From Chinese unofficial police stations to the assassination attacks perpetuated by Russian or Iranian secret agents on their citizens and diaspora communities residing abroad, authoritarian states have become increasingly emboldened and assertive in projecting their power on their population across borders. Through tactics such as physical threats, Interpol arrest warrants, and digital surveillance, authoritarian states are not shying away from silencing their critics abroad, even in democratic countries. Dictators are becoming increasingly creative in using their repression tools to contain new forms of dissent and security challenges arising from their population abroad. This phenomenon is now broadly defined as transnational repression (TNR).

 

In recent years we have seen a rising number of international initiatives shaping a narrative to counter TNR. In its 2023 Resolution on the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders^[1], the European Parliament highlighted the increase in transnational threats against human rights defenders. Similarly, in its Conclusions on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2025, the Foreign Affairs Council committed to considering measures to prevent and tackle TNR^[2]. At a broader European level, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE) recognised in Resolution 2509 (2023) that transnational repression is a growing concern which undermines the rule of law and human rights in Europe^[3].  More recently, at the 2025 G7 Leaders’ Summit held in Kananaskis, G7 leader, under the presidency of Canada, condemned acts of TNR and encouraged nation states to further develop concrete strategies counter TNR and increase the costs for those who engage TNR activities^[4].

 

Building resilience against authoritarian transnational repression is also rapidly becoming a critical national security issue for countries around the world. The United States, in the aftermath of the killing of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi introduced a plethora of new measures aimed to counter TNR. These include the so-called Khashoggi Ban, Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021, which proposes prohibiting US arms sales to Saudi Arabia for as long as the government is engaging in transnational repression against dissidents, and the Transnational Repression Accountability and Prevention (TRAP) Act, which targets the abuse of INTERPOL by strengthening transparency and liability within the organization^[5].

 

Similarly, in the UK, following an escalation of foreign interference threats ranging from foreign interference, disinformation, cyber-attacks, intimidation and transnational repression targeting diaspora communities in the UK, the Minister of State Security, Tom Tugendhat, introduced the Defending Democracy Taskforce initiative which aims to reduce the risks of foreign interference to the UK’s democratic processes, institutions and society at large^[6]. Other states like the Netherlands, are revising their espionage laws that would criminalise aspects of TNR activities related to espionage such as digital espionage and diaspora espionage. In the case of the Netherlands, the new law expands on existing legislation and criminalises actions such as leaking information or working for foreign governments that harm Dutch interests. Offenders can face up to 8 years in prison, with a maximum of 12 years for severe cases.

 

Yet while such policy initiatives are welcome, in the current context, liberal democracies still lack adequate institutional frameworks, which are needed to address the complex challenges of transnational repression.

 

Challenges of countering TNR

 

First, the hidden, multifaceted and ambiguous nature of transnational repression incidents makes them difficult to deter, identify, and counter. Authoritarian states engaged in TNR, often rely on covert operations or ‘clandestine diplomacy’ to target their regime critics abroad or individuals perceived as a regime threat^[7]. Strategies may involve the use of secret intelligence services or non-state actors such as criminal groups that are experienced in using covert means to influence targets and establish clandestine contacts with various groups. The use of state and non-state actors in carrying various covert attacks provide the perpetrator state with official deniability and a layer of obfuscation blurring the lines between intelligence services and criminal groups. This as a result makes it difficult to distinguish the identity of perpetrators launching the attacks. The use of proxies in covert operations provides the state with more plausible deniability and reduces government’s exposure to blame. The attack on MI6 spy, Sergei Skripal, in England in February 2018, using Russian-made military grade nerve agents, is a good example. Despite widespread accusations, the Kremlin consistently denied its sponsorship.

 

In other instances, repressive tactics may involve a mixture of legal and illegal means such as instrumentalising international organisations like INTERPOL or manipulate international agreements like extradition treaties to pursue regime critics under the guise of legality.

 

Second, the challenge of addressing TNR stems not only from its hybrid nature, but also from its often unclear definition. In the current context transnational repression has been embedded within the more general ‘authoritarian interference’ or ‘hybrid threat’ frame and has not yet been problematised in a systematic way. Consequently, this further affects how policymakers understand and deal with authoritarian transnational repression challenges. This careless use of terminology creates conceptual confusions and consequently affects policy responses. Subsuming TNR with foreign interference tactics like election manipulation, disinformation campaigns,and sabotage targeting critical infrastructure among other tactics, not only creates conceptual ambiguity, but also risks generating unnecessary confusion concerning the level and methods of responses. Such loose conceptual interpretation of TNR as a result further undermines the human rights dimensions of TNR. Although there are overlaps between TNR and authoritarian interference, the current paradigm of foreign interference prioritises national security over human rights protection. Such an approach fails to capture the human rights implications of TNR. Acts of transnational repression imperil civil and political liberties of vulnerable populations and civilians residing in democracies. At the individual level such authoritarian practices violate autonomy and dignity of the person, but at the collective level, they can disable diaspora voices simultaneously which can threaten the democratic process, just as secrecy and disinformation.

 

Third, responses to TNR are further conditioned by pragmatic politics. Host state attitudes towards the state engaging in TNR can vary according to existing bilateral and strategic interests. Here, the prioritisation of economic and broader geopolitical interests and the desire to avoid political conflict with strategic partners, mean that host states often turn ‘a blind eye’ on incidents related to transnational repression and prioritise material national interests over normative human rights dimensions. Such dynamics makes host states, including democracies, directly complicit in TNR. In other instances, pragmatic migration and asylum policies can further undermine human rights protection of individuals targeted by TNR. In the UK and elsewhere in Europe, the adoption of stricter migration and asylum measures put at greater risk individuals targeted by TNR. In the UK the outsourcing of asylum to authoritarian states like Rwanda undermines the very principles of international protection, and the obligation to protect individuals at risk of being persecuted by their authoritarian home states. The Rwandan government has been named as one the key perpetrators of transnational repression according to the latest HRW report^[8]. However, this did not stop the last UK government to pass the controversial bill that would have allowed  asylum seekers to be deported to Rwanda.

 

These trends are not unique to the UK but are part of a broader trend. Across Europe, increasingly restrictive migration policies are undermining asylum protections and weakening commitments to shared humanitarian values.

 

How can states respond to transnational repression?

 

Given the rising trend in authoritarian practices in current global affairs, it is likely that incidents of TNR will continue to grow. By taking a weak stand to respond to TNR, Western leaders effectively grant legitimacy and continuity of such authoritarian patterns. This in turn undermines the rights and freedom of individuals who have been granted safe haven in democracies.

 

Addressing TNR requires a unified and coordinated response as well as cross-sectoral cooperation with relevant civil society organisations and law enforcement agencies. In particular, such a collaborative approach needs to focus on integrating diaspora and minority groups, who otherwise risk being used as proxies for authoritarian interference efforts. Additionally, such threats must be tackled using the means of national and international laws, as well as through prevention and education campaigns. This approach should further include the use of punishment mechanisms and tools such as targeted sanctions against individuals involved in transnational repression and human rights violations.

 

Last week the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) published its report Transnational Repression in the UK ^[9]. The report acknowledges that TNR represents a threat to human rights and those who have sought safety within its borders. The report warns that hostile governments—including China, Iran, and Russia—are employing transnational repression (TNR) tactics such as surveillance, harassment, and the manipulation of international legal mechanisms like INTERPOL to silence human rights defenders and diaspora communities in the UK. It also exposes serious shortcomings in the UK’s response, including the lack of a clear legal definition, insufficient data collection, and the absence of dedicated reporting channels for victims. The report calls for urgent and decisive action to curb the growing threat of TNR in the UK.

 

In a similar vein, in June 2025, the Subcommittee on Human Rights of the European Parliament published a study focusing on transnational repression of human rights defenders^[10]. The study highlights that transnational repression threatens the safety of defenders even when in exile and further shrinks civic space globally. Such efforts are crucial to spotlight the growing threat of transnational repression (TNR) to human rights and the rule of law, and to underscore the need to hold authoritarian regimes accountable for their actions. This in particular, when there is a disengagement from the United States on human rights and its commitment to tackle transnational repression. As observed by the former Freedom House Director, Nate Schenkkan: ‘while the Biden administration made policies to protect exiles and diasporas a priority. Trump 2.0 has already undercut these efforts’. Though the United States formally signed on to the G7 statement, under the new Trump administration, the government has destroyed the infrastructure that was being built to make the U.S. a leader in counter-TNR policy^[11].

 

Therefore, in light of these developments, there remains a critical void that must be addressed by other democratic states committed to tackling TNR. This requires building comprehensive work across the multiple policy areas, increasing multilateral cooperation and engaging with vulnerable communities and civil society actors. Their continued leadership will play a vital role in maintaining global momentum on this issue.

 

For now though, incidents of transnational repression remain largely unpunished, therefore such forms of authoritarian interference constitute a highly tempting and potentially effective strategy for repressive regimes.

 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

 

Saipira Furstenberg, PhD, is a Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre and an independent researcher and policy consultant. She specialises in international security, migration, and sustainable development topics that support human rights, accountability, and democratic processes around the world. She is currently affiliated with the University of Exeter as an Associate Research Fellow. From 2022–2024, she was a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Cofund Research Fellow at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice.

Her research focuses on extraterritorial politics, the international dimensions of authoritarian regimes, human rights, and global governance. Her work on transnational repression has appeared in the European Journal of International Security, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, The International Journal of Human Rights, among others. In 2024, together with Dana Moss, she published an edited volume on Transnational Repression in the Age of Globalization (Edinburgh University Press).

 

[1] European Parliament, ‘European Parliament resolution of 16 March 2023 on the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders (P9_TA(2023)0086)’, March 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0086_EN.html

[2]Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2025’, January 2025, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5638-2025-INIT/en/pdf

[3]Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), ‘Resolution 2509 (2023): Transnational repression as a growing threat to the rule of law and human rights’, June 2023, https://pace.coe.int/en/files/32999/html

[4] Group of Seven (G7), ‘G7 Leaders’ Statement on Transnational Repression’, June 2025, https://g7.canada.ca/en/news-and-media/news/g7-leaders-statement-on-transnational-repression/

[5] US Department of State, ‘Accountability for the Murder of Jamal Khashoggi’, February 2021, https://www.state.gov/accountability-for-the-murder-of-jamal-khashoggi/; Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021, H.R. 1392, 117th Congress, US House of Representatives, February 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1392; Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021, S. 1591, 117th Congress, US Senate, February 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1591

[6] UK Government (Home Office and Cabinet Office), ‘Ministerial Taskforce meets to tackle state threats to UK democracy’, November 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ministerial-taskforce-meets-to-tackle-state-threats-to-uk-democracy

[7] Mikael Wigell, The Washington Quarterly, ‘Democratic Deterrence: How to Dissuade Hybrid Interference’, March 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893027

[8] Human Rights Watch, ‘Transnational Repression by Rwanda’, February 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/02/15/transnational-repression-rwanda

[9] Joint Committee on Human Rights (UK Parliament), ‘Growth of foreign repression on UK soil going unchecked – JCHR report warns’, July 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/93/human-rights-joint-committee/news/208770/growth-of-foreign-repression-on-uk-soil-going-unchecked-jchr-report-warns/

[10] European Parliament, ‘Study: Transnational repression of human rights defenders: The impacts on civic space and the responsibility of host states’, June 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2025/754475/EXPO_STU(2025)754475_EN.pdf

[11]  Nate Schenkkan, Lawfare, ‘Trump is undermining policies against transnational repression’, July 2025, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/trump-is-undermining-policies-against-transnational-repression