US Election Aftermath: How Trump won and what it means for the US and the world

Article by Dr Andrew Gawthorpe

November 8, 2024

US Election Aftermath: How Trump won and what it means for the US and the world

The votes are still being counted, but it is already clear who is the winner of the US election – Donald Trump. He not only sailed to victory in the Electoral College, but also is likely to end up with more total votes than his opponent, Kamala Harris. Unlike in 2016, Trump is the clear choice of the majority of Americans – or at least of those who voted.

How did he do it?

Although it takes time for the data to trickle in, we are starting to have a sense of the geography and demographics which drove Trump to victory. The former president won by improving his performance in every single type of locality – urban, suburban, and rural. The biggest swings towards him were in urban areas, a reflection of slightly better performance with non-white voters than he achieved in 2016 or 2020. Harris’ hope of improving her standing in the suburbs, and particularly among women, did not transpire. She actually performed slightly worse with female voters overall than Biden did in 2020. The only demographic group she did better with was highly educated women, but they only make up a small part of the electorate.[1]

Postmortems of the Harris campaign have already begun, and the debate over what it could have done differently is likely to continue for years. Her defeat seems to have been mainly due to general malaise in America caused by a period of high inflation and an unpopular incumbent president. There was a fairly uniform swing against the Democrats across all areas of the country and demographic groups, suggesting that it was not some mistake by Harris which turned off a key slice of voters. It was just that the country was ready for a change.

There is also no indication that America is headed for an extended period of dominance by Trump or the Republican Party. His ultimate margin in the popular vote, if he wins one at all, will be small. Moreover, in the swing states in which the two candidates actively campaigned, Harris did between 3 and 5% better than in states in which she did not campaign. This suggests that many people were convinced by her message – just not quite enough to overcome the national backlash against her party.

In Trump’s first term, his chaotic and offensive behaviour quickly produced a backlash of its own which drove down his popularity and led to subsequent electoral defeat. The same thing is likely to happen again this time, provided he does not do too much damage to American democracy in the meantime.

What does it mean?

Nevertheless, the implications of the election for the country and the world will be profound. Firstly, this election surely marks the acceptance of Trumpism as a normal, legitimate part of the American political spectrum. It is by no means politically dominant, but nor is it a temporary aberration. Trump won despite making no effort to moderate his racism, misogyny or authoritarian tendencies. Whether voters were really enthusiastically embracing these things is unclear, but a majority of them did not regard them as disqualifying.

The exact impact that Trump will have on the stability of democratic institutions and values in the US is hard to predict. He has talked about carrying out a mass deportation of immigrants and weaponising the criminal justice system against his political opponents and the media. The very fact that he will now avoid facing trial for his role in the January 6^th insurrection and his broader attempt to overturn the 2020 election also undermines democratic norms.

In a worst-case scenario, Trump and his allies might attempt to make more structural changes to the nature of American democracy, for instance through changing the way elections are administered or the way that the media is regulated. Such changes would likely kick off a furious backlash from civil society and be contested in the courts, but this does not mean they will necessarily fail. The hope of everyone must be that the country can make it through to November 2028 with its democracy more or less intact and that another free and fair election can be held.

The election also carries consequences for the world at large. The fact that Trumpism still remains a viable electoral force even after his disastrous first term means that it poses a more long-term challenge to Europe and the rest of the world. While America’s traditional internationalism and transatlanticism are by no means dead – they still have the support of the Democratic Party and some Republicans – they now co-exist with a more unilateral, even isolationist view. It is this view that will be ascendant over the next four years.

Therefore Britain and Europe can expect less attention from the United States as a result – and the attention that they do get will be of a less benign kind. Trump’s opposition to providing continued support to Ukraine is well known, and he appears to have kept up his friendly relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin while out of office.[2] Trump has also proposed placing 10% tariffs on all imports into the US, a move that economists have warned could plunge the Eurozone into recession and halve economic growth in Britain.[3]

The focus of European policymakers in the short term will be on trying to divine whether Trump plans to follow through with these security and economic policies, and how he might be persuaded not to. Trump’s very personalised approach to diplomacy means that foreign leaders will need to attempt to build a friendly rapport with him. This could prove divisive, with leaders vying for his favour and hoping that he directs his tariffs against their neighbours instead.

Foreign capitals also need to pay close attention to who Trump takes into the White House with him. In his first term, he often – although not always – placed experienced administrators and experts in charge of key agencies and in White House positions. However, the expectation is that in a second term Trump will be more dependent on figures who are closely associated with his Make America Great Again movement and the right-wing fringes of American politics. It is vital now for European governments to learn who these people are, what drives them, and how to establish a relationship with them.

The city on the hill no longer

After Trump takes office, Europe will exist in a world in which none of the major global powers – Russia, the United States, or China – has a leadership which is committed to liberal democracy, the rule of law, or the multilateral institutions which make up the international order. Navigating this world while maintaining support for these values at home will require cooperation within Europe, including Great Britain. This requires European countries to develop not only the tools of power and influence, but also new mechanisms for pooling their strength and acting together.

The immediate challenge will be in finding ways to aid the defence of Ukraine and fend off the economic harm of Trump’s tariffs. Beyond that, Europe will need to become more serious about charting its own destiny. The continent’s prosperity and security cannot be left to the whim of voters in Michigan any longer. Nor can Europe continue to rely on always having an American leader who more or less shares the continent’s values. It must develop the capacity to champion and defend those values itself.

In practical terms, this means a few things. Firstly, it means boosting European defence industries so that the continent has the defence industrial base that it needs to look after itself. This will come too late to enable Ukraine to fight on if Trump pulls the plug on American support, but it would help with the defence of the continent in the future. Secondly, European governments – including the UK – need to do more to stimulate economic growth in order to generate the resources that the continent needs to stand on its own two feet. Finally, there is an urgent need for increased solidarity and coordination between Britain and the European Union, who must pool their resources to meet this moment.

Trump’s first term produced four years of talk about “strategic autonomy” in Europe, but far too few concrete steps to realise it. These steps proved to be difficult in part because the first time around, few European leaders wanted to accept that Trump and the movement he represented would be around for long. It was easier to still live in a mental universe in which the US still had a dominant seat at the table, even if that seat was temporarily unoccupied. This time around, Trump seems to want to turn over the table altogether. Europe needs to be prepared to build a new one in its place.

Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre

Photograph courtesy of Oleg Yunakov via WikiCommons.

[1] Kevin Schaul and Kati Perry, How Counties Are Shifting In The 2024 Presidential Election, The Washington Post, November 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/interactive/2024/11/05/compare-2020-2024-presidential-results/; Kaitlin Lewis, CNN Exit Poll Shows Kamala Harris’ One Area Of Growth In Election, Newsweek, October 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/kamala-harris-democrats-election-white-college-voters-1981832.

[2] Michael Hirsh, The Enduring Mystery Of Trump’s Relationship With Russia, Foreign Policy, October 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/30/enduring-mystery-trump-relationship-russia/.

[3] Larry Elliott, Trump Tariffs Would Halve UK Growth And Push Up Prices, Says Thinktank, The Guardian, November 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/06/donald-trump-tariffs-would-cut-uk-growth-by-half-and-push-up-inflation-thinktank-warns; Piero Cingari, Why Trump’s Plans For Tariffs Could Be Bad For Europe’s Economy, Euronews.com, November 2024, https://www.euronews.com/business/2024/11/04/how-much-could-trumps-tariffs-damage-europes-economy.

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Today is Election Day in America. Who will win – and what is at stake?

Article by Dr Andrew Gawthorpe

November 5, 2024

Today is Election Day in America. Who will win – and what is at stake?

After what has felt like an endless campaign, today is Election Day in the United States (US). Presuming that counting proceeds smoothly, there’s a good chance that by tomorrow we will know the winner of one of the most consequential elections in modern history. That makes it a good moment to look back on what has happened during the campaign and consider the stakes for the future.

The state of the race

Let’s start with the current state of the race. As always, the outcome of the election depends on the swing states. Most US states reliably vote the same way every election. By contrast, the swing states are those in which a victory for either candidate is possible and so which will ultimately decide the overall winner. These seven states – Georgia, North Carolina, Nevada, Arizona, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania – have been polled more than ever before, and we also now have early voting data available from all of them.

So far, all of this information is inconclusive. The race appears to be a dead heat, with neither candidate enjoying a significant advantage. However, this appearance is based largely on the polls, which have been giving strange and contradictory results. The 2024 election comes at a make-or-break moment for the American polling industry, which badly misread both the 2016 and 2020 elections by underestimating support for Donald Trump.

Determined not to make the same mistake again, pollsters have radically changed their methods, and the exact changes have varied from pollster to pollster. Many seem to be suppressing results which suggest a clear victory for either candidate because they fear reputational damage from another drastically wrong call. This could be one reason why the polls appear so abnormally stable and tied.[1]

Early voting data is also a poor guide to the outcome of the election. Widespread early voting is a relatively recent phenomenon in U.S. elections, and this year it has been embraced by the Republican Party on a scale unseen in the past. This means that we lack a basis for comparison to previous elections.[2]

Not that this has stopped anxious (and sometimes jubilant) members of each party poring over the data looking for signs of an advantage. For instance, Republicans have been buoyed by turnout among seniors, and Democrats have been pleased to see women disproportionately represented among those who have voted early.[3] Yet there is no evidence that this means that younger people or men are less likely to vote on Election Day itself, when their votes will count just as much as those who turned out early.

The campaigns

Everything, then, hinges on what happens today – who turns out to vote, and who they actually vote for. Here is what the two campaigns will be hoping is going to happen.

Kamala Harris has run her campaign with one overriding goal: to appeal to moderate, white swing voters in general and women in particular. She had three reasons for doing this. Firstly, as a woman of colour – not to mention a former senator from California – she realized that her biggest potential liability was being seen by the electorate as too liberal. Secondly, ever since 2016 Democrats have been able to make enormous inroads into America’s formerly Republican-leaning suburban communities as their residents have been repelled by Trump. Harris’ focus on the idea of Trump as a threat to democracy in the final weeks of her campaign is designed to win over more of this group. Thirdly, the overturning of Roe v. Wade – which guaranteed the right to abortion – has galvanized American women against the Republican Party, and Harris has made abortion rights a central part of her message.[4]

Victory for Harris hence looks something like this. Firstly, she needs to make sure that her party’s most reliable supporters turn out to vote in significant numbers in large cities like Philadelphia, Milwaukee and Atlanta. Secondly, she needs to peel as many suburban moderates and women away from Trump as possible.

Right now, defeat looks most likely to come from a failure of the party’s base to be enthused by her candidacy. If Harris loses, she’ll be criticized for not paying enough attention to voters of colour and working-class whites. Campaigning with former Republicans like Liz Cheney might have appeal in the suburbs, but there’s a chance it turns people off downtown.[5]

The Trump campaign is trying to pull off a similar balancing act. In previous elections, Trump has managed to mobilize white rural and working-class voters in large numbers while also maintaining some support in the suburbs. This time around, Trump himself has focused on using divisive and incendiary rhetoric to mobilize his base. While his campaign advertising has focused much more often on messages about inflation and immigration which are designed to appeal more to suburban moderates, it has also featured a heavy attack on transgender rights.[6]

Trump has also made an explicit appeal to men a central part of his campaign and has made some moves towards trying to broaden the Republican Party’s appeal with men of colour. The impact of the latter, however, has been blunted by the open racism of his campaign in its final weeks.[7]

If they were fielding any other candidate, then this would be the Republican Party’s election to lose. The US has just seen sky-high inflation, a crisis at its southern border, and an unpopular incumbent president having to step down halfway through his own re-election campaign. Virtually every other post-pandemic leader or government which oversaw similar levels of inflation has been ejected from office. The Republicans ought to be leading comfortably in the polls, not locked in an apparent tie. Instead, the party is paying a “Trump Tax” for their candidate’s divisiveness and extremism.[8] If victory comes, it will be because their discontent with the state of the country in the last four years persuaded just enough voters to give the former president another chance anyway.

The stakes

In a sense, what is on the ballot today is not just who will be president for the next four years – it is whether the country will finally reject Trumpism or accept it as a normal feature of the country’s political landscape. If Trump loses, his political record will be a grim one for Republicans. The former president faced an unpopular opponent in 2016 and won by a tiny margin, and then went on to lead his party to dramatically underperform in the 2020 presidential election and the 2018 and 2022 midterms. Another loss now would present an opportunity for moderate Republicans with respect for the constitution to reclaim their party, and for the US to draw a line under the Trump era.

Victory, by contrast, would unleash Trump like never before. Indeed, Trump and his campaign seem to be relishing in divisiveness more openly than ever, meaning that it will be hard to claim that Americans did not know what they were getting themselves in for if they elect him. Trump’s campaign this year has been more overtly racist. He has complained that immigrants have bad “genes” and that they “poison the blood” of the American people.[9] At an event billed as his campaign’s “closing argument”, Trump hosted a comedian well known for making racist remarks – who then proceeded to do just that, sparking a furious backlash from some of the voters of colour who Trump had previously claimed to be trying to win over.[10]

Trump has also continued his violent rhetoric and attacks on the democratic process. These have included welcoming violence against journalists, speculating about his political opponents being jailed and shot, and making baseless accusations of election fraud. And that is just in the past week.[11]

Something else has hung over the closing days of the campaign – the possibility of violence or divisive legal contests, particularly if Trump loses. The Trump campaign has been ratcheting up its criticism of the electoral process in recent days, and it will almost certainly attempt to use lawsuits and pressure on local election officials to influence the counting process. The result could be chaos – or outbreaks of violence against election officials and offices, such as that which Trump has been criminally charged with orchestrating on January 6^th, 2021.

All of this means that the stakes are high. It matters a great deal to the rest of the world whether the United States is a country in which this style of politics is accepted by voters and practiced by the nation’s president. What happens today will determine the course of the next four years, and far beyond.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre

Photograph courtesy of Phil Roeder via Wikicommons.

[1] Robert Tait, Dead-Heat Poll Results Are Astonishing – And Improbable, These Experts Say, The Guardian, November 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/02/what-polls-mean-so-far-trump-harris-election-voters.

[2] Ivan Pereira, Tens Of Millions Of Early Votes Have Been Cast. What Could It Mean For Election Day?, ABC News, November 2024, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/tens-millions-early-votes-cast-election-day/story?id=115272249.

[3] Joey Garrison, Women Outpacing Men In Early Voting, Boosting Harris Campaign’s Optimism, USA Today, November 2024, https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/11/01/women-outpacing-men-early-voting-optimism-harris/75990004007/; Ryan King, Trump Camp Touts GOP Early-Voting Gains Over 2020 As Election Comes Down To Wire, The New York Post, November 2024, https://nypost.com/2024/11/03/us-news/trump-camp-touts-gop-early-voting-gains-over-2020-as-election-comes-down-to-wire/.

[4] Megan Messerly and Meridith McGraw, Harris Is Courting Moderate Republicans. Liz Cheney Is Helping, Politico, November 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/10/21/harris-liz-cheney-moderate-republicans-00184765; Justine McDaniel, Abortion Rights Gave Democrats Big Wins Post-Roe. Harris Wants A Repeat, The Washington Post, November 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/11/03/kamala-harris-abortion-campaign-voters/.

[5] Nicholas Nehamas and Erica L. Green, As Harris Courts Republicans, The Left Grows Wary And Alienated, The New York Times, November 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/24/us/politics/kamala-harris-progressives-democrats.html.

[6] Susan Davis, GOP Ads On Transgender Rights Are Dominating Airwaves In The Election’s Closing Days, NPR, November 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/10/19/g-s1-28932/donald-trump-transgender-ads-kamala-harris.

[7] Zac Anderson, Crude Talk And The NFL: Trump Doubles Down On His Lead With Male Voters, USA Today, October 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/10/19/g-s1-28932/donald-trump-transgender-ads-kamala-harris; Harry Enten, Trump Was Doing Historically Well With Hispanic Voters Before Madison Square Garden Backlash, CNN, October 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/28/politics/hispanic-voters-trump-election-rally/index.html.

[8] Andrew Gawthorpe, Republicans Pay A Trump Taks – Again, America Explained, October 2024, https://amerex.substack.com/p/republicans-pay-a-trump-tax-again.

[9] Kate Sullivan, Trump Suggests Undocumented Immigrants Who Commit Murder Have ‘Bad Genes’, CNN, October 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/07/politics/trump-undocumented-immigrants-bad-genes/index.html; Maggie Astor, Trump Doubles Down On Migrants ‘Poisoning’ The Country, The New York Times, March 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/17/us/politics/trump-fox-interview-migrants.html.

[10] Jill Colvin and Michelle L. Price, Trump’s Madison Square Garden Event Features Crude And Racist Remarks, The Associated Press, October 2024, https://apnews.com/article/trump-madison-square-garden-new-york-election-fcfe75be7f8281fde7bffa3adb3bba5d.

[11] Hannah Knowles and Meryl Kornfield, Trump Says He Doesn’t Mind Someone Shooting At Journalists At Rally, The Washington Post, November 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/2024/11/03/trump-rally-media-shooting/; Michael Gold and Adam Nagourney, Trump Assails Liz Cheney And Imagines Guns ‘Shooting At Her’, The New York Times, November 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/01/us/politics/trump-liz-cheney-tucker-carlson.html; Alexandra Marquez, Jake Traylor and Jillian Frankel, Trump Talks About Shooting At Press, Ramps Up Election Fraud Claims At Pa. Rally, NBC News, November 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-wouldnt-mind-if-someone-shot-media-pa-rally-rcna178573.

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Election Monitoring

Women's Rights

Regions

United States and Canada

United States

Op-ed: Would Trump 2.0 mean “No War”?

Article by David Hastings Dunn

November 1, 2024

Donald Trump regularly claims that his strong leadership prevented the outbreak of war during his presidency. However, it’s an argument that doesn’t stand up to much scrutiny.

Some of the conflicts that have dogged his successor Joe Biden’s presidential administration are the direct result of policies put in place during Trump’s time in the White House. Not to mention the time Trump’s grandstanding almost embroiled the United States (US) in a conflict with North Korea in 2017.[1]

The first foreign policy act for which Trump criticised the Biden administration was the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. The fact is that Biden was following the previous administrations’ plan, having been left with little choice but to implement Trump’s deal with the Taliban in February 2020.[2]

This agreement, done without the involvement of the Afghan government, involved the US committing to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan in return for the Taliban pledging not to attack American forces. There was no corresponding requirement to prevent the Taliban attacking Afghan government forces, no mechanism to enforce this agreement, and the deal sanctioned the release of 5,000 Taliban fighters who soon found themselves back on the front line.

The US withdrawal also involved the removal of military protection of US contractors who serviced and maintained Afghan army helicopters and other equipment. Their withdrawal contributed heavily to the rapid defeat of these forces.[3] Mark Esper, Trump’s then defence secretary, criticised the deal for pulling out too many troops, too quickly for nothing in return.[4] H.R. McMaster, Trump’s second national security adviser, went further in calling the deal “a surrender agreement with the Taliban”.[5] So, although Afghanistan was a defeat on Biden’s watch, it was a failure of the Trump administration’s making.

Similarly, it can be argued that a contributing factor behind the decision by Hamas to launch its murderous attack on Israel in October 2023 was to derail the normalisation of relations between the Arab world and Israel that the Trump administration initiated through the Abraham Accords.[6] The bilateral agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco is seen as one of, if not the, signature foreign policy achievements of the Trump administration. [7]

However, the Accords failed to address the Palestinian question meaning efforts to extend normalisation to Saudi Arabia were perceived by Hamas as the abandonment of their plight. While talks of normalisation paid lip service to the need to address the Palestinian question, Hamas, amongst others, were clearly of the opinion that that framing of the Abraham Accords that Trump set in motion was decidedly and deliberately exclusionary of their interests.

That Hamas’s plan was a success in this regard was borne out by the subsequent statement in 2024 by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that: “No relations with Israel will be established before progress is made toward establishing a Palestinian state”.[8]

While Biden could have deviated from Trump’s policies in both Afghanistan and the Middle East there would have been costs associated with doing so. In Afghanistan, it would have required sending huge numbers of American military forces back to the region. In the Middle East, it would have meant unpicking a diplomatic initiative that has already granted Israel diplomatic progress without the requirement to make concessions.

That he did not do so does not mean that responsibilities for these debacles lays solely with Biden. These were all policy decisions of which Trump would have reaped the consequences had he won a second term in November 2020.

What is most often forgotten about Trump’s years in the White House is how close America came to war with North Korea. In July 2017, Pyongyang developed an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with the capability to reach the continental US, something that candidate Trump vowed would never happen. While the military advised quiet defensive measures and military signalling, Tump took to twitter, calling Kim Young Un “Little rocket man” and promising: “Fire and fury like the world has never seen.”[9]

His threats towards North Korea, however, were not confined to escalatory rhetoric. Instead, Trump ordered three carrier battle groups to the region and flew numerous simulated air attacks against the country.[10]

Discussion within the White House over a US nuclear attack against Pyongyang’s rocket forces were so advanced that Defence Secretary Jim Mattis was being dropped off at Washington’s National Cathedral on his way home from the Pentagon, in order to pray for guidance as he prepared plans to “incinerate a couple million people.”[11]

It was a crisis that could have so easily have escalated had Trump not been seduced by a series of vague promises and the opportunity to meet the North Korean leader in three media-drenched summit meetings. On this occasion Trump’s love of the cameras, the sense of anticipation and the belief that the summits were in themselves substantive, persuaded him to drop the pressure on North Korea and effectively accept the nuclear threat that Kim now presents to America.

At the time Trump declared “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea”, with US Senator Chuck Schumer responding: “Saying it doesn’t make it so.” [12] Since this episode US relations with North Korea have only worsened.

Trump’s handling of the threat of Iranian nuclear proliferation also brings into question the idea that his return to the White House would be conflict free. In May 2018 Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for Iran – the “Iran Nuclear deal”, without having any alternative plan beyond sanctions of limiting the development of Tehran’s latent nuclear weapons programme.[13] As a result, Iran is much closer to a nuclear weapons capability than ever before. Trump’s response to this is to publicly support the notion that Israel should pre-emptively destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities before they can develop the capacity to reach the United States. [14] In order to be successful such an action would likely require a joint US Israeli attack of considerable scale.[15]Hardly the impression that Trump likes to give of what his second term would be like.

How a second Trump administration would deal with threats over Iran, North Korea, the Chinese threat to Taiwan, the war in Ukraine will play out are unknowable. Yet what is certain is that the track record of his first term in office is no guarantee of peace and security for the next four years.

David Hastings Dunn is Professor of International Politics at the University of Birmingham, he writes on US and international security issues.

Photograph courtesy of The White House from Washington, DC, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] James Hohmann, The Washington Post, 16 September 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/16/daily-202-us-came-much-closer-war-with-north-korea-2017-than-public-knew-trump-told-woodward/

[2] David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, Conflict – The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Gaza, 15 October 2024 https://www.harpercollins.com/products/conflict-david-petraeusandrew-roberts?variant=41467744092194

[3] ibid.

[4] Amber Philips, The Washington Post, 26 August 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/08/20/trump-peace-deal-taliban

[5] Bari Weiss, X, 19 August 2021, https://x.com/bariweiss/status/1428191060791005186

[6] Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Steven Tian and Dan Raviv, Time, ‘Why Hamas Tried to Sabotage Arab-Israeli Peace Prospects With a Massive Unprovoked Attack’, 08 October 2023, https://time.com/6321671/why-hamas-sabotaged-peace-prospects-israel-attack/

[7] Quint Forgey, Politico, ‘‘The dawn of a new Middle East’: Trump celebrates Abraham Accords with White House signing ceremony’ , 15 September 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/15/trump-abraham-accords-palestinians-peace-deal-415083

[8] Tamir Pardo and Nimrod Novik, The Jerusalem Post, ‘Former Mossad chief warns Netanyahu’s ‘curse plan’ endangers Israel’s regional future – opinion’, 30 September 2024 https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-822472

[9] Bob Woodward, Rage, Simon & Schuster, 31 May 2021, https://www.simonandschuster.co.uk/books/Rage/Bob-Woodward/9781471197741

[10] ibid.

[11] James Hohmann, The Washington Post, 16 September 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/16/daily-202-us-came-much-closer-war-with-north-korea-2017-than-public-knew-trump-told-woodward/

[12] Donald Trump, X, 13 June 2018 https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1006837823469735936

Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, The New York Times, ‘Trump Sees End to North Korea Nuclear Threat Despite Unclear Path’, 13 June 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/us/politics/trump-north-korea-denuclearization.html

[13] Mark Lander, The New York Times, ‘Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned’ 8 May 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html

[14] AFP, The Times of Israel, ‘Trump says he thinks Israel should ‘hit’ Iran nuclear facilities’, 05 October 2024 https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/trump-says-he-thinks-israel-should-hit-iran-nuclear-facilities/

[15] Doreen Horschig, CSIS, ‘Why Striking Iranian Nuclear Facilities Is a Bad Idea’, 25 October 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-striking-iranian-nuclear-facilities-bad-idea

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Regions

Georgia: Ruling party attacks LGBTI rights, amid wider crackdown on freedoms ahead of parliamentary elections

Article by Mariam Uberi

October 23, 2024

Georgia: Ruling party attacks LGBTI rights, amid wider crackdown on freedoms ahead of parliamentary elections

Democratic backsliding has often been seen to come in tandem with a rise in anti-LGBTQI rhetoric and policy making. The same is true in Georgia where anti-LGBTQI laws have been enacted, framed as efforts to uphold ‘traditional family values’. This upcoming weekend’s parliamentary elections are being held at a time when the country is at a crossroads. While the majority of Georgian society is understood to be supportive of Euro-Atlantic integration, this aspiration is being weakened on two fronts – externally by Russian influence and internally by the actions of Georgian Dream (GD), the current ruling party.

On 26 October 2024, Georgians will elect a 150-member parliament in the nation’s first fully proportional elections. Only the parties that pass a five percent threshold will secure parliamentary seats. This election follows months of political turmoil in Georgia, including a series of anti-democratic moves by the GD such as the passage of the Foreign Agents Law, anti-LGBT legislation, and the use of repressive measures to crack down on dissent and protests. The GD’s election campaign has focused on scaremongering, by reinforcing the rhetoric that Georgia will repeat Ukraine’s fate should the GD lose – with the GD looking to ban opposition parties in Georgia should they win.^[1] The GD has also been perpetuating existing political polarisation, which goes against one of the main recommendations that the European Union (EU) posed for Georgia to receive the EU membership candidacy.[2]

Legislative Changes

The ‘traditional family values’ and anti-LGBT propaganda has been deployed to fortify conservative notions of gender and family, with LGBTI people depicted as a threat to Georgia’s core “national” identity. On 17 September, the Georgian Parliament passed a law on ‘Family Values and Protection of Minors’, with corresponding amendments to administrative and legislative laws.[3] These laws banned ‘alternative’ forms of marriage and prevent ‘‘those who identify as different from their sex’’ and non-heterosexual people – including single individuals – from adopting children. The law bans gender reaffirming surgery or other types of medical interventions. It also bans ‘‘LGBT propaganda’’ in education institutions, in particular the dissemination of information ‘‘aimed at promoting belonging to the opposite sex or same sex relations.’’ Restrictions are also to be placed on gatherings and demonstrations that aim to ‘‘promote’’ a person’s identification with a different gender or same sex relationships.

Georgia’s law ‘on family values and protection of minors’ violates both the national laws and international human rights norms and standards.^[4] The law is discriminatory and further restricts human rights advocacy.^[5] At present the law explicitly targets individuals based on their gender-diverse identities or expressions and thus justifies them by the need to protect minors. It is largely wielded against freedom of expression and advocacy for equal rights. On a general level, the framing of this law as necessary for child protection implies that LGBTI persons are a threat to children and that young people themselves cannot have diverse sexual orientations and gender identities, thus further compounding homophobia, misunderstanding, and social stigma.^[6] Furthermore, the terms “propaganda” or “promotion” suggest ‘‘a deliberate, ideological and potentially sinister motive’’ behind advocating for fundamental human rights.^[7] The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has identified eliminating such laws as a priority for ending discrimination against young people based on their sexual orientation or gender identity. ^[8]

The GD administration has decided to target LGBTI people as part of a populist electoral strategy to align their political ambition with the value of a growing religious base of voters. The party’s recent actions, statements and electoral promises take the country away from the European path and signal a shift towards authoritarianism.

Voting abroad and alleged confiscation of the ID cards.

In another move, Georgian civil society have raised concerns with the possible shortfall of polling stations that could be opened by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to enable voters to cast their votes from abroad. The Election Code dictates that the Central Election Commission (CEC) can open polling stations abroad, but that there must be a minimum of 50 and maximum 3,000 voters in each location.^[9]

There have been repeated requests about the necessity of opening polling stations abroad by Georgian citizens. The lawsuit brought by the civil society organisation Fair Elections to allow more polling stations, stated that while the CEC is legally required to create election precincts abroad, the specific location for these precincts fall within its discretionary authority. It was suggested that the MFA did not demonstrate the necessary political will to open temporary consular institutions. Nevertheless such a step by the CEC would have facilitated the realisation of the voting rights of citizens living abroad, further serving the commission’s primary goal of safeguarding the electoral rights of all citizens.^[10]

Civil society organisations have also expressed their concerns regarding recent violations in the pre-election monitoring process where there have been several instances of illegal processing of voters’ personal data and the confiscation of identity cards.^[11] It has been suggested that it was the activists of the ruling party asking some voters and civil servants, or others employed through state funding) to hand over their identity documents so that they will be unable to vote.^[12] These actions amount to criminal offences.^[13]

Georgia’s European Path Endangered

On 17 October 2024, the General Secretariat of the Council of Europe delegation issued a statement, reiterating its “serious concern regarding the course of action taken by the Georgian government, which runs counter to the values and principles upon which the European Union is founded” and reaffirming its support towards the Georgian people’s EU aspirations.^[14] According to the EU, the government’s current stance jeopardises Georgia’s European path and de facto halts the accession process. The European Council then went on to call for Georgia “to adopt democratic, comprehensive and sustainable reforms, in line with the core principles of European integration.”^[15] The Council stressed that it would continue monitoring the situation in Georgia closely. With reference to the upcoming parliamentary elections, the Council reiterated their expectations for Georgia’s looming elections to be free and fair, in line with international standards, along with unconditional access for international and domestic election observers.^[16]

Conclusion

GD have adopted a discernible trend to summon public antagonism against LGBTI persons as a political strategy to boost their own popularity. Importantly, the ruling party has exploited existing prejudices by tapping into divisive sentiments to mobilise voters and advance their own political agendas.

The rhetoric used to justify new laws and policies relies on harmful and false stereotypes and perpetuates misinformation about the LGBTI community. Concepts such as “protecting children” from those who identify as LGBTI due to a purported negative influence misrepresents LGBTI persons as a threat to the family, society and the state. While these are absurd claims to direct against a group in society, they have proven to be an effective scapegoating strategy in many instances, further perpetuating polarisation within Georgian society. This is further aggravated by political dichotomy, increased anti-western rhetoric and alleged pressure on civil servants in a bid to mobilise voters. It is therefore unsurprising that this election can be seen as a referendum that will determine Georgia’s path either towards the EU or Russia. We will know the outcome soon enough.

Mariam Uberi is an FPC Research Fellow, Qualified Georgian criminal lawyer and a Human Rights analyst.

Photograph free to use under the Unsplash Licenses.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Nini Gabritchidze, October’s elections, odds, context, past contest, Civil Georgia, 09 September 2024, https://civil.ge/archives/627440.

[2] European Commission, Memo: Opinion on the EU membership application on Georgia, 17 June 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_22_3800

[3] United Nations, Press Release: Georgia must repeal discriminatory law targeting LGBT persons and human rights activists: UN experts, 26 September 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/09/georgia-must-repeal-discriminatory-law-targeting-lgbt-persons-and-human

^[4] Civil Georgia, Parliament speaker presents homophobic legislation, 04 June 2024, https://civil.ge/archives/611284

^[5] Human Rights Council, Protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in relation to the human rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, 18 April 2024, pp.5

^[6] Ibid.p.5.

^[7] Ibid.p.7.

^[8] UNICEF, Eliminating sexual discrimination based on their gender and identity, Current Issues (9) 2014, https://www.unicef.org/media/91126/file

^[9] Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, GYLA′s assessment regarding the opening of election precincts abroad, 11 October 2024, https://gyla.ge/en/post/8417

^[10] Ibid.

^[11] Ibid.

^[12] Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Local Monitoring Organizations’ Statement Regarding Instances of Alleged Illegal Processing of Voters’ Personal Data and the Confiscation of Identity Cards, 18 October 2024, https://gyla.ge/en/post/sadamkvirveblo-organizaciebis-gancxadeba-6879

^[13] International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, Local Monitoring Organizations’ Statement Regarding Instances of Alleged Illegal Processing of Voters’ Personal Data and the Confiscation of Identity Cards, 18 October 2024, https://shorturl.at/wXcku

^[14] General Secretariat of the Council, European Council, Note EUCO 25/24, 17 October 2024, https://civil.ge/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf

^[15] Civil Georgia, EU Accession Process Halted, Aid to MoD Frozen, Relations at a Low Point, Ambassador Herczyński Regrets, 09 July 2024, https://civil.ge/archives/615670

^[16] Ibid.

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Regions

Op-Ed: Long-range missile debate reveals key problems for Ukraine and its supporters

Article by Dr Andrew Gawthorpe

October 7, 2024

Op-Ed: Long-range missile debate reveals key problems for Ukraine and its supporters

With the US presidential election fast approaching, Ukraine’s allies in the West have been trying to find ways to shore up Kyiv. Further support for Ukraine seems much more uncertain if Donald Trump wins the American presidency, and so the window for the West to act in a more or less unified fashion may be closing. This is the context in which a number of Western countries, led by the UK, recently argued for Ukraine to be given permission to fire long-range missiles provided by the West deeper into Russia.^[1]

For some time, Western countries – namely the UK, France, and the US – have been providing Ukraine with long-range missiles which are technically capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. At the same time, however, these countries have only given Kyiv permission to use the missiles on Ukrainian territory, fearing that their use in Russia itself might lead to a dramatic escalation of the conflict. Conversely, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has downplayed the risk of escalation this may cause, and instead argued that this restriction is preventing Ukraine from defending itself as effectively as possible.^[2]

At the time of writing, it appears that the Biden administration is unlikely to approve Ukraine’s request. US intelligence agencies assess that the strategic value of allowing the use of the missiles in this manner is outweighed by the risks of escalation. While they acknowledge that the Ukrainian military would be able to do some damage to Russian supply lines and strike capabilities, they argue that the missiles would not be available to the Ukrainians in sufficient quantity to fundamentally change the course of the conflict.^[3] Russia is widely reported to have already prepared for the decision by moving many of its military assets outside of the range of the missiles.^[4]

It is possible, of course, that the Biden administration will change its mind. Given British Prime Minister Keir Starmer still strongly endorses allowing Ukraine to use long-range missiles within Russia, it is fathomable that the deteriorating position on Ukraine’s eastern front may eventually convince Washington that granting permission has value, even merely as a gesture of diplomatic support. However, the debate over the missiles has also highlighted four issues which will continue to plague the Western alliance, even if Ukraine eventually gets to use the missiles as it wishes.

The first is the cumbersome and public process of decision-making. As democracies, the UK and the US – along with other members of NATO – make decisions through building domestic and international consent. This involves allowing wide discussion of a decision before it is taken, which sacrifices surprise and secrecy. The extent to which Russia has adapted its supply lines and the disposition of its forces in anticipation of any missile decision is a testament to how difficult it is for the Western allies to achieve a measure of surprise.

The second problem regards escalation of risk. US officials are said to be concerned both about the possibility of sabotage or lethal attacks on military bases in Europe, and that Russia might strike back somewhere else in the world, for instance by providing Yemen’s Houthis with missile technology to strike at American military bases or shipping in the Middle East.^[5] The Biden administration desperately wants to avoid entering a cycle of increasing tit-for-tat action with the Kremlin, and for now it seems that Russia has succeeded in deterring it from doing so.

Even if permission to use the missiles for deep strikes into Russia is eventually granted, it seems that we are at or very near the limits of Washington’s appetite for taking further risks in order to help Ukraine defend itself. Further steps would raise the likelihood of Russian retaliation. Given that the usage of these missiles to strike deeper into Russia is unlikely to strategically change the course of the conflict, Washington is right to suspect that if it grants permission, the conversation will quickly shift to even riskier proposals – ones which American officials do not want to consider, much less accept.

This fact is reinforced by the third point, which is that Ukraine and its allies are beginning to disagree more than ever about what “victory” looks like and how to achieve it. As part of his push for loosening the missile restrictions, Zelensky presented a “victory plan” to US and European officials; however, the plan reportedly left the officials unimpressed. Behind closed doors, fewer and fewer officials outside of Ukraine believe that the country’s goal of regaining all of its lost territory is realistic.^[6]

With even those supportive of the missile decision conceding that it would not turn the conflict around, there also appears to be no other conceivable decision that Ukraine’s allies could take that would have a large impact on the course of the war at what Washington considers an acceptable level of risk. The disconnect between Ukraine’s goals and what its international supporters are able and willing to do will become a key problem if diplomatic efforts to pause the conflict ramp up after the US presidential election.

The fourth problem is just how tenuous Kyiv’s Western lifeline may be. Although the UK and France supported loosening restrictions on the usage of these long-range missiles, the key strategic decisions regarding Western support are ultimately made in one place – the White House. That means that Ukraine is particularly vulnerable to abrupt changes in American policy.

Even under the strongly internationalist Biden administration, US support for Ukraine has been deliberative and cautious. With the United States more concerned about the rising threat of China than it is about Russia – and ultimately unwilling to risk war with Russia to defend Ukraine – Kyiv will eventually face pressure to settle the conflict. If Trump wins the presidential election, Ukraine’s support from the US may evaporate entirely. Long-range missiles or not, both Ukraine and its allies will eventually be faced with some agonising choices regarding the kind of end to the conflict that they are willing to accept.

Andrew Gawthorpe is a historian of the United States at Leiden University. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office. He writes a newsletter called America Explained.

Photograph courtesy of The White House, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Michael D. Shear and David E. Sanger, Meeting With Biden, British Leader Hints at Ukraine Weapon Decision Soon, The New York Times, September 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/13/us/politics/biden-starmer-ukraine-russia-missiles.html.

^[2] James Marson, Alexander Ward, and Lara Seligman, Zelensky Visited U.S. to Seek War Boost. His Most-Important Ally Shrugged, The Wall Street Journal, September 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/zelensky-visited-u-s-to-seek-war-boost-his-most-important-ally-shrugged-d7ba76e7.

^[3] Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Intelligence Stresses Risks in Allowing Long-Range Strikes by Ukraine, The New York Times, September 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/26/us/politics/us-ukraine-strikes.html.

^[4] Clare Sebastian, Ukraine Wants To Fire Western Long-Range Weapons Into Russia. But The Battlefield Gain Is Not Clear-Cut, CNN, September 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/22/europe/ukraine-western-long-range-weapons-russia-intl/index.html.

^[5] Julian E. Barnes and John Ismay, Alert Level Raised at U.S. Bases in Europe Over Russian Threats, The New York Times, September 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/01/us/politics/us-bases-alert-level-russia.html; Josh Irish, Parisa Hafezi and Jonathan Landay, Exclusive: Iran Brokering Talks To Send Advanced Russian Missiles To Yemen’s Houthis, Sources Say, Reuters, September 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-brokering-talks-send-advanced-russian-missiles-yemens-houthis-sources-say-2024-09-24/.

^[6] Alexander Ward and Lara Seligman, U.S. ‘Unimpressed’ With Ukraine’s Victory Plan Ahead of Biden-Zelensky Meeting, The Wall Street Journal, September 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/u-s-unimpressed-with-ukraines-victory-plan-ahead-of-biden-zelensky-meeting-23e87bff.

Topics

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

An ambiguous future? Russia’s declining material presence and remaining soft power in Serbia

Article by Dr Ernest Reid

September 20, 2024

An ambiguous future? Russia’s declining material presence and remaining soft power in Serbia

In Western media, Serbia is often presented as a pawn in Vladimir Putin’s confrontation with his US counterparts. However, the real situation is far more complex. While the Russian state does maintain a significant presence in this Balkan state, its influence has been relatively limited. Furthermore, Putin’s reckless gamble in Ukraine has resulted in a greater decline of Moscow’s ties to Belgrade. In the same vein, while Serbian society has a long history of pro-Russian orientation, a closer look suggests a more nuanced picture that extends beyond simplistic explanations circling around ‘Russophilia’ and ‘Putinomania’. This article analyses the development of Russia’s influence in Serbia under the Progressive Party (SNS), which has been in power since 2012, and outlines the current state of affairs.

Power and Russia’s desired outcomes in Serbia

In international relations, influence is often conceptualised as power – “the ability to affect the behaviour of others to get what one wants”.^[1] It can be exercised through mechanisms that are either hard (coercion and payment) or soft (attraction and persuasion), and the extent of their impact can be judged by the outcomes.[2] A state’s desired outcomes in respect of other states can be determined from the general aims and specific goals codified in its official documents. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, Military Doctrine and National Security Strategy allow insight into the state’s desired outcomes regarding international relations. To date, Serbia has not been mentioned in any past or current versions of this strategy, which suggests its low-priority status for Russia’s power elite. Nevertheless, based on the general aims and more region-specific goals articulated by the Russian leadership, their desired outcomes in Serbia have been to: maximise Russia’s security by pushing back against North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), their “main external military danger”; to amass economic and cultural influence by securing the Serbian segment of Russia’s gas and oil supply network and other trade activities; as well as generating pro-Russian attitudes among Serbia’s power elite and public.^[3]

Security

Security cooperation between Russia and Serbia began to advance in 2012, when the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) took over from their more openly Western-oriented predecessors, the Democratic Party. This manifested in the signing of the bilateral Military Cooperation Agreement (MCA) in 2013, providing for information and experience exchange, cooperation in military education, cartography, topography, and peacekeeping.[4] MCA was followed in 2014 by the Military Technical Cooperation Agreement (MTCA), securing Serbia as a client of Russia’s military industry, as well as other agreements on cooperation to combat organised crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.^[5] Since 2013, Serbia has also been an observer in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and took part in joint Russian-led military exercises (“Slavic Brotherhood” & “BARS”) between 2014 and 2021.[6]

Looking at the bigger picture, however, Russia’s military influence in Serbia peaked in June 1999, when a relatively small Russian military contingent took over the Slatina Airport near Priština in an attempt to prevent NATO’s control over Yugoslavia’s Kosovo & Metohija region. They managed to temporarily block the US-led “Allied Force”. However, due to Russia’s weak position in the global political landscape at that time, the country’s leadership could not secure a supply route for their military contingent. Their risky gambit was over within a few days.

Since 1999, NATO, led by the US, has secured its military supremacy in Serbia, which resulted in the construction of the second largest US military base in Europe (Camp Bondsteel, in the southern part of Kosovo) in 1999; the departure of the Russian peacekeepers from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission in 2003; and several agreements signed between NATO and Belgrade. This includes the NATO Transit Agreement, which allowed NATO troops to travel freely through Serbian territory, as well as the establishment of the Serbia-NATO Defence Reform Group and the Partnership for Peace, bringing Serbia even closer to the North Atlantic alliance. This partnership has continued under the SNS, with the previous Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić signing the Individual Partnership Action Plan and an agreement on support and procurement (NSPO), and the current Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić pursuing further cooperation. Serbia has also regularly participated in NATO’s military exercises, which outnumbered their joint manoeuvres with Russia five-to-one.

In 2022, in the context of intensifying confrontation between Moscow and Washington over Ukraine, the Serbian government suspended their engagement in military exercises with both sides. However, they have since resumed their participation in US-led military training activities while Russia’s recent military exercises, including “Union Shield 2023”, were marked by the absence of Serbia’s military contingent.[7]

Economy

Russia’s most significant economic progress in Serbia has been related to energy supply. Following the signing of the Energy Cooperation Framework Agreement between Belgrade and Moscow in 2008, Gazprom Neft acquired the controlling stake of 51% in Serbia’s faltering energy giant Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS). This share was increased to 56.15% in 2011.[8] With oil products and gas accounting for almost half of Serbia’s total energy consumption, and with a quarter of its oil and almost all of its gas coming from Russia, Belgrade has become highly energy-reliant on Moscow.[9]

Over the years, Serbia proved to be a reliable partner, accommodating one of Russia’s key pipelines supplying gas to Europe (TurkStream), while buying Russian oil and gas at relatively advantageous rates. In addition to this, the Strategic Partnership Declaration (SPD) signed by the then Serbian President Nikolić in 2013 provided for greater cooperation in business, investment and trade, as well as transport, tourism, and agriculture.[10] Economic ties were further bolstered by a series of bilateral agreements signed by President Vučić in 2019.[11] However, the bigger picture reveals a situation that is not as favourable to the Kremlin.

Despite the aforementioned developments, Russia is not the prime mover in Serbia’s economy, trailing behind Germany, other European countries and increasingly China. Furthermore, Serbia’s trade with Russia has fallen significantly over the past two years due to new rounds of US-led sanctions, after Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in 2022.[12] In addition to this, with Serbia’s recent strides towards energy diversification manifested in its recent agreements on natural gas with Azerbaijan and on nuclear energy with France, as well as potential liquified natural gas (LNG) perspectives via Greece and Montenegro, Russia’s influence in the only sector of Serbia’s economy where it had been able to achieve significant success is likely to decrease in the near future.

While Gazprom Neft and other companies affiliated with the Kremlin (e.g. Russian Railways) continue to operate in Serbia, albeit under increasing pressure, others (e.g. Sberbank) have left. One may note the recent expansion of Russian IT companies (Yandex in particular) and mushrooming of small Russian enterprises around Belgrade and Novi Sad. However, most of these new arrivals, relokanty (“individuals who have relocated for an indefinite period“), tend to be opponents rather than supporters of Putin and are highly unlikely to facilitate the Russian state’s influence in their newly-found Balkan refuge.

At the same time, while Serbia voted for the United Nations’ motion condemning Putin’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, it did not join economic sanctions against Russia despite the pressure from the US. One reason for this is the aforementioned dependence on affordable Russian gas. However, there is more to it.

US, Russia and Serbian society

In 2008, Priština-based challengers of the central government in Belgrade proclaimed Kosovo’s independence, which was swiftly recognised by Washington. The expectation that a state leader must preserve their country’s territorial integrity and the extant cultural importance of Kosovo to many Serbs meant that accepting its secession would have cost then-president Boris Tadić his political career. Therefore, despite the ruling Democratic Party’s pro-Western stance, Tadić decided to pivot towards Russia while maintaining ties to the US, adopting a neo-Titoist approach of balancing between the West and the East. Hence, in this context, Russia emerged as Serbia’s indispensable ally, using its permanent seat at the UN Security Council to block the full legitimisation of Kosovo’s statehood.

Another potential factor underpinning President Vučić’s decision not to join the US-led sanctions against Russia, is the pro-Russian sentiments common in Serbian society. In this respect, any policies perceived as anti-Russian are prone to invoking strong negative reactions from the staunchly pro-Kremlin, Putinist segment of the public and silent disapproval from the moderately Russia-friendly majority. These dynamics can be explained by several cultural and material factors.

The majority of Serbs and Russians identify with Orthodox Christianity, which enables a perception of mutual societal similarities, in particular among the practising Orthodox Christians. Furthermore, the closeness between Russian and Serbian clergy and their vocal support for both governments make them efficient public diplomacy agents for the Russian state. Another cultural factor is a shared history, from an earlier, spiritual connection between the two Slavic nations through to Russia emerging as zaštitnica (defender) of Serbs. The latter theme has crystallised as a result of Russia’s role in facilitating Serbia’s independence from the Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia’s survival in the First and Second World Wars and in its conflict with NATO in the late 1990’s. Considering the popularity of national history and reading in Serbian society and the consonance between Russian and Serbian narratives in the aforementioned themes, they have come together as a solid cultural foundation for the Kremlin’s soft power in Serbia.

The cultural aspect of Russia’s soft power in Serbia also has a solid material base. For instance, Russia showed high scores and gradual growth (up to 72%) in a series of polls on the general impression of foreign countries among the young adults in Serbia, conducted between 2008 and 2016. This contrasted with the lower perceptions of the US, which did not rise above the 20% mark.[13] Looking more closely, the increases in pro-Russian attitudes demonstrated in this poll appear to have coincided with particular events, such as: the announcement of Russia’s energy projects in Serbia; Putin’s takeover of Crimea; Moscow’s veto of the genocide resolution on Srebrenica at the UN; and Russian Foreign Minister’s visit to Belgrade for an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conference, at which he mentioned the “NATO aggression against Yugoslavia” and the “Kosovo tragedy” themes.[14] Therefore, while pro-Russian attitudes are common in Serbia, they also appear to be influenced by the Kremlin’s diplomatic support for Serbia’s territorial integrity and international reputation. This hypothesis is reinforced by recent polls that feature Russia as the top choice for the country that should be more involved in the talks on Kosovo (29%), a country that Serbia should rely on in international relations (42.1%) and align its foreign policy with (61%).^[15]

Furthermore, with the perception of the US as the enemy (due to the NATO’s previous military and ongoing political alignment with Bosniaks and Kosovan Albanians against Serbs), any of Russia’s actions against the interests of the US are likely to generate a positive response. This is reinforced by recent research that points to the perception of similarity between Serbia’s and Russia’s negative experiences with the West (economic sanctions and military confrontation) as the reason for the high opposition to sanctions against Russia (74.3%) in Serbian society.[16] Hence, the basis of Russia-friendly attitudes among the majority of Serbian citizens is not only cultural, but also material.

Russia’s public diplomacy in Serbia

Unsurprisingly, all of the above themes have been systematically promoted by Russia’s Serbian-language online media (e.g. Sputnik Srbija), the Russian House (Kremlin’s cultural diplomacy centre in Belgrade) and other, smaller organisations, through exhibitions, film screenings, concerts and religious events (e.g. Holy Fire). These have often been endorsed by various Serbian political officials looking to reaffirm their respect for their Russian partners and to capitalise on pro-Russian sentiments among the public. It must be noted that Russia’s public diplomacy actors have seldom been able to reach beyond the minority groups of Russophile intellectuals and ultra-conservatives. Nevertheless, certain cultural constructs such as Putin’s strongman persona have travelled through society organically, manifested in various ways, from local bars bearing his name or displaying his portraits to mugs, T-shirts and other Putin paraphernalia. As famously explained by Dragan Vučićević, the owner of the country’s leading tabloid, Informer: “Our usual daily circulation is 120,000… When I have Putin calendars, we sell 250,000… If I had put Catherine Ashton or Juncker on calendar, I don’t think I would sell even 12 copies”.[17] Moreover, Serbia’s own news media, cinemas and other platforms have been fairly accommodating to Russia’s political perspectives and cultural products.

At the same time, Serbian media have also platformed pro-Western voices, and the CNN-affiliated channel N1 has taken a prominent spot on Serbia’s television grid. Furthermore, Western films, TV series and music remain far more plentiful and popular in Serbia than the Russian products, especially among young adults. Similarly, English and other West European languages continue to be more popular than Russian.[18] Moreover, despite the extant belief in potential aid from Russia, the perception of Russia as Serbia’s main donor continues to fall behind the European Union (EU) and now also China. The same can be said about the appeal of the Kremlin’s state model, overshadowed by Switzerland, Norway and Germany.^[19] The latter may have been partially influenced by some of the 370,000 relokanty, recent Russian émigrés many of whom have been vocal about the rise of repression and corruption in their home country.[20] Meanwhile, the EU continues to represent genuine economic opportunities, with a far greater number of Serbian citizens living, working and studying in the EU states than in Russia.^[21]

There have been recent attempts to revamp Russia’s cultural strategy with the arrival of new, pro-active public diplomacy chiefs on the scene – in particular the new head of Rossotrudnichestvo (Russia’s cultural diplomacy agency) Yevgeniy Primakov Jr and new Russian House director Yevgeniy Baranov. Over the past three years, they have doubled down on youth exchange programmes and social media activities in Serbia. However, whether these efforts will bring any significant results remains to be seen. In the same vein, in 2022, following their banishment from the West, RT finally launched a Serbian-language online portal, but their reach and public engagement remain modest. Russia’s only potential game-changer in this respect would be expanding to television, which remains the dominant news platform in Serbia. If some segments of the Serbian public switch from national channels to one completely dominated by carefully crafted pro-Kremlin frames, Russia’s soft power potential may increase. However, with the launch previously announced for 2024, RT has yet to materialise on Serbian TV screens.[22] Considering the Serbian government’s already precarious situation in the context of the war in Ukraine and the questionable appeal of having another TV channel beyond their control, the prospects for RT appearing on Serbia’s television grid remain uncertain, albeit not unlikely.

Conclusion

The results of the Russian government’s efforts in Serbia have been relatively modest despite the enabling environment offered by their counterparts in Belgrade. Russia has been long overtaken by the US-led NATO in the military domain, and trails behind European states and China economically, with the exception of the energy sector. Furthermore, Putin’s reckless actions in Ukraine not only jeopardised Moscow’s chances of any further advancement, but they also compromised what the Kremlin had managed to achieve in the previous ten years. Its military cooperation with Belgrade has been reduced and its, once solid, position in the energy sector is now at risk of decline.

At the same time, Moscow’s extant power can be evidenced by Belgrade’s refusal to join the US-led sanctions against Russia. Clearly, the Kremlin has been successful in generating some pro-Russian policies from Serbia’s leadership and cultivating pro-Russian attitudes among the Serbian public. This has been enabled by Moscow’s consistent political support for Serbia’s territorial integrity and international reputation, which sits in contrast to Washington’s current policies and previous military actions against Belgrade. Meanwhile, shared religion, history and other cultural aspects continue to provide an organic foundation for Russia’s soft power in Serbia.

While a significant percentage of Serbian citizens may collectively look up to Russia as the defender of their state on the global arena, nevertheless, as individuals, many opt for the EU due to the greater economic opportunities it offers and prefer the political models of West European states such as Switzerland, Norway and Germany. Meanwhile, some of the recent 370,000 relokanty from Russia are likely to reinforce and amplify these attitudes by sharing their experiences of growing authoritarianism and corruption in their home country. At the same time, because of the low-cost strategy pursued by Moscow vis-à-vis Serbia in previous years, its public diplomacy capabilities remain limited.

Recent signs of reactivation of Kremlin’s cultural actors in Serbia may mean some increase in pro-Russian attitudes in the near future, certainly if they manage to secure their spot on the TV grid. However, if these efforts do not bear any fruit, Moscow’s influence will continue to diminish, overshadowed by Washington, Brussels and Beijing.

Dr Ernest A Reid is a Teaching & Development Assistant at Aston University and an Associate Fellow at Advance HE (AFHEA). He was formerly a PhD Scholar at Aston School of Social Sciences and an IMESS Scholar at UCL School of Slavonic & Eastern European Studies (UCL SSEES). His expertise on Russia’s influence in Serbia comes from a research project he had developed and carried out for UCL SSEES, spending nine months in Belgrade and travelling to Moscow to observe and interact with Russian public diplomacy actors. Fluent in Russian, he has also worked as a translator, with former clients including the UK government and law enforcement agencies, as well as IGOs, NGOs and media companies.

Photograph courtesy of author.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Joseph Nye, Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power, Foreign Affairs, July 2009, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20699631

[2] Joseph Nye, Hard, soft and smart power, The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, March 2013, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199588862.013.0031

^[3] President of Russia, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2008, Kremlin, January 2008, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116; President of Russia, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2013, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Thailand, February 2013, https://thailand.mid.ru/en/o_rossii/vneshnyaya_politika/kontseptsiya_vneshney_politiki_rf/; President of Russia, The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/; President of Russia, Strategiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda, Kremlin, May 2009, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/424 ; President of Russia, Ukaz ‘O strategii Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, December 2015, https://rg.ru/documents/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html; President of Russia, Strategiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, National Security Council of the Russian Federation, July 2021, http://scrf.gov.ru/media/files/file/l4wGRPqJvETSkUTYmhepzRochb1j1jqh.pdf; President of Russia, Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii, National Security Council of the Russian Federation, December 2014, http://scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document129/

[4] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Soglasheniye o voyennom sotrudnichestve, Russian Embassy in Serbia, November 2013, https://serbia.mid.ru/ru/countries/legal_base/mezhpravitelstvennye_dogovory/

^[5] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Soglasheniye o voyenno-tehnicheskom sotrudnichestve, Russian Embassy in Serbia, October 2014, https://serbia.mid.ru/ru/countries/legal_base/mezhpravitelstvennye_dogovory/

[6] Rossiya perebrosila na ucheniya v Serbiyu batareyu “Pantsirey”, Interfaks – Agentstvo Voyennyh Novostey, October 2021, https://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=0&nid=558708&lang=RU

[7] V Rossii nachalis’ sovmestnye s Belorussiyey ucheniya, Yevraziya, September 2023, https://eurasia.expert/v-rossii-nachalis-sovmestnye-s-belarusyu-ucheniya-shchit-soyuza-2023/

[8] Gazprom Neft buys 5.15 pct of Serbia’s NIS, Reuters, March 2011, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/stocks/gazprom-neft-buys-515-pct-of-serbias-nis-idUSLDE72H0UB/

[9] Serbia, International Energy Agency, January 2021, https://www.iea.org/countries/serbia/energy-mix; Michał Paszkowski, Serbia activates natural gas supply efforts, Instytut Europy Środkowej, July 2023, https://ies.lublin.pl/en/comments/serbia-activates-natural-gas-supply-efforts/

[10] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Deklaratsiya o strategicheskom partnyorstve, Kremlin, May 2013, http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/1461

[11] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Dokumenty, podpisannye oficial’nogo visita Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federacii V. Putina v Respubliku Serbiyu, Kremlin, January 2019, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5386

[12] Statistics of external trade 23, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, December 2022, https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2024/PdfE/G20241207.pdf; Statistics of external trade 207, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, June 2024, https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2023/PdfE/G20231023.pdf

[13] Ernest Reid, “Moscow’s public diplomacy and Russophilia in Serbia, 2012–2019”, FPN Godišnjak, June 2020, https://www.fpn.bg.ac.rs/wp-content/uploads/FPN-Godisnjak-23-2020.pdf

[14] Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s Remarks at the 22nd OSCE Ministerial Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2015, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1519569/

^[15] Opinion poll report: socio-political views of Serbian citizens in 2023, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, April 2023, https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/wfd_nws_2023_eng_final.pdf ; Political attitudes of citizens of Serbia – Fall 2022, CRTA Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability 2022, December 2022, https://crta.rs/en/opininon-poll-political-attitudes-of-citizens-of-serbia-fall-2022/

[16] Vuk Vuksanovic, Srdjan Cvijic, Maksim Samorukov, Beyond Sputnik & RT: How does Russian soft power in Serbia really work, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, December 2022, https://bezbednost.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/How-does-Russian-soft-power-in-Serbia-really-work.pdf

[17] Valerie Hopkins, In Balkans, Britain rejoins battle for influence, Politico, March 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/balkans-bbc-britain-rejoins-battle-for-influence-russia-soft-power/

[18] Ernest Reid, Third Rome or Potemkin village: Analyzing the Extent of Russia’s Power in Serbia, 2012–2019, Nationalities Papers, October 2020, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/abs/third-rome-or-potemkin-village-analyzing-the-extent-of-russias-power-in-serbia-20122019/E8E755F37EB6AA8AB477EAB3FBB3474E

^[19] Public Opinion Polls, Ministry of European Integration, December 2022, https://www.mei.gov.rs/eng/documents/national-documents/public-opinion-poll/

[20] Broj ruskih firmi u Srbiji od početka rata skočio za 1.000 odsto, Nova Ekonomija, June 2024, https://novaekonomija.rs/vesti-iz-zemlje/broj-ruskih-firmi-u-srbiji-od-pocetka-rata-skocio-za-1-000-odsto

^[21] Political attitudes of citizens of Serbia – Fall 2022, CRTA Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability 2022, December 2022, https://crta.rs/en/opininon-poll-political-attitudes-of-citizens-of-serbia-fall-2022/

[22] Počeo sa radom portal ruske RT na srpskom jeziku, RTS, November 2022, https://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/poceo-sa-radom-portal-ruske-rt-na-srpskom-jeziku_1391190.html

Topics

Energy, Environment and Resources

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Europe

Serbia

Former Soviet Union

Russia

US Presidential Election: What would a Harris-Walz foreign policy look like?

Article by Dr Andrew Gawthorpe

August 21, 2024

US Presidential Election: What would a Harris-Walz foreign policy look like?

This week at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Kamala Harris and Tim Walz will formally accept their party’s nomination for president and vice-president. Given the speed and unusual circumstances in which Harris and Walz have emerged as their party’s standard-bearers, observers around the world will be closely watching the convention – as well as the planned protests against United States’ policy towards Gaza taking place on the sidelines – for clues as to the likely foreign policy approach of any future Harris administration.

The Harris-Walz campaign has come together quickly, and so far, it has not focused strongly on world affairs. Harris has given no major speech on this topic, and none are currently planned. However, this should not be mistaken for disinterest, or inexperience – in fact, Harris would come to the Oval Office with more executive branch foreign policy experience than any president in decades.[1] By looking at her record both in the Biden administration and as a senator, it’s possible to piece together her worldview and reach cautious conclusions about the direction she might take US foreign policy in an administration of her own.

For his part, Walz has less direct experience of foreign affairs – he has never served in the executive branch, and the only federal office he has held is as a member of the House of Representatives. That does not mean he’s a blank slate though. Walz served 24 years in the National Guard, including deployments overseas, and also has a surprising, and long-running, interest in China. If he became vice president, he would bring a distinct populist worldview to the role.

Here’s a quick guide to what a Harris-Walz foreign policy might look like.

General principles and personnel

Perhaps the biggest question about a Harris foreign policy is whether it would be mostly a continuation of the approach seen under current President Joe Biden or if it would chart some new course. The answer is probably the former. As vice president, it has been Harris’ job to defend the policies of the administration she was a part of, meaning that any private doubts or disagreements she may have had were buried. Yet little about her record before becoming vice president suggests that Harris would make a fundamental break with this policy either.

Like Biden, Harris has always been a committed internationalist who believes that the US should play an active role in world affairs. As vice president, she has chosen mainstream, career diplomats as her key foreign policy aides – first Nancy McEldowney, and then Philip Gordon. She has also enthusiastically embraced multilateral agreements such as the Paris Climate Accords and the Iran nuclear deal and made clear that she values and supports America’s allies. All of this would suggest that, in contrast to Donald Trump, she believes in the need for America to lead groups of like-minded countries in tackling global problems.

If she has a major difference of principle with Biden, it’s that she apparently views his tendency to frame global affairs as an ongoing battle between “democracy” and “autocracy” as a misleading over-simplification.[2] This echoes a criticism that has long been made by outside analysts who have pointed out that this narrative makes little sense in a world in which autocratic states like Saudi Arabia and Vietnam are close US partners.[3]

Although Harris’ criticism on this point seems to be mostly rhetorical, some foreign policy thinkers in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party are hoping it might be an opportunity for greater influence. Foreign policy progressives – who tend to believe in the need to reduce the U.S. military footprint around the world, dial back conflict with China, and be more consistent on democracy and human rights – would like to see some of their own kind placed in key positions in a future Harris administration.[4]

Given that she hails from a younger generation and has risen through the party at a time of greater progressive influence, Harris is likely more sympathetic to these voices than Biden has been. Yet there’s little sign she has fully bought into their worldview, and the youthful, progressive wing lacks leaders with the experience and stature that Harris seems to value. In the end, she’s likely to give second- and third-tier jobs to some while placing career technocrats in more important positions.

Perhaps the greatest hope that progressives have for redirecting Harris’ foreign policy comes from Walz, who over time has been more sceptical of military intervention than the average Democrat. He opposed the Iraq troop surge of 2006, Barack Obama’s desire to strike Syria after the country used chemical weapons against civilians in 2013, and US support for Saudi Arabia’s recent war in Yemen. Yet Walz’s distaste for the horrors of war is more that of the soldier than the pacifist. In 2016, he joined Republicans in opposing cuts to the Army, arguing that it needed to be well-funded to face challenges around the world. As a Midwestern populist who served for 24 years in uniform, Walz has a deep appreciation of the costs of war for ordinary Americans – but he’s no dove, either.[5]

Europe and NATO

In the Biden administration, Harris has been a key spokesperson for the government’s attempt to convene a coalition of countries to oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. She has led the US delegation to the Munich Security Conference three times, met Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky six times, and called the US commitment to NATO “unwavering” and “sacrosanct”.[6] On the other hand, however, she had little prior exposure to the continent before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has been criticized by some European officials for a lack of engagement on other issues.[7]

All of this suggests continuity. Harris is firmly committed to the defence of Ukraine, but otherwise seems to agree with the consensus position in US foreign policy circles that Europe is of declining importance in a world in which the locus of global power is moving towards Asia. At the same time, Gordon – Harris’ key national security aide – is a dedicated Europhile who speaks four European languages and is well-known on the continent. If he takes a position in her administration, that ought to calm European leaders who are worried that Harris might leave them behind.[8]

The Middle East

Few aspects of Harris’ foreign policy views have generated as much comment as those on the Middle East. Whatever its merits, Biden’s unequivocal support of Israel is out of step with his own party – and as a representative of a younger generation, Harris has been widely assumed to have more nuanced views.

The actual evidence for this is somewhat thin. Harris has publicly voiced more empathy for Palestinian suffering than Biden, and she is said to have privately advocated that the administration push Israel more forcefully towards either changing the way it conducts the war or ending it.[9] Since becoming the presumptive nominee however, she has neither announced any major policy departure nor wholeheartedly embraced left-wing protesters who oppose the administration’s approach to the region. This has been noted, and protesters are planning to try to disrupt the DNC this week in an attempt to force policy changes.[10] They’ll find little comfort from Harris’ running mate, who has also hewed closely to the Biden administration’s line throughout the conflict.[11]

For now, Harris seems to view the Middle East primarily through the lens of politics. She wants to win back left-wing voters critical of the administration without scaring away pro-Israel independent voters. In office, this splitting of the difference would be likely to continue – a consequence both of political necessity and Harris’ pragmatic, non-ideological worldview.

Trade and climate

Like many Democrats, Harris has been on an interesting journey with regards to trade. She has described herself as “not a protectionist”, but also said she would have voted against both the 1994 North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiated by Obama. This suggests that she does not buy into the old neoliberal consensus around free trade either. In fact, Harris in recent years has sounded more and more sceptical of free trade, and her running mate has always sounded that way. Walz opposed both NAFTA and the TPP as well as a host of smaller bilateral trade agreements during his time in Congress, some on the grounds that they would help to bolster governments with poor human rights records.[12]

Most notably, both Harris and Walz opposed the Trump-negotiated United States, Mexico, and Canada Agreement – a replacement for NAFTA – because they said it did not do enough to protect the environment or workers’ rights. This indicates that their administration would double down on the Biden administration’s attempts to use trade as a tool of climate policy, and probably also to promote human rights. It also means that London’s desire for a US trade deal will continue to be frustrated.[13]

China and the Indo-Pacific

China policy is another area in which Harris seems closely wedded to the Biden administration’s position, which is that the US should attempt to pursue economic and military competition with Beijing while at the same time cooperating on shared challenges such as climate change. Harris has had relatively little exposure to China, having met its President Xi Jinping only once and never having travelled to the country.[14] Hence, there is little indication of how, if at all, she differs from the administration in which she has served. Especially given the strong hawkish consensus towards China which exists in US politics, she is unlikely to bring about any major change of policy.

Walz, by contrast, has a long-standing interest in the country which has been reflected in both his private and public life. He first visited the country just after the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 and has gone back over 30 times since, primarily to facilitate trips by American students. He has spoken admiringly of Chinese people but been sharply critical of their government’s human rights abuses, including by meeting with the Dalai Lama. His nuanced view suggests that he understands the importance of dialogue between America and China, but is likely to push for strong criticism of its human rights record.[15]

Conclusion

A Harris-Walz foreign policy is one which is not likely to see any major departure from Biden’s approach. It will be strongly internationalist, remaining committed to the defence of Ukraine and organizing a coalition of countries to oppose the rise of China. It will likely be more engaged – and honest – about human rights and the environment, but still pragmatic and dominated by technocrats rather than progressive reformers. It will also, of course, be shaped by events which we cannot yet predict – much less understand the implications of – possibly even before US citizens go to the polls on 5^th November.

[1] Fred Kaplan, Kamala Harris Has Been Much More Involved In Foreign Policy Than We Realize, Slate, August 2024, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2024/08/kamala-harris-foreign-policy-2024-presidential-election.html.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Joshua Keating, Biden Promised to Defeat Authoritarianism. Reality Got In The Way, Vox, May 2024, https://www.vox.com/2024/5/20/24159229/biden-democracy-authoritarianism-india-saudi-arabia.

[4] Nahal Toosi, Phelim Kine and Joseph Gedeon, Progressives Jostle For Nat Sec Jobs Under Harris, Politico, August 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/13/progressives-harris-foreign-policy-jobs-00173697.

[5] Connor O’Brien and Eric Bazail-Eimil, How Tim Walz Could Help Harris Connect With Veterans, Politico, August 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/06/tim-walz-vp-harris-veterans-00172782; Noah Berman and Diana Roy, Issue Guide: Tim Walz On Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, August 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/issue-guide-tim-walz-foreign-policy.

[6] The Kamala Harris Doctrine, Foreign Policy, July 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/26/kamala-harris-policy-china-russia-trade-immigration-israel-gaza-india/.

[7] Suzanne Lynch and Ben Munster, ‘Invisible’ Kamala Harris Struggles To Win Over Europe, Politico, July 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/kamala-harris-europe-us-election-joe-biden-democratic-party/.

[8] Laura Kayali and Clea Caulcutt, Phil Gordon: Europe’s ‘Ally’ on Kamala Harris’ Team, Politico, August 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/philip-gordon-us-politics-kamala-harris-us-elections-europe-joe-biden-emmanuel-macron/.

[9] Eugene Daniels and Holly Otterbein, Kamala Harris Pushes White House To Be More Sympathetic Toward Palestinians, Politico, December 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/14/kamala-harris-gaza-palestinians-00131633; Yasmeen Abutaleb and Shane Harris, Harris Created Distance From Biden On Gaza By Emphasizing Palestinian Suffering, The Washington Post, July 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/07/24/harris-gaza-israel/.

[10] Tens Of Thousands Of Activists Prepare Protests Over Gaza war At Democratic National Convention, The Guardian, August 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/aug/19/democratic-national-convention-gaza-protests-pro-palestine.

[11] Andrew Prokop, Is Tim Walz A Progressive Or A Centrist – Or Both?, Vox, August 2024, https://www.vox.com/2024-elections/366201/tim-walz-record-governor-progressive-agenda.

[12] Greg Rosalsky, The Economic Mind of Tim Walz, NPR, August 2024, https://www.npr.org/sections/planet-money/2024/08/13/g-s1-16662/the-economic-mind-of-tim-walz.

[13] Ana Swanson, With Kamala Harris, U.S. Free Trade Skepticism May Continue, The New York Times, July 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/26/us/politics/kamala-harris-trade-trump.html.

[14] China’s Rulers Are Surprised By Kamala Harris and Tim Walz, The Economist, August 2024, https://www.economist.com/china/2024/08/18/chinas-rulers-are-surprised-by-kamala-harris-and-tim-walz.

[15] Paul Musgrave, Tim Walz Has Always Been Consistent On China, Foreign Policy, August 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/12/tim-walz-china-record-us-election-harris-trump/; John Sudworth, Walz Has History With China – It’s More Hawkish Than Critics Claim, BBC, August 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgewpzyd91o.

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Regions

United States and Canada

United States

Key takeaways from the ‘Learning From Failure: How to Prevent Civil War Recurrence’ roundtable

Article by Dr Giuditta Fontana and Prof Stefan Wolff

August 15, 2024

Key takeaways from the ‘Learning From Failure: How to Prevent Civil War Recurrence’ roundtable

On Monday 8 July 2024, the Foreign Policy Centre and the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham (POLSIS) hosted an online roundtable with policymakers, government officials, NGO representatives, and academics to discuss the findings of the research project ‘Learning from Failure: How to Prevent Civil War Recurrence’. Funded by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the project explored how to prevent the resumption of large-scale conflict-related violence after the conclusion of a peace accord.

The meeting was chaired by Dr Giuditta Fontana, Associate Professor in International Security at the University of Birmingham, who co-directed the project with Professor Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham. They were joined by the other members of the research team, Dr Argyro Kartsonaki (University of Hamburg) and Professor Natascha S. Neudorfer (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf). The team presented their research process and shared the key findings before engaging in a broader discussion with participants on how peace processes can be developed and maintained.

Research Findings and Discussion

The overarching conclusion from the ‘Learning from Failure’ project is that carefully designed and managed peace processes can help prevent civil war recurrence. Two factors were identified as having a key impact: UN leadership of peace processes, and peace agreement provisions that map the inclusion of women in post-conflict institutions (particularly in economic and social institutions). The research team explained that this is because together, UN leadership of peace processes, and provisions for including women in post-conflict societies, can create and nurture multi-level coalitions invested in maintaining and implementing a peace accord (‘coalitions for peace’).

The five key takeaways that emerged from the discussion, were as follows:

1. Civil war recurrence can be prevented through the creation and long-term support for multi-level ‘coalitions for peace’ that help craft peace accords (or agreements), monitor their implementation, provide early warning, and devise context-appropriate actions to address localised tensions and prevent their escalation. Coalitions for peace are most effective when they build on pre-existing networks and use context-specific mechanisms to provide early warning and early response before localised tensions escalate.

2. The UN is uniquely positioned to support the prevention of civil war recurrence because it can provide the necessary international leadership to deliver mediation that is perceived as legitimate and impartial, deploy technical support and know-how, and mobilise resources in support of the peace process.

3. Provisions for the inclusion of women in post-conflict society can help prevent civil war recurrence when they empower existing, locally legitimate, networks. Women-led organisations are often cross-communal and cross-ethnic, so can nurture grassroot coalitions during the negotiation and crafting of a peace accord. Where such cross-community networks exist, based on traditional practices and customs, international actors can invest in these pre-existing informal networks to provide impetus for negotiations and/or strengthen buy-in for the peace process.

4. Power sharing and territorial self-governance may be important components of a sustainable settlement, and are consistently adopted in the accords examined by the research team. While these provisions do not impede a lasting agreement, they also do not appear to prevent subsequent relapses into violence.

5. The UN and other like-minded multilateral actors now face serious challenges as a result of renewed and intensifying geopolitical competition. However, their role in successfully preventing civil war recurrence underscores the importance of such multilateral international organisations and the need to preserve them.

Summary of the Research Process

The research sought to understand why civil war recurred and how, if at all, this could be prevented.

The researchers developed an innovative MultiStage Mixed Methods Approach to generate hypotheses and test them through original empirical data and carefully sequenced methodologies, including supervised machine learning, regression analysis, survival analysis, congruence analysis, and elite interviews with negotiators, mediators, case study experts, and practitioners.

The research proceeded in three main stages: The first step of research aimed to identify which components of peace processes may predict the stable end of conflict-related violence. It focused on fourteen peace processes in eleven countries: Angola, Bangsamoro, Bougainville, Burundi, Aceh, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Myanmar, and Sierra Leone. These internal conflicts encompass territorial ethnic, and governmental conflicts. These peace processes (1) took place between 1976 and 2015; (2) achieved a peace accord bringing to the end large-scale conflict-related violence among the same belligerent groups; and (3) did so after experiencing at least one relapse into large-scale conflict-related violence.

The second step of the research tested whether these elements could predict the non-recurrence of conflicts across all 235 political agreements concluded worldwide between 1989 and 2016.

A third step explored the relationship between the end of conflict-related violence and UN leadership of the mediation process and provisions for the inclusion of women in post-conflict societies in selected case studies (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire).

Click here for more information about the work of Conflict and Peace Processes Research Group of the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham.

For further comments and questions, please contact:

Giuditta Fontana, Associate Professor in International Security, POLSIS, University of Birmingham: g.fontana@bham.ac.uk
Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, POLSIS: University of Birmingham, s.wolff@bham.ac.uk
Alice Copland, FPC Policy and Parliamentary Affairs Manager: alice.copland@fpc.org.uk

Topics

Civil Society

Conflict Resolution and Security

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Human Rights

International Development

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Op-Ed: What recent events could mean for the US Presidential race and America’s future

Article by Dr Andrew Gawthorpe

July 8, 2024

Op-Ed: What recent events could mean for the US Presidential race and America’s future

Over the past few weeks, two events have dramatically changed the nature of the US presidential race. Joe Biden’s debacle in his debate against Donald Trump threw the Democratic Party into chaos, making it increasingly unclear whether Biden can continue as the party’s nominee. Perhaps even more importantly, a recent decision by the US Supreme Court has granted presidents immunity from prosecution for a wide range of criminal behavior, dramatically raising the stakes of November’s election.

The Assassin-in-Chief?

The Supreme Court ruling came in response to an attempt by Trump to have the charges against him in the federal January 6^th probe thrown out. However, the justices ruled in a way that goes far beyond that narrow case, and in doing so they fundamentally revised the American constitutional order. From now on, presidents have absolute immunity from prosecution for any acts which relate to their “core constitutional responsibilities” and what the court called “presumptive immunity” for any acts related to their “official duties”.[1]

Cutting through this legalese is hard, in part because the court has entirely invented much of it. There is no precise definition of “official duties”, “core constitutional responsibilities”, or even “presumptive immunity”. Presumably, these will be defined by future case law.

Let’s take a look at one much-discussed example: could the president order the military to assassinate a political rival? The answer seems to be quite clearly that yes, he could. Control of the military is clearly within the president’s core constitutional responsibilities, as set out in Article II of the constitution.[2] Even conservative commentators who have been dismissive of this scenario only do so based on the claim that the president would not be able to find any military personnel willing to carry out the order, and that he would be impeached if he did.[3] Given previous examples of presidential abuse of power involving the military as well as the intense partisanship of current US politics, both of these assumptions are highly questionable.

To take another example: the president’s ability to influence the legal process. Both the pardon power and the power to direct the Department of Justice are clearly within the president’s “core constitutional responsibilities”. Henceforth the president can order his political opponents to be prosecuted on false pretenses, and pardon any of his own supporters who commit federal crimes. In the assassination scenario, whoever pulled the trigger would still ordinarily be liable to prosecution – but a rogue president could now simply pardon them without any fear of legal ramifications.

Raising the stakes

Long-term, the myriad ways in which future presidents might abuse this ruling are hard to predict. In the short-term, however, it is clear that whoever wins in November, they will be handed an office with vastly increased powers. And if the victor in that election is Donald Trump, we already have some idea of how he might use them.

Trump has been quite open about his plans for a second term, and even before the immunity decision he did not shy away from spelling out how he would abuse the powers of his office. Among other things, Trump has threatened to have his political opponents prosecuted or subject to military tribunals, laid out plans to deport millions of people in mass immigration sweeps involving the military, and said he will pardon the perpetrators of the January 6^th insurrection.[4] The immunity ruling provides him with a menu of other options for using presidential power to advance his personal and political interests, from enriching his family through corruption to suppressing political opposition.

In such a scenario, the only potential checks on Trump would be Congress, the federal bureaucracy, and mass protests. However, in today’s hyper-polarized age, impeachment is almost impossible. Members of Congress are not willing to risk the wrath of members of their own party by voting to convict, and the Congressional Republican Party is today more pro-Trump than it has ever been.[5] The federal bureaucracy might provide a check, but Trump’s allies have already formulated plans to reduce the power of civil servants and subject the bureaucracy to much greater political control.[6] Trump has also openly speculated about using the military to suppress protests in a second term.[7] Moreover, while presidents would in theory still face regular elections, they could also use their new powers to subvert them, much as Trump attempted to in 2020.

Democratic woes

These developments have coincided with the outbreak of complete chaos in the Democratic Party. Biden’s disastrous performance at the presidential debate in Atlanta has brought out into the open long-standing concerns about the president’s age and cognitive abilities.

Perhaps even more damaging than the debate itself has been what has happened since. As Biden’s standing in the polls has plummeted, he has appeared to falter in subsequent appearances in which he has been unable to rely on a teleprompter. This has fueled the belief that the president is unable to campaign and sparked rage among other Democratic politicians that the deterioration of his condition has been hidden up to this point. It has not helped that the White House has attacked critics from within the party as “bedwetters” and “hysterical” while also repeatedly changing its story about why Biden appeared so unwell during the debate.[8]

With the Supreme Court’s immunity decision focusing the party’s minds on the stakes in November, Vice President Kamala Harris has seen her stock within the party rise dramatically. Attitudes towards her taking the nomination range from resignation to enthusiasm. Even her critics concede that passing her over might alienate sections of the Democratic Party, and they also realize that campaign finance law makes her the only plausible candidate who can maintain access to the Biden campaign’s substantial financial resources.[9] More enthusiastic supporters point out that she is young, energetic, and can be an articulate spokesperson for the party’s case.

Over the past year, the Democratic Party has arguably become used to setting its expectations low. Even before the debate, the Biden campaign had decided on a light schedule for its candidate in deference to his age and low energy levels. The theory was that it would not matter if Biden was not particularly visible, because Trump would implode in a cloud of his own legal woes and controversial statements.[10] If that strategy was ever tenable, it is not anymore after the debate, when Biden himself has become the focus of media attention. Democrats desperately need to get the focus back on Trump. Having a much younger and energetic candidate barnstorming the swing states, while highlighting the stakes of a new Trump presidency, might be just the way to do it.

If Biden does step down from the campaign, focus is likely to shift to the question of whether it is even tenable for him to remain president for the next seven months in the run up to the election. If his mental condition really has deteriorated as dramatically as it seems, it will be difficult – not to mention distracting – for Harris to continue to justify him remaining in office on the campaign trail. Letting President Harris run, with all of the powers of incumbency, might be the best way forward.[11]

These are not easy matters to navigate. American democracy is currently in grave peril, and almost any decision that Biden and others in the party take carries great risks. Yet one thing is clear: absolute focus must be maintained on keeping Trump and the authoritarian forces that he represents out of the White House.

There is no time, now, to allow personal egos or long-running intra-party feuds get in the way of what needs to be done. A Democratic presidential candidate needs not only to be able to win the election, but also to engage in the long struggle ahead to put American democracy back on a sustainable footing. When the dangers are this great, anyone who aspires to carry the torch of freedom has to prove that they can bear it – or hand it over to someone else who can.

Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.

[1] Supreme Court of the United States, Trump v. United States, July 2024, https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf

[2] Quinta Jurecic and Benjamin Wittes, A Decision of Surpassing Recklessness In Dangerous Times, Lawfare, July 2024, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/a-decision-of-surpassing-recklessness-in-dangerous-times

[3] The Supreme Court Protects the Presidency In Trump v. US, Wall Street Journal, July 2024, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-v-u-s-supreme-court-presidential-immunity-official-acts-john-roberts-january-6-c4d5eddc; Dan McLaughlin, Actually, Presidents Still Can’t Murder People With Impunity, National Review, July 2024, https://fpc.org.uk/the-transatlantic-partnership-looking-ahead-on-the-impacts-of-trade/

[4] Chris Cameron, Trump Amplifies Calls to Jail Top Elected Officials, Invokes Military Tribunals, The New York Times, July 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/01/us/politics/trump-liz-cheney-treason-jail.html; Zachary B. Wolf, Trump Explains His Militaristic Plan To Deport 15-20 Million People, CNN, May 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/01/politics/trump-immigration-what-matters/index.html; Lauren Aratani, Trump Says Pardoning Capitol Attackers Will Be One Of First Acts If Elected Again, Guardian, March 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/12/trump-january-6-pardons

[5] Patrick Svitek and Mariana Alfaro, Trump’s Influence Looms Large Over Congressional Republicans, The Washington Post, April 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/04/12/donald-trump-congress-republicans-mike-johnson-fisa-ukraine-abortion/

[6] Trump’s Schedule F Plan, Explained, Protect Democracy, June 2024, https://protectdemocracy.org/work/trumps-schedule-f-plan-explained

[7] Michael Waldman, Trump’s Insurrection Act Threat, Brennan Center for Justice, November 2023, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/trumps-insurrection-act-threat

[8] Toluse Olorunnipa, Tyler Page and Michael Scherer, Biden Team Works Furiously To Quell Any Democratic Revolt After Debate, The Washington Post, June 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/06/30/biden-democrats-election/; Alex Thompson, “Freaking The F*** Out”: Turmoil In The White House Over Biden, Axios, July 2024, https://www.axios.com/2024/07/02/biden-white-house-campaign-staff-freaking-out-debate

[9] David Dayen, Campaign Finance Laws Give Harris Big Boost in Biden Dropout Scenario, The American Prospect, July 2024, https://prospect.org/power/2024-07-02-campaign-finance-laws-harris-big-boost-biden-dropout-scenario/

[10] Edward-Isaac Dovere, How The Biden Campaign Hopes To Make 2024 Less About Biden And More About A Contrast With Trump, CNN, January 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/02/politics/biden-campaign-strategy-trump-2024/index.html

[11] Andrew Gawthorpe, The Case for Biden Resigning Right Now, America Explained, June 2024, https://amerex.substack.com/p/the-case-for-biden-resigning-right

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Ten key takeaways from the European Parliament election for Germany and Europe

Article by Dr Ed Turner

June 17, 2024

Ten key takeaways from the European Parliament election for Germany and Europe

Some aspects of Sunday’s European Parliament election results were expected (a victory for the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), declining support for the Greens, some strengthening of the far right), but others were a surprise.[1] Here are ten key takeaways:

The far right did not make a huge breakthrough, but Europe’s centre of gravity has shifted rightwards. A quick glance at seats won and lost by each of the major European political groups would give the impression of relatively little shift, beyond a decline in the number of Green and Liberal MEPs. Claims of a lurch to the far right would be over-stated, but amongst those MEPs who are not members of a group, there are a good many right-wingers (for instance, the Alternative for Germany is in that category having been kicked out of the ID group which includes Marine Le Pen’s National Rally).[2] Both the ECR group (European Conservatives and Reformists Group – originally co-founded by the UK’s Tories, now home amongst others to Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy and Spanish Vox) and the EPP have been veering to the right.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is likely to be re-elected by groups in the political centre, but the margins will be tight. It would be anticipated that, as last time, she would receive support from the three groups clustered around the political centre (S&D – Socialists & Democrats, Renew Europe and EPP), and that they have been holding off full endorsement to strengthen their negotiating position for other top jobs. However, in total they have 403 MEPs out of 720 so there is limited room for manoeuvre and in this secret ballot discipline often wanes – in 2019, von der Leyen should have got 444 votes but managed just 383.[3]

Those hoping for a progressive shift on climate and migration from the European Union (EU) are likely to be disappointed. We should not over-state the impact of relatively small shifts in the European Parliament upon substantive policy – it is just one part (albeit an important one) of the EU’s legislative process. However, the rightward shift referred to above also meshes with some tougher positioning in key member states that will also play into the EU’s legislative process. For months, Olaf Scholz in Germany has been talking a tough game on migration, the CDU (Christian Democratic Union – likely to lead the next German government) has embraced a migration plan akin to the UK’s proposals to send asylum seekers to Rwanda and leave them there even if claims are successful. There is also a nervousness from centre-left to centre-right across Europe about green policies fuelling far-right support, especially if they have adverse economic impacts (with Macron calling for a “regulatory break” to help industry).[4]

Political polarisation and fragmentation are in evidence across Europe. We see polarisation (and particularly divisions between mainstream parties and far-right or populist challengers) in many countries across Europe, including those such as Portugal and Germany which had been assumed to be resistant to it. Mainstream parties also see a declining share of the vote. To take just Germany, France and Spain, and comparing these European elections to those in 1994, we see the proportion of votes going to the two main parties of the left and the right has fallen drastically in the first two cases, and even in Spain, where the moderate right regained much ground, the share was well below that 30 years previously:

Macron’s gamble and Scholz’ defeat will really undermine EU leadership (with implications for the UK). Following the elections and Emmanuel Macron’s decision to call early parliamentary elections, French politics has been plunged into chaos.[5] Any outcome that does not involve the highly unlikely scenario of success for Macron allies will leave him further weakened in authority, distracted and potentially constrained where parliamentary or government agreement is required (including in the Council of the European Union). Scholz, whose rapport with Macron has been patchy at best, will also face further friction and erosion of authority. All in all, Franco-German leadership of the EU feels an unlikely prospect for the coming years. For the UK, which may struggle to gain bandwidth in Brussels for any changes to its relationship with the EU, this is not helpful.

There was a stark contrast in German voting behaviour between those in eastern and western Germany, over 34 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The map showing winning candidates in the European elections in Germany is truly remarkable and has drawn much comment.[6] With just a handful of exceptions (in Berlin, adjacent Potsdam, and the cities of Jena, Weimar and Erfurt, each of which has a university), the AfD (Alternative for Germany) topped the poll across eastern German counties and cities. It failed to do so in a single equivalent area in the west. There is much debate over what drives the distinctive voting behaviour in the east. Explanations range from greater affinity towards Russia and rejection of Germany’s western alignment (something uniting both the AfD and the left-populist BSW (Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance) is their rejection of support for Ukraine), to the relative lack of ethnic diversity there compared to the west and fear of “the other”, through to being “left behind”, with more highly-educated sections of the population having moved away, leaving those with lower skill levels and salaries behind, and poor infrastructure. Yet these latter factors also apply in some parts of the west, where there is a lower propensity to vote for the AfD.

Germany’s far right is established and state elections in eastern Germany in the autumn will prove a major challenge to mainstream parties. In September, three eastern states (Thuringia, Saxony and Brandenburg) will vote and on current evidence, in each of them there is a good chance of the AfD topping the poll. The party has not been on the journey away from extremism that Le Pen and Meloni have been, it is regarded as potentially extremist by Germany’s secret services, and mainstream parties will therefore try to keep it out of government.[7] However, doing so may require unwieldly, misaligned multi-party coalitions, which could increase the AfD’s ability to claim it is being persecuted. The numbers may force the CDU to choose between ditching a ban on co-operation with the far right and one on co-operation with the far left, likely to fuel internal debates about whether to tag to the right or stick to the Merkelian centre ground.

Age differences in voting behaviour in Germany were stark and should give mainstream parties real cause for concern.[8] The moderate left (SPD) and right (CDU/CSU) together got 59% of votes of over 60s, but just 26% of those of under 25s. Amongst younger voters, minor parties including Volt (pro-European, centre-left) and a satirical party did well, but so too did the AfD (which came second amongst under 25s). Green support imploded amongst under 25s, with just 11% compared to 34% in 2019.

Different attitudes to the war in Ukraine are playing out in Germany and are affecting mainstream parties. While the majority of Germans still support the country’s backing for Ukraine in the conflict (68% want to see western nations do more, or at least maintain current levels of support), there is a substantial minority (28%) that want to see it do less, and that figure is substantially higher in eastern Germany (45%), fuelling (and possibly fuelled by) support for the AfD and BSW.[9] The SPD, rather awkwardly, chose the slogan “Secure peace, vote SPD”, in a clumsy acknowledgement of discontent with German support for Ukraine, and Scholz has given an impression of wavering (for instance declining to send Taurus missiles).[10] The CDU/CSU is apparently steadfast in its support for Ukraine but has begun to criticise benefit entitlements of Ukrainian refugees.[11]

Germany’s ruling coalition finds itself gripped by a vicious circle and the process of budget negotiation, overshadowed by constitutional constraints on borrowing, will make it worse. The three-party “traffic light” coalition of SPD, liberal FDP and Greens is well-practiced in losing mid-term state elections. Following defeat, party figures take to the airwaves to demand their party sharpens its profile within the coalition. This makes governing harder, and creates an impression of strife and disarray (23% of Germans declare themselves satisfied with the government, and 10% are satisfied with the way coalition partners treat each other).[12] The parties have fundamental disagreements over budget policy anyway (with SPD and Greens at odds with the economically liberal FDP), while a constitutional court verdict in 2023 drastically reduced room for manoeuvre without breaching the “debt brake” in the country’s Basic Law, making negotiations harder still.[13] All coalition parties will want to avoid new elections that a collapse of the government would likely entail, but finding agreement on proposals for 2025 by July, in this context, will be immensely difficult.

All in all, it is a pretty bleak outlook for Germany, and one which points to difficult times ahead for the EU.

[1] European Elections 2024, 2024 European election results, European Parliament, https://results.elections.europa.eu/

[2] Ibid

[3] BBC News, Von der Leyen elected EU Commission head after MEPs vote, July 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-49010801

[4] Tagesschau, “We need to deport faster”, October 2023, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/scholz-abschiebungen-100.html; CDU, Policy Programme, see: https://www.grundsatzprogramm-cdu.de/grundsatzprogramm; Paul Messad and Euractiv France, Macron calls for ‘regulatory break’ in EU green laws to help industry, Euractiv, May 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/macron-calls-for-regulatory-break-in-eu-green-laws-to-help-industry/

[5] Laurent Geslin, The Brief – France’s political scene in chaos, Euractiv, June 2024, https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/opinion/the-brief-frances-political-scene-in-chaos/

[6] Tagesspiegel, Map of Germany for the 2024 European elections, All results by districts and federal states, see: https://interaktiv.tagesspiegel.de/lab/europawahl-2024-live-karte-deutschland-wahlergebnisse/

[7] Ed Turner and Julian Hoerner, Far-right AfD makes unprecedented election gains in west Germany, worrying national government, The Conversation, October 2023, https://theconversation.com/far-right-afd-makes-unprecedented-election-gains-in-west-germany-worrying-national-government-215647

[8] Tagesschau, Who did younger and older people vote for?, June 2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2024-06-09-EP-DE/umfrage-alter.shtml

[9] Forschungsgruppe, Politbarometer June I 2024, https://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Aktuelles/Politbarometer/

[10] Tagesschau, The SPD is committed to peace – but which kind?, May 2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/spd-russland-108.html; Joshua Posaner, Germany’s Scholz says sending Taurus missiles to Ukraine is ‘out of the question’, POLITICO, March 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/germanys-scholz-says-sending-taurus-missiles-to-ukraine-is-out-of-the-question/

[11] Focus online, CDU woman warns of “citizen’s allowance trap”: Only in one country do Ukrainian refugees get more money than in Germany, May 2024, https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/cdu-frau-warnt-vor-buergergeld-falle-nur-in-einem-land-kriegen-ukraine-fluechtlinge-mehr-geld-als-in-deutschland_id_259956610.html

[12] Tagesschau, Ensuring peace is crucial in EU elections, May 2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend/deutschlandtrend-3424.html

[13] Professor Mark Hallerberg, The debt brake and Germany’s international competitiveness, UK in Changing Europe, November 2023, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-debt-brake-and-germanys-international-competitiveness/

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