Op-ed | The Taiwan Trap: Why Beijing Needs Russia’s War in Ukraine

Article by William Dixon and Maksym Beznosiuk

January 7, 2026

Op-ed | The Taiwan Trap: Why Beijing Needs Russia’s War in Ukraine

For the past four years, only one global superpower has had the capacity and influence to stop the war in Ukraine: China. Yet it has chosen not to – why?

Through a combination of proactive sanctions avoidance, direct military support, and help to keep the Russian economy alive, Beijing has enabled Putin’s war machine to continue long after it should have been exhausted.^[1] Russia might be the junior partner in material terms, but the West needs to understand: Beijing needs Moscow even more than Moscow needs Beijing.

Last month, French President Emmanuel Macron made a direct appeal to Beijing, urging it to exert pressure on the Kremlin to agree to a ceasefire with Ukraine.^[2] German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul made similar efforts, and the same messages have been communicated from the highest levels of EU leadership.^[3] Ursula von der Leyen and EU Council President Antonio Costa travelled to meet with President Xi Jinping in June, specifically to seek Chinese leverage to pressure Russia to end the war.^[4] However, the deeper insight from all of these European efforts is continued miscalculation.

When the continent’s leaders appeal to President Xi Jinping to “pressure Putin” toward a ceasefire, they fundamentally misunderstand Beijing’s incentives. They assume China shares an interest in restoring regional stability. It does not. Beijing’s interest lies in Western distraction and fracture, and Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine is the perfect tool for this.

China does not support Russia because Moscow is powerful or ideologically aligned – but because it is strategically useful. The asymmetry of the partnership benefits China: it enables Beijing to externalise the costs of confrontation with the West while advancing its geopolitical aims without engaging in direct conflict. What Western leaders fail to understand is that this relationship will continue to deepen and harden. Not despite Ukraine, but because of it – and for three strategic reasons:

1. Russia is Beijing’s Strategic Lever: It Forces the West to Choose

China’s most sophisticated gain from Russia’s war on Ukraine is that it forces the West to make difficult strategic choices. By enabling Russian aggression across multiple theatres – from Europe to the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific – Beijing has weaponised the Kremlin’s instability. This diverts Western focus, fractures strategic coherence, and drains resources from the Indo-Pacific competition, which remains China’s principal concern. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, underscored this point explicitly with his European counterpart, Kaja Kallas.^[5] He warned that China could not accept Russia losing the war, arguing that such an outcome would allow the United States and the West to shift their full attention toward China and the wider Indo-Pacific.

The mechanism is straightforward: Russia creates crises faster than the West can address them simultaneously. European capitals are forced to commit defence budgets to the eastern flank; the US Navy divides its attention between NATO’s northern exposure and its forward deployment in the Indo-Pacific. NATO members debate Arctic strategy while China consolidates regional dominance.^[6] Each Russian escalation in Ukraine compounds these trade-offs, forcing alliance members to divide attention and resources between simultaneous threats, rather than focusing efforts in a single direction.

Recent US actions in Venezuela underscore that US power remains decisive but increasingly prioritised by theatre and proximity, reinforcing Beijing’s incentive to sustain the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine as a means of complicating and delaying a complete US strategic concentration on the Indo-Pacific region.

This is where Beijing’s force multiplier advantage becomes decisive. Recent joint-bomber patrols near Japan – involving Russian nuclear-capable Tu-95 strategic bombers operating alongside Chinese H-6 bombers – demonstrate the operational principle.^[7] China signals regional resolve and stretches Japanese air-defence responses without incurring the full political cost of independent action. Russia absorbs the diplomatic friction; China gains the strategic benefits.

Critically, this approach works because Russia and China operate on different timescales and objectives. Russia seeks immediate battlefield gains in Ukraine. China, by contrast, is playing the longer game of regional dominance. Russia’s urgency becomes China’s strategic cover.

2. Ukraine is Beijing’s Spanish Civil War: The Taipei Testing Ground

Just as the 1930s War in the Iberian Peninsula was a live test-bed for the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, China is now using Russia and Ukraine as its own military and strategic test-bed. The objective is not to conquer Kyiv, but to understand Chinese efforts to take Taipei as we enter the critical “Davidson Window.”^[8]

Beijing has treated the war in Ukraine as a case study for analysing Russian successes and failures across logistics, air defence, reconnaissance-strike integration, and electronic warfare. It has already translated these lessons into the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine, training, and force development.^[9] The PLA increasingly reflects observations drawn from Russia’s adaptations and failures.^[10] This is most noticeable in integrated air defence, logistics, and information dominance, accelerating joint operations readiness for high-intensity conflict scenarios, including a potential Taiwan contingency.

The Kremlin’s experience under sanctions, such as rewiring its economy, rerouting trade flows, and operating under long-term export controls, allows Beijing to test its own economic resilience and evaluate which sanction mechanisms are effective and how to circumvent them.^[11] Crucially, this learning comes at minimal cost to Beijing, as Russia absorbs the political, economic, and military risks of experimentation while China refines its own preparedness for an anticipated potential Taiwan escalation in the years ahead.

3. Russia is Beijing’s Legitimacy: It Accelerates an Alternative Global Order

While the West exhausts itself debating the future of Ukraine, Beijing exploits Russia’s isolation to accelerate construction of an alternative global economic and political architecture centred not in Washington, but in Beijing. Russia’s sanctions experience and forced pivot toward non-Western partners does not weaken this alternative order – it legitimises and accelerates it.

Beijing has weaponised Russia’s ostracism to demonstrate that the Western financial system is no longer essential for major powers to thrive. As Russia pivots toward CIPS – the Chinese Cross-Border Payment System – rather than SWIFT, toward bilateral trade settlement rather than dollar-denominated transactions, it becomes a living laboratory proving that economic decoupling from the West is survivable.^[12] When Russia joins Chinese-led technology standards initiatives – such as 5G, semiconductors, and AI – while the West maintains separate ecosystems, it proves that both can function independently and in parallel.^[13]

China does not need to force this transition; Russia’s desperation does the work for Beijing. Every successful Russian workaround to sanctions further affirms the viability of Beijing’s own alternative infrastructure. More broadly, Russia’s defiance has accelerated the expansion of the BRICS forum and other solidarity mechanisms that marginalise Western leverage.^[14] The BRICS+ bloc now encompasses over 30% of global GDP and is growing. Russia’s willingness to absorb Western punishment while Beijing remains unblemished positions China as the rational, rising power within this alternative consensus – the partner that benefits from Western overreach without bearing its costs. Russia becomes the test case proving that confronting the West-led order is possible.

Looking Ahead

The China-Russia partnership succeeds not because it resembles a traditional alliance, but because it resembles a relationship where the latter does not yet realise it is infected. Moscow absorbs costs across every dimension – military escalation, sanctions pressure, political isolation, diplomatic friction – while Beijing extracts strategic value with minimal risk or exposure. This is not a partnership. It is calculated exploitation disguised as alignment.

Every month that the Kremlin keeps the West locked into European crisis management is a month China gains in the Indo-Pacific with minimal Western involvement. Russia’s willingness to absorb military, diplomatic, and sanctions-related risks enables Beijing to apply cumulative pressure across multiple regions without direct confrontation, stretching US and allied planning capacity while China consolidates military readiness and improves its strategic positioning.

Every NATO defence dollar committed to the eastern flank is a dollar unavailable for contingency planning for Taiwan. Every Western political argument about burden-sharing and allied commitment is an opening for Beijing to consolidate regional dominance without direct confrontation. NATO has spent four years strengthening European deterrence while inadvertently weakening its position in the theatre that will define the 21^st century.

The real question is not why Beijing supports Moscow: it is whether the West will recognise a trade-off it has unknowingly accepted before it becomes irreversible.

The architecture of this asymmetry is likely permanent. As long as Ukraine drags on, Beijing wins. As long as the West divides its attention, China advances. Western leaders who continue to appeal for Chinese restraint are asking Beijing to abandon its most significant strategic advantage at precisely the moment it matters most. As soon as the West recognises this reality, Beijing will accelerate its Taiwan timeline, in order to act before Western unity and coordination can emerge to confront them.

William Dixon is a Senior Associate Fellow of the Royal United Service Institute, specialising in cyber and international security issues.

Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst & writer whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] RFE/RL’s Russian Service, EU Finds China Responsible For 80 Percent of Russia Sanctions Avoidance, Says German Report, May 2025, https://www.rferl.org/a/german-report-eu-china-russia-sanctions-avoidance-80-percent/33425633.htm; Seth G. Jones, China And Russia Bolster Their ‘No Limits’ Alliance, WSJ Opinion, December 2025, https://www.wsj.com/opinion/china-and-russia-bolster-their-no-limits-alliance-c6bc6e49; Keith Bradsher, How a Chinese border town keeps Russia’s economy afloat, The Japan Times, July 2025, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/07/25/world/politics/chinese-border-town-russia-economy/; Huileng Tan, Russia’s wartime lifeline from China comes with a price: an ‘embarrassing reversal’ for Moscow, Business Insider, December 2025, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-economy-china-reliance-oil-exports-embarrassing-reversal-2025-12

^[2] Le Monde with AFP, Macron calls on China to help end war in Ukraine, rebalance trade, Le Monde, December 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/12/04/macron-tells-xi-that-france-and-china-must-overcome-their-differences_6748135_4.html

^[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs China, Wang Yi holds talks with German Foreign Minister Waldfol, December 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202512/t20251208_11768951.shtml

^[4] Zoya Sheftalovich, EU warns China to push Putin to end war as relations hit ‘inflection point’, Politico, July 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-warns-china-push-vladimir-putin-russia-end-ukraine-war-relations-hit-inflection-point-summit/

^[5] Reuters, Exclusive: Chinese engines, shipped as ‘cooling units’, power Rssian drones used in Ukraine, July 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/chinese-engines-shipped-cooling-units-power-russian-drones-used-ukraine-2025-07-23/

^[6] Patrik Andersson, China and Russia challenge the Arctic order: But understanding how means looking beyond their partnership, DIIS Policy Brief, July 2025, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/china-and-russia-challenge-the-arctic-order

^[7] Reuters, Russian bombers join Chinese air patrol near Japan as Tokyo-Beijing tensions simmer, CNN World, December 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/12/09/asia/south-korea-japan-china-russia-warplanes-intl-hnk-ml

^[8] Davidson Window signals the period during which senior US defence officials have warned China might attempt military action against Taiwan.

^[9] Colin Christopher, China Accelerates Modernization by Applying Lessons From Russia-Ukraine War, TRADOC Intelligence Post, September 2025, https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/china-accelerates-modernization-by-applying-lessons-from-russia-ukraine-war/

^[10] Howard Wang and Brett Zakheim, China’s Lessons From the Russia-Ukraine War: Perceived New Strategic Opportunities and an Emerging Model of Hybrid Warfare, RAND, May 2025, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA3100/RRA3141-4/RAND_RRA3141-4.pdf

^[11] Georgi Kantchev and Lingling Wei, China Is Studying Russia’s Sanctions Evasion to Prepare for Taiwan Conflict, The Wall Street Journal, December 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-is-studying-russias-sanctions-evasion-to-prepare-for-taiwan-conflict-5665f508

^[12] Natalia Chabarovskaya, Going Steady: China and Russia’s Economic Ties are Deeper than Washington Thinks, CEPA, June 2025, https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/going-steady-china-and-russias-economic-ties-are-deeper-than-washington-thinks/; Gleb Bryanski, Darya Korsunskaya, Elena Fabrichnaya and Gleb Stolyarov, Russia eyes China trade revival as Putin prepares for Xi summit, sources say, Reuters, August 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russia-eyes-china-trade-revival-putin-prepares-xi-summit-sources-say-2025-08-28/

^[13] Daniel Balazs, IP25091 | China-Russia Dual-Use Technology Cooperation: Geopolitical Bifurcation in the Age of Emerging Technologies, September 2025, RSiS, https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/ip25091-china-russia-dual-use-technology-cooperation-geopolitical-bifurcation-in-the-age-of-emerging-technologies/

^[14] BRICS is an acronym for a bloc of emerging economies including: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. With a further expansion in 2024 to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, it is sometimes referred to as BRICS+. Stewart Patrick et al., BRICS Expansion and the future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants?lang=en

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

International Relations and Geopolitics

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

Asia

Europe

Former Soviet Union

Russia

Ukraine

United States and Canada

United States

Expert briefing | Georgia’s Political Landscape in Focus: A critical point for democracy

Article by Foreign Policy Centre

December 1, 2025

Download PDF

Expert briefing | Georgia’s Political Landscape in Focus: A critical point for democracy

On 11th November 2025, the Foreign Policy Centre convened a parliamentary roundtable on Georgia’s democratic crisis, examining the country’s rapid authoritarian backsliding, the resilience of civil society, and the scope for international support, particularly from the UK.

The event was chaired by Joe Powell MP and featured expert insights from: Eka Gigauri, Executive Director, Transparency International Georgia; Nino Evgenidze, Executive Director, Economic Policy Research Center; and Professor Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham and FPC Senior Fellow.

Speakers reflected on the Georgian Dream regime’s growing alignment with Russian interests, the systematic dismantling of democratic institutions, and the wave of repression facing journalists, protestors, and NGOs. They also examined the impact of targeted sanctions, the limits of EU engagement, and how the UK can leverage financial and diplomatic tools to support those resisting from within.

To explore the key thematic takeaways from this expert discussion, you can download the full briefing here.

Topics

Human Rights

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Former Soviet Union

South Caucasus

Kyrgyz Parliamentary Election’s Snapshot

Article by Dr. Aijan Sharshenova

November 27, 2025

Kyrgyz Parliamentary Election’s Snapshot

The Kyrgyz Parliament – Jogorku Kenesh (Supreme Council) called for an early election in September on the grounds of avoiding an overlap of two important electoral campaigns in 2026 – presidential and parliamentary.^[1] On November 30^th, Kyrgyzstan will hold snap preliminary parliamentary elections.

A brief history of Kyrgyz parliamentarism

Since gaining independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has held eight parliamentary elections and had seven parliamentary convocations. In the early independence years, the country experimented with a bicameral parliamentary system, which consisted of the Legislative Assembly and the Assembly of People’s Representatives. Since 2007, however, the Kyrgyz parliament has been a unicameral body.

Throughout the last 34 years, Kyrgyzstan oscillated between parliamentary, parliamentary-presidential, and presidential-parliamentary forms of governance. Kyrgyz politics, however imperfect they might have been, were dynamic, lively, and left space for public and political debate and contestation. The most recent constitutional amendments, initiated by the current President, Sadyr Japarov, marked an important shift to a strong presidential model of governance.^[2]

Notably, two out of three government coups in independent Kyrgyzstan were triggered by contested parliamentary elections, first in March 2005^[3] and again in October 2020.^[4] In a way, parliamentary elections often contain seeds of public unrest as proven by history. The seventh election’s results were annulled due to the mass protest and the government coup.^[5] The sixth parliamentary convocation had its term extended until 2021. The eight elections, held later that year, formed the current convocation of the Parliament (seventh), which has lost a significant part of its powers in the aftermath of the constitutional referendum of 2021.

A snapshot of the upcoming parliamentary election

The upcoming election will stick to the previous Parliament’s composition of 90 members of parliament. However, there will be some important technical changes. Following the 2025 amendments to the Electoral Code, the electoral system shifted from a mixed system to a majoritarian one: MPs are elected from 30 multi-member constituencies, with each district electing three representatives via plurality voting (the top three candidates win). To ensure gender representation, it is a requirement that at least one woman must be among the top three in each district.^[6]

Kyrgyzstan’s current population stands at approximately 7.5 million people, with around 4.237 million citizens who are eligible and registered to vote.^[7] Voting will occur at 2,492 polling stations across the country, with voters able to cast their ballots at any station. This marks a departure from the country’s Soviet legacy, which tied voters to polling stations based on their registered address. Before, internal migrants had to travel back to their registered address to get a letter allowing them to vote in their current (temporary or permanent) location.

The candidates finished their registration by November 10. At the moment, a total of 467 candidates have been registered (276 men and 191 women). The electoral campaign has officially started and will finish at 08:00 on November 29 2025 – 24 hours before voting begins. Eligibility requirements state that candidates must be at least 25 years old, hold a higher education degree, have resided continuously in Kyrgyzstan for the last five years, and have no criminal record.^[8]

Why this election matters but why it feels stale

The upcoming parliamentary election might lack the usual dynamism of Kyrgyz political scene, but it is important for three reasons.^[9]

First, this election signifies a return to the pre-2007 single mandate voting system. While it might seem like an electoral reform element, this shift is de facto the last nail in the Kyrgyz political party system. In this mode, candidates’ resources, public profile, and local networks tend to outweigh their party affiliations or ideological positions. This probably is an honest move, but it does make political parties and political ideologies even less relevant than before. The changes were approved in June 2025, suggesting the plans to hold this snap election must have been in the making for a while.

Second, there are some changes in the electoral process. These include the administrative division of electoral districts, the possibility to register and vote in different polling stations, and the use of social media and social media influencers in electoral campaigns. The Central Electoral Committee approved 30 multi-mandate districts incorporating roughly 142 thousand voters each in October 2025.^[10] Most of these changes reflect on the current reality of digitalisation and the extended use of social media among populations, as well as the final acknowledgement of the extreme mobility of the electorate. Kyrgyzstan is a country of fluid external and internal migration after all.

Finally, this election consolidates the constitutional changes of 2021, which have significantly reduced the Parliament’s powers while strengthening the presidency. As such, this election effectively closes the chapter on previous efforts to develop a more democratic parliamentary or parliamentary-presidential system. Kyrgyzstan is now a strong presidential system.

Although not directly related to the election, it is important to note two significant developments that are taking place against the background of the electoral campaign. President Putin is expected to make an appearance at the upcoming Collective Security Treaty Organisation’s Council meeting in Bishkek from 25-27 November 2025. A few days before this, several opposition politicians and activists were detained on allegations of plotting mass protests and attempting a coup.^[11]

The parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan feels less dynamic this year. However, it marks two important departures from all previous political processes that have taken place in the country so far. First, it signals the diminishing relevance of political party competition and, to an extent, the existence of political parties in the Kyrgyz political landscape. Second, it signifies the consolidation of a strong undemocratic presidential regime.

Dr Aijan Sharshenova, FPC Senior Fellow. Aijan is the Executive Director at Crossroads Central Asia, an independent think tank in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, and a Leading Visiting Researcher at the Riga Stradins University, Riga, Latvia. She holds two Masters in the EU and Central Asian Studies and in International Studies, and a PhD in Politics from the University of Leeds. Aijan’s research interests include foreign policy, public diplomacy and soft power, as well as democracy promotion and autocracy diffusion. She published extensively on Central Asian politics, focusing on the region’s relations with the EU, Russia and China. Aijan authored a book on the EU democracy promotion in Central Asia and co-edited a recent book on navigating positionality in research.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] Council of Europe (Venice Commission), ‘Opinion No. 1021/2021 (CDL(2021)021) – Joint Opinion on the Draft Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic’, March 2021, https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/68/163; Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic, Tөрага Нурланбек Тургунбек уулу: “VII чакырылыш өз кызыкчылыгынан өлкөнүн кызыкчылыгын бийик коюп, өзүн‑өзү таратуу чечимин кабыл алдык’, September 2025, https://kenesh.kg/posts/14810; https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL(2021)021

[2] Serik Rymbetov, Kyrgyzstani Parliamentary Elections Strengthen President Japarov’s Rule, Jamestown, July 2021, https://jamestown.org/kyrgyzstani-parliamentary-elections-strengthen-president-japarovs-rule/

[3] Global Nonviolent Action Database, Kyrgyz citizens overthrow President Ayakev (Tulip Revolution) 2005, n.d., https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/kyrgyz-citizens-overthrow-president-ayakev-tulip-revolution-2005

[4] Aijan Sharshenova, Kyrgyzstan elects a potential strongman: Implications for international partners and the future of Kyrgyz democracy, March 2021, https://fpc.org.uk/kyrgyzstan-elects-a-potential-strongman-implications-for-international-partners-and-the-future-of-kyrgyz-democracy/

[5] Asel Doolotkeldieva, Uncovering the Revolutionaries from Epistemic Injustice: The Politics of Popular Revolts in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Affiairs, July 2023, https://brill.com/view/journals/caa/10/2/article-p99_1.xml

[6] AKIpress, Выборы в Жогорку Кенеш: Сколько женщин баллотируются? Список, October 2025, https://kg.akipress.org/news:2347875

[7] AKIpress, ‘В Кыргызстане насчитывается 4 млн 237 тыс. избирателей’, September 2025, https://kg.akipress.org/news:2336910

[8] The Central Electoral Commission, ‘Кандидаты/Талапкерлер: Выдвижение кандидатов’, n.d., https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/Kandidaty_Talapkerler/Vydvijenie_kandidatov/

[9] Aijan Sharshenova, Is Politics Dead in Kyrgyzstan?, The Diplomat, November 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/is-politics-dead-in-kyrgyzstan/

[10] oper.kaktus.media, ЦИК утвердил границы избирательных округов на досрочных выборах в Жогорку Кенеш. Список, n.d., https://oper.kaktus.media/doc/532638_cik_ytverdil_granicy_izbiratelnyh_okrygov_na_dosrochnyh_vyborah_v_jogorky_kenesh._spisok.html

[11] Catherine Putz, Kyrgyz Authorities Arrest Alleged Protest Plotters Ahead of Election, The Diplomat, November 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/kyrgyz-authorities-arrest-alleged-protest-plotters-ahead-of-election/

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Central Asia

Op-ed | What Trump Hopes to Gain by Taking on the BBC

Article by Andrew Gawthorpe

November 24, 2025

Op-ed | What Trump Hopes to Gain by Taking on the BBC

The BBC has apologised to President Donald Trump after an episode of Panorama which aired last year misleadingly spliced together two parts of a speech that Trump gave on the day of the January 6^th Capitol riots. But for the US president, an apology is not enough. Trump is now threatening to sue the BBC for between one and five billion dollars, a figure which could cripple the broadcaster.

The BBC undoubtedly erred with this broadcast, combining excerpts in a way that implied he had directly incited violence. The programme portrayed him saying: “We’re going to walk down to the Capitol… and I’ll be there with you. And we fight. We fight like hell”. In fact, Trump said “We’re going to walk down to the Capitol, and we’re going to cheer on our brave senators and congressmen and women,” only adding the exhortation to “fight like hell” 50 minutes later.^[1] Even though many analysts and academics think that Trump’s rhetoric did encourage violence that day, even if only tacitly, the edited segment was still a misleading way to present that specific speech.^[2]

Trump and the media

Trump’s threat to sue the BBC fits a broader pattern in which the US president uses financial threats and public pressure campaigns to attempt to cow media outlets who carry messages that he dislikes. In the past year, he has sued a range of media outlets for defamation – claiming that they knowingly lied about him in order to hurt his reputation. His targets have included TV companies such as ABC News and CNN, and newspapers including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and Iowa-based Des Moines Register.

Trump’s hostility to the media is long standing. Shortly after he was elected in 2016, he referred to the media as “the enemy of the people”.^[3] According to Trump, many forms of mass media are systematically biased against him because they are staffed by people he considers to hold liberal political views. Because he views large sections of the media as engaged in an unjust campaign against him, he and his supporters see retaliation efforts to push back against critical media coverage as legitimate. Hence, Trump has used not only these lawsuits but also various instruments of state power to attempt to punish or marginalise professionally run media outlets. For instance, he has downgraded the status of traditional media in White House briefings, inviting friendly podcasters and social media influencers to ask questions instead.^[4]

The favourable treatment that Trump has shown towards right-wing media – especially Fox News, the flagship outlet of conservative news – shows that it is not media per se that he objects to. Rather, he objects to media outlets that give him negative coverage – and he is willing to use the tools at his disposal to punish such coverage. Such steps not only please many of his supporters, who likewise see large parts of the media as an enemy which does not represent their values. It also serves to have a chilling effect on other journalists. Be careful how you cover Trump, the message is – or you might find yourself facing a $5bn lawsuit.

And that is exactly where the BBC now finds itself.

Unlikely to succeed

One curious aspect of Trump’s lawsuits against media outlets is that, legally at least, they rest on extremely shaky ground. Their intent should hence be understood as political – and on those terms, they can be much more successful.

The legal vehicle that Trump has used in previous lawsuits, and which he wants now to wield against the BBC, is defamation. The modern framework of defamation law in the United States was created in 1964 by a Supreme Court ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a case in which Southern segregationists sued The New York Times for printing what it said were defamatory lies by supporters of civil rights campaigner Martin Luther King Jr.

In the case, the Supreme Court established an extremely high bar for any official holding public office to win a defamation case against a media outlet. The court declared – unanimously – that winning such a case must involve showing that untrue statements were made with “actual malice” or “reckless disregard”. Put differently, that means that the claimant must prove that the media outlet knew the statement was false or at least had serious doubts about its accuracy. Furthermore, officials bringing defamation cases have to prove that the statement is false, rather than placing the burden of proof on the defendant.

This legal precedent is commonly understood as making it extremely difficult for public officials to win defamation cases – which was the entire point behind the Supreme Court’s ruling. The court reasoned that robust public debate must involve strong protections for media outlets criticising public officials, and they created them accordingly. No US president has ever brought a defamation lawsuit against a media outlet in the modern era, partly because they knew they would be likely to lose. Trump is likely to lose too.

There are other reasons why Trump would likely find the case against the BBC difficult to win. Defamation cases hinge on whether or not untrue statements cause damages – emotional, financial, or in some other category. Trump would presumably argue that the Panorama documentary harmed his political career, but that is difficult to prove. Firstly, the episode never even aired in the United States, and he has no political career in Britain. Secondly, Trump went on to win re-election as President of the United States just over a week after it aired, suggesting that any damage to his reputation was not particularly grave. Thirdly, Trump and lawyers seem to not even have noticed that the documentary existed until British media brought it to light just a few weeks ago.

Trump might argue that he suffered commercial damages, but this again would be difficult to prove. He remains an incredibly wealthy man and continues to strike business deals all over the world. Any damage to his UK business interests cannot have been particularly severe if he did not even notice it at the time.

This is why most legal observers consider that Trump’s lawsuit against the BBC is unlikely to succeed in court.^[5] But that may not be the point.

Victory of another kind

Despite the difficulties of winning a defamation case, Trump has already shown how such cases can result in a positive outcome for him. When he sued ABC News over a defamatory statement allegedly made by anchor George Stephanoupolus, the legal consensus was that the case would be very difficult to win. But ABC News never even let the case get to court, instead admitting fault and settling for $15m.^[6]

The reason for ABC to do this was simple: it avoided becoming embroiled in a lengthy court battle that could suck up the network’s time and resources and perhaps harm the business interests of its parent company, Disney. The settlement also allowed the network to get into the good graces of the Trump administration, which has other regulatory tools that it can use to harm the interests of US-based media outlets.

In the ABC News case, making a legally dubious claim worked to Trump’s advantage because it boxed his adversary into a political corner. But not every case has worked out this way. The New York Times, for instance, has fought back against Trump’s defamation allegations, the first version of which was subsequently dismissed by the court. Since then, Trump has refiled a new claim, and the NYT plans to fight that too.^[7] Even though Trump looks unlikely to get a settlement from the NYT, he still likely relishes his ability to suck its time and resources into a distracting court battle.

These tactics suggest that Trump does not actually need to win his court cases for them to damage media organisations and have a chilling effect on media freedom. This brings us back to the BBC.

So far, the BBC insists that it will not reach a settlement with Trump. This is understandable – after all, Trump is unlikely to win the case in court, and any settlement would essentially be paid with British taxpayers’ money. But the episode can still do the broadcaster considerable damage. Firstly, it makes it vulnerable to political criticism at home, aiding a long-running campaign by its commercial rivals to undercut its influence. Secondly, the heightened scrutiny means that the BBC will have to be much more careful in how it presents controversial topics, particularly relating to Trump, which is likely to make it more cautious in its coverage.

Nor is the damage likely to be limited to the BBC. Trump’s extraordinary decision to sue a foreign broadcaster serves as another example of the lengths to which he is willing to go to quash speech that he dislikes. By breaking previous norms of presidential behaviour, Trump constantly keeps media outlets guessing about what he might do next. The result is a chilling effect on press freedom, even if Trump never has a successful day in court.

Andrew Gawthorpe is an FPC Research Fellow and expert on US politics and foreign policy at Leiden University in The Netherlands and the creator of the newsletter America Explained. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] Noor Nanji, BBC Apologises to Trump Over Panorama Edit but Refuses to pay Compensation, BBC News, November 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c874nw4g2zzo.

[2] Capitol Riots: Did Trump’s Words at Rally Incite Violence?, BBC News, February 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55640437 ; Evangelos Ntonis et al., A Warrant for Violence? An Analysis of Donald Trump’s Speech before the US Capitol Attack, British Journal of Social Psychology (2023), https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/bjso.12679.

[3] Marvin Kalb, Enemy of the People: Trump’s War on the Press, the New McCarthyism, and the Threat to American Democracy. Brookings Institution Press, 2018.

[4] Liam Scott, White House to Open Media Access to Podcasters, Influencers, Voice of America, January 2025, https://www.voanews.com/a/white-house-to-open-media-access-to-podcasters-influencers/7953761.html.

[5] Rebecca Moosavian, Trump v the BBC: A Legal Expert Explains how the Case Could Play Out, The Conversation, November 2025, https://theconversation.com/trump-v-the-bbc-a-legal-expert-explains-how-the-case-could-play-out-269551.

[6] Michael R. Sisak, ABC Agrees to Give $15 Million to Donald Trump’s Presidential Library to Settle Defamation Lawsuit, Associated Press, December 2024, https://apnews.com/article/abc-trump-lawsuit-defamation-stephanopoulos-04aea8663310af39ae2a85f4c1a56d68.

[7] Jenna Amatulli and George Chidi, Trump Files Amended $15bn Defamation Complaint against New York Times, The Guardian, October 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/oct/16/trump-new-york-times-defamation-complaint.

Topics

Human Rights

Media and Online Freedom

Regions

Europe

United Kingdom

United States and Canada

Op-ed | Africa’s Moment: South Africa’s G20 Fight to Centre Development

Article by Elizabeth Sidiropoulos

November 21, 2025

Op-ed | Africa’s Moment: South Africa’s G20 Fight to Centre Development

Taking over from three Global South presidencies of the G20, South Africa’s (SA) agenda in 2025 built on those of Brazil, India, and Indonesia, while emphasising African concerns as the first African G20 presidency. Its agenda has amplified key developmental concerns requiring international cooperation at a moment when some countries are contesting both development and cooperation.

Although the G20 was originally a grouping of finance ministers, established after the Asian financial crisis of 1998, its agenda has grown since 2008 when it was elevated to heads of state. As global challenges, such as climate, pandemics, and inequality have become more acute, the need to bring development to the forefront has become essential, although not always easy. South Africa’s themes of “Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability” reflect the trend in the Global South presidencies to re-centre development in global discourse.^[1]

South Africa set an ambitious agenda. From tackling the high cost of capital in African economies to ensuring a just energy transition, advancing the Sustainable Development Goals, tackling inequality, promoting women’s empowerment, and ensuring debt sustainability – South Africa has not shied away from issues that are increasingly being contested across the world and in G20 countries.

The complex geopolitical context makes agreement on some of these extremely difficult. However, there have been some wins. A set of voluntary principles on combating illicit financial flows (IFFs) was adopted by the development ministers that recognised the linkage between IFFs and the erosion of domestic resource mobilisation, which has become more urgent in a climate of declining aid. There was also a ministerial statement on debt sustainability, which reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen the Common Framework on Debt treatment, and support for the ongoing review of the debt sustainability frameworks by the IMF and World Bank. During a year where several working groups issued only a chair’s statement, the ability to have a statement on debt was symbolically important even if there was no major innovation on plugging already identified weaknesses regarding the Common Framework.

The spotlighting of debt sustainability has brought renewed attention to the proposals incorporated into the Compromiso de Sevilla, particularly the establishment of a borrowers’ club, around which preparatory work has been undertaken already in New York. The club is likely to be launched in 2026.^[2]

Recognising the crucial role of critical minerals in Africa, especially in contributing to industrialisation, the Summit will likely adopt a G20 Critical Minerals Framework. This framework would mainstream the importance of local beneficiation and value addition at source, while also recognising the asymmetry in exploration capabilities between advanced and developing economies. In parallel, a set of voluntary principles on sustainable industrial policies has been developed, emphasising the link with inclusive economic growth, industrialisation, jobs, and equality.

Yet, the legacy of South Africa’s presidency goes beyond these outcomes documents. There are several issues that SA advocated that have contributed to a more nuanced debate on the challenges of development. This includes the initial proposal for a commission on the cost of capital, intended to address the issue of the African risk premium. While this was not established, this issue received significant coverage in global forums, including in the Fourth Financing for Development conference. Relatedly, SA’s work on combating illicit financial flows was reflected in the Compromiso de Sevilla. While the commission was not established, South Africa appointed an African Expert Panel that focused on the interconnection between growth, debt and development, and issues related to the high cost of capital in Africa. Its recommendations include, among others: launching a new G20 debt financing initiative for low-income and vulnerable countries, and reform of the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) allocation system, which reduces the discretionary and political nature of the current allocation process.

South Africa has also sought to build consensus on the concept of global public goods. While there was only a chair’s statement on a set of principles relating to global public goods, South Africa will be establishing an Ubuntu commission focused on fostering international cooperation for the protection and delivery of global public goods.

The establishment of an expert panel on inequality, chaired by Joe Stiglitz and presented to president Ramaphosa in early November, aimed to synthesise the research on this issue. It proposes the creation of an International Panel on Inequality, modelled on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to function as a technical advisory body.

However, South Africa’s G20 presidency has had to contend with difficult geopolitical headwinds and a fraying bilateral relationship with the US. The US chose to participate only in some of the meetings of the various working groups and task forces, with the Trump administration making it clear that it considered the priorities of the SA presidency as contrary to the interests of the US. In recent weeks, President Trump has made it clear that not only will the US not attend the summit in Johannesburg, it will also oppose the issuing of a Leaders’ Declaration, as the absence of the US would mean that there was no consensus in the group.^[3]

The G20 operates on the basis of consensus, requiring all members to agree on the final text. This approach necessitates compromises by all members so that the outcome reflects a set of common political commitments, even though there is no enforcement mechanism and these are voluntary. However, the position that the US has taken is unprecedented. The underlying assumption for consensus-based decision-making is that countries are willing to negotiate in good faith and make trade-offs so as to arrive at an outcome. When countries eschew this approach because they do not want a Declaration, it raises questions about the principle of consensus; it gives the power to one country to veto the entire process, where member states have spent weeks negotiating the Declaration. It also sets the precedent that other countries can do the same in future if they do not agree with the host country or are opposed to its place within the group. Such an approach would undermine the constructive role that the G20 can play as a forum for fostering understanding and compromise, even in a context of heightened power rivalries.

In an era when many accepted principles of international cooperation are being questioned and undermined, how member states secure the G20 platform as a forum for dialogue and coordination on common challenges, will contribute to the future trajectory of multilateralism.

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos is the chief executive of the South African Institute of International Affairs.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] G20 South Africa, 2025, https://g20.org/

^[2] United Nations, FFD4 Outcome Document: Sevilla Commitment, July 2025, https://financing.desa.un.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/FFD4%20Outcome%20Booklet%20Final_SP%20-%20pages.pdf

^[3] BBC news, US to boycott G20 in South Africa, Trump says, November 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckgzek4rl8lo

Topics

International Development

Regions

Europe

South Africa

United States and Canada

Op-ed | Science as Soft Power: How UK Research Institutions Drive Global Health Impact

Article by Molly Thompson

November 17, 2025

Op-ed | Science as Soft Power: How UK Research Institutions Drive Global Health Impact

From the discovery of penicillin to the development of one of the world’s first COVID-19 vaccines, the UK’s contribution to global health has long shaped its diplomatic reach and global standing. For decades, British universities and research institutes have quietly powered global progress – advancing lifesaving science, training generations of health leaders, and shaping equitable access to innovation.

In an era where the use of soft power is all the more important to mitigate growing global conflict, UK science remains one of Britain’s greatest diplomatic assets. However, as funding for global health and research partnerships tightens, the UK’s ability to continue driving progress on the world’s most pressing health challenges is under growing threat.

The UK has a strong heritage of scientific contribution to global health, with an array of prestigious institutions that have shaped the world’s response to infectious diseases, from malaria elimination and vaccine development to the scale-up of HIV prevention and treatment.

The work of UK research institutions and universities does more than deliver scientific breakthroughs. It also creates global public goods through the data, evidence, and tools that underpin public health programmes worldwide. These collaborations, often supported through UK Aid and critical partnerships with organisations such as Unitaid, WHO, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, have enabled millions to access life-saving interventions more affordably and effectively.

The stakes have never been higher. Despite remarkable progress over the past two decades, AIDS remains one of the world’s deadliest diseases.^[1] By the end of 2024, an estimated 40 million people were living with HIV, with 630,000 dying of HIV-related illnesses.^[2]

However, there is hope. A defining moment for the global HIV response came this year with the announcement of a historic price agreement for generic lenacapavir (LEN), a breakthrough long-acting injectable offering six months of HIV prevention with a single injection. Described by many as the closest thing yet to an HIV vaccine, lenacapavir could transform prevention for those facing stigma or limited access to health facilities. Unitaid and the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI), alongside the Gates Foundation, secured two price agreements at just US$40 per year, with earlier commitments also made by the Global Fund and President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to reach two million people within three years.

Behind this milestone lies UK science. Research by the University of Liverpool’s Centre of Excellence for Long-Acting Therapeutics provided the cost-modelling that helped underpin this price; a quiet but powerful example of British influence through evidence.

Beyond lenacapavir, UK research institutions have consistently delivered breakthroughs that have transformed global health. The London School for Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) led the trials and evidence generation for new malaria vaccines, including RTS,S – the first malaria vaccine recommended by WHO – now protecting hundreds of thousands of children in Africa.^[3] The University of Liverpool and Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine have been at the forefront of long-acting HIV therapeutics and helped develop innovative delivery models for injectable PrEP. The Innovative Vector Control Consortium (IVCC) developed next-generation insecticide-treated bed nets that have dramatically reduced malaria transmission across multiple countries.^[4] These examples show how UK science does not just generate knowledge; it saves lives at scale, strengthens health systems, and reinforces the country’s global reputation as a hub for innovation.

Global health collaboration has long been one of the UK’s most effective tools of influence, building lasting relationships of trust. This network of scientific diplomacy enhances the UK’s reputation not just as a funder, but as a partner open to co-creating solutions in global health through science and innovation. The partnerships generated through decades of research collaboration cannot be manufactured and are earned through impact. And at a time when many countries are opting to look inwards, this kind of outward-facing, partnership-driven leadership is precisely what is needed.

However, as the world saw during the COVID-19 pandemic, innovation alone is not enough. While UK institutions helped shape vaccine research and delivery, global access was hampered by inequities in supply, manufacturing, and intellectual property. Ensuring that future breakthroughs, from malaria vaccines to long-acting HIV prevention, are accessible to all must remain a core test of the UK’s global health leadership. In an era when political leaders like Donald Trump are undermining scientific research and multilateral cooperation, the UK has an opportunity to strengthen its soft power by championing equitable, evidence-driven science in genuine partnership with Southern-based institutions. The UK must ensure that publicly funded research delivers public benefit, both at home and abroad, to promote and strengthen equitable global access to innovation.

Drawing on its history of scientific excellence, the UK has made significant and lasting contributions to global health and the fight against infectious diseases ranging from foundational medical breakthroughs to the development of modern vaccines and ongoing research. Yet this form of soft power cannot be taken for granted. Cuts to global health and research funding risk weakening the very partnerships that give the UK global credibility.

To sustain the progress made to date in global health, alongside the UK’s influence, the government must protect funding for global health R&D and strengthen partnerships both with British research institutions and critical multilateral initiatives, such as Unitaid, WHO, and the Global Fund which turn innovation into access. In doing so, Britain can demonstrate that its global health leadership is not only about what it invents, but also about ensuring those innovations reach everyone who needs them.

Molly Thompson is Senior Advocacy Advisor at STOPAIDS. STOPAIDS is an HIV, health and human rights advocacy network of 50 UK international development agencies working globally to end AIDS and realise all people’s right to health and wellbeing.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] UN News, AIDS still killing one person every minute as funding cuts stall progress, June 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164111

^[2] The Global Health Observatory, HIV, https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/hiv-aids

^[3] London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, MRCG at LSHTM’s integral role in the development of the RTS,S malaria vaccine, January 2024, https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/newsevents/news/2024/mrcg-lshtms-integral-role-development-rtss-malaria-vaccine

^[4] Insecticide Treated Nets (ITN), New Nets Project (NNP), IVCC, https://www.ivcc.com/project/new-nets-project

Topics

International Development

Soft Power

Regions

Europe

United Kingdom

Expert Look: Unanswered questions regarding UK Government’s approach to defence and security

Article by Foreign Policy Centre

November 12, 2025

Expert Look: Unanswered questions regarding UK Government’s approach to defence and security

In their first year in power, the Labour Government made several big policy announcements related to national security, defence, and their vision for Britain’s place in the world. As the UK and its allies continue to confront the most dangerous moment for European security since the Cold War, respond to the growing levels of human insecurity in many regions around the world and navigate global economic challenges, a considered strategic approach is clearly needed.

Yet, less than a month out from the next Budget, questions continue to mount about the financial feasibility, priorities, and long-term direction of the country’s approach towards ensuring our defence; as well as the relationship between the UK’s evolving soft and hard power strategies. How will the Government reconcile strengthening defence and security with growing pressures at home? What progress has been made on the Government’s stated ambitions?

Below is an overview of the recent developments, followed by views from FPC’s experts, including those who contributed to FPC’s 2024 submission to the SDR, and to our most recent report Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy, as to how the UK’s approach to defence and security is evolving in practice, and where gaps remain in implementation, public communication, and whole-of-society readiness.

Strategic Defence Review, Soft Power and Aid Cuts

In June 2025, the UK Government outlined a new approach to defence and security, publishing the ‘Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2025’, which contained 62 recommendations.^[1] The SDR outlined a range of strategic goals, including renewed focus on NATO, investment in AI and drone technologies, and discussion of potential UK participation in NATO’s nuclear mission. The Government also committed to an increase in defence spending to “2.5% of GDP by 2027 and 3% in the next Parliament when fiscal and economic conditions allow,” with a view to “help make defence an engine for growth—boosting prosperity, jobs and security for working people across the UK.”

The Review was highly anticipated given the context of heightened uncertainty for the Euro-Atlantic alliance, the ongoing war in Ukraine, an unpredictable US administration under President Donald Trump, and shifting security realities in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and beyond. While the SDR contained some significant shifts in posture, there remain considerable concerns about resourcing, prioritisation, and delivery.

In January 2025, the Government launched its Soft Power Council, an advisory body to support the development of a ‘soft power’ strategy, which is expected to be released spring of next year. What this will contain and similarly, how it will be implemented is yet to be seen. However, the significant aid cuts the Government announced in February and their impact on the UK’s soft power potential was a key discussion point at every major political party conference in September.

The decision by the UK Government to reduce aid from 2027 to 0.3% of gross national income (GNI), in favour of increasing the UK’s defence spending (as outlined above) drew sharp criticism at the time.^[2] Not least because Labour had previously indicated they aimed to restore aid spending to 0.7%, after it was cut to 0.5% of GNI in 2021.

While the need to strengthen UK defences is clear, there remains a question as to whether doing so at the expense of aid is the right answer. A recent Chatham House report noted that “the £6 billion saving from aid is unlikely to plug defence gaps,” while “the West’s retreat from aid will leave an obvious opening for revisionist powers to build further influence in developing countries.”^[3] The significant fallout from the closure of The US Agency for International Development (USAID) in July this year, has been notable, and likely destabilising for a number of countries that significantly relied on international support. Last month, the UK Parliament’s International Development Committee launched an inquiry to examine how the UK can continue to deliver high impact international aid and development assistance in the face of a 40% budget cut. Announcing the inquiry, Committee Chair Sarah Champion MP posed the question: “What should drive the Government’s vision for foreign aid; national security, moral duty, international obligations?”.

Meanwhile, earlier this year, in response to the funding cuts, former national security adviser, Lord Peter Ricketts, coordinated a letter to the Prime Minister urging him to sustain funding for the British Council.^[4] In comments to The Guardian, he noted: “A lot of defence people will tell you that a small investment in soft power such as the British Council is worth a lot of money on the military side.”^[5] However, neither international aid nor soft power are mentioned in the SDR, despite the clear linkages with national security and defence – a notable omission that reinforces concerns about cross-Whitehall coordination.

What do these combined developments mean for our national security? Views from our Experts

Dr Andrew Gawthorpe
Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University

“The SDR sets out an ambitious agenda for UK defence policy going forward, but there are limits to how much planning is possible in the current international environment. The recent NATO summit in June calmed fears that Donald Trump might announce an immediate withdrawal from the alliance, but it also left all of the major questions dividing the U.S. from Europe, and European countries from each other, unresolved. Later this year the U.S. will likely announce the withdrawal of tens of thousands of soldiers from Eastern Europe, making the continent even harder to defend.”

Dr Andrew Gawthorpe also cautions that the UK’s ability to follow through on its defence spending promises and to coordinate effectively with European partners on rearmament, remains uncertain. “Whether the UK government can actually deliver on the necessary spending commitments and whether the UK and the rest of Europe can coordinate rearmament in a smart and effective way remain to be seen. In the meantime, the ultimate direction of U.S. policy remains unclear – and under Trump, basically unpredictable.”

Christopher Langton
Head of Independent Conflict and Research Analysis (ICRA)

Langton acknowledges the SDR’s attention to innovation but raised two concerns: “The Review highlights the all-important use of AI in defence. However, I wonder if the environmental impact of AI—most notably its water usage—has been considered, particularly amid increasing climate pressures.” But commitments on welfare and personnel are welcome: “The focus on manpower and welfare is a very welcome part of the Review. However, our history on delivering in this area is not good. A firm ring-fenced commitment to fund increases in personnel and expenditure on the defence estate, including housing, would bring confidence to boost recruiting and retention.”

Nina Kuryata
Ukraine and Defence Editor, The Observer

Regarding the Review’s emphasis on NATO as a strategic priority: “It says ‘NATO first’- but what does it actually mean in terms of measures to be taken? If the UK wants to lead in NATO, it must back that up with clear timelines and funding. At present, there’s a pledge to increase military spending to 2.5% by April 2027, with a “clear ambition” to reach 3% by 2034, would economic conditions allow. This is still far from the 5% that all NATO members committed to reach by 2035.”

She also questions some of the more rhetorical claims: “It says we will create a British army which is 10 times more lethal. That would need more development, I think, because it’s not clear what it means – number of soldiers, more deadly weapons or something else.”

Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams
Senior Fellows, European Leadership Network

“The recommendation  by the Review that the UK commence discussions on enhanced participation in NATO’s nuclear mission constitutes, potentially, a substantial change in the UK nuclear posture. More generally, the SDR leaves many fundamental questions unanswered, relying on the assumption, or hope, that NATO will continue much as it did before Trump.  The military implications for force capabilities and structure of having to operate in a purely European framework or a US-lite NATO framework are not explored. There is, however, a surprising indication that while the UK has always declared the primacy of NATO in strategic and defence terms, in practice, it has not taken its contribution to NATO’s military posture as seriously as it pretended. ”

You can read more of Simon and Nicholas’ analysis of enhanced UK participation in NATO’s nuclear mission in their longer piece here.

Poppy Ogier

Research and Communications Manager, and author of ‘Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy’, Foreign Policy Centre

“A modern defence strategy must recognise the vitality of soft power. Take the BBC World Service, it is the world’s most trusted news provider, reaching over 450 million people each week – and only costs around 5% of what Russia and China are thought to be spending internationally in an age of information warfare. However, its sustained funding is in question – and neither it, nor soft power more broadly, is mentioned in the SDR. The ‘influence’ of others is discussed – Russia’s, China’s and the US’s – without addressing what tools to influence the UK has. Including soft power in a defence review is not an optional extra, it’s a force multiplier for everything else.”

Susan Coughtrie

Executive Director, Foreign Policy Centre

“While there is a clear need for a shift in how the UK approaches the country’s defence in today’s climate, there are concerns with the current approach. For the implementation of the SDR and the future soft power strategy to be effective, they must recognise the dynamic between domestic and international developments.

Encouragingly, the SDR recognises the need for a ‘whole of society approach’ and argues to “Build national resilience to threats below and above the threshold of an armed attack through a concerted, collective effort involving—among others—industry, the finance sector, civil society, academia, education, and communities.” However, the Government should more closely examine the layered threats specifically directed at these groups, including through the use of transnational repression, foreign influence, disinformation and cyber attacks; which are only likely to further increase with more countries sliding towards authoritarianism. The impact of the aid cuts should be examined through this security lens too, to ensure that short-term ‘gains’ do not give way outcomes that will take years to rectify.”

Next steps

While the Government’s commitment to increased defence spending is evident, significant tension remains around what this will look like in practice, particularly how it can be delivered without further damaging other critical areas of UK influence, such as soft power and development aid. Key questions persist around resourcing, prioritisation, and whether the Government can protect vital diplomatic, cultural, and development tools while pursuing an ambitious defence agenda.

In an era marked by geopolitical changes, strategic uncertainty, and shifting power dynamics, particularly with an unpredictable US administration and evolving threats in the Middle East, the success of the SDR will depend on more than political will and funding. It will require sustained strategic focus, effective implementation, a strong soft power strategy and international coordination. Most importantly, an effective defence strategy calls for an approach that upholds democratic principles, protects human rights, and preserves the UK’s institutional integrity at home and abroad.

^[1] Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, June 2025 ,https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/683d89f181deb72cce2680a5/The_Strategic_Defence_Review_2025_-_Making_Britain_Safer_-_secure_at_home__strong_abroad.pdf

^[2] House of Commons Debates, Defence and Security vol. 762, February 2025, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-02-25/debates/8BF58F19-B32B-4716-A613-8D5738541A30/DefenceAndSecurity#contribution-DB32B970-42F2-4B1B-A92C-54CA0B28BA41

^[3] Chatham House, First USAID closes, then UK cuts aid: what a Western retreat from foreign aid could mean, March 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/first-usaid-closes-then-uk-cuts-aid-what-western-retreat-foreign-aid-could-mean

^[4] Lord Ricketts, Tweet (@LordRickettsP), April 2025, https://x.com/LordRickettsP/status/1915396877018632373

^[5] The Guardian, British Council ‘may have to close in 60 countries’ amid cuts to aid budget, June 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jun/08/british-council-spending-plans-may-close-in-60-countries

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

Regions

Europe

United Kingdom

Who is standing up for media freedom – and who is not? A new Index has some answers

Article by Martin Scott and Mel Bunce

November 10, 2025

Who is standing up for media freedom – and who is not? A new Index has some answers

Every year, on 2^ndNovember, the United Nations and its member states condemn attacks on journalists. In 2025, this “International Day to End Impunity for Crimes Against Journalists” is a particularly sombre occasion – with threats to journalists at an all-time high.

More than 120 journalists were killed in 2024 while doing their work.^[1] Countless others were arbitrarily detained, abused, and threatened both physically and online. News outlets are struggling to develop sustainable business models, and media freedom is at its lowest level globally in at least two decades, according to Reporters Without Borders.^[2]

This matters because a decline in media freedom can contribute to a deeper collapse in the systems that support democracy. As Nobel Prize-winning journalist, Maria Ressa, recently warned: “if journalism dies, democracy dies”.^[3]

Unfortunately, supporting media freedom is not a foreign policy priority for most countries. Multilateral fora – like the Media Freedom Coalition – encourage their member states to take action. However, these fora lack enforcement or accountability mechanisms.

To help address this gap, the Centre for Journalism and Democracy has launched a new annual index to try to hold states to account and encourage them to take action to promote media freedom beyond their borders. The Index for International Media Freedom Support (IMFS) evaluates 30 countries across three key foreign policy areas: diplomacy, funding, and safety/protection.^[4] The results paint a concerning and inconsistent picture – with no state performing strongly across all three categories.

Financial support for media freedom

According to the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media, “globally… the first problem to be fixed is the insufficient volume of Official Development Assistance (ODA) that goes to media support”.^[5] On average, the 30 countries assessed in the IMFS Index allocated just 0.16% of their foreign aid to supporting independent journalism in 2023. Thirteen countries awarded less than 0.1%, while three – Latvia, Greece, and Slovenia – reported allocating 0%.

The only country that came close to the benchmark set by the Forum on Information and Democracy of allocating 1.0% of ODA to media support was Sweden – who contributed 0.91%. In 2023, Sweden spent over $51 million supporting initiatives such as rural radio stations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and strengthening environmental reporting across the Asia-Pacific region.^[6] Largely for this reason, Sweden came 2^nd overall in the 2025 IMFS Index.

Support for journalism safety and protection

Another group of leading experts – The High-Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom – has consistently advised governments that providing safe refuge to journalists at risk is one of the most effective measures to improve the climate for press freedom around the world.^[7]

The IMFS Index finds that only one country – Latvia (who came 9^thoverall) – had both an active emergency visa scheme for at-risk journalists and supported a national scheme promoting the safety of exiled media workers. Twenty-one of the thirty countries in the Index had neither measure in place.

Diplomatic support for media freedom

Lithuania was the highest ranked country in the 2025 IMFS Index, largely because of its diplomatic leadership roles in several UN initiatives relating to media freedom and journalist safety. Estonia (4^th overall) also performed well diplomatically, having served as co-chair of the Media Freedom Coalition in 2024, alongside Germany (equal 5^th).

The lowest scoring countries in the ‘diplomatic’ category of the IMFS Index were Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and Switzerland.

Making media freedom a foreign policy priority

The results of the 2025 IMFS Index suggests that political will – rather than state capacity – is a country’s greatest barrier to supporting media freedom worldwide.

The Baltic states – Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia – were amongst the smallest – but also the strongest performing. By contrast, four members of the G7 – the United Kingdom (equal 12^th), the United States (equal 12^th), Italy (equal 24^th) and Japan (28^th) – all ranked in the Index’s lowest ‘bronze’ category.

Due to the time lag in data reporting, the Index does not capture recent cuts to foreign aid that occurred in 2025 in the United States, the UK, Germany, France, and elsewhere. Therefore, future versions of the IMFS Index are likely to show an even bigger gap between some countries’ public commitments to media freedom and their actual support.

Given this, the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media is right to argue that “what is needed now is not [a] reinvention of the wheel, but a new level of political will and a concerted commitment by governments to invest in what we know works – nationally and internationally.”^[8]

Hopefully, by publicly tracking countries’ performances, this new Index will help to generate more political pressure for meaningful action.

Martin Scott is a Professor of Media and Global Development at the University of East Anglia. His publications include, ‘Capturing News, Capturing Democracy’ (2024), ‘Humanitarian Journalists’ (2022), ‘Media and Development’ (2014) and ‘From Entertainment to Citizenship’ (2014).

Mel Bunce is a Professor of International Journalism and Politics, and the Director of the Centre for Journalism and Democracy at City St George’s, University of London. She was previously the Head of City’s renowned Department of Journalism. Her research focuses on journalism and democracy, crisis reporting, media freedom and international journalism.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024 is deadliest year for journalists in CPJ history, February 2025 https://cpj.org/special-reports/2024-is-deadliest-year-for-journalists-in-cpj-history-almost-70-percent-killed-by-israel/

[2] RSF, World Press Freedom Index 2025: over half the world’s population in red zones, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-2025-over-half-worlds-population-red-zones

[3] Kathimerini, Maria Ressa warns social media is ‘demolishing democracy’ at Athens forum, October 2025, https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/society-in-depth/1282767/maria-ressa-warns-social-media-is-demolishing-democracy-at-athens-forum/

[4] Centre for Journalism and Democracy, The 2025 Index on International Media Freedom Support, n.d., IMFS Index is published by the Centre for Journalism and Democracy, and is available at https://jdem.org/the-imfs-index/; The 30 states included in the index are members of both the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, and the Media Freedom Coalition (OECD-DAC).

[5] Forum on Information and Democracy, Statement of the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media: The Economic Imperative of Investing in Public Interest Media, September 2025, https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Economic-Imperative-of-Investing-in-Public-Interest-Media.pdf

[6] Forum on Information and Democracy, “The Forum on Information and Democracy calls for a New Deal for Journalism, June 2021, https://informationdemocracy.org/2021/06/16/the-forum-on-information-and-democracy-calls-for-a-new-deal-for-journalism/

[7] Media Freedom Coalition, High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom, n.d., https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/who-is-involved/high-level-panel-of-legal-experts/

[8] Forum on Information and Democracy, Statement of the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media: The Economic Imperative of Investing in Public Interest Media, September 2025, https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Economic-Imperative-of-Investing-in-Public-Interest-Media.pdf

Topics

Human Rights

Media and Online Freedom

Regions

At COP30, UK leadership requires paying up on climate finance

Article by Sophie Powell

November 7, 2025

At COP30, UK leadership requires paying up on climate finance

COP30 – the 30th Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change – will take place in Belém, Brazil from 10th to 21st November 2025.

The last 10 years have been the hottest on record, and an estimated 3.3-3.6 billion people live in contexts highly vulnerable to climate change. This year, countries were due to publish their updated national climate plans outlining their contribution to cutting global emissions (‘national determined contributions’ or ‘NDCs’). However, plans so far fall well short of what is required to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C.^[1] Therefore, COP30 needs to focus on the further ambition required to close the gap. Yet achieving this greater ambition will not be possible without the large-scale delivery of grant-based climate finance, making finance an equally critical discussion in Belém.

COP30 must deal with climate finance

Last year’s COP in Baku agreed to a new global climate finance goal (the so-called NCQG) to deliver at least $300 billion per year by 2035, led by developed countries and directed to developing country parties. However, the agreement lacked both a roadmap and the accountability mechanisms required to ensure that governments pay up. The NCQG also included an even vaguer aspiration to scale up finance to $1.3 trillion per year.

Implementation of the new finance goal is critical, as lower income countries require significant finance to develop their economies cleanly; to adapt to worsening climate impacts; and to pay for the escalating costs of the damage to homes, infrastructure and livelihoods (so-called ‘Loss and Damage’). The impacts of the climate crisis disproportionately affect the most vulnerable and least responsible the hardest, and could push up to 132 million more people into extreme poverty by 2030. African countries contribute just 4% of global carbon emissions but are among the hardest hit, and yet, along with other lower income countries, have thus far received only a small fraction of the finance they need – therefore having to take on most of the financial burden themselves. Indeed, the climate crisis is one of the key drivers of today’s debt crisis, as governments are forced to borrow more simply to recover and rebuild from climate disasters.

In this context, building trust among developing countries that the NCQG will be fulfilled is essential to maintaining a multilateral process capable of limiting temperature rises to safe levels. Delivery of climate finance at scale by developed countries, including the UK, is a well-established principle in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and is a legal obligation, as recently affirmed by the International Court of Justice. It is also a moral responsibility falling upon historically high emitters who bear the greatest responsibility for causing the climate crisis. Any wealthy government that considers itself a principled global actor must, at a very minimum, act in good faith to deliver their fair share of the $300 billion finance goal as a starting point.

Governments responsible for delivering this finance are increasingly putting their eggs in the private finance basket. Yet, while private finance has a key role to play, especially in delivering mitigation initiatives like large scale energy projects, it also has huge limitations. Very little private finance is flowing to the world’s most climate-vulnerable communities, especially for adaptation and ‘Loss and Damage’, and the evidence suggests it is not likely to do so at scale, particularly for the poorest countries. To date less than 50 cents in every $100 of all climate finance has been private finance for adaptation efforts, and only 3% of private climate finance goes to low-income countries.^[2] Moreover, the majority share of climate finance has thus far been provided as repayable loans with interest, which simply adds to the debt burden of those countries which are not responsible for the climate crisis – yet are, in this way, expected to doubly pay for its costs.

The reality is that to meet the needs of the world’s most climate vulnerable communities most of the NCQG finance must be public grant-based finance.

Will the UK Government show moral leadership?

When entering power the Labour Government said it wanted to rebuild broken trust with the global South and reestablish the UK as a global climate leader.^[3] While certainly deserving of credit for being the first G7 economy to outline its new strengthened emissions reduction target (the UK launched its NDC at the beginning of the year^[4]), genuine climate leadership requires this government to set out a credible offer on international climate finance too. And it must look beyond aid and private finance to do so.

Despite the UNFCCC principle that climate finance should be “new and additional”, successive governments have so-far drawn the UK’s international climate finance contributions from the aid budget, as have other developed countries. It was one thing to do so while the aid budget was going up. And to its credit, the UK Government was bucking the trend by delivering most of its climate finance as grants not loans. But as the ODA budget began to shrink, taking climate finance from the same pot has become increasingly untenable, so the Government has resorted to creative accounting and a shift towards loans rather than grants.^[5] With the latest aid cuts imposed earlier this year, combined with the greater size of the new global climate finance goal, alternative sources of finance obviously need to be found.

Aware of this, the Government’s narrative is now primarily focused on the idea that private finance will come to the rescue. But, unfortunately too much of this appears based on wishful thinking rather than evidence about where private finance does and does not reach. If the Government truly wants to rebuild trust with Global South governments, honesty is the best policy. It can’t just wish away the evidence because it finds it politically inconvenient at home; it needs to deal in reality not fantasy.

Realistic solutions do exist and the Government should pursue them. The UK could employ new and progressive ways of raising public finances, including through fair ‘polluter pays’ measures, at no cost to the average taxpayer, and use a portion of the revenues raised to deliver on its climate finance responsibilities. Ending fossil fuel producer subsidies in the UK could save around £3.6 billion per year for climate finance. A permanent excess profits tax on fossil fuel producers and/or a Climate Damages Tax on the production of fossil fuels extracted could raise further billions. A reformed financial transaction tax could raise £6.5 billion annually. Meanwhile, a net wealth tax on those with assets over £10 million to the tune of 2% would raise £24 billion a year – part of which could go to climate finance. The UK could also join the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force which recently secured an agreement by eight countries, including France, Spain and Kenya to implement luxury air travel taxes and is building momentum for coordinated action on other revenue raising measures. Why is the UK not part of this?

Polling shows overwhelming public and cross-party support for the polluter pays principle. In a YouGov survey conducted in March 2025, 85% of respondents agreed that those most responsible for pollution should bear the cost of addressing the harm it causes. Another poll in May 2025 found 7 in 10 Reform-leaning voters support higher taxes on oil and gas companies and other high-emitting businesses to fund climate action.

The UK Government can and must turn up to COP30 with a proper plan on international climate finance that is capable of truly delivering for the world’s most marginalised people. That, combined with ambitious net zero plans at home, would give the UK genuine grounds to claim the badge of climate leadership.

Sophie Powell is the Chief of UK Advocacy and Policy at Christian Aid. She currently leads Christian Aid’s engagement with the UK Government on the charity’s advocacy priorities of debt and climate justice. Sophie has worked in the international development field for over 20 years in policy, advocacy and campaigning roles on a wide range of themes – from trade, agriculture, tax and debt, to refugee rights and climate. During her first decade in the sector she worked particularly closely with partners across several African countries, including while working for Oxfam in Kenya for several years, before moving into more UK-facing roles.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] Fiona Harvey, World’s climate plans fall drastically short of action needed, analysis shows, The Guardian, October 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/oct/28/worlds-climate-plans-fall-drastically-short-of-action-needed-analysis-shows

[2] Christian Aid, Putting our money where our mouth is, November 2024, https://www.christianaid.org.uk/resources/our-work/putting-our-money-where-our-mouth

[3] Labour Party, Britain Reconnected, March 2025, https://labour.org.uk/change/britain-reconnected/

[4] UK Government, UK shows international leadership in tackling climate crisis, November 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-shows-international-leadership-in-tackling-climate-crisis/

[5] Independent Commission for Aid Impact, UK aid’s international climate finance commitments, February 2024, https://icai.independent.gov.uk/review/uk-aids-international-climate-finance-commitments/

Topics

Climate Change

Energy, Environment and Resources

Human Rights

International Development

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Op-ed | UK Soft Power and the Soft Power Council

Article by Patrick Stevens

November 5, 2025

Op-ed | UK Soft Power and the Soft Power Council

Earlier this year the Soft Power Council (SPC) was formed to provide concrete and actionable advice and support in the development and delivery of a UK soft power strategy. Comprising of leading experts from outside of government, spanning the arts, culture, and education as well as foreign policy priorities, the SPC is co-chaired by the Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Lisa Nandy.

Soft power is described by some as the power of attraction; it is a reason why people and other states might be drawn to the UK. Happily, the UK is blessed with many such reasons. Our language alone is a huge advantage globally; UK arts, music, and sport are loved the world over; the BBC (and the BBC World Service) provides us with unique levels of access and influence; Shakespeare, the Beatles, Coldplay are loved by billions; the Premier League is one of the world’s greatest brands, as is our reputation for education, science and technology.

More recently, we have also recognised that the UK’s reputation, expertise and leadership in harder edged fields is not only welcomed by partners around the world but also provides significant additional advantages and opportunities (soft power). Despite what often seems like turbulent and discordant times at home, our reputation for the rule of law and justice, a stable democracy, and military leadership, allows the UK to lead on the international stage, be a partner of choice, and attract inward investment.

So, soft power is already recognised as vital to UK growth, prosperity, and national security – if we want other countries to work with us and support us, we need them to value us, and soft power plays a critical part in achieving that. For evidence of this, one only has to look at the UK’s international successes in the last 12 months – trade deals with the US, the EU, and India; securing a more unified approach to NATO and supporting Ukraine through a coalition of the willing; and forging agreements with France and Germany to work together more effectively on irregular migration.

Crucially, in each of these, the objectives were very clear, and the key decision makers and influencers could be identified. Deep and trusted relationships had to be built, and common ground found and agreed. Undoubtedly, all of this was achieved primarily as a result of intensive, sustained and skilled hard work, commitment, and diplomacy by a host of senior and working level ministers, officials and civil servants – both in London and around the globe. But soft power also played its own vital part. Recognising and understanding that contribution is essential if we are to seize the opportunity presented by the SPC and develop a more strategic and targeted approach to soft power.

Even the most basic understanding of international affairs makes it obvious that, in addition to the intense political and diplomatic work, soft power plays a crucial role in advancing the UK’s interests. For example, President Trump’s second state visit in September (and the PM’s visit to the White House and more) was crucial to securing the US trade deal, support for the West in the face of aggression from Russia, and UK input to discussions re the Gaza ceasefire. That’s classic soft power, delivered by some of our greatest soft power assets: the Royal Family and the office of Prime Minister (and their iconic homes).

Similarly, when President Zelensky was met and photographed on the steps of Downing Street – just 24 hours after his disastrous first visit to the White House, an event that is widely credited as a catalyst for getting US/Ukraine back on track – the event’s staging leveraged soft power. The symbolism of that greeting in Downing Street, is a classic use of that UK soft power asset, as is Sir Keir Starmer and President Macron together at the D-Day celebrations or travelling up the Champs Elysees in a tank. Every visit to Chequers by a European leader tells a similar story: this is who we are, and this is the welcome, the support, the history, and friendship the UK offers.

Of course, these are top-level examples, and given their vital importance to the UK, the attention to, and use of, soft power is carefully considered and planned. And this is how I believe the Soft Power Council can add real value to the next level of UK efforts to deliver growth, prosperity, and enhanced security.

The UK has consistently ranked very highly in global soft power. We have the fantastic GREAT campaign that strategically builds on and amplifies our many strengths. But there is undoubted room for improvement in a more tactical and transactional deployment of our many strengths, as too often, the coordinated use of soft power is a secondary or belated consideration. More generally, coordination across government departments in our engagement with soft power partners could be better joined up. This is precisely where the SPC can help: by ensuring UK efforts are more coherent and joined up, and by acting as a super connector between HMG and the UK’s soft power partners, the SPC can better harness and utilise these many assets. Moreover, the SPC can become a go to soft power hub for the whole of HMG when they are planning how best to deliver hard-edged, specific outcomes.

To do this, we need to work very closely with our government leaders and senior civil servants. Ultimately, the onus is on them to recognise this opportunity, identify their priority objectives, and demand our input. With clear objectives, and briefings, the SPC must then deliver bespoke and targeted soft power – just as effectively as HMG has done on the very highest international priorities. And the best thing about all of this is that it does not have to cost very much at all; it is much more about being better joined up, thinking differently, and acting as a team than about expensive new initiatives. It also allows for us to use what is already in existence rather than reinventing the wheel.

Of course, there is much talk about the reduction in our aid budget and its impact on UK soft power (and inevitably a reduction in spending can negatively impact levels of ambition). But the SPC exists to advise the Government on how best to harness and utilise what we do have, rather than to lament what we do not. So, taking the world as it is, the work of the SPC aligns clearly with the four stated shifts in UK aid support (as set out by Baroness Chapman in her recent essay for the Fabian Society).^[1] These include partnering closely with countries to unlock growth and drive innovative finance and private sector investment; focusing on system support, so that we work alongside countries and move from grants to providing expertise, as they build their own education, health, economic, and legal systems. The UK’s soft power strengths, our world-class universities, and expertise in finance, law, health, and technology, perfectly aligns with this approach, enabling us to support others through partnership and shared expertise.

Working together in this way and demonstrating the SPC’s added value to securing and deploying soft power in a manner that helps HMG deliver on its most important objectives over the next year or so, is the true marker of success. We all know that the UK is ‘Great’, but the challenge is to now use all those things that make us great in a strategic, impact-driven, and focused way.

When we reach the point where, whenever our government partners think about their priority objectives and how to achieve them, and one of their first thoughts is “We need the support of the Soft Power Council”, then we will be able to confidently say that we are delivering on our remit.

Patrick Stevens is Rule of Law Director at International Justice Development. He is an internationally renowned leader in justice development and delivery with two decades of unrivalled experience. After leading some of the UK’s most sensitive and serious terrorism cases in the unprecedented period immediately post 9/11, Patrick helped set up and lead the Crown Prosecution Service’s (CPS) International Division for over a decade. As the CPS’s first International Director, Patrick developed a global network of justice advisors and international engagement that delivered strategic and operational Rule of Law improvement at the heart of the UK’s national security effort worldwide. He now works as a justice development consultant for International Justice Development Ltd and is a member of the UK’s Soft Power Council.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Fabian Society, Promising development: The future of aid in an uncertain world, September 2025, https://fabians.org.uk/publication/promising-development/

Topics

International Relations and Geopolitics

Soft Power

Regions

Europe

United Kingdom

Op-ed | The Taiwan Trap: Why Beijing Needs Russia’s War in Ukraine

Join our mailing list

Expert briefing | Georgia’s Political Landscape in Focus: A critical point for democracy

Join our mailing list

Kyrgyz Parliamentary Election’s Snapshot

Join our mailing list

Op-ed | What Trump Hopes to Gain by Taking on the BBC

Join our mailing list

Op-ed | Africa’s Moment: South Africa’s G20 Fight to Centre Development

Join our mailing list

Op-ed | Science as Soft Power: How UK Research Institutions Drive Global Health Impact

Join our mailing list

Expert Look: Unanswered questions regarding UK Government’s approach to defence and security

Join our mailing list

Who is standing up for media freedom – and who is not? A new Index has some answers

Join our mailing list

At COP30, UK leadership requires paying up on climate finance

Join our mailing list

Op-ed | UK Soft Power and the Soft Power Council

Join our mailing list

Join our mailing list