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    Long Read | The Technological Limits to Armenia’s Rosatom Decoupling Ambitions

    Article by Ilya Roubanis

    July 14, 2026

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    Long Read | The Technological Limits to Armenia’s Rosatom Decoupling Ambitions

    Armenia must decide on its nuclear technology path. The upper-middle-income state in the South Caucasus depends on nuclear energy for upwards of 30% of its energy mix; building a new plant would require a decade. Yerevan looks determined to extend the operation of the Metsamor’s nuclear power plant for as long as possible, potentially until 2036. What happens thereafter is a decision that must be taken by the end of 2026 or early 2027. 

     

    This paper explores the technological, political, and economic factors Armenia must factor in as it considers moving away from its long-standing commitment to Russian technology with Rosatom.

     

    Read the full paper here.

     

    Key conclusions:

    1. The consensus for analysts interviewed for this paper is that Rosatom’s value proposition cannot be matched from an industrial policy perspective, particularly given unique spent-fuel-take-back and soft financing elements.

     

    2. There is no apparent benefit for countries that assume the cost of de-risking private investment in experimental US SMR technology, such as Romania, Poland, or indeed Armenia.

     

    3. The one measure Armenia can take to hedge its singular dependence on Rosatom is to consider an alternative supply of nuclear fuel, in cooperation with Westinghouse.

     

    4. The South Caucasus is no longer dominated by a single military power. In this sense, technological ‘lock-ins’ and economic influence are factors that are likely to become diplomatically significant.

     

    Dr Ilya Roubanis (PhD, EUI Florence) is Senior Fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Athens (IDIS) and Research Fellow at the Aletheia Research Institution. His business intelligence work spans energy and security, driven by HUMINT and strategic analysis across Europe and the MENA regions.

     

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

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      From Silence to Agency: What Post-Totalitarian Societies Must Learn from Their Stories

      Article by Olga Reka

      July 13, 2026

      From Silence to Agency: What Post-Totalitarian Societies Must Learn from Their Stories

      There was a time when war took my voice away. When reality becomes unbearable, reflection is reduced into mere observation. Silence ceases to be calm – it turns into the anticipation of terror from the sky. Under conditions of total war, people lose not only their homes, but also the capacity to narrate what is happening to them. Reason narrows to instinct. And everything that requires sensitivity – art, in particular – seems to fall mute. This is how we begin to treat culture as a luxury, as something that can be postponed until more stable times.

       

      Yet the opposite is true: culture is not an adjunct to democracy; it is a precondition for agency.

       

      We live in a time of eroding trust. Governments, media, and institutions are losing credibility. The frameworks that once defined democratic order no longer feel sufficient. Reality itself has fragmented. Policies and protocols may create structure, but they cannot resolve what is, at its core, a crisis of narratives – a rupture between identities, experiences, and meanings. This is not only a Ukrainian question. It is a European one.

       

      Almost five years ago, storytelling and cinema became, for me, a way of resisting this fragmentation. A feature film script about the first months of the Russian full-scale invasion felt not like documentation, but rather reconstruction – an attempt to reclaim authorship over my own experience. In this sense, culture is not representation. It is a safe space where meaning is restored, and with it – the capacity to act.

       

      Since 2022, I have noted a new habit: I catch myself observing people in large European cities as though through an invisible yet dense membrane. This distance is not geographical, but experiential. War creates a rupture that resists translation. And this gives rise to an uneasy question: is agency possible without the experience of existential risk?

       

      Our unprocessed histories – colonial pasts, totalitarian traumas, genocide – return through narratives as recurring threats. This is why the figure of the antagonist is so central to contemporary storytelling. Yet the antagonist is not only what we fight against. It is what we recognise, ‘other’ and refuse to integrate.

       

      Popular culture now offers telling examples. Squid Game does not invent a dystopia – it exposes the future shock of a traditional society. Adolescence does not resolve the problem of contemporary masculine identity – it renders the “accursed questions”[1] even more complex. These stories resonate because they name what society already senses, but cannot yet articulate.

       

      Post-totalitarian cultures – particularly in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia – face a different problem. They have inherited a cultural hero who is fundamentally passive: the silent dissident, the ironic observer, the one who survives but does not act. In such contexts, silence is mistakenly perceived as strength. In reality, it is often a symptom of learned helplessness. If this narrative remains unchanged, it will continue to reproduce itself – even under democratic conditions. A society that tells itself stories of endurance rather than action will continue to endure, but not to transform.

       

      One of my most sincere sources of inspiration in recent months has been Václav Havel’s essay ‘The Power of the Powerless’, invoked by the Prime Minister of Canada during the 2026 forum in Davos. This text is not merely political commentary in the conventional sense. It is a cultural essay that describes how agency arises not from systems, but from small acts of redefinition – moments when individuals choose to refuse reproducing the scripts imposed upon them.

       

      It seems that our societies today need not simply new content, but a new narrative structure, a different kind of cultural hero – one who acts without guarantees, speaks without certainty, and accepts vulnerability not as weakness, but as a condition of agency.

       

      In Ukraine, the Revolution of Dignity of 2013-14 marked a defining moment when society’s agency not only became unmistakably visible, but also emerged as a force capable of safeguarding democratic values. Since the first months of Russia’s aggression in 2014, volunteer initiatives have quite literally helped keep the Ukrainian state functioning. Their work extends far beyond procuring military equipment and tactical medical supplies. Volunteers have built evacuation networks, supported internally displaced people, and helped devastated communities begin the long process of rebuilding.

       

      The same spirit of initiative has also shaped Ukraine’s soft power abroad. Many of the country’s most effective international cultural and civic initiatives have not been orchestrated by the state but have grown organically through self-organisation and the networks of the Ukrainian diaspora. Ukraine has also demonstrated a remarkable ability to embrace digital innovation, with civil society playing a pivotal role not only in developing and implementing these innovations but also in rigorously testing their effectiveness and holding them to account.

       

      Equally fundamental to Ukraine’s contemporary sense of agency is the ongoing reimagining of local identities across its towns and villages. In recent years, communities have explored their own histories through a wide range of cultural and civic initiatives, rediscovering local heritage, engaging with the complexities of multicultural memory, and dismantling narratives imposed from outside. In doing so, they are reclaiming the right to tell their own stories, and, ultimately, to define themselves on their own terms.

       

      Not all our societies are ready for such a shift. Many are still organised around survival rather than transformation. And this is precisely why the delicate work within the realm of the sensuous – cultural practice – cannot be secondary. Without it, political change lacks psychological grounding.

       

      Our current moment is marked by simultaneities. For some, agency now signifies the basic capacity to act; for others, it denotes a deeply existential experience of subjecthood.

       

      Until quite recently, the ‘Old World’ reliably provided institutional frameworks through which an individual could choose a profession, a way of life, political convictions, partners, or a place to live. Yet reality is unsettlingly clear that no structure can guarantee any longer either meaning or safety.

       

      At such a moment, action becomes inseparable from responsibility: values come at a cost; freedom is not a default condition; neutrality, as an avoidance of choice, no longer functions.

       

      Our identity now is action. It is our daily practice, be it screenwriting, art, human rights advocacy, or a commitment to the rule of law. Alternatively, it can also be the rejection of all the above in surrender to a totalitarian trend.

       

      Democracy today does not begin with institutions. It begins with a shift in how we tell our stories.

       

       

      Explore the full mini-series here.

       

      Olga Reka is a Ukrainian producer, writer and cultural storyteller whose work explores archetypal and transformational narratives shaped by themes of war, dignity, trauma and cultural memory. With over 150 hours of national television to her credit, she has created award-winning fiction projects and is known for story worlds that reflect the contemporary Ukrainian experience. She currently co-ordinates the publication project “Ukraine and Ukrainians”, a historical ethnographic art album of the NCFC “The Ivan Honchar Museum”, Gunia Project and The Ivan Honchar Charitable Foundation. Her recent films include the features “Nodokasa”, “Zenith” and “Misty in Places”; and the short “In the Shadows” (Grand Prix – Ukraina Festiwal Filmowy 2021; Special Jury Mention – Short of the Year 2021). Olga was also the showrunner and co-writer of “5baksiv.net”, Ukraine’s first web series and winner of the Grand Prix at Bilbao Web Fest 2017.

       

      Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

       

      [1] “Accursed questions” (often called proklyatye voprosy in Russian) are universal, foundational inquiries about human existence that never have a single, final answer.

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        How Can We Secure a Healthy Political and Social Order in a Fragmented World?

        Article by Lord John Alderdice

        How Can We Secure a Healthy Political and Social Order in a Fragmented World?

        This article introduces a new series of short essays by JST Fellows – leaders working across Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia – exploring how societies can build the trust, agency and resilience needed for an era of fracture and flux.

         

        We are living through a period of profound change and uncertainty. The erosion of the rules-based international order is causing instability on a global scale. Familiar frameworks and alliances, such as NATO, are no longer seen as providing security guarantees and a basis for shared understanding between states. The institutions that form the foundations of healthy democracy – the media, government, judiciary, and civil society – are not functioning in the way that they should. Media ecosystems no longer offer a shared factual reference point; governments struggle to deliver on the concerns of those they represent; judiciaries face growing pressure on their independence; and civil society is increasingly recast – through propaganda and hostile narratives – as a threat rather than a mechanism for accountability and civic action. It all adds up to a climate of social and political polarisation, creating distrust: in governments, in one another, and in democracy itself.

         

        Added to this, the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) presents both opportunities and threats to how our societies and economies function. The political emergence of Gen Z, with youth-led protests in countries as disparate as Georgia, Nepal, Peru and Madagascar, is seen as evidence of growing frustration of young people with inequality, corruption, and the failure of existing institutions to respond to people’s concerns.[1]

         

        These forces are not temporary disruptions but structural shifts reshaping political and social life. As such, they demand a new approach. This is not a time for nostalgia but for a collective rethink. Throughout this mini-series, our contributors delve into experiences of culture, trust and agency in their societies to explore a central question: What actions do we need to take and what stories must we ensure are heard, in order to shape and secure a healthy political and social order for the emerging global era?

         

        In the articles that follow, JST Fellows explore this question in depth, offering diverse perspectives on what it means to rethink democracy through the lens of culture, trust, and agency. They look at opportunities and challenges emerging in media, technology, and information systems. They look at the power of identity and narratives, and their effect on social cohesion. And they look at agency and engagement, with a focus on young people.

         

        These are not separate strands but interwoven dynamics that reinforce each other. Technology drives identity narratives. Identity politics shape how young people engage. And youth movements reshape information ecosystems.

         

        Our Fellows, who come from countries across Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, write about how these forces are playing out in the contexts in which they live and work. Questions of identity, culture and memory also run throughout the series. Olga Reka, from Ukraine, writes about the critical role of the arts, culture, and storytelling in creating meaning and agency as a precondition for democracy. Botagoz Zhumabekova examines the psychological foundations of democratic participation, arguing that active citizenship depends not only on political opportunity but also on people feeling safe enough to engage.

         

        Trust – or its absence – is a common theme. Gulshat Ayydova and Aaron Campbell look at what we can learn from the way young people already engage in informal spaces to encourage meaningful participation and build trust in political processes. Joldoshbek Osmonov, from Kyrgyzstan, looks at the legitimacy crisis facing civil society and how organisations can rebuild trust in the face of propaganda that presents them as a threat. Farrukh Irnazarov explores the role of education in building trust in institutions and civic responsibility across Central Asia.

         

        Looking at democratic renewal through a political lens, Palina Brodik reflects on the future of the Belarusian democratic movement, arguing that preserving collective memory while remaining adaptable is essential to sustaining political agency in exile.

         

        The series concludes with Liliana Gutan’s reflection on Moldova, where democracy is measured not only by elections but by what institutions deliver between them. Her article brings together many of the themes explored throughout the series, arguing that democratic resilience ultimately depends on whether people experience dignity, security, and belonging in their everyday lives.

         

        I hope these articles offer both provocation and possibility – showing what it looks like when values-driven leaders think seriously about the challenges of our time. They are part of the generation of diverse leaders needed in this moment, to shape a new order in which people can live in sustainable, peaceful and just societies.

         

         

        Explore the full mini-series here.

         

        John Alderdice, Professor, the Lord Alderdice. UK Trade Envoy to Azerbaijan & Central Asia and JST Trustee.

         

        Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

         

        [1] Daniel Boffey, ‘We are very strong’: Georgia’s gen Z drives protests against return to past, The Guardian, May 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/16/georgia-gen-z-drives-protests-against-return-to-past-foreign-agents-law; Omkar Khandekar and Yam Kumari Kandel, How Gen Z-led protests put Nepal’s 1st female prime minister in power, NPR, September 2025, https://www.npr.org/2025/09/20/nx-s1-5545760/nepal-protests-gen-z; Marco Aquino and Alexander Villegas, Peru’s Gen Z rallies against President Boluarte, protesting over pensions and corruption, Reuters, September 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/perus-gen-z-rallies-against-president-boluarte-protesting-over-pensions-2025-09-27/; AP News, How Gen Z protesters brought down Madagascar’s government and now want the president out, October 2025, https://apnews.com/article/madagascar-protests-gen-z-rajoelina-e39ef11bd1f4a92f1f4b353900348219

        Footnotes
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          Op-ed | Devolving to a More Resilient Nation: Lessons From Ukraine

          Article by Alex Sobel MP and Luke Cooper

          July 6, 2026

          Op-ed | Devolving to a More Resilient Nation: Lessons From Ukraine

          Alex Sobel and Luke Cooper were recently in Gdańsk, Poland, for the Ukraine Recovery Conference where there is a clear and perceptible shift in tone and actions, mirroring our own shifting political focus.

           

          Andy Burnham’s pitch to lead Labour promises to overturn “four decades of neoliberalism”.[1] His ‘Manchesterism’ centres on an interventionist state: more public ownership within a foundational economy, an end to the privatisation premium that has raised the cost of basic services, and a restored state role in core utilities. He also pledges to devolve significant fiscal power to cities and regions. Burnham builds on existing Labour policies but frames them far more stridently – as a radical break with market fundamentalism.

           

          Having been deeply involved in a range of meetings and events at the annual Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC), which took place in Gdańsk, Poland, on the 25-26 June, we feel it is important to emphasise though that this new economic thinking is not something unique to Britain – and, quite on the contrary, we are actually playing catch-up.

           

          Governments all over the world are looking at how markets can be made to work in the public interest – and the large majority of states never went as far down the road of privatisation as the UK in the first place.

           

          What we learnt at the URC

          Ukraine along with the other post-Soviet economies offers an important lens on this process. After its failed neoliberal transition in the 1990s, which enabled the oligarchic capture of large parts of its economy, Ukrainian public opinion has moved sharply against privatisation over the last two decades.[2] Ukraine’s political debates, like any country, are complicated and diverse, but there is a discernible effort to move away from the old bureaucratic Soviet model while also recognising the importance of maintaining a key role for the state, including local government, in the economy. This is reflected above all in its wartime economy that sees, not only state enterprises, but also smaller and nimbler tech and drone firms, play a critical role.

           

          There has been a notable mood shift on these issues at the URC. Even privatisation’s most ardent supporters tend to concede that Ukraine’s strategically important industries should remain in public ownership, and there is a renewed interest in cooperatives and mutuals. Coordination between the public and private sector is the framing of choice of most panel contributions, advancing targeted and international calibrated industrial policy. A Japanese programme for example offers grants for technology transfer to Ukraine through business partnerships and co-creation, an approach Tokyo argues reflects how Europe and East Asia rebuilt after World War II.[3]

           

          In shifting toward Manchesterism, we could do far worse than take a closer look at Ukraine’s domestic policy. Yuliya Yurchenko, in her book Ukraine and the Empire of Capital, offers a trenchant criticism of Ukraine’s post-Maidan, IMF-mandated neoliberal reform programme. She highlights how the failure of that agenda to deliver sustainable growth has opened up new opportunities for social democratic thinking in Ukraine – and that this can have global policy implications, including for western countries. “Britain has a lot to learn from Ukraine’s experience”, she argues, having also spent several days at the URC, with the “national rail and the recently rebuilt from scratch Mykolayiv water pipeline and treatment facility… the shining examples of efficacy and efficiency of state ownership combined with responsive management and relying on local contractors”.[4]

           

          While the UK gradually reverses rail privatisation, Ukraine’s state-run rail network has provided a critical lifeline for citizens through the war. Privatbank, which was nationalised in 2016 during Ukraine’s mid-decade financial crisis, is today highly profitable having been cleaned up and reformed under public ownership.[5] State owned firms like Ukrhydroenergo (hydropower), Energoatom (nuclear), GTS Operator of Ukraine (gas transmission), Naftogaz (gas), and Ukrainian Defence Industry (defence production), all made significant contributions to Ukraine’s budget in 2024 and 2025.

           

          In 2023, President Zelensky announced an ambition that, by 2027, all primary school children would receive free school meals. By 2025, just over half of children in this cohort were receiving meals, thanks to an ambitious programme of kitchen upgrades and the training of cooks to improve nutritional value, all against the challenges of operating schools in a war.

           

          Ukraine’s system of local government also has the kind of fiscal powers that Burnham has advocated for cities and regions. Territorial communities receive some 64% of money raised through personal income taxes to spend on public services, housing and municipal and infrastructure investments.[6] This fiscal freedom has been absolutely essential to the war effort, for instance, allowing free public transport in several cities including Kharkiv where the metro also acts as the main public shelters for citizens. In Lviv, which has a close relationship with Manchester under Mayor Andriy Sadovyi, there has been a huge expansion in the tram and guided bus network, as well as cycle infrastructure called “Lion on Wheels”, with over 50% of residents now using public transport or cycles for journeys. Lviv has also expanded its city centre pedestrian zone creating one of the largest pedestrianised historic centres in Europe. The challenges that Ukraine has faced in the unevenness of local technical and administrative capacity to make the most of these powers and resources may well also prove to have shared lessons for Burnham’s reform agenda for kickstarting regional development.

           

          International policy is central to Burnham’s mission

          This is why international policy should never be an afterthought when it comes to building our transformative agenda at home. The international arena provides a wellspring of ideas and global relationships that will be vitally important in creating a strong, foundational ballast for Burnham’s transformative domestic agenda. The lessons emerging from Ukraine can also support new Labour thinking in areas like defence production and international development, where we have often struggled to develop a distinctively social democratic approach and vision.

           

          Alex Sobel is the Labour MP for Leeds Central and Headingley, and the Prime Minister’s Trade Envoy to Ukraine.

           

          Luke Cooper is an Associate Professorial Research Fellow in International Relation at London School of Economics and Director of the LSE Ukraine Programme.

           

          Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

           

          Photo via war.ukraine.ua (Collection of War Photos)

           

          [1] The Mirror, LIVE: Andy Burnham gives speech at the Great North Investment Summit ahead of Makerfield by-election, YouTube, May 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xWObFdHYz0A

          [2] Tymofii Brik and Vitalii Protsenko, Does crime undermine support for privatization? Evidence from Ukraine, Volume 39: Issue 1, pp. 91-117, Bristol University Press, March 2024, https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/view/journals/jpfpc/39/1/article-p91.xml

          [3] United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Green industrial recovery project for Ukraine, https://www.unido.org/girp-ukr-jpn

          [4] Autostrada, see: https://vodogin.autostrada.ua/en

          [5] Privatbank, Growing trust and supporting the national economy: PrivatBank has released its financial results for 2025, February 2026, https://privatbank.ua/en/news/2026/2/9/growing-trust-and-supporting-the-national-economy-privatbank-has-released-its-financial-results-for-2025

          [6] Igor Piddubnyi, Serhii Tytiuk, Andrii Darkovich, “Military” PIT: How the Tax Allocation System Can Change and What It Will Lead To, Vox Ukraine, September 2023, https://voxukraine.org/en/military-pit-how-the-tax-allocation-system-can-change-and-what-it-will-lead-to

          Footnotes
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            Key Takeaways & Policy Recommendations: Lessons for the UK from a Transnational Influence Battlefield

            Article by Andra-Lucia Martinescu

            July 2, 2026

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            Key Takeaways & Policy Recommendations: Lessons for the UK from a Transnational Influence Battlefield

            The contextual and data-driven analyses tell a clear story: Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary election was not merely a consequential national democratic contest but a stress test for Europe’s wider resilience to networked interference (link to publication). One analysis explains the political terrain; the other shows how that struggle was engineered online. Read together, they evidence how hostile influence moves from money to messaging, from local grievance to transnational mobilisation, and from one election to the next. 

             

            Some key insights:

             

            • While elections remain national, malign interference (at scale) does not. It persists as a standing infrastructure that operates between electoral cycles, moving across platforms, languages, borders, and communities. Its reach is facilitated by opaque platform algorithms, fragmented oversight, and, increasingly, AI-enabled tools that accelerate content production, translation, targeting and imitation, exponentially. The UK should, therefore, build responses that follow the networks rather than the map. 

             

            • Moldova was not simply a target of propaganda. It functioned as an operational theatre for Russia’s hybrid strategy, in which the information space was weaponised to shape political choices before voters reached the ballot box (i.e. participatory deterrence). Analysis of the online ecosystem over several months preceding the elections revealed not an isolated country-based interference effort, but a regionally integrated information strategy. This hostile strategy simultaneously targeted Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, as well as the European Union (EU), NATO, and other European countries, fused into a single geopolitical battlespace (albeit virtual). Elections are systematically framed from procedural democratic events into externally orchestrated power contests.

             

            • Under the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), Moldova experienced its first sustained pro-European alignment between parliament and government since independence. The 2025 parliamentary election preserved this trajectory, but the campaign was marked by intense foreign-backed pressure, proxy mobilisation, and coordinated manipulation at transnational scale. The Moldovan diaspora, estimated at 1.2 million, emerged as a decisive political force and, therefore, also as a strategic target.

             

            • Russia and its vast proxy networks did not rely on a single political vehicle. They appear to have backed or amplified multiple parties and candidates to fragment Moldova’s pro-European orientation, confuse voter choices, and insert several channels of influence in the electoral arena. Investigations cited in the reports linked some of these operations to Russian funding, including (but not limited to) support for campaign infrastructure and online dissemination at scale.

             

            • The decentralised behaviour of these influence networks makes them harder to expose and easier to reproduce. Influence is no longer carried only by political parties, state media or paid trolls; it is laundered through NGOs, ‘media schools’, youth programmes, content creators and self-styled journalists. One example, Evrazia, the Russian-backed non-profit linked to Ilan Shor and sanctioned by the EU and the UK, shows how supposedly civic or educational language can mask an influence pipeline, where youth and young professionals are intensely targeted for recruitment – not only limited to Eastern Europe, but increasingly forceful across Western countries, as well as the US and the Global South.

             

            • The data analysis points to a modular and interconnected interference ecosystem, designed to outlast a single election. Telegram acted as the main coordination and redistribution layer, while TikTok drove engagement exponentially. Overall, the ecosystem spanned and migrated across multiple platforms and the web.

             

            • A distinctive feature of Russian-affiliated activity was the production and dissemination of narratives in multiple languages through channel and account spin-offs, and often with near-identical semantic structures. Channels or accounts that appear to operate from the UK or Germany are likely controlled by actors/units elsewhere, using VPNs, spoofed metadata, or leased digital infrastructures to shield themselves through plausible deniability.

             

            • This multilingual architecture becomes relevant for the UK, with anglophone amplification as a distinct feature. For instance, narratives around alleged voter suppression in Transnistria were picked up by English-language channels, linked in the report to figures with direct connections to Russian state media and influence operations. Such channels help launder Russian-origin claims into wider English-speaking audiences, giving them a veneer of independent commentary before they are recirculated into European, diasporic, and domestic political spaces.

             

            • Disinformation networks repeatedly target civil society organisations, independent media or watchdog civic groups as corrupt agents of foreign interests, collapsing all institutional checks into a single hostile ‘system’. This tactic is designed to isolate democratic actors, discourage scrutiny, and normalise conspiracy narratives as common sense.

             

            • Diaspora communities are not merely overseas constituencies in a procedural sense but have increasingly become vectors of cross-border information environments. This aspect makes them both a democratic asset and a strategic target: they can decisively impact elections, but they can also be exposed to demobilisation, polarisation, and political radicalisation. Narratives travel transnationally and often under the radar of response and prevention efforts, through families, platforms, community groups, churches, influencers, and local politics, in both countries of origin and residence. 

             

            • In the 7th May UK local elections, 100 Romanian-origin candidates stood; half ran on the Reform UK ticket. This may seem paradoxical if viewed outside the more insidious dynamics of transnational populist/extremist circulation, where anti-establishment, anti-EU, ‘sovereign’ and anti-migration narratives can be repackaged across contexts, even when they sit uneasily with the lived experiences of migrant communities themselves. It should not be read as evidence of malign activity, but as a cautionary tale that populist and far-right platforms in Moldova, Romania and other European localities (the UK notwithstanding) increasingly draw from a common political grammar, adapting the same emotional cues to different national settings: betrayal, loss of control, cultural displacement, institutional distrust and the promise of restoration.

             

            Recommendations for the UK:

             

            • As a strategic priority, the UK should treat democratic legitimacy as a national security asset. Moldova shows that hostile influence is not an episodic campaign tactic but a permanent architecture for degrading trust, fragmenting coalitions and making democratic choice feel futile. The UK response must, therefore, be equally permanent, transnationally aware and network-focused.


            • Make transnational influence a core resilience test: UK democratic security should move beyond the domestic/foreign divide. Hostile state-sponsored networks operate fluidly through language spaces, communities, platforms, financial pipelines and political identities that transcend borders. Risk assessments by the Cabinet Office, Electoral Commission, Ofcom, and local authorities should therefore ask not only “is this content legal?” but “which infrastructure is making this particular message/narrative travel, and who benefits?”

             

            • Beyond content: The UK should also treat hostile influence as a capacity-building ecosystem, not only a content problem. Sanctions, platform enforcement, political finance scrutiny and civil society support should also be designed to disrupt recruitment pipelines, media-training fronts posing as legitimate journalism, and cross-border amplification networks before they mature into electoral assets.

             

            • Risk mapping and mitigation: The UK should develop a dedicated democratic resilience risk index to track permanent influence infrastructures, not only acute election threats. This would complement the National Risk Register, the Defending Democracy Taskforce and the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) by measuring slow-burn risks to democratic legitimacy; e.g. opaque funding, proxy outlets/hubs, AI-enabled amplification suffocating online public debate, legal intimidation, transnational relay networks, etc.

             

            • Platform accountability: The UK should not rely on ‘proactive’ platform cooperation nor leave democratic integrity to platform discretion. The Online Safety Act affords Ofcom powers to address illegal online harms, including foreign interference, but it does not yet constitute a dedicated election-integrity transparency regime comparable to the EU’s Digital Services Act’s systemic risk framework. Ofcom and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) should develop enforceable election and crisis protocols that require platforms to preserve and disclose network-level evidence (i.e., tackling the infrastructure of inauthentic coordination that mimics organic consensus), with secure access for regulators, electoral authorities, and vetted researchers. 

             

            • Build resilience through bilateral and regional partnerships: The UK should embed democratic resilience and information integrity provisions into its existing bilateral strategic partnerships. Existing frameworks with Moldova and Ukraine increasingly address hybrid threats, cyber resilience, and foreign information manipulation, but equivalent provisions are not consistently embedded in strategic partnerships with other exposed European states, such as Romania. These enhanced frameworks should cover shared threat mapping, sanctions coordination (with the EU), platform evidence-sharing, journalist protection, political finance risks, and monitoring.

             

            • Protect civic trust as critical infrastructure: Journalists, watchdogs, researchers, and community organisations should be treated as part of the UK’s early-warning system. Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) protections, secure reporting channels, and targeted support for investigative capacity should be strengthened because hostile networks often attack civil society first in a bid to weaken the civic tissue that exposes manipulation, verifies facts, protects vulnerable communities, and sustains public trust.

             

            • Close political finance loopholes: Parliament should strengthen the UK’s defences against opaque and foreign-linked money. Existing safeguards remain fragmented across the Electoral Commission, police and other agencies, with no dedicated national unit responsible for political finance enforcement. The government should adopt the recommendation to create a specialist Political Finance Enforcement Unit, bringing together the Electoral Commission, police, National Crime Agency (NCA), HMRC and other agencies’ expertise. This should be paired with ‘know your donor’ duties, tighter rules on company donations and unincorporated associations, beneficial ownership disclosure, and restrictions on crypto donations, and clearer checks on the original source of funds behind major donations.

             

            To conclude, for far too long, the UK’s openness, legal sophistication, and financial depth have also made it an attractive destination for oligarchic wealth, mercenary and opaque networks seeking access, protection or influence. Moldova’s experience shows why this cannot be treated as a narrow financial integrity issue. The same networks that shelter assets or reputations can also sustain malign influence, fund proxies and weaken democratic choice across borders. For the UK, recognising these connections becomes a duty of care: to protect the integrity of its financial, legal, political and civic systems, and to ensure these are not used as permissive spaces from which hostile influence can shelter, regenerate or project power into more exposed democracies. 

             

            Andra-Lucia is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre, specialising in threat intelligence, hybrid operations, conflict analysis and democratic resilience. Her recent work also focuses on how hostile influence, political violence, information manipulation and proxy networks affect vulnerable democracies, particularly across Eastern Europe and the wider European neighbourhood. She has previously held research roles with the British Army’s Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, RUSI, RAND Europe and other institutions, and has provided evidence to the UK Parliament on a number of issues. She is also actively involved in civic-tech, independent electoral monitoring and grassroots democratic initiatives. Andra-Lucia is co-founder of Qriton and The Diaspora Initiative, the latter, an independent Luxembourg-based project working at the intersection of diaspora studies, migration, good governance and democratic participation.

             

            Disclaimer: The views expressed in this publication are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

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              Long read | Recasting the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan

              Article by Francisco Olmos

              June 23, 2026

              Long read | Recasting the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan

              On 19 and 20 May Astana held a symposium on the Golden Horde, a descendant state of the Mongol Empire.[1] This was not, however, an event limited to academics discussing an obscure topic, but rather the culmination of a historical narrative process that has been taking place in Kazakhstan over the past few years.

               

              Since Kassym-Jomart Tokayev became president of Kazakhstan, the authorities have embarked on a quest for a new historical narrative, and they found it in the shape of the Golden Horde. This medieval khanate, which emerged from the descendants of Jochi, the eldest son of Genghis Khan, ruled the Eurasian steppe for three hundred years before disintegrating in the 15th century. It was a state that had been purposely overlooked by Tokayev’s predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and that had been much maligned during the Soviet period as it had dominated the Russian principalities.[2]

               

              The process of embracing the Golden Horde started back in 2019. Since then, interest in the Ulus of Jochi has materialised in the establishment of a dedicated institute for its study, archaeological finds, history articles in non-specialised media, and even a TV series, among other developments.[3]

               

              The timing and use of the Golden Horde by the Kazakh authorities are no coincidence. Tokayev’s New Kazakhstan was missing a national narrative to provide cohesion and distinguish itself from Nazarbayev’s discourse. The need for a historical narrative stretching back centuries became more acute in 2022, after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Kazakhstan’s large neighbour to the north has on multiple occasions questioned Kazakhstan’s sovereignty and national identity, especially in the past few years.[4] The use of the Ulus of Jochi reaffirms the country’s own history centuries before Russian colonisation. In fact, for much of its existence, the Golden Horde exercised authority over the Russian principalities, but that is not the message Astana wants to emphasise in this New Kazakhstan.

               

              The use being made of the Ulus of Jochi stays away from a bellicose tone or a strong nationalist sentiment. Instead of building the narrative around the Horde’s rulers, famous battles or monuments, Kazakhstan approaches it from a different perspective. It calls upon the medieval state’s diversity, role in global trade, intellectual and financial legacies. There are no bloody conquests or feats that could raise eyebrows in neighbouring countries.

               

              As Tokayev put in the recent symposium: “this [the Golden Horde] is one of the most important pages in the chronicle of our country and all humanity.”[5] In other words, Astana aims to portray the Ulus of Jochi as a state whose legacy extends beyond modern Kazakhstan and possesses a universal rather than exclusive character.

               

              The Golden Horde in the 21st century

              The use of the Golden Horde by Tokayev for his New Kazakhstan can be considered a right choice for the purpose it seeks to articulate. Although over five centuries have passed since it ceased to exist, some of its characteristics can be useful to the Kazakh authorities in this day and age.

               

              The Ulus of Jochi presents Astana a state in accordance with its current foreign policy aspirations. These descendants of Genghis Khan ruled an extensive empire that, at its height, stretched from the Black Sea in the west to Siberia in the east. At the same time, it maintained diplomatic relations with a wide range of states: from other Mongol successor empires, to European kingdoms and Islamic states. A true Eurasian empire that matches Kazakhstan’s role in modern geopolitics and its multi-vector foreign policy that includes China, Russia and the EU as key partners.

               

              Like Kazakhstan today, the Jochid Ulus was also a multiethnic state. The Horde was home to Mongols, Turkic peoples and Slavs, among others. Despite Kazakhs being now the majority of the population, the country continues to preserve a diverse ethnic and linguistic mix. More than 70 ethnic groups live in the country, with large minority groups such as Russians (14.9% of the population), Uzbeks (3.3%) and Ukrainians (1.9%).[6] The Golden Horde, despite its strong turco-mongol character, existed before the emergence of nationalism, an ideology that can be harmful to the country’s multiethnic background.

               

              Despite the reasons above, the choice of the Golden Horde as a national narrative is not without its issues and controversies.

               

              This medieval polity occupied territories well beyond Kazakhstan, and Astana is not the only state that can claim its legacy, although so far no other has actively done so. Its principal capitals, for example, were located along the Volga in what is now Russia, even if they were less central to the state than the capitals of more sedentary medieval polities because of the Horde’s nomadic character.

               

              Another key characteristic of the Golden Horde is missing from its modern interpretation: its military might and conquests. Among its most significant achievements was its domination of the Russian principalities and their vassalage to the Horde. This is not a pleasant topic for Moscow, which could use Kazakhstan’s embrace of Jochi’s descendants in its nationalist discourse and usual verbal attacks from its propagandists and officials against Tokayev’s government.

               

              The way the narrative is being built also raises other questionable points. The virtues of the Horde are exalted, as expected, but it lacks historical figures with whom people can identify with. Contrary to what happens in Uzbekistan with Amir Timur (i.e. Tamerlane) and, to a much lesser extent, his descendants Ulugh Beg and Babur, Kazakhstan’s is shying away from the main historical figures of the Jochid Ulus.[7] And there is no shortage of them: from Batu (r. 1227-55), founder of the Golden Horde, to his brother Berke (1257-66), Uzbeg Khan (1313-41) or Jani Beg (1342-57), to name a few. But besides some mentions of Jochi himself, most other rulers and conquerors are overlooked.

               

              The composition of the Golden Horde is another interesting subject. In its origin it was a Mongol state, and while later the Turkic component would gradually come to predominate, the link with the modern Kazakhs is not straightforward. The same happens from a state perspective. The Golden Horde is not the direct ancestor of Kazakhstan. The Ulus of Jochi fragmented permanently into different khanates in the 15th century, including those of Crimea, Kazan and Astrakhan, located in modern Ukraine and Russia, as well as the Uzbek and Kazakh khanates. The link between the latter and Kazakhstan is stronger than with the Golden Horde.

               

              Why not the Kazakh Khanate?

              There is a loser of Kazakhstan’s new interest in the Golden Horde and that is the Kazakh Khanate. This state established in the mid-15th century by Kerei and Janibeg, two nomadic leaders who broke away from the Uzbek Khanate in what is now southern Kazakhstan, is the most direct link modern Kazakhstan has to a historical past. It not only occupied roughly the current territory of the republic but was also the state that was later colonised by the Russians before Kazakhstan achieved its independence in 1991.

               

              The Kazakh Khanate had been used to some extent by Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, notably when confronted by a familiar threat: Russia. While a statue of the khanate founders was unveiled in Astana back in 2010, it was not until 2014 that this state rose to prominence. This was a result of Vladimir Putin’s words a year earlier suggesting that “Kazakhs never had a statehood.”[8] Nazarbayev’s reaction was to celebrate the 550th anniversary of the khanate’s establishment the following year.

               

              This Central Asian state produced notable rulers that could have been prominently promoted by Astana if the Kazakh Khanate was given more importance within the national narrative.

               

              The khans Kerei and Janibeg might have been considered the principal founding fathers of the Kazakh nation. Kasym Khan could have been elevated as the national figure. Tauke Khan, together with his Zheti Zhargy (Seven Charters), could have been used to prove the existence of the Kazakh statehood from a legalistic perspective back in the 17th century.[9] Kenesary Khan (d. 1847), in turn, would have provided a heroic, yet ill-fated, national liberation figure centred on resisting the Russian invaders. However, beyond their presence through a small number of statues, commemorative coins, and educational curricula, these historical figures have largely played a supporting role in Kazakhstan’s nation-building process, rather than occupying a central symbolic position.

               

              However, there are reasons why the Ulus of Jochi may be a more suitable choice for Kazakhstan’s aspiring role in the world. While the Golden Horde spanned the Eurasian steppe, the Kazakh Khanate’s borders were limited to modern-day Kazakhstan. It was a regional power, as the Uzbek Khanates found out through constant wars in the 16th century, but its role in world history is much more limited. In addition, it had a stronger Kazakh ethnic component, which works well when striking a nationalist chord, but lies out of place in a more diverse Kazakhstan that the authorities seek to promote today.

               

              Conclusion

              Five centuries after its dissolution, the Golden Horde is experiencing a revival in one of its former territories. The rediscovery of this medieval state in the 21st century reflects an attempt to build a historical narrative that supports modern Kazakhstan’s state identity and foreign policy objectives. By elevating the Ulus of Jochi, a Eurasian empire characterised by its territorial extension, multiethnic composition and transregional connectivity, Astana seeks to shape its current aspirations by drawing on the past.

               

              At the same time, this new narrative highlights the limitations and shortcomings of a state-led historical construction. As outlined above, the direct link between the Golden Horde and modern Kazakhstan is open to debate, especially when compared to the Kazakh Khanate. Moreover, many of its key characteristics are deliberately overlooked in the search for a sanitised narrative that can be accepted both at home and abroad. The result is a balancing act that reflects both the opportunities and constraints of using the past as an instrument of modern nation-building.

               

               

              Francisco Olmos is a Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre. He is a researcher and analyst specializing in Central Asian affairs, focusing on nationalism, power transitions, and the geopolitics of the post-Soviet space. He is a Senior Researcher at GEOPOL 21, where he contributes analysis on Central Asia’s relations with Russia, China, and Western actors. Holding an MA in International Relations and World Order from the University of Leicester, Olmos frequently writes for think tanks and media outlets, participates in academic forums and podcasts, and was awarded the Beca Ruy de Clavijo for his work on Spain’s relations with Central Asia.

               

              Image: © The Mausoleum of Jochi Khan

               

              Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

               

              [1] UNESCO, International Symposium on the Golden Horde Held in Astana under the Patronage of UNESCO, UNESCO, May 2026, https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/international-symposium-golden-horde-held-astana-under-patronage-unesco

              [2] Bakhytzhan Kurmanov, Zhaxylyk Sabitov, and Rustem Kudaibergenov, Making the Golden Horde “Great Again”: Historians as Memory Actors and Reinterpretation of the Historical Narratives in Independent Kazakhstan, Nationalities Papers, Cambridge University Press, October 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/making-the-golden-horde-great-again-historians-as-memory-actors-and-reinterpretation-of-the-historical-narratives-in-independent-kazakhstan/057D6F6125AE71CE3A62B0B5D6B4F147

              [3] Aibarshyn Akhmetkali, Kazakhstan’s Ulus of Jochi Institute Explores Forgotten Eras of Statehood, The Astana Times, January 2025, https://astanatimes.com/2025/01/kazakhstans-ulus-of-jochi-institute-explores-forgotten-eras-of-statehood/; Aibarshyn Akhmetkali, Everything You Need to Know About Ulus of Jochi, The Astana Times, August 2024, https://astanatimes.com/2024/08/everything-you-need-to-know-about-ulus-of-jochi; Dana Omirgazy, The Golden Empire: Everything We Know So Far, Qazinform, July 2025, https://qazinform.com/news/the-golden-empire-everything-we-know-so-far-e7b35d

              [4] Francisco Olmos, La sombra del nacionalismo ruso en Asia Central, Geopol 21, September 2024, https://geopol21.com/la-sombra-del-nacionalismo-ruso-en-asia-central/

              [5] Office of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Akorda), Address by the Head of State Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the International Symposium “The Golden Horde as a Model of Steppe Civilization: History, Archaeology, Culture, Identity”, May 2026, https://www.akorda.kz/ru/vystuplenie-glavy-gosudarstva-kasym-zhomarta-tokaeva-na-mezhdunarodnom-simpoziume-zolotaya-orda-kak-model-stepnoy-civilizacii-istoriya-arheologiya-kultura-identichnost-1945730

              [6] Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan, [Statistical Report / Data File], 2024, https://stat.gov.kz/api/iblock/element/178068/file/en/

              [7] Francisco Olmos, State-building Myths in Central Asia, The Foreign Policy Centre, October 2019, https://fpc.org.uk/state-building-myths-in-central-asia/

              [8] Farangis Najibullah, Putin Downplays Kazakh Independence, Sparks Angry Reaction, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 2014, https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-putin-history-reaction-nation/26565141.html

              [9] Rafail N. Zinurov, “«Жеті Жарғы» («Семь установлений») Тауке-хана как великий памятник права: правовой обычай, судопроизводство и наказание” [“Zheti Zhargy (‘Seven Charters’) by Tauke Khan as a Great Monument of Law: Customary Law, Judicial Procedure, and Punishment”], Pravovoe gosudarstvo: teoriya i praktika, no. 4 (58) (2012): 32–37

              Topics
              Footnotes
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                Op-ed | Armenia’s 2026 Parliamentary Election and the Future of the South Caucasus

                Article by James Stanley and Stefan Wolff

                June 4, 2026

                Op-ed | Armenia’s 2026 Parliamentary Election and the Future of the South Caucasus

                The upcoming Armenian elections are often framed as a choice between Russia and the West. In reality, the outcome will shape the country’s evolving relationship with Russia, the West, and its neighbours in the strategically important South Caucasus. This article forms part of the Foreign Policy Centre’s work on democracy and elections.

                 

                In the shadow of war in the Middle East and Russia’s ongoing war waged against Ukraine, Armenia is heading into parliamentary elections on 7 June that will not only be critical for the country’s own direction but are also likely to have an impact for the wider South Caucasus region; itself of broader geopolitical significance at a crucial north-south and east-west crossroads.

                 

                At stake is first of all the future of incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party government, which came to power in 2018 after the Velvet Revolution. The movement ousted the government of long-term leader Serzh Sarkisian, who had tried to prolong his stay in power “by moving from the office of president to that of prime minister”.[1] This triggered nation-wide protests propelling Pashinyan to the premiership that May and to electoral victory in December.

                 

                Under Pashinyan, who was re-elected in 2021, Armenia has generally gravitated towards the European Union and away from Russia.[2] The latter is mostly a result of Russia’s failure to support Armenia during the Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. The offensive resulted in Azerbaijan retaking control over the territory, which Armenia had illegally occupied since the first Karabakh war in the early 1990s – causing the displacement of around 100,000 Armenians from the region. These events unfolded in the presence of Russian ‘peacekeepers’ deployed under the terms of a cease fire agreement that ended the second Karabakh war in 2020.[3]

                 

                Armenia’s election on 7 June therefore marks an important milestone not only domestically, but also for the wider region. Pashinyan campaigns on a platform “to reopen the country’s borders, lower dependence on Russia, and diversify its foreign and economic profile by normalising relations with traditional adversaries Azerbaijan and Turkey”.[4] If Pashinyan secures another term, this would give him the mandate to carry out a major shift in Armenia’s foreign policy orientation, and in this sense, the elections are also a “strategic referendum on Armenia’s geopolitical orientation.”[5]

                 

                A popular endorsement of Pashinyan’s agenda would enable the continuation of three important trends in the region: first, the gradual emergence of regional ties between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan; second, further declining Russian influence in a region where Moscow once was the undisputed hegemonic power; and third, a strengthening foothold for the EU and the US in a region that is a strategic land bridge towards Central Asia and China.

                 

                The relationship between Moscow and Yerevan has steadily deteriorated over the past decade.[6] Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the weight and significance of Russia in the region has clearly diminished, but this has been a gradual process, rather than an abrupt rupture.[7]

                 

                While Russia retains significant influence in Georgia, and the Georgian Dream government in Tbilisi is, for now, seemingly more closely aligned with Moscow than with either Brussels or Washington, it is also trying to balance its relationship more carefully between Russia and the West. This includes forging closer ties with Azerbaijan and Türkiye.[8] A victory for Pashinyan and his pro-Western agenda is likely to reinforce the trend towards the geopolitical re-orientation of the region, but this will remain a more careful multi-vector balancing act – with a mixture of political, economic, and cultural relationships to different actors outside the region – rather than a more one-directional pivot towards the West.[9]

                 

                Although Russian influence may be declining, Moscow’s strategic interests in the South Caucasus, including in Armenia, remain strong. Russia is poised to use whatever tools and leverage it still has to prevent a further decline of its role as erstwhile regional hegemon, including by using cultural and religious channels of influence.[10] Economically, Russia remains Armenia’s most important trade partner and energy supplier.[11] Many opposition forces also remain closely aligned with Russia, including the Strong Armenia bloc led by billionaire Samvel Karapetyan.[12] Most Armenians favour diversification of relations rather than an outright rejection of Russia. According to recent polling, 43% see Moscow as the country’s most important partner, compared to 42% who think of Washington in that way, and 29% who think of Brussels.[13]

                 

                The geopolitical dynamics in and around Armenia are therefore more complex and nuanced than the political rhetoric accompanying them. Yet, Russia’s capacity to exercise real influence effectively – and comparably to its previous dominance – is more constrained than ever. For example, Armenia has completely shifted away from Moscow as a security provider not only rhetorically but also in terms of who now supplies most of its arms: where Russia once accounted for over 90% of Armenia’s weapons purchases, its share has now dropped to somewhere between 5% and 10%, while France and India have become Armenia’s primary defence partners.[14]

                 

                Armenia, thus, has not, and most likely will not, replace its close alignment with Russia with one that solely relies on the West. However, the change in foreign policy direction under Pashinyan has clearly shifted away from Russia and towards Brussels and Washington. On the European side, this has been reciprocated with the back-to-back European Political Community summit and first bilateral Armenia-EU summit held in Yerevan in May 2026.[15]

                 

                The United States under President Donald Trump has also demonstrated a continuing interest in the region, which is most evident in Trump’s engagement in trying to broker a permanent peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While this has yet to be achieved, several pieces of this puzzle have been put in place, including, most recently, a bilateral framework agreement on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).[16] Given the transactional and erratic nature of much of Trump’s foreign policy, this is unlikely to be a pivotal game changer either for peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan or for long-term US commitment to the country or the region, but it is part of the broader picture of the geopolitical importance of Armenia and the South Caucasus – and the opportunities that this may create for Pashinyan’s agenda.

                 

                A careful balance therefore needs to be struck between dismissing Armenia’s parliamentary elections as the continuation of Armenia’s historic dependence on Russia, and exclusively reorienting strategic alignment in the much bigger geopolitical game surrounding the South Caucasus. The outcome of the elections will be important for the country’s direction, and speed of travel: whoever forms the next government in Yerevan will still have a range of pre-existing problems to resolve in an environment where external support is neither certain nor dependably benign.

                 

                 

                James Stanley is an M.A. International Relations student at the University of Birmingham. He has experience in policy research and public engagement, including contributing to the Helios exhibition at The Exchange. His research interests include Russia, European security, and the wider Eurasian region.

                 

                Stefan Wolff is Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre and Professor of International Security in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Birmingham. A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts, in post-conflict state-building in deeply divided and war-torn societies, and in contemporary geopolitics and great-power rivalry. Wolff has extensive expertise in the post-Soviet space and has also worked on a wide range of other conflicts elsewhere, including in the Middle East and North Africa, in Central Asia, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Wolff holds degrees from the University of Leipzig (Erstes Staatsexamen), the University of Cambridge (M.Phil.), and the LSE (Ph.D.).

                 

                Image: © European Union 2026 – Source : EP

                 

                Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

                 

                 

                [1] Miriam Lanskoy and Elspeth Suthers, Armenia’s Velvet Revolution. Journal of Democracy, April 2019, https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0027

                [2] Council of the European Union, EU Relations with Armenia, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/armenia/

                [3] Michael Ertl, Nagorno-Karabakh: Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenians explained, BBC News,September 2023, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66852070

                [4] Thomas de Waal, Armenia’s Election Is a Foreign Affair, Strategic Europe, November 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2025/11/armenias-election-is-a-foreign-affair

                [5] Robert Lansing Institute, Armenia’s Parliamentary Elections 2026: A Battle for the State’s Geopolitical Future,May 2026, https://lansinginstitute.org/2026/05/18/armenias-parliamentary-elections-2026-a-battle-for-the-states-geopolitical-future/

                [6] Ulviyya Asadzade, Russia’s Grip Weakens In The South Caucasus, Opening Doors To New Players, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 2025, https://www.rferl.org/a/south-caucasus-russia-losing-influence-armenia-azerbaijan/33475018.html

                [7] Emil Avdaliani, “Russian Influence Drains Away in the South Caucasus”, Center for European Policy Analysis, 22 May 2026, https://cepa.org/article/russian-influence-drains-away-in-the-south-caucasus/

                [8] Mark Temnycky, Caught Between NATO And Russia, Georgia Turns To The South Caucasus, Forbes, December 2025, https://www.forbes.com/sites/marktemnycky/2025/12/13/caught-between-nato-and-russia-georgia-turns-to-the-south-caucasus/

                [9] Laurence Broers, Armenia’s election: Voters to decide on Pashinyan’s peace agenda”, Chatham House, May 2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/05/armenias-election-voters-decide-pashinyans-peace-agenda

                [10] Mikayel Zolyan, “Russia Won’t Give Up Its Influence in Armenia Without a Fight”, Carnegie Politika, 3 February 2026, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/01/armenia-russia-drifting-apart; Davit Gasparyan, Russian Religious Networks and Armenia’s Church-State Confrontation, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, March 2026, https://substack.com/home/post/p-188618614

                [11] SpecialEurasia, Trade as Leverage: Russia’s Enduring Economic Role in Armenia, March 2026, https://www.specialeurasia.com/2026/03/11/trade-russia-armenia-leverage/

                [12] Sergey Kanev, Grabbing him by the ‘Beard’: The Insider identifies the FSB, GRU, and SVR agents Russia sent to Armenia to take on PM Nikol Pashinyan, The Insider, May 2026, https://theins.press/en/inv/292740

                [13] International Republican Institute, Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Armenia, February 2026, March 2026, https://www.iri.org/resources/public-opinion-survey-residents-of-armenia-february-2026/

                [14] Leonid Nersisyan and Sergei Melkonian, Escaping Russia’s Backyard: Armenia’s Strategic Defense Shift, War on the Rocks, November 2024, https://warontherocks.com/escaping-russias-backyard-armenias-strategic-defense-shift/

                [15] Rayhan Demytrie, European leaders converge on Armenia as Russia looks on, BBC News, May 2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cgkp1124y3yo

                [16] Office of the Spokesperson, The United States and Armenia Announce the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) Framework Agreement and Sign the Strategic Partnership Charter and Critical Minerals Memorandum of Understanding, US Department of State, May 2026, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/05/the-united-states-and-armenia-announce-tripp-framwork-agreement-and-sign-the-strategic-partnership-charter-and-critical-minerals-mou/

                Footnotes
                  Related Articles

                  Op-ed | After the Locals: How Reform and the Greens Could Reshape Foreign Policy

                  Article by Dr Thomas Martin

                  May 12, 2026

                  Op-ed | After the Locals: How Reform and the Greens Could Reshape Foreign Policy

                  The local elections have shown how politically fragmented the UK has become in recent years. Both Labour and the Conservatives – the traditional parties of Government – have lost out. Reform UK are the big winners; and the Greens and Liberal Democrats are making gains, with the Greens continuing to make inroads into the UK’s urban centres.

                   

                  This turbulence is likely to have impacts on the UK’s foreign and national security politics. It has long been the case that foreign policy in the UK has been driven by a broad, cross-party consensus. Yet the emergence of Reform, and to a lesser extent the Greens, threatens to disrupt this.

                   

                  In my research, I have been looking into how people in the UK think about national security and foreign policy. What threats do they perceive as most significant? What makes them feel secure or insecure? And what are people’s national security priorities? My research (conducted at the end of 2025, prior to subsequent developments such as the war in Iran) shows that people’s perspectives on national security have become inseparable from their politics. National security is experienced and perceived differently within the UK – with those in different political communities believing very different things.

                   

                  A notable finding is that those saying they would vote Reform UK tended to feel less secure in the UK. It is perhaps unsurprising that a sense of insecurity might lead people to vote for parties outside of the mainstream. They identify migration as their biggest concern, and are much more likely to do so than others in the UK. Conversely, they are much less concerned than others about global instability and climate change. They are more likely to see the UK’s nuclear deterrent as a source of security, and at the time of polling, were the voting cohort who were much more likely to see the UK’s relationship to the US, and President Donald Trump himself, as contributing positively to UK security They felt that UK foreign and economic policies made them less secure, and are less likely to see the UN and NATO as sources of security. Their policy priorities tend to include reducing migration and increasing defence spending.

                   

                  Those intending to vote Green shared some similarities with potential Reform voters. They too, were less likely to feel that UK foreign and economic policies would make them secure. Yet their diagnosis of the problem was fundamentally different. Green voters were much less concerned about ‘traditional’ security threats such as terrorism, and instead placed greater emphasis on climate and economic insecurity. They were the voting cohort most concerned about President Trump and the UK’s relationship to the US, as well as the only cohort who overall felt that the UK’s nuclear deterrent made them less secure. They were notably the most opposed to increasing defence spending, instead, they would prioritise human security concerns, such as the economic and health insecurities of those living in the UK, alongside efforts to tackle climate change.

                   

                  Green voters nevertheless viewed the UK as a global actor, seeing the UN as a source of security, and the UK as playing a role in global peacebuilding. When asked about the UK Government’s policy towards Ukraine, they were the cohort most likely to state that we have a moral obligation to help Ukraine protect itself. This contrasts with Reform voters, who were most likely to state we should instead prioritise spending money on those in need at home.

                   

                  While these findings are not necessarily surprising, they are nevertheless important. In essence, they outline divergent paths for the UK’s national security and foreign policy that depart in significant ways from the current broad consensus.

                   

                  Reform voters tend to want a more insular and self-sufficient United Kingdom, with resources focused domestically rather than on involvement in foreign conflicts, while maintaining ties with the US and Trump.

                   

                  Green voters, by contrast, tend to be highly critical of the UK’s current tools of deterrence, such as defence spending and the nuclear deterrent, and instead see security as being produced through multilateralism, tackling the climate emergency, and investing in the human security needs of the UK.

                   

                  The recent Strategic Defence Review and National Security Strategy both called for a ‘national conversation’ on the future of UK defence and security.[1] My research highlights the challenges involved in that ambition.[2] As the two-party system fractures, questions around what the UK’s national security and foreign policy priorities should be are likely to become increasingly politicised. If the UK is going to achieve cross-societal solidarity in a more difficult and dangerous world – and convince the public to pay for coherent long-term responses to wide-ranging security challenges – it is going to need a much more expansive, democratic conversation about what security is for, who it is for, and how it should be delivered.

                   

                   

                  Dr Thomas Martin is a Senior Lecturer in International Studies at The Open University. He is interested in national security politics, public opinion, and terrorism and counterterrorism.

                   

                   

                  Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

                   

                  [1] Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, June 2025 ,https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/683d89f181deb72cce2680a5/The_Strategic_Defence_Review_2025_-_Making_Britain_Safer_-_secure_at_home__strong_abroad.pdf

                  [2] Dr Thomas Martin, Public Opinion & National Security in the UK: A People-Centred Approach, GCSJ Policy Report, Centre for Global Challenges and Social Justice, The Open University, https://fass.open.ac.uk/research/centres/GCSJ/policy-incubator

                  Footnotes
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                    Op-ed | International Aid as a Line of Defence: What Happens to Human Security Without Soft Power?

                    Article by Anna Chernova

                    April 24, 2026

                    Op-ed | International Aid as a Line of Defence: What Happens to Human Security Without Soft Power?

                    Securitisation of foreign (and domestic) policy is leading to a prioritisation of hard power approaches over civilian-led, soft power approaches, leaving many wondering about the future. As Europe rearms in response to the Russian threat to its collective security, and as the US proves itself an unreliable security partner, the UK finds itself repositioning within a fractured Euro-Atlantic alliance. This raises a broader question: how to de-securitise and return to “normal” politics?[1]

                     

                    If militarism shapes the next generation’s approach to public policy, what are the prospects for addressing the root causes of violence that are driving the skyrocketing humanitarian needs and record levels of forced displacement? The impact of armed conflict is increasingly more severe and violence is becoming the new normal, while political solutions are de-funded and militarised approaches take precedence.[2]

                     

                    As the UK and many other democratic states reduce investment into peacebuilding and other soft power efforts, resource constraints are affecting the very institutions that help prevent and mitigate conflict, support collective security, and promote diplomatic solutions.

                     

                    Today, the international community marks the importance of multilateralism and diplomacy for peace.

                     

                    This takes place in a context of increasing global arms transfers, the proliferation of non-state armed groups, a resurgence of international armed conflicts, and systematic violations of the UN Charter across continents.[3] The low cost of entry into conflict for both state and non-state actors (in part enabled by globalisation, including access to technology, finance, and information), combined with social, economic and environmental factors, is undermining peace and other development goals. In a globalised order, military escalations in one region risk pushing millions into poverty, including in already conflict-affected contexts.[4]

                     

                    This dynamic is also unfolding alongside increasing inequalities and restrictions on civic space. Democratic backsliding has reduced agency for civil society, including humanitarian actors, women’s rights groups, LGBTQI+ movements and many others relying on a rights-based, rules-based international world order – particularly in contexts where the states are unwilling or unable to adhere to a viable social contract. Without multilateral spaces, civil society voices risk further marginalisation and isolation in the face of expanding authoritarianism.[5] Without civic space, the positive peace agenda is undermined.

                     

                    At the same time, significant reductions in aid are reshaping the UN and the multilateral architecture underpinning diplomacy for peace. Regional and global multilateral institutions and their civil society partners are grappling with a steadily increasing wave of violence and militarism with dwindling resources. The private sector, philanthropy, and new donors (e.g. in the Gulf) seem willing to meaningfully engage in ways that come close to replacing USAID’s contribution to pathways for peace, and the wider Nexus approach that brings together Humanitarian Development and Peace.[6]

                     

                    Human Development progress, particularly around Women, Peace and Security and gender justice, are stalling and regressing. These trends point to the continued importance of investment in soft power, including support for democracy, human rights, gender equality, the rule of law, and security sector reform. While the UK has historically positioned itself as a leader in this area and continues to recognise its importance, current policy choices suggest a growing gap between this recognition and the protection of funding for peacebuilding, development and humanitarian relief.[7]

                     

                    Where does this leave the UK role in the wider European neighbourhood and globally?

                    A renewed focus on human security is needed. A purely state-centric approach, driven by self-interest among a growing number of undemocratic and unequal states is likely to lead to a more violent world order that will not yield the desired collective human development dividends. The UK’s historic role in championing human security approaches in institutions like NATO, and reflected in its approaches at the UN Security Council is more needed than ever.  In a shifting global order, where collaboration among middle powers around shared geographic or sectoral interests and values is becoming critical, the UK’s track record on human security lends value regionally and globally.

                     

                    The UK’s Ministry of Defence review of strategic trends flagged important human security dimensions, outlining risks around inequalities and other socio-economic factors that are likely to drive instability and diminish UK’s global role and its national security.[8] Yet despite the availability of such detailed and well-considered analysis,  foreign policy and national security decision-makers continue to defund the human security agenda, and inadvertently make the world (and the country) less safe.

                     

                    With civic space narrowing, citizens and states must be represented in regional and global dialogues, as well as in the institutions that underpin them. While the UK prides itself on a long historic track record of soft power, particularly through its academic institutions, think tanks, vibrant media, and civil society – these all require public investment. Without a well-resourced and stable civil service to help deliver on these objectives, this historic soft power asset risks weakening, with implications for peacebuilding outcomes.

                     

                    Holding the pen, and running out of paper: what happens to penholding at the UN Security Council?

                    A major factor in the UK’s global security positioning is in the power of its permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The UK holds the pen on some key thematic and geographic files, convening peace and security conversations across a wide range of diverse states.

                     

                    For a post-Brexit middle-power, the UK retains an impressive amount of influence in these soft power spaces. However, much of the political credit goes to historic investments by DFID and  the Foreign Office in regional institutions such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the UN aid systems, and the Human Security agenda within NATO. Without sustained investment in these spaces, including in the civil service staff and structures, the UK’s soft power positioning will not be sustainable and it will not be able to build on its impressive historic track record of conflict resolution and peacebuilding through collective security and human security approaches.

                     

                    Without diplomacy and resources to civilian-led processes, military solutions will be increasingly seen as “normal” and viable. A growing share of the population, particularly younger generations coming of age in a renewed period of geopolitical competition, may come to view conflict as an inevitable feature of international relations. Without diplomacy, there will be more bullets.[9]

                     

                     

                    Anna Chernova has a background in foreign policy and international development, with a focus on human rights, conflict resolution and humanitarian action. She has worked in diplomatic and non-governmental sectors in Eurasia and West Asia. At the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, she led work on human rights and democracy, including parliamentary diplomacy efforts in conflict resolution, election observation and inquiries. Prior to joining the OSCE, Anna managed large-scale humanitarian operations in Russia’s North Caucasus at the close of the second Chechen war, and had worked on refugee issues with the UN in Bulgaria. Since 2014, she has been advising humanitarian organisations on foreign policy analysis, political risk and transnational threats. Her research and policy work focuses on gender and conflict, human security, counter-terrorism and human rights. She is particularly interested in conflict prevention and addressing root causes of violence driving humanitarian crises, such as extreme inequalities and authoritarianism. Anna’s academic background is in International Studies, Russia/Eastern Europe and Global Security. She is a US Fulbright Research and IREX Public Service Fellow, and is based in the UK.

                     

                    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

                     

                    [1] Jonathan Luke Austin, Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard, “(De)securitisation dilemmas: Theorising the simultaneous enaction of securitisation and descuritisation,” Review of International Studies (2017) https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/desecuritisation-dilemmas-theorising-the-simultaneous-enaction-of-securitisation-and-desecuritisation/FE45D2C1D20870EC0E74DF54FA487C06

                    [2] ACLED Conflict Watchlist 2026, “What is driving conflict today? A review of global trends,” (2025) https://acleddata.com/report/whats-driving-conflict-today-review-global-trends

                    [3] ICRC https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/challenges-report_ihl-and-non-state-armed-groups.pdf; SIPRI, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025 https://www.sipri.org/publications/2026/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2025

                    [4] UNDP, “Military escalation in the Middle East could push more than 30 million people into poverty worldwide,” (2026) https://www.undp.org/press-releases/military-escalation-middle-east-could-push-more-30-million-people-poverty-worldwide-un-development-programme-warns

                    [5] Freedom House – Freedom in the World 2026, “The Growing Shadow of Autocracy,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2026/growing-shadow-autocracy

                    [6] World Bank Group, “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” (2018) https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/publication/pathways-for-peace-inclusive-approaches-to-preventing-violent-conflict

                    [7] International Development Committee, “Future of UK aid and development assistance: interim report, Government Response,” https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/52758/documents/293937/default/

                    [8] Ministry of Defence, “Global Strategic Trends out to 2055,” 7th edition (2024) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68dba439dadf7616351e4bf8/GST_7_Final_post_pic_change_WEB.pdf

                    [9] Forbes, “Heed General Mattis’ Warning, D.C.: Less Diplomacy Means ‘More Ammunition’”, June 2025https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewtisch/2025/06/18/heed-general-mattis-warning-dc-less-diplomacy-means-more-ammunition/

                    Footnotes
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