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Op-ed | British Soft Power and increasing defence: Holding the pen on gender in an age of violence

Article by Anna Chernova

October 31, 2025

Op-ed | British Soft Power and increasing defence: Holding the pen on gender in an age of violence

This 31st October marks 25 years since the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) – a key commitment articulating how the international community plans to pursue gender equality in war. Feminist movements, mainstream civil society organisations, and allies had long campaigned for a framework, bringing together wide-ranging equality agendas, aspiring to shift norms and mandates of established institutions, and foreign policy agendas.

 

Despite shortcomings highlighted by feminist movements, this Resolution demonstrated states’ formal commitments to inclusion and participation, conflict prevention, protection from gender-based violence, and gender-sensitive relief and recovery efforts. 25 years later, the international community is marking this milestone against a backdrop of widespread backsliding in gender equality, democracy, and the rules-based international order.

 

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the penholder for the WPS agenda, the UK has been an important champion, engaging not only states but also civil society and academia in a robust policy effort to protect gains in securing gender rights in peace and security, and investing significant political capital and public resources.

 

Looking ahead to 2030, what can the UK do to mitigate risks to this long track record? As the US, a key UK ally in peace and security, takes a sharp turn to the right and intentionally moves away from gender, peace and security, and the wider inclusion agenda, can the UK avoid a scenario where gender equality is sacrificed in foreign policy terms, falling behind other national security priorities such as economic and military objectives?

 

Gender in peace and security – domestic and foreign policy contexts

There has been a general assumption that the liberal norms underpinning much of the international rules-based order align with human development trajectories and are generally linear. However, to better understand violence and conflict, it is important to see societies as complex systems following nonlinear trajectories generated by the interactions, decisions, and actions of multiple actors.[1] The Sustainable Development Goals themselves have come under criticism for applying causal assumptions and anticipating human development trajectories to remain broadly linear.[2] Yet, as with the societies in which they unfold, the pathways to peace seldom are straightforward.[3] Similarly, the humanitarian and human rights communities have cautioned against the belief that advances in gender equality and human rights will automatically continue.[4] Many rights-based institutions now assess that civic space is shrinking, and gender equality is backsliding and facing a wider backlash.[5]

 

As economic pressures loom, the international community, including traditional donor champions of gender-responsive aid funding (like the UK), is reducing aid budgets. Women’s rights organisations have been raising concerns that cuts to Official Development Assistance (ODA) will undermine gender equality gains in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.[6] In considering how the UK ties its foreign aid to returns on investments, the UK should carefully consider gendered impacts of such policies, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected settings, where protracted violence exacerbates existing inequalities.[7] The rise in European defence spending amidst increasing global arms transfers, combined with declining ODA and other negative global trends impacting equality, runs the risk of bringing about a more securitised and militarised approach to domestic and foreign policy-making – relegating gender equality in peace and security to second-tier priorities.[8]

 

Evaluating the UK’s work as the UNSC penholder on WPS

In foreign policy and international development circles, the UK is often seen as an important soft power stakeholder. Through its cross-Government support to women’s rights organisations, the UK has contributed to strengthening the status of women in institutions from Somalia to Yemen.[9] The UK has helped shaped global narratives around survivor-centred and justice-focused approaches on issues of conflict-related sexual violence.[10] From public broadcasting, to active civil society and academic thought leadership, British soft power has traditionally been considered an asset for influencing, building collective goodwill and finding non-military solutions to conflicts, therefore reducing reliance on aggressive coercive or military measures.[11]

 

As penholder of the WPS agenda, civil society stakeholders hold the UK domestic and foreign policies to a particularly high standard. Critics expressed dismay that the UK co-sponsored a UN Resolution with a key ally in the Gulf, the UAE, which some viewed as a setback on issues of human rights and security, at risk of implicitly endorsing a growing global reactionary movement.[12] Given the WPS agenda is often criticised for failing to fully address root causes of militarism and violence, the UK’s record on arms control record and historical foreign policy should prompt some self-reflection.[13]

 

With the 2024 change in Government, many civil society stakeholders anticipated a policy shift toward a more progressive approach to gender and inclusion. However, the ODA cuts, combined and implicitly linked to a sharp increase in defence spending, surprised many, with some viewing these changes as strongly reactionary to the sea-change in the US and serving as a test for the new UK Government.

 

WPS advocates criticised the Government for missed opportunities in transformative change, with commitment to “progressive realism” appearing mainly “realist.”[14] Recent Parliamentary inquiries continued to recognise the historical track record and rhetorical commitments of the UK to the WPS agenda at the UNSC, but pressed the UK to go further. The Government has been encouraged to strengthen its UN Security Council statements, resolutions and mandates by including measurable and concrete commitments which protect language around women’s inclusion and health.[15]

 

How can the UK advance the WPS agenda at the UN

In addition to thematic UN Security Council penholding (WPS and Protection of Civilians), the UK also leads on key geographic files (e.g. Myanmar and Yemen). This uniquely positions the UK to ensure that gender dimensions are integrated in high-level peace and security dialogues for these conflict-affected states.[16] For instance, the UK has been recognised by some for its progressive leadership on gender and inclusion in Yemen’s political settlements and peace processes, and for maintaining attention on a complex and often forgotten conflict and ensuing humanitarian crisis.[17] With regard to Myanmar, the UK has convened UN Security Council meetings, managed to put forward diplomatically significant UN resolutions and joined international legal actions[18] that continue to shed light on the injustice of conflict and suffering. However, has also been criticised for at times shying away from facilitating important debates for fears it may undermine future consensus, as well as inconsistent follow-up to these diplomatic initiatives.[19]

 

As it faces a potential reduction in soft power due to cuts to ODA, the UK should consider how to improve synergies between its geographic and thematic files in the Security Council in ways that address national, regional and global challenges in gender, peace and security.

 

Humanitarian agencies, peacebuilding and research institutions have raised alarms over the changing nature of conflict, with implications for gender inequalities, forced displacement and the protracted nature of violence.[20]  For example, in an increasingly digital world, gendered cyber threats disproportionately impact women and the LGBTQI+ community.[21]

 

The UN’s WPS thematic Resolutions are credited with increased reflection of gender perspectives in peace agreements, grounded in evidence that more inclusive peace agreements tend to be more long-lasting and sustainable.[22] Evidence demonstrates that multilateral (e.g. UN) leadership and provisions for inclusion of women in post-conflict societies significantly reduces conflict recurrence (outweighing other factors such as geopolitics).[23] As the world grows more unequal and the gender rollback takes hold, it is safe to assume that the gendered nature of conflict (in digital and physical spaces) will need to remain in focus.[24]

 

Given critical and rapid negative shifts in US foreign policy on gender and conflict, some experts have called for greater multi-lateral engagement among middle powers (e.g. through mini-lateralism) of like-minded states to lend new impetus to the WPS agenda.[25] Given the UK’s strong track record in penholding the international community on gender, peace and security, the next few years will be a key test of the UK’s commitment to upholding these values within its foreign policy.[26]

 

In addition to championing issues of gender and human security, the UK is often perceived (Brexit aside) as a strategic partner in collective security and wider regional cooperation. As a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the UK’s approach to human security and stabilisation continues to be important to the wider European security architecture.[27] Amid geopolitical shifts, the UK is well placed to ensure that its UNSC WPS penholding role goes beyond rhetoric, and is also reflected in national defence and security strategies, as well as forms part of strategic US, NATO, and EU security policy dialogues.[28] The concepts of human security, peace and gender strongly intersect to mutually benefit foreign policy while also boosting domestic legitimacy through civilian harm mitigation and a more holistic approach to national and collective defence.[29]

 

Domesticating the WPS Agenda

To be a credible leader on WPS there are also key steps that need to be taken domestically. Beyond the important areas identified by the UK National Plan for Women, Peace and Security, HMG must ensure their whole-of- society approach to defence and societal resilience is gender-responsive, acknowledging the different ways violence can affect women and youth.[30] The UK’s historical approach of viewing human development and defence through the human security prism allows for a deeper, context-specific, gender-sensitive, and more anticipatory analysis of transnational threats and the trends that drive them.[31] Exploring intersectional drivers of inequalities, including gender inequalities (e.g. exclusion) as threats to national and global peace and security should remain a key focus of UK policy and form part of its UN Security Council role as WPS penholder.[32] The cohesion of asylum and migration policies (bridging the divide between foreign policy and its domestic implications) and the violence against women and girls agenda (VAWG) must also be addressed to strengthen our leadership on gender equality.[33]

 

In marking the 25th anniversary of the UN Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security, the UK reiterated its commitment to this Agenda, noting that the gendered impacts of conflict and reproductive violence exacerbate humanitarian and health crises – building the case for greater engagement of human development agendas in peace and conflict efforts.[34] Building on evidence in domestic and foreign policy, the UK is well- placed to champion gender, peace and security efforts in multi-lateral spaces – making the case that inclusion contributes to global peace, prosperity and stability.

 

 

Anna Chernova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre. She  has a background in human rights, democracy, conflict resolution and humanitarian issues. She served as Programme Director for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, where she led the work of the General Committee for human rights and democracy. Specialising in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Anna directed the work of the OSCE PA on the Human Dimension – including numerous election observation missions, as well as freedom of the media, association and assembly, and INTERPOL reform. She advised on the establishment of the Kyrgyzstan International Inquiry Commission and lead work on democratisation in Belarus and parliamentary diplomacy around the Transdniestrian conflict. Prior to joining the OSCE PA, Anna managed large-scale humanitarian programmes in Russia’s North Caucasus at the close of the second Chechen war, and worked on refugee issues with UNHCR in Bulgaria. Since 2014, she has been advising Oxfam on working in fragile and conflict affected contexts, developing policy and programmes on inclusive peace, rights-based global campaigning, civic space, active citizenship, humanitarian access and comprehensive human security in the Middle East, Eurasia and beyond.

 

 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

 

[1] World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, 2018, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/4c36fca6-c7e0-5927-b171-468b0b236b59

[2] Elvind Engebretsen, Trisha Greenhalgh, Missed SDG targets: from ‘trying harder’ to engaging critically with paradox and conflict, Critical Public Health, Vol. 35, February 2025, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09581596.2025.2463465#d1e138

[3] World Bank, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, 2018, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/4c36fca6-c7e0-5927-b171-468b0b236b59

[4] Amnesty International, Annual Report Warns of Global Human Rights Crisis as ‘Trump Effect’ Accelerates Destructive Trends, April 2025, https://www.amnesty.ie/annual-report-launch/

[5] United Nations Office of the High commissioner for Human Rights, Protecting and expanding civic space, https://www.ohchr.org/en/civic-space; Saskia Brechenmacher, The New Global Struggle Over Gender, Rights, and Family Values, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/06/the-new-global-struggle-over-gender-rights-and-family-values

[6] The Fabian Society, Promising Development: the Future of Aid in an Uncertain World, September 2025, https://fabians.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/International-development-ll.pdf

[7] UK Parliament, Women, Peace and Security Bill Volume 840, November 2024 https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2024-11-15/debates/2194D3EA-9FA2-43CA-9386-CB03A7650D72/WomenPeaceAndSecurityBill(HL)

[8] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Trends in International Arms Transfers, March 2025, https://www.sipri.org/publications/2025/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2024; NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, 2025 Open letter to Permanent Representatives to the United Nations in advance of the annual Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security, September 2025, https://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/resource/open-letter-un-wps-2025/; Gender Action for Peace and Security UK, Assessing UK Government Action on Women, Peace and Security in 2024, 2025, https://gaps-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Assessing-UK-Government-Action-of-Women-Peace-and-Security-in-2024.pdf

[9] UK FCDO and MoD, Corporate Report: Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan, report to Parliament 2024-2025,https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/women-peace-and-security-national-action-plan-report-to-parliament-2024-to-2025/women-peace-and-security-national-action-plan-report-to-parliament-2024-to-2025

[10] Gender Action for Peace and Security UK, Assessing UK Government Action on Women, Peace and Security in 2024, https://gaps-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Assessing-UK-Government-Action-of-Women-Peace-and-Security-in-2024.pdf

[11] Poppy Ogier, The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy, The Foreign Policy Centre, Spetember 2025, https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/FPC-report-Playing-to-our-strengths-September-2025.pdf

[12] Saskia Brechenmacher, New UN Security Council Resolution on ‘Human fraternity’ Raises Human Rights Concerns, Just Security, June 2023, https://www.justsecurity.org/86993/new-un-security-council-resolution-on-human-fraternity-raises-human-rights-concerns/

[13] GAPS et al, Putting Women’s Rights into the Arms Trade Treaty, June 2012, https://gaps-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/GAPS-Putting-Womens-Rights-into-the-Arms-Trade-Treaty-June-2012.pdf; Oxfam, Researchers without Borders, Beyond Rhetoric: Feminist Leadership for a Transformative Women, Peace and Security Agenda at 25, October 2025, https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2025-10/Beyond%20Rhetoric%20WPS%20at%2025.pdf and Oxfam, Veoting Humanity: How a few powerful nations hijacked global peace and why reform is needed at the UN Security Counci, September 2024, https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/621621/bp-vetoing-humanity-190924-en.pdf;jsessionid=2664AFEB2F8EF483AAE882C400E44539

[14] GAPS UK, Written Evidence Submission, Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry into the UK at the United Nations Security Council, https://committees.parliament.uk/work/9001/the-uk-at-the-united-nations-security-council/publications/

[15] UK House of Commons, The write to protect: Britain’s pen on the world stage, Foreign Affairs Committee Second Report of Session 2024-2026 HC 930, September 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49593/documents/264116/default/

[16] GAPS UK, Written Evidence Submission, Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry into the UK at the United Nations Security Council, 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/work/9001/the-uk-at-the-united-nations-security-council/publications/

[17] UK House of Commons, The write to protect: Britain’s pen on the world stage, Foreign Affairs Committee Second Report of Session 2024-2026 HC 930, September 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49593/documents/264116/default/; UK FCDO Statement, The United Kingdom condemns the detentions of at least 22 United Nations personnel by the Houthis: UK statement at the UN Security Council, September 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-united-kingdom-condemns-the-detentions-of-at-least-22-united-nations-personnel-by-the-houthis-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council

[18] Burma Campaign, UK Welcomes British Government Joining ICJ Rohingya Genocide Case, August 2022, https://burmacampaign.org.uk/burma-campaign-uk-welcomes-british-government-joining-icj-rohingya-genocide-case/; UK House of Commons, The write to protect: Britain’s pen on the world stage, Foreign Affairs Committee Second Report of Session 2024-2026 HC 930, September 2025,

[19]  UK House of Commons, The write to protect: Britain’s pen on the world stage, Foreign Affairs Committee Second Report of Session 2024-2026 HC 930, September 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49593/documents/264116/default/

[20] PRIO, New data shows conflict at historic high as US signals retreat from world stage, June 2025, https://www.prio.org/news/3616

[21] Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, “Gendering Cybersecurity through Women, Peace and Security: Gender and Human Rights in National-level Approaches to Cybersecurity, March 2023, https://ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Gendering-Cybersecurity-through-WPS-Final-Report_March-2023.pdf

[22] Westminster Foundation for Democracy’s, Written evidence to the International Development Committee enquiry on women, peace and security, May 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/141896/pdf/

[23] University of Birmingham, Learning from Failure: How to Prevent Civil War Recurrence, https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/about/college-of-social-sciences/policy-engagement/learning-from-failure-how-to-prevent-civil-war-recurrence

[24] Kristina Wilfore, The Digital War on Women Peacemakers: Why This Moment Calls for Doubling Down on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, Council on Foreign Relations, July 2025, https://www.cfr.org/blog/digital-war-women-peacemakers-why-moment-calls-doubling-down-women-peace-and-security-agenda

[25] Cristal Downing, The WPS Agenda Needs Strong Wills to Counter Rough Headwinds, October 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/wps-agenda-needs-strong-wills-counter-rough-headwinds

[26] Paul Kirby, Hannah Wright and Aisling Swaine, The Future of the UK’s Women, Peace and Security Policy, LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security, July 2022, https://www.lse.ac.uk/women-peace-security/assets/documents/2022/W922-0167-WPS-Policy-Paper-7-V4-SINGLES.pdf

[27] NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, June 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf

[28] UK House of Commons, The write to protect: Britain’s pen on the world stage, Foreign Affairs Committee Second Report of Session 2024-2026 HC 930, September 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49593/documents/264116/default/

[29] Alexander Gilder, Human Security Must Remain on the NATO Agenda, Rethinking Security, July 2025, https://rethinkingsecurity.org.uk/2025/07/15/human-security-must-remain-on-the-nato-agenda/

[30] Katharine A.M. Wright, Realising Societal Resilience for a Whole of Society Approach to Defence, Royal United Services Institute,  October 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/realising-societal-resilience-whole-society-approach-defence

[31] Ministry of Defence, Global Strategic Trends Out to 2055, 2024, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68dba439dadf7616351e4bf8/GST_7_Final_post_pic_change_WEB.pdf

[32] Jessica White, Isabella Vogel and Balazs Gyimesi, The Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Today’s Geopolitical Environment, Royal United Services Institute, March 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/women-peace-and-security-agenda-todays-geopolitical-environment

[33] Gender Action for Peace and Security UK, Assessing UK Government Action on Women, Peace and Security in 2024, https://gaps-uk.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Assessing-UK-Government-Action-of-Women-Peace-and-Security-in-2024.pdf

[34] UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, The UK remains steadfast in our commitment to advancing the Women, Peace and Security agenda globally, UK at the UN Security Council, October 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-remains-steadfast-in-our-commitment-to-advancing-the-women-peace-and-security-agenda-globally-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council

Topics
Human Rights
Women's Rights
Regions
Europe
United Kingdom
Footnotes
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    Op-ed |Georgian Elections: Unpacking the fallout of 4th October

    Article by Davit Jintcharadze

    October 30, 2025

    Op-ed |Georgian Elections: Unpacking the fallout of 4th October

    On 4th October 2025, Georgia held local elections that will be remembered for many reasons, but not for the actual outcome. These elections broke new ground – only 41% of the population cast their votes, as the majority of the parties decided to boycott the process. Traditionally, local elections in Georgia were never too popular. As a highly centralised state, Georgia has seen repeated – but unsuccessful – attempts by some opposition parties to push for federalisation.

     

    Still, the 4th October elections were different. They were taking place almost a year after Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, had manipulated the results in parliamentary elections that were widely seen as a choice between a pro-Russian and pro-European trajectory. Since then, the ruling party has suspended negotiations with the EU, violently cracked down on protests, and introduced several pieces of repressive legislation. At the time the electoral campaign was announced, Georgia had more than 60 prisoners of conscience in its jails — now it’s closer to 120.

     

    According to the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), the legislative changes to these elections have made the conditions worse than for the previous elections, which were already considered neither free nor fair by the majority of the international observers, the opposition, and Georgia’s 5th President.[1] Georgian Dream scrapped the 40% threshold required for the majoritarian seats, increased the number of majoritarian seats in each city council, and increased the threshold necessary for a party to make it to the local government. These changes meant that statistically, it would be almost impossible for smaller opposition parties to compete.

     

    The recent introduction of the ‘foreign agents law’ and the law that requires all foreign funding to get the government’s approval before it is paid to the beneficiary nonprofits means that observing these elections has become extremely difficult. Further changes introduced have limited the rights of the election observers, effectively giving Georgian Dream an unfair advantage in these and any future elections. Combined with ongoing issues such as vote buying, multiple-voting, and carousels present in Georgia’s elections, the prospect for free or fair elections was diminished.

     

    The opposition faced a choice — boycotting elections and empowering the protest, or participating under a unified candidate. In nonviolent resistance under authoritarian regimes, unity, discipline, and strategic planning are essential. A full boycott would have been a strategic decision — undermining the legitimacy of the process and reinforcing the idea that, after the fiasco of previous parliamentary elections, the electoral way of changing the regime is no longer an option.

     

    However, a unified opposition response was not achieved — the growing authoritarianism, as well as more repressive laws that made it impossible for independent observers to monitor the elections, forced eight opposition parties to boycott the local elections. In contrast, two other parties – ‘Lelo – Strong Georgia’ and ‘Gakharia – For Georgia’ – chose to contest the elections in several municipalities.

     

    The results were not surprising. Incumbent mayor, Kakha Kaladze, got more than 70% of the votes as the majority of the people followed the parties into a boycott. In actual terms, Kaladze got only 20% of the votes from the total population of Tbilisi.

     

    Some groups affiliated with the United National Movement (UNM) scheduled a parallel event on 4th October, announcing a peaceful revolution on the day. The attempt largely failed, with a small group of people attempting to storm the presidential palace, but it was unclear who these people were, as the majority of the protesters had taken to the streets near the Georgian parliament and peacefully protested the elections that they saw as neither free nor fair. Some argue that this was a setup: the government deliberately left access points open, making it easier for a small group of people to enter the garden of the presidential palace, and then cracked down on them afterwards. In the aftermath of 4th October, more than 60 people were prosecuted under the charges of an attempted coup.

     

    The ‘attempted revolution’, as well as the local elections, created a tense reality for both civil society and the opposition. As unity wasn’t achieved prior to the elections, the opposition is risking repeating the mistakes made by their colleagues in Belarus and fragmenting themselves even further. One bloc, the seven parties along with the former President, Salome Zourabichvili, have distanced themselves both from the 4th October attempted revolution and from the local elections. The UNM, meanwhile, is seen as a separate political center in its own right. The parties that decided to participate, on the other hand, have blamed the boycott supporters and proclaimed that they only believe in the change of power through elections. Understandably, mutual blame currently clouds the political landscape, and a challenge remains in moving the resistance movement forward strategically.

     

    The boycott was arguably the right decision. As the Georgian Dream government delegitimised elections, clinging to them for the simulation of the democratic process just prolongs the crisis and wastes resources on battles that are predetermined. Empowering the protest and unifying different factions under the nonviolent resistance umbrella is the only viable solution. At the same time, the fragmented responses harm the common battle, and it is easy to overanalyse the events and find people to blame, with all three segments of the opposition blaming the other two. An important question to ask now is not who was right about 4th October, but what should be done next.

     

    Specific activities are hard to plan, but the overall strategy is simple: unity, strategic planning, and discipline. These three core components can help civic groups and activists in Georgia avoid fragmentation. These same strategies proved effective in Serbia, Ukraine, and in Georgia itself back in 2003 – and are still effective today.[2]

     

    Unity does not mean that all political parties should agree on the same candidate or the same strategy; it means most parties, organisations, and activists agreeing on core principles and distancing themselves from those who undermine them. Strategic planning means focusing on the resources already available rather than on the ones it would like to have – as hard as this can sound. Finally, discipline means directing the limited resources toward the main challenges and identifying potential allies in the new post-4th October reality. Without these three components, any resistance movement is destined to fail.

     

     

    Davit Jintcharadze is a fellow at Newspeak House and the founder of Freedom Fund, a crowdsourcing initiative to aid the protesters in Georgia. He holds a BA in psychology from New York University and a MA in psychotherapy from the University of Cambridge. Before becoming a member of Georgia’s resistance movement, he was researching the psychological factors influencing people’s voting behaviours.

     

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

     

     

    [1] Civil Georgia, ISFED: Election Law changes tilt October 4 vote further toward Georgian Dream, August 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/697904

    [2] Centre for Applied NonViolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), 50 Crucial Points: A Strategic Approach to Everyday Tactics, 2006, https://canvasopedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/50-Crucial-Points-web.pdf

    Topics
    Democracy and Elections
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    Former Soviet Union
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      Long Read | Dealing with the Sanctions Bubble in Georgia

      Article by Ilya Roubanis and Anonymous Co-author

      October 29, 2025

      Download PDF
      Long Read | Dealing with the Sanctions Bubble in Georgia

      Summary

      Western sanctions against Russia, designed to isolate and weaken the Kremlin’s war economy, have instead generated a global “sanctions bubble”: an adaptive ecosystem of intermediaries, offshore jurisdictions, and political enablers that convert constraint into profit. At the center of this system stands Georgia, which has evolved from passive circumvention to strategic facilitation, leveraging its geography, financial infrastructure, and political flexibility to become a key node in Russia’s sanctions-evasion network.

       

      Rather than crippling Russia’s capacity to sustain its war effort, successive sanction rounds have redirected trade and capital flows through the Caucasus, Central Asia, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates. These channels have allowed sanctioned goods, funds, and individuals to re-enter global markets through legal, semi-legal, and illicit means. Georgia’s economic and political elite have capitalised on these gaps, transforming re-exports, dual-use technology transfers, and permissive financial regulation into sources of revenue. As a result, the Georgian economy has become structurally dependent on Russian-linked capital inflows, turning sanctions into an instrument of enrichment rather than deterrence.

       

      This dependency has reshaped Georgia’s political and institutional landscape. The influx of Russian money, businesses, and professionals has deepened the capture of state institutions by oligarchic interests aligned with Moscow’s economic sphere. At the same time, the Georgian government has sought to protect these interests through legislative measures that have shielded domestic actors from Western regulatory scrutiny. These developments have coincided with democratic backsliding, the erosion of Euro-Atlantic alignment, and ideological convergence with sovereigntist regimes that promote “peace through neutrality” while shielding their economies from sanction-related costs.

       

      The weaknesses of the Western sanctions regime are both structural and conceptual. By targeting categories of individuals rather than specific financial and corporate networks, the system has blurred legal and moral distinctions, creating opportunities for evasion and undermining its own legitimacy. Fragmentation within the European Union and declining transatlantic coordination have further limited the coherence and effectiveness of enforcement. The result is a sanctions framework that produces symbolic political gains for Western states while enabling material enrichment for those it was intended to constrain.

       

      To address these challenges, a strategic recalibration of the sanctions regime is needed. This includes shifting from broad-based designations toward targeted, precision instruments that isolate key enablers within the global evasion network; strengthening regulatory coordination among willing states; and creating structured pathways for economic and political defection from the Russian sphere of influence. The objective is not punitive isolation but strategic disruption: dismantling the protection economies that sustain kleptocratic governance in both Russia and its partner states.

       

      The Georgian case demonstrates that sanctions, when poorly designed or inconsistently enforced, do not simply fail but transform. They create new centres of power, profit, and dependency. Reversing this dynamic is essential if sanctions are to remain a credible tool of international governance rather than an accelerant of global authoritarian capital.

       

      Read the full piece here.

       

      Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

       

      Dr Ilya Roubanis (PhD, EUI Florence) is Senior Fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Athens (IDIS) and Research Fellow at the Aletheia Research Institution. His business intelligence work spans energy and security, driven by HUMINT and strategic analysis across Europe and the MENA regions.

      Topics
      International Relations and Geopolitics
      Rule of Law
      Regions
      Former Soviet Union
      Georgia
      South Caucasus
      Footnotes
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        Long Read | The New 1730s: Lessons from Britain’s historic involvement in Eastern Europe

        Article by Dan Sperrin

        October 24, 2025

        Long Read | The New 1730s: Lessons from Britain’s historic involvement in Eastern Europe

        How should the UK respond to the ongoing war in Ukraine, more than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion? Dan Sperrin explores what lessons can be learnt from Britain’s historical involvement in the region.

         

        Since February 2022, it has been unclear as to whether there will be a continental or global war if parts of Ukraine are ceded to Russia or if Russia expands its war into NATO territory. The risks have increased with the emergence of war in the Middle East and elsewhere around the globe.

         

        In order to bring a degree of broader understanding to such a complex and dangerous geopolitical scenario, some analysts have turned to the past. In particular, the appeasement period of 1935-1939, when Western European powers allowed Nazi Germany to annex Austria and the Sudetenland without serious consequence, paving the way to world war. In a similar vein, some believe that the second US Trump administration and Russian-sympathising members of the European Union (EU) might force a shift in the strategic direction of NATO by allowing Putin to slice up Ukraine in a series of agreed partitions, leading eventually to the outbreak of a much more comprehensive NATO-Russia war.

         

        A new appeasement phase?

        There is a very strong possibility that we are in an appeasement phase of some kind. Russia’s recent testing of NATO airspace in Poland and Estonia suggests that the costs of any inactivity, disorganisation, or concession on the part of the alliance will be high. The Trump administration has just hit Moscow with major sanctions of a kind that Zelensky and the EU have long been hoping for, but the fundamental issues of sovereignty and security in Ukraine are not addressed by these actions, which means that the underlying current of appeasement remains.[1]

         

        The most obvious risk of a new appeasement phase largely driven by Washington is that Ukraine will look like Poland in the 18th century, which was partitioned three times and then signed out of existence altogether in 1795. There is a real danger that Ukraine is consumed gradually over an extended period of time, even if there is some kind of peace agreement with Putin in the near future, meaning that it is eventually reduced to a rump state of Odessa or fully incorporated into the Russian Federation. The fact that this would encourage Putin to go further in Europe has been discussed at length.

         

        Would postwar Ukraine be able to reconstitute itself and claim back a post-federal future? The reconstitution of a whole country requires, at a minimum, major changes in the political complexion of the wider region, but it is possible in some cases. The old Kingdom of Prussia, which was incorporated into Bismarckian Germany in 1871, was signed out of its existence in perpetuity by Allied decree in 1947. The once-partitioned Poland, by contrast, was reconstituted as a viable state in 1918, and has since emerged as one of the central players in European defence and security after the fall of the Berlin Wall. There is no way of predicting which path a fully absorbed Ukraine would be able to follow in the future.

         

        Secondary risks of a 1930s appeasement period might include a permanent splitting of the oil and gas markets into Western and anti-Western blocs, or the entrenchment of competitive geostrategic currency spheres. Both are likely to lead to further conflict, whether that be a kinetic military conflict, conflict in the cyber sphere, or more of what we have seen in terms of a geostrategic trade war.

         

        While comparisons between the period of the Ukraine war and the 1930s are undoubtedly justified in certain respects, they have not yet allowed us to clarify how the UK should respond to the ongoing war in Ukraine more than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion. Perhaps the more instructive precedent lies not in the 1930s but in the 1730s. The UK’s real formative experience of war in Eastern Europe came two centuries earlier. Understanding what happened then may help the UK shape a clearer NATO role in the region today.

         

        Revisiting Britain’s historical precedent

        Modern Britain’s engagement with Eastern Europe as a hinge-point of European security can be dated back to the Peace of Utrecht (1713-1715), a very complicated series of treaties which ended the War of the Spanish Succession. Britain was a controversial player in the peace negotiations, because the then Tory government broke from the Grand Alliance and negotiated directly with Louis XIV. This accelerated peace but also allowed Britain to shape its imperial gains independently and secure its future prosperity. After 1715, the primary European defence pact was that between Britain, France, and the Holy Roman Empire. This was always an uneasy pact, given that Britain had been fighting Louis XIV’s France for most of its recent history.

         

        Meanwhile, the Northern European states were still preoccupied with the Great Northern War, which was primarily being fought between the Swedish Empire of Charles XII and a Russian alliance led by Peter the Great. Partly because of its gains at Utrecht and its enlarged sense of imperial prosperity, Britain lost touch with the security dimension of Eastern Europe, though it opposed Sweden on behalf of Hanover and Britain respectively in 1714 and 1717. It made pacts with Denmark, Norway, Prussia, and Russia, but showed no interest in eastern Europe. The Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth and its neighbouring territories on the borders of Russia were left out while the British government went back to establishing good relations with Peter the Great. The main focus was to protect imperial trade routes in the Baltic, which involved keeping Russia on side.

         

        Throughout the 1720s, Eastern Europe was deprioritised in British foreign policy. At the same time, France re-emerged as a primary hostile power, so British attention inevitably turned back to France, Iberia, and the Mediterranean. There was no single Foreign Office in Whitehall at that time. Foreign affairs were managed by Northern and Southern departments, and the Southern Department often took precedence under geopolitical pressure. In 1731, Britain joined a new pact with the Habsburg Empire and the Dutch Republic, with Spain later joining. The goal was to contain France. Gallic tyranny would not be allowed to re-emerge as it had done under Louis XIV. Alliance powers would join together once again and there would be a collective commitment to European security, but only as it was understood at the Southern Department. Borders would be held and sovereignty protected. Not much was said about Eastern Europe.

         

        What happened in the 1730s?

        In the 1730s, Eastern Europe became the great test of British defence commitments: a test Britain failed, which led to chronic problems down the line.

         

        When the War of the Polish Succession broke out in 1733, Britain, Austria, and Russia supported Augustus III as the legitimate heir to the Polish throne, while France supported Stanisław Leszczynski (Louis XV’s father-in-law), who had briefly held the throne when Augustus II was removed under Swedish pressure. Stanislaw was elected, so Russia invaded Poland. A wider continental war broke out. What emerged in Poland was a traditional succession war which also functioned as a proxy war for the dominant powers of the post-Utrecht world.

         

        Britain was committed to the Austrian alliance, partly because it had a German king who was ultimately beholden to the Holy Roman Emperor, so in theory it was enjoined to defend Eastern Europe. Instead, Prime Minister Robert Walpole, wary of the cost, abandoned earlier defence pledges and prioritised his domestic and imperial trade interests. This withdrawal angered allies, weakened regional stability, and signalled Britain’s retreat from continental security. The Austrians, remembering the promises of 1731, were furious, and began negotiating directly with the French diplomats under Cardinal Fleury. Britain had allowed domestic concerns to eclipse vital questions of collective security in a region it had long been formally committed to. It behaved as if Poland and Eastern Europe were not of immediate relevance to the broader European security architecture, and it paid a serious price.

         

        Ukraine’s fate in this period was similarly shaped by external power struggles. The outbreak of war in Poland in 1733 allowed Russia to pursue its ambitions to absorb the Hetmanate. The Hetmanate was variously collapsed and reconstituted as a semi-independent state throughout the eighteenth century, but it was finally abolished in 1760 under Catherine the Great. By 1775, remaining independent peoples within greater Ukraine were ultimately absorbed into the Russian Empire.

         

        Abandonment of the defence pact of 1731 meant that trust in the British war state was undermined across eastern Europe for at least a decade. Its withdrawal of maritime support during the Polish succession war meant that it was also behind the curve in the wars that followed. The succession war in Poland led to another in Austria between 1740-1748. This set the conditions for a much larger imperial war in the Americas between 1756 and 1763.

         

        By the end of the Austrian conflict, diplomatic relations between Britain and Eastern Europe were a mess. It has been noted that Britain’s ambassador to Poland in the 1740s was ‘doing his very best now and afterwards’ but had absolutely ‘no success at all.’[2] The British ambassador to the Holy Roman Empire was similarly unsuccessful. The ambassador to Russia who wanted to push for success at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 claimed victory afterwards but in reality found little traction with the Kremlin. There was a lot of formality and not a lot of action.

         

        Lessons to be Learnt

        One thing we learn from the behaviour of the Walpole government in the 1730s is that missed opportunities, abandoned pacts, and a general weakening of British support in Eastern Europe can cast very long shadows — shadows so long that future conflicts are almost a predictable outcome, because the military and geostrategic ties tend to be determinative for the broader map of Europe. In general terms, Eastern Europe has always been a complicated network of states with extremely deep histories of contested sovereignty, which is why it has to be handled with such geostrategic care. One problem for the Western alliance and NATO at the moment is that Russia has a kind of muscle memory when it comes to absorbing states in that region and redefining their various power structures under Russian influence, but the West does not have the same muscle memory when it comes to alliance formation and war financing there.

         

        Britain’s eighteenth century experience tells us that decisive action in Eastern Europe can help maintain broader continental security because these two are much more deeply related than many imagine. It also tells us, however, that indecision or disengagement in the region almost always leads to a domino effect in terms of future war. The Baltics, Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, both in the eighteenth-century and modern forms, are a hinge of Eurasian great power conflict.

         

        The UK does not quite know itself anymore when it comes to war in Eastern Europe. It was involved in Serbia and Kosovo with NATO, but it had no major experience in the region during the First or the Second world wars. The last time Britain was heavily engaged in a kinetic war in Eastern Europe was during the Crimean War of 1853-1856. Such a complex network of contested states, which many still remember as the near frontier of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, can seem far removed from the immediate concerns of the modern UK public. The UK is also faced with a series of obvious contradictions when it comes to the region. Brexit was, in part, a rejection of immigration from Eastern Europe, but Starmer still needs popular uptake of the war to secure parliamentary backing when it comes to helping the Zelensky government. More to the point, having left the EU itself the UK is now in a war which is partly being fought to allow Ukraine to join it.

         

        The UK is not signalling that it will turn its attention away from Eastern Europe. In fact, it was wise to sign a new defence pact with Poland in 2023, which was a remarkable document because it reaffirmed UK-Polish defence relations both within and outside of NATO. The UK understands NATO’s Operation Eastern Sentry. It has also just signalled that it is willing to send troops to Ukraine if a ceasefire is achieved and the current frontlines are frozen. However, the precedent set by the Trump administration has a very high chance of encouraging others to think along the same lines — particularly as exhaustion with the conflict deepens over time and if a Russia-sympathising right grows in domestic politics. This presents a serious challenge, especially if European publics cannot be encouraged to lend popular support for Eastern Europe. This is such a tricky issue in the UK because of the motivations behind Brexit, and it might be the case that popular support for Ukraine does not actually extend into the wider region.

         

        As his essay on Ukraine tells us, Putin has made contact once again with his own eighteenth century. He is looking at the geostrategic ambitions of Peter and Catherine the Great: like his forebears, he wants control of the Dnieper river and the military geometries of the Ukrainian interior. Britain will know itself better if it remembers the long term costs of abandoning its defence pacts in Eastern Europe, and in doing so it will also be able to shape its position more effectively within the broader NATO alliance.

         

         

        Dr. Dan Sperrin is a private sector political consultant and an academic at the University of Cambridge. He specialises in information wars, geostrategic risk, and political history. His first book, State of Ridicule: A History of Satire in English Literature (Princeton UP), is the first large-scale history of political satire from Roman antiquity to the present day. He is currently writing a biography of the allied propagandist and wartime cartoonist Sir David Low, which looks at counter-information and strategic influence campaigns during the Second World War.

         

        Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

         

        [1] BBC News, ‘Trump says Putin talks ‘don’t go anywhere’ as he imposes new sanctions’, October 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cd6758pn6ylo

        [2] An observation made in several major reappraisals of this period’s diplomacy. For this quotation, see Thomas Carlyle, ‘History of Friedrich II of Prussia, called Frederick the Great’, new edition, 6 vols, London, 1858–65, vol. 6, p. 109.

        Topics
        International Relations and Geopolitics
        Regions
        Europe
        Eastern Europe
        United Kingdom
        Footnotes
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          Op-ed | The enduring relevance of the Far Right ahead of the Dutch National Election on 29th October

          Article by Stijn van Kessel

          October 22, 2025

          Op-ed | The enduring relevance of the Far Right ahead of the Dutch National Election on 29th October

          Alongside issues such as housing and health care, the key far-right theme of immigration continues to feature high on the political agenda ahead of the Dutch national election on 29th October. In a fragmented political landscape marked by intense competition on the socio-cultural right, mainstream parties are also deliberately choosing to make this issue important in their campaigns.

           

          Just under two years ago, the Netherlands experienced a shock national election result, with Geert Wilders’ far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) becoming the largest party in parliament by a considerable margin (winning almost a quarter of the vote and 37 of the 150 seats).[1]

           

          As is typical for these parties in Europe and beyond, the PVV is known for its vehement opposition to immigration and multiculturalism. There are cultural components to this discourse (focusing on the supposed threat of Islam to Western norms and values, in particular), as well as economic ones (arguing that welfare entitlements should be reserved for the ‘native’ population).

           

          The PVV eventually entered government, despite reservations of its more centrist coalition partners, New Social Contract (NSC) and the Liberals (VVD), concerning the parts of the PVV programme that are at odds with liberal democratic principles such as freedom of religion. The third coalition partner, the agrarian and culturally conservative Farmer Citizen Movement (BBB) expressed fewer concerns.

           

          Government formation took over half a year. The cabinet was led by the non-partisan and previously unknown Prime Minister Dick Schoof. It was marked by poor relationships between the coalition partners and ineffectiveness in terms of policy outcomes. The pugnacious PVV immigration minister Marjolein Faber became known for headline-grabbing policies and controversial statements, but failed to deliver on her promise of the ‘strictest asylum policy ever’ and did nothing to alleviate the clogged-up asylum system.

           

          On June 3rd 2025, less than a year after the installation of the Schoof government, Wilders instigated a cabinet crisis centred on his core issue of migration.[2] He presented his coalition partners with new far-reaching demands they could not agree to. As a result, the PVV left the coalition and the government assumed caretaker (‘demissionary’) status, and new elections were scheduled for 29th October. Notably, the NSC later withdrew from the demissionary cabinet due to disagreements over the government’s position towards Israel (NSC favouring further-reaching sanctions than the VVD and BBB).[3]

           

          For understandable reasons, the political chaos and ineffectiveness dented public trust in politics.[4] Remarkably, however, after the cabinet breakdown, Wilders’ PVV has remained the leading party in opinion polls.[5] This indicates that – at least for his supporters – Wilders successfully deflected the blame to his erstwhile coalition partners, claiming these blocked the implementation of the PVV’s desired immigration policies.

           

          Indeed, immigration has remained a key issue in the run-up to the election. In September, violent riots erupted on the back of an anti-immigration protest in The Hague (the ‘political capital’ of the Netherlands).[6] Across the country, further unruly and intimidating protests took place at the sites of asylum centres. What was unprecedented at these events was the unveiled flaunting of extreme-right symbols and chants.

           

          Even though its violence was widely condemned, the rise of the extreme-right at the grassroots level has done little to stop traditional mainstream parties, particularly on the centre-right, from politicising immigration. The debate has focused predominantly on asylum, which is by default framed as a ‘problem’ that needs a solution. Many politicians have furthermore been careful to show sympathy for citizens concerned about the supposed erosion of Dutch cultural identity, and few have challenged the widespread perception that the housing shortage – another salient issue – is connected in large part to asylum seekers receiving priority over native citizens.

           

          Specific party stances differ, of course. While shunning the more apocalyptic rhetoric of the PVV, the centre-right VVD, in particular, but also the Christian Democrats (CDA) have made reducing immigration an important theme in their campaigns. The Liberal Democrats (D66) have also ‘moved to the right’ on socio-cultural issues, including asylum, but have been keener to welcome ‘talented’ migrants that serve the Dutch economy. On the centre-left, the Green-Labour Party coalition (Groenlinks-PvdA) expressed the need to limit labour migration in the name of halting exploitation and social injustice, while taking a more welcoming stance towards refugees.

           

          Yet, overall, arguments in favour of immigration – such as its role in addressing labour market shortages and mitigating the effects of an ageing population – have been largely absent from the campaign. Similarly, any virtues of multiculturalism have been left unmentioned.

           

          As is the case in so many other European countries, the rise of far-right parties in the Netherlands has significantly impacted the political debate. Across the continent, mainstream parties have adopted stricter positions on immigration, as they fear the far right’s electoral competition. There is evidence that such a strategy is risky at best: it is, on balance, the far right that tends to benefit from an increased focus on its key themes.[7] The more general effect is the normalisation and legitimisation of the far right’s agenda and discourse.

           

          In the Dutch context, it is particularly remarkable how both mainstream parties and many media outlets have facilitated far-right agenda-setting. Far-right actors and sympathisers have been given considerable airtime at televised talk show tables. Geert Wilders himself has been quiet during the early stages of the campaign, citing security threats as reasons for his absence in several radio and televised debates. However, his absence cast a clear shadow over these events where the theme of immigration and asylum took centre stage, irrespectively.

           

          There is also no shortage of other far-right political parties besides the PVV. The BBB has now entered far-right territory with its anti-immigration positions and concerns about radical Islam. The more extreme-right Forum for Democracy (FvD) is likely to win a few seats as well. The more ‘moderate’ JA21 may benefit in particular from the fact that the PVV is not a likely coalition option anymore for most other parties.

           

          Given the highly fragmented nature of Dutch politics, a new government may consist of a broad coalition of parties, thus lacking a clear ideological direction. This may in turn fuel disappointment (and continued support for the radical right) in the longer term. A key lesson for mainstream parties and media elsewhere – and this certainly includes the UK – is not to let the far right set the terms of the debate to the extent it has in the Netherlands.

           

           

          Stijn van Kessel is Professor of Comparative Politics at Queen Mary University of London. His main research interests are populism and the politics of European integration, with a particular emphasis on radical right parties and Euroscepticism. His latest co-authored book is Populist Radical Right Parties in Action: The Survival of the Mass Party (Oxford University Press, 2025).

           

           

          Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

           

          [1] Stijn van Kessel, The Guardian, ‘Geert Wilders’ win shows the far right is being normalised. Mainstream parties must act´, November 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/26/far-right-normalised-mainstream-parties-geert-wilders-dutch

          [2] Laura Gozzi and Anna Holligan, BBC News, ‘Dutch government collapses after far-right leader quits coalition’, June 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0r1x5yyd5wo

          [3] Clea Skopeliti, The Guardian, ‘Dutch foreign minister quits over failure to secure sanctions against Israel’, August 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/23/netherlands-foreign-minister-sanctions-israel-gaza

          [4] Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, ‘Nederlanders machteloos en gefrustreerd over het land en de politiek in aanloop naar de verkiezingen’, October 2025, https://www.scp.nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/10/20/nederlanders-machteloos-en-gefrustreerd-over-het-land-en-de-politiek-in-aanloop-naar-de-verkiezingen

          [5] See the Dutch ‘poll of polls’: https://peilingwijzer.tomlouwerse.nl/

          [6] Stijn van Kessel and Andrej Zaslove, Illiberalism Studies Program, ‘What mainstream parties and media should learn from the Dutch extreme‑right riots’, September 2025, https://www.illiberalism.org/what-mainstream-parties-and-media-should-learn-from-the-dutch-extreme-right-riots/

          [7] Werner Krause, Denis Cohen and Tarik Abou‑Chadi, The Guradian, ‘Copying the far right doesn’t help mainstream parties’,  April 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2022/apr/13/copying-far-right-doesnt-help-mainstream-parties

          Topics
          Democracy and Elections
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          Europe
          The Netherlands
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            Op-ed | The First Election in The New Syria: A Missed Opportunity

            Article by Mohammad Al Abdallah, Jalal Alhamad, and Riad Ali

            October 7, 2025

            Op-ed | The First Election in The New Syria: A Missed Opportunity

            On Sunday, 5th October 2025, Syria held its first parliamentary elections since the fall of Bashar Al-Assad. However, these “elections” were a deeply flawed process, and failed to meet even the minimum standards of political participation. Rather than advancing democratic transition, they are part of a broader centralisation of executive power by President Al-Sharaa.

             

            The elections took place following Decree No. 143 of 2025, issued by the office of the Transitional President of Syria, Ahmed Al-Sharaa.[1] This Decree, instead of establishing a transitional parliamentary body, creates a legislature largely under the power of the executive. Under its provisions, the President directly appoints one-third of parliamentarians and selects the members of the High Electoral Committee—a body that both elects the remaining two-thirds of Parliament and oversees elections. Thus, in practice, this “electoral process” is placed entirely within the President’s direct and indirect control.

             

            The Decree’s provisions on candidacy likewise do not meet standards for political participation. It allows for the disqualification of candidates under broad, undefined terms such as “a supporter of the former regime” or advocating for “separation, division, or reliance on foreign powers” (Article 21, Paragraph 9).[2] In practice, this vague language is not applied against affiliates of the former regime who committed human rights violations and other grave crimes. Instead, it permits the executive to disqualify candidates based on political considerations—a tool that can be, and in other countries has been, wielded against opposition parties and government critics.

             

            In fact, leading up to the elections, candidates reported that they had been disqualified based on the testimony of anonymous witnesses.[3] The candidates were denied access to the information upon which the disqualifications were based and were not permitted to appeal the decision.

             

            Moreover, the Decree falls short in ensuring adequate representation of women and other marginalised groups. Article 24 sets a minimum 20% quota for women—an insufficient measure to guarantee full equality. Representation of women and other groups, including persons with disabilities and former detainees, is only advisory and non-binding.  The lack of meaningful inclusion undermines efforts to build a truly representative political system under which Syrians can be genuinely represented and further deepens divisions among Syrians.

             

            Centralisation by Elections: What Do These Elections Reveal?

             

            These problematic “elections” are a transparent effort to further centralise power in the executive. The Constitutional Declaration signed in March 2025 similarly gives President Al-Sharaa wide-reaching authority for a transitional period of five years.[4] He commands the armed forces and heads the National Security Bureau. He appoints a Cabinet, a Vice President, and ambassadors. He has the power to propose law, the power to appoint each judge on the Supreme Constitutional Court, the right to unilaterally declare a state of emergency, and potentially the ability to exercise emergency powers and suspend human rights in the absence of a formally declared emergency. There is limited capacity on the part of the legislature or judiciary to serve as effective checks on his concentration of power.

             

            In this context, it is clear the “elections” held on Sunday were not a true representative process. They were in clear contravention of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2254, which states that “the only sustainable solution…is through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process.”[5]

             

            Less than a year after the fall of the former regime, Syria’s transitional period faces many challenges, making the prospect of holding direct general elections at this stage unrealistic. However, creating the appearance of representative governance through a tightly controlled legislative body is not the solution. Instead, Syria should have set up a transitional parliamentary body with limited jurisdiction to address urgent issues, while it works with the UN to hold “free and fair elections” (S/Res/2254 § 4) within the UN’s proposed timeframe of 18 months.

             

            In the meantime, Syria should implement changes to its temporary electoral system. To respect the principle of separation of powers and ensure meaningful checks on executive power, Syria should remove the transitional president’s role in appointing one-third of Parliament, and establish an independent body to oversee elections, one that is not subject to executive influence. More broadly, Syria should place legislative and judicial limits on executive power and reduce the current executive’s influence across the legislative and judicial branches of government.

             

            Syria should also implement reforms to prevent political interference in election candidacy. This includes removing its imprecise and restrictive candidacy conditions with clear and objective criteria—such as age and legal capacity. A candidate should only be subject to disqualification under these criteria, rather than through a system without appeal that can be manipulated for political purposes. To protect freedom of expression, Syria should ensure freedom of public campaigning. Similarly, it should repeal its current provision imposing double criminal penalties for electoral offences, particularly where its vague wording could be used to criminalise activities related to legitimate political participation.

             

            It is imperative that Syria align both its transitional electoral process and its future electoral arrangements with international standards on human rights. Syria has ratified—and restated its obligation in the Constitutional Declaration—a number of international treaties and agreements guaranteeing equal suffrage and the right to political participation. The elections held on October 5 clearly fail to meet these standards.

             

            Moreover, the international community should not turn a blind eye to the political situation in Syria in favor of stability. After decades of dictatorship, Syrians deserve an inclusive political process that represents all Syrians and allows for free and fair political participation. While not immediate, efforts must nonetheless begin towards preparing for presidential, legislative, and local elections via direct vote. Indeed, a return to authoritarian governance would ultimately undermine the goal of a safe and stable Syria.

             

            One need only look to failed transitions in the region—such as Iraq’s experience with de-Ba’athification—to understand the dangers of hollowing out political life and civil society under the guise of reform.[6] To avoid repeating such mistakes, the international community should do its part to push back against President Al-Sharaa’s attempts to consolidate power and should encourage the fledgling government to respect international standards of governance, accountability, and inclusion

             

             

            Mohammad Al Abdallah is Director of the Syrian Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC). Al Abdallah is a Syrian human rights lawyer and democracy researcher and activist. He received a Bachelor of Law from the Lebanese University in 2007; in 2014, he received a Master’s of Public Policy from George Mason University with a specialty in governance and international institutions. He previously worked as a researcher for Human Rights Watch in Beirut from where he covered Syria from 2007-2009. Al Abdallah is a former prisoner and survivor of torture who was imprisoned in Syria on two separate occasions for his work defending human rights and lobbying for political reform.

             

            Jalal Alhamad is Executive Director of Justice for Life Organization and  researcher in human rights and transitional justice.

             

            Riad Ali is a Syrian legal expert and former judge with extensive experience in judicial reform, transitional justice, and international law. He has served as a magistrate in Syria and as a legal consultant for organizations such as Syrians for Truth and Justice, Pell, and The Day After. His research focuses on constitutional law, property rights, and governance in post-conflict contexts.

             

            Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

             

            [1] Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, ‘Joint Position Paper Regarding the Temporary Electoral System for the Syrian Parliament’, September 2025, https://syriaaccountability.org/joint-position-paper-regarding-the-temporary-electoral-system-for-the-syrian-parliament/

            [2] Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), ‘Presidency, August 2025, https://sana.sy/presidency/2267661/?ref=syriaaccountability.org

            [3] Almodon, لماذا يجب إلغاء انتخابات سوريا التشريعية فورا؟, October 2025, https://www.almodon.com/opinion/2025/10/01

            [4] Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, ‘A Problematic Constitutional Declaration’, March 2025, https://syriaaccountability.org/a-problematic-constitutional-declaration/

            [5] United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 2254 (2015)’, December 2015, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2254.pdf

            [6] Middle East Institute, ‘De‑Ba`thification in Iraq: How Not to Pursue Transitional Justice’, January 2014, https://www.mei.edu/publications/de-bathification-iraq-how-not-pursue-transitional-justice

            Topics
            Democracy and Elections
            Regions
            Middle East and North Africa
            Syria
            Footnotes
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              Expert Briefing: ‘Syria’s transition nine months on: Examining frameworks for international justice and accountability’

              Article by Foreign Policy Centre

              October 6, 2025

              Download PDF
              Expert Briefing: ‘Syria’s transition nine months on: Examining frameworks for international justice and accountability’

              On 9th September 2025, the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC), the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) and the University of Lancaster’s Sectarianism, Proxies and Desectarianisation project (SEPAD) co-hosted a high-level expert roundtable exploring Syria’s transition following the fall of the Assad regime, and the future of justice and accountability in the country. 

               

              The event was chaired by Mark Stephens CBE, IBAHRI Co-Chair, and brought together an expert panel  including legal and policy experts, academics and civil society leaders: Yumen Hallaq, Senior Researcher at the Syrian Network for Human Rights; Sana Kikhia, Executive Director of the Syrian Legal Development Programme (SLDP); Dr Maria Kastrinou, Senior Lecturer in Anthropology at Brunel, University of London; Alan Haji, Lead for Case Building at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC); Mariana Karkoutly, Co-Founder and Board Member of Huquqyat; and Professor Simon Mabon, Chair in International Politics at Lancaster University and Director of the SEPAD project.

               

              The roundtable provided an opportunity to assess the state of Syria’s political and legal transition nine months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Since the takeover by opposition forces in December 2024, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Syria has been governed by a transitional government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa, operating under a five-year constitutional declaration framework. While the international community has cautiously welcomed these changes and initial commitments to reform, major questions remain about the durability of the transition, the prospects for justice and reconciliation, and the appropriate role for international actors in supporting this process.

               

              In charting a way forward for Syria, justice and accountability must be pursued through mechanisms that foster equal citizenship, political rights and freedoms, and collective trust, rather than reproduce the political processes of division that have fuelled sectarian and gendered violence. Domestic actors, civil society organisations, survivors, and victim’s families should be at the forefront of any accountability, legal or institutional reform. The international community can repeat calls and support processes that recognise the suffering of all victims, ensure accountability for the gravest of crimes, and foster genuine reconciliation and respect for the rule of law. Transitional justice processes must be coupled with long-term initiatives and dialogue to ensure that accountability and guarantees of non-reoccurrence of crimes become a foundation for sustainable truth, justice, and reconciliation. By embedding justice within a broader framework of social healing and inclusive governance, Syria can lay the groundwork for lasting peace in which accountability strengthens unity and helps prevent future cycles of violence.

               

              To explore key themes and insights from the parliamentary roundtable discussion — including legal reform, institutional fragility, humanitarian conditions, and international engagement — you can download the full briefing here.

               

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              Conflict Resolution and Security
              Good Governance and Institutional Reform
              Justice and Accountability
              Regions
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                Op-ed | US Retreat from Multilateralism: Open Doors for Chinese Repression

                Article by Florian Irminger

                September 9, 2025

                Op-ed | US Retreat from Multilateralism: Open Doors for Chinese Repression

                The 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), opening on Tuesday 9 September 2025 in New York, might mark the end of the UN’s human rights pillar as we know it.

                 

                The United Nations (UN) is being reshaped: What is unfolding is a strategic campaign to control who gets to speak, what can be said, and which values survive. The withdrawal of the United States (US) from multilateralism has, once again, created space that China is now readily occupying – whilst the UN Secretariat looks the other way. A particular responsibility now rests with France and, notably, the United Kingdom (UK) as permanent members of the Security Council to uphold the values the institution was built up to achieve 80 years ago.

                 

                The reorientation of the US involves withdrawing support from key multilateral bodies.[1] This is not the first time the US has distanced itself from the UN system: under President George W. Bush, the US disengaged from climate and human rights mechanisms, while Trump’s first term (2017-2021) saw a more sweeping retreat from multilateralism.[2] His administration withdrew from the Human Rights Council, UNESCO, the WHO, and the Paris Agreement, and repeatedly attacked the legitimacy of the UN itself — reflecting a longstanding hostility toward multilateral institutions within the Republican establishment, exemplified by figures like Ambassador John Bolton.[3]

                 

                This exodus created a vacuum each time. This time, China is moving in to fill it — and has, indeed, methodically prepared for this moment through a four-part strategy: fill the void left by US retreat and Western lethargy; weaken independent civil society access; control the narrative through proxies and silence dissent; and escape accountability for mass atrocities.

                 

                Firstly, China’s ascent in the UN is about setting new terms of debate. By inserting vague references to ‘mutual respect’, ‘non-interference’, and ‘cultural values’ into UN human rights language, it is eroding the normative clarity of international human rights standards — and facing little resistance from Western states.[4]

                 

                Secondly, China is silencing critical civil society voices before they can even enter the room. Independent NGOs struggle to gain or maintain accreditation, while government-organised NGOs — entities that serve as state mouthpieces — are amplified.[5] These proxies praise Beijing’s record, attack critics, and reframe human rights as a matter of development alone. In short, China is ‘choking civil society’ at the United Nations and securing a self-congratulatory performance for itself.[6]

                 

                This redefinition of norms and participation cannot succeed without silence. That is why China’s repression is not merely a domestic concern. As recognised by the G7 recently, diaspora communities are monitored, threatened, and harassed. Systematic surveillance and intimidation of Uyghurs and Tibetans by Chinese agents operating under diplomatic cover has become a reality throughout Europe, as the Transnational Repression (TNR) in the UK Working Group also documented in its evidence submitted to the Joint Committee on Human Rights on transnational repression in the UK.[7] China’s surveillance of civil society abroad is codified within its Overseas NGO Law, enacted in 2016, and constitutes an essential component of the silencing of Chinese dissent internationally.[8] China’s targeting of dissent abroad is the third pillar of its strategy to control the narrative on the global stage.

                 

                Finally, while reshaping the UN from within and silencing dissent, China simultaneously contributes to undermining the institution’s authority. Nowhere is this clearer than in the response to grave abuses in Xinjiang. In 2022, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a landmark assessment, detailing allegations of arbitrary detention of hundreds of thousands people, torture, sexual violence, forced labour, family separation, and the systemic persecution of Uyghurs and other minorities through a legal and policy framework that enables ongoing persecution.[9] These findings pointed to possible crimes against humanity.[10] Yet the Human Rights Council vote to even debate the Xinjiang report was defeated.[11] Since then, no accountability has been secured.

                 

                In this context, the UK has a unique responsibility — and opportunity — to step up as a principled leader on human rights and multilateralism. As the FPC’s recent report underscores, the UK’s credibility depends on consistency: defending universal human rights through policy, diplomacy, and resource allocation.[12] This includes calling out transnational repression, resisting the erosion of civil society access at the UN, and backing concrete reforms that ensure the human rights pillar remains central to the UN’s future.

                 

                A group of human rights leaders assembled through Human Rights Compass, recommended the establishment of a cross-regional leadership coalition for human rights, modelled on the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. Driven by states from all regions, the coalition could counterbalance efforts to hijack the system.[13] Given the unique reach of Britain’s diplomatic presence, and the UK’s responsibility and role as permanent member of the Security Council, it could be well placed to lead such an effort at the occasion of the 80th General Assembly.

                 

                In this sense, the President of the 80th General Assembly, Annalena Baerbock, has rightly placed human rights at the heart of the UNGA High-Level Week. UNGA80 could serve as the moment where states agree to embed rights-based approaches into peacebuilding, humanitarian response, and sustainable development.

                 

                The credibility of the United Nations is being drained, quietly and strategically. A UN that cannot speak freely, include independent voices, or address grave violations is no longer a forum for international law. It becomes a stage for repression, dressed in multilateral clothing.

                 

                 

                Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

                 

                Florian Irminger is President of Progress & Change Action Lab and member of the Foreign Policy Centre’s Advisory Council.

                 

                 

                [1] The White House, Withdrawing the United States from and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations, February 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-and-ending-funding-to-certain-united-nations-organizations-and-reviewing-united-states-support-to-all-international-organizations/

                [2] Rajesh Sahu, The Missing Nexus: A Historical and Contemporary Position of the United States, Journal of Communication, November 2023, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00208817231204663; George W. Bush, White House archives, President Bush Addresses the United Nations General Assembly, September 2007, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070925-4.html

                [3] John Bolton, U.S. Ambassador to the UN speech on reform, YouTube, posted by HipHughes, March 2006, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOINBs8eOdk

                [4] Vivian Sun, China’s Human Rights Discourse: Reshaping the International Framework – Part One, Human Rights Research Center, November 2024, https://www.humanrightsresearch.org/post/china-s-human-rights-discourse-reshaping-the-international-framework-part-one; UN News, China’s Foreign Minister stresses principle of non‑interference at UN debate, September 2012, https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/09/421682; China (Wang Yi, Minister for Foreign Affairs), Statement at the UN General Assembly General Debate (79th Session), September 2024, https://gadebate.un.org/en/79/china

                [5] Devex, For many human rights NGOs, UN access remains out of reach, February 2020, https://www.devex.com/news/for-many-human-rights-ngos-un-access-remains-out-of-reach-96516

                [6] Rana Siu Inboden, China at the UN: Choking Civil Society, Journal of Democracy, July 2021, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-at-the-un-choking-civil-society/

                [7] Tackling TNR in the UK Working Group, UK Parliament Human Rights Joint Committee, Written evidence submitted by Tackling TNR in the UK Working Group (TRUK0154), September 2024, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/138140/pdf/; Foreign Policy Centre, Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group, August 2025, https://fpc.org.uk/tackling-transnational-repression-in-the-uk-working-group/; G7 (Group of Seven), G7 Leaders’ Statement on Transnational Repression, June 2025, https://g7.canada.ca/en/news-and-media/news/g7-leaders-statement-on-transnational-repression/

                [8] U.S.-Asia Law Institute, Securitizing Overseas Nonprofit Work in China: Five years of the Overseas NGO Law framework and its new application to academic institutions, November 2021, https://usali.org/usali-perspectives-blog/securitizing-overseas-nonprofit-work-in-china

                [9] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China, August 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchr-assessment-human-rights-concerns-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region

                [10] Human Rights Watch, China: UN needs to address crimes against humanity, August 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/08/27/china-un-needs-address-crimes-against-humanity

                [11] Amnesty International, China: Xinjiang vote failure betrays core mission of UN Human Rights Council, October 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/10/china-xinjiang-vote-failure-betrays-core-mission-of-un-human-rights-council/

                [12] Poppy Ogier, Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy, Foreign Policy Centre, September 2025, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/playing-to-our-strengths-the-future-of-the-uks-soft-power-in-foreign-policy/

                [13] Progress & Change Action Lab, Human Rights Compass: Real‑Time Policy Analysis & Advocacy, June 2025, https://progress-change-actionlab.org/human-rights-compass#kpg_209169

                Topics
                Good Governance and Institutional Reform
                Human Rights
                International Relations and Geopolitics
                Soft Power
                Tackling Transnational Repression
                UN Reform
                Regions
                Asia
                China
                Europe
                United Kingdom
                United States and Canada
                United States
                Footnotes
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                  Op-ed | The urgent need to revive democracy and the power of diplomacy

                  Article by Nick Hopkinson

                  August 8, 2025

                  Op-ed | The urgent need to revive democracy and the power of diplomacy

                  A recently published volume, The Policies and Power of Public Diplomacy – Wilton Park’s Road, based on reports of Wilton Park’s higher level international policy discussions since 1946, provides a concise background to key challenges facing the world today.[1]  Wilton Park is an executive agency of the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) focused on facilitating international policy dialogue, convening around 80 strategic discussions a year. Nick Hopkinson, the volume’s Editor, and a former director of Wilton Park (1987-2010), provides his insight into how the power of diplomacy can be used to revive democracy.

                   

                  Few challenges are as pressing as the need to stop the democratic backsliding seen in many leading nations today, as evidenced by, for example, the increased undermining of independent media and the judiciary, and growing infringements of human rights. Weaknesses in, or the absence of, democracy are often at the root of conflict, whether internal or international. Discussing challenges and ultimately co-operating are cheaper than the heavy cost, both human and financial, of crises and war. Both can be mitigated, perhaps on occasion avoided, through greater international understanding and co-operation nurtured in what are called ‘Track 2 spaces’ for dialogue, such as Wilton Park.[2]

                   

                  Post-WWII Origins

                   

                  Initially a ‘re-education camp’ for German officers after World War Two (WW2), Wilton Park was a key part of Sir Winston Churchill’s vision to build a democratic post-war Germany. Since then it has evolved into a first-class international policy forum which has expanded beyond its 16th century country home in West Sussex to work in more than 50 countries.  Founded by Sir Heinz Koeppler, Wilton Park established an independent approach to democracy building and international policy dialogue. Koeppler believed strengthening democracy and international understanding could be progressed through talking, debating, eating and living together. The original ‘courses’ evolved into interactive roundtables for ministers, diplomats, officials, academics, businesspeople, journalists and non-governmental opinion formers from countries around the world.

                   

                  The UK’s model of parliamentary democracy has been discussed regularly at Wilton Park, especially in its early years. Sir Heinz was sensitive to possible accusations that the institution might be regarded as an instrument of government propaganda. To avoid this he crafted an independent, inter-disciplinary, international and interactive method which became widely recognised as a skilful exercise in education, engagement and influencing.

                   

                  After its original mission was successfully achieved, Wilton Park focused on other topics, sometimes to survive as an institution. It has addressed topical international policy issues and challenges since 1946 including: forging consensus in the transatlantic alliance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; the Cold War; developments in the Former Soviet Union, in particular the Russian Federation; arms control; UK relations with the European Community and the Commonwealth; integration in and enlargement of the European Union; Africa (including ending apartheid); China, and the Middle East.

                   

                  Post-Cold War Shift

                   

                  The end of the Cold War resulted in Wilton Park’s greatest expansion of subject coverage, notably transnational challenges such as migration, crime and terrorism, curbing climate change and disease, as well as humanitarian intervention. There was also a renewed emphasis on democracy promotion, this time focused on the developing world.

                   

                  As transnational challenges grew in salience in the post-war era, tackling them has exposed the limits of the nation state. As former Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of State, Sir Kenneth Younger, argued at Wilton Park in 1973 “none of these modern problems can be solved within the framework of the traditional nation state”[3].In the past dozen years, coverage of developing world issues has come to dwarf European coverage, in part reflecting changing UK government priorities, notably the UK’s — possibly short-lived — pivot away from Europe after Brexit. Most recently, the multi-national response to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates the need for, and benefits of, international co-operation.

                   

                  The Current Age of Democratic Erosion

                   

                  A triumph of the liberal order was the spread of prosperity to developing nations, notably China. It was hoped economic liberalisation would lead to the strengthening of democratic practice, but in spite of positive signs in the 1990s, progress in the new millennium has proven limited, and in some cases democratic reforms have been reversed.

                   

                  The ongoing rise of populism suggests strengthening democracy is needed more than ever, even in the mature democracies which championed it during and after WW2. The recent democratic backsliding can be attributed, inter alia, to low growth after the 2007/8 global financial crisis, the failure of governments to spread the benefits of globalisation fairly, and the inability of nation states to resolve the new transnational challenges to which Sir Kenneth alluded. Furthermore, the revolution in digital technology has resulted in an explosion of media sources and increasing misinformation, leading to a decline in a shared understanding about domestic and global developments. This makes it much more difficult for governments to address problems and to co-operate internationally.

                   

                  Populism in the digital age appeals to nationalist, isolationist and protectionist sentiment which provide particularly ill-suited solutions to today’s challenges. Today’s performative populist politics is less directed against other states, and rails against an amorphous globalisation and other social groups. The growth of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism and the scapegoating of refugees deflect attention from the real need to tackle growing domestic inequality and under-investment in health, education and infrastructure. If politicians fail to deliver solutions based on evidence and need, the integrity of democratic institutions themselves is further threatened, and authoritarian tendencies are strengthened. To restore faith in the functioning of democracy, citizens, particularly the young, need to be empowered through greater education and digital literacy, especially critical thinking and the ability to assess the veracity of media content.

                   

                  The growing erosion of democracy has international ramifications. Wilton Park’s discussions since 1946 reflect the rise, consolidation and more recently decline of the post-war liberal ‘Western’ international order. That order can only be effective if democracy continues to function effectively in the countries which have underpinned it. Furthermore, if the US in particular is no longer able to and/or willing to champion the international post-war liberal order it shaped, the perception grows that the order is less relevant.

                   

                  What Next?

                   

                  Indeed, today the liberal international order looks less liberal, less international and less ordered. Stasis in the World Trade Organisation and failure to reform the United Nations system are symptomatic of declining international cohesion. Most worryingly, as foreseen in a 2017 Wilton Park conference, the increasing ineffectiveness of global powers and diplomacy means interstate conflict becomes a greater threat. Five years later, Russia invaded Ukraine and conflict rages again in Israel-Palestine. Might has prevailed over right.

                   

                  As the international order fragments, what can be done? One senior Pakistani diplomat, Malik Azhar Ellahi, noted Track 2 exchanges such as those at Wilton Park can play an important role.

                   

                  “When existing treaties (are) being junked and ongoing initiatives trashed… the one tempting conclusion is that it makes no difference what goes on in Track 2 exchanges. This in my view will not only be unfair but also unfortunate. I would think that there is a greater need at this time for policy to take into account views and concerns expressed in informal settings so that the divide which has emerged in official fora is not made permanent”. [4]

                   

                  If democratic governments, opposition parties, non-governmental organisations and citizens do not redouble efforts wherever we can to counter the growing threat of populism, the continuing weakening of democratic checks and balances, and the undermining of international law and institutions, we risk ending up where Wilton Park started after WW2. After another horrific global conflict, ways and structures will again have to be created for nations to co-operate and live together in peace.

                   

                  In the context of the fragmenting post-war global order, democratic backsliding and the growth of misinformation, spaces such as Wilton Park are needed more than ever as forums to exchange and influence policy and opinion through constructive informed dialogue. Sir Heinz’ logo for Wilton Park of a bridge of international understanding remains as apt as ever.

                   

                   

                  Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

                   

                  Nick Hopkinson is a writer on EU and international affairs and is former director of Wilton Park where he served from 1987 to 2010. He posts @nickhopkinson.bsky.social

                   

                  Image: Wiston House. © Wilton Park. Used with permission.

                   

                  [1] Hopkinson, Nick (ed.), The Policies and Power of Public Diplomacy – Wilton Park’s Road. Routledge, London and New York, 2025. A free copy of the volume is available by clicking on the open access button within the following link: https://www.routledge.com/The-Policies-and-Power-of-Public-Diplomacy-Wilton-Parks-Road/Hopkinson/p/book/9781032831251

                  [2] “Track Two diplomacy consists of informal dialogues among actors such as academics, religious leaders, retired senior officials, and NGO officials that can bring new ideas and new relationships to the official process of diplomacy.” – Peter Jones, Stanford University Press, Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice, September 2015, https://www.sup.org/books/politics/track-two-diplomacy-theory-and-practice

                  [3] Hopkinson, Nick (ed.), The Policies and Power of Public Diplomacy – Wilton Park’s Road. Routledge, London and New York, 2025. A free copy of the volume is available by clicking on the open access button within the following link: https://www.routledge.com/The-Policies-and-Power-of-Public-Diplomacy-Wilton-Parks-Road/Hopkinson/p/book/9781032831251

                  [4] Ibid.

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                    The challenges of addressing authoritarian transnational repression in democracies

                    Article by Dr Saipira Furstenberg

                    August 6, 2025

                    The challenges of addressing authoritarian transnational repression in democracies

                    From Chinese unofficial police stations to the assassination attacks perpetuated by Russian or Iranian secret agents on their citizens and diaspora communities residing abroad, authoritarian states have become increasingly emboldened and assertive in projecting their power on their population across borders. Through tactics such as physical threats, Interpol arrest warrants, and digital surveillance, authoritarian states are not shying away from silencing their critics abroad, even in democratic countries. Dictators are becoming increasingly creative in using their repression tools to contain new forms of dissent and security challenges arising from their population abroad. This phenomenon is now broadly defined as transnational repression (TNR).

                     

                    In recent years we have seen a rising number of international initiatives shaping a narrative to counter TNR. In its 2023 Resolution on the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders[1], the European Parliament highlighted the increase in transnational threats against human rights defenders. Similarly, in its Conclusions on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2025, the Foreign Affairs Council committed to considering measures to prevent and tackle TNR[2]. At a broader European level, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE) recognised in Resolution 2509 (2023) that transnational repression is a growing concern which undermines the rule of law and human rights in Europe[3].  More recently, at the 2025 G7 Leaders’ Summit held in Kananaskis, G7 leader, under the presidency of Canada, condemned acts of TNR and encouraged nation states to further develop concrete strategies counter TNR and increase the costs for those who engage TNR activities[4].

                     

                    Building resilience against authoritarian transnational repression is also rapidly becoming a critical national security issue for countries around the world. The United States, in the aftermath of the killing of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi introduced a plethora of new measures aimed to counter TNR. These include the so-called Khashoggi Ban, Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021, which proposes prohibiting US arms sales to Saudi Arabia for as long as the government is engaging in transnational repression against dissidents, and the Transnational Repression Accountability and Prevention (TRAP) Act, which targets the abuse of INTERPOL by strengthening transparency and liability within the organization[5].

                     

                    Similarly, in the UK, following an escalation of foreign interference threats ranging from foreign interference, disinformation, cyber-attacks, intimidation and transnational repression targeting diaspora communities in the UK, the Minister of State Security, Tom Tugendhat, introduced the Defending Democracy Taskforce initiative which aims to reduce the risks of foreign interference to the UK’s democratic processes, institutions and society at large[6]. Other states like the Netherlands, are revising their espionage laws that would criminalise aspects of TNR activities related to espionage such as digital espionage and diaspora espionage. In the case of the Netherlands, the new law expands on existing legislation and criminalises actions such as leaking information or working for foreign governments that harm Dutch interests. Offenders can face up to 8 years in prison, with a maximum of 12 years for severe cases.

                     

                    Yet while such policy initiatives are welcome, in the current context, liberal democracies still lack adequate institutional frameworks, which are needed to address the complex challenges of transnational repression.

                     

                    Challenges of countering TNR

                     

                    First, the hidden, multifaceted and ambiguous nature of transnational repression incidents makes them difficult to deter, identify, and counter. Authoritarian states engaged in TNR, often rely on covert operations or ‘clandestine diplomacy’ to target their regime critics abroad or individuals perceived as a regime threat[7]. Strategies may involve the use of secret intelligence services or non-state actors such as criminal groups that are experienced in using covert means to influence targets and establish clandestine contacts with various groups. The use of state and non-state actors in carrying various covert attacks provide the perpetrator state with official deniability and a layer of obfuscation blurring the lines between intelligence services and criminal groups. This as a result makes it difficult to distinguish the identity of perpetrators launching the attacks. The use of proxies in covert operations provides the state with more plausible deniability and reduces government’s exposure to blame. The attack on MI6 spy, Sergei Skripal, in England in February 2018, using Russian-made military grade nerve agents, is a good example. Despite widespread accusations, the Kremlin consistently denied its sponsorship.

                     

                    In other instances, repressive tactics may involve a mixture of legal and illegal means such as instrumentalising international organisations like INTERPOL or manipulate international agreements like extradition treaties to pursue regime critics under the guise of legality.

                     

                    Second, the challenge of addressing TNR stems not only from its hybrid nature, but also from its often unclear definition. In the current context transnational repression has been embedded within the more general ‘authoritarian interference’ or ‘hybrid threat’ frame and has not yet been problematised in a systematic way. Consequently, this further affects how policymakers understand and deal with authoritarian transnational repression challenges. This careless use of terminology creates conceptual confusions and consequently affects policy responses. Subsuming TNR with foreign interference tactics like election manipulation, disinformation campaigns,and sabotage targeting critical infrastructure among other tactics, not only creates conceptual ambiguity, but also risks generating unnecessary confusion concerning the level and methods of responses. Such loose conceptual interpretation of TNR as a result further undermines the human rights dimensions of TNR. Although there are overlaps between TNR and authoritarian interference, the current paradigm of foreign interference prioritises national security over human rights protection. Such an approach fails to capture the human rights implications of TNR. Acts of transnational repression imperil civil and political liberties of vulnerable populations and civilians residing in democracies. At the individual level such authoritarian practices violate autonomy and dignity of the person, but at the collective level, they can disable diaspora voices simultaneously which can threaten the democratic process, just as secrecy and disinformation.

                     

                    Third, responses to TNR are further conditioned by pragmatic politics. Host state attitudes towards the state engaging in TNR can vary according to existing bilateral and strategic interests. Here, the prioritisation of economic and broader geopolitical interests and the desire to avoid political conflict with strategic partners, mean that host states often turn ‘a blind eye’ on incidents related to transnational repression and prioritise material national interests over normative human rights dimensions. Such dynamics makes host states, including democracies, directly complicit in TNR. In other instances, pragmatic migration and asylum policies can further undermine human rights protection of individuals targeted by TNR. In the UK and elsewhere in Europe, the adoption of stricter migration and asylum measures put at greater risk individuals targeted by TNR. In the UK the outsourcing of asylum to authoritarian states like Rwanda undermines the very principles of international protection, and the obligation to protect individuals at risk of being persecuted by their authoritarian home states. The Rwandan government has been named as one the key perpetrators of transnational repression according to the latest HRW report[8]. However, this did not stop the last UK government to pass the controversial bill that would have allowed  asylum seekers to be deported to Rwanda.

                     

                    These trends are not unique to the UK but are part of a broader trend. Across Europe, increasingly restrictive migration policies are undermining asylum protections and weakening commitments to shared humanitarian values.

                     

                    How can states respond to transnational repression?

                     

                    Given the rising trend in authoritarian practices in current global affairs, it is likely that incidents of TNR will continue to grow. By taking a weak stand to respond to TNR, Western leaders effectively grant legitimacy and continuity of such authoritarian patterns. This in turn undermines the rights and freedom of individuals who have been granted safe haven in democracies.

                     

                    Addressing TNR requires a unified and coordinated response as well as cross-sectoral cooperation with relevant civil society organisations and law enforcement agencies. In particular, such a collaborative approach needs to focus on integrating diaspora and minority groups, who otherwise risk being used as proxies for authoritarian interference efforts. Additionally, such threats must be tackled using the means of national and international laws, as well as through prevention and education campaigns. This approach should further include the use of punishment mechanisms and tools such as targeted sanctions against individuals involved in transnational repression and human rights violations.

                     

                    Last week the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) published its report Transnational Repression in the UK [9]. The report acknowledges that TNR represents a threat to human rights and those who have sought safety within its borders. The report warns that hostile governments—including China, Iran, and Russia—are employing transnational repression (TNR) tactics such as surveillance, harassment, and the manipulation of international legal mechanisms like INTERPOL to silence human rights defenders and diaspora communities in the UK. It also exposes serious shortcomings in the UK’s response, including the lack of a clear legal definition, insufficient data collection, and the absence of dedicated reporting channels for victims. The report calls for urgent and decisive action to curb the growing threat of TNR in the UK.

                     

                    In a similar vein, in June 2025, the Subcommittee on Human Rights of the European Parliament published a study focusing on transnational repression of human rights defenders[10]. The study highlights that transnational repression threatens the safety of defenders even when in exile and further shrinks civic space globally. Such efforts are crucial to spotlight the growing threat of transnational repression (TNR) to human rights and the rule of law, and to underscore the need to hold authoritarian regimes accountable for their actions. This in particular, when there is a disengagement from the United States on human rights and its commitment to tackle transnational repression. As observed by the former Freedom House Director, Nate Schenkkan: ‘while the Biden administration made policies to protect exiles and diasporas a priority. Trump 2.0 has already undercut these efforts’. Though the United States formally signed on to the G7 statement, under the new Trump administration, the government has destroyed the infrastructure that was being built to make the U.S. a leader in counter-TNR policy[11].

                     

                    Therefore, in light of these developments, there remains a critical void that must be addressed by other democratic states committed to tackling TNR. This requires building comprehensive work across the multiple policy areas, increasing multilateral cooperation and engaging with vulnerable communities and civil society actors. Their continued leadership will play a vital role in maintaining global momentum on this issue.

                     

                    For now though, incidents of transnational repression remain largely unpunished, therefore such forms of authoritarian interference constitute a highly tempting and potentially effective strategy for repressive regimes.

                     

                    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

                     

                    Saipira Furstenberg, PhD, is a Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre and an independent researcher and policy consultant. She specialises in international security, migration, and sustainable development topics that support human rights, accountability, and democratic processes around the world. She is currently affiliated with the University of Exeter as an Associate Research Fellow. From 2022–2024, she was a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Cofund Research Fellow at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice.

                    Her research focuses on extraterritorial politics, the international dimensions of authoritarian regimes, human rights, and global governance. Her work on transnational repression has appeared in the European Journal of International Security, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, The International Journal of Human Rights, among others. In 2024, together with Dana Moss, she published an edited volume on Transnational Repression in the Age of Globalization (Edinburgh University Press).

                     

                    [1] European Parliament, ‘European Parliament resolution of 16 March 2023 on the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders (P9_TA(2023)0086)’, March 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0086_EN.html

                    [2]Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2025’, January 2025, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5638-2025-INIT/en/pdf

                    [3]Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), ‘Resolution 2509 (2023): Transnational repression as a growing threat to the rule of law and human rights’, June 2023, https://pace.coe.int/en/files/32999/html

                    [4] Group of Seven (G7), ‘G7 Leaders’ Statement on Transnational Repression’, June 2025, https://g7.canada.ca/en/news-and-media/news/g7-leaders-statement-on-transnational-repression/

                    [5] US Department of State, ‘Accountability for the Murder of Jamal Khashoggi’, February 2021, https://www.state.gov/accountability-for-the-murder-of-jamal-khashoggi/; Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021, H.R. 1392, 117th Congress, US House of Representatives, February 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1392; Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021, S. 1591, 117th Congress, US Senate, February 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1591

                    [6] UK Government (Home Office and Cabinet Office), ‘Ministerial Taskforce meets to tackle state threats to UK democracy’, November 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ministerial-taskforce-meets-to-tackle-state-threats-to-uk-democracy

                    [7] Mikael Wigell, The Washington Quarterly, ‘Democratic Deterrence: How to Dissuade Hybrid Interference’, March 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893027

                    [8] Human Rights Watch, ‘Transnational Repression by Rwanda’, February 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/15/transnational-repression-rwanda

                    [9] Joint Committee on Human Rights (UK Parliament), ‘Growth of foreign repression on UK soil going unchecked – JCHR report warns’, July 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/93/human-rights-joint-committee/news/208770/growth-of-foreign-repression-on-uk-soil-going-unchecked-jchr-report-warns/

                    [10] European Parliament, ‘Study: Transnational repression of human rights defenders: The impacts on civic space and the responsibility of host states’, June 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2025/754475/EXPO_STU(2025)754475_EN.pdf

                    [11]  Nate Schenkkan, Lawfare, ‘Trump is undermining policies against transnational repression’, July 2025, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/trump-is-undermining-policies-against-transnational-repression

                     

                    Topics
                    Democracy and Elections
                    Freedom of Expression
                    Human Rights
                    Tackling Transnational Repression
                    Footnotes
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