Op-ed | Africa’s Moment: South Africa’s G20 Fight to Centre Development

Article by Elizabeth Sidiropoulos

November 21, 2025

Op-ed | Africa’s Moment: South Africa’s G20 Fight to Centre Development

Taking over from three Global South presidencies of the G20, South Africa’s (SA) agenda in 2025 built on those of Brazil, India, and Indonesia, while emphasising African concerns as the first African G20 presidency. Its agenda has amplified key developmental concerns requiring international cooperation at a moment when some countries are contesting both development and cooperation.

Although the G20 was originally a grouping of finance ministers, established after the Asian financial crisis of 1998, its agenda has grown since 2008 when it was elevated to heads of state. As global challenges, such as climate, pandemics, and inequality have become more acute, the need to bring development to the forefront has become essential, although not always easy. South Africa’s themes of “Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability” reflect the trend in the Global South presidencies to re-centre development in global discourse.^[1]

South Africa set an ambitious agenda. From tackling the high cost of capital in African economies to ensuring a just energy transition, advancing the Sustainable Development Goals, tackling inequality, promoting women’s empowerment, and ensuring debt sustainability – South Africa has not shied away from issues that are increasingly being contested across the world and in G20 countries.

The complex geopolitical context makes agreement on some of these extremely difficult. However, there have been some wins. A set of voluntary principles on combating illicit financial flows (IFFs) was adopted by the development ministers that recognised the linkage between IFFs and the erosion of domestic resource mobilisation, which has become more urgent in a climate of declining aid. There was also a ministerial statement on debt sustainability, which reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen the Common Framework on Debt treatment, and support for the ongoing review of the debt sustainability frameworks by the IMF and World Bank. During a year where several working groups issued only a chair’s statement, the ability to have a statement on debt was symbolically important even if there was no major innovation on plugging already identified weaknesses regarding the Common Framework.

The spotlighting of debt sustainability has brought renewed attention to the proposals incorporated into the Compromiso de Sevilla, particularly the establishment of a borrowers’ club, around which preparatory work has been undertaken already in New York. The club is likely to be launched in 2026.^[2]

Recognising the crucial role of critical minerals in Africa, especially in contributing to industrialisation, the Summit will likely adopt a G20 Critical Minerals Framework. This framework would mainstream the importance of local beneficiation and value addition at source, while also recognising the asymmetry in exploration capabilities between advanced and developing economies. In parallel, a set of voluntary principles on sustainable industrial policies has been developed, emphasising the link with inclusive economic growth, industrialisation, jobs, and equality.

Yet, the legacy of South Africa’s presidency goes beyond these outcomes documents. There are several issues that SA advocated that have contributed to a more nuanced debate on the challenges of development. This includes the initial proposal for a commission on the cost of capital, intended to address the issue of the African risk premium. While this was not established, this issue received significant coverage in global forums, including in the Fourth Financing for Development conference. Relatedly, SA’s work on combating illicit financial flows was reflected in the Compromiso de Sevilla. While the commission was not established, South Africa appointed an African Expert Panel that focused on the interconnection between growth, debt and development, and issues related to the high cost of capital in Africa. Its recommendations include, among others: launching a new G20 debt financing initiative for low-income and vulnerable countries, and reform of the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) allocation system, which reduces the discretionary and political nature of the current allocation process.

South Africa has also sought to build consensus on the concept of global public goods. While there was only a chair’s statement on a set of principles relating to global public goods, South Africa will be establishing an Ubuntu commission focused on fostering international cooperation for the protection and delivery of global public goods.

The establishment of an expert panel on inequality, chaired by Joe Stiglitz and presented to president Ramaphosa in early November, aimed to synthesise the research on this issue. It proposes the creation of an International Panel on Inequality, modelled on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to function as a technical advisory body.

However, South Africa’s G20 presidency has had to contend with difficult geopolitical headwinds and a fraying bilateral relationship with the US. The US chose to participate only in some of the meetings of the various working groups and task forces, with the Trump administration making it clear that it considered the priorities of the SA presidency as contrary to the interests of the US. In recent weeks, President Trump has made it clear that not only will the US not attend the summit in Johannesburg, it will also oppose the issuing of a Leaders’ Declaration, as the absence of the US would mean that there was no consensus in the group.^[3]

The G20 operates on the basis of consensus, requiring all members to agree on the final text. This approach necessitates compromises by all members so that the outcome reflects a set of common political commitments, even though there is no enforcement mechanism and these are voluntary. However, the position that the US has taken is unprecedented. The underlying assumption for consensus-based decision-making is that countries are willing to negotiate in good faith and make trade-offs so as to arrive at an outcome. When countries eschew this approach because they do not want a Declaration, it raises questions about the principle of consensus; it gives the power to one country to veto the entire process, where member states have spent weeks negotiating the Declaration. It also sets the precedent that other countries can do the same in future if they do not agree with the host country or are opposed to its place within the group. Such an approach would undermine the constructive role that the G20 can play as a forum for fostering understanding and compromise, even in a context of heightened power rivalries.

In an era when many accepted principles of international cooperation are being questioned and undermined, how member states secure the G20 platform as a forum for dialogue and coordination on common challenges, will contribute to the future trajectory of multilateralism.

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos is the chief executive of the South African Institute of International Affairs.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] G20 South Africa, 2025, https://g20.org/

^[2] United Nations, FFD4 Outcome Document: Sevilla Commitment, July 2025, https://financing.desa.un.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/FFD4%20Outcome%20Booklet%20Final_SP%20-%20pages.pdf

^[3] BBC news, US to boycott G20 in South Africa, Trump says, November 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckgzek4rl8lo

Topics

International Development

Regions

Europe

South Africa

United States and Canada

Op-ed | Science as Soft Power: How UK Research Institutions Drive Global Health Impact

Article by Molly Thompson

November 17, 2025

Op-ed | Science as Soft Power: How UK Research Institutions Drive Global Health Impact

From the discovery of penicillin to the development of one of the world’s first COVID-19 vaccines, the UK’s contribution to global health has long shaped its diplomatic reach and global standing. For decades, British universities and research institutes have quietly powered global progress – advancing lifesaving science, training generations of health leaders, and shaping equitable access to innovation.

In an era where the use of soft power is all the more important to mitigate growing global conflict, UK science remains one of Britain’s greatest diplomatic assets. However, as funding for global health and research partnerships tightens, the UK’s ability to continue driving progress on the world’s most pressing health challenges is under growing threat.

The UK has a strong heritage of scientific contribution to global health, with an array of prestigious institutions that have shaped the world’s response to infectious diseases, from malaria elimination and vaccine development to the scale-up of HIV prevention and treatment.

The work of UK research institutions and universities does more than deliver scientific breakthroughs. It also creates global public goods through the data, evidence, and tools that underpin public health programmes worldwide. These collaborations, often supported through UK Aid and critical partnerships with organisations such as Unitaid, WHO, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, have enabled millions to access life-saving interventions more affordably and effectively.

The stakes have never been higher. Despite remarkable progress over the past two decades, AIDS remains one of the world’s deadliest diseases.^[1] By the end of 2024, an estimated 40 million people were living with HIV, with 630,000 dying of HIV-related illnesses.^[2]

However, there is hope. A defining moment for the global HIV response came this year with the announcement of a historic price agreement for generic lenacapavir (LEN), a breakthrough long-acting injectable offering six months of HIV prevention with a single injection. Described by many as the closest thing yet to an HIV vaccine, lenacapavir could transform prevention for those facing stigma or limited access to health facilities. Unitaid and the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI), alongside the Gates Foundation, secured two price agreements at just US$40 per year, with earlier commitments also made by the Global Fund and President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to reach two million people within three years.

Behind this milestone lies UK science. Research by the University of Liverpool’s Centre of Excellence for Long-Acting Therapeutics provided the cost-modelling that helped underpin this price; a quiet but powerful example of British influence through evidence.

Beyond lenacapavir, UK research institutions have consistently delivered breakthroughs that have transformed global health. The London School for Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) led the trials and evidence generation for new malaria vaccines, including RTS,S – the first malaria vaccine recommended by WHO – now protecting hundreds of thousands of children in Africa.^[3] The University of Liverpool and Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine have been at the forefront of long-acting HIV therapeutics and helped develop innovative delivery models for injectable PrEP. The Innovative Vector Control Consortium (IVCC) developed next-generation insecticide-treated bed nets that have dramatically reduced malaria transmission across multiple countries.^[4] These examples show how UK science does not just generate knowledge; it saves lives at scale, strengthens health systems, and reinforces the country’s global reputation as a hub for innovation.

Global health collaboration has long been one of the UK’s most effective tools of influence, building lasting relationships of trust. This network of scientific diplomacy enhances the UK’s reputation not just as a funder, but as a partner open to co-creating solutions in global health through science and innovation. The partnerships generated through decades of research collaboration cannot be manufactured and are earned through impact. And at a time when many countries are opting to look inwards, this kind of outward-facing, partnership-driven leadership is precisely what is needed.

However, as the world saw during the COVID-19 pandemic, innovation alone is not enough. While UK institutions helped shape vaccine research and delivery, global access was hampered by inequities in supply, manufacturing, and intellectual property. Ensuring that future breakthroughs, from malaria vaccines to long-acting HIV prevention, are accessible to all must remain a core test of the UK’s global health leadership. In an era when political leaders like Donald Trump are undermining scientific research and multilateral cooperation, the UK has an opportunity to strengthen its soft power by championing equitable, evidence-driven science in genuine partnership with Southern-based institutions. The UK must ensure that publicly funded research delivers public benefit, both at home and abroad, to promote and strengthen equitable global access to innovation.

Drawing on its history of scientific excellence, the UK has made significant and lasting contributions to global health and the fight against infectious diseases ranging from foundational medical breakthroughs to the development of modern vaccines and ongoing research. Yet this form of soft power cannot be taken for granted. Cuts to global health and research funding risk weakening the very partnerships that give the UK global credibility.

To sustain the progress made to date in global health, alongside the UK’s influence, the government must protect funding for global health R&D and strengthen partnerships both with British research institutions and critical multilateral initiatives, such as Unitaid, WHO, and the Global Fund which turn innovation into access. In doing so, Britain can demonstrate that its global health leadership is not only about what it invents, but also about ensuring those innovations reach everyone who needs them.

Molly Thompson is Senior Advocacy Advisor at STOPAIDS. STOPAIDS is an HIV, health and human rights advocacy network of 50 UK international development agencies working globally to end AIDS and realise all people’s right to health and wellbeing.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] UN News, AIDS still killing one person every minute as funding cuts stall progress, June 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164111

^[2] The Global Health Observatory, HIV, https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/hiv-aids

^[3] London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, MRCG at LSHTM’s integral role in the development of the RTS,S malaria vaccine, January 2024, https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/newsevents/news/2024/mrcg-lshtms-integral-role-development-rtss-malaria-vaccine

^[4] Insecticide Treated Nets (ITN), New Nets Project (NNP), IVCC, https://www.ivcc.com/project/new-nets-project

Topics

International Development

Soft Power

Regions

Europe

United Kingdom

Expert Look: Unanswered questions regarding UK Government’s approach to defence and security

Article by Foreign Policy Centre

November 12, 2025

Expert Look: Unanswered questions regarding UK Government’s approach to defence and security

In their first year in power, the Labour Government made several big policy announcements related to national security, defence, and their vision for Britain’s place in the world. As the UK and its allies continue to confront the most dangerous moment for European security since the Cold War, respond to the growing levels of human insecurity in many regions around the world and navigate global economic challenges, a considered strategic approach is clearly needed.

Yet, less than a month out from the next Budget, questions continue to mount about the financial feasibility, priorities, and long-term direction of the country’s approach towards ensuring our defence; as well as the relationship between the UK’s evolving soft and hard power strategies. How will the Government reconcile strengthening defence and security with growing pressures at home? What progress has been made on the Government’s stated ambitions?

Below is an overview of the recent developments, followed by views from FPC’s experts, including those who contributed to FPC’s 2024 submission to the SDR, and to our most recent report Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy, as to how the UK’s approach to defence and security is evolving in practice, and where gaps remain in implementation, public communication, and whole-of-society readiness.

Strategic Defence Review, Soft Power and Aid Cuts

In June 2025, the UK Government outlined a new approach to defence and security, publishing the ‘Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2025’, which contained 62 recommendations.^[1] The SDR outlined a range of strategic goals, including renewed focus on NATO, investment in AI and drone technologies, and discussion of potential UK participation in NATO’s nuclear mission. The Government also committed to an increase in defence spending to “2.5% of GDP by 2027 and 3% in the next Parliament when fiscal and economic conditions allow,” with a view to “help make defence an engine for growth—boosting prosperity, jobs and security for working people across the UK.”

The Review was highly anticipated given the context of heightened uncertainty for the Euro-Atlantic alliance, the ongoing war in Ukraine, an unpredictable US administration under President Donald Trump, and shifting security realities in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and beyond. While the SDR contained some significant shifts in posture, there remain considerable concerns about resourcing, prioritisation, and delivery.

In January 2025, the Government launched its Soft Power Council, an advisory body to support the development of a ‘soft power’ strategy, which is expected to be released spring of next year. What this will contain and similarly, how it will be implemented is yet to be seen. However, the significant aid cuts the Government announced in February and their impact on the UK’s soft power potential was a key discussion point at every major political party conference in September.

The decision by the UK Government to reduce aid from 2027 to 0.3% of gross national income (GNI), in favour of increasing the UK’s defence spending (as outlined above) drew sharp criticism at the time.^[2] Not least because Labour had previously indicated they aimed to restore aid spending to 0.7%, after it was cut to 0.5% of GNI in 2021.

While the need to strengthen UK defences is clear, there remains a question as to whether doing so at the expense of aid is the right answer. A recent Chatham House report noted that “the £6 billion saving from aid is unlikely to plug defence gaps,” while “the West’s retreat from aid will leave an obvious opening for revisionist powers to build further influence in developing countries.”^[3] The significant fallout from the closure of The US Agency for International Development (USAID) in July this year, has been notable, and likely destabilising for a number of countries that significantly relied on international support. Last month, the UK Parliament’s International Development Committee launched an inquiry to examine how the UK can continue to deliver high impact international aid and development assistance in the face of a 40% budget cut. Announcing the inquiry, Committee Chair Sarah Champion MP posed the question: “What should drive the Government’s vision for foreign aid; national security, moral duty, international obligations?”.

Meanwhile, earlier this year, in response to the funding cuts, former national security adviser, Lord Peter Ricketts, coordinated a letter to the Prime Minister urging him to sustain funding for the British Council.^[4] In comments to The Guardian, he noted: “A lot of defence people will tell you that a small investment in soft power such as the British Council is worth a lot of money on the military side.”^[5] However, neither international aid nor soft power are mentioned in the SDR, despite the clear linkages with national security and defence – a notable omission that reinforces concerns about cross-Whitehall coordination.

What do these combined developments mean for our national security? Views from our Experts

Dr Andrew Gawthorpe
Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University

“The SDR sets out an ambitious agenda for UK defence policy going forward, but there are limits to how much planning is possible in the current international environment. The recent NATO summit in June calmed fears that Donald Trump might announce an immediate withdrawal from the alliance, but it also left all of the major questions dividing the U.S. from Europe, and European countries from each other, unresolved. Later this year the U.S. will likely announce the withdrawal of tens of thousands of soldiers from Eastern Europe, making the continent even harder to defend.”

Dr Andrew Gawthorpe also cautions that the UK’s ability to follow through on its defence spending promises and to coordinate effectively with European partners on rearmament, remains uncertain. “Whether the UK government can actually deliver on the necessary spending commitments and whether the UK and the rest of Europe can coordinate rearmament in a smart and effective way remain to be seen. In the meantime, the ultimate direction of U.S. policy remains unclear – and under Trump, basically unpredictable.”

Christopher Langton
Head of Independent Conflict and Research Analysis (ICRA)

Langton acknowledges the SDR’s attention to innovation but raised two concerns: “The Review highlights the all-important use of AI in defence. However, I wonder if the environmental impact of AI—most notably its water usage—has been considered, particularly amid increasing climate pressures.” But commitments on welfare and personnel are welcome: “The focus on manpower and welfare is a very welcome part of the Review. However, our history on delivering in this area is not good. A firm ring-fenced commitment to fund increases in personnel and expenditure on the defence estate, including housing, would bring confidence to boost recruiting and retention.”

Nina Kuryata
Ukraine and Defence Editor, The Observer

Regarding the Review’s emphasis on NATO as a strategic priority: “It says ‘NATO first’- but what does it actually mean in terms of measures to be taken? If the UK wants to lead in NATO, it must back that up with clear timelines and funding. At present, there’s a pledge to increase military spending to 2.5% by April 2027, with a “clear ambition” to reach 3% by 2034, would economic conditions allow. This is still far from the 5% that all NATO members committed to reach by 2035.”

She also questions some of the more rhetorical claims: “It says we will create a British army which is 10 times more lethal. That would need more development, I think, because it’s not clear what it means – number of soldiers, more deadly weapons or something else.”

Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams
Senior Fellows, European Leadership Network

“The recommendation  by the Review that the UK commence discussions on enhanced participation in NATO’s nuclear mission constitutes, potentially, a substantial change in the UK nuclear posture. More generally, the SDR leaves many fundamental questions unanswered, relying on the assumption, or hope, that NATO will continue much as it did before Trump.  The military implications for force capabilities and structure of having to operate in a purely European framework or a US-lite NATO framework are not explored. There is, however, a surprising indication that while the UK has always declared the primacy of NATO in strategic and defence terms, in practice, it has not taken its contribution to NATO’s military posture as seriously as it pretended. ”

You can read more of Simon and Nicholas’ analysis of enhanced UK participation in NATO’s nuclear mission in their longer piece here.

Poppy Ogier

Research and Communications Manager, and author of ‘Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy’, Foreign Policy Centre

“A modern defence strategy must recognise the vitality of soft power. Take the BBC World Service, it is the world’s most trusted news provider, reaching over 450 million people each week – and only costs around 5% of what Russia and China are thought to be spending internationally in an age of information warfare. However, its sustained funding is in question – and neither it, nor soft power more broadly, is mentioned in the SDR. The ‘influence’ of others is discussed – Russia’s, China’s and the US’s – without addressing what tools to influence the UK has. Including soft power in a defence review is not an optional extra, it’s a force multiplier for everything else.”

Susan Coughtrie

Executive Director, Foreign Policy Centre

“While there is a clear need for a shift in how the UK approaches the country’s defence in today’s climate, there are concerns with the current approach. For the implementation of the SDR and the future soft power strategy to be effective, they must recognise the dynamic between domestic and international developments.

Encouragingly, the SDR recognises the need for a ‘whole of society approach’ and argues to “Build national resilience to threats below and above the threshold of an armed attack through a concerted, collective effort involving—among others—industry, the finance sector, civil society, academia, education, and communities.” However, the Government should more closely examine the layered threats specifically directed at these groups, including through the use of transnational repression, foreign influence, disinformation and cyber attacks; which are only likely to further increase with more countries sliding towards authoritarianism. The impact of the aid cuts should be examined through this security lens too, to ensure that short-term ‘gains’ do not give way outcomes that will take years to rectify.”

Next steps

While the Government’s commitment to increased defence spending is evident, significant tension remains around what this will look like in practice, particularly how it can be delivered without further damaging other critical areas of UK influence, such as soft power and development aid. Key questions persist around resourcing, prioritisation, and whether the Government can protect vital diplomatic, cultural, and development tools while pursuing an ambitious defence agenda.

In an era marked by geopolitical changes, strategic uncertainty, and shifting power dynamics, particularly with an unpredictable US administration and evolving threats in the Middle East, the success of the SDR will depend on more than political will and funding. It will require sustained strategic focus, effective implementation, a strong soft power strategy and international coordination. Most importantly, an effective defence strategy calls for an approach that upholds democratic principles, protects human rights, and preserves the UK’s institutional integrity at home and abroad.

^[1] Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, June 2025 ,https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/683d89f181deb72cce2680a5/The_Strategic_Defence_Review_2025_-_Making_Britain_Safer_-_secure_at_home__strong_abroad.pdf

^[2] House of Commons Debates, Defence and Security vol. 762, February 2025, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-02-25/debates/8BF58F19-B32B-4716-A613-8D5738541A30/DefenceAndSecurity#contribution-DB32B970-42F2-4B1B-A92C-54CA0B28BA41

^[3] Chatham House, First USAID closes, then UK cuts aid: what a Western retreat from foreign aid could mean, March 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/first-usaid-closes-then-uk-cuts-aid-what-western-retreat-foreign-aid-could-mean

^[4] Lord Ricketts, Tweet (@LordRickettsP), April 2025, https://x.com/LordRickettsP/status/1915396877018632373

^[5] The Guardian, British Council ‘may have to close in 60 countries’ amid cuts to aid budget, June 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jun/08/british-council-spending-plans-may-close-in-60-countries

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

Regions

Europe

United Kingdom

Who is standing up for media freedom – and who is not? A new Index has some answers

Article by Martin Scott and Mel Bunce

November 10, 2025

Who is standing up for media freedom – and who is not? A new Index has some answers

Every year, on 2^ndNovember, the United Nations and its member states condemn attacks on journalists. In 2025, this “International Day to End Impunity for Crimes Against Journalists” is a particularly sombre occasion – with threats to journalists at an all-time high.

More than 120 journalists were killed in 2024 while doing their work.^[1] Countless others were arbitrarily detained, abused, and threatened both physically and online. News outlets are struggling to develop sustainable business models, and media freedom is at its lowest level globally in at least two decades, according to Reporters Without Borders.^[2]

This matters because a decline in media freedom can contribute to a deeper collapse in the systems that support democracy. As Nobel Prize-winning journalist, Maria Ressa, recently warned: “if journalism dies, democracy dies”.^[3]

Unfortunately, supporting media freedom is not a foreign policy priority for most countries. Multilateral fora – like the Media Freedom Coalition – encourage their member states to take action. However, these fora lack enforcement or accountability mechanisms.

To help address this gap, the Centre for Journalism and Democracy has launched a new annual index to try to hold states to account and encourage them to take action to promote media freedom beyond their borders. The Index for International Media Freedom Support (IMFS) evaluates 30 countries across three key foreign policy areas: diplomacy, funding, and safety/protection.^[4] The results paint a concerning and inconsistent picture – with no state performing strongly across all three categories.

Financial support for media freedom

According to the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media, “globally… the first problem to be fixed is the insufficient volume of Official Development Assistance (ODA) that goes to media support”.^[5] On average, the 30 countries assessed in the IMFS Index allocated just 0.16% of their foreign aid to supporting independent journalism in 2023. Thirteen countries awarded less than 0.1%, while three – Latvia, Greece, and Slovenia – reported allocating 0%.

The only country that came close to the benchmark set by the Forum on Information and Democracy of allocating 1.0% of ODA to media support was Sweden – who contributed 0.91%. In 2023, Sweden spent over $51 million supporting initiatives such as rural radio stations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and strengthening environmental reporting across the Asia-Pacific region.^[6] Largely for this reason, Sweden came 2^nd overall in the 2025 IMFS Index.

Support for journalism safety and protection

Another group of leading experts – The High-Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom – has consistently advised governments that providing safe refuge to journalists at risk is one of the most effective measures to improve the climate for press freedom around the world.^[7]

The IMFS Index finds that only one country – Latvia (who came 9^thoverall) – had both an active emergency visa scheme for at-risk journalists and supported a national scheme promoting the safety of exiled media workers. Twenty-one of the thirty countries in the Index had neither measure in place.

Diplomatic support for media freedom

Lithuania was the highest ranked country in the 2025 IMFS Index, largely because of its diplomatic leadership roles in several UN initiatives relating to media freedom and journalist safety. Estonia (4^th overall) also performed well diplomatically, having served as co-chair of the Media Freedom Coalition in 2024, alongside Germany (equal 5^th).

The lowest scoring countries in the ‘diplomatic’ category of the IMFS Index were Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and Switzerland.

Making media freedom a foreign policy priority

The results of the 2025 IMFS Index suggests that political will – rather than state capacity – is a country’s greatest barrier to supporting media freedom worldwide.

The Baltic states – Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia – were amongst the smallest – but also the strongest performing. By contrast, four members of the G7 – the United Kingdom (equal 12^th), the United States (equal 12^th), Italy (equal 24^th) and Japan (28^th) – all ranked in the Index’s lowest ‘bronze’ category.

Due to the time lag in data reporting, the Index does not capture recent cuts to foreign aid that occurred in 2025 in the United States, the UK, Germany, France, and elsewhere. Therefore, future versions of the IMFS Index are likely to show an even bigger gap between some countries’ public commitments to media freedom and their actual support.

Given this, the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media is right to argue that “what is needed now is not [a] reinvention of the wheel, but a new level of political will and a concerted commitment by governments to invest in what we know works – nationally and internationally.”^[8]

Hopefully, by publicly tracking countries’ performances, this new Index will help to generate more political pressure for meaningful action.

Martin Scott is a Professor of Media and Global Development at the University of East Anglia. His publications include, ‘Capturing News, Capturing Democracy’ (2024), ‘Humanitarian Journalists’ (2022), ‘Media and Development’ (2014) and ‘From Entertainment to Citizenship’ (2014).

Mel Bunce is a Professor of International Journalism and Politics, and the Director of the Centre for Journalism and Democracy at City St George’s, University of London. She was previously the Head of City’s renowned Department of Journalism. Her research focuses on journalism and democracy, crisis reporting, media freedom and international journalism.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024 is deadliest year for journalists in CPJ history, February 2025 https://cpj.org/special-reports/2024-is-deadliest-year-for-journalists-in-cpj-history-almost-70-percent-killed-by-israel/

[2] RSF, World Press Freedom Index 2025: over half the world’s population in red zones, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-2025-over-half-worlds-population-red-zones

[3] Kathimerini, Maria Ressa warns social media is ‘demolishing democracy’ at Athens forum, October 2025, https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/society-in-depth/1282767/maria-ressa-warns-social-media-is-demolishing-democracy-at-athens-forum/

[4] Centre for Journalism and Democracy, The 2025 Index on International Media Freedom Support, n.d., IMFS Index is published by the Centre for Journalism and Democracy, and is available at https://jdem.org/the-imfs-index/; The 30 states included in the index are members of both the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, and the Media Freedom Coalition (OECD-DAC).

[5] Forum on Information and Democracy, Statement of the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media: The Economic Imperative of Investing in Public Interest Media, September 2025, https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Economic-Imperative-of-Investing-in-Public-Interest-Media.pdf

[6] Forum on Information and Democracy, “The Forum on Information and Democracy calls for a New Deal for Journalism, June 2021, https://informationdemocracy.org/2021/06/16/the-forum-on-information-and-democracy-calls-for-a-new-deal-for-journalism/

[7] Media Freedom Coalition, High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom, n.d., https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/who-is-involved/high-level-panel-of-legal-experts/

[8] Forum on Information and Democracy, Statement of the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media: The Economic Imperative of Investing in Public Interest Media, September 2025, https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Economic-Imperative-of-Investing-in-Public-Interest-Media.pdf

Topics

Human Rights

Media and Online Freedom

At COP30, UK leadership requires paying up on climate finance

Article by Sophie Powell

November 7, 2025

At COP30, UK leadership requires paying up on climate finance

COP30 – the 30th Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change – will take place in Belém, Brazil from 10th to 21st November 2025.

The last 10 years have been the hottest on record, and an estimated 3.3-3.6 billion people live in contexts highly vulnerable to climate change. This year, countries were due to publish their updated national climate plans outlining their contribution to cutting global emissions (‘national determined contributions’ or ‘NDCs’). However, plans so far fall well short of what is required to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C.^[1] Therefore, COP30 needs to focus on the further ambition required to close the gap. Yet achieving this greater ambition will not be possible without the large-scale delivery of grant-based climate finance, making finance an equally critical discussion in Belém.

COP30 must deal with climate finance

Last year’s COP in Baku agreed to a new global climate finance goal (the so-called NCQG) to deliver at least $300 billion per year by 2035, led by developed countries and directed to developing country parties. However, the agreement lacked both a roadmap and the accountability mechanisms required to ensure that governments pay up. The NCQG also included an even vaguer aspiration to scale up finance to $1.3 trillion per year.

Implementation of the new finance goal is critical, as lower income countries require significant finance to develop their economies cleanly; to adapt to worsening climate impacts; and to pay for the escalating costs of the damage to homes, infrastructure and livelihoods (so-called ‘Loss and Damage’). The impacts of the climate crisis disproportionately affect the most vulnerable and least responsible the hardest, and could push up to 132 million more people into extreme poverty by 2030. African countries contribute just 4% of global carbon emissions but are among the hardest hit, and yet, along with other lower income countries, have thus far received only a small fraction of the finance they need – therefore having to take on most of the financial burden themselves. Indeed, the climate crisis is one of the key drivers of today’s debt crisis, as governments are forced to borrow more simply to recover and rebuild from climate disasters.

In this context, building trust among developing countries that the NCQG will be fulfilled is essential to maintaining a multilateral process capable of limiting temperature rises to safe levels. Delivery of climate finance at scale by developed countries, including the UK, is a well-established principle in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and is a legal obligation, as recently affirmed by the International Court of Justice. It is also a moral responsibility falling upon historically high emitters who bear the greatest responsibility for causing the climate crisis. Any wealthy government that considers itself a principled global actor must, at a very minimum, act in good faith to deliver their fair share of the $300 billion finance goal as a starting point.

Governments responsible for delivering this finance are increasingly putting their eggs in the private finance basket. Yet, while private finance has a key role to play, especially in delivering mitigation initiatives like large scale energy projects, it also has huge limitations. Very little private finance is flowing to the world’s most climate-vulnerable communities, especially for adaptation and ‘Loss and Damage’, and the evidence suggests it is not likely to do so at scale, particularly for the poorest countries. To date less than 50 cents in every $100 of all climate finance has been private finance for adaptation efforts, and only 3% of private climate finance goes to low-income countries.^[2] Moreover, the majority share of climate finance has thus far been provided as repayable loans with interest, which simply adds to the debt burden of those countries which are not responsible for the climate crisis – yet are, in this way, expected to doubly pay for its costs.

The reality is that to meet the needs of the world’s most climate vulnerable communities most of the NCQG finance must be public grant-based finance.

Will the UK Government show moral leadership?

When entering power the Labour Government said it wanted to rebuild broken trust with the global South and reestablish the UK as a global climate leader.^[3] While certainly deserving of credit for being the first G7 economy to outline its new strengthened emissions reduction target (the UK launched its NDC at the beginning of the year^[4]), genuine climate leadership requires this government to set out a credible offer on international climate finance too. And it must look beyond aid and private finance to do so.

Despite the UNFCCC principle that climate finance should be “new and additional”, successive governments have so-far drawn the UK’s international climate finance contributions from the aid budget, as have other developed countries. It was one thing to do so while the aid budget was going up. And to its credit, the UK Government was bucking the trend by delivering most of its climate finance as grants not loans. But as the ODA budget began to shrink, taking climate finance from the same pot has become increasingly untenable, so the Government has resorted to creative accounting and a shift towards loans rather than grants.^[5] With the latest aid cuts imposed earlier this year, combined with the greater size of the new global climate finance goal, alternative sources of finance obviously need to be found.

Aware of this, the Government’s narrative is now primarily focused on the idea that private finance will come to the rescue. But, unfortunately too much of this appears based on wishful thinking rather than evidence about where private finance does and does not reach. If the Government truly wants to rebuild trust with Global South governments, honesty is the best policy. It can’t just wish away the evidence because it finds it politically inconvenient at home; it needs to deal in reality not fantasy.

Realistic solutions do exist and the Government should pursue them. The UK could employ new and progressive ways of raising public finances, including through fair ‘polluter pays’ measures, at no cost to the average taxpayer, and use a portion of the revenues raised to deliver on its climate finance responsibilities. Ending fossil fuel producer subsidies in the UK could save around £3.6 billion per year for climate finance. A permanent excess profits tax on fossil fuel producers and/or a Climate Damages Tax on the production of fossil fuels extracted could raise further billions. A reformed financial transaction tax could raise £6.5 billion annually. Meanwhile, a net wealth tax on those with assets over £10 million to the tune of 2% would raise £24 billion a year – part of which could go to climate finance. The UK could also join the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force which recently secured an agreement by eight countries, including France, Spain and Kenya to implement luxury air travel taxes and is building momentum for coordinated action on other revenue raising measures. Why is the UK not part of this?

Polling shows overwhelming public and cross-party support for the polluter pays principle. In a YouGov survey conducted in March 2025, 85% of respondents agreed that those most responsible for pollution should bear the cost of addressing the harm it causes. Another poll in May 2025 found 7 in 10 Reform-leaning voters support higher taxes on oil and gas companies and other high-emitting businesses to fund climate action.

The UK Government can and must turn up to COP30 with a proper plan on international climate finance that is capable of truly delivering for the world’s most marginalised people. That, combined with ambitious net zero plans at home, would give the UK genuine grounds to claim the badge of climate leadership.

Sophie Powell is the Chief of UK Advocacy and Policy at Christian Aid. She currently leads Christian Aid’s engagement with the UK Government on the charity’s advocacy priorities of debt and climate justice. Sophie has worked in the international development field for over 20 years in policy, advocacy and campaigning roles on a wide range of themes – from trade, agriculture, tax and debt, to refugee rights and climate. During her first decade in the sector she worked particularly closely with partners across several African countries, including while working for Oxfam in Kenya for several years, before moving into more UK-facing roles.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] Fiona Harvey, World’s climate plans fall drastically short of action needed, analysis shows, The Guardian, October 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/oct/28/worlds-climate-plans-fall-drastically-short-of-action-needed-analysis-shows

[2] Christian Aid, Putting our money where our mouth is, November 2024, https://www.christianaid.org.uk/resources/our-work/putting-our-money-where-our-mouth

[3] Labour Party, Britain Reconnected, March 2025, https://labour.org.uk/change/britain-reconnected/

[4] UK Government, UK shows international leadership in tackling climate crisis, November 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-shows-international-leadership-in-tackling-climate-crisis/

[5] Independent Commission for Aid Impact, UK aid’s international climate finance commitments, February 2024, https://icai.independent.gov.uk/review/uk-aids-international-climate-finance-commitments/

Topics

Climate Change

Energy, Environment and Resources

Human Rights

International Development

International Relations and Geopolitics

Op-ed | UK Soft Power and the Soft Power Council

Article by Patrick Stevens

November 5, 2025

Op-ed | UK Soft Power and the Soft Power Council

Earlier this year the Soft Power Council (SPC) was formed to provide concrete and actionable advice and support in the development and delivery of a UK soft power strategy. Comprising of leading experts from outside of government, spanning the arts, culture, and education as well as foreign policy priorities, the SPC is co-chaired by the Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Lisa Nandy.

Soft power is described by some as the power of attraction; it is a reason why people and other states might be drawn to the UK. Happily, the UK is blessed with many such reasons. Our language alone is a huge advantage globally; UK arts, music, and sport are loved the world over; the BBC (and the BBC World Service) provides us with unique levels of access and influence; Shakespeare, the Beatles, Coldplay are loved by billions; the Premier League is one of the world’s greatest brands, as is our reputation for education, science and technology.

More recently, we have also recognised that the UK’s reputation, expertise and leadership in harder edged fields is not only welcomed by partners around the world but also provides significant additional advantages and opportunities (soft power). Despite what often seems like turbulent and discordant times at home, our reputation for the rule of law and justice, a stable democracy, and military leadership, allows the UK to lead on the international stage, be a partner of choice, and attract inward investment.

So, soft power is already recognised as vital to UK growth, prosperity, and national security – if we want other countries to work with us and support us, we need them to value us, and soft power plays a critical part in achieving that. For evidence of this, one only has to look at the UK’s international successes in the last 12 months – trade deals with the US, the EU, and India; securing a more unified approach to NATO and supporting Ukraine through a coalition of the willing; and forging agreements with France and Germany to work together more effectively on irregular migration.

Crucially, in each of these, the objectives were very clear, and the key decision makers and influencers could be identified. Deep and trusted relationships had to be built, and common ground found and agreed. Undoubtedly, all of this was achieved primarily as a result of intensive, sustained and skilled hard work, commitment, and diplomacy by a host of senior and working level ministers, officials and civil servants – both in London and around the globe. But soft power also played its own vital part. Recognising and understanding that contribution is essential if we are to seize the opportunity presented by the SPC and develop a more strategic and targeted approach to soft power.

Even the most basic understanding of international affairs makes it obvious that, in addition to the intense political and diplomatic work, soft power plays a crucial role in advancing the UK’s interests. For example, President Trump’s second state visit in September (and the PM’s visit to the White House and more) was crucial to securing the US trade deal, support for the West in the face of aggression from Russia, and UK input to discussions re the Gaza ceasefire. That’s classic soft power, delivered by some of our greatest soft power assets: the Royal Family and the office of Prime Minister (and their iconic homes).

Similarly, when President Zelensky was met and photographed on the steps of Downing Street – just 24 hours after his disastrous first visit to the White House, an event that is widely credited as a catalyst for getting US/Ukraine back on track – the event’s staging leveraged soft power. The symbolism of that greeting in Downing Street, is a classic use of that UK soft power asset, as is Sir Keir Starmer and President Macron together at the D-Day celebrations or travelling up the Champs Elysees in a tank. Every visit to Chequers by a European leader tells a similar story: this is who we are, and this is the welcome, the support, the history, and friendship the UK offers.

Of course, these are top-level examples, and given their vital importance to the UK, the attention to, and use of, soft power is carefully considered and planned. And this is how I believe the Soft Power Council can add real value to the next level of UK efforts to deliver growth, prosperity, and enhanced security.

The UK has consistently ranked very highly in global soft power. We have the fantastic GREAT campaign that strategically builds on and amplifies our many strengths. But there is undoubted room for improvement in a more tactical and transactional deployment of our many strengths, as too often, the coordinated use of soft power is a secondary or belated consideration. More generally, coordination across government departments in our engagement with soft power partners could be better joined up. This is precisely where the SPC can help: by ensuring UK efforts are more coherent and joined up, and by acting as a super connector between HMG and the UK’s soft power partners, the SPC can better harness and utilise these many assets. Moreover, the SPC can become a go to soft power hub for the whole of HMG when they are planning how best to deliver hard-edged, specific outcomes.

To do this, we need to work very closely with our government leaders and senior civil servants. Ultimately, the onus is on them to recognise this opportunity, identify their priority objectives, and demand our input. With clear objectives, and briefings, the SPC must then deliver bespoke and targeted soft power – just as effectively as HMG has done on the very highest international priorities. And the best thing about all of this is that it does not have to cost very much at all; it is much more about being better joined up, thinking differently, and acting as a team than about expensive new initiatives. It also allows for us to use what is already in existence rather than reinventing the wheel.

Of course, there is much talk about the reduction in our aid budget and its impact on UK soft power (and inevitably a reduction in spending can negatively impact levels of ambition). But the SPC exists to advise the Government on how best to harness and utilise what we do have, rather than to lament what we do not. So, taking the world as it is, the work of the SPC aligns clearly with the four stated shifts in UK aid support (as set out by Baroness Chapman in her recent essay for the Fabian Society).^[1] These include partnering closely with countries to unlock growth and drive innovative finance and private sector investment; focusing on system support, so that we work alongside countries and move from grants to providing expertise, as they build their own education, health, economic, and legal systems. The UK’s soft power strengths, our world-class universities, and expertise in finance, law, health, and technology, perfectly aligns with this approach, enabling us to support others through partnership and shared expertise.

Working together in this way and demonstrating the SPC’s added value to securing and deploying soft power in a manner that helps HMG deliver on its most important objectives over the next year or so, is the true marker of success. We all know that the UK is ‘Great’, but the challenge is to now use all those things that make us great in a strategic, impact-driven, and focused way.

When we reach the point where, whenever our government partners think about their priority objectives and how to achieve them, and one of their first thoughts is “We need the support of the Soft Power Council”, then we will be able to confidently say that we are delivering on our remit.

Patrick Stevens is Rule of Law Director at International Justice Development. He is an internationally renowned leader in justice development and delivery with two decades of unrivalled experience. After leading some of the UK’s most sensitive and serious terrorism cases in the unprecedented period immediately post 9/11, Patrick helped set up and lead the Crown Prosecution Service’s (CPS) International Division for over a decade. As the CPS’s first International Director, Patrick developed a global network of justice advisors and international engagement that delivered strategic and operational Rule of Law improvement at the heart of the UK’s national security effort worldwide. He now works as a justice development consultant for International Justice Development Ltd and is a member of the UK’s Soft Power Council.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Fabian Society, Promising development: The future of aid in an uncertain world, September 2025, https://fabians.org.uk/publication/promising-development/

Topics

International Relations and Geopolitics

Soft Power

Regions

Europe

United Kingdom

Op-ed | Trump’s Central Asia Gambit

Article by Dr Alex Folkes

November 4, 2025

A well placed source in the US Government has told the Reuters News Agency that President Trump will be meeting with the leaders of the five central Asian states on 6th November.^[1] Is the US serious about being involved in the region, or is it more a political gambit?

The source said that the purpose of his discussions with the leaders of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan would be trade and security guarantees. Not surprising, but disappointingly, Trump, like previous Western leaders approaching this region, appears to have failed to include the third pillar of values: democracy and human rights.

There are few regions of the world more in need of trade and customs reform than Central Asia. Bureaucracy, corruption and officialdom do more than anything else to stymie the economic development of these countries. Whilst Kazakhstan, in particular, has developed strong relations on the basis of its extractive industries and has attracted Western investment and partnerships, regional trade is beset with difficulties. For instance, many agricultural products cannot effectively reach their market before they rot as they are held up by domestic corruption, customs delays, and logistical hardship.

President Trump is not, of course, particularly interested in Uzbek cherries. But he is concerned about the investment that American firms have made in the region’s oil and gas industries, as well as sales of high-value goods such as commercial aircraft. He also appears to believe that there are untapped rare earth resources in the region – not an unreasonable assumption. Unlocking access to these would give him more of a hand to play in negotiations with China, the world’s prime producer and refiner of such products. So whilst his trade dealings with President Xi appear to be making progress, having some form of back-up plan seems wise.

Pretty obviously, any mention of the Central Asian states also raises hackles with President Vladimir Putin. Still viewed as Russia’s zone of influence by the Kremlin, all previous attempts at a customs union or other forms of export liberalisation have been ended either by, or at the behest of, the Russian leader. Even the region’s most powerful figure, former President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, found his efforts in this area kiboshed.

If the USA can get a meaningful trade deal with China over the line – and the mood music (but it is no more than that) at this time seems promising – then that is the greatest prize. But opening a dialogue with the Central Asian leaders gives Trump leverage with China and signals his annoyance with the failure of President Putin to make meaningful steps toward peace in Ukraine.

Alex Folkes is an international election observer and analyst. He has worked for a range of election observation bodies including OSCE/ODIHR, the EU, IRI and the Carter Center across the former Soviet states and South Asia. In addition he has worked on projects concerned with the influence of online campaigning and social media in elections. Previously, Alex worked for the Electoral Reform Society where he led projects on electoral fraud and has led capacity building projects with political parties in developing democracies.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Reuters, Trump to meet with Central Asian leaders next week, source says, October 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/trump-uzbekistans-president-meet-next-week-us-official-says-2025-10-28/

Topics

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Asia

Central Asia

United States and Canada

United States

Central Asia

Op-ed | If we value Democracy, we have to end impunity for those who kill journalists

Article by Fiona O'Brien

November 3, 2025

Op-ed | If we value Democracy, we have to end impunity for those who kill journalists

A dozen years ago, in 2013, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on the safety of journalists which proclaimed 2 November as the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists.^[1] Not the most catchy of names, admittedly, but intended as a line in the sand, and a formal recognition that attacks on journalists cannot go unpunished, because when they do, further violence becomes all the more likely.

The UN was correct in its evaluation: impunity is not just an injustice to the victims of crimes, it is a carte blanche for perpetrators. And when we are talking about crimes against journalists – given the vital role of the press in underpinning democracy – allowing impunity to flourish means accepting that human rights and democratic freedoms are undermined.

What a tragedy, then, that 12 years after that UN resolution, the world has made no progress at all towards ending impunity for crimes against journalists. The data is shocking: according to UNESCO, of the more than 1,700 cases of journalists killed around the world between 2006 and 2024, around 85 per cent never even made it to court. Some estimates are even higher.^[2]

Right now, in 2025, the world is more dangerous for journalists than ever. As Reporters Without Borders (RSF) marked 2 November once again, on our minds were the 546 journalists and media workers imprisoned worldwide, and the 56 who have been killed this year. And beyond physical threats, journalists face rampant harassment online, abusive lawsuits, the pursuit of their families, intrusive surveillance, and a raft of other online and offline tactics used to silence them.^[3] While conflict and authoritarian crackdowns are often the most proximate cause, it is entrenched impunity which emboldens those who attack the press.

There has been no more glaring example of this than Gaza, where, since October 2023, Israeli forces have killed more than 200 journalists, more than 50 of whom were either deliberately targeted or killed while working.^[4] Israel has also denied Gazan journalists vital medical evacuations, spread lies to discredit them, blocked international colleagues from reinforcing them, stopped organisations like RSF from sending protective equipment, and targeted the infrastructure they need to report. All with complete impunity.

Like everything about the war in Gaza, the scale of Israel’s attacks on journalists has defied comprehension – but they did not come out of nowhere. Long before the current war, RSF filed complaints to the International Criminal Court (ICC) about Israeli attacks on journalists: in 2018, after two journalists were killed and 18 wounded; in 2021, following Israeli air strikes on more than 20 media outlets in Gaza; and in 2022 when it supported an Al Jazeera complaint about the fatal shooting of journalist Shireen Abu Akleh.^[5] An investigation by the Committee to Protect Journalists meanwhile found that between 2001-2022, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed at least 20 journalists, 18 of whom were Palestinians.^[6]

The fact that no one was ever held accountable for any of these crimes not only shows how deeply embedded the culture of impunity is, it laid the ground for the subsequent horror unfolding in Gaza. The failure to hold Israel to account was effectively a silent invitation to Israel to do even more of the same. Impunity has far-reaching and devastating consequences.

Gaza may be the most stark example of how entrenched impunity plays out, but it is far from the only one. Across the world, journalists are being killed, detained, tortured, harassed or otherwise attacked, with few consequences for their oppressors. In Mexico, for example, one of the most dangerous countries in which to be a journalist, state failures to ensure the protection of at-risk journalists and the ineffectiveness of prosecutors means few have been brought to justice for the violence which has seen more than 150 journalists murdered since 2000.^[7] In Sudan, those who harass and attack journalists are often protected by the authorities and enjoy total impunity.^[8] Even right here in the UK, justice has yet to be served for the 2001 murder of Sunday World journalist Martin O’Hagan or the killing of investigative journalist Lyra McKee in 2019.^[9] Press freedom worldwide is declining, and impunity incubates that decline.

So what do we do?

As UN Secretary-General António Guterres once again used 2 November to call for justice for journalists, international promises ring increasingly hollow. Low public trust in media, economic uncertainty, and turbulent and divided politics provide a depressing backdrop.^[10] But the bottom line is that we cannot afford to give up. Because ultimately, this is not a story about journalists at all: it is a story about our right, as citizens and human beings, to know more of the world around us.

We need to protect journalists, because it is journalists who hold the powerful to account on our behalf, who expose corruption and reveal what is done in all of our names. We need to protect journalists, because good journalism is the antidote to bad governance. Indeed there can be no stronger proof of journalism’s power than the targeting of journalists by those who do not want their wrongdoings exposed.

It is critical therefore that democracies come together to stop those who kill, torture, detain, harass, or otherwise silence journalists. It is not enough for states just to condemn these actions, restate a belief in press freedom, or hide their inertia in statements forgotten as soon as they are heard.

This year, world leaders need to stop talking and start doing: set up a standing International Investigative Task Force, as outlined by the Media Freedom Coalition’s High Level Panel of Legal Experts in 2020, use targeted sanctions, support the ICC, and work together proactively to bring an end to a culture which emboldens hostile actors and chills the press. Investigate, prosecute, and punish. It is time for action, not words. It is time for impunity for crimes against journalists to end.

Fiona O’Brien has been the UK Director of Reporters Without Borders (RSF) since 2023. She started her career as a journalist, working as a foreign correspondent in Africa and the Middle East. She has also worked for the UN as a consultant editor, and ran the MA in Journalism at Kingston University. She is a Fellow of the Higher Education Authority and a member of the Chartered Institute of Editing and Proofreading.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Resolution A/RES/68/163: The Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, December 2013, https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/68/163

^[2] UN News, 85 per cent of journalist killings go unpunished, November 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1156426

^[3] Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Press Freedom Barometer, n.d, https://rsf.org/en/barometer

^[4] RSF, RSF files fifth complaint with ICC about Israeli war crimes against journalists in Gaza, September 2025, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-files-fifth-complaint-icc-about-israeli-war-crimes-against-journalists-gaza

^[5] RSF, RSF asks ICC to investigate Israeli sniper fire on Palestinian journalists, May 2018, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-asks-icc-investigate-israeli-sniper-fire-palestinian-journalists; RSF, RSF asks ICC prosecutor to say whether Israeli airstrikes on media in Gaza constitute war crimes, May 2021, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-asks-icc-prosecutor-say-whether-israeli-airstrikes-media-gaza-constitute-war-crimes; RSF, Shireen Abu Akleh’s murder: RSF alongside Al Jazeera to support its complaint before the ICC, September 2022, https://rsf.org/en/shireen-abu-akleh-s-murder-rsf-alongside-al-jazeera-support-its-complaint-icc

^[6] Committee to Protect Journalists, Deadly Pattern: 20 journalists died by Israeli military fire in 22 years. No one has been held accountable, May 2023, https://cpj.org/reports/2023/05/deadly-pattern-20-journalists-died-by-israeli-military-fire-in-22-years-no-one-has-been-held-accountable/

^[7] RSF, Mexico, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/country/mexico

^[8] RSF, Sudan, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/country/sudan

^[9] RSF, United Kingdom, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/country/united-kingdom

^[10] United Nations Information Service (UNIS), Message for the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists, October 2025, https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2025/unissgsm1542.html

Topics

Freedom of Expression

Human Rights

Media and Online Freedom

Op-ed | British Soft Power and increasing defence: Holding the pen on gender in an age of violence

Article by Anna Chernova

October 31, 2025

Op-ed | British Soft Power and increasing defence: Holding the pen on gender in an age of violence

This 31st October marks 25 years since the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) – a key commitment articulating how the international community plans to pursue gender equality in war. Feminist movements, mainstream civil society organisations, and allies had long campaigned for a framework, bringing together wide-ranging equality agendas, aspiring to shift norms and mandates of established institutions, and foreign policy agendas.

Despite shortcomings highlighted by feminist movements, this Resolution demonstrated states’ formal commitments to inclusion and participation, conflict prevention, protection from gender-based violence, and gender-sensitive relief and recovery efforts. 25 years later, the international community is marking this milestone against a backdrop of widespread backsliding in gender equality, democracy, and the rules-based international order.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the penholder for the WPS agenda, the UK has been an important champion, engaging not only states but also civil society and academia in a robust policy effort to protect gains in securing gender rights in peace and security, and investing significant political capital and public resources.

Looking ahead to 2030, what can the UK do to mitigate risks to this long track record? As the US, a key UK ally in peace and security, takes a sharp turn to the right and intentionally moves away from gender, peace and security, and the wider inclusion agenda, can the UK avoid a scenario where gender equality is sacrificed in foreign policy terms, falling behind other national security priorities such as economic and military objectives?

Gender in peace and security – domestic and foreign policy contexts

There has been a general assumption that the liberal norms underpinning much of the international rules-based order align with human development trajectories and are generally linear. However, to better understand violence and conflict, it is important to see societies as complex systems following nonlinear trajectories generated by the interactions, decisions, and actions of multiple actors.^[1] The Sustainable Development Goals themselves have come under criticism for applying causal assumptions and anticipating human development trajectories to remain broadly linear.^[2] Yet, as with the societies in which they unfold, the pathways to peace seldom are straightforward.^[3] Similarly, the humanitarian and human rights communities have cautioned against the belief that advances in gender equality and human rights will automatically continue.^[4] Many rights-based institutions now assess that civic space is shrinking, and gender equality is backsliding and facing a wider backlash.^[5]

As economic pressures loom, the international community, including traditional donor champions of gender-responsive aid funding (like the UK), is reducing aid budgets. Women’s rights organisations have been raising concerns that cuts to Official Development Assistance (ODA) will undermine gender equality gains in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.^[6] In considering how the UK ties its foreign aid to returns on investments, the UK should carefully consider gendered impacts of such policies, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings, where protracted violence exacerbates existing inequalities.^[7] The rise in European defence spending amidst increasing global arms transfers, combined with declining ODA and other negative global trends impacting equality, runs the risk of bringing about a more securitised and militarised approach to domestic and foreign policy-making – relegating gender equality in peace and security to second-tier priorities.^[8]

Evaluating the UK’s work as the UNSC penholder on WPS

In foreign policy and international development circles, the UK is often seen as an important soft power stakeholder. Through its cross-Government support to women’s rights organisations, the UK has contributed to strengthening the status of women in institutions from Somalia to Yemen.^[9] The UK has helped shaped global narratives around survivor-centred and justice-focused approaches on issues of conflict-related sexual violence.^[10] From public broadcasting, to active civil society and academic thought leadership, British soft power has traditionally been considered an asset for influencing, building collective goodwill and finding non-military solutions to conflicts, therefore reducing reliance on aggressive coercive or military measures.^[11]

As penholder of the WPS agenda, civil society stakeholders hold the UK domestic and foreign policies to a particularly high standard. Critics expressed dismay that the UK co-sponsored a UN Resolution with a key ally in the Gulf, the UAE, which some viewed as a setback on issues of human rights and security, at risk of implicitly endorsing a growing global reactionary movement.^[12] Given the WPS agenda is often criticised for failing to fully address root causes of militarism and violence, the UK’s record on arms control record and historical foreign policy should prompt some self-reflection.^[13]

With the 2024 change in Government, many civil society stakeholders anticipated a policy shift toward a more progressive approach to gender and inclusion. However, the ODA cuts, combined and implicitly linked to a sharp increase in defence spending, surprised many, with some viewing these changes as strongly reactionary to the sea-change in the US and serving as a test for the new UK Government.

WPS advocates criticised the Government for missed opportunities in transformative change, with commitment to “progressive realism” appearing mainly “realist.”^[14] Recent Parliamentary inquiries continued to recognise the historical track record and rhetorical commitments of the UK to the WPS agenda at the UNSC, but pressed the UK to go further. The Government has been encouraged to strengthen its UN Security Council statements, resolutions and mandates by including measurable and concrete commitments which protect language around women’s inclusion and health.^[15]

How can the UK advance the WPS agenda at the UN

In addition to thematic UN Security Council penholding (WPS and Protection of Civilians), the UK also leads on key geographic files (e.g. Myanmar and Yemen). This uniquely positions the UK to ensure that gender dimensions are integrated in high-level peace and security dialogues for these conflict-affected states.^[16] For instance, the UK has been recognised by some for its progressive leadership on gender and inclusion in Yemen’s political settlements and peace processes, and for maintaining attention on a complex and often forgotten conflict and ensuing humanitarian crisis.^[17] With regard to Myanmar, the UK has convened UN Security Council meetings, managed to put forward diplomatically significant UN resolutions and joined international legal actions^[18] that continue to shed light on the injustice of conflict and suffering. However, has also been criticised for at times shying away from facilitating important debates for fears it may undermine future consensus, as well as inconsistent follow-up to these diplomatic initiatives.^[19]

As it faces a potential reduction in soft power due to cuts to ODA, the UK should consider how to improve synergies between its geographic and thematic files in the Security Council in ways that address national, regional and global challenges in gender, peace and security.

Humanitarian agencies, peacebuilding and research institutions have raised alarms over the changing nature of conflict, with implications for gender inequalities, forced displacement and the protracted nature of violence.^[20] For example, in an increasingly digital world, gendered cyber threats disproportionately impact women and the LGBTQI+ community.^[21]

The UN’s WPS thematic Resolutions are credited with increased reflection of gender perspectives in peace agreements, grounded in evidence that more inclusive peace agreements tend to be more long-lasting and sustainable.^[22] Evidence demonstrates that multilateral (e.g. UN) leadership and provisions for inclusion of women in post-conflict societies significantly reduces conflict recurrence (outweighing other factors such as geopolitics).^[23] As the world grows more unequal and the gender rollback takes hold, it is safe to assume that the gendered nature of conflict (in digital and physical spaces) will need to remain in focus.^[24]

Given critical and rapid negative shifts in US foreign policy on gender and conflict, some experts have called for greater multi-lateral engagement among middle powers (e.g. through mini-lateralism) of like-minded states to lend new impetus to the WPS agenda.^[25] Given the UK’s strong track record in penholding the international community on gender, peace and security, the next few years will be a key test of the UK’s commitment to upholding these values within its foreign policy.^[26]

In addition to championing issues of gender and human security, the UK is often perceived (Brexit aside) as a strategic partner in collective security and wider regional cooperation. As a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the UK’s approach to human security and stabilisation continues to be important to the wider European security architecture.^[27] Amid geopolitical shifts, the UK is well placed to ensure that its UNSC WPS penholding role goes beyond rhetoric, and is also reflected in national defence and security strategies, as well as forms part of strategic US, NATO, and EU security policy dialogues.^[28] The concepts of human security, peace and gender strongly intersect to mutually benefit foreign policy while also boosting domestic legitimacy through civilian harm mitigation and a more holistic approach to national and collective defence.^[29]

Domesticating the WPS Agenda

To be a credible leader on WPS there are also key steps that need to be taken domestically. Beyond the important areas identified by the UK National Plan for Women, Peace and Security, HMG must ensure their whole-of- society approach to defence and societal resilience is gender-responsive, acknowledging the different ways violence can affect women and youth.^[30] The UK’s historical approach of viewing human development and defence through the human security prism allows for a deeper, context-specific, gender-sensitive, and more anticipatory analysis of transnational threats and the trends that drive them.^[31] Exploring intersectional drivers of inequalities, including gender inequalities (e.g. exclusion) as threats to national and global peace and security should remain a key focus of UK policy and form part of its UN Security Council role as WPS penholder.^[32] The cohesion of asylum and migration policies (bridging the divide between foreign policy and its domestic implications) and the violence against women and girls agenda (VAWG) must also be addressed to strengthen our leadership on gender equality.^[33]

In marking the 25^th anniversary of the UN Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security, the UK reiterated its commitment to this Agenda, noting that the gendered impacts of conflict and reproductive violence exacerbate humanitarian and health crises – building the case for greater engagement of human development agendas in peace and conflict efforts.^[34] Building on evidence in domestic and foreign policy, the UK is well- placed to champion gender, peace and security efforts in multi-lateral spaces – making the case that inclusion contributes to global peace, prosperity and stability.

Anna Chernova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre. She has a background in human rights, democracy, conflict resolution and humanitarian issues. She served as Programme Director for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, where she led the work of the General Committee for human rights and democracy. Specialising in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Anna directed the work of the OSCE PA on the Human Dimension – including numerous election observation missions, as well as freedom of the media, association and assembly, and INTERPOL reform. She advised on the establishment of the Kyrgyzstan International Inquiry Commission and lead work on democratisation in Belarus and parliamentary diplomacy around the Transdniestrian conflict. Prior to joining the OSCE PA, Anna managed large-scale humanitarian programmes in Russia’s North Caucasus at the close of the second Chechen war, and worked on refugee issues with UNHCR in Bulgaria. Since 2014, she has been advising Oxfam on working in fragile and conflict affected contexts, developing policy and programmes on inclusive peace, rights-based global campaigning, civic space, active citizenship, humanitarian access and comprehensive human security in the Middle East, Eurasia and beyond.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, 2018, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/4c36fca6-c7e0-5927-b171-468b0b236b59

[2] Elvind Engebretsen, Trisha Greenhalgh, Missed SDG targets: from ‘trying harder’ to engaging critically with paradox and conflict, Critical Public Health, Vol. 35, February 2025, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09581596.2025.2463465#d1e138

[3] World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, 2018, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/4c36fca6-c7e0-5927-b171-468b0b236b59

[4] Amnesty International, Annual Report Warns of Global Human Rights Crisis as ‘Trump Effect’ Accelerates Destructive Trends, April 2025, https://www.amnesty.ie/annual-report-launch/

[5] United Nations Office of the High commissioner for Human Rights, Protecting and expanding civic space, https://www.ohchr.org/en/civic-space; Saskia Brechenmacher, The New Global Struggle Over Gender, Rights, and Family Values, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/06/the-new-global-struggle-over-gender-rights-and-family-values

[6] The Fabian Society, Promising Development: the Future of Aid in an Uncertain World, September 2025, https://fabians.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/International-development-ll.pdf

[7] UK Parliament, Women, Peace and Security Bill Volume 840, November 2024 https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2024-11-15/debates/2194D3EA-9FA2-43CA-9386-CB03A7650D72/WomenPeaceAndSecurityBill(HL)

[8] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Trends in International Arms Transfers, March 2025, https://www.sipri.org/publications/2025/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2024; NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, 2025 Open letter to Permanent Representatives to the United Nations in advance of the annual Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security, September 2025, https://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/resource/open-letter-un-wps-2025/; Gender Action for Peace and Security UK, Assessing UK Government Action on Women, Peace and Security in 2024, 2025, https://gaps-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Assessing-UK-Government-Action-of-Women-Peace-and-Security-in-2024.pdf

[9] UK FCDO and MoD, Corporate Report: Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan, report to Parliament 2024-2025,https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/women-peace-and-security-national-action-plan-report-to-parliament-2024-to-2025/women-peace-and-security-national-action-plan-report-to-parliament-2024-to-2025

[10] Gender Action for Peace and Security UK, Assessing UK Government Action on Women, Peace and Security in 2024, https://gaps-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Assessing-UK-Government-Action-of-Women-Peace-and-Security-in-2024.pdf

[11] Poppy Ogier, The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy, The Foreign Policy Centre, Spetember 2025, https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/FPC-report-Playing-to-our-strengths-September-2025.pdf

[12] Saskia Brechenmacher, New UN Security Council Resolution on ‘Human fraternity’ Raises Human Rights Concerns, Just Security, June 2023, https://www.justsecurity.org/86993/new-un-security-council-resolution-on-human-fraternity-raises-human-rights-concerns/

[13] GAPS et al, Putting Women’s Rights into the Arms Trade Treaty, June 2012, https://gaps-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/GAPS-Putting-Womens-Rights-into-the-Arms-Trade-Treaty-June-2012.pdf; Oxfam, Researchers without Borders, Beyond Rhetoric: Feminist Leadership for a Transformative Women, Peace and Security Agenda at 25, October 2025, https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2025-10/Beyond%20Rhetoric%20WPS%20at%2025.pdf and Oxfam, Veoting Humanity: How a few powerful nations hijacked global peace and why reform is needed at the UN Security Counci, September 2024, https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/621621/bp-vetoing-humanity-190924-en.pdf;jsessionid=2664AFEB2F8EF483AAE882C400E44539

[14] GAPS UK, Written Evidence Submission, Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry into the UK at the United Nations Security Council, https://committees.parliament.uk/work/9001/the-uk-at-the-united-nations-security-council/publications/

[15] UK House of Commons, The write to protect: Britain’s pen on the world stage, Foreign Affairs Committee Second Report of Session 2024-2026 HC 930, September 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49593/documents/264116/default/

[16] GAPS UK, Written Evidence Submission, Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry into the UK at the United Nations Security Council, 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/work/9001/the-uk-at-the-united-nations-security-council/publications/

[17] UK House of Commons, The write to protect: Britain’s pen on the world stage, Foreign Affairs Committee Second Report of Session 2024-2026 HC 930, September 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49593/documents/264116/default/; UK FCDO Statement, The United Kingdom condemns the detentions of at least 22 United Nations personnel by the Houthis: UK statement at the UN Security Council, September 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-united-kingdom-condemns-the-detentions-of-at-least-22-united-nations-personnel-by-the-houthis-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council

[18] Burma Campaign, UK Welcomes British Government Joining ICJ Rohingya Genocide Case, August 2022, https://burmacampaign.org.uk/burma-campaign-uk-welcomes-british-government-joining-icj-rohingya-genocide-case/; UK House of Commons, The write to protect: Britain’s pen on the world stage, Foreign Affairs Committee Second Report of Session 2024-2026 HC 930, September 2025,

[19] UK House of Commons, The write to protect: Britain’s pen on the world stage, Foreign Affairs Committee Second Report of Session 2024-2026 HC 930, September 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49593/documents/264116/default/

[20] PRIO, New data shows conflict at historic high as US signals retreat from world stage, June 2025, https://www.prio.org/news/3616

[21] Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, “Gendering Cybersecurity through Women, Peace and Security: Gender and Human Rights in National-level Approaches to Cybersecurity, March 2023, https://ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Gendering-Cybersecurity-through-WPS-Final-Report_March-2023.pdf

[22] Westminster Foundation for Democracy’s, Written evidence to the International Development Committee enquiry on women, peace and security, May 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/141896/pdf/

[23] University of Birmingham, Learning from Failure: How to Prevent Civil War Recurrence, https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/about/college-of-social-sciences/policy-engagement/learning-from-failure-how-to-prevent-civil-war-recurrence

[24] Kristina Wilfore, The Digital War on Women Peacemakers: Why This Moment Calls for Doubling Down on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, Council on Foreign Relations, July 2025, https://www.cfr.org/blog/digital-war-women-peacemakers-why-moment-calls-doubling-down-women-peace-and-security-agenda

[25] Cristal Downing, The WPS Agenda Needs Strong Wills to Counter Rough Headwinds, October 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/wps-agenda-needs-strong-wills-counter-rough-headwinds

[26] Paul Kirby, Hannah Wright and Aisling Swaine, The Future of the UK’s Women, Peace and Security Policy, LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security, July 2022, https://www.lse.ac.uk/women-peace-security/assets/documents/2022/W922-0167-WPS-Policy-Paper-7-V4-SINGLES.pdf

[27] NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, June 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

[28] UK House of Commons, The write to protect: Britain’s pen on the world stage, Foreign Affairs Committee Second Report of Session 2024-2026 HC 930, September 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49593/documents/264116/default/

[29] Alexander Gilder, Human Security Must Remain on the NATO Agenda, Rethinking Security, July 2025, https://rethinkingsecurity.org.uk/2025/07/15/human-security-must-remain-on-the-nato-agenda/

[30] Katharine A.M. Wright, Realising Societal Resilience for a Whole of Society Approach to Defence, Royal United Services Institute, October 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/realising-societal-resilience-whole-society-approach-defence

[31] Ministry of Defence, Global Strategic Trends Out to 2055, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68dba439dadf7616351e4bf8/GST_7_Final_post_pic_change_WEB.pdf

[32] Jessica White, Isabella Vogel and Balazs Gyimesi, The Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Today’s Geopolitical Environment, Royal United Services Institute, March 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/women-peace-and-security-agenda-todays-geopolitical-environment

[33] Gender Action for Peace and Security UK, Assessing UK Government Action on Women, Peace and Security in 2024, https://gaps-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Assessing-UK-Government-Action-of-Women-Peace-and-Security-in-2024.pdf

[34] UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, The UK remains steadfast in our commitment to advancing the Women, Peace and Security agenda globally, UK at the UN Security Council, October 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-remains-steadfast-in-our-commitment-to-advancing-the-women-peace-and-security-agenda-globally-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council

Topics

Human Rights

Women's Rights

Regions

Europe

United Kingdom

Op-ed |Georgian Elections: Unpacking the fallout of 4th October

Article by Davit Jintcharadze

October 30, 2025

Op-ed |Georgian Elections: Unpacking the fallout of 4th October

On 4th October 2025, Georgia held local elections that will be remembered for many reasons, but not for the actual outcome. These elections broke new ground – only 41% of the population cast their votes, as the majority of the parties decided to boycott the process. Traditionally, local elections in Georgia were never too popular. As a highly centralised state, Georgia has seen repeated – but unsuccessful – attempts by some opposition parties to push for federalisation.

Still, the 4th October elections were different. They were taking place almost a year after Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, had manipulated the results in parliamentary elections that were widely seen as a choice between a pro-Russian and pro-European trajectory. Since then, the ruling party has suspended negotiations with the EU, violently cracked down on protests, and introduced several pieces of repressive legislation. At the time the electoral campaign was announced, Georgia had more than 60 prisoners of conscience in its jails — now it’s closer to 120.

According to the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), the legislative changes to these elections have made the conditions worse than for the previous elections, which were already considered neither free nor fair by the majority of the international observers, the opposition, and Georgia’s 5th President.^[1] Georgian Dream scrapped the 40% threshold required for the majoritarian seats, increased the number of majoritarian seats in each city council, and increased the threshold necessary for a party to make it to the local government. These changes meant that statistically, it would be almost impossible for smaller opposition parties to compete.

The recent introduction of the ‘foreign agents law’ and the law that requires all foreign funding to get the government’s approval before it is paid to the beneficiary nonprofits means that observing these elections has become extremely difficult. Further changes introduced have limited the rights of the election observers, effectively giving Georgian Dream an unfair advantage in these and any future elections. Combined with ongoing issues such as vote buying, multiple-voting, and carousels present in Georgia’s elections, the prospect for free or fair elections was diminished.

The opposition faced a choice — boycotting elections and empowering the protest, or participating under a unified candidate. In nonviolent resistance under authoritarian regimes, unity, discipline, and strategic planning are essential. A full boycott would have been a strategic decision — undermining the legitimacy of the process and reinforcing the idea that, after the fiasco of previous parliamentary elections, the electoral way of changing the regime is no longer an option.

However, a unified opposition response was not achieved — the growing authoritarianism, as well as more repressive laws that made it impossible for independent observers to monitor the elections, forced eight opposition parties to boycott the local elections. In contrast, two other parties – ‘Lelo – Strong Georgia’ and ‘Gakharia – For Georgia’ – chose to contest the elections in several municipalities.

The results were not surprising. Incumbent mayor, Kakha Kaladze, got more than 70% of the votes as the majority of the people followed the parties into a boycott. In actual terms, Kaladze got only 20% of the votes from the total population of Tbilisi.

Some groups affiliated with the United National Movement (UNM) scheduled a parallel event on 4th October, announcing a peaceful revolution on the day. The attempt largely failed, with a small group of people attempting to storm the presidential palace, but it was unclear who these people were, as the majority of the protesters had taken to the streets near the Georgian parliament and peacefully protested the elections that they saw as neither free nor fair. Some argue that this was a setup: the government deliberately left access points open, making it easier for a small group of people to enter the garden of the presidential palace, and then cracked down on them afterwards. In the aftermath of 4th October, more than 60 people were prosecuted under the charges of an attempted coup.

The ‘attempted revolution’, as well as the local elections, created a tense reality for both civil society and the opposition. As unity wasn’t achieved prior to the elections, the opposition is risking repeating the mistakes made by their colleagues in Belarus and fragmenting themselves even further. One bloc, the seven parties along with the former President, Salome Zourabichvili, have distanced themselves both from the 4th October attempted revolution and from the local elections. The UNM, meanwhile, is seen as a separate political center in its own right. The parties that decided to participate, on the other hand, have blamed the boycott supporters and proclaimed that they only believe in the change of power through elections. Understandably, mutual blame currently clouds the political landscape, and a challenge remains in moving the resistance movement forward strategically.

The boycott was arguably the right decision. As the Georgian Dream government delegitimised elections, clinging to them for the simulation of the democratic process just prolongs the crisis and wastes resources on battles that are predetermined. Empowering the protest and unifying different factions under the nonviolent resistance umbrella is the only viable solution. At the same time, the fragmented responses harm the common battle, and it is easy to overanalyse the events and find people to blame, with all three segments of the opposition blaming the other two. An important question to ask now is not who was right about 4th October, but what should be done next.

Specific activities are hard to plan, but the overall strategy is simple: unity, strategic planning, and discipline. These three core components can help civic groups and activists in Georgia avoid fragmentation. These same strategies proved effective in Serbia, Ukraine, and in Georgia itself back in 2003 – and are still effective today.^[2]

Unity does not mean that all political parties should agree on the same candidate or the same strategy; it means most parties, organisations, and activists agreeing on core principles and distancing themselves from those who undermine them. Strategic planning means focusing on the resources already available rather than on the ones it would like to have – as hard as this can sound. Finally, discipline means directing the limited resources toward the main challenges and identifying potential allies in the new post-4th October reality. Without these three components, any resistance movement is destined to fail.

Davit Jintcharadze is a fellow at Newspeak House and the founder of Freedom Fund, a crowdsourcing initiative to aid the protesters in Georgia. He holds a BA in psychology from New York University and a MA in psychotherapy from the University of Cambridge. Before becoming a member of Georgia’s resistance movement, he was researching the psychological factors influencing people’s voting behaviours.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Civil Georgia, ISFED: Election Law changes tilt October 4 vote further toward Georgian Dream, August 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/697904

^[2] Centre for Applied NonViolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), 50 Crucial Points: A Strategic Approach to Everyday Tactics, 2006, https://canvasopedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/50-Crucial-Points-web.pdf

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Georgia

South Caucasus

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Op-ed |Georgian Elections: Unpacking the fallout of 4th October

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