The challenges of addressing authoritarian transnational repression in democracies

August 6, 2025

From Chinese unofficial police stations to the assassination attacks perpetuated by Russian or Iranian secret agents on their citizens and diaspora communities residing abroad, authoritarian states have become increasingly emboldened and assertive in projecting their power on their population across borders. Through tactics such as physical threats, Interpol arrest warrants, and digital surveillance, authoritarian states are not shying away from silencing their critics abroad, even in democratic countries. Dictators are becoming increasingly creative in using their repression tools to contain new forms of dissent and security challenges arising from their population abroad. This phenomenon is now broadly defined as transnational repression (TNR).

In recent years we have seen a rising number of international initiatives shaping a narrative to counter TNR. In its 2023 Resolution on the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders^[1], the European Parliament highlighted the increase in transnational threats against human rights defenders. Similarly, in its Conclusions on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2025, the Foreign Affairs Council committed to considering measures to prevent and tackle TNR^[2]. At a broader European level, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE) recognised in Resolution 2509 (2023) that transnational repression is a growing concern which undermines the rule of law and human rights in Europe^[3]. More recently, at the 2025 G7 Leaders’ Summit held in Kananaskis, G7 leader, under the presidency of Canada, condemned acts of TNR and encouraged nation states to further develop concrete strategies counter TNR and increase the costs for those who engage TNR activities^[4].

Building resilience against authoritarian transnational repression is also rapidly becoming a critical national security issue for countries around the world. The United States, in the aftermath of the killing of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi introduced a plethora of new measures aimed to counter TNR. These include the so-called Khashoggi Ban, Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021, which proposes prohibiting US arms sales to Saudi Arabia for as long as the government is engaging in transnational repression against dissidents, and the Transnational Repression Accountability and Prevention (TRAP) Act, which targets the abuse of INTERPOL by strengthening transparency and liability within the organization^[5].

Similarly, in the UK, following an escalation of foreign interference threats ranging from foreign interference, disinformation, cyber-attacks, intimidation and transnational repression targeting diaspora communities in the UK, the Minister of State Security, Tom Tugendhat, introduced the Defending Democracy Taskforce initiative which aims to reduce the risks of foreign interference to the UK’s democratic processes, institutions and society at large^[6]. Other states like the Netherlands, are revising their espionage laws that would criminalise aspects of TNR activities related to espionage such as digital espionage and diaspora espionage. In the case of the Netherlands, the new law expands on existing legislation and criminalises actions such as leaking information or working for foreign governments that harm Dutch interests. Offenders can face up to 8 years in prison, with a maximum of 12 years for severe cases.

Yet while such policy initiatives are welcome, in the current context, liberal democracies still lack adequate institutional frameworks, which are needed to address the complex challenges of transnational repression.

Challenges of countering TNR

First, the hidden, multifaceted and ambiguous nature of transnational repression incidents makes them difficult to deter, identify, and counter. Authoritarian states engaged in TNR, often rely on covert operations or ‘clandestine diplomacy’ to target their regime critics abroad or individuals perceived as a regime threat^[7]. Strategies may involve the use of secret intelligence services or non-state actors such as criminal groups that are experienced in using covert means to influence targets and establish clandestine contacts with various groups. The use of state and non-state actors in carrying various covert attacks provide the perpetrator state with official deniability and a layer of obfuscation blurring the lines between intelligence services and criminal groups. This as a result makes it difficult to distinguish the identity of perpetrators launching the attacks. The use of proxies in covert operations provides the state with more plausible deniability and reduces government’s exposure to blame. The attack on MI6 spy, Sergei Skripal, in England in February 2018, using Russian-made military grade nerve agents, is a good example. Despite widespread accusations, the Kremlin consistently denied its sponsorship.

In other instances, repressive tactics may involve a mixture of legal and illegal means such as instrumentalising international organisations like INTERPOL or manipulate international agreements like extradition treaties to pursue regime critics under the guise of legality.

Second, the challenge of addressing TNR stems not only from its hybrid nature, but also from its often unclear definition. In the current context transnational repression has been embedded within the more general ‘authoritarian interference’ or ‘hybrid threat’ frame and has not yet been problematised in a systematic way. Consequently, this further affects how policymakers understand and deal with authoritarian transnational repression challenges. This careless use of terminology creates conceptual confusions and consequently affects policy responses. Subsuming TNR with foreign interference tactics like election manipulation, disinformation campaigns,and sabotage targeting critical infrastructure among other tactics, not only creates conceptual ambiguity, but also risks generating unnecessary confusion concerning the level and methods of responses. Such loose conceptual interpretation of TNR as a result further undermines the human rights dimensions of TNR. Although there are overlaps between TNR and authoritarian interference, the current paradigm of foreign interference prioritises national security over human rights protection. Such an approach fails to capture the human rights implications of TNR. Acts of transnational repression imperil civil and political liberties of vulnerable populations and civilians residing in democracies. At the individual level such authoritarian practices violate autonomy and dignity of the person, but at the collective level, they can disable diaspora voices simultaneously which can threaten the democratic process, just as secrecy and disinformation.

Third, responses to TNR are further conditioned by pragmatic politics. Host state attitudes towards the state engaging in TNR can vary according to existing bilateral and strategic interests. Here, the prioritisation of economic and broader geopolitical interests and the desire to avoid political conflict with strategic partners, mean that host states often turn ‘a blind eye’ on incidents related to transnational repression and prioritise material national interests over normative human rights dimensions. Such dynamics makes host states, including democracies, directly complicit in TNR. In other instances, pragmatic migration and asylum policies can further undermine human rights protection of individuals targeted by TNR. In the UK and elsewhere in Europe, the adoption of stricter migration and asylum measures put at greater risk individuals targeted by TNR. In the UK the outsourcing of asylum to authoritarian states like Rwanda undermines the very principles of international protection, and the obligation to protect individuals at risk of being persecuted by their authoritarian home states. The Rwandan government has been named as one the key perpetrators of transnational repression according to the latest HRW report^[8]. However, this did not stop the last UK government to pass the controversial bill that would have allowed asylum seekers to be deported to Rwanda.

These trends are not unique to the UK but are part of a broader trend. Across Europe, increasingly restrictive migration policies are undermining asylum protections and weakening commitments to shared humanitarian values.

How can states respond to transnational repression?

Given the rising trend in authoritarian practices in current global affairs, it is likely that incidents of TNR will continue to grow. By taking a weak stand to respond to TNR, Western leaders effectively grant legitimacy and continuity of such authoritarian patterns. This in turn undermines the rights and freedom of individuals who have been granted safe haven in democracies.

Addressing TNR requires a unified and coordinated response as well as cross-sectoral cooperation with relevant civil society organisations and law enforcement agencies. In particular, such a collaborative approach needs to focus on integrating diaspora and minority groups, who otherwise risk being used as proxies for authoritarian interference efforts. Additionally, such threats must be tackled using the means of national and international laws, as well as through prevention and education campaigns. This approach should further include the use of punishment mechanisms and tools such as targeted sanctions against individuals involved in transnational repression and human rights violations.

Last week the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) published its report Transnational Repression in the UK ^[9]. The report acknowledges that TNR represents a threat to human rights and those who have sought safety within its borders. The report warns that hostile governments—including China, Iran, and Russia—are employing transnational repression (TNR) tactics such as surveillance, harassment, and the manipulation of international legal mechanisms like INTERPOL to silence human rights defenders and diaspora communities in the UK. It also exposes serious shortcomings in the UK’s response, including the lack of a clear legal definition, insufficient data collection, and the absence of dedicated reporting channels for victims. The report calls for urgent and decisive action to curb the growing threat of TNR in the UK.

In a similar vein, in June 2025, the Subcommittee on Human Rights of the European Parliament published a study focusing on transnational repression of human rights defenders^[10]. The study highlights that transnational repression threatens the safety of defenders even when in exile and further shrinks civic space globally. Such efforts are crucial to spotlight the growing threat of transnational repression (TNR) to human rights and the rule of law, and to underscore the need to hold authoritarian regimes accountable for their actions. This in particular, when there is a disengagement from the United States on human rights and its commitment to tackle transnational repression. As observed by the former Freedom House Director, Nate Schenkkan: ‘while the Biden administration made policies to protect exiles and diasporas a priority. Trump 2.0 has already undercut these efforts’. Though the United States formally signed on to the G7 statement, under the new Trump administration, the government has destroyed the infrastructure that was being built to make the U.S. a leader in counter-TNR policy^[11].

Therefore, in light of these developments, there remains a critical void that must be addressed by other democratic states committed to tackling TNR. This requires building comprehensive work across the multiple policy areas, increasing multilateral cooperation and engaging with vulnerable communities and civil society actors. Their continued leadership will play a vital role in maintaining global momentum on this issue.

For now though, incidents of transnational repression remain largely unpunished, therefore such forms of authoritarian interference constitute a highly tempting and potentially effective strategy for repressive regimes.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

Saipira Furstenberg, PhD, is a Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre and an independent researcher and policy consultant. She specialises in international security, migration, and sustainable development topics that support human rights, accountability, and democratic processes around the world. She is currently affiliated with the University of Exeter as an Associate Research Fellow. From 2022–2024, she was a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Cofund Research Fellow at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice.

Her research focuses on extraterritorial politics, the international dimensions of authoritarian regimes, human rights, and global governance. Her work on transnational repression has appeared in the European Journal of International Security, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, The International Journal of Human Rights, among others. In 2024, together with Dana Moss, she published an edited volume on Transnational Repression in the Age of Globalization (Edinburgh University Press).

[1] European Parliament, ‘European Parliament resolution of 16 March 2023 on the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders (P9_TA(2023)0086)’, March 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0086_EN.html

[2]Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2025’, January 2025, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5638-2025-INIT/en/pdf

[3]Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), ‘Resolution 2509 (2023): Transnational repression as a growing threat to the rule of law and human rights’, June 2023, https://pace.coe.int/en/files/32999/html

[4] Group of Seven (G7), ‘G7 Leaders’ Statement on Transnational Repression’, June 2025, https://g7.canada.ca/en/news-and-media/news/g7-leaders-statement-on-transnational-repression/

[5] US Department of State, ‘Accountability for the Murder of Jamal Khashoggi’, February 2021, https://www.state.gov/accountability-for-the-murder-of-jamal-khashoggi/; Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021, H.R. 1392, 117th Congress, US House of Representatives, February 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1392; Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021, S. 1591, 117th Congress, US Senate, February 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1591

[6] UK Government (Home Office and Cabinet Office), ‘Ministerial Taskforce meets to tackle state threats to UK democracy’, November 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ministerial-taskforce-meets-to-tackle-state-threats-to-uk-democracy

[7] Mikael Wigell, The Washington Quarterly, ‘Democratic Deterrence: How to Dissuade Hybrid Interference’, March 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893027

[8] Human Rights Watch, ‘Transnational Repression by Rwanda’, February 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/15/transnational-repression-rwanda

[9] Joint Committee on Human Rights (UK Parliament), ‘Growth of foreign repression on UK soil going unchecked – JCHR report warns’, July 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/93/human-rights-joint-committee/news/208770/growth-of-foreign-repression-on-uk-soil-going-unchecked-jchr-report-warns/

[10] European Parliament, ‘Study: Transnational repression of human rights defenders: The impacts on civic space and the responsibility of host states’, June 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2025/754475/EXPO_STU(2025)754475_EN.pdf

[11] Nate Schenkkan, Lawfare, ‘Trump is undermining policies against transnational repression’, July 2025, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/trump-is-undermining-policies-against-transnational-repression

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Freedom of Expression

Human Rights

Tackling Transnational Repression

Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group

Article by Foreign Policy Centre

August 4, 2025

Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group

For more information on the Working Group, please visit the website: https://tackling-tnr.uk/ or get in touch via email at: info@tackling-tnr.uk

Transnational repression (TNR) is on the rise globally, fuelled by rapidly evolving technology, global democratic- backsliding and the rise of authoritarianism and years of neglect by previous governments. It is a major policy blind spot, resulting in significant constraints on the exercise of fundamental rights in the UK.

Repressive actors, including powerful and hostile states, have a growing set of tools to surveil, threaten, harass and attack individuals in the UK, violating their fundamental rights guaranteed under international and domestic laws such as the Human Rights Act 1998. Political dissidents, exiled journalists and human rights defenders have traditionally been the main targets of TNR, but today a broader array of groups and individuals also find themselves subject to transnational human rights violations here in the UK.

The UK’s responses to TNR to date have been sparse, incoherent and largely inaccessible to targeted communities and individuals. Law enforcement is an important part of the solution, but the cross-border nature of TNR demands a broader approach to protect the rights of those targeted.

The Foreign Policy Centre is a founding member of the Tackling Transnational Repression (TNR) in the UK Working Group. Formed in September 2024, the Tackling TNR Working Group is an informal coalition of individuals and organisations working to address TNR in the UK context.

The working group’s steering committee includes: The Foreign Policy Centre, Richardson Institute at Lancaster University, Index on Censorship, Reporters Without Borders, Azadi Network and The Rights Practice. The wider membership also comprises organisations such as Amnesty International UK, ARTICLE 19, the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), China Dissent Network, Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, FairSquare, Hong Kong Democracy Council, Hong Kong Watch, and Iran International, as well as other individual experts and researchers.

The aims of the group are to:

To advance research and monitor incidents and effects of TNR in the UK;

Support individuals and groups affected by TNR; and

Identify and shape the development of a comprehensive policy response to TNR in the UK.

Together, the Tackling TNR WG has developed a ‘Four Part Approach’ for addressing TNR in the UK, which is outlined in detail below. This approach was included in the Tackling TNR in the UK Working Group’s submission to the Human Rights (Joint Committee) inquiry into ‘Transnational repression in the UK,’ in February 2025. Our evidence was published by the Committee in June 2025, and is available here. FPC’s Director, Susan Coughtrie, also gave oral evidence to the Committee in March 2025, the transcript of which can be found here.

Following the publication of the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report on transnational repression in the UK on 30th July 2025, the Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group prepared a statement in response. To read the statement, click here.

On 30th October 2025, the UK Government published its response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report on TNR. While the Working Group welcomes the Government’s acknowledgement of TNR as a human rights issue and its intention to improve coordination, it maintains concerns about the lack of transparency, the absence of a clear definition of TNR, and limited plans to engage affected communities. In response, the Working Group has written to the Home Secretary to outline these concerns. You can read the full letter here.

In March 2026, members of the Working Group wrote to Ministers about recent incidents affecting the Iranian and Pakistani communities in the UK. You can read the letters here and here.

The Working Group organised a parliamentary reception on Tuesday, 14 April, hosted by Lord Alton of Liverpool, Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The event featured first-hand accounts from UK residents targeted by Iran, Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN Special Rapporteur on Iran, and MPs whose constituents have been targeted, including Alex Sobel MP and Joshua Reynolds MP. You can read more on the event here.

During the reception, he Working Group launched its new policy paper ‘Unseen Threats, Unheard Voices: Towards Stronger UK Protections on TNR’ setting out the group’s four-part plan to tackle TNR. The paper features powerful first-hand testimonies from people targeted by countries such as Hong Kong, Egypt and Iran and has been endorsed by MPs from multiple parties. The Group also launched a new website (https://tackling-tnr.uk/), which includes more information and resources on the issue.

The Tackling TNR Working Group’s ‘Four Part Approach’ for addressing TNR in the UK

If you are interested to find out more about the working group and/or to enquire about joining, please email: info@fpc.org.uk

Topics

Human Rights

Tackling Transnational Repression

From paperwork to digital protocols: how exile rewrites citizenship

Article by Ray Svitla

July 25, 2025

From paperwork to digital protocols: how exile rewrites citizenship

Bureaucracy still moves at the speed of fax, but exile communities are prototyping governance technologies at the speed of necessity. This opens new possibilities for host countries of those in exile to learn from their innovations, while building democratic values and resilience.

As someone exiled twice – first from Belarus due to political persecution, then from Ukraine due to war – I have come to see home not as a place, but as a protocol, where new digital governance tools enable active citizenship. Diasporas are building these protocols under fire. Displacement breeds innovation: those in exile are not merely adapting to digital governance; they are pioneering it because their old institutions have collapsed.

Diaspora communities should be taken seriously because they have the power to influence change at home. We saw this in action when voters from abroad tipped the scales in Moldova’s October 2024 EU accession referendum. The decisive votes were not cast in Chișinău – they came from WhatsApp groups in Italy, community centres in Germany and kitchen tables in Dublin^[1]. One in four Moldovans now lives abroad^[2]; their ballots turned a domestic stalemate into constitutional change.

The Belarusian diaspora pushed even further, electing a parliament in exile. Despite cyber harassment and threats to relatives, we held block chain audited elections for a Coordination Council in May 2024^[3]. Six thousand verified votes out of a million strong diaspora is not regime toppling, but it is a proof of concept that democratic processes can outlive failed states^[4].

In the shadow of authoritarianism, new technologies are making democratic engagement possible. Zero knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are one promising approach. Projects like Freedom Tool let citizens prove passport validity without revealing personal data^[5].

Zero knowledge voting sounds dystopian until your polling station becomes a prison cell. Then it becomes a tool for building democratic resilience. Early pilots in Russian, Iranian and Georgian contexts suggest the method can scale, even under authoritarian pressure^[6]. It deserves rigorous security audits and a clear path to legal recognition.

Policymakers in Western democracies must understand that digital innovations by exile communities are more than fringe experiments – they are stress testing governance under extreme conditions. The UK should observe carefully, not as saviour but as strategic learner.

One quick win is improved administrative efficiency. For example, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office takes weeks to certify official documents, but secure digital credentials could streamline verification. Pilot schemes would surface real world obstacles early.

As authoritarian states weaponise diasporas, the UK could partner with democratic exile networks on standards and sandbox trials, that test new technologies in safe environments^[7].

Low-risk pilots could include a sandbox test for diaspora credentials as supplementary evidence for specific visa categories^[8]. Think tanks could convene Belarusian, Moldovan, Ukrainian, Hong Kong and Taiwan tech teams with MPs, regulators and the FCA sandbox to swap playbooks.

The government could also fund independent open-source audits of diaspora governance tools to understand security threats and vulnerabilities before deeper institutional engagement.

These technologies might eventually reshape citizenship and belonging. However, the transition from paperwork to digital protocols demands careful navigation. The question is not whether exile communities will innovate, but whether established democracies can learn from their experiments without repeating their mistakes.

Ray Svitla is a Belarus-born entrepreneur, fractional CMO and governance strategist working at the nexus of Web3, civil-society tech and frontier finance. He has mobilised $25 M+ in capital and unlocked $200 K in equity-free grants from USAID, the NEAR Foundation and others. As co-founder of WAKA he scaled the matchmaking platform to 100 000 users at one-tenth typical CAC. He also led a research department producing more than 80 publications that drew tier-1 clients including Blockchain.com. Today he stewards the 404embassy.com network, hosting salons with visionaries such as Vitalik Buterin. A John Smith Trust Fellow, Ray applies value-driven governance insights to build more resilient, inclusive futures.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Wikipedia, ‘2024 Moldovan European Union membership constitutional referendum’, October 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Moldovan_European_Union_membership_constitutional_referendum

^[2] Tiina Kaukvere, Emerging Europe, ‘Is Moldova’s diaspora ready to return home?’, May 2025, https://emerging-europe.com/analysis/is-moldovas-diaspora-ready-to-return-home/

^[3] Kamil Kłysiński, OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, ‘Belarus: elections to the opposition parliament’, May 2024, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-05-29/belarus-elections-to-opposition-parliament

^[4] Ray Svitla, Embassy.Svit.la, ‘Pavel Liber: Building a New Belarus in Exile (An Interview)’, June 2025, https://embassy.svit.la/p/pavel-liber-building-a-new-belarus

^[5] Rarimo, Medium, ‘Introducing Freedom Tool’, February 2024, https://rarimo.medium.com/introducing-freedom-tool-15709e9eaa73; Ray Svitla, Embassy Svit.la, ‘Kitty Horlick (Rarimo): ZKDemocracy & Privacy’s Future’, July 2025, https://embassy.svit.la/p/kitty-horlick-rarimo-zk-democracy

^[6] Oleksandr Kurbatov and Lasha Antadze, Medium, ‘Building ZK passport-based voting’, September 2024, https://rarimo.medium.com/building-zk-passport-based-voting-3f6f97ebb445

^[7] Citizen Lab, UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Written evidence to UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee – Transnational Repression (TRUK0112)’, 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/138042/html/

^[8] Office for Digital Identities and Attributes, GOV.UK, ‘About us’, November 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-for-digital-identities-and-attributes

Topics

Diaspora

Regions

Belarus

Legal certainty could boost Ukrainians’ economic contribution in the UK

Article by Nataliia Danova

July 23, 2025

Legal certainty could boost Ukrainians’ economic contribution in the UK

Displaced Ukrainians in the UK are highly educated, with strong professional backgrounds and well placed to contribute economically and socially. However, to do this, they need greater certainty about their future in the country.

More than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the UK has provided refuge to over 218,600 displaced Ukrainians under humanitarian visa schemes.

Government data shows 68% of Ukrainian adults are employed or self-employed^[1]. Yet only about one-third are working in their original professions, with 20% employed in the hospitality sector, indicating that there are opportunities to make much better use of their skills^[2].

Many Ukrainians are also proactively contributing to community life, establishing cultural associations, grassroots organisations, and volunteer initiatives that provide language classes, cultural events, and mental health support.

Last year, I joined the John Smith Trust’s Ukrainian Women’s Leadership programme in Scotland and I met many women who are contributing to the UK economy and whose efforts have strengthened both Ukrainian and local communities.

One Fellow, Hanna Tekliuk, is an active member of the Education Working Group of the CPG on Ukraine. She has also established the Ukrainian St Margaret’s Saturday School for relocated Ukrainian children. These schools are vital for maintaining a deep connection to their heritage.

Anna Kulish is another of the many women and John Smith Fellows making a vital contribution. She is the Secretary of the Scottish Parliament Cross-Party Group on Ukraine and chairs its business and economy working group, which promotes economic ties between Scotland and Ukraine.

With the CPG, she led the first trade visit from Ukraine to Scotland in over a decade, with 60 delegates including community leaders and mayors of Ukrainian cities. They came to Scotland not to ask for aid, but to present investment projects.

However without a clear pathway to permanence in the UK, many displaced Ukrainians face limited opportunities. The three-year visas under the Ukraine schemes are now approaching expiry. The Ukraine permission extension grants an additional 18 months’ stay, offering temporary reassurance. However, this extension does not guarantee indefinite leave to remain, leaving long-term status unresolved.

Career advancement, housing stability, and family planning are all shaped by legal uncertainty. Policy choices now will influence whether integration efforts continue to yield social and economic dividends—or risk stagnation under prolonged precarity.

While some Ukrainians intend to return when conditions allow, most are laying down roots and wish to remain long term^[3]. However, a sense of belonging remains constrained.

As one displaced Ukrainian reflected: “We came here to survive, but we’ve built lives. Now we need to know whether we’re staying as guests—or neighbours.”

As the UK navigates this next phase, there is an urgent need for clarity. Policymakers may consider how temporary protection could transition into more secure residency for those who would like to remain, aligning with broader migration and integration objectives.

Ukrainians in the UK have a great deal of untapped potential, with the skills and motivation to contribute more to the economy. Targeted investment in credential recognition, bridging programmes, and language support could address underemployment and better align Ukrainian skills with labour market needs. This is a clear win for both Ukrainians and the UK communities that have welcomed them. Meanwhile, strengthening partnerships with Ukrainian-led organisations could enhance community integration and complement formal support services.

Integration is shaped by opportunity and agency. Policy decisions taken now will influence whether displaced Ukrainians can contribute through work, taxes, and civic engagement or remain constrained by temporary status.

Three years on, the UK faces a pivotal policy moment: whether the welcome extended in 2022 becomes a pathway to belonging or remains a temporary refuge.

Nataliia Danova is a John Smith Trust alumna, currently working for Edinburgh City Council. She is the co-founder of Help Ukraine Scotland, an organisation providing informational support and resources to displaced Ukrainians across Scotland. Nataliia is a creative practitioner, cultural mediator, and advocate for refugee and migrant rights, committed to building pathways for integration and community support through grassroots initiatives.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, ‘Ukrainian migration to the UK’, December 2024, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/ukrainian-migration-to-the-uk/

^[2] Chatham House, ‘Ukrainian refugees and their shifting situation’, part of Ukraine’s fight for its people, February 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/02/ukraines-fight-its-people/ukrainian-refugees-and-their-shifting-situation

^[3] Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, ‘Ukrainian migration to the UK’, December 2024, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/ukrainian-migration-to-the-uk/

Topics

Civil Society

Diaspora

Regions

Ukraine

Beyond transactions to rebuilding trust with Central Asia

Article by Ainur Kanafina

July 21, 2025

Beyond transactions to rebuilding trust with Central Asia

As global power dynamics shift, Central Asia’s strategic relevance is rising, – but so too is the need for a reset in engagement by international partners. Could a more principled, values-driven approach unlock lasting stability and democratic resilience in the region?

Central Asia stands at a peculiar crossroads. Decades after gaining independence, a common refrain echoes: “Everything has changed, but nothing has changed.”

On the surface, new infrastructure rises, economies evolve, and geopolitical alignments shift. Yet, beneath this veneer, the fundamental nature of international engagement often remains stubbornly familiar, characterised by a transactional approach that prioritises short-term gains over long-term partnership. What was once subtly implied is now glaringly apparent: a pervasive lack of genuine interest in the region’s holistic development, with compromises frequently driven by the pursuit of trade and resources.

Deepening regional integration is paramount. Initiatives like the Central Asian Summit are fostering greater cooperation among the republics themselves, building a collective identity and reducing reliance on external powers for regional stability. This internal cohesion makes the region a more attractive and reliable partner for others.

To truly move forward, a fundamental shift is required: a transition towards a more principled and value-driven approach to diplomacy. This means moving beyond the immediate gratification of trade deals or security pacts and embracing a long-term vision rooted in genuine partnership.

A key opportunity lies in enhancing regional connectivity and integration. As global supply chains are re-evaluated and diversified, Central Asia’s geographic position as a land bridge between East and West becomes even more critical. Investing in modern transport corridors, logistics hubs, and digital infrastructure can transform the region into a vital transit artery, generating substantial transit revenues and stimulating local economies.

Firstly, a principled approach entails consistent investment in human capital and civil society. This includes supporting independent media, educational exchanges, and grassroots initiatives that empower citizens and foster critical thinking. Such investments, though not immediately yielding economic returns, are foundational for resilient societies and accountable governance.

Secondly, diplomacy must be predicated on shared values like the rule of law, transparency, and sustainable development. Instead of overlooking governance issues for the sake of a trade agreement, international partners should consistently advocate for reforms that strengthen institutions and combat corruption. This does not mean imposing Western models, but rather supporting Central Asian efforts to build systems that serve their own people effectively and justly.

Thirdly, fostering regional integration that benefits all citizens, not just elites, should be a priority. Supporting cross-border initiatives in areas like water management, energy, and transport can build trust and interdependence, creating a more stable and prosperous region.

A principled approach is not merely altruistic – it is strategically sound. By investing in the long-term stability and genuine development of Central Asian nations, international partners build more reliable and resilient allies. It counters malign influences by offering a compelling alternative rooted in mutual respect and shared prosperity. It acknowledges that true security and economic growth stem from strong institutions, empowered citizens, and a commitment to universal values.

The time has come to shed the transactional shadows and embrace a brighter, more principled path for diplomacy in Central Asia. Only then can “everything truly change” for the better, fostering a future of genuine partnership and lasting progress.

Ainur Kanafina is a Programme Specialist in Population and Development at United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Regional Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia in Istanbul, Türkiye. Previously, Ainur served at the World Health Organization (WHO) in Amman, Jordan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Kazakhstan. She has also worked at the British Embassy in Astana KAZGUU Higher School of Economics, Global Center for Cooperative Security and the Institute for Strategic Development. Ainur holds a MSc in public policy from University College London and a BSc in information technology and business from Indiana University. She is an alumna of various programmes organised by Council of Europe, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Riga Graduate School of Law and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Academy. Ainur is also a Bolashak scholar and a PMP certified project manager. 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

Topics

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

International Development

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Kazakhstan

Europe and Central Asia can benefit from changing migration patterns

Article by Meder Dastanbekov

High unemployment and limited economic opportunities in Central Asian countries have traditionally driven millions of people to migrate to Russia in search of work^[1]. Where the region’s historical, cultural and linguistic links with Russia have been a major factor in migrants’ choice of destination, new migration patterns are however emerging, influenced by geopolitical shifts in the region. These present opportunities for Central Asian governments, the receiving countries, and the migrants themselves^[2].

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, life has become more difficult for Central Asian migrants who live and work in Russia. Those who hold Russian passports are compelled to join the armed forces, and tens of thousands have been sent to the war zone^[3]. Some returned to their home countries to avoid the draft.

Then there are undocumented migrants. Since the terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall by Tajik nationals, Russia’s attitude towards Central Asian migrants has become more hostile^[4]. Combined with military mobilisation, this has led to new regulatory frameworks and tools for registering undocumented migrants.

From the perspective of Central Asian countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, whose economies rely heavily on remittances, dependence on a single country as a migration destination is a high-risk strategy^[5]. It gives the destination country a disproportionate influence over policies and leaves you vulnerable to changes in theirs.

That is why governments in Central Asia need to pursue a strategy to diversify the migration destinations of their citizens. We are seeing opportunities to expand mutually beneficial agreements on labour migration with countries such as the UK, Germany, Japan and South Korea ^[6]. These countries offer workers better conditions than Russia, with proper contracts that reduce the risk of exploitation and better legal protections.

The UK’s Seasonal Workers Scheme is a good example^[7]. The UK has a quota system, which allocates a specific number of places for each country. In 2024, Great Britain allocated 45,000 seasonal work visas for Central Asia, with approximately 30% going to citizens of Kyrgyzstan^[8]. Central Asian migrants view the scheme as a valuable opportunity for legitimate, well-paid and well-regulated work. The scheme benefits the UK by filling a seasonal labour shortage in the agricultural and poultry sectors. The same is true in Japan and South Korea.

For the governments of receiving countries such as the UK, labour migration schemes offer opportunities for cultural exchange and stronger relations in the region^[9]. Central Asian governments appreciate the UK’s scheme because it helps them to resolve their unemployment issues. So, if UK policy is to increase its influence in Central Asia, this is received more positively.

The temporary and seasonal nature of these schemes suits Central Asian citizens themselves, as they are not looking to emigrate but to resolve an economic need. For host societies, Central Asian seasonal workers present minimal integration challenges, as their temporary stay avoids long-term social or economic strain. As long as the scheme is well-regulated, everybody wins.

Meder Dastanbekov is the former country director for Winrock International in the Kyrgyz Republic, where he led initiatives to promote safe migration and combat human trafficking in the Kyrgyz Republic and wider Central Asia region. His work addresses the critical challenges faced by migrants, particularly in light of evolving geopolitical dynamics, such as the war in Ukraine and its impact on migration patterns. With extensive experience fostering collaboration between governments, international organisations, and civil society, Meder helps in developing inclusive policies and practices that prioritise human rights and empower vulnerable populations.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Kommersant, ‘Мы реально не знаем, кто к нам едет’, September 2024, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7166241

^[2] University of Central Asia Institute of Public Policy and Administration, How War in Ukraine Has Shaped Migration Flows in Central Asia, policy brief, c. 2023, https://ucentralasia.org/media/psdnh1p1/pbmigration-flow-change-in-central-asia-en.pdf

^[3] Kaktus.media, ‘Бастрыкин заявил, что десятки тысяч мигрантов с гражданством РФ находятся на передовой’, May 2025, https://kaktus.media/doc/524105_bastrykin_zaiavil_chto_desiatki_tysiach_migrantov_s_grajdanstvom_rf_nahodiatsia_na_peredovoy.html

^[4] BBC News, ‘Ukraine war: US and UK to supply longer‑range missiles to Kyiv’, June 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68665896

^[5] Азаттык Радиосу (RFE/RL), ‘Рублдин курсу борбор азиялык мигранттарга кандай таасир этти?’ (How the ruble exchange rate affects Central Asian migrants), April 2025, https://www.azattyk.org/a/33394657.html

^[6] Farangis Najibullah, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘Happy To Be In Britain, Central Asian Migrants Want More Work To Cover Expenses’, August 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/britain-central-asia-migrants-more-work-expenses/31997221.html; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘“This Is Not My World”: Central Asian Migrants in Russia Say They Could Never Return Home’, April 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-migrants-centralasia-uzbekistan/33261194.html; and, Akchabar.kg, ‘Kyrgyzstan and Japan deepen cooperation in employment and social projects’, n.d., https://www.akchabar.kg/en/news/kirgizstan-i-yaponiya-uglublyayut-sotrudnichestvo-v-sfere-trudoustrojstva-i-sotsialnikh-proektov-pdhtnmeblegahkmk

^[7] Association of Labour Providers, ‘Seasonal Worker Scheme’, n.d., https://www.labourproviders.org.uk/seasonal-worker-scheme/

^[8] Akchabar.kg, ‘Великобритания выделяет 45 тысяч квот для сезонных работников из ЦА — 30 получат граждане Киргизстана’ (Britain allocates 45,000 quotas for seasonal workers from Central Asia — 30 will go to Kyrgyzstan citizens), n.d., https://www.akchabar.kg/en/news/velikobritaniya-videlyaet-45-tisyach-kvot-dlya-sezonnikh-rabotnikov-iz-tsa-30-poluchat-grazhdane-kirgizstana-mdphrmumvuomxzgj

^[9] The Economist, ‘Why Central Asians are flocking to Britain’, July 2023, https://www.economist.com/britain/2023/07/24/why-central-asians-are-flocking-to-britain

Topics

Diaspora

Human Rights

Regions

Kyrgyzstan

How can we start conversations to shift colonial mindsets?

Article by Aigulle Sembaeva

July 18, 2025

How can we start conversations to shift colonial mindsets?

When speaking about Russian and Soviet colonialism, the first step is to agree on the terminology. Why do we continue to define the region by referencing that it ‘formerly’ belonged to the Soviet Union more than 30 years ago? To move on from the Soviet identity, we should refer instead to Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

Yet this solution does not reflect the commonality of problems countries in this region face, exactly because of their tumultuous history and present circumstances. Given ‘post-socialist’, ‘post-communist’ or ‘post-anything’, present the same definitional problem as the ‘former soviet union’. One suggestion is to call the region the “Global East”^[1]. The second step is to realise that not all countries that were the republics of the Soviet Union and before that parts of the Russian Empire, necessarily agree that they were “colonised”. Some reject the term as degrading and not reflecting the economic and cultural reality they lived in. Some Georgians, for example, prefer to talk about it in terms of an occupation.

We also need to recognise that experiences vary hugely by country. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia kept their cultural identities and language. However, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, due to the influx of Slavic and other non-Asian populations, Russian remains the lingua franca and an official language until this day. In Estonia and Latvia, the large Russian-speaking populations form parallel social structures. In Belarus, Lukashenko’s regime actively promotes russification, and speaking Belarusian is perceived as a sign of being in the opposition.

Ukraine and Kazakhstan suffered starvation under Stalin in the 1930s. In Ukraine, memorialising the Holodomor is one of the foundations of modern Ukrainian identity^[2]. Meanwhile, the Kazakh famine (Asharshylyk), which was equally devastating, is less well-remembered and less researched^[3].

So, how can we start to shift colonial mindsets? We need to have conversations between different nations and ethnic groups about their experiences, including national minorities from Russia and ethnic Russians. Failing to do so allows propaganda to build. The consequences of failing to challenge false narratives can clearly be seen in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

A good place to start is for decolonial activists from across the region to find spaces where we can share our experiences and build a common understanding. Independent media are ideally placed to support this process. For example, the Kyrgyz podcast O’decolon (English version Yurt Jurt) brings people together from almost all the countries in the region to discuss their experiences^[4].

When we are ready to reach a bigger audience, a series in the mainstream media exploring these issues in a more engaging way could be a good way to breakthrough. Just as Adolescence sparked conversations about teenagers, social media and misogyny, a series tackling colonial issues could help shift mindsets on a large scale.

Shifting mindsets within Russian society is an important component too, and not only with the involvement of civil society and independent media in exile. Hundreds of thousands of people fled Russia to avoid being mobilised^[5], with many ending up in Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan and other countries of the region.

For those who have left Russia at least, there is an opportunity to see their country from another perspective. It could be the beginning of some overdue reflection on the Soviet legacy and Russian colonialism.

Aigulle Sembaeva is an experienced civil society professional, Aigulle’s area of expertise is in leading and designing education, capacity building and youth participation programmes. Throughout her career she has brought together students, activists, journalists, reformers, and researchers from Central Asia and Eastern Europe to share their experiences and innovative ideas. She is a strong believer in the power of people’s networks to effect change.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] G. John Ikenberry, International Affairs, ‘Three Worlds: the West, East and South and the competition to shape global order’, vol. 100, no. 1, January 2024, pp. 121–138, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad284

^[2] National Museum of the Holodomor‑Genocide, ‘The History of the Holodomor’, n.d. https://holodomormuseum.org.ua/en/the-history-of-the-holodomor/

^[3] Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, ‘Remembering Kazakhstan’s Great Famine of the 1930s’, https://ieres.elliott.gwu.edu/project/remembering-kazakhstans-great-famine-of-the-1930s/

^[4] Bashтан, Подкаст О’Деколон, YouTube playlist, 43 episodes, last updated 19 December 2024, https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLjI-VRWtNFhNoA45bMJhPzqY82-smpeZF; and, Bashтан, Yurt Jurt, Spotify podcast, hosted by Dr. Diana Kudaibergen, https://open.spotify.com/show/51uxvx3yDWujSSBPykPZYR

^[5] The Bell, ‘Russia’s 650,000 wartime emigres’, July 2024, https://en.thebell.io/russias-650-000-wartime-emigres/

Topics

Regions

Russia

We must make the connection between diversity and peace

Article by Nino Gogoladze

July 16, 2025

We must make the connection between diversity and peace

All societies are diverse, even if some people have got used to thinking that their country should be homogeneous, where everyone looks the same, speaks the same language, and follows the same religion.It is this mindset that enables authoritarian and populist leaders to divide their societies into “us and them”.

Globally we are seeing a pushback against the diversity, equality and inclusion (DEI) agenda, not least of all in the United States under the second Trump administration. Yet DEI is crucial to maintaining a peaceful society.My work, as the national coordinator in Georgia for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe High Commissioner on National Minorities,is mostly about preventing ethnic conflict and promoting a diverse society. Inclusive decision-making is one of the ways to make this happen.

When minorities take part in the decision-making process, they take ownership of those decisions^[1]. It gives the process more legitimacy because it represents the interests and needs of the whole society. This is relevant for all groups, whether ethnic, religious minorities or the LGBTQI community.

This is extremely important for democracy, especially today, as politicians all over the world revert to divisive rhetoric , fostering distrust among communities and attempting to manipulate and try to manipulate us.

It’s never easy. You make certain steps forward, but then you must go back and start over again. In Georgia right now, where civil society is under unprecedented pressure from the government, there are fewer opportunities to implement a diversity agenda^[2]. When there is a rise in authoritarianism, minorities try to stay silent to weather the storm and survive this pressure. This further alienates them.

Despite this, there is still an opportunity to show people why diversity is important. We can do this by making the connection between diversity and peace. When there is too much pressure on minority communities, people start resisting, and that could lead to tensions and then even conflict. But when you foster diversity, there is less friction and a greater chance of different communities living together peacefully. Thus, exclusion is not an answer; societies need to find their own way to embrace diversity so that it reflects the needs and aspirations of their members.

Diversity matters more than ever because it’s about individual dignity and security for everyone. It’s about creating avenues which enable people to become part of society so that they do not have to fight every single day to get a job, an education, medical help. National governments need to design inclusive policies to address these issues.

In Georgia, I would like us to reach a point where ethnic minorities feel confident and welcome to speak up, not only about their own issues, but also about issues that affect the whole country.

For this to happen, we need inclusive leadership and role models in high-level positions. And we need to see this from our partners in Western democracies. The UK could lead by example, including diversity not only in policies but also in their actions when interacting with Georgian politicians. It sends an important message.

I want society and politicians to understand that diversity is not a danger to our identities. You do not have to build barriers between different groups to keep people safe. Instead, you celebrate diversity and benefit from it. It creates opportunities for us all.

Nino Gogoladze is a national programme coordinator for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE HCNM) in Tbilisi, Georgia. She manages the work of the HCNM in Georgia seeking to prevent ethnic conflict in the country and promote integration of diverse society. Nino previously worked as a project coordinator at the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), a programme coordinator at the Heinrich Boell Foundation, and national anti-trafficking officer for the OSCE Mission to Georgia. She holds an LLM degree from London School of Economics and Political Science; and an MA in international relations and European studies from the Central European University, Budapest.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre nor those of the OSCE HCNM.

^[1] OSCE, ‘The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’, September 1999, https://www.osce.org/hcnm/lund-recommendations

^[2] Nini Gabritchidze, ‘Georgian Dream’s FARA Takes Effect’, Civil.ge, May 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/684669

Topics

Regions

Georgia

How democracies can leverage Ukraine’s resistance for a global reset

Article by Kateryna Musienko

July 14, 2025

How democracies can leverage Ukraine’s resistance for a global reset

Ukraine is not just a battlefield – it is democracy’s most critical frontline. It is misleading to treat war as a regional conflict – the spillover of Russian aggression beyond Ukraine’s borders is not just possible, but likely.

What we are witnessing now is the global shift from a rules-based to a power-based order. The outcome of this confrontation will decide the politics of the future. We have a window of opportunity to create a global alliance based on democratic values and we must not miss it.

The cooperation between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea becomes more strategic than ever, as they prepare to undermine the Western-led, rule-based order. For Europe and the democratic world, it is crucial to break the endless cycle of appeasing the aggressor and to adopt a firm, practical policy of isolating Russia.

While some think about possible concessions to the aggressor, it is important to understand that what is being sacrificed is not only territory but also our values and freedom. Appeasement encourages further aggression. In this context, democracies must show they have the strength and tools to counter authoritarian power. And while we cannot change our existing institutions – such as NATO and the European Union (EU) – overnight, we can adapt.

There are still instruments that have not been fully utilised. Despite Russia’s hybrid aggression and energy blackmail costing hundreds of billions, Europe has hesitated to confiscate Russian assets for Ukraine’s benefit. Seizing the Russian Central Bank’s assets to create a European defence fund would provide crucial resources and demonstrate Europe’s commitment to countering ongoing threats^[1]. Building on this, there must be a policy shift towards total economic isolation of Russia by ending all trade with it.

The ‘Coalition of the Willing,’ led by the UK and France, provides the decisive leadership Europe needs^[2]. This coalition has the potential to evolve into a broader security mechanism, with existing institutions like the EU taking on a greater role. In this context, the UK can further support a humanitarian operation to protect Ukraine’s airspace over the north-western sector of the Black Sea and western Ukraine.

Building on Ukrainian practical experience of modern warfare with new technologies, the UK could also develop initiatives like Sky Shield^[3]. This could protect the sky in Europe and the UK using the Ukrainian example to build air superiority.

Ukrainian military experience is highly beneficial for Europe and NATO because they can better understand what they’re dealing with. Looking beyond our traditional allies, we must make space for new partners and security alliances, such as Japan and South Korea. A values-based alliance is our real strategic advantage.

The partnerships between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are based on mutual benefits and goals but there is no trust.  On the contrary, Ukraine is paying with its blood for choosing Europe. That is why our accession to the EU remains a top priority. With Russia watching, it sends a powerful message that Europe supports our aspirations. It’s more than integration. It’s about the strategic perspective and common security.

If we stay firm on our common values, we can build greater trust and unity based on a shared vision. A consensus-based approach takes time, and there is a need to move quickly in this fast-changing environment. However, in the long term, it will be more reliable than the transactional-based approach of the autocracies.

Kateryna Musiienko is a Kremenchuk City Council member and deputy head of the Committee for Foreign Relations, Education and Youth. She is a Head of the Foreign Affairs, Strategic Partnerships and Innovations at ANTS NGO. Kateryna was an advisor to a member of the European Parliament and former advisor to the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Ukrainian Parliament. Her educational background is in political science (Passau University) and diplomacy (University of Oxford).

Fellow Photo (c) Sarah Oughton, The John Smith Trust

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Ukrainian Victory, Confiscation of Russian State-Owned and Affiliated Property in Ukraine: Path to Justice and Recovery, n.d., https://ukrainianvictory.org/wp-content/uploads/Confiscation.pdf

^[2] UK Government, ‘Coalition of the Willing: Joint UK–France statement following 10 April meeting’, April 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/coalition-of-the-willing-joint-uk-france-statement-following-10-april-meeting

^[3]Dan Sabbagh, The Guardian, ‘European‑led Ukraine air protection plan could halt Russian missile attacks’, March 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/06/european-led-ukraine-air-protection-plan-could-halt-russian-missile-attacks

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

Democracy and Elections

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Ukraine

Geopolitical shifts: crisis or opportunity for democracy?

Article by Baroness Alison Suttie

We are living through the biggest shift in geopolitical power since the Second World War, accelerated by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, China’s economic ascendency, and the US retreat from guaranteeing Europe’s security.

A new multipolar power-based order is emerging. And in many countries, democracy is under threat as populist leaders exploit false and divisive narratives to gain and maintain power. In these turbulent times, we can see all too clearly that democracy is fragile and precious, and not to be taken for granted. We must have the courage to defend it in the face of growing authoritarianism.

Amid these shifts and crises, it has never been more important for UK policymakers to listen to a wide range of voices and perspectives, especially those we often don’t hear from. And where there are crises, there are also sometimes opportunities if you are willing to look for them and keep an open mind.

In this mini-series, John Smith Fellows from Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia discuss opportunities for transformation and development in their societies. We hear from Fellows in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, as well as Fellows exiled from Belarus and Russia, on topics including changing colonial mindsets, looking beyond traditional alliances, keeping the diversity agenda alive and opportunities for displaced people and local communities to thrive together.

Our Fellows are leaders and changemakers in their fields, who are committed to tolerance, openness and rules-based, people-focused governance. Together, they bring diverse perspectives and embody the value of connection and shared ‘sense-making’ in moments of crisis.

During our 30-year history, the John Smith Trust has built a network of more than 500 Fellows from across the region. This means that together we are well-placed to develop cross-regional and cross-sectoral connections, create space for new ideas and share expertise at a time of increasing polarisation.

The UK still excels at open discussion and respectful disagreement, which our Fellows value highly and take back to their societies. And while hard security cooperation – such as that proposed by the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ – is becoming increasingly important, the UK’s soft power diplomacy approaches are also crucial in the defence of democratic values in Europe and beyond.

For UK policymakers and advisors, it’s well worth spending time exploring emerging opportunities for local action and identifying where there’s potential for new alliances and collaborative relationships.

We can find strength in our shared values and focus on what unites us, not what divides us.

Baroness Suttie is a Member of the House of Lords since October 2013, Alison is currently the Liberal Democrat Northern Ireland Spokesperson in the House of Lords and is also a Party Whip. She served on the EU Select Committee in the House of Lords from 2015-19. She currently is a member of the Constitution Committee.

Alison was Head of the Liberal Democrat Leader’s office from 2006 to 2010 and was Deputy Chief of Staff to the Deputy Prime Minster for the first 18 months of the Coalition Government from 2010 to 2011.

In addition to being a working peer, Alison also works as an independent consultant in developing parliaments around the world. She has worked in Jordan, Iraq, Sudan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tunisia.

Having studied Russian and French at Heriot-Watt university in Edinburgh as well in Voronezh State University in Russia in 1988, she continues to enjoy speaking both languages.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

Topics

Democracy and Elections

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Europe

Central Asia

The challenges of addressing authoritarian transnational repression in democracies

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Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group

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From paperwork to digital protocols: how exile rewrites citizenship

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Legal certainty could boost Ukrainians’ economic contribution in the UK

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Beyond transactions to rebuilding trust with Central Asia

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Europe and Central Asia can benefit from changing migration patterns

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How can we start conversations to shift colonial mindsets?

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We must make the connection between diversity and peace

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How democracies can leverage Ukraine’s resistance for a global reset

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Geopolitical shifts: crisis or opportunity for democracy?

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