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Op-ed | The Future of the OSCE and the UK’s Role

Article by Prof Stefan Wolff

February 20, 2026

Op-ed | The Future of the OSCE and the UK’s Role

The 25th Winter Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly should be a moment of celebration and reflection on past successes in advancing the organisation’s broader goals of comprehensive and collective security. Yet, much like the 50th anniversary of the organisation in 2025, it will be anything but. The OSCE continues to be in a deep crisis.

 

Triggered by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, this is first and foremost a crisis of paralysis, with meaningful dialogue and decision-making among participating States in Vienna largely stalled. The OSCE continues to function operationally, with at least some meaningful and substantive business being conducted in the organisation’s specialised institutions – the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), and the Representative on Freedom of the Media – as well as in its eleven field operations in eastern and southeastern Europe and Central Asia.

 

The existing crisis of paralysis is further compounded by the wider crisis of multilateralism and the deliberate dismantling of the rules-based international order, which did not begin with, but has significantly accelerated since the return of Donald Trump to the White House 13 months ago. The implications for the OSCE became particularly evident at the Ministerial Council in Vienna on 4 December 2025, when a representative of the US State Department called for “a reduction of at least €15 million in the annual budget by December 2026”, a shift in priorities away from politically contentious issues, and renewed engagement with Russia. Implied, if not explicitly stated, was the threat of US withdrawal from the OSCE: “If the OSCE continues on its current path, the United States will continue to assess our participation and support.”[1]

 

As with previous periods of institutional strain, the key question that arises from it is not new: can participating States reform the organisation and help it find a way back to being an effective contributor to security across its vast geographic area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok? And perhaps more importantly, should they?

 

The priorities of this year’s Swiss Chairpersonship under the theme “Dialogue – Trust – Security” certainly suggest that a serious attempt will be made. Key objectives include safeguarding the OSCE’s operational capacity (“preserve the basic instruments … and to ensure their financing”) and revitalising multilateral diplomacy (“foster an open dialogue on security”, “maintain channels of communication on security, including between States in conflict”).[2]

 

Another priority – to work for lasting peace on the basis of the Helsinki principles (enshrined in the organisation’s 1975 founding act) – envisages that “the OSCE is mobilising its instruments across all three dimensions to support a just and lasting peace in Ukraine”. Not only does this naturally align with the very purpose of the organisation but it also could give the OSCE a new lease of life in light of recent developments in the war against Ukraine.

 

The prospect of elections, a referendum, and a possible peace deal could give the OSCE and its participating States an opportunity to bring to bear its experience and expertise in election observation, ceasefire monitoring, demining, on-the-ground mediation, and post-conflict institution building.

 

However, not all of the OSCE’s past experiences in these areas were stellar successes. Getting the organisation into a position where it could meaningfully contribute to a lasting peace in Ukraine will require pain-staking, detail-oriented work in the corridors of the OSCE secretariat and the Hofburg in Vienna, not the megaphone diplomacy that tends to take place in the meetings of the Permanent Council or the Forum for Security Cooperation.

 

For the UK, the OSCE – notwithstanding the organisation’s ongoing crisis – still represents an important forum to articulate and pursue its national interests. While just one among several minilateralisms that have recently emerged – including the ‘coalition of the willing’, the European Political Community, the Ukraine Defence Contact (or Ramstein) Group – it is unique in the sense that it is one of the few remaining fora where direct dialogue with Russia is not just possible but embedded in the organisation’s founding purpose.

 

Such dialogue must, however, serve a concrete purpose and it needs to be based on clear principles. As Chair of the Forum for Security Co-operation in the last trimester of 2026, and as a member of the Forum’s Troika in the preceding and subsequent trimesters, the UK is well positioned to support the Swiss Chairpersonship’s reform agenda and to contribute to restoring the OSCE’s operational effectiveness. This is further enhanced by the fact that the Head of the UK Delegation to the OSCE, Ambassador Neil Holland, will also continue in his role as Chair of the Security Committee, one of the informal subsidiary bodies of the Permanent Council, specifically charged with discussing politico-military issues and supporting the preparation of the Annual Security Review Conference, which provides participating States with an opportunity to discuss regional security issues in plenary form.

 

The UK’s long-standing experience in multilateral diplomacy, its role as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and its still pivotal role at the nexus of Euro-Atlantic security create a unique opportunity for making a lasting contribution to making the OSCE relevant again as a forum for dialogue among all its participating States. This will not be easy and success will not be guaranteed, but it will be a worthwhile investment of UK

 

 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

 

 

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Birmingham. A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts, in post-conflict state-building in deeply divided and war-torn societies, and in contemporary geopolitics and great-power rivalry. Wolff has extensive expertise in the post-Soviet space and has also worked on a wide range of other conflicts elsewhere, including in the Middle East and North Africa, in Central Asia, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Wolff holds degrees from the University of Leipzig (Erstes Staatsexamen), the University of Cambridge (M.Phil.), and the LSE (Ph.D.).

 

Image Credit: © OSCE

 

[1] United States Mission to the OSCE, “Plenary Statement 32nd OSCE Ministerial Council Vienna, Austria, December 4, 2025”, December 2025, https://www.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2025/12/mcdel0056%20usa.pdf

[2] OSCE, Programme and priorities of Switzerland’s OSCE Chairpersonship 2026, https://www.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/2026/01/OSCE2026_Broschuere_Faltkarte_EN_Web%20%282%29.pdf.

Footnotes
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    Long Read | The German Far-Right’s Subversive Foreign Policy

    Article by Rachel Herring

    February 5, 2026

    Long Read | The German Far-Right’s Subversive Foreign Policy

    The German right-wing populist party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) has been at the centre of countless controversies since its formation in 2013, not least regarding its foreign policy. From AfD politicians’ downplaying of Nazi crimes to suspected links to the Russian and Chinese governments, the party is a source of disruption and debate in the media and in the German parliament itself.[1] This article analyses the AfD’s foreign policy outlook and considers its implications in the context of emerging foreign policy challenges.

     

    Why the AfD’s foreign policy matters

    Having entered parliament in 2017 and secured the second-highest share of votes in the 2025 federal election, the AfD has rapidly established itself in the German political landscape, and indeed the foreign policy landscape. Regardless of whether the party gains power or remains in opposition in the coming years, it will undoubtedly remain part of the foreign policy conversation in Germany and beyond.

     

    Identifying the party’s core positions and vision of Germany’s role in the world is therefore important, not only to understand the possible foreign policy implications of the AfD being in government, but also to understand how it is already shaping Germany’s relations with partner countries and institutions.

     

    Historical (re)interpretation

    Foreign policy is inseparable from national history, and there is no better example of this than Germany. For decades, the dominant interpretations shaping German foreign policy have been rooted in guilt, responsibility, and reconciliation in the aftermath of the Nazi regime. The AfD, however, both downplays such narratives and selectively invokes history to offer competing interpretations. For example, AfD parliamentary speeches on Israel and the conflict in Gaza appropriate narratives of historical responsibility to legitimise the party’s anti-Islam agenda. This kind of rhetoric fundamentally disrupts the relative consensus on key foreign policy pillars, challenging other parliamentarians to defend their positions and creating a divide between political elites who uphold existing pillars and those (primarily the AfD) who openly question them.

     

    At the international level, the AfD’s controversial historical interpretations have not gone unnoticed. In Germany’s bilateral relationship with Poland, a central partner and neighbour where historical debates are ongoing, the AfD has the potential to be a highly problematic force. In late 2025, Polish historian and adviser to President Nawrocki, Andrzej Nowak, accepted an invitation from the AfD to speak in the German Bundestag, stating that his aim was to warn AfD politicians against naive positions towards Russia.[2] Just a few months later, AfD politician Kay Gottschalk stated on X that his first act as Minister for Finance would be to demand 1.3 billion euros in reparations from Poland in response to the attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022.[3] Uncoincidentally, this is the same sum President Nawrocki has demanded from Germany in war reparations.[4] Such interactions have the potential to significantly sour relations, particularly given the AfD’s ongoing popularity.

     

    Questioning established cooperation

    The subversion of historical narratives is part of a wider challenge posed by the AfD to long-standing German partnerships and alliances. This is perhaps most evident – and most subversive – when it comes to the AfD’s stance towards the EU. Membership of the EU and European integration are fundamental pillars of German foreign policy, deeply intertwined with bilateral relations with other member states. While the other German political parties naturally differ regarding specific policy preferences, they are united in the position that EU membership is not only beneficial to Germany, but central to its identity and role in the world.

     

    In contrast, and in line with the populist radical right tendency towards anti-globalisation and anti-establishment views, the AfD accuses the EU of being technocratic, elitist, and threatening to German interests and sovereignty. Following the 2024 European elections, which showed a clear shift to the right, the 14 AfD Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) formed a new far-right parliamentary group named Europe of Sovereign Nations, together with 11 representatives from seven different countries.[5] The result indicated that the AfD’s scepticism towards the EU and championing of sovereignty over liberal institutionalism resonates beyond the national level.

     

    These positions reflect a wider worldview held by many AfD politicians, in which the international system is understood primarily in terms of power politics and pragmatism. The AfD frequently attacks arguments in favour of interdependence and common values in the German parliament, dismissing these as ideologically driven or detached from political reality. Instead, AfD politicians favour a non-aligned position which resists external influence, even from traditional allies such as the US. A particular source of controversy in this regard is the AfD’s position on Putin’s war against Ukraine, which emphasises the negative impact of sanctions on the German economy, and calls for negotiations with Putin. Such positions are met with widespread rejection in the German parliament and again have the effect of uniting the other parties in their rhetorical commitment to defending international law and the European peace order.

     

    Same positions, new context

    The AfD’s status as a disruptive force within the German foreign policy discourse is unlikely to diminish as long as it remains in opposition. Whether it would significantly adapt its foreign policy positions if it were to enter government remains uncertain. At the same time, Russia’s war against Ukraine and President Trump’s aggressive and unpredictable foreign policy pose ongoing dilemmas for ruling and opposition parties alike.

     

    In recent years, right-wing populists across Europe and the US have tended to uphold similar foreign policy positions and attitudes towards global security, including the pragmatic prioritisation of national interest, a non-aligned approach towards Russia and China, and a scepticism towards liberal institutions like the EU.[6] It has also been characteristic of these political actors to cultivate transnational networks of political support. President Trump has frequently served as a point of reference in this regard, from the friendly relationship between Trump and Polish President Karol Nawrocki to Elon Musk’s public backing of the AfD.[7]

     

    However, Trump’s recent aggressive foreign policy moves towards Venezuela and Greenland may signal the beginning of the decline of this era. Along with other European right-wing parties, AfD leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla condemned Trump’s foreign policy in January 2026.[8] These developments pose important questions regarding the direction of the AfD’s foreign policy. Will the German right increasingly distance itself from its previously friendly stance towards the Trump administration? And how will AfD advocates of a non-aligned, pragmatic approach respond to attempts to uphold liberal institutions and diversify global cooperation, such as the recent EU trade deals with Mercosur and India?[9]

     

    The AfD’s stance towards the international system not only has implications for German and European foreign policy. It also resonates within broader debates about the future of the so-called liberal international order. At the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addressed this discourse, arguing that the so-called rules-based order, and in particular American hegemony, had constructed a myth which has now been ‘ruptured.’[10] He went on to argue that the solution is not a ‘world of fortresses’ but ‘collective investments in resilience.’ While many parties and governments are rallying around liberal institutions and alliances, the AfD’s foreign policy discourse to date clearly indicates a preference for a ‘world of fortresses.’

     

    This article is based on a recently published original paper by Maximilian Tkocz and Rachel Herring, which can be found here.

     

    Rachel Herring is a PhD researcher at Aston University and the University of Birmingham. Her research focuses on German foreign policy, Germany’s relations with Central Europe, and the role of civil society actors in foreign relations. She was the Think Visegrad Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Prague in 2024 and is currently a visiting researcher at the Jacques Delors Centre, Berlin.

     

     

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

     

     

    [1] Deutsche Welle, AfD chief downplays Nazi era as ‘bird shit’, Deutsche Welle, February 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/afds-gauland-plays-down-nazi-era-as-a-bird-shit-in-german-history/a-44055213; Der Spiegel, Maik Baumgärtner et al, How the AfD Became the Long Arm of Russia and China, May 2024, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/afd-spionageaffaere-russland-und-china-im-fokus-neue-enthuellungen-belasten-die-partei-1714480876-a-a1c05e64-b6bc-4c6b-844e-a78a32ec4f91

    [2] Jan Sternberg, Neue Annäherung zwischen der AfD und der polnischen Rechten, October 2025, https://www.rnd.de/politik/neue-annaeherung-zwischen-afd-und-der-polnischen-rechten-JRUDLEPR45FAZFVVCIEXQWCSKU.html

    [3] Welt, „Wer zuletzt lacht, lacht am besten“ – AfD-Politiker fordert 1,3 Billionen Euro von Polen, January 2026, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article6974fbce707d4aa2075800bf/reparationszahlung-wer-zuletzt-lacht-lacht-am-besten-afd-politiker-fordert-1-3-billionen-euro-von-polen.html

    [4] Tagesschau, Deutschland lehnt Reparationsforderungen erneut ab, September 2025, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/merz-steinmeier-polen-reparationen-100.html

    [5] Francois Hublet, 10 Key Lessons of the 2024 European Parliament Election, 2024, https://geopolitique.eu/en/articles/10-key-lessons-of-the-2024-european-parliament-election/

    [6] Jeremy Cliffe et al, Rise to the challengers: Europe’s populist parties and its foreign policy future, June 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/rise-to-the-challengers-europes-populist-parties-and-its-foreign-policy-future/

    [7] Jacek Lepiarz, What does Poland’s president hope to achieve in Washington?, February 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/poland-karol-nawrocki-washington-visit-donald-trump-nato-v2/a-73851111; Jessica Parker, Musk interviews German far-right frontwoman, January 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr7errxp5jmo

    [8] Sarah Marsh and Elizabeth Pineau, Europe’s far right and populists distance themselves from Trump over Greenland, January 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/europes-far-right-populists-distance-themselves-trump-over-greenland-2026-01-21/; Die Zeit, AfD-Spitze geht auf Distanz zu Trumps Außenpolitik, January 2026, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2026-01/afd-weidel-chrupalla-aussenpolitik-usa

    [9] European Commission, The EU-Mercosur trade agreement, 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/; Roshni Majumdar and Shakeel Sobhan, EU, India clinch historic free trade deal, January 2026, https://www.dw.com/en/india-eu-trade-deal-reached-modi-says/live-75669574

    [10] World Economic Forum, Davos 2026: Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, January 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/

    Footnotes
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      Op-ed | One Year into Trump 2.0: Domestic Instability and Foreign Policy Disruption

      Article by Dr Andrew Gawthorpe

      February 3, 2026

      Op-ed | One Year into Trump 2.0: Domestic Instability and Foreign Policy Disruption

      Over the past month, President Donald Trump has proven that he still has the capacity to shock the world. On 3 January, he ordered the US military to capture Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro. A few days later, he renewed his threats to forcibly annex Greenland. This prompted one of the most severe crises in the history of transatlantic relations – before Trump abruptly backed off in a speech at Davos. Trump then authorised a substantial military build-up to take place around Iran, in what may be a precursor to an attempt to overthrow the country’s government – or just another negotiating ploy.

       

      At the same time, domestic tensions escalated sharply during what some have called the ‘Battle of Minneapolis’ – the most intense confrontation between the federal government and local citizens in modern American memory.[1] The struggle eventually left two people dead and called into question whether the Trump administration could continue implementing its immigration agenda so aggressively.

       

      In many ways, January 2026 has been a microcosm of Trump’s first year back in office. His foreign policy has been alternatively aggressive, flexible, and – to many allies – just plain confusing. Domestically, he has sought to implement a radical version of his nationalistic and frequently openly racist ‘Make America Great Again’ agenda. In doing so, Trump appears to have gone beyond what most of the public support, causing a huge electoral headache for his party ahead of the midterm elections later this year.

       

      Domestic woes

      Trump won the 2024 election extremely narrowly. His victory in the popular vote was by a margin of just 0.6%, 7.5 times smaller than Joe Biden’s margin in 2020.

       

      Although this narrow victory was mostly driven by voter concern over high inflation, since his inauguration Trump has governed as if he had received a broad-based mandate to pursue a radical version of his MAGA agenda.[2] He has attempted to persecute his political opponents and pursue a deportation campaign which has involved flagrant abuses of the rights of countless citizens and residents. When confronted by judges or disapproving members of Congress, he has branded their resistance as a betrayal.[3] At every step, he has sought to sow division rather than unite the nation.

       

      Americans do not appear to be enjoying the spectacle much. In a recent poll, Trump’s approval rating stood at just 37%, not far from its all-time low.[4] Voters are particularly frustrated that the President has done little to reduce the cost of living, which remains extremely high.[5] With Trump so unpopular, even members of his own party are becoming more willing to criticise him, and they only become more so as the midterms approach.

       

      Trump’s signature domestic policy initiative of mass deportation has received the most attention. Over the past year, the White House has fundamentally changed how immigration enforcement works. Gone are targeted raids on known undocumented persons with criminal records. Instead, immigration agents have taken to aggressively patrolling urban areas, demanding to see the papers of anyone whose skin colour raises their suspicion. This campaign has involved violations of constitutional rights on a massive scale.[6] It has been justified by openly racist rhetoric from Trump himself, who has referred to the members of some communities as “garbage” who come from “hellholes”.[7]

       

      Voters have been souring on Trump’s deportation campaign for some time, but events in Minneapolis over the past month led the dam to burst. For weeks, protesters in the city resisted attempts by immigration agents to arrest their neighbours, creating scenes that sapped support for the administration’s aggressive approach. After federal agents then killed two citizens – one a young mother, Renee Nicole Good, and the other a nurse at a veterans’ hospital, Alex Pretti – the nationwide backlash was extreme. In response, Trump removed Greg Bovino, the deputy in charge of the deportation campaign, and signalled a change of course. What comes next is unclear, but now even Trump’s signature domestic policy initiative is being challenged.

       

      Foreign adventures

      It is common for leaders who face frustration at home to instead look for achievements abroad. American presidents are remarkably free to chart their own course in foreign policy, with few formal requirements to consult Congress or civil servants. Trump has taken full advantage of this freedom, with the result that his foreign policy has been characterised by wild swings, ambitious goals, and little attention paid to practical implementation.

       

      Perhaps the biggest change from Trump’s first term has been his increased comfort with using military force. Both the capture of Maduro and the bombing of Iran showed that Trump is now looking to the military to score quick wins. Even Greenland became the subject of explicit military threats, prompting alarm among NATO allies. In each and every case, what seems to be missing is any long-term plan for what happens after the military action or threat is over. It rarely seems like Trump is engaging in a rational calculation of means and ends.

       

      The Greenland affair is a good example. Almost everything that Trump says he wants from Greenland – an increased military presence and mineral mining rights – could be accomplished with simple negotiations and no change of ownership. Instead, he threatened to seize the island outright, doing perhaps irreparable damage to the transatlantic alliance in the progress. He then retreated from his position, indicating that a negotiated arrangement within the existing territorial framework would suffice. All the damage, it seemed, was for nothing.[8]

       

      Another feature of Trump’s second-term foreign policy is its expansive scope. Trump is sometimes called an isolationist, but if he is then it is hard to explain why he took the time to try to broker peace between Thailand and Cambodia or Azerbaijan and Armenia. He often boasts that he has ended eight wars.[9] Even if his real impact on these conflicts has usually been temporary and marginal, his desire to play global peacemaker is another sign that he is trying to rack up wins on the world stage. It may also be an attempt to distract from his failure to end the war in Ukraine.

       

      Many European leaders entered the second Trump administration thinking that the main threat facing them was an American withdrawal. But over the last year, it has become increasingly apparent that the more immediate challenge may be something different: focused and hostile intervention in European affairs. From his threats to seize Greenland to his administration’s sustained criticism against European migration policy and liberal values, Trump seems to reshape Europe more than he wants to abandon it.

       

      For Europeans, this is an uncomfortable and dangerous place to be in. Since the dawn of American global power a century or so ago, every region of the world except Europe has been subject to Washington’s capricious and often destructive power. The alliances and bonds of affection that seemed to shield Europe from these attentions are fraying, and it is natural for Europeans to wonder what awaits them.

       

      It would be unwise for European leaders to assume that Trump’s domestic problems will constrain his international agenda. In fact, the harder things get at home, the more his gaze might shift abroad – with unpredictable consequences for us all.

       

       

      Andrew Gawthorpe is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre and a specialist in U.S. politics and foreign policy at Leiden University. He also writes a newsletter called America Explained.

       

       

      Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

       

       

      [1] Ryan Cooper, The Battle of Minneapolis is Not Over, Prospect, January 2026, https://prospect.org/2026/01/29/ice-trump-minneapolis-alex-pretti-border-protection-kristi-noem-stephen-miller/

      [2] Oxford Economics, Inflation was the Main Driver for Trump Victory, November 2024, https://www.oxfordeconomics.com/resource/inflation-was-the-main-driver-for-trump-victory/

      [3] Kevin Frey and Mychael Schnell, Trump Suggests Some Democrats should be Hanged – and Some Republicans Rush to his Defence, MS NOW, November 2025, https://www.ms.now/news/trump-calls-democrats-seditious-traitors-republicans-rcna245028; Dan Maurer, ‘On Treason and Traitors’, Lawfare, June 2025, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/on-treason-and-traitors

      [4] Hannah Hartig and Jocelyn Kiley, Confidence in Trump Dips, and Fewer Now Say They Support his Policies and Plans, Pew Research, January 2026, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2026/01/29/confidence-in-trump-dips-and-fewer-now-say-they-support-his-policies-and-plans/.

      [5] Kathryn Palmer, How is Trump on Affordability? What Most Voters Said in New Poll, USA Today, January 2026, https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2026/01/22/trump-worse-affordability-new-poll/88302812007/

      [6] Kyle Cheney, Judges Across the Country Rebuke ICE for Defying Court Orders, Politico, January 2026, https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/30/ice-immigration-court-orders-00757894; Walter Olsen, In Minnesota, ICE is Assaulting the Constitutional Rights of Citizens, Cato Institute, January 2026, https://www.cato.org/blog/ice-versus-fourth-amendment

      [7] Melissa Hellmann, Donald Trump in his Own Words – the Year in Racism and Misogyny, The Guardian, December 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/dec/29/donald-trump-racism-dei-misogyny-2025-review

      [8] Katya Adler, Confronted over Greenland, Europe is Ditching its Softly-Softly Approach to Trump, BBC News, January 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0lx7j1lrwro

      [9] Jake Horton and Nike Beake, How Many Wars has President Trump Really Ended?, BBC News, October 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y3599gx4qo

      Footnotes
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        Op-ed | Patterns of History in Transatlantic Relations

        Article by David Harley

        January 30, 2026

        Op-ed | Patterns of History in Transatlantic Relations

        In this op-ed, David Harley, FPC Advisory Council member and former EU diplomat, offers an insider perspective on the historical continuities in US foreign policy and their implications for the future of transatlantic relations.

         

        The slogan ‘America First’ has a long history. Often used by President Donald Trump, the phrase was first coined by President Woodrow Wilson during his 1916 presidential campaign, when he pledged to keep the United States (US) out of the First World War. The US nevertheless entered the war in April 1917. The non-intervention movement in America remained strong during the inter-war years, personified by the pro-Nazi stance taken by Joseph P. Kennedy, the US ambassador to the UK from 1938 to 1940 and father of John F. Kennedy. 

         

        Despite strong pleading from Winston Churchill, President Franklin Roosevelt would not commit the US to enter the Second World War after the start of hostilities in September 1939. It was only after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 that Congress, at Roosevelt’s bidding, unanimously voted to declare war. Six days later, in conditions of utmost secrecy, Churchill set sail for America in the battleship Duke of York. At Roosevelt’s invitation, he was to stay for three weeks in the White House: from their conversations, often until long into the night, the special relationship was born and an alliance forged with the ultimate goal of defeating Nazi Germany and restoring freedom to Western Europe.

         

        Transatlantic relations today are, in many respects, very different, yet with certain similarities. Trump 2.0 and the machinations of the President himself represent and greatly accentuate a deep-seated historical trend of US foreign policy. Once again, Britain and Europe are under threat of war, this time from Russia, but Trump is clearly no Roosevelt, and clear, decisive leadership on the European side is notably absent. Moreover the scourge of populist nationalism is on the rise, on both sides of the Atlantic. The strong likelihood is that the US under President Trump will disengage from Europe and NATO. 

         

        Not since the Suez crisis in 1956 has an American president treated Britain with such disdain as the current incumbent. A particularly low point was reached by Trump’s remarks at Davos regarding British soldiers who lost their lives in Afghanistan. These comments have intensified concerns about the future of the transatlantic partnership. The British government now faces an urgent strategic question: how did the UK reach this position, and what should its next course of action be? The current British government’s line of refusing to choose between the US and the EU is becoming increasingly less tenable. 

         

        As a senior EU official, I witnessed at first hand, at various meetings in Washington and New York, the continued trend of ruthlessly promoting American interests as they defined them. This was evident both under President Clinton and President George W. Bush. In the case of Iraq, both administrations used unproven allegations of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) held by Sadam Hussein as justification for first bombing and then waging war. The Blair government seemed to swallow the American line unquestioningly.

         

        President Trump’s recently stated objective of taking over Venezuela’s oil reserves echoes words spoken by Vice-President Dick Cheney at a meeting I attended at the White House in July 2002. Cheney made clear that the primary US concern about Iraq was that ‘Saddam is sitting on 10% of the world’s oil reserves, which it cannot allow to fall into the hands of a rogue state or a murderous dictator who refuses to cooperate with the international community’. At the time, Cheney had recently served as CEO of the oil and gas company Haliburton (1995-2000), and as Vice-President he still retained significant stock options. 

         

        At a meeting later that day with Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser to President Bush, she began with a little joke that policy differences between Europe and the US had always existed, ever since American independence and even to the burning of the White House by British Forces in 1814. She went on to state forcefully the US’s ‘profound reservations’ about ever submitting to judgments of the International Criminal Court. Rice made it abundantly clear that the US would only recognise or cooperate with international institutions ‘such as the UN or even the EU if and when it served their national interest’. 

         

        Although Britain backed the Bush administration over Iraq, other political leaders in mainland Europe were not blind to these long-standing features of US foreign policy and took a very different view. During a lunch I attended in June 2003 at the Élysée Palace, President Jacques Chirac launched into a furious diatribe against US policy. I discreetly noted down the President’s words as follows: ‘Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe has no longer been strategically important for the US. The Balkans conflict masked this change. The main objective of US foreign policy is to break up Europe.’

         

        If Chirac’s analysis may have sounded exaggerated at the time, over 20 years later his words have proved prescient. The warnings from the patterns of history were there but we – Britain and Europe – chose to ignore them. We must hope that it is not too late to change course as we face the dual threat of Russian expansion and American withdrawal. As Mark Carney memorably said earlier this month in Davos nostalgia is not a strategy.’ In today’s turbulent times, nor is the special relationship.

         

        David Harley is a former EU diplomat, political communications consultant, and author. Posts held include Deputy Secretary-General of the European Parliament and Senior Advisor at the Brussels public affairs agency Burson Cohn & Wolfe. He holds a degree in Modern Languages from the University of Cambridge and a Diploma in Creative Writing from the University of East Anglia. In 2021 David published the transcription of his political diaries in ‘ Matters of Record – Inside European Politics’ and in 2022 co-edited ‘The Forgotten Tribe – British MEPs 1979-2020’. He is currently a member of the Foreign Policy Centre’s Advisory Board, and is a regular speaker and commentator on UK-EU relations.

         

        Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

        Footnotes
          Related Articles

          Expert Look | Venezuela in Focus: Human Rights, Geopolitical Dilemmas, and International Law

          Article by Foreign Policy Centre

          January 19, 2026

          Expert Look | Venezuela in Focus: Human Rights, Geopolitical Dilemmas, and International Law

          The capture of Nicolás Maduro by the US military has triggered an immediate and polarised international debate. Questions of sovereignty, legality, and precedent have rightly come to the fore, reviving anxieties about the erosion of the rules-based international order and the risks of unilateral military action.

           

          However, Venezuela’s collapse did not begin on the night of the intervention. It is the result of decades of institutional dismantling, systematic repression, and the hollowing out of democratic accountability. Over time, this internal erosion became entangled with external interests, regional power dynamics, and repeated failures of international engagement. The result is a crisis that is at once legal, political, humanitarian, and geopolitical, and one that resists explanation through any single analytical lens.

           

          This expert analysis brings together four perspectives that speak to different, but interconnected, dimensions of the Venezuelan crisis. Laura Vidal, digital rights researcher and civil society observer, centres the human rights reality inside Venezuela, highlighting that legal debates detached from lived experience risk normalising repression and compounding victimisation. Andrew Gawthorpe, FPC Senior Fellow, analyses the emerging US strategy towards Venezuela, arguing that Washington is moving away from ‘regime change’ towards a more coercive model of ‘regime management’, with uncertain leverage and destabilising consequences. Dame Audrey Glover, FPC’s Chair of Trustees, sets out the international legal implications of the US operation, underscoring the dangers posed by selective adherence to foundational legal norms. Stefan Wolff, FPC Senior Fellow, examines the dilemmas facing Europe as it seeks to reconcile its commitment to a rules-based order with alliance politics and shifting power realities.

           

          Taken together, these contributions expose the risks of selective concern: invoking international law only at moments of crisis, privileging geopolitical stability over accountability, or debating legality while disregarding human suffering. If Venezuela is to be understood and addressed in a meaningful way, these dimensions need to be held together, not treated as competing narratives.

           

          The Human Rights Dimension of Venezuela’s Crisis

          By Laura Vidal

           

          Any assessment of Venezuela’s current crisis that sidelines human rights is necessarily incomplete. The most visible entry point remains the situation of political prisoners.[1] Detentions continue to function as a revolving door: individuals are arrested, released under opaque conditions, and replaced by new detainees.[2] Deaths in custody, enforced disappearances, and prolonged incommunicado detention remain documented practices.[3] Torture centers continue to operate, and releases are often negotiated, partial, or discretionary rather than grounded in due process or judicial review. The pace of releases has been extremely slow, even as new arrests routinely follow moments of political tension, reinforcing a system based on fear rather than accountability.

           

          This pattern, however, represents only one layer of a much longer process of deterioration. Venezuela’s human rights crisis has unfolded over years through the systematic dismantling of institutions, the erosion of checks and balances, and the capture of the justice system. The result is a complex humanitarian emergency that predates recent geopolitical escalations. Nearly a third of the population has left the country, many under precarious conditions that expose them to exploitation, abuse, and trafficking networks along migration routes. Those who remain face chronic shortages of basic services, including healthcare, electricity, and access to potable water.[4]

           

          The media landscape has been progressively constrained through closures, licensing pressures, legal harassment, and digital censorship. Accessing information online increasingly requires the use of circumvention tools, exposing users to heightened risks of surveillance and criminalisation. Reporting, documentation, and civic organising have consequently become high-risk activities.[5]

           

          This reality is often misrepresented as the consequence of international sanctions alone, despite the fact that economic collapse and institutional erosion began years before sectoral sanctions were imposed. Framing the crisis exclusively through sanctions obscures its structural roots and diverts attention from long-standing patterns of repression, impunity, and state failure.[6] Human rights violations in Venezuela are not episodic; they are systemic, cumulative, and deeply embedded in the country’s governance model.

           

          From Regime Change to Regime Management

          By Andrew Gawthorpe

           

          The US military operation against Nicolas Maduro represents a novel approach to foreign policy. “Regime change” is out and “regime management” is in. The Trump administration’s intention appears to be to leave the current Venezuelan government formally in place, while coercing it into adopting policies that will benefit US security and economic interests. Washington’s main demands for the government in Caracas include opening up the country’s oil wealth to American investment and control, severing friendly relations with China and Russia, and ending support for the government in Cuba.

           

          Trump’s methods are nakedly imperial – a throwback to the “gunboat diplomacy” of the nineteenth century. It is notable that they even lack the justification, common in previous US military interventions, with the familiar claim that intervention will liberate the Venezuelan people from a dictatorial government. Instead, Washington is proposing to work with that dictatorial government in order to deliver profits for American oil companies.

           

          From the perspective of the Trump administration, this strategy has obvious appeal. It lacks the commitment of resources and potentially lives to a long-term military occupation designed to transform Venezuela’s government, as was attempted in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, it remains unclear whether this approach gives the US enough leverage over the government in Venezuela to achieve its goals.

           

          Venezuela’s new leader, Delcy Rodríguez, has to avoid angering nationalist opinion at home – not least in her country’s military. She cannot go too far in appeasing the US. For their part, American oil companies also have little interest in investing in Venezuela, particularly while the current government remains in place. Meanwhile, President Trump’s attention seems to have wandered, with him now threatening new military action against Iran. As a result, what’s coming next in Venezuela remains highly unclear.

           

          International Law and the Erosion of Legal Restraint

          By Dame Audrey Glover

           

          Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states:

          “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

           

          This article, part of the foundation of the post-Second World War international rules-based order, establishes a core principle against aggression, subject only to narrowly defined exceptions: self-defence and UN Security Council authorisation. This provision is binding on all States, regardless of whether they are members of the United Nations.

           

          The action of US Forces entering Venezuela uninvited at night to detain President Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and place them in custody in the US to await trial, constitutes a breach of Article 2(4). Under International law, only an assault on another country by military means qualifies as a trigger for self-defence.

           

          The consequence of the US operation is therefore a violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty, contrary to International Law. Furthermore, the intervention has not resulted in an attempt to restore democratic governance in the country. Maduro has been replaced by his Deputy, Delcy Rodríguez, without an election or consultation of the electorate and opposition– particularly significant given that Maduro himself overturned a prior electoral outcome to retain power. Her appointment undermines any argument that the intervention was undertaken in pursuit of democratic principles.

           

          For his part, President Trump has said he will ‘run’ Venezuela remotely, a proposition that raises serious questions about both feasibility and legitimacy. It also prompts broader concerns regarding regional security and the future of Venezuela’s oil sector, including how it might be rebuilt and governed under such circumstances.

           

          Stephen Miller, an adviser to President Trump, has said: “Forget international law. We live in a world that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power”. Such rhetoric reflects an explicit rejection of the legal norms that underpin international stability.

           

          Recent events including the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, have further imperilled the rules-based international order at the core of which are the principles of individual liberty, intellectual and religious freedom, constitutional democracy and free trade. The most damaging has been the rejection of the principles of international law that the US helped to create. Venezuela stands as the latest example of this deterioration. The time has come to save these principles from extinction.

           

          Europe and the Dilemmas of the Rules-Based Order

          by Stefan Wolff

           

          The apprehension of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by the US military on the night of 3rd January is the first time in over three decades that the White House has conducted such an operation. The operation reflects Washington’s new national security strategy and its emphasis on hemispheric dominance, even as it sits in clear tension with international law. For Europe, the operation, and how to respond to it, poses multiple dilemmas.

           

          The first dilemma concerns how to reconcile hitherto unwavering European support for a rules-based international order with the need to preserve what is left of the transatlantic alliance. This includes American security guarantees for European allies and continuing support for Ukraine’s war effort. The display of American capability and the meek reactions not only by Europe but also by Russia and China also demonstrated that for all the talk of a multipolar world order, Moscow and Beijing have few credible options to respond to American assertions of power. From a European perspective, this reality is in some respects reassuring, especially in the context of the Kremlin’s apparently insatiable revisionism in eastern Europe.

           

          Closely related is a second dilemma: US ambitions for absolute dominance in the western hemisphere have revived Trump’s designs for Greenland, returning them to the transatlantic agenda where they spell potential for disruption—both in the sense of distracting attention from the actual threat of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and Moscow’s broader hybrid campaign elsewhere on the continent, and of potentially diverting critical resources away from deterring further Russian adventurism in Europe towards Arctic security, an area long neglected by both Europe and the United States.

           

          The third dilemma is that the removal of Maduro from power is in line with long-stated European preferences for a democratic transition in the country, and as such should be welcomed. However, what seems to have resulted from the US operation is at best a face lift at the top of the Venezuelan regime, followed by internal power consolidation and increased external subservience to the demands of the mercurial incumbent of the White House. This dilemma also has wider implications. Europe may lack the hard power to effect regime change, but not the desire to do so. With probably more than half an eye on the situation in Iran, there are likely some figures in Europe’s political class who would not object too loudly or strongly if the US and/or Israel were adopting a more proactive stance on supporting protesters in Tehran and dozens of other cities. Yet externally driven regime change is hardly ever cost- or consequence-free, as the experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, among others, vividly demonstrate.

           

          European equivocation and prevarication in response to the US military operation against Maduro reflects the difficulty of navigating these dilemmas. Such ambivalence is neither a long-term solution nor will it allow Europeans to avoid discussing two equally unpalatable options: submitting to the whims of Trump, or an attempt to act independently in an increasingly hostile and lawless world. As so often, Europe is likely to fall back on muddling through: seeking to placate and flatter President Trump while ignoring the flaws and dangers of his foreign policy, and simultaneously trying to build towards the mythical promise of strategic autonomy. This approach rests on the hope that unconstrained, illiberal great power dominance within distinct spheres of influence does not become the new normal – one in which Europe is permanently downgraded to Washington’s, let alone Moscow’s or Beijing’s vassal.

           


           

          For a comprehensive examination of the decades-long institutional erosion, systemic human rights abuses, and profound humanitarian crisis that have shaped contemporary Venezuela, see Laura Vidal’s Op-Ed: International law, institutional collapse, and the danger of selective concern, which situates the country’s current situation within a broader history of democratic decay, international inaction, and the human cost.

           

          Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

           

          [1] Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: Political Prisoners Cut Off From the World, September 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/09/22/venezuela-political-prisoners-cut-off-from-the-world

          [2] Efecto Cocuyo, Efecto Paz #11 – Presos políticos después del 3E, January 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EhV_CpfoBpw&t=2821s

          [3] United Nations News, Venezuela’s National Guard linked to killings, torture and repression, UN probe finds, December 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166565

          [4] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Venezuela, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/venezuela

          [5] Puyosa, Azpúrua, Suárez Pérez, How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism, Atlantic Council, July 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/how-venezuela-became-a-model-for-digital-authoritarianism/; VE sin Filtro, Censura y represión digital en las elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela, 2025, https://vesinfiltro.org/noticias/2025-03-12-reporte-elecciones-presidenciales/

          [6] Nizar El Fakih, Aproximación al Régimen de Sanciones Internacionales y al caso de Venezuela, IDB, December 2020, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://publications.iadb.org/en/node/29550&ved=2ahUKEwiWtLq81IiSAxWFVKQEHW0vBnUQFnoECBYQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Ega3sYVRtvTyuCerIVUlw

          Footnotes
            Related Articles

            Op-ed | International law, institutional collapse, and the danger of selective concern

            Article by Laura Vidal

            January 15, 2026

            Op-ed | International law, institutional collapse, and the danger of selective concern

            In the immediate aftermath of Nicolás Maduro’s military extraction by the United States, protests erupted across major cities in Europe and the Americas calling for respect for Venezuela’s sovereignty. Venezuelans themselves, however, were largely absent from these protests. This contrast is not incidental. It reflects a deeper misalignment in how the crisis is being framed and debated.

             

            For Venezuelans abroad, this moment has triggered yet another cycle of incomprehension. Many are confronted with responses that center almost exclusively on international law and precedent, while leaving aside the humanitarian and human rights crisis that has driven millions into forced migration or exile. This tension mirrors the ambivalent position of the region itself: shaken by a military intervention, yet unable to deny nearly two decades of institutional dismantling under authoritarian rule.

             

            In the days following Maduro’s extraction, expressions of joy and relief within Venezuela circulated widely on social media platforms, often accessed through VPNs. Such reactions, however, carry real risks. Reports indicate that individuals have been detained, had their phones searched, and faced extortion when authorities discovered any reference to the intervention or signs of celebration.[1]

             

            Critics of the intervention have rightly underscored the gravity of violating territorial integrity and the risks such actions pose to international law. Carolina Sandoval, president of Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), pointed at regional concerns by the precedent being set, particularly given the long history of US military action in the hemisphere.[2] At the same time, Sandoval also acknowledges a second, unresolved dimension: Venezuela has endured years of systematic repression under an authoritarian and violent government, and the need for accountability and a democratic transition remains urgent.

             

            As political actors reposition themselves and new details emerge, another uncomfortable reality has become harder to ignore. Despite decades of anti-imperialist rhetoric, it appears increasingly evident to many analysts that negotiations with the United States were not imposed from the outside, but actively pursued by actors within the regime itself. This contradiction between discourse and practice further complicates efforts to interpret the moment through clean ideological binaries. Meanwhile, the continued presence of chavismo deeply hurts the hopes of a genuine transition to democracy.

             

            As Atlantic Council senior research fellow Iria Puyosa has noted, key figures within the governing coalition now face an unprecedented challenge: meeting Washington’s demands while preventing internal fracture or a military coup. Those demands include regulatory stability and transparent property frameworks, precisely the institutional environment that chavismo systematically dismantled over years of rule.[3]

             

            Language also matters in this context. For Venezuelans, particularly victims of human rights violations, an exclusive focus on sovereignty and legal neutrality is not a technical debate but a political act. As journalist and human rights defender Luis Carlos Díaz told me, “framing the crisis solely in terms of territorial violation without acknowledging the criminal capture of the Venezuelan state produces a concrete effect: it normalises and protects those responsible for destroying constitutional order and committing crimes against humanity. From the perspective of victims, this is not neutrality: it is discursive revictimisation”.

             

            This is not an isolated rupture

            Any attempt to understand the current moment collapses if it treats the US intervention as an isolated rupture caused by a single set of actors. Venezuela was not a space free of foreign influence prior to this operation.

             

            Cuban involvement in intelligence and repressive structures has been documented for years, facilitated through political and economic exchanges that included preferential access to oil.[4] Russian military presence is also well established, including documented operations linked to the Wagner Group.[5] Venezuela remains deeply indebted to Chinese creditors, owing roughly 20 billion dollars in loans that have shaped economic dependency and constrained policy autonomy. Iran has provided technological support that has translated into tools of repression, including the reported use of drones during demonstrations in 2024.[6] This record complicates claims that a previously respected red line was suddenly crossed.

             

            Venezuela’s institutional dismantling and democratic struggle did not begin recently. It spans nearly three decades, with the past ten years marking the most intense phase, one in which legal frameworks, state resources, and institutional checks were stretched or eliminated to extinguish meaningful separation of powers. Within this trajectory, the 2024 elections stand out as a critical turning point. For many Venezuelans, they represented the last available democratic mechanism, despite conditions that were neither free nor fair and despite widespread expectations of fraud.

             

            International responses to these elections revealed a familiar pattern. While condemnations were issued, institutional action stalled. In late July 2024, the Organization of American States rejected a resolution calling on the Venezuelan government to provide transparency regarding the election results, with 17 votes in favor, none against, and a notable number of 11 abstentions.[7] To this day, Maduro’s government has failed to present evidence substantiating its claimed victory.[8]

             

            None of this justifies violent interventions. It does, however, situate recent events within a longer history of institutional collapse, abandoned justice, and power vacuums already exploited by multiple actors across ideological lines. As the Venezuelan civil society organisation CEPAZ has warned, “the international community now faces one last major opportunity to mitigate a crisis that its own prolonged ineffectiveness helped create”.[9]

             

            Human rights cannot be bracketed out

            Any analysis of Venezuela that sidelines human rights is analytically incomplete. The situation of political prisoners offers a stark entry point. Detention in Venezuela is constantly referred to by human rights defenders as a “revolving-door” system marked by deaths in custody, forced disappearances, and torture.[10] So-called “releases” are often conditional, opaque, and reversible, functioning as instruments of control rather than steps toward justice. The pace of releases has been extremely slow, and new detentions are feared.[11]

             

            These practices are not confined to isolated events.[12] Nearly a third of the population has fled the country, many under precarious conditions that expose them to exploitation and trafficking networks along migration routes. Inside Venezuela, the humanitarian crisis remains complex and multidimensional, affecting access to food, healthcare, and other basic services. Independent media has been blocked or captured, while transnational repression extends surveillance and intimidation beyond borders.[13] Internet access is limited, unreliable, and often dangerous.[14] Vulnerable groups, including Indigenous communities, face persistent attacks despite having once served as a central pillar of the regime’s legitimacy.[15]

             

            This reality is often misrepresented as the consequence of international sanctions alone, despite the fact that economic collapse and institutional erosion began years before sectorial sanctions came into force.[16] The persistence of this narrative obscures responsibility and diverts attention from corruption and deliberate policy choices that hollowed out the state.

             

            Amid widespread confusion and the difficulty of making sense of incomplete and often contested data, many of the most reliable sources on Venezuela today are civil society organisations, some of them working in exile. These organisations have been essential in documenting the multiple, overlapping layers that define the crisis, offering analyses that move beyond fixed or binary narratives. They continue to play that role despite operating under constant persecution, threats, and criminalisation inside the country, while simultaneously facing defunding and diminishing support from international partners and allies.

             

            Weighing what already broke

            It is expected that governments, political parties, and institutions interpret events through their own lenses and fears. The rupture represented by a US military extraction is serious, and the concerns it raises regarding its precedent and international law are legitimate. But treating this moment as the beginning of the problem distorts the balance of what is at stake.

             

            The Venezuelan crisis ceased to be solely a domestic problem years ago. It has reshaped migration routes across the hemisphere, strained regional economies, and generated humanitarian emergencies well beyond national borders. It has also been sustained by economic interests and political arrangements in which multiple actors benefited from the regime’s permanence, even as institutions collapsed and accountability disappeared.

             

            Focusing exclusively on the legality of a single act, while ignoring the accumulated damage that made such an act conceivable, risks repeating the same error that has defined international engagement with Venezuela for over a decade: reacting to moments of rupture while tolerating the slow dismantling that precedes them. If international law is to retain meaning, it cannot be invoked only at the point of intervention. It must also reckon with the long record of impunity, complicity, and selective concern that paved the way.

             

             

            Laura Vidal is a digital rights researcher and civil society observer working across Latin America and international spaces. For nearly two decades, she has followed and documented Venezuela’s crisis from multiple vantage points, with a focus on authoritarianism, technology, and gender. She currently works with IFEX and Digital Action, and her research, analysis, and essays have been published by organisations such as Internews, The Engine Room, Mozilla, APC, EFF, and Global Voices, among others. Her work sits at the intersection of digital power, civic resilience, and the lived experiences of communities navigating repression and displacement.

             

            Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

             

            [1] Espacio Público, Detienen a cinco ciudadanos por celebrar detención de Maduro, Espacio Público, January 2026, . https://espaciopublico.ong/detienen-a-cinco-ciudadanos-por-celebrar-detencion-de-maduro/

            [2]In interview with Efecto Cocuyo, Efecto Paz #11 – Presos políticos después del 3E, January 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EhV_CpfoBpw&t=2821s

            [3]Iria Puyosa, Delcy Rodríguez’s untenable balancing act, Atlantic Council, January 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/delcy-rodriguezs-untenable-balancing-act/

            [4] Angus Berwick, Imported repression: How Cuba taught Venezuela to quash military dissent, Reuters Investigates, August 2019, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/venezuela-cuba-military/; Armando.Info, La bitácora de los tanqueros fantasmas al servicio de la revolución, Armando.Info, April 2020, https://armando.info/la-bitacora-de-los-tanqueros-fantasmas-al-servicio-de-la-revolucion/

            [5] Silja Thoms, Más allá de Rusia: la actividad del Grupo Wagner en Venezuela, Deutsche Welle, June 2023, https://www.dw.com/es/m%C3%A1s-all%C3%A1-de-rusia-la-actividad-de-grupo-wagner-en-venezuela/a-66048041

            [6] Conexión Segura y Libre / VE sin Filtro, Censura y represión digital en las elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela, 2025, https://vesinfiltro.org/res/files/informe-presidenciales_2024-VEsinFiltro.pdf; Laura Bicker, Trump’s Venezuela raid has created chaos — and that is a risk for China, BBC News, January 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly92dkxqvko

            [7] Yurani Arciniegas, Fracasa en el Consejo de la OEA resolución que pedía transparencia al Gobierno de Venezuela, France 24, July 2024, https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20240731-%F0%9F%94%B4-en-directo-petro-afirma-que-hay-graves-dudas-sobre-los-comicios-en-venezuela-y-pide-transparencia

            [8] Tiago Rogero, How Venezuela’s opposition proved its election win: ‘A brilliant political move’, The Guardian, August 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/10/gonzalez-proof-win-venezuela-election-vote-tally-maduro

            [9] Centro de Justicia y Paz (CEPAZ), La comunidad internacional tiene una última gran oportunidad en Venezuela de mitigar la crisis que su propia ineficacia ocasionó, January 2026, https://cepaz.org/la-comunidad-internacional-tiene-una-ultima-gran-oportunidad-en-venezuela-de-mitigar-la-crisis-que-su-propia-ineficacia-ocasiono/

            [10]Deutsche Welle, Muere bajo custodia un policía detenido en Venezuela, November 2026, https://www.dw.com/es/muere-bajo-custodia-un-polic%C3%ADa-detenido-en-venezuela/a-75463951

            [11] BBC News, “I thought I was going to die”: Jailed Venezuelan activist details brutality of prison life, January 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgz5l6l7k7o

            [12] United Nations News, Venezuela’s National Guard linked to killings, torture and repression, UN probe finds, December 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166565

            [13] Matt Ford, Colombia: Venezuelan activists attacked in targeted shooting, DW (Reuters/AP), October 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/colombia-venezuelan-activists-attacked-in-targeted-shooting/a-74341871

            [14] Iria Puyosa, Andrés Azpúrua, Daniel Suárez Pérez, How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism, Atlantic Council, July 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/how-venezuela-became-a-model-for-digital-authoritarianism/

            [15] FundaRedes, Boletín N.º 47: Grupos armados y Estado venezolano vulneran el derecho a la vida de los pueblos indígenas, FundaRedes, November 2023, https://www.fundaredes.org/2023/11/01/boletin47-grupo-armados-y-estado-venezolano-vulneran-el-derecho-a-la-vida-de-los-pueblos-indigenas/; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Venezuela 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/venezuela

            [16] Nizar El Fakih, Aproximación al Régimen de Sanciones Internacionales y al caso de Venezuela, Discussion Document No. IDB-DP-840, Inter-American Development Bank, December 2020, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://publications.iadb.org/en/node/29550&ved=2ahUKEwiWtLq81IiSAxWFVKQEHW0vBnUQFnoECBYQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Ega3sYVRtvTyuCerIVUlw

            Footnotes
              Related Articles

              Op-ed | The Taiwan Trap: Why Beijing Needs Russia’s War in Ukraine

              Article by William Dixon and Maksym Beznosiuk

              January 7, 2026

              Op-ed | The Taiwan Trap: Why Beijing Needs Russia’s War in Ukraine

              For the past four years, only one global superpower has had the capacity and influence to stop the war in Ukraine: China. Yet it has chosen not to – why?

               

              Through a combination of proactive sanctions avoidance, direct military support, and help to keep the Russian economy alive, Beijing has enabled Putin’s war machine to continue long after it should have been exhausted.[1] Russia might be the junior partner in material terms, but the West needs to understand: Beijing needs Moscow even more than Moscow needs Beijing.

               

              Last month, French President Emmanuel Macron made a direct appeal to Beijing, urging it to exert pressure on the Kremlin to agree to a ceasefire with Ukraine.[2] German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul made similar efforts, and the same messages have been communicated from the highest levels of EU leadership.[3] Ursula von der Leyen and EU Council President Antonio Costa travelled to meet with President Xi Jinping in June, specifically to seek Chinese leverage to pressure Russia to end the war.[4] However, the deeper insight from all of these European efforts is continued miscalculation.

               

              When the continent’s leaders appeal to President Xi Jinping to “pressure Putin” toward a ceasefire, they fundamentally misunderstand Beijing’s incentives. They assume China shares an interest in restoring regional stability. It does not. Beijing’s interest lies in Western distraction and fracture, and Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine is the perfect tool for this.

               

              China does not support Russia because Moscow is powerful or ideologically aligned – but because it is strategically useful. The asymmetry of the partnership benefits China: it enables Beijing to externalise the costs of confrontation with the West while advancing its geopolitical aims without engaging in direct conflict. What Western leaders fail to understand is that this relationship will continue to deepen and harden. Not despite Ukraine, but because of it – and for three strategic reasons:

               

              1. Russia is Beijing’s Strategic Lever: It Forces the West to Choose

              China’s most sophisticated gain from Russia’s war on Ukraine is that it forces the West to make difficult strategic choices. By enabling Russian aggression across multiple theatres – from Europe to the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific – Beijing has weaponised the Kremlin’s instability. This diverts Western focus, fractures strategic coherence, and drains resources from the Indo-Pacific competition, which remains China’s principal concern. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, underscored this point explicitly with his European counterpart, Kaja Kallas.[5] He warned that China could not accept Russia losing the war, arguing that such an outcome would allow the United States and the West to shift their full attention toward China and the wider Indo-Pacific.

               

              The mechanism is straightforward: Russia creates crises faster than the West can address them simultaneously. European capitals are forced to commit defence budgets to the eastern flank; the US Navy divides its attention between NATO’s northern exposure and its forward deployment in the Indo-Pacific. NATO members debate Arctic strategy while China consolidates regional dominance.[6] Each Russian escalation in Ukraine compounds these trade-offs, forcing alliance members to divide attention and resources between simultaneous threats, rather than focusing efforts in a single direction.

               

              Recent US actions in Venezuela underscore that US power remains decisive but increasingly prioritised by theatre and proximity, reinforcing Beijing’s incentive to sustain the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine as a means of complicating and delaying a complete US strategic concentration on the Indo-Pacific region.

               

              This is where Beijing’s force multiplier advantage becomes decisive. Recent joint-bomber patrols near Japan – involving Russian nuclear-capable Tu-95 strategic bombers operating alongside Chinese H-6 bombers – demonstrate the operational principle.[7] China signals regional resolve and stretches Japanese air-defence responses without incurring the full political cost of independent action. Russia absorbs the diplomatic friction; China gains the strategic benefits.

               

              Critically, this approach works because Russia and China operate on different timescales and objectives. Russia seeks immediate battlefield gains in Ukraine. China, by contrast, is playing the longer game of regional dominance. Russia’s urgency becomes China’s strategic cover.

               

              2. Ukraine is Beijing’s Spanish Civil War: The Taipei Testing Ground

              Just as the 1930s War in the Iberian Peninsula was a live test-bed for the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, China is now using Russia and Ukraine as its own military and strategic test-bed. The objective is not to conquer Kyiv, but to understand Chinese efforts to take Taipei as we enter the critical “Davidson Window.”[8]

               

              Beijing has treated the war in Ukraine as a case study for analysing Russian successes and failures across logistics, air defence, reconnaissance-strike integration, and electronic warfare. It has already translated these lessons into the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine, training, and force development.[9] The PLA increasingly reflects observations drawn from Russia’s adaptations and failures.[10] This is most noticeable in integrated air defence, logistics, and information dominance, accelerating joint operations readiness for high-intensity conflict scenarios, including a potential Taiwan contingency.

               

              The Kremlin’s experience under sanctions, such as rewiring its economy, rerouting trade flows, and operating under long-term export controls, allows Beijing to test its own economic resilience and evaluate which sanction mechanisms are effective and how to circumvent them.[11] Crucially, this learning comes at minimal cost to Beijing, as Russia absorbs the political, economic, and military risks of experimentation while China refines its own preparedness for an anticipated potential Taiwan escalation in the years ahead.

               

              3. Russia is Beijing’s Legitimacy: It Accelerates an Alternative Global Order

              While the West exhausts itself debating the future of Ukraine, Beijing exploits Russia’s isolation to accelerate construction of an alternative global economic and political architecture centred not in Washington, but in Beijing. Russia’s sanctions experience and forced pivot toward non-Western partners does not weaken this alternative order – it legitimises and accelerates it.

               

              Beijing has weaponised Russia’s ostracism to demonstrate that the Western financial system is no longer essential for major powers to thrive. As Russia pivots toward CIPS – the Chinese Cross-Border Payment System – rather than SWIFT, toward bilateral trade settlement rather than dollar-denominated transactions, it becomes a living laboratory proving that economic decoupling from the West is survivable.[12] When Russia joins Chinese-led technology standards initiatives – such as 5G, semiconductors, and AI – while the West maintains separate ecosystems, it proves that both can function independently and in parallel.[13]

               

              China does not need to force this transition; Russia’s desperation does the work for Beijing. Every successful Russian workaround to sanctions further affirms the viability of Beijing’s own alternative infrastructure. More broadly, Russia’s defiance has accelerated the expansion of the BRICS forum and other solidarity mechanisms that marginalise Western leverage.[14] The BRICS+ bloc now encompasses over 30% of global GDP and is growing. Russia’s willingness to absorb Western punishment while Beijing remains unblemished positions China as the rational, rising power within this alternative consensus – the partner that benefits from Western overreach without bearing its costs. Russia becomes the test case proving that confronting the West-led order is possible.

               

              Looking Ahead

              The China-Russia partnership succeeds not because it resembles a traditional alliance, but because it resembles a relationship where the latter does not yet realise it is infected. Moscow absorbs costs across every dimension – military escalation, sanctions pressure, political isolation, diplomatic friction – while Beijing extracts strategic value with minimal risk or exposure. This is not a partnership. It is calculated exploitation disguised as alignment.

               

              Every month that the Kremlin keeps the West locked into European crisis management is a month China gains in the Indo-Pacific with minimal Western involvement. Russia’s willingness to absorb military, diplomatic, and sanctions-related risks enables Beijing to apply cumulative pressure across multiple regions without direct confrontation, stretching US and allied planning capacity while China consolidates military readiness and improves its strategic positioning.

               

              Every NATO defence dollar committed to the eastern flank is a dollar unavailable for contingency planning for Taiwan. Every Western political argument about burden-sharing and allied commitment is an opening for Beijing to consolidate regional dominance without direct confrontation. NATO has spent four years strengthening European deterrence while inadvertently weakening its position in the theatre that will define the 21st century.

               

              The real question is not why Beijing supports Moscow: it is whether the West will recognise a trade-off it has unknowingly accepted before it becomes irreversible.

               

              The architecture of this asymmetry is likely permanent. As long as Ukraine drags on, Beijing wins. As long as the West divides its attention, China advances. Western leaders who continue to appeal for Chinese restraint are asking Beijing to abandon its most significant strategic advantage at precisely the moment it matters most. As soon as the West recognises this reality, Beijing will accelerate its Taiwan timeline, in order to act before Western unity and coordination can emerge to confront them.

               

               

              William Dixon is a Senior Associate Fellow of the Royal United Service Institute, specialising in cyber and international security issues.

               

              Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategy and security analyst & writer whose work focuses on Russia, Ukraine, and international security. 

               

               

              Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

               

              [1] RFE/RL’s Russian Service, EU Finds China Responsible For 80 Percent of Russia Sanctions Avoidance, Says German Report, May 2025, https://www.rferl.org/a/german-report-eu-china-russia-sanctions-avoidance-80-percent/33425633.htm; Seth G. Jones, China And Russia Bolster Their ‘No Limits’ Alliance, WSJ Opinion, December 2025, https://www.wsj.com/opinion/china-and-russia-bolster-their-no-limits-alliance-c6bc6e49; Keith Bradsher, How a Chinese border town keeps Russia’s economy afloat, The Japan Times, July 2025, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/07/25/world/politics/chinese-border-town-russia-economy/; Huileng Tan, Russia’s wartime lifeline from China comes with a price: an ‘embarrassing reversal’ for Moscow, Business Insider, December 2025, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-economy-china-reliance-oil-exports-embarrassing-reversal-2025-12

              [2] Le Monde with AFP, Macron calls on China to help end war in Ukraine, rebalance trade, Le Monde, December 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/12/04/macron-tells-xi-that-france-and-china-must-overcome-their-differences_6748135_4.html

              [3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs China, Wang Yi holds talks with German Foreign Minister Waldfol, December 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202512/t20251208_11768951.shtml

              [4] Zoya Sheftalovich, EU warns China to push Putin to end war as relations hit ‘inflection point’, Politico, July 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-warns-china-push-vladimir-putin-russia-end-ukraine-war-relations-hit-inflection-point-summit/

              [5] Reuters, Exclusive: Chinese engines, shipped as ‘cooling units’, power Rssian drones used in Ukraine, July 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/chinese-engines-shipped-cooling-units-power-russian-drones-used-ukraine-2025-07-23/

              [6] Patrik Andersson, China and Russia challenge the Arctic order: But understanding how means looking beyond their partnership, DIIS Policy Brief, July 2025, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/china-and-russia-challenge-the-arctic-order

              [7] Reuters, Russian bombers join Chinese air patrol near Japan as Tokyo-Beijing tensions simmer, CNN World, December 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/12/09/asia/south-korea-japan-china-russia-warplanes-intl-hnk-ml

              [8] Davidson Window signals the period during which senior US defence officials have warned China might attempt military action against Taiwan.

              [9] Colin Christopher, China Accelerates Modernization by Applying Lessons From Russia-Ukraine War, TRADOC Intelligence Post, September 2025, https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/china-accelerates-modernization-by-applying-lessons-from-russia-ukraine-war/

              [10] Howard Wang and Brett Zakheim, China’s Lessons From the Russia-Ukraine War: Perceived New Strategic Opportunities and an Emerging Model of Hybrid Warfare, RAND, May 2025, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA3100/RRA3141-4/RAND_RRA3141-4.pdf

              [11] Georgi Kantchev and Lingling Wei, China Is Studying Russia’s Sanctions Evasion to Prepare for Taiwan Conflict, The Wall Street Journal, December 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-is-studying-russias-sanctions-evasion-to-prepare-for-taiwan-conflict-5665f508

              [12] Natalia Chabarovskaya, Going Steady: China and Russia’s Economic Ties are Deeper than Washington Thinks, CEPA, June 2025, https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/going-steady-china-and-russias-economic-ties-are-deeper-than-washington-thinks/; Gleb Bryanski, Darya Korsunskaya, Elena Fabrichnaya and Gleb Stolyarov, Russia eyes China trade revival as Putin prepares for Xi summit, sources say, Reuters, August 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russia-eyes-china-trade-revival-putin-prepares-xi-summit-sources-say-2025-08-28/

              [13] Daniel Balazs, IP25091 | China-Russia Dual-Use Technology Cooperation: Geopolitical Bifurcation in the Age of Emerging Technologies, September 2025, RSiS, https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/ip25091-china-russia-dual-use-technology-cooperation-geopolitical-bifurcation-in-the-age-of-emerging-technologies/

              [14] BRICS is an acronym for a bloc of emerging economies including: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. With a further expansion in 2024 to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, it is sometimes referred to as BRICS+. Stewart Patrick et al., BRICS Expansion and the future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants?lang=en

              Footnotes
                Related Articles

                Expert briefing | Georgia’s Political Landscape in Focus: A critical point for democracy

                Article by Foreign Policy Centre

                December 1, 2025

                Download PDF
                Expert briefing | Georgia’s Political Landscape in Focus: A critical point for democracy

                On 11th November 2025, the Foreign Policy Centre convened a parliamentary roundtable on Georgia’s democratic crisis, examining the country’s rapid authoritarian backsliding, the resilience of civil society, and the scope for international support, particularly from the UK.

                 

                The event was chaired by Joe Powell MP and featured expert insights from: Eka Gigauri, Executive Director, Transparency International Georgia; Nino Evgenidze, Executive Director, Economic Policy Research Center; and Professor Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham and FPC Senior Fellow.

                 

                Speakers reflected on the Georgian Dream regime’s growing alignment with Russian interests, the systematic dismantling of democratic institutions, and the wave of repression facing journalists, protestors, and NGOs. They also examined the impact of targeted sanctions, the limits of EU engagement, and how the UK can leverage financial and diplomatic tools to support those resisting from within.

                 

                To explore the key thematic takeaways from this expert discussion, you can download the full briefing here.

                 

                Footnotes
                  Related Articles

                  Kyrgyz Parliamentary Election’s Snapshot

                  Article by Dr. Aijan Sharshenova

                  November 27, 2025

                  Kyrgyz Parliamentary Election’s Snapshot

                  The Kyrgyz Parliament – Jogorku Kenesh (Supreme Council) called for an early election in September on the grounds of avoiding an overlap of two important electoral campaigns in 2026 – presidential and parliamentary.[1] On November 30th, Kyrgyzstan will hold snap preliminary parliamentary elections.

                   

                  A brief history of Kyrgyz parliamentarism

                  Since gaining independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has held eight parliamentary elections and had seven parliamentary convocations. In the early independence years, the country experimented with a bicameral parliamentary system, which consisted of the Legislative Assembly and the Assembly of People’s Representatives. Since 2007, however, the Kyrgyz parliament has been a unicameral body.

                   

                  Throughout the last 34 years, Kyrgyzstan oscillated between parliamentary, parliamentary-presidential, and presidential-parliamentary forms of governance. Kyrgyz politics, however imperfect they might have been, were dynamic, lively, and left space for public and political debate and contestation. The most recent constitutional amendments, initiated by the current President, Sadyr Japarov, marked an important shift to a strong presidential model of governance.[2]

                   

                  Notably, two out of three government coups in independent Kyrgyzstan were triggered by contested parliamentary elections, first in March 2005[3] and again in October 2020.[4] In a way, parliamentary elections often contain seeds of public unrest as proven by history. The seventh election’s results were annulled due to the mass protest and the government coup.[5] The sixth parliamentary convocation had its term extended until 2021. The eight elections, held later that year, formed the current convocation of the Parliament (seventh), which has lost a significant part of its powers in the aftermath of the constitutional referendum of 2021.

                   

                  A snapshot of the upcoming parliamentary election

                  The upcoming election will stick to the previous Parliament’s composition of 90 members of parliament. However, there will be some important technical changes. Following the 2025 amendments to the Electoral Code, the electoral system shifted from a mixed system to a majoritarian one: MPs are elected from 30 multi-member constituencies, with each district electing three representatives via plurality voting (the top three candidates win). To ensure gender representation, it is a requirement that at least one woman must be among the top three in each district.[6]

                   

                  Kyrgyzstan’s current population stands at approximately 7.5 million people, with around 4.237 million citizens who are eligible and registered to vote.[7] Voting will occur at 2,492 polling stations across the country, with voters able to cast their ballots at any station. This marks a departure from the country’s Soviet legacy, which tied voters to polling stations based on their registered address. Before, internal migrants had to travel back to their registered address to get a letter allowing them to vote in their current (temporary or permanent) location.

                   

                  The candidates finished their registration by November 10. At the moment, a total of 467 candidates have been registered (276 men and 191 women). The electoral campaign has officially started and will finish at 08:00 on November 29 2025 – 24 hours before voting begins. Eligibility requirements state that candidates must be at least 25 years old, hold a higher education degree, have resided continuously in Kyrgyzstan for the last five years, and have no criminal record.[8]

                   

                  Why this election matters but why it feels stale

                  The upcoming parliamentary election might lack the usual dynamism of Kyrgyz political scene, but it is important for three reasons.[9]

                   

                  First, this election signifies a return to the pre-2007 single mandate voting system. While it might seem like an electoral reform element, this shift is de facto the last nail in the Kyrgyz political party system. In this mode, candidates’ resources, public profile, and local networks tend to outweigh their party affiliations or ideological positions. This probably is an honest move, but it does make political parties and political ideologies even less relevant than before. The changes were approved in June 2025, suggesting the plans to hold this snap election must have been in the making for a while.

                   

                  Second, there are some changes in the electoral process. These include the administrative division of electoral districts, the possibility to register and vote in different polling stations, and the use of social media and social media influencers in electoral campaigns. The Central Electoral Committee approved 30 multi-mandate districts incorporating roughly 142 thousand voters each in October 2025.[10] Most of these changes reflect on the current reality of digitalisation and the extended use of social media among populations, as well as the final acknowledgement of the extreme mobility of the electorate. Kyrgyzstan is a country of fluid external and internal migration after all.

                   

                  Finally, this election consolidates the constitutional changes of 2021, which have significantly reduced the Parliament’s powers while strengthening the presidency. As such, this election effectively closes the chapter on previous efforts to develop a more democratic parliamentary or parliamentary-presidential system. Kyrgyzstan is now a strong presidential system.

                   

                  Although not directly related to the election, it is important to note two significant developments that are taking place against the background of the electoral campaign. President Putin is expected to make an appearance at the upcoming Collective Security Treaty Organisation’s Council meeting in Bishkek from 25-27 November 2025. A few days before this, several opposition politicians and activists were detained on allegations of plotting mass protests and attempting a coup.[11]

                   

                  The parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan feels less dynamic this year. However, it marks two important departures from all previous political processes that have taken place in the country so far. First, it signals the diminishing relevance of political party competition and, to an extent, the existence of political parties in the Kyrgyz political landscape. Second, it signifies the consolidation of a strong undemocratic presidential regime.

                   

                   

                  Dr Aijan Sharshenova, FPC Senior Fellow. Aijan is the Executive Director at Crossroads Central Asia, an independent think tank in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, and a Leading Visiting Researcher at the Riga Stradins University, Riga, Latvia. She holds two Masters in the EU and Central Asian Studies and in International Studies, and a PhD in Politics from the University of Leeds. Aijan’s research interests include foreign policy, public diplomacy and soft power, as well as democracy promotion and autocracy diffusion. She published extensively on Central Asian politics, focusing on the region’s relations with the EU, Russia and China. Aijan authored a book on the EU democracy promotion in Central Asia and co-edited a recent book on navigating positionality in research.

                   

                  Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

                   

                  [1] Council of Europe (Venice Commission), ‘Opinion No. 1021/2021 (CDL(2021)021) – Joint Opinion on the Draft Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic’, March 2021, https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/68/163; Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic, Tөрага Нурланбек Тургунбек уулу: “VII чакырылыш өз кызыкчылыгынан өлкөнүн кызыкчылыгын бийик коюп, өзүн‑өзү таратуу чечимин кабыл алдык’, September 2025, https://kenesh.kg/posts/14810; https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL(2021)021

                  [2] Serik Rymbetov, Kyrgyzstani Parliamentary Elections Strengthen President Japarov’s Rule, Jamestown, July 2021,  https://jamestown.org/kyrgyzstani-parliamentary-elections-strengthen-president-japarovs-rule/

                  [3] Global Nonviolent Action Database, Kyrgyz citizens overthrow President Ayakev (Tulip Revolution) 2005, n.d., https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/kyrgyz-citizens-overthrow-president-ayakev-tulip-revolution-2005

                  [4] Aijan Sharshenova, Kyrgyzstan elects a potential strongman: Implications for international partners and the future of Kyrgyz democracy, March 2021, https://fpc.org.uk/kyrgyzstan-elects-a-potential-strongman-implications-for-international-partners-and-the-future-of-kyrgyz-democracy/

                  [5] Asel Doolotkeldieva, Uncovering the Revolutionaries from Epistemic Injustice: The Politics of Popular Revolts in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Affiairs, July 2023, https://brill.com/view/journals/caa/10/2/article-p99_1.xml

                  [6] AKIpress, Выборы в Жогорку Кенеш: Сколько женщин баллотируются? Список, October 2025, https://kg.akipress.org/news:2347875

                  [7] AKIpress, ‘В Кыргызстане насчитывается 4 млн 237 тыс. избирателей’, September 2025, https://kg.akipress.org/news:2336910

                  [8] The Central Electoral Commission, ‘Кандидаты/Талапкерлер: Выдвижение кандидатов’, n.d., https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/Kandidaty_Talapkerler/Vydvijenie_kandidatov/

                  [9] Aijan Sharshenova, Is Politics Dead in Kyrgyzstan?, The Diplomat, November 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/is-politics-dead-in-kyrgyzstan/

                  [10] oper.kaktus.media, ЦИК утвердил границы избирательных округов на досрочных выборах в Жогорку Кенеш. Список, n.d., https://oper.kaktus.media/doc/532638_cik_ytverdil_granicy_izbiratelnyh_okrygov_na_dosrochnyh_vyborah_v_jogorky_kenesh._spisok.html

                  [11] Catherine Putz, Kyrgyz Authorities Arrest Alleged Protest Plotters Ahead of Election, The Diplomat, November 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/kyrgyz-authorities-arrest-alleged-protest-plotters-ahead-of-election/

                  Footnotes
                    Related Articles

                    Op-ed | What Trump Hopes to Gain by Taking on the BBC

                    Article by Dr Andrew Gawthorpe

                    November 24, 2025

                    Op-ed | What Trump Hopes to Gain by Taking on the BBC

                    The BBC has apologised to President Donald Trump after an episode of Panorama which aired last year misleadingly spliced together two parts of a speech that Trump gave on the day of the January 6th Capitol riots. But for the US president, an apology is not enough. Trump is now threatening to sue the BBC for between one and five billion dollars, a figure which could cripple the broadcaster.

                     

                    The BBC undoubtedly erred with this broadcast, combining excerpts in a way that implied he had directly incited violence. The programme portrayed him saying: “We’re going to walk down to the Capitol… and I’ll be there with you. And we fight. We fight like hell”. In fact, Trump said “We’re going to walk down to the Capitol, and we’re going to cheer on our brave senators and congressmen and women,” only adding the exhortation to “fight like hell” 50 minutes later.[1] Even though many analysts and academics think that Trump’s rhetoric did encourage violence that day, even if only tacitly, the edited segment was still a misleading way to present that specific speech.[2]

                     

                    Trump and the media

                    Trump’s threat to sue the BBC fits a broader pattern in which the US president uses financial threats and public pressure campaigns to attempt to cow media outlets who carry messages that he dislikes. In the past year, he has sued a range of media outlets for defamation – claiming that they knowingly lied about him in order to hurt his reputation. His targets have included TV companies such as ABC News and CNN, and newspapers including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and Iowa-based Des Moines Register.

                     

                    Trump’s hostility to the media is long standing. Shortly after he was elected in 2016, he referred to the media as “the enemy of the people”.[3] According to Trump, many forms of mass media are systematically biased against him because they are staffed by people he considers to hold liberal political views. Because he views large sections of the media as engaged in an unjust campaign against him, he and his supporters see retaliation efforts to push back against critical media coverage as legitimate. Hence, Trump has used not only these lawsuits but also various instruments of state power to attempt to punish or marginalise professionally run media outlets. For instance, he has downgraded the status of traditional media in White House briefings, inviting friendly podcasters and social media influencers to ask questions instead.[4]

                     

                    The favourable treatment that Trump has shown towards right-wing media – especially Fox News, the flagship outlet of conservative news – shows that it is not media per se that he objects to. Rather, he objects to media outlets that give him negative coverage – and he is willing to use the tools at his disposal to punish such coverage. Such steps not only please many of his supporters, who likewise see large parts of the media as an enemy which does not represent their values. It also serves to have a chilling effect on other journalists. Be careful how you cover Trump, the message is – or you might find yourself facing a $5bn lawsuit.

                     

                    And that is exactly where the BBC now finds itself.

                     

                    Unlikely to succeed

                    One curious aspect of Trump’s lawsuits against media outlets is that, legally at least, they rest on extremely shaky ground. Their intent should hence be understood as political – and on those terms, they can be much more successful.

                     

                    The legal vehicle that Trump has used in previous lawsuits, and which he wants now to wield against the BBC, is defamation. The modern framework of defamation law in the United States was created in 1964 by a Supreme Court ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a case in which Southern segregationists sued The New York Times for printing what it said were defamatory lies by supporters of civil rights campaigner Martin Luther King Jr.

                     

                    In the case, the Supreme Court established an extremely high bar for any official holding public office to win a defamation case against a media outlet. The court declared – unanimously – that winning such a case must involve showing that untrue statements were made with “actual malice” or “reckless disregard”. Put differently, that means that the claimant must prove that the media outlet knew the statement was false or at least had serious doubts about its accuracy. Furthermore, officials bringing defamation cases have to prove that the statement is false, rather than placing the burden of proof on the defendant.

                     

                    This legal precedent is commonly understood as making it extremely difficult for public officials to win defamation cases – which was the entire point behind the Supreme Court’s ruling. The court reasoned that robust public debate must involve strong protections for media outlets criticising public officials, and they created them accordingly. No US president has ever brought a defamation lawsuit against a media outlet in the modern era, partly because they knew they would be likely to lose. Trump is likely to lose too.

                     

                    There are other reasons why Trump would likely find the case against the BBC difficult to win. Defamation cases hinge on whether or not untrue statements cause damages – emotional, financial, or in some other category. Trump would presumably argue that the Panorama documentary harmed his political career, but that is difficult to prove. Firstly, the episode never even aired in the United States, and he has no political career in Britain. Secondly, Trump went on to win re-election as President of the United States just over a week after it aired, suggesting that any damage to his reputation was not particularly grave. Thirdly, Trump and lawyers seem to not even have noticed that the documentary existed until British media brought it to light just a few weeks ago.

                     

                    Trump might argue that he suffered commercial damages, but this again would be difficult to prove. He remains an incredibly wealthy man and continues to strike business deals all over the world. Any damage to his UK business interests cannot have been particularly severe if he did not even notice it at the time.

                     

                    This is why most legal observers consider that Trump’s lawsuit against the BBC is unlikely to succeed in court.[5] But that may not be the point.

                     

                    Victory of another kind

                    Despite the difficulties of winning a defamation case, Trump has already shown how such cases can result in a positive outcome for him. When he sued ABC News over a defamatory statement allegedly made by anchor George Stephanoupolus, the legal consensus was that the case would be very difficult to win. But ABC News never even let the case get to court, instead admitting fault and settling for $15m.[6]

                     

                    The reason for ABC to do this was simple: it avoided becoming embroiled in a lengthy court battle that could suck up the network’s time and resources and perhaps harm the business interests of its parent company, Disney. The settlement also allowed the network to get into the good graces of the Trump administration, which has other regulatory tools that it can use to harm the interests of US-based media outlets.

                     

                    In the ABC News case, making a legally dubious claim worked to Trump’s advantage because it boxed his adversary into a political corner. But not every case has worked out this way. The New York Times, for instance, has fought back against Trump’s defamation allegations, the first version of which was subsequently dismissed by the court. Since then, Trump has refiled a new claim, and the NYT plans to fight that too.[7] Even though Trump looks unlikely to get a settlement from the NYT, he still likely relishes his ability to suck its time and resources into a distracting court battle.

                     

                    These tactics suggest that Trump does not actually need to win his court cases for them to damage media organisations and have a chilling effect on media freedom. This brings us back to the BBC.

                     

                    So far, the BBC insists that it will not reach a settlement with Trump. This is understandable – after all, Trump is unlikely to win the case in court, and any settlement would essentially be paid with British taxpayers’ money. But the episode can still do the broadcaster considerable damage. Firstly, it makes it vulnerable to political criticism at home, aiding a long-running campaign by its commercial rivals to undercut its influence. Secondly, the heightened scrutiny means that the BBC will have to be much more careful in how it presents controversial topics, particularly relating to Trump, which is likely to make it more cautious in its coverage.

                     

                    Nor is the damage likely to be limited to the BBC. Trump’s extraordinary decision to sue a foreign broadcaster serves as another example of the lengths to which he is willing to go to quash speech that he dislikes. By breaking previous norms of presidential behaviour, Trump constantly keeps media outlets guessing about what he might do next. The result is a chilling effect on press freedom, even if Trump never has a successful day in court.

                     

                     

                    Andrew Gawthorpe is an FPC Research Fellow and expert on US politics and foreign policy at Leiden University in The Netherlands and the creator of the newsletter America Explained. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.

                     

                    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

                     

                     

                    [1] Noor Nanji, BBC Apologises to Trump Over Panorama Edit but Refuses to pay Compensation, BBC News, November 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c874nw4g2zzo.

                    [2] Capitol Riots: Did Trump’s Words at Rally Incite Violence?, BBC News, February 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55640437 ; Evangelos Ntonis et al., A Warrant for Violence? An Analysis of Donald Trump’s Speech before the US Capitol Attack, British Journal of Social Psychology (2023), https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/bjso.12679.

                    [3] Marvin Kalb, Enemy of the People: Trump’s War on the Press, the New McCarthyism, and the Threat to American Democracy. Brookings Institution Press, 2018.

                    [4] Liam Scott, White House to Open Media Access to Podcasters, Influencers, Voice of America, January 2025, https://www.voanews.com/a/white-house-to-open-media-access-to-podcasters-influencers/7953761.html.

                    [5] Rebecca Moosavian, Trump v the BBC: A Legal Expert Explains how the Case Could Play Out, The Conversation, November 2025, https://theconversation.com/trump-v-the-bbc-a-legal-expert-explains-how-the-case-could-play-out-269551.

                    [6] Michael R. Sisak, ABC Agrees to Give $15 Million to Donald Trump’s Presidential Library to Settle Defamation Lawsuit, Associated Press, December 2024, https://apnews.com/article/abc-trump-lawsuit-defamation-stephanopoulos-04aea8663310af39ae2a85f4c1a56d68.

                    [7] Jenna Amatulli and George Chidi, Trump Files Amended $15bn Defamation Complaint against New York Times, The Guardian, October 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/oct/16/trump-new-york-times-defamation-complaint.

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