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How international law can reverse the global assault on free speech: A review of a new expert guide

Article by William Horsley

March 19, 2024

How international law can reverse the global assault on free speech: A review of a new expert guide

The global struggle to protect free speech has reached a new fever pitch. The power of news media to act as a safeguard against tyranny has been critically undermined as the world’s autocracies have grown to outnumber the democracies. The Economist says a global gag on free speech has tightened thanks to “the new censors”.[1] Technology has brought new opportunities to suppress truthful communications, and the coarsening of language has poisoned the well of public debate, affecting us all.

 

Recognising those dangers, 200 leading international lawyers and civil society figures gathered in London in January at the launch of a remarkable initiative aimed to turn back the tide by harnessing the law in the service of free speech. Renowned human rights lawyer Amal Clooney and Lord Neuberger, former President of the UK Supreme Court, have marshalled some of the world’s most authoritative jurists. Their joint publication Freedom of Speech in International Law (OUP) seeks to codify the universal rights to freedom of expression in a single substantial volume for the first time.[2]

 

The book charts the chilling decline in protections for speech in multiple jurisdictions. It also it aims to provide a useable roadmap for governments to comply with the minimum standards in law that they have signed up to. The endeavour is inspired by the belief that the impressive body of international human rights laws that has been developed since 1945 – although much scorned and often flouted – can yet be used by “courts and newsrooms” around the world to win this Manichean contest.

 

Lord Neuberger sounded a personal alarm, telling the meeting he had never before been so keenly aware of the importance and the fragility of international law. When Slobodan Milošević was found guilty of war crimes at the tribunal in The Hague in 1999, he had thought that victory for justice would usher in a new “era of accountability”. Now instead he saw signs of an “age of impunity and apathy”, and declared it to be imperative to halt the slide towards “unreason” or even fascism.

 

Amal Clooney is the project’s moving spirit. In Gaza, journalists are “our eyes and ears”, Clooney said, but more than 70 had been killed in “the deadliest month ever recorded” for journalists in any conflict. In India the authorities’ widespread use of sedition and terrorism laws sends journalists and human rights defenders to jail for years even before a conviction. In the Philippines the Nobel prize-winning journalist Maria Ressa still faces a possible six years in jail after a “false” libel conviction in a corruption case.[3] And in Thailand thousands of citizens have been prosecuted for criticising the King, an offence which carries a penalty of up to 15 years in jail.

 

Western states’ legal provisions that criminalise speech attract equally blunt criticism. Amal Clooney singled out the failure of the USA and the UK to recognise public interest as a defence against harsh anti-terrorism laws, meaning that prosecutions in both jurisdictions can lead to long jail sentences and those laws have a wider “chilling effect” on free speech. Lord Neuberger acknowledged his own embarrassment that not so long ago British judges had backed the use of secret super-injunctions to curtail free speech on important public issues.

 

The authors – seven in all – focus on four categories of laws which they say are being weaponised to silence the press and independent voices: laws regulating political speech, false speech, hate speech, and speech related to official secrets and national security. They recount how new legislative tools are being used by states to quash dissent – not only familiar ones like sedition, treason and criminal defamation laws but increasingly terrorism, ‘false news’ and other vague laws that autocrats use to protect themselves against unflattering press. Hong Kong, for example, has revived sedition laws which have lain dormant for decades with devastating consequences for publisher Jimmy Lai and a host of other critical voices.

 

The building blocks of free speech protection

The postwar framework of international human rights, explicitly aimed at preventing a repeat of the Holocaust and carnage of World War Two war, accorded seminal importance to the rights of freedom of expression and opinion from the start. In 1948 the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 19 of the UDHR proclaimed that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes “the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”.

 

A slate of legitimate restrictions on freedom of expression were also identified, in particular with regard to the rights of others, national security, public order, and public health; but enforcement of those restrictions is permissible only if provided for by law, necessary in democratic society, and proportionate. In 1976 the right to free speech was first made legally binding through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which has been ratified by 173 states.

 

Clooney, Neuberger and the other co-authors set out with meticulous clarity and in granular detail how, despite setbacks, the jurisprudence arising from the various international and regional treaties shows broad convergence on key issues. Among them are the principles that restrictions on free speech must be tightly drawn and not vague or overbroad; that freedom of opinion may never be curtailed; and that imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty for speech unless it also involves more serious harms such as incitement to violence.

 

International bodies also broadly agree on the importance of protecting the press. The UN Human Rights Committee, interpreting the ICCPR’s provisions on freedoms of opinion and expression in its 2011 guidance to state authorities, says that “a free, uncensored and unhindered press is essential in any society”;[4] and that the press merits certain particular protections because of its role in enabling and promoting open public debate, without which an informed and engaged citizenry cannot exist. The European Court of Human Rights has strongly endorsed the vital “public watchdog role” of the press, which is accorded the broadest scope of protection in its case law, including with respect to the protection of journalists’ confidential sources.

 

Yet in reality, Amal Clooney says, states have often imposed the harshest possible penalties on journalists to block or curtail their work to keep the public informed. In particular, states weaponise their legal systems by allowing “baseless lawsuits against journalists” that are often prohibitively expensive to defend against. In 2023, the UK Government faced a blizzard of criticism when it was revealed that the government gave permission for sanctioned Russian warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin to sue the founder of Bellingcat, Eliot Higgins, the man who had exposed Prigozhin’s crimes as head of the Wagner group.

 

South African lawyer and academic Dr Dario Milo co-authored the book’s chapter on insulting speech. He called for states to act decisively to end “lawfare”, the widespread and cynical use of vexatious or abusive lawsuits or legal threats by the rich and powerful to harass and silence journalists and activists who report on matters of public interest. The numbers involved are extraordinary. In a 2023 survey of around 500 media workers in over 100 countries, half of the respondents reported that they or their media were facing legal threats.[5] The authors call for legal protections against abuse, including provisions for the early dismissal of frivolous cases, placing the burden proof on the plaintiff, and awarding full legal costs to defendants who are cleared.

 

Misuses and law and the “undoing” of vital protections

The book draws on exhaustive research data to show how devastating the real-world consequences of misuses of the law can be. Between 2014 and 2020 over 9000 people were imprisoned in Turkey for insulting President Erdogan. Before she was murdered, Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia faced more than 40 libel claims, many of them from politicians or public officials. As many as 160 states still have criminal defamation laws on their books; and the global census of jailed journalist by the Committee to Protect Journalists found that 320 journalists – close to an all-time record number – were imprisoned as of December 2023.

 

Spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic, governments have enacted a raft of new misinformation laws in the past decade, especially related to speech on the internet. At least 18 states passed legislation against ‘fake information’ or ‘online misinformation’. Many of them apply criminal penalties and have extraterritorial reach. In Hungary, for example, a conviction can lead to a five year prison term. In many cases the institutions of the state – the judiciary, military or the government – have applied those laws to protect their own reputations in ways which, the authors insist, violates international legal standards. Among the book’s standout recommendations is that “false” speech should not be liable to penalties unless real-world harms result from it.

 

The ubiquity of the Internet in people’s lives has landed private companies with a hornet’s nest of responsibilities to take quasi-judicial decisions by the minute about words and images are allowed on their Platforms. The authors propose as a general rule that those companies should recognise international human rights standards as “a floor, not a ceiling, of speech protection”. The scale of the task is extraordinary: Facebook/Meta’s removal of hateful material rose tenfold in two years up to 2020, while TikTok alone removed more than 100 million videos in the first half of that year

 

Big technology and social media companies face fierce criticism from all sides, but this examination of their record shows that leading players have committed to ensuring that their policies are consistent with human rights standards. Meta’s Oversight Board of independent experts is tasked with determining “what to take down, what to leave up and why’. Its task includes holding the company to account to live up to its pledge to comply with international human rights standards.

 

A systemic obstacle to a uniform global code of practice lies in the uneven or contradictory principles enshrined in the major sources of standards on free speech and human rights. Twitter (now known as ‘X’) claims to ground its values in both the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the European Convention, which are “two very different bodies of law”. Meta’s Oversight Board, however, has said it would not apply the First Amendment as it does not govern the conduct of private companies.

 

The field of allowable speech online is fiercely contested. The less than satisfactory conclusion reached here is that there is as yet “no single principle for resolving conflicts of interpretation, nor a hierarchy or avenue of appeal”. A future Research report focusing on Internet shutdowns is promised by members of the same team of legal experts.[6]

 

International law: a launchpad for recovering the lost ground of free speech?

The authors also point to important legal and institutional reforms that have recently been launched but which must gather wider political traction and public support if they are to have a decisive impact. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, for example, has issued a strong Recommendation to its 46 member states on countering SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation). Regional human rights courts in Africa and the Americas have delivered landmark judgements – for example, directing state authorities to decriminalise defamation and to honour their obligations to give emergency protection to journalists who face imminent threats of violence. The past decade has seen the birth of some major initiatives in which governments are working in tandem with dynamic civil society and stakeholder organisations as never before.

 

Amal Clooney, David Neuberger and Darius Milo are members of the High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom.[7] The panel is an independent advisory body of the Media Freedom Coalition established by the UK and Canada in 2019.[8] The Coalition now comprises 50 countries, which have made a public commitment to promote and protect a vibrant, free, and independent media. Such innovations reflect the encouraging fact that the stifling of free speech and independent media and its pernicious impact on standards of democratic behaviour have risen sharply up the international policy agenda, often driven by dynamic civil society organisations. The 46 member states of the Council of Europe recently began an unprecedented Europe-wide Journalists matter campaign which will go on until 2027, aimed at improving the safety of journalists, protecting media freedom, and raising wider public awareness of the necessary part journalists play in safeguarding democratic and pluralistic societies.[9]

 

There is also a message for academics here. Engaged academics are committed to advancing the implementation of the UN Action Plan on the Safety of journalists and the Issue of Impunity through collaborative research with local actors in order to develop policies which can strengthen protections and safeguard journalists’ rights.[10] Yet the authors observe that many scholars focus somewhat narrowly on one jurisdiction or type of speech, such as defamation, without demonstrating connections between those findings and the wider picture. The explicit aim of the new publication is to effect change by spurring governments, big tech companies and other duty-bearers to enforce the international standards that exist to protect free speech.

 

Strikingly, the international law experts assert that Article 19 of the ICCPR has achieved the status of “customary international law”, after decades in which the legal standards for protecting freedom of expression have been fought over and refined through a host of decisions in international and domestic courts, The International Court of Justice has already accepted that it has done so. If that were to be generally accepted, then states like China, Myanmar and Saudi Arabia, which have not ratified any of the relevant treaties, can be bound by same rules as the countries that have ratified them.

 

Clooney, Neuberger and their colleagues recognise that it will be a hard slog to embed meaningful reforms and truly hold states accountable. Many are convinced the death in February of Alexei Navalny, like those of Anna Politkovskaya, Jamal Khashoggi, Daphne Caruana Galizia and other charismatic critics of authoritarian rulers, amounts to state-sanctioned murder. Each one of those iconic cases also speaks to the close connection between the fight for free speech and the demand for political freedoms.

 

The authors of this book have lucidly articulated the goal of preventing autocratic regimes and overzealous prosecutors from manipulating the law to silence journalists and protect themselves. As they show only too well, some habitual state practices are “wildly at odds” with what is written in international treaties. But they make a powerful case that international law is not just the best instrument we have to undo the stifling of free speech. It is the only one.

 

 

William Horsley is co-founder and international director of the Centre for Freedom of the Media (CFOM) at the University of Sheffield and a former BBC foreign correspondent in Europe and Asia. He is the author of the Safety of Journalists Guidebooks published by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and his work for the Association of European Journalists was instrumental in the establishment in 2015 of the Council of Europe’s digital Platform for the Safety of Journalists, a Europe-wide monitoring and response system to counter threats to media freedom and the safety of journalists. He is a member of the UK Advisory Board of RSF (Reporters Without Borders).

 

Photo supplied by: IBA Human Rights Institute.

 

[1] The Economist, The global gag on free speech is tightening, August 2019, https://www.economist.com/international/2019/08/17/the-global-gag-on-free-speech-is-tightening

[2] Ms Amal Clooney and Lord David Neuberger, Freedom of Speech in International Law, Oxford University Press, January 2024, https://global.oup.com/academic/product/freedom-of-speech-in-international-law-9780198899372?cc=gb&lang=en&

[3] Committee to Protect Journalists, Hold The Line Coalition welcomes acquittal of Maria Ressa and Rappler, calls for dropping of remaining cases, September 2023, https://cpj.org/2023/09/hold-the-line-coalition-welcomes-acquittal-of-maria-ressa-and-rappler-calls-for-all-remaining-cases-to-be-dropped/

[4] United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR/C/GC/34, September 2011, https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf

[5] The Foundation, New research exposes global trends in legal attacks facing journalists, Thomas Reuters Foundation, April 2023, https://www.trust.org/i/?id=b68bd251-a405-4dbe-890b-0ed50bc33f8f

[6] High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom – Our Reports, Research Reports on International Standards, International Bar Association, https://www.ibanet.org/HRI-Secretariat/Reports#IntStandards

[7] International Bar Association, High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom, see: https://www.ibanet.org/IBAHRIsecretariat

[8] Media Freedom Coalition, see: https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/

[9] Council of Europe, Journalists Matter: Council of Europe Campaign for the Safety of Journalists, see: https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/safety-of-journalists-campaign

[10] UNESCO, UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, https://www.unesco.org/en/safety-journalists/un-plan-action

Topics
Civil Society
Freedom of Expression
Human Rights
Investigative journalism
Media and Online Freedom
SLAPPs
Regions
Europe
United Kingdom
Footnotes
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    Op-Ed: Can The UK’s Professions Stop Butlering to the World?

    Article by Alex Jacobs

    March 6, 2024

    Op-Ed: Can The UK’s Professions Stop Butlering to the World?

    A lively event in parliament this week discussed how Britain’s PR industry could stop ‘butlering to the world’: serving kleptocrats and some of the most corrupt people around.[1]

     

    As the chair Liam Byrne MP noted, this ‘professional enabling’ is an integral part of Britain’s immense dirty money problem, which sees us in the super league of global economic crime.

     

    Participants from PR, journalism and civil society discussed what was going wrong and how it could be stopped. But is something more needed to help Britain’s professions kick the butlering habit and the huge fees it generates?

     

    PR and kleptocracy: a new report

    The event marked the launch of an excellent new report: What’s the Risk? PR & Communication Agencies and Kleptocracy.[2] (Disclosure: it was funded by the Joffe Trust and published by the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC).)

     

    It was hosted by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Anti-Corruption & Responsible Tax and the FPC in partnership with Curzon PR, The Chartered Institute of Public Relations (CIPR) and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism.

     

    The report shines a light on how British PR firms have helped kleptocratic regimes, and others involved in grand corruption, to launder their reputations and turn illicit wealth into status, influence and power.

     

    In a wide-ranging discussion, participants touched on how some PR firms may not know what harms they are enabling. Others may be more aware, for instance using anonymous social media to attack their clients’ opponents. Michela Wrong’s experience of ‘a tide of vilification’ was sobering.[3]

     

    There was general agreement of the need for change. As the CEO of the CIPR, Alistair McCapra, put it: “if we don’t want to become a gangster paradise, we need to act.”

     

    So what’s to be done?

    General regulation of PR as a profession is unlikely to be practical. The solutions suggested included both carrot and stick.

     

    Carrots included: raising awareness of the risks & human impact of kleptocracy; and promoting good practices like transparency, client due diligence and reporting suspicious activity to the authorities.

     

    Sticks included: more naming and shaming, supported by better resourcing for journalism; investigating PR agencies alongside regulated professions; and better regulation in specific areas such as SLAPPs or on-line harm.

     

    There was talk of an overall goal of changing the culture of the PR profession, to take an ethical approach to kleptocracy. Could the next generation of young professionals help drive change?

     

    A wider problem

    PR is only one of Britain’s so-called enabling professions, helping wrong-doers enjoy the ill gotten gains of kleptocracy and corruption at vast social cost. In 2022, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine raised the heat more generally on lawyers, accountants and others.

     

    Since then, the Government has put great emphasis on improving the supervision of professions and tackling enablers through the second Economic Crime Plan and two recent Economic Crime Acts.

     

    A number of civil society initiatives are also working to drive change, such as The UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition, The Taskforce on Business Ethics and the Legal Profession, Principals with Principles and The UK Anti-Corruption Coalition.[4]

     

    But change remains elusive. For now, it seems the wider problem of butlering persists. Many states beyond Russia are seen to be involved, from Saudi Arabia to China. Last month’s evidence to the Business & Trade Committee suggests that the overall problem of economic crime may be getting worse.[5] And every crime needs its enablers.

     

    A wider solution?

    Recent legislation should deliver real improvements in Britain’s defences against economic crime. But the acid test when it comes to professional butlering is: what will change the established culture, in the teeth of ferocious commercial incentives?

     

    This could be addressed head on, at the same time as new laws come into force. For example, professional bodies could promote awareness of the risks of tangling with kleptocrats and build associated good practices into their work.

     

    However, a crucial link in the chain may be missing. Change will not happen overnight or by itself. The agenda will need to be consistently pushed among professionals and their institutions, alongside all their other priorities. This will probably take several years of consistent work, with creative approaches to build pressure and urgency for reform. It could be done, for instance, by some new specialist initiative, some kind of Kleptocracy Unit, working across professions. It could even be run by and for the next generation of professionals, as an engine of change.

     

    Without such an initiative, there is a risk that this new report’s recommendations will gather dust on the shelf. As ever, the heart of the question is not only what should be done, but who is going to make it happen.

     

    At the Joffe Trust, we would love to talk about any practical ideas we could support to help the UK’s professions kick the butlering habit, and close the UK’s doors to dirty money. Please don’t hesitate to get in touch.

     

    Alex Jacobs has been the executive Director of the Joffe Trust since 2018. He was previously a board member and worked closely with Joel Joffe for 20 years. He has a particular focus on illicit finance and supporting non-profit leaders. (https://joffetrust.org/)

     

    [1] Robert Verkaik, Butler to the World by Oliver Bullough review – oligarch’s paradise, The Guardian, March 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2022/mar/17/butler-to-the-world-by-oliver-bullough-review-britain-reliance-russian-dirty-money

    [2] Thomas Mayne, What’s the Risk? PR & Communication Agencies and Kleptocracy, Foreign Policy Centre, March 2024, https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Whats-the-Risk-report-March-2024.pdf

    [3] Michela Wrong, I criticised Rwanda’s leader – now I wake up screaming after constant online attacks, The Guardian, January 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/27/i-criticised-rwandas-leader-now-i-wake-up-screaming-after-constant-online-attacks

    [4] UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition, see: https://antislapp.uk/; Institute of Business Ethics, Taskforce on Business Ethics and the Legal Profession, https://www.ibe.org.uk/knowledge-hub/legal-profession-taskforce.html; Principals with Principles, see: https://principalswithprinciples.wordpress.com/author/tnjnangle/; UK Anti-Corruption Coalition, see: https://www.ukanticorruptioncoalition.org/

    [5] Business and Trade Committee, Oral evidence: Implementation of Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, HC 522, House of Commons, February 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/14244/pdf/

     

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

     

    Photo credited to Menelik Samuels.

    Topics
    Civil Society
    Good Governance and Institutional Reform
    Investigative journalism
    SLAPPs
    Regions
    Europe
    United Kingdom
    Footnotes
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      Op Ed: Out of the spotlight Belarusians’ struggle for freedom continues amidst persistent repression

      Article by Joanna Szymańska

      March 2, 2024

      Op Ed: Out of the spotlight Belarusians’ struggle for freedom continues amidst persistent repression

      As 2024 dawned, the world found itself plunged into deeper socio-political upheaval, with ever more tumultuous events dominating global headlines. Overshadowed amongst these was the elections that took place in Belarus last weekend, the first since the fraudulent presidential vote in 2020 and the subsequent mass protests.

       

      On 25 February 2024, Belarus elected 12,514 local council deputies and 110 deputies to the House of Representatives of the National Assembly. The outcome was of no surprise, and further reinforces President Alexander Lukashenko’s iron grip on power. Meanwhile, Belarusians continue to endure an unprecedented level of repression, which similarly has seen little coverage, since the events of four years ago.

       

      Nevertheless, the year 2020 undoubtedly stands as a haunting memory for Lukashenko. In August of that year, thousands of Belarusians took to the streets to defy the dubious official results of the presidential election which secured Lukashenko his sixth consecutive victory. People voiced their strong dissent while waving the historic white-red-white flags: a symbol of a democratic and independent Belarus, later banned by the authorities. Protesters believed that the rightful winner, and thereby the next president, was Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, whose growing popularity became an escalating problem for the regime in the lead up to the elections. As a result, she was threatened, and ultimately forced into exile, where she remains today.

       

      The months that followed brought with them mass repression on a scale that the country had not seen before. Many active protesters had to flee the country. Those who did not want to or did not manage to on time, were detained, imprisoned, tortured, or even killed. The experience of the 2020 mass protests made Lukashenko even more ruthless and extremely determined to prevent any future challenges to his power.

       

      In February 2022, just a few days after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including from the territory of Belarus, the regime in Minsk conducted a sham constitutional referendum to further consolidate power. The referendum, among other things, served as a tool to remove presidential term limits, give a lifetime immunity to Lukashenko and constitutionalise the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, a body introduced by Lukashenko in the 1990s. Officially, this group of about 1,200 people, selected from among local and national officials, is tasked with providing support to the Government and acting as a voice of ‘the people’. It has the power to declare martial law, initiate the process to remove a president from office, or even overturn presidential election results. The purpose of this group is clear: it has been formed to prepare the ground for when Lukashenko no longer serves as president.

       

      In 2023, the regime was able to ban or dissolve most political parties through new regulations that forced all political parties to re-register, under much stricter requirements.[1]  Out of the 15 parties previously registered in the country, only four were confirmed in October 2023 by the Ministry of Justice as successfully meeting the new requirements.[2] They were Belaya Rus, the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus, the Communist Party of Belarus, and the Republican Party of Labour and Justice. Not surprisingly, all of them are considered pro-government and support the regime.

       

      As a result, the outcome of the February 2024 elections was easy to predict, further reinforced by the opposition forces in exile calling for a boycott of the vote.[3] The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was not invited by Belarusian authorities to conduct impartial election observation.[4] Instead, the regime invited observers from the Advisory Council of Heads of Electoral Bodies of the friendly Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member states.[5]

       

      The lack of strong mobilisation by Belarusians against the highly questionable way in which these 2024 February elections have been held, can be explained not only by the call of the opposition in exile to boycott them, but also by the pervasive terror which has persisted inside the country since 2020. The Government of Belarus has stepped up its efforts to excessively hinder people’s ability to speak out or protest by introducing or amending various repressive laws. According to official data, by November 2023, the number of criminal cases on charges related to “extremism” surged to 16,000.[6] As of December 2023, at least 960 NGOs were in the process of forced liquidation.[7] Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus have effectively outlawed human rights work and independent media, criminalising “working on behalf of unregistered or liquidated organisations” and making it punishable by imprisonment.[8]

       

      Activists, human rights defenders and journalists have been added to the list of ‘extremists’; currently even a single ‘like’ under a social media post written by those on the list can result in criminal charges. Independent media has reported that Belarus and Russia plan to unify their lists of ‘extremist’ individuals and organisations, allowing coordinated repression of independent voices.[9]

       

      Given the level of repression, the courage of Belarusians who actively oppose the regime continues to amaze. A day before the elections, on 24 February, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya reported on X (formerly Twitter) that her address to Belarusians about the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Lukashenko’s sham elections was displayed on 2,000 screens in public spaces throughout the country, an action organised by BELPOL, a coalition of former police & security forces officers.[10]

       

      According to the Human Rights Center ‘Viasna’, currently there are 1,411 political prisoners in Belarus.[11] Many of them have faced inhuman treatment, denial of medical care and no access to lawyers. Nasta Lojka, a prominent human rights defender who was sentenced in 2023 to seven years in prison for ‘incitement of racial, national, religious or other social enmity or discord’, reported that she was forced to remain in a courtyard without any outerwear for eight hours in temperatures below ten degrees celsius, after which she fell ill.[12]  A few days before the elections, on 20 February 2024, it became known that a 63-year-old political prisoner Ihar Lednik died in the Minsk regional hospital. Such news does not always make headlines in the western media, but it is crucial to highlight that Ledinik is the fifth political prisoner known to have died in Belarus since 2021.[13]

       

      Families of many political prisoners have not heard from their loved ones for months, many do not know if they are still alive. This includes Siarhei Tsikhanouski, blogger and husband of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, or Maria Kalesnikava, one of the leaders of the opposition. Many other political prisoners have very little or no opportunity to send and receive letters. With the continuous disbarment of lawyers who can represent the victims, access to any information related to the well-being and condition of political prisoners is increasingly limited. As recently as last month, the security forces have raided homes and detained family members of former and current political prisoners.[14]

       

      More than three years after the 2020 protests, the regime continues to do everything in its power, with a vast arsenal of violent means at its disposal, to spread fear and terror among its citizens. In the face of the ongoing repression, the West must strengthen the support for Belarusian civil society, which, despite the mounting challenges, continues to be very active and vibrant.

       

      We must continue to show unwavering support to the brave people of Belarus repressed for exercising their fundamental human rights and demand the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners. As Tsikhanouskaya called for recently, sanctions against the regime must be tightened.[15] Thanks to Belarusian and international investigative journalists, we know about the instances of sanctions evasion in the European Union, and the European community must address this as a matter of urgency.[16]

       

      Belarus might not be front page news, but the struggle for a free and democratic country continues.

       

      Joanna Szymańska is the Acting Head of Europe Office at ARTICLE 19. She has extensive experience of working on freedom of expression issues in Central and Eastern Europe.

       

      [1] CSO Meter, Belarus launches campaign of forced liquidation of political parties, July 2023, https://csometer.info/updates/belarus-launches-campaign-forced-liquidation-political-parties

      [2] Alexandra Boguslavskaya, Ban any opinion: are the authorities of the Republic of Belarus building a party system?, DW, November 2023, https://www.dw.com/ru/zapretit-luboe-mnenie-vlasti-rb-stroat-partijnuu-sistemu/a-67576770

      [3] Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya to Belarusians: “This day is for you, not the regime. Spend it wisely!”, February 2024, https://tsikhanouskaya.org/en/news/sviatlana-tsikhanouskaya-to-belarusians-this-day-is-for-you-not-the-regime-spend-it-wisely.html

      [4] Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections, The OSCE ODIHR regrets that the Belarusian authorities did not invite observers to the upcoming elections, Elections*-2024, February 2024, https://elections2024.spring96.org/en/news/114502

      [5] Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections, “Seriously underlines the credibility of this kind of company.” Pavel Sapelka spoke about international elections* monitoring, Elections*-2024, January 2024, https://elections2024.spring96.org/en/news/114036

      [6] REFORM.by, The Prosecutor General’s Office has counted more than 16 thousand “extremist” crimes since 2020, Reformation, November 2023, https://reform.by/genprokuratura-naschitala-bolee-16-tysjach-jekstremistskih-prestuplenij-s-2020-goda

      [7] LAWTREND, Monitoring the situation of freedom of association and civil society organisations in the Republic of Belarus December 2023, https://www.lawtrend.org/english/monitoring-the-situation-of-freedom-of-association-and-civil-society-organisations-in-the-republic-of-belarus-december-2023

      [8] OMCT, Belarus: New amendment to the Criminal Code leaves no room for legal human rights activities, January 2022, https://www.omct.org/en/resources/statements/belarus-new-amendment-to-the-criminal-code-leaves-no-room-for-legal-human-rights-activities

      [9] Maria Yeryoma, Belarus Weekly: Belarus, Russia to unify lists of ‘extremists,’ coordinating repression, The Kyiv Independent, February 2024, https://kyivindependent.com/belarus-weekly-belarus-russia-to-unify-lists-of-extremists-coordinating-repression/

      [10] Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Twitter post, Twitter, February 2024, https://twitter.com/Tsihanouskaya/status/1761471246309450116

      [11] Viasna, As of February 28 1411 persons in Belarus are considered as political prisoners, https://prisoners.spring96.org/en

      [12] ARTICLE 19, Belarus: End persecution of human rights defender Nasta Lojka, April 2023, https://www.article19.org/resources/belarus-end-persecution-of-nasta-lojka/

      [13] Viasna, Political prisoner Ihar Lednik died. He had health problems, February 2024, https://spring96.org/en/news/114453

      [14] European Parliament, New wave of mass arrests in Belarus of opposition activists and their family members, February 2024, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-02-08_EN.html#sdocta1

      [15] Todd Prince, Tsikhanouskaya Calls On U.S> To Support Belarusian Opposition, Tighten Sanctions on Lukashenka, RFE/RL, December 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/tsikhanouskaya-us-support-belarusian-opposition-sanctions/32715837.html

      [16] OCCRP, Lithuania Cracks Down on Sanction Evasion Schemes after OCCRP Investigation, March 2023, https://www.occrp.org/ru/daily/17377-lithuania-cracks-down-on-sanction-evasion-schemes-after-occrp-investigation

       

      Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

      Topics
      Civil Society
      Democracy and Elections
      Human Rights
      Regions
      Former Soviet Union
      Belarus
      Footnotes
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        Two Years On: New recommendations for the safety of journalists working on the frontline

        Article by Maria Ordzhonikide and Valeriya Chudarova

        March 1, 2024

        Two Years On: New recommendations for the safety of journalists working on the frontline

        The London-based charity Justice for Journalists Foundation (JFJ), in partnership with the National Union of Journalists in Ukraine, has been collecting open-source evidence and satellite imagery of attacks on media workers during the war in order create better ways to protect journalists heading to the war zone. Maria Ordzhonikide and Valeriya Chudarova from JFJ, explain more about their work and recommendations for journalists working on the frontline.

         

        After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago, thousands of Ukrainian journalists found themselves becoming frontline correspondents almost overnight. Dozens of foreign journalists also arrived in the country to report on the war. Without these professional and citizen reporters the world would not have been able to understand the extent of the unfolding catastrophe.

         

        However, a high toll has already been paid, as according to the National Union of Journalists, at least 16 media workers have died while performing their professional duties, nine media workers have died as a result of collateral damage and at least 54 journalists have died while serving in the armed forces.[1]

         

        At JFJ, in partnership with the National Union of Journalists in Ukraine, and with the financial support by UNESCO, we have been collecting open-source evidence and satellite imagery of attacks on media workers during the war in order to create safety recommendations (outlined below), risk assessments and HEFAT training for journalists heading to the war zone.

         

        Over the course of the project, we have obtained and processed information about 35 instances of both fatal and non-fatal attacks against media workers in Ukraine, involving at least 55 journalists from countries including Ukraine, Turkey, Czech Republic, the USA, Russia, Ireland, the UK, Italy, France, Japan, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, and Lithuania.

         

        Verified data confirms that 12 media workers have died as a result of enemy shelling. This includes six foreign journalists: Arman Soldin, Frédéric Leclerc-Imhoff, Mantas Kvedaravičius, Pierre Zakrzewski, Oksana Baulina, Brent Renault; and four Ukrainian journalists: Oleksandra Kuvshinova, Maks Levin, Bohdan Bitik and Yevheniy Sakun.

         

        2024 has already seen two journalists and one fixer for the Turkish news agency Anadolu injured by Russian shelling on the Park Hotel in Kharkiv. Additionally, a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty camera crew came under mortar fire while working on the front line.

         

        Having analysed the collected data and interviewed the victims and witnesses of these attacks, JFJ has identified the key risks journalists were facing while reporting from the war zone and developed preliminary safety recommendations for media workers covering the war in Ukraine. These recommendations do not cover all aspects of journalists’ safety, but will be useful for those who are reporting from Ukraine.

         

        While some physical attacks against media workers become public, not all cases are known. In particular, this concerns journalists working for smaller regional publications, freelancers, and fixers. While journalists working for more prominent media outlets routinely receive essential training prior to their trips to war zones, and have both access to the necessary equipment and support, the safety of freelancers and local team members is in their own hands. They often have to deal with costly expenses alone, while also assessing and mitigating their professional risks.

         

        JFJ and its partners aim to increase the safety of media workers in Ukraine by creating and maintaining a secure database of evidence related to those attacks and ensuring media workers are aware of their risk mitigation options.

         

        Safety Recommendations for Journalists

         

        • COMPLETE A HEFAT TRAINING COURSE BEFORE TRAVELLING TO THE WAR ZONE

        Completing a hostile environment and first aid training course is crucial before travelling to the conflict zone. Skills developed during this training will help media workers learn more about the basics of safety; how to conduct a risk assessment; how to act in dangerous situations, and potentially save their fellow crew members’ lives. Even if you are a well-trained journalist and have a lot of experience covering conflicts, because all wars are unique it is essential to refresh these skills every year.

         

        • CONDUCT RISK ASSESSMENT BEFORE TRAVELLING

        Conducting preliminary risk assessment and developing a specific risk protocol prior to travelling to the war zone should be mandatory for all media workers in conflict zones. It is vital to understand the specificities of the regional context, including tactics, combat uniforms and weapons used by both sides.

         

        While planning the route, informing your colleagues or management about your whereabouts is key. Remember the safety basics, i.e., avoid using the same entrance and exit roads while planning your route.

         

        • CONDUCT LOCAL RECONNAISSANCE

        While on assignment, keep in touch with locals to keep up to date with what is happening in the area you plan on travelling to. Do not rely on outdated information, even if it is just a couple of days old. In the area of direct combat operations, get new information as often as possible.

         

        When visiting an unknown area, conduct a preliminary terrain analysis. Never rely on technology, learn to read physical maps, and navigate the terrain without the help of gadgets whose signals can be tracked.

         

        • CHOOSE ACCOMMODATION CAREFULLY

        Evidence shows that the Russian military targets hotels favoured by international and Ukrainian media representatives. When choosing your accommodation, try to avoid hotels that could become a target of such an attack. Avoid staying close to administrative buildings, railway junctions, warehouses and other strategic objects that can be targeted. The best option, when possible, is to rent a flat discreetly. Regular safety considerations should not be forgotten: the building should not be tall and should have an easy escape route in the case of attack. Familiarise yourself with all the entrances and emergency exits in advance.

         

        • PROTECTIVE GEAR

        A journalist must be fully equipped with protective gear on the frontline, including a bulletproof vest and protective helmet with the inscription “PRESS”. Avoid wearing military-style clothing as there is a significant risk of being confused with military personnel.

         

        • MARK AND PREPARE YOUR VEHICLE

        Marking the car with a “PRESS” inscription is vital. Do not go for options like “TV” as in Ukraine it might be read as “V”, which is used by the Russian Armed Forces. In case of a drone attack, the usual “PRESS” sign can be hardly visible. Consider using polyvinyl magnets, which are easy to apply and remove. The marking should be large and visible on all sides of the car: on the front, on both sides, and on the roof.

         

        To avoid being identified as military personnel and becoming a target, avoid marking your car with any signs associated with the military (such as yellow tape, white crosses, etc.), even if this is suggested by the local armed forces.

         

        Ensure that the car is in good condition and has spare wheels, as well as other necessary tools for emergency repairs.

         

        • BEWARE OF SWITCHING CARS

        Make sure your vehicle always has clear “PRESS” markings. Try to avoid changing vehicles, and do not get in a car with unknown people or military personnel, who can be targeted by the opposing military. Be careful when using taxis to travel to dangerous areas. Ensure that your driver fully understands the risks; will not abandon the crew in case of an attack; and has the necessary spare parts for the vehicle in case of an emergency.

         

        • HAVE ADDITIONAL CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION

        Never rely on technology while in the conflict zone. If you are a journalist working for a media outlet, try to obtain a satellite phone. This can often be costly for freelance journalists who can use a cheaper alternative, like a satellite navigator. Always have a backup plan if the technology fails.

         

        Remember that both sides use electronic warfare equipment near the combat zone, while mobile gadgets may not work properly or provide unreliable GPS navigation data. Avoid using your GPS in a combat zone unless you have no other means to determine your location.

         

        For more information, please see – https://jfj.fund/

         

        Maria Ordzhonikide is Director of the Justice for Journalists Foundation and a member of FPC Advisory Council.

         

        Valeriya Chudarova is the Research Manager at the Justice for Journalists Foundation.

         

        [1]NSJU, List of journalists who have died since the beginning of full-scale Russian aggression (updated), February 2024, https://nsju.org/novini/arman-soldin-stav-14-ym-mediapraczivnykom-shho-zagynuv-pry-vykonanni-profesijnyh-obovyazkiv/

         

        Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

        Topics
        Conflict Resolution and Security
        Human Rights
        Investigative journalism
        Media and Online Freedom
        Ukraine Conflict
        Regions
        Former Soviet Union
        Ukraine
        Footnotes
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          War in Ukraine: The ongoing conflict has provided growing strategic opportunities for GCC states

          Article by Drewery Dyke

          February 28, 2024

          War in Ukraine: The ongoing conflict has provided growing strategic opportunities for GCC states

          Heading into the third year of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the Gulf Arab states – the six states comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – continue to maintain an intentional ambiguity regarding their stances in relation to the governments of Russia and Ukraine in respect to the ongoing conflict, rejecting the dichotomous pro/anti Russia/West stance.

           

          No GCC state has categorically backed either party to the conflict. Instead they have, mainly via Saudi Arabia and the UAE, sought to operationalise the conflict for their own objectives, opting, in general, for an increasingly multipolar diplomatic and security stance. As the Ukraine war does not constitute a direct threat to the Gulf’s security or political interests, broadly, engagement has adhered to carefully formulated policy objectives.

           

          Each GCC state has carried its own nuanced perspective into bilateral relations with the parties to the conflict: Qatar, subject to a regionally-imposed blockade between 2017-2021; and Kuwait, occupied by Iraq in 1990-1991, both initially appeared sympathetic to Ukraine.[1] Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, arguably initially appeared to give Russia considerable political leeway, possibly on account of its role in OPEC+ or since these Gulf states have provided a safe haven for Russian capital facing widespread western sanctions.[2] The conflict also enabled Saudi Arabia to distract and expunge residual western concerns over the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia’s Istanbul consulate. Collectively, however, the conflict has presented opportunities for economic, security and diplomatic diversification.

           

          This has been bolstered by their economic situation: the collapse of oil prices in 2014 adversely impacted on Gulf states’ budgets, exacerbating aspects of their domestic challenges.[3] Yet since Gulf states possess nearly 40% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 23% of proven natural gas reserves, Europe’s sudden diversion away from Russian sources had an immediate impact. According to a January 2024 report, the conflict resulted in around a 50% increase in oil prices.[4] Gas prices increased tenfold in the months following the invasion, falling to a threefold increase towards the end of year one.[5]

           

          The resulting pivot away from Russian energy sources toward Gulf sources underscored the centrality of the Gulf to the UK and much of Europe’s energy security.[6] It bolstered Gulf self-confidence as well as political leverage amidst a period of doubt by Gulf states about the primacy of security relations with a seemingly unreliable United States (US) following the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and apparent US inaction following the 2019 and March 2022 Houthi attack on Saudi Arabian oil facilities, including on the Gulf.[7]

           

          While, in broad terms, US staying-power appears to have ebbed over the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations, Gulf caution remains predicated on the US military presence in the region and it is still the case that “GCC’s economies remain strongly tied to the US, as their currencies are pegged to the dollar and the global sale of oil is conducted in that currency.”[8]

           

          Yet growing multipolar economic relations presage diplomatic ones: In 2017, the People’s Republic of China surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest crude oil importer; in 2022, Saudi Arabia was China’s top supplier of oil – later overtaken by Russia.[9] Perhaps commensurate with this economic orientation, in March 2023, exemplifying Gulf states’ increasingly confident diplomatic diversification and shaking up of engagement with great powers, Saudi Arabia, Iran and China issued a joint trilateral statement. This statement declared their “agreement to resume diplomatic relations between [Iran and China] and re-open their embassies and missions […] and [that] the agreement includes their affirmation of the respect for the sovereignty of states and the non-interference in internal affairs of states.”[10] A June 2023 assessment stated that “China’s growing clout poses a challenge to America’s long-held political and diplomatic influence in the region”, but it overlooked that it was also a decision taken by Saudi Arabia, as well as Iran.[11]

           

          The Ukraine war has provided Gulf states a two year opportunity to learn-by-doing as well as extend their own influence. In March 2022 – only a month after the invasion -Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy made a surprise virtual appearance at the Doha Forum and called on Qatar to “contribute to stabilizing the situation in Europe” and “increase energy production to make Russia understand that no state should use energy as a weapon and to blackmail the world.”[12]

           

          In 2023, GCC states – mainly Saudi Arabia and the UAE – built on this engagement:

          – In February 2023, the GCC and US re-activated the US-Gulf Cooperation Council Working Groups on Integrated Air and Missile Defense and Maritime Security.[13]

          – Also in February, reflecting a cautious, measured policy approach, the “UAE cancelled the branch licence for Russia’s MTS Bank, the target of British and US sanctions.”[14]

          – In March came the Chinese-led Saudi Arabia- Iran agreement, when Saudi Arabia also joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Chinese-led Asian security and economic bloc, with the status of dialogue partner.[15]

          – In May, on invitation, President Zelenskiy addressed a meeting of the Arab League, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.[16]

          – In June, while western figures avoided the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, the UAE’s President, Mohamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan nevertheless attended: UAE-Russia trade increased 63% between January to September 2023.[17]

          – In June and September, the GCC and the US convened ministerial-level meetings.[18] In early August at an event convened by Saudi Arabia, “representatives from over 40 countries gathered […] to discuss Ukraine’s plan to bring its protracted war with Russia to an end. The summit included high-level delegations from the United States, the European Union, China, India, and dozens of other states—and conspicuously did not include any officials from Russia, who were not invited.”[19] The Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba called the summit a “breakthrough”.[20]

          – In the same month, the UAE sent a ship carrying 250 tons of relief aid to Ukraine. In early December 2023, Vladimir Putin visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia and held discussions with President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, respectively.[21] With both, Russia sought to engage their counterparts in relation to bilateral cooperation in trade and investment; on 10 December, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, undertook a virtual engagement at the Doha Forum, where he gave a bullish account of the Ukraine conflict, appearing to appeal to the ‘global south’.[22]

          – In late 2023, the UAE brokered a high-profile Ukraine-Russia prisoner swap, following on from a similar exchange that the UAE and Saudi had supported in 2022, deepening their experience of working with both sides to the conflict.[23]

           

          Has the Ukraine war offered only opportunity? No, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are nevertheless apprehensive about Russia’s engagement with Iran in respect to technology transfers in the arms sector between Iran and Russia, particularly in respect to precision missiles and drones.[24] Recalling observations made by Professor Simon Mabon in February 2023, even in the Gulf, food security remains a concern.[25] Recent Yemen-based Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea has also raised Gulf concern about the vulnerability of global supply chains and the impact of inflation, notably on food prices.

           

          Heading into the third year of the Ukraine war, while it may still be a bit premature to assert that “Persian Gulf States May Be the Best Mediators for Peace in Ukraine” on account of the links they have assiduously maintained with both sides, they have, broadly, grasped opportunities, gained experience and expanded their strategic knowledge, depth and perhaps, above all, diffidence.[26]

           

          It is the case that “Ukraine war shows [the] soft power of the Gulf states”.[27] As Kristian Coates Ulrichsen forecast in April 2023, “Ties with long-established security and defense partners, such as the United States, will continue along issue-specific and transactional lines but may not be regarded as exclusive of developing other relationships […]”[28] And GCC leaders will continue “to stay out of any confrontation that may occur and minimize the regional overspill. To the extent that any global uncertainty is likely to keep oil prices at elevated levels, the region’s energy producers will accrue economic leverage and reinforce their self-perception as influential middle powers.”

           

          The war in Ukraine has enabled GCC states and their leaders to grow, learn and gradually, purposefully, extend their reach and influence. A UK still working out the impact of Brexit; with its own, deep ties to the Gulf as well as long-standing security links, must re-assess and re-calibrate its own relationship to the region and how to balance Gulf stances with its own.

           

          Drewery Dyke is a FPC Senior Research Fellow.

           

          [1] Giorgio Cafiero, Where has the Ukraine Conflict Left Gulf States? , Italian Institute for International Political Studies / Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), February 2023, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/where-has-the-ukraine-conflict-left-gulf-states-116712

          [2] Eugene Chausovsky, Persian Gulf States May Be the Best Mediators for Peace in Ukraine, Foreign Policy, February 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/09/persian-gulf-states-mediators-peace-ukraine-russia-west/#:~:text=This%20points%20to%20the%20unique,them%20leverage%20with%20the%20West; See: “The Gulf states have actually increased their own imports of Russian oil since the conflict began, using cheaper oil from Russia for domestic use while increasing exports of their own oil to Europe [and] GCC states have also resisted alienating Moscow from OPEC+”. It comprises “a loose grouping of energy producers that includes OPEC members as well as other countries like Russia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, South Sudan, and Sudan” and coordinate members’ oil supplies, even after the invasion. For example, in October 2022 “they agreed to cut production against the wishes of the Biden administration.”

          [3] Office for Budget Responsibility, Why have oil prices fallen by so much?, Box sets >> Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2015, Box: 2.1, Page 27, https://obr.uk/box/why-have-oil-prices-fallen-by-so-much/#:~:text=During%20the%20second%20half%20of,our%20economic%20and%20fiscal%20forecasts.

          [4] Qi Zhang, Yi Hu, Jianbin Jiao & Shouyang Wang, The impact of Russia–Ukraine war on crude oil prices: an EMC framework, Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume 11, Article number: 8 (2024), January 2024, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-023-02526-9#:~:text=In%20other%20words%2C%20the%20Russia,%2C%20an%20increase%20of%2056.33%25. They state that “[…] the Russia–Ukraine war caused the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices to rise by $37.14, an increase of 52.33%, while Brent crude oil prices rose by $41.49, an increase of 56.33%.”

          [5] Energy and Climate intelligence Unit, The Cost of Gas since the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, February 2023, https://ca1-eci.edcdn.com/Cost-of-Gas-since-Russian-invasion-ECIU-briefing-Feb-23.pdf?v=1676929286

          [6] For just one example, prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, EU countries received almost 40% of their gas from Russia. In October 2023, QatarEnergy agreed to supply Netherlands-based Shell for 27 years, mirroring an agreement the same company concluded with France-based TotalEnergies, also in October 2023, constituting Qatar’s largest and most enduring gas supply agreements with EU states. See: Yousef Saba, Qatar supplies gas to Europe, vying with US to replace Russia supply, Reuters, October 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/qatarenergy-shell-agree-27-year-lng-supply-2023-10-18/

          [7] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Beyond Riyadh: Houthi Cross-Border Aerial Warfare 2015-2022, January 2023, https://acleddata.com/about-acled/. ACLED noted, in the introduction, that “on 25 March 2022, the Houthis launched a large-scale attack on Saudi Arabia using a combination of loitering munitions, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. This coordinated attack targeted oil refineries and energy infrastructure across Saudi territory, from Asir to the Eastern Province, and even threatened the Formula 1 Grand Prix in Jeddah.”

          [8] Dr Diana Galeeva, Ukraine war shows soft power of the Gulf states, Arab News, September 2023, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2365801

          [9] United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest crude oil importer in 2017, December 2018, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37821; Aljazeera, Russia overtakes Saudi Arabia as China’s top oil supplier / Chinese imports of Russian oil rise by nearly one-quarter from the same period in 2022, March 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/3/20/russia-overtakes-saudi-arabia-as-chinas-top-oil-supplier#:~:text=Imports%20of%20Saudi%20crude%20totalled,equivalent%20to%201.75%20million%20bpd

          [10] Embassy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Sweden, Joint Trilateral Statement by the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, March 2023, http://se.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgxw_0/202303/t20230311_11039241.htm

          [11] Amrita Jash, Saudi-Iran Deal: A Test Case of China’s Role as an International Mediator, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs / Conflict & Security, June 2023, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/23/saudi-iran-deal-a-test-case-of-chinas-role-as-an-international-mediator/#:~:text=Overall%2C%20in%20its%20current%20form,to%20sustain%20the%20manufactured%20peace. The article also noted that in August 2022, “Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s national oil company, signed a memorandum of understanding with its Chinese counterpart, Sinopec, covering multiple areas of potential collaboration between the parties in Saudi Arabia. The other joint ventures between the two companies include Fujian Refining and Petrochemical Company (FREP) and Sinopec Senmei Petroleum Company (SSPC) in China, and Yanbu Aramco Sinopec Refining Company (YASREF) in Saudi Arabia.”

          [12] The Cradle, Zelensky makes surprise address to Doha Forum amid GCC split between Washington, Moscow The Ukrainian president is the latest western envoy to try his hand at convincing GCC countries to increase oil production, March 2022, https://thecradle.co/articles/zelensky-makes-surprise-address-to-doha-forum-amid-gcc-split-between-washington-moscow

          [13] US Department of Defense, Readout of the New Round of U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council Working Groups on Integrated Air and Missile Defense and Maritime Security, February 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3298553/readout-of-the-new-round-of-us-gulf-cooperation-council-working-groups-on-integ/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20and%20GCC,the%20GCC%2DU.S.%20Strategic%20Partnership

          [14] Dr Diana Galeev, Ukraine war shows soft power of the Gulf states, Arab News, September 2023, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2365801

          [15] Ibid.

          [16] Giorgio Cafiero, Why Saudi Arabia, Arab League invited Zelenskyy to their summit / Ukraine’s president and Arab nations might not seem like a natural fit, but they both had their reasons for extending and accepting invitation, Aljazeera, May 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/23/why-saudi-arabia-arab-league-invited-zelenskyy-to-their-summit

          [17] Andrew Roth and Pjotr Sauer, Western firms snub ‘Russian Davos’ as its prestige evaporates / Annual event headlined by Vladimir Putin described as ‘totally toxic’ since full-scale invasion of Ukraine, The Guardian, June 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/15/western-firms-snub-russian-davos-prestige-evaporates

          [18] See, for example, US Department of State, Joint Statement Following the Ministerial Meeting of the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), September 2023, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-following-the-ministerial-meeting-of-the-united-states-and-the-gulf-cooperation-council-gcc-2/

          [19] Ambassador William Roebuck, Saudi-Hosted Ukraine Event Ends Without Breakthrough but Still Irritates Absent Russia, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW), August 2023, https://agsiw.org/saudi-hosted-ukraine-event-ends-without-breakthrough-but-still-irritates-absent-russia/

          [20] Eugene Chausovsky, Global South Pivot: Ukraine’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Gulf, Gulf International Forum, https://gulfif.org/global-south-pivot-ukraines-diplomatic-strategy-in-the-gulf/

          [21] President of Russia (website – note: site is not secure) – On December 6, Vladimir Putin will pay working visits to the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, December 2023, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72913

          [22] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation – Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media questions following the 21th Doha Forum, December 2023, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1920028/

          [23] Eugene Chausovsky, Global South Pivot: Ukraine’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Gulf, Gulf International Forum, https://gulfif.org/global-south-pivot-ukraines-diplomatic-strategy-in-the-gulf/; Agence France Presse (AFP), in the Moscow Times, Russia, Ukraine Swap Hundreds of Prisoners in UAE Brokered Deal, January 2024, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/01/04/russia-ukraine-swap-hundreds-of-prisoners-in-uae-brokered-deal-a83637

          [24] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The Russia-Ukraine War and the Impact on the Persian Gulf States, Project Muse, Asia Policy, Volume 18, Number 2, April 2023, pp. 39-46 (Article), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/893919/pdf

          [25] Professor Simon Mabon, One year on: The reverberations of the war in the Middle East, Foreign Policy Centre, February 2023, https://fpc.org.uk/one-year-on-the-reverberations-of-the-war-in-the-middle-east/

          [26] Eugene Chausovsky, Persian Gulf States May Be the Best Mediators for Peace in Ukraine, Foreign Policy, February 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/09/persian-gulf-states-mediators-peace-ukraine-russia-west/#:~:text=This%20points%20to%20the%20unique,them%20leverage%20with%20the%20West

          [27] Dr Diana Galeeva, Ukraine war shows soft power of the Gulf states, Arab News, September 2023, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2365801

          [28] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The Russia-Ukraine War and the Impact on the Persian Gulf States, Project Muse, Asia Policy, Volume 18, Number 2, April 2023, pp. 39-46 (Article), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/893919/pdf

           

          Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

          Topics
          Conflict Resolution and Security
          International Relations and Geopolitics
          Ukraine Conflict
          Regions
          Former Soviet Union
          Ukraine
          Middle East and North Africa
          Footnotes
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            Legal impasse or excuse for inaction? The state of play in the efforts to seize oligarchs’ assets

            26/02/24
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            Legal impasse or excuse for inaction? The state of play in the efforts to seize oligarchs’ assets

            Article by Dr Maria Nizzero and Oksana Ihnatenko

            February 26, 2024

            Legal impasse or excuse for inaction? The state of play in the efforts to seize oligarchs’ assets

            In the two years since Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine, policymakers in the Western block have made big statements of their intention to seize Russian oligarchic wealth in their countries. Sanctions were rolled out quickly to freeze assets. It was thought that their confiscation would come just as nimbly.

             

            Experts were, however, quick to point out that confiscation was going to be an uphill and lengthy battle.[1] The most obvious solution, devising a new mechanism that would allow the seizure of sanctioned assets within the boundaries of the law and in full respect of human rights, needed time and skilled researchers. However, political interest, and with it funding for research, ran out quickly.

             

            Despite this, proposals on how to break the deadlock on asset recovery have been made. First, it was suggested to focus on sanctions evasion as a short-term route for confiscation, albeit with limited scope, given it would only allow for confiscation where sanctions evasion is proved.[2] Supporting this approach, in early February this year, the UK government announced new reporting obligations for sanctioned individuals to disclose their UK assets, making it easier to tackle sanctions evasion attempts.[3] It is a little early to claim victory, but it’s a step in the right direction. Still, the UK response remains far from ideal. While confiscations have started appearing in the US, the UK’s Combatting Kleptocracy Cell is yet to announce a high-profile case.[4]

             

            Upgrading the overall asset recovery response is also required.[5] After all, the oligarchs’ wealth has notoriously been amassed through corrupt practices. Enhancing the ability to recover the proceeds of crime would be a sensible move. Two Economic Crime Acts later, one of which included amendments to the Unexplained Wealth Orders (UWOs) regime, no significant case has been initiated against any high-level sanctioned kleptocrat, and law enforcement remains largely under-resourced to meet the challenge.

             

            With sanctions and asset recovery not doing the trick, a voluntary donation route has been proposed. But even there, rhetoric and reality mismatched. Last June, the UK Government promised a route for sanctioned oligarchs to donate their frozen funds for Ukrainian reconstruction.[6] Since then, neither the route, nor an oligarch offering to donate has appeared. Even the much-anticipated sale of Chelsea FC, the result of an agreement between Abramovich and the UK Government, has stalled – provoking the ire of the House of Lords.[7]

             

            While the UK has taken every opportunity for inaction, Ukraine has kept itself busy. As a country at war, Ukraine has developed and employed three distinct mechanisms for asset seizure: confiscation via sanctions, forcible seizure of objects of property rights of the Russian Federation and its residents, and confiscation within the criminal proceeding framework.[8] The forcible seizure mechanism is currently being applied against the financial assets of Ukrainian subsidiaries of bank Sberbank.[9] Meanwhile, the High Anti-Corruption Court has issued 34 decisions on seizure of the assets of Russian oligarchs.[10] Ukraine’s confiscation mechanisms may potentially result in contested cases in international arbitration. They also represent an exceptional scenario, given Ukraine is currently under martial law. However, they are a good reminder of the benefit that recovered assets could bring to Ukraine’s cause.

             

            It seems that it is not just the oligarchs’ assets that are frozen in limbo; the Western asset recovery response is too. If at the beginning the legal difficulties of moving ‘from freeze to seize,’ and the lack of understanding of the issue by policymakers, could be blamed, now these seem just an excuse for inaction. Western governments had all the opportunities to act. Whether by tackling sanctions evasion, funding research to develop new legislation, strengthening existing asset recovery mechanisms against any kind of kleptocratic wealth, or encouraging voluntary donations to materialise – the options to confiscate these assets are many.

             

            In the words of the House of Lords, this ‘reflects poorly’ on Western governments, and the UK in particular.[11] What is needed now is for rhetoric and reality to meet. Not all is lost: the sanctioned oligarchs’ pot is still there, albeit slightly depleted by their attempts to evade sanctions.

             

            The options mentioned above are all still viable and are not mutually exclusive – now it is up to governments to listen and act. This year, different countries will undergo election processes. While the focus will inevitably shift to domestic issues, it is important that support for Ukraine, and long-term commitments to sustain its reconstruction, remain high on the agenda – if oligarchs pay, taxpayers that have been supporting Ukraine will feel some relief. Despite the complexities involved, asset confiscation still stands as one of the tangible means of bolstering Ukraine’s pursuit of freedom.

             

            Maria Nizzero is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI. She is a member of the Financial Crime Policy Programme, which tracks the implementation and evolution of anti-financial crime policy both in the UK and globally.

             

            Oksana Ihnatenko is a Researcher for the SMURF project at the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI.

             

            [1] Maria Nizzero, From Freeze to Seize: How the UK Can Break the Deadlock on Asset Recovery, RUSI, October 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/freeze-seize-how-uk-can-break-deadlock-asset-recovery

            [2] Maria Nizzero, Sanctioned oligarchs should have to list their UK assets, The Times, February 2023, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/sanctioned-oligarchs-should-have-to-list-their-uk-assets-lqprkw3fs

            [3] Giles Thomson, New reporting requirements for Designated Persons under the Russia Regime, Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, Gov.uk, February 2024, https://ofsi.blog.gov.uk/2024/02/12/new-reporting-requirements-for-designated-persons-under-the-russia-regime/

            [4] RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service, U.S. Attorney General Allows First Transfer Of Russian Oligarch’s Confiscated Assets To Ukraine, RFE/RL, February 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-malofeyev-transfer/32255371.html

            [5] SOC ACE Research Programme, How to Seize a Billion: Exploring Mechanisms to Recover the Proceeds of Kleptocracy, RUSI, March 2023, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/external-publications/how-seize-billion-exploring-mechanisms-recover-proceeds-kleptocracy

            [6] FCDO, HM Treasury, Home Office, The Rt Hon Suella Braverman KC MP, The Rt Hon Jeremy Hunt MP, and The Rt Hon James Cleverly MP, New legislation allows Russian sanctions to remain until compensation is paid to Kyiv, Gov.uk, June 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-legislation-allows-russian-sanctions-to-remain-until-compensation-is-paid-to-kyiv

            [7] Kiran Stacey, ‘Incomprehensible’ that Abramovich’s Chelsea funds not yet spent on Ukraine, The Guardian, January 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/31/incomprehensible-roman-abramovich-chelsea-proceeds-still-not-spent-to-help-ukraine; House of Lords European Affairs Committee, Call for UK and Eu to continue support for Ukraine, and sanctions on Russia, UK Parliament, January 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/516/european-affairs-committee/news/199672/call-for-uk-and-eu-to-continue-support-for-ukraine-and-sanctions-on-russia/

            [8] The Law of Ukraine, About sanctions (Reports of the Verkhovna Rada (VVR), 2014, No.40, Article 2018), https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1644-18#Text; The Law of Ukraine, About the main principles of forced seizure in Ukraine of objects of property rights of the Russian Federation and its residents, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2116-20#Text

            [9] National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Decision from May 11, 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0006525-22#n2

            [10] Higher Anti-Corruption Court, Decisions in administrative cases (Part 7 of Article 283-1 of the Code of Administrative Procedure of Ukraine), https://hcac.court.gov.ua/hcac/gromadyanam/administrative_judgments

            [11] House of Lords European Affairs Committee, Call for UK and EU to continue support for Ukraine, and sanctions on Russia, UK Parliament, January 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/516/european-affairs-committee/news/199672/call-for-uk-and-eu-to-continue-support-for-ukraine-and-sanctions-on-russia/

             

            Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

            Topics
            Conflict Resolution and Security
            International Relations and Geopolitics
            Ukraine Conflict
            Regions
            Europe
            United Kingdom
            Former Soviet Union
            Russia
            Ukraine
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              Two years on: The importance of protecting the media and winning the informational frontline in Ukraine

              Article by Sergiy Tomilenko

              February 23, 2024

              Two years on: The importance of protecting the media and winning the informational frontline in Ukraine

              The Ukrainian army has been holding the Russian aggressor off for two years already. In its desire to destroy Ukraine at any cost, the Kremlin has spared neither its missiles nor its soldiers. Moreover, Putin has also spared no resources to fight on the parallel informational front, in order that the world receives distorted information about his crimes.

               

              Once Russian soldiers have seized a new piece of our land, the propaganda machine immediately begins to inundate local residents with Russian-printed newspapers. At the same time, the enemy often resorts to falsifications, including using the names of Ukrainian local media, so that people believe more in what they read.

               

              Today, it has become common practice that a journalist with the inscription ‘PRESS’ on his body armor is a target no less important than a tank or artillery unit for a Russian soldier. Ukrainian and international journalists document the war crimes of the Russians so that, thanks to the international court, Putin will be brought to justice.

               

              Unfortunately, more than 80 journalists have already been killed in Ukraine, and the fate of several more is unknown. Of that number, 16 colleagues were killed while performing their professional duties; nine became civilian victims of the aggressor state, and others have been mobilised to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Journalists who reveal the truth about the war in Ukraine to the whole world understand their extremely important mission.

               

              While the Russians convince the world that their targets are only military facilities, Ukrainian and international journalists show the world destroyed cities with civilians. Currently, a critical situation has developed in the thousand-strong town of Avdiyivka, Donetsk Region. The city has almost been destroyed.

               

              Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians who continue to live in the front-line and de-occupied territories remain in an information vacuum. They have neither electricity supply nor communication. Sometimes, Russian or Belarusian radio reaches their territory.

               

              Therefore, the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU) is doing everything possible to find funding for Ukrainian newspapers. Today, thanks to the cooperation of the Union and international partners, we have resumed the work of 30 newspapers in the front-line and de-occupied territories. Hundreds of thousands of people in the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and the Kharkiv Regions are now able to obtain information from Ukrainian sources.

               

              Since the beginning of the war, the NUJU, together with UNESCO, has also launched six assistance centers for Ukrainian and international journalists, where they can receive protective equipment, advice, and/or use an equipped workplace in a co-working space. Due to the constant danger to the work of journalists in Kharkiv, we recently opened the Journalists’ Solidarity Center. There, hundreds of colleagues receive both protective equipment and a place where they can work readily and easily.

               

              Two full years have passed since the full-scale invasion. The war continues. The world is increasingly talking about fatigue. Ukrainians are also tired. But evil does not exhaust… and so we must continue.

               

              Support Ukraine. Support Ukrainians! Support journalists who fight injustice. Journalists are important!

               

              Sergiy Tomilenko is the President of the National Union of journalists of Ukraine.

               

              Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

              Topics
              Conflict Resolution and Security
              Human Rights
              Media and Online Freedom
              Ukraine Conflict
              Regions
              Former Soviet Union
              Ukraine
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                Two years on: Breaking the cycle of impunity for Russian war crimes

                Article by Oleksandra Matviichuk

                Two years on: Breaking the cycle of impunity for Russian war crimes

                The full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a result of the total impunity that Russia enjoyed for decades. The Russian military has committed terrible crimes in Chechnya, Moldova, Georgia, Syria, Mali, and Libya but was never punished. They believe they can do whatever they want.

                 

                Now, Russian troops are destroying residential buildings, churches, museums, schools, and hospitals in Ukraine. They are shooting at evacuation corridors. They are torturing people in filtration camps. They are forcibly taking Ukrainian children to Russia. They are abducting, robbing, raping and killing in the occupied territories.

                 

                This is a conscious policy. Russia uses war crimes as a method of warfare. Russia attempts to break people’s resistance and occupy the country by means of inflicting immense pain on civilians. At the Centre for Civil Liberties, we document this pain. Over the past two years alone, with the joint efforts of the ‘Tribunal for Putin’ initiative, we have documented 62,000 episodes of war crimes.

                 

                However, we face an accountability gap. The Ukrainian legal system is overloaded with an extreme level of war crime cases. Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court restricts its investigations to just a few selected cases and has no jurisdiction over the crime of aggression to hold Russia to account for its actions against Ukraine.

                 

                If we want to prevent wars, we have to punish the states, and their leaders, responsible for starting them. In the whole history of humankind, we have only one such precedent.

                 

                That’s why we still look at the world through the lens of the Nuremberg Trials, where Nazi war criminals were tried only after the Nazi regime had collapsed. But we are living in a new century. Justice should not depend on how and when the war ends. We must establish a special tribunal now and hold Putin, as well as Belarussian President Lukashenko and others, guilty of the crime of aggression, accountable.

                 

                Besides the crime of aggression, there are other international crimes – war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. These crimes should not have to remain as simply information stored in our archives, in the media, and in reports of international organisations.

                 

                New technologies allow us to document war crimes in a way that we could not even dream of 15 years ago. The experience of the open source media outlet Bellingcat and other investigators convincingly proves that we can rebuild a picture of what took place without even being on the spot.

                 

                The challenge facing Ukraine is the unprecedented amount of international crimes. The Office of General Prosecutor has registered more than 125,000 criminal proceedings. International donors can finance thousands of training and hundreds of advisors; but in a situation where Ukrainian investigators need to investigate more than a thousand criminal cases simultaneously, we will not get results.

                 

                Instead, we must ingrain an international element into the level of national investigation and national justice. Ukraine requires the support of foreign professionals, judges, prosecutors and detectives, in order to properly investigate and ensure court proceedings for the tens of thousands of crimes, in compliance with international standards of justice.

                 

                We must break this circle of impunity. Not only for Ukrainians. But also for the people who could become the next target of Russian aggression. And prevent it this time.

                 

                Oleksandra Matviichuk is the Head of the human rights organisation Center for Civil Liberties, which won the Nobel Peace Prize 2022.

                 

                Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

                Topics
                Civil Society
                Conflict Resolution and Security
                Human Rights
                Ukraine Conflict
                Regions
                Former Soviet Union
                Ukraine
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                  Two years on: in the face of continued Russian aggression, Moldova is navigating its path towards the West

                  Article by Iulian Groza

                  February 22, 2024

                  Two years on: in the face of continued Russian aggression, Moldova is navigating its path towards the West

                  Two years have elapsed since Russia initiated its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, yet the reverberations persist across the European continent. Moldova, standing among the most affected states after Ukraine, grapples with the enduring repercussions of Russia’s hybrid aggression.

                   

                  Amidst these challenges, Moldova has showcased a resilient spirit and an unwavering commitment to fortify its defenses, secure its future, and advance on its path to becoming a member of the European Union (EU). The national aspiration, as set by President Maia Sandu, is for Moldova to be prepared to join by 2030.

                   

                  In April 2023, the EU reaffirmed its support for Moldova by deploying the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM), signaling a robust commitment to bolster the country’s crisis management structures and ability to combat hybrid threats, including cyber warfare and foreign information manipulation. Moldova’s embrace of this collaborative initiative underscores its determination to safeguard its sovereignty in the face of external pressures and fortify its ties with European allies.

                   

                  The adoption of Moldova’s new National Security Strategy in December 2023 marked a pivotal moment in the country’s security agenda. President Sandu’s vision for Moldova prioritises strengthening democracy, fostering prosperity, and ensuring the protection of all citizens through a modern security sector. Central to this vision is the imperative of building resilience to hybrid threats and modernising Moldova’s armed forces and civil security sector. The strategic partnership with the EU emerges as a cornerstone for comprehensive security enhancement, encompassing economic, energy, cyber, and environmental dimensions.

                   

                  In 2023, Moldova faced escalating hybrid aggression from Russia, including attempts to undermine the country’s democratic process. Kremlin-backed forces sought to manipulate Moldova’s local elections, prompting decisive action to preserve the integrity of the country’s democratic institutions. The resilience displayed in the face of external interference underscores Moldova’s commitment to upholding democratic values and protecting its national sovereignty.

                   

                  Supported by the EU, the United States, and other Western allies, Moldova has made significant strides towards economic resilience and energy independence. By reducing its dependency on Russian gas, Moldova has charted a path towards self-reliance and sustainability, mitigating vulnerabilities to external pressures and advancing its integration into European networks.

                   

                  As Moldova continues on its European path, the forthcoming constitutional referendum initiated by President Sandu will determine the country’s strategic objective of EU accession, solidifying Moldova’s commitment to becoming a member of the EU in the next decade. The overwhelming support for European integration reflects the Moldovan people’s aspirations for prosperity, stability, and security within the European family of nations. The referendum, slated to coincide with presidential elections, symbolises a pivotal moment in securing the country’s future within the Western democratic fold.

                   

                  Two years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moldova stands as a testament to resilience and determination. As Moldova charts a path towards a brighter future, its resilience serves as an inspiration for nations striving to uphold democratic values and principles in the face of adversity.

                   

                  Iulian Groza is an expert in international relations, European affairs and good governance. He is a former Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Moldova in charge for European integration and international law. Currently, Groza leads the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE) – a Moldovan think-tank that aims at supporting Moldova’s accession to the EU. Since 2022, Groza is representing Moldovan civil society in the Supreme Security Council and the National Committee for European Integration chaired by the President of the Republic of Moldova. He holds a University Degree in Law. He also did postgraduate European Studies at Birmingham University and NATO Security Studies at SNSPA in Bucharest. He is fluent in English, Russian and Romanian (native) languages. Groza is a career diplomat and holds a diplomatic rank of Minister-Counsellor. He is also an FCO Chevening Scholar.

                   

                  Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

                  Topics
                  Conflict Resolution and Security
                  International Relations and Geopolitics
                  Ukraine Conflict
                  Regions
                  Europe
                  Former Soviet Union
                  Moldova
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                    Two years on: Business as usual in a new geopolitical reality?

                    Article by Dr. Aijan Sharshenova

                    Two years on: Business as usual in a new geopolitical reality?

                    Two years into the full-scale Russian invasion in Ukraine, Central Asia finds itself under slightly less pressure to take sides. It seems that both Russia and the West have finally accepted Central Asian republics’ reluctance to unequivocally support one side over another and have left them to be ‘neutral’ on the matter. Nevertheless, it is possible to trace some direct and indirect impacts of the war on Central Asian society, politics and economics.

                     

                    In the external political domain, international politics is still a dynamic balancing act for Central Asia. The republics’ leaders have to continue cooperating with Russia without alienating the rest of the world.[1] Secondary sanctions remain a very real threat, but the extent to which this threat provides strong leverage is questionable given the limited trade the region has with the European Union (EU) and the USA, the key driving forces behind anti-Russian sanctions.[2]

                     

                    In terms of economic development, there has certainly been a reinvigoration of Russian-Central Asian economic relations, but there also exists a continuous danger that Russia’s war economy might result in an economic crisis domestically, which might have a ripple effect impacting on Central Asia too.

                     

                    In the regional political domain, the war in Ukraine has become a part of everyday news. As each country in the region grapples with their own internal political struggles, energy and food security issues, the war is not something that stays at the top of the agenda.

                     

                    However, those in the region face another issue connected to the ongoing conflict, that is – the growing level of disinformation and misinformation. As a region where Russian is either the second or third most-frequently used language, any Russian-language information about the war finds its way into the Central Asian information spaces. And, this is not necessarily limited to the war in Ukraine only – Russian conspiracy theories of any kind spread freely via social media platforms.

                     

                    Central Asian governments have adapted their narratives and policies to make the most of the current geopolitical situation, seeking benefits from all parties involved and avoiding any negative repercussions through a declared neutrality. To what extent this neutrality is genuine is difficult to assess due to the closed nature of the states. What the majority of the region’s population thinks about the war is even more obscure as reliable public opinion polls are still lacking two years into Russia’s full-scale invasion into Ukraine.

                     

                    Dr Aijan Sharshenova is a FPC Research Fellow.

                     

                    [1] Aijan Sharshenova, Understanding Russia’s Central Asia policy, Crossroads Central Asia, September 2023, https://crossroads-ca.org/understanding-russia-s-central-asia-policy/

                    [2] Filippo Costa Buranelli, Central Asia and Secondary Sanctions: The Tight Rope of Compliance, ISPI, November 2023, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/central-asia-and-secondary-sanctions-the-tight-rope-of-compliance-151442

                     

                    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

                    Topics
                    Conflict Resolution and Security
                    International Relations and Geopolitics
                    Ukraine Conflict
                    Regions
                    Former Soviet Union
                    Central Asia
                    Ukraine
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