What must the international community do now to end the violence?

By Greg Austin and Ben Koppelman

The Sudanese government has carried out a murderous campaign in its Darfur region through deliberate bombing of civilian targets and through support of Jingaweit militias raping and killing on the ground. It cannot be trusted to end the killing, though it may see some temporary gain in slowing or pausing it.

Yet current international measures seem to depend on the Sudanese government as a partner. The US has proposed a draft UN Security Council resolution calling on the government of Sudan to stop the violence in Darfur, to impose an arms embargo on the Jingaweit militia, and to arrest Jingaweit leaders.

In addition, the US is supporting the African Union’s monitoring of the ceasefire and its role in restarting talks for a political solution in Darfur. Yet the Sudan government is saying that the AU will do or can do nothing without Sudan’s consent. It remains an open question whether the new-born AU will be prepared to override this taboo of non-intervention without Sudan’s consent.

To end the violence, the UN and major powers, like Canada, must understand that the government they are dealing with is a dictatorship that has directly sponsored terrorist attacks and harboured Osama bin laden. This government has already been subject several times to UN sanctions or unilateral US sanctions, which have not always been successful.

Despite repeated promises by Sudan to disarm the militia, including to Kofi Annan in June, the Jingaweit continues to kill with impunity. Moreover, some of those being ‘disarmed’ are reportedly being absorbed into government police and paramilitary forces operating in Darfur. Given the extent of the proliferation of arms in Darfur now, an arms embargo seems equally futile.

Ultimately, it is government officials who are responsible for the murderous campaigns in Darfur. Until their calculus of political gain is specifically targeted, the violence will not stop. These officials should be publicly named and shamed, and be subjected to personal sanctions, such as freezing of bank accounts or banning of international travel. Simultaneously, the major powers or the UN should form a working group to document and publicise the war crimes in Darfur in a rapid and authoritative manner.

In the short term, it is paramount that there is a ceasefire. But the two previous ceasefires (September 2003 and April 2004) have not held. This suggests that another ceasefire would be of no value unless supported by other firm measures.

First, the AU ceasefire monitoring team must be more robust in terms of troops as well as logistical support, especially transport and modern satellite communications. Darfur is a vast and remote region (as big as France), has a low population density (one tenth that in Rwanda), and has few transport links.

Second, the mandate of the AU troops to protect the monitors should be extended. Their duties must go beyond observing to include protecting refugees and disarming militias, a measure Kofi Annan identified in 2001 as a necessary adjunct to any UN peacekeeping deployment.

However, a necessary condition for diplomacy to succeed is the threat of international military action, especially since the sanctions against Sudan in the late 1990s were not fully effective. The only way to demonstrate the seriousness of such resolve would be through the contribution of troops from non-Western countries — in particular, African and Arab states. A force led by, or even containing troops from, the USA or the UK may be out of the question entirely.

Along with threats, there must also be incentives. An effective way to end attacks by the Jingaweit and their opponents may be to offer cash incentives to them, or communities who support them, to stop fighting. (Such an approach worked well in Mozambique.) The international community should also provide emergency funds for quick effect projects to revamp the regional infrastructure.

Over the last 12 to 18 months, the UN and interested major powers have avoided dealing decisively with the Darfur conflict due to fear of disturbing the peace talks to end the civil war between the government and rebels in the south of the country. However, there has to be some recognition – based on the Darfur events — that this government of Sudan may not be not a reliable partner in that longer standing negotiation process. It is now open to serious question whether that peace process can be saved in the absence of a political process across Sudan as a whole, in which all rebel groups and marginalised communities can participate.

It has taken a long time for the international community to act despite being aware of Khartoum’s genocidal campaign against non-Arab tribes in Darfur, at least as early as September 2003. The international community must act without delay. The Security Council cannot allow more time to see if Khartoum will fulfil its pledges because this only provides more time for further atrocities to be committed or for Khartoum to manipulate the cease-fires to its own murderous purposes.

Direct, tangible and imminent threats – combined judiciously with incentives – and targeted at the Sudanese leadership and Arab militia leaders are needed now to end to the violence.

Greg Austin is Director of Research at the Foreign Policy Centre, Ben Koppelman is a Research Officer there.

The £17m it costs Britain annually to run its embassy in Paris, a former home to Napoleon’s sister, is justified on the grounds that grandeur is required to impress political elites. In the words of Pauline Neville Jones, former political director of the UK’s Foreign Office: “If you want to be important in France then you need to be grand.”

It also means, however, that Foreign Office resources are tied up acting as an unofficial arm of the National Trust, the UK’s main guardian of stately homes, rather than in putting Britain’s case to the French public. The running costs of the Foreign Office’s £1bn property portfolio seem untenable in an age when Sir Michael Jay, the department’s permanent secretary, has warned that job cuts will be necessary to help meet the costs of hosting the European Union and Group of Eight summits next year. An increase of £100m in the Foreign Office’s budget this year will barely cover the costs of setting up in Iraq and improving embassy security. Of course, most governments can raise revenue by selling embassies in costly capital cities and relocating to cheaper – and often more secure – buildings further out of town. Other foreign ministries are recognising the logic of moving out. In Kensington Palace Gardens, London’s “millionaires’ row”, the Russians and the Dutch have recently sold properties.

The UK Foreign Office’s “asset recycling programme” has helped the reallocation of funds, selling off 230 ambassadorial homes since 1997. But property sales raised a mere £13m in 2002-03, a derisory saving given the department’s requirement to cut 2.5 per cent of its running costs. European countries have more scope to reduce costs by sharing diplomatic premises. Nordic countries have long practiced co-operation and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the first embassies in the Baltic states were shared between the British, German and Scandinavians. However, most European governments believe that national prestige requires national buildings. This will only end when leading EU countries collectively decide to end their diplomatic contest. Plans for a new EU External Action Service provide the perfect opportunity. Britain should champion a proposal to give the new service, staffed by diplomats from EU member states, powers to issue visas and passports. This would allow non-essential embassies to close.

It has been 25 years since Nicholas Henderson, a former UK ambassador in Paris, warned that EU integration would erode the importance of Britain’s embassies in European capitals. Influencing public opinion across the continent is more important than ever, but the original purpose for maintaining embassies appears increasingly irrelevant. In the early 20th century, an ambassador’s telegram was the only way for governments to follow political developments abroad. Now much of this information can be found by a civil servant in London via Google. Leaders of major allied countries, and those further down the ministerial chain, rarely go more than a few days without speaking, a fact that further lessens the need for the intermediary skills of ambassadors.

Yet, with so much of domestic politics now dependent on international decisions, foreign services have never been more important. But finance ministries everywhere increasingly use the trappings of 19th-century diplomatic life as a convenient excuse to impose tight financial settlements. The former US ambassador in London, Raymond Seitz, complained about having to run his official residence on a “beer budget”. In the UK, Treasury officials regularly criticise the Foreign Office’s largesse; and in France, diplomatic personnel went on strike last year in protest at budget cuts which, they claimed, had left them without paper.

Over the next few years, the UK Foreign Office is measuring the contribution of Britain’s overseas posts to the department’s “strategic priorities” on immigration, terrorism, crime and securing energy supplies. Reports suggest that minor posts such as Iceland and Mauritius will face cuts. But with the UK government planning to sack 104,000 civil servants and compiling a “doomsday book” of government property and the Foreign Office reviewing its functions, a change in British diplomatic priorities has never seemed more likely.

Rob Blackhurst is editorial director of the Foreign Policy Centre.

Published in The Financial Times on Friday 27th August 2004, http://www.ft.com

In recent years, Russia has transformed itself from a defunct military — although still nuclear — superpower into a new energy superpower.

New uses for oil revenues

Although Russia has retained many of the vestiges of Soviet “hard power” — including nuclear weapons and a massive conventional army — it is not the superpower of old.

New energy revenues have not been used to boost military spending or to revive Russia’s defense industry at the expense of every other sector as in the Soviet period. Oil wealth has been transformed more into butter than guns.

And there is more to Russia’s attractiveness than oil riches. Consider the persistence of the Russian language as a regional lingua franca — the language of commerce, employment and education — for many of the states of the former Soviet Union.

Russian pop culture

Then there is a range of new Russian consumer products, a burgeoning popular culture spread through satellite TV, a growing film industry, rock music, Russian popular novels and the revival of the crowning achievements of the Russian artistic tradition.

They have all made Russia a more attractive state for populations in the region than it was in the 1990s. Over the last several years, Russia has become a migration magnet for Eurasia.

New prospects

Millions of people have flooded into Moscow, St. Petersburg and other Russian cities — from the South Caucasus and Central Asia in particular — in search of work and a better life.

Instead of the Red Army, the penetrating forces of Russian power in Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia are now Russian natural gas and the giant gas monopoly, Gazprom, as well as Russian electricity and the huge energy company, UES — and Russian culture and consumer goods.

Gazprom is the primary provider of gas to the Eurasian states and has regained its position in markets like Georgia, where other companies had entered in the late 1990s. UES has similarly expanded its markets, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where early energy sector privatizations brought in foreign investors.

Defining the term

In addition, private firms — such as Russia’s Wimm-Bill-Dann Foods — have begun to dominate regional markets for dairy products and fruit juices.

Russia may not be able to rival the United States in the nature and global extent of its “soft power” —which Harvard Professor Joseph Nye defines as emanating from three resources: “[a state’s] culture (in places where it is attractive to others),” its political values (where it lives up to them at home and abroad) and “its foreign policies (where they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).”

Regaining influence

But Russia is well on its way to recovering the degree of soft power the USSR once enjoyed in its immediate sphere of influence.

Since 2000, Russia’s greatest contribution to the security and stability of its vulnerable southern tier has not been through its military presence on bases, its troop deployments, or security pacts and arms sales.

Rather, it has been through absorbing the surplus labor of these states, providing markets for their goods, and transferring funds in the form of remittances (rather than foreign aid).

Central Asian states in particular are fearful of the social consequences of large numbers of labor migrants returning to the region from Russia if there were to be a political backlash against migrants or a Russian economic downturn. This migration to Russia has become a safety valve for the whole region.

More powerful than the United States?

As a matter of fact, Russia has the potential to achieve the economic and cultural predominance in Eurasia that the United States has in the Americas.

It will succeed in this mission if the influx of migrants to Russia continues, if Russian business investment grows in neighboring states, if regional youth continue to watch Russian TV and films, purchase Russian software, CDs and DVDs and other consumer products.

Trade — not military muscle

Most of all, it would succeed if the heavy-hand of Moscow is pulled back — and the hand of commerce is extended instead in Russian foreign policy. Given this list of “ifs”, clearly some skill is required to draw upon Russia’s soft power resources in crafting a successful regional policy.

The current U.S. failure to capitalize on its own undisputed soft power and growing global anti-Americanism demonstrate the risks involved, and the limits of soft power if a state is not seen to live up to its own values abroad or its foreign policy motivations are questioned overseas.

It is by no means assured that Russia’s increasing soft power will be used to positive effect. But the prospect is clearly there – and should be encouraging Russia’s current leadership to chart a new regional policy for itself in Eurasia.

This article is adapted from Fiona Hill’s study on “Russia’s Energy Empire”, which will be published by the Foreign Policy Centre in September 2004.

Russia’s democratic institutions have always been weak and fragile. Since becoming President in January 2000, Vladimir Putin has made them even weaker. He has systematically undercut the freedom and independence of the press, destroyed the checks and balances in the Russian federal system, arbitrarily imprisoned both real and imagined political rivals, removed legitimate candidates from electoral ballots, harassed and arrested NGO leaders, and weakened Russia’s political parties. In the wake of the horrific crime in Beslan, President Putin has announced plans to further centralize power and to push through measures that will take Russia a step closer to authoritarian regime.

We are also worried about the deteriorating conduct of Russia in its foreign relations. President Putin’s foreign policy is increasingly marked by a threatening attitude towards Russia’s neighbors and Europe’s energy security, the return of rhetoric of militarism and empire, and by a refusal to comply with Russia’s international treaty obligations. In all aspects of Russian political life, the instruments of state power appear to be being rebuilt and the dominance of the security services to grow. We believe that this conduct cannot be accepted as the foundation of a true partnership between Russia and the democracies of NATO and the European Union.

These moves are only the latest evidence that the present Russian leadership is breaking away from the core democratic values of the Euro-Atlantic community. All too often in the past, the West has remained silent and restrained its criticism in the belief that President Putin’s steps in the wrong direction were temporary and the hope that Russia would soon return to a democratic and pro-Western path. Western leaders continue to embrace President Putin in the face of growing evidence that the country is moving in the wrong direction and that his strategy for fighting terrorism is producing less and less freedom. We firmly believe dictatorship will not and cannot be the answer to Russia’s problems and the very real threats it faces.

The leaders of the West must recognize that our current strategy towards Russia is failing. Our policies have failed to contribute to the democratic Russia we wished for and the people of this great country deserve after all the suffering they have endured. It is time for us to rethink how and to what extent we engage with Putin’s Russia and to put ourselves unambiguously on the side of democratic forces in Russia. At this critical time in history when the West is pushing for democratic change around the world, including in the broader Middle East, it is imperative that we do not look the other way in assessing Moscow’s behaviour or create a double standard for democracy in the countries which lie to Europe’s East. We must speak the truth about what is happening in Russia. We owe it to the victims of Beslan and the tens of thousands of Russian democrats who are still fighting to preserve democracy and human freedom in their country.

(Names listed below are for identification purposes only. The signatories have signed this letter in their individual capacities.)

Mr. Mark Leonard, The Foreign Policy Center, United Kingdom
Mr. Urban Ahlin, Member of Parliament, Sweden
The Honorable Giuliano Amato, Former Prime Minister, Italy
Dr. Uzi Arad, Institute for Policy and Strategy, Israel
Dr. Timothy Garton Ash, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, United Kingdom
Dr. Anders Aslund, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United States
Dr. Ronald D. Asmus, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, United States
Mr. Rafael L. Bardaji, Strategic Studies Group, Spain
Prof. Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Former Foreign Minister, Poland
Dr. Arnold Beichman, Hoover Institution, United States
Dr. Jeff Bergner, Former Staff Director, U.S. Senate, United States
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Senator, United States
Mr. Carl Bildt, Former Prime Minister, Sweden
Mr. Max Boot, The Council on Foreign Relations, United States
Ms. Ellen Bork, Project for the New American Century, United States
Mr. Pascal Bruckner, Writer, France
Mr. Mark Brzezinski, McGuire Woods LLP, United States
Mr. Reinhard Buetikofer, Chairman, Green Party, Germany
Dr. Janusz Bugajski, Center for Strategic and International Studies, United States
Sir Michael Butler, Former Permanent Representative to the European Community,
United Kingdom
The Honorable Martin Butora, Former Ambassador, Slovakia
Mr. Daniele Capezzone, Italy
The Honorable Per Carlsen, Institute of International Affairs, Denmark
Ms. Gunilla Carlsson, Member of Parliament, Sweden
Dr. Ivo Daalder, Brookings Institution, United States
The Honorable Massimo D’Alema, Former Prime Minister, Italy
Mr. Pavol Demes, Former Foreign Minister, Slovakia
Dr. Larry Diamond, United States
His Excellency Philip Dimitrov, Former Prime Minister, Bulgaria
Mr. Thomas Donnelly, American Enterprise Institute, United States
Mr. Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute, United States Mr. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Former Foreign Minister, Denmark
Ms. Helga Flores Trejo, Heinrich Böll Foundation of North America, United States
Dr. Francis Fukuyama, United States
Dr. Jeffrey Gedmin, Aspen Institute Berlin, Germany
Prof. Bronislaw Geremek, Former Foreign Affairs Minister and Member of European
Parliament, Poland
Dr. Carl Gershman, National Endowment for Democracy, United States
The Honorable Marc Ginsberg, United States
Mr. Andre Glucksmann, Writer, France
Dr. Phil Gordon, Brookings Institution, United States
The Honorable Karl-Theodor von und zu Guttenberg, Member of Parliament, Germany
The Honorable Istvan Gyarmati, Institute for Euro-Atlanticism and Democracy, Hungary
Mr. Pierre Hassner, Center for International Studies and Research, France
His Excellency Vaclav Havel, Former President, Czech Republic
The Honorable Richard C. Holbrooke, Former Ambassador to the United Nations, United
States
The Honorable Toomas Ilves, Former Foreign Minister and Member of European Parliament,
Estonia
Mr. Bruce Jackson, Project on Transitional Democracies, United States
Dr. Donald Kagan, Yale University, United States
Mr. Robert Kagan, United States
Mr. Jerzy Kozminski, Former Ambassador to the United States, Poland
Mr. Craig Kennedy, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, United States
Ms. Glenys Kinnock, Member of European Parliament, United Kingdom
Dr. Bernard Kouchner, Former UN Special Envoy to Kosovo, France
Dr. Ivan Krastev, Center for Liberal Strategies, Bulgaria
Mr. William Kristol, Project for the New American Century, United States
The Honorable Girts Valdis Kristovskis, Former Minister of Defense, Latvia
Prof. Dr. Ludger Kuehnhardt, University of Bonn, Germany
The Honorable Mart Laar, Former Prime Minister, Estonia
The Honorable Vytautas Landsbergis, former President and Member of European Parliament,
Lithuania
Dr. Stephen Larrabee, RAND Corporation, United States
The Honorable Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Member of European Parliament,
Germany
Mr. Tod Lindberg, Policy Review, United States
Mr. Tom Malinowski, Human Rights Watch, United States
Mr. Will Marshall, Progressive Policy Institute, United States
Prof. Dr. Margarita Mathiopoulos, University of Potsdam, Germany
Mr. Clifford May, United States
The Honorable John McCain, Senator, United States
Dr. Michael McFaul, United States
Mr. Matteo Mecacci, Italy
Mr. Mark Medish, Former Senior Director of the National Security Council, United States
Prof. Dr. Thomas O. Melia, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, United States
Dr. Sarah E. Mendelson, United States
Mr. Michael Mertes, Dimap Consult, Germany
The Honorable Ilir Meta, Former Prime Minister, Albania
Mr. Adam Michnik, Gazeta Wyborcza, Poland
The Honorable Richard Morningstar, Former Ambassador to the EU, United States
Dr. Joshua Muravchik, American Enterprise Institute, United States
Gen. Klaus Naumann (ret.), Former Chairman NATO Military Committee, Germany
The Honorable Dietmar Nietan, Member of Parliament, Germany
Mr. James O’Brien, Former Presidential Envoy to the Balkans, United States
The Honorable Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Member of European Parliament, Poland
The Honorable Cem Ozdemir, Member of European Parliament, Germany
Dr. Can Paker, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, Turkey
Ambassador Mark Palmer, Capital Development Company, LLC, United States
Mr. Martin Peretz, United States
The Honorable Dr. Friedbert Pflueger, Member of Parliament, Germany
Ms. Danielle Pletka, American Enterprise Institute, United States
Mr. Florentino Portero, Strategic Studies Group, Spain
Ms. Samantha Ravich, Phd, Long Term Strategy Project, United States
The Honorable Janusz Reiter, Center for International Relations, Poland
The Honorable Alex Rondos, Former Ambassador, Greece
The Honorable Jim Rosapepe, Former Ambassador to Romania, United States
Dr. Jacques Rupnik, Center for International Studies and Research, France
Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, German Council on Foreign Relations, Germany
Mr. Randy Scheunemann, Project for the New American Century, United States
Dr. Gary Schmitt, Project for the New American Century, United States
Dr. Simon Serfaty, Center for Strategic and International Studies, United States
The Honorable Stephen Sestanovich, United States
Mr. Radek Sikorski, American Enterprise Institute, United States
Mr. Stefano Silvestri, Institute for International Affairs, Italy
Mr. Martin Simecka, Editor, Slovakia
Dr. Gary Smith, American Academy in Berlin, Germany
Dr. Abraham Sofaer, Hoover Institution, United States
Mr. James Steinberg, The Brookings Institution, United States
Mr. Gary Titley, Member of European Parliament, United Kingdom
Mr. Ivan Vejvoda, Fund for Open Society, Serbia
The Honorable Sasha Vondra, Former Deputy Foreign Minister, Czech Republic
Dr. Celeste Wallander, Center for Strategic and International Studies, United States
Prof. Ruth Wedgwood, United States
Dr. Richard Weitz, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, United States
Mr. Kenneth Weinstein, Hudson Institute, United States
Ms. Jennifer Windsor, Freedom House, United States
Mr. R. James Woolsey, United States

In a year’s time, he will almost certainly have a third election victory, but he will be a leader with a potentially terminal political problem: turning around the 2:1 Euro-sceptic majority against the European Constitution in a fast-approaching referendum. Pro-Europeans have previously argued that he can achieve this feat. The 1975 referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Community was won against similar odds.

There are also reasons to be optimistic this time around: new research by MORI for The Foreign Policy Centre shows that two-thirds of the electorate are undogmatic “waverers” on the constitution, ready to be convinced by political argument. These swing voters outnumber both the yes and no camps by 2:1. But here’s the rub. In the past many voters, aware of their ignorance on Europe, have been willing to be swayed by politicians they trust.

Since Iraq trust has become a scarce commodity. With 60% of the public calling the Prime Minister untrustworthy, blind supporters of the PM are as thin on the ground as WMD in Baghdad. To make matters worse, Blair’s ratings are at their lowest amongst the very groups that he needs to convince.

First, there are the “Tory Lost Sheep”. This 7% of the electorate are certain to vote, and are inclined to support the Constitution. MORI describe them as “natural Tories uncomfortable with the Conservative Party”. Mainly middle-class broadsheet readers – particularly influenced by the Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail and Guardian – they deserted the Tories in droves in 1997, and fell straight into the arms of Blair. But since the war they have been blind to his charms, though they are surprisingly keen on Charles Kennedy.

The second group could be seen as “Persuadable Sceptics”. They are sure to vote, make up 8% and are currently against the Constitution, though they claim their mind could be changed. But an Islington barrister isn’t the man do it. Older than the “Tory lost sheep”, these voters are more likely to mutter into copies of the Sun, Mail and Telegraph (Their favoured reading) that this country is going to the dogs than they are to embrace the spirit of European fraternity. They are on of the few groups who actually prefer Michael Howard.

The third group on the Pro-Europeans’ hit list are those 9% of the electorate that Tony Blair has spent a decade infuriating. They are the “old Labour heartlanders” –fed up with the Government, and are inclined to use any opportunity to give the PM a bloody nose, if they bother voting at all.

Only the fourth group of “swing voters” is likely to find Tony Blair truly convincing – and it is the most apathetic. These “Labour loyalists” are predominantly working class, don’t read any newspapers, and are profoundly uninterested in Europe. This 11% of the population would vote yes if they bother to turn up – but most predict they will stay at home.

The Prime Minister faces a conundrum: on the one hand he cannot afford to maintain his trappist silence on Europe any longer. The waverers will not vote unless the government can demonstrate that, far from the “tidying up exercise” that they originally claimed, the Constitution matters. But at the same time the more the Prime Minister personalises the issue the more likely voters are to take a pain-free chance to vent their frustration, as in the 1999 and 2004 European elections, without waking up to see Michael Howard waving from Number 10.

This does not mean that the vote is a lost cause. The key will be making the referendum a debate about Britain’s future in the world – rather than the prime Minister’s vanity. Many waverers will be won over if Gordon Brown and John Prescott are dispatched to drum up support in Labour’s heartlands, and if Charles Kennedy can take some time off attacking last year’s war in Iraq to focusing on the next war over Europe. But what is needed above all is a senior politician prepared to put Europe above party-political gain. This was the role that Roy Jenkins and Ted Heath were prepared to take last time around. In November, a new candidate for the role will return from Brussels. Chris Patten combines a strong commitment to the EU with an appeal to the “one nation Tories” and “Tory loyalists” crucial to the referendum. And as John Major found in 1992, he knows how to win the unwinnable. Granting the spotlight to Patten may not come easily to Blair, but it would be greater act of leadership than attempting to win this fight alone.

Mark Leonard is the director of the Foreign Policy Centre.

Published in The New Statesman on 9 September 2004, http://www.newstatesman.com

China’s rise through America’s eyes: “When a speeding freight train is heading towards you, you either get on board or you get out of the way. We want to get on board.” The locomotive is China, whose economy is forecast to become the second largest in the world by 2016 and to have overtaken America by 2041. “We” are the people of South Carolina, the southern US state whose textile-based economy is under increasing threat from cheap labour in the People’s Republic. And getting on board means trying to get the Chinese to invest in the state rather than trying to keep them out by erecting protective trade barriers.
The speaker is Mark Sanford, South Carolina’s Republican governor, who has travelled to Beijing to attract Chinese investment to revive its beleaguered economy. He is speaking at a private dinner in a club so exclusive that it doesn’t have a name, just an unmarked red door in a windowless wall. The late Deng Xiaoping used to come here to relax, but today the mix of privacy and transparency has become an irresistible magnet to China’s nouveau riche.

In his Southern drawl, Sanford speaks elegiacally of a knitwear factory that closed in his neighbouring state of North Carolina. This closure, and others like it, have led to a heated debate about attempts to restrict “off-shoring”. Sanford explains that his goal is to attract investment from Chinese companies such as Haier, which built a fridge factory in South Carolina in 2000, completing an integrated system of production and sales with its design centre in Los Angeles and trade centre in New York. He speaks about turning his state into a “poster-boy” for globalisation, a Chinese gateway into America, reversing the sense of an inexorable flow of jobs and business from the US to China, and creating a “win-win” scenario. The Chinese roar with approval at his speech: they like this new face of America, as supplicant rather than bully.

But Sanford is a lonely voice in preaching the need to woo China, despite the overwhelming force of the statistics: China has a population of more than a billion, an economy that is growing year-on-year by more than 8%, and had a trade surplus with the US of $124bn in 2003; Chinese imports into the US are outpacing American exports to China by more than five to one. More typical, perhaps, are the words of Roger W Robinson Jr, the former chairman of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the official body charged with assessing the security implications of the trade between the US and China. “The US-China economic relationship is heavily imbalanced and undermining our long-term economic health,” he said at the launch of the commission’s last report. John Edwards, the vice-presidential nominee who represents the neighbouring state of North Carolina in the Senate, has taken a much tougher line than Sanford: he promises to review US trade agreements and investigate workers’ rights abuses in China.

China’s growing economic power is doing much more than harming America’s trade figures. Its development needs huge quantities of oil, forcing up prices on the world market. That is another big campaign issue in the world’s most oil-hungry nation. According to the International Energy Agency, China will generate one-third of global incremental demand for oil between 2002 and 2004. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times has argued: “As Asian growth continues, the global balance between demand and supply will continue to be tight, unless (or until) a vast increase in investment takes place. With such tight markets, relatively modest disruptions could lead to explosive jumps in oil prices, as happened twice in the 1970s.”

If the US Democrats are exercised by China’s economic threat, the Republicans have focused on its military one. President George Bush’s first intelligence briefing from the CIA listed China as one of three strategic threats, along with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The thin red mist descends and China becomes, in the neo-con imagination, a Soviet Union of the east, intent on establishing puppet regimes, governed by a modern mandate from heaven. Though not all would go as far as denouncing Deng Xiaoping as a “chain smoking communist dwarf”, as the rightwing firebrand Pat Buchanan did, there is a segment of the US political class that recoils at reports of double-digit increases in Chinese military spending, an intense focus on military modernisation and the simmering tensions over Taiwan.

Back in 1997, Paul Wolfowitz, the neo-conservative flag-carrier who is now deputy defence secretary, wrote an article in the journal Foreign Affairs that compared the rise of China at the dawn of the 21st century to the rise of Germany a century earlier. He characterised China as “a country that felt it had been denied its place in the sun”, that believed it had been mistreated by the other powers, and that was determined to achieve its rightful place by nationalistic assertiveness. He warned there may be another world war. But rather than a hot war, the two have engaged in a competition for influence in the Asian region.

The establishment of US bases in central Asia, America’s tightening defence ties with Japan and Australia, and its growing relationship with India are all seen by China’s elite as part of Washington’s design to keep them in check. China’s response has been to bend over backwards to prove it is no threat either to the US or its neighbours. Li Junru, the vice president of the Central Party School, one of the Communist part institutions, has said the policy of heping jueqi (literally “merging precipitously in a peaceful way”) means other nations need not fear. “China’s rise will not damage the interests of other Asian countries,” he told the Beijing Review. “That is because as China rises, it provides a huge market for its neighbours. At the same time, the achievements of China’s development will allow it to support the progress of others in the region.” He talks of the Chinese developing free trade areas and security organisations for the region on the model of the European Union and Nato. As part of this strategy, Beijing has resolved virtually all its land border disputes with its neighbours: it has signed a non-aggression pact with the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean); it is working to help resolve the North Korean nuclear issue; it is signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Asean which includes free trade agreements and economic aid; and it is conducting joint military exercises with Russia, Kyrgyzstan, India and Pakistan.

The American analyst Robert W Radtke, writing in the Christian Science Monitor, argued that China’s soft sell appeals to America’s allies in Asia: “China’s peaceful rise was introduced to Asia by Chinese President Hu Jintao on his tour of south-east Asia in October – on the heels of President Bush’s visit to the region that month. The contrast in tone between the two leaders couldn’t have been more striking. In short, China’s message was, ‘We’re here to help,’ while the US message was ‘You’re either with us or against us’ in the war on terror. It’s not hard to imagine which was the more effective diplomatic strategy.”

But the Chinese will not push this competition too far: their biggest fear is that the neo-cons in Washington will encourage Bush to ratchet up the pressure over Taiwan, whose government has been making noises about declaring independence from the mainland, to the displeasure of the Beijing administration. Since the spat early in Bush’s term when a US spy-plane crashed into a Chinese fighter, relations between the world’s two leading powers have thawed. Beijing has provided Washington with useful intelligence and, like Russia, used the war on terror as an excuse to damn its own separatist movements. Even over Iraq, the Chinese supported the first UN resolution and kept a low profile over the second. During Kosovo, by contrast, Chinese spokesmen were on a 24-hour rota condemning Nato’s illegal action. This time the risk of causing a rift with the Americans was judged too great.

American policy towards China is trapped between an imperative for engagement and a preference for containment. Earlier this year US policymakers welcomed a Chinese trade delegation for a multi-billion dollar buying and spending spree, during which the Chinese were to look at making investments. Within days of the delegation’s departure, however, the US threatened sanctions that would make the purchases impossible. And in the security sphere the US is seeking the People’s Republic’s help on the proliferation of WMD in North Korea at the same time as pushing a missile defence shield that could launch a new arms race between the two nations.

What is becoming clear is that the Chinese are no longer easily manipulated. China’s welfare is so intimately woven into the international order that its welfare affects the hope and dreams of others across the world. China is already on its way to becoming America’s chief banker: the $400bn of foreign reserves it has accumulated allows the US to sustain its astronomical budget deficit. If Beijing stopped buying dollars, the US currency would collapse. The security analyst François Heisbourg has even compared the Chinese hold on the dollar to a nuclear weapon: “Breaking the dollar would be the functional equivalent of using a nuclear weapon,” he wrote in 2003. “The possession of such a capability cannot be ignored by the weaker party.”

Because of this mutual dependence it is unlikely that Wolfowitz’s predictions of world war will come true. But as China rises, the balance of power will continue to shift to the east and more and more Americans will follow Sanford’s example: approaching China with a begging bowl rather than a stick. China itself will face intense pressures over the coming years – unemployment, labour unrest, environmental problems and financial problems – but any problems in the People’s Republic will also threaten American interests.

Maybe the neocons have got it wrong. Perhaps the only thing worse for the US than a China that is too strong in 2020 will be one that is too weak.

Mark Leonard is director of the Foreign Policy Centre.

Published in The Guardian on 11 September 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk

These young Bengalis are not just motivated by regional passions. Everywhere in the developing world people are sitting up and taking notice of the Chinese juggernaut. As a model for development it is a source of inspiration, its giddy growth rates of over 8% a year lifting millions of people out of poverty.

But even more exciting is the prospect of a new superpower that might challenge US hegemony and the American way of doing things. In a paper for the Foreign Policy Centre, Joshua Ramo, a former foreign editor at Time who is based in China, laid out the elements of a new “Beijing consensus”, which he sees as a direct challenge to the “Washington consensus” that defined attitudes towards the development debate in the 1990s. Beijing is “driven not by a desire to make bankers happy, but by the more fundamental urge for equitable, high-quality growth”, he wrote.

China treats the ideas of privatisation and free trade with caution rather than pursuing them with zeal; the country is defined by its ruthless willingness to innovate and experiment and has created a series of “special economic zones” to test out new ideas. Its foreign policy is driven by a lively defence of national borders and interests (see its attitude towards Taiwan) and an increasing commitment to multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, which it hopes will pin the US down. Together these policies have allowed China to grow without surrendering its independence to such financial institutions as the World Bank and IMF, global companies, or the Bush administration.

This recipe for success is so intoxicating that, on visits to countries as diverse as Iran and South Africa, I have been drawn into discussions about the “Chinese model of development”. China’s model is seducing leaders in countries as different as Vietnam (which is taking business tips from the thoughts of the former Chinese president Jiang Zemin), Brazil (which is sending study teams to Beijing), and India (Ramgopal Agarwala, an eminent sociologist, observed: “China’s experiment should be the most admired in human history. China has its own path.”).

Few in the west have picked up on this excitement, because they have looked at China’s power simply by measuring the size of its economy or the technology of its army. But by focusing on Chinese hard power (its ability to use military force or economic might to get its way) people are missing the extraordinary rise of the country’s “soft power” – the ability of its ideas and values to shape the world. It is an unwritten rule in the minds of the west that though China might become wealthy, it is western values and culture that will continue to define the rules of the world.

That is already changing. For the first time there is an emerging pole that is strong enough to change the way things are done on the global stage. Japan was too small and inward-looking; India is too protectionist; Russia too weak. As China emerges as a superpower, it is desperately trying to present itself as a force for good in the world. The past few years have seen a successful Olympic bid, the creation of an English language international TV channel, a series of high-level visits by President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to key countries, and a concerted attempt to befriend not just China’s neighbours but other countries as far afield as Africa and Latin America. Two centuries ago Napoleon warned China was a “sleeping giant” that “once awake would astonish the world”. That prediction looks like it is about to be fulfilled.

Rise of the east

The Chinese president, Hu Jintao, laid down a marker for the world in April when he outlined China’s ambitions in a speech to the Boao Forum for Asia. “We will quadruple the 2,000 GDP to $4 trillion with a per capita GDP of $3,000, and further develop the economy, improve democracy, advance science and education, enrich culture, foster greater social harmony and upgrade the texture of life for the people,” he said.

Some in America responded positively to the remarks – former president George Bush Sr said China’s peaceful rise was “very reassuring and very, very important to the Asian horizon and Asia’s landscape” – but there are many in America who are disquieted by China’s rise. Its military expenditure is rising, though it will still not compete with US defence spending and it has become increasingly bullish over Taiwan. In July, Jiang Zemin – the former president who heads China’s armed forces – said China would have recovered the island by 2020.

His remarks coincided with military exercises involving 18,000 troops, designed to demonstrate China’s air superiority in the Taiwan Strait. It is also seeking to compete in space: Luan Enjie, the head of the national space programme, said last November that China intends to land a man on the moon by 2020.

One motor of China’s growth is its increasing population but with such rapid expansion come problems. Some relate to China’s programme of population planning. The one-child policy has created a shortage of female babies, and the government has admitted that by 2020 China might have as many as 40 million single men, which could pose a threat to social stability.

Published in The Guardian on 11 September 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk

President Fox was pleased for a variety of reasons. No doubt he was hopeful that the creation of legal migration routes into the US could put a break on the daily battle witnessed on the infamous US-Mexican border. And like Bush, he is approaching an election year and saw this as a political opportunity, not least among Mexican-Californians or Texans who, by law, are eligible to vote in Mexican elections. But his pleasure was also the result of hard economics. For many years Mexican governments have taken advantage of the job-creating opportunities which its geography affords, establishing tax free industrial zones for US companies and lobbying the US government for the inclusion of the free movement of people within the terms of the NAFTA agreement. Ultimately, Mexico’s leaders have started to accept that the US job market is the most important pressure valve for Mexico’s job starved economy.

While brain drains are undoubtedly a serious concern for many developing countries, particularly in Africa where HIV and conflict compound skill shortages, the export of people is today written into the development plans of a number of poor countries. The reason for this is mainly that, as in the case of Mexico, job generation is a serious problem for developing countries, even in countries which have high economic growth rates. In addition, in the context of shrinking aid budgets and declining levels of foreign direct investment, capital starved developing countries today depend heavily on the $60billion annual remittance transfer from the developed to the developing world. Many developing countries would therefore be looking on jealously at Fox’s great opportunity.

The Philippines is a market leader in ‘diaspora driven development’. 8% of the country’s population resides elsewhere and 17% of Filipino households receive money from abroad. These figures are high but not unusual. 14% of Ecuadorians and 28% of people in El Salvador are remittance receivers. But what is more surprising is that most of this migration is the product of a government plan.

What is exceptional however is that the Filipino migration plan is a closely managed affair based on three core principles. Firstly, the government sets the terms of these movements. Whether it is nurses or nannies, the state pays to train a surplus of top-class professionals groomed for the international job market and targeted at sectors where there is specific demand.

Secondly, migrants spend at home. Visa card schemes, advantageous exchange rates, as well as tax-free investment plans and duty free shopping are government sponsored programmes introduced to ensure that none of the Filipino migrant earnings are lost to rich economies. Migrants are even celebrated at their own national holiday, in which 20 awards are handed out to the migrant workers who have sent back the most.

Thirdly, migrants return and to guarantee this perks such as training schemes are offered under contract and families at home are taken care of on the understanding that people return after a period abroad.

Other countries are following in these footsteps. For example, in 2002 the Indian BJP government introduced a dual nationality scheme as an attempt to ensure that the wealth of the colossal Indian diaspora could be tapped into. And at an international level, a coalition including several Latin American countries, Egypt, China, India, Philippines and Thailand is today lobbying hard at the WTO for the approval of the GATS (General Agreement of Trade in Services) Mode 4.

However, ‘diapora driven development’ strategies are undoubtedly a risky option for developing countries and much stands in the way of making this a sustainable solution to important development problems. The possibility of economic downturn and growing concerns about security are no doubt putting pressures on developed country governments. In the EU these concerns are accompanied by ongoing debates surrounding the unsustainable strains on welfare systems and the impact which migrant workers can have on social cohesion, particularly in the face of widespread hostility towards newcomers.

However, development agencies and NGOs need to start developing strategies which compliment the efforts by developing country government. The European development community has been so slow off the mark when it comes to migration and development. While in the US, development agencies (such as USAID) and research organisations (such as the Centre for Global Development) have well-established programmes of research on the linkages between migration and development, in Europe we continue to frame our ideas around the notion that development is a tool for ‘controlling’ migration, rather than part and parcel of the same effort. This became most evident in 2001 when Tony Blair and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar went as far as proposing that the European countries should withdraw aid from countries that did not stem the outflow of illegal migrants.

If anything, the development community should respond to anti-migration lobbies which have been making huge capital out brain drain and other debates of this kind. To quote from one of Britain’s most virulent migration-sceptics: “Immigration is a very ineffective development policy … because it removes a stabilising middle class, removes wealth-creating and tax-paying professional and entrepreneurial classes, and it sustains dictatorial regimes by removing awkward dissidents.” While true to some extent, most development experts would agree that the links between migration and development are not black and white.

While migration is clearly a consequence of underdevelopment and economic stagnation, the cases of Mexico and the Philippines show that managed effectively it could also be part of the cure. But in order for this to happen, both host and exporting countries need manage it effectively. Firstly, without secure residence rights and work permits, migrants are unable to contribute to development because they cannot move back and forth. Furthermore, illegal migrants are less likely to invest or mobilise the resources needed at home because they run the risk of being traced.

Secondly, development plans need to factor in migration. In the same way that European governments want to manage immigration, countries like Ghana, Jamaica or India need to ensure that emigration is sustainable and moulded to their needs. They need to be able to ensure that key sectors such as health and education don’t suffer and that they are gaining maximum benefit from the migrants who are leaving, targeting Western needs as well as ensuring that links with home are facilitated. This is particularly important at a time when rich countries are busy developing scheme to attract skilled migrants, to the detriment of the unskilled. Countries like the UK government could consider covering the cost of training schemes in the developing world for IT, construction and health workers, all of which would help ease pressures at home and compliment other development aims.

Finally, we need to formalise our relationships with migrant communities. While some efforts are being made to tap into the flow of remittances and ensure that these are being spent productively, these large resource functions mostly informally. While migrants are rightly suspicious of ‘officials’ and resist attempts to ‘officialise’ funds, they would undoubtedly be more cooperative should official channels help ease the burden of commercial money transfer companies which can take up to 20% commissions.

Yet, in spite of the importance of the referendum result, the government and its allies in the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative party have kept their heads well down. It is legitimate for the government to argue that the referendum should be delayed until after the next general election, given that the election is likely to take place in the early summer of 2005. But a conspiracy of silence by the pro-Europeans can only play into the hands of opponents. Supporters need to act now.

The first detailed survey of public opinion since the referendum was announced, carried out by Mori for the Foreign Policy Centre and published today*, shows that the anti-constitution camp is well ahead. The Mori poll found only 31 per cent in favour of the UK adopting the constitutional treaty. However, it demonstrates that, contrary to the pessimism of many commentators, the Yes camp could win.

The key finding of the survey is the public uncertainty. Only 35 per cent have made up their minds. A large chunk of the electorate could shift their position, according to their view of whether a European constitution was good or bad for the UK. If one adds these “waverers” to those already in favour, they make up 54 per cent of the voters. In addition, a significant number, about one-fifth, are “don’t knows”. So there is everything to play for.

But if the Yes camp is to exploit the fluidity of opinion, it needs to seize the initiative. Crucial for a Yes result will be a well planned, powerfully sustained campaign. To a considerable extent, the No camp can afford to rest on their laurels. The pro-constitutionalists must start making up ground early.

The campaign will have to be broad-based and able to appeal across party lines. The Mori survey shows conclusively that neither Tony Blair nor the Labour party can win the vote on their own. Of course, it will be necessary to mobilise the support of Labour voters who are now split narrowly against adopting the constitution. Fortunately, most of the Labour opponents are “waverers”, who are likely to be persuaded by a Labour cabinet campaign that must be spearheaded by Gordon Brown, the chancellor, John Prescott, deputy prime minister, and Jack Straw, foreign secretary, as well as Mr Blair. But if vital Liberal and Tory “waverers” are to be won over, the Yes campaign will also need the active support of Charles Kennedy, leader of the Liberal Democrats, and pro-European Tories such as Kenneth Clarke, Michael Heseltine and Christopher Patten.

The Yes campaign will need to be conducted at different levels to succeed. In spite of the barrage of propaganda in the Eurosceptic press, half of respondents to the Mori poll are still in favour of British membership of the EU, compared with 41 per cent against. It will therefore be helpful to remind voters of the advantages a Yes vote would bring to Britain’s position in Europe, as well as the disadvantages of a No vote, including the possible threat to membership. However, it would be unwise to overstate the membership issue or to rely solely on strategic arguments. Details of the treaty also need to be disseminated and explained.

At present a major disadvantage for the Yes campaign is the widespread ignorance about the European constitutional treaty in particular and the EU in general. This allows the Eurosceptic press to print scare stories and misinformation – such as claims that the constitution will be a threat to national identity or lead to a European super state. The public is entitled to demand that the government publishes a summary of the treaty, which should be available in every post office. This should work to the benefit of the Yes camp; Mori shows that the more people know about the EU, the more likely they are to support the constitution.

The passage of the necessary legislation for a referendum during the autumn and winter ought to be a signal for a concerted effort to explain the advantages of the constitutional treaty. A failure to act by pro-Europeans risks allowing opinion against the constitution to become set in stone, making a Yes victory more difficult.

Lord Radice is a board member of Britain in Europe.

Published in The Financial Times on 6 September 2004, http://www.ft.com

In America “outsourcing” has turned into one of the central political issues of the presidential campaign. Recent months have seen the sharpest ever drop in support for free trade; abuse heaped on Bush’s ‘pro-outsourcing’ economic advisor and the introduction of a ban on the outsourcing of government work to non-Americans. Even the US’s membership to NAFTA and support for the WTO are currently being questioned partly as a result. Meanwhile, outsourcing shines as the most treasured jewel in India’s new crown. Some analysts are even going as far as assigning outsourcing the power of not only “doing for India what manufacturing did for China” but of seeing it as a force in defeating conservatism, decreasing ethnic tensions and even transforming gender relations in Indian households.

Outsourcing is not a development magic bullet and the jobs generated represent just a drop in the ocean for a job starved economy like India. Moreover, Americans are right to point out that the outsourcing frenzy may have created a globalised mirage which hides the fact that India is a very reluctant liberaliser. Internet use may be growing at 136% per year but with average agricultural tariffs standing at 112% (compared to an average of 12% in the US) India is still one of the most protectionist countries in the world.

Even so, outsourcing has undoubtedly had an important effect on Indian national morale and its global outlook. The fact that Indian firms such as Tata, Infosys and Wipro are today global entities which are actively courted by giants like IBM, American Express and Citigroup is a source of national pride and has played an important role in driving investment-led growth. Furthermore, even though the lion’s share of jobs will be going to India, its outsourcing success story is becoming an icon for much of the developing world. Service providers are also emerging in countries as varied as Bangladesh, Brazil, China, the Philippines, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Venezuela and Viet Nam. And other countries are joining the queue: the South African government recently issued reports urging businesses not to miss the boat on offshoring; even Rwanda and Uganda have produced strategies to promote local SMEs in low-skill sectors such as transcription and data input.

The momentum that has gathered behind outsourcing therefore raises the stakes in terms of our economic relations with the developing world. Taking this lifeline away, particularly at a time when the developed nations are bitter about our failure to live up to promises on agriculture at Cancun, could have dire consequences adding to the litany of accusations which are currently driving globalisation-sceptic agendas in countries like India where economic nationalism is never far from the surface. In the words of Sunil Mehta, vice president of the leading Indian IT body NASSCOM: “Developed economies should be wary of the way in which their actions get interpreted in India. Globalisation is still a new concept in the popular imagination and antipathy for foreign companies and investors could easily be whipped up by politicians with populist agendas.”

Importantly, the offshoring row could fuel further impatience with multilateral trade liberalisation and the WTO among free traders who are becoming frustrated with the lack of progress on the negotiating table. Trade experts like Jagdish Bhawati have already warned of the danger that developing countries today would rather avoid becoming embroiled in the costly and tortuous processes of the WTO. So-called ‘can do’ nations naturally prefer the easy option of bilateral trade agreements, even if in so doing they deny themselves the ability to hold their partners to account. This impatience is likely to become even more intense when it comes to trade in services. The problems in resolving agricultural disputes is dwarfed by the challenges facing the General Agreement in Trade in Services (commonly referred to as GATS), which is likely to become more acute as the number of ‘tradable’ services increases due to advances in technology and business models.

Offshoring has opened a new front in debates about the world trade. However, the defence cannot be left to economists alone. Leaders in the developed nations, particularly the US, need to look at the international implications of their paranoia about jobs disappearing “off-shore”. Ignoring the advice of economic advisors and announcing, for example, blanket bans on the outsourcing of government contracts, while raising cheers at home, will further sour our relations with much of the rest of the world and the health of the multilateral system.