by violent groups’, notably ISIS and violent far right movements’, increasingly professional and strategic exploitation of social media networks in order to recruit and radicalise. Radicalisation, particularly online, poses an evolving threat to societies, warranting some form of governmental response. This article explores why overly broad terrorist legislation is so problematic and explores alternative approaches to effectively tackle terrorist threats, while respecting the right to freedom of expression and other associated rights.
Abuse of counterterrorism legislation
In December last year, Dunja Mijatović, Commissioner of Human Rights at the Council of Europe, published an article describing the misuse of anti-terrorism legislation as one of the greatest threats to freedom of expression in Europe[3].
In Turkey, for example, an estimated 175 journalists have been arrested following the July 2016 coup attempt.[4] Many face charges of affiliation with, membership of, or propaganda for a terrorist organisation; however, independent trial monitors, myself included, have documented the almost total lack of evidence in such cases. The cases rely almost solely on articles written by defendants, or posts on social media, which contain no calls to, or apologies for, violent acts.[5]
Mijatović identifies ‘vague or unduly broad’ definitions, such as ‘glorification’ or ‘propaganda’ to terrorism as particularly problematic. These have proliferated across Europe, targeting musicians, activists and ordinary citizens, particularly those expressing themselves on social media. For example in 2017, a Spanish court sentenced student Vera Cassandra to a one year suspended sentenced for ‘glorification’ of terrorism’ (Article 578 of the Spanish Penal Code) in relation a series of tweets she sent, joking about a Franco-era Minister, killed in an ETA terrorist attack.[6]
Meanwhile, at the European Union level, the European Commission has proposed a new Regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online.[7] The inclusion of vague and broad definitions of ‘terrorist content’ have been sharply criticised by freedom of expression advocates as potentially enabling the arbitrary removal of content, particularly that produced by human rights defenders, independent media and minority groups.[8]
International human rights law is clear that, in very limited circumstances, the right to freedom of expression may be restricted in order to ensure national security and prevent terrorism. However, any legislation must be precisely formulated, to avoid broad or abusive application, and strictly necessary for the purposes of national security. In practice, this means that, when imposing any sanction against terrorist speech, a court must demonstrate that the expression is intended to incite imminent violence; it is likely to incite such violence; and there is a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the likelihood of violence.[9]
International human rights standards maintain that offensive, shocking or disturbing speech must be permitted.[10] When states prosecute such expression, or invoke anti-terror legislation to silence criticism, they make our societies poorer, limiting dialogue and obstructing pluralism and diversity. Moreover, unfounded restrictions seed distrust towards authorities, delegitimising efforts to prevent genuine incitement to violence.
Beyond restrictions on expression
This does not mean there is no role for government in responding to terrorist speech. In May 2017, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2354, urging UN Member States to support positive and credible alternatives to audiences vulnerable to extremist messages.[11]
Counter narratives have also been advanced as a solution to offensive, shocking or extremist speech, where it doesn’t meet the threshold of severity that would warrant a restriction. [12] Such expression, which might also be called ‘hate speech’[13], does not pose a direct threat to national security; however, it raises serious concerns about societal cohesion and may undermine others’ enjoyment of rights, particularly the right to equality and non-discrimination. It is entirely legitimate that a government, and indeed broader society, would challenge such expression through non-coercive and non-restrictive approaches.
Aimed at discrediting and deconstructing terrorist and/or extremist messaging, counter and alternative narratives providing alternative viewpoints that promote democratic values and human rights. The underlying theory, that compelling positive speech will win out against terrorist or extremist narratives, is appealing. However, in reality, counter narratives vary in quality, often struggling to secure sufficient funding to produce content of the same quality of the propaganda that they are trying to debunk.[14] Moreover, there is a myriad of challenges in reaching a vulnerable audience at risk of consuming violent extremist content with credible counter narratives; and a high risk that, in targeting the wrong people, or deploying off-message content, you actually exacerbate the problem.
Methodologies such as Google Jigsaw’s Redirect Method,[15] which uses Google Adwords targeting tools to connect at-risk individuals with online counter narratives, may help tackle this problem. As pressure grows on social media companies to respond to the growth of extremist content on their platforms, we will likely see ever more complex technological solutions to content moderation. However, it seems likely that both tech companies and governments may need some persuasion to adopt transparent tools for responding to online terrorist content that adhere to international human rights standards. Civil society, particularly freedom of expression advocates concerned by the over-removal of content, can play a further valuable role in advocating for governments and businesses to adopt and support human rights compliant that promote online counter narratives, over the cruder method of content removal.
Finally, much radicalisation occurs offline; therefore, efforts to prevent radicalisation must also operate offline. Academics and experts have advanced various theories on the drivers of radicalisation, including socio-economic exclusion, concerns about poor governance, inequality and poverty and psychological issues at the individual level.[16] While counter narratives may go some way to addressing these, the role of outreach workers and community mobilisers working with at risk individuals is critical.
Conclusion
Overly broad restrictions on ‘terrorist’ are not only a human rights violation; they are also unlikely to prevent violence as they fail to recognise the complexity of radicalisation. The work of civil society organisations and human rights watchdogs in monitoring and exposing governments’ misuse of anti-terrorism legislation to restrict freedom of expression is thus essential. However, their work would be strengthened by a clear evidence base demonstrating the effectiveness of non-legislative approaches to challenging terrorist, extremist or divisive content. This requires broad cooperation between tech companies, academia and civil society, underpinned by state support, to measure the impact of the recent proliferation of counter narrative initiatives; and ensure such approaches comply with human rights.
Katie currently works for Moonshot CVE, a tech start up working to disrupt violent extremism. She previously worked as Head of Europe and Central Asia at ARTICLE 19, a human rights NGO focused on freedom of expression. She oversaw a number of projects across the EU, Eurasia and Turkey, focused on media freedom and pluralism, access to information, hate speech and freedom of expression online. Prior to this, Katie worked as Conflict and Security Advisor for Europe and Central Asia at Saferworld, a conflict-prevention and peacebuilding organisation.[1] Amnesty International, Europe: Dangerously disproportionate: The ever-expanding national security state in Europe, 17 January 2017 https://cdt.org/insight/letter-to-ministers-of-justice-and-home-affairs-on-the-proposed-regulation-on-terrorist-content-online/, pp.37 - 44
[2] Europol, EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (2018), https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/tesat_2018_1.pdf[3] Dunja Mijatović, ‘Misuse of anti-terror legislation threatens freedom of expression’, Council of Europe Human Rights Comment, 04/12/18 https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/misuse-of-anti-terror-legislation-threatens-freedom-of-expression[4] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2019, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/turkey#803bf5[5] See for example: Article 19, Turkey: Aggravated life sentences in Altans trial confirm absence of rule of law’, 03/10/18 https://www.article19.org/resources/turkey-aggravated-life-sentences-in-altans-trial-confirm-absence-of-rule-of-law/ Bar Human Rights Committee, ‘Trial Observation Interim Report, Şahin Alpay & others v Turkey Zaman Newspaper: Journalists on trial June 2018’, http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Zaman-TRIAL-OBSERVATION-INTERIM-REPORT-FINAL-1-1.pdf[6] Amnesty International, ‘Spain: Counter-terror law used to crush satire and creative expression online’, 13/03/18 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/spain-counter-terror-law-used-to-crush-satire-and-creative-expression-online/[7]https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-preventing-terrorist-content-online-regulation-640_en.pdf[8] Letter to Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs on the Proposed Regulation on Terrorist Content Online, 04/12/2018 https://cdt.org/insight/letter-to-ministers-of-justice-and-home-affairs-on-the-proposed-regulation-on-terrorist-content-online/[9] See, the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, which authoritatively interpret international human rights law in the context of national security https://www.article19.org/resources/turkey-academics-peace-trials-violate-free-expression/[10] Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No. 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.2 (2010) https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ed34b562.html[11] UN Security Council, Resolution 2354, U.N. Doc S/RES/2354 (2017) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2354(2017)[12] See for example: Council of Europe, WE CAN! Taking Action against Hate Speech through Counter and Alternative Narratives, 2017 https://rm.coe.int/wecan-eng-final-23052017-web/168071ba08[13] There is no universal definition of ‘hate speech’ under international law. The worst cases of ‘hate speech’ may be prosecuted under charges of incitement to violence, hostility and discrimination; however much ‘hate speech’ cannot be restricted, despite being offensive. Such expression nevertheless demands a robust government response, including condemning such expression and the implementation of positive policy measures aimed at promoting dialogue and equality. See Article 19’s ‘Hate Speech Tool Kit’ (2015) for an overview of international legislation standards in this area: https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38231/'Hate-Speech'-Explained---A-Toolkit-%282015-Edition%29.pdf[14] RAN Issue Paper, Counter Narratives and Alternative Narratives (2015) https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_cn_oct2015_en.pdf[15]https://redirectmethod.org/[16] ODI, ‘What do we know about drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism, globally and in Niger?’, February 2017, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11405.pdf
[post_title] => Responding to terrorism requires social cohesion, not censorship
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[post_content] => The British and the Europeans are not the only two publics, holding their breath and waiting for the outcome of Brexit. Turkey is also observing the situation, hoping for the approval of a Brexit deal by the UK Parliament. But why is Brexit significant to Turkey? Why would the UK’s ‘divorce’ from the European Union ( EU) be a concern for Turkey, a non-EU country?
There are two sides to the story, one political and the other economic. When the Brexit campaign started in 2016, the economic consequences for bilateral relations between the UK and Turkey was not the most important item on the agenda given that the VoteLeave campaign demonized Turkey [1]and its prospects of EU membership. This was worrisome especially because consecutive British governments had been supportive of Turkish aspirations for membership of the EU[2] and the two countries had, for the most part, enjoyed good relations since 1945. With Brexit, Turkey would lose a significant diplomatic ally inside the Union.
However, in the aftermath of the referendum, the VoteLeave campaign was quickly forgotten and there were hopes in Ankara and London that Brexit might, in fact, be an opportunity to reinforce bilateral ties. The then UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson’s visit to Turkey in September 2016, where he announced the desire to sign a “jumbo trade deal,”[3] strengthened these hopes. Positive sentiments continued and in May 2018 when President Erdoğan visited London, it was mutually agreed that steps would be taken to increase the volume of trade by over 30 %[4].
The reality, however, turned out to be more complicated than these high profile bilateral visits would suggest. As I was doing field research and interviews in the past three months for a project on Anglo-Turkish relations, funded by the British Institute at Ankara[5], I learned from Turkish officials and business community that a no-deal Brexit would be an undesirable outcome. As some of my interviewees stressed, Turkey could possibly incur significant economic losses in the event of a no-deal Brexit because it is a Customs Union country, but not an EU member. In other words, if the United Kingdom leaves the EU without a deal, and hence no Customs Union, Turkey would lose its comparative advantage in the UK market with no immediate bilateral mechanism to replace it.
Among the 28 trade partners in the EU, the UK has been an important destination for Turkish exporters. The volume of trade between the two countries was over 16 billion USD[6] in 2017 and rising. While the UK exports high-value-added goods to Turkey, it imports basic goods resulting in a ‘traditional trade structure’[7] that seems to favour British businesses. However, in terms of trade balance, the UK is the only major European country with which Turkey has a surplus. Turkey exported 9.6 billion USD worth of goods to the UK in 2017 and imported 6.5 billion USD. Both figures were increased by 62 and 89 % respectively in the past eight years[8]. The UK is Turkey’s second biggest export destination after Germany and this, coupled with the trade surplus, explains the special place credited to the British market by Turkish businesses and government officials.
The success of Turkish exporters to the UK, especially in the textile and automotive sectors, is attributed to two factors. Firstly, Turkish products have comparative advantage over some other nations, such as China, due to geographical proximity, which results in faster and less costly shipments. And secondly, as a member of the Customs Union, there has been no tariffs and quotas that adversely affected trade relations in the exchange of goods between the countries.
The latter is now at risk due to Brexit. If Britain leaves the EU without a deal that would keep it in the Customs Union, then Turkish exports would lose their comparative advantage. Although London has declared its intentions to sign bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) after it leaves the EU, this does not seem to be a viable option in the case of its partnership with Ankara. Turkey’s Customs Union obligations make it difficult to sign FTAs independent of the EU. Indeed, Turkey’s relationship with the EU is ‘asymmetric and dependent’[9] because it is obligated to follow EU commercial policy without having a say in it. It is no surprise that, Ankara has not signed many meaningful FTAs since joining the Customs Union and has been requesting to modify its trade arrangement[10] with the EU. Now Turkey faces the additional danger of losing its comparative advantage in the UK market vis-à-vis third countries, who would be able to sign FTAs.
If the UK Parliament approves a deal, this would help Turkey buy time. It is likely that the Customs Union will continue at least two more years, during which the EU and the UK will try to sign another deal to manage trade relations. However, Turkey will have to wait on the side-lines (as it has been mostly doing until now) since it has no decision-making powers in the EU. If in the end, the UK decides to leave the Customs Union, then Turkey would find itself in the situation that it dreads now: the possibility of losing its trade advantage in Britain, even if the EU and the UK sign a trade deal (because EU FTAs do not automatically cover Turkey).
The ambivalent position of Turkey during the Brexit negotiations should also serve as a valuable lesson to keep in mind for London. Despite the advantages Turkish businesses have gained in the European markets (exports to the UK being certainly the most successful example), Ankara’s hands have been tied with regards to FTAs with third countries. If the UK eventually stays in the Customs Union, it would certainly be a positive outcome for Turkey, but then the UK would be unable to sign FTAs in the goods with other countries as it wishes, a point which was alluded to by others, including Donald Trump[11].
The implications of Brexit are beyond Britain and the EU. While the negotiations have revealed once again how Ankara has been left out of the decision-making process in the EU, the gloomy long-term prospects of bilateral trade between Turkey and the UK is also a good reminder of how Brexit has consequences outside the EU borders.
Photo by Matt Dunham/Pool via Reuters.[1] James Ker-Lindsay (2018) Turkey’s EU accession as a factor in the 2016 Brexit referendum, Turkish Studies,19:1, 1-22, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683849.2017.1366860?journalCode=ftur20[2] Britain: An ally of Turkey in Europe? Othon Anastasakis, Insight Turkey, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October - December 2004), pp. 38-48
[3] Boris Johnson wants 'jumbo' Turkish trade deal, BBC News, September 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37483088[4] Turkey, UK aim for $20 billion in trade volume, Erdoğan says, DailySabah, May 2018, https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2018/05/13/turkey-uk-aim-for-20-billion-in-trade-volume-erdogan-says[5] The British Institute at Ankara website https://biaa.ac.uk/[6] Commercial and Economic Relations between Turkey and the UK, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 2018 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/commercial-and-economic-relations-between-turkey-and-england.en.mfa[7] Britain’s relationship with Turkey in charts, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/91c8a1ba-54fb-11e8-b3ee-41e0209208ec[8] Türkiye, İngiltere ekonomik ilişkilerde altın çağını yaşıyor, May 2018, ‘Dunya’ Turkish news website, https://www.dunya.com/ekonomi/turkiye-ingiltere-ekonomik-iliskilerde-altin-cagini-yasiyor-haberi-415718[9] Turkey is no model for Britain’s post-Brexit trade policy, Open Europe, October 2016, https://openeurope.org.uk/impact/turkey-no-model-britains-post-brexit-trade-policy/
[10] EU–Turkey Customs Union Prospects for Modernization and Lessons for Brexit, Chatham House, December 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-12-12-eu-turkey-customs-union-hakura.pdf[11] Yes, Donald Trump is talking perfect sense on May’s Brexit deal, The Guardian, November 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/27/donald-trump-theresa-may-brexit-deal-peter-mandelson
[post_title] => Why would a Third Country Root for Soft Brexit? Views and Lessons from Turkey
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[post_date] => 2018-11-20 16:54:33
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[post_content] => Earlier this year, Georgia celebrated the 100th anniversary of its independence. [1] The celebrations in Georgia stood in sharp contrast to the muted commemoration in Russia, just a few months earlier, of the Bolshevik Revolution.
While the Russians, including President Putin, have mixed feelings about the Bolshevik seizure of power and the seven decades of Communist Party rule that followed, the Georgians have a rather more positive take on their country’s history. To them, the three years of Georgian independence which preceded the Red Army invasion of 1921 are something to be proud of. This is because their republic was hailed at the time as a model social democratic society, despite the difficult conditions of war and economic crisis.[2]Though its Menshevik leaders claimed to be Marxists, like Lenin and the Bolsheviks, their state could not have been more different than Soviet Russia.
For one thing, it was democratic. Though Lenin wrote about how the Soviets had achieved a higher form of democracy by getting rid of such annoyances as free elections, the Georgians created a genuinely multi-party society, with free and fair elections based on universal suffrage. In addition to the Social Democrats, Georgia had National Democrats, Socialist Federalists and Social Revolutionaries, all of whom won seats in the Constituent Assembly. Not only could women vote – and this happened before it happened in Britain or the US – but they could be elected to the Constituent Assembly, and were. In fact, the first Muslim woman elected to a parliament was elected in Georgia in 1919.
Human rights were largely respected, and there was a free press, an independent judiciary, freedom of assembly and religion. It may be argued – and it was argued by Trotsky, among others – that the Georgian Social Democrats, who won 80% of the votes in the elections, were no less dictatorial than the Bolsheviks. The local Bolshevik party, they asserted, was illegal. [3]
But this neglects the fact that the Bolsheviks in Georgia, as elsewhere, operated in the underground by choice. They believed in the violent overthrow of Georgia’s democratically-elected government, and worked diligently – though fruitlessly – toward that end. Their attempts to stage a coup d’etat in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, were laughable failures. Following a peace treaty in 1920, in which the Russians recognised Georgian independence, the Georgian Bolsheviks emerged from the shadows – and worked tirelessly again to subvert the state.
The Georgian Democratic Republic during its three short years of independence was characterised by a thriving civil society. There were powerful, independent trade unions which demanded, and won, a constitutionally-guaranteed right to strike. They were instrumental in setting up something called the Wages Board – a forerunner of the post-World War II social partnerships that social democratic politicians would embrace. This body, which included representatives of trade unions, employers and government, regulated wages and working conditions, and ensured that the basic food staples were available at low cost to working people. As a result, there were fewer and fewer strikes. Urban working class support for the government remained strong.
The Georgians were most proud of their agrarian reform which aimed at the creation of a middle class in the countryside, and the avoidance of a war between town and country such as happened in Soviet Russia, and which resulted in mass starvation and famine. This was accomplished by distributing land to the peasants which had belonged to the nobles, the tsarist state or the church. There was no forced collectivisation in Georgia as there would be in the USSR.
And independent Georgia also witnessed the rise of a powerful, independent cooperative movement which increasingly played a central role in the gradual transformation of Georgia from a purely capitalist society to a social mixed economy. Those cooperatives retained their autonomy, unlike in Russia where they quickly fell under state control.
That first Georgian republic was not perfect. The treatment of national minorities, for example, left much to be desired. The South Ossetians were particularly badly treated, after they rebelled – with Russian support – against the central government. Georgian had its problems. But unlike the Bolsheviks, the Georgian Social Democrats never aspired to create a perfect society, just a better one. They were not Utopians.
Their state was, inevitably, militarily weak. Georgia was surrounded by hostile neighbours, and was attacked by Turkey, Russia and even little Armenia. The Georgians relied upon the Germans, and then the British, to guarantee their sovereignty. Their best efforts to woo the European powers – and international social democracy – eventually came to nothing, when the Red Army invaded in February 1921. For the next seventy years, Georgia was part of the USSR.[4]
In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia regained its independence. It adopted many of the trappings of the first republic: its crimson flag, its national holiday on May 26th, and even the constitution which was finally adopted by the Social Democrats in 1921, as the Russian troops closed in on the port city of Batumi, to which the government had fled. [5]
But these were only trappings: the actual content of the new Georgian state quickly became neo-liberal (once the civil wars that marred the 1990s had ended), and no worthy successor of the Social Democratic Party emerged. Today, Georgia is a liberal capitalist society with a multi-party system and free elections. It aims to eventually become a full member of both the European Union and NATO, and has carried out a series of reforms to show that is suited to join those elite clubs of nations.
Its political system includes a small Social Democratic Party and a Labour Party, with the former having joined the coalition government led by the Georgian Dream, the ruling party. But these parties are not genuine successors to the Georgian Social Democratic Party which led the first republic, and do not claim to be so.
So why did no successor organisation emerge once Georgia was finally free of Soviet rule? During the very early years of Soviet Georgia, the Social Democrats remained hugely popular, leading an armed rebellion in 1924 and maintaining a high level of support even under the totalitarian regime. But over the years, their influence weakened and eventually disappeared entirely. And more important, thanks in part to the efforts of the Soviet Communist regime, all memory of the first Georgian republic was deliberately erased.
Fantastic lies were told about the Social Democrats. One that comes to mind was the allegation that the government leaders fled in the face of the Red Army invasion, taking all the country’s gold with them. Considering the poverty in which the exiled Georgian Social Democrats would later live, this was patently absurd. And it was said repeatedly that they were not real Georgian patriots and that they allowed their country to be occupied by foreign troops (the Germans and later the British).
This same historical amnesia explains why throughout the post-Communist world, political parties which existed prior to the Communist takeovers did not simply re-emerge from the shadows to take their rightful places after 1989. This is particularly true in Russia, where nothing like the pre-1918 Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries and Kadets emerged in 1991 when the Communist regime fell, though some of their ideas were found in new parties created after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Part of the reason that this happened is that the political ecosystem in which the Georgian Social Democrats grew up no longer existed. Their ideas were imported by young Georgian social democrats who spent time abroad. Foremost among them was Noe Zhordania, who went on to become the country’s first president. Zhordania, like so many others, travelled to Germany, France and Britain, learning from the existing mass social democratic parties. Those parties with their democratic Marxist worldview barely exist these days, and long ago abandoned their Marxism. In the absence of a global democratic Marxist current, one cannot expect the Georgians to revive ideas that were popular a century ago.
By the time the 100th anniversary of the first Georgian republic was commemorated, there appeared the first books – mostly academic ones – which aimed to overcome that amnesia and to restore the memory of the Social Democrats and their republic. At an international scholarly conference in Tbilisi in June 2018, young Georgian historians presented their work alongside men (and they were all men) from all over the world who had been the leading writers about Georgia and the South Caucasus for many decades. The first republic was finally, tentatively, being discussed. [6]
But that discussion was taking place only in small groups. To the vast majority of Georgians, the ideas of social democracy remain long forgotten. As elsewhere in the post-Communist world, everything which was considered wrong and evil under Stalinism became popular. For that reason, the Georgian Church has become an enormously powerful and popular institution. The role is has played in Georgian politics has not always been a good one.
For example, attempts by Tbilisi’s vibrant LGBTI community to publicly commemorate the International Day Against Homophobia have been broken up in recent years by church-led conservative groups, sometimes involving physical violence. In 2018, on the very eve of the commemoration of the centenary of Georgia’s social democratic republic, fears of violence led the LGBTI leaders to cancel planned actions.[7]
Does anything remain of social democracy in Georgia? Probably not much in the country’s political parties, but one could argue that the spirit of the Mensheviks is kept alive most notably in the country’s trade unions. Those unions are organised into the Georgian Trade Union Confederation (GTUC), which in 2005 was taken over by younger leaders keen to replace a fossilised, corrupt post-Soviet leadership. They have stubbornly fought to preserve the union’s independence.
In 2017, the leadership of Irakli Petriashvili was challenged from within the GTUC, and he charged the government with interference. His call was backed up the International Trade Union Confederation, to which the GTUC has long been affiliated. Petriashvili prevailed, and the GTUC remains in the forefront of workers’ struggles for better wages and working conditions. [8]
Last year an attempt to close down a Stalin-era sugar factory in the town of Agara and replace it with a crypto-currency mining operation was met by fierce resistance by workers, who marched the 90 kilometres from their town to Tbilisi. They were joined by left-wing students for part of the march, and eventually they prevailed: the government intervened to keep the factory open. [9]
Later in the year, workers on the Tbilisi metro went on strike, again with some support from students, and this time were told that while they had the right to strike, they could only do so at times when they were not working (e.g. late at night). [10]This prompted more protests and eventually the local government relented.
There doesn’t seem to be much talk in the unions of the creation of a Labour Party though in 2016 Petriashvili himself made a run for a parliamentary seat in Tbilisi, campaigning as an independent. The campaign was not successful.
The emergence of a student movement that has repeatedly intervened in support of striking railway workers, sugar workers and so on, reminds one of the early days, more than a century ago, in the history of the Georgian labour movement. The Social Democratic Party which ruled Georgia from 1918-1921 came out of the revolutionary student movement of that time. Today there is much talk of a radicalised student movement and the rise of a Georgian “new left”. [11]Maybe Georgian social democracy is going to get a second chance?
About the author
Eric Lee is the founding editor of LabourStart, the news and campaigning website of the international trade union movement. He is the author of several books, the most recent of which is The Experiment: Georgia's Forgotten Revolution 1918-1921 published by Zed books (see: https://www.zedbooks.net/shop/book/the-experiment/)
[1] The full text of the Georgian Declaration of Independence from 26 May 1918 is available in English here: http://www.ericlee.info/theexperiment/declaration.php[2] For a sympathetic eyewitness account of the Georgian Democratic Republic, see Karl Kautsky’s short 1921 book, Georgia: A Social-Democratic Peasant Republic – Impressions And Observations. https://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1921/georgia/[3] For a Bolshevik view of the Georgian republic, see Leon Trotsky, Between Red and White: A Study of Some Fundamental Questions of Revolution, With Particular Reference to Georgia - https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1922/red-white/index.htm[4] For a comprehensive recent look at the first Georgian republic, see Eric Lee, The Experiment: Georgia’s Forgotten Revolution 1918-1921 (London: Zed Books, 2017).
[5] The full text of that constitution is available in English here: https://matiane.wordpress.com/2012/09/04/constitution-of-georgia-1921/[6] Régis Genté, Georgia’s new generation of historians: seeking democracy’s past, Civil.ge, August 2018 https://civil.ge/archives/250000[7] Peter Tatchell and Eric Lee, In The Streets Of Tbilisi, Georgians Need To Make A Choice, Huffington Post, May 2018 https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/georgia-lgbt-rights_uk_5b080f32e4b0802d69ca88d9[8] Georgia: Government Interference in Trade Union Affairs - International Trade Union Confederation. https://www.ituc-csi.org/georgia-government-interference-in[9] Bradley Jardine, As Stalin-era factory turns to crypto mining, Georgian workers protest: Workers are concerned that energy-hungry cryptocurrency mining is killing jobs, Eurasianet, April 2018, https://eurasianet.org/as-stalin-era-factory-turns-to-crypto-mining-georgian-workers-protest[10] OC Media, Tbilisi court indefinitely bans metro strike ‘during working hours’, May 2018, http://oc-media.org/tbilisi-court-indefinitely-bans-metro-strike-during-working-hours/[11] Luka Pertaia, Are Georgia’s disparate left-wing protesters consolidating into a coherent political force? February 201, OC Media, http://oc-media.org/are-georgias-disparate-left-wing-protesters-consolidating-into-a-coherent-political-force/
[post_title] => 100 Years On, What’s Left Of Georgian Social Democracy?
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[post_content] => Most analysis of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry seems to miss the fundamental points that underline the tension.[1] Iran is trying to save itself from either foreign intervention or domestic unrest[2] while Saudi Arabia does not fear foreign intervention, like Iran it is concerned with domestic dissent.
Arguably, the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) is determined to perpetuate four decades of rivalry and conflict with Iran. The Prince has been struggling with a domestic context that is beneficial to perpetuating this conflict. He has used the rivalry with Tehran to deflect from the complexity of his own domestic uncertainties. The same may be true of Iran.
As Iran became an Islamic Republic, Saudi Arabia was threatened by the high expectations of its own Islamists, who must have been inspired by the Iranian success and intensified their activism to establish their own version of the Islamic state. Riyadh embarked on a project to spread its Wahhabi version of Islam and its clerics increased the frequency of their anti-Shi’a theology.
While not underestimating Saudi regional ambitions that underpin the most recent episode of the troubled and volatile Saudi-Iranian relations, to understand the current roots of antagonism we need not go beyond Saudi domestic uncertainties. These are different from those that in the past had fuelled the conflict.
Today Mohammad bin Salman needs to keep Iran isolated to deflate the current uncertainties he faces, not all of them are related to the prospect of radical Saudi Islamist violence such as the kind that ravaged Syria and Iraq. Previous Kings, Khalid (1975-1982), Fahd (1982-2005), and Abdullah (2005-2015) faced different domestic challenges that the rivalry with Iran helped to deflate but today there are new sets of uncertainties that Mohammad bin Salman is currently unable to resolve to his own advantage.
The most important challenge facing the Crown Prince is consolidating his own rule and centralising major policy decisions under his umbrella, thus excluding a whole range of other aspiring princes. From swift dismissals (eg. sacking Crown Prince and Minister of Interior Muhammad ben Nayif and the Commander of the Saudi National Guard Mitab ben Abdullah), to the detention of wealthy princes (Walid ben Talal in an allegedly anti-corruption campaign), Mohammad bin Salman feels restless. The unprecedented marginalisation and even humiliation of senior princes still haunt not only the young prince but also a large pool of disgruntled brothers and cousins. It is uncertain what the outcome of such drastic and unprecedented measures would be in the long term, particularly after the Khashoggi affair.
The Crown Prince’s strong anti-Iranian rhetoric and multiple promises to roll back Iranian influence in Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, where it had so obviously been proliferating by the time he became Crown Prince in 2016, are meant to create a war like situation in which internal dissent is silenced. Under the threat of Iran, his domestic policies have become sacrosanct.
The regime wants to remind both the marginalised princes and Saudis more broadly that the young Crown Prince is fighting an existential threat, represented by the hawkish Iranians. By amplifying the Iranian threat and magnifying his own Arab mission to save the region from Persianisation and shiification, MBS blames Iran for any dissent in the country. This applies not only to the Shi’a protest movement in the Eastern province but also Sunni dissidents, especially those who emerged during the 2011 Arab uprisings.[3] He frightens the Sunni majority with the threat of an Iranian backed conspiracy to destabilise the kingdom, create a Shi’a enclave in the oil-rich province, and eventually partition Saudi Arabia along regional and sectarian lines.[4]
By highlighting his determination to curb Iran, the Crown Prince aspires to emerge as the sole saviour of not only Saudi Arabia but also the region as a whole. The unresolved uncertainties surrounding his own kingship and the prospect of internal dissent among both the princes and ordinary Saudis prompt him to amplify the external enemy.
Amplifying the Iranian danger and perpetuating enmity with Tehran is a prerequisite for the domestic ideological shift that MBS, under the auspices of his father King Salman, has instigated since 2015. King Salman adopted the title malik al-hazm, king of steadfastness, in contrast with the soft face of King Abdullah, who became known as the King of Humanity before he died in 2015. Although old King Salman adopted a symbolic aggressive title, it was his son Muhammad who was entrusted with the mission to show masculine steadfastness, nowhere but in Yemen where Saudi militarised nationalism was to be tested against the Houthis, dubbed as Iranian clients.[5]
With the Saudi Wahhabi legitimacy narrative subsiding and even gradually being denied and suppressed, the Saudi leadership adopted a populist Saudi militarised nationalism, whose main target is Iran with its alleged aggressive Persian counter nationalism. The Saudi war in Yemen was perceived as a necessary response to an existential threat, and a battle for survival for the Saudi nation. Rivalry with Iran keeps the momentum of the emerging Saudi populist nationalism. It strengthens the abstract sense of Saudi national solidarity. Continuing a proxy war with Iran even without a decisive victory in Yemen remains important for domestic reasons. Saudi Arabia is yet to find a diplomatic solution to a conflict that proved to be difficult to win.
The economic supremacy of Saudi Arabia is inevitably still dependent on the country maintaining its historical share in the global oil market, and its position as an investment destination for global capital in the region. Keeping a large oil producing country under international pressure and a huge market with great potential like Iran excluded remains so important to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia sees the Iranian economy through the lens of competition rather than regional integration. It seeks the shrinking or even the collapse of the Iranian economy under sanctions and has never engaged into a bid to create regional integration in which Iranian human resources and products become readily integrated in a wider Gulf regional initiative. In retaliation, in 2016, the Iranians have used cyber warfare against Saudi ARAMCO, the oil company, to undermine the Saudi oil economy especially after Saudi Arabia refused to lower its oil production in 2014, a move that resulted in even lower oil prices.[6]
Finally, perpetuating enmity with Iran is extremely important for Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the West. Any rapprochement between the West and Iran- such as the one that led to the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement - is seen with suspicion and fear.[7] Saudi Arabia needs to be the only US client not only in the Arabian Peninsula but also in the region and beyond. Saudi Arabia currently does not accept a return to the status quo ante during the Cold War when Iran provided the military base and Saudi Arabia provided Islamic ammunition against the Soviet Union.
Conflict with Iran contributes above all to Saudi Arabia maintaining its position as an Arab regional force, loyal to the US and willing to pursue policies and strategies favourable to US national interests. Saudi Arabia’s worse nightmare is for the US to contemplate normalisation of relations with Iran, albeit unlikely under President Donald Trump, or even diversify the countries the US can rely on as regional partners in the Persian Gulf.
While Mohammad bin Salman cannot expect US-Israeli relations to worsen more than they did under the Obama administration, he fears most a US rapprochement with Iran. Since 2015 Mohammad bin Salman has stepped up his demonisation of Iran during his several visits to the US. He held it responsible for radicalisation in Saudi Arabia, global terrorism and the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in areas where Iranian influence and Shi’a ascendance had led to marginalising the Sunni population such as in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. On several occasions, he reminded American audiences that Al-Qaida affiliates and relatives of Osama bin Laden took refuge in Iran.[8] More recently, he held Iran responsible for creating violent sectarian militia that terrorise Sunni populations under the guise of fighting terrorism in Iraq and Syria. He referred to Supreme Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the new Hitler, thus striking a chord among US and other Western audiences.[9] Saudi Arabia is constantly trying to mitigate against its nightmare scenario, namely the reintegration of Iran in the international community.
[1] This essay is adapted from an article first produced for the LSE Middle East Centre entitled Saudi Domestic Uncertainties and the Rivalry with Iran published in June 2018, which is available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/06/18/saudi-domestic-uncertainties-and-the-rivalry-with-iran/[2] ABC News, Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei claims foreign plot to overthrow system has failed, January 2018, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-10/iran-foiled-plot-to-use-protests-to-overthrow-system-khamenei/9316406.
[3]Toby Matthiesen, Saudi Arabia: the Middle East's most under-reported conflict, January 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/23/saudi-arabia-shia-protesters[4] Al-Rasheed, Madawi, 2017, Sectarianism as counter-revolution: Saudi responses to the Arab Spring. In: Hashemi, Nader and Postel, Danny, (eds.) Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East. London: C Hurst & Co Ltd, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/83593/[5]Al-Rasheed, Madawi (ed.), 2018, Salman’s Legacy: The Dilemmas of a New Era in Saudi Arabia , London: C Hurst & Co Ltd,https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/salmans-legacy/[6] Sam Jones, Cyber warfare: Iran opens a new front, FT, April 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/15e1acf0-0a47-11e6-b0f1-61f222853ff3[7]Iran nuclear deal: Key details, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33521655[8] Norah O'Donnell, Saudi Arabia’s heir to the throne talks to 60 Minutes, CBS News, March 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-crown-prine-talks-to-60-minutes/[9] Ben Hubbard, Khamenei is Hitler: MBS, March 2018, https://www.telegraphindia.com/world/khamenei-is-hitler-mbs-216032Author: Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed is Visiting Professor at the Middle East Centre, London School of Economics. Previously she was Professor of Social Anthropology at King’s College, London and Visiting Research professor at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore. Her research focuses on history, society, religion and politics in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, Middle Eastern Christian minorities in Britain, Arab migration, Islamist movements, state and gender relations, and Islamic modernism.
[post_title] => The view from Riyadh
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[post_content] => Saudi Arabia and Iran, as key power brokers in the Middle East, continue to couch their bilateral relations in antagonistic terms as they chafe against each other in a battle for influence in the region. Characterising this rivalry in the purely sectarian terms of a deep-rooted Sunni-Shi’a enmity is simplistic and fails to understand the complex geopolitical dynamics at play. However, for the Islamic Republic, Iran’s religious identity as the pre-eminent ‘Shi’a power’ gives it a means of influence and co-optation over its co-religionists. A key element of building such relationships is its transnational religious networks which form the basis of much of its cultural and religious diplomacy work.
Religion, justice and contemporary Iranian foreign policy
Iran’s commitment to the core revolutionary themes of ‘justice’, ‘resistance’, and the cultivation of Shi’a networks act as a continual thread in its foreign policy since the revolution. While high-level diplomacy relating to Iran is often cast in terms of its elected President and their own foreign policy outlooks,[1] this only tells part of the story, with the religious networks and cultural outreach work fostered by the Islamic Republic abroad coming under the purview of the Supreme Leader.
Iran’s ability to make use of its transnational links to Shi’a communities has been aided by regional developments, most notably the ouster of Saddam Hussein and coming to power of a friendly government in Iraq. Iran’s position as the Shi’a metropole gives it the ability to make use of its transnational religious networks as and when they serve its national interests. This has long been the case in its sponsorship of Hizballah, and also in the religious justification seen in taking the fight to Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Iran sees itself and by extension Shi’a communities it has ties with, as a victim of sectarianism in the region. The Islamic Republic has tied this fight to its long-standing resistance narrative, and thus carrying out its own ‘war on terror’ in the face of the Sunni ‘takfiri’ threat.[2] Resistance to Israeli and Western aims in the region, support for the Palestinian cause, and protection of the Shi’a draw on ideas of ‘justice’ and which form part of the Islamic Republic’s constitutionally-defined foreign policy objectives,[3] which seek to give support to the oppressed.
Religious networks
Having abandoned the active export of the Islamic revolution in the 1980s, Iran went on to invest in building its diplomatic and religious infrastructure, expanding its religious outreach activities across the Shi’a world, drawing on its position as something of a Shi’a metropole in a demonstration of its growing soft power. This, in combination with the repression of Iraqi Shi’a until the removal of Saddam Hussein, meant that Iranian centres of religious learning, most notably Qom, came to rival and in some cases overtake the traditional Shi’a centre of Najaf in Iraq, though the balance has been redressed somewhat in recent years.[4] Iran’s transnational religious linkages help to provide legitimacy for Iran’s actions in terms of its activities in the region. This can be seen in its application of a religious overlay in its active military engagements in Iraq and Syria, such as through the channelling of ‘shrine defenders’ to conflict zones from Shi’a communities in the region.[5] This gives Iran a significant role among Shi’a communities that it can utilise to enhance its standing among its co-religionists.[6]
Iran has historical ties to Iraqi Shi’a which go back to long-standing religious and familial ties with shrine cities in southern Iraq, most notably Najaf and Karbala. The latter, being the site of the martyrdom of the third Shi’a imam, Hussein, carries great significance to Shi’a worldwide and symbolises the fight against oppression and unjust rulers which has proved so foundational to the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary message. These ties were also strengthened through political sanctuary provided by the Islamic Republic to Shi’a opposition fleeing Saddam. Similarly, the religious links with Lebanese Shi’a are well-documented and go back centuries, as do religious ties to the Shi’a populations in Bahrain, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.[7] The centrality of Iran in the Shi’a world can be seen in the cosmopolitan nature of Qom - the centre of Iranian religious learning. Here students and clerics from across the world attend its various seminaries, and then go back to their own countries having earned their religious education in Iran, further cementing ties.
However, this transnational network not only comprises traditional ‘religious’ activities affiliated to the hawza but also involves the educational and diplomatic missions undertaken abroad by the Iranian government. The transnational linkages that Iran has as a result of its position as religious hub are used as vector to enhance diplomatic relations and deepen ties with communities across the Shi’a world, acting as an enhancer of its soft power.[8] This work is carried out through various parastatal organisations, such as the Ahl ul-Bayt World Assembly, Islamic Culture and Relations Organisation (ICRO) and the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (Emdad). The Ahl ul-Bayt grouping brings Shi’a scholars and religious leaders from around the world together every four years for a conference in Tehran.[9] The ICRO direct Iran’s cultural diplomacy and employ its cultural attaches abroad – they have a flexible remit in terms of their cultural outreach,[10] though much of its work is done in the religious sphere. Emdad,[11] as one of Iran’s largest charitable foundations, carries out development work primarily inside Iran, but also has an active international operation providing development assistance to Muslim communities worldwide.
Iran thus has a multiplicity of networks which draw on its position as a centre of Shi’a learning and influence, and which allow it to harness an identity-based narrative that finds a practical utility in both its soft and ‘hard’ engagements in the region. Its position as a Shi’a metropole gives it a means of influence among Shi’a worldwide, with its cultural and religious outreach work further reinforcing ties to these communities.
[1] See, for example: Shahram Akbarzadeh and Dara Conduit (Eds.), Iran in the World:
President Rouhani's Foreign Policy, 2016, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan:; Maaike Warnaar, Iranian Foreign Policy during Ahmadinejad: Ideology and Actions, 2013 New York: Palgrave MacMillan; Edward Wastnidge, Diplomacy and Reform in Iran: Foreign Policy under Khatami, 2016, London: I.B. Tauris.
[2] Edward Wastnidge,‘Iran’s own ‘War on Terror’: Iranian foreign policy towards Syria and Iraq during the Rouhani Era, in Luciano Zaccara (ed) The Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani (Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming 2019).
[3] Article 3.16 of Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (in Persian), available online at: http://www.moi.ir/Portal/File/ShowFile.aspx?ID=ab40c7a6-af7d-4634-af93-40f2f3a04acf. English version available online at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989.pdf?lang=en[4] Ali Mamouri, ‘Competition Heats Up Between Qom, Najaf’, Al Monitor, May 2013: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/qom-najaf-anxiety-competition-shiite.html[5] Wastnidge, Iran’s own ‘War on Terror’[6] For an example of how this translates into positive views of Iran’s regional role among Iraqi Shia, see Fotini Christia, Elizabeth Dekeyser, and Dean Knox, ‘To Karbala: Surveying Religious Shi’a from Iran and Iraq’, MIT Political Science Department Research Paper, No. 2016-39. 2016
[7] See, for example, Sabrina Mervin (ed), The Shi'a Worlds And Iran 2010, London: Saqi Books: London.
[8] Edward Wastnidge, ‘The Modalities of Iranian Soft Power – from Cultural Diplomacy to Soft War', Politics, Vol. 35, issue 3-4. 2015.
[9] See website of the Ahl ul-Bayt World Assembly: http://www.ahl-ul-bayt.org/en/introducing-the-assembly[10] Wastnidge, The Modalities of Iranian Soft Power[11] See website of the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation: https://portal.emdad.ir/Author: Dr Edward Wastnidge is Lecturer in Politics and International Studies at the Open University where he is also the Director for the International Studies programme. He holds a PhD in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Manchester. His main research interests concern the politics and international relations of the Middle East and Central Asia, with a particular focus on contemporary Iranian politics and foreign policy. His current research explores the intersection of ideas and foreign policy, soft power, cultural and religious diplomacy, and the role of identity in international relations. His monograph Diplomacy and Reform in Iran was published in 2016.
[post_title] => Religion and geopolitics in Iranian foreign policy
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[post_content] => The rise of armed sectarian nonstate actors (NSAs) is one of the main consequences of the grand Saudi-Iranian contest over regional dominance unleashed in the wake of the 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq.[1] Albeit this contest predated the popular uprisings, its sectarianization[2] after the uprisings led to the ‘return of the weak Arab state’[3] and the concomitant rise of sectarian, ethnic, or tribal non-state actors. Whether in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, or Yemen local and transnational nonstate actors have assumed paramount domestic and geopolitical roles.
Two kinds of NSAs emerged as a consequence of this sectarianization of geopolitical contests: 1) armed, local or transnational, NSAs operating in a proxy capacity to advance the geopolitical interests of their regional patrons; and 2) others that pursue strictly local objectives but are nevertheless supported by regional states in a bid to accumulate more geopolitical capital. Hizballah, the plethora of groups organized in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), and other NSAs in Syria and Libya are examples of the former type. The relationship between Iran and the Houthis in Yemen exemplifies the latter, however.
This explosion of local and transnational armed nonstate actors as a result of the return of the weak Arab state underscores another trend in regional dynamics: the changing nature of the system’s permeability, a process that began in earnest before the popular uprisings of 2011, but which has since intensified. The regime-induced, top-down, state-building permeability of the 1950s and 1960s,[4] driven by Arab nationalist ideology, is replaced by a bottom-up state-destroying permeability driven by sectarian nonstate actors.
This new kind of permeability expressed by transnational nonstate actors is bound to complicate future prospects for state rebuilding in the Arab world in at least two ways.
Demands for greater local autonomy by ethnic, tribal, or sectarian groups may have become irreversible and cannot be ignored any longer.
The type of post-war state that will emerge in Libya, Yemen, or even Syria, may be captured by different NSAs vying for the political economic and ideological control of ethnic, sectarian, or tribal parts of the population – much like the one that exists in Lebanon, or has been emerging in Iraq since 2003.
Given the destructive local and transnational roles played by armed sectarian nonstate actors, two kinds of bargains, at both the domestic and regional levels, are required to restore a modicum of political stability in post-war reconstituted states. First, there must be democratic power-sharing arrangements that cross-cut sectarian, ethnic, and tribal cleavages with interest-based ones, whether along regional or socioeconomic lines. Only this will launch the difficult process of peacebuilding, and state building and rebuilding, along a democratic path, thus reversing the erosion of the state’s ideological and infrastructural capabilities.
Second, there must be a grand regional geopolitical bargain identifying or acknowledging spheres of influence among the main international and regional actors vying for influence in the Middle East as a means of reducing fear and perception of nefarious intent. This is especially true for Saudi Arabia and Iran. Describing the contest between Iran and Saudi Arabia in existential or sectarian terms misses each state’s real security concerns. Riyadh views Tehran in offensive realist terms. By contrast, Iran considers itself engaged in a defensive realist confrontation with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. From this perspective, transnational sectarian armed nonstate actors are instruments in Iran’s strategy to escape its regional isolation and deter potential American or Israeli attacks. Refusing to recognize Tehran’s newfound role in the Middle East and real geopolitical interests is a recipe for more wars in the region. By the same token, Saudi Arabia exerts substantial political influence in Lebanon, Iraq, and parts of post-war Syria as a balance to Iran’s overwhelming position in these crucial states. Moreover, Yemen will always remain Saudi Arabia’s security backyard. Consequently, Tehran may have to roll back its military and political engagement in Yemen – to alleviate Riyadh’s fears – in exchange for its reintegration into the system of regional states.
Only these dual bargains can help extricate the Middle East from the domestic and regional security dilemmas that have proliferated since the sectarianization of geopolitical contests after the popular uprisings.[5][1] Bassel F. Salloukh, The Arab Uprisings and the Geopolitics of the Middle East, The International Spectator 48, June 2013: 32-46.
[2] Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, eds. 2017, Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East. New York: Oxford University Press
[3] Bassel F. Salloukh, 2017, Overlapping Contests and Middle East International Relations: The Return of the Weak Arab State, PS: Political Science and Politics 50: 660–63.
[4] Rex Brynen, Permeability Revisited: Reflections on the Regional Repercussions of the al-Aqsa Intifada, in Bassel F. Salloukh and Rex Brynen (ed.), 2004, Persistent Permeability? Regionalism, Localism, and Globalization in the Middle East, London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 125–48.
[5] Marc Lynch, The New Arab Order: Power and Violence in Today’s Middle East, Foreign Affairs 97, 5, September/October 2018, 116-126.
Author: Bassel F. Salloukh is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Lebanese American University (LAU) in Beirut. His recent publications include the co-authored The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon (Pluto Press, 2015), “The Arab Uprisings and the Geopolitics of the Middle East” in The International Spectator (June 2012), the co-authored Beyond the Arab Spring: Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Arab World (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), and the co-authored article “Elite Strategies, Civil Society, and Sectarian Identities in Postwar Lebanon” in International Journal of Middle East Studies (November 2013). His current research looks at post-conflict power-sharing arrangements, the challenge of re-assembling the political orders and societies of post-uprisings Arab states, and the geopolitics of the Middle East after the popular uprisings.
[post_title] => Sectarianized geopolitical contests and the rise of armed sectarian nonstate actors
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[post_content] => In the aftermath of invasion and regime change in 2003, Iraq’s political field was deliberately and overtly restructured around an informal version of consociationalism, the Muhasasa Ta’ifia (sectarian apportionment) system. This exclusive elite pact was designed to empower people and parties who claimed to be acting as representatives of three allegedly distinct communities, Shi’a, Sunni and Kurd.[1] The empowerment of those wielding sectarian rhetoric left Iraq with a post-invasion civil war, endemic corruption, institutional weakness and the widespread alienation of the populous from the governing elite.
The planning for the Muhasasa Ta’ifia system was done in the early 1990s, by a disparate group of exiled Iraqi politicians. It was then imported into the country, along with those exiles that went on to form Iraq’s new ruling elite, under American force of arms. At various points in its history, the functioning of the Muhasasa Ta’ifia has been defended and extended by US, Iranian and Saudi Arabian intervention.
The System
Plans for the Muhasasa Ta’ifia system were agreed upon by the Iraqi opposition at a conference in October 1992. Here a number of councils and committees were established to act as a government-in-waiting. Most importantly, positions on these governing bodies were allocated according to the ‘Salah al-Din principles’, with a ‘virtual census’ upon dividing jobs according to the conference’s assessment of the percentage of the population that were Shi’a, Kurdish and Sunni.[2] An assertion of religious and ethnic identities was placed at the centre of this agreement. The seven major parties that came to dominate Iraqi politics post - 2003 were the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Iraqi National Council, the Iraqi National Accord, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Dawa Islamic Party and the Iraqi Islamic Party. They all agreed to work within the Muhasasa Ta’ifia to solidify and expand their grip on Iraq.
In June and July 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the American civilian body running the occupation of Iraq, created the Iraq Governing Council, (IGC) the first political body after regime change designed to represent the Iraqi population during the occupation. The predominance of a sectarian understanding of Iraq was so strong that the process of its formation was an act of ethno-sectarian balancing.
The seven parties that formed the majority of the ICG’s membership were then given the job of picking ministers to run Iraq’s government. Not only had the Muhasasa system been used to pick Iraq’s first post-2003 governing body, it had given economic power to those parties promoting ethno-sectarian division. Each party appointed Ministers who controlled the resources and payroll of their ministries, accelerating the sacking of existing civil servants, justified through de-Ba’athification, whilst hiring those linked to their parties and the sectarian communities they claimed to represent.
After the IGC was formed in 2003, during the interim government of 2004, and after each national election in 2005, 2010, 2014 and most recently in 2018, the Muhasasa system has dictated that ministries and their resources were awarded to the ethno-sectarian parties in governments of national unity. Each party has used its ministers to exploit government resources. They expand government payrolls to employ their members and followers. As a result, access to government employment, dominant in the Iraqi job market, is only guaranteed by pledging alliance to one of the political parties promoting the Muhasasa system. Iraqis seeking government jobs are interpolated as members of exclusive ethno-sectarian communities, Sunni, Shi’a or Kurd. The extent of this practise can be seen in the rapid growth of the state payroll that swelled from 850,000 employees a year after regime change to between seven and nine million in 2016.
The external players
Although the US and their formerly exiled allies set up and imposed the MuhasasaTa’ifia system, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have at times intervened to ensure it works in their interests. Major General Qassem Suleimani, the Commander of the Quds Forces of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, is the central coordinator of Iran’s presence in Iraq. Dr Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Iraq’s former National Security Adviser, has proclaimed that Suleimani is ‘the most powerful man in Iraq without question. Nothing gets done without him’.[3] Suleimani has been in Baghdad and actively involved in the process of government formation in 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018. Of equal importance, he has been central in defending the Muhasasa system when it has been in crisis, during the ‘Charge of the Knights’ in 2008, the strong showing of the anti-Muhasasa,Iraqiyaa coalition, in the 2010 elections and in the aftermath of the fall of Mosul to the Islamic State in 2014. Clearly, Iran sees Muhasasa as the best vehicle for empowering its client Shi’a Islamist parties and keeping the Iraqi state weak enough to secure its own interests.
Saudi Arabia’s role in Iraq has been more informal and covert. Initially, Saudi intervention was constrained by a strong American presence. Support for the post-war insurgency and one side in the civil war came from senior religious figures in the kingdom, with societal actors supplying resources and encouraging a sizeable number of Islamic radical ‘Jihadi tourists’ to fight and die in Iraq.
However, in the run- up to the second election of 2005, the Saudi government leant its considerable financial support to establishing a specifically Sunni electoral coalition, Jabha al-Tawafuq al-Iraq (the Accord Front). This coalition successfully mobilised the Sunni section of Iraqi society, interpolating them specifically as Sunnis and juxtaposing them against the Shi’a and Kurdish sections of society, integrating them into the MuhasasaTa’ifia system as minority players.
Conclusions
The dominance of Iraq’s political field by the MuhasasaTa’ifia system has greatly weakened the Iraqi state, while the widespread political and personal corruption it encourages has reduced the state’s ability to deliver public goods. From at least 2015 onwards, this has produced a large protest movement within Iraqi society, calling for the removal of religion from politics and the creation of a civic state. It is this popular alienation that led to such a low electoral turn out in the May 2018 elections. However, parties that have benefitted from Muhasasa have simply ignored popular pressure for change and formed yet another government using the system. In doing so, they were strongly supported by both the United States and Iran.
[1] On exclusive elite pacts see Stefan Lindemann, ‘Do inclusive elite bargains matter? A research framework for understanding the causes of civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Crisis States Discussion Paper 15, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, February 2008, http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-discussion-papers/dp15-Do-Inclusive-Elite-Bargains-Matter.pdf. On its application to Iraq see Toby Dodge, Iraq; from war to a new authoritarianism, 2012, Abingdon: Routledge, 2012.
[2] Ibrahim Nawar, ‘Untying the Knot’, Al-Ahram Weekly, No. 625, February 2003, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/archive/2003/625/sc5.htm.
[3]Martin Chulov, Qassem Suleimani: the Iranian General “Secretly Running” Iraq, The Guardian, July 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/28/qassem-suleimani-iran-iraq-influence.
Author: Professor Toby Dodge is a professor in the International Relations Department at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is also Research Director for Iraq, in the DFID funded Conflict Research Programme. His main areas of research include the comparative politics and historical sociology of the Middle East, the politics of intervention, the evolution of the Iraqi state and state-society dynamics and political identities in Iraq. His publications include Inventing Iraq: The failure of nation building and a history denied (2003), Iraq's Future: The Aftermath of Regime Change and Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism (2013).
[post_title] => Iraq and Muhasasa Ta’ifia; the external imposition of sectarian politics
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[post_content] => Lebanon is a battleground of Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Both provide aid. While Iranian aid to Hizballah creates a military fighting force, Saudi aid is notable for its economic impact. Iranian aid is already widely discussed[1] so this article will focus on the risk of Lebanon’s over-dependence on Saudi development aid funding.
The goal of Hizballah’s network of religious institutions, schools, youth associations, health clinics, women’s associations and of course its military wing is to build a ‘resistance society’. The all-encompassing range of services offered to Lebanon’s majority Shi’a community entrenches sectarianism. Hizballah funding is necessarily opaque.[2] Iran is said to fund Hizballah through cash and charities, training and logistical support. Bashar al Assad’s Syria is a crucial geographic conduit for Iranian aid, which goes a long way to explaining the movement’s support for the regime’s survival. Another source of funding is from wealthy Shi’a donors within Lebanon and the overseas diaspora. Finally, Hizballah allegedly runs various licit and illicit business ventures inside and outside of Lebanon. Recent media reports suggested that the movement is facing financial difficulties due to the cost of fighting in Syria and Iran’s economic difficulties in the face of renewed US sanctions.[3]
In the 1980s, Rafiq Hariri emerged as the main conduit of the Kingdom’s aid to Lebanon. After Hariri’s assassination in 2005 his son and current Prime Minister, Saad Hariri took over. Saad Hariri pursued no holistic goal such as ‘resistance society’. Hariri did not overcome political fragmentation within his own Sunni community as Hizballah did among the Shi’a, he simply put himself at the head of the disparate communal scene. The Hariri Foundation’s schools and health centres have played a role in parliamentary elections since 2000. Hariri became a typical confessional political boss, furnished with extraordinary resources through his own wealth and Saudi largesse. Saad Hariri’s military ambitions appear to have been limited to funding a largely ineffective force run under the guise of a private security company.[4]
Riyadh did not just sponsor Hariri’s clientelism but also Lebanon’s Central Bank. In the midst of the Israeli war with Lebanon in 2006, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait deposited $1.5 billion to support the Beirut Central Bank’s currency chest. In 2008 the Central Bank received another $1 billion from Saudi Arabia. These funds proved vital to the maintenance of the Lebanese pound’s peg to the dollar, which has been in place since 1997 but has come under increasing pressure. In 2017 Lebanon’s government debt stood at 153 per cent of GDP, the third highest rate in the world. Its current account deficit of 25 per cent of GDP was also among the highest globally. The country needs to constantly attract capital inflows to maintain the peg. But why do investors keep pouring money into this questionable financial proposition? A 2008 IMF working paper found that Lebanese investors perceive an ‘implicit -guarantee’ by donors – and Saudi Arabia has historically been the most prolific among them.[5] The expectation that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states would provide funds to stabilise the currency during a crisis has helped the country weather a succession of financial storms.
A recent weakening of Saudi support for Lebanon’s economy therefore puts the country’s financial system in grave danger. Hariri seems to have fallen out of favour with Riyadh. His construction company Saudi Oger began to collapse in 2015 after a new guard of Saudi royals under now Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman slashed state contracts and was wound up in 2017.[6] This eroded Hariri’s ability to dole out patronage. Riyadh also created doubt over its commitment to support Lebanon’s financial stability when, in February 2016, it withdrew a promised $3 billion aid package to the Lebanese army over perceived Lebanese government unwillingness to distance itself from Iran.[7] The Lebanese Central Bank had to turn to increasingly adventurous financial ‘engineering’, at one point offering 40 percent interest on a one-year loan to attract the foreign currency it needed to maintain the dollar peg.[8]
In November 2017, Saudi Arabia brought Lebanon to the brink of both military and economic crisis. Just when Hariri was in Riyadh to ask the Kingdom to support donor conference, the Saudi rulers appeared to strong-arm Prime Minister Hariri into a televised resignation, in which he accused Hizballah of plotting to assassinate him.[9] The episode prompted fears of Riyadh forcing a confrontation of its local clients with Hizballah. Rumours swirled that Riyad was going to impose an economic blockade on Lebanon akin to the action taken against Qatar in 2017. This would have strangled Lebanon’s fragile economy. France worked to resolve the political crisis and Riyadh stepped back from the brink. At a donor conference in Paris in April 2018, Saudi Arabia restored a previously pledged credit line of $1 billion to Lebanon.[10]
To conclude, Saudi and Iranian aid to Lebanon is similar in some respects: Both countries finance the confessional clientelism of local allies. Yet Saudi Arabia also plays a pivotal economic role, creating a different kind of risk. While Iranian weapons increase the danger of military confrontation, Lebanon’s dependence on Saudi economic aid means that Riyadh can destabilise the Lebanese financial system at any time.
[1] For an overview of Iran’s role in Hizballah’s history, see: Augustus Richard Norton, Hizballah: A Short History, 2007, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 29-46. For Hizballah’s view on the relationship, see: Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from within, 2007, London: Saqi: London, pp. 387-393.
[2] Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah finances: Funding the party of god, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2005, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hezbollah-finances-funding-the-party-of-god[3] Ibrahim Bayram, Hezbollah turns to charity amid economic woes, An Nahar, August 2018, https://en.annahar.com/article/847815-hezbollah-turns-to-charity-amid-economic-woes[4] Borzou Daragahi and Raed Rafei, Private force no match for Hezbollah, Los Angeles Times, May 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/12/world/fg-security12[5] Axel Schimmelpfennig and Edward H. Gardner, Lebanon - Weathering the perfect storms, IMF Working Paper, 08/17, January 2008, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp0817.pdf[6] Matthew Dalton and Nicolas Parasie, With Saudi Ties Fraying, Lebanese Premier’s Construction Empire Crumbles, Wall Street Journal, November 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/with-saudi-ties-fraying-lebanese-premiers-construction-empire-crumbles-1511519402[7] Tom Perry, Laila Bassam, Hezbollah signals no end to Saudi crisis; central bank reassures on currency, Reuters, 26 February 2016, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-saudi-lebanon/hezbollah-signals-no-end-to-saudi-crisis-central-bank-reassures-on-currency-idUKKCN0VZ1KO[8] The Economist, Lebanon’s economy has long been sluggish. Now a crisis looms, August 2018, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/08/30/lebanons-economy-has-long-been-sluggish-now-a-crisis-looms[9] David Ignatius, Saudi Arabia forcibly detained Lebanon’s prime minister, sources say, Washington Post, November 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/saudi-arabia-forcibly-detained-lebanons-prime-minister-sources-say/2017/11/10/b93a1fb4-c647-11e7-84bc-5e285c7f4512_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f855aa7d2a8a[10] John Irish, Marine Pennetier, Lebanon wins pledges exceeding $11 billion in Paris, Reuters, April 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-economy-france/lebanon-wins-pledges-exceeding-11-billion-in-paris-idUSKCN1HD0UUAuthor: Dr Hannes Baumann is a lecturer at the University of Liverpool. His research interests are in international political economy, development, and the politics of ethnicity and nationalism. His current research project is the first comprehensive study of the politics of Gulf investment in non-oil Arab states. He is the author of Citizen Hariri: Lebanon's Neoliberal Reconstruction.
[post_title] => The different risks of Saudi and Iranian aid to Lebanon
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[post_content] => The diffusion of protests against authoritarian regimes across the Arab world in 2011 reinvigorated Yemen’s marginalized social movements and united different geographical and political factions in Yemen, such as the northern Houthi movement and the southern secessionist movement Hiraak.[1] The Saudi Kingdom, along with other Gulf monarchies, swiftly designed a transitional plan for the country to ensure that President Ali Abdullah Saleh wass replaced with a friendly government led by President Abd Rabo Hadi. Disillusioned by the transition, the Houthis took military control of the capital Sana’a in September 2014, and Yemen descended into a civil war. On 26 March 2015, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on Yemen with the aim to restore the Saudi-backed Hadi government and destroy the Houthi movement. What was initially planned as a limited operation degenerated into a war of attrition without a conclusion insight. Scholars and policy analysts moved quickly to examine the Yemen war as a by-product of Saudi-Iranian rivalry and another manifestation of a region-wide war between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. Yet, the crisis in Yemen is more complex; it is neither an international proxy war nor a sectarian confrontation.
First, the Iranian role in Yemen has been exaggerated and even deliberately distorted by the Saudi Kingdom to legitimize its military intervention. The Houthi movement is a tribal group that is rooted in the Yemeni political context, and the group’s decisions and political goals are rooted in its local Yemeni leadership.[2] Some evidence suggests that Iran’s links to the Houthis might have increased at the end of 2014.[3] Yet, this evidence remains suggestive at best. The UN Panel of experts on Yemen has stated in January 2017 that there was ‘no sufficient evidence to confirm any large-scale direct supply of arms from the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran’.[4] Instead, the Houthis have received military support from their most important ally, the former President Saleh, whose army was equipped with US weapons. In other words, Iran’s marginal involvement has no effect on the underlying structure of the conflict.[5]
Second, depicting the political struggle in Yemen as a mere sectarian binary is simplistic. Although the Houthi movement belongs to the Zaydi sect, a branch of Shiism, it is wrong to assume that the Yemen crisis is driven by primordial identities. Zaydism is distinct from the ‘Twelver Shiism’ found in Iran both in doctrine and practice, and the theological difference between both Zaydi and Twelver Shiism leaves the Zaydis closer to Sunni Islam. The Zaydis present themselves as a separate sect distinct from both Shiism and Sunnism. It is also worth noting that Saleh’s supporters from the Yemeni army fighting with the Houthis are Sunnis.[6]
Instead, the recent crisis in Yemen can be viewed as a civil war between groups in a political struggle, and with international interference. Although sectarianism is alien to Yemeni religious culture, several observers have noticed a growing sectarian polarization in Yemen that relies on borrowing sectarian slurs from the conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The Houthi movement is often called as ‘Twelver Shiites’, ‘the new Hizballah of the Arabian Peninsula’ or an ‘Iranian puppet’. The Houthis have also used sectarian terms to refer to their opponents, such as takfiris and daeshites.[7]
Iran’s ambitions in Yemen are limited and do not wish to escalate the conflict with Saudi Arabia. Yet, local actors involved in the conflict have an interest in borrowing sectarian narratives to mobilize international support and resources by situating their struggle in the regional meta-narrative. President Hadi has adopted an anti-Shiite narrative in his confrontation with the Houthis to maintain the support from Gulf countries, who perceive the Iranian expansion in the region as the most dangerous threat. The Houthis would like more support from Iran by adopting slurs from the ‘’Twelver Shiite’’ vocabulary and using famous historical symbols, such as the name of Hussein. The Saudi Kingdom is also interested in providing legitimacy for its military operation, especially at home, and sectarianism provides a wide support for the operation. In short, sectarianism in Yemen remains alien to the local culture but has grown as a strategic war narrative used by local and international actors.
Although Yemen lacks the sharp sectarian divides found in Iraq, Bahrain, and Syria, the sectarianisation of the political transition in Yemen generates distinct junctures, which are likely to have long-lasting implications on Yemen and the region. First, this venom of sectarian hatred that speeded into the Yemen conflict has destroyed centuries of tolerance between the Islamic schools in Yemen, which might take decades to rebuild. Furthermore, the sectarian violence in Yemen made the conflict less localized and increasingly internationalised, which renders the conflict resolution more difficult.
Photo by Ibrahem Qasim, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.[1] For more details on the movement and its development, see International Crisis Group, Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern Question, October 2011, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/breaking-point-yemen-s-southern-question[2] Joost R. Hiltermann and April Longley Alley, The Houthis Are Not Hezbollah, Foreign Policy, February 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/27/the-houthis-are-not-hezbollah/[3] W. Andrew Terrill, Iranian Involvement in Yemen, Orbis vol. 58, no. 3 (2014), p.438; Thomas Juneau, Iran’s Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: A Limited Return on a Modest Investment, International Affairs vol. 92, no. 3 (2016), p. 657.
[4] UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Expert on Yemen, January 2017, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_81.pdf[5] Elizabeth Kendall, Iran’s Fingerprints in Yemen: Real or Imagined?, Atlantic Council, October 2017, http://pushback.atlanticcouncil.org/papers/irans-fingerprints-in-yemen-real-or-imagined/[6] Anna Gordon and Sarah Parkinson, ‘How the Houthis Became ‘Shi‘a,’ Middle East Report Online, January 2018, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero012718[7] Al-Muslimi, Farea, How Sunni-Shia Sectarianism Is Poisoning Yemen. Carnegie Middle East Center, December 2015, http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/62375Author: Dr May Darwich is an Assistant Professor in International Relations of the Middle East in the School of Government and International Affairs (SGIA) at Durham University, in the United Kingdom. She holds a PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Edinburgh (2015), an MA in International Politics from Science Po Bordeaux (2010), and a BA in Political Science from Cairo University (2009). Dr Darwich held a Research Fellowship at GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, within the IDCAR-Network ‘The International Diffusion and Cooperation of Authoritarian Regimes’ (2014-2016). She was also a Teaching Assistant at the University of Edinburgh (2012-2014) and Cairo University (2010-2011). Her current research projects focus on regional military interventions in the Middle East, with a particular focus on the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen since 2015, the diffusion of sectarianism in not so sectarian societies in the Middle East, and the concept of 'shame' in international relations and its impact on state identity formation.
[post_title] => The Yemen war: a proxy sectarian war?
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[post_content] => Saudi Arabia and Iran have both been deeply involved in the Syrian civil war from its beginning in 2011, each sponsoring rival sides. Both have utilised sectarian identity politics to further their goals and both have contributed to the growth of violence along sectarian lines. This has led to a characterisation by many that both are sectarian actors that immediately reach for identity politics as a tool of influence. However, a closer examination of the Syrian case would challenge this. Drawing on research by myself and Morten Valbjorn that examines the relationship between Syrian fighting groups and their external sponsors, this article argues that in Syria identity politics was not the immediate policy pursued by either Saudi Arabia or Iran.[1] Instead, sponsoring sectarian actors was a plan B after backing other, more inclusive actors failed. This suggests a degree of pragmatism from both governments, rather than being driven exclusively by sectarian zeal.
The Syrian conflict is often characterised as sectarian, but this is one strand of several driving the civil war.[2] There has been variation across Syria and over the course of the conflict. In some areas, the war has been driven more by political, economic and international factors than sectarianism. That said, an identity component has often been present, with violence, sexual assault and looting taking place along sectarian lines. Saudi Arabia and Iran have contributed to this. Saudi Arabia has sent arms and money to overtly sectarian Sunni Islamist fighters. Its government turned a blind eye for the first few years of the war to private Saudi donors sending money to radical Sunni groups, and it did little to clamp down on its sectarian preachers appearing on satellite television watched in Syria.
Iran’s sectarian activity was even more pronounced. From 2012 it sent Islamist Shi’a militia to Syria to fight for President Bashar al-Assad, with up to 8,000 fighters from its Lebanese ally Hizballah and 12,000 Afghani and Pakistani fighters present by 2017. It sent its own Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force officers, led by Major General Qassem Suleimani, to direct the war effort and retrain Syria’s military. Several of these retrained units were based around sectarian identities, as were the non-governmental pro-Assad militia they encouraged. The presence of Shi’a militia in the Syria conflict, many with an explicitly anti-Sunni agenda, helped to radicalise anti-Assad fighters, who were overwhelmingly Sunni, and further sectarianized the conflict.
However, it is important to note that turning to sectarian fighters was neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia’s first reaction, and their policies evolved from the failure of earlier options. Riyadh, initially sponsored moderates among those who took up arms against Assad. From early 2012 Saudi Arabia backed the Free Syria Army (FSA), which had a national Syrian rather than a Sunni sectarian focus, even though most were Sunni Muslims. Unlike other sponsors of the opposition like Qatar and Turkey who turned to more Islamist and sectarian fighters earlier, Saudi Arabia feared Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood and preferred the mostly secular former army officers of the FSA.
It was only after the FSA proved unable to defeat Assad and its fighters started joining more radical Islamist groups that Riyadh looked for alternatives. It eventually backed the Salafist Jaysh al-Islam in Damascus in late 2013, led by Zahran Alloush whose father was an imam in Saudi Arabia. This connection also led to it briefly backing the mostly Islamist Jaysh al-Fatah coalition in Idlib in 2015. Both included Sunni sectarianists. However, it encouraged Alloush and his successors to moderate their slogans.[3] This suggests that Saudi Arabia was pragmatic enough to recognise that ultra-sectarian actors would struggle to win in multi-faith Syria and must compromise. Moreover, Saudi did not abandon the FSA completely and maintained its sponsorship of the Southern Front, a south Syria FSA militia until 2017 at the same time. This shows a degree of expediency from Riyadh. It turned to Alloush in desperation, when plan A of backing the FSA failed. Yet even then it stuck with the southern FSA in the hope it would still triumph.
Iran was also more nuanced, turning to sectarian actors only after others failed. Tehran first sent weapons and advisers to help Assad’s army, the nominally inclusive Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Though its elite units were dominated by members of Assad’s Shi’a-linked Alawi sect, it was no sectarian institution, boasting Sunnis, Shi’as, Alawis and Christians in its ranks and utilising inclusive national symbols and slogans. However, the SAA performed poorly in the first year of the war, prompting Iran to send Suleimani to Damascus to salvage the situation. Within a few weeks, the Quds force commander reportedly stated, “The Syrian army is useless! Give me one brigade of Basij [the IRGC’s paramilitary force] and I could conquer the whole country!”[4] Soon Suleimani turned to Hizballah and other Shi’a militia from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan to come to Syria. Having trained many of them himself, especially in Iraq during the post-2003 campaign against the US, Suleimani saw such sectarian actors as more dependable than the SAA.
Yet, as with the Saudis, this suggests a pragmatic rather than an exclusively sectarian motivation. These militias were utilised for their reliability and fighting ability rather than purely ideological reasons. Moreover, Iran used these groups to supplement rather than replace Assad’s national forces and the SAA continued to receive support. Indeed, when the Iranians reorganised Syria’s paramilitary forces in 2013 they gave it a national rather than sectarian name: The National Defence Forces (NDF). While the NDF did include sectarian militia, it retained a deliberately national character. Again, expediency may have driven this. Shi’as make up barely 1-2% of Syria’s population, and Alawis are barely 12%. Were Iran to encourage a purely sectarian chauvinistic discourse, they would have isolated key Christian, Druze and Sunni constituents that continued to back Assad.[5] Unlike in Iraq, where over 60% of the population is Shi’a, demographics in Syria were not in Suleimani’s favour. Even had he wanted to adopt a sectarian approach from the beginning, it would have been counter-productive.
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran, therefore, were not as sectarian as often characterised in their sponsorship of fighting groups in the Syrian civil war. Though both would eventually turn to sectarian militia, each did this only after their first option, more inclusive national-focused fighters, failed. Yet each continued to sponsor national groups alongside these sectarian actors, possibly recognising the impracticality of backing only exclusionary actors in a multi-faith country. In both cases, governments often portrayed as arch-sectarian actors showed a considerable degree of pragmatism and expediency.
[1] Chris Phillips and Morten Valbjorn, ‘What is in a Name?’: The Role of (Different) Identities in the Multiple Proxy Wars in Syria’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 29 (3), 414-433
[2] G. Abdo, The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shia–Sunni Divide. Brookings, SD: Saban Center for Middle East Policy Paper. April 10, 2013.
[3] Phillips and Valbjorn, ‘What is in a Name?’
[4] Dexter Filkins, ‘The shadow commander’, The New Yorker, September 2013, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander[5] Chris. Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International rivalry in the New Middle East, 2016, London: Yale University Press, pp. 50-53.
Author: Dr Christopher Phillips is Reader in International Relations at Queen Mary, University of London and an Associate Fellow at the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa programme and the Imperial War Museum. He was co-curator of ‘Syria: Story of a Conflict’, a public exhibition at the Imperial War Museum and IWM North in 2017-18. He was previously the deputy editor for Syria and Jordan at the Economist Intelligence Unit. He lived for several years in Syria and conducts frequent research trips to the US, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and the Gulf. His new book, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East, was published in September 2016, with a paperback update in 2018.
[post_title] => Sectarianism as Plan B: Saudi-Iranian identity politics in the Syria conflict
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[post_content] => Amidst the violence that has spread across Syria since 2011, most scholarship concerned with the Syrian conflict has focused on questions related to how the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has shaped the Syrian crisis.[1] The escalated rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia over Syria has stemmed from both regional and geopolitical interests in determining the leader of the region. The existing literature has approached this regional conflict using a sectarian lens, yet such account of the development of the Syrian conflict from a secular movement, calling for social justice to be a regional rivalry that brought sect and identity to the fore, needs to be further analysed in relation to how both states and non-state actors define identity and belonging.
Starting with a simple definition of sectarianism by Makdisi, he elaborates that it is often ‘characterized as the violent and illiberal manifestation of competing, age-old antagonistic religious identities in the region’.[2] This sectarian affiliation is rooted in a fixed, one-dimensional conceptualisation of identity that has evolved in the Arab world very much in tandem with the emergence of modern nation-states. It is worth noting that the Syrian uprising was not a clean-cut sectarian conflict at the outset. While many scholars have argued the securitisation of the ‘other’ as an existential threat that has sectarianised the Syrian conflict, consequently, the pressing question is: What can be done politically to overcome the mobilisation of sectarian narrative in the region and in Syria particularly?[3]
This research aims to highlight the importance of deconstructing the official rhetoric perpetuated by state actors that designates particular models of national identities and belonging. Asking the question: What role does masculinism play in the shaping, defining or legitimising sectarianism in the Syrian conflict? entails proposing a shift from the standard practice of taking identities (whether Sunni or Shi’a) as given, which might then inform regional politics in the Middle East, toward a more sophisticated one that sees cross-cutting influences in both directions. The simple answer to the question is that men’s dominance of the political and military dimensions of the Syrian conflict has meant that the story of the conflict has generally been a story about men.
This nationalist and sectarian antagonism reinforced men's roles as protectors and defenders of national and sectarian communities and shaped violent expressions of masculinities. Due to the primacy of using primordiaism and instrumentalism as key frameworks of analysis in research on sectarianism in the Middle East,[4] the relationships between the construction of identity both before and during the conflict as driven by gender has been overlooked.[5] Therefore, the existing debate on understanding sectarianism in the Middle East overlooks identity formation in tandem with the rise of hyper masculinity and competing masculinities.
Since the main objective of this publication and the SEPAD project is how to solve this religious tension and how can we go beyond looking at sectarian identities in the Middle East as tool of explanation and analysis, we need to deconstruct and challenge narratives that idealize violence, militarism and masculine prowess. The power of religion in the Middle East, is only one factor among many multilayered and dimensional spectrums in which identity and the sense of belonging become entrenched with characteristics that glorify manliness and masculinist protection as means for survival. The pressing question is: what have instigated, encouraged, provoked and intensified the sectarian divide in the Syrian war?
My starting point for thinking about the relationship between masculinity and sectarianism in the Syrian context is Iris Young’s proposition about the logic of masculinist protection. Central to the logic of masculinist protection is the subordinate status of those perceived as in need of protection. This logic is based on dominative masculinity that defines protective masculinity as its other. Such conceptualization of masculine men as protectors therefore entails gratification of fighting and sacrificing for the sake of the nation. Employing Young’s model of ‘the logic of masculinist protection’ as being associated with ‘ideas of chivalry’ is central to the subordinate status of those perceived as in need of protection.[6] By constructing and perpetuating an image of the man as courageous, dominating and active, this idealisation of heroism is traced back to Hobbes’s view of the state of nature as a state of war - a dangerous and wild place where men had to rely on their masculine prowess to survive.[7] The Middle East post-Arab Uprisings was deemed to be anarchic and, as such, like a state of nature. Therefore, while ‘othering’ in the Syrian conflict is masked with sectarian affiliation, the attempt to deconstruct how the constructions of identity and belonging are premediated with the ethos of chivalric masculinity is essential. I argue that the perpetuation and gratification of the chivalric male model in Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and depending on militarism (whether in Iran, Syria, and a sheikhdom in Saudi Arabia) in the early formation of the state, instigate violence.
Evaluating the official narratives of both Saudi Arabia and Iran, the securitisation of the ‘other’ has not been fuelled by using an explicit sectarian rhetoric, rather through perpetuating masculinist traits as the main characteristics of national belonging and identity. In this sense, belonging to the nation becomes synonymous with the ability to die and kill the other to preserve nation’s dignity. Iran’s official rhetoric is full of references to heroism, strength and physical prowess. For example, the slogan used by the Iranian militias configures Zainab and Ali as symbols of both religious and national significance.[8] Arguing that the use of these two slogans ‘Labik ya Zainab’ and ‘Labik ya Hussein’ is rather not sectarian stems from the fact that both Sunnis and Shi’as love Zainab and Ali, however, have the Iranian militias used the terms Muˈa̅wia or Aisha[9], then it would be said that sectarianism gives the ultimate form of the current conflict.
At the same time, the Saudi official narrative has shifted in its approach towards defining belonging to the Kingdom. Before 2011, the rhetoric that had dominated most nationalist songs defined belonging to the nation in romantic and soft terms that idealise religious supremacy[10], belonging being measured by your loyalty to religion and the king. However, after 2011, most nationalist songs have substituted this primordial expression that defined belonging to the nation instead with militarised and masculinist notions such as greater use of the words: bullet, fight and act courageously.[11]
It is a commonplace observation that the sectarian violence in Syria reflects a world of men in that they influence regional affairs through their physical capabilities, through masculinist prowess at both regional levels, and through the symbolic links between sectarianism and masculinity. As soldiering universally disciplines the male body, it determines the national and, at times, sectarian contours of a conflict. Therefore, there is a need to examine the relationship between masculinities and embodiment of national identity in Iran and Saudi Arabia in relation to the Syrian conflict, when conscripting soldiers became intimately bound up with notions of masculinity. This shaping in the Syrian conflict was inflected by sectarianism. Therefore, one approach towards what is needed for a democratic transition in the region is deconstructing and challenging official national narratives that define belonging to the nation in masculinist terms, while seeking to breakdown the gendered hierarchies in these countries.
[1] Hurd, E. S. 2015. Politics of Sectarianism: Rethinking Religion and Politics in the Middle East. Middle East Law and Governance 7 (1): 61–75
[2]Makdisi, Usama. The Mythology of Sectarian Middle East. Centre for the Middle East, February 2017,https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/5a20626a/CME-pub-Sectarianism-021317.pdf[3] May Darwich & Tamirace Fakhoury,2016. Casting the Other as an existential threat: The securitisation of sectarianism in the international relations of the Syria crisis, Global Discourse, 6:4, 712-732
[4] The primordialist approach attributes the break of sectarianism in the region to the ancient hatred and irreconcilable differences between Sunni and Shi’a. However, the instrumentalist approach focuses on how sectarianism is a constructed narrative used and mobilised by political elites to maintaine regional power and interest.
[5] See Nasr, V. 2006. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W.W. Norton.
[6] Young, Iris Marion. 2003. The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State. Journal of Women in Culture and Society 29 (1): 1-26.
[7] Hobbes, Thomas. (1668) 1994. Leviathan. Indianapolis: Hackett.
[8] Zainab is the daughter of Prophet Mohammad and the wife of Ali. They are both perceived as loved religious figures and no sectarian division on their roles by Sunnis or Shi’ia.
[9]Muˈa̅wia was the founder and first caliph of the Umayyad Caliphate. He led the Battle of the Camel against Ali which marks the first Islamic civil war. Aisha in turn supported Muˈa̅wia and further tentions between the two groups led to the emergence of Shi’a and Sunni sects in Islam. Therefore, these two figures are perceived as not true followers of Prophet Mohammad and hated by Shi’a.
[10] For example, the song (Above the Sky) [Fawq al-sahaab]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=urs6_wNmTAE[11] An obvious example to this shift is the song (Lions of Al-Jazeera) [Usuud Al-Jazeera] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0jueZMHxepEAuthor: Dr Rahaf Aldoughli is Lecturer in Middle East and North Africa studies at Lancaster University. She teaches courses on the Comparative Politics and International Relations of the Middle East and is a Visiting Fellow at LSE Middle East Centre. Her areas of research expertise include identifying the ideological borrowings between European and Arab nationalism, the rise of the nation-state in the Middle East, the Syria crisis, militarism and the construction of masculinity in the Arab world. She is working on her book Constructing the Nation: Masculinism and Gender Bias in Syrian Nationalism.
[post_title] => The securitisation of the ‘Masculinist’ other in the Syrian conflict
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[post_content] => The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has invested more than €650 million in support of the Kyrgyz Republic since the Central Asian country gained its independence following collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
One of the core objectives of the EBRD in the Kyrgyz Republic is to address inclusion gaps in relation to gender equality.
EBRD projects in southern Kyrgyzstan
In line with its goals, the EBRD has provided a loan of €5.7 million and a grant of €3.1 million to implement the modernisation of bus and trolleybus fleets, the introduction of an e-ticket system, staff training and improvement of technical equipment in the country’s second largest city of Osh. In addition to the public transport project, the EBRD has also provided more than €10 million to rehabilitate wastewater and drinking water supply infrastructure in Osh.
In 2016, the government of Switzerland and EBRD collectively provided funding for a new wastewater plant in the city of Osh. The EBRD extended a €3 million sovereign loan and Switzerland a €5.05 million grant for the project, undertaken by the Osh Water Company, a municipal water and wastewater operator. The works included an upgrade of existing facilities as well as the installation of brand new equipment.
Screenshot from “5News” report on the drinking water quality in Osh city, 2017
Researchers, including this author, travelled to Osh to conduct a survey on the impact of these projects on gender equality in the city’s public transportation and water sectors in the month of October 2017. The EBRD’s investments in Osh city were largely welcomed and supported by residents who participated in the field survey. The research survey focused on acquiring data based on age, gender and occupation in the public transportation and water sectors. Whilst the gender-mainstreaming study objective was focused on gender inclusion, the survey has revealed the problems with accessibility for disabled residents and recurrent issues regarding school children’s safety in private transportation.
The survey underlines common use of public transportation and municipal water supply. Therefore, it is primarily focused on the EBRD funded projects to improve public services in Osh city. However, the poll results for the private transportation sector outline a whole set of separate challenges in contrast to the city’s public transportation.
In context with the methodology of the research, additional questions have been prepared for the Osh city Mayor’s Office and municipal services. However, the city officials declined to be interviewed citing procedural requirements for the meeting with researchers on initial visit to the Mayor’s administration. In the days and weeks after the first visit, the city administration officials failed to respond in a timely manner or demonstrate their willingness to provide information for this survey during research mission in October 2017.
Nonetheless, researchers established that the EBRD’s objective to ‘improve human resource policies and practices both from equal opportunities and commercially focused perspectives’ had yet to be fully implemented for both project aims to include a gender inclusion component.
Indeed, in a response letter to this study, the EBRD acknowledged the challenges of gender mainstreaming in the Osh city municipality. ‘The Gender Advisory Services Programme for the Osh Auto Public Transport Company started in 2015 and is scheduled to finish in mid-2018. The total cost of the assignment is €179,928. The Programme was developed by the bank after pre-investment due diligence revealed that only 20 of the Company’s 236 workforce were women and only one of their 164 drivers was female. The due diligence revealed that the high staff turnover is one of the big challenges – for example, in 2015 they have reported a loss of 50% of their drivers.’ according to the EBRD.
The research findings in Osh are consistent with the conclusions of the paper ‘Gender Equality Initiatives in Transportation Policy’ authored by Yael Hasson and Marianna Polevoy who found that ‘The travel patterns of women differ from those of men. These differences are linked to gender inequality within the home and the labor market, urban structures, and the processes of socialisation and education. Women and men make different use of a shared system of transportation’.
Gender Inclusion Challenges
According to the bank’s announcement the ‘EBRD-supported gender advisory services programme will see the city’s authorities and the Osh Auto Transport Company work together to offer improved job and career growth opportunities to women in the company’.
EBRD funded public transport project in Osh city, 2017
However, the Osh city development plan 2016-2020 does not stipulate career opportunities for women in the public transportation and water sectors or include objectives for the municipal services in the same period. It does include a chapter which underlines priority for the gender policy and support of women. In the expected outcome, the development roadmap implies more job opportunities will be created for women and youth in Osh, which seemingly has declarative intent rather than a realistic plan based on an agreement.
Furthermore, the Mayor’s Office pledge, in the development roadmap for greater transparency and open access to public and civil society organisations falls short of actual delivery of policy. The affirmed goal of close cooperation with public and civil society regarding evaluation and monitoring of the city development programs raises questions regarding lack of communication in the Mayor’s Office.
The city development plan has a detailed description of expenditure for the public transportation sector which includes modernisation of the bus and trolleybus fleet, introduction of an e-ticket system, staff training and improvement of the technical equipment, but a gender component of the EBRD funded project is not included in the city’s expenditure plans. In a similar fashion, the city’s plans for the Water Company doesn’t include expenditure for an inclusive gender policy.
Previously, the media coverage of the Mayor’s Office roadmap 2016-2020 highlighted deficiencies in the city development plan. The RFE/RL Kyrgyz language service (Azattyk) report stressed the city administration’s immediate focus on infrastructure projects and the lack of human development programs in the plan itself. It is unclear how the city authorities conduct or implement their original development target goals with respect to gender-mainstreaming.
It is even less clear whether a commitment on gender equality is part of the city administration’s long-term planning for the public transportation and water sectors, despite the official narratives.
The research team was unable to verify or observe the EBRD’s ‘work-in-progress’ in the Osh municipal services regarding gender inclusion, due to the city administration’s failure to collaborate with observers on the ground.
Recommendations
Throughout the month-long research, the team has discovered acute concerns and problems regarding functionality of the public and private transportation and water services. Just as in the country’s capital Bishkek, the city of Osh may require expansion of the public transportation routes within city limits in addition to existing geographical coverage.
Among critical concerns which were raised by the survey participants: the discrimination and harassment of pupils in the private transportation sector; unsafe rides on private minibuses underscored by both gender groups; lack of capacity of the existing transportation system due to traffic congestion and the insufficient number of public transportation units; a report of sexual harassment in one specific case; untrained staff in both, public and private transportation; disparity of communication between the authorities and city residents; and an unsatisfactory level of service for the disabled residents in public and private transportation.
Respectively, the Water Municipal Company will require enhancement of the communication policy with city residents which seems inadequate at its present level, more efforts to maintain an uninterrupted supply of water throughout the year, improvement of the quality of drinking water during rainy seasons, cooperation with local civil society organisations and activist groups on the promotion of water conservation practices in the city.
The gender-mainstreaming study objective of the research mission couldn’t be fully achieved as a result of the Osh city administration’s failure to communicate with the team after the Presidential election. It appears the EBRD funds are prioritised on the first-need service basis rather than the long-term strategy goals identified by the EBRD in both the public transportation and water sectors.
It is recommended that the EBRD conducts further consultation with clients on bringing focus back to the gender component in the decision-making process in the local administration and municipal companies; facilitates open access for civil society organisations to the information on gender equality in the municipal companies of Osh city; take steps to undertake annual research and analysis in the public transportation and water sectors based on gender component; improve the city administration’s communication strategy with the public and civil society organisations; include the perspectives of women and youth in the decision-making process; integrate more women in planning and implementation of development plans for the municipal services; and introduce annual target goal parameters for gender equality in the public transportation and water sectors.
This essay summary of a report produced for Bankwatch and available here.
[post_title] => More efforts from the EBRD required to mainstream gender in Kyrgyzstan
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[post_date] => 2018-09-24 14:17:06
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[post_content] => On the eve of China’s ‘4th of May Day’ in 2017, President Xi Jinping announced that “the rule by law is our historical mission.” It is a sentence which harks back to a centuries old legal system which many Chinese have regarded with pride. And yet its utterance was only necessary because, even over 30 years after China began its journey towards a capitalist, rules-based economic system, rule of law is still a source of tension in China. Indeed, many Western commentators noted and mocked the phrase ‘rule by law’ as fundamentally missing the point of ‘rule of law’, even if in Mandarin they mean the same thing.
The central argument of this essay is that Western governments and businesses should take seriously rule of law in China and devote their diplomatic and lobbying powers to seek better Chinese legal institutions. Through examining China’s legal history and exploring recent interactions between foreign investors and China’s legal system, the authors argue that many historical and current diplomatic tensions between China and the West - including the trade war and disputes around intellectual property rights - are related to China’s poor legal infrastructure, which does not meet Western standards of rule of law. Looking to the future, this poses serious problems as China expands its geopolitical visions and looks to export its own values and institutions.
Ultimately, the authors argue that the rule of law has the potential to be an effective point of diplomatic engagement with China. There is an appetite within China and among foreign investors for change, and Xi Jinping’s Government should take advantage of the economic and diplomatic opportunities presented by reforming China’s legal system. Chapter 1 looks at China’s rich legal history and how rule of law has failed to take root in China, giving us the system we see in China today. Chapter 2 looks at contemporary disputes between Western businesses, governments and China, and argues that many of these are closely linked to issues around rule of law. Chapter 3 argues that the rule of law offers an excellent opportunity to engage productively with China and that the opportunity should be seized by Western governments and businesses.
Download the full article here.
About authors:
Johnny Patterson works for a human rights NGO and is studying a Human Rights MSc at the London School of Economics. His research focuses on the rule of law in China.
David Lawrence is Senior Political Adviser at the Trade Justice Movement and previously worked in Parliament. He has an interest in China having grown up there, and previously studied at the London School of Economics and the University of Oxford.
[post_title] => FPC Briefing: Rule of Law in China: A priority for businesses and Western Governments
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[post_date] => 2018-09-18 13:16:12
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[post_content] => China’s draconian approach to the Uighur Muslim minority in its far-western province of Xinjiang is currently – and rightly – receiving a substantial amount of media attention. Less discussed are the vast infrastructural changes also underway in the region, particularly in Xinjiang’s southern city of Kashgar, an economically deprived, religiously conservative and hitherto deeply isolated area, in which approximately 90% of the population are Uighurs. The centrepiece of this construction frenzy is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). With a total financial outlay of around US$51 billion, CPEC is expected to be completed by 2030, and will connect China’s far-western Xinjiang Province with Pakistan’s Gwadar port via a network of highways, railways and trading hubs, providing China with important trading access to the Middle East and Africa.[1] While the expansion of infrastructural networks will doubtlessly bring significant economic benefits to the region, the possibility of connecting militant and terrorist networks in the two regions presents a substantial security risk for the two states and the wider region.
The level and pace of infrastructural development underway in southern Xinjiang is unprecedented. A railway extending from Kashgar, passing through Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to connect with railways in Iran, is currently in the first phase of construction. A second railway project linking Kashgar with the Uzbekistani city of Pap in the Ferghana Valley is also under construction. Highway projects connecting Andijan (Uzbekistan) with Osh (Kyrgyzstan) and Kashgar are also underway. Xinjiang already boasts the most airports of any Chinese province, and their number is expected to expand from 17 to 28 by 2020.[2] However, the most significant projects in this sphere are part of CPEC: the Karakoram Highway, which links Kashgar with Hassan Abdal in Pakistan and was originally constructed in the 1970s, is being upgraded with parts to be expanded into a 4-lane motorway and extensions to the Khunjerab railway that will also link the Pakistani rail network to China’s Kashgar-Hotan railway, allowing rail links from the Gwadar Port into Xinjiang. In the next few years, Kashgar will become a major transit hub for mainland China, with rail and road infrastructure connecting it directly with Pakistan and Central Asia. This will have far-reaching consequences for the local way of life, which has remained virtually unchanged for centuries.
Perhaps the most significant security threat concerns the expansion of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the primary terrorist organization driving the Uighur separatist cause, across the region. After al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), ETIM has become the third largest foreign militant group located on the porous Pakistan-Afghan border region, known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). ETIM is in alliance with local and international militant terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda and the Taliban, not only sharing their ideology, but also operating with their assistance. ETIM’s primary aims are the liberation of Xinjiang from Chinese rule and the implementation of sharia’ in the region, goals which are increasingly shared by the other militant groups in the region. As such, China has become an important target for militant groups, not only for ETIM, but also for al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Following the July 2009 riots in the Xinjiang capital of Urumqi, al Qaeda leader Abu Yahiya al Libi released a video threatening China. Pakistani security officials believe that in the aftermath of the riots, hundreds of Uighurs joined ETIM in FATA. In 2013, ETIM released a video showing Uighur children being trained in militant camps somewhere in FATA. The following year, the IMU’s Mufti al Burmi released a video entitled ‘Let’s disturb China’, in which he directed all militant groups affiliated to the Taliban and al Qaeda to target Chinese interests in Pakistan. Thus, close and expanding connections between Uighur and non-Uighur militants is driving the latter to take up the cause of the former, and growing trade and infrastructural connections between Xinjiang and Pakistan will doubtlessly facilitate militant connections between these groups. Beijing’s current project to transform Xinjiang into what has been termed by Western media reports as a ‘surveillance state’ constitutes its illiberal response to this threat.
Islamic radical organizations are deeply rooted in Pakistani society and militant activities are threatening longstanding Pakistan-China relations. Following pressure from the Chinese leadership to take action against ETIM, in 2014 the Pakistan Army launched a military operation codenamed Zarb-i-Azb. However, although this massive military offensive destroyed militants’ command and control systems in FATA, numerous splinter groups have formed a new command system across the border in Eastern Afghanistan. The battle to eradicate these militant groups is therefore far from over.
Despite popular concern about the growing levels of Chinese activities in Pakistan, with some Pakistani senators comparing CPEC to the East India Company, formal China-Pakistan relations have never been better. Both Pakistani and Chinese leaders have repeatedly referred to their relationship as ‘sweeter than honey’ and ‘stronger than steel’.[3] And the two big Pakistani religio-political parties, Jamiat Ulama i Islam (JUI) and Jamat i Islami (JI) have signed agreements with China. The Pakistani government has even defended Chinese policy towards Muslims in Xinjiang in the Organization for Islamic Co-operation.
Such allegiance by Pakistan to its Communist neighbour is driven primarily by economics: the Pakistani economy is highly dependent on Chinese trade and investment. According to the 2017 edition of the annual government-authored Pakistan Economic Survey, the volume of trade between Pakistan and China, which was approximately US$4 billion between 2006 and 2007, reached an all-time high at US$13.77 billion in 2015-16. Pakistan’s exports to China have increased by almost 200 percent since the implementation of the FTA, from US$575 million in 2007 to 1690 million in 2016, making China the second largest importer of Pakistani goods after the United States.[4] It is highly unlikely that Pakistan will reduce its co-operation with China.
The Chinese authorities are, of course, well aware of the threats posed by this cross-border infrastructural expansion – and the on-going repression of Muslims in Xinjiang must be seen in this context. In Pakistan, the threat against Chinese activity has become so severe that the Pakistani Army has created a special division whose sole purpose is to protect CPEC and its Chinese workers, and comprises nine army battalions, six civil wings and nearly 13,700 personnel.[5] It therefore seems likely that as CPEC gains momentum, so will the crackdowns on those deemed to pose security risks to the high stakes project. And this of course includes the entirety of Xinjiang’s Uighur population. As crackdowns against practicing Muslims in Xinjiang increase, however, the growing infrastructural connections between Pakistan and China will not only facilitate the transfer of goods, but also the transfer of militant and anti-Chinese ideology.
Note: The essay was written by two academics who wish to remain anonymous.
[1] Andrew Small (2017) ‘First Movement: Pakistan and the Belt and Road Initiative’, Asia Policy, 24: 80-87.
[2] Cui Jia (2016) ‘Work to start on rail link with Iran’, China Daily, 15 January 2016. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-01/15/content_23096031.htm[3] See Times of India (2017) ‘Our friendship is sweeter than honey: Chinese vice premier to Pakistan’, Times of India, 14 August 2017. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/our-friendship-is-sweeter-than-honey-chinese-vice-premier-to-pakistan/articleshow/60057468.cms; Tribune (2014) ‘“Pak-China friendship is 'sweeter than the sweetest honey”: Nawaz’, Tribune, 21 April 2014. Available at: https://tribune.com.pk/story/698409/pak-china-friendship-is-sweeter-than-the-sweetest-honey-nawaz/.
[4] Pakistan Economic Survey 2016-17, May 2017. Available at: http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey_1617.html.
[5] Xinhua (2017) ‘Pakistan army chief vows to protect China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’, Xinhua, 11 March 2017. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/11/c_136121332.htm.
[post_title] => The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Security Risks of Infrastructural Expansion
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[post_date] => 2018-09-14 09:52:41
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[post_content] => Is Brexit just a choice between the Chequers deal or a ‘hard Brexit’? Supporters of ‘associate citizenship’ believe there is not. The proposed associate citizenship would allow individuals to enjoy some of the benefits of EU citizenship in return for a (likely substantial) fee. While this would undoubtedly bring benefits to those able to take up associate citizenship, it would also have a transformative effect on the concept of citizenship itself, exacerbating existing trends towards transnational forms of citizenship and a reduced role for nation states.
Associate citizenship of the EU will enable UK citizens to ‘buy in’ to EU citizenship.[1] Associate citizens would enjoy access to the same rights as EU citizens but will be required to pay-in to the EU.[2] This proposal has much to recommend it, yet it is likely to prove politically controversial because it will substantially alter the relationship between the individual and the state.
The proposal has been endorsed by Guy Verhofstadt, the European Parliament’s lead on Brexit negotiations and is referred to in the Parliament’s resolution on Brexit,[3] and obtained significant civil society support in the UK. For example, over 300 000 people have signed petitions calling for the inclusion of associate citizenship in Brexit negotiations.[4]
Opponents of associate citizenship argue that it will undermine the Brexit process. For Andrew Bridgen, a Conservative MP and Leave campaigner, it will create “two classes of EU citizen”.[5] Bridgen’s analysis, however, is the wrong way around. Associate citizenship will leave EU citizenship substantively unchanged. Yet it will create two classes of British citizenship: those who enjoy rights in the EU and those who do not. This will alter the nature of national citizenship, establishing a precedent for a form of citizenship that transcends nation-states. This will empower individuals and cities in relation to national governments. The benefits of the proposal are, however, likely to be limited to more affluent urban elites, exacerbating existing social divisions in the UK. This article offers a brief overview of the most significant barriers and likely impacts of associate citizenship, and an assessment of the proposal’s likelihood of success.
What is Associate Citizenship?
The precise nature of associate citizenship is unclear. Any proposal would, in any case, be subject to intensive negotiation before it could be approved. It is possible, however, to identify a few key features likely to be included in any negotiation of a form of associate citizenship. Associate citizens would enjoy a bundle of certain rights and duties. A ‘thick’ form of associate citizenship could include enjoyment of the four freedoms (free movement of goods, capital, services, and persons) and other EU rights subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). This would likely ease the process of travel from the UK to the EU and provide associate citizens with easier access to EU markets and institutions from the UK. It could also include the right to vote in certain EU elections (although this would require the creation of transnational MEPs, which would require some considerable changes to the current European Parliament’s structures). This would likely come at the cost of a substantial financial contribution by associate citizens. The EU27 are unlikely to grant UK citizens rights in the EU without this. ‘Thinner’ forms of associate citizenship would include some, but not all, of the above but are still likely to come at a significant financial cost.
Associate citizens will likely enjoy a number of political, social, and (perhaps) economic benefits. Access to the four freedoms and other rights will enable associate citizens to travel in the EU, take part in EU political discourse and elections, and interact more directly with their fellow EU citizens. Increased access to EU markets would offer associate citizens economic opportunities not available to those who enjoy only British citizenship. The extent of the benefit enjoyed as a result of associate citizenship would, of course, depend on the thickness of the version of associate citizenship ultimately adopted.
Legal Hurdles
Critics of associate citizenship argue that it is legally impossible.[6] Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for EU citizenship as ‘co-citizenship’.[7] While national citizenship remains pre-eminent, the individual is a citizen of both their own state and the EU. This is not, however, an insurmountable barrier. It is conceivable that associate citizens would retain their British citizenship as well as their EU citizenship: remaining co-citizens of the UK and EU.[8] A more significant challenge is the likely necessity of treaty change. EU law must be based on the powers conferred in the EU treaties. Article 20 does not, prima facie, appear to confer the power to create associate citizens. A treaty change requires the consent of all member states. It may, however, be argued that the required power is implicit. Article 20 does not rule out associate citizenship, it is merely silent on the matter, meanwhile Article 77 of the treaty empowers the Commission to confer EU passports[9] and Articles 223 to 234 and 314 confer legislative initiative on the Commission and the Parliament.[10] The combination of these powers could form a basis for the argument that the EU already has the power to create associate citizens through its existing legislative processes.[11]A Challenge to the Nature of Citizenship
Nation states are traditionally the arbiter of citizenship. The state decides who is, and who is not, a citizen, as well as the rights and duties that come with citizenship. [12] This is part of a state’s cultural, social, and political legitimacy.[13] Citizenship and individual identity are interlinked.[14] Our perception of our own identity is heavily influenced by our citizenship because we reflexively understand ourselves as members of a particular group with a particular history.[15] Our membership of these groups is often by our citizenship status. As the ultimate arbiter of citizenship, the state thus plays a role in the formation and re-formation of individual self-understanding. The state is therefore vital to individuals in a social, cultural, and political sense.
As John Urry puts it:
“The concept of society has been central to western notions of what it is to be a human. To be human has meant that one is unambiguously a member of a particular society. Historically and conceptually there has been a strong connection between the idea of humanness and that of membership of a society. Society involves an ordering through a nation-state, clear territorial and citizenship boundaries and a system of governance over its particular citizens.”[16]
Since, at least, 1989 the state’s monopoly on the determination of citizenship has eroded. Social, commercial, and cultural relationships are increasingly transnational.[17] This creates space for informal alternative citizenships. Individuals increasingly self-identify with communities beyond the nation-state.[18] Some national leaders see this as eroding the role of the state and, by extension, their own authority. In her 2016 Conference speech Theresa May attacked those who embrace alternative citizenship identities, arguing that “if you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere”.[19]
EU associate citizenship would represent a quantum change in the nature of citizenship. It would formalise, and further legitimise, alternative citizenship identities. The state would no longer be the ultimate arbiter of citizenship. Individuals would be able to formally elect an alternative form of citizenship that transcends the nation state. The bundle of rights and duties that come with citizenship would no longer be conferred solely by the state. The individual would have the option of additional rights and duties and to formally identify with socio-cultural and, crucially, political communities beyond the nation state. The individual would thus become a co-equal arbiter of citizenship. Associate citizenship would therefore alter the relationship between the individual and the state.
The impacts of associate citizenshipGlobalisation
Associate citizenship would empower individuals to interact with a supra-national organisation and with their fellow EU citizens in a manner that transcends the nation state (albeit to a greater or lesser extent depending on whether a ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ version of associate citizenship is adopted). If associate citizenship is taken up by significant numbers of individuals, this will accelerate the transnationalisation of individual relations that has occurred as a result of globalisation.[20] It will consequently erode the status of states at the global level by dispersing the (formerly exclusive) power to confer citizenship status from states to individuals. ‘Globalisation’ is often used in a pejorative sense yet, in empowering individuals and facilitating relationships and identity building beyond the confines of the nation state, associate citizenship will likely have a positive impact.
Cities
Cities play an increasingly prominent global economic and political role.[21] Economic growth tends to be focused in cities and, in the UK, increased devolution has empowered cities to elect their own leaders exercising broad policy making powers.[22] Cities increasingly cooperate transnationally, such as through the C40 initiative on climate change.[23]
In the UK, associate citizenship will further empower cities at the expense of the national government. Cities like London, Manchester, and Birmingham[24] tend to be richer[25] and more pro-EU than rural areas or smaller cities.[26] They thus have both greater means and inclination to benefit from associate citizenship. Associate citizens are therefore likely to be concentrated in major cities. This will incentivise mayors to pursue closer relationships with the EU than those pursued by national government. For the EU’s part, city governments will become an important point of intercession with associate citizens. Cities will thus become increasingly transnational and the role of the national government correspondingly marginalised. Cities are unlikely to participate in EU institutions in the same way as states unless those institutions undergo substantial changes. Their informal role, however, as key intercessors between large concentrations of associate citizens and the EU, combined with a more outward-looking approach to the EU, will give cities an enhanced substantive role.
Social tension
This will exacerbate the existing social and economic divisions in the UK. The economic benefits of associate citizenship will accrue to those who have both the means and inclination to take advantage: wealthier liberals who tend to live in cities. Secondary impacts are likely to be concentrated in cities as well. Urban dwellers already tend to be wealthier than those in rural areas or provincial towns[27] and wealth correlates with likelihood of voting for Brexit and being suspicious about immigration.[28]
Associate citizenship will increase the economic, cultural, and social opportunities of associate citizens, increasing the cosmopolitan attitudes and economic advantages enjoyed by the urban middle class. By contrast, those outside this group, who were already likely to be poorer (and thus unable to afford the – likely – substantial financial cost of associate citizenship) and more anti-European, will be denied these opportunities. The impression will be of one group enjoying special privilege while the other is neglected. This will harden existing scepticism towards globalisation and supra-national bodies like the EU. Associate citizenship is thus likely to further entrench the UKs existing political and socio-economic divides.
The Fatal Flaw: Political Will
While the legal barriers to associate citizenship are not insurmountable, it is likely the project will fail for lack of political will. Those conducting the negotiations have no incentive to advance a project that will marginalise national governments. On the UK side, the national government faces a situation in which the cities most likely to benefit from associate citizenship are either controlled by a hostile political party or an independent minded mayor. On the EU side, Brexit negotiations are overseen by the Council, the body that represents the nation states. While the immediate impacts of associate citizenship will only be felt in the UK, the project as a whole establishes a worrying precedent from the perspective of nation states. It demonstrates that the nation state is no longer necessary as the sole arbiter of citizenship. This exacerbates a trend in which nation states are losing the pre-eminence as both international and domestic actors. There is therefore likely to be little real enthusiasm for the project around the Brexit negotiating table.
Conclusions
The practical barriers to associate citizenship are not insurmountable. The political issues, however, require more careful consideration. The project would undoubtedly empower individuals and cities and, for this reason, has much to recommend it. While it will likely exacerbate existing economic and social divisions in the UK, the root cause of these lies elsewhere. These problems should be addressed, but they will not be solved by opposing associate citizenship. Yet, the projects greatest advantage, that it will redefine the relationship between the individual and the state, is also its greatest political weakness. Those charged with negotiating Brexit stand to lose from associate citizenship. The project is therefore likely to fail for a lack of political will.
[1] The Economist, Can Britons Keep Their Citizenship After Brexit?, April 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21720631-though-many-would-it-looks-both-legally-and-politically-unlikely-can-britons-keep-their[2] Ibid.
[3] Guy Verhofstadt, “The EU will defend its interests in the Brexit talks, but will also be generous to British citizens”, The Independent, April 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-eu-will-defend-its-interests-in-the-brexit-talks-but-will-also-be-generous-to-british-citizens-a7674371.html[4] The largest petition, which closed at 315 934 signatures, can be found on Change.org at https://www.change.org/p/eu-offer-european-citizenship-to-uk-citizens[5] The Economist, n. 1
[6] The Economist, n. 1
[7] European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01, Art. 20(1)
[8] This would be unprecedented – a concept of co-citizenship with a non-member state does not exist in EU law. Yet Brexit is, itself, unprecedented. It is not unreasonable to assume that the process will require precedent-setting solutions in some areas.
[9] Ibid. Art. 77(3)
[10] Ibid. Art. 223-234 and 314
[11] This paper does not purport to offer a clear solution in this area, merely to highlight the potential for further legal analysis.
[12] See John Urry, Globalisation and Citizenship, 5 Journal of World-Systems Research 2 (1999)
[13] B. Gilly, ‘The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy, 45 European Journal of Political Research 3 (2006), pp. 499-525
[14] Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Modern Age, (Cambridge; Polity, 1991), pp. 10-34
[15] Urry, n. 11
[16] Ibid., p. 433
[17] Akira Iriye, The Making of A Transnational World, in Iriye (ed), Global Interdependence: The World After 1945, (London; Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), pp. 679-847
[18] Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership, (Princeton, NJ; Princeton UP, 2006), pp. 219-233
[19]Theresa May, Address to the Conservative Party Conference, 4th October 2016, reproduced in The Telegraph, Theresa May’s Conference Speech in Full , October 2016, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/05/theresa-mays-conference-speech-in-full/[20] Iriye, n. 17
[21] See generally, Richard Child Hill and June Woo Kim, Global Cities and Developmental States: New York, Tokyo and Seoul, 37 Urban Studies 12 (2000)
[22] See Tom Gash and Sam Sims, What Can Elected Mayors do for Our Cities?, Institute for Government, (29th March 2012)
[23] See C40 Cities, available at http://www.c40.org/cities[24] See, for example, JLL, Greater Birmingham: An Economic Renaissance? September 2014
[25] See, for example, Danny Dorling and John Pritchard, The Geography of Poverty, Inequality and Wealth in the UK and Abroad: Because Enough is Never Enough, 3 Appl. Spatial Anlysis 81 (2010), pp. 81-106
[26] BBC, EU Referendum: Britain’s most Pro-EU and Anti-EU Boroughs, June 2016, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36616747[27] Dorling and Pritchard, n. 23
[28] See Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath, Brexit vote explained: poverty, low skills, and lack of opportunities, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, (31st August 2016)
[post_title] => Associate EU Citizenship: A Brief Assessment
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[post_content] => As the UK faces the uncertainty of Brexit, this article examines how its policies towards third countries including enlargement, trade, migration, development and energy policies have been mediated through the EU membership. It demonstrates how the UK has used the EU to amplify power, to protect UK interests and security, and to pursue its foreign policy priorities and interests. Finally, it offers some thoughts as to the risks to the UK’s foreign policy influence following Brexit.
A power amplifier
The UK has had a successful history in normatively influencing the EU through its membership. The impact of the UK and the FCO over the last 40 years in ensuring that its ideas are transmitted via a 28-member bloc and its networks across the world should not be underestimated. Some of the EU’s most enduring policies testify to British ideas at the heart of EU decision-making: From Churchill’s European vision which led to the founding of the European movement, to the widening (as opposed to deepening) of the union via its enlargement and neighbourhood policies the UK has been a thought leader on EU foreign policy. The enlargement of the EU in 2004 to admit 10 new members radically altered the centre of gravity and emphasis of the union to Whitehall’s liking[1]. In recent years, the EU has been more Anglo-Saxon than ever in its interactions beyond its borders – and not just because the language of its business is English. EU Free Trade Agreements – often negotiated by UK trade lawyers - draw the interest of trading giants, such as latterly, Canada, the US[2] and Japan. In a number of foreign policy areas, from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which enables the EU to speak with one voice on political affairs in relation to third countries and articulate EU common interests and values, to policies ranging from border control to energy and climate change to development – the EU amplifies British soft power.
Safeguarding UK interests
The EU has played a key role in safeguarding UK interests ranging from sanctions to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policy. On the bigger foreign policy questions, including sanctions on third countries following abuses of power and violations of international norms, the UK has been able to draw on collective bloc decisions which favour its position and avoid being singled-out to face negative political and economic consequences, such as export bans on arms/equipment. The EU is also one of the only mechanisms by which Britain can successfully push its pro-sanctions position (notably on Russia and Syria) since sanctions are frequently rendered impossible via the UN route due to Russian and Chinese veto at the UNSC. The departure of the UK has led some allies (notably Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands) to express concern about a possible shift of the balance of power within the EU on EU-Russia policy. It may make the EU common position more susceptible to pressure from Austria, Italy and other governments to weaken the sanctions policy.
The EU has also offered the UK a useful ‘’bad cop’’ in situations where UK bilateral policy is to appease rather than sanction a third country: The June 2018 EU sanctions on Myanmar generals as a result of suspected crimes against humanity against the Rohingya were tacitly supported by the UK as a means of applying pressure for accountability, whilst allowing the UK, the former colonial power, to pursue a pragmatic, pro-engagement bilateral policy toward Aung San Suu Kyi’s Government. In the case of Libya in 2011, the UK benefited from the unanimous endorsement of EU sanctions, which went further than UNSCR 1970 as well as asset freezing[3]. These coordinated moves by EU member states provided political space for more concerted action by the EU’s two military and diplomatic powers, UK and France – even taking into account Germany’s abstention at the UN Security Council.
In contexts where individual EU member states such as the UK are considered partial, the EU is also able to achieve outcomes as an honest broker – notably in the success of the European External Action Service on the Iran deal, and in current mediation efforts by the EU High Representative in the Western Balkans. Through its work on conflict prevention and civilian crisis management, the EU is doing more on the ground than other conflict prevention formats in which the UK has a stake in the Eastern and Southern European neighbourhood: OSCE, NATO, UN or G20. EU civilian crisis management policy is able to do more in Moldova and Georgia than the OSCE (which remains hobbled by Russia) or NATO for whom the region is too politically sensitive to enter. EU Operation Sofia, in the Mediterranean, for all the challenges of its mandate, mounted a serious smuggling prevention operation.
There is great complementarity and burden sharing opportunities for larger EU member states, such as the UK: The EU mission in Libya on border security supports the UK intervention as well as UK national security concerns, just as by analogy the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali supports France. The multinational pool of expertise for EU deployments to these missions supports wider knowledge sharing and transfer. EU civilian crisis management missions provide an outlet for UK policing ideas via their personnel, whereas in other contexts where the UK has a stake but less cultural reach and expertise (for example Armenia and Moldova), experts from Central and Eastern European states do that job. The EU is also effectively providing a security guarantee for Georgia. Despite the UK’s tough stance on Russia, it is not clear that the UK has the geopolitical capital or financial resources to deploy a mission on the scale of, for example, the 200-strong EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia and would not consider doing so alone. The EUMM complements the FCO’s dedicated bilateral funding ‘niche’, supporting conflict-prevention NGOs in the South Caucasus region.[4]Free-riding on Home Affairs
The EU has also expanded UK influence in relations with partners - at a limited material cost to the UK. The Enlargement process, and the European Neighbourhood Policy and its successor in the East, the Eastern Partnership, have carried weight in partner countries for whom association with the EU means clean water, safe transport, travel opportunities through easier access to Europe, via budget airlines, and the potential to sell goods to a market of, currently, 500 million people.
This leverage has allowed the EU to demand reforms on migration and asylum in exchange for visas for the Schengen area, such as justice reforms or anti-corruption measures in public procurement which, when implemented by neighbouring countries, also benefit the UK down the line. The obligation on partner countries to cooperate with Eurojust and Europol protects the UK. In the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood, five out of six countries have signed or are negotiating visa facilitation agreements have been obliged to adopt readmission agreements.[5] Since the visa facilitation agreements apply only to Schengen the UK has valid readmission agreements without giving up anything materially. Other EU member states have borne the cost of the reduction from 60 Euros to 35 Euros for a single-entry Schengen visa[6], or for the free visas offered to an extended list of categories, ranging from students to journalists. With its decision to leave the EU, the UK faces the prospect of concluding bilateral readmission negotiations with each of these third countries which may cost it more in concessions on visa. At the same time, it is not clear that Britain alone would have the leverage to negotiate the accompanying reforms, whose implementation is also supported through pooled EU funding, and trade incentives (see below).
Large trading market
The EU as a trading bloc with a single-market has more clout in a partner country than any single EU member state. Britain has long embraced this vision. In the neighbourhood, as elsewhere in the world, the EU facilitates market access and investment opportunities for British companies through its Common Commercial policy. For many countries outside Europe, the EU collectively is the largest trading partner: In 2015 – EU trade with Ukraine was worth 31 billion USD whereas Britain’s trade with Ukraine was 2.1 billion USD[7]. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs), negotiated with Eastern neighbours, and considered for the Southern neighbours, are modelled on the successful accession process and aim to increase exports and investment through opening new markets. Because standards are high they also protect the EU’s member states including Britain against dumping. Through ensuring that neighbouring countries align their legislation with EU standards, the EU not only opens but transforms markets. DCFTAs aim at transforming societies on the EU’s periphery by demanding reforms in areas ranging from customs practices to taxation to product standards, with broad implications for the fight against corruption and good governance.
As well as the benefits for British companies, Britain can afford to be clear that regulation is both necessary and useful for its foreign policy, both in strengthening the EU internal market in key geo-strategic areas such as energy – see below – and raising standards among neighbours. Britain alone would be less likely to achieve this level of convergence with its legislation, nor be able to offer sweeteners on the scale of the €12.8 billion offered by the EU to support the reform process in Ukraine[8]. This is a political as well as a technical question in a country like Ukraine, where the EU is its largest trading partner and – together with Russia – accounts for 50% of Ukraine’s trade.
Likewise, the size of the EU energy market gives it real clout in the sector. The EU has taken the lead on negotiating MoUs to establish gas pipelines of strategic importance to the EU27, notably the Southern Energy Corridor. The transnational nature of the issue, as well as the scale of collective EU energy demand, means that the EU Commissioner for Energy has more leverage than a single member state. At the same time, EU energy policy, including the Energy Union and particularly the Energy Security Strategy (2014) links the liberalisation of the internal energy market to the achievement of reduced dependence on particular external actors in a way that national policy could not. By launching an anti-trust case against Gazprom in September 2012, the European Commission’s DG Competition has been fighting the corner for British business and British strategic interest through challenging Gazprom’s monopoly[9]. This is an example of where EU single market rules and regulations in competition policy act in the British interest. Further, the EU has established an Energy Community –which is expanding the EU acquis on the security of supply, energy efficiency, oil, renewable energy and statistics to countries ranging from the Western Balkans to Ukraine, creating reliable markets for British companies.
Global development
In development policy, the UK - as a top bilateral development donor, as well as a net contributor to the EU development budget - leverage the EU’s funding, networks and delegations. The EU, together with its member states, is the world’s largest development donor. Much of EU development and humanitarian policy thinking has been shaped by the UK. The Department for International Development (DFID) has used its own leverage as a top donor historically to shape the EU’s development policy focus on health and education in development and prioritisation of the the Least Developed Countries, as well as funding modalities pursued by the EU’s humanitarian assistance department (ECHO), most recently on cash-programming. DFID often works in Joint Actions with the EU, notably in West Africa. EU and UK ‘super grants’ are fostering development outcomes on a greater scale on issues such as infant nutrition, in Bangladesh[10]. With the UK contributing up to 15% of the EU’s Development Fund annually[11] and ‘paying to play’ in setting the EU’s priorities through the fund, the challenge for the UK (and the EU) post-Brexit, will be to make less funding go further in transforming lives and buying change.
Losing out from the divorce
Whether the EU can continue to exercise the power of attraction at the same level without UK membership is an open question. The Union faces a number of political challenges aside from Brexit, including open challenges to its own values from existing members, most notably ins Hungary and Poland[12]. The new long-term budget of the EU is likely to shrink directly as a result of Brexit, and indirectly as other countries seek to use funding leverage to articulate demands[13].
Yet, all the signs are that challenges for Britain as a result of Brexit will be arguably greater. In an increasingly multipolar world, one which belongs to regional trading blocs and bigger countries, it is unclear what advantages can be derived from the UK’s ‘Global Britain’ policy. A pivot to an Asia-Pacific strategy and a rekindling of colonial ties could prove costly, given that the majority of the UK’s trading partners are next door. The EU accounted for 90% of the UK’s trading in 2017, considering that it was the destination for 44% of UK’s exports, with 53% of the UK’s imports coming from the other 27 EU member states[14]. This market of 500 million people allows the UK to enjoy some 50 trade agreements with countries and regions across the world[15]. It follows that post-Brexit bilateral deals struck for a UK market of 66 million people will be harder to come by, and will take time, during which the UK will be subject to high tariffs under basic WTO rules.
A diminished economic power will also face diminishing returns in foreign policy: With Britain on the sidelines – at best being permitted to observe foreign policy ministerial decisions by the EU27 – there will be less potential to influence EU-bloc decisions that are taken into multilateral fora, from the WTO to the Human Rights Council. Although it cannot yet be quantified, the loss of UK influence in Brussels foreign policy decision-making during the Brexit process indicates worst to come. Put simply, the UK risks losing normative and soft power through exiting the club that it has so successfully shaped.
[1] The fact that the 2004 enlargement arguably was a fact in sowing the seeds of Brexit has more to do with successive UK governments’ poor handling of the migration debate than the policies of the new EU members
[2] The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership has so far failed to come to fruition, but negotiations are quietly ongoing and would see the US submit to EU standards whilst uniting the two markets to form the world’s largest trading bloc.
[3] In COUNCIL DECISION 2011/137/CFSP and COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 204/2011 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011R0204&from=EN The EU placed 20 people on its visa ban list in addition to the 6 on the UN list
[4] DFID downgraded the Eastern European countries a few years ago.
[5] These are: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan
[6] Currently offered to children under 12 and citizens of: Georgia, Kosovo, Russia, and Ukraine
[7] See: Ukraine Foreign Ministry https://uk.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-uk/trade and DG Trade http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/ukraine/
[8] For an overview of macro-financial assistance from foreign partners to Ukraine see http://www.aalep.eu/financial-assistance-ukraine
[9] The case was concluded in May 2018 without fines to Gazprom, but with a deal outlining significant concessions by the company designed to break its monopoly, including on price-setting and removal of contractual constraints that had prevented clients from reselling gas
[10] https://everyone.savethechildren.net/articles/tackling-child-malnutrition-bangladesh-suchana-programme
[11] The UK is the third biggest contributor to the European Development Fund, behind France and Germany. See UK Parliament: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/1680/168005.htm.
[12] The electoral victory for Matteo Salvini in Italy, and an increasingly right-leaning Austria are a sign of a growing populist challenge to the EU across its member states.
[13] Matteo Salvini has invoked the methods of Donald Trump in threatening to withhold Italy’s annual contribution to the EU budget unless the other Member States enact burdensharing arrangements for the reception of migrants and refugees. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/24/eu-dismisses-italys-threats-in-migration-ship-row-suspend-budget-payments
[14] https://fullfact.org/europe/uk-eu-trade/vvbb
[15] European Commission, Memo- The EU's bilateral trade and investment agreements – where are we?, December 2013, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/november/tradoc_150129.pdf#page=6
[post_title] => How UK foreign policy benefits from EU membership, and the pitfalls of Brexit
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[post_content] => At first sight, EU relations with Switzerland might seem a ‘niche’ topic for a British observer. But in fact current developments are rather important in understanding potential models for the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU, as well as providing insights into some of the difficulties in structuring bilateral relations.
After all, both countries are already highly integrated economically with the EU; at the same time they also grapple with a balance between this and national sovereignty. The Swiss rejected an initiative to begin EU accession negotiations in 2001 by a large majority in a referendum, having earlier rejected (by a hair’s breadth) membership of the European Economic Area in 1992 – issues of national sovereignty are strongly emphasised by Swiss voters and politicians alike, with a strong tendency for discussion of technical matters to become issues of principle. At the heart of the complications in the Swiss relationship are the constitutional provisions for referendums on legislative proposals – allowing the Swiss to retain the sovereignty to conduct such referendums is clearly at odds with the EU’s desire for a common legislative and regulatory framework where single market access is desired. It is easy to see parallels with the UK’s expressed desire for the ability to make its own laws and avoid direct European Court of Justice jurisdiction, while at the same time wishing to maintain the benefits of single market access. Swiss negotiators, too, have noticed that Brexit has heightened interest in whatever deal they are able to strike.
We should not downplay the extent to which Switzerland already co-operates with the EU. It is a member of the Schengen agreement (although that is not without its challenges), allowing free movement without border checks with EU countries. Unlike other members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Switzerland does not enjoy full access to the Single Market (in return for full acceptance of EU law), and instead there is a series of bilateral agreements governing Swiss-EU trade relations. There are two areas in which these are perceived to be inadequate at present. From the Swiss perspective, first, there are areas in which Switzerland would like to see integration with the EU go further (for instance, around equity markets). Secondly, seven Swiss bilateral agreements with the EU are currently affected by a ‘guillotine’, under which if one agreement falls, then, like a house of cards, all agreements cease to apply within six months. This is extremely risky for both parties in a circumstance where Swiss domestic politics may assert itself through a referendum. The EU, too, wants to see change: ever since the Swiss rejected EU accession, EU leaders have urged them to reach an agreement on institutional questions, such as how to update bilateral agreements according to the evolution of EU law (to what extent changes are automatically adopted, for example), and how disputes can be resolved.
The FDP, a centre-right, pro-market political party, which is part of the government and whose member Ignazio Cassis heads the Foreign Ministry, has put forward proposals to break the deadlock that have now been broadly endorsed by the national government. Specifically, Switzerland would agree, in principle, to adopt new EU law provided it had greater influence on EU legislative decisions. These would need to be adopted domestically in Switzerland (with such provisions still having the potential to be defeated by a referendum). If that happened, then there would be a negotiation on compensatory measures between the two countries, and if agreement could not be reached there, an independent court of arbitration would take the final decision. These proposals have received a cautious welcome from Brussels – if adopted, they could perhaps provide a way through the UK’s conundrum of how to reconcile sufficient regulatory alignment to allow an acceptable measure of co-operation and single market access, with ‘red lines’ around national sovereignty and ECJ jurisdiction.
There are further lessons that can be learned from recent Swiss interactions with the EU. First, Brussels has a tendency to become impatient and intolerant of the peculiarities of domestic political processes. A perception of heavy-handedness was generated when it only granted a year’s mutual recognition to Swiss equity traders, rather than the expected ongoing agreement.
Secondly, in both Switzerland and the UK (but increasingly beyond), domestic and foreign policy are become intertwined. This can lead to a certain volatility – for instance, Switzerland’s membership of the Schengen zone has been placed in jeopardy by proposed new measures on handguns (the country might face a referendum on this issue from shooting clubs, and failure to adopt the new Schengen rules would force it out of the zone).
Thirdly, Brexit has complicated the picture for the EU’s relations with third countries. Cassis, when appointed Foreign Minister, decided to spend his first hundred days ‘taking stock’ of the situation. That posed a dilemma for Switzerland – whether to seek to conclude a new agreement with the EU before Brexit or to delay: by going early the Swiss would potentially miss out on concessions that might flow by precedent from a bespoke EU-UK deal and shaped by the UK market’s greater significance; equally, they might avoid unwelcome precedents if the UK ends up with a ‘hard Brexit’. In the end, the country has opted to try to get an institutional agreement with the EU in advance of Brexit (which says something about Bern’s perception of progress on the Brexit negotiations).
Fourth, the Swiss and indeed the UK’s situations are an important reminder that the relations of both EU member states and third countries are driven very much by issues of principle, not just hard economic interests. If only the latter were relevant, Brexit would not have happened, and Switzerland would have compromised on issues of its sovereignty a long time ago.
So we contend that it is important for London’s negotiators to keep looking towards Bern and its dealings with Brussels – there could well be some important tips in how to handle thorny issues of regulatory convergence in areas where single market access is being sought. At the same time, dealings with Switzerland should perhaps give the EU pause for thought about whether it is sometimes rather high-handed in its rejection of concerns about national sovereignty. And both cases prompt us to consider domestic foibles, as well as economic rationalities, when looking to understand relationships with the EU.
Ed Turner is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Aston University and a Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre. Anna Wartmann works for the FDP in Bern. Both write in a personal capacity and the contents of this piece represent their own views.
[post_title] => What Brexiting Britain can learn from Bern
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[post_content] => The 2018 State Security Service of Georgia report[1]set out for the first time, the major objectives of ‘foreign intelligence services’ in Georgia:
to encourage anti-Western sentiments in Georgian society;
to damage Georgia’s image as a reliable partner at an international level;
to stimulate distrust, uncertainty, hopelessness and nihilism in society;
to create the grounds for destabilization on ethnic and religious grounds, with the aim to cultivate disintegration processes throughout the country and to promote the polarization of Georgian society.
The State Security Service report suggested that a ‘propagandist media campaign and the disinformation components’ are some of the tools for the implementation of those goals, and added ‘foreign intelligence services attempt to establish expert scientific-research centers and agencies, to affect public opinion and disseminate disinformation’.
A comprehensive list of these centers and media organizations were revealed in a study[2] published in 2015. Two organizations, the Eurasian Institute and Eurasian Choice, were the main pro-Russian organizations in Georgia. The founders of these organizations are also in charge of other organizations. The aforementioned organizations pursued their activity in two directions. The Eurasian Institute is mainly engaged in an analytical activity and the organization of conferences and seminars, whereas Eurasian Choice carries out more proactive activities by holding various rallies and demonstrations in support of the membership of the Eurasian Union. Both of them portray Russia as a partner and friend.
But today, the pro-Russian narrative has been rebranded as ‘pro-Georgian’, yet its objective still discredits the West and stimulates Euroscepticism. Some pro-Russian NGOs stopped functioning, while the number of media organizations remains unchanged. However, there is an apparent increase in Facebook pages that promote anti-Western sentiment, focusing on the cultivation of nationalist ideas and using the fear of losing national values and traditions to distribute anti-Western information, which is mostly groundless homophobic and xenophobic misinformation. However, the growth of nationalist aspirations has affected public attitudes and driven legislative changes.
NGOs
Throughout the years the Eurasian Institute has been a popular pro-Russian NGO, expressing a positive attitude towards Russia and discussing the improvement of Russian-Georgian relations. There are also many other organizations such as Global Research Center, Club of Young Political Scientists, and Center for Globalization Issues which are associated with Eurasian Institute and participated in the joint conferences and organized study tours in Russia, as well as some other activities. However, they have not succeeded in becoming stronger and gaining influence. Moreover, some of these organisations have stopped functioning, while the rest have not engaged in public activities with other civil society members for a long time.
The information published by Eurasian Institute on its website, on December 21 2017, stated that the management of the Institute and its regional representatives decided to suspend the active work of the institution. Head of Eurasian Institute, Gulbaat Rtskhiladze, expressed dissatisfaction with the inactivity on the Russian side, particularly with the functioning of the Russian World Foundation (Russky Mir), the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Support Foundation, Yevgeny Primakov Georgian-Russian Public Center and Sputnik Georgia. He said that Russian World could not go beyond Russian language courses,and called the activity of the Gorchakov Fund ‘beating the air’, as the Fund had spent considerable funds sending anti-Russian Georgian-based journalists on a trip to Russia including Moscow and Grozny, but only received mocking articles and reports in return[3].
Overall, Eurasian Institute has failed to raise funds, while its members have neither participated in expert debates nor invited to comment on issues by the media. That became the reason for the suspension of its activities. In 2018 there has been no public activity on the part of other pro-Russian organizations associated with Eurasian Institute, such as the Global Research Center, the Club of Young Political Scientists, and the Center for Globalization Issues.
2. Russian foundations in Georgia
As with the Eurasian Institute, the pro-Russian website Saqinform.ge has also published materials criticizing Russian foundations as well, saying that ‘Russian soft power doesn’t actually exist, as the efficiency of the virtual activity of those organizations in Georgia is near zero’. Even though these Russian-funded organizations have essentially ceased functioning, the activity of Russian foundations persists in Georgia implementing various small-scale projects.
Russky Mir is one of the major foundations, still active in Georgia, set up[4] in 2007 by order of the President of the Russian Federation to popularize the Russian language ‘as Russian national heritage and an important cultural element of the world’. Russky Mir has been financing Russian language courses for many years in Georgia and continues to be active in the cultural field. For instance, it sponsored an essay contest for the Russia-Georgia Youth Organization, founded by Irakli (Merab) Kipiani in 2017. Kipiani is a former member of Eurasian Institute known for his pro-Russian statements. The winner of the essay contest could win a visit to Moscow. This organization was going to import chocolate with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s image. According to Irakli Kipiani, he supported Vladimir Putin in the March 18th 2018 elections, and the chocolate portraying the Russian leader symbolized that support[5]. However, the chocolates didn’t make it to the Georgian market. The other activity of the organization remains unknown to the public, except for commemorating the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier with flowers. Their social network page has 600 likes and shows little activity.
Another organizations supported by Russky Mir is the Cultural and Educational Union called the Russian Club. Founded in 2003, it has been organizing cultural evenings over the years in an effort to establish friendly relations between Russia and Georgia[6]. The Russian Club is headed by Nikoloz Sventitsky, who is also the director of the Griboedov Theatre in Tbilisi and chairman of the Coordination Council of the Russian Compatriots’ Organization. During his press conference Sventitsky told the audience about possibilities for Georgian applicants to get free education at Russian universities[7] and other opportunities. Russky Mir conducts Dictation contest in partnership with this organization. The event is aimed at enhancing the knowledge of Russian language. In 2018, only 50 applicants participated in the contest, which is significantly smaller compared to over 100 participants in 2017[8].
Lika (Anzhelika) Zakharova who represents various organizations also collaborates with Russky Mir. The most active of these organizations is the National Congress of Slavic People, which holds discussions about the Russian language. This organization arranged on May 9th 2018 the march of the Immortal Regiment in honor of the victory in the so-called Great Patriotic War (World War II) in various cities of Georgia, using the officially banned Soviet symbols during the rally, which resulted in conflict with the locals. It was Lika Zakharova whom the editor of pro-Russian Saqinform, Arno Khidirbegishvili, accused of hampering ‘the spread of propaganda’, and called ‘Muscovites and their Georgian partners corrupted thieves that steal funds destined for Russian propaganda’[9].
Another Russian foundation which works in Georgia is The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund. It was founded in 2010 by decree of the former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The fund’s board of trustees embraces Russian politicians and businessmen. Similar to other foundations, the Gorchakov Fund has not stepped up the scale of its activity. Its main partner in Georgia is the Yevgeny Primakov Russian-Georgian Public Center which was founded in 2013, initially called the Russian- Georgian Public Center. In November 2017 Dimitri Lortkipanidze became the new head of the organization. Lortkipanidze a politician from the Democratic Movement[10] known for his anti-Western narrative, and is associated with Georgian March-an organization expressing fascist and nationalistic rhetoric. The Russian-Georgian Public Center is basically engaged in a limited number of activities. For instance, it offered free Russian language courses to young people, hosted war veterans on May 9, delivered a series of lectures on ‘Russian-Georgian relations in the context of the US and Europe’, the Karabakh conflict, tourism, investment policy, etc. These lectures have not reached any significant scale.
Media
Studies show that Georgian-language media is the main distributor of anti-Western narratives in the country[11], as Russian-language media lacks popularity in Georgia, parallel to the declining demand for foreign language media in general[12]. As in the case of NGOs, recent years have not seen the appearance of new media outlets linked to Russian foundations on expressing Russian narrative. Russian propaganda in Georgia is mainly associated with boosting anti-Western sentiments. This is the reason why media outlets that essentially use hate speech against the Western world and foreigners concur with the Russian narrative. Such media outlets inherently try to spread hate speech, misinformation and manipulative materials.
The websites that are seen to use profuse Euroscepticism and hate speech (geworld.ge, saqinform.ge SAQINFORM.GE, RU.SAQINFORM.GE, GRUZINFORM.GE, RU.GRUZINFORM.GE) have not made progress in terms of popularity[13]. Judging by the absence of ad banners, they generate no income from advertisement. All domains, including geworld.ge are registered to head of the Historical Heritage NGO Taras Gagnidze. Also, political scientist Alexander Chachia has been a member of the Public Council of the National Heritage since the day of its foundation. In 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev awarded Chachia with an order for “his great contribution to strengthening friendship and cooperation with the Russian Federation”.
The size of the Russian news agency Sputnik’s audience has not grown significantly in recent years. It only functions as an online media platform spreading Russian propaganda. The Georgian version (sputnik-georgia.com) ranks 160th among the websites in Georgia, with its Russian language version (sputnik-georgia.ru) in 109th place[14].
Since 2015, a few other homophobic and xenophobic websites have been established. For instance, TB24.ge and marshalpress.ge, whose founders were journalists that had worked for news portal Info9.ge that belonged to Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream. The founder of marshalpress.ge, Oto Stephanishvili, was also a campaigner for Georgian Dream. The founder of TB24, Gocha Nachkebia, is a member of the board of Public Monitoring Center along with Vladimir Bedukadze that took the spotlight after disclosing footage of inmate tortures in prison[15]. TB24 got an authorization for broadcasting but failed to start broadcasting. According to the data of the regulatory commission, the company did not have any income. As for broadcasters, Obiektivi TV which is founded by members of the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia party remains as a homophobic and xenophobic media outlet with pro-Russian narrative[16].
Facebook pages of neo-Nazi and fascist forces
The failure of NGOs and media outlets to make progress has led to those promoting illiberal values increasingly using Facebook to get their message across with their Facebook pages seeing a rapidly growing number of likes. And even though the content distributed by those pages do not portray Russia as a positive power, describing it as an enemy (a sensible tactic given the lingering resentment following the 2008 war), their basic narrative nonetheless complies with the primary messages of Russian propaganda- that the West tries to destroy national identity. Consequently, recent cases witness the transformation of anti-Western sentiments into a nationalist narrative, with the appearance of groups generally organized through social networks and trying to discredit the West with their content, accusing it of assaulting national values, traditions and identity, and striving to impose homosexuality. This is why they promote racist, xenophobic and homophobic sentiments.
The protest rallies following the police crackdown on nightclubs on May 12th 2018 and May 17thInternational Day against Homophobia and Transphobia have consolidated the country’s neo-Nazi and fascist forces. They have joined forces and organized a counter-rally to stave off so-called ‘LGBT propaganda’ and protect ‘nationality’, fear of which was given by police as the reason for preventing a subsequent rally by liberal opponents of the polices behaviour and supporters of drug liberalisation. The Interior Minister informed the organizers of this rally of the government’s inability to stop the counter-effort of fascist and neo-Nazi forces and asked them to cancel the rally in order to prevent further clashes. They were then taken away by police-escorted buses from the location, which was later taken over by the neo-Nazi and fascist forces.
A few days later the activists were unable to celebrate International Day against Homophobia on May 17, as they had no security guarantees from the authorities. As a result, neo-Nazi and fascist forces once again managed to occupy Rustaveli Avenue. The groups actively employ dozens of pages on social networks mostly created after 2017. These pages are used for spreading their particular narrative and for organizing rallies, as well as for sharing videos and arrangement of events. Currently, their content has thousands of views. The pages often stress their goal to win the information war for against, the liberally thinking society. Some pages manage to increase the number of likes by 2-3 thousand a month.
These pages were banned by Facebook administrators in May 2018. Soon they re-opened
Neo-Nazi forces start to show up in Georgia since 2015 with the appearance of Georgian Power, followed by the creation of Georgian March, which has been an active organization since 2017. Both staged protests with xenophobic appeals. Georgian Power is a more ideology-oriented entity backed up by the youth, while Georgian March is ruled by former politicians and individuals expressing pro-Russian views (Dimitri Lortkipanidze, Sandro Bregadze, Guram Palavandishvili). They have good relations with Levan Vasadze, a businessman with a Russian background who is also lashing out at the so-called LGBT propaganda.
Though the narrative of the nationalist powers comply with Russian propaganda, it’s difficult to prove that they are funded by the Kremlin. However, it’s evident that Georgian March is similar to the xenophobic marches in Ukraine, Russian and Moldova, therefore it is obvious that they have similar agendas. And the fact of its leadership being comprised of former politicians with obvious pro-Russian views confirms these doubts.
As for Georgian Power, its leader is Nikoloz Burnadze, a US citizen living in the USA, which criticizes Georgian March, saying that pro-Russian people manage this organization, which is unacceptable to him.
A fascist organization Georgian National Unity popped up in 2016, and has already managed to conduct a number of demonstrations with xenophobic messages. Regardless of the differences, all three groups (Georgian March, Georgian Power and Georgian National Unity have consolidated under a national idea of ‘fighting against LGBT propaganda’. They engaged dozens of their Facebook pages to organize their protests.
The page Iberian Unity was created in 2017 and became proactive in 2018. It promotes neo-Nazi ideas and claims that users with pro-Russian or pro-Turkey ideas will be blocked. The page shares posts of other anti-liberal pages, supports demonstrations against LGBT people.
Another Facebook large page, the Anti-Liberal Club, appeared in 2015 and has approximately 44K followers posting homophobic and xenophobic’ statuses’ using disinformation and manipulation. The administrator of the page is Shota Martinenko, who also owns web site altinfo.com, which is used for distributing anti- liberal opinions. Its articles are shared by above-mentioned pages.
Georgian Idea is the Facebook page of a political party with the same title founded in 2014 and participated in 2016 parliamentary elections. The leader is Levan Chachua, who was arrested after a fight at TV Kavkasia in 2010. 3 years later he was released as a political prisoner. Georgian Idea cooperates with Georgian March and other neo Nazi groups, participating in homophobic and xenophobic demonstrations.
Change of popular sentiments and legislative regulations
The new ‘pro-Georgian’ narrative basically relies on the fear of losing traditions and national identity, and has manifested itself in two directions- an increasingly negative attitude for foreigners and the ‘protection of families’ from LGBT propaganda. Both issues have translated into particular activities and have also affected the policies of decision makers. Moreover, an entry appeared in the constitution in 2017 defining agricultural land as a resource of special importance that can only be owned by a Georgian citizen, thus precluding foreigners from the acquisition of land in the country. Another entry defined the marriage as a union between man and woman, and being the only kind of union that entitles to marriage-related civil rights. These restrictions did not exist in the Georgian constitution until 2017.[17]
NGOs, media outlets and neo Nazi forces discussed support both, for the protection of Georgian land and the consolidation of heterosexual families. The sharp increase in negative popular attitude for foreigners can be clearly seen in corresponding studies. Period between 2015 and 2017 saw the increase of people dissatisfied with foreigners staying in Georgia over three months from 5 to 16 percent[18], and the number considering Georgian land exclusive property of Georgian citizens, regardless of the type of use, increased from 41 to 64 percent[19].
The Orthodox Church of Georgia has also contributed to the protection of Georgian national values in the fight against LGBT propaganda by declaring May 17, commonly associated with International Day against Homophobia and Transphobia, as the International Family Sanctity Day. The decision was preceded by violent actions by Orthodox believers and clergy against LGBT rights defenders. May 17 has never been celebrated without incidents in Georgia. The already high number (71 percent) of people believing that the proper citizen must protect traditions has increased by 5 percent[20].
The overall increase of negative attitude against foreign citizens and the growing fear of losing traditions, which in turn boosts reluctance towards the Western world, also revealed itself in 2017 data suggesting an increase in the number of people opposing Georgia’s accession to the EU. The number dropped in 2018 and stopped at 15 percent and one of the main reason for 14% is the fear of losing national identity.
Unlike in other post-Soviet countries, it’s very difficult to create an image of ‘saviour’ from Russia, as it had occupied 20 percent of Georgian territory. This is why explicitly pro-Russian organizations and media outlets have failed as ‘shapers’ of popular opinion, having instead turned into marginal groups. The main objective – slurring the West and boosting Euroscepticism- now implements a new strategy, emphasizing the negativity of Europe and America, rather than Russia’s positivity.
This particular narrative is a conveyor of xenophobic and anti-liberal content that seemingly protects national identity, while in fact promoting anti-Western sentiments, which naturally implies resistance to European membership, claiming the West to be the main power that wants to strip national values and traditions. The State Security Service has recognized the peril of Russian propaganda, but has not specified the exact responsibility for the distribution of anti-Western or nihilistic sentiments in the country which has dramatically increased[21]. These organizations have clearly made certain progress in their mission. In these conditions the government’s action plan to respond the looming threats of Russian propaganda becomes ever more important.
The government and donor organizations should have common strategic view for countering propaganda and anti-western narratives. Georgian high quality media needs support, increasing their accessibility especially in the regions near the border and the occupied territories is crucial. The government should create relevant legislation to bolster media pluralism. As the main source of funding for independent high quality media is donor organizations their strategy should be renewed support and engagement. There remains a need for investment in the institutional development and sustainability of media companies and also in promoting media literacy amongst society to reduce vulnerability to media manipulation and disinformation.
Author : Nata Dzvelishvili is the executive director of Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics. Prior to this, Nata worked on media issues for NGO Institute for Development Freedom of Information (IDFI). She also was one of the authors of media criticism portal mediachecker.ge and the project coordinator of the Training Center for Liberalism. Both projects were implemented by the Charter. From 2010-2014 Nata worked as a journalist for www.media.ge website. She is the author of several papers and studies
[1] The Report of the State Security Service of Georgia, 01.01.2017-31.12.2017 https://ssg.gov.ge/uploads/%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98%E1%83%A8%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98/SSSG%20Report%202017.pdf[2] Nata Dzvelishvili and Tazo Kupreishvili. Russian influence on Georgian NGOs, May, 2015 https://www.academia.edu/36353738/Russian_Influence_on_Georgian_NGOs_and_Media[3] Eurasian Institute statement, December 2017 http://politforumi.com/geo/1677/evraziis-institutis-gamgeobis-shemajamebeli-kreba.html[4] Information about the Russky Mir Foundation https://www.russkiymir.ru/en/fund/index.php[5] Dmitry Alexandrov, Candy with the image of Putin on the label is planned to be sold in Georgia, January 2018 https://vz.ru/news/2018/1/20/904401.html[6] Information about The Cultural and Educational Union Russian Club http://russianclub.ge/content/view/13/38/[7] Free learning for Georgian Students – Chances and Advices, Sputnik Georgia, February, 2018 https://sputnik-georgia.com/reviews/20180206/239202953/ufaso-swavla-ruseTSi-qarTveli-abiturientebisaTvis-Sansebi-da-rCevebi.html[8] Total Dictation 2017 – Participants and winners were awarded in Tbilisi, Sputnik Georgia, May 2017 https://sputnik-georgia.com/society/20170501/235818422/totaluri-karnaxis-shedegebi.html[9] Arno Khidirbegishvili: Moscow pests (in Georgian), 2018, http://saqinform.ge/news/36195/arno+xidirbegishvili%3A+moskoveli+mavneblebi.html[10] The centre-right opposition party headed by Nino Burjanadze with a notably pro-Russian orientation
[11] Anti-Western propaganda, Media Development Fund, 2017 http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/library/89/file/anti_dasavluri_propaganda_2017_-_GEO.pdf[12] Gela Bochikashvili, trust and source of information – tendencies based on NDI polls, mediachecker.ge, May, 2018 https://www.mediachecker.ge/ka/mediagaremo/mimokhilva/article/52005-informaciis-mighebis-gzebi-da-gavlena-tendenciebi-ndi-s-mikhedvith[13] Geworld.ge rates 1076 among Georgian websites, saqinform.ge -2650.
[14] Source: www. alexa.com
[15] Bedukadze served at No.8 establishment of the penitentiary department and recorded inmate tortures, and was also accused of participating in the violence. He was later released on plea bargain, as he noticeably contributed to the victory of Georgian Dream by releasing the so-called prison footage in the pre-election period.
[16] The Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics, Results of Media Monitoring for the 2017 Local Self-Government Elections in Georgia, December 2017 http://mediamonitor.ge/uploads_script/accounts/MM_FINAL_REPORT_2017_ENG.pdf[17] Constitution of Georgia, article 31, https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/30346[18] The Caucasus Research Resource Centers, Caucasus Barometer 2015/2017 http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2015ge/IMMIGATT/[19] The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. Knowledge of and attitudes toward the EU in Georgia, 2015/2017 http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/eu2017ge/LANDOWN/[20] The Caucasus Research Resource Centers, Caucasus Barometer 2017 http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/eu2017ge/ICITTRAD/[21] International Republic Institute, Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Georgia, April, 2018 http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-5-29_georgia_poll_presentation.pdf
[post_title] => From a Pro-Russian to a Pro-Georgian Narrative
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[post_content] => On May 13th 2018, the space encompassing the Parliament building, Kashueti church and Freedom Square, 'Les Lieux de Mémoire'[1] in Tbilisi for the most of Georgians, was physically and symbolically divided between at first glance two social groups: citizens standing for freedom of expression and self-declared fascist[2] organization members and their supporters. The latter, led by the group Nationalist-Socialist Movement and Georgian National Unity, gave Nazi salutes and chanted “glory to the nation – death to the enemies”. Space was split up by the lines of police barricades and yellow buses. It was a peculiar event for many reasons. Far-right groups had thronged Tbilisi’s streets showcasing Nazi symbols before, however their protests were more spontaneous and physically isolated from their ideological adversaries. This time, two separate wide-scale demonstrations were taking place within the same spatial and temporal boundaries[3]. This experience echoed recent traumatic events of May 17th 2013, when peaceful pro-LGBTQI demonstrators were violently dispersed by the Orthodox clergy and lay citizens, reportedly around 20,000 people[4].
Georgian National Unity was founded in 2016, as a non-governmental organization. According to its founding statutes, the organization’s aim is to prioritise a ‘Georgian mentality and worldview.’ Among its goals are listed the: ‘Annulment of the President’s Institute; reforming the education system according to national traditional values; abrogating the anti-discrimination laws; banning the sale of lands to foreigners’ etc. According to internal rules of the organization, ‘racial mingling’, same-sex marriages, converting to certain religions are strictly prohibited[5]. Organization’s symbol is black, while the Nazi swastika is replaced by the Borjgali (sun symbol)[6] and a cross.
“We will get involved in the battle. We will use irons, forks and everything at our disposal.” - said the head of Georgian National Unity, Giorgi Chelidze[7] on May 13 2018 promising to be “brutal” against his opponents.
Later this quote gave an inspiration to netizens create memes[8], ridiculing Chelidze and his supporters. Irony might be a smart way to confront, however, recent years have shown that extremist groups have become quite active and visible in public spaces, media and social networks.
Who are the actors and what do they want?
They are organized groups and individuals, leaders and followers. The group of actors at first glance is homogeneous, but if we examine more closely, it is quite diverse. While zooming out, they still gather around the same values and the ways of articulation of their protest are similar - verbal and physical violence.
Transparency International Georgia’s report lists some of the organizations (Georgian March, the Agreement of National Powers, the ‘Nationals’ movement, Georgia’s National Unity, Civil Solidarity Movement, Social-Political Movement, Georgian Mission and a number of other individuals) that are interconnected as well as financially and politically linked to Russia[9]. For instance, one of the leaders of the Agreement of National Powers, Dimitri Lortkipanidze, was appointed director of the Y.M. Primakov Georgian-Russian Public Centre. The Centre was founded in 2013 by the International Relations Institute and Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Support Fund established by Russia’s former President, Dmitry Medvedev.
One of the prominent groups is Georgian March, the union of illiberal, neo-Nazi organizations, led by a former deputy minister under the current government, Sandro Bregadze. Georgian March held their first big demonstration of around 2000 people in 2017, in one of Tbilisi’s main avenues in the Middle Eastern retail district, an area largely built by German settlers and architects. They called for an end to Muslim immigration, changing state policy regarding foreigners and banning overseas funding to civil society organizations[10]. In 2018, Bregadze announced his plans to run in the presidential elections and, in his own words, on a “Marine Le Pen”-style platform.
Some individuals and organizations are also associated with Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC)[11] or splinter civil groups of the church who were rarely, if ever, publicly condemned for intolerance by the Patriarchate. Empirical evidence in Georgia suggests that far-right, fascist, pro-Russian civil and political groups, active Orthodox clergy, the ones formally and/or informally affiliated with the GOC, allegedly acted in concert. At the same time, these ideas often accord with the policies of the Russian government, creating strongholds of soft power[12].
Comparatively, Giorgi Gabedava, a leading member of the Nationals Movement was one of the active organizers of violent dispersal of anti-homophobia rally in Tbilisi on May 17th 2013. Gabedava and several other extremists were released as political prisoners in 2012, under the current government. They had previously been jailed for storming TV Kavkasia in 2010 when the attackers had physically abused a number of employees, guests, as well as the head of the TV company during live broadcasting of a program, dedicated to the book Saidumlo Siroba (Holy Crap) by young Georgian writer, Erekle Deisadze.[13] These individuals are also associated with religious extremist organizations, the Orthodox Parents’ Union and the People’s Orthodox Union. Notably, two days after the incident at TV Kavkasia, the Patriarch Ilia II awarded Archpriest David Isakadze, the spiritual leader of these religious extremist organizations, with an embellished cross and the right to wear a mitre[14]. Isakadze and his supporters are notorious for their intolerant and xenophobic sentiments. For instance, they protested the arrival of the Pope Francis in Georgia in 2016. They met the Pope in Tbilisi airport with banners declaring, ‘The Pope is a heretic’ or ‘Antichrist!’[15]
The Union of Orthodox Flock (commonly known as the People’s Orthodox Union) named after St. King David the Builder is an unregistered organization, ‘based on volunteerism’. “One of the key goals of the Union is to defend Orthodox Church from dissidence, to fight against the introducers or instigators of the split.”[16] The organization is known for its conservative views and physical attacks on citizens of different values and positions. Members of the Union of Orthodox Flock, together with another organization with a similar name, the Orthodox Parents’ Union were involved in demonstrations against JK Rowling’s Harry Potter books in 2002[17] and the film the Da Vinci Code in 2010[18], an attack on a Halloween party in 2008, demonstrations against the book Saidumlo Siroba (Holy Crap) in 2009 in front of Ilia State University[19] and the Kavkasia TV incident[20] in 2010 mentioned above, an attack on citizens marking anti-homophobia day (second IDAHOTB) on May 17th 2012[21] and so on.
Illiberal political and civil groups use the GOC for their political legitimacy, as well as GOC’s requests are articulated by the same groups. For instance, the Orthodox clergy from time to time directly or covertly request administrative/criminal charges[22] for ‘insulting religious feelings.’ In 2013, GOC openly backed the law put forward by then-Deputy Interior Minister Levan Izoria; In 2016, Zviad Tomaradze, the head of Demographic Society XXI was the author of the bill, proposed by a Georgian MP from the ruling Georgian Dream coalition;[23] In 2018, Emzar Kvitsiani, a member of Parliamentary party, Alliance of Patriots put forward the bill. To be noted, in 2018 Kvitsiani publicly admitted that in 2006-2012 he had been collaborating with the Russian security services[24], spreading Russian propaganda. The bill’s author again was Zviad Tomaradze. Furthermore, along with Sandro Bregadze, the former minister under the current government and currently the most prominent face of Georgian March, Tomaradze was a member of the initiative group that in 2016 requested holding a referendum on defining marriage as union of a man and a woman. The same idea had been put forward by some Orthodox clergy, including David Isakadze[25].
Tomaradze works for another influential actor, Levan Vasadze, founder of the Georgian Demographic Society XXI, a Georgian businessman who accrued his wealth in Russia (1998-2006)[26]. Vasadze is widely known for his homophobic rhetoric and allegiance to the GOC. On May 15-17th2016 he hosted the World Congress of Families’ event in Tbilisi[27], dedicated to Family Purity Day, pronounced by the GOC to counter the symbolism of the May 17 anniversary of the mob attack on LGBTQI supporters[28].
The World Congress of Families is a U.S.-based organization founded in the mid-1990s as an international umbrella organization for groups supporting conservative social values. The WCF also has close links to Konstantin Malofeyev and Vladimir Yakunin, oligarchs with close ties to the Russia’s government. Another person affiliated with the WCF is Alexander Dugin, the founder of the Eurasianist movement and ultranationalist philosopher, who promotes Russian territorial and ideological expansion. "Together with our Russian friends, we got rid of and defeated first fascism and then communism, both of which came from the West," Vasadze said at an event in Tbilisi[29].
There are other examples of collaboration between the Orthodox clergy and self-declared pro-Russian organizations, such as the Alliance of Eurasia, the Institute of Eurasia, Eurasian Choice, the Erekle II Society, etc. According to the Georgian Institute of Politics[30], the leaders of these respective organizations admit cooperating with Orthodox priests and some representatives of the GOC are actively involved in their activities.
Who and what do they target?
Mainly in the fight against liberal values, modernism, democracy and the concept of human rights these groups use distorted narratives of Georgian traditions and symbols to prove the West is undermining the authentic Georgian identity. They also use the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) for legitimacy in their fight against different minority social groups, non-Orthodox religious entities and LGBTQI; crackdown on so called ‘illegal migrants’ (foreigners of Asian and African descent); request that the State ban the sale of land to non-Georgians; prohibit foreigners settling in Georgia; they request the government to outlaw NGOs[31] and international organizations, especially the Open Society Foundation, as traitors of the nation; they fight against freedom of expression[32], nightclubs, art, literature and films. The targets change according to the current political, social and cultural context. Usually, the aggression is directed towards those who manifest their existence and the rights in a public space. Offenders often say, “They can do whatever they want in their bedrooms, as long as they do not take it outside”[33]This formulation demonstrates that non-dominant group have to respect specific boundaries set for them in order to be tolerated and remain subordinated to the majority. The frontline of this conflict is a public space which embodies political power and cultural hegemony. Imagining society as a homogeneous social group, excludes the concepts of individual rights and liberties.
The political and religious context of social hostilities
83.4 percent[34] of Georgian citizens identify as Orthodox Christians. While their trust in state institutions remains low, dominant religious organization, like the Georgian Orthodox Church (GoC), preserves its clout[35]. Understanding the role and the influence of the church is essential to deconstruct how illiberal groups operate.
The post-Soviet history of Georgia can be construed according to the forms of nationalism and political transitions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the tenure of Georgia’s first President Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s (1991) was characterised by ethnic[36] or ecstatic nationalism[37]. Whilst the second President and former Soviet high-ranking official Eduard Shevardnadze (1992-2003) shifted politics to a system of elite-mediated liberalism. During Shevardnadze’s tenure, ‘nationalism turned into an ‘institute’, which he used as a framework to talk about conciliation and the importance of an alliance with Europe”[38]. President Mikheil Saakashvili’s tenure (2003-2013) is defined by some scholars as a period of civic or ‘revolutionary nationalism’. The State, on the levels of both policy and official discourse, stopped differentiating between its citizens according to their ethnic backgrounds and defined citizenship as a main marker of Georgian identity[39]. According to Georgian philosopher and sociologist Giga Zedania, the new narrative was inclusive, not exclusive. ‘But this trait could not—and did not—take away its revolutionary character.’
The government started protecting the rights of minorities and punishing extremists for hate crimes, however, they did not stop using the church for political legitimacy. Consequently, it was not difficult to observe the rise of religious nationalism, the ideology which makes religious affiliation to Orthodoxy an essential factor in determining national identity. In this case, any challenge to church dominance is seen as a challenge to Georgian nationhood.[40] Living under this paradigm, non-Orthodox, especially, Georgian Muslims are being constantly reproached for their religious identities and their ‘Georgianness’ is often questioned. Eventually, the GOC constructed ‘political Orthodoxy’, ‘through which Georgians would satisfy their patriotic passion by condemning the West’.[41]
As for the current ruling political party, Georgian Dream, there is enough empirical evidence to conclude that the government is particularly loyal to the GOC and neglectful of the offenses committed on the grounds of intolerance against religious minorities and LGBTQI (Assaults on Muslims in Tsintskaro (2012), Nigvziani (2012)[42] and Samtatskaro villages (2013)[43]; forceful removal of the minaret in Chela village (2013)[44]; nailing a pig’s head to the Muslim boarding school in Kobuleti (2014)[45]; physical abuse of Muslims in Mokhe village (2014)[46], and IDAHOTB on May 17, 2013). None of these cases have been fully investigated and alleged perpetrators have not been punished, and some representatives of law enforcement bodies has supposedly verbally and physically abused Muslims[47]. These events, clustered in the first 18 months of the initial Georgian Dream government look symptomatic, rather than coincidental. The high-ranking politicians and MPs regularly demonstrate their discriminatory and biased approaches. Taken into consideration, the GOC’s open support of Georgian Dream in the 2012 Parliamentary elections, the new government knew whom to thank, which later revealed in impunity of the Orthodox clergy, legislative initiatives examined below, and generally, in church-government ideological convergence. Public defence of the GOC became an imperative for many politicians, just as loyalty to the communist faith was decades ago[48].
In Georgia, members of the GOC regularly fight against fundamental human rights, pluralism and cultural diversity. For instance, the majority of Orthodox clergy were against adopting the law on the elimination of all forms of discrimination in 2014. This was also a result of an EU-Georgia visa liberalization agreement, in which Georgia agreed to increase its efforts to eliminate various forms of discrimination. Anti-discrimination bill was considered by some clergy as “propaganda and legalisation” of a “deadly sin”, because it included “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” in the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination[49].
These groups periodically request that the State limit freedom of expression in traditional media, social networks and art. Some Orthodox priests allegedly physically abuse civil rights activists[50]. Other priests condemn writers, journalists and human rights organizations from the pulpits. Official press of the GOC is saturated with homophobic, intolerant and insulting statements against people of different religious identities.
Taking into consideration rapidly accumulated wealth and documented corruption within the church, some scholars argue, that real motivation of the Orthodox clergy is far from fundamentalist doctrine and there is predominantly an economic interest behind their religious requests to the Georgian government. In other words, the church is bargaining with the State.
Religious extremism and attacks on minority members is not a new phenomenon in Georgia. In the beginning of the 1990's, radical groups within Orthodox Church started continuous persecution of non-Orthodox[51]. Despite hundreds of documented physical attacks on members of religious minorities, predominantly Jehovah’s Witnesses, including people being hospitalised, and places of worship and religious literature being destroyed, the alleged attackers were not punished[52]. The State not only neglected hate crimes but also acted in collusion with offenders. At this time serving clergy of the Patriarchate and affiliated groups personally organized and participated in violent physical attacks on the non-Orthodox and human rights activists[53]. The impunity with which such actions were treated encouraged further social hostilities. Later the protests swirled up against books, paintings, theatre plays, films, universities, and media, everything that questioned dominant narratives and established frameworks of thinking. Illiberal sentiments were fostered by the most respected religious authority, the Patriarch Ilia II himself. In his sermons, he condemned what he called 'extreme liberalism'[54].
Modern-day digital actors
Initially illiberal, socially conservative groups were represented in physical public spaces and later various groups with different digital profiles emerged. This is related to the increasing popularity of the internet and social networks. In a country with a population of 3,907,131, there are 2,100,000 Facebook subscribers[55].
Illiberal digital groups shape the modern Georgian discourse of nationalism. Central topics are religion and history, namely, the authority of religious and historical persons used for social mobilisation - pictures of saints, kings and writers, quotations or videos are the main tools used to keep users involved and active[56].
The flow of information from these Facebook pages is well targeted, fills up the ideological vacuum and strikes a chord with ultra-nationalist sentiments, which makes it easier to maintain and even increase the audience. Information is spread by public Facebook pages, as well as semi-closed Facebook groups (e.g. Georgian National Awaking, Nationalists, Georgians, National self-consciousness, Nationalistic Legion). They are divided into thematic categories such as nationalists, Georgia and/or Georgians, News, World and others. For instance, the group of Emigrant's personal page with 18 000 members, is a very active group. Accounts with individual names or news web-pages spread information, share links of their own or other agencies on topics, such as gender, political parties, poems, advertisements, religious news or current issues. Besides their online activity, they often go to streets, hold public demonstrations or small gatherings around the city centre to mark some historic dates or protest new legislative initiatives.
Summary
Observation of the emergent violent groups suggests, that they construct their identities in opposition to imagined enemies. The difference is a sign of threat - cultural ‘others’, religious minorities, immigrants, LGBTQI and organizations that ‘plant’ liberal values. Religious extremists, socially conservative populists and neo-fascist groups and individuals endeavour to acquire dominance on urban public spaces. Who wins the space, his/her ‘Georgianness’ is reaffirmed. Revanchist City, the concept of Neil Smith[57] might be applicable in Georgian case. He suggests, that revanchist anti-urbanism represents a reaction against the supposed “theft of the city, desperate defense of a challenged phalanx of privileges, cloaked in the populist language of civic morality, family values and neighborhood security. [...] it portends a vicious reaction against minorities, the working class, homeless people, the unemployed, women, gays and lesbians, immigrants’’. The whole process is about rediscovery of the enemy within, rather than fathoming real external threats.
Counter -demonstrations, producing Facebook pages and other digital content, shows that they fight for physical and digital public spaces but only when these spaces are busy /occupied by so-called liberal groups. From a very short observation it can be assumed that these groups need demonstrations against homophobia, ‘clubbers’ gathering against police raids, public events of religious minorities, or Halloween party to reassert their existence. These groups also have political aspirations. The leader of Georgian March, Sandro Bregadze, named as the Presidential candidate for October 2018 elections, recently stated: “I will not be the candidate of the Americans or Russians. I will be the presidential candidate of the Georgians”.[58] Based on the increased activities in public, as well as in online spaces, it can be assumed that these groups have become more proactive, instrumentalizing twisted notions of Georgian nationalism. As for motivating factors of the followers/supporters, they might be various - pragmatic, as well as a continuum of ideological, social and psychological factors, identification of which, requires a particular examination.
Taking into consideration the rise of the far-right in European states, the image of Europe and the West is seen through different lenses: Europe N1 is a place of LGBTQI, infidels, people against family and ‘traditional values’ and the Europe N2 with far-right, ultranationalist, patriot groups who defend ‘traditional values’ (Hungry, Poland, Germany, etc.). Basically, this paradigm is seen in the light of the contradiction of tradition and modernity, the old and the new, conservative and liberal. This binary is beneficial for those groups who are in search of enemies to maintain their own image and justify their existence
Moreover, these groups capitalise on the growing discontent and concerns of Georgian citizens due to economic problems, unemployment, growing inequality and the unresolved issue of territorial integrity to buttress their xenophobic agendas and scepticism towards the EU-integration process and democratic institutions in general.
Authors: Ekaterine Chitanava is a human rights activist and the director of a non-governmental organization, Tolerance and Diversity Institute (TDI), based in Tbilisi, Georgia. Her work is focused on freedom of religion and belief as well as minority rights. The organization is providing free legal aid to people experiencing discrimination on religious, ethnic and/or racial grounds in Georgia, as well as conducting various educational activities, state policy research, legal analysis and sociological studies. From 2009 to 2011 Ms. Chitanava, as a journalist was regularly writing for Georgian analytical magazines and international outlets. She was also producing short documentaries about religious and ethnic minorities in Georgia for the Tolerance Centre under the auspices of Public Defender. Currently she is contributing to Forum 18, different international media outlets and academic journals.
Katie Sartania graduated from the faculty of social and political sciences of Tbilisi State University, she holds a BA degree in sociology. Her research interest includes the minority groups, post-soviet space and social media. Since 2014 she has been involved in research of different social groups, concentrated on minorities (religious; ethnic; IDP groups) in Georgia. She has authored a number of articles on social issues. Currently she is an independent researcher based in Tbilisi.
[1] Nora, Pierre. "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Mémoire." Representations, no. 26 (1989): 7-24. doi: 10.2307/2928520. A ‘lieu de mémoire’ is any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community. It may refer to any place, object or concept vested with historical significance in the popular collective memory, such as a monument, a museum, an event, a symbol like a flag or even a colour vested with historical memory.
[2]The video featuring counter-demonstrator far-right group members, Kviris Palitra, May 2018, https://palitranews.ge/video/chven-vart-kartveli-fashistebi-danarchenze-pasukhi-metaurma-gastsa-sakartvelos-erovnuli-ertobis-tsevrebi-kashvetis-tadzarshi-mividnen[3] Drug raids in two leading clubs in Tbilisi in the early hours of 12 May, 2018 and the police’s heavy-handed tactics, caused an outcry among the youth and drug policy activists, prompting calls for the resignation of the Prime Minister and Interior Minister. In response to the large-scale rally in front of the Parliament building, self-declared fascist, Nationalist-Socialist organization members and Georgian March organized counter-demonstrations. The endeavor to win the public space by human rights activists and the youth protesting the takeover of freedom of expression was finally unsuccessful. With the argument that they were unable to protect the demonstrators from aggressors, State officials asked the organizers to stop the rally and promised them to revise the punitive policies on drug use.
[4] Conservatives attack gay activists at rally in Tbilisi, BBC news, May 2013, https://bbc.in/2kXB3WP[5] Facebook page of the organization, https://www.facebook.com/pg/GeoNSM/about/?ref=page_internal[6] Georgian symbol of the sun, It consists of an ancient, seven-winged solar wheel, often shown rising from a symbolic tree of life. http://symboldictionary.net/?p=984[7] We will use irons, forks and everything that will be in our hands to protect our homeland and the nation" - Giorgi Chelidze "Free space" (in Georgian language), Iberia TV, May 2018, https://goo.gl/RaSQDf[8] Facebook page, Only Fascist Child, https://www.facebook.com/Jarshiverwaval/[9] Anatomy of Georgian Neo-Nazism, Transparency International Georgia, May 2018
http://www.transparency.ge/en/blog/anatomy-georgian-neo-nazism[10] Civil.ge, Ultranationalists March Against Immigration, Counter-Protesters Rally Against Occupation, July 2017, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=30272[11] Civil.ge, 'Family Day', Rally Against Gay 'Propaganda' Planned for May 17, May 2014, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27237[12] Dmitri Trenin, Demands on Russian Foreign Policy and Its Drivers: Looking out Five Years, Carnegie Moscow Center, August 2017, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/72799[13] Radical Orthodox Christian Group Stirs Fistfight in TV Station, Civil.ge, May 2010 https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22278[14] Kekelia, Tatia. 2012. Modernization and Secularization - Georgian Case Study. Identity Studies, Vol. 4, p. 97.
[15] Andrew Higgins and Jim Yardley, Pope Francis Navigates Orthodox Georgia’s Rocky Terrain, The New York Times, October 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/world/europe/pope-francis-georgia.html[16] Webpage of St. King David the Builder’s Union of Orthodox Flock, http://www.religia.ge/about.html[17] Beka Mindiashvili, A Formula For Victory, Tabula, May 2010, http://www.tabula.ge/en/story/69931-a-formula-for-victory[18] Georgian Orthodox Church Joins ‘The Da Vinci Code’ Protests, Civil.ge, May 2006 https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12591[19] Video of the rally in front of Ilia State University, Netgazeti, May 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RHj9h6hclU8[20] Radical Orthodox Christian Group Stirs Fistfight in TV Station, Civil.ge, May 2010 https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22278[21] March of Gay Activists Ends in Scuffle in Downtown Tbilisi, Civil.ge, May 2012https://civil.ge/archives/121936[22] Statement of the No to Phobia! civil platform regarding the initiative on punishability of insults to ‘religious feelings’, Tolerance and Diversity Institute (TDI), May 2018, http://tdi.ge/en/statement/statement-no-phobia-civil-platform-regarding-initiative-punishability-insults-religious[23] Mariam Gavtadze, Eka Chitanava, GEORGIA: Proposed insulting religious feelings law withdrawn – for now, Forum 18, February 2016, http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2152[24] Emzar Kvitsiani about his collaboration with Russian special forces, Rustavi 2, April 2018 http://rustavi2.ge/ka/news/102416[25] Eka Chitanava, Georgia’s Politics of Piety, Open Democracy, September, 2016 https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/eka-chitanava/georgia-s-politics-of-piety[26] Davit Batashvili, Levan Vasadze - A Political Project, Tabula, December 2013 http://www.tabula.ge/en/story/78568-a-political-project[27] Tbilisi, Georgia: Site of World Congress of Families X, November 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tQzftojCzm0&t=33s[28] Giorgi Lomsadze, Georgia: A “Family” Gathering Commemorates an Anti-Gay Riot, Eurasianet, May 2016, https://eurasianet.org/s/georgia-a-family-gathering-commemorates-an-anti-gay-riot[29]Russian Links of World Congress of Families, Myth Detector by Media Development Foundation (MDF), May2018, http://www.mythdetector.ge/en/myth/russian-links-world-congress-families[30] Policy brief, Georgian Orthodox Church as a Civil Actor: Challenges and Capabilities, Georgian Institute of Politics, May 2017, http://gip.ge/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Policy-brief-8-Salome-Minesashvili.pdf[31] Ultranationalists Rally Against Soros Foundation, Land Ownership Changes, Civil.ge, September 2017 https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=30436[32] Public TV Show in Limbo after Church Meddling, Civil.ge, January 2009 https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20281[33] Tolerance and Diversity Institute (TDI).Student Attitudes Towards Minorities and the Role of Media. Tbilisi, 2017. http://tdi.ge/sites/default/files/tdi-research-cover-eng-web.pdf[34] 2014 General Population Census, http://www.geostat.ge/cms/site_images/_files/english/population/Census_release_ENG_2016.pdf[35] Although According to the polls of National Democratic Institute (NDI) in 2018, the church’s favorability has significantly dropped to 56 percent from almost 80 percent in 2015. The reason for this decline could be an active media coverage of the corruption inside the GOC and the scandal around the alleged poisoning of Patriarch Ilia II.
[36] Vachridze, Zaza. 2012. Two Faces of Nationalism and Efforts to Establish Georgian Identity. Identity Studies in the Caucasus and the Black Sea Region, Ilia State University, p 82-87. http://ojs.iliauni.edu.ge/index.php/identitystudies/article/viewFile/47/35[37] Jones, Stephen F. 2013. Georgia: A Political History Since Independence. London: I.B Tauris.
[38] Revaz Koiava, Georgian National Narratives of Conflicts: 1991-2012, Regional Dialogue, March 2016, http://regional-dialogue.com/en/georgian-national-narratives-on-conflicts-1991-2012/[39] Zedania, Giga. 2011. The Rise of Religious Nationalism in Georgia. Identity Studies, Ilia State University, Vol. 3, p. 121.
[40] Jones, Stephen F. 2013. Georgia: A Political History Since Independence. London: I.B Tauris.
[41] Beka Mindiashvili, The Law of Georgian-Russian Eternity, Tabula, February 2013, http://www.tabula.ge/en/story/70787-the-law-of-russian-georgian-eternity[42] Londa Beria, Group criticizes Georgia for handling of religious conflicts, Democracy and Freedom Watch, December 2013 http://dfwatch.net/group-criticizes-georgia-for-handling-of-religious-conflicts-57907-25192[43] Felix Corley, GEORGIA: Will police protect Muslim prayers from mobs?, Forum 18, July 2013
http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1854[44] Minaret back up in Georgian village Chela, Democracy and Freedom Watch, November 2013http://dfwatch.net/minaret-back-up-in-georgian-village-chela-79904-24443[45] Pig's Head Nailed to Planned Muslim School in Kobuleti, Civil.ge, September 2014 https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27654[46] Analysis of Occurrences in Mokhe Village, Tolerance and Diversity Institute (TDI), October 2014 http://www.tdi.ge/en/news/164-analysis-occurrences-mokhe-village[47] Annual report of the Public defender of Georgia, the Situation of Human Rights and Freedoms in Georgia 2015 http://www.ombudsman.ge/uploads/other/3/3892.pdf[48] Jones, Stephen F. 2013. Georgia: A Political History Since Independence. London: I.B Tauris.
[49] Georgian Church Speaks Out Against Anti-Discrimination Bill, Civil.ge, April 2014 https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27175&search=[50] Violence Against Anti-Homophobia Rally, Civil.ge, May 2013 https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26073[51]Felix Corley, GEORGIA: Georgian Orthodox priests incite mobs against religious minorities, Forum 18, May 2005 http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=569[52] Felix Corley GEORGIA: Attacks on religious minorities unpunished, Forum 18, January 2005 http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=492[53] Felix Corley, Georgia: How should religious violence legacy be overcome? Forum 18, January 2005 http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=499[54] Jones, Stephen F. 2013. Georgia: A Political History Since Independence. London: I.B Tauris.
[55] Internet World Stats, Asia Marketing Research, Internet Usage, Population Statistics and Facebook Subscribers, 2,100,000 Facebook subscribers in Dec 2017, 53.7% penetration, https://www.internetworldstats.com/asia.htm#ge[56] To be noted, national narratives are often distorted, the attitudes of Georgian historical figures, including the Orthodox clergy, regarding the West and tolerance towards cultural minorities are misconstrued.
[57] Smith, Neil. 2005. The New Urban Frontier. London: Routledge.
[58] Georgia Today, Ultra-Nationalist Group Georgian March Names Their Presidential Candidate, April 2018, http://georgiatoday.ge/news/9925/Ultra-Nationalist-Group-Georgian-March-Names-Their-Presidential-Candidate
[post_title] => Public Space: The battleground in the Revanchist City
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[post_content] => Editor's Note (February 2022): It has come to our attention that this piece has been used in online debate seemingly to give credence to Russian propaganda that Ukraine or its Government is a 'neo-nazi' state or that there is some legitimacy to President Putin's claims that his central war aim is 'denazification'. This essay does not make that case so we would urge it not to be used for that purpose.
Written by Volodymyr Ishchenko (a Ukrainian academic and activist writing from a left anti-fascist perspective) it is a serious study of the real concerns about the levels of organisation, activism and influence posed by far-right groups (whose strength had been bolstered since Russia's 2014 invasions), that also makes clear their reasonably limited political popularity, and makes no claim that their influence dominates the Government of Ukraine (indeed the title notes that such groups pose a threat to it). It should also be noted that it was written in 2018, prior to the change of Presidency in 2019 that saw the election of a President of Jewish heritage in Volodymyr Zelenskyy. It formed part of this publication on The rise of illiberal civil society in the former Soviet Union?, which also covers different (though still critical) perspectives on the issue of the far-right in Ukraine as well as the rise of socially conservative, anti-feminist, anti-LGBTQ+ movements across the region, written predominantly by local authors.
The Ukrainian far right and Euromaidan
Electorally Ukrainian far-right parties have not been successful in comparison with their Western European counterparts. Before 2012 only a few MPs from any Ukrainian radical nationalist parties succeeded in entering the Parliament.[1] A major reason for this was the split Ukrainian national identity leading to polarized political attitudes on history, language, geopolitical issues in western-central and south-eastern regions.[2] Support for Ukrainian radical nationalists was the strongest in three Galician (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil) regions and used to be negligible outside of western Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Svoboda (‘Freedom’) party was gradually increasing its support after successfully ‘moderating’ and re-branding itself from the Social-National Party of Ukraine in 2004. In the 2009-10 local elections the party made a breakthrough winning majorities in three Galician regions and the mayor’s office in Ternopil. In 2012 Svoboda for the first time entered the Parliament with 10.4 per cent of votes.
In 2013-14 Ukrainian radical nationalists played a crucial and indispensable role in the Maidan uprising that was triggered by President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to postpone signing an Association Agreement with the EU, which violently escalated in response to inefficient repression and ended in a change of government. Nevertheless, Svoboda supported less the idea of European integration but rather an opportunity for Ukraine to break away from Russia.[3] In the case of The Right Sector’s (Pravyi Sektor) – an umbrella coalition of even more extreme radical nationalist and fringe neo-Nazi groups – their spokesmen have been always quite open that they did not support the EU but exploited the opportunity of the mass anti-governmental mobilization to push forward their own agenda of the ‘national revolution’.[4]
Since the start of massive violence in January 2014, the far right’s role in the Maidan protests has been systematically downplayed and distorted for the sake of the information warfare against Russian propaganda.[5] The far right was indeed a minority amongst the Maidan protesters, however, according to systematic protest event data Svoboda was the most active collective agent in Maidan protest events, while the Right Sector was the most active collective agent in violent protest events.[6] The far right possessed a unique combination of resources that allowed them to play such a prominent role in Maidan’s mobilization, coordination, radicalization processes and eventual transfer of power. Unlike any other opposition party, Svoboda combined thousands of ideologically committed activists, resources of a parliamentary party, and control over local councils in the western regions with the highest support for Maidan. The Right Sector combined violent skills, a revolutionary ideology, and political organization making its violent actions more strategic and efficient compared to other groups with experience of violence like football ultras and Soviet Afghanistan war veterans.[7]
Their critical contribution to the uprising’s success had important consequences: they mainstreamed radical nationalist symbols and slogans amongst the protesters, in this way pushing the sceptical majorities in south-eastern regions further away from supporting Maidan;[8] the far right escalated violence with Anti-Maidan protesters, contributing to the war in Donbass;[9] the formation of autonomous armed paramilitary groups challenged the state monopoly on violence and contributed to the weakening of Ukrainian state capacity.[10]Extra-parliamentary power of Ukrainian radical nationalists
In 2014 Svoboda and Right Sector leaders scored low at the presidential elections and later the parties failed to get into Parliament, although a dozen far-right MPs were elected in the single-member districts and on the lists of the ‘centrist’ parties.[11] References to their electoral defeat became a popular argument ‘proving’ supposed ‘irrelevance’ of the far right in Ukraine continuing the propaganda line taken in defence of the Maidan uprising.
However, the extra-parliamentary power of the Ukrainian far right is uniquely strong in the whole of Europe. In no other European country do radical nationalists control large politically loyal armed units relatively autonomous from the official military and law enforcement structures. The most notorious of them is the ‘Azov’ regiment formed in 2014 by activists of neo-Nazi ‘Patriot of Ukraine’ and ‘Social-National Assembly’ organizations. In 2016 Azov formed its own party the National Corps (Natsionalnyi Korpus) and in 2018 presented a paramilitary wing the National Militia (Natsionalni druzhyny). Svoboda-affiliated armed units had been disbanded by 2016 and their combatants integrated individually into official military and law-enforcement units, however, Svoboda united all the party members with combat experience into ‘Svoboda’s Legion’ association. Despite pressure from the government, the Right Sector has not even integrated its ‘Voluntary Ukrainian Corps’ (Dobrovolchyi Ukrainskyi Korpus) into official enforcement structures.
There is no reliable estimate of the total number of the combatants in the far right-affiliated military and paramilitary units; five thousand men under arms could be an approximate count. This does not mean that they are all ideologically extreme right, however, the ideological party activists usually form the core of such units and they control the commanding heights. Moreover, even demobilized combatants usually retain their connections with former commanders on whose patronage networks and finances they often continue to depend.[12]
The result is tightly interpenetrating networks of veterans, volunteers, and radical nationalists active in the local politics. There have been several cases of the far right paramilitary interference in the voting of local councils and intimidation of judges forcing them to issue decisions in favour of the radical nationalists.[13] Another problem is the successful cooperation of the far right with the law enforcement in patrolling the streets in a number of regions[14] and penetration of the law enforcement structures at the highest positions. For example, the deputy Minister of Interior and the former acting Chief of the National Police is Vadym Troian, a former activist of the ‘Patriot of Ukraine’ organization and a deputy commander of Azov.
The extra-parliamentary power of Ukrainian far right is aggravated by the overall weakness of Ukraine’s liberal civil society. The far right performed poorly at the recent elections, however, they lost to oligarchic electoral machines with no commitment to any specific ideology but with far greater media and financial resources that opportunistically exploited nationalist and Euro-liberal rhetoric. The ideological liberal parties – like Democratic Alliance or Syla liudei (‘People’s power’) – are much weaker than the far right and are usually not even included in the polls now. In comparison to other Ukrainian political parties, NGOs and civic initiatives, the radical nationalists have the strongest street mobilization potential.[15] Moreover, the ideological tradition of Ukrainian liberalism is underdeveloped and many of self-declared Ukrainian liberals are simply moderate nationalists in the crucial historical and language questions of Ukrainian national identity. The lack of institutionalized political and ideological boundary between the far right and liberal segments of Ukrainian civil society combined with the overall ‘fortress under siege’ atmosphere of the country at war contributes to the legitimacy for the far right and impunity of their radical stance and violent actions.
The political impact of the far right
The extra-parliamentary strength of Ukrainian far right, the political weakness of liberal civil society within the framework of the unreformed political regime of competing ‘oligarchic’ patronage pyramids results in significant impact of the far right on historical and language politics, and on contraction of political freedoms after 2014.
Nationalist and anti-Communist policies usually lacked the majority public support[16] within Ukraine, even when limited to the governmental-controlled territories. Moreover, they deteriorated relations with strategically important neighbours like Poland and Hungary. However, they were the easiest way for the ruling oligarchic pyramids to simulate changes after the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ and split the opposition sustaining intense patriotic hysteria, while resisting socio-economic and political reforms that would threaten their own material interests. At the same time the radical nationalists were exploiting their legitimacy within society and overlapping interests with the ruling elite, and have been raising the bar of nationalist demands.[17]
For example, issues which used to be the hobbyhorse of the far right, like banning the Communist Party of Ukraine became state policies in 2015. They were also combined with criminalizing ‘propaganda of the criminal totalitarian (Soviet) regime’, comprehensive dismantling of all Soviet monuments[18] and renaming geographical places that sometimes had only a slight relationship to Soviet ideology. The national-patriotic education penetrating the education system on all levels – from kindergartens to higher education institutions – is based on the nationalist historical narrative glorifying the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)[19] – the tradition which almost all Ukrainian radical nationalists build on but majorities in Ukraine’s south-eastern regions still are opposed to.[20] In 2015 together with criminalizing ‘propaganda of the Communist regime’ the Ukrainian Parliament recognized OUN and UPA as ‘fighters for Ukrainian independence’ and a public display of disrespectful attitude against them is punished under the law. The mythical day of the UPA foundation October 14 – previously a holiday only for the radical nationalists – became a national holiday. OUN’s greetings and symbolism that were mainstreamed by the radical nationalists during the Maidan uprising became semi-official in post-Maidan Ukraine. Although admiration of OUN and UPA among the general public does not necessarily mean xenophobic attitudes towards Poles or Jews, it is usually based on ignorance and denialism about their mass murders and collaborationism with the Nazis.[21]
The far right has also been the harshest critics of the Minsk Accords with Russia and Donbass separatists. They also strongly opposed any reconciliatory dialogue or even tolerance to the voices sceptical about or hostile to the official pro-Maidan narrative about 2013-14 events, which comprise a significant proportion of the public even in the governmental-controlled territories.[22] On August 31, 2015 the rally against the parliamentary vote for a special status for the separatist-controlled Donbass ended in a bloodshed when a Svoboda activist threw a hand-grenade killing four and injuring over 150 policemen and National Guard soldiers. There have been multiple cases of the far right mobilization, intimidation, and violent attacks against media, journalists, and public figures dissenting from the official narrative about Maidan and the war.[23] They typically went unpunished, while the Government is itself pressing against the opposition media and employs selective political repression.[24]Radical nationalists and liberal values
As mentioned above, Ukrainian far- right support for pro-EU protests in 2013-14 was largely strategic. The radical nationalists retained Eurosceptic position. The ‘National Manifesto’ presenting strategic program of Ukrainian radical nationalists and signed in 2017 by Svoboda, the National Corps, Right Sector and several minor far-right organizations called for a ‘new vector of Ukrainian geopolitics’ against both Eastern and Western orientations – for a union of nations in the Baltic-Black Sea region.[25] However, Euroscepticism is not a primary issue of Ukrainian far right mobilizations as in the polarized geopolitics exacerbated by the war this position can be easily criticized as ‘pro-Russian’. Besides, sometimes radical nationalists try to exploit pro-European attitudes appealing to the ‘true’ ‘traditional’ Europe eroded by contemporary liberal values.[26]
The latter has become recently the target of escalated violence by the far right who benefit from their legitimacy within civil society, interpenetration with the law-enforcement, and enjoy impunity for their violent actions. Amnesty International Ukraine listed over 20 violent attacks on feminist, LGBT or human rights discussions and rallies committed by the radical nationalists during the recent year and criticized the Government’s connivance in these actions.[27] Since April the far right pogromed at least four Roma camps; in one incident several people got serious injuries and one Romani man was killed.[28] These pogroms were openly publicized and in some cases policemen, and journalists even joined the radical nationalists. The left movement is forced into a semi-underground situation. For example, despite the Communist party appealed against its ban in 2015 and is not technically banned at the moment of writing, it reduced all public activities to the minimum, rightfully expecting the violent attacks. Victory Day rallies on May 9, 2017 ended in massive clashes with the nationalists with multiple arrests for public demonstration of Soviet symbols.
These attacks against the marginalized left, ethnic and gender minorities maintain the militant tone of the groups of young nationalists giving them an ersatz of radical activity against ‘internal enemies’ while there is no major escalation on the frontline in Donbass. At the same time, these victims are the easiest targets who are usually unable to defend themselves physically and are stigmatized by large anti-Communist and conservative publics. The far right is also able to present their victims as foreign agents pointing to sometimes real, sometimes alleged support from Western liberal or left foundations and NGOs. Despite a significant segment of Ukrainian feminist and LGBT communities being loyal to the patriotic consensus,[29] often espousing a kind of ‘progressive’ legitimation of the war with the conservative Russian government and Donbass separatists and ‘pink-washing’ the post-Maidan regime,[30] it does not stop the far right violence against them.
Policy implications
Recognize the problem that is neither a fiction of Russian propaganda, nor it can be reduced to the inevitable but temporary effects of the war. Ukrainian radical nationalists’ unique extra-parliamentary power, which is aggravated by their interpenetration with the law-enforcement and weak liberal civil society, present a real danger to human rights and political liberties in Ukraine. The far right contribute to self-destructive nationalist radicalization dynamics destabilizing the political regime in Ukraine which is especially dangerous on the eve of Ukrainian presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019 with unpredictable results.
As a minimum the Ukrainian government must: a) disband all armed units affiliated with political organizations; b) use all efforts to prevent, prosecute and punish all violence and intimidation against political, ethnic, and gender minorities; c) thoroughly investigate and consistently punish law enforcement’s support for radical nationalist violence and its failure to enforce the law against such groups; d) abstain from any further nationalist policies in history, language, and education alienating large segments of the population in a culturally diverse country and cancel at least some of the most criticized (including by international human rights institutions) and discriminatory laws.
Considering the weakness of local opposition to the nationalist radicalization, Western powers should put these demands on the table in any future negotiations about support for the Ukrainian government.
Ukrainian gender and ethnic minority communities, the political left and cosmopolitan liberals should form a broad front of solidarity of all those endangered by far right violence and nationalist policies in Ukraine.
About the author: Volodymyr Ishchenko is a Kiev sociologist who authored a number of articles and interviews on radical right and radical left participation in Ukrainian Maidan uprising and the following war in 2013-14. He is currently working on analysis of the Maidan uprising from the perspective of sociology of social movements and revolutions theories.
[1] Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak, The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine. The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 30 in The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (ed. Jens Rydgren), Oxford University Press. 2018. http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190274559-e-30[2] Ivan Katchanovski, Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2006.
[3] Andrii Mokhnyk: Nastupna khvylia revoliutsii, v yakii i ‘Svoboda’ bratyme uchast, bude antyoliharkhichnoiu, MIR, February 2018, https://iamir.info/52105-andrij-mohnik-nastupna-hvilja-revoljucii-v-jakij-i-svoboda-bratime-aktivnu-uchast-bude-antioligarhic[4] Viacheslav Likhachev, The ‘Right Sector’ and others: The behavior and role of radical nationalists in the Ukrainian political crisis of late 2013 - Early 2014. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48(2-3): 263. 2015.
[5] Volodymyr Ishchenko, Ukrainian protesters must make a decisive break with the far right, The Guardian, February 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/07/ukrainian-protesters-break-with-far-right[6] Volodymyr Ishchenko, Far right participation in the Ukrainian Maidan protests: an attempt of systematic estimation, European Politics and Society 17(4): 453-472, 2016.
[7] Volodymyr Ishchenko, Denial of the Obvious: Far Right in Maidan Protests and Their Danger Today, Vox Ukraine, April 2018, https://voxukraine.org/en/denial-of-the-obvious-far-right-in-maidan-protests-and-their-danger-today[8] Andreas Umland, How spread of Banderite slogans and symbols undermines Ukrainian nation-building, Kyiv Post, December 2013, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/how-spread-of-banderite-slogans-and-symbols-undermines-ukrainian-nation-building-334389.html[9] Serhiy Kudelia, Domestic Sources of Donbass Insurgency, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 351, September 2014. http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/domestic-sources-donbas-insurgency[10] Volodymyr Ishchenko, Denial of the Obvious: Far Right in Maidan Protests and Their Danger Today, Vox Ukraine, April 2018, https://voxukraine.org/en/denial-of-the-obvious-far-right-in-maidan-protests-and-their-danger-today[11] Volodymyr Ishchenko, Ukraine has ignored the far right for too long – it must wake up to the danger, The Guardian, November 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/nov/13/ukraine-far-right-fascism-mps[12] Kimberley Marten and Olga Oliker, Ukraine’s volunteer militia may have saved the country, but now they threaten it, The War on the Rocks, September2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/ukraines-volunteer-militias-may-have-saved-the-country-but-now-they-threaten-it[13] See, for example, Marc Bennets, Ukraine’s National Militia: ‘We’re not neo-Nazis, we just want to make our country better, The Guardian, March 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/13/ukraine-far-right-national-militia-takes-law-into-own-hands-neo-nazi-links; See also: Kirill Malyshev, Vitalii Gubin, Delo Kokhanivskogo. Radikaly spravili pominki po reforme pravosudiia v Sviatoshinskom sude, Strana.ua, October, 2017, https://strana.ua/articles/analysis/100755-natsionalisty-razhromili-sud-v-ukraine-spljasav-na-eho-ostankakh.html[14] See Joint Letter to Ukraine’s Minister of Interior Affairs and Prosecutor General Concerning Radical Groups signed by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Frontline Defenders, and Freedom House, June 2018 https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/14/joint-letter-ukraines-minister-interior-affairs-and-prosecutor-general-concerning[15] Volodymyr Ishchenko, Nationalist Radicalization Trends in post-Euromaidan Ukraine, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 529, May 2018, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/nationalist-radicalization-trends-post-euromaidan-ukraine[16] With exception of Ukrainianization policies primarily aimed at limiting or eliminating completely the use of Russian language in the governmental, education and media institutions. See Volodymyr Kulyk, Ukrainians are ready to shed the legacy of Soviet Russification, Kyiv Post, October 2017, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/volodymyr-kulyk-ukrainians-ready-shed-legacy-soviet-russification.html[17] Volodymyr Ishchenko, Nationalist Radicalization Trends in post-Euromaidan Ukraine, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 529, May 2018, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/nationalist-radicalization-trends-post-euromaidan-ukraine[18] Initiated precisely by the far right during and right after the Maidan uprising, see Haidai, Oleksandra. 2018. Kamianyi hist. Lenin u Tsentralnii Ukraini. Kiev: K.I.S., pp. 172-90.
[19] See Stanislav Serhiienko, Choho chekaty vid vrpovadzhennia natsional-patriotychnoho vykhovannia?, Commons: Journal of Social Criticism, July 2015, https://commons.com.ua/uk/chogo-chekati/[20] Pidtrymka vyznannia OUN-UPA uchasnykamy borotby za dershavnu nezalezhnist Ukrainy, Kiev International Institute of Sociology, October 2017, http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=718&page=2[21] OUN was pretty close both politically and ideologically to fascist movements of the interbellum Europe. UPA was formed by OUN in 1943 after the Stalingrad battle in order to fight for the independent Ukrainian state in anticipation of the Nazi retreat. Ukrainian nationalists collaborated with the Nazis in the beginning of the WWII participating in the Holocaust and counter-insurgency activities against Soviet partisans, organized the ethnic cleansing of the Polish population in Volhynia and terrorized Soviet citizens in Western Ukraine after the WWII.
[22] Survey of Russian Propaganda Influence on Public Opinion in Ukraine Findings, Media Sapiens, February 2017, http://ms.detector.media/detector_media_en/reports_eng/survey_of_russian_propaganda_influence_on_public_opinion_in_ukraine_findings .
[23] The level of public ignorance and indifference towards the violent actions of the far right is well illustrated by the fact that a neo-Nazi group C14 receives state grants on ‘national patriotic education’. The group is well known for their beatings, attacks, and intimidation of dissident journalists, bloggers, and activists, they openly boast about in popular media. C14 initiated a recent wave of anti-Roma pogroms. Two of their members are under trial suspected in the murder of a pro-Russian journalist Oles Buzyna in 2015. See Christopher Miller, Ukrainian Militia Behind Brutal Romany Attacks Getting State Funds, RFE/RL, June 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukrainian-militia-behind-brutal-romany-attacks-getting-state-funds/29290844.html[24] Maryna Stavniichuk, Freedom of Speech: Between Power and Truth in Ukraine, Kennan Institute Focus Ukraine, February 2018, http://www.kennan-focusukraine.org/freedom-of-speech-between-power-and-truth-in-ukraine .
[25] Natsionalisty pidpysaly ta predstavyly Natsionalnyi manifest, Svoboda, March 2017, http://svoboda.org.ua/news/events/00114270 .
[26] Pravyi Sektor: ‘My rasskazhem Yevrope, kuda yei idti’, LSM, February 2014, https://rus.lsm.lv/statja/novosti/mir/praviy-sektor-mi-rasskazhem-evrope-kuda-ey-idti.a78435 .
[27] Ukraina: vlada poturaie eskalatsii nasylstva z boku radykalnykh uhrupovan, Amnesty International Ukraine, May 2018 http://amnesty.org.ua/nws/ukrayina-vlada-poturaye-eskalatsiyi-nasilstva-z-boku-radikalnih-ugrupovan .
[28] Chris Scott, Roma’s murder by far right reveals deep wounds in Ukraine, Al Jazeera, June 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/attack-roma-killed-laid-rest-180629175419541.html[29] A good example would be the ‘Invisible battalion’ initiative (http://uacrisis.org/57284-nevidimij-bataljon) that started with a sociological survey of social problems and gender discrimination of the women fighting on Ukrainian side in Donbass and developed into a well-received documentary based on six cases of female combatants including a known Right Sector activist. The initiative is challenging traditional gender stereotypes while reproducing the nationalist narrative about the war.
[30] See more detailed criticism of these tendencies in Mariia Maierchyk, Deshcho pro praid ta pravykh, Krytyka, 2015 https://krytyka.com/ua/community/blogs/deshcho-pro-prayd-ta-pravykh and Popova, Dariia. 2016. Viina, natsionalism ta zhinoche pytannia: poshuk shliakhiv feministychnoho aktyvizmu v Ukraini. Commons: Journal of Social Criticism 10: 72-90, https://commons.com.ua/uk/vijna-nacionalizm-ta-zhinoche-pitannya .
[post_title] => The unique extra-parliamentary power of Ukrainian radical nationalists is a threat to the political regime and minorities
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[post_content] => The evolution of the illiberal/conservative discourse in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) is similar to what is happening in the rest of Europe: a rise of xenophobia, nationalism, radical groups and political parties becoming popular and winning seats in parliaments. One perspective on these trends is that these form part of a natural historical dynamic, when after a massive advancement or progress in any area there comes a time of ‘reaction’. The illiberal backlash can be seen as a general reaction in Europe to the advancement of human rights and democratic values, the liberal agenda at large. Any society at any time has a diversity of opinions and attitudes, either openly expressed or supported tacitly but the key question in a time of an illiberal backlash is “Why these groups, parties, politicians are getting popular? Why do citizens support them?” Having radical opinions or attitudes is nothing new or rare, and spreading them in a democratic society is also acceptable. The danger emerges when these radical, and sometimes unacceptable opinions, become a criminal behaviour supported by a large part of the population, often in the context of weak rule of law, poor legislation and where the state or factions within it support such activates.
Background
The Republic of Moldova is emerging from centuries of political dependence and dominance first from the Turkish Empire, Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, historically being part of Romanian state for centuries. Given this longstanding domination, it is understandable that independence and self-determination are two very important concepts in the process of re-establishing Moldovan national identity. An identity rooted in part in by language and religion the ‘lost old days ways of living’. In this context there is clearly a risk that all the ‘new ways’, alongside external pressure for international standards in human rights, democracy, or EU accession requirements – when framed as “western” concepts & values - could be perceived as another attempt to be conquered and assimilated, which of course feels like a threat to quite a number of people who are thinking in terms of a re-emerging nation.
Civilizational crash
The situation in Moldova today is deeply polarized. High levels of emigration among working-age Moldovans leaves a permanent population skewed towards both the young and old, with a challenging relationship to a more progressive diaspora. Trust in the Government and Judiciary is undermined by corruption, with the idea of European values compromised by the actions of the current ‘pro-European’ Alliance Government. The Media is highly politicized and dependent on political patrons. The Moldovan Orthodox Church is deeply intertwined with state institutions and is authoritarian in outlook. Sexism[1] and homophobia are rampant across society, with the latter in particular used by politicians such as President Dodon and former President Voronin to win support. While the nation is still dealing with social division caused by the Transnistria conflict. Human Rights Defenders and independent journalists may still be persecuted. In all a challenging time for the promotion of liberal values and an encouraging one for the conservative reaction.
Illiberal civil society in the Republic of Moldova: identifying the groups
The resistance to liberalism in Moldova is not homogenous in form. So it is important to examine some of the key players and contributors. This research divides them into three notable categories: the far right, conservative groups and the Church.
Far right and ‘ultras’ groups
Noua Dreapta (the New Right) - a radical group operating in Moldova.[2] It has been inspired, supported and led by a similar organisation in Romania.[3] The group is pro-Romanian Christian nationalistic in outlook, a ‘unionist’ group supporting a political union between Moldova and Romania. It is xenophobic and homophobic and actively promotes concepts of the ‘traditional family’ and ‘normality’.
Occupy Paedophilia - a radical group of vigilantes operating in Moldova, inspired by a group based in Russia and with similar copycat groups in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.[4] In Moldova the group it is led by Stanislav Ghibadulin, the main suspect in several administrative and criminal investigations regarding the Occupy Paedophilia gang’s homophobic activity, as reported by GENDERDOC-M and other human rights groups.[5] The members of his groups are often teenagers or underage persons, operating in a small gang of around 8-10 people that allegedly go after ‘paedophiles’, in reality, a gay bashing group with a homophobic agenda. ‘Occupy’ members pose as gay or bisexual men who wish to meet their peers. The groups set up meetings with their future victims to entrap them, and humiliate, beat, sexually assault or torture them before posting a video of the encounter online. At least seven videos of this kind were posted in Moldova. At least three criminal investigations were initiated following victims’ complaints but despite years of their extremist activity in Moldova no one has been successfully jailed for their crimes. Emboldened by their own impunity these extremists have continued and escalated their attacks against Moldovan LGBT rights activists and gay men, moving from verbal threats and insults to physical assaults.
It is worth noting that these two groups hold significantly different geo-political outlooks, one looking to Romania and the other to Russia, however, they share a common narrative around the ‘traditional’ (male dominated, heterosexual) family and hatred of LGBTI rights.
Conservative pressure groups
Stop Ham – an informal group operating in the Republic of Moldova, playing the role of societal police and acting in situations where the ‘police are missing or not taking action’. Led by a couple of people, one of them Alexander Ciolac.[6] This group has been inspired and supported by a similar ‘Stop Ham’ group in Russia.[7] Their agenda in Moldova has ranged from combating bad or illegal parking and other similar social nuisance focused campaigns to protesting against the advertisement of certain products for women, such as stockings, on the grounds of ‘immorality. They have been active in promoting a Conservative vision around issues of gender and sexuality. They have undertaken a lawsuit against a local human rights NGO and its managers, for displaying pictures on homosexual relationships within a public photo exhibition (a picture of a Swedish author with 2 homosexuals in their bedroom, provided by Civil Rights Defenders, Swedish NGO operating in Moldova). Their Facebook page is liked by 79,600 people.
Moldova Crestina – a fundamentalist Christian protestant group,[8]whose agenda involves ‘pro-life’ campaigning and opposition to comprehensive sex education, instead advocating in favour of abstinence and against contraception, as well as supporting gay ‘conversion therapy’.[9] They also questioned and opposed laws preventing domestic violence against children and opposed the anti-discrimination law. They invited Scott Lively, President of US Christian Conservative organisation the Abiding Truth Ministries and founder of International evangelical campaign group Watchmen on the Walls, to speak about “the danger” of an AD legislation, addressing the Parliament, Government and larger audience. [10] Similarly they invited anti-gay psychologist Paul Cameron to speak about the ‘danger’ of homosexuality.[11] Their Facebook page has gathered 39,000 likes despite Protestants only forming a small section of the Moldovan population.
ProFamilia - an NGO affiliated to Moldova Crestina and headed by Pastor Vasile Filat. They also invited the UK based lawyer Alex Spak and Miss Ukraine 2007 Lika Roman, now an expert in diplomacy and international relations, to speak about “New European policies on Diversity and Equality and their consequences for society and culture”.[12] They also called on the Mayor of Chisinau to ban Gay Pride Parades in the city.[13] Vitalie Marian, who is both a member of Moldova Crestina and Deputy President of the Pro Familia published on his website in 2011 a list containing the names of eight public figures (the Moldova’s Ombudsman, six members of the Council of the National Radio-TV Institution and a law lecturer at a law university in Moldova), along with their photo and quotations of their public previous declarations on LGBT issues. He did this to publicise who had ever publically expressed opinions favourable to the LGBT community and their rights, exposing them as ‘the gay supporters’. Taking into account the general outcry against the LGBT community and their rights in the context of the Anti-Defamation Law ADL adoption, this was an attempt to create a blacklist. After being sued and losing the case nationally, Vitalie Marian filed a complaint to the ECtHR with support from the Christian Conservative legal group the European Centre for Law and Justice, claiming a freedom of speech violation.[14]
Anti-abortion Initiative-founded by Valery Ghiletki, a Moldovan Politician, Baptist priest and member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,[15], where he chairs the Committee on the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights and sits on the Equality and Non-Discrimination Committee. This group cooperates closely with Vasile Filat from Moldova Crestina.
Veterans of the (1979-89) Afghanistan War- a paramilitary group. This group has been involved in mass protests on a range of different topics, such as the anti-discrimination law and other issues on LGBT rights. They were involved in a 2008 attack on a bus of LGBT protestors, where the police failed to intervene to protect the LGBT group.
The Moldovan Orthodox Lawyers Movement - a group with 21,000 likes on Facebook and an active website hosting a mix of conspiracy theories and extreme headlines such as ‘Blasphemy: Unity in Satan’ lambasting a June meeting between Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew (spiritual leader of the Eastern Orthodox Church) and the Pope.[16]
Moldovan Orthodox Church
The Moldovan Orthodox Church (MOC- the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova), a self-governing part of the Russian Orthodox Church, is the dominant religious institution in the country with huge influence. As an institution it has used its influence to crack down on rival religious groups, challenge the advance of LGBT rights and secular sex education/pushed life skills course out of school curricula and been seen to support political figures that back its agenda.
Religious intolerance towards other cults
There are a number of examples of the Moldovan Orthodox Church using its influence to restrict the rights of minority religions. In the early days of Moldovan independence the Metropolis of Bessarabia, an Orthodox Church under Romanian Patriarchate, had its registration process denied by state institutions, as the result of influence and opposition of the dominant Moldovan Orthodox Church, a case resolved only after a ECtHR decision in favour of the Bessarabian church after a decade of delays. Similarly, in 2005 the Spiritual Organisation of Muslims, led by Talgat Masaev had its official registration denied due to pressure from the Church and again this situation required intervention from the European Court in 2009 to force the authorities to facilitate registration.[17] In a high profile incident in 2009 a protest led by Protoiereu (senior priest) Anatolie Cibric, the Moldovan Christians’ Orthodox Association Fericita Maică Matrona and other protesters from Sfânta Paraschiva church, pulled down a publically displayed Hannukah candle and replaced it with a wooden cross.[18] When the protestant Seventh-Day Adventist Church attempted to have its own public action dedicated to Bible study a number of Orthodox priests prevented them from unfolding the event by occupying the designated space and urging local authorities to prevent Protestant displays in Central Square of an Orthodox country.[19]Opposition to the Anti-Discrimination Law
During the contentious debates over the passage of the EU backed Anti-Discrimination Law (ADL) in 2013 the leader of the Moldovan church Metropolitan Vladimir spoke in the Moldovan Parliament and referred to the sexual orientation criteria as unacceptable in the law, claiming the Christian population in RM is 98 % and cannot be equated with the 2% of homosexuals.[20] He also issued a public address to the state authorities and then President, demanding the modification of the law and withdrawal of the homosexuality criteria.[21] Similarly, Bishop Marchel spoke against the ADL in a press conference and threatened the MPs who voted for it with excommunication from the church if they failed to take sexual orientation out of the text of the law.[22]
After the adoption of the ADL, further pressure was organised by regular church goers speaking in a press conference and handing Metropolitan Vladimir a signed petition urging him to take action on the matter,[23] and threatened Vladimir with protests. On May 19 2013, at the Great National Assembly Square in Chisinau Metropolitan, Vladimir read the Church Synod declaration, which demanded the annulment of the ADL in within a month, otherwise threatening that the Church would continue to protest. This was the decision that Synod of the church agreed earlier.
An interesting evolution is the coalition of the Orthodox and some Protestant Churches against the ADL and Pride events, given that the Orthodox Church does not otherwise normally recognise these churches, calling them ‘sects’ and putting them under continued pressure. Hate became the perfect glue for old enemies. Also, the anti-Pride protests gathered together Christians, neo-Nazis, and far- right groups.[24] All these groups have found a common enemy in the LGBT community and are militating against their rights. This is, in fact, the best illustration of the de facto values and principles that these apparently different groups share.
School curricula influenced by the Church
The life skills course was pulled out of school curricula under the huge pressure of the church because of a chapter on homosexual couples. Sexual education is still missing in schools thanks to the opposition of the Orthodox Church, while information about the Holocaust is also still missing in the schools’ curricula, an issue often suppressed by the Moldovan state thanks to hostile attitudes of the church. Gender stereotyping in textbooks and school occupational practices continue. Christian Orthodox Religion is taught in schools and most of the time by priests. Making religion a Mandatory course in school has been used as a tool for re-entering the political arena by Valeriu Pasat, ex-director of the Moldovan Secret Service, who proposed an attempted referendum on this issue.[25]Bodies and individuals active within the church illiberal agenda
While Moldova’s major churches are deeply institutionally conservative in their approach and doctrine there are a number of groups and individuals associated with the church that is active in pushing it to be more proactive on these social issues. These include the Moldovan Christians’ Orthodox association Fericita Maică Matrona[26] and the ASCOR Chisinau- Association of Romanian Christian Orthodox Students in Moldova whose leading member Octavian Racu has built a public profile,[27] both groups which have mobilised on LGBT, anti-abortion and other reproductive rights issues. There is also Pro-Ortodoxia, whose President Ghenadie Valuta is a vocal orthodox priest who has directly challenged Metropolitan Vladimir to take a tougher line on LGBT rights issues. [28] His spat with the church leadership that includes allegations he was involved in a leak of photos linking Metropolitan Vladimir, who is supposed to be celibate, to holidaying with Nelli Tcaciuc,[29] has led to Valuta facing a ban from preaching within the church.[30]Despite official church rules preventing priest from explicit political campaigning Valuta has openly backed President Dodon’s election campaign by donating 50,000 lei.[31]Conclusions
Small, underdeveloped countries such as Moldova with little or no tradition in democracy have become the stage for the battle over the liberal agenda, a platform for fringe and extreme figures from larger countries such as Americans Paul Cameron and Scott Lively. This year a host of such figures will be attending the World Congress of Families in Chisinau that will be held on 14-16th of September 2018, under the patronage of the President of Moldova. To support the event President Dodon has met with the president of the International Fund for Orthodox Nations Unity, Valeri Alexeev, with financial support coming from a range of donors, including the Moldovan First Lady’s Fund.
The Congress is focused on protection of the “traditional family” and Christian values. Unfortunately, most of the time, the pursuers of these goals understand achieving them by attacking everything else that falls outside of this definition. So liberal perspective and attitudes continue to be under a great threat in Moldova, especially with this ‘heavy duty’ artillery being involved, such as conservative, traditionalist church and struggling with democracy state actors or institutions. [32]
In his announcement of the event, the President has made a number of comments regarding the LGBT community and Pride Parades, stating his condemnation of the latest pride parade, criticising state authorities and the police for protecting the LGBT protestors, and restricting and arresting the counter-demonstrators. The President stated his major objective is the preservation of the traditional family and has accused the Government and the Parliamentary majority of “promoting draft laws and values that do not belong to us”.[33] He mentioned that not only would Patriarch Kyrill of the Russian Orthodox Church be present at the event on his personal invitation, but also a high Vatican representative. So this event, an export of American fundamentalism, is providing a platform the local Orthodox Church and its Russian colleagues to further project their fundamentalist message to the Moldovan population.
The main actors of the illiberal society are the sections of the state and Moldovan Orthodox Church under the Russian Patriarchate, plus some vocal fundamentalist Protestant churches. Many of the other groups without such affiliations are smaller and have little political influence-. Politicians abusing their Parliamentary mandates for personal gain, using scapegoating and ‘divide and rule’ strategies within Moldovan society, supported by a high level of corruption, the lack of efficient and independent justice system and almost no free media. This, of course, includes the current notionally pro-European Governing coalition, the alliance of Liberal, Democratic and Liberal-Democratic Parties. While declaratively promoting the standards and values of liberalism, mostly driven by external political demand such as from the EU, the main target is financial support that comes with such agreements. A most notorious example of the government’s attitude was the 2014 corruption scandal of one billion dollars (equivalent to 12% of Moldovan GDP) that was stolen from three Moldovan banks, where there was seen to be close ties between members of the government and led to the eventual imprisonment of former Prime Minister Vlad Filat.[34]
The church is the greatest ally or even counterpart of the state where there is no clear separation of the state and church institutions in Moldova. For example, the Orthodox doctrine is taught in public schools during the ‘optional course’ on Religion, have turned out to be largely mandatory, with massive enrolment being largely done at the schools’ authority’s initiative and participation.
Following the collapse of the Soviet system the bubble burst and all the censored and tabooed issues broke in, while accurate, scientific and up to date information and education is missing. So the issues are associated with something foreign to our societies, which only appeared to be here after the fall of the wall, so had to be “imported” artificially. As a result – the denial of acknowledgment of the state of affairs in the country on a number of issues and resistance in accepting the new models and patterns is generally the reaction of the population. It includes aggressive and violent attempts to defend the outlook that used to be the pillar and guideline in the past. This is true too for some of the liberal civil society actors and individuals that struggle with their own homophobic, nationalistic, xenophobic or other illiberal attitudes.
Illiberal messages, and in some cases the groups supporting them, are thriving in Moldova thanks to a context created by corrupted authorities of different sorts, that are discrediting the idea of democracy/liberalism in the attempt to hold on to their power. They have managed to achieve this by playing on people’s fears and anxieties, and some post-totalitarian submissive mentality or on hopes and dreams of ancient rules and order.
The current players in the Moldovan political landscape are:
State authorities – seen as corrupt
Church – traditionally controlling and holding the power to heavily influence both state and people
People – traditionally heavily oppressed and struggling to survive
Human Rights defenders and liberal civil society – ´watch dogs´ and agents of change, following the democratic and human rights based model
Illiberal groups and civil society – pursuers of the ‘old good times’ idea, who are impeding the social evolution to modernity and are dragging it back to a ‘middle ages’ societal model
International bodies/structures willing to impact RM evolution in democratic/liberal direction
International bodies/structures willing to impact RM evolution into the conservative direction
After the collapse of USSR, the Republic of Moldova exited one totalitarian regime and has not truly established a new one, torn between east and west, conservative and liberal. Taking into the account the long -established conservative and totalitarian tradition in this territory, huge pressure from a number of highly influential actors, such as Orthodox Church, Russia’s political interest in the country, the traditionalist mentality of the general public, the chances for the instalment of a liberal society in the near future is very small, even with the efforts of the international community and local supporters.
On the other hand, the Diaspora is becoming more and more of a voice, especially in the context of election procedures, whose active involvement was triggered by the manipulations of votes during last Parliamentary elections and the annulment of the last Mayoral election in Chisinau. Also, there is a part of the local population who is fed up with government corruption and financial scandals, a difficult financial existence and separation from family members working abroad to make a living. The last decade has been tough on the population: the 8 years of harsh communist government during the 2000s has been followed by a pro-European government famous for its corruption and deepening economic crises. The situation has all the signs of a revolution but requires a lot of strength and resistance from the citizens, and substantial support from international partners to address the situation.
Recommendations The role of Diasporas and migrant workers in influencing social attitudes
There is scope to build on the influence of those who have traveled, studied (especially the social sciences) or who have worked abroad, who are more receptive to liberal values after having witnessed and experienced the benefits of it while overseas. Similarly, young people who speak English/other foreign language and are curious to learn about other cultures and societies, developing their own personal experiences. Part of a strategy for improving understanding of more liberal approaches should include more cultural and educational opportunities abroad, and not only for intellectual elites.
Working with liberal civil society
Local civil society: only a part of it is concerned with the liberal agenda, is divided upon particular topics; in competition for resources from international donors, and which somewhat reinforce the perception of liberalism as a foreign import.
There is a further need for the:
Education of general society and state officials on democracy and liberalism
Sharing best practices and how best to cope with challenges
Creation of a robust democratic system with check and balances that doesn’t allow easy misuse/abuse of this system
Exploration of opportunities for dialog with illiberal groups through well-regulated UN and EU forums, with religious or cultural groups willing do so - a grouping that does not include many organisations identified in this essay.
International support to be bottom up, both financial and capacity building: money and expertise should go straight to the people, local organisations and public administration who have demonstrated that they are implementing the democratic and Human Rights based approach.
Law no. 121 on ensuring equality of 25/05/2012[7],
Law no. 298 on the activity of the Council on Prevention and Elimination of Discrimination and Ensuring Equality of 21/12/2012.[8]
Law no. 121 on ensuring equality, which was adopted on 25.12.2012 after period of controversial debates during which the initial draft has been modified (but not necessarily improved) and came into force on 1st of January 2013, is the only special normative framework regulating the prevention and elimination of discrimination and ensuring of equality. The law defines the basic concepts (discrimination, types of discrimination), sets the protected criteria, the worst forms of discrimination and the fields of discrimination. In addition, the Law also sets the institutional framework for resolving the cases of discrimination, the procedures and the task of evidence collection, as well as a list of remedies. This law works in conjunction with a number of other special laws as Law no. 5 on the equality of opportunities for women and men. It regulates the discrimination on the basis of sex and gender criteria. Law no. 60 on the social inclusion of persons with disabilities defines the concepts of “disability” and disability-based discrimination. Also the Law no. 64 on the freedom of expression defines the concept of hate speech.
These laws are in turn supplemented by explanatory decisions, consultative notifications and recommendations issued by the Supreme Court of Justice. The Decisions of the Council on Prevention and Elimination of Discrimination and Ensuring Equality (CPEDEE) are becoming another important source of law in the field of discrimination, as the only public institution empowered with responsibilities in this area.[9]MOST DISCRIMINATED
A 2016 study prepared by the CPEDEE and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), on equality perceptions and attitudes[10] emphasizes that Moldova’s population is still prone to intolerance with regard to different vulnerable groups. The study showed that Moldovans most trust the Church (over 81%) and have the least trust in the justice system (14%), the President (11%), Parliament (11%) and Political parties (10%). According to the study, the most discriminated group in Moldova is the LGBT group. It is followed by persons living with HIV, detainees and persons with mental disabilities. Thus, the study shows that while church is the most trusted institution in Moldova, LGBT people are most discriminated.
Threats to equality
The legal framework regarding equality and non-discrimination is not seen as a positive step by some actors of Moldovan society. The most vocal opponents of the laws on equality are The Orthodox Church under the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova (Moldovan Orthodox Church) and the Socialist Party of Moldova (PSRM). On numerous occasions, they criticized the law on ensuring equality and those that support it. While the Orthodox Church uses this rhetoric based on doctrinal reasons, the Socialist Party of Moldova uses it to gain political capital and as one of the main arguments against European integration.
The position of the Church
The Moldovan Orthodox Church has constantly criticized the law on ensuring equality, both before and since its adoption. The most contentious provision appears to be the one that outlaws discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Church condemned the provision, declaring that it “legalizes harlotry through enabling gay parades and propaganda of the gay life style”.[11]
The Russian Orthodox Church, of which the Moldovan Orthodox Church is part, also expressed its dissatisfaction with the Law. As mentioned in a statement of the Sacred Synod (the highest authority) of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Church “protests against the legalization of evil and the declaration of sinful behaviour as ordinary activity.” It calls on Moldovan authorities to resist “attempts of propaganda of sexual perversion” and to take steps to amend the law in order to comply with the will of the majority of Moldovan citizens.[12]
In 2013, in a statement issued after Orthodox leaders met in Chisinau, the church said that it would call for nationwide protests unless the government amended a law protecting homosexuals, bisexuals, and transgender people from discrimination. The church also expressed its will for new laws against what it calls "immoral propaganda" and a ban on "homosexual, lesbian, transsexual, bisexual, paedophilic, zoophilic, incestuous, and perverse behaviour."[13] Moreover, the Church constantly stands against Gay Prides organized in Chisinau by Genderdoc-M[14] asking for these parades to be banned because of in their view the “absence of any legal, moral and rational reason of such a type of absurd manifestation.”[15]
The above-mentioned positions of the Church encourage and legitimize intolerance, discrimination and hate speech in Moldovan society. That is reflected in the high levels of social conservatism[16] that characterize Moldovan civil society but also in the increasing number of cases of violence against LGBT community. For instance, in 2013 the participants at the Pride couldn’t march more than 10 minutes because of the violence and danger to the public security. Indeed, the “counter-manifestation” organized by different Orthodox groups and associations forced the police to stop the march and to evacuate the participants.[17]
With the aim of spreading its conservative position, the Moldovan Orthodox Church founded or sustains a number of different organizations and groups such as: ‘Tineretul orthodox’ (Orthodox Youth)[18], ‘Asociație Moldova pentru viață’ (the Association Moldova for Life)[19] and the ‘Asociaţia Fericita Maică Matrona’.[20]
The first one ‘Tineretul orthodox’ - is the youth movement of the Moldovan Orthodox Church and includes sub-groups such as the ‘Asociația Studenților Creștini Ortodocși din Republica Moldova’ (Republic of Moldova Christian Orthodox Students Association)[21], a student union that has its headquarters in Moldova State University church.
The Orthodox Youth holds a number of conferences and workshops, as well as organizing the ‘March for life’ in collaboration with the Association ‘Moldova for Life’ and ‘Asociaţia Fericita Maică Matrona’ – an event supporting traditional family values.
Another religious event – ‘March for Families’ was organized by the Moldovan Orthodox Church and its supporters and took place in 2016 to mark the importance of ‘traditional family values’. Its third edition, called the ‘March of Silence’, was de jure a public action for traditional family values, but de facto it was an event organized in collaboration with socialist-linked groups and sustained by President of Moldova Igor Dodon. It was designed as a public manifestation against homosexuality and Gay Pride, took place one week after.
On that occasion, as in many others, the association ‘Asociaţia Fericita Maică Matrona’ had a central role in spreading intolerance based on the idea that it is necessary to fight against the current status quo, called by them the ‘atheist-Satanist system’.[22]In May 2018 this group organized another public demonstration against ‘homosexual propaganda in the Republic of Moldova’ and against a bill that aimed to introduce sexual education courses in schools. The participants marched displaying signs with messages such as ‘Moldova needs normal children’ or ‘Our children should grow up as normal ones, not as abominations.’[23]
As a result, civil society organizations and groups, directly linked and supported by the Orthodox Church promote prejudices and stereotypes, perpetuate intolerance and incite to discrimination among Moldovan society.
Position of the political parties and politicians
The Socialist Party of Moldova (PSRM) is the main political power to stand against equality and non-discrimination laws. PSRM repeatedly expressed its position as a pro-Russian party, which aims to protect traditional family values and fight, so called “gay propaganda”, which, according to them is also promoted by the Laws on ensuring and protecting equality.
In 2012, after the adoption of the Laws, the leader at that time of the PSRM, Igor Dodon challenged the legitimacy of the Laws at the Constitutional Court of Republic of Moldova.[24] The Court rejected his claims as unfounded.[25]
In 2016, the PSRM tried one more time to repeal the laws on equality by introducing an amendment to the Parliament on this issue. Parliament rejected the bill, but the PSRM continues to use the anti-equality law rhetoric, especially in political campaigns.[26]
In spring 2016, the PSRM raised in the Parliament a draft law on ‘gay propaganda’.[27] The draft pending in Parliament aimed to amend two national laws. It would add a paragraph to Article 21 of the Law on the Rights of a Child that reads: “The state ensures protection of a child from the propaganda of homosexuality for any purpose and under any form.” It aimed also to amend Article 88 of the Code of Administrative Offenses to define “propaganda of homosexuality” as: “Propaganda of homosexual relations among minors by means of assemblies, mass media, Internet, brochures, booklets, images, audio-video clips, films and/or audio-video recordings, via sound recording, amplifiers or other means of sound amplification.” The bill was also rejected by the Parliament.
In the 2016 Presidential electoral campaign, Igor Dodon – the candidate from PSRM actively used homophobic and discriminatory speech. It targeted mainly his opponent – Maia Sandu, but also affected 3 major groups: a) refugees/migrants, b) LGBT and c) Unionists (people that advocate for reunion of Republic of Moldova and Romania).
One of the most discussed and controversial events in this regard, related to news that one of the opposition leaders would bring in Moldova 30,000 Syrian refugees if they were to win.[28] This news escalated the prejudice that “aggressive Muslims” will spread all over the country, “rape women and girls and rob locals”. The same rhetoric was used in the 2018 elections for the Mayor of Chisinau, against a pro-European candidate Andrei Nastase. A lot of fake news were making claims that Chisinau will be leased out to United Arab Emirates if Nastase wins. This news was reported as hate speech by Promo-LEX Association.[29]
The Socialist Party (similar to the Orthodox Church) is finances civil society groups and associations with the aim of strengthening and promoting its illiberal positions. An example is the Garda Tînără-Молодая Гвардия” (The Young Guard)[30], the youth branch of Socialist Party, which sustains and pursues traditional and orthodox values as “the only way Moldova has to survive”.[31]
Moreover, the Church linked groups often collaborate with the Socialist linked groups in organizing their protests. In fact, the Garda Tînără participated alongside with the above-mentioned Church organizations and the Foundation Din Suflet Foundation[32] at the March for Families.
All these organizations and social groups nominally promote their own values. However, when analysed from the general perspective, they all share links to the Orthodox Church and/or the Socialist Party and actively promote a Pro-Russian or Anti-European values agenda.
Conclusions and recommendations
In order to tackle social exclusion and discrimination, it is important to understand the processes by which they vulnerable groups are excluded, e.g. inefficient functioning of institutions, behaviour, and traditions, and the specific features that reproduce the prevailing social attitudes, bias, stereotypes and other values.
The main reason for the frequent violations and threats to equality is the lack of efficient mechanisms and commitment, to implement existing policies and international obligations that Moldova undertook to perform.
For this, the authors and their organization Promo-LEX recommends that:
The government should allocate adequate funding to national policies and action plans aimed at eliminating all forms of discrimination against vulnerable civil society actors, ensuring inclusive education and equal opportunities in employment;
Authorities should intensify the efforts to prevent and combat hate speech at all levels, including in electoral campaigns
National Audio-Visual Centre should elaborate an efficient monitoring mechanism to identify and sanction discrimination in media; and
The Government should develop and conduct systematic raising awareness campaigns to promote diversity and tolerance in Moldova.
About the author: Dumitru Sliusarenco, is a Human Rights lawyer and attorney at Promo-LEX Association, practicing since 2011 in Moldova. He is specialized on issues on equality and non-discrimination. Since 2017 Mr. Sliusarenco is the leading national expert at Promo-LEX Association within the project “Strengthening a platform for the development of human rights activism and education in order to reduce the social tensions generated by ignorance, manipulation, and the use of hate speech and discrimination
Ion Foltea, is a Promo-LEX intern and an International Relations student at University of Trento, Italy. He is currently engaged in the monitoring and analysing the issues of hate speech, within Promo-LEX research on the public discourse and hate speech in Republic of Moldova.
The Promo-LEX Association is a civil society organization with special consultative status with the UN (ECOSOC) based in Chisinau, whose purpose is to advance democracy in the Republic of Moldova through promoting and defending human rights, and monitoring democratic processes and strengthening civil society through a strategic mix of legal action, advocacy, research and capacity building.
[1] Eugene Rumer, Moldova Between Russia and the West: A Delicate Balance, May 2017
http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/23/moldova-between-russia-and-west-delicate-balance-pub-70056[2] Cristi Vlas, President Igor Dodon opposes LGBT March in Moldova, plans march for supporting traditional family, May 2017 http://www.moldova.org/en/president-igor-dodon-opposes-lgbt-march-moldova-plans-march-supporting-traditional-family/[3] Sputnik Moldova - Russia’s Moldova & Romanian language news agency, website, and radio broadcast service https://sputnik.md/[4] Republic of Moldova, Parliament, Law no. 5 (available in Moldovan and Russian languages) http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?id=315674&lang=1[5]Republic of Moldova, Parliament, Law no. 6 (available in Moldovan and Russian languages) http://lex.justice.md/md/344149/[6]Republic of Moldova, Parliament, Law no. 7 ((available in Moldovan and Russian languages) http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view&view=doc&id=335145&lang=1[7]Republic of Moldova, Parliament, Law no. 8 (available in Moldovan and Russian languages) http://lex.justice.md/md/343361/[8]Republic of Moldova, Parliament, Law no. 9 (available in Moldovan and Russian languages) http://lex.justice.md/md/346943/[9] According to Article 12 of Law no. 121, the Council’s responsibilities are focused on the following important dimensions:
Analysis and drafting of public policies
Raising the society’s level of awareness about discrimination issues
International collaboration
Direct activities of protection of discrimination victims;
[10] Study on Equality Perceptions and Attitudes in the Republic of Moldova, Chişinău, 2015 http://md.one.un.org/content/dam/unct/moldova/docs/pub/ENG-Studiu%20Perceptii%202015_FINAL_2016_Imprimat.pdf[11]: Rosbalt, The Moldovan parliament passed a law on the protection of gay rights caused a scandal (available in Russian language) May, 2012, http://www.rosbalt.ru/world/2012/05/25/985061.html. Also Moldova: Various Forms of Discrimination Are Banned by Law, November 2012, http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/moldova-various-forms-of-discrimination-are-banned-by-law/. See also Rosbalt, The Moldovan parliament passed a law on the protection of gay rights caused a scandal (available in Russian language) May, 2012, http://www.rosbalt.ru/world/2012/05/25/985061.html[12]Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church in connection with the adoption of the "Law on Ensuring Equality" in the Republic of Moldova, June 2012, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2270817.html[13]Church Pressures Moldova's Government To Repeal Antidiscrimination Laws, June 2013, RFE/RL's Moldovan Servicehttps://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-gay-church-rights-discrimination-laws/25024061.html[14] Genderdoc-M is a Moldovan non-governmental organization (https://gdm.md/en/), which aims to create a legislative, legal and social framework for lesbians, gay, bisexual and transgender people in society, by developing LGBT community, by informing, promoting rights and providing services, and expanding organizational capacities.
[15] From an open letter sent by Mitropol Vladimir, Moldovan Orthodox Church’s head, to Chişinău municipality(in Moldovan language) May 2018 http://mitropolia.md/biserica-ortodoxa-din-moldova-se-opune-categoric-la-organizarea-din-acest-an-al-marsului-solidaritatii-fara-frica/[16]Defined as “a cluster of values that emphasize the importance of family, tradition, religious teachings and traditional gender roles”. Voicu O., Cash J. and Cojocaru V.; (2017); Church and State in the Republic of Moldova. (p. 18) https://www.soros.md/publication/studiu-biserica-stat-republica-moldova[17] Homosexuals were cursed by priests but supported by diplomats, Mary Gay from Chisinau (available in Moldovan language) May 2013, https://adevarul.ro/moldova/social/marSul-gay-chiSinAu-homosexualii-fost-blestemat-preoti-sustinut-diplomati-galerie-foto-1_5199a755053c7dd83fb23cbd/index.html[18] Information about ‘Movement of the Orthodox Youth’ (in Moldovan language) http://tineretulortodox.md/miscarea-tineretului-ortodox/[19] Website of the ‘Association Moldova for Life’ http://moldovapentruviata.md/[20] Information about the ‘Association of Orthodox Christians of Moldova "Happy Mother Matrona" The Toaca newspaper (in Moldovan language) http://www.toaca.md/?page=AsociatiaFericitaMaicaMatrona[21] Information about theChristian Orthodox Christian Students Association of the Republic of Moldova (ASCOR) (in Moldovan language) http://ong.md/index.php/companies/42/15/Asocitia-Studentilor-Crestini-Ortodocsi-Romani-din-Republica-Moldova-ASCOR[22] An expression used in ‘Association of Orthodox Christians of Moldova "Happy Mother Matrona", The Toaca newspaper ( in Moldovan language) http://www.toaca.md/?page=AsociatiaFericitaMaicaMatrona[23] Prayer protest. Hundreds of parishioners and several priests have asked the Legislature to ban the propaganda of homosexuality in the Republic of Moldova (in Moldovan language), canal2.md, May 2018, http://www.canal2.md/news/protest-cu-rugaciuni-sute-de-enoriasi-impreuna-cu-mai-multi-preoti-au-cerut-legislativului-sa-interzica-propaganda-homosexualitatii-in-republica-moldova_87836.html[24]Dodon sticks to the word. Appealed to the Constitutional Court the Equality Law (in Moldovan language) May, 2012, Publika,md, https://www.publika.md/dodon-se-tine-de-cuvant-a-contestat-la-curtea-constitutionala-legea-egalitatii_872301.html[25]Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova, (in Moldovan language), October 2013 http://www.constcourt.md/public/files/file/Actele%20Curtii/acte_2013/d_14.2013.ro.pdf[26]PSRM calls for the repeal of the law on equal opportunities; Ignored by the parliamentary majority, the Socialists left Parliament (in Moldovan language) Jurnal.md, April 2016 http://jurnal.md/ro/politic/2016/4/27/psrm-cere-anularea-legii-cu-privire-la-egalitatea-de-sanse-ignorati-de-majoritatea-parlamentara-socialistii-au-parasit-sedinta-parlamentului/[27]Moldova: Reject ‘Gay Propaganda’ Law, Human Rights Watch, June 2016 https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/21/moldova-reject-gay-propaganda-law[28] Old Fashioned Skulduggery Overshadows the Elections in Moldova, Emerging Europe, November 2016
http://emerging-europe.com/voices/voices-intl-relations/old-fashioned-skulduggery-overshadows-the-elections-in-moldova/[29] Promo Lex: Report no.2 Observation Mission New Local Election of May 20, 2018, See chapter V, May 2018 https://promolex.md/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/RAPORT-nr.2_MO-Promo-LEX_ALN_20.05._eng-1.pdf,
[30] Website of The Young Guard (in Moldovan language) http://gardatinara.md/md/[31] From a Declaration released by Victoria Grosu, leader of The Young Guard, (in Moldovan language) October 2016 http://gardatinara.md/md/top/viktoriya-grosu-vlast-prenebregaet-nravstvennostyu-i-traditsionnymi-tsennostyami/[32] The Din Suflet Foundation (https://www.facebook.com/dinsufletrm/) is a non-profit organization, headed by Galina Dodon, the First Lady of Republic of Moldovan. Despite the fact that the foundation claims its independence, it openly sustains Socialists illiberal positions, proving the existence of deep relations between them.
[post_title] => The rise of illiberal civil society in Moldova
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[post_content] => In October 2016, the ‘nation army’ concept was brought onto the agenda of Armenian political life by the then newly appointed Defence Minister Vigen Sargsyan, something that would come to be presented as the core of Armenia’s defence strategy from October 2016 to April 2018. Although the concept was named the core of the government program by Sargsyan himself, it is hard even today to define what the “nation-army” ideology is, two years after the introduction of the concept. According to the now former Defence Minister Vigen Sargsyan, “The idea of "nation-army" is that all the governmental bodies, civilians and anybody else must precisely realize their role in the defence of the country.”[1] Furthermore, almost two years after the launch of the ‘nation-army’ concept and the resignation of Vigen Sargsyan from the post of Defence Minister in May 2018 in the aftermath of the so-called ‘Velvet Revolution’,[2] there are still a number of questions concerning the “nation-army” concept that require answers, in case future governments seek to revive its principles.
Among the many questions concerning the ‘nation-army’ concept, the most important one refers to its inherent nature. This paper seeks to find an answer to this question. Furthermore, this paper aims to analyse the methods of dissemination of the ‘nation-army’ concept among the population and the current state of affairs regarding its dissemination.
Nation-army concept
The idea of the nation-army initiated a wide public debate in the period of October 2016 – May 2018. After that period and despite a large number of discussions on the essence of the ‘nation-army’ model, today it is hard to properly define this concept. The most important reason for this ambiguity is that the concept was never written on paper. Hence, definitions of the concept are based on the speeches of state officials, and one single document - the ‘Seven Year Army Modernization Program’ published in March 2018. The document states that the modernization plan of Armenia should be based on the pillars of the ‘nation-army’ concept. According to the document, the five pillars of “nation-army” are leadership, respect towards law and humanism, progress, innovation and inclusiveness. Among those pillars the first one, leadership, was the most distressing for the civil society. According to it, the Armenian army was supposed to become ‘a smithy of leaders’.[3] Furthermore, according to Vigen Sargsyan himself, the aim of the government was “to make the Armenian army a school for the society, shaping a more patriotic generation.”[4] The nation-army concept was also aimed at erasing the existing institutional division between the army and the society.[5] As Vigen Sargsyan states, "the society cannot be isolated from the army and vice versa." The ideology was claimed to be about the deep respect and trust for the army, the serious attitude towards the service in the military field, finding each citizen’s proper place in the country’s defence system.[6] These and other similar statements by the government have led to a conclusion that the aim of the ‘nation-army’ concept was to increase the influence of the army within the society, hence, further militarize the country. No wonder the ‘nation-army’ concept was characterized by a number of Armenian civil society organizations as propaganda of an artificial top-to-bottom national-militaristic ideology. Armenia’s liberal civil society groups were particularly criticizing the militarization effect of the concept, the dominant role the concept had planned for the army within society,[7] the anti-democratic essence of the concept[8], the social inequality[9] of the programs offered in the framework of nation-army concept[10] and the silencing of public demands to initiate a fight against the corruption within the army.[11] In sum, civil society, alongside opposition and independent media were claiming that the ‘nation-army’ was not only is failing to solve problems in the army, but strengthening autocratic tendencies in the country.
The propaganda of the ‘nation-army’ ideology
According to the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, propaganda is the ‘expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of other individuals and groups with reference to predetermined ends’.[12] The Encyclopaedia Britannica, defines propaganda as a systematic effort to manipulate other people’s beliefs, attitudes, or actions by means of symbols (words, gestures, banners, monuments, music, clothing, insignia, designs on postage stamps, etc.).[13] Furthermore, the concepts spread by propaganda do not occur naturally and would not exist if they were not created and developed artificially.[14] To sum up, the propaganda is a systematic, deliberately designed effort to influence the opinions and actions of others via dissemination of artificial ideology. Hence, the question is whether the ‘nation-army’ concept can be characterized as propaganda.
The artificial character of the ‘nation-army’ concept was clear from the moment of its introduction. On May 5th 2017 Vigen Sargsyan mentioned that the nation-army is already a reality because there is one soldier per 40 people, i.e. “we are a nation-army, whether you want it or not".[15] Although the Minister of Defence had stated on a number of occasions that Armenians already are a nation-army and the ‘nation-army’ ideology is a mere institutionalization of objective reality,[16] these claims did not correspond to reality. In fact, the term ‘nation-army’ itself had appeared in Armenian media only once before October 2016. In October 2014, ‘Founding Parliament’,[17] an Armenian civil initiative, issued a press release suggesting the creation of a Nation-Army Public Committee.[18] However, this suggestion of had never been a topic of public debate prior to the Government’s launch of the concept. Moreover, it was unnoticed to such an extent that when Vigen Sargsyan brought the ‘nation-army’ concept to the core of the Armenian defence agenda in 2016, almost nobody remembered that it had previously been a suggestion of this civic initiative.
In this context, it should be noted that the army has always enjoyed wide public respect as one of the most valued state institutions within Armenia. According to the annual Caucasus Barometer survey, in 2015, before the introduction of the ‘nation-army’ concept, 76% of the respondents in Armenia fully or somewhat trusted the army.[19] Despite the respect towards the army and war veterans, the Armenian public never formed a public demand for a national-militaristic agenda. Interestingly, after the intense clashes on the borderline with Azerbaijan in April 2016 was widely characterized as the war inside the country, there was a significant increase of patriotic feelings. Simultaneously a public discussion on corruption issues within the army increased to an unprecedented level. Overall public debate in the period between April and October 2016 concentrated on corruption issues in the army. In 2016, military expenditure of Armenia comprised 15.1% of overall government expenditure.[20] Despite the significant amount of funding allocated to the military sphere, the April 2016 fighting showed that there was a significant shortage of weapons and ammunition in the army. The soldiers standing on the frontline had no proper protective equipment; there was also shortage of food and fuel on the frontline. This exposure raised questions concerning the allocation of military expenditure. What particularly sparked the anger of the public was the news and official statements that revealed during the April 2nd-5th2016 fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh the Armenian forces were using weapons and military hardware produced in the 1980s.[21] In April 2016, the opposition and civil society representatives started a public discussion about the multimillion-dollar expenses of government officials and agencies on luxury cars and complexes, as well as their offshore businesses.[22] The corruption issues were widely discussed in different platforms before the introduction of the ‘nation-army’ ideology. After its introduction the public demand to fight the corruption in the army automatically became secondary. The discussion of the concept and its shortcomings suddenly became the main discussion topic for the opposition and civil society. This was natural, as far as the ‘nation-army’ and its anti-democratic value-system became the most significant problem of the Armenian military sphere in the following one and a half years.
The artificial and top-to-bottom character of this ideology was most visible on social media. Facebook is the main social media platform for public discussions on politics in Armenia. Monitoring of Facebook posts on the topic of the ‘nation-army’ concept in the period from October 2016 to May 2018 reveals that the ideology was widely promoted on the pages managed by state institutions. For instance, the Yerevan municipality’s Facebook page has been the most active in using the #nation_army hashtag on Facebook. A large number of other state institutions and their employees have made centralized propaganda of the ‘nation-army’ concept. The Armenian Police, Yerevan State University, a number of public schools and universities, official student unions, official student debate clubs and councils were also active promoters of the concept. Furthermore, several government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) were actively participating in the propaganda of the concept along with the state institutions. The ‘For Armenian Soldier’ NGO was the most active organization that promoted the concept on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. The For Armenian Soldier NGO was founded in late August 2016 and is a youth-oriented NGO working purely on army-related issues. In August 2017 they launched a ‘Nation-army’ project focused on strengthening ties between the army and society, which was financed by the Ministry of Sport and Youth Affairs.[23]
A number of other government-backed NGOs participated in similar work. For example, the Youth Foundation of Armenia, which is a state-funded foundation, financed a school poster competition entitled ‘Armenian soldier.’[24] The Gevorgyan Martial Art School[25] and VoMa Centre (The Art of Staying Alive Centre)[26] NGOs had special ‘nation-army’ projects. The financial sources of both organizations are not public, but they were both publicly perceived to be associated with the former government. The main characteristic uniting all of the above-mentioned NGOs and foundations is that the beneficiaries of their projects are mostly, the youth (12-25 age range).
The Armenian Church has also expressed its support for the ‘nation-army’ concept. The head of the Armenian Apostolic Church Catholicos, Karekin II, announced his support for the concept, going so far as announcing, in a October 2016 meeting with Defence Minister Vigen Sargsyan, that every child of Armenian nation must consider himself a part of Armenian army. The Catholicos promised that the Armenian Church will make efforts and will use every opportunity to form that public consciousness. [27] The need to incorporate the church into the presentation of the ‘nation-army’ concept was stressed on a number of occasions also by the Minister of Defence. According to the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the ‘nation-army’ was the “value system that on the firm basis of Armenian Apostolic Holy Church is preparing its soldiers to the service in the domain of morality and principles.”[28] The Armenian Apostolic Church has always been an active supporter of the Armenian army. The active presence of Apostolic Church priests has long been raising concerns among national minorities and human rights defenders, but if formerly this involvement was not officially supported by the government, the ‘nation-army’ concept came to institutionalize the church’s involvement in the armed forces.
The youth was the main target group of the ‘nation-army’ propaganda. From October 2016 to May 2018, the concept was widely promoted by state-owned education institutions. In this period, the cooperation between the MOD and the Ministry of Education had grown extensively. In February 2017, MoD Spokesman, Artsrun Hovhannisyan, announced during a program on the Ararat TV channel that the ‘nation-army’ concept was also "the work that will be carried out in universities and in schools, through close cooperation with them."[29] At the Nation-Army conference on April 20, 2017 the Minister of Education and Science Levon Mkrtchyan stated: “The main goal of the Armenian education system is to ensure the continuity of the Armenian kind.” He emphasized the importance of patriotic ideology and the return of Preliminary Military Training[30] teachers to schools.[31] Deliberate systematic propaganda of the ‘nation-army’ concept has been implemented in the public educational institutions of the republic. A large number of secondary schools hosted a poster illustration contest called ‘Armenian Soldier’ run by the Youth Foundation of Armenia. The official aim of the contest was -to strengthen ‘nation-army’ ties. Schools all over the country had special lessons on such topics as ‘The Role and the Importance of the Army’ and the ‘Nation-Army Concept’. Officers of the Armenian Police Juvenile Affairs Department also participated in these events. In particular, the police officers delivered lectures on such topics as ‘Army-Soldier-Homeland’, ‘A Student, a Police Officer, and a Soldier - Devotees of the Homeland’. The active participation of the police officers in the dissemination of ‘nation-army’ ideology within schools also proved the concept was deliberately disseminated to the public.
The Armenian Public TV channel and other media outlets which are publicly perceived to be under the control of former government have also participated in the dissemination of the ‘nation-army’ concept. The case of Armenian Public TV channel is particularly interesting. During its prime-time news and current affairs programs, Armenian Public TV allocated the extensive amount of time to the coverage of ‘nation-army’ concept. The coverage of the concept was always positive, and critical content was never broadcast by the channel. Furthermore, while online media and social media platforms had often been used as platforms for criticizing the “nation-army” concept, its shortcomings have never been discussed in the framework of Public TV channel’s programs or news. The taxpayer-funded Armenian Public TV channel is a part of the Public Television and Radio Company, which, according to its legal obligations, is supposed to be governed by principles of objectivity, democracy, impartiality, diversity and pluralism.[32] Despite this, Armenian Public TV, due to its reluctance to criticize any initiative of the government, has always been publicly perceived as the official channel of ruling governments.
In the period of October 2016 to May 2018, the Armenian Public TV channel not only refused to provide objective coverage of the “nation-army” concept, but also refused to cover large waves of public criticism of the concept. At least twice, large waves of public criticism of the concept were discussed in the country. The first discussion concerned the introduction of ‘nation-army’ concept and appeared in October 2016, while the second concerned the new military service law in November-December 2017 which deprived students of academic deferment. Both initiatives raised public discord and -described as anti-democratic. Despite the lack of support among wider public circles and within civil society, both initiatives were largely promoted by experts and opinion makers perceived to be pro-governmental. The latter group was trying to justify the initiatives mostly via patriotic claims and attempts to present Vigen Sargsyan as a smart and high-level statesman and a promising strategic thinker. Armenian politics is very much centred on personalities and not ideologies, while Vigen Sargsyan always left an impression of an educated politician. In a country where criminal oligarchs had been dominating the politics for two decades, this was an effective tactic to influence wider public opinion. The Public TV was also protecting the official position. Critical discussions on the ‘nation-army’ concept were reflected exclusively in social media and online media platforms, but was never broadcast on Public TV. Besides exclusively positive coverage of the topic, the Armenian public TV channel satellite version also prepared and broadcast a separate program under the title ‘Nation-army’. The program could be easily classified as a 20- minute bimonthly promo-video of the concept.
The dissemination of the ‘nation-army’ concept was also organized via posters, banners, stamps, exhibitions, debates and public discussions organized within a number of universities by the official student unions and student clubs, and even songs. For example, in August 2017, the boy-band Detq, in collaboration with the MOD, while they were still conducting their military service, released a song titled “One Nation, One Army”.[33] The band had a number of videos which were prepared thanks to the financial support of - ex-president Serzh Sargsyan’s wife and a number of state foundations. Later in January 2018, the band released a video for the same song. The band thanked the Pyunik Foundation and MOD for their support in the preparation of the video. The Pyunik Foundation is a famous GONGO with a large number of privileges and whose executive director is Levon Sargsyan, ex-president Serzh Sargsyan’s brother. Before the ‘Velvet Revolution’ the foundation was receiving significant funding from Yerevan municipality and Yerevan Foundation[34] and since the revolution, it has come under investigation for possible tax evasion.[35] Other examples of symbols were posters and banners devoted to the ‘nation-army’ and distributed all over Yerevan by unknown groups.[36]
Another interesting aspect of the concept was its rapid fall into oblivion. After the resignation of Serzh Sargsyan from the post of Prime Minister on April 23rd 2018[37]and following the resignation of Vigen Sargsyan from the post of Minister of Defence, it was almost forgotten in two weeks. After the Velvet Revolution in Armenia, the concept is slowly being withdrawn from the political discourse of Armenia. Since mid-May 2018 to mid-June 2018, the ‘nation-army’ concept has barely been mentioned in local media. In this period, any mentioning of the concept is in the context of corruption in the army and, hence, is solely negative. Meanwhile, state institutions, including Yerevan Municipality,[38] which prior to the change of government were actively using the nation army hashtag on Facebook, have barely mentioned the concept after the change of the government. The quick withdrawal of ‘nation-army’ concept from the inner political agenda of the country is another proof of its artificial top-to-bottom character.
Conclusions
The ‘nation-army’ concept was introduced to the Armenian political agenda by former Defence Minister. Prior to its introduction, despite the high respect towards the Army and high level of patriotism, there has never been any public demand to introduce and accept such a concept as an official ideology. This leads to the conclusion that the concept was driven by artificial top-to-bottom propaganda. After the introduction of the concept, the public debate on corruption cases in the army, which had prevailed inside Armenia after April 2016, was silenced. Hence, the concept had an aim to manipulate public opinion and strengthen the image of the army as an untouchable institution which cannot become - subject to criticism.
In order to promote the concept, a number of methods and symbols were used, starting with open lessons at primary schools to the writing of songs. Moreover, the active participation of state education institutions and Armenian Public TV channel in the promotion of the ‘nation-army’ concept is a misuse of public funds. A number of GONGOs and the Church have also supported the concept and participated in its promotion among school and university students. Furthermore, the participation of Church was actively welcomed by Vigen Sargsyan.
Luckily for Armenia, the change of government is leading to the gradual oblivion of the concept. The Velvet revolution has frozen, if not put an end to propaganda of this militaristic concept for an indefinite time. Despite the high level of militarization in Armenia, the new government has so far been reluctant to continue the systematic propaganda of the concept. The newly appointed Minister of Defence David Tonoyan in the last two months has made only two public statements concerning the ‘nation-army’ concept. First of all, in the framework of a meeting with the first participants of the ‘I am’ program, he mentioned that is an important project for the army.[39] Secondly, in an interview with Mediamax, he was asked if the concept will be continued. His answer to this question was not clear. By stressing the objective reality and the need for national consolidation because of the security threats he stated that for him the most important is the essence, not the name.[40] On the other hand, unlike the previous one and a half years, there is no centralized ‘nation-army’ propaganda by state institutions. This allows to conclude that the new government of Armenia so far has been reluctant to continue the propaganda of ‘nation-army’ concept. Moreover, the newly appointed secretary of the Armenian Security Council, Armen Grigoryan in one of his interviews mentioned that he has always had a negative opinion of ‘nation-army’ concept and that an adequate society does not need such an ideology.[41] The new Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan has avoided using the term, once again proving that the propaganda of ‘nation-army’ concept is not in the list of his priorities. This does not mean that Armenia will take the road to demilitarization. Demilitarization of the country can be possible only if Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is resolved, but at the moment Armenia is – slowly not becoming a militaristic state based on the ‘nation-army’ ideology.
About the author: Anna Pambukhchyan is the Monitoring Programs Coordinator at Union of Informed Citizens NGO. Moreover, as one of the leading experts of UIC she prepares research articles on Armenian foreign policy, EU-Armenia relations and democracy-related issues. Ms. Pambukhchyan holds an MA degree from College of Europe in European Interdisciplinary Studies and from Central European University in International Relations and European Studies.
[1] Defence Minister of Armenia Elaborated on the "Nation-Army" Principle, Armedia, October 2016, http://armedia.am/eng/news/40901/defense-minister-of-armenia-elaborated-on-the-nation-army-principle.html[2] Country-wide protests in Armenia in April-May 2018 that lead to massive political changes and put end to the two decades long rule of the Republican Party of Armenia in the country.
[3] The Modernization Plan of Armed Forces of Republic of Armenia in 2018-2024. Extension to the decree number NH-103-A of the President of Armenia from February 17, 2018.
[4] Defence Minister of Armenia Elaborated on the "Nation-Army" Principle, Armedia, October 2016, http://armedia.am/eng/news/40901/defense-minister-of-armenia-elaborated-on-the-nation-army-principle.html[5] “Nation-Army” ideology does not lead to the militarization of the state: Vigen Sargsyan, Armenpress, October 2016, https://armenpress.am/arm/news/865849/azg-banak-gaxaparakhosutyuny-bnav-chi-tanum-petutyan.html[6] Nation-Army: A model for development of collective potential, Speech by Armenian Minister of Defence Vigen Sargsyan at "Nation-Army: A model for development of collective potential" session of the Sixth Armenia-Diaspora Forum, Ministry of Defence official website, September 2018, http://www.mil.am/en/news/4953[7] The nation-army militarization must not exist in Armenia: it is the guarantee of the Republican Party of Armenia’s endurance, 1in.am, November 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c5W3tItXMOk[8] Nation-army: Necessary mobilization against danger or deeper militarization?, Armtimes, June 2017, http://armtimes.com/hy/article/113891[9] One of the two alternative military service programs, offered in the framework of the ‘nation-army’ concept, was called ‘I am’ was offering financial reimbursement (around 10 thousand USD) for an additional year of military service to the two years of the compulsory military service. The money would be paid by the state at the end of the contract. The second program was called “I have the honor” and was offering academic deferment for 3 years of military service instead of compulsory two as an officer. In both cases the soldiers would serve on the borderline. CSOs have criticized both programs because they could be attractive only for the soldiers from financially insecure families, hence the soldiers standing on the borderline would be mostly from poor families.
[10] Factor TV, “What issues are solving the new programs of the nation army concept ‘I am’ and ‘I have the honour’ programs, May 2017 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mM2vROAoimM[11] A1plusnews, Will the nation-army concept increase the fight efficiency of the Armenian army, May 2017 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qLx2EYKKcXo[12] Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Inc. 1937. Monthly Letter Volume 1: https://archive.org/stream/IPAVol1/IPA_vol1_djvu.txt[13] Propaganda, Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/propaganda[14] Black, Jay. How to Understand Propaganda. 2001. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 16: 121-137
[15] Orakarg, Public TV, May 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-wmPPjYbm4&feature=youtu.be&t=337%5C[16] Nation-Army: A model for development of collective potential, Speech by Armenian Minister of Defence Vigen Sargsyan at "Nation-Army: A model for development of collective potential" session of the Sixth Armenia-Diaspora Forum, RA Ministry of Defence official website, September 2018, http://www.mil.am/en/news/4953[17] Founding parliament is a radical opposition group mostly comprised of Nagorno-Karabakh war (1988-1994) veterans. On July 17 2016, a group of armed men (mostly members of the Founding Parliament) take over a police station in Yerevan, killing a police officer and taking several others hostage. The demands of the gunmen included the release of Jirayr Sefilian, leader of the radical opposition Founding Parliament and Karabakh war veteran, who was arrested one month earlier for allegedly planning an armed insurrection.
[18] Nation-Army Public Committee is being formed, A1+, October 2014, http://www.a1plus.am/1340975.html[19] Caucasus Barometer 2015 Results Presented, Caucasus Research Resource Center, April 2016, http://www.crrc.am/514-Caucasus-Barometer-2015-Results-Presented?lang=en[20] SIPRI Military Expenditure Database for 1949-2017, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex[21]Money For Army: Anti-corruption sentiments grow in Armenia amid Karabakh escalation, ArmeniaNow.com, April 2016, https://www.armenianow.com/en/society/2016/04/15/armenia-panama-papers-offshore-scandal-mihran-poghosyan-karabakh/1067/[22] Ibid
[23] Press release by For Armenian Soldier NGO, banak.info, August 2017, https://www.banak.info/2017/08/mamuli-haxordagrutyun.html[24] The posters competition entitled ‘Armenian Soldier" was summed up, Armenian Youth Foundation, November 2017, http://heh.am/?module=article&utility=show_article&id_article=3415&lang=am[25] A comprehensive military training program will help to strengthen the roots of the ‘Nation-army’ concept, March 2018, https://168.am/2018/03/10/919379.html[26] Voma center’s website’s section on ‘nation-army’, http://voma.am/am/army/analytic?url=Azg_Banak[27] Vigen Sargsyan: Nation and Army should be considered as one, Mediamax, October 2016, https://mediamax.am/am/news/society/20153/[28] ‘Nation-army’, Ministry of Defence of RA, http://www.mil.am/hy/pages/21[29]Cornerstone, Ararat TV channel, February 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zcv0JbuawOI[30] Preliminary Military Training is a mandatory course in the Armenian high school program, where student are thought history and regulations of the Armenian army and practical military skills, such as how to use Kalashnikov
[31]Our country does not have a rear or a border, front line or back line. Levon Mkrtchyan, RA Ministry of Education and Science official website, http://edu.am/index.php/am/news/view/6568[32] Law on Television and Radio of Republic of Armenia. Chapter 4, Article 26. http://www.arlis.am/DocumentView.aspx?docid=73839[33] Detq - One Nation, One Army, August 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jSHburD0Ekw[34] Yerevan Foundation was a daughter foundation of the Yerevan Municipality and is currently also under investigation.
[35]The new revelation of the State Revenue Committee: Damage of 300 million AMD, rummage was performed in Pyunik foundation, News.am, June 2018, https://news.am/arm/news/458273.html[36] Despite a large number of requests to Yerevan Municipality it was not possible to find out who had paid for the banners and posters as the Municipality would not provide the information.
[37] Former President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan initiated constitutional changes in Armenia in 2015 to switch from presidential system to parliamentary. In April 2018, he made an attempt to become the Prime-Minister of the country, but was forced to resign as a result of massive decentralized protests all over Armenia.
[38] The Municipality and Mayor of Yerevan did not change in the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution.
[39] ‘I am’ is an important program for the armed forces: David Tonoyan, banak.info, May 2018, https://www.banak.info/2018/05/Es-em-zinvac-ujeri-hamar-karevor-cragir-e-Davit-Tonoyan.html[40] David Tonoyan: Continuity is a very important factor, Mediamax, May 2018, https://mediamax.am/am/news/interviews/28677/[41] Armen Grigoryan, Adequate society does not need a ‘nation-army’, Tert.am, May 2018, http://www.tert.am/am/news/2018/05/21/armen-grigoryan/2690730
[post_title] => The ‘Nation-Army’ concept: The story of failed national-militaristic propaganda in Armenia
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[post_content] => Kyrgyzstan is correctly regarded as among the most democratic leaning of the post-Soviet states. It is the only country in Central Asia that consistently earns a “partly free” rating in Freedom House's annual Freedom in the World rankings whereas all the other Central Asian countries are rated as “not free.” Kyrgyz citizens, moreover, are themselves inclined toward democratic governance. Seventy-one percent of Kyrgyz surveyed in Gallup’s 2016 World Poll agreed with the statement: ‘democracy is important for the development of the country’.[1] How is it, then, that a polity that with both a democratically-oriented population as well as the region's most competitive political institutions is concomitantly a polity home to elements of illiberal civil society?
In recent years Kyrgyzstan has seen growing ethno-nationalism, deadly ethnic riots, and an up-swell in anti-LGBT rhetoric. Kyrgyz citizens, moreover, are more comfortable expressing support for ‘suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets’ in defense of Islam than are people elsewhere in Central Asia.[2] These illiberal movements and sentiments have different wellsprings. Decades of tension between the titular population and the ethnic Uzbek minority in southern Kyrgyzstan has sparked periodic waves of economic ethno-nationalism in the country. Anti-LGBT alarmism, pervasive in the Russian media, offers ready-narratives for political and social entrepreneurs championing ‘traditional’ Kyrgyz values. And frequent images in the press of civilians dying as a result of US and coalition air strikes in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria may be driving public support for violence in defense of Islam.
In addition to these drivers it is necessary, albeit admittedly uncomfortable, to acknowledge one additional reason for why Kyrgyzstan may be witnessing an uptick in illiberal civil society: democracy. Kyrgyz politics, in contrast to more autocratic states elsewhere in Central Asia, is competitive. Illiberalism sells in Kyrgyzstan, just as illiberalism is now popular in Europe and the United States. Illiberal ideas, moreover, find space to circulate in a free press – something Kyrgyzstan has and other Central Asian states do not. This is not to say Kyrgyzstan would do well to abandon competitive politics. Central Asian leaders, most notably Uzbekistan’s first president, Islam Karimov, have used the specter of militant Islam as well as other potential societal ills as justification for autocratic rule and mass repression. Confronting uncivil society in a competitive political environment is far preferable to autocracy and repression. Indeed, illiberalism in Kyrgyzstan, most notably Kyrgyzstan’s flirtations with ethno-nationalism, have proven episodic. As such, there is evidence to suggest deliberative democracy, just as it may facilitate the rise of illiberalism, may also hasten the demise of uncivil social movements.
Kyrgyz ethno-nationalism
Kyrgyzstan has endured two episodes of deadly ethnic conflict. Riots between the titular majority and ethnic Uzbeks in 1990 resulted in over 300 deaths. Ethnic riots in 2010 left nearly 400 people dead. While all sides suffered unspeakable tragedies, the casualties and property loss in both the 1990 and 2010 conflicts were most heavily concentrated among the minority Uzbek population in southern Kyrgyzstan.
Although both the 1990 and 2010 riots were preceded by specific ‘sparks’—a land dispute arising out of Gorbachev's economic reforms in 1990 and a fight between an ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbek at a casino in 2010— the enduring economic and political disparities produced an environment that have been conducive to episodic conflict. In southern Kyrgyzstan’s largest city, Osh, for example, the 1989 census placed the ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbek populations at near parity—32.2 percent Kyrgyz and 32.6 percent Uzbek.[3] The Kyrgyz, however, held the lion-share of the city’s political offices whereas Uzbeks controlled a disproportionate share of the city’s lucrative industries – retail, restaurants, and taxis. Further straining relations was the reality that ethnic Kyrgyz were relative newcomers to Osh and other major southern cities such as Jalal-Abad and Uzgen. Housing stock in these cities was predominantly in Uzbek hands, a reality that the 1990 land dispute and the 2010 destruction of Uzbek property demonstrates the anger at this amongst ethnic Kyrgyz.
Kyrgyz politicians have repeatedly sought to capitalize on this ethnic-based political and economic disconnect. Osh’s Mayor in the early 1980s, Mukhit Dzhambekov, promised to bulldoze single family homes and, in their place, build high-rise apartments.[4] And Osh’s Mayor in 2010, Melis Myrzakmatov, suggested that a third of Osh’s population had to be removed from ‘seismically active zones’ and resettled in high-rise apartments.[5] Veiled in the language of modernity and safety, both the Soviet and post-Soviet mayors’ proposals were designed to appeal to a titular (Kyrgyz) population that feels economically dispossessed in their home country.
Although the 1990 and 2010 ethnic riots shared the same enduring structural cause, the political aftermaths of the two events were noticeably different. Kyrgyzstan’s new leader (more precisely, the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic’s new leader) in 1990, Askar Aakaev, appealed for ethnic unity and the slogan, ‘Kyrgyzstan, our Shared Home’, could be found on billboards in all major towns and cities. In 2010 the message was not unity, but rather, ethno-nationalist one-upmanship. The Kyrgyz parliament rejected the OSCE’s report on the June 2010 riots, arguing that the investigation wrongly concluded that “only one ethnic group has committed crimes, ignoring the victims and deaths of this group…. and unfairly portrayed ethnic Uzbeks as 'defenseless victims.'”[6] President Otunbaeva’s spokesman, Azimbek Beknazarov, declared the Osh Mayor, Myrzakmatov, not an instigator but, rather, a “hero of the events.”[7] And, as a final punctuation to the deadly episode, in May 2011 the Kyrgyz parliament declared the author of the OSCE report, Kimmo Kiljunen, persona non grata.
The critical difference between 1990 and 2010 and the reason why ethno-nationalism saw a marked upswing following the second episode of deadly riots and not the first is that Kyrgyz politics in the 2010s had become mass-based and competitive. Stressing one’s nationalist bona fides, even for someone like President Otunbaeva—perceived both in Kyrgyzstan and abroad as a strong supporter of democracy—was essential for any politician who wanted to win or remain in office. Not to appear sufficiently pro-Kyrgyz would have resulted in reformers like Otunbaeva being outflanked by virulent nationalists in Kyrgyzstan’s newly popular Ata-Jurt party.
Kyrgyz ethno-nationalism has waned in recent years. Ata-Jurt, the leading vote winner in the October 2010 Kyrgyz parliamentary elections, fell to second place behind the Social Democratic Party in the 2015 vote. The decline in Ata-Jurt’s influence and the attraction of ethno-nationalism more broadly can be attributed to several factors. Although difficult to affix firm numbers, the razing of Uzbek neighborhoods and destruction of Uzbek commercial property in Osh and Jalal-Abad shifted the economic balance toward ethnic Kyrgyz in these southern cities. Relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, moreover, have improved under the new Uzbek presidency of Shavkat Mirziyoyev since 2016. As a result, rumors of ethnic Uzbek secession, widespread in 2010, are not credible today. Ethnic Uzbek political leaders, moreover, are far less visible than they were in 2010. Businessman and former MP, Kadyrjan Batyrov, perhaps the most prominent ethnic Uzbek in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, was tried in absentia and found guilty of instigating the 2010 riots. Batyrov now lives in exile in Sweden. A final factor driving the decline in Kyrgyz ethno-nationalism is the identification of new threats, for example the perceived threat the LGBT community poses to traditional values, around which Kyrgyz social and political entrepreneurs can mobilize.
An LGBT community under attack
As with ethno-nationalism, so too do anti-LGBT movements in Kyrgyzstan draw on deep-rooted societal sentiments. Asked in Gallup’s 2013 World if ‘openly demonstrating a homosexual relationship’ was morally acceptable or morally wrong, only 1.7 percent of Kyrgyz respondents agreed that open homosexuality was morally acceptable. Similarly, in a 2012 survey Pew conducted, only three percent of Kyrgyz agreed homosexuality is morally acceptable.[8] The 2012 Pew survey, moreover, revealed that attitudes toward homosexuality were invariant across demographics. In contrast to public opinion in the United States and Europe, where younger people are more accepting of homosexuality than are older cohorts, in Kyrgyzstan 2.8 percent of respondents under the age of 30 viewed homosexuality as morally acceptable whereas 3.2 percent of respondents 30 and over approved of homosexuality.
Despite widespread anti-LGBT sentiments in Kyrgyzstan, the LGBT community only recently became a target of political entrepreneurs. In January 2011 the Kyrgyz Ministry of Justice refused to register the LGBT Rights NGO called Pathfinder because the NGO’s full name, the ‘Alliance and Social Services of Gays and Lesbians—Pathfinder’, references homosexuality. Such language, the Ministry of Justice concluded, can lead to the ‘disintegration of moral and ethical norms and national traditions of the people of Kyrgyzstan’.[9] In May 2012 a Bishkek city court ruled a film entitled I Am Gay and Muslim, could not be shown at a human rights festival. In March 2014 150 protesters from the Kalys nationalist youth movement took to Bishkek’s streets to demand parliament pass a law ‘banning gay propaganda in Kyrgyzstan’.[10] A few weeks after the Kalys march, a group of Kyrgyz MPs introduced a bill that would punish ‘calls to unconventional sexual relations’. The bill would make punishable by imprisonment the dissemination of information about ‘non-traditional sexual orientations in the media’ and severely restrict ‘gatherings’ that promote LGBT rights.[11] While Kyrgyzstan’s anti-LGBT law remains under consideration, the question of same sex-marriage has been resolved. In 2016 Kyrgyz voters passed an amendment to the constitution defining marriage as a “union between a man and a woman.”[12]
This 2011-2016 uptick in anti-LGBT activism can be attributed to two developments: (1) the European Union and the US. government’s emphasis on LGBT rights in foreign policy and (2) Russia’s effective politicization of LGBT rights as a political wedge to mobilize not only Russian society, but also post-communist societies more broadly against the EU and the US. In order to become an EU member or, moreover, in order to receive visa free travel to the EU and other closer agreements with it, countries must accept EU Directive 2000/78, a directive which prohibits ‘discrimination based on religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’.[13] While the prospect of US aid may be considerably less enticing than EU membership, the Obama administration also hinted at conditionality in a December 2011 Presidential Memorandum directing ‘all agencies engaged abroad to ensure that U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance promote and protect the human rights of LGBT persons.’[14]
Moscow has gone to extensive lengths to distinguish traditional values from what it portrays as deviant EU and US western values. Dmitri Kiselyov, a Russian television personality widely followed by Russians as well as Russian-speakers across the post-Soviet expanse, opined on Rossiya 1 in 2012 that not only is it appropriate to “fine gays for propagandizing homosexuality”, but also, “they should be prohibited from donating blood or sperm… and their hearts, in the case of a car accident, should be buried, or burned, as unfit for extending anyone’s life.”[15] Notably, a few months after making this statement, Putin elevated Kiselyov to director of the Russian State News Agency. The Russian parliament, for its part, passed a law in June 2013 making the promotion of ‘non-traditional relations’ punishable by a fine of 100,000 Rubles.
The Russian law is an inspiration for Kyrgyzstan’s ‘traditionalists.’ Kyrgyz MP Kurmanbek Dykanbaev, for example, explains that just like the Russian law, so too with the Kyrgyz law “it’s about promoting these forms of orientation in the media… especially among children.”[16] The Kyrgyz anti-LGBT law, again it is worth noting, has yet to be passed. Dykanbaev explained in 2014 that the Kyrgyz law was necessary because the “European mentality” on sexual orientation is at odds with the Kyrgyz mentality: “What is allowed in Holland contradicts Christianity and Islam. … Both the Russian-speaking population and the Kyrgyz-speaking population do not support such Western standards. We must defend our children.”[17] The rise of the political right both in Europe and in the US may ease Kyrgyz MP concerns. If nothing else, the rise of the right in the US and the EU makes sloganeering against purportedly immoral and non-traditional western acceptance of diverse sexual orientations less politically effective. Paradoxically then, growing illiberalism in the west may prompt a decline of anti-LGBT activism in Kyrgyzstan.
Support for militant Islam
Whereas the rise of the political right may point to a decline in the emphasis on LGBT rights in western diplomacy, there is little to suggest that the US or EU countries will curtail efforts to limit the spread of Islamist militancy. Kyrgyzstan, for more than a decade, was a partner to this effort. The Manas Transit Center was, until its closure in 2014, a central staging point for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) effort in Afghanistan. Kyrgyz politicians eventually soured on the ISAF’s presence at the country’s main international airport, and demanded western forces depart the Center. This turn in opinion was due in part to Moscow’s pressure, but also to growing suspicion of western tactics in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.
The vast majority of Kyrgyz, like the majority of other Central Asian populations, self-identify as Muslim. Kyrgyz, however, are an outlier when it comes to expressed support for forms of militant Islam. In its 2012 poll of predominantly Muslim countries, Pew found only 66 percent of Kyrgyz respondents rejected ‘suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets’ in defense of Islam whereas 93 percent of Kazakh respondents and 76 percent of Tajik respondents rejected violence in defense of Islam. That Kyrgyz appear markedly more tolerant of violence in defense of Islam is likely attributable to two factors: (1) Kyrgyzstan’s comparatively open information space and (2) a considerably less oppressive political environment in which self-censorship is unnecessary. Engaged Central Asians know about the vast civilian casualties first hinted at in the Snowden and Manning leaks. Moreover, western journalists’ documentation of civilian casualties at the hands of coalition airstrikes—the findings of reports such as the New York Times ‘The Uncounted’—have circulated widely in the Central Asian press.[18] While these civilian casualties are widely known, they are not widely discussed across Central Asia. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, all other Central Asian states are secular autocracies. Voicing Islamist sentiments can land citizens in prison in these countries. In Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, citizens are free on-line and in person to express support of militancy when confronted with reports of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.
Critically, there is little to suggest that outward expressions of militancy have translated into substantive Islamist mobilization within Kyrgyzstan. This makes sense in the environs of a competitive political system like Kyrgyzstan’s. In both the case of Kyrgyz ethno-nationalism and anti-LGBT activism, local targets—ethnic Uzbeks and LGBT NGOs—can readily be identified against which to mobilize political support. Frustration at the mounting Muslim civilian casualties in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, while real, has no local target and, as such, limited political utility. There is some evidence that Kyrgyzstanis—approximately 600 according to the Kyrgyz government—have gone abroad to join militant Islamist groups.[19] Cases of domestic Islamist militancy within Kyrgyzstan, however, are rare and Islamist platforms are all but non-existent in Kyrgyz politics.
Kyrgyzstan in comparative context
Viewed in the global context, Kyrgyzstan’s periodic bouts with uncivil society are neither unusual nor puzzling. Ethno-nationalism and anti-LGBT sentiments wax and wane in western polities just as these sentiments come and go in Kyrgyzstan. Competitive politics, as the Weimar Germany case so poignantly illustrates, is no defense against illiberalism; just the opposite, competitive politics may time-to-time, prove the genesis of uncivil society.
This reality presents a dilemma for civil society advocates: democracy promotion, long the mantra of western government and international organization outreach efforts in Central Asia, offers no guarantee civil society will always flourish. Democracy promotion advances civil society only when paired with sustained local human rights and civil liberties advocacy. This is no small task. Constitutional design is easy; we know how to design institutions that give rise to competitive politics. Less well understood is how to effect cultures of enduring civil society. Increasingly this is not just a challenge for post-Soviet Central Asia, but also for western democracies, those same countries which, in an earlier, optimistic ‘wave of transition’, were much more enthusiastic and self-confident champions of political reform.
About the author: Eric McGlinchey is an Associate Professor of Politics and Government in George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government. Dr. McGlinchey is the author of Chaos, Violence, Dynasty: Politics and Islam in Central Asia (2011). He is the Principal Investigator for the study, Russian, Chinese, Militant, and Ideologically Extremist Messaging Effects on United States Favorability Perceptions in Central Asia (Minerva Research Initiative, January 2017 – December 2019). Grants from the National Science Foundation, the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, the International Research & Exchanges Board, the Social Science Research Council, and the U.S. Department of State have also funded his research. Dr. McGlinchey has published widely in academic journals and the press. He has contributed to U.S. government studies, including the 2007 USAID-funded Study of Political Party Assistance in Eastern Europe and Eurasia as well as three 2013 USAID-funded risk assessments on Violent Extremism and Insurgency in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia. Dr. McGlinchey received his Doctorate from Princeton University.
This essay partly draws on research undertaken as part of the project Russian, Chinese, Militant, and Ideologically Extremist Messaging Effects on United States Favorability Perceptions in Central Asia, funded by the US Department of Defense and the US Army Research Office/Army Research Laboratory under the Minerva Research Initiative, award W911-NF-17-1-0028. The views expressed here are those of the author and should not be attributed to the US Department of Defense or the US Army Research Office/Army Research Laboratory.
[1] Gallup Inc, The Gallup World Poll,Gallup.com, https://www.gallup.com/analytics/232838/world-poll.aspx.[2] The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society, Pew Research Center, April 2013, http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_Affiliation/Muslim/worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-full-report.pdf.[3] Eric McGlinchey, Fast Forwarding the Brezhnev Years, Russian History 41, no. 3 (July 21, 2014): 373–91 https://doi.org/10.1163/18763316-04103005.
[4] Nicholas Daniloff, A Soviet Fiefdom Where Two Worlds Clash, U.S. News & World Report, July 1982.
[5] Uchkun Tashpaev: Bolee Treti Zhitelei Goroda Osha Prozhivaet v Zone Tektonicheskikh Razlomov, 24.Kg, March 2010.
[6] Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Head Of Commission On Kyrgyz Violence Declared ‘Persona Non Grata, May 2011, https://www.rferl.org/a/head_of_commission_on_kyrgyz_violence_declared_persona_non_grata/24205930.html .
[7] Kyrgyz President’s Envoy Slams NGOs over Ethnic Riots, Calls Osh Mayor Hero, Kyrgyz Telegraph Agency (KyrTAg), June 2011.
[8] The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society.
[9] Bektur Iskender, “Minyust otkazalsya registrirovat’ organizatsiyu za «geyev i lesbiyanok» v nazvanii,” KLOOP.KG - Novosti Kyrgyzstana (blog), January 2011, https://kloop.kg/blog/2011/01/21/minyust-otkazalsya-registrirovat-organizaciyu-za-geev-i-lesbiyanok-v-nazvanii/.
[10] Khloya Geine, “Video: Miting protiv NPO i ‘gey-propagandy’ v Bishkeke,” KLOOP.KG - Novosti Kyrgyzstana (blog), March 2014, https://kloop.kg/blog/2014/03/12/video-miting-protiv-npo-i-gej-propagandy-v-bishkeke/.
[11] Khloya Geine, “Deputaty predlagayut sazhat’ za ‘prizyvy k netraditsionnym seksual’nym otnosheniyam,’” KLOOP.KG - Novosti Kyrgyzstana (blog), March 2014, https://kloop.kg/blog/2014/03/26/deputaty-predlagayut-sazhat-za-prizy-vy-k-netraditsionny-m-seksual-ny-m-otnosheniyam/.
[12] “Kyrgyz Voters Back Amendments On Same-Sex Marriage, Presidential Power,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, December 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-constitutional-referendum-voting/28168872.html .
[13] “Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation,” https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/78/oj .
[14] “Presidential Memorandum -- International Initiatives to Advance the Human Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Persons,” whitehouse.gov, December 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/06/presidential-memorandum-international-initiatives-advance-human-rights-l.
[15] David Remnick, “Gay Rights and Putin’s Olympics,” The New Yorker, December 2013, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/gay-rights-and-putins-olympics.[16] Geine, “Deputaty predlagayut sazhat’ za ‘prizyvy k netraditsionnym seksual’nym otnosheniyam.’”
[17] Geine.
[18] , https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/16/magazine/uncounted-civilian-casualties-iraq-airstrikes.html[19] Bruce Panier, Analysis: Are Central Asia’s Militants Already Coming Home From The Middle East?,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, May 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozo-kyrgyzstan-militants-coming-home-central-asia-middle-east-/29251178.html
[post_title] => The Changing Landscape of Uncivil Society in Kyrgyzstan
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[post_content] => Central Asia is commonly known in the international community as a landlocked and autocratic region of post-Soviet Asia that is sandwiched between the competing geopolitical interests of two world superpowers. Perhaps, rightly so on the surface. More than seventy years under Soviet rule and evident authoritarianism following the collapse of USSR in 1991 are shaping the politics of the countries, to this day. The Kyrgyz Republic in Central Asia is a special case, despite setbacks in recent years. The country has been known for its continuing efforts to adopt democratic norms of governance since the 1990s. This is the only nation in the entire region where power is shared between the Parliament and President whereas the rest of the regional states are governed by authoritarian regimes.
And yet, even in the Kyrgyz Republic, the rights of women remain a subject of concern regardless of the country's wider record. In spite of having the domestic laws to protect women's rights and maintain gender equality, the Kyrgyz state does not seem to have the capacity to sufficiently implement and enforce the legal norms on women's rights nationwide. More so, it is becoming evident in the last several years that the women's rights groups and feminist-activists are being targeted by the nationalist and conservative factions; and religious groups increasingly in favour of raising the issues of polygamy, discrimination against women and reproductive rights in the country. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study on combating gender inequality in political participation in the Kyrgyz Republic indicated that conservatives have significantly intensified their activity in the Central Asian nation after 2010. According to the UNDP ‘When discussing the new version of the Constitution, religious groups attempted to remove the definition of Kyrgyz Republic as a secular state. The secular status was maintained thanks to public campaigns organized by women activists’.[1]
In retrospect, conservatives and religious groups in Kyrgyzstan have taken more proactive steps to influence country’s politics in the years following the second regime change in April 2010, which led to an outburst of mass violence in the North and South of Kyrgyz Republic. Among the most politically active nationalist groups, the Kyrk Choro (Forty Knights) movement is the most aggressive of those whose political activity has become known during and after 2010. Their leader Zamir Kochorbayev claimed Kyrk Choro was part of the ‘April Revolution’ during which movement members protected the Kyrgyz government administration building in Bishkek from looting. He told the local newspaper that the Kyrgyz state agencies collectively financed and supported the Kyrk Choro office in the Kyrgyz capital since 2013.[2]
This question of murky links between nationalist groups such as Kyrk Choro and the government have been raised in the Kyrgyz Republic’s media. It was reported in 2015 that Kyrk Choro had signed a memorandum of cooperation with seven government agencies, including Ministry of Interior, State Committee on National Security and Prosecutor General's Office on helping the local population in emergency situations and assisting state border service near the frontier.[3] The spokesman for Bishkek city police even told RFE/RL's Kyrgyz language service that the law enforcement agency supported Kyrk Choro activists because they "prevent the spread of abnormalities in the society that are not inherent to the [Kyrgyz] people and not consistent with the national mentality". [4] Kyrk Choro activists have reportedly attacked and physically assaulted Kyrgyz women for dating or socializing with non-Kyrgyz men[5] and have staged protests against legislation on reproductive rights[6] supported by United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).
There are also individual politicians, parliamentarians and religious figures that consistently promote conservative ideas. Former lawmaker and leader of the conservative political party ‘Erkin Kyrgyzstan’ (Free Kyrgyzstan) Tursunbay Bakir Uulu is the brightest example among those who have publicly defended polygamy and called for the introduction of religious education in schools as well as removal of sex education literature from the education system throughout the nation.[7] Similarly, Kamchybek Joldoshbayev MP from the ’Onuguu-Progress’ (Development-Progress) political faction in the Kyrgyz Parliament supported the legalization of polygamy and suggested a modification to the Constitution to allow the practice of having more than one spouse in the country.[8] Seemingly, some preachers within the muftiate of Kyrgyzstan are cautious to openly back the proposal while arguing that it is permitted to practice polygamy in Islam if certain conditions are met. According to Ergazy Nurmatov, a representative of the muftiate in Osh province, “in the Koran it is allowed to have 2 or 3 wives. But it also says: ‘If you cannot cope with responsibility, then it is better to live with one wife.’ If we, theologians, say: ‘Sharia admits polygamy’, go for it, then we, it turns out, will infringe the rights of women. If the head of the family is able to treat both wives fairly, then he is entitled to a second marriage. We must not forget about the first wife, marrying the second.”[9]
In some specific cases, women activists are reluctant to speak out in public due to concerns for their safety. In one reported incident, young women activists were physically attacked in daylight in the country's capital Bishkek leaving two female campaigners injured.[10] A female activist based in the southern province of Osh, who was interviewed for this essay and requested the concealment of her name, said there have been numerous attempts by the religious establishment and nationalist movements in the Kyrgyz Republic to exert control over women's rights in their public speeches and campaigns. To prove her argument she said there's a case of a former grand mufti Chubak Jalilov who called for polygamy in the country last year, openly defying the constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic that prohibits such acts in the nation.[11] Jalilov’s controversial opinion was backed by religious preacher Ozubek Chotonov who said that “wealthy men should have up to four wives”.[12] Surprisingly, legalization of polygamy was also supported by a few Kyrgyz women. Journalist Nazira Begim published her letter to the President Sooronbay Jeenbekov expressing her personal approval of polygamy and urged the government to decriminalize it in the Kyrgyz Republic.[13]However, a survey in 2017 showed that more than 67% of the population decisively reject the legalization of polygamy in the Central Asian nation.[14]The latest example of discrimination against women has come to light in recent months when a conservative-leaning group of Kyrgyz migrant men campaigned[15] for introducing legislation in the Kyrgyz Parliament that would ban young women under 26 from traveling abroad. Previously, parliamentarians had adopted a similar travel ban for women up to 22 years of age[16]to discourage young Kyrgyz women “from traveling to foreign countries and becoming prostitutes”, according to MP who initiated the bill. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan remains one of the least developed countries with high unemployment and widespread poverty in the region. According to a study compiled by the Paris-based International Federation for Human Rights, a non-governmental federation for human rights organizations ‘Kyrgyz migrants make up today some 650 thousand to 1 million out of a total population of 5.8 million in Kyrgyzstan. Although migratory flows are mainly comprised of young males, feminization has increased. Currently, nearly 40 percent of Kyrgyz migrants in Russia are women’.[17]
In addition to potential constraints, the Kyrgyz Republic has put legal barriers for country's women to participate freely in the labour force. Women are excluded from 400 occupations and tasks that had been traditionally reserved for men only under the existing Labour Code. The disparity is observed in the mining industry, energy and gas sectors, construction, transport and the storage of goods. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development determined that there is a "growing gap between men and women’s participation in the workforce in the Kyrgyz Republic. Today women comprise only 40 percent of the Kyrgyz workforce, compared with 44 percent in 1990. Women’s participation in the workforce decreased particularly sharply between 2002 and 2006, a period of economic decline".[18]Picture: [19]
Aida Kasymaliyeva, a female MP in the Kyrgyz Parliament is strongly convinced that politicians and political factions do not see the problem of discrimination of women and gender inequality in the country as a concern and they de-facto oppose real progress with women's rights. [20]She insists more women in local councils, Parliament and Government will ultimately bring badly-needed change and draw attention to procedural changes that may assist women’s participation in Parliament.
Female lawmaker said: "From 2020, the law will work, when instead of the woman who left the party list, a woman comes on the list, and instead of the next placed candidate if they were - men. This bill was drafted because women came to the parliament on a 30 percent quota, but they were easier to "expel" from the Jogorku Kenesh [parliament] because of the lack of clan and financial support. Let's see how the law works. And now in the parliament, a group of women are working on the reservation of 30 percent of seats in ayil keyesh [local council]. From year to year, there are fewer and fewer women in local councils, the statistics are depressing. Our goal - 50/50, not a thirty percent quota. But if we talk about reality, it will be extremely difficult to achieve it."
Kasymaliyeva stressed that religious and conservative groups play a role in formulating negative public opinions regarding the rights of women. "They [both groups] strongly influence young people, values and the formation of negative stereotypes about the activity of women" she said.
Steve Swerdlow, Central Asia researcher for Human Rights Watch, believes women activists in Kyrgyzstan and the greater post-Soviet region face difficult tasks in the process of defending their rights. “Truly confronting the serious violations of women’s rights in Central Asia - severe domestic violence, sexual harassment and sex discrimination in the workplace, rampant sexism and economic inequality, the lack of proportionate political representation - requires challenging the very structures of Central Asian society and the most powerful entrenched systems of patriarchy that form their foundation" he replied in comments for this essay. "This is why women’s rights activists in the region have a truly revolutionary task at hand. They face resistance from many corners, including political bureaucracies, religious authorities, but also sometimes even from other women and people who have not been exposed to an understanding of feminism”.
Picture: [21]
Kyrgyzstan has also been known in the international community for its controversial and widely-accepted practice of abducting and forcing women into marriage, known in popular culture as ‘bride-kidnapping’. The scale of it can be beyond conventional wisdom and comprehension to many observers outside the Kyrgyz Republic. "Between 16 and 23 percent of women in Kyrgyzstan are abducted for marriage, but the rate is much higher among ethnic Kyrgyz where a third of all marriages are due to kidnapping." concluded a 2017 Duke University study.[22]The Women Support Centre in Kyrgyzstan reported that number of kidnapped women reaches nearly twelve thousand annually.
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the body that oversees implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), in its 2015 report on Kyrgyzstan urged the Central Asian nation's government to do more to stop the "persistent abduction of women and girls for forced marriages".[23] The UN Committee was especially alarmed by the high number of forced marriages and bride-kidnapping cases in Kyrgyzstan.
International organizations slammed the government of Kyrgyzstan in recent weeks for doing little to stop bride-kidnapping following the latest incidents in May-June. 20-year-old medical student Burulai Turdaliyeva was murdered by her abductor in a failed attempt of bride-kidnapping.[24] Within weeks after the deadly kidnapping, 18-year-old woman was abducted in the country’s capital and raped by her kidnapper.[25] “The Kyrgyzstani authorities must take action to promptly bring all alleged perpetrators of these violent and abhorrent crimes to justice, and send a strong message that gender-based violence will not be tolerated,” said in a statement by Amnesty International when it reacted to violence against women in the Kyrgyz Republic.
Subsequently, the kidnapping and forcing women into marriage is a crime in the Central Asian nation that can carry prison sentences of up to 7 and 10 years for bride-kidnapping. “But in reality, it goes unpunished, there is a kind of impunity for this crime in the country.” in its report stated The Forum of Women’s NGOs of Kyrgyzstan.[26] Indeed, only one out of 700 abduction cases is investigated and only one out of 1500 bride-kidnapping crimes leads to sentencing in courts of law for the entire country according to a UN Women assessment.[27] The Forum of Women's NGOs of Kyrgyzstan believes that the main factors of bride kidnapping are “patriarchal acceptance”, deeply-entrenched “social stereotypes”, “poverty and low social status of victims.”[28] A UNFPA survey in 2016 showed that widespread abduction of young women for forced marriage persist due to the existing “customs and traditions” in Kyrgyz Republic. UNFPA polling indicated that the “vast majority of women (81%) and men (78%) in Kyrgyzstan are negative about bride abduction. At the same time, approximately similar number of women and men (4-5%) are positive about women abducting for marriage and nearly 11% of women and more than 14% of the men are neutral.”[29]
Strikingly, the dysfunctional judiciary of the Kyrgyz Republic is only exacerbating the issue. Amnesty International report indicated that ‘64% of police officers in the southern city of Osh consider ‘bride kidnapping’ to be ‘normal’ and 82% of them believe that the abduction is ‘provoked’ by the women themselves’.[30] Women’s rights groups are strongly convinced that despite the ratification of international conventions on women’s rights including CEDAW and criminalizing the act of bride-kidnapping, access to justice for victims of bride-kidnapping has not improved. Kyrgyz women’s rights non-governmental organizations believe deterioration of the situation with women’s rights is part of Kyrgyzstan’s challenging transition process after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Forum of Women’s NGOs argues the combined effect of the loss of communist ideology and an increasing impact of the religion in the Kyrgyz Republic resulted in a tendency that is designed to “narrow down women’s roles into positions limited to the role of only mother and wife, thus limiting educational, economic and political rights and opportunities for women in the society”. This assessment highlights the rise of anti-women’s rights conservative politicians and nationalist movements; and growing influence of religious figures that are promoting travel bans for young Kyrgyz women, calling for approval of polygamy nationwide and engaging in political campaigning against the law on reproductive rights in Kyrgyzstan.
The ultimate question then, is what can be done to reverse the trend and sustain efforts to make real progress with women's rights in the Kyrgyz Republic? The country's donors and global organizations must concentrate their efforts on the transparency of aid distribution at all levels of the Kyrgyz state which is the beneficiary of foreign aid assistance programs that are tied to supporting women's rights initiatives as well. Kyrgyzstan has a vibrant civil society, including women's rights NGOs that can effectively contribute to the successful delivery of assistance programs on the ground. It is crucial that international organizations should proactively engage in a long-term cooperation and continuous dialogue with the women's rights groups.
International development banks, such as European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), World Bank, Asian Development Bank and many other financial institutions that are operating in this Central Asian country could play a positive role through their projects that must include gender equality as part of the required procedure. There are good examples of gender mainstreaming in Kyrgyzstan such as EBRD financed gender inclusion project in the municipal services of the second largest city of Osh.[31] However, the local women's rights activists and NGOs have been critical of ‘financing gender equality commitments’ in Kyrgyzstan due to ‘methodological difficulties on differentiation and integration of financial resources allocated for gender development. The analysis of foreign aid strategies in terms of gender integration showed weak coordination of donor policies and the absence of mandatory accounting and transparency of aid flows in support of gender equality’.[32] Kyrgyzstan has received more than $9 billion in foreign loans (72%) and grants (28%) for social-economic development over the period of two decades.[33]
Human rights observers say western states and many other governments who traditionally have supported women’s rights in the region need to increase their commitment to programs for early childhood education for girls and women’s empowerment in Central Asia. Steve Swerdlow argued that "they should contribute funds to supporting domestic violence and gender-sensitive training for police. Tajikistan is a good example, where a 2013 law to combat domestic violence on its face is relatively forward-looking and the OSCE has provided gender-sensitive training to staff several police stations with female police officers trained in handling domestic violence complaints. We should see more international support for such initiatives, including further support for shelters and service providers."
Essentially, it is important for the international community to determine whether the previous decades of insufficient attention to the rights of women in Central Asia may have had a negative impact on the social and political development of the landlocked region. And as the global women’s rights movement is gaining momentum around the world, there is an opportunity for the international organizations to increase support and assistance to the women's rights groups and organizations in the politically unstable region to promote gender-friendly policies in the state branches and protect the rights of women from an aggressive nationalist-conservative agenda and religious fundamentalism.
About the author: Ryskeldi Satke is a journalist and independent researcher based in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic. He wrote and published reports from Central Asia and Mongolia with international research institutions and global news organizations. His most recent policy-briefs on the regional topics include -“Between East and West: Kazakhstan and China’s new Silk Road”; Barcelona Centre for International Affairs; 2015; “Kyrgyz Republic’s experience with investment treaties and arbitration cases”; Transnational Institute; 2017.
[1] UNDP, Case Study on combating gender inequality in political participation in Kyrgyzstan, October 2016 http://www.kg.undp.org/content/dam/kyrgyzstan/Publications/gender/Case%20study_Eng10Oct2016.pdf[2]"- ‘’Precedent Partner Group’’: How can ‘Kyrk Choro’ grow? ( in Russian) The Evening Bishkek, February 2015
https://www.vb.kg/doc/301989_precedent:_vo_chto_mojet_pererasti_kyrk_choro.html[3] Kyrk Choro" - pro-government project? RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service (Azattyk), July 2015
https://rus.azattyk.org/a/27133965.html [4] Ibid.
[5] Understanding Illiberal Sentiments of Kyrgyz Youth; Gulzhigit Ermatov; Central Asia Program, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University; 2017, http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Kyrgyzstan_.pdf[6]Astra Youth, Law on reproductive rights in Kyrgyzstan signed, August 2015 http://www.astra.org.pl/youth/news/289-law-on-reproductive-rights-in-kyrgyzstan-signed.html[7] - Tursunbay Bakir Uulu is planning to run for President ( in Russian) Kloop, June 2017 https://kloop.kg/blog/2017/06/24/tursunbaj-bakir-uulu-planiruet-ballotirovatsya-v-prezidenty/[8] A member of the Parliament suggests the legalization of polygamy,(in Russian) Knews, September 2016
http://knews.kg/2016/09/08/parlamentarij-vnov-predlagaet-uzakonit-mnogozhenstvo/[9]Law Journalist.kg ,Who is allowed to have a second wife?(in Russian), September 2016
http://law.journalist.kg/2016/09/27/komu-dozvoleno-brat-vtoruyu-zhenu/[10]CACI Analyst, Feminist Activist Attacked in Osh, Kyrgyzstan; March 2014;
https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/12938-feminist-activist-attacked-in-osh-kyrgyzstan.html[11] My first wife is upset a little' - Kyrgyz scholar on polygamy; Sherie Ryder and Maruf Siddikov; BBC Social News and BBC Monitoring; November 2017; http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-42150072[12] A Muslim Cleric brings ‘polygamy’ onto the agenda once again , RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service (Azattyk), June 2017
https://rus.azattyk.org/a/28542667.html[13]Kyrgyzstan: female journalist asks president to legalize polygamy, The Times of Central Asia, February 2018
https://www.timesca.com/index.php/news/19300-kyrgyzstan-female-journalist-asks-president-to-legalize-polygamy[14] Most of population of Kyrgyzstan against polygamy, 24KG, July 2017 https://24.kg/english/58356_Most_of_population_of_Kyrgyzstan_against_polygamy/[15] Prohibition for girls under 26 to work abroad proposed in Kyrgyzstan; Current Time; April 2018;
https://www.currenttime.tv/a/29187588.html[16] Girl Travel Ban Passed in Kyrgyzstan; Aigul Kasymova; CACI; 27 August 2013; https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/12795-girl-travel-ban-passed-in-kyrgyzstan.html[17] Women and children from Kyrgyzstan affected by migration, An exacerbated vulnerability; FIDH; September 2016;
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_kyrgyzstan_uk-2-web2.pdf[18] Legal barriers to women’s participation in the economy in the Kyrgyz Republic; EBRD; October 2015;
https://www.ebrd.com/documents/admin/legal-barriers-gender.pdf[19] EBRD (2015)
[20] Aida Kasymaliyeva MP was interviewed for the purpose of informing this essay.
[21] From Bhakti Patel, A Troubling Tradition: Kidnapping Women For Marriage In Kyrgyzstan! Bride-kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan, image d.haberay.net http://womenpla.net/troubling-tradition-kidnapping-women-marriage-kyrgyzstan/[22] One in five girls and women kidnapped for marriage in Kyrgyzstan: study, Reuters, August 2017; https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kyrgyzstan-women-bride-kidnapping/one-in-five-girls-and-women-kidnapped-for-marriage-in-kyrgyzstan-study-idUSKBN1AH5GI[23] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Kyrgyzstan, March 2015, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/791384/files/CEDAW_C_KGZ_CO_4-EN.pdf[24] Young Woman’s Murder in Kyrgyzstan Shows Cost of ‘Tradition’ Human Right Watch, May 2018 https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/31/young-womans-murder-kyrgyzstan-shows-cost-tradition[25] Kyrgyzstan: New rape case highlights need for immediate action to end appalling “bride kidnapping” practice, Amnesty International, June 2018 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/06/kyrgyzstan-new-rape-case-highlights-need-for-immediate-action-to-end-appalling-bride-kidnapping-practice/[26] Access to justice for victims of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan, Forum of Women's NGOs of Kyrgyzstan, 2011 https://www.karat.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Access_to_justice_Report_Kyrgyzstan_en.pdf[27] New law in Kyrgyzstan toughens penalties for bride kidnapping, UN Women, February 2013
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2013/2/new-law-in-kyrgyzstan-toughens-penalties-for-bride-kidnapping#edn1[28] Access to justice for victims of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan, Forum of Women's NGOs of Kyrgyzstan, 2011 https://www.karat.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Access_to_justice_Report_Kyrgyzstan_en.pdf[29] Gender in Society Perception Study, National Survey Results 2016 https://kyrgyzstan.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/GSPS_english.pdf[30] Kyrgyzstan: New rape case highlights need for immediate action to end appalling “bride kidnapping” practice, Amnesty International, June 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/06/kyrgyzstan-new-rape-case-highlights-need-for-immediate-action-to-end-appalling-bride-kidnapping-practice/[31] First EBRD-financed buses arrive in Osh, Kyrgyz Republic; EBRD; December 2016; http://www.ebrd.com/news/2016/first-ebrdfinanced-buses-arrive-in-osh-kyrgyz-republic-.html[32] Strengthening foreign aid effectiveness in Kyrgyzstan; 24KG; March 2014; https://24.kg/archive/en/bigtiraj/169423-news24.html/[33] The Downside of Foreign Aid in Kyrgyzstan; The Diplomat; June 2017; https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/the-downside-of-foreign-aid-in-kyrgyzstan/
[post_title] => Illiberal forces put women’s rights under strain in Kyrgyzstan
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[post_content] => The focus of civil society research in the social and political sciences has, for the most part, been on progressive and liberal groups and movements who defend the cause of equal human rights against an unjust state or against oppressive majorities. Progressive norm entrepreneurs trigger debates in the course of which general principles of human rights, such as equality, justice and non-discrimination, become framed as concrete values and demands. A classic example of this is the expansion of the principle of equality from male citizens to all adult citizens through women’s suffrage. The norm entrepreneurs, in this case, were women’s movements. Another example for norm entrepreneurship are gay and lesbian movements, who have become increasingly successful in seeing their demands of equality and non-discrimination written into the law of most Western democracies. Both stories exemplify how a general principle becomes framed in terms of concrete values and demands and how the issues raised eventually translate into new policies. ‘Norm cascade’ is the term which the political scientists Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink have used to describe this dynamic.[1] Human rights principles need active, discursive and legal implementation, which is always rooted in the choices and actions of concrete actors.
Today we have to concede that the focus on progressive, liberal civil society in the literature on norm entrepreneurship has been one-sided. Besides liberal NGOs actors on the right also mobilize. The concerns of these groups vary from anti-immigration to gun-promotion, from anti-abortion to religious exemptions. Illiberal civil society uses the very same mechanisms and strategies as a progressive civil society: actors create NGOs and transnational platforms, they employ lawyers and lobby politicians, as well as using the internet and media to attract new followers. In this contribution, I pick out one such illiberal civil society organization – the World Congress of Families (WCF) – and look at its role in two of the countries that are the focus of this compilation: Georgia and Moldova.
The WCF organizes international and regional congresses in support of the ‘natural family’ across Europe, the United States, and the former Soviet Union. It was founded in 1997 by American and Russian partners, with the Howard Center for Family, Religion, and Society from Rockford, Illinois being the main driving force for the first ten years. The Russian engagement in the WCF coordination became prominent only after 2010. In that year, the late Larry Jacobs, at the time the WCF’s managing director, traveled to Russia on an official visit to speak at an event organized by the Russian pro-life organization Sanctity of Motherhood. “We were delighted by the support we found there”, Jacobs was quoted in the media after this trip. “Russian pro-life/pro-family forces are eager to cooperate with their counterparts in the West. Given its traditional support for faith and family, Russia will play an increasingly important part in the international struggle to preserve the natural family”.[2] The WCF so far has organized two international congresses in the former Soviet Union; one summit in 2014 in Moscow, the other 2016 in Tbilisi. The 2018 Congress will take place in the capital of Moldova, Chisinau, in September.
The World Congress of Families is the American Christian Right going international. Since 2016 the WCF has become a chapter of the International Organization for the Family (IOF). The organization does not self-identify explicitly as Christian, but the religious character is evident. Congresses are attended by Christians of all denominations, including Mormons, and occasionally also Muslims are invited. The IOF mission statement includes a plea to ‘protect freedom, faith, and family’.[3] Orthodox Christians from Eastern Europe are newcomers in this circle, and they are setting their own agenda.
The local partners for the Moscow and Tbilisi summits were wealthy businessmen, Konstantin Malofeev from Russia and Levan Vasadze from Georgia. The Moscow Summit was also co-sponsored by the organization Sanctity of Motherhood, which is headed by the wife of the Russian oligarch, and former head of Russian Railways Vladimir Yakunin. Malofeev and Yakunin are on the international sanctions list imposed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The three businessmen present themselves as committed Orthodox Christians: Malofeev runs the St. Basil the Great Charitable Foundation, which sponsors, among other things, an Orthodox private school and a TV-station that promotes Russian Orthodox statehood (tsargrad.tv)[4]; Yakunin is the head of St. Andrew the First Called Endowment Fund, which finances several programs, among them the Russki Mir Foundation and the Sanctity of Motherhood pro-life network[5]; Vasadze likewise founded an Orthodox private school in Tbilisi[6]. Both Vasadze and the Russian WCF representative Alexey Komov have studied in the United States, they know Western languages, culture and politics, and they have adopted the habitus of American Christian conservatives. Now they are importing the American culture wars into their home countries.
WCF congresses are networking events for social conservative activists, professionals and politicians from across the US, Europe and other parts of the world. Liberalism is the declared opponent. For American participants, the enemies are progressive liberals in their own country. The enemy for the Eastern Europeans is the European Union. The few Western European participants, almost all from the far-right spectrum of the Catholic Church, feature in the WCF congresses as token victims of the EU. A French participant at the Tbilisi Congress went on record in front of a Georgian TV station saying: “Do not join the EU, the EU will destroy your families”, and a notorious German anti-gender activist, Gabriele Kuby, frightened the Georgian audience with the (false) statement that the EU would impose a school curriculum that teaches masturbation.[7] One politician present in Tbilisi in 2016 was Igor Dodon, now the pro-Russian president of Moldova and the host of this year’s congress.
For the Eastern European sponsors of the WCF events in Georgia and Moldova the ideological battle clearly goes beyond family questions. The larger context is the question whether their countries should orient their political and economic development westwards or eastwards, towards the EU or towards Russia. The way westwards is depicted as capitalist, immoral, anti-religious and anti-family, the way eastwards as path of salvation, complete with state-regulated (and not global capitalist) economies, morality, Orthodox religious education and demographic growth. A recent speech by Vasadze in Moldova published by Visegrad Post outlines the economic and political side of the program.[8] What makes this agenda new with regard to the anti-Westernism of the traditional Orthodox, Russian or Soviet kind is that this anti-liberalism identifies allies in the West. It is not the West as such that is rejected, but the ‘liberal West’. Social conservatives of all denominations from the West are welcome partners.
This alliance with the Western Christian right constitutes a real innovation in the context of rampant Orthodox anti-ecumenism. The strong message of political support that is sent out by church leaders who attend the WCF cannot be underestimated: just consider that Patriarch Ilia of Georgia, who merely conceded an airport meeting to Pope Francis on his visit to Georgia in 2016, made a personal appearance at the WCF summit in Tbilisi, and that Patriarch Kirill of Moscow announced that he would attend the congress in Chisinau in September 2018. If he will make true on this promise, he will also send a message to the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate of Bucharest, which competes with Moscow over canonical jurisdiction in Moldova.
The WCF is a social conservative caravan of always the same people and topics that tours different cities: Prague 1997, Geneva 1999, Mexico City 2004, Warsaw 2007, Amsterdam 2009, Madrid 2012, Sydney 2013, Moscow 2014, Salt Lake City 2015, Tbilisi 2016, Budapest 2017, and Chisinau 2018. The congresses in Eastern Europe, at least those I have followed more closely, have always served a dual purpose of launching a political message and of boosting local civil society activism. Pro-life groups from all over the former Soviet Union had been invited to Tbilisi in 2016, some of them visibly at their first experience of presenting their work in English in front of an international audience. The Budapest WCF featured a family street festival. To local activists, WCF offers a global narrative for concrete grievances (for example high abortion rates) and a promise of influence. It is the ideological alternative to the progressive and liberal civil society that already exists in their countries and that is faced with increasing pressure (the campaign against George Soros in Hungary or restrictive NGO-legislation in Russia). The illiberal civil society promoted by the WCF and its local sponsors retains some of the attractive features of the progressive program – internationality, predominance of English language, the opportunity to access funds and obtain travel grants – but at the same time is it politically conformist, ideologically ‘safe’ in an illiberal, repressive political environment and it appeals to people’s religious feelings.
The WCF acts as transnational norm entrepreneur, much of the same kind as norm protagonists described in the beginning of this paper, only that it is illiberal and conservative, not liberal and progressive. It contributes to the rise of illiberal civil society in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It also makes its influence felt in Western Europe, with actors from the Christian Right, who are a minority in their home countries, finding large audiences. It is an open question whether this development will lead to a European scenario of protracted but ultimately stable liberal-conservative culture wars as we know them from the United States, or whether this development has the potential to become fundamentally destructive for EU integration and liberal democracy on the long run.
Recommendations for action[9]
In light of the challenge posed by the WCF and the rise of illiberal organizations across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union there are two recommendations that may be helpful for the international community to explore. These are:
The creation of fora where representatives of liberal and illiberal civil society may engage in dialogue. This will represent a departure from the current situation where liberal and illiberal civil society exists in entirely autonomous conditions. Increased dialogue may help to stem the increasing polarization that has affected democracies in both East and West with the rise of populism.
Improving communication on EU non-discrimination policies that are perceived in many Eastern European countries as a threat to traditional values held by the majority of the Eastern populations.
About the author: Kristina Stoeckl is Associate professor and leader of the ERC funded research project Postsecular Conflicts (https://www.uibk.ac.at/projects/postsecular-conflicts/) at the University of Innsbruck and writes about the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in transnational norm mobilization.
[1] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998).
[2] Christian NewsWire, "Jacobs Finds Support for International Pro-Family and Pro-Life Movement in Moscow," Christian News Wire 13 December 2010: http://www.christiannewswire.com/news/4302615709.html.
[3] International Organization for the Family website: https://www.profam.org/mission/[4] St Basil the Great Foundation website: http://fondsvv.ru/about/[5] St Andrew Foundation website: http://www.st-andrew-foundation.org/about-found/[6] Iakob Gogebashvili School website http://www.kiketischool.ge/?lan=en&p=Njg. For a good background article about Levan Vasadze that is still relevant today, see: Davit Batashvili, "A Political Project," Tabula, December 2013: http://www.tabula.ge/en/story/78568-a-political-project[7] For a good report of the Tbilisi event, see: Masha Gessen, "Family Values. Mapping the Spread of Antigay Ideology," Harper's Magazine, March-issue (2017): https://harpers.org/archive/2017/03/family-values-3/[8] Levan Vasadze, "About Post-Communist Economies," Visegrad Post, no. 7 January 2018: https://visegradpost.com/en/2018/01/07/about-post-communist-economies-by-levan-vasadze-georgian-entrepreneur/[9] The author wishes to thank Caroline Hill for input on the recommendations.
[post_title] => Transnational norm mobilization: The World Congress of Families in Georgia and Moldova
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[post_content] => The UK’s departure from the European Union (EU) in 2019 will provide an opportunity for the country to re-define its foreign policy. This opportunity is greatest in regions where the UK can now conduct its foreign policy outside the EU. One such region is the Western Balkans, the six Southeast European states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) that remain outside the EU, but which are included in the EU’s Enlargement policy.
So what could post-Brexit British policy towards the Western Balkans look like? What priorities and objectives could shape the UK’s approach to the region from 2019? Here I discuss several factors that can influence that debate, such as the commercial and strategic importance of the region, as well as historical links and legacies.
Commercially, the Western Balkans is not very important for the UK. The region is in the southeast corner of Europe, encircled by EU member states, and does not share a border (maritime or land) with the UK. The countries and markets are small, not fully integrated with each other, and do not provide a major commercial opportunity for the UK.[1] As a result, investing additional resources to strengthen commercial ties to the region is unlikely to lead to significant returns for the UK. In addition, these economies are to a great extent already integrating with the EU and within the next decade are likely to become EU members. Therefore, ultimately, they will fall under the UK’s new external trade and commercial policies with the EU. Drafting a short-term separate external trade and commercial policies towards the Western Balkans will not be an efficient use of British diplomatic resources.
Strategically, the region is also of limited importance to the UK. Although security concerns are typically raised in arguments favouring greater involvement with the Balkans, once the UK is outside the EU this argument will partly lose its force. While the Balkans remain important for European security and stability, as the 2015 migration crisis demonstrated when thousands of refugees from the Middle East arrived in the EU through the Western Balkans route, for the national security of the UK this is at best an indirect threat. To the extent that the UK remains invested in European security post-Brexit, mostly through NATO structures, the region will retain some strategic importance, but with the entire European continent between itself and the Western Balkans, the UK will not be directly affected by security developments in that region.
Finally, unlike some other regions, such as the Commonwealth countries, the UK does not have strong historical and cultural ties with the Western Balkans. Although the population in the region is increasingly fluent in English, and aspects of British culture and education have become well accepted, UK’s cultural links to many of these countries are weak. Even as the Western Balkans societies over the past decade have become closer to the EU, thanks to increased mobility since the Schengen visa restrictions were lifted in 2010, this has not extended to the UK, which maintains a strict (and expensive) visa regime to the countries in this region, which is unlikely to be relaxed after Brexit. Consequently, the Western Balkans diaspora in the UK is small[2] and not very influential.
By and large, due to its small size and the limited strategic and commercial importance to the UK, the Western Balkans countries are unlikely to become a significant priority in British foreign policy after Brexit. Limited diplomatic resources in the UK are likely to be applied elsewhere, to issues and regions perceived to be of higher importance.
This is not to argue that the UK should disengage and de-prioritise this region from 2019. After all, there are several important legacies of British foreign policy in the region worth safeguarding and building upon. First, the UK, together with other global actors, has been actively involved in the rebuilding and reconciliation projects in the former Yugoslav states after the conflicts of the 1990s. This UK was directly involved in negotiating and rebuilding peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, which remain critical to regional stability and peace. Over the past almost thirty years, the UK has developed strong diplomatic and civil society networks with local and regional organisations in the Balkans as well as among the political elite and influencers. It should continue to use these networks and exercise its influence to further strengthen the stability and regional cooperation in the region. The UK should continue to work with the EU and other governments and international organisations in the region to support the continuing peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts there.
In the Balkans, the British legacy of the past couple of decades is worth preserving and expanding. This is particularly important in the context of developing a value-based foreign policy. Since the UK’s clout in the international arena is not anchored in commercial or military power, nor driven by large resource reserves, its foreign policy is largely rooted in promoting liberal and democratic values. As the UK seeks to carve out a distinct profile and role in the international arena after its exit from the EU, championing key values, such as human rights and good governance or the rule of law, can provide it with a foundation for its future foreign policy doctrine.
Second, continued albeit limited, engagement with the Western Balkans will provide the UK an opportunity to remain involved in Europe and European affairs beyond the EU. The government has often repeated claims that leaving the EU does not mean that Britain will leave Europe, but it will remain invested in European security, cooperation , nd prosperity. The Western Balkans is one area where these claims could be successfully tested, especially given the footprint that British diplomacy already has in the region.
Of course, the Western Balkans’ countries key foreign policy priority is EU membership, so this may complicate their relationship with the UK in future. While the UK remains supportive of their accession into the EU, it may see a declining willingness by countries in the region to engage on a bilateral basis. With limited diplomatic resources available, governments in the region may well choose to focus them elsewhere – probably in Brussels or Berlin – where their impact on achieving strategic goals would be higher.
Nonetheless, to the extent that British priorities for the Western Balkans coincide with those of the EU, the UK can have a significant voice in the region. In particular, in areas such as rule of law or judicial reforms, where the UK has a long track record of assisting governments in the region, the UK can work alongside the EU in helping governments in the region to improve governance standards.
While the Western Balkans is unlikely to become a major foreign policy priority for the UK government after Brexit, it has the potential to be a place where an independent British foreign policy can be tested and developed. Given the positive legacies of British involvement in the region in the past two decades, and the largely overlapping priority areas towards the region with the EU, the UK can continue to play a positive and significant role there, without the need for significant increase of diplomatic and technical resources.
Cvete Koneska is a Senior Analyst-Europe at Control Risks.
[1] See figures from the Office for National Statistics on trade relationship between the UK and Western Balkans states. https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/internationaltrade/articles/whodoestheuktradewith/2017-02-21[2] See data from the Office for National Statistics, with the total of WB6 population in the UK amounting to around 75,000 in 2017 (around 60,000 from Albania and Kosovo). https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationalityunderlyingdatasheets
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[post_content] => The old issue of Greek-Turkish animosity has resurfaced as the last addition to the series of problems that has inflicted damage to the southern flank of NATO. Just within the span of a week in mid-April, Greek soldiers opened fire on a Turkish helicopter, a Greek fighter jet crashed into the Aegean on its return from one of the mock dog fights with Turkish warplanes, it was reported that Prime Minister Tsipras’ helicopter was harassed by Turkish aircraft and Ankara claimed to have removed a Greek flag planted on an uninhibited islet in the Aegean.[1]
Based on news reports from both sides, things are appearing to spiral out of control fast. What are the root causes of these tensions and what can we expect in the near future?
A History of Animosity
Conflict between Greece and Turkey is nothing new. The two countries fought their independence wars against each other and formed their national identities against one another. Greece seceded from the Ottoman Empire in 1830 and the Turkish Republic was founded after the Greek army was defeated in Asia Minor in 1922. The Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923 by the Allies of the First World War, set the borders of Modern Turkey and has been the main text that has regulated Greek-Turkish relations since then.
Historical animosities, however, were hardly resolved by the peace treaty. Over the years, the perceptions of the enemy was stereotyped and perpetuated in both countries through education, historiography and literary texts.[2] Past conflicts were compounded by the experience of ongoing intercommunal conflicts. In September 1955, the Greek minority of Istanbul was attacked, killing tens of people, damaging millions of dollars’ worth of property and leading thousands of Greeks to flee.[3] Both countries still blame each other for the mistreatment of their minorities and not recognizing their rights. On the island of Cyprus, where the two communities lived together, civil strife dragged on for decades until the Turkish forces' de facto partition of the island in 1974.[4] The dispute over Cyprus, as well as memories of the bitter war that has left thousands of deaths and many more displaced in its wake, continues to casts a shadow over bilateral relations.
Among all of the issues that afflict relations, however, the main problem today is the Aegean –a unique, relatively narrow, semi-closed sea separating the mainlands of both countries. The Aegean has around 3000 islands, islets and rocks scattered around, with no explicit ownership of the smaller formations given to either county in international treaties. Since the 1970s, the two sides have had disputes over the extent of territorial waters, continental shelves, national airspaces and the Flight Information Region (FIR), as well as the militarization of the Greek islands on the Eastern Aegean. Ankara claims that Greece is trying to turn the Aegean into a Greek lake, whereas Athens argues that Turkey violates Greek sovereignty.[5]
The disputes over the Aegean could have been easily solved through diplomatic channels. Indeed, the two countries have shown that with appropriate political leadership and mutual will, it is possible to reduce dissent. After the 1922 war, for instance, there was a period of relative calm in the 1930s. Similarly, only three years after Greece and Turkey came close to armed combat over the uninhabited small islets of Imia/Kardak, there was a period of rapprochement, with increased levels of diplomatic, as well as economic and social interactions.[6] Despite high hopes, the last episode of rapprochement failed in resolving the Aegean dispute or even putting it on the back burner for the long-term, as the current escalation of tensions clearly demonstrate.
The Current Imbroglio
Given the historical hostility of the two countries, the current crisis is perhaps not unusual. Yet, it has been still surprising in some respects. First, it has occurred after nearly two decades of comparative tranquillity. Sure, the two countries had continued to show their teeth, especially through dog fights between aircrafts and sometimes with fatal accidents,[7] but these had not led to continuous vicious circles of discord as we are witnessing today. Second, both countries should have been ‘busy’ with other priorities –Athens, with the continuing economic crisis, and Ankara, with the Syrian war and the Kurdish conflict.
Although pinpointing the start of the current rise of tensions is difficult, one of the first signs of the upcoming set of events was the fleeing of eight air force pilots to Greece following the 15 July 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey. In January 2017, the Greek Supreme Court decided against the extradition of the soldiers. President Erdoğan remarked that bilateral relations and confidence between the two countries would be damaged with this decision, mentioning that Prime Minister Tsipras had personally promised the repatriation of the soldiers.[8] To the dismay of the Turkish side, later in the year, one of the pilots was granted asylum by a committee of judges and experts.[9]
This was, in fact, one of the many issues that President Erdoğan had brought up in his visit to Athens prior to the committee’s decision. While the Greek side was expecting the first visit of a Turkish President after 65 years to be an opportunity to mend ties, Erdoğan astonished government officials with his rebukes. Aside from the fate of the soldiers, he claimed that the Lausanne Treaty should be reconsidered, accused Greece of mistreating the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace and blamed the Greek side for the failure of peace talks in Cyprus.[10] A few months later, in what appeared to be a case of retaliation for the eight pilots, Turkish forces arrested two Greek soldiers who claimed to have accidently crossed the border in bad weather. The soldiers were arrested and charged with espionage.[11]
In the meantime, confrontations both in the Aegean Sea and air have significantly escalated. In July 2017, a Turkish vessel was shot at by the Greek coastal guard,[12] and in February 2018, two patrol boats collided near the Imia/Kardak islets,[13] setting the stage for the unusual week in mid-April. With the leaders of both countries persistent in making declarations that do not calm nerves down, there seems to be no quick de-escalation in sight.
Why Now?
It is clear that, despite historic animosity and many clashes before, relations have not been this much strained for this long. Since the Aegean dispute is hardly new, the main reasons for the recent entanglement must be sought in the changing domestic and regional context. Both Greece and Turkey have nationalistic political cultures. Historical animosities are easy to tap into whenever the approval of governments must be increased for domestic purposes. With the next general elections scheduled for June in Turkey and next year in Greece, politicians in Athens and Ankara can expect to achieve personal gain from escalating tensions.
Additionally, on the Turkish side, the 15 July 2016 coup attempt changed both domestic politics and foreign relations in fundamental ways. According to the Turkish government, the coup itself was masterminded by Fethullah Gülen, a preacher residing in Pennsylvania. The US has refused to extradite Gülen, leaving bilateral relations between the NATO allies in disarray. In fact, Turkey has been in a series of rows with other European powers and losing the battle in persuading the West that Gülen himself was behind the coup.[14] Many Gülen affiliates still reside in the West and, without the cooperation of foreign powers, it would be impossible to secure the return of these people and their trial. This is why Ankara is insistent on the return of the eight pilots who fled to Greece. Their extradition can be instrumentalized for the domestic audience as an achievement and can force the hands of other countries in especially South East Europe to agree on the return of other Gülen affiliates.[15] Thus, the issue of the repatriation of eight soldiers is a sine qua non for the de-escalation of the imbroglio from Ankara’s point of view. Athens, however, maintains that this is a judicial matter out of the authority of the elected government.
Despite holding democratic principles on this matter, the SYRIZA-ANEL government is also partly responsible for the current state of affairs. The smaller partner of the coalition, the right-wing ANEL, holds 9 seats in the 300-seat parliament, barely above the 3% threshold. The ultra-nationalist leader of party, Panos Kammenos, is also the Minister of National Defence, who has personally taken a tough stance against Turkey contributing to the rise in hostilities. When Kammenos received his ministerial post in January 2016, his first act was to visit Imia/Kardak, drop a wreath in memory of the soldiers who died in the 1996 incident and remind everyone that the dispute still continued.[16] In February 2017, Kammenos threatened that if the Turkish Foreign Minister set foot on Imia/Kardak he would “be dealt with” and more recently, implied that there was no way to speak with President Erdoğan because he was “crazy” and acted like a “sultan”.[17] These types of personal outbursts of the Minister are not helping in easing tensions.
In past crises, hostilities would be brought down with the intervention of the US, warning both NATO allies and mediating between the parties. This was how the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis was prevented from turning into a prolonged battle. But, this option is not available at the moment. Turkey’s relations with the US are already strained because of the failed coup and the two are on the opposing sides in the bigger crisis of the region, namely the Syrian War. NATO itself is in disorder after the comments of the American administration regarding differences in defence spending among the allies. The dissent within NATO and the so-far disinterest shown by the American administration over the Aegean conflict, as well as the lack of another alternative intermediator, explain why now things are spiralling out of control in contrast to previous crises.
Conclusion: Future Prospects
Turkey and Greece have never fought an actual war since the 1920s. We can expect hostilities to continue for some time but fall short of an actual war. Both sides should be perfectly aware that any type of aggression on the mainland of the enemy would result in thousands of deaths and the possible involvement of other NATO allies. A disaster of this sort is something both sides would want to avoid.
The worst case scenario for Greece and Turkey is the possibility of almost continuous, small-scale military operations especially on and around the Aegean islets. Such military operations might lead to limited combats, with military and even civilian casualties on both sides. An ‘accident’” could lead to more serious battles unless political leadership on both sides of the Aegean make a conscious effort to ease off their rhetoric both diplomatically and publically.
Dr Yaprak Gürsoy is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Aston University. She would like to thank Othon Anastasakis, Evangelos Liaras and İlke Toygur for fruitful discussions on the recent developments in the Aegean.
[1] “Greek Fighter Pilot Killed in Crash”, TRTWorld, 12 April 2018, https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/greek-fighter-pilot-killed-in-crash-16678 ; “Turkish Fighter Jets Harass Tsipras's Helicopter”, Ekathimerini, 17 April 2018, http://www.ekathimerini.com/227758/article/ekathimerini/news/turkish-fighter-jets-harass-tsiprass-helicopter; “Turkey Warns Greece After Hoisting of Flag on Aegean Islet”, Reuters, 16 April 2018, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-greece/turkey-warns-greece-after-hoisting-of-flag-on-aegean-islet-idUKKBN1HN2BX.
[2] Hercules Millas, “National Perception of the ‘Other’ and the Persistence of Some Images” in Mustafa Aydin and Kostas Ifantis eds., pp. 53-66, Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean (London: Routledge, 2005).
[3] Dilek Güven, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları Bağlamında 6-7 Eylül Olayları (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2005).
[4] James Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem: What Ever yone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
[5]For the claims of both countries, see, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Issue of Greek-Turkish Relations”, https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/, and Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkish-Greek Relations/Aegean Problems, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?deb1dc4c-926f-45bd-9a7c-27b45654c0e4.
[6] Leonidas Karakatsanis, Turkish-Greek Relations: Rapprochement, Civil Society and the Politics of Friendship (Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2014).
[7] See, for instance, “Mid-air Fighter Plane Collision Risks New Greek-Turkish Crisis”, The Guardian, 24 May 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/may/24/turkey.topstories3.
[8] “Erdogan Expresses Anger over Turkish Officers, Suggests Tsipras promised their return”, Ekathimerini, 27 January 2018, http://www.ekathimerini.com/215665/article/ekathimerini/news/erdogan-expresses-anger-over-turkish-officers-suggests-tsipras-promised-their-return.
[9] “One of Eight Turkish servicemen Granted Asylum by Greece”, Ekathimerini, 30 December 2017, http://www.ekathimerini.com/224544/article/ekathimerini/news/one-of-eight-turkish-servicemen-granted-asylum-by-greece.
[10] “Confrontational Erdoğan Stuns Greek Hosts on Athens Visit”, The Guardian, 07 December 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/07/turkish-president-erdogan-to-make-landmark-visit-to-greece.
[11] “Turkey Refuses to Release Greek Border Guards in Spy Row”, The Guardian, 05 March 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/05/turkey-refuses-to-release-greek-border-guards-in-spy-row.
[12] “Greek Coast Guards Fire on Turkish Vessel in Aegean”, The Telegraph, 03 July 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/03/greek-coast-guards-fire-turkish-vessel-aegean/.
[13] “Greece Protests to Turkey over Boat Incident, Ankara Denies Fault”, Reuters, 13 February 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-turkey/greece-protests-to-turkey-over-boat-incident-ankara-denies-fault-idUSKCN1FX2AO.
[14] The German intelligence agency, for instance, was not “convinced” that Gülen was behind the attempt. See, “Coup in Turkey Was Just a Welcome Pretext”, Der Spiegel, 20 March 2017, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-intelligence-chief-bruno-kahl-interview-a-1139602.html.
[15] “Gulen Schools Fight Provokes New Tensions in Bosnia”, Balkan Insight, 26 July 2016, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/gulen-schools-fight-provokes-new-tensions-in-bosnia-07-26-2016; “Turkey Presses Albania To Extradite Key 'Gulenist' Suspect”, Balkan Insight, 13 October 2017, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-to-face-turkish-request-to-extradite-gulen-supporter-10-13-2017; “Kosovo Parliament to Probe Arrests of Turkish Nationals”, Reuters, 04 April 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-turkey-security/kosovo-parliament-to-probe-arrests-of-turkish-nationals-idUSKCN1HB2VH, “Turkey Presses Albania To Extradite Key 'Gulenist' Suspect”, Balkan Insight, 13 October 2017, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-to-face-turkish-request-to-extradite-gulen-supporter-10-13-2017.
[16] “New Greek Nationalist Defence Minister Resurrects Old Tensions with Turkey”, The Guardian, 30 January 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/30/greece-turkey-imia-kardak-tensions-fighter-jets.
[17] “Kammenos Threatens Turkey: Don’t Step Foot on Greek Islands”, The National Herald, 27 February 2017, https://www.thenationalherald.com/152186/kammenos-threatens-turkey-dont-step-foot-greek-islands/; “Erdogan ‘Has Gone Completely Crazy’ says Kammenos”, Ekathimerini, 03 April 2018, http://www.ekathimerini.com/227339/article/ekathimerini/news/erdogan-has-gone-completely-crazy-says-kammenos.
[post_title] => The recent crisis between Greece and Turkey: Two NATO allies on the brink of war, again
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This collection of essays has sought to provide a platform for a range of different views about some of the most challenging debates in human rights and peace building. It…
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The terrorist threat in Central Asia needs to be taken seriously and demands broader engagement in the region. However, as the article illustrates, in Central Asia the ‘threat’ has often been manipulated and exaggerated by state actors to pursue strategic domestic policies and increase regime’s legitimacy. We need to reflect more in-depth on the contested and political nature of terrorism in Central Asia.
[1] International Crisis Group, Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia, January 2015, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/syria-calling-radicalisation-central-asia
[2] David Gauthier-Villars and Drew Hinshaw, Stockholm Attack Puts Focus on Terrorists From Central Asia, Wall Street Journal, April 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/stockholm-attack-puts-focus-on-terrorists-from-central-asia-1491764083 and BBC, New York truck attack: Sayfullo Saipov pleads not guilty, November 2017, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-42161549?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/cggpe1p9dwqt/new-york-truck-attack&link_location=live-reporting-story
[3] Daniil Turovsky, How Isis is recruiting migrant workers in Moscow to join the fighting in Syria, Guardian, May 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/isis-russia-syria-islamic-extremism
[4] Noah Tucker, What Happens When Your Town Becomes an ISIS Recruiting Ground?, Central Asia Program, July 2018, http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Tucker-CAP-Paper-July-2018.pdf
[5] Arne Seifert, The problems of Central Asian migration to Russia, January 2018, https://doc-research.org/2018/01/the-problems-of-central-asian-migration-to-russia/
[6] John Heathershaw and David W Montgomery, The Myth of Post-Soviet Muslim Radicalization in the Central Asian Republics, Chatham House, November 2014, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/myth-post-soviet-muslim-radicalization-central-asian-republics
[7] Olivier Roy, Who are the new jihadis?, The Guardian, April 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/apr/13/who-are-the-new-jihadis
[8] Eurasianet, Kazakhstan: Court Dubs Opposition Movement Extremist, March 2013, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-court-dubs-opposition-movement-extremist
[9] For more on the Central Asian Political Exiles Database see here: https://excas.net/projects/political-exiles/
[10] United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 – Kazakhstan, July 2017, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e43413.html
[11] The Global Terrorism Database (START) https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
[12] Based on author’s own calculation
[post_title] => The state of Islamic threat in Central Asia: assessing the threat of terrorism from Central Asia
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[post_content] => This report finds that recent changes in EU border management have limited refugees’ movement across Europe, and as such, have resulted in outsourcing of refugee settlement and care to states previously described as ‘transit’ countries along the Balkan Route(s): Serbia, Greece and Bosnia. This report analyses the problems related to refugee provisions and accommodation in these countries and along the Balkan Route(s) towards Western Europe. It highlights the disparity of refugee services, housing and living conditions across the region, and acute and ongoing humanitarian crises. The report discusses the key factors affecting poor living conditions for refugees, including: overcrowding, fragmentation of services along the routes, and a lack of consistency in camp management. Subsequently, the report discusses a range of other refugee housing options existing in transit countries - including informal and makeshift camps, squats, hotels and UN-supported housing schemes known as ‘urban shelters’ - and notes the strengths and weaknesses of each. The findings are based on the authors’ field research in Serbia, mainland Greece and the islands of Lesvos, Samos, Chios and Kos, between 2017 and 2019.
A number of key conclusions can be drawn from the report:
(1) Population size and levels of overcrowding are one of the fundamental factors affecting provisions and quality of life in all types of refugee housing. Mainland camps and informal housing provision such as squats, are able to control the number of residents they have whereas island reception centres have far less control.
(2) Relationships between camps, reception centres and third sector provision plays a key role in determining access to healthcare, sanitation, psycho-social support and community spaces and whether these are provided inside or outside of accommodation spaces.
(3) Lack of clarity and transparency surrounding asylum procedures leads to increased anxiety about the process.
(4) Different forms of housing support are dependent on individual circumstances; however, provision lacks flexibility, particularly surrounding vulnerable cases where a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not suitable.
(5) Refugees are driven towards informal housing such as squats and makeshift settlements for two main reasons: poor camp conditions or overcrowding, and uncertainty over the asylum process, including long waits for asylum interviews in Greece.
(6) There is a lack of formal support for people living in informal accommodation, particularly healthcare, food and sanitation.
The report makes a number of recommendations for policy change:
(1) The urgent need to manage the numbers of people living in the island reception centres, by increasing the number of transfers to mainland Greece or elsewhere in Europe; and improving mainland living conditions and provision.
(2) The need for greater transparency and increased dialogue between some reception centres and third sector provision.
(3) Urgent increase in capacity to process asylum registrations in Greece and thus reduce current waiting times and overcrowding in reception centres. More, and better quality of information provided to refugees in the early stages of the asylum process, about each stage, predicted waiting times and what each stage means; to reduce anxiety for people living in reception centres.
(4) Greater flexibility is required in the provision of housing, especially for vulnerable cases where the needs of individuals differ greatly. To achieve this greater resource is required.
(5) Increased funding and support for the UN ‘Urban Shelter’ scheme which transfers refugees from camps and settles them in apartments. Increased capacity of non-camp housing, and creation of incentives for local authorities reluctant to cooperate with the scheme.
Introduction
This report focuses on refugee housing and welfare provision along the key hotspots along the Balkan Route(s). The report draws on field research[1] carried out between 2017 and 2019 in:
For example, on the island of Samos, there are currently (January 2019) over 4000 refugees accommodated in Vathy RIC with an official capacity of 700 and an overflow space referred to as ‘The Jungle’. Similarly, on Lesvos Moria RIC which has its own overflow space, ‘The Olive Grove’. In July 2017, the population of the RIC plus the ‘Olive Grove’ was approximately 7467 individuals, rising to 9000 in 2018 (New York Times, 2018). In January 2019 a single tent, housing 50 individuals, burnt down. While no one was killed in this incident it did reveal the unsuitable nature of the ad hoc shelters resulting from overcrowding (AYS Daily Digest 2019).
Third Sector Provision/Support
The support offered by the third sector differs between the various areas investigated, as does the relationships between camp or reception centre officials, local and national government, and third sector providers. For instance, MSF had a strong presence on Lesvos and Chios. In November 2018 they undertook a vaccination program for all children in the RICs. However, their involvement on Samos is limited as they are unable to carry out these programmes inside the RIC. Whilst the vaccination programme will go ahead it happens outside of the RIC on Samos. Their lack of access to the RIC limits them to working with and supporting volunteer networks and providing funding to smaller grassroots NGOs.
The variations in service availability and quality is evident when comparing Lesvos and Samos. There are more than 40 NGOs working on Lesvos to support the refugee population with some having access to Moria RIC and others working in the neighbouring town of Mytilene and with nearby Kera Tepe and Pikpa camps. Conversely, on Samos, there were until recently fewer than 10 registered NGOs. Against a backdrop of a rapid increase in the size of the refugee population on Samos and a clear need for additional support for provision of basic needs and services (i.e. access to toilets, medical attention, laundry and legal support) this number is increasing. For example, between 2 January – 24 January 2019 the NGO Refugees 4 Refugees set up a distribution centre for women and children while Attika Human Support began distributing clothing to men.
Similar variations in NGOs’ access to official camps exist across the Balkan Route(s). Two official reception centres in the vicinity of Belgrade have completely different arrangements with NGOs. Whilst the Krnjaca Reception Centre hosts multiple local and international NGOs providing a range of services, the Obrenovac Reception Centre with a much larger population, allows access to far fewer NGOs. Authorities claim that access is controlled so as to avoid duplication of services. However, NGOs do also act as watchdogs of camp conditions. Across the region, there is evidence that third party access seems to be more restricted in camps known for poorer conditions.
NGOs need to remain flexible and responsive to changing needs. NGO Samos Volunteers, for instance, is facing over-crowding in its social centre and their basic English language classes have waiting lists. They are not granted access to the RIC. They support the refugee population within ‘The Jungle’. Interviews with Reception and Identification Service officials suggest the reticence for a strong working relationship with NGOs is to ensure that the refugee population are not provided with false hopes from the NGO/volunteer sector about the asylum process. Yet this message is not consistent with those of refugee camps in Athens, for example, which rely on NGO support to deliver mother and baby spaces, community centres, sewing rooms and English lessons.
NGO and support networks are in constant flux, partly as they rely on volunteers. For instance, in July 2018, the voluntary support network on Kos had disintegrated. In January 2019, a number of NGOs including groups from Chios, Lesvos and even further afield in Calais, have put out calls for additional volunteers, since refugees continue to arrive but organisations tend to be understaffed in winter and spring, with most volunteers arriving in the summer.
Population Size
There are significant differences in living conditions in overcrowded camps, as compared to those functioning at or below capacity. Skaramagas, a refugee camp just outside Athens, and the Krnjaca centre in Serbia are seen by residents and NGOs as ‘better’ than many other camps. In Skaramagas, the containers used for the accommodation have heating and air conditioning and the camp offers a range of support and activities, such as mother and baby sessions. The residents are also able to build chicken coops and sell eggs in the camp. The camp has a population of 2000 with around half being under 18. Similarly, the Krnjaca centre outside Belgrade hosted 300 people in 2018, though it has capacity for around 1000 people. This allows minimum camp standards to be met, services not to be overloaded and stretched, and staff to get know most of the residents personally and respond to issues in a timely and more informed manner. The lower populations of camps in Serbia and mainland Greece are often the result of border management policies which mean that fewer people are managing to leave the islands (whilst arrivals continue) and move northwards, as well as through constant changes in the route. The Krnjaca camp ‘emptied’ as the route moved towards Bosnia. Whilst the Krnjaca camp is under capacity, several thousand people are now living in makeshift camps in Bosnia, particularly around the Croatian border.
RECOMMENDATION: Alleviate overcrowding of island camps by increasing transfers to the mainland. Improve all camp conditions to ensure that minimum standards can be met.
The limited continuity of provision and availability of information between geographical regions
Management of refugee camps and reception centres
One of the most significant factors in camp conditions is management. There is a multitude of actors involved: including the military, private sector companies and municipalities, with overall responsibility for camps as a system delegated to relevant national Ministries. The Moria reception centre is run by the First Reception and Identification Services and the Ministry of Migration Policy. The nearby, Kara Tepe, is a refugee camp housing women, children, and vulnerable people, and is run by the Municipality of Lesvos. Pikpa, a ‘community-based space’, is organised by Lesvos Solidarity and offers an alternative to RIC’s and refugee camps. It is built on the principles of solidarity, empowerment and active participation and provides a variety of activities for residents. Both Pikpa and Kera Tepe are widely thought to offer superior forms of accommodation and support in comparison to the far more overcrowded Moria.
Who runs the camp has a direct impact on the lines of communication within the structure itself. Interviews with RIC officials discussed the confusion of the population surrounding their roles: they manage and are the outward facing representative, of the reception centre, but are also viewed by residents as representing the Asylum Services and the Ministry of Migration. Yet they are unable to communicate the decisions of these bodies and have little impact on them. Consequently, there is confusion on the part of the refugee population stemming from inconsistent information, case scheduling and outcomes, the awarding of open cards, and the cancelling of meetings. This in turn, has contributed to a lack of transparency and accountability within the spaces governed by First Reception.
Limited Lines of Communication
There is a lack of effective and efficient communication within and between governing bodies themselves, between governing bodies and NGOs, as well as NGOs and the wider third sector, and, importantly, to the refugee population, particularly on the islands of Lesvos Chios and Samos. This has consequences for the delivery of refugee support.
Refugees are in a precarious position when waiting for a decision to be reached about their ‘open card’ (document allowing travel off of the island hot spots). In the first instance they are informed that their papers are ineligible for renewal. This means one of two things, a rejection or an open card. The time period for confirmation is variable and generates a high level of uncertainty and fear for those awaiting a decision. A quicker process and clearer information would reduce anxiety.
Once an individual is given an open card, there are also concerns about what happens next. Whilst NGO’s such as refugee.info provide certain amounts of information to populations, they are often underserved by UNHCR and First Reception with regards to information sharing. The time and location of the transfer from the RICs are provided but little else. Refugees rely on social media and formal and informal online resources to learn details of their next location.
There is a heavy reliance on rumours and often unreliable information, compounded by inconsistencies in rules of accommodation in different regions. People given a space in mainland Greek camps lose the space if absent for twenty four hours or more. This is less the case in Serbia where it appears that camp residents do not lose their allocated place due to absence (usually attempts to cross borders) even though rules stipulate this should be done. This is again due to under-capacity, but does have a stabilising effect in that refugees are not left destitute and in a precarious situation once they fail to cross borders and return to Serbia.
Unaccompanied minors
A lack of consistent information has a particular effect on unaccompanied minors (UAM), who grow accustomed to the independence of the RICs. Unaccompanied minors leaving the Aegean Islands are given limited information about the next stages of their journey, other than from third sector organisations. As a result many find themselves leaving the NGO support network of the islands and entering major cities of Athens or Thessaloniki with a limited support package in place. Housing provision for UAMs on the mainland relies on a UNHCR system of shelters and apartments run on the ground by a number of different organisations including Caritas and Praksis; partially funded by the European Union. The influence of multiple organisations means that UAMs often fall through the gaps of a heavily bureaucratic system finding themselves, as interviews suggest, struggling with drugs, prostitution and crime. As of December 2018 there were 552 unaccompanied minors reported as homeless in Greece and a further 203 with no reported location, this is a large percentage of 3741 currently known to be in Greece (EKKA, 2018).
In contrast, in Serbia, UAMs have more stable and regular access to a dedicated social worker than in Greece, even when they arrive into Serbia ‘irregularly’. For instance, the NGO network in Belgrade is able to quickly identify and meet UAMs soon after they arrive, and refer them to social workers contracted specifically for UAM protection, who then see them through the registration ad settlement into a centre. Again, the system works better than in Greece due to smaller numbers but even so, there are gaps in UAM protection (particularly outside of ‘office hours’) and each social worker has a high case load.
RECOMMENDATION: Clearer information provided to those seeking asylum. A transparent system for how to communicate and ask for support from officials to better understand the process.
Squats, informal housing, and makeshift camps
Large numbers of refugees have ended up in informal housing and makeshift camps. Reasons include, but are not limited to: poor camp conditions, difficulty accessing camps, not wishing to register in a transit country, or transiting a country without a functional or adequate camp infrastructure (currently, Bosnia, but also Serbia and Greece in 2015).
Informal housing includes squats (occupied or repurposed derelict buildings, often supported by grassroots networks) and makeshift camps and ‘tent cities’ often along country borders. Informal housing sets up more quickly than formal camps or other NGO initiatives, all of which are subject to multiple levels of regulation and governance. Most makeshift camps and settlements have no facilities and rely on volunteers for basic services, but in some cases, local authorities indirectly support them through a lack of intervention or providing additional services such as waste disposal.
Informal housing allows a degree of flexibility, but there are limitations. Despite some informal housing being relatively well established and tolerated by the authorities particularly in Athens, some services (healthcare, tax) do not accept squat addresses as a ‘proper’ address for registration and access to that service. Residents of squats also have no access to services that refugees would normally have when they are registered with the asylum service, such as financial support for food. Conditions in squats vary but many urban squats have sewage, heating or structural problems, and rely on volunteers or residents with carpentry or plumbing skills to resolve them.
Photo ‘Informal Housing’ here, caption: Informal refugee housing (squat) in central Athens.
Makeshift camps often form out of necessity, but are inadequate. Multiple makeshift camps have formed along the Balkan Route(s) as the route shifted – Idomeni in Greece, camps along the Serbia-Hungary border, and more recently, along the Bosnia-Croatia border. The makeshift camps generally have no running water or electricity, nor adequate shelter, food, waste disposal or facilities of any kind other than aid provided by small volunteer groups – local and national governments tend to discourage aid provision on these sites as they claim it creates a ‘pull factor’. Multiple problems exist: smugglers can sometimes ‘seize’ a makeshift camp, or a part of it, and ‘rent’ it out to refugees. Poor or non-existent infrastructure make it difficult for volunteers to provide services such as hot food, and individuals helping near the sites are criminalised or penalised by local authorities.
Makeshift camps and ad hoc informal support (whether organised by refugees themselves or aid providers) are vulnerable as they are ‘unregulated’ or informal. Authorities can invoke any number of regulations to shut them down: evictions, sanitation inspections, or ad hoc restrictions on volunteers. Restrictions on aid near informal sites are also linked to EU funding: for local authorities in transit countries, funding is channelled primarily to camps, border management and the formal sector, meaning that thousands of refugees living informally outside of it, are entirely reliant on volunteer and NGO aid.
RECOMMENDATION: Recognition of residents of informal spaces when registering for healthcare provision and refugee support. Greater support for NGOs and services they provide in informal housing.
‘Urban shelters’ and apartments
The UNHCR ESTIA programme (Emergency Support To Integration and Accommodation) managed to relocate around 27,000 vulnerable people (as of 31st December 2018)[2] from camps in to ‘urban shelters’: apartments that are not only located in cities, but also in some rural areas and islands such as Crete. The programme is run a cooperation between UNHCR, municipalities and third sector providers – the overall responsibility is now being transferred to the Greek national authorities.
Once refugees are identified as vulnerable and relocated out of a camp to an apartment, they are assigned a team which includes a social worker, housing officer and translator, and from whom they receive regular visits. The team meets with residents in their home and helps with issues like liaising with landlords or referring residents to relevant services. Each social worker is assigned a group of apartments/cases to look after and they work exclusively in the ESTIA context (not local social services more generally), meaning that they often get to know individual residents well and can respond to their needs.
Whilst some parts of the scheme work well – apartments are well provisioned, for instance, and the social workers are well trained and responsive – there are issues, however, mostly related to resources.
Screenshot from “5News” report on the drinking water quality in Osh city, 2017
Researchers, including this author, travelled to Osh to conduct a survey on the impact of these projects on gender equality in the city’s public transportation and water sectors in the month of October 2017. The EBRD’s investments in Osh city were largely welcomed and supported by residents who participated in the field survey. The research survey focused on acquiring data based on age, gender and occupation in the public transportation and water sectors. Whilst the gender-mainstreaming study objective was focused on gender inclusion, the survey has revealed the problems with accessibility for disabled residents and recurrent issues regarding school children’s safety in private transportation.
The survey underlines common use of public transportation and municipal water supply. Therefore, it is primarily focused on the EBRD funded projects to improve public services in Osh city. However, the poll results for the private transportation sector outline a whole set of separate challenges in contrast to the city’s public transportation.
In context with the methodology of the research, additional questions have been prepared for the Osh city Mayor’s Office and municipal services. However, the city officials declined to be interviewed citing procedural requirements for the meeting with researchers on initial visit to the Mayor’s administration. In the days and weeks after the first visit, the city administration officials failed to respond in a timely manner or demonstrate their willingness to provide information for this survey during research mission in October 2017.
Nonetheless, researchers established that the EBRD’s objective to ‘improve human resource policies and practices both from equal opportunities and commercially focused perspectives’ had yet to be fully implemented for both project aims to include a gender inclusion component.
Indeed, in a response letter to this study, the EBRD acknowledged the challenges of gender mainstreaming in the Osh city municipality. ‘The Gender Advisory Services Programme for the Osh Auto Public Transport Company started in 2015 and is scheduled to finish in mid-2018. The total cost of the assignment is €179,928. The Programme was developed by the bank after pre-investment due diligence revealed that only 20 of the Company’s 236 workforce were women and only one of their 164 drivers was female. The due diligence revealed that the high staff turnover is one of the big challenges – for example, in 2015 they have reported a loss of 50% of their drivers.’ according to the EBRD.
The research findings in Osh are consistent with the conclusions of the paper ‘Gender Equality Initiatives in Transportation Policy’ authored by Yael Hasson and Marianna Polevoy who found that ‘The travel patterns of women differ from those of men. These differences are linked to gender inequality within the home and the labor market, urban structures, and the processes of socialisation and education. Women and men make different use of a shared system of transportation’.
Gender Inclusion Challenges
According to the bank’s announcement the ‘EBRD-supported gender advisory services programme will see the city’s authorities and the Osh Auto Transport Company work together to offer improved job and career growth opportunities to women in the company’.
EBRD funded public transport project in Osh city, 2017
However, the Osh city development plan 2016-2020 does not stipulate career opportunities for women in the public transportation and water sectors or include objectives for the municipal services in the same period. It does include a chapter which underlines priority for the gender policy and support of women. In the expected outcome, the development roadmap implies more job opportunities will be created for women and youth in Osh, which seemingly has declarative intent rather than a realistic plan based on an agreement.
Furthermore, the Mayor’s Office pledge, in the development roadmap for greater transparency and open access to public and civil society organisations falls short of actual delivery of policy. The affirmed goal of close cooperation with public and civil society regarding evaluation and monitoring of the city development programs raises questions regarding lack of communication in the Mayor’s Office.
The city development plan has a detailed description of expenditure for the public transportation sector which includes modernisation of the bus and trolleybus fleet, introduction of an e-ticket system, staff training and improvement of the technical equipment, but a gender component of the EBRD funded project is not included in the city’s expenditure plans. In a similar fashion, the city’s plans for the Water Company doesn’t include expenditure for an inclusive gender policy.
Previously, the media coverage of the Mayor’s Office roadmap 2016-2020 highlighted deficiencies in the city development plan. The RFE/RL Kyrgyz language service (Azattyk) report stressed the city administration’s immediate focus on infrastructure projects and the lack of human development programs in the plan itself. It is unclear how the city authorities conduct or implement their original development target goals with respect to gender-mainstreaming.
It is even less clear whether a commitment on gender equality is part of the city administration’s long-term planning for the public transportation and water sectors, despite the official narratives.
The research team was unable to verify or observe the EBRD’s ‘work-in-progress’ in the Osh municipal services regarding gender inclusion, due to the city administration’s failure to collaborate with observers on the ground.
Recommendations
Throughout the month-long research, the team has discovered acute concerns and problems regarding functionality of the public and private transportation and water services. Just as in the country’s capital Bishkek, the city of Osh may require expansion of the public transportation routes within city limits in addition to existing geographical coverage.
Among critical concerns which were raised by the survey participants: the discrimination and harassment of pupils in the private transportation sector; unsafe rides on private minibuses underscored by both gender groups; lack of capacity of the existing transportation system due to traffic congestion and the insufficient number of public transportation units; a report of sexual harassment in one specific case; untrained staff in both, public and private transportation; disparity of communication between the authorities and city residents; and an unsatisfactory level of service for the disabled residents in public and private transportation.
Respectively, the Water Municipal Company will require enhancement of the communication policy with city residents which seems inadequate at its present level, more efforts to maintain an uninterrupted supply of water throughout the year, improvement of the quality of drinking water during rainy seasons, cooperation with local civil society organisations and activist groups on the promotion of water conservation practices in the city.
The gender-mainstreaming study objective of the research mission couldn’t be fully achieved as a result of the Osh city administration’s failure to communicate with the team after the Presidential election. It appears the EBRD funds are prioritised on the first-need service basis rather than the long-term strategy goals identified by the EBRD in both the public transportation and water sectors.
It is recommended that the EBRD conducts further consultation with clients on bringing focus back to the gender component in the decision-making process in the local administration and municipal companies; facilitates open access for civil society organisations to the information on gender equality in the municipal companies of Osh city; take steps to undertake annual research and analysis in the public transportation and water sectors based on gender component; improve the city administration’s communication strategy with the public and civil society organisations; include the perspectives of women and youth in the decision-making process; integrate more women in planning and implementation of development plans for the municipal services; and introduce annual target goal parameters for gender equality in the public transportation and water sectors.
This essay summary of a report produced for Bankwatch and available here.
[post_title] => More efforts from the EBRD required to mainstream gender in Kyrgyzstan
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[post_date] => 2018-09-24 14:17:06
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[post_content] => On the eve of China’s ‘4th of May Day’ in 2017, President Xi Jinping announced that “the rule by law is our historical mission.” It is a sentence which harks back to a centuries old legal system which many Chinese have regarded with pride. And yet its utterance was only necessary because, even over 30 years after China began its journey towards a capitalist, rules-based economic system, rule of law is still a source of tension in China. Indeed, many Western commentators noted and mocked the phrase ‘rule by law’ as fundamentally missing the point of ‘rule of law’, even if in Mandarin they mean the same thing.
The central argument of this essay is that Western governments and businesses should take seriously rule of law in China and devote their diplomatic and lobbying powers to seek better Chinese legal institutions. Through examining China’s legal history and exploring recent interactions between foreign investors and China’s legal system, the authors argue that many historical and current diplomatic tensions between China and the West - including the trade war and disputes around intellectual property rights - are related to China’s poor legal infrastructure, which does not meet Western standards of rule of law. Looking to the future, this poses serious problems as China expands its geopolitical visions and looks to export its own values and institutions.
Ultimately, the authors argue that the rule of law has the potential to be an effective point of diplomatic engagement with China. There is an appetite within China and among foreign investors for change, and Xi Jinping’s Government should take advantage of the economic and diplomatic opportunities presented by reforming China’s legal system. Chapter 1 looks at China’s rich legal history and how rule of law has failed to take root in China, giving us the system we see in China today. Chapter 2 looks at contemporary disputes between Western businesses, governments and China, and argues that many of these are closely linked to issues around rule of law. Chapter 3 argues that the rule of law offers an excellent opportunity to engage productively with China and that the opportunity should be seized by Western governments and businesses.
Download the full article here.
About authors:
Johnny Patterson works for a human rights NGO and is studying a Human Rights MSc at the London School of Economics. His research focuses on the rule of law in China.
David Lawrence is Senior Political Adviser at the Trade Justice Movement and previously worked in Parliament. He has an interest in China having grown up there, and previously studied at the London School of Economics and the University of Oxford.
[post_title] => FPC Briefing: Rule of Law in China: A priority for businesses and Western Governments
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[post_date] => 2018-09-18 13:16:12
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[post_content] => China’s draconian approach to the Uighur Muslim minority in its far-western province of Xinjiang is currently – and rightly – receiving a substantial amount of media attention. Less discussed are the vast infrastructural changes also underway in the region, particularly in Xinjiang’s southern city of Kashgar, an economically deprived, religiously conservative and hitherto deeply isolated area, in which approximately 90% of the population are Uighurs. The centrepiece of this construction frenzy is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). With a total financial outlay of around US$51 billion, CPEC is expected to be completed by 2030, and will connect China’s far-western Xinjiang Province with Pakistan’s Gwadar port via a network of highways, railways and trading hubs, providing China with important trading access to the Middle East and Africa.[1] While the expansion of infrastructural networks will doubtlessly bring significant economic benefits to the region, the possibility of connecting militant and terrorist networks in the two regions presents a substantial security risk for the two states and the wider region.
The level and pace of infrastructural development underway in southern Xinjiang is unprecedented. A railway extending from Kashgar, passing through Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to connect with railways in Iran, is currently in the first phase of construction. A second railway project linking Kashgar with the Uzbekistani city of Pap in the Ferghana Valley is also under construction. Highway projects connecting Andijan (Uzbekistan) with Osh (Kyrgyzstan) and Kashgar are also underway. Xinjiang already boasts the most airports of any Chinese province, and their number is expected to expand from 17 to 28 by 2020.[2] However, the most significant projects in this sphere are part of CPEC: the Karakoram Highway, which links Kashgar with Hassan Abdal in Pakistan and was originally constructed in the 1970s, is being upgraded with parts to be expanded into a 4-lane motorway and extensions to the Khunjerab railway that will also link the Pakistani rail network to China’s Kashgar-Hotan railway, allowing rail links from the Gwadar Port into Xinjiang. In the next few years, Kashgar will become a major transit hub for mainland China, with rail and road infrastructure connecting it directly with Pakistan and Central Asia. This will have far-reaching consequences for the local way of life, which has remained virtually unchanged for centuries.
Perhaps the most significant security threat concerns the expansion of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the primary terrorist organization driving the Uighur separatist cause, across the region. After al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), ETIM has become the third largest foreign militant group located on the porous Pakistan-Afghan border region, known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). ETIM is in alliance with local and international militant terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda and the Taliban, not only sharing their ideology, but also operating with their assistance. ETIM’s primary aims are the liberation of Xinjiang from Chinese rule and the implementation of sharia’ in the region, goals which are increasingly shared by the other militant groups in the region. As such, China has become an important target for militant groups, not only for ETIM, but also for al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Following the July 2009 riots in the Xinjiang capital of Urumqi, al Qaeda leader Abu Yahiya al Libi released a video threatening China. Pakistani security officials believe that in the aftermath of the riots, hundreds of Uighurs joined ETIM in FATA. In 2013, ETIM released a video showing Uighur children being trained in militant camps somewhere in FATA. The following year, the IMU’s Mufti al Burmi released a video entitled ‘Let’s disturb China’, in which he directed all militant groups affiliated to the Taliban and al Qaeda to target Chinese interests in Pakistan. Thus, close and expanding connections between Uighur and non-Uighur militants is driving the latter to take up the cause of the former, and growing trade and infrastructural connections between Xinjiang and Pakistan will doubtlessly facilitate militant connections between these groups. Beijing’s current project to transform Xinjiang into what has been termed by Western media reports as a ‘surveillance state’ constitutes its illiberal response to this threat.
Islamic radical organizations are deeply rooted in Pakistani society and militant activities are threatening longstanding Pakistan-China relations. Following pressure from the Chinese leadership to take action against ETIM, in 2014 the Pakistan Army launched a military operation codenamed Zarb-i-Azb. However, although this massive military offensive destroyed militants’ command and control systems in FATA, numerous splinter groups have formed a new command system across the border in Eastern Afghanistan. The battle to eradicate these militant groups is therefore far from over.
Despite popular concern about the growing levels of Chinese activities in Pakistan, with some Pakistani senators comparing CPEC to the East India Company, formal China-Pakistan relations have never been better. Both Pakistani and Chinese leaders have repeatedly referred to their relationship as ‘sweeter than honey’ and ‘stronger than steel’.[3] And the two big Pakistani religio-political parties, Jamiat Ulama i Islam (JUI) and Jamat i Islami (JI) have signed agreements with China. The Pakistani government has even defended Chinese policy towards Muslims in Xinjiang in the Organization for Islamic Co-operation.
Such allegiance by Pakistan to its Communist neighbour is driven primarily by economics: the Pakistani economy is highly dependent on Chinese trade and investment. According to the 2017 edition of the annual government-authored Pakistan Economic Survey, the volume of trade between Pakistan and China, which was approximately US$4 billion between 2006 and 2007, reached an all-time high at US$13.77 billion in 2015-16. Pakistan’s exports to China have increased by almost 200 percent since the implementation of the FTA, from US$575 million in 2007 to 1690 million in 2016, making China the second largest importer of Pakistani goods after the United States.[4] It is highly unlikely that Pakistan will reduce its co-operation with China.
The Chinese authorities are, of course, well aware of the threats posed by this cross-border infrastructural expansion – and the on-going repression of Muslims in Xinjiang must be seen in this context. In Pakistan, the threat against Chinese activity has become so severe that the Pakistani Army has created a special division whose sole purpose is to protect CPEC and its Chinese workers, and comprises nine army battalions, six civil wings and nearly 13,700 personnel.[5] It therefore seems likely that as CPEC gains momentum, so will the crackdowns on those deemed to pose security risks to the high stakes project. And this of course includes the entirety of Xinjiang’s Uighur population. As crackdowns against practicing Muslims in Xinjiang increase, however, the growing infrastructural connections between Pakistan and China will not only facilitate the transfer of goods, but also the transfer of militant and anti-Chinese ideology.
Note: The essay was written by two academics who wish to remain anonymous.
[1] Andrew Small (2017) ‘First Movement: Pakistan and the Belt and Road Initiative’, Asia Policy, 24: 80-87.
[2] Cui Jia (2016) ‘Work to start on rail link with Iran’, China Daily, 15 January 2016. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-01/15/content_23096031.htm
[3] See Times of India (2017) ‘Our friendship is sweeter than honey: Chinese vice premier to Pakistan’, Times of India, 14 August 2017. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/our-friendship-is-sweeter-than-honey-chinese-vice-premier-to-pakistan/articleshow/60057468.cms; Tribune (2014) ‘“Pak-China friendship is 'sweeter than the sweetest honey”: Nawaz’, Tribune, 21 April 2014. Available at: https://tribune.com.pk/story/698409/pak-china-friendship-is-sweeter-than-the-sweetest-honey-nawaz/.
[4] Pakistan Economic Survey 2016-17, May 2017. Available at: http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey_1617.html.
[5] Xinhua (2017) ‘Pakistan army chief vows to protect China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’, Xinhua, 11 March 2017. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/11/c_136121332.htm.
[post_title] => The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Security Risks of Infrastructural Expansion
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[post_date] => 2018-09-14 09:52:41
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[post_content] => Is Brexit just a choice between the Chequers deal or a ‘hard Brexit’? Supporters of ‘associate citizenship’ believe there is not. The proposed associate citizenship would allow individuals to enjoy some of the benefits of EU citizenship in return for a (likely substantial) fee. While this would undoubtedly bring benefits to those able to take up associate citizenship, it would also have a transformative effect on the concept of citizenship itself, exacerbating existing trends towards transnational forms of citizenship and a reduced role for nation states.
Associate citizenship of the EU will enable UK citizens to ‘buy in’ to EU citizenship.[1] Associate citizens would enjoy access to the same rights as EU citizens but will be required to pay-in to the EU.[2] This proposal has much to recommend it, yet it is likely to prove politically controversial because it will substantially alter the relationship between the individual and the state.
The proposal has been endorsed by Guy Verhofstadt, the European Parliament’s lead on Brexit negotiations and is referred to in the Parliament’s resolution on Brexit,[3] and obtained significant civil society support in the UK. For example, over 300 000 people have signed petitions calling for the inclusion of associate citizenship in Brexit negotiations.[4]
Opponents of associate citizenship argue that it will undermine the Brexit process. For Andrew Bridgen, a Conservative MP and Leave campaigner, it will create “two classes of EU citizen”.[5] Bridgen’s analysis, however, is the wrong way around. Associate citizenship will leave EU citizenship substantively unchanged. Yet it will create two classes of British citizenship: those who enjoy rights in the EU and those who do not. This will alter the nature of national citizenship, establishing a precedent for a form of citizenship that transcends nation-states. This will empower individuals and cities in relation to national governments. The benefits of the proposal are, however, likely to be limited to more affluent urban elites, exacerbating existing social divisions in the UK. This article offers a brief overview of the most significant barriers and likely impacts of associate citizenship, and an assessment of the proposal’s likelihood of success.
What is Associate Citizenship?
The precise nature of associate citizenship is unclear. Any proposal would, in any case, be subject to intensive negotiation before it could be approved. It is possible, however, to identify a few key features likely to be included in any negotiation of a form of associate citizenship. Associate citizens would enjoy a bundle of certain rights and duties. A ‘thick’ form of associate citizenship could include enjoyment of the four freedoms (free movement of goods, capital, services, and persons) and other EU rights subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). This would likely ease the process of travel from the UK to the EU and provide associate citizens with easier access to EU markets and institutions from the UK. It could also include the right to vote in certain EU elections (although this would require the creation of transnational MEPs, which would require some considerable changes to the current European Parliament’s structures). This would likely come at the cost of a substantial financial contribution by associate citizens. The EU27 are unlikely to grant UK citizens rights in the EU without this. ‘Thinner’ forms of associate citizenship would include some, but not all, of the above but are still likely to come at a significant financial cost.
Associate citizens will likely enjoy a number of political, social, and (perhaps) economic benefits. Access to the four freedoms and other rights will enable associate citizens to travel in the EU, take part in EU political discourse and elections, and interact more directly with their fellow EU citizens. Increased access to EU markets would offer associate citizens economic opportunities not available to those who enjoy only British citizenship. The extent of the benefit enjoyed as a result of associate citizenship would, of course, depend on the thickness of the version of associate citizenship ultimately adopted.
Legal Hurdles
Critics of associate citizenship argue that it is legally impossible.[6] Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for EU citizenship as ‘co-citizenship’.[7] While national citizenship remains pre-eminent, the individual is a citizen of both their own state and the EU. This is not, however, an insurmountable barrier. It is conceivable that associate citizens would retain their British citizenship as well as their EU citizenship: remaining co-citizens of the UK and EU.[8] A more significant challenge is the likely necessity of treaty change. EU law must be based on the powers conferred in the EU treaties. Article 20 does not, prima facie, appear to confer the power to create associate citizens. A treaty change requires the consent of all member states. It may, however, be argued that the required power is implicit. Article 20 does not rule out associate citizenship, it is merely silent on the matter, meanwhile Article 77 of the treaty empowers the Commission to confer EU passports[9] and Articles 223 to 234 and 314 confer legislative initiative on the Commission and the Parliament.[10] The combination of these powers could form a basis for the argument that the EU already has the power to create associate citizens through its existing legislative processes.[11]
A Challenge to the Nature of Citizenship
Nation states are traditionally the arbiter of citizenship. The state decides who is, and who is not, a citizen, as well as the rights and duties that come with citizenship. [12] This is part of a state’s cultural, social, and political legitimacy.[13] Citizenship and individual identity are interlinked.[14] Our perception of our own identity is heavily influenced by our citizenship because we reflexively understand ourselves as members of a particular group with a particular history.[15] Our membership of these groups is often by our citizenship status. As the ultimate arbiter of citizenship, the state thus plays a role in the formation and re-formation of individual self-understanding. The state is therefore vital to individuals in a social, cultural, and political sense.
As John Urry puts it:
“The concept of society has been central to western notions of what it is to be a human. To be human has meant that one is unambiguously a member of a particular society. Historically and conceptually there has been a strong connection between the idea of humanness and that of membership of a society. Society involves an ordering through a nation-state, clear territorial and citizenship boundaries and a system of governance over its particular citizens.”[16]
Since, at least, 1989 the state’s monopoly on the determination of citizenship has eroded. Social, commercial, and cultural relationships are increasingly transnational.[17] This creates space for informal alternative citizenships. Individuals increasingly self-identify with communities beyond the nation-state.[18] Some national leaders see this as eroding the role of the state and, by extension, their own authority. In her 2016 Conference speech Theresa May attacked those who embrace alternative citizenship identities, arguing that “if you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere”.[19]
EU associate citizenship would represent a quantum change in the nature of citizenship. It would formalise, and further legitimise, alternative citizenship identities. The state would no longer be the ultimate arbiter of citizenship. Individuals would be able to formally elect an alternative form of citizenship that transcends the nation state. The bundle of rights and duties that come with citizenship would no longer be conferred solely by the state. The individual would have the option of additional rights and duties and to formally identify with socio-cultural and, crucially, political communities beyond the nation state. The individual would thus become a co-equal arbiter of citizenship. Associate citizenship would therefore alter the relationship between the individual and the state.
The impacts of associate citizenship
Globalisation
Associate citizenship would empower individuals to interact with a supra-national organisation and with their fellow EU citizens in a manner that transcends the nation state (albeit to a greater or lesser extent depending on whether a ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ version of associate citizenship is adopted). If associate citizenship is taken up by significant numbers of individuals, this will accelerate the transnationalisation of individual relations that has occurred as a result of globalisation.[20] It will consequently erode the status of states at the global level by dispersing the (formerly exclusive) power to confer citizenship status from states to individuals. ‘Globalisation’ is often used in a pejorative sense yet, in empowering individuals and facilitating relationships and identity building beyond the confines of the nation state, associate citizenship will likely have a positive impact.
Cities
Cities play an increasingly prominent global economic and political role.[21] Economic growth tends to be focused in cities and, in the UK, increased devolution has empowered cities to elect their own leaders exercising broad policy making powers.[22] Cities increasingly cooperate transnationally, such as through the C40 initiative on climate change.[23]
In the UK, associate citizenship will further empower cities at the expense of the national government. Cities like London, Manchester, and Birmingham[24] tend to be richer[25] and more pro-EU than rural areas or smaller cities.[26] They thus have both greater means and inclination to benefit from associate citizenship. Associate citizens are therefore likely to be concentrated in major cities. This will incentivise mayors to pursue closer relationships with the EU than those pursued by national government. For the EU’s part, city governments will become an important point of intercession with associate citizens. Cities will thus become increasingly transnational and the role of the national government correspondingly marginalised. Cities are unlikely to participate in EU institutions in the same way as states unless those institutions undergo substantial changes. Their informal role, however, as key intercessors between large concentrations of associate citizens and the EU, combined with a more outward-looking approach to the EU, will give cities an enhanced substantive role.
Social tension
This will exacerbate the existing social and economic divisions in the UK. The economic benefits of associate citizenship will accrue to those who have both the means and inclination to take advantage: wealthier liberals who tend to live in cities. Secondary impacts are likely to be concentrated in cities as well. Urban dwellers already tend to be wealthier than those in rural areas or provincial towns[27] and wealth correlates with likelihood of voting for Brexit and being suspicious about immigration.[28]
Associate citizenship will increase the economic, cultural, and social opportunities of associate citizens, increasing the cosmopolitan attitudes and economic advantages enjoyed by the urban middle class. By contrast, those outside this group, who were already likely to be poorer (and thus unable to afford the – likely – substantial financial cost of associate citizenship) and more anti-European, will be denied these opportunities. The impression will be of one group enjoying special privilege while the other is neglected. This will harden existing scepticism towards globalisation and supra-national bodies like the EU. Associate citizenship is thus likely to further entrench the UKs existing political and socio-economic divides.
The Fatal Flaw: Political Will
While the legal barriers to associate citizenship are not insurmountable, it is likely the project will fail for lack of political will. Those conducting the negotiations have no incentive to advance a project that will marginalise national governments. On the UK side, the national government faces a situation in which the cities most likely to benefit from associate citizenship are either controlled by a hostile political party or an independent minded mayor. On the EU side, Brexit negotiations are overseen by the Council, the body that represents the nation states. While the immediate impacts of associate citizenship will only be felt in the UK, the project as a whole establishes a worrying precedent from the perspective of nation states. It demonstrates that the nation state is no longer necessary as the sole arbiter of citizenship. This exacerbates a trend in which nation states are losing the pre-eminence as both international and domestic actors. There is therefore likely to be little real enthusiasm for the project around the Brexit negotiating table.
Conclusions
The practical barriers to associate citizenship are not insurmountable. The political issues, however, require more careful consideration. The project would undoubtedly empower individuals and cities and, for this reason, has much to recommend it. While it will likely exacerbate existing economic and social divisions in the UK, the root cause of these lies elsewhere. These problems should be addressed, but they will not be solved by opposing associate citizenship. Yet, the projects greatest advantage, that it will redefine the relationship between the individual and the state, is also its greatest political weakness. Those charged with negotiating Brexit stand to lose from associate citizenship. The project is therefore likely to fail for a lack of political will.
[1] The Economist, Can Britons Keep Their Citizenship After Brexit?, April 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21720631-though-many-would-it-looks-both-legally-and-politically-unlikely-can-britons-keep-their
[2] Ibid.
[3] Guy Verhofstadt, “The EU will defend its interests in the Brexit talks, but will also be generous to British citizens”, The Independent, April 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-eu-will-defend-its-interests-in-the-brexit-talks-but-will-also-be-generous-to-british-citizens-a7674371.html
[4] The largest petition, which closed at 315 934 signatures, can be found on Change.org at https://www.change.org/p/eu-offer-european-citizenship-to-uk-citizens
[5] The Economist, n. 1
[6] The Economist, n. 1
[7] European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01, Art. 20(1)
[8] This would be unprecedented – a concept of co-citizenship with a non-member state does not exist in EU law. Yet Brexit is, itself, unprecedented. It is not unreasonable to assume that the process will require precedent-setting solutions in some areas.
[9] Ibid. Art. 77(3)
[10] Ibid. Art. 223-234 and 314
[11] This paper does not purport to offer a clear solution in this area, merely to highlight the potential for further legal analysis.
[12] See John Urry, Globalisation and Citizenship, 5 Journal of World-Systems Research 2 (1999)
[13] B. Gilly, ‘The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy, 45 European Journal of Political Research 3 (2006), pp. 499-525
[14] Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Modern Age, (Cambridge; Polity, 1991), pp. 10-34
[15] Urry, n. 11
[16] Ibid., p. 433
[17] Akira Iriye, The Making of A Transnational World, in Iriye (ed), Global Interdependence: The World After 1945, (London; Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), pp. 679-847
[18] Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership, (Princeton, NJ; Princeton UP, 2006), pp. 219-233
[19]Theresa May, Address to the Conservative Party Conference, 4th October 2016, reproduced in The Telegraph, Theresa May’s Conference Speech in Full , October 2016, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/05/theresa-mays-conference-speech-in-full/
[20] Iriye, n. 17
[21] See generally, Richard Child Hill and June Woo Kim, Global Cities and Developmental States: New York, Tokyo and Seoul, 37 Urban Studies 12 (2000)
[22] See Tom Gash and Sam Sims, What Can Elected Mayors do for Our Cities?, Institute for Government, (29th March 2012)
[23] See C40 Cities, available at http://www.c40.org/cities
[24] See, for example, JLL, Greater Birmingham: An Economic Renaissance? September 2014
[25] See, for example, Danny Dorling and John Pritchard, The Geography of Poverty, Inequality and Wealth in the UK and Abroad: Because Enough is Never Enough, 3 Appl. Spatial Anlysis 81 (2010), pp. 81-106
[26] BBC, EU Referendum: Britain’s most Pro-EU and Anti-EU Boroughs, June 2016, www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36616747
[27] Dorling and Pritchard, n. 23
[28] See Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath, Brexit vote explained: poverty, low skills, and lack of opportunities, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, (31st August 2016)
[post_title] => Associate EU Citizenship: A Brief Assessment
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[post_content] => As the UK faces the uncertainty of Brexit, this article examines how its policies towards third countries including enlargement, trade, migration, development and energy policies have been mediated through the EU membership. It demonstrates how the UK has used the EU to amplify power, to protect UK interests and security, and to pursue its foreign policy priorities and interests. Finally, it offers some thoughts as to the risks to the UK’s foreign policy influence following Brexit.
A power amplifier
The UK has had a successful history in normatively influencing the EU through its membership. The impact of the UK and the FCO over the last 40 years in ensuring that its ideas are transmitted via a 28-member bloc and its networks across the world should not be underestimated. Some of the EU’s most enduring policies testify to British ideas at the heart of EU decision-making: From Churchill’s European vision which led to the founding of the European movement, to the widening (as opposed to deepening) of the union via its enlargement and neighbourhood policies the UK has been a thought leader on EU foreign policy. The enlargement of the EU in 2004 to admit 10 new members radically altered the centre of gravity and emphasis of the union to Whitehall’s liking[1]. In recent years, the EU has been more Anglo-Saxon than ever in its interactions beyond its borders – and not just because the language of its business is English. EU Free Trade Agreements – often negotiated by UK trade lawyers - draw the interest of trading giants, such as latterly, Canada, the US[2] and Japan. In a number of foreign policy areas, from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which enables the EU to speak with one voice on political affairs in relation to third countries and articulate EU common interests and values, to policies ranging from border control to energy and climate change to development – the EU amplifies British soft power.
Safeguarding UK interests
The EU has played a key role in safeguarding UK interests ranging from sanctions to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policy. On the bigger foreign policy questions, including sanctions on third countries following abuses of power and violations of international norms, the UK has been able to draw on collective bloc decisions which favour its position and avoid being singled-out to face negative political and economic consequences, such as export bans on arms/equipment. The EU is also one of the only mechanisms by which Britain can successfully push its pro-sanctions position (notably on Russia and Syria) since sanctions are frequently rendered impossible via the UN route due to Russian and Chinese veto at the UNSC. The departure of the UK has led some allies (notably Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands) to express concern about a possible shift of the balance of power within the EU on EU-Russia policy. It may make the EU common position more susceptible to pressure from Austria, Italy and other governments to weaken the sanctions policy.
The EU has also offered the UK a useful ‘’bad cop’’ in situations where UK bilateral policy is to appease rather than sanction a third country: The June 2018 EU sanctions on Myanmar generals as a result of suspected crimes against humanity against the Rohingya were tacitly supported by the UK as a means of applying pressure for accountability, whilst allowing the UK, the former colonial power, to pursue a pragmatic, pro-engagement bilateral policy toward Aung San Suu Kyi’s Government. In the case of Libya in 2011, the UK benefited from the unanimous endorsement of EU sanctions, which went further than UNSCR 1970 as well as asset freezing[3]. These coordinated moves by EU member states provided political space for more concerted action by the EU’s two military and diplomatic powers, UK and France – even taking into account Germany’s abstention at the UN Security Council.
In contexts where individual EU member states such as the UK are considered partial, the EU is also able to achieve outcomes as an honest broker – notably in the success of the European External Action Service on the Iran deal, and in current mediation efforts by the EU High Representative in the Western Balkans. Through its work on conflict prevention and civilian crisis management, the EU is doing more on the ground than other conflict prevention formats in which the UK has a stake in the Eastern and Southern European neighbourhood: OSCE, NATO, UN or G20. EU civilian crisis management policy is able to do more in Moldova and Georgia than the OSCE (which remains hobbled by Russia) or NATO for whom the region is too politically sensitive to enter. EU Operation Sofia, in the Mediterranean, for all the challenges of its mandate, mounted a serious smuggling prevention operation.
There is great complementarity and burden sharing opportunities for larger EU member states, such as the UK: The EU mission in Libya on border security supports the UK intervention as well as UK national security concerns, just as by analogy the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali supports France. The multinational pool of expertise for EU deployments to these missions supports wider knowledge sharing and transfer. EU civilian crisis management missions provide an outlet for UK policing ideas via their personnel, whereas in other contexts where the UK has a stake but less cultural reach and expertise (for example Armenia and Moldova), experts from Central and Eastern European states do that job. The EU is also effectively providing a security guarantee for Georgia. Despite the UK’s tough stance on Russia, it is not clear that the UK has the geopolitical capital or financial resources to deploy a mission on the scale of, for example, the 200-strong EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia and would not consider doing so alone. The EUMM complements the FCO’s dedicated bilateral funding ‘niche’, supporting conflict-prevention NGOs in the South Caucasus region.[4]
Free-riding on Home Affairs
The EU has also expanded UK influence in relations with partners - at a limited material cost to the UK. The Enlargement process, and the European Neighbourhood Policy and its successor in the East, the Eastern Partnership, have carried weight in partner countries for whom association with the EU means clean water, safe transport, travel opportunities through easier access to Europe, via budget airlines, and the potential to sell goods to a market of, currently, 500 million people.
This leverage has allowed the EU to demand reforms on migration and asylum in exchange for visas for the Schengen area, such as justice reforms or anti-corruption measures in public procurement which, when implemented by neighbouring countries, also benefit the UK down the line. The obligation on partner countries to cooperate with Eurojust and Europol protects the UK. In the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood, five out of six countries have signed or are negotiating visa facilitation agreements have been obliged to adopt readmission agreements.[5] Since the visa facilitation agreements apply only to Schengen the UK has valid readmission agreements without giving up anything materially. Other EU member states have borne the cost of the reduction from 60 Euros to 35 Euros for a single-entry Schengen visa[6], or for the free visas offered to an extended list of categories, ranging from students to journalists. With its decision to leave the EU, the UK faces the prospect of concluding bilateral readmission negotiations with each of these third countries which may cost it more in concessions on visa. At the same time, it is not clear that Britain alone would have the leverage to negotiate the accompanying reforms, whose implementation is also supported through pooled EU funding, and trade incentives (see below).
Large trading market
The EU as a trading bloc with a single-market has more clout in a partner country than any single EU member state. Britain has long embraced this vision. In the neighbourhood, as elsewhere in the world, the EU facilitates market access and investment opportunities for British companies through its Common Commercial policy. For many countries outside Europe, the EU collectively is the largest trading partner: In 2015 – EU trade with Ukraine was worth 31 billion USD whereas Britain’s trade with Ukraine was 2.1 billion USD[7]. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs), negotiated with Eastern neighbours, and considered for the Southern neighbours, are modelled on the successful accession process and aim to increase exports and investment through opening new markets. Because standards are high they also protect the EU’s member states including Britain against dumping. Through ensuring that neighbouring countries align their legislation with EU standards, the EU not only opens but transforms markets. DCFTAs aim at transforming societies on the EU’s periphery by demanding reforms in areas ranging from customs practices to taxation to product standards, with broad implications for the fight against corruption and good governance.
As well as the benefits for British companies, Britain can afford to be clear that regulation is both necessary and useful for its foreign policy, both in strengthening the EU internal market in key geo-strategic areas such as energy – see below – and raising standards among neighbours. Britain alone would be less likely to achieve this level of convergence with its legislation, nor be able to offer sweeteners on the scale of the €12.8 billion offered by the EU to support the reform process in Ukraine[8]. This is a political as well as a technical question in a country like Ukraine, where the EU is its largest trading partner and – together with Russia – accounts for 50% of Ukraine’s trade.
Likewise, the size of the EU energy market gives it real clout in the sector. The EU has taken the lead on negotiating MoUs to establish gas pipelines of strategic importance to the EU27, notably the Southern Energy Corridor. The transnational nature of the issue, as well as the scale of collective EU energy demand, means that the EU Commissioner for Energy has more leverage than a single member state. At the same time, EU energy policy, including the Energy Union and particularly the Energy Security Strategy (2014) links the liberalisation of the internal energy market to the achievement of reduced dependence on particular external actors in a way that national policy could not. By launching an anti-trust case against Gazprom in September 2012, the European Commission’s DG Competition has been fighting the corner for British business and British strategic interest through challenging Gazprom’s monopoly[9]. This is an example of where EU single market rules and regulations in competition policy act in the British interest. Further, the EU has established an Energy Community –which is expanding the EU acquis on the security of supply, energy efficiency, oil, renewable energy and statistics to countries ranging from the Western Balkans to Ukraine, creating reliable markets for British companies.
Global development
In development policy, the UK - as a top bilateral development donor, as well as a net contributor to the EU development budget - leverage the EU’s funding, networks and delegations. The EU, together with its member states, is the world’s largest development donor. Much of EU development and humanitarian policy thinking has been shaped by the UK. The Department for International Development (DFID) has used its own leverage as a top donor historically to shape the EU’s development policy focus on health and education in development and prioritisation of the the Least Developed Countries, as well as funding modalities pursued by the EU’s humanitarian assistance department (ECHO), most recently on cash-programming. DFID often works in Joint Actions with the EU, notably in West Africa. EU and UK ‘super grants’ are fostering development outcomes on a greater scale on issues such as infant nutrition, in Bangladesh[10]. With the UK contributing up to 15% of the EU’s Development Fund annually[11] and ‘paying to play’ in setting the EU’s priorities through the fund, the challenge for the UK (and the EU) post-Brexit, will be to make less funding go further in transforming lives and buying change.
Losing out from the divorce
Whether the EU can continue to exercise the power of attraction at the same level without UK membership is an open question. The Union faces a number of political challenges aside from Brexit, including open challenges to its own values from existing members, most notably ins Hungary and Poland[12]. The new long-term budget of the EU is likely to shrink directly as a result of Brexit, and indirectly as other countries seek to use funding leverage to articulate demands[13].
Yet, all the signs are that challenges for Britain as a result of Brexit will be arguably greater. In an increasingly multipolar world, one which belongs to regional trading blocs and bigger countries, it is unclear what advantages can be derived from the UK’s ‘Global Britain’ policy. A pivot to an Asia-Pacific strategy and a rekindling of colonial ties could prove costly, given that the majority of the UK’s trading partners are next door. The EU accounted for 90% of the UK’s trading in 2017, considering that it was the destination for 44% of UK’s exports, with 53% of the UK’s imports coming from the other 27 EU member states[14]. This market of 500 million people allows the UK to enjoy some 50 trade agreements with countries and regions across the world[15]. It follows that post-Brexit bilateral deals struck for a UK market of 66 million people will be harder to come by, and will take time, during which the UK will be subject to high tariffs under basic WTO rules.
A diminished economic power will also face diminishing returns in foreign policy: With Britain on the sidelines – at best being permitted to observe foreign policy ministerial decisions by the EU27 – there will be less potential to influence EU-bloc decisions that are taken into multilateral fora, from the WTO to the Human Rights Council. Although it cannot yet be quantified, the loss of UK influence in Brussels foreign policy decision-making during the Brexit process indicates worst to come. Put simply, the UK risks losing normative and soft power through exiting the club that it has so successfully shaped.
[1] The fact that the 2004 enlargement arguably was a fact in sowing the seeds of Brexit has more to do with successive UK governments’ poor handling of the migration debate than the policies of the new EU members
[2] The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership has so far failed to come to fruition, but negotiations are quietly ongoing and would see the US submit to EU standards whilst uniting the two markets to form the world’s largest trading bloc.
[3] In COUNCIL DECISION 2011/137/CFSP and COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 204/2011 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011R0204&from=EN The EU placed 20 people on its visa ban list in addition to the 6 on the UN list
[4] DFID downgraded the Eastern European countries a few years ago.
[5] These are: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan
[6] Currently offered to children under 12 and citizens of: Georgia, Kosovo, Russia, and Ukraine
[7] See: Ukraine Foreign Ministry https://uk.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-uk/trade and DG Trade http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/ukraine/
[8] For an overview of macro-financial assistance from foreign partners to Ukraine see http://www.aalep.eu/financial-assistance-ukraine
[9] The case was concluded in May 2018 without fines to Gazprom, but with a deal outlining significant concessions by the company designed to break its monopoly, including on price-setting and removal of contractual constraints that had prevented clients from reselling gas
[10] https://everyone.savethechildren.net/articles/tackling-child-malnutrition-bangladesh-suchana-programme
[11] The UK is the third biggest contributor to the European Development Fund, behind France and Germany. See UK Parliament: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/1680/168005.htm.
[12] The electoral victory for Matteo Salvini in Italy, and an increasingly right-leaning Austria are a sign of a growing populist challenge to the EU across its member states.
[13] Matteo Salvini has invoked the methods of Donald Trump in threatening to withhold Italy’s annual contribution to the EU budget unless the other Member States enact burdensharing arrangements for the reception of migrants and refugees. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/24/eu-dismisses-italys-threats-in-migration-ship-row-suspend-budget-payments
[14] https://fullfact.org/europe/uk-eu-trade/vvbb
[15] European Commission, Memo- The EU's bilateral trade and investment agreements – where are we?, December 2013, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/november/tradoc_150129.pdf#page=6
[post_title] => How UK foreign policy benefits from EU membership, and the pitfalls of Brexit
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[post_content] => At first sight, EU relations with Switzerland might seem a ‘niche’ topic for a British observer. But in fact current developments are rather important in understanding potential models for the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU, as well as providing insights into some of the difficulties in structuring bilateral relations.
After all, both countries are already highly integrated economically with the EU; at the same time they also grapple with a balance between this and national sovereignty. The Swiss rejected an initiative to begin EU accession negotiations in 2001 by a large majority in a referendum, having earlier rejected (by a hair’s breadth) membership of the European Economic Area in 1992 – issues of national sovereignty are strongly emphasised by Swiss voters and politicians alike, with a strong tendency for discussion of technical matters to become issues of principle. At the heart of the complications in the Swiss relationship are the constitutional provisions for referendums on legislative proposals – allowing the Swiss to retain the sovereignty to conduct such referendums is clearly at odds with the EU’s desire for a common legislative and regulatory framework where single market access is desired. It is easy to see parallels with the UK’s expressed desire for the ability to make its own laws and avoid direct European Court of Justice jurisdiction, while at the same time wishing to maintain the benefits of single market access. Swiss negotiators, too, have noticed that Brexit has heightened interest in whatever deal they are able to strike.
We should not downplay the extent to which Switzerland already co-operates with the EU. It is a member of the Schengen agreement (although that is not without its challenges), allowing free movement without border checks with EU countries. Unlike other members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Switzerland does not enjoy full access to the Single Market (in return for full acceptance of EU law), and instead there is a series of bilateral agreements governing Swiss-EU trade relations. There are two areas in which these are perceived to be inadequate at present. From the Swiss perspective, first, there are areas in which Switzerland would like to see integration with the EU go further (for instance, around equity markets). Secondly, seven Swiss bilateral agreements with the EU are currently affected by a ‘guillotine’, under which if one agreement falls, then, like a house of cards, all agreements cease to apply within six months. This is extremely risky for both parties in a circumstance where Swiss domestic politics may assert itself through a referendum. The EU, too, wants to see change: ever since the Swiss rejected EU accession, EU leaders have urged them to reach an agreement on institutional questions, such as how to update bilateral agreements according to the evolution of EU law (to what extent changes are automatically adopted, for example), and how disputes can be resolved.
The FDP, a centre-right, pro-market political party, which is part of the government and whose member Ignazio Cassis heads the Foreign Ministry, has put forward proposals to break the deadlock that have now been broadly endorsed by the national government. Specifically, Switzerland would agree, in principle, to adopt new EU law provided it had greater influence on EU legislative decisions. These would need to be adopted domestically in Switzerland (with such provisions still having the potential to be defeated by a referendum). If that happened, then there would be a negotiation on compensatory measures between the two countries, and if agreement could not be reached there, an independent court of arbitration would take the final decision. These proposals have received a cautious welcome from Brussels – if adopted, they could perhaps provide a way through the UK’s conundrum of how to reconcile sufficient regulatory alignment to allow an acceptable measure of co-operation and single market access, with ‘red lines’ around national sovereignty and ECJ jurisdiction.
There are further lessons that can be learned from recent Swiss interactions with the EU. First, Brussels has a tendency to become impatient and intolerant of the peculiarities of domestic political processes. A perception of heavy-handedness was generated when it only granted a year’s mutual recognition to Swiss equity traders, rather than the expected ongoing agreement.
Secondly, in both Switzerland and the UK (but increasingly beyond), domestic and foreign policy are become intertwined. This can lead to a certain volatility – for instance, Switzerland’s membership of the Schengen zone has been placed in jeopardy by proposed new measures on handguns (the country might face a referendum on this issue from shooting clubs, and failure to adopt the new Schengen rules would force it out of the zone).
Thirdly, Brexit has complicated the picture for the EU’s relations with third countries. Cassis, when appointed Foreign Minister, decided to spend his first hundred days ‘taking stock’ of the situation. That posed a dilemma for Switzerland – whether to seek to conclude a new agreement with the EU before Brexit or to delay: by going early the Swiss would potentially miss out on concessions that might flow by precedent from a bespoke EU-UK deal and shaped by the UK market’s greater significance; equally, they might avoid unwelcome precedents if the UK ends up with a ‘hard Brexit’. In the end, the country has opted to try to get an institutional agreement with the EU in advance of Brexit (which says something about Bern’s perception of progress on the Brexit negotiations).
Fourth, the Swiss and indeed the UK’s situations are an important reminder that the relations of both EU member states and third countries are driven very much by issues of principle, not just hard economic interests. If only the latter were relevant, Brexit would not have happened, and Switzerland would have compromised on issues of its sovereignty a long time ago.
So we contend that it is important for London’s negotiators to keep looking towards Bern and its dealings with Brussels – there could well be some important tips in how to handle thorny issues of regulatory convergence in areas where single market access is being sought. At the same time, dealings with Switzerland should perhaps give the EU pause for thought about whether it is sometimes rather high-handed in its rejection of concerns about national sovereignty. And both cases prompt us to consider domestic foibles, as well as economic rationalities, when looking to understand relationships with the EU.
Ed Turner is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Aston University and a Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre. Anna Wartmann works for the FDP in Bern. Both write in a personal capacity and the contents of this piece represent their own views.
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[post_content] => The 2018 State Security Service of Georgia report[1] set out for the first time, the major objectives of ‘foreign intelligence services’ in Georgia:
These pages were banned by Facebook administrators in May 2018. Soon they re-opened
Neo-Nazi forces start to show up in Georgia since 2015 with the appearance of Georgian Power, followed by the creation of Georgian March, which has been an active organization since 2017. Both staged protests with xenophobic appeals. Georgian Power is a more ideology-oriented entity backed up by the youth, while Georgian March is ruled by former politicians and individuals expressing pro-Russian views (Dimitri Lortkipanidze, Sandro Bregadze, Guram Palavandishvili). They have good relations with Levan Vasadze, a businessman with a Russian background who is also lashing out at the so-called LGBT propaganda.
Though the narrative of the nationalist powers comply with Russian propaganda, it’s difficult to prove that they are funded by the Kremlin. However, it’s evident that Georgian March is similar to the xenophobic marches in Ukraine, Russian and Moldova, therefore it is obvious that they have similar agendas. And the fact of its leadership being comprised of former politicians with obvious pro-Russian views confirms these doubts.
As for Georgian Power, its leader is Nikoloz Burnadze, a US citizen living in the USA, which criticizes Georgian March, saying that pro-Russian people manage this organization, which is unacceptable to him.
A fascist organization Georgian National Unity popped up in 2016, and has already managed to conduct a number of demonstrations with xenophobic messages. Regardless of the differences, all three groups (Georgian March, Georgian Power and Georgian National Unity have consolidated under a national idea of ‘fighting against LGBT propaganda’. They engaged dozens of their Facebook pages to organize their protests.
The page Iberian Unity was created in 2017 and became proactive in 2018. It promotes neo-Nazi ideas and claims that users with pro-Russian or pro-Turkey ideas will be blocked. The page shares posts of other anti-liberal pages, supports demonstrations against LGBT people.
Another Facebook large page, the Anti-Liberal Club, appeared in 2015 and has approximately 44K followers posting homophobic and xenophobic’ statuses’ using disinformation and manipulation. The administrator of the page is Shota Martinenko, who also owns web site altinfo.com, which is used for distributing anti- liberal opinions. Its articles are shared by above-mentioned pages.
Georgian Idea is the Facebook page of a political party with the same title founded in 2014 and participated in 2016 parliamentary elections. The leader is Levan Chachua, who was arrested after a fight at TV Kavkasia in 2010. 3 years later he was released as a political prisoner. Georgian Idea cooperates with Georgian March and other neo Nazi groups, participating in homophobic and xenophobic demonstrations.
A 2016 study prepared by the CPEDEE and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), on equality perceptions and attitudes[10] emphasizes that Moldova’s population is still prone to intolerance with regard to different vulnerable groups. The study showed that Moldovans most trust the Church (over 81%) and have the least trust in the justice system (14%), the President (11%), Parliament (11%) and Political parties (10%). According to the study, the most discriminated group in Moldova is the LGBT group. It is followed by persons living with HIV, detainees and persons with mental disabilities. Thus, the study shows that while church is the most trusted institution in Moldova, LGBT people are most discriminated.
Threats to equality
The legal framework regarding equality and non-discrimination is not seen as a positive step by some actors of Moldovan society. The most vocal opponents of the laws on equality are The Orthodox Church under the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova (Moldovan Orthodox Church) and the Socialist Party of Moldova (PSRM). On numerous occasions, they criticized the law on ensuring equality and those that support it. While the Orthodox Church uses this rhetoric based on doctrinal reasons, the Socialist Party of Moldova uses it to gain political capital and as one of the main arguments against European integration.
The position of the Church
The Moldovan Orthodox Church has constantly criticized the law on ensuring equality, both before and since its adoption. The most contentious provision appears to be the one that outlaws discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Church condemned the provision, declaring that it “legalizes harlotry through enabling gay parades and propaganda of the gay life style”.[11]
The Russian Orthodox Church, of which the Moldovan Orthodox Church is part, also expressed its dissatisfaction with the Law. As mentioned in a statement of the Sacred Synod (the highest authority) of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Church “protests against the legalization of evil and the declaration of sinful behaviour as ordinary activity.” It calls on Moldovan authorities to resist “attempts of propaganda of sexual perversion” and to take steps to amend the law in order to comply with the will of the majority of Moldovan citizens.[12]
In 2013, in a statement issued after Orthodox leaders met in Chisinau, the church said that it would call for nationwide protests unless the government amended a law protecting homosexuals, bisexuals, and transgender people from discrimination. The church also expressed its will for new laws against what it calls "immoral propaganda" and a ban on "homosexual, lesbian, transsexual, bisexual, paedophilic, zoophilic, incestuous, and perverse behaviour."[13] Moreover, the Church constantly stands against Gay Prides organized in Chisinau by Genderdoc-M[14] asking for these parades to be banned because of in their view the “absence of any legal, moral and rational reason of such a type of absurd manifestation.”[15]
The above-mentioned positions of the Church encourage and legitimize intolerance, discrimination and hate speech in Moldovan society. That is reflected in the high levels of social conservatism[16] that characterize Moldovan civil society but also in the increasing number of cases of violence against LGBT community. For instance, in 2013 the participants at the Pride couldn’t march more than 10 minutes because of the violence and danger to the public security. Indeed, the “counter-manifestation” organized by different Orthodox groups and associations forced the police to stop the march and to evacuate the participants.[17]
With the aim of spreading its conservative position, the Moldovan Orthodox Church founded or sustains a number of different organizations and groups such as: ‘Tineretul orthodox’ (Orthodox Youth)[18], ‘Asociație Moldova pentru viață’ (the Association Moldova for Life)[19] and the ‘Asociaţia Fericita Maică Matrona’.[20]
The first one ‘Tineretul orthodox’ - is the youth movement of the Moldovan Orthodox Church and includes sub-groups such as the ‘Asociația Studenților Creștini Ortodocși din Republica Moldova’ (Republic of Moldova Christian Orthodox Students Association)[21], a student union that has its headquarters in Moldova State University church.
The Orthodox Youth holds a number of conferences and workshops, as well as organizing the ‘March for life’ in collaboration with the Association ‘Moldova for Life’ and ‘Asociaţia Fericita Maică Matrona’ – an event supporting traditional family values.
Another religious event – ‘March for Families’ was organized by the Moldovan Orthodox Church and its supporters and took place in 2016 to mark the importance of ‘traditional family values’. Its third edition, called the ‘March of Silence’, was de jure a public action for traditional family values, but de facto it was an event organized in collaboration with socialist-linked groups and sustained by President of Moldova Igor Dodon. It was designed as a public manifestation against homosexuality and Gay Pride, took place one week after.
On that occasion, as in many others, the association ‘Asociaţia Fericita Maică Matrona’ had a central role in spreading intolerance based on the idea that it is necessary to fight against the current status quo, called by them the ‘atheist-Satanist system’.[22]In May 2018 this group organized another public demonstration against ‘homosexual propaganda in the Republic of Moldova’ and against a bill that aimed to introduce sexual education courses in schools. The participants marched displaying signs with messages such as ‘Moldova needs normal children’ or ‘Our children should grow up as normal ones, not as abominations.’[23]
As a result, civil society organizations and groups, directly linked and supported by the Orthodox Church promote prejudices and stereotypes, perpetuate intolerance and incite to discrimination among Moldovan society.
Position of the political parties and politicians
The Socialist Party of Moldova (PSRM) is the main political power to stand against equality and non-discrimination laws. PSRM repeatedly expressed its position as a pro-Russian party, which aims to protect traditional family values and fight, so called “gay propaganda”, which, according to them is also promoted by the Laws on ensuring and protecting equality.
In 2012, after the adoption of the Laws, the leader at that time of the PSRM, Igor Dodon challenged the legitimacy of the Laws at the Constitutional Court of Republic of Moldova.[24] The Court rejected his claims as unfounded.[25]
In 2016, the PSRM tried one more time to repeal the laws on equality by introducing an amendment to the Parliament on this issue. Parliament rejected the bill, but the PSRM continues to use the anti-equality law rhetoric, especially in political campaigns.[26]
In spring 2016, the PSRM raised in the Parliament a draft law on ‘gay propaganda’.[27] The draft pending in Parliament aimed to amend two national laws. It would add a paragraph to Article 21 of the Law on the Rights of a Child that reads: “The state ensures protection of a child from the propaganda of homosexuality for any purpose and under any form.” It aimed also to amend Article 88 of the Code of Administrative Offenses to define “propaganda of homosexuality” as: “Propaganda of homosexual relations among minors by means of assemblies, mass media, Internet, brochures, booklets, images, audio-video clips, films and/or audio-video recordings, via sound recording, amplifiers or other means of sound amplification.” The bill was also rejected by the Parliament.
In the 2016 Presidential electoral campaign, Igor Dodon – the candidate from PSRM actively used homophobic and discriminatory speech. It targeted mainly his opponent – Maia Sandu, but also affected 3 major groups: a) refugees/migrants, b) LGBT and c) Unionists (people that advocate for reunion of Republic of Moldova and Romania).
One of the most discussed and controversial events in this regard, related to news that one of the opposition leaders would bring in Moldova 30,000 Syrian refugees if they were to win.[28] This news escalated the prejudice that “aggressive Muslims” will spread all over the country, “rape women and girls and rob locals”. The same rhetoric was used in the 2018 elections for the Mayor of Chisinau, against a pro-European candidate Andrei Nastase. A lot of fake news were making claims that Chisinau will be leased out to United Arab Emirates if Nastase wins. This news was reported as hate speech by Promo-LEX Association.[29]
The Socialist Party (similar to the Orthodox Church) is finances civil society groups and associations with the aim of strengthening and promoting its illiberal positions. An example is the Garda Tînără-Молодая Гвардия” (The Young Guard)[30], the youth branch of Socialist Party, which sustains and pursues traditional and orthodox values as “the only way Moldova has to survive”.[31]
Moreover, the Church linked groups often collaborate with the Socialist linked groups in organizing their protests. In fact, the Garda Tînără participated alongside with the above-mentioned Church organizations and the Foundation Din Suflet Foundation[32] at the March for Families.
All these organizations and social groups nominally promote their own values. However, when analysed from the general perspective, they all share links to the Orthodox Church and/or the Socialist Party and actively promote a Pro-Russian or Anti-European values agenda.
Conclusions and recommendations
In order to tackle social exclusion and discrimination, it is important to understand the processes by which they vulnerable groups are excluded, e.g. inefficient functioning of institutions, behaviour, and traditions, and the specific features that reproduce the prevailing social attitudes, bias, stereotypes and other values.
The main reason for the frequent violations and threats to equality is the lack of efficient mechanisms and commitment, to implement existing policies and international obligations that Moldova undertook to perform.
For this, the authors and their organization Promo-LEX recommends that:
Aida Kasymaliyeva, a female MP in the Kyrgyz Parliament is strongly convinced that politicians and political factions do not see the problem of discrimination of women and gender inequality in the country as a concern and they de-facto oppose real progress with women's rights. [20]She insists more women in local councils, Parliament and Government will ultimately bring badly-needed change and draw attention to procedural changes that may assist women’s participation in Parliament.
Female lawmaker said: "From 2020, the law will work, when instead of the woman who left the party list, a woman comes on the list, and instead of the next placed candidate if they were - men. This bill was drafted because women came to the parliament on a 30 percent quota, but they were easier to "expel" from the Jogorku Kenesh [parliament] because of the lack of clan and financial support. Let's see how the law works. And now in the parliament, a group of women are working on the reservation of 30 percent of seats in ayil keyesh [local council]. From year to year, there are fewer and fewer women in local councils, the statistics are depressing. Our goal - 50/50, not a thirty percent quota. But if we talk about reality, it will be extremely difficult to achieve it."
Kasymaliyeva stressed that religious and conservative groups play a role in formulating negative public opinions regarding the rights of women. "They [both groups] strongly influence young people, values and the formation of negative stereotypes about the activity of women" she said.
Steve Swerdlow, Central Asia researcher for Human Rights Watch, believes women activists in Kyrgyzstan and the greater post-Soviet region face difficult tasks in the process of defending their rights. “Truly confronting the serious violations of women’s rights in Central Asia - severe domestic violence, sexual harassment and sex discrimination in the workplace, rampant sexism and economic inequality, the lack of proportionate political representation - requires challenging the very structures of Central Asian society and the most powerful entrenched systems of patriarchy that form their foundation" he replied in comments for this essay. "This is why women’s rights activists in the region have a truly revolutionary task at hand. They face resistance from many corners, including political bureaucracies, religious authorities, but also sometimes even from other women and people who have not been exposed to an understanding of feminism”.
Picture: [21]
Kyrgyzstan has also been known in the international community for its controversial and widely-accepted practice of abducting and forcing women into marriage, known in popular culture as ‘bride-kidnapping’. The scale of it can be beyond conventional wisdom and comprehension to many observers outside the Kyrgyz Republic. "Between 16 and 23 percent of women in Kyrgyzstan are abducted for marriage, but the rate is much higher among ethnic Kyrgyz where a third of all marriages are due to kidnapping." concluded a 2017 Duke University study.[22]The Women Support Centre in Kyrgyzstan reported that number of kidnapped women reaches nearly twelve thousand annually.
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the body that oversees implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), in its 2015 report on Kyrgyzstan urged the Central Asian nation's government to do more to stop the "persistent abduction of women and girls for forced marriages".[23] The UN Committee was especially alarmed by the high number of forced marriages and bride-kidnapping cases in Kyrgyzstan.
International organizations slammed the government of Kyrgyzstan in recent weeks for doing little to stop bride-kidnapping following the latest incidents in May-June. 20-year-old medical student Burulai Turdaliyeva was murdered by her abductor in a failed attempt of bride-kidnapping.[24] Within weeks after the deadly kidnapping, 18-year-old woman was abducted in the country’s capital and raped by her kidnapper.[25] “The Kyrgyzstani authorities must take action to promptly bring all alleged perpetrators of these violent and abhorrent crimes to justice, and send a strong message that gender-based violence will not be tolerated,” said in a statement by Amnesty International when it reacted to violence against women in the Kyrgyz Republic.
Subsequently, the kidnapping and forcing women into marriage is a crime in the Central Asian nation that can carry prison sentences of up to 7 and 10 years for bride-kidnapping. “But in reality, it goes unpunished, there is a kind of impunity for this crime in the country.” in its report stated The Forum of Women’s NGOs of Kyrgyzstan.[26] Indeed, only one out of 700 abduction cases is investigated and only one out of 1500 bride-kidnapping crimes leads to sentencing in courts of law for the entire country according to a UN Women assessment.[27] The Forum of Women's NGOs of Kyrgyzstan believes that the main factors of bride kidnapping are “patriarchal acceptance”, deeply-entrenched “social stereotypes”, “poverty and low social status of victims.”[28] A UNFPA survey in 2016 showed that widespread abduction of young women for forced marriage persist due to the existing “customs and traditions” in Kyrgyz Republic. UNFPA polling indicated that the “vast majority of women (81%) and men (78%) in Kyrgyzstan are negative about bride abduction. At the same time, approximately similar number of women and men (4-5%) are positive about women abducting for marriage and nearly 11% of women and more than 14% of the men are neutral.”[29]
Strikingly, the dysfunctional judiciary of the Kyrgyz Republic is only exacerbating the issue. Amnesty International report indicated that ‘64% of police officers in the southern city of Osh consider ‘bride kidnapping’ to be ‘normal’ and 82% of them believe that the abduction is ‘provoked’ by the women themselves’.[30] Women’s rights groups are strongly convinced that despite the ratification of international conventions on women’s rights including CEDAW and criminalizing the act of bride-kidnapping, access to justice for victims of bride-kidnapping has not improved. Kyrgyz women’s rights non-governmental organizations believe deterioration of the situation with women’s rights is part of Kyrgyzstan’s challenging transition process after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Forum of Women’s NGOs argues the combined effect of the loss of communist ideology and an increasing impact of the religion in the Kyrgyz Republic resulted in a tendency that is designed to “narrow down women’s roles into positions limited to the role of only mother and wife, thus limiting educational, economic and political rights and opportunities for women in the society”. This assessment highlights the rise of anti-women’s rights conservative politicians and nationalist movements; and growing influence of religious figures that are promoting travel bans for young Kyrgyz women, calling for approval of polygamy nationwide and engaging in political campaigning against the law on reproductive rights in Kyrgyzstan.
The ultimate question then, is what can be done to reverse the trend and sustain efforts to make real progress with women's rights in the Kyrgyz Republic? The country's donors and global organizations must concentrate their efforts on the transparency of aid distribution at all levels of the Kyrgyz state which is the beneficiary of foreign aid assistance programs that are tied to supporting women's rights initiatives as well. Kyrgyzstan has a vibrant civil society, including women's rights NGOs that can effectively contribute to the successful delivery of assistance programs on the ground. It is crucial that international organizations should proactively engage in a long-term cooperation and continuous dialogue with the women's rights groups.
International development banks, such as European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), World Bank, Asian Development Bank and many other financial institutions that are operating in this Central Asian country could play a positive role through their projects that must include gender equality as part of the required procedure. There are good examples of gender mainstreaming in Kyrgyzstan such as EBRD financed gender inclusion project in the municipal services of the second largest city of Osh.[31] However, the local women's rights activists and NGOs have been critical of ‘financing gender equality commitments’ in Kyrgyzstan due to ‘methodological difficulties on differentiation and integration of financial resources allocated for gender development. The analysis of foreign aid strategies in terms of gender integration showed weak coordination of donor policies and the absence of mandatory accounting and transparency of aid flows in support of gender equality’.[32] Kyrgyzstan has received more than $9 billion in foreign loans (72%) and grants (28%) for social-economic development over the period of two decades.[33]
Human rights observers say western states and many other governments who traditionally have supported women’s rights in the region need to increase their commitment to programs for early childhood education for girls and women’s empowerment in Central Asia. Steve Swerdlow argued that "they should contribute funds to supporting domestic violence and gender-sensitive training for police. Tajikistan is a good example, where a 2013 law to combat domestic violence on its face is relatively forward-looking and the OSCE has provided gender-sensitive training to staff several police stations with female police officers trained in handling domestic violence complaints. We should see more international support for such initiatives, including further support for shelters and service providers."
Essentially, it is important for the international community to determine whether the previous decades of insufficient attention to the rights of women in Central Asia may have had a negative impact on the social and political development of the landlocked region. And as the global women’s rights movement is gaining momentum around the world, there is an opportunity for the international organizations to increase support and assistance to the women's rights groups and organizations in the politically unstable region to promote gender-friendly policies in the state branches and protect the rights of women from an aggressive nationalist-conservative agenda and religious fundamentalism.
About the author: Ryskeldi Satke is a journalist and independent researcher based in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic. He wrote and published reports from Central Asia and Mongolia with international research institutions and global news organizations. His most recent policy-briefs on the regional topics include -“Between East and West: Kazakhstan and China’s new Silk Road”; Barcelona Centre for International Affairs; 2015; “Kyrgyz Republic’s experience with investment treaties and arbitration cases”; Transnational Institute; 2017.
[1] UNDP, Case Study on combating gender inequality in political participation in Kyrgyzstan, October 2016 http://www.kg.undp.org/content/dam/kyrgyzstan/Publications/gender/Case%20study_Eng10Oct2016.pdf
[2]"- ‘’Precedent Partner Group’’: How can ‘Kyrk Choro’ grow? ( in Russian) The Evening Bishkek, February 2015
https://www.vb.kg/doc/301989_precedent:_vo_chto_mojet_pererasti_kyrk_choro.html
[3] Kyrk Choro" - pro-government project? RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service (Azattyk), July 2015
https://rus.azattyk.org/a/27133965.html
[4] Ibid.
[5] Understanding Illiberal Sentiments of Kyrgyz Youth; Gulzhigit Ermatov; Central Asia Program, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University; 2017, http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Kyrgyzstan_.pdf
[6] Astra Youth, Law on reproductive rights in Kyrgyzstan signed, August 2015 http://www.astra.org.pl/youth/news/289-law-on-reproductive-rights-in-kyrgyzstan-signed.html
[7] - Tursunbay Bakir Uulu is planning to run for President ( in Russian) Kloop, June 2017 https://kloop.kg/blog/2017/06/24/tursunbaj-bakir-uulu-planiruet-ballotirovatsya-v-prezidenty/
[8] A member of the Parliament suggests the legalization of polygamy,(in Russian) Knews, September 2016
http://knews.kg/2016/09/08/parlamentarij-vnov-predlagaet-uzakonit-mnogozhenstvo/
[9] Law Journalist.kg ,Who is allowed to have a second wife?(in Russian), September 2016
http://law.journalist.kg/2016/09/27/komu-dozvoleno-brat-vtoruyu-zhenu/
[10] CACI Analyst, Feminist Activist Attacked in Osh, Kyrgyzstan; March 2014;
https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/12938-feminist-activist-attacked-in-osh-kyrgyzstan.html
[11] My first wife is upset a little' - Kyrgyz scholar on polygamy; Sherie Ryder and Maruf Siddikov; BBC Social News and BBC Monitoring; November 2017; http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-42150072
[12] A Muslim Cleric brings ‘polygamy’ onto the agenda once again , RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service (Azattyk), June 2017
https://rus.azattyk.org/a/28542667.html
[13] Kyrgyzstan: female journalist asks president to legalize polygamy, The Times of Central Asia, February 2018
https://www.timesca.com/index.php/news/19300-kyrgyzstan-female-journalist-asks-president-to-legalize-polygamy
[14] Most of population of Kyrgyzstan against polygamy, 24KG, July 2017 https://24.kg/english/58356_Most_of_population_of_Kyrgyzstan_against_polygamy/
[15] Prohibition for girls under 26 to work abroad proposed in Kyrgyzstan; Current Time; April 2018;
https://www.currenttime.tv/a/29187588.html
[16] Girl Travel Ban Passed in Kyrgyzstan; Aigul Kasymova; CACI; 27 August 2013; https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/12795-girl-travel-ban-passed-in-kyrgyzstan.html
[17] Women and children from Kyrgyzstan affected by migration, An exacerbated vulnerability; FIDH; September 2016;
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_kyrgyzstan_uk-2-web2.pdf
[18] Legal barriers to women’s participation in the economy in the Kyrgyz Republic; EBRD; October 2015;
https://www.ebrd.com/documents/admin/legal-barriers-gender.pdf
[19] EBRD (2015)
[20] Aida Kasymaliyeva MP was interviewed for the purpose of informing this essay.
[21] From Bhakti Patel, A Troubling Tradition: Kidnapping Women For Marriage In Kyrgyzstan! Bride-kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan, image d.haberay.net http://womenpla.net/troubling-tradition-kidnapping-women-marriage-kyrgyzstan/
[22] One in five girls and women kidnapped for marriage in Kyrgyzstan: study, Reuters, August 2017; https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kyrgyzstan-women-bride-kidnapping/one-in-five-girls-and-women-kidnapped-for-marriage-in-kyrgyzstan-study-idUSKBN1AH5GI
[23] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Kyrgyzstan, March 2015, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/791384/files/CEDAW_C_KGZ_CO_4-EN.pdf
[24] Young Woman’s Murder in Kyrgyzstan Shows Cost of ‘Tradition’ Human Right Watch, May 2018 https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/31/young-womans-murder-kyrgyzstan-shows-cost-tradition
[25] Kyrgyzstan: New rape case highlights need for immediate action to end appalling “bride kidnapping” practice, Amnesty International, June 2018 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/06/kyrgyzstan-new-rape-case-highlights-need-for-immediate-action-to-end-appalling-bride-kidnapping-practice/
[26] Access to justice for victims of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan, Forum of Women's NGOs of Kyrgyzstan, 2011 https://www.karat.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Access_to_justice_Report_Kyrgyzstan_en.pdf
[27] New law in Kyrgyzstan toughens penalties for bride kidnapping, UN Women, February 2013
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2013/2/new-law-in-kyrgyzstan-toughens-penalties-for-bride-kidnapping#edn1
[28] Access to justice for victims of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan, Forum of Women's NGOs of Kyrgyzstan, 2011 https://www.karat.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Access_to_justice_Report_Kyrgyzstan_en.pdf
[29] Gender in Society Perception Study, National Survey Results 2016 https://kyrgyzstan.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/GSPS_english.pdf
[30] Kyrgyzstan: New rape case highlights need for immediate action to end appalling “bride kidnapping” practice, Amnesty International, June 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/06/kyrgyzstan-new-rape-case-highlights-need-for-immediate-action-to-end-appalling-bride-kidnapping-practice/
[31] First EBRD-financed buses arrive in Osh, Kyrgyz Republic; EBRD; December 2016; http://www.ebrd.com/news/2016/first-ebrdfinanced-buses-arrive-in-osh-kyrgyz-republic-.html
[32] Strengthening foreign aid effectiveness in Kyrgyzstan; 24KG; March 2014; https://24.kg/archive/en/bigtiraj/169423-news24.html/
[33] The Downside of Foreign Aid in Kyrgyzstan; The Diplomat; June 2017; https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/the-downside-of-foreign-aid-in-kyrgyzstan/
[post_title] => Illiberal forces put women’s rights under strain in Kyrgyzstan
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[post_content] => The focus of civil society research in the social and political sciences has, for the most part, been on progressive and liberal groups and movements who defend the cause of equal human rights against an unjust state or against oppressive majorities. Progressive norm entrepreneurs trigger debates in the course of which general principles of human rights, such as equality, justice and non-discrimination, become framed as concrete values and demands. A classic example of this is the expansion of the principle of equality from male citizens to all adult citizens through women’s suffrage. The norm entrepreneurs, in this case, were women’s movements. Another example for norm entrepreneurship are gay and lesbian movements, who have become increasingly successful in seeing their demands of equality and non-discrimination written into the law of most Western democracies. Both stories exemplify how a general principle becomes framed in terms of concrete values and demands and how the issues raised eventually translate into new policies. ‘Norm cascade’ is the term which the political scientists Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink have used to describe this dynamic.[1] Human rights principles need active, discursive and legal implementation, which is always rooted in the choices and actions of concrete actors.
Today we have to concede that the focus on progressive, liberal civil society in the literature on norm entrepreneurship has been one-sided. Besides liberal NGOs actors on the right also mobilize. The concerns of these groups vary from anti-immigration to gun-promotion, from anti-abortion to religious exemptions. Illiberal civil society uses the very same mechanisms and strategies as a progressive civil society: actors create NGOs and transnational platforms, they employ lawyers and lobby politicians, as well as using the internet and media to attract new followers. In this contribution, I pick out one such illiberal civil society organization – the World Congress of Families (WCF) – and look at its role in two of the countries that are the focus of this compilation: Georgia and Moldova.
The WCF organizes international and regional congresses in support of the ‘natural family’ across Europe, the United States, and the former Soviet Union. It was founded in 1997 by American and Russian partners, with the Howard Center for Family, Religion, and Society from Rockford, Illinois being the main driving force for the first ten years. The Russian engagement in the WCF coordination became prominent only after 2010. In that year, the late Larry Jacobs, at the time the WCF’s managing director, traveled to Russia on an official visit to speak at an event organized by the Russian pro-life organization Sanctity of Motherhood. “We were delighted by the support we found there”, Jacobs was quoted in the media after this trip. “Russian pro-life/pro-family forces are eager to cooperate with their counterparts in the West. Given its traditional support for faith and family, Russia will play an increasingly important part in the international struggle to preserve the natural family”.[2] The WCF so far has organized two international congresses in the former Soviet Union; one summit in 2014 in Moscow, the other 2016 in Tbilisi. The 2018 Congress will take place in the capital of Moldova, Chisinau, in September.
The World Congress of Families is the American Christian Right going international. Since 2016 the WCF has become a chapter of the International Organization for the Family (IOF). The organization does not self-identify explicitly as Christian, but the religious character is evident. Congresses are attended by Christians of all denominations, including Mormons, and occasionally also Muslims are invited. The IOF mission statement includes a plea to ‘protect freedom, faith, and family’.[3] Orthodox Christians from Eastern Europe are newcomers in this circle, and they are setting their own agenda.
The local partners for the Moscow and Tbilisi summits were wealthy businessmen, Konstantin Malofeev from Russia and Levan Vasadze from Georgia. The Moscow Summit was also co-sponsored by the organization Sanctity of Motherhood, which is headed by the wife of the Russian oligarch, and former head of Russian Railways Vladimir Yakunin. Malofeev and Yakunin are on the international sanctions list imposed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The three businessmen present themselves as committed Orthodox Christians: Malofeev runs the St. Basil the Great Charitable Foundation, which sponsors, among other things, an Orthodox private school and a TV-station that promotes Russian Orthodox statehood (tsargrad.tv)[4]; Yakunin is the head of St. Andrew the First Called Endowment Fund, which finances several programs, among them the Russki Mir Foundation and the Sanctity of Motherhood pro-life network[5]; Vasadze likewise founded an Orthodox private school in Tbilisi[6]. Both Vasadze and the Russian WCF representative Alexey Komov have studied in the United States, they know Western languages, culture and politics, and they have adopted the habitus of American Christian conservatives. Now they are importing the American culture wars into their home countries.
WCF congresses are networking events for social conservative activists, professionals and politicians from across the US, Europe and other parts of the world. Liberalism is the declared opponent. For American participants, the enemies are progressive liberals in their own country. The enemy for the Eastern Europeans is the European Union. The few Western European participants, almost all from the far-right spectrum of the Catholic Church, feature in the WCF congresses as token victims of the EU. A French participant at the Tbilisi Congress went on record in front of a Georgian TV station saying: “Do not join the EU, the EU will destroy your families”, and a notorious German anti-gender activist, Gabriele Kuby, frightened the Georgian audience with the (false) statement that the EU would impose a school curriculum that teaches masturbation.[7] One politician present in Tbilisi in 2016 was Igor Dodon, now the pro-Russian president of Moldova and the host of this year’s congress.
For the Eastern European sponsors of the WCF events in Georgia and Moldova the ideological battle clearly goes beyond family questions. The larger context is the question whether their countries should orient their political and economic development westwards or eastwards, towards the EU or towards Russia. The way westwards is depicted as capitalist, immoral, anti-religious and anti-family, the way eastwards as path of salvation, complete with state-regulated (and not global capitalist) economies, morality, Orthodox religious education and demographic growth. A recent speech by Vasadze in Moldova published by Visegrad Post outlines the economic and political side of the program.[8] What makes this agenda new with regard to the anti-Westernism of the traditional Orthodox, Russian or Soviet kind is that this anti-liberalism identifies allies in the West. It is not the West as such that is rejected, but the ‘liberal West’. Social conservatives of all denominations from the West are welcome partners.
This alliance with the Western Christian right constitutes a real innovation in the context of rampant Orthodox anti-ecumenism. The strong message of political support that is sent out by church leaders who attend the WCF cannot be underestimated: just consider that Patriarch Ilia of Georgia, who merely conceded an airport meeting to Pope Francis on his visit to Georgia in 2016, made a personal appearance at the WCF summit in Tbilisi, and that Patriarch Kirill of Moscow announced that he would attend the congress in Chisinau in September 2018. If he will make true on this promise, he will also send a message to the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate of Bucharest, which competes with Moscow over canonical jurisdiction in Moldova.
The WCF is a social conservative caravan of always the same people and topics that tours different cities: Prague 1997, Geneva 1999, Mexico City 2004, Warsaw 2007, Amsterdam 2009, Madrid 2012, Sydney 2013, Moscow 2014, Salt Lake City 2015, Tbilisi 2016, Budapest 2017, and Chisinau 2018. The congresses in Eastern Europe, at least those I have followed more closely, have always served a dual purpose of launching a political message and of boosting local civil society activism. Pro-life groups from all over the former Soviet Union had been invited to Tbilisi in 2016, some of them visibly at their first experience of presenting their work in English in front of an international audience. The Budapest WCF featured a family street festival. To local activists, WCF offers a global narrative for concrete grievances (for example high abortion rates) and a promise of influence. It is the ideological alternative to the progressive and liberal civil society that already exists in their countries and that is faced with increasing pressure (the campaign against George Soros in Hungary or restrictive NGO-legislation in Russia). The illiberal civil society promoted by the WCF and its local sponsors retains some of the attractive features of the progressive program – internationality, predominance of English language, the opportunity to access funds and obtain travel grants – but at the same time is it politically conformist, ideologically ‘safe’ in an illiberal, repressive political environment and it appeals to people’s religious feelings.
The WCF acts as transnational norm entrepreneur, much of the same kind as norm protagonists described in the beginning of this paper, only that it is illiberal and conservative, not liberal and progressive. It contributes to the rise of illiberal civil society in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It also makes its influence felt in Western Europe, with actors from the Christian Right, who are a minority in their home countries, finding large audiences. It is an open question whether this development will lead to a European scenario of protracted but ultimately stable liberal-conservative culture wars as we know them from the United States, or whether this development has the potential to become fundamentally destructive for EU integration and liberal democracy on the long run.
Recommendations for action[9]
In light of the challenge posed by the WCF and the rise of illiberal organizations across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union there are two recommendations that may be helpful for the international community to explore. These are:
These pages were banned by Facebook administrators in May 2018. Soon they re-opened
Neo-Nazi forces start to show up in Georgia since 2015 with the appearance of Georgian Power, followed by the creation of Georgian March, which has been an active organization since 2017. Both staged protests with xenophobic appeals. Georgian Power is a more ideology-oriented entity backed up by the youth, while Georgian March is ruled by former politicians and individuals expressing pro-Russian views (Dimitri Lortkipanidze, Sandro Bregadze, Guram Palavandishvili). They have good relations with Levan Vasadze, a businessman with a Russian background who is also lashing out at the so-called LGBT propaganda.
Though the narrative of the nationalist powers comply with Russian propaganda, it’s difficult to prove that they are funded by the Kremlin. However, it’s evident that Georgian March is similar to the xenophobic marches in Ukraine, Russian and Moldova, therefore it is obvious that they have similar agendas. And the fact of its leadership being comprised of former politicians with obvious pro-Russian views confirms these doubts.
As for Georgian Power, its leader is Nikoloz Burnadze, a US citizen living in the USA, which criticizes Georgian March, saying that pro-Russian people manage this organization, which is unacceptable to him.
A fascist organization Georgian National Unity popped up in 2016, and has already managed to conduct a number of demonstrations with xenophobic messages. Regardless of the differences, all three groups (Georgian March, Georgian Power and Georgian National Unity have consolidated under a national idea of ‘fighting against LGBT propaganda’. They engaged dozens of their Facebook pages to organize their protests.
The page Iberian Unity was created in 2017 and became proactive in 2018. It promotes neo-Nazi ideas and claims that users with pro-Russian or pro-Turkey ideas will be blocked. The page shares posts of other anti-liberal pages, supports demonstrations against LGBT people.
Another Facebook large page, the Anti-Liberal Club, appeared in 2015 and has approximately 44K followers posting homophobic and xenophobic’ statuses’ using disinformation and manipulation. The administrator of the page is Shota Martinenko, who also owns web site altinfo.com, which is used for distributing anti- liberal opinions. Its articles are shared by above-mentioned pages.
Georgian Idea is the Facebook page of a political party with the same title founded in 2014 and participated in 2016 parliamentary elections. The leader is Levan Chachua, who was arrested after a fight at TV Kavkasia in 2010. 3 years later he was released as a political prisoner. Georgian Idea cooperates with Georgian March and other neo Nazi groups, participating in homophobic and xenophobic demonstrations.
