In Western media, Serbia is often presented as a pawn in Vladimir Putin’s confrontation with his US counterparts. However, the real situation is far more complex. While the Russian state does maintain a significant presence in this Balkan state, its influence has been relatively limited. Furthermore, Putin’s reckless gamble in Ukraine has resulted in a greater decline of Moscow’s ties to Belgrade. In the same vein, while Serbian society has a long history of pro-Russian orientation, a closer look suggests a more nuanced picture that extends beyond simplistic explanations circling around ‘Russophilia’ and ‘Putinomania’. This article analyses the development of Russia’s influence in Serbia under the Progressive Party (SNS), which has been in power since 2012, and outlines the current state of affairs.
Power and Russia’s desired outcomes in Serbia
In international relations, influence is often conceptualised as power – “the ability to affect the behaviour of others to get what one wants”.[1] It can be exercised through mechanisms that are either hard (coercion and payment) or soft (attraction and persuasion), and the extent of their impact can be judged by the outcomes.[2] A state’s desired outcomes in respect of other states can be determined from the general aims and specific goals codified in its official documents. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, Military Doctrine and National Security Strategy allow insight into the state’s desired outcomes regarding international relations. To date, Serbia has not been mentioned in any past or current versions of this strategy, which suggests its low-priority status for Russia’s power elite. Nevertheless, based on the general aims and more region-specific goals articulated by the Russian leadership, their desired outcomes in Serbia have been to: maximise Russia’s security by pushing back against North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), their “main external military danger”; to amass economic and cultural influence by securing the Serbian segment of Russia’s gas and oil supply network and other trade activities; as well as generating pro-Russian attitudes among Serbia’s power elite and public.[3]
Security
Security cooperation between Russia and Serbia began to advance in 2012, when the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) took over from their more openly Western-oriented predecessors, the Democratic Party. This manifested in the signing of the bilateral Military Cooperation Agreement (MCA) in 2013, providing for information and experience exchange, cooperation in military education, cartography, topography, and peacekeeping.[4] MCA was followed in 2014 by the Military Technical Cooperation Agreement (MTCA), securing Serbia as a client of Russia’s military industry, as well as other agreements on cooperation to combat organised crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.[5] Since 2013, Serbia has also been an observer in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and took part in joint Russian-led military exercises (“Slavic Brotherhood” & “BARS”) between 2014 and 2021.[6]
Looking at the bigger picture, however, Russia’s military influence in Serbia peaked in June 1999, when a relatively small Russian military contingent took over the Slatina Airport near Priština in an attempt to prevent NATO’s control over Yugoslavia’s Kosovo & Metohija region. They managed to temporarily block the US-led “Allied Force”. However, due to Russia’s weak position in the global political landscape at that time, the country’s leadership could not secure a supply route for their military contingent. Their risky gambit was over within a few days.
Since 1999, NATO, led by the US, has secured its military supremacy in Serbia, which resulted in the construction of the second largest US military base in Europe (Camp Bondsteel, in the southern part of Kosovo) in 1999; the departure of the Russian peacekeepers from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission in 2003; and several agreements signed between NATO and Belgrade. This includes the NATO Transit Agreement, which allowed NATO troops to travel freely through Serbian territory, as well as the establishment of the Serbia-NATO Defence Reform Group and the Partnership for Peace, bringing Serbia even closer to the North Atlantic alliance. This partnership has continued under the SNS, with the previous Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić signing the Individual Partnership Action Plan and an agreement on support and procurement (NSPO), and the current Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić pursuing further cooperation. Serbia has also regularly participated in NATO’s military exercises, which outnumbered their joint manoeuvres with Russia five-to-one.
In 2022, in the context of intensifying confrontation between Moscow and Washington over Ukraine, the Serbian government suspended their engagement in military exercises with both sides. However, they have since resumed their participation in US-led military training activities while Russia’s recent military exercises, including “Union Shield 2023”, were marked by the absence of Serbia’s military contingent.[7]
Economy
Russia’s most significant economic progress in Serbia has been related to energy supply. Following the signing of the Energy Cooperation Framework Agreement between Belgrade and Moscow in 2008, Gazprom Neft acquired the controlling stake of 51% in Serbia’s faltering energy giant Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS). This share was increased to 56.15% in 2011.[8] With oil products and gas accounting for almost half of Serbia’s total energy consumption, and with a quarter of its oil and almost all of its gas coming from Russia, Belgrade has become highly energy-reliant on Moscow.[9]
Over the years, Serbia proved to be a reliable partner, accommodating one of Russia’s key pipelines supplying gas to Europe (TurkStream), while buying Russian oil and gas at relatively advantageous rates. In addition to this, the Strategic Partnership Declaration (SPD) signed by the then Serbian President Nikolić in 2013 provided for greater cooperation in business, investment and trade, as well as transport, tourism, and agriculture.[10] Economic ties were further bolstered by a series of bilateral agreements signed by President Vučić in 2019.[11] However, the bigger picture reveals a situation that is not as favourable to the Kremlin.
Despite the aforementioned developments, Russia is not the prime mover in Serbia’s economy, trailing behind Germany, other European countries and increasingly China. Furthermore, Serbia’s trade with Russia has fallen significantly over the past two years due to new rounds of US-led sanctions, after Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in 2022.[12] In addition to this, with Serbia’s recent strides towards energy diversification manifested in its recent agreements on natural gas with Azerbaijan and on nuclear energy with France, as well as potential liquified natural gas (LNG) perspectives via Greece and Montenegro, Russia’s influence in the only sector of Serbia’s economy where it had been able to achieve significant success is likely to decrease in the near future.
While Gazprom Neft and other companies affiliated with the Kremlin (e.g. Russian Railways) continue to operate in Serbia, albeit under increasing pressure, others (e.g. Sberbank) have left. One may note the recent expansion of Russian IT companies (Yandex in particular) and mushrooming of small Russian enterprises around Belgrade and Novi Sad. However, most of these new arrivals, relokanty (“individuals who have relocated for an indefinite period“), tend to be opponents rather than supporters of Putin and are highly unlikely to facilitate the Russian state’s influence in their newly-found Balkan refuge.
At the same time, while Serbia voted for the United Nations’ motion condemning Putin’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, it did not join economic sanctions against Russia despite the pressure from the US. One reason for this is the aforementioned dependence on affordable Russian gas. However, there is more to it.
US, Russia and Serbian society
In 2008, Priština-based challengers of the central government in Belgrade proclaimed Kosovo’s independence, which was swiftly recognised by Washington. The expectation that a state leader must preserve their country’s territorial integrity and the extant cultural importance of Kosovo to many Serbs meant that accepting its secession would have cost then-president Boris Tadić his political career. Therefore, despite the ruling Democratic Party’s pro-Western stance, Tadić decided to pivot towards Russia while maintaining ties to the US, adopting a neo-Titoist approach of balancing between the West and the East. Hence, in this context, Russia emerged as Serbia’s indispensable ally, using its permanent seat at the UN Security Council to block the full legitimisation of Kosovo’s statehood.
Another potential factor underpinning President Vučić’s decision not to join the US-led sanctions against Russia, is the pro-Russian sentiments common in Serbian society. In this respect, any policies perceived as anti-Russian are prone to invoking strong negative reactions from the staunchly pro-Kremlin, Putinist segment of the public and silent disapproval from the moderately Russia-friendly majority. These dynamics can be explained by several cultural and material factors.
The majority of Serbs and Russians identify with Orthodox Christianity, which enables a perception of mutual societal similarities, in particular among the practising Orthodox Christians. Furthermore, the closeness between Russian and Serbian clergy and their vocal support for both governments make them efficient public diplomacy agents for the Russian state. Another cultural factor is a shared history, from an earlier, spiritual connection between the two Slavic nations through to Russia emerging as zaštitnica (defender) of Serbs. The latter theme has crystallised as a result of Russia’s role in facilitating Serbia’s independence from the Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia’s survival in the First and Second World Wars and in its conflict with NATO in the late 1990’s. Considering the popularity of national history and reading in Serbian society and the consonance between Russian and Serbian narratives in the aforementioned themes, they have come together as a solid cultural foundation for the Kremlin’s soft power in Serbia.
The cultural aspect of Russia’s soft power in Serbia also has a solid material base. For instance, Russia showed high scores and gradual growth (up to 72%) in a series of polls on the general impression of foreign countries among the young adults in Serbia, conducted between 2008 and 2016. This contrasted with the lower perceptions of the US, which did not rise above the 20% mark.[13] Looking more closely, the increases in pro-Russian attitudes demonstrated in this poll appear to have coincided with particular events, such as: the announcement of Russia’s energy projects in Serbia; Putin’s takeover of Crimea; Moscow’s veto of the genocide resolution on Srebrenica at the UN; and Russian Foreign Minister’s visit to Belgrade for an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conference, at which he mentioned the “NATO aggression against Yugoslavia” and the “Kosovo tragedy” themes.[14] Therefore, while pro-Russian attitudes are common in Serbia, they also appear to be influenced by the Kremlin’s diplomatic support for Serbia’s territorial integrity and international reputation. This hypothesis is reinforced by recent polls that feature Russia as the top choice for the country that should be more involved in the talks on Kosovo (29%), a country that Serbia should rely on in international relations (42.1%) and align its foreign policy with (61%).[15]
Furthermore, with the perception of the US as the enemy (due to the NATO’s previous military and ongoing political alignment with Bosniaks and Kosovan Albanians against Serbs), any of Russia’s actions against the interests of the US are likely to generate a positive response. This is reinforced by recent research that points to the perception of similarity between Serbia’s and Russia’s negative experiences with the West (economic sanctions and military confrontation) as the reason for the high opposition to sanctions against Russia (74.3%) in Serbian society.[16] Hence, the basis of Russia-friendly attitudes among the majority of Serbian citizens is not only cultural, but also material.
Russia’s public diplomacy in Serbia
Unsurprisingly, all of the above themes have been systematically promoted by Russia’s Serbian-language online media (e.g. Sputnik Srbija), the Russian House (Kremlin’s cultural diplomacy centre in Belgrade) and other, smaller organisations, through exhibitions, film screenings, concerts and religious events (e.g. Holy Fire). These have often been endorsed by various Serbian political officials looking to reaffirm their respect for their Russian partners and to capitalise on pro-Russian sentiments among the public. It must be noted that Russia’s public diplomacy actors have seldom been able to reach beyond the minority groups of Russophile intellectuals and ultra-conservatives. Nevertheless, certain cultural constructs such as Putin’s strongman persona have travelled through society organically, manifested in various ways, from local bars bearing his name or displaying his portraits to mugs, T-shirts and other Putin paraphernalia. As famously explained by Dragan Vučićević, the owner of the country’s leading tabloid, Informer: “Our usual daily circulation is 120,000… When I have Putin calendars, we sell 250,000… If I had put Catherine Ashton or Juncker on calendar, I don’t think I would sell even 12 copies”.[17] Moreover, Serbia’s own news media, cinemas and other platforms have been fairly accommodating to Russia’s political perspectives and cultural products.
At the same time, Serbian media have also platformed pro-Western voices, and the CNN-affiliated channel N1 has taken a prominent spot on Serbia’s television grid. Furthermore, Western films, TV series and music remain far more plentiful and popular in Serbia than the Russian products, especially among young adults. Similarly, English and other West European languages continue to be more popular than Russian.[18] Moreover, despite the extant belief in potential aid from Russia, the perception of Russia as Serbia’s main donor continues to fall behind the European Union (EU) and now also China. The same can be said about the appeal of the Kremlin’s state model, overshadowed by Switzerland, Norway and Germany.[19] The latter may have been partially influenced by some of the 370,000 relokanty, recent Russian émigrés many of whom have been vocal about the rise of repression and corruption in their home country.[20] Meanwhile, the EU continues to represent genuine economic opportunities, with a far greater number of Serbian citizens living, working and studying in the EU states than in Russia.[21]
There have been recent attempts to revamp Russia’s cultural strategy with the arrival of new, pro-active public diplomacy chiefs on the scene – in particular the new head of Rossotrudnichestvo (Russia’s cultural diplomacy agency) Yevgeniy Primakov Jr and new Russian House director Yevgeniy Baranov. Over the past three years, they have doubled down on youth exchange programmes and social media activities in Serbia. However, whether these efforts will bring any significant results remains to be seen. In the same vein, in 2022, following their banishment from the West, RT finally launched a Serbian-language online portal, but their reach and public engagement remain modest. Russia’s only potential game-changer in this respect would be expanding to television, which remains the dominant news platform in Serbia. If some segments of the Serbian public switch from national channels to one completely dominated by carefully crafted pro-Kremlin frames, Russia’s soft power potential may increase. However, with the launch previously announced for 2024, RT has yet to materialise on Serbian TV screens.[22] Considering the Serbian government’s already precarious situation in the context of the war in Ukraine and the questionable appeal of having another TV channel beyond their control, the prospects for RT appearing on Serbia’s television grid remain uncertain, albeit not unlikely.
Conclusion
The results of the Russian government’s efforts in Serbia have been relatively modest despite the enabling environment offered by their counterparts in Belgrade. Russia has been long overtaken by the US-led NATO in the military domain, and trails behind European states and China economically, with the exception of the energy sector. Furthermore, Putin’s reckless actions in Ukraine not only jeopardised Moscow’s chances of any further advancement, but they also compromised what the Kremlin had managed to achieve in the previous ten years. Its military cooperation with Belgrade has been reduced and its, once solid, position in the energy sector is now at risk of decline.
At the same time, Moscow’s extant power can be evidenced by Belgrade’s refusal to join the US-led sanctions against Russia. Clearly, the Kremlin has been successful in generating some pro-Russian policies from Serbia’s leadership and cultivating pro-Russian attitudes among the Serbian public. This has been enabled by Moscow’s consistent political support for Serbia’s territorial integrity and international reputation, which sits in contrast to Washington’s current policies and previous military actions against Belgrade. Meanwhile, shared religion, history and other cultural aspects continue to provide an organic foundation for Russia’s soft power in Serbia.
While a significant percentage of Serbian citizens may collectively look up to Russia as the defender of their state on the global arena, nevertheless, as individuals, many opt for the EU due to the greater economic opportunities it offers and prefer the political models of West European states such as Switzerland, Norway and Germany. Meanwhile, some of the recent 370,000 relokanty from Russia are likely to reinforce and amplify these attitudes by sharing their experiences of growing authoritarianism and corruption in their home country. At the same time, because of the low-cost strategy pursued by Moscow vis-à-vis Serbia in previous years, its public diplomacy capabilities remain limited.
Recent signs of reactivation of Kremlin’s cultural actors in Serbia may mean some increase in pro-Russian attitudes in the near future, certainly if they manage to secure their spot on the TV grid. However, if these efforts do not bear any fruit, Moscow’s influence will continue to diminish, overshadowed by Washington, Brussels and Beijing.
Dr Ernest A Reid is a Teaching & Development Assistant at Aston University and an Associate Fellow at Advance HE (AFHEA). He was formerly a PhD Scholar at Aston School of Social Sciences and an IMESS Scholar at UCL School of Slavonic & Eastern European Studies (UCL SSEES). His expertise on Russia’s influence in Serbia comes from a research project he had developed and carried out for UCL SSEES, spending nine months in Belgrade and travelling to Moscow to observe and interact with Russian public diplomacy actors. Fluent in Russian, he has also worked as a translator, with former clients including the UK government and law enforcement agencies, as well as IGOs, NGOs and media companies.
Photograph courtesy of author.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] Joseph Nye, Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power, Foreign Affairs, July 2009, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20699631
[2] Joseph Nye, Hard, soft and smart power, The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, March 2013, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199588862.013.0031
[3] President of Russia, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2008, Kremlin, January 2008, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116; President of Russia, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2013, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Thailand, February 2013, https://thailand.mid.ru/en/o_rossii/vneshnyaya_politika/kontseptsiya_vneshney_politiki_rf/; President of Russia, The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/; President of Russia, Strategiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda, Kremlin, May 2009, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/424 ; President of Russia, Ukaz ‘O strategii Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, December 2015, https://rg.ru/documents/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html; President of Russia, Strategiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, National Security Council of the Russian Federation, July 2021, http://scrf.gov.ru/media/files/file/l4wGRPqJvETSkUTYmhepzRochb1j1jqh.pdf; President of Russia, Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii, National Security Council of the Russian Federation, December 2014, http://scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document129/
[4] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Soglasheniye o voyennom sotrudnichestve, Russian Embassy in Serbia, November 2013, https://serbia.mid.ru/ru/countries/legal_base/mezhpravitelstvennye_dogovory/
[5] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Soglasheniye o voyenno-tehnicheskom sotrudnichestve, Russian Embassy in Serbia, October 2014, https://serbia.mid.ru/ru/countries/legal_base/mezhpravitelstvennye_dogovory/
[6] Rossiya perebrosila na ucheniya v Serbiyu batareyu “Pantsirey”, Interfaks – Agentstvo Voyennyh Novostey, October 2021, https://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=0&nid=558708&lang=RU
[7] V Rossii nachalis’ sovmestnye s Belorussiyey ucheniya, Yevraziya, September 2023, https://eurasia.expert/v-rossii-nachalis-sovmestnye-s-belarusyu-ucheniya-shchit-soyuza-2023/
[8] Gazprom Neft buys 5.15 pct of Serbia’s NIS, Reuters, March 2011, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/stocks/gazprom-neft-buys-515-pct-of-serbias-nis-idUSLDE72H0UB/
[9] Serbia, International Energy Agency, January 2021, https://www.iea.org/countries/serbia/energy-mix; Michał Paszkowski, Serbia activates natural gas supply efforts, Instytut Europy Środkowej, July 2023, https://ies.lublin.pl/en/comments/serbia-activates-natural-gas-supply-efforts/
[10] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Deklaratsiya o strategicheskom partnyorstve, Kremlin, May 2013, http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/1461
[11] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Dokumenty, podpisannye oficial’nogo visita Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federacii V. Putina v Respubliku Serbiyu, Kremlin, January 2019, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5386
[12] Statistics of external trade 23, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, December 2022, https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2024/PdfE/G20241207.pdf; Statistics of external trade 207, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, June 2024, https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2023/PdfE/G20231023.pdf
[13] Ernest Reid, “Moscow’s public diplomacy and Russophilia in Serbia, 2012–2019”, FPN Godišnjak, June 2020, https://www.fpn.bg.ac.rs/wp-content/uploads/FPN-Godisnjak-23-2020.pdf
[14] Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s Remarks at the 22nd OSCE Ministerial Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2015, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1519569/
[15] Opinion poll report: socio-political views of Serbian citizens in 2023, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, April 2023, https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/wfd_nws_2023_eng_final.pdf ; Political attitudes of citizens of Serbia – Fall 2022, CRTA Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability 2022, December 2022, https://crta.rs/en/opininon-poll-political-attitudes-of-citizens-of-serbia-fall-2022/
[16] Vuk Vuksanovic, Srdjan Cvijic, Maksim Samorukov, Beyond Sputnik & RT: How does Russian soft power in Serbia really work, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, December 2022, https://bezbednost.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/How-does-Russian-soft-power-in-Serbia-really-work.pdf
[17] Valerie Hopkins, In Balkans, Britain rejoins battle for influence, Politico, March 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/balkans-bbc-britain-rejoins-battle-for-influence-russia-soft-power/
[18] Ernest Reid, Third Rome or Potemkin village: Analyzing the Extent of Russia’s Power in Serbia, 2012–2019, Nationalities Papers, October 2020, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/abs/third-rome-or-potemkin-village-analyzing-the-extent-of-russias-power-in-serbia-20122019/E8E755F37EB6AA8AB477EAB3FBB3474E
[19] Public Opinion Polls, Ministry of European Integration, December 2022, https://www.mei.gov.rs/eng/documents/national-documents/public-opinion-poll/
[20] Broj ruskih firmi u Srbiji od početka rata skočio za 1.000 odsto, Nova Ekonomija, June 2024, https://novaekonomija.rs/vesti-iz-zemlje/broj-ruskih-firmi-u-srbiji-od-pocetka-rata-skocio-za-1-000-odsto
[21] Political attitudes of citizens of Serbia – Fall 2022, CRTA Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability 2022, December 2022, https://crta.rs/en/opininon-poll-political-attitudes-of-citizens-of-serbia-fall-2022/
[22] Počeo sa radom portal ruske RT na srpskom jeziku, RTS, November 2022, https://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/poceo-sa-radom-portal-ruske-rt-na-srpskom-jeziku_1391190.html