Array ( [0] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4761 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2020-07-14 00:14:49 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-07-13 23:14:49 [post_content] => Spotlight on UzbekistanIn September 2016, longstanding Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev assumed the Presidency of Uzbekistan following the death of President Islam Karimov, the despotic ruler who had dominated the country since independence. After decades of heavy repression and isolation by a regime Mirziyoyev was intimately involved with, many international and local observers have been surprised and cautiously heartened by Uzbekistan’s efforts to open up to the outside world and address some of the regime’s more egregious abuses, but questions have remained over the long-term intentions of the new leadership. The recent coronavirus crisis has provided an acid test for assessing the government’s progress, and its response - effective in suppressing the virus - has highlighted progress made in many areas while further illuminating some continuing areas of concern. This introductory essay, and the Spotlight on Uzbekistan essay collection as a whole, seeks to assess the progress Uzbekistan has made since 2016, identify the challenges that remain and develop ideas for further action. A brief history of modern UzbekistanUzbekistan can trace its roots back to the first settlements of the Scythian people before their absorption into the Persian Empire and its successor states until the Arab conquest in the 7^th century. The Mongol conquests in the 13^th century consolidated the migration of Turkic peoples to the region that had been gradually taking place in previous centuries. Timur (known in the West as Tamerlane) founded his empire in Samarkand, and later rulers (notably Islam Karimov) have sought to frame him as a founder of Uzbekistan.[1] The remnants of the Timurid Empire were conquered in turn by the Shaybanids, who also took the name Ozbeg (Uzbek) in honour of a senior leader of the Mongol Golden Horde from which they descended, establishing smaller kingdoms in the region. Russia attempted to push south into the region as part of its imperial expansion with the failed Khivan expedition in 1717 under the rule of Peter the Great. This was followed a century and a half later by the Russian capture of Tashkent in 1865, the annexation of Samarkand from the Emirate of Bukhara in 1868, and the annexation of the Khanate of Kokand in 1876, with the full and final absorption of the remnants of the Emirate of Bukhara and Khanate of Khiva in 1920. Until 1924 the Soviet regions somewhat mirrored their predecessor states with the Khorezm People's Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) replacing the Khanate of Khiva, the Bukharan People's SSR covering the former Emirate of Bukhara, and the Turkestan Autonomous SSR (ASSR) covering everything else. This was dissolved in 1924 with the creation of the Uzbek SSR, which, after the departure of the Tajik ASSR to form its own republic in 1929, comprises the territory that makes up Uzbekistan today, with Tashkent replacing Samarkand as its capital in 1930. Islam Karimov ascended to the position of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in 1989, becoming the first and only President of the Uzbek SSR a year later and at its independence in September 1991 became the first President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, a post subsequently ratified in a controversial December 1991 election. He would rule with an increasingly iron fist, with notable crackdowns following a mysterious series of car bombs in 1999 and the massacre of hundreds of people following unrest in Andijan in 2005, until his death, announced on September 2^nd 2016. For the last 13 years of Karimov’s rule Shavkat Mirziyoyev served as his Prime Minister (PM). Karimov now lies in a purpose built mausoleum complex overlooking the old city of Samarkand, where citizens go to pray and pay their respects. Islam Karimov Avenue runs from his resting place to a large statue near the historic Registan, with shops on the route selling his photo. While his successor may be seeking to move beyond his legacy he is not taking active measures to quell the Karimov cult of personality, instead letting it slowly tick downwards, as shown by fewer examples of pictures of the first President being displayed in public buildings and publically contrasting the actions of the new President with past. Mirziyoyev era reformsMirziyoyev became interim President on September 8^th 2016, after elbowing aside the constitutionally designated interim President Chairman of the Senate Nigmatilla Yuldashev to get the role on a temporary basis and outmanoeuvring key rivals, Deputy PM Rustam Azimov and particularly the head of the National Security Service Rustam Inoyatov, to secure the post permanently through election. Azimov would be fired from government in June 2017 and Inoyatov would be removed from his post in January 2018. Mirziyoyev’s inaugural address as President gave some hints at a reformist direction of travel: “In further deepening the democratic reforms and implementing the concept of developing a civil society, we believe that, as it was before, the citizens’ self-governance bodies – mahallas, as well as the non-state, non-profit organizations, free and impartial mass media will take an active place. In implementing the important principle, namely, “From a strong state to a strong civil society”, above all, we will lean upon the strength and capabilities of such social institutions.” However such commitments are often made by leaders who have no intention of delivering on them. Assessing the state of the much-touted reform process is the central question this essay collection seeks to address. After initial scepticism, it has become quickly clear that under Mirziyoyev the regime has sought clearly to differentiate itself from the image of the Karimov era and the comparisons with other regional poor performers such as Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Early efforts on currency liberalisation (which has dramatically shrunk the black market), tackling forced labour, visa liberalisation, and reducing censorship led the international community to take notice of a process of rapid change.[2] Irrespective of the continuing debate over the new regime’s motivation, it correctly identified that failure to address its huge economic and structural problems would substantially increase the risk of political instability and the pressure for revolutionary change. The challenge is to identify where change is substantive, where it is cosmetic and where the long-term direction of travel is either unclear or controversial. The process has been driven from the top with a blizzard of presidential decrees and new legislation, with 25 per cent of all legislation adopted since independence being issued between 2016 and 2019.[3] Supporters of the process have argued this intensively top-down approach is necessary to tackle the institutional inertia of the bureaucratic system developed under Karimov, hitting it on multiple fronts to spur it to action. While that perspective is understandable, there have been notable challenges including: incorporating the views of key stakeholders; errors due to the speed of transposition and implementation; and the ongoing cultural challenge of a risk-averse and poorly educated middle management level, steeped in Soviet and Karimov era paper pushing, being placed under even more pressure, which sometimes leads to increased buck-passing rather than fundamental change. The mantra of the reformist wing of the Uzbek officialdom is repeated relentlessly: that missteps and delays in the reform process are driven by a lack of capacity rather than a lack of political will. Their diagnosis is that the continual infusion of better trained, reform-minded people (often from the diaspora) into the system will help break down the roadblocks to reform (or replace them), a subject addressed in more detail in this collection’s essay by Navbahor Imamova. While this will undoubtedly be important, the leadership will have to find a way to allow greater space for experimentation and measured risk-taking in implementing the reforms in the face of presidential pressure to ensure that the buck-passing culture is brought to an end rather than grinding down a new generation of officials. Recognition that such a top-down approach is unstainable can be seen in efforts to increase the responsibilities of Parliament and to devolve certain functions to local government; however both institutions are in need of significant reform (as addressed below) and the fear that loss of control would lead to a loss of stability persists. One of the signature initiatives has been the creation of ‘virtual receptions’ (currently 208 of them), under the auspices of the Presidential Administration, where complaints from citizens about poor performing public services and other problems were fed directly to administration officials, initially bypassing the ministries and local administrations. The Centres proved very popular, with over 3,726,949 appeals from the public at time of writing, of which 3,673,670 had been reviewed by officials according to the government.[4] They provided a channel through which the new leadership could assess the key pressure points in the system to inform their policy response, as well as helping to boost the public image of a new President who was seen to be listening to people’s problems.[5] However, there have been reports that after initial success, the public believes they are becoming less effective as a tool in that they now more regularly act to pass on information to the ministries or local officials rather than bypassing them.[6] This shift in approach would make sense in the context of the evolution of government but risks the responses being lost in only partially-reformed bureaucracies. The picture across the ministries is mixed. Uzbek PM Abdulla Aripov and Deputy PM Achilbay Ramatov are known to be part of the old guard but loyal to the President. The Ministers of Justice, Education, Investment and Agriculture are seen as reformers, and have become the main points of contact for Western interlocutors. Unsurprisingly given the top-down approach to driving forward the reform process, the Presidential administration is powerful but lacks transparency and direct accountability. The Uzbek Government has been proactively trying to obtain international assistance with the reform programme, with the United Nations (UN) Office in Uzbekistan and International Labour Organisation (ILO) becoming prominent voices both within the country and in highlighting progress to the wider international community. There has been significant growth in the number of international consultants and donor agencies advising on the reform process.[7] The UN has identified education reform, social security transformation and wider public sector reform, climate change and water management, and the protection of historic buildings as the key areas for international focus.[8] However the extent of the response by Western governments and international institutions has been somewhat hampered by Uzbekistan’s middle-income status, which limits the amount of official resources under Official Development Assistance (ODA) rules that can be devoted to it. The wrangling between Mirziyoyev and Karimov’s security Chief Rustam Inoyatov was just one dimension of the perceived rivalry between the President and the Karimov era security apparatus. Inoyatov’s successor, long-time ‘securocrat’ Ikhtiyor Abdullayev, was himself subsequently arrested and imprisoned for 18 years on charges of bribery, extortion and forming a criminal enterprise alongside 24 other officials from the security services and prosecutor’s office.[9] The rivalry reflects both inter-elite competition and competing visions on the governance of Uzbekistan. The President has taken steps to strengthen the National Guard and Presidential security service as a counterweight to the National Security Service (SNB), giving them greater resources and the power of arrest.[10] There remains a perception that the security services are still not full behind the reform programme, with allegations that they have used proxies to target independent voices, and are more prone to take measures to crackdown on dissent.[11] This perception both perhaps reflects reality and gives a degree of political distancing between the new regime and efforts to crackdown on more troublesome critics. As well as the old guard in the security services and ministry middle management, the most regularly identified roadblock to reform is the role of local and regional government. The heads of local district (Tuman), city and regional (Viloyat) administrations are ‘Khokims’ currently appointed by the central government, many of whom have been in their posts, or otherwise building up local power bases, since the Karimov era. Regional leaders are routinely blamed for being slow to implement reforms at the speed or to the extent desired by reformers in Tashkent, and as set out in numerous places in this essay collection are often at the heart of local concerns around corruption and administrative incompetence. Both Tashkent Khokim Jakhongir Artykkhodjaev and Ferghana Governor Shuhrat Ganiyev have been recorded as threatening bloggers and other media critics, with the latter involved in a string of controversial incidents (including claims that he threatened residents of the Sokh enclave after unrest that he would ‘erase [their] villages from the map’). That he was not fired by a forgiving President has led critics to dub him as ‘immortal’.[12] In a further sign that personal loyalty to the President is the primary requirement for the job, disgraced former Agriculture Minister and Deputy PM Zoyir Mirzaev, fired in 2018 for being abusive towards farmers, has been reappointed as Khokim of Kashkadarya Province.[13] Only one Khokim of a district, city or region in Uzbekistan - Dilfuza Uralova who heads the local Bayaut district (tuman) in Syrdarya province - is a woman.^[14] The President and other senior leaders have talked about ways to make local government structures more accountable to local people, but progress on delivery has been slow. The initial discussions have centred on separating the executive role of Khokims, appointed by the government, from the elected regional assemblies or local councils (Kengash) so that these representative bodies can improve their scrutiny of the operations of the Khokimiat.[15] At present, while in some cases the Kengash may provide scrutiny of the actions of local officials, it is unknown for them to block a decision of the Khokim. In the absence of genuinely competitive political environment, the administrative separation of executive and scrutiny functions in unlikely to pose an effective check on the activities of the Khokims. Despite raising the issue in 2016 Mirziyoyev has yet to take action on the direct election of Khokims themselves, something that is increasingly becoming a source of local discontent, with a June 2020 petition due to be debated in parliament following local unrest in Fergana.[16] The heads of local neighbourhood associations, the Mahalla Committees, are now elected and the Mahalla remains an important organising institution in Uzbek life. While direct election of the Khokim may be a more effective tool for fostering local accountability than elections to the relatively toothless Kengashs, in the absence of more competitive political environment local leaders will still ultimately owe their positions to their relationships to, and usefulness for, the President. At present local government funding is reliant on funding from central government, and while regional inequality will necessitate significant financial flows from the centre in any scenario, developing opportunities for local administrations to raise funds locally to boost financial independence may help encourage greater political independence and a stronger focus on local needs rather than constantly looking up to the regional or national government for guidance.[17] The President’s State of the Nation speech on January 24^th 2020 made an ambitious list of promises for further reform this year, including pledges on reform to Propiska (controls on moving residency), strengthening social protections including on health insurance, the creation of a new anti-corruption agency, addressing judicial independence, speeding up the publication of a national human rights strategy (approved in June 2020), a promise of citizenship for 50,000 stateless people who had been resident since before 1995, and a raft of other well received proposals.[18] The reforms so far, and perceptions of the direction of travel, have led to widespread international praise, such as Uzbekistan’s widely trumpeted rating by the Economist as ‘most improved country’ in 2019.[19] Many long-standing international observers, and a number of emerging local voices, are cautiously optimistic. This is due at least in part to a much greater willingness amongst the elite to speak openly about the challenges the country faces, setting expectations and benchmarks against which their performance can be judged. For Uzbek leaders, many of whom held senior posts under Karimov, this is a delicate dance that involves admitting that problems exist, widely declaring that there is willingness to undertake significant change under Mirziyoyev, but avoiding direct criticism of Karimov.[20] Despite this many longer-standing Uzbek opposition voices, who under Karimov made the same criticisms of the system that the politicians are making now, are still left out in the cold.[21] Political SpaceIn his January 2020 address to the nation the President said that ‘democratic reforms are the only right way for us.’[22] The speech took place only a month after the December 2019 parliamentary elections that provided an excellent showcase of Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan, for both good and ill. The government sought to use the elections themselves as a showcase for the reform process - something it partially achieved -but in what was something of a rare international PR misstep, it also drew attention to the limits on what has been achieved so far. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ (OSCE ODIHR) long-term observation findings, the gold standard in international election observation, highlighted some critical areas of continuing concern. According to the OSCE the December 22^nd parliamentary elections in Uzbekistan ‘took place under improved legislation and with greater tolerance of independent voices, but did not yet demonstrate genuine competition and full respect of election day procedures’. They also noted that ‘regrettably, the new legislation and modernized administration of elections did not improve the polling process, with international observers reporting numerous serious irregularities, such as voting on behalf of others and disregard for key procedures during counting’. [23] As the OSCE point out, in order to stand for election a party must have been registered with the Ministry of Justice ‘at least four months prior to the announcement of the election and to have collected the supporting signatures of at least 40,000 eligible voters across Uzbekistan’s 14 administrative territorial units provided that no more than eight per cent of the signatures collected are from one unit. Given that a party is not required to nominate candidates in all constituencies, the signature collection requirements may be burdensome, in particular, the ceiling of eight per cent per region could create an eligibility barrier for a party that enjoys broad support nationally but lacks such support in one or a few regions’.[24] Independent candidates are barred from standing. By way of comparison only two people are required to form a basic political party in the United Kingdom (UK) and any Parliamentary candidate, whether a member of a party or standing as an independent, requires signatures of ten registered voters in the seat they are contesting.[25] It is therefore unsurprising that with the exception of the Ecological Party of Uzbekistan, which had previously sat in parliament as the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan with unelected seats reserved for it, no new party has been registered since 2003. The OSCE ODIHR has described these restrictions as ‘burdensome and open to arbitrary application’, and explained that in 2019 ‘these factors limited the opportunity for elections to serve as a contest between distinct political viewpoints and narrowed the choice available to voters’, given that ‘all parties are supportive of presidential policies, and while parties worked to distinguish themselves during the campaign, none identify themselves as an opposition party’.^[26] What was being put forward by the regime to voters in December 2019 was an attempt at ‘competitive authoritarianism’: encouraging some intra-party competition within limited bounds that was restricted to the notional representation and prioritisation of issues rather than challenging the system. Each party staked out a broad but different political message, albeit not backed by detailed policies, to give voters the semblance of choice. Mirziyoyev’s Liberal Democratic Party (UzLiDeP) promoted a pro-business message, and the Democratic Party (Milliy Tiklanish) staked out a family values- and cultural heritage-focused conservative platform. Two parties positioned themselves on the centre-left, with the People’s Democratic Party focused on the welfare state and the Social Democratic Party (Adolat) looking at on reforming justice.[27] The Ecological Party notionally addressed environmental issues - albeit whilst actively promoting nuclear power. In the end the UzLiDeP received 43 seats, Milliy Tiklanish 35, Adolat 21, the People’s Democratic Party 18 and the Ecological Party went down to 11 seats.[28] The role of the new Majils (Parliament) has been conceived by the regime as helping to inform and manage the reform process, with stated plans to use it to increase scrutiny of legislation, budgets and the implementation, rather than being a strong external check and balance to it. The elections were used to facilitate a changing of the guard within the Majilis, to bring in new, younger faces and increase the proportion of women parliamentarians (rising from 16 per cent to 32 per cent in the new parliament).[29] Whatever the merits of this system it is certainly not something that could be reasonably described as democratic, nor is it automatically a step towards becoming a democracy. What comes next will be critical. At a press conference given for the UK media and policy community, Sodiq Safoyev, first deputy chairperson of the Senate, described the regime’s approach as ‘setting the legal framework to allow domestic opposition to develop from the grassroots’. The idea being presented is that the combination of fresh blood in Parliament and the gradual opening of political space (including allowing public criticism of ministers, regional leaders and elements of the government’s delivery) would allow the system to develop into a more competitive political environment organically over time. However given the barriers to the registration and development of independent political parties, the current setup has the risk of echoing Russian ‘managed democracy’, where Potemkin parties have presented alternative platforms within a curated system without ever truly challenging the structures of power or sought to honestly compete for the presidency. There certainly seems to be no political appetite amongst the current elite for reassessing the relationship with diaspora-based opposition parties, such as the banned Unity (Birlik) Party and the Erk Democratic Party (led by Muhammad Salih who stood in the 1991 presidential election), which were forced into exile under Karimov. Government officials claim that these groups have no credibility and that bringing them into the process would be ‘artificial’. However if the regime is correct( as it may well be) that such groups have little to no political support within the country, then continuing to ban them seems pointless and potentially counterproductive, given that banning them makes it look like they have something to fear. Economic change and the opportunities it brings, for good and illEconomic stagnation and authoritarian control defined the Karimov era state. The urgent need to strengthen Uzbekistan’s previously sclerotic economy has been the driving force behind the reform process, given that the failure to address economic hardships could provide the spark for even more radical change. The challenge of delivering transformative economic change has now been further exacerbated by the pressures of COVID-19. In this collection, essays by Yuliy Yusupov, Kate Malinson and Professor Kristian Lasslett address the reform process, the environment for investors and the challenge of corruption respectively in great detail, but it is worth drawing attention here to some of the key challenges that faced the Mirziyoyev government as it took office. Under Karimov, the combination of a restrictive currency system (which limited currency convertibility and tied the som to a United States (US) dollar peg), high tariffs, and attempts to focus the economy on import substitution generated the conditions for a substantial black market (including in the country’s large bazaars and street markets), with a substantial gap between black market prices and official purchasing prices for many goods. In 2017 the currency was allowed to float freely, leading to the rapid official conversion of almost $300 million US dollars into Uzbek Som. Over time the Som has continued to depreciate against the dollar,  helping the transition from the black economy and informal employment, (together thought to equate to up to a third of the overall economy) to the real economy by helping equalise the currency rates in the two systems.[30] In addition to the impact of currency liberalisation, the withdrawal of price controls from autumn 2018 on staples such as bread, flour, electricity, natural gas and gasoline have also driven the cost of living up and have proved controversial, with compensatory welfare payment for vulnerable groups not seen to fully cover the increases.[31] Inflation spiked in 2018 at 17.5 per cent and, prior to the crisis, had been relatively slow to decline. During the Karimov era high tariffs tended to create substantial import monopolies, where political connections were seen to help obtain exemptions from customs duty. While initial efforts were made to reduce tariffs, as Yuliy Yuspov points out in his essay, in late 2018 local interests created a list of domestically produced products that were exempt from tariff abolition, leading to concerns that the process was being driven by local power brokers rather than a desire to help independent industries adjust to the global markets.[32] Until now the high tariffs have also helped keep prices in Uzbekistan artificially high; for example cars sold in Uzbekistan from the state owned UzAuto monopoly are between 20 and 50 per cent more expensive than the same UzAuto-built cars that are sold in other Central Asian markets, helping drive local smuggling operations.[33] Criticism from the public and the government’s own Anti-Monopoly Committee may have helped drive the President’s decision to remove excise tax from car imports as of August 1^st 2020.[34] The continuation of smuggling has helped drive Uzbekistan to reinstate border posts near the border with Kyrgyzstan, which had been removed in an earlier phase of the presidency.[35] Trying to cut taxes while boosting enforcement to bring more of the economy out of the informal sector is an understandable approach under the circumstances, but it has had some practical challenges. For example. VAT has been reduced from 20 per cent to 15 per cent, presented as support for small business, but in reality many of them are paying it for the first time and are finding the official implementation sometimes punitive.[36] The transition from cash to credit card payments also increases VAT collection and as such had been resisted in some quarters prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. For firms transitioning from the black economy to the real economy there are real risks that they may be tempted to return to the shadows. The desire to squeeze the black economy and increase the tax base may be necessary to balance the budget and regularise the economy, but it has a risk of choking off the growth of small business and of greater social tension if this is taking place amid the continuation or expansion of high-level corruption and the perception that the richest in society are avoiding their fair share of the burden. Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak extensive efforts had been underway to take advantage of Uzbekistan’s heritage assets in the cities of Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva amongst others to promote international tourism. Short-term visa-free travel has been provided for 73 countries and pressure is underway to expand international quality hotel capacity and generate favourable coverage about the country’s potential for tourism.[37] However, the pandemic has hit the fledgling sector very hard. Efforts to increase agricultural exports to China are of critical importance to the development of the sector, with cherries (the subject of fierce bidding wars), melons, peanuts, and honey the limited group of agricultural products able to access Chinese markets at present.[38] Attempts at reforming the sector, as set out in the October 2019 Presidential Decree ‘On approval of the Strategy for the Development of Agriculture of the Republic of Uzbekistan for 2020- 2030’ and its attached roadmap, have positive elements but lacked details about reform mechanisms (though some of this has been addressed by the announcements in 2020 on ending the state order system, more about which below).[39] Efforts are also underway to improve antiquated irrigation systems to save water and electricity whilst boosting output.[40] In their essays Yuily Yuspov and Professor Kristian Lasslett highlight some of the changes to the agricultural sector that are currently underway, both in terms of long-promised land reform and the impact of the new ‘clusters’ (vertically integrated businesses that are seeking to develop local crops - first cotton and now fruit and vegetables - into higher value outputs). Given that 27 per cent of formally employed Uzbeks currently work in agriculture (as well as more involved informally and with their domestic small holdings) making it the largest sector of the economy, it is essential that the changes underway are handled with care to protect small farmers, who currently lease their land from the government on 49-year terms.[41] There are concerns that higher-quality agricultural land may end up being consolidated under the control of powerful business interests through the cluster system, either by requiring land swaps or coercing farmers into working for the cluster, as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) have reported amid government complaints about the current underutilisation of arable land - an important debate but an area with clear potential for abuse.[42] Lasslett examines the opaque ownership structures of the clusters in more detail in his essay, but it is clear that there is a real risk of Uzbekistan replacing state monopolies with an oligarchic system (a series of local private monopolies operating on a regional and sectoral basis) rather than boosting competition in the agricultural sector. There have been some steps taken to end the state electricity monopoly, with Uzbekenergo due to be broken up into Thermal Power Stations (TPP), National Electric Grids of Uzbekistan (NESU), and Regional Electric Grids (REG).[43] Ownership of Uzbekistan’s airports have been separated from Uzbekistan Airways, but the national flag carrier still dominates access to slots.[44] Liberalisation in the banking sector has been limited, with the state retaining control of most banks. Direct foreign ownership has been limited to less than 50 per cent of total shares even under the December 2019 banking reforms - measures designed in part to limit the ability for shares to be held by opaque offshore accounts from Uzbek business people as well as limiting international competition.[45] State control of banks helps continue the practice whereby state-owned enterprises receive cut-rate loans from banks that specialise in that sector.[46] Attempts at liberalisation and privatisation carry concerns about the risk of the transfer of power from the state to politically connected private interests and around the desire to promote genuine competition rather than transferring monopoly power to the private sector. It is essential that Uzbekistan learns the right lessons from previous privatisation efforts in the wider region, as transferring companies (or their opportunities for corruption and patronage) from the state to oligarchic control is unlikely to generate the benefits for economy and society that genuine reformers are looking for. Irrespective of political or economic preferences over the relative merits of the state and private sector, the case for reform of Uzbekistan’s public sector and publically owned enterprises, so that activity can be refocused on more socially productive outputs, is overwhelming. For example, there is substantial political pressure, both internally and from international partners such as the UN and World Bank, to expand the social safety net as well as to reform its operation. At present, only a third of Uzbekistan’s poorest people receive some form of social assistance overall and only 37 per cent of poor families receive family allowances.[47] Significant overstaffing is apparent in a number of areas of the public sector, from traffic police on every street corner, to multiple security guards or other staff checking tickets in the same line at train stations or museums - what Kate Mallinson refers to as ‘stamp culture’. To deliver the necessary efficiency gains, and to free up state funds to increase recruitment of suitable staff in more productive areas of public service, there needs to be both expanded opportunities for skills training and for sustained private sector growth to provide jobs for those not able to be redeployed within the public sector, but also for the many citizens, particularly from rural areas, who may prefer to seek employment in Uzbekistan rather than lead the precarious life of a migrant working in Russia. Before the pandemic, a combination of limited local job opportunities and restrictions on internal migration through the Propiska system, saw Russia (and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan, Turkey and Dubai) become home to significant numbers of migrant workers. While precise numbers are difficult to quantify in 2017 1.8 million Uzbek citizens who arrived in Russia declared their purpose for visiting as being for labour.[48] Surveys have suggested that average annual remittances are approximately $418 per worker and the World Bank estimates that remittances accounted for 15 per cent of GDP in 2018.[49] As economic opportunities in Uzbekistan have begun to grow post-2016, the rate of migration has begun to slow, with some also returning from Russia into both skilled jobs in the public sector and into expanding sectors including taxi driving. However, the pandemic has led to large numbers of migrant workers returning, with around 500,000 labour migrants returning to Uzbekistan by the end of May 2020.[50] With Russia dealing with an oil price slump as well as the pandemic, it is likely that the Uzbek economy may have to absorb many more of these workers into its own economy sooner than it would have planned, further adding to the challenge of economic recovery. While the reforms undertaken so far are far from perfect, the mood music and positive press coverage they generated prior to COVID-19 meant that business optimism was on the rise.[51] Uzbekistan is currently applying for World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership and attempts are being made to attract international investment.[52] While Chinese, Russian, Korean and Turkish investors may be exploring a wider range of business opportunities, Western interests are focused primarily on education, retail, services, machinery and specialist/technical services (such as architects, law firms and accountants). While independent international investors have been relatively slow to make substantial investments in Uzbekistan, the sense of new economic opportunity has encouraged ethnic Uzbek billionaires, significantly Alisher Uzmanov, a Russian national based in the UK, and Patokh Chodiev, a Belgian national resident in Kazakhstan, to expand their involvement in the Uzbek economy and public life. For example, Uzmanov’s company SFI Management Group LLC has taken over running of the AlMailk Metallurgical Combine, acting as trustee for the government’s share in the complex to deliver a modernisation programme.[53] Uzmanov has also recently given $20 million to the Uzbek government to respond to the COVID-19 outbreak to help build an emergency hospital, and $15 million to victims of the Sardoba dam tragedy.[54] According to the Financial Times he has also declared that he has put ‘several hundred million dollars’ into not-for-profit ventures to ‘help the new President and his team’, with Mirziyoyev a relative of his by marriage.[55] The International Chodiev Foundation has played an active role in supporting the development of Buyuk Kelajak (Great Future), an organisation designed to promote Mirzyoyev’s reform process by coordinating activities of experts in the Uzbek diaspora and working with some of them to return into roles inside the Uzbek government.[56] The evolution of the Uzbek economy from rigid state control to a more market-based system carries a significant risk, the opportunity for expansion, diffusion and diversification of higher level (‘grand’) corruption. Under Karimov petty corruption amongst lower-middle tier officials was endemic, with bribes used for everything, from getting better exam grades to getting out of forced labour. The police and particularly the traffic police were notoriously active in bribe taking. After a series of interventions this situation has markedly improved for ordinary Uzbeks, with bribe taking by junior officials framed by the new regime as an impediment to Uzbekistan’s economic development and with policing having undergone a significant overhaul.[57] However while petty corruption was endemic, and elite politics described as ‘an all-embracing system of rent seeking and patronage’ where ‘State institutions were little more than a façade, behind which the real powerbrokers engaged in informal decision-making’ the rigidity in the system and the suppressed state of the economy cramped some of the potential financial scale of elite corruption.[58] As the tale of the former President’s daughter Gulnara Karimova, set out in detail in Professor Kristian Lasslett’s essay, shows such extravagant displays of corruption were possible but restricted both in areas of opportunity and in their proximity to the first family.[59] Corruption investigations have been a common feature in removing institutional opposition to Mirziyoyev, notably amongst the security services had been at the heart of institutionalised corruption in the Karimov era.[60] New economic opportunities are seen as facilitating new opportunities for corruption, cronyism and nepotism both at a local and national level. The construction boom has seen examples where local politicians have become intertwined with local developers ranging from less than transparent relationships, such as in the case of the current Khokim of Tahskent Jahongir Artikhodjaev outlined in Lasslett’s essay, through to convicted cases of corruption such as in the case of the former Khokim of Samarkand jailed for 13 years for accepting bribes and abuse of power.[61] The perception is widespread that the construction industry and access to construction permits are being dominated by local oligarchs, while concerns about exploitation of the cluster system are set out above, below and in the essays by Lasslett and Lynn Schweisfurth. Overall Uzbekistan’s ranking in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 153^rd in the World, is the same position in the 2019 survey as it was in the last full year of Karimov’s rule, though its points tally has improved slightly.[62] In the summer of 2019, the Government announced a new State Anti-Corruption Programme, including an interagency Special Commission.[63] The OECD is providing technical support to the programme and to the prosecutor’s office in relation to anti-corruption work.[64] As set out below Mirziyoyev is aware that corruption poses a significant challenge to both international perceptions of Uzbekistan and to local satisfaction with his rule, as highlighted by his public responses to perceptions of official shenanigans in the housing sector also discussed below. However, it is still unclear about what his strategic objective is. Since coming to power he has aligned himself against some traditional power centres, such as the security services that were mired in corruption, but in doing so he has relied on the support of politically connected networks of business people both to shape Uzbekistan’s new business friendly international image and consolidate his power, and they have seen to particularly benefit from the new opportunities for profit available in today’s Uzbekistan. So questions remain about the long-term direction of travel. It is notable that there has been no steps directly taken by the Government of Uzbekistan to explore participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), despite initial contact meetings being made through donor agencies.[65] As part of efforts to tackle corruption and reform the civil service the Government has produced a draft law that would, amongst other things require civil servants to ‘annually submit a declaration of his income, property and large expenses, as well as a declaration of income, property and large expenses of their family members’. However, this law and transparency requirement will not apply to the President, deputies of the Legislative Chamber (Majils) and members of the Senate, the Central Election Commission, judges, the Ombudsman, deputies of the Zhokarga Kenes of Karakalpakstan and local representative bodies.[66] At present, there is no law that requires these elected officials to declare their sources of income, adding to the controversy around the new law, leaving continuing conflicts of interest unaddressed and opportunities for grand corruption left wide open. Home Demolitions and the Housing Crisis,One of the most controversial topics in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan has been the impact of the recent building boom on ordinary citizens. As Dilmira Matyakubova’s essay on the high profile Tashkent City project points out, physical renewal has been used as a symbol of prospective economic renewal, with Soviet era buildings being replaced by shiny modern edifices. However, as with many regeneration projects around the world, those who previously lived in these areas have not always benefited from the changes. There have been a number of initiatives taken by the Government to promote regeneration, housing and commercial development to boost housing supply and economic growth. For example many of the major projects in Tashkent, such as Tashkent City, fall under the Presidential Decree from July 2017 July entitled ‘on measures to improve the architectural appearance and improvement of the central part of Tashkent, as well as creation of appropriate conditions for the population and visitors to the capital.[67] The Government of Uzbekistan also has two state directed regeneration programmes the Obod Mahalla (Prosperous Neighbourhood) and Obod Qishloq (Prosperous Villages) aimed at improving infrastructure in local communities, the latter project now being backed by $100 million in grants from the World Bank.^[68] According to the President in 2019, “large-scale construction and improvement works were carried out in 479 villages and auls, as well as 116 urban mahallas. 6.1 trillion Soms were directed for these purposes.”[69] In addition to specific initiatives, there has been clear pressure from the top to deliver new developments in communities across Uzbekistan. According to the President, the schemes delivered 34,700 new residential units in 2019, evenly split across urban and rural areas.[70] The experience of long-standing communities being displaced and cast aside by both urban renewal initiatives and market driven gentrification is far from a being a problem unique to Uzbekistan but the particular challenges faced by local residents highlight some of the issues the country faces around rule of law and corruption. In the autumn of 2019, the Cabinet of Ministers produced a new resolution, entitled ‘On ensuring the guarantee of property rights of citizens and business entities, as well as the procedure for seizure of land plots and compensation for damage to property owners’, which set out to try and bring order to a construction boom that was beginning to resemble some of the worst aspects of both the Soviet era and the Wild West.^[71] The new rules set out the revised legal grounds for compulsory purchase which now included expanded provisions for ‘projects of investment and socio-economic importance, aimed at the integrated development of territories, including the development and improvement of the architectural appearance of a certain territory (hereinafter referred to as investment projects)’, giving a clearer legal basis for practices that had already been taking place for several years in the absence of a specific framework.[72] It made clear that such provisions should apply to ‘large-scale investment and other projects, including the improvement of housing and living conditions of citizens in a certain area, the development of infrastructure and the construction of high-demand socio-economic facilities.’ Such developments are supposed to require detailed plans, in accordance with published masterplans for the area. They should also be ‘carried out only with consent of the owner (or land user, tenant) on the basis of a decision of the Kengash of People's Deputies (local council) or in accordance with a resolution of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan.’ [73] Furthermore the ‘decision on demolition of residential and non-residential premises, owned by individuals and legal entities in connection with the withdrawal of land for state and public needs, shall be made after full compensation for the market value of the property and damages caused to the owner.’  This new legal framework has the potential to make a difference to the lives of ordinary Uzbeks if it is properly implemented, albeit it formalises the existing much more expansive use of state backed compulsory purchase mechanisms to facilitate private business development than is common in more developed legal systems. However, it comes after several years of growing tensions, where in the absence of a clear legal framework high handed officials have pushed through controversial projects and faced accusations of corruption or cronyism in their delivery, with newly established firms with opaque structures or those with ties to political appointees winning contracts for major projects; such as Akfa Dream World, a firm involved in the Tashkent City project and linked to the Tashkent Khokim Jahongir Artykhodzhaev, whom prior to becoming Khokim had been director of the state enterprise responsible for the construction and operation of Tashkent City.^[74] Another example is the former Khokim of Samarkand, whom was jailed for 13 years in August 2019 for taking bribes from construction firms involved in a series of controversial developments in and around Samarkand’s UNESCO protected old city; demolitions that further drew attention to the current lack of formal protections, such as a ‘listing’ system or conservation area status, for properties of historical or architectural interest.^[75] Decision making around granting planning permission for developments and the creation of area masterplans is not properly open to public consultation and scrutiny. In Tashkent for example the planning decisions are made by the Khokim (with no formal requirements or mechanisms for prior public consultation) but are ratified by meetings of the local Kengash, which are open to the public but are poorly attended and advertised and so far they have never overturned a decision of the Khokim. Planning decisions made by regional Khokims are formally signed off by the national Cabinet of Ministers. The paperwork residents receive informing them about what is happening with a development and how to get compensation often does not follow official procedures. The requirements for obtaining consent, notionally at least 75 per cent of the current residents should agree to the new development, are in practice elusory due to pressure from developers and the authorities. Crucially many residents were not being fully compensated or in some cases they had not received any relief at all, with compensation payments not paid or replacement homes (where offered) being of lower quality and in less desirable areas. While payments are supposed to be made by developers the local Khokimiyat has responsibility for ensuring compensation is paid, a duty far from always delivered on. In July 2019, one month before the new decree, over a thousand of angry residents from Urgench in the Khorezm region blocked the main Urgench-Khazarasp highway in protest at their treatment by the regional government.^[76] Families from around 400 demolished homes, who were living in a temporary tent city without running water, had only received partial payment of the promised compensation since their eviction and they were further angered by local businesses hiking the price of construction materials by up to 50 per cent making it even harder to rebuild their lives (displaced people in rural areas are often expected to build their own replacement accommodation). The day after the protests PM Abdulla Aripov was dispatched to the area promising the displaced families full payment of compensation and a freeze on demolition where compensation had not been paid.^[77] This major protest followed controversial demolitions in Rishtan, Ferghana and in Yakkabog, Qashqadaryo Province where the Deputy Khokim was set alight by protestors and subsequently fired for his poor handling of the demolitions, and in the Yangiyul suburb of Tashkent where residents received demolition notices without any prior consultation or warning that a development scheme was being planned.^[78] There has been a clear recognition of the potential for this issue to become a major political problem for the Government. The swift response by Aripov was followed in August 2019, not only by the Presidential Decree, but a public berating by Mirziyoyev of the regional Khokims, singling out the leaders of the Ferghana, Khorezm and Kashkadarya regions in angry terms. The President’s comments highlight his awareness of the potential reputational damage for his own leadership, telling the Governors: “One of your subordinates quarrelled with one of the local residents and made me a disgrace in the eyes of the international community. If your brain doesn’t work, why are you demolishing a normal building? If your house is demolished, what will you do? You have no shame, when did I instruct you to demolish the buildings? I told you to get permission from the residents and pay all the compensation.” He also said that “I read users’ comments on the internet about the demolition of homes in the Rishtan district… People cry in the comments. It isn’t your photograph that is featured there. It’s mine! Have you no shame? Giving your idiotic orders to demolish homes. Before you tear up any homes, you’d better take your own head off first! … You’ve brought shame to all of Uzbekistan! … I gave you the money… so that you would improve the district but also first that you would get the people’s permission.” ^[79] Many of the building projects from the last few years have failed to clearly show that land being appropriated for investment purposes provides a clear public, rather than private, benefit and the requirement for residents consent has often not been met. Time will tell if changes in practice rather than on paper can be delivered and sustained, but controversies have continued, for example the cases of Khushnud Gojibnazarov in January 2020 and Muqaddas Mustafoev in February 2020 who set themselves alight in protest at demolition plans.^[80] One ongoing point of tension, relevant to the Mustafoev case, is the decision of the Government to pursue demolition of properties deemed to be built illegally on agricultural land, otherwise without permission or where state records are incomplete.^[81] The Government conducted an Amnesty in 2018, which formalised the status of 500,000 homes, despite this 28,000 homes believed to be illegal remain and had been marked to be demolished in 2020 prior to the COVID 19 crisis.^[82] Farida Charif, a Tashkent based housing activist has been on the front line of protests against some of the Uzbekistan more controversial developments. Her Facebook group, Tashkent Demolition which provides mutual aid and legal advice to those facing demolition, has attracted more than 21,000 members protesting the demolition of the city’s historic Mahallas and other properties. While she has not been directly targeted for her activism her son was kidnapped and beaten by people pretending to be from the SNB who tried to make him provide apology video for his activism, as yet there has been no progress from prosecutors in resolving the case.[83] The construction boom has also been blamed for the widespread removal of trees from public spaces across the city to be used as building materials or to make way for new developments, to widespread public anger. Such removals have included both outright tree theft and applications to local officials for their removal, processes not always subject to significant public oversight or consultation. The Government has begun to respond with fines for identified perpetrators and a Presidential Moratorium on the removal of certain trees.^[84] The housing situation intersects with Uzbekistan’s long-standing lack of political freedoms in the case of the Soviet era policy of Propiska (residential permit), internal restrictions on freedom of movement that legally specify where a citizen is allowed to live and access government services (such as health and education).^[85] The system prevents people legally moving their permanent residence without official permission, leading to a situation where only five per cent of people in Uzbekistan were living in regions other than where they were born.^[86] In practice the scheme acts to limit the legal flow of people from Uzbekistan’s regions into Tashkent, encouraging both high and low skilled migrants from the regions to seek opportunities abroad rather than migrating to their national capital. Currently the ability to permanently move to Tashkent is restricted to those working in specific Government Agencies, those who can be sponsored by existing residents (such as through marriage) and those who have purchased a new house built in the last three years to encourage investment in the construction industry.^[87] After repeated public pronouncements in previous years only lead only to superficial changes in his January 2020 State of the Nation speech Mirziyoyev announced a further effort to reform the system, describing the system as ‘shackling’ Uzbekistan’s citizens, giving the Cabinet and Parliament the deadline of April 1^st 2020 to find a solution. However, by March it became clear that the Government’s approach was to replace one form of registration (the Propiska) with a new form of residential registration, though the draft produced in mid-March was returned for further revision after the initial public backlash.^[88] The version introduced in April amended the previous system by extending the possible length of temporary registration from one to five years, allowing people who bought any property (not just new property) in Tashkent to obtain a new residency registration, and expanding the ability of Tashkent residents to sponsor the registration a wider range of out of town family members, also enabling them to be housed in other homes owned by the existing resident rather than just with them in their primary residence. This means that ability to move permanently to Tashkent is still restricted people able to afford to buy property or who have relatives living there, leaving those on lower incomes reliant on the more precarious temporary registrations, which were only formally opened to non-residents who had been offered a job in 2019. Such comparatively modest changes to such a controversial system are unlikely to mollify public pressure for change. The World Bank had joined the chorus of disproval at the previous system with a recent policy paper highlighting how the Propiska system locked in unemployment and underemployment in Uzbekistan’s regions while supressing the potential for economic growth in the capital.^[89] Supporters of the current restrictions argue it helps the government manage pressure on housing and public services, which in turn raises questions as to why the new wave of construction has not led to the significant delivery of new social infrastructure (such as schools, clinics or public amenities) or more affordable housing. The system for determining such contributions seems in practice to be ad hoc arrangements between local authorities and developers, with Tashkent City conspicuous by its lack of provision of facilities to support families, as pointed out in Matyakubova’s essay in this collection. There could be considerable benefits in making transparent requirements of developers to provide support for social infrastructure and affordable housing as part of the planning approval process, processes that require much greater public involvement prior to official consent for developments are given. Uzbekistan could look at the UK’s different systems for providing social infrastructure such as the Community Infrastructure Levy (a cash payment made directly to local authorities for them to provide infrastructure, provided in the Uzbek context transparency could be achieved to ensure the money was subsequently spent correctly) and Section 106 (where developers directly build social infrastructure and other modifications for the benefit of the local community to their developments).^[90] Alternatively Uzbekistan could explore models of land value capture, used to social infrastructure and low-cost housing in Hong Kong, and that are becoming increasingly popular in Australia. The World Bank report also highlights how the high cost of housing, particularly in Tashkent, creates further social and economic bottlenecks. As it stands around 95 per cent of Uzbeks own their own home, and this includes designated low income housing provided with low purchase costs supported by low interest mortgages.^[91] However as the World Bank shows it is extremely difficult for citizens to get on the property ladder in Tashkent given the unaffordability of new property, where the city ranks as less affordable in relative terms than hotspots such as London and San Francisco.^[92] Overcoming cultural and practical impediments to renting (such as pressure to stay with family if people are unable to afford to buy), both for market and social rents, could create greater flexibility in the Tashkent housing market to respond to the loosening of the residential registration requirements. Facilitating the expansion of a broader private rented sector could also help bring unoccupied new build properties that are being purchased for investment purposes into the active housing supply, something that may require the growth of professional letting agents and property management companies where the owners are not able to market and manage the properties for rent themselves.^[93] Forced LabourFor years one of the most egregious human rights abuses in Uzbekistan has been its systematic and widespread use of forced labour to pick its cotton, the country’s primary cash crop nicknamed Oq Oltin (white gold). After independence Uzbekistan continued with Soviet era practices through which a ‘state order’ system would give each regional government a quota to fulfil for the production of cotton and wheat. Regional government would work with lower tiers of local government and state owned enterprises to make public sector workers participated in picking the cotton crop. The situation was exacerbated in the immediate post-Soviet period as due to the dissolution of Soviet Machine Tractor Parks and wider economic challenges, the proportion of cotton collected through mechanisation (primarily specialised combine harvesters) fell from 40 per cent in 1992 to four per cent in 1997.[94] For ordinary Uzbeks the experience of forced labour could involve being deployed to work in the fields for several weeks, in some cases several months, in the late summer and early autumn (particularly September and October) to pick cotton by hand, though wealthier people were often able to pay others to handle their personal quota (a trend that has increased as a proportion of overall forced labour recent years). Child labour was a significant problem, both as a result of children being required to work (often organised through schools) and due to parents being required take children with them due to lack of childcare.[95] In the last full year of Karimov’s rule (2015) the ILO’s surveys estimate that 3.4 million Uzbeks participated in the cotton harvest in some capacity, of which 448,000 were identified as being forced, though campaigners put the figure considerably higher.[96] In response to the systemic use of forced and child labour a group of Uzbek and international human rights activists and trade unionists formed the Cotton Campaign, to help pressure the global garment industry to pledge that it would boycott the use of Uzbek cotton. The campaign, one of whose key members the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights has contributed an essay on cotton for this collection, was highly successful in removing Uzbek cotton from the supply chains of major Western oriented brands. Child labour was formally banned in 2012 in a decree by then PM Mirziyoyev, who was heavily involved in the supervision of the cotton harvests under Karimov. Systematic use of child labour dramatically decreased from the 2013 harvest onwards to a point today when all but a few isolated cases remain.[97] In 2013, following pressure on World Bank and the widening boycott, the ILO was permitted to undertake its first monitoring mission, with a widespread ILO led third party monitoring scheme coming into place in 2015.[98] The ILO identified dramatic falls in forced labour from 448,000 in both 2015 and 2016 to 364,000 in 2017, 170,000 in 2018 and 102,000 in 2019.[99] Wages per kilogram (kg) of cotton picked have significantly increased in parallel, from 280 soms per kg in 2016 to between 700-1300 soms per kg in 2018 and 800-1400 soms per kg in 2019. The 2019 Harvest saw a tenfold increase in government officials (259 in total) being fined for forced labour violations. The continuing problem of forced labour, its messages about its criminalisation and the Government’s policy goal of eliminating it, are now being discussed openly and regularly by government officials and in the Uzbek media, including in state outlets.[100] While a significant improvement 102,000 people being forced to pick cotton is still poses an enormous challenge.[101] In the 2019 harvest both the ILO and Cotton Campaign monitors agreed that the prohibition on the use of nurses, doctors, teaches and student had been observed but that some initiatives at a local government level in the regions still led to some in middle income jobs or businesses being required to pay for pickers. The use of 2100 firefighters, following a decree by the Ministry of Emergencies, and military cadets and conscripts (at the direction of the Ministry of Defense) have been confirmed, although according to the ILO as these workers were paid this was not technically forced labour though still in breach of its standards.[102] Concerns have also been raised around (state) bank lending to farmers for machinery, seed and other supplies being tied to commitments to producing set amounts of cotton, which led to forced labour being provided both through local government and in some cases by the banks themselves providing staff as pickers or paying for others to bring in the cotton.[103] There are enduring concerns that the privatisation of the cotton harvest, through the ‘clusters’ which vertically integrate farming, harvesting, processing and in many cases the manufacture of textiles, will not necessarily bring forced labour to an end. The opaque ownership structures of clusters can mask the influence of local power brokers, who are or who are working closely with local officials to continue to pressure people into working in the fields. Transferring forced labour from official state policy to the province of localised corruption and private gain must be avoided at all costs. As mentioned above farmers too have complained about late payments, land confiscation and coercive practices by the new clusters.[104] On March 6^th 2020 a Presidential Decree was ending the state order system in 2020 so that farmers who rent land from the state would be free to determine their own output levels and choice of cotton crop ahead of the 2020 harvest, as well as expediting further planned changes to liberalise prices and bank lending.[105] This went faster than a number of experts had previously predicted and that was set out in the 2019 agricultural development strategy, which looked at a phased approach by 2023.[106] The combination of a strong relationship between the ILO and Government and sustained external pressure has helped drive the changes forward on the ground. However, there is a clear difference of opinion over the relative merits of supporting and pressuring the Government of Uzbekistan into ending forced labour once and for all, rooted in different theories of change. The ILO sees its role as supporting those in Government who have been driving the reforms, something that includes praising progress so far to help  give reformers the political ‘wins’ needed internally to keep progress going and to build the case for further international support to complete the reforms. To that end, the ILO has supported Government efforts to end the international boycott of the Uzbek Cotton sector, arguing that this will allow further increases in wages and spur investment in mechanisation to root out remaining pockets of forced labour. Other supporters of now ending the boycott have made wider arguments including about how normalisation would end smuggling that currently sees Uzbek cotton on international markets posing as products of other nations and encourage Western investment into the sector (with perceptions of higher labour and environmental standards) rather than relying on Russian and Chinese investment.^[107] The debate has been added given added impetus by the COVID-19 outbreak that came shortly after constructive but inconclusive discussions between the Cotton Campaign representatives and the Government of Uzbekistan. The Government of Uzbekistan has made a public call for the ending of the boycott to help the economy weather the impact of the COVID-19 crisis including challenge of rising unemployment and the return of labour migrants.[108] However the Cotton Campaign, as Lynn Schweisfurth makes clear in this collection, stand by their call for the Government to enable the registration of independent human rights and cotton monitoring non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to provide oversight of the efforts to completely end forced labour as a precondition for lifting the boycott.[109] The transition to the cluster model provides both new economic opportunities but new areas where monitoring will be required to prevent the use of forced or coerced labour, not only in the cotton fields but in the emerging textile factories that are developing in dispersed communities potentially away from necessary scrutiny. At present, neither the local human rights activists who work with the ILO nor those who work with the Cotton Campaign have been able to register the local NGOs despite repeated attempts (part of wider restrictions on independent NGOs discussed below). Harassment against unregistered monitors and investigative journalists has significantly reduced but still continues and those who have sacrificed so much to help bring the practice of forced labour to an end must have an opportunity to play a part in the future. To achieve international credibility and trust in Uzbek cotton there needs to be an ongoing role for the Cotton Campaign, both its local partners and international networks, in providing monitoring and assurance about the forced labour situation in Uzbekistan including examining conditions in the emerging processing and textile operations within the clusters. If Uzbekistan wants to build international support for ending the boycott, allowing the NGO registration of both the Cotton Campaign’s local partners and of those working with the ILO would seem to be a crucial step, along with registrations of independent trade unions for seasonal agricultural workers.[110] Given the economic challenges facing Uzbekistan post-COVID 19 the urgency of finding a pathway to end the boycott is stronger than ever but it is essential that Uzbekistan remains on the path to rapidly end outstanding cases of forced labour. In the longer-term, the development of independent trade unions will be crucial in labour organising and protecting workers from exploitation, so changes in this area must form part of Uzbekistan’s reform process. As Bennet Freeman of the Cotton Campaign puts it ‘the issue is less whether to end the pledge - but when and how - and above all, how ending it can become a catalyst for responsible sourcing and investment’.[111] The process of opening up the cotton sector to international markets needs to be expedited to meet Uzbekistan’s economic needs and bolster the improvements in rural wages and the registration of cotton focused NGOs and independent unions (as a key step in delivering the wider process of NGO reform) would seem a small price for the Government to pay to strengthen international confidence that the final steps of eradicating forced labour are to be achieved and sustained.[112] It is worth noting that the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights and others have also documented reports of forced labour being used to carryout local infrastructure and renovation work as part of the Obod Qishloq (prosperous villages) program, by abusing the Soviet era concept of hashar, whereby residents come together to carry out voluntary work for the benefit of their communities. According to the Forum  ‘by labelling public works as hashar, local officials are able to forcibly recruit employees of both state-owned and private enterprises to work without pay and often under difficult and dangerous conditions rather than creating new — paid — employment opportunities’.[113] There have also been reports from RFE/RL that despite the COVID-19 lockdown in late March 2020 hundreds of residents were pressed into work assisting city officials beautify Andijan before a Presidential visit.[114] Media and online FreedomUzbekistan has made gradual progress in the international press freedom rankings from 166^th out of 180 in 2015, the last full year under Karimov, to 156 out of 180 in 2020 with the description ‘thaw under way’ and a decrease in its Global Score of over eight points, placing just ahead of Kazakhstan and Singapore and just behind Turkey and Rwanda.[115] The Mirziyoyev era has seen a significant growth in independent-minded local journalism online with news sites such as Gazzetta.Uz, Kun.Uz, Hook Report and independent bloggers using Telegram Channels and Facebook pages to reach wide audiences and tackle controversial topics in a way that would have been unthinkable under Karimov. As of May 2019, most internationally based websites are now able to be accessed in Uzbekistan, a few notable exceptions such as RFE/RL’s Uzbek language service Ozodlik.[116] All journalists imprisoned during the Karimov era, such as former RFE/RL contributors Solijon Abdurahmonov and Yusuf Ruzimuradov have been released after long prison sentences, and no journalists remain in long-term detention in Uzbekistan at time of writing, following the release of Bobomurod Abdullaev and Hayot Nasriddinov in 2018.[117] In certain cases local officials have been penalised for impeding the work of journalists, for example a senior official in the Fergana region was fired after having Sharifa Madrahimova, a journalist from the Marifat (Enlightenment) newspaper, arrested for her investigations into price rises at a local market.[118] The new freedom is a fragile one with reporters unable to fully predict the reaction to stories from the authorities or powerful members of the elite and while criticism of officials and politicians is now broadly tolerated, direct criticism of the President and first family is still off limits on anything more than minor quibbles on procedural issues. ‘Constructive criticism’ seems to be being encouraged but the situation is still some way from full freedom of speech and the media. There is a sense that the more reform-minded parts of the elite see value the development of independent minded domestic media both as a safety valve and a source of information to help inform further reforms to the system. The Government also seems keen to allow the expansion of new domestic providers to help reduce reliance on external media sources (such as BBC World Service, VOA, RFE/RL, and Fergana). While, as with many things reforms of the media environment are a work in progress, a more cynical view would be that the precarious basis on which media freedom is currently built both encourages a degree of self-censorship and openness to pressure on more controversial topics. The fragility of the situation has been underlined by two recent, at time of writing, cases. In May 2020 well-known journalist Anora Sodiqova was fired from the Uzbek National News Agency in what she believed to be retaliation in particular for her comments on Facebook about Presidential Advisor Khayriddin Sultonov (who until 2018 had overseen the media sector) and about the Sardoba dam tragedy which she said led to increased pressure from her superiors at the agency.[119] The Nemolchi (Don’t Keep Silent) website, which catalogues anonymous stories from domestic abuse sufferers run by women’s rights campaigner Irina Matviyenko was subject of a ludicrous intervention by the Agency for Information and Mass Communications (about which more below). The site was told it was ‘disseminating immoral content’ under laws focused on regulating pornography and ordered to take down references to rape and masturbation in a heartbreaking but important story explaining a survivors’ experiences of being abused as a child.[120] After local and international outcry, the takedown request was withdrawn by the Agency following support for Nemolchi by the Public Fund for Support and Development of National Mass Media.[121] One of the main challenges still facing journalists are the laws on different types of defamation. In January 2020 a draft law was published seeking to implement the principles of a December 2020 Presidential decree that would remove the threat of prison for ‘slander and insult’ making amendments to the procedures in the administrative and criminal codes. While removing the threat of prison the changes would substantially increase the upper limit of fines imposed from 200 Basic Calculation units ($4250) to 500 BCU ($10,630) which retaining the option of up to 360 hours community service. The crime of insulting someone in connection with their official or civil duty still exists but has been downgraded to an administrative offence.[122] With legal costs high and court system still struggling with corruption the courts are a heavily used route for aggrieved business people and officials to suppress critical voices. As of time of writing the draft law on slander has not been implemented, with rumours circling about the development of an entirely new law of mass media that might incorporate such changes. The current law on mass media, despite amendments in 2018, remains the source of concern, with international media freedom organisation Article 19 calling for the removal of content and contributor restrictions and the need to clearly differentiate between print/online output and broadcast services with regulation only appropriate for the latter.[123] However, some local journalists have questioned whether further changes to legislation should be the focus of attention, given that many of the outstanding problems in the media sector stem from poor implementation of existing laws and in the structures of power in the country. This is not to say that the risk of direct harassment and arrest of journalists have entirely gone away, particularly for those in the regions at the hands of local law enforcement. Indeed, there clearly is a sign that more activist journalists who have been challenging the state since the Karimov era, or who take a more negative view of the Government’s reform agenda are more likely to receive negative treatment, reinforcing the cycle of distrust. So those, who fall into the space between political activism and small time blogging (and so sometimes are not seen as being part of the local media landscape) still face significant pressures.[124] This is particularly true for those focused on religious issues or with links to Uzbekistan’s exiled political groups. Poet and blogger Mahmud Rajabov was given a 27 month suspended sentence on smuggling charges for importing banned books produced by former Presidential candidate Muhammad Salih and served time in administrative detention for a march protesting his treatment.[125] A blogger and activist who covered Rajabov’s case, Nafosat Olloshukurova, was arrested and forcibly detained in a psychiatric facility before being able to flee into exile with the support of the US Embassy and local human rights campaigners.[126] Journalist Davlatnazar Ruzmetov was the subject of significant harassment from police and local security services in Khorezm for his coverage of Rajabov and Olloshukurova’s cases and his activities in exposing forced labour in the cotton sector, up until the point he was killed by being run over crossing the road in November 2019.[127] In 2018, eight conservative leaning religious bloggers and activists were arrested and detained on 15 day administrative charges at a time of heightened tension with religious communities following new school uniform regulations that strengthened the de facto ban on the hijab.[128] The situation on traditional broadcast media (TV and Radio) is more mixed. The advent of digital broadcasting has enabled the growth of new TV channels, such as UzReport, to enter the market and grow their audiences, providing more diverse and critical coverage than their traditional competitors but within similar parameters faced by new online media. State run TV and Radio however have yet to meaningfully reform, with requirements to dutifully follow and repeat the government line (albeit that the line itself is now more open than it was in the Karimov era), with censorship of songs (and lyrics) and other cultural content to avoid controversial topics even on social matters. While there has been an improvement in production values, there have not been significant steps to reform output into more challenging areas or to engage with the international community on different models of public broadcasting or structural reforms.[129] A newly organised Agency for Information and Mass Communications, overseeing the media sector and consolidating a wide range of government information services, was set up in February 2019 under the leadership of the President’s former Press Secretary Komil Allamjonov, with the President’s daughter Saida Mirziyoyeva as his deputy.[130] After establishing the agency Allamjonov and Mirziyoyeva moved in February 2020 to set up the Public Fund for Support and Development of National Mass Media, a new public foundation for freedom of the media with the stated aims to give bloggers and independent journalists legal, organisational, technical and other assistance. At the fund’s launch Mirziyoyeva announced that “we believe in freedom of speech and we believe in its power. We believe that high-quality journalism is necessary for the life of a democratic society in which all people are equal and have the right to choose regardless of their faith, race, gender, nationality or social status”. She also argued that freedom of speech and the role of bloggers and independent journalists were an essential part of the reform process, saying that “Our president understands that it is more effective to monitor the implementation of reforms when millions of eyes observe the work of authorized bodies. Of course, these authorized persons are not always so comfortable, but only in this way a strong civil society is built.”^[131] In the most countries, particularly in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes, placing the President’s daughter and former Press Secretary first as the leadership the of the press regulator and then the country’s main foundation for media freedom would raise a number of red flags about the seriousness of commitments to freedom of the media and the ability for the journalists to hold the government to account. However the situation here is perhaps somewhat more complicated by the internal power dynamics of the government, in that a number of journalists have argued that this duo (hailing from the reformist camp and with impeccable access to the President) have been active allies in defending journalistic independence against pressure from the system’s old guard, given the stated importance of media development for the Mirziyoyev project. Irrespective of how substantive the support given to journalists by the reformists has been there remains a substantive gap between nurturing constructive criticism to help spur government backed reforms and a fully open media environment, particularly when it comes to direct criticism of the President and first family. A recent interview by Allamjonov on Uzreport highlighted some of these tensions where he talked of wanting to create ‘a responsible, ethical media space gaining control over their field through credibility’ rather than having journalists and bloggers continuing without rules of engagement ‘where government will keep drawing lines for them’. While supporting efforts to improve accuracy of reporting and sourcing is all well and good he still sees it as the role of the state to apply pressure to achieve these goals, inserting its own conceptions of accuracy and its interests into the process.[132] At present, due to the restrictions on NGO registration outlined below and deep government scepticism there are not currently not-for-profit donor funded or part-funded outfits such as Kloop in Krygyzstan, loads of outlets in Georgia and Ukraine (such as OC Media or Hromadske), nor OCCRP and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (and similar Western investigative groups). While some commercial entities are doing more investigative journalism, the lack of well-funded investigative journalism organisations that are not reliant on advertising does limit the opportunities for in depth scrutiny. Space for Civil SocietyAfter a brief opening in the early 1990s, in the years that followed under Karimov independent civil society was gradually suffocated. Registration requirements and state interference in activities progressively expanded, with the Ezgulik Human Rights Centre one of the last independent NGOs to receive registration in 2003 (only made possible with the assistance of the OSCE and US Government). In 2004 new requirements on international NGOs to reregister with the Ministry of Justice, to place all international donations in two particular state banks and to obtain official permission to access their funds (creating a de facto freeze on NGO bank accounts) led to the closure of local presence of Internews, the Open Society Foundations and the Institute of War and Peace Reporting.[133] Crackdown on human rights activists and independent voices in the wake of the 2005 Andijan Massacre led to a further wave of pressure against both local and international NGOs forcing the withdrawal of most of the remaining international organisations such as  the Eurasia Foundation, CounterPart International, Freedom House, the American Bar Association and IREX.[134] The climate of repression against independent organisations would persist throughout the Karimov era. As is so often the case in much of the post-Soviet space the lack of independent NGOs is not the same as a lack of NGOs. Many of the most prominent organisations that get described as ‘NGOs’ in Uzbekistan, such as Buyuk Kelajak or the Public Fund for Support and Development of National Mass Media mentioned above, were founded by Government Decrees, receive significant funding from state budgets, and are reporting to and operating under the strategic direction of the Government. Some of these organisations have shown a significant degree of dynamism in recent years with Yuksalish, a think tank founded in conjunction with the Parliament, for example proactively trying to raises its profile and engage with international organisations, while developing useful initiatives to support the sector such as the Unions.uz website that seeks to link NGOs with volunteers.^[135] These quasi non-governmental organisations (QUANGOS) can be an important part of the delivery of government policy in many countries, they can bring together useful expertise and can often involve effective public participation but they are not non-governmental in any meaningful sense.[136] As Dilmurad Yuspov points out in his essay in this collection when all the separately registered local branches of these systemic NGOs, political parties and trade unions are counted up they amount for around 65 per cent of the 9338 NGOs that are currently registered with the Ministry of Justice in Uzbekistan. The government or parliament are quite open about their role in founding such organisations, leaving little space for the more insidious form of Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisation (GONGO) seen in some of the countries that have been notionally independently founded but remain wholly controlled by regime figures. Many of the other NGOs that have been able to operate are those which address non-controversial topics and humanitarian activities, allowing more collaborative relations with government. Unlike the liberalisation in the media environment there has not been a similar opening up for new independent NGOs. As Dilmurad Yuspov explains the registration for independent NGOs remains a bureaucratic nightmare (despite some limited reforms and an new online portal) and activities by unregistered groups are banned, though some have reported that in recent years enforcement of penalties for unregistered organisations has for the most part become less strict. The fear of independent, and especially internationally funded NGOs, runs deep across the more authoritarian parts of the post-Soviet Space, buying into narratives that they were the driving force behind the Maidan (Ukraine) and the ‘colour’ revolutions of the 2000s.[137] While a direct causal link between NGOs and revolution remains farfetched, and the subject of substantial propaganda by Russia and other authoritarians, the growth in truly independent organisations would of course provide new opportunities for examining the performance of the Government and provide participants with the skills to do so more effectively.[138] At the moment while criticism of Government policy and delivery is being encouraged by the President and his administration it is predominantly through means, if not always directly controlled then at least mediated by, the Government itself. In the absence of simple registration paths for formal NGOs, informal but very active Facebook and Telegram groups about issues of local importance have partially filled the void, creating new opportunities for mobilisation on civic and political issues. In March 2020, the Government approved the registration of Huquqiy Tayanch (Legal Base), a prisoner rights organisation that had been turned down eight times previously and is the first human rights organisation registered since 2002,  and the US NGO Mercy Corps, which had been previously deregistered in 2006 in the wake of Andijan.[139] However, this positive first step has not led to a flood of successful approvals with human rights NGOs, such as the Karakalpakstan based human rights organisation Chiroq being rejected multiple times in 2020, most recently in April.[140] A new NGO code is being drafted, and clearly needs to be expedited, but there needs to be a must political steer from the highest level to end the bureaucratic roadblocks to registration, something that can be done even on the basis of the current legal arrangements. The April 2020 announcement of the new public chamber comprising a mix of NGO representatives as a formal consultative body between the Government and Civil Society.  If its members are drawn solely from the ranks of QUANGOs and other GONGOs it will lack credibility, both in Uzbekistan and to the international community. This initiative should be used a springboard to open up NGO registration and to enable independent voices to be heard at the highest level.[141] Human RightsUnder Karimov Uzbekistan was rightly seen as a global pariah on human rights. The regime was marked by the mass jailing political prisoners, widespread use of torture and deaths in custody (including infamous cases where prisoners were believed to have been boiled to death), poor prison conditions as well as wider problems around corruption, rule of law, freedoms and minority rights addressed in other sections of this collection.[142] Mirziyoyev has made substantive changes in this area, recognising not only the impact that loosening the pressure on dissent has only on the internal environment but in changing Uzbekistan’s international reputation. Over 50 political prisoners have been released since 2016, including almost all of those imprisoned in the Karimov era.[143] Those released now included a number of figures arrested in the early phase of the Mirziyoyev era, with the release of Andrei Kubatin in September 2019, a scholar and supporter of pan-Turkism, arrested and tortured in December 2017. In his case and many others the finger of blame has been pointed at the security services, including by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers Diego Garcia-Sayán.[144] As time has gone on the political rivalries between Mirziyoyev and the Karimov era security establishment have also helped opened up opportunities for replacing key personnel and evolving practices at a grassroots level, including reducing the use of blacklists of human rights activist and journalists with 20,000 people removed according to Human Rights Watch (HRW). HRW have also been told that the Uzbekistan has stopped applying Section 221 of the Criminal Code on ‘violation of prison rules’ that was often used to extend the sentences of political prisoners.[145] In December 2017, a Presidential Decree declared that evidence obtained through torture would be inadmissible in court.^[146] While in 2019 the notorious Jaslyk Prison, renowned as ‘the house of torture’ and home to a number of political prisoners was closed.[147] On March 14^th 2019, President Mirziyoyev signed into law new provisions mandating the Ombudsman (about which more below) to establish a National Preventive Mechanism in relation to Uzbekistan’s international commitments under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.[148] However, it has yet to sign the ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ which sets the international benchmarks for how national monitoring mechanisms should operate. The relative relaxation in the political environment has facilitated an almost tenfold increase in the number of formal complaints to the prosecutor’s office about incidents of torture and mistreatment but the rise in official investigations into malpractice has not been commensurate with the increase in complaints according to HRW.[149] Overall most observers believe there has been a significant reduction, though not elimination, of the use of torture, though sometimes because more devious methods, including pressure on families. The recent deaths of Farrukh Hidirov, where activist have shown pictures believed to show evidence of burning and scaring (while the authorities argue that these were symptoms of Tuberculosis) and Alijon Abdukarimov (discussed below) suggest that more still needs to be done to stamp out this previously endemic scourge.[150] There are two official bodies with particular roles in addressing human rights in Uzbekistan; the Office of the Authorised Person of the Oliy Majlis for Human Rights (Ombudsman) which handles complaints from members of the public on human rights issues, and the National Human Rights Centre (NHRC), an NGO founded in by Presidential Decree in December 2018 with a focus on improving standards, informing legislation and international engagement (PR role).[151] The Ombudsman’s office has been gradually increasing its independence and ability to address more challenging issues as the climate of repression lifted. This has included engaging with independent campaigners on issues including torture and prison inspection (reporting 138 allegations of torture in 2019, mostly in prisons).[152] However, the annual budget of the Ombudsman is currently 3,600,300,000 soms ($350,000) and it has been seeking international funding to help expand its capacity. The NHRC has received significantly more funding in recent years with its government funding for 2020 is 7,254,000,000 soms ($715,000) and it plays an active role in promoting the progress of the Mirziyoyev reforms to the international community.[153] Uzbekistan took the opportunity provided by the international goodwill generated by the initial burst of reforms to convene host an ‘Asian Forum on Human Rights’ in November 2018 at a convention centre in Samarkand, which as HRW noted the event was heavy on international observers and Uzbek dignitaries (facilitating dialogue between the two groups) but few independent local activists were able to attend.[154] It had planned to create a follow-up event in May 2020, the Samarkand Human Rights Forum, before being postponed due to COVID-19.[155] The forums form part of Uzbekistan’s campaign a seat on the UN Human Rights Council for 2021-23.[156] Uzbek Government is in negotiations with the UN about the number of UN special rapporteurs able to visit each year, building on recent visits but the ability to deliver these visits rely perhaps more on availability and global on the UN side than on the Uzbek side. As discussed below Uzbekistan is in the process of mounting a bid to join the UN Human Rights Council for 2021-23. Despite the identifiable progress there is still much to do before international human rights standards are fully met. The case and treatment of former diplomat Kadyr Yusupov was convicted by a closed court of treason in January 2020 has rung alarm bells due to allegations of torture, threats to his family members and prior mental health issues that included a suicide attempt immediately prior to his arrest.^[157] This and other cases show that all though progress has been made in checking the power of the security services, including reducing their political threat to the regime, there are still credible concerns that some of their arrests are for the purposes of perpetuating their own existence at current resourcing levels (by keeping Uzbekistan safe from spies whether real and imagined) than meeting the wider needs of Uzbek national security.[158]Campaigners have argued for reforms to Article 157 of the Criminal Code, which sets out the criteria for High Treason though in practice it will take further reform of the security services and of the courts to reduce the risk of national security cases being made on dubious grounds. Further evidence for the need for more security service reform has been set out by Amnesty International who have identified a sophisticated phishing and spyware campaign to try to monitor a number of Uzbekistani human rights activists.^[159] In principle provisions for freedom assembly are enshrined in the constitution and law. However, in practice under Karimov protests were virtually prohibited in practice and continue to be difficult to organise to this day. While, prior to the COVID-19 lockdown, the Government had become less heavy handed in its response to spontaneous public protests, such as over natural gas prices and the housing protests mentioned above, attempts to address formal restrictions on freedom of assembly have stalled.[160] In the summer of 2019, the Government consulted on the ‘Draft Law on Rallies, Meetings and Demonstrations of the Republic of Uzbekistan’. Following criticism by international experts convened by the OSCE/ODIHR that the proposed law was ‘generally not compliant with international human rights standards, and there are a several areas that may be considered particularly deficient in this regard’, the legislation has been stuck.[161] The OSCE had called for Uzbekistan to move from a system where authorities had to authorise demonstrations to one where protesters were only required to inform the Government and to loosen rules around demonstration venues, times and durations. Longstanding human rights activists describe their situation as having gone from being repressed to being (mostly) ignored. There are some new opportunities for interacting with more reform-minded ministers but perception that many of the changes are cosmetic, with many older hands more cynical about the overall director of travel than the newer group of activists and commentators who have emerged in the Mirziyoyev era. As set out previously the legacy of the Karimov era hangs heavily over Uzbekistan today. The intimate involvement of many of today’s elite with the Karimov regime leaves questions of transitional justice unanswered, past failings are acknowledged but without accountability or redress in a relentless focus on moving forward. The unwillingness to talk about the past even includes the Andjian Massacre, the 2015 event that so defined Uzbekistan’s retreat from the world, with officials unwilling to address its legacy and the Interior Minister at the time of the massacre, Zokir Almatov, currently holds a post of special advisor in the interior ministry.[162] This approach fuels scepticism about the sincerity of the current efforts at change. The new National Strategy of Uzbekistan on Human Rights confirmed by Presidential Decree in June sets out, on paper at least an ambitious set of action plans with internal monitoring mechanisms to report on progress.[163] However, the real test will be in the implementation and whether local and international activists and journalists are able to openly monitor the situation in practice. Rule of LawImproving the situation in relation to the rule of law in Uzbekistan is a central challenge both for addressing the country’s human rights and economic challenges. It is an area where progress has been somewhat uneven compared to some other reforms and major challenges remain ahead around corruption in the judiciary, the continued dominance of the prosecutor’s office and the lack of defence lawyers. As with so many areas of policy the pace of regulatory change in the legal sphere has been rapid, with around 15,000 new Ministry of Justice documents and regulations in the last three years (compared to 20,000 in the previous 25 years). One area where there has been a clear step forward is in the area of policing. As discussed above, prior to recent reforms low-level bribery was endemic amongst beat and traffic police.[164] After recent changes Uzbek’s everyday interactions with police have markedly improved, though independent activists report that some low level harassment and monitoring of their activities persist. Following the tragic case of Alijon Abdukarimov, who was beaten to death by police officers in May, the Government has committed to installing CCTV in the interrogation rooms of 497 police stations across Uzbekistan, while the police involved have been arrested and charged with torture and illegal detention.[165] At the heart of Uzbekistan’s rule of law problems have been the overwhelming power of the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) in controlling the legal process from arrest (officers used to have unrestricted power of arrest but though now courts determine who can be arrested it is almost unknown for them to refuse prosecutors requests) through to sentencing (judges almost always accept the sentence proposed by the prosecutors). The charging decision, in the hands of the PGO, is critical in determining the outcome of a trial in a system where acquittals are still extremely rare. Mirziyoyev has spoken openly about the need to increase the number of acquittals in legal proceedings. Following the speech, the annual number of acquittals has risen from six in 2016 to 867 in 2018.[166] However, some observers have noted concerns that these numbers may be being padded out with cases that have yet to complete where sentencing is postponed or where the applicants have died.[167] Reforming the PGO itself has also been an important part of the reform agenda. In August 2017 Mirziyoyev claimed that the PGO officials had been ‘major thieves and facilitators of theft’, saying that he had replaced 80 per cent of them and in March 2019 made further changes to redistribute responsibilities to other state agencies and reduce the PGO workforce by 23 per cent.[168] Despite these reforms, the inequality of arms in the court room in criminal and administrative court cases is palpable. On the other side of the court from the still powerful PGO across the courtroom in criminal trial are a small band of advocates. As of January 2019 there were 3944 lawyers licensed as attorneys at law in total in a country of 33 million people.[169] Given Uzbekistan’s expanding array of new business opportunities many of these lawyers (and many others with legal training but not registered with the Chamber of Advocates) work in the commercial sector leaving a small number to take up the thankless task of defending those accused in a system with the acquittals rate and sentencing policy noted above. There are issues around the need to improve the status of lawyers in the country, but particularly to make it more attractive to act as a defence lawyer. At the moment lawyers taking human rights or politically challenging cases tend to be from the small group of older lawyers, with younger lawyers still afraid that taking such cases could destroy their careers. There are some small steps underway to change the situation facing lawyers in Uzbekistan. Firstly, efforts are underway to reform the Chamber of Advocates that represents the profession, attempting to loosen the level of control the Ministry of Justice has over its activities. Following a Presidential Decree from December 2019, the Chamber of Advocates has been tasked with developing a new concept for the administration of the legal profession with a working group, involving a broader range of advocates than previously might have been the case. Key issues under investigation include the nature of the relationship with the Ministry of Justice (previously chair of Chamber of Advocates was chosen by Ministry of Justice) and the development new policy on legal aid, with a view to providing criminal, administrative and civil case support from advice through to trial for those who meet low income criteria and this will be managed by a series of regional centres independent of the judiciary who administered the legacy system (often the cause of corruption and favouritism amongst lawyer). The Chamber of Advocates now has a consultative role in approving any new legislation relating to the profession. On positive initiate in improving access to justice is the Madad network of legal advisory bureaus across Uzbekistan, an ‘NGO’ funded by government decree in 2019, that aim to shortly have an office in every district as well as the national website Advice.uz all providing free legal advice.[170] Reform of the judiciary remains very much a work in progress; something the President has been open about in is 2020 State of the Nation Speech.[171] At present, the Supreme Judicial Council, created in 2018, makes appointment of judges on the recommendation of the Supreme Court. However, the President appoints the council and formally approves judicial appointments, giving concerns over the ability of the Presidential administration to influence the decisions.[172] Judicial salaries have been increased though still not to a level commensurate with the lifestyles they and their families have come to expect from their position.[173] Reports of bribe taking remain rife, particularly in the criminal and administrative courts. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers 85 per cent of judges remain on a five-year tenure which leaves them potentially more open to pressure in order to secure their future reappointment than more established judges on longer terms.[174] The rapporteur also noted that civil society representatives that he met during his visit with were subject to interrogation by the security services. The majority of the judges working today have made their way through the Prosecutor’s office. The working group of the Chamber of Advocates has suggested that all new judges in the criminal courts have spent time as a defence lawyer, something that may help change perspectives as well as improving the status of lawyers in general. The more egregious excesses of the judiciary have been removed while the need for deeper institutional change remains. The international community has been engaging with judicial reform process both on training and on building technical capabilities, such as the well-publicised project by the UN to make documents from the administrative court system open to the public. Efforts to create an automated system of case distribution are yet to be completed with case allocation decisions when assigned judges are unavailable are still being made by the powerful chairs of each court as part of the widespread powers they have over the selection, promotion, evaluation and discipline of judges. As the UN Special Rapporteur noted the measures taken so far ‘should be regarded as initial steps towards the establishment of a truly independent and impartial justice system. Much more needs to be done to ensure that the judiciary is truly independent from other branches of the State, and that judges, prosecutors and lawyers are free to carry out their professional activities without any undue interference or pressure.’ Women’s rightsOne of the major challenges recognised by both Government and international donors is the need to address systemic discrimination against women in Uzbekistan’s economy, society and amongst its political elite. Even in the Soviet era of nominal gender equality and state run welfare support networks Uzbekistan was a patriarchal society with few women in leadership roles but as Uzbek academic Nozima Davletova points out the transition to the market economy in the 90s, the gradual re-emergence of religion (about which more below) and the patriarchal way in which the national patriarch Islam Karimov sought to define post-independence Uzbek identity has led to has growing led to a ‘growing re-traditionalisation’, where both economic and cultural pressure ends up promoting ‘traditional’ gender roles.[175] At present, no full members of the Cabinet of Ministers or regional governors are women. There is only one district level Governor who is a woman and Uzbekistan has only just appointed its first woman Ambassador in June 2020, Feruza Mahmudova the new Ambassador to Israel.[176] However, the recent Majils elections the number of women elected doubled to 48, just under a third of the total members of Parliament, and the new chairperson of the Senate is former Deputy PM Tanzila Narbaeva.[177] Davletova believes that there is some political will from the current elite to address women’s rights issues but a lack of capacity to address informal and discriminatory practices at the middle management level and a local level outside of Tashkent.[178] Even positive steps have led to outcomes that have disadvantaged women. For example, efforts to raise standards of education in pre-school education (kindergarten/nursery) led not only to improvements in the curriculum but a change of the age of admission from two to six years to three to seven years, thereby removing it as a childcare option for families of two year olds and making it harder for the primary caregiver (almost always women) from returning to work.[179] This links to a system of maternity leave which provides 126 days (somewhat oddly spaced split to give more time-70- days prior to birth than after 56 days) of leave paid by the employer, followed by the option of unpaid leave until the child reaches the age of three. Similarly the progressive elimination of forced labour leading to a rise in higher paid male cotton pickers displacing women who had previously been employed (including those doing work on behalf of others who paid to get out of forced labour). It is important to note however that the specific focus on preventing the use of teaching and health care workers as forced labour gives particular protections for women. Women in rural communities often find themselves responsible for managing the family’s Tomorqa (backyard/subsistence smallholding) and lack of access to water can lead to a disproportionate impact on women in collecting it. Rural Communities disproportionately deal with the challenge for women around labour migration. The average age of marriage is 21-22 years and, while forced marriage does exist, there are wider problems around pressure to marry early. A combination of culture pressure and the housing crisis often leads to many new wives being forced to move in with her husband’s parents. This creates a particular challenge in cases, as is often the case in rural communities where the husband may be required to become a migrant worker. These arrangements that can last for many years and often become permanent. In the context of low spousal loyalty due to early or pressured marriage, it is often the parents who are the direct recipients of remittance payments and there have been many cases where the wives are forced out of their in-laws homes and made homeless when their migrant husbands have decided to start new families in Russia or elsewhere. Domestic violence remains a significant problem (with claims that 90 per cent of women have faced some form of domestic violence) that has until recently not been talked about (and even then with narrow focus on physical violence and deprivation of liberty rather than the full range of domestic abuse). The work done by Irina Matvienko, the creator of the independent information project Nemolchi.uz (Don’t Be Silent) mentioned above has been extremely effective in drawing the attention of the Government and international community to these issues.[180] On September 2^nd 2019, President Mirziyoyev signed the 'Protection of Women from Harassment and Violence Act and the Guarantees of Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men Act, as part of a wider range of initiatives towards gender equality in.[181] Although the law, which sought to provide additional support for women bringing forward cases of domestic violence, came into effect immediately there had been delays in the regulatory changes required to bring key elements into force.[182] While there is pressure amongst some in elite circles to improve gender equality there is also countervailing pressure from both gradually growing nationalist movements that are using social media (Telegram and Facebook) to promoting ideas of ‘Uzbek national values’ which include traditional or misogynistic conceptions of women’s role in society. Cultural conservatism includes criticism of women’s clothing including wearing jeans or shorts being used as a signifier of growing disrespect of traditional gender roles and family structures.[183] Following a recent case in Fergana where a young women was attacked and had her jaw broken in a row over her wearing short shorts, women’s rights activists have been staging a virtual flashmob across Uzbekistan, posting pictures of themselves protesting alone with protest signs challenging attempts to control what women wear. Gradual religious liberalisation and growing religiosity, discussed in more detail below, has also been identified by women’s rights activist as reinforcing conservative cultural attitudes towards women including pressures to enforce hijab, the use of which remains effectively illegal in Uzbekistan. In 2018 the Government introduced a law brought in that required the presentation of a legal civil marriage certificate before religious marriage could be performed by cleric as attempt to crack down on temporary Islamic marriages, polygamy, etc. which, according to Women’s rights campaigners, have been on the rise. The official Muftiate does do anti-polygamy work but lacks credibility and campaigners argue that a wider range of public interventions will be needed. Freedom of Religion and beliefThe role of religion in modern Uzbekistan, and Uzbek identity is a complex one. As Uzbekistan’s many tourist sites can attest, the country has played an important role in the spiritual life of Central Asia over many centuries. Under the Soviets Uzbekistan was home to the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM), which coordinated training, materials and supervision of religious activity in across the five Central Asian republics. Under Karimov, while Islamic identity was a constituent part around which he sought to build the remerging Uzbek identity, his approach to the religion itself remained one of tight state control of religion under the supervision of Uzbekistan's branch of SADUM renamed the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan.[184] In the late 1990s and early 2000s growing concerns about radicalisation and impact of conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan helped to facilitate a further crackdown on religious activity across Uzbekistan and in particular in the more devout Fergana valley. The crackdown, and the opening of the notorious Jaslyk Prison, was spurred on by six car bombs in Tashkent on February 16^th 1999 that targeted government facilities, including one outside the Cabinet of Ministers just before Karimov was due to give a speech there. The official narrative pinned responsibility on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), though many at the time questioned this, including whether the regime itself was responsible.[185] The result was huge pressure on devout Muslims, particularly those operating independently of the state backed Muslim Board, leading to the arrest and imprisonment of thousands often on allegations (both suspected and fabricated) of membership not only of the IMU but of the banned non-violent extremist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, whose adherents were often given long sentences and some of whom died in jail after torture.[186] A similar witch hunt of devout Muslims took place in the wake of Andijan Massacre, with hundreds jailed on the grounds of alleged membership of Akromiya, supposedly an splinter group of Hizb ut-Tahrir headed by Andijan native Akrom Yo‘ldoshev, though there have been allegations that the organisation’s role was exaggerated or even its existence fabricated by the Government as a pretext for rounding up independent Muslims.[187] Under Mirziyoyev, many of the systems put in place under the Karimov era but for the most part the pressure on religious activity has eased substantially. One of the early acts of the new regime was to remove 16,000 members of an alleged 17,000 strong watch list of suspected religious extremists being kept under surveillance, while HRW have reported that the Prison Authorities claim hundreds of independent Muslims had been released it is impossible to confirm the number of prisoners currently incarcerated for religious offenses.[188] Many of those given Presidential pardons in May 2020 to celebrate Eid al-Fitr had previously been jailed for religious offenses.[189] Uzbekistan has been removed from the US Commission on International Religious Freedom’s (USCIRF) list of countries of particular concern, instead recommending that it remain on its ‘Special Watch List’.[190] The overall number of raids, fines and other punishments have been reduced. However, there are concerns that more recently the numbers on the ‘blacklist’ have increased and that during the COVID-19 pandemic there have been security sweep focused on Hizb ut-Tahrir in the Fergana Valley.[191] Uzbekistan is yet to deliver on its 2018 pledge, made following the visit of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or belief to revise the 1998 Law on Religion, and earlier drafts seen by campaigners were deemed not to contain many major improvements.[192] The current law states that ‘Citizens' of the Republic of Uzbekistan (except a registered religious organisation's ministers) cannot appear in public places in religious attire, with the implementing regulations providing the options of fines of between five to ten times the monthly minimum wage or up to 15 days administrative detention though there is no definition of ‘religious attire’.[193] In practice the ‘religious attire’ provisions have allowed police, institutions and local authorities to attempt to prevent the wearing of the hijab or for younger and middle aged men to have long or bushy beards. Although there is some uncertainty about the national direction of travel in 2019, there have been public efforts at Tashkent to prevent children from wearing the hijab on school property while students at the Islamic University (and other institutions) have been expelled for insisting on wearing them, while beards of men at markets in Namangan and Tashkent were forcibly shaved.[194] While these prohibitions exist there does seem to be an attempt to enforce them in a less heavy-handed manner, however Muslim activist Tulkun Astanov was sentenced to five years suspended sentence for his efforts at lobbying the Muslim board over the hijab ban which included materials the authorities deemed extremist.[195] The Governor of Fergana Shuhrat Ghaniev was reprimanded for linking the hijab and beards to Islamic Extremism as part of a rant that talked of his work trying to stop their use in his region.[196] As with independent NGOs, registering religious organisations is proving challenging with Shia Mosques and some protestant groups struggling to register without bribes. Jehovah’s Witnesses face similar registration challenges, amid rumours of efforts to ban adherents, and have had appeals to the ombudsman rejected.[197] International religious freedom organisation Forum 18 have documented how state control over participation in the Haj is used as both a mechanism of control over Muslims outside of state structures and an opportunity for corruption.[198] Even during the COVID lockdown raids on unsanctioned religious materials have continued.[199] Minority rightsUzbekistan remains, along with Turkmenistan, one of the two countries in the post-Soviet space where sex between men is against the law, with penalties ranging from fines to three years imprisonment under article 120 of the criminal code.[200] A notable feature of the current Government has been a willingness to discussing difficult topics, even where action is not being taken, which makes its unwillingness even to discuss issues of sexuality stand out as an area of concern. Like many other international observers, this author had been advised on multiple occasions by otherwise helpful officials that writing on this topic would damage the wider research project, making the issue all the more important for it to be addressed. Efforts to raise discrimination against Uzbekistan’s LGBTQ community has received short shrift in international forums.[201] The atmosphere of repression means that it is very difficult for a community to develop, even in Tashkent which is comparatively tolerant when compared to the regions and some venues are more tolerant of LGBTQ people (even if not openly so).[202] Recent arrests of gay men include couples arrested in their own homes; with police using arrests such opportunities for extortion. Over the last year, a number of murders have been linked to attacks on the LGBTQ community, notably the death of Shokir Shavkatov shortly after coming out on social media.[203] Unsurprisingly given both the overall lack of independent NGOs and the legal situation there are no groups openly working directly on LGBTQ issues on the ground in Uzbekistan. HIV testing, even when undertaken anonymously, is challenging given the levels of homophobia in the medical profession, with doctors known to contact relatives of patients and with issues around data security given tests are logged with a code identifying the risk category (homosexual sex) why the sample was taken. Given the relative ease of travel gay men and transwomen often seek some form of refuge in Russia, where homosexuality is legal but heavily discriminated against but, particularly in cases of trafficking, many end up being forced into sex work. The rise of Telegram and Facebook groups, as well as the use of WhatsApp, YouTube, Instagram and vkontakte has provided a multitude of platforms for homophobic abuse to be shared, as part of a wider meme culture and examples of toxic masculinity. Examples include the @tashGangs page on telegram with 576,000 followers at time of writing.[204] Such groups have been known to share personal information of LGBTQ people and spread videos of physical punishment, lynchings, humiliation and abuse of gay men. Mirziyoyev has not spoken publically about LGBTQ issues, even when called out in a public letter by Shohrukh Salimov (a gay Uzbek man who after police harassment had to relocate to Istanbul) in the summer of 2019.[205] However given his willingness to talk publically about most other issues, and the government’s blanket denial of the need to address issues facing the LGBTQ community this does not bode well for the chances of reform, amid conservative fear that openly discussing issues of equality in Uzbekistan might lead to weakening of the existing cultural taboos.[206] Although limited in their leverage, Western-partners will need to continue to push for decriminalisation and make clear the lasting damage that its current position does to the country’s international reputation. Uzbekistan is slowly working to improve how it treats its disabled citizens, though with significant challenges including deinstitutionalisation, changing bureaucratic responses to disabled people and adapting the legacy of the Soviet and Karimov era built environment to try to improve accessibility. It is an area of growing interest to campaigners, such as Dilmurad Yusupov who writes in this collection on NGO registration work that followed on challenges around the registration of the Association of Disabled People of Uzbekistan.[207] Uzbekistan’s place in the world and relations with the UKOne of the most dramatic areas of change under Mirziyoyev has been speed with which Uzbekistan has emerged from geo-political isolation under Karimov to become a regional leader and active international player, in a manner appropriate for Central Asia’s most populous country. Initially under Karimov, a policy of balancing external forces prevailed, with an at times hostile posture towards Russia leading it to become a founder member of the GUUAM Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development (along with the more Russia sceptic nations in the post-Soviet Region) but by the early 2000s it had begun to disengage with such relationships, formally withdrawing into semi-isolation after the diplomatic fallout of the Andijan massacre. The fallout from Andijan also significantly curtailed the post-Afghanistan marriage of convenience between Uzbekistan and the West over security cooperation. As Dr Luca Anceschi and Dr Vladimir Paramonov highlight in their essay contribution Mirziyoyev has been energetic in reviving relationships with other Central Asian leaders, while simultaneously strengthening relations with Russia, China and potential Western investment partners. Part of this has been about deploying the increasingly effective public relations machine to burnish the new leadership’s international credentials to boost the attractiveness of Uzbekistan as an investment opportunity but it is built on a real and significant change in behaviour. At a Central Asian level the diplomacy has been frenetic, both in terms of opening up physical borders to facilitate travel and trade, and frequent visits and publicised phone calls.[208] Taken together these initiatives project a desire for Uzbekistan to proactively push regional cooperation rather than pull away from it as it often did under Karimov. This increase in Uzbek assertiveness has coincided with the political transition period in Kazakhstan, the country that had somewhat assumed regional leadership during Uzbekistan’s isolation. While the domestic response to the cross border tension with Kyrgyzstan over the Sokh enclave has been broadly criticised and is discussed in the crisis response section here, at an intergovernmental level Uzbekistan swiftly dispatched PM Abdulla Aripov to meet the Kyrgyz Deputy PM at the border to seek to prevent a diplomatic fallout.[209] Uzbekistan’s improving relationships with Russia and China comprises both enhanced business and diplomatic engagement but also increasing cooperation with their respective economic-strategic projects: the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Belt and Road. As Anceschi and Paramonov point out the debate about Uzbek membership of the EAEU has been rumbling on since Mirziyoyev took office, and noises, particularly from the Russian side, prior to the COVID-crisis suggested that Uzbekistan was likely to join in 2020.[210] Reducing both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade (particularly in the agricultural sector) with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (as well as Russia), lowering prices on certain imported goods as well as to helping regularise the status of up to two million Uzbek Labour migrants in Russia are understandably big potential prizes that could be won from EAEU.[211] However, there remain significant problems around the extent of regulatory alignment that would be required as part of membership and the implications swifter market opening would have for the, often politically connected, import substitution based industries in Uzbekistan. Furthermore, Uzbekistan is considering joining the EAEU at a time when the union’s other Central Asian members are expressing dissatisfaction with a system that has been seen to provide a greater economic boost to Moscow, where the organisation’s institutions are based (and critics would say policies shaped) and have served to encourage trade flows to and from Russia rather encouraging the cross-border trade in Central Asia that had been hoped for. As it is bilateral efforts already undertaken have delivered significant improvements in Uzbekistan’s trade with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.[212] Furthermore historic concerns about Russian attitudes towards Uzbeks and Uzbekistan’s independence of action from the Russian orbit persist, with the debate over the continuing use of the Russian language a source of tension.[213] As with many multilateral projects the EAEU initially slow to demonstrate its usefulness as a solidarity mechanism during the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia was seen to priorities sending aid to Western European nations such as Italy rather than directing support to Central Asia in the way that might have been expected. Uzbekistan has become an official observer nation to the EEAU but further announcements that some observers had expected for early summer 2020 have been slowed by the pressures of the COVID response. This debate over Uzbekistan’s membership of the EAEU comes at the time not only when Uzbekistan is seeking to increase bilateral trade with China, something that has now surpassed trade with Russia, but also its participation in Belt and Road infrastructure projects.[214] Unlike Russia, China has also been proactive in responding to the COVID-19 crisis in supplying PPE (‘mask diplomacy’) and other health related aid to Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia, reviving the concept of a ‘health silk road’ as an adjunct to Belt and Road.[215] Already a crucial economic player in the region, the crisis has seen it expand its role into more political areas previously seen as Moscow’s area of interest.[216] The Uzbek elite have studiously avoided being drawn into dispute with China over its treatment of the Uighur community, including backing China at the UN over its treatment of the Uighurs and preventing the entry into Uzbekistan of the academic Gene Bunin who has been documenting the plight of those in China’s camps.[217] Over recent decades Western strategic interest in Uzbekistan and the wider Central Asian region has gradually dwindled, particularly after the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan. Economic interests still remain, particularly amongst European states but the sense of political drift has been palpable.[218] In 2019 both the US and European Union (EU) have released new Central Asia strategies, reflecting on paper at least, a desire to increase their presence on the ground and give an alternative diplomatic and economic outlet to the Russia-China duopoly.[219] While Uzbekistan clearly desires new sources of investment and market access, a combination of past neglect and the lack of proximity, means that both the US and EU are unlikely to be more than bit-part players, helping to balance out the interests of the regional hegemons in the regime’s strategic thinking. One of the few remaining strategic priorities for the US and EU remains the fraught situation in Afghanistan both in terms of stability and the impact of drug trafficking and organised crime across the Uzbek-Afghan border. Under Mirziyoyev Uzbekistan has been attempting to play a diplomatic role with both the Government in Kabul and the Taliban.[220] Beyond the major players and blocks a number of other countries such as South Korea (Uzbekistan hosts a significant Korean minority population) and Turkey have been showing an active business and political presence to take advantage of economic opportunities.[221] When looking at these mid-tier players it is useful, given the Foreign Policy Centre’s London base, to briefly explore the emerging relationship between the UK and Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan. Unlike many other post-Soviet elites London had not become an epicentre for an Uzbek diaspora, though efforts to boost ties are growing. Uzbekistan was one of the first countries to agree a post-Brexit UK-Uzbekistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). This arrangement mostly transferred over the contents of the EU-Uzbekistan PAC but without reference to EU treaties and bodies. The UK-Uzbekistan agreement did not seek to replicate the formal political dialogue processes (such as the human rights dialogues) contained in the EU agreement, however it does contain a joint-declaration confirming that violations on issues of ‘democracy, principles of international law and human rights’ particularly breaches of UN and OSCE commitments, could lead to a suspension of the agreement.[222] The UK is home to a significant concentration of financial institutions and globally connected service sector organisations that the Government wishes to engage with to boost its attractiveness for trade and investment. These include a range of different public relations and communications operations to help promote the Government’s message around the reform agenda. For example Corporate Communications International Ltd who own the Eurasian Investor website focused on business stories in the post-Soviet space and operates as an event brand through which the now annual Uzinvest Forum takes place in London, featuring networking with many senior figures in the Uzbek Government for a standard entrance fee of £999 per ticket.[223] The UK also provides the legal inspiration for the Navoi Free Enterprise Zone (FEZ), now covering the whole Navoi region, which has now adopted the use of English Law for commercial proceedings.[224] As set out in the essay by Professor Kristian Lasslett the UK, and its Caribbean dependencies, are also hope to a ranged of different financial vehicles, including Scottish Limited Partnerships that are used to hide the ownership of countries across the world, including in Uzbekistan. Education is an important pillar of the UK-Uzbekistan relationship and has been identified as a key growth area by the British Government. In 2002 Westminster International University in Tashkent, a partnership between the UK’s Westminster University (which accredits the degrees) and the Uzbek Government (which oversees local administration and management), became the first international university in the Country. WIUT provides a range of courses such as business, computing and law that respond to the demands of the emerging economy and the Government’s educational priorities but does not yet cover potentially more challenging topics in the areas of social and political science. Given the nature of the Uzbek government’s approach to higher education academic freedom is not what would be expected on campus in the UK, with some academics reporting they had been warned against publishing research or articles seen to be overtly criticising the Government.^[225] Bangor University and the University of Sunderland also have a partnership with MDIS (Management Development Institute of Singapore) Tashkent, validating a number of their business courses. They have recently been joined by the University of Law, the UK based but Netherlands owner for-profit legal training institution, to provide consultancy around the development of a new International University of Law in Tashkent.^[226] In the broader education world the British Council has a presence in Tashkent though its semi-diplomatic status in the country limits some of the more commercially focused activities, such as English language teaching, that it provides in some other countries leaving it focused on cultural exchanges. However, UK Education services firm Cambridge Assessments is playing a major role in supporting education reform in the country through a partnership that has led to the creation of 14 presidential Schools across each regions. The schools are free to access boarding schools with a curriculum designed by Cambridge and a focus on encouraging critical thinking rather than rote learning. They are academically selective on entrance with 28,500 applicants for 560 places at the first four to open.[227] Although the schools report directly to the cabinet of ministers rather than the Ministry of Education, the goal is to use these schools to help spread new teaching practices and raise standards across the public education system. Cambridge are also working to develop a new evaluation framework for school standards inspection, including multiple inspectors and anonymous write components that the Uzbek Government would deliver with Cambridge providing monitoring and support. There is seen to be scope to help reform the administration of state exams, which are seen by many Uzbeks as being open to corruption, while UK companies are expanding involvement in the nursery (kindergarten) sector. Uzbekistan is currently campaigning for membership of the UN Human Rights Council for 2021-23, due to be decided at the 2020 General Assembly in October. While given that voting takes place regionally some of the world’s worst human Rights abusers make it onto the council, if Uzbekistan was able to be elected in the Eastern European states section (mirroring the former Eastern bloc so comprising both the EU’s Eastern Members, the Western Balkans and the post-Soviet space) it would be seen as a big endorsement of the Mirziyoyev reforms (and its improved diplomacy). Therefore it is important that the international community fully assess the country’s recent performance on human rights related issues, which as set out above is significant but more patchy and problematic than the scale of reforms in some other areas. Responding to crisisAt the start of this research project it seemed that one of the most important ways to judge the true progress of the Mirziyoyev reform programme was how it would respond to first significant setback and what its response would tell the world about the depth and breadth of progress. Over the last few months Uzbekistan has not only faced a number of major domestic challenges including the collapse of the Sardoba Dam and the resurgence of violence at the border with Kyrgyzstan but faced the impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic. The response has highlighted both the strengths and weaknesses of the current system. After registering its first case of COVID-19 on March 15^th, Uzbekistan immediately announced the test result.[228] The following day (on March 16^th) the Government of Uzbekistan closed itself off from international travel by plane and car (with international rail travel ceasing on March 19^th), closed all schools and universities by bringing forward their holiday period and banned mass gatherings and sporting events.[229] Measures escalated rapidly after this with restrictions on long-distance travel through the return of region-level police posts on March 23^rd, wearing a facemask in public became mandatory (with penalties including up to 15 day imprisonment) on March 25^th and by March 27^th a comprehensive lockdown was instituted with citizens only able to leave their house to shop for groceries and medicine.[230] Certain sectors of the economy, such as major agricultural and industrial operations and construction sites were reopened on April 14^th with hygiene measures put in place.[231] Schools and universities have transitioned to online and distance learning, with online classes taking place during the lockdown and exams simplified to enable them to be done remotely. The government has announced that schools and universities will remain shut and remote learning will continue until at least September 2020.[232] As the number of cases had begun to decline Uzbekistan introduced a ‘traffic light’ system of local infection with ‘red’ zones maintaining most of the previous quarantine restrictions, while ‘yellow’ and ‘green’ zones have respectively fewer restrictions, with the latter group seeing sports facilities and children’s summer camps reopen.[233] Restaurants, cafes have reopened for food outside and public transport has restarted (notionally with social distancing) as of June 8^th, while long distance train journeys within the country and limited international flights returned on June 15^th.[234] Particularly in the early phases of the crisis the Uzbek state was able to move quickly to clearly and widely communicate public health messages, swiftly mobilising state resources (including creating an emergency medical helpline and building temporary hospital facilities) and showing an openness to discuss cases that would have been unthinkable in the Karimov era.[235] The proof of success has been the extent to which the country has control the spread of the virus. As of early July, Uzbekistan with a population of approximately 33 million, had confirmed 9,326 virus infections and 28 deaths (compared to 53,858 deaths in the UK, a country with only twice the population size).[236] However, the effective deployment of Uzbekistan’s improved public communications capacity, was accompanied by a darker side such as coordinated campaigns to encourage school children and teachers to post pro-Mirziyoyev comments on the Telegram channel and other social media feeds of independent media outlets such as RFE/RL’s Ozodlik service.[237] Uzbekistan has introduced new measures in the criminal code to prohibit the spreading of false information about the spread of COVID-19 or other infectious diseases that could include large fines or up to three years in prison.[238] The Government has used administrative provisions against ‘spreading false’ information to stop the work of bloggers such as Osmonjon Qodirov jailed for 15 days.^[239] Overall police reported large numbers of quarantine violations, 86,400 by mid-April, most of whom received small fines.^[240] However the quarantine regulations have reportedly been used as a political to force human rights activists monitoring suspected child labour in the cotton harvest to quarantine themselves for 14 days (in one case with police supervision) despite the activity taking place in a ‘green’ COVID-free Pop district in Namangan.[241] Despite public pressure, Mirziyoyev has so far rejected calls to increase direct cash payments to at risk citizens- ‘helicopter money’. As set out in the essay by Eldor Tulyakov, the March and April economic support packages total 32.3 trillion soms ($3.177 billion or £2.4 billion) in support for businesses and citizens, equating to only 6.2 per cent of Uzbekistan’s GDP.[242] Instead the Government has encouraged/put pressure on the local business community, as part of a national strategy dubbed Sakhovat va Komak (‘Kindness and Solidarity’/‘Generosity and Assistance’) to provide support for the unemployed and economically disadvantaged, by offering tax breaks and low interest loans to support such activities so as ‘hang its task on the neck of entrepreneurs’ in the words of Finance Minister and Deputy PM Jamshid Kuchkarov.[243] The President has talked of the need for entrepreneurs to hire ‘needy’ people, while a new Sakhovat va Komak Fund has been established under the auspices of the Mahalla Charitable Foundation for direction by local officials.[244] Its initial efforts focused on the provision of food aid, through coordinated distribution centres, but its wider activities are somewhat opaque. There has been evidence that state employees such as teachers and police officers are being pressured into donating up to 30 per cent of their salaries to support the initiative by their superiors while local businesses face heavy pressure from officials to ‘donate’.[245] Placing the burden of support onto the emerging entrepreneurial class is in line with Mirziyoyev’s approach that has sought to expand opportunities for the new elite (and pressuring state employees comes from a longstanding playbook), but there are future risks if the support expands elite patronage networks. There are also practical questions around how reliance on business to drive support systems if the downturn in the global economy sends the Uzbek economy into recession - so far World Bank growth projections have been cut from 5.7 per cent to 1.6 per cent but this remains open to change depending on both national and international factors.[246] The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has provided $375 million in credit to Uzbekistan to assist with the pandemic, while the country has ramped up gold exports at a time of rising international prices with $1.55 billion in sales from January-April 2020.[247] Understandably, the previously burgeoning tourist industry has been thrown into disarray during the crisis and demand is unlikely to rebound substantially until the global public health crisis recedes. Businesses have been offered an interest holiday on loans and some tax relief but the sector will struggle to recover. Despite wider efforts to move away from the Karimov autarkic model the impact of the pandemic has encouraged the President to launch a nationwide push to promote agricultural self-sufficiency, given that the country had to import almost three million tonnes of grain in 2019-20 and was reliant on imports of rice, soybeans and sunflower seed from the EAEU, which had been subject to an export ban during the crisis while Kazakhstan also caped its grain exports.[248] While economic barriers have been raised Mirziyoyev has taken the opportunity presented by the crisis, and the conspicuous Russian absence, to be seen to be leading regional coordination efforts in Central Asia in response to the public health crisis.[249] The message of the pandemic has been clear the swift and comparatively transparent public health response has led to performance in suppressing the virus that far exceeds many more developed countries, though authoritarian tendencies (particularly at a local level) have reared their heads on occasion to suppress dissent but not as much as might have been feared. The economic response however has been more patchy, albeit set in the context of limited resources. A number of observers had wondered if pent-up frustration catalysed by the crisis, perhaps focused on inequalities exacerbated by the crisis or a revival of previous flashpoints around construction, would manifest as some form of social explosion on the streets but for the most part has yet to happen. One example where local tensions have exploded however is in the Sokh district, an Uzbek enclave surrounded by the territory of Kyrgyzstan in the Fergana valley that has been the source of cross border tensions since independence.[250] In late May tensions flared over a long-running dispute over ownership of a spring (and frustration at corruption or harassment at border crossings), which led to riots that left 150 Uzbeks and 25 Kyrgyz injured.[251] On the Uzbek side, the incident flared into shows of public dissatisfaction with Fergana’s controversial Khohkim Shuhrat Ganiev who was the subject of protest, including reports he was pelted with stone, and calls for his dismissal. As ever Ganiev avoided dismissal, with Sokh district Khokim being replaced instead.[252] The President has responded by sending a business ombudsman to report on local economic problems and has prepared a $50 million expansion of the Sokh budget for 2020-22 with business loans, investment in local hospitals, targeted tax cuts and loans.[253] The other major flashpoint in recent months has been the dramatic collapse on May 1^st of the Sardoba Dam, part of a reservoir complex in the Sirdaryo region that was primarily used for irrigation but where only the previous month work had begun to build a new hydroelectric plant.[254] The dam was built in 2017 at a cost of $400 million. The subsequent flooding led to five deaths and the evacuation of 70,000 despite the pressures of the pandemic. The evacuation itself was seen to be handled effectively by the Government with praise too for effective cross-border collaboration with Kazakhstan, which was heavily impacted by the flood water. However, concerns have been raised about the cause of the collapse and whether corruption or mismanagement had taken place during the building of the dam, with RFE/RL documenting multiple claims that construction was not up to the specified standard and that the tender process was influenced by political interests. The investigation process will be a test of the Government’s transparency and accountability, not least because President was seen to be associated with the project. The inclusion of one of those involved in constructing the dam on the board of investigation and the lack of a clear timeline or remit do not bode well in this regard. Concerns have also been raised about money allocated for support being misallocated due to local corruption and cronyism and RFE/RL report that pressure has been put on farmers in Andijan to make contributions to the Sardoba relief effort under the threat of having their land confiscated.[255] What our authors sayThis essay collection brings together a broad range of different perspectives, some of them differing, to try and help broaden the understanding of what is happening in Uzbekistan. Yuliy Yusupov examines how, from 1996 onwards, the Government of Uzbekistan set a course for strengthening state interference in the economy and implementing import substitution policy. The results have been very poor. However, since 2017 the country has started significant reforms. Much has been done over this time, but more changes are still to come. The essay covers the achievements, problems of implementation and perspectives of reforms. Currently, the emphasis is placed on foreign economic activity, the banking sector, the tax system, the legal regulation of business, the agricultural sector, and administrative reform. Kate Mallinson explores President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s reformist ambition and its impacts on the investment climate in Uzbekistan. She writes that Uzbekistan’s government has set on a clear path of liberalising the economy and improving the business environment, including removing currency controls, liberalising exchange rates and relaxing visa regulations. However, the next phase of the programme including breaking up the monopolies, privatisation and capital markets reform, is more challenging and now coincides with the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the collapse in energy prices, which will result in reduced investment capital, increased debt and a more complicated foreign business environment. Professor Kristian Lasslett writes on the complex legacy of corruption left by Uzbekistan’s first post-soviet President, Islam Karimov, who passed away in 2016. Uzbekistan did not suffer serious political upheaval on his death. However, an increasingly secretive and coercive authoritarian state groomed a political economy that favoured select networks of security chiefs, politicians, mandarins, businessmen, and organised crime figures, who built personal alliances, and leveraged unchecked state power, to administer rackets and protect economic territory. Karimov’s successor Shavkat Mirziyoyev has attempted to distinguish his Presidency through a programme of governance reforms and market liberalisation measures that tackle some, but not all, of these legacies. This essay examines how heavily the legacies of grand corruption and kleptocracy weigh on the present, looking at investigative data sets from the Mirziyoyev era. It also considers how these dynamics will mediate the reform trajectories currently under way. Navbahor Imamova writes that Uzbekistan simply cannot develop without the contributions of Uzbek professionals around the world. The good news is that they are increasingly interested and willing to return, and then work in the public and private sectors, as well as in non-governmental institutions. Others are committed to supporting reforms from their current homes overseas. They, too, want to support Uzbekistan by leveraging their social and professional networks and lending their expertise but Tashkent has not systematised its approach to talent recruitment, retention, and placement. Instead, the government is relying on its embassies to find the right talent and connect them with the relevant entities but this is all being done in an ad hoc, informal, and often haphazard way. Not surprisingly, the approach has not been effective. What Uzbekistan needs now is a transparent, fair, and professional recruitment system, specifically tasked to hire from abroad. Dilmira Matyakubova’s paper examines the rebranding policies of the government of Uzbekistan by remodelling the architecture of the cities. It argues that the urban redevelopment process is creating social and increasingly political problems as it involves forced evictions without adequate compensation or resettlement. It is becoming a major source for resistance, resentment and discontent among the population, who commit desperate actions in protesting the home demolitions and evictions. The urban transformation actions are also yielding irreversible changes in the environment surrounding historically important sites turning them into Disney-like amusement parks. The paper argues that building glittering, soaring, pretentious cities will not improve the country’s reputation. The nation branding agenda cannot be achieved without enhancing and ensuring human rights protection, independence of the judiciary, transparency, good governance and an open dialogue with people. Nikita Makarenko discusses the moves being taken to promote freedom of speech and media in Uzbekistan. Despite a few challenges such as self-censorship, lack of qualified human resources and pressure in the courts, the situation is improving. Online media is growing and bloggers are on the rise. The media is successfully united to combat the pandemic; however, the future is uncertain with a possible economic crisis on the horizon. Dilmurad Yusupov examines the challenges that grassroots activists and self-initiative NGOs are still facing in Uzbekistan despite the strong political will of President Mirziyoyev to strengthen the role of civil society in the process of democratic development of the country. While giving credit where credit is due, he argues that unlike government-organised NGOs, bottom-up groups are struggling to get registered and the whole process of administrative procedures is designed to frustrate and discourage. Besides red tape, registered NGOs are suffocating due to burdensome reporting and the demand for advance approval requirements for the day-to-day activities. On top of limited local financial resources and weak organisational capacities, Uzbek NGOs are limited in foreign funding. Practical recommendations are provided on how to allow the third sector a breath freely by erasing stereotypes, prejudice and negative attitudes towards NGOs in Uzbekistan. Lynn Schweisfurth writes on how Uzbekistan’s cotton sector has long been associated with child and forced labour, making it unattractive to global buyers bound by ethical commitments in their codes of conduct. Since coming to power in 2016, President Mirziyoyev has embarked on a reform process that has invested enormous efforts in eradicating forced labour in order to win back the trust of brands and retailers. Through the privatisation of the sector and the creation of ‘clusters’ intended to unite production, processing and manufacturing, the government hopes to entice brands to start sourcing Uzbek cotton again. But the question still remains on whether it will be enough. Steve Swerdlow writes that four years since the death of Islam Karimov, whose ruthless 27-year reign (1989-2016) in Uzbekistan became synonymous with the worst forms of repression, torture, and political imprisonment his successor President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has taken several decisive steps to address some of Karimov’s worst human rights abuses. However, the past, left unexamined, can take revenge on well-intentioned reforms. Swerdlow argues the government should fully rehabilitate political prisoners as well as victims of other serious human rights abuses. It should commit to a meaningful process of reckoning with the past and of transitional justice: judicial and non-judicial measures focused on truth and reconciliation as well as on justice and accountability to acknowledge the legacy of widespread human rights abuses under Karimov. The essay sets out a number of ways in which this might be achieved, providing a roadmap for transitional justice in Uzbekistan.Nadejda Atayeva gives a critical analysis of both of the horrific cases of human rights abuse under Karimov and also of the recent developments under Mirziyoyev. She makes the case that independent activists still face political pressure, that political prisoners and their families who have been released in recent years still face discrimination and that those in the exiled human rights community still face abuse by the authorities.Uzbek human rights activists, writing anonymously, share their concerns about the series of factors in the wake of the COVID-19 and Sardoba dam crises that may lead to future social unrest in Uzbekistan including increasing economic anxiety, issues in the disaster response and limits on freedom of speech. Eldor Tulyakov provides a comprehensive account of the legislative and administrative actions taken by the Government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This includes detailed information by all the different sectors of economy and society. He argues that overall the Government’s response to the crisis has been effective in stabilising the economy and society while controlling the virus. Dr Luca Anceschi and Dr Vladimir Paramonov write that the evolution of Uzbekistan’s relations with China and Russia since the accession to power of Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Its argument highlights the continuity sitting at the core of these relationships, showing how Uzbekistan is pursuing equidistance when it comes to the great powers, a policy that, ultimately, was perfected during the long Karimov era. [1] Francisco Olmos, State-building myths in Central Asia, Foreign Policy Centre, October 2019, https://fpc.org.uk/state-building-myths-in-central-asia/[2] Catherine Putz, Uzbekistan Abolishes Exit Visa System, The Diplomat, January 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/uzbekistan-abolishes-exit-visa-system/[3] Gazeta.uz, A new moratorium proposed to amend new laws, December 2019, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/12/14/law-moratorium/[4] President Mirziyoyev’s website: https://pm.gov.uz/ru#/[5] Lee Kyung-sik, “Uzbekistan enters a new decade; great opportunities open up to spearhead transformation even deeper”, The Korea Post, February 2020, http://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=20207[6] Lira Zaynilova, Public Image Problems of State Instiutions in Uzbekistan: How to Establish Dialogue with the People?, May 2019, CABAR, https://cabar.asia/en/public-image-problems-of-state-institutions-in-uzbekistan-how-to-establish-dialogue-with-the-people/[7] GIZ, Uzbekistan, December 2019, https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/364.html[8] This article suggests that Uzbekistan spends in the range of six to nine per cent on social security annually, spent across a fragmented range of different bodies, Kun.uz, Government of Uzbekistan, UN launch joint programme to strengthen social protective system in the country, November 2019,  https://kun.uz/en/news/2019/11/12/government-of-uzbekistan-un-launch-joint-programme-to-strengthen-social-protection-system-in-the-country; The World Bank recorded the figure as 5.9% of GDP in 2018, The World Bank, International Development Association – Project appraisal document on a proposed credit in the amount of US$50 million to the Republic of Uzbekistan for a strengthening of the social protection system project, May 2019, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/895931562292157182/pdf/Uzbekistan-Strengthening-Social-Protection-System-Project.pdf[9] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Former security services chief sentenced to 18 years in prison, September 2019, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-former-security-services-chief-sentenced-to-18-years-in-prison[10] Bruce Pannier, Uzbekistan’s New Security Powerhouse: The National Guard, RFE/RL, August 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/the-national-guard-uzbekistan-s-new-security-powerhouse/30139322.html[11] For example Steve Swerdlow (who writes in this collection) was harassed in July 2019 in an incident seen to be orchestrated by those with links to the Security Services; Reuters, Uzbekistan says it will investigate harassment of Western rights activist, June 2019,  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uzbekistan-rights/uzbekistan-says-it-will-investigate-harassment-of-western-rights-activist-idUSKCN1TI258[12] Kun.uz, Shukhrat Ganiyev: It is high time to collaborate with the mass media, December 2019, https://kun.uz/en/news/2019/12/17/shukhrat-ganiyev-it-is-high-time-to-collaborate-with-the-mass-media; Nikita Makarenko, Twitter post, Twitter, June 2020, https://twitter.com/nikmccaren/status/1267874028250947584?s=20; Gazeta’uz, “All hokims have ill-wishers”, June 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/06/02/calls/[13] Bruce Pannier, Uzbekistan’s Unsinkable Zoyir Mirzaev, RFE/RL, November 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-s-unsinkable-zoyir-mirzaev-/30255942.html[14] Gazeta.uz, Khokim of Bayautsky district approved Dilfuza Uralova, February 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/02/18/hokim/?utm_source=push&utm_medium=telegram&fbclid=IwAR2dwb_L4wemIoniJMXVkmapPGV4KuugVTNtFOfSaynVijel6d8x8ZJjblo;[15] Daryo, Tanzila Norbaeva: Governors are currently the head of the representative and executive body. In time, these two will be separated, January 2020, https://daryo.uz/2020/01/31/tanzila-norboyeva-hokimlar-hozircha-vakillik-va-ijro-organi-rahbari-vaqti-soati-kelib-bu-ikkalasi-ajratiladi/[16] Kun.uz, Petition on electing Khokims gained more than 10 thousand votes, June 2020, https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/06/06/petition-on-electing-khokims-gained-more-than-10-thousand-votes[17] For background on local government reform: Rustam Urinboyev, Local Government in Uzbekistan, Lund University, 2018, https://portal.research.lu.se/portal/files/51006205/Proof_Local_Government_in_Uzbekistan.pdf[18] Full speech text: Lee Kyung-sik, “Uzbekistan enters a new decade; great opportunities open up to spearhead transformation even deeper”, The Korea Post, February 2020, http://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=20207; Eurasianet, Uzbek president’s state-of-the-nation greeted with hope and gratitude, January 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbek-presidents-state-of-the-nation-greeted-with-hope-and-gratitude[19] The Economist, Which nation improved the most in 2019?, December 2019, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/12/21/which-nation-improved-the-most-in-2019[20] The author has experienced this but see also: Navbahor Imamova, Where Freedoms Are Expanding – Slowly, The Atlantic, October 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/10/uzbekistan-freedom-slowly-expanding/599446/[21] There has been opportunities provided for those willing to speak positively about the changes under Mirziyoyev but for those who have yet to trust the new regime opportunities are limited.[22] Uzbekistan News, Twitter Post, Twitter, January 2020, https://twitter.com/UzReport/status/1220616505748004864[23] OSCE, Uzbekistan, Parliamentary Elections, 22 December 2019: Final Report, May 2020, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/uzbekistan/452170[24] Ibid.[25] The Electoral Commission, Introduction to registering a political party, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_file/intro-registration-rp.pdf;  The Electoral Commission, UK Parliamentary general elections: Guidance for candidates and agents, November 2018, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_file/UKPGE-Part-2a-Standing-as-an-independent-candidate.pdf; UK Parliamentary Candidates are required to submit a deposit of £500 (6.5 million soms) which is returned if the candidate receives five per cent of the vote and all candidates receive free postage for one piece of election literature (printed at the candidates expense) to go either addressed to every elector or unaddressed to every household in the Parliamentary Constituency.[26] OSCE, Uzbekistan, Parliamentary Elections, 22 December 2019: Interim Report, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/uzbekistan/442093; OSCE, Uzbekistan, Parliamentary Elections, 22 December 2019: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, December 2019, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/uzbekistan/442888[27] Peter Leonard, Uzbekistan: Elections look livelier but choice still threadbare, Eurasianet, December 2019, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-elections-look-livelier-but-choice-still-threadbare?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter[28] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan election delivers humdrum result but major expectations, December 2019, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-election-delivers-humdrum-result-but-major-expectations[29] OSCE, Republic of Uzbekistan: Parliamentary Elections 22 December 2019, ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Final Report, May 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/3/452170_1.pdf[30] As Sam Butia points out part of the driver has been increased imports of capital products that should post Uzbekistan’s productivity in the medium to long-term: Sam Bhutia, What the recent weakening of the sum says about Uzbekistan’s economy, Eurasianet, September 2019, https://eurasianet.org/what-the-recent-weakening-of-the-sum-says-about-uzbekistans-economy; https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-official-currency-trading-hints-at-size-of-black-market; Sam Bhutia, Measuring Central Asia’s shadow economies, Eurasianet, February 2020, https://eurasianet.org/measuring-central-asias-shadow-economies[31] Kun.uz, Uzbekistan ends wheat flour and bread subsidies, September 2018, https://kun.uz/en/77891356; EuroWeek Editor 1, Powering up Uzbekistan’s electricity supply, GlobalCapital, October 2019, https://www.globalcapital.com/special-reports?issueid=b1hr2wmkc00dnm&article=b1hlnjj5xz81cw; Further changes to electricity prices in 2019 have further increased costs to households: Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Utilities prices to go up as lure to investors, August 2019 https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-utilities-prices-to-go-up-as-lure-to-investors[32] Kate Mallinson, Can Uzbekistan’s President Meet Raised Expectations?, Chatham House, December 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/can-uzbekistan-s-president-meet-raised-expectations[33] Sam Mceachern, GM Uzbekistan Now Wholly Owned By Uzbek Government, GM Authority, July 2019, https://gmauthority.com/blog/2019/07/gm-uzbekistan-now-wholly-owned-by-uzbek-government/; Kun.uz, “UzAuto Motors has constantly violated consumer rights” – Antimonopoly Committee, March 2020, https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/03/13/uzauto-motors-has-constantly-violated-consumer-rights-antimonopoly-committee[34] Kun.uz, How much will it be cheaper to import a car to Uzbekistan from August 1?, June 2020, https://kun.uz/40798032[35] RFE/RL, Uzbekistan restores patrol posts abolished by Mirziyayev, December 2019, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30304912.html[36] Richard Asquith, Uzbekistan VAT cut to 15% Oct 2019, Avalara VATlive, September 2019, https://www.avalara.com/vatlive/en/vat-news/uzbekistan-vat-cut-to-15--oct-2019.html[37] Todd Prince, Uzbekistan Turns To Foreign Social-Media Stars To Boost Tourism, RFE/RL, September 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-tourism-foreign-social-media-stars-to-boost-tourism/30176880.html; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Visa of the Republic of Uzbekistan, https://mfa.uz/en/consular/visa/[38] Cherry Hysteria - middle men competing with farmers for supplies (big Chinese export markets) and effective local auctions going on; UZ Daily, Uzbekistan and China sign a protocol, opening up the Chinese market for Uzbek melon and honey, September 2019, https://uzdaily.uz/en/post/51621; Podrobno.uz, Uzbekistan first started exporting peanuts to China, June 2020, https://podrobno.uz/cat/uzbekistan-i-kitay-klyuchi-ot-budushchego/uzbekistan-vpervye-nachal-eksportirovat-arakhis-v-kitay-/; Talks are underway for other fresh produce including pomegranates, lemons and grape.[39] For more details see: Alisher Ilhamov, What is the reason for the continued practice of “voluntary=forced”cotton picking in Uzbekistan?, November 2019, CABAR, https://cabar.asia/ru/v-chem-prichina-prodolzhayushhejsya-praktiki-dobrovolno-prinuditelnogo-sbora-hlopka-v-uzbekistane/?fbclid=IwAR3m-jpsKJkfrMYGpc9pciwcIbPguEqep5yn4uUAqxgt_fUECu6k97WOUOU[40] Kun.uz, About 40% of water is lost in irrigation networks – Minister of Water Resources, June 2020, https://kun.uz/13630165[41] State Statistics Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan: https://stat.uz/uz/180-ofytsyalnaia-statystyka-uz/6555-mehnat-bozori[42] Ron Synovitz and Sadriddin Ashur, Uzbek Farmers Get ‘Cluster’ Bombed by Reforms, RFE/RL, December 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbek-farmers-get-cluster-bombed-by-reforms/30328781.html; Tellingly Agriculture Minister Jamshid Hodjaev has been quoted as saying ‘Uzbekistan has four million hectare arable land but most of it is not used. So, the principal question is not whether the land should be a private property but how to best use what's available. You can do a lot with any land leased for 50 years.’; Navbahor Imamova, Twitter Post, Twitter, January 2020, https://twitter.com/Navbahor/status/1213480795861639170[43] UZ Daily, The liquidation process of Uzbekenergo starts, April 2020, uzdaily.com/en/post/55763[44] Russian Aviation Insider, Uzbekistan completes a key stage in the restructuring of its civil aviation, November 2019, http://www.rusaviainsider.com/uzbekistan-completes-a-key-stage-in-the-restructuring-of-its-civil-aviation/[45] Dentons, Changes in the Uzbek banking system, February 2020, https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2020/february/5/changes-in-the-uzbek-banking-system; Ben Aris, Uzbekistan banking on international investors, BNE Intellinews, September 2019, https://www.intellinews.com/uzbekistan-banking-on-international-investors-167149/[46] Eurasian Investor, Uzbekistan attempting difficult move away from state-led growth, November 2019, https://www.eurasianinvestor.com/analysis-articles/2019/11/8/uzbekistan-seeks-to-move-away-from-state-led[48] Sherzod Eraliev, Can Return Migration Be a ‘Brain Gain’ for Uzbekistan?, The Diplomat, May 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/can-return-migration-be-a-brain-gain-for-uzbekistan/[49] Kun UZ, Average amount of remittances sent by labor migrants from Russia to Uzbekistan announced, December 2019, https://kun.uz/en/news/2019/12/24/average-amount-of-remittances-sent-by-labor-migrants-from-russia-to-uzbekistan-announced; Bruce Pannier, Do Oil Price Cuts Signal Bad Economic Times Will Return To Central Asia?, RFE/RL, March 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/analysis-do-oil-price-cuts-signal-bad-economic-times-will-return-to-central-asia-/30488141.html; The World Bank, World Bank Personal remittances, received (% of GDP), Uzbekistan,  https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=UZ&view=chart[50]Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Heartbreak and despair for expat laborers trapped by COVID, June 2020,  https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-heartbreak-and-despair-for-expat-laborers-trapped-by-covid[51]Peter Leonard, Uzbekistan: A private sector affair, Eurasianet, August 2019,  https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-a-private-sector-affair; The World Bank, Uzbekistan: Toward a New, More Open Economy, August 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/uzbekistan/publication/economic-update-summer-2019[52]Todd Prince, Where Wall Street Meets Tashkent: Amid Reforms At Home, Uzbek Officials Make Their Pitch To Investors In New York, July 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-wall-street-investors-reforms/30073584.html[53] JSC <Almalyk MMC> website: agmk.uz/index.php/en/about-us; Azernews, Uzbekistan leaves full profit to Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Combine, October 2018, https://www.azernews.az/region/138858.html[54] The Tashkent Times, Alisher Usmanov donates US$20 million for emergency hospital to treat coronavirus, April 2020, https://tashkenttimes.uz/national/5135-alisher-usmanov-donates-us-20-million-for-emergency-hospital-to-treat-coronavirus; Ben Aris, Uzbek-born philanthropist Alisher Usmanov donates $ 15mn to help victims of the Sardoba dam distaster, BNE Intellinews, May 2020, https://www.intellinews.com/uzbek-born-philanthropist-alisher-usmanov-donates-15mn-to-help-victims-of-the-sardoba-dam-disaster-182712/[55] Henry Foy, Alisher Usmanov: ‘I was never what you could call an oligarch’, Financial Times January 2020 https://www.ft.com/content/a472f9e6-28c6-11ea-9305-4234e74b0ef3?fbclid=IwAR25HDIbMuRW1DwZr82QDJV8ybin8T6tmYq53a2irQxHPDU9Hfl9-dxUCto[56] Buyuk Kelajak website: https://buyukkelajak.uz/; Press Release PR Newswire, The International Chodiev Foundation Welcomes Nafissa Chodieva and Asal Chodieva to its Management Team, Markets Insider, November 2018, https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/the-international-chodiev-foundation-welcomes-nafissa-chodieva-and-asal-chodieva-to-its-management-team-1027719695; Kun.uz, Ministry of Energy, Buyuk Kelajak sign a memorandum of understanding, March 2019, https://kun.uz/en/news/2019/03/06/ministry-of-energy-buyuk-kelajak-sign-a-memorandum-of-understanding[57]  BBC News, Uzbek transport police banned from hiding behind trees, March 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-43418161[58] David Lewis, TACKLING CORRUPTION IN UZBEKISTAN: A WHITE PAPER, Open Society Foundations, June 2016, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/ff271daf-1f43-449d-a6a2-d95031e1247a/tackling-corruption-uzbekistan-20160524.pdf; Rustam Urinboyev, Corruption in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan, Lund University, 2018, https://portal.research.lu.se/portal/files/51840914/Urinboyev2019_ReferenceWorkEntry_CorruptionInPost_SovietUzbekis.pdf[59] Miranda Patrucic, Following Gulnara’s Money, OCCRP, March 2015, https://www.occrp.org/en/corruptistan/uzbekistan/gulnarakarimova/following-gulnaras-money[60] ACCA, In Uzbekistan, former Prosecutor General and Special Services’ head with his deputy were convicted, February 2020, https://acca.media/en/in-uzbekistan-former-prosecutor-general-and-special-services-head-with-his-deputy-were-convicted/[61] Kun.uz, Court verdict against the ex-khokim of Samarkand region Turobjon Jurayev announced, August 2019, https://kun.uz/en/75468129?q=%2Fen%2F75468129[62] Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2019, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/results/uzb; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2015/results[63] Un.int, Uzbekistan approves the State Anti-Corruption Program on combating corruption, June 2019, https://www.un.int/uzbekistan/news/uzbekistan-approves-state-anti-corruption-program-combating-corruption[64] Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Uzbekistan anti-corruption project, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/uzbekistananti-corruptionproject.htm[65] Situation explained by the EITI International Secretariat to the author.[66] Gazeta.uz, The frat law on public service is put up for discussion, May 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/05/26/civil-servant/[67] DECREE CABINET OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN, On measures to improve the architectural appearance and landscaping of the central part of the city of Tashkent, as well as create appropriate conditions for the population and guests of the capital, July 2017 https://lex.uz/docs/3295075#3295185; President.uz, Appointed hokim of Tashkent, December 2018, https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/2210[68] The World Bank, Prosperous Villages, https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P168233?lang=en; The details of the proposal can be seen here though this was when the funding request was for $75 million: The World Bank, Uzbekistan Prosperous Villages, October 2018, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/502791539523038928/text/Concept-Project-Information-Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Uzbekistan-Prosperous-Villages-Obod-Qishloq-P168233.txt[69] Lee Kyung-sik, “Uzbekistan enters a new decade; great opportunities open up to spearhead transformation even deeper”, The Korea Post, February 2020, http://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=20207[70] Ibid.[71] Regulation.gov.uz, Discussion of draft regulatory documents of the Republic of Uzbekistan: https://regulation.gov.uz/ru/document/7229?fbclid=IwAR19IJcUd8_f9iJGTecLG8KiA1-dCu9byP1JEYZa4azoJniviPZTLygh7A[72] The previous law was frames as follows: ‘the Regulation on the procedure for compensation of losses to citizens and legal entities in connection with the seizure of land for state and public needs (Appendix to the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated May 29, 2006 N 97) gave five fairly broad grounds for land seizure:

• the provision of land for the needs of defence and state security, protected natural areas, the creation and functioning of free economic zones;
• fulfilment of obligations arising from international treaties;
• discovery and development of mineral deposits;
• construction (reconstruction) of roads and railways, airports, airfields, aeronautical facilities and aeronautical centres, railway facilities, bridges, subways, tunnels, power systems and power lines, communication lines, space activities, trunk pipelines, engineering and communications networks; and
• execution of master plans for settlements in the construction of facilities at the expense of the State budget of the Republic of Uzbekistan, as well as in other cases directly provided for by laws and decisions of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.’

See: Norma.uz, All legislation of Uzbekistan, https://nrm.uz/contentf?doc=105171_polojenie_o_poryadke_vozmeshcheniya_ubytkov_grajdanam_i_yuridicheskim_licam_v_svyazi_s_izyatiem_zemelnyh_uchastkov_dlya_gosudarstvennyh_i_obshchestvennyh_nujd_(prilojenie_k_postanovleniyu_km_ruz_ot_29_05_2006_g_n_97)&produ[73] Consent, according to the legislation means that the initiator of the development has to gain 75 per cent of the residents’ consent of the building targeted for redevelopment/demolition. If the remaining 25 per cent of the residents’ were to withhold consent then the initiator would be able to go to court to obtain final approval.[74] Kristian Lasslett, You should know where the money’s coming from: a response to the mayor of Tashkent, openDemocracy, February 2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/you-should-know-where-money-s-coming-from-response-to-mayor-of-tashkent/[75] Kun.uz, Court verdict against the ex-khokim of Samarkand region Turobjon Jurayev announced, August 2019, https://kun.uz/en/75468129?q=%2Fen%2F75468129;  CABAR, Renovation in Uzbekistan: to Evict and Demolish, April 2019, https://cabar.asia/en/renovation-in-uzbekistan-to-evict-and-demolish/[76] Sadriddin Ashur and Ozodlik, In Khorezm, thousands of people blocked the highway in protest against non-payment of compensation for demolition of houses (video), Ozodlik, July 2019, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30078847.html[77] BBC News, Uzbeks protest against at house demolitions, July 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-49164936[78] Gazeta.uz, How Rishtan is undergoing reconstruction, July 2019, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/07/01/rishtan/; Bruce Pannier, In Uzbekistan, The Fraught Politics of Building Demolitions, RFE/RL, July 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbek-prime-minister-reacts-to-vehement-protests-against-building-demolitions/30085673.html; Gazeta.uz, In Yangiyul hastily demolished houses, July 2019, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/07/14/demolitions/[79] Victoria Panfilova, Uzbek President rants at local authorities about illegal house demolitions, Vestnik Kavkaza, August 2019, https://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/Uzbek-President-rants-at-local-authorities-about-illegal-house-demolitions.html; HRW, Charting Progress in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan, October 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/07/charting-progress-mirziyoyevs-uzbekistan[80] Vladimir Rozanskij, Another woman sets herself on fire to save her home, AsiaNews.it, February 2020, http://asianews.it/news-en/Another-woman-sets-herself-on-fire-to-save-her-home-49359.html[81] Fergane.News, A resident of Kashkadarya set herself on fire in protest against the demolition of her house, February 2020, https://fergana.ru/news/115308/[82] Fergana.News, Uzbek Justice Ministry hints at new wave of illegal buildings demolitions, February 2020, https://en.fergana.ru/news/115498/[83]ACCA, Uzbekistan: no elements of crime were found in kidnapping and torture of blogger, February 2020, https://acca.media/en/uzbekistan-no-elements-of-crime-were-found-in-kidnapping-and-torture-of-blogger/; JfJ, Attacks on journalists, bloggers and media workers in the Central Asia and Azerbaijan, 2017-2019, https://jfj.fund/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Joint-CA-report-ENG.pdf[84] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Tree-lovers score win in battle against developers, February 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-tree-lovers-score-win-in-battle-against-developers[85] The Propsiska system was in fact strengthened in the post-Soviet period over its predecessor so that as of 1999 it became almost impossible for outsiders to gain residency in Tashkent.[86] William Seitz, Free Movement and Affordable Housing: Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan, The World Bank, January 2020, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/595891578495293475/pdf/Free-Movement-and-Affordable-Housing-Public-Preferences-for-Reform-in-Uzbekistan.pdf[87] Umida Hashimova, The Unattainable Uzbek Propiska, The Diplomat, December 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/the-unattainable-uzbek-propiska/; Kun.uz, Permanent registration: income or income? What about human rights? December 2018, https://kun.uz/news/2018/12/02/doimij-propiska-takikmi-eki-daromad-inson-ukuklarici[88] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Planned Propiska changes slammed by public, March 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-planned-propiska-changes-slammed-by-public; Fergana.News, Uzbek draft law proposes abolition of “Propiska”system, April 2020, https://en.fergana.ru/news/116825/; Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of The Republic of Uzbekistan, On further simplification of the procedure for permanent registration and registration of citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the city of Tashkent and Tashkent region, ID-15922, Regulation.gov.uz, March 2020, https://regulation.gov.uz/uz/document/15922[89] William Seitz, Free Movement and Affordable Housing Public Preferences for Reform in Uzbekistan,  The World Bank, January 2020, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/595891578495293475/pdf/Free-Movement-and-Affordable-Housing-Public-Preferences-for-Reform-in-Uzbekistan.pdf; Catherine Putz, William Seitz on Uzbekistan’s Propiska Problem, The Diplomat, February 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/william-seitz-on-uzbekistans-propiska-problem/[90] GOV.UK, Guidance: Community Infrastructure Levy, June 2014 (updated September 2019), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/community-infrastructure-levy; LGA, S106 obligations overview, https://www.local.gov.uk/pas/pas-topics/infrastructure/s106-obligations-overview[91] As Seitz notes 5 million, predominantly urban, homes previously owned by the State Housing Fund were privatised in the 1991-93 period in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.[92] Both Seitz figure 4 and using more recent figures for comparator cities from: Wendell Cox, Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey Executive Summary, January 2019, New Geography, https://www.newgeography.com/content/006201-15th-annual-demographia-international-housing-affordability-survey-2019[93] Services that could be delivered by either the private sector or using cooperative or local authority led models.[94] Deniz Kandiyoti, Invisible To the World? The Dynamics of Forced Child Labour in the Cotton Sector of Uzbekistan, SOAS, https://www.soas.ac.uk/cccac/events/cotton-sector-in-central-asia-2005/file49842.pdf[95] Ibid.[96] ILO, Third-party monitoring of child labour and forced labour during the 2019 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipec/documents/publication/wcms_735873.pdf[97] Ibrat Safo and William Kremer, Doctors and nurses forced to pick cotton, BBC News, October 2012, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19931639; Cotton Campaign, Pick All the Cotton: Update on Uzbekistan’s Use of Forced Child Labour in 2009 Harvest, December 2009, http://www.cottoncampaign.org/uploads/3/9/4/7/39474145/uzbekcottonfall09update.pdf[98] ILO, Third Party Monitoring on Child and Forced Labour in Uzbekistan, https://www.ilo.org/moscow/projects/WCMS_704979/lang--en/index.htm[99] ILO, Third-party monitoring of child labour and forced labour during the 2019 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipec/documents/publication/wcms_735873.pdf[100] Jonas Astrup, Twitter Post, Twitter, September 2019, https://twitter.com/AstrupILO/status/1177644244414210049?s=20[101] It is worth noting that in the essay by Lynn Schweisfurth of the Uzbek Forum she notes some scepticism that the ILO’s data is fully capturing the scale of the continuing problems. However given the lack of other hard data, the detailed work that has gone into the ILO’s process and the fact that its figures are comparable year on year they provide the best place to start when examining the overall trends in the reduction of forced labour.[102] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Cotton Harvest in Uzbekistan – 2019, March 2020, https://www.uzbekforum.org/cotton-harvest-in-uzbekistan-2019/[103] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, The accountability gap: Are Uzbek bank officials really organizing nationwide forced labor?, February 2020, https://www.uzbekforum.org/the-accountability-gap-are-uzbek-bank-officials-really-organizing-nationwide-forced-labor/[104] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Cotton clusters and the despair of Uzbek farmers: land confiscations , blank contracts and failed payments, April 2020, https://www.uzbekforum.org/cotton-clusters-and-the-despair-of-uzbek-farmers-land-confiscations-blank-contracts-and-failed-payments/[105] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan scraps cotton state-order system, March 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-scraps-cotton-state-order-system; RFE/RL, Presidential Decree: The cotton-growing schedule and its purchase price will be abolished, March 2020, https://www.ozodlik.org/a/%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%85%D1%82%D0%B0-%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B0-/30472124.html[106] From conversations with international officials and cotton campaigners see also: Kun.uz, Jamshid Khobzhaev called the abolition of state orders for cotton and grain a turning point in the life of 60% of the population, February 2020, https://kun.uz/ru/72675268[107] Centre 1, Shukhrat Ganiev: five reasons to cancel the boycott of Uzbek cotton, May 2019, https://centre1.com/uzbekistan/shuhrat-ganiev-pyat-prichin-otmenit-bojkot-uzbekskogo-hlopka/?fbclid=IwAR18Mz_pVf06RzrfDUk_JGKLfl23Sp5ngVJ0ymPUTOdxLfvXB986d86Gtng[108] Ministry of Employment and Labor Relations of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Open letter to Cotton Campaign Coalition of removing the Uzbek Cotton Pledge, April 2020, https://mehnat.uz/en/news/open-letter-to-cotton-campaign-coalition-on-removing-the-uzbek-cotton-pledge[109] Julian K. Hughes and Nate Herman, It’s Not Time to End the Uzbek Cotton Boycott Yet, Foreign Policy May 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/28/uzbek-international-cotton-boycott/[110] No relation of the controversial Fergana Governor.[111] hNavbahor Imamova, Twitter Post, Twitter, April 2020, https://twitter.com/Navbahor/status/1250766680936062977?s=20[112] This framing is that of the editor. For the suggested criteria for lifting the boycott being put forward by the Cotton Campaign see the article in the collection by Lynn Schweisfurth.[113] Ishita Petkar and Lynn Schweisfurth, Can communities lead their own development in places where civil society is severly restricted? Development banks think so, Medium, April 2020, https://medium.com/@accountability/can-communities-lead-their-own-development-in-places-where-civil-society-is-severely-restricted-ee436a24e5dd[114] Mehribon Bekieva and Ozodlik, Hundreds of residents of Andijan closed for quarantine brought on a clean-up day to Mirziyayev’s arrival, Ozodlik, April 2020, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30521984.html[115] RSF, Ranking 2020, https://rsf.org/en/ranking; RSF, Ranking 2015, https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2015; The higher the Global Score in the ranking the worse the situation.[116] IIWPR Central Asia, Uzbekistan: A Small Dose of Media Freedom, IWPR, June 2019, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/uzbekistan-small-dose-media-freedom[117] RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Independent Uzbek Journalist Released After Nine Years in Prison, RFE/RL, October 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-journalist-abdurahmonov-released/28775300.html; ACCA, In Uzbekistan, journalist spent almost 20 years in prison, April 2020, https://acca.media/en/in-uzbekistan-journalist-spent-almost-20-years-in-prison/; CPJ, Uzbekistan releases remaning jailed journalists, May 2018, https://cpj.org/2018/05/uzbekistan-releases-remaining-jailed-journalists.php; Though the use of administrative detention continues and in the Olloshukurova case forced psychiatric detention was used instead.[118] Fergana.News, An official detaining a Ferghana journalist lost his job, April 2020, https://fergana.ru/news/117451/[119] The UNNA claimed that Sodiqova had resigned voluntarily, a claim she denied: BBC News, Uzbekistan: Why did journalist Anora Sodiqova resign? Uzbekistan, May 2020, https://www.bbc.com/uzbek/world-52617818; Navbahor Imamova, Twitter Post, Twitter, May 2020, https://twitter.com/Navbahor/status/1258823920326762501[120] Malik Mansur, Uzbekistan Orders Article on Abuse to Be Deleted, VOA, April 2020, https://www.voanews.com/press-freedom/uzbekistan-orders-article-abuse-be-deleted; Irina Matvienko, Twitter Post, Twitter, March 2020, https://twitter.com/iammatvienko/status/1243571039315136515; Reader Stories, …mother said that I was spoiled, and that boy was not to blame (when I was 3 years old, he was 12 years old)…., NeMolchi, February 2020, https://nemolchi.uz/2020/02/19/mat-skazala-chto-jeto-ja-isporchennaja-a-tot-malchik-ne-vinovat-kogda-mne-bylo-3-goda-emu-bylo-let-12/[121]Public Fund for Support and Development of National Mass Media, https://t.me/massmediauz/87[122] Currently the legislation reads Administrative Code, article 40: Slander i.e. that is, the dissemination of deliberately false fabrications, disgracing another person — entails the imposition of a fine of twenty to sixty basic calculated values; Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Administrative Responsibility, Section One, General, Lex.UZ, September 1994, https://lex.uz/ru/docs/97661?query=%D0%BA%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B0;  Criminal code, article 139: SlanderSlander, i.e. the distribution of deliberately false fabrications, dishonoring another person, committed after the application of administrative penalties for the same actions, shall be punishable by a fine of up to two hundred basic calculation units or by compulsory community service up to three hundred hours or by correctional labour up to two years. The information in the January draft legislation was here: ACCA, In Uzbekistan, prison sentence for slander and insult will be replaced by a fine, January 2020, https://acca.media/en/in-uzbekistan-prison-sentence-for-slander-and-insult-will-be-replaced-by-a-fine/; Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, A Common Part, Lex.UZ, September 1994, https://lex.uz/ru/docs/111457?query=%D0%BA%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B0#160360[123] Article 19, Uzbekistan: Law on Mass Media, https://www.article19.org/resources/uzbekistan-law-on-mass-media/; Article 19, Uzbekistan: Law on the Protection of Professional Activity of Journalists, May 2019, https://www.article19.org/resources/uzbekistan-law-on-the-protection-of-professional-activity-of-journalists/[124] For some recent examples see: Amnesty International, Blogging in Uzbekistan: welcoming tourism, silencing criticism, June 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2020/06/blogging-in-uzbekistan-welcoming-tourism-silencing-criticism/[125] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Home of poet and journalist Mahmud Rajanbov raided by police, May 2019, https://www.uzbekforum.org/home-of-poet-and-journalist-mahmud-rajabov-raided-by-police/; Cotton Campaign, Uzbekistan: Amidst reform effort, journalists and activists face criminal charges, arbitrary detention, forced psychiatric treatment, International Labor Rights Forum, October 2019, https://laborrights.org/releases/uzbekistan-amidst-reform-effort-journalists-and-activists-face-criminal-charges-arbitrary; RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Uzbek Poet Gets Suspended Prison Term For Importing ‘Banned’ Books, RFE/RL, October 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/banned-books-uzbekistan/30223844.html[126] RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Blogger Flees Uzbekistan After Spending Weeks in Involuntary Psychiatric Care, RFE/RL, January 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/blogger-flees-uzbekistan-after-spending-weeks-in-involuntary-psychiatric-care/30387814.html[127]Ozodlik, Khorezm-based journalist Davlatnazar Ruzmetov was detained at a police station for five hours, Ozodlik, October 2019, https://www.ozodlik.org/a/%D1%9E%D0%B7%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BD/30200563.html; All three had been previously involved in monitoring and exposing the issue of forced labour in Uzbekistan: Mehribon Bekieva and Ozodlik, In Khorezm, a car knocked to death a journalist Davlatnazar Ruzmetov, who was under pressure from the authorities, Ozodlik, November 2019, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30443935.html, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30258000.html[128] Catherine Putz, Conservative Religious Bloggers Detained in Uzbekistan, The Diplomat, September 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/conservative-religious-bloggers-detained-in-uzbekistan/[129] Navbahor Imamova, Twitter Post, Twitter, March 2020, https://twitter.com/Navbahor/status/1240657246092234752?s=20[130] Agency of Information and Mass Communications under the Administration of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Provisions, https://aoka.uz/en/agency/provisions[131] Gazeta.uz, “We believe in freedom of speech and its power” – Saida Mirziyoyeva, February 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/02/02/saida-mirziyoyeva/[132] Navbahor Imamova, Twitter Post, Twitter, June 2020, https://twitter.com/Navbahor/status/1276698187240218624[133] Eurasianet, Uzbek Authorities Crack Down on Another Foreign NGO in Tashkent, September 2004, https://eurasianet.org/uzbek-authorities-crack-down-on-another-foreign-ngo-in-tashkent; RSF, Uzbek authorities shut down international organization Internews, January 2016, https://rsf.org/en/news/uzbek-authorities-shut-down-international-organization-internews; The New Humanitarian, New registration procedure for international NGOs, January 2004, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2004/01/29/new-registration-procedure-international-ngos; Office for Communications, Uzbek Government Forces Closures of Local Soros Foundation, Open Society Foundations, April 2004, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/newsroom/uzbek-government-forces-closure-local-soros-foundation[134] Relief Web, Uzbekistan: Government closes another American NGO, May 2006, https://reliefweb.int/report/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-government-closes-another-american-ngo[135] Unions website: http://unions.uz/l; YukSalish, NGOs and volunteers on one web site, March 2020, https://yumh.uz/ru/news_detail/172[136] Oonagh Gay, Quangos, UK Parliament, 2010, https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/key_issues/Key-Issues-Quangos.pdf[137] Gazeta.uz, Maidan paranoia, January 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/01/31/ngos/[138] See the Exporting Repression Project.[139] Steve Swerdlow, Twitter Post, Twitter, February 2020, https://twitter.com/steveswerdlow/status/1223468776974245888?s=11; RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Uzbek Justice Ministry Registers Prisoners’ Rights Group, U.S. – Based NGO, RFE/RL, March 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbek-justice-ministry-registers-prisoners-rights-group-u-s--based-ngo/30484147.html[140] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Failure to Register – Please Submit Again: Uzbek Human Rights NGO Rejected Once More, April 2020, https://www.uzbekforum.org/failure-to-register-please-submit-again-uzbek-human-rights-ngo-rejected-once-more/; Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Tricks, Threats and Deception: Registering an NGO in Uzbekistan, March 2020, http://uzbekgermanforum.org/tricks-threats-and-deception-registering-an-ngo-in-uzbekistan/[141] Ozodlik, Under the President of Uzbekistan, a Public Chamber is being created, April 2020, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30560581.html[142] HRW, Uzbekistan: Two Brutal Deaths in Custody, August 2002, https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/09/uzbekistan-two-brutal-deaths-custody[143] HRW, Charting Progress in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan, October 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/07/charting-progress-mirziyoyevs-uzbekistan[144] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Scholar imprisoned for espionage absolved and released, September 2019, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-scholar-imprisoned-for-espionage-absolved-and-released[145] HRW, Charting Progress in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan, October 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/07/charting-progress-mirziyoyevs-uzbekistan[146] RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Uzbek President’s Decree Says Evidence Obtained Though Torture Inadmissible, RFE/RL, December 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-presidential-decree-evidence-from-torture-inadmissible/28890570.html[147] Mansur Mirovalev, Uzbekistan closes infamous prison, but experts question motive, Al Jazeera, August 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/uzbekistan-closes-infamous-prison-experts-question-motive-190811101338923.html; Farangus Najibullah, Uzbekistan’s ‘House of Torture’, RFE/RL, August 2012, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistans-house-of-torture/24667200.html[148] The editor is grateful for input from Penal Reform International in relation to these issues.[149] HRW, Uzbekistan: Torture Widespread, Routine, December 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/09/uzbekistan-torture-widespread-routine[150]Will Nicol, A Torture Scandal Is Prompting Scrutiny For Uzbekistan’s Bid To Host The 2027 Asian Cup, Forbes July 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/willnicoll/2020/07/03/a-torture-scandal-could-end-uzbekistans-bid-to-host-the-2027-asian-games/#af5aba824786[151] NHRC website: http://nhrc.uz/; Ombudsman website: http://ombudsman.uz/[152] Navbahor Imamova, Twitter Post, Twitter, May 2020, https://twitter.com/Navbahor/status/1266384893703073794?s=20[153] Funding figures provided to the FPC in PDF format.[154] HRW, Beyond Samarkand: Can Uzbekistan Turn Its Nascent Reform Efforts into a Clear Break with Its Brutal Past?, March 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/08/beyond-samarkand[155] Asian Forum website: https://asianforum.uz/en[156] NHRC, Voluntary Obligations of Uzbekistan, http://nhrc.uz/uz/menu/zbekistonning-ihtierij-mazhburijatlari[157] Nataliya Vasilyeva, Secret Uzbek court convicts former envoy to UK for treason amid human rights objections, The Telegraph, January 2020, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/01/09/secret-uzbek-court-convicts-former-envoy-uk-treason-amid-human/ and Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Ex-deputy ambassador to UK imprisoned after secret trial, January 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-ex-deputy-ambassador-to-uk-imprisoned-after-secret-trial[158] Bruce Pannier and Muhammad Tahir, Majlis Podcast: Spy Games In Uzbekistan, June 2020, RFE/RL,  https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-spies-in-uzbekistan/30670139.html[159] Amnesty International, Uzbekistan: New Campaign of Phishing and Spyware Attacks Targeting Human Rights Defenders, March 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/03/uzbekistan-new-campaign-of-phishing-and-spyware-attacks-targeting-human-rights-defenders/[160] Umida Hashimova, What Recent Protests in Uzbekistan Really Tell Us, The Diplomat, December 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/what-recent-protests-in-uzbekistan-really-tell-us/[161] OSCE ODIHR, Comments on the draft law on rallies, meetings and demonstrations of the Republic of Uzbekistan, September 2019, https://www.osce.org/odihr/434870?download=true[162] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Andijan blindness slows transition to era of openness, experts say, May 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-andijan-blindness-slows-transition-to-era-of-openness-experts-say[163] KunUz, The National Strategy of Uzbekistan on Human Rights has been approved, June 2020, https://kun.uz/64926322[164] Local observers reported extraordinary, but unverified, claims that Tashkent traffic police previously were to required to meet a $100 per day quota for fines and bribes to return to their bosses (before officers took their own cut).[165] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Police to fit interrogation rooms with recording equipment, June 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-police-to-fit-interrogation-rooms-with-recording-equipment?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter[166] UN OHCHR, Uzbekistan faces crucial challenges for judicial independence, says UN human rights expert, September 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25056&LangID=E[167] From discussions with a well-known legal observer.[168] Kun.uz, Shavkat Mirziyoyev sharply criticized prosecutors, August 2017, https://kun.uz/news/2017/08/04/savkat-mirzieev-prokurorlarni-keskin-tankid-kildi; Umida Hashimova, Uzbekistan Makes Serious Cuts to the Prosecutors General’s Office, The Diplomat, March 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/uzbekistan-makes-serious-cuts-to-the-prosecutor-generals-office/[169] Paruz.uz, Forms of activity reports and statistics, January 2020, https://www.paruz.uz/post/otchety-o-deyatelnosti-advokatskih-formirovaniy[170] The Tashkent Times, Central office of Madad NGO opens in Tashkent, December 2019, https://tashkenttimes.uz/national/4715-central-office-of-madad-ngo-opens-in-tashkent[171] Lee Kyung-sik, “Uzbekistan enters a new decade; great opportunities even deeper”, The Korea Post, February 2020, http://www.koreapost.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=20207[172] Supreme Council of Judges of the Republic of Uzbekistan website: http://www.sudyalaroliykengashi.uz/uz UN, Human Rights Council: Visit to Uzbekistan, April 2020, https://undocs.org/A/HRC/44/47/ADD.1[173] Believed to be a range of between seven to ten million soms (700-1000 dollars) per month, significantly more than the average wage of 2.21 million soms per month. For information on the latter see The Tashkent Times, Average salary in Uzbekistan at US$ 235, October 2019, https://tashkenttimes.uz/national/4510-average-salary-in-uzbekistan-at-us-235#:~:text=In%20January%2DSeptember%202019%2C%20the,634%2C880%20soums%2C%20US%24%2067.[174] United Nations Human Rights, A/HRC/44/47/Add.1, April 2020, https://ap.ohchr.org/Documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/44/47/Add.1[175] Central Asia Program, Women of Uzbekistan: Empowered on Paper, Inferior on the Ground, July 2019, https://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Davletova-CAP-Paper-223-July-2019.pdf[176] Kun.uz, For the first time in recent years, the Senate has appointed a woman ambassador, June 2020, https://kun.uz/12659391[177] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Little change in parliament, but more women represented, January 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-little-change-in-parliament-but-more-women-represented[178] In discussions with the editor.[179] Norma, Admission to Kindergartens – From 3 Years, August 2017, https://www.norma.uz/novoe_v_zakonodatelstve/priem_v_detskie_sady_-_s_3-h_let[180] NeMolchi website: https://nemolchi.uz/; NeMolchi Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/nemolchi.uz/; UNDP Europe and Central Asia, #HearMeToo: Activists in Central Asia break ground in fight against violence, November 2018, https://www.eurasia.undp.org/content/rbec/en/home/stories/hearmetoo-activists-in-central-asia-break-ground-in-fight-agains.html[181] See point eight her: OHCHR, Sixth periodic report submitted by Uzbekistan under article 18 of the Convention, due in the 2019, November 2019,http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsvglKm%2F71Q4iogAZSMgJYVs60KRy5crJ6kEiuyr%2BMf3kQZOR7xy6os%2FgfVi6U8SWJyPdXstO1OxzL6OUntGaW7CwybNjFCtq%2FK%2FieKSvU65l; CIS-Legislation, Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, September 2019, https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=118581; UZ Daily, President signs law on the protection of women from harassment, September 2019, https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/51593[182] ACCA, Law concerning the protection of women in Uzbekistan is inactive for four months, July 2020, https://acca.media/en/law-concerning-the-protection-of-women-in-uzbekistan-is-inactive-for-four-months/[183] Nikita Makarenko, Twitter Post, Twitter, October 2019, https://twitter.com/nikmccaren/status/1181076815391137793[184] NHRC website: http://nhrc.uz/[185] A terrorist group founded by ethnic Uzbeks Tohir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani (Jumaboi Khodjiyev) who participated in the Civil War in Tajikistan and became enmeshed in the conflict in Afghanistan.[186] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir trial a testbed for religious boundaries, May 2018, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-hizb-ut-tahrir-trial-a-testbed-for-religious-boundaries; Galima Bukharbaeva, Uzbek Prison Brutallity, IWPR, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/uzbek-prison-brutality[187]Sarah Kendzior, Inventing Akromiya: The Role of Uzbek Propagandists in the Andijon Massacre, Academia, https://www.academia.edu/170210/Inventing_Akromiya_The_Role_of_Uzbek_Propagandists_in_the_Andijon_Massacre; Jeffrey Donovan, Former Uzbek Spy Accuses Government Of Massacres, Seek Asylum, RFE/RL, September 2008, https://www.rferl.org/a/Former_Uzbek_Spy_Seeks_Asylum/1195372.html[188] HRW, Charting Progress in Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan, October 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/07/charting-progress-mirziyoyevs-uzbekistan; Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir trial a testbed for religious boundaries, May 2018, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-hizb-ut-tahrir-trial-a-testbed-for-religious-boundaries; USCIRF 2020 Annual Report, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF%202020%20Annual%20Report_Final_42920.pdf[189] Kun.uz, Shavkat Mirziyoyev pardoned 258 convicts, May 2020, https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/05/22/shavkat-mirziyoyev-pardoned-258-convicts[190] USCIRF 2020 Annual Report, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF%202020%20Annual%20Report_Final_42920.pdf; Catherine Putz, US Religious Freedom Report Signals Improvements in Uzbekistan, The Diplomat, April 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/us-religious-freedom-report-signals-improvements-in-uzbekistan/[191] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan keeps up heat on marginal Islamic groups, May 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-keeps-up-heat-on-marginal-islamic-groups?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter[192] OHCHR, UN expert welcomes Uzbekistan roadmap to ensure freedom of religion or belief, June 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23179&LangID=E; Mushfig Bayram and Felix Corley, Uzbekistan: When will draft Religion Law be made public?, Forum 18, June 2020, http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2576[193] The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Freedom of Worship and Religious Organizations (New Versin), https://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/uzbeklaw.html; HRW, Laws and Rules Regulating Religious Attire, 1999, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/uzbekistan/uzbek-03.htm[194] RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Uzbek Teachers Get Tough Assignment: ‘Remove Their Hijabs, But Don’t Hurt Their Feelings’, RFE/RL, October 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbek-teachers-get-tough-assignment-remove-their-hijabs-but-don-t-hurt-their-feelings-/30208276.html; Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: Supporters of Islamic clothing take battle to court, March 2019, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-supporters-of-islamic-clothing-take-battle-to-court; RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Fresh Anti-Beard Campaign Reported In Uzbekistan, RFE/RL, September 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/fresh-anti-beard-campaign-uzbekistan/30186953.html; RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Uzbek Men Reportedly Detained, Forced To Shave Beards, RFE/RL, August 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbek-men-reportedly-detained-forced-to-shave-beards/30129899.html[195] The Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan, T. About Astanov’s Case, January 2020, http://sud.uz/28-01-2020-8959698959698/; Mushfig Bayram, Uzbekistan: Muslim activist’s sentence imminent?, Forum 18, October 19, http://forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2513; Sentenced under 244 d) of the Criminal Code for the Production or storage for the purpose of disseminating materials containing ideas of religious extremism, separatism and fundamentalism, calls for pogroms or forced evictions of citizens or aimed at creating panic among the population, as well as production, storage for the purpose of distribution or demonstration of attributes or symbols of religious extremist, terrorist organizations… d) using the media or telecommunications networks, as well as the worldwide information network Internet; Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, A Common Part, September 1994, Lex.UZ, For the full criminal code see https://lex.uz/docs/111457[196] RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Uzbek Governor In Hot Water After ‘Ugly Beard,’ Hijab Remarks, RFE/RL, September 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbek-governor-in-hot-water-after-ugly-beard-hijab-remarks/30191875.html[197] Mushfig Bayram, Uzbekistan: Obstacle, pressure, bribe demands obstruct legal status applications, Forum 18, December 2019, http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2527[198] Mushfig Bayram, Uzbekistan: Haj pilgrims face state control, bribery, exit ban lists, Forum 18, November 2019, http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2520[199] Mushfig Bayram, Uzbekistan: Despite coronavirus lockdown officials continue literature raids, Forum 18, April 2020, http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2564[200] Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/1712/file/a45cbf3cc66c17f04420786aa164.htm/preview[201] Reuters, Anything you want – except gay rights, Uzbekistan tells U.N., May 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uzbekistan-rights/anything-you-want-except-gay-rights-uzbekistan-tells-u-n-idUSKCN1IO2OA[202] Darina Solod, In Uzbekistan, homosexuality is illegal. Here’s what LGBT life is like there, open Democracy, February 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/uzbekistan-homosexuality-illegal-heres-what-lgbt-life/; Global Voices, In Uzbekistan, where homosexuality is illegal, LGBTQ+ people must hide to survive, November 2019, https://globalvoices.org/2019/11/27/in-uzbekistan-where-homosexuality-is-illegal-lgbtq-people-must-hide-to-survive/; ADC Memorial, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan: Criminal Prosecution for Consensual Same-Sex Relationships Between Men, https://adcmemorial.org/en/publications/turkmenistan-and-uzbekistan-criminal-prosecution-for-consensual-same-sex-relationships-between-men/[203] RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Murder In Tashkent: Killing of Gay Man Spotlights Plight Of Uzbek LGBT Community, RFE/RL, September 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/killing-of-gay-man-spotlights-plight-of-uzbek-lgbt-community/30167271.html; Umberto Bacchi, Gay man’s murder raises questions over Uzbek human rights reforms, Thomson Reuters Foundation News, September 2019, https://news.trust.org/item/20190927144443-n71k8/; Steve Swerdlow, Twitter Post, Twitter, September 2019, https://twitter.com/steveswerdlow/status/1172600370046164998?s=11[204] tashGangs Telegram channel, https://telegram.me/tashGangs; Egor Petrov and Ekaterina Kazachenko, No one will hide behind a rainbow (18+), September 2019, https://fergana.agency/articles/110271/?fbclid=IwAR2MvDor2SZgsvA59WeR4ApUaTx9ugHyaZF0CfCv6Ar2Qps7PBHeXNaOKXw[205] RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service, Murder In Tashkent: Killing Of Gay Man Spotlights Plight of Uzbek LGBT Community, RFE/RL, September 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/killing-of-gay-man-spotlights-plight-of-uzbek-lgbt-community/30167271.html[206] For example, this bizarre article argues for the need to maintain social taboos on discussing LGBTQ issues for fear of moving the Overton Window, arguing that if ‘a person succumbs to this hobby (homosexuality), he will lose such spiritual qualities as a sense of patriotism, the instinct of self-preservation and self-defense’. Re:post, Analyst from UzA announces introduction of homosexuality ideas in Uzbekistan through Overton’s Window, October 2019, https://repost.uz/overtona-net[207] For more on Dilmurad’s work on disability rights please see his website here: https://dilmurad.me/op-eds/[208] Ozodlik, On the border between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is expected to open another border post, December 2019, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30346875.html[209] Muso Bobohozhiev, As a result of the conflict, about 175 people were injured on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border on both sides, Asia-Plus, June 2020, https://www.asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/incidents/20200601/v-rezultate-konflikta-na-uzbeksko-kirgizskoi-granitsi-raneni-okolo-175-chelovek-s-dvuh-storon[210] Bek Khoshimov, Twitter Post, Twitter, December 2019, https://twitter.com/bkhoshim/status/1201012305502330881?s=20; Eurasianet, Uzbekistan befuddled by Eurasian Economic Union tug of war, November 2019, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-befuddled-by-eurasian-economic-union-tug-of-war[211] Luca Anceschi, Twitter Post, Twitter, October 2019, https://twitter.com/kate_mallinson1/status/1179688356143386624?s=11[212] Muhammad Tahir and Bruce Pannier, Majlis Podcast: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Show Dissatisfaction With Eurasian Economic Union, RFE/RL, May 2020, https://www.rferl.org/amp/majlis-podcast-kazakhstan-kyrgyzstan-show-dissatisfaction-with-eurasian-economic-union/30637145.html#click=https://t.co/6t20eGQstP[213] Shukhrat Babadzhanov and Ozodlik, An employee of the Russian oil company Lukoil called the Uzbek workers “a crowd of rams” (video), Ozodlik, November 2019, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30265561.html; Eurasianet, Uzbekistan bristles at Russia wading into language law debate, May 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-bristles-at-russia-wading-into-language-law-debate?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter[214] Elliot Watson, Russia losing ground in Central Asia as key rival pumps in cash, GlobalMarkets, May 2019, https://www.globalcapital.com/article/b1f9mj5gd4t5kb/russia-losing-ground-in-central-asia-as-key-rival-pumps-in-cash[215] Asia Bound, Mapping China’s Health Silk Road, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/mapping-chinas-health-silk-road; EIAS, “The Health Silk Road”: Implications for the EU under Covid-19, April 2020, https://www.eias.org/news/the-health-silk-road-implications-for-the-eu-under-covid-19/[216] Reid Standish, China’s Central Asian Plans Are Unnerving Moscow, Foreign Policy, December 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/23/china-russia-central-asia-competition/[217] China.org.cn, Chinese, Uzbek FMs hold talks on ties, August 2019, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2019-08/20/content_75117215.htm; Mansur Mirovalev, Why are Central Asian countries so quiet on Uighur persecution?, Al Jazeera, February 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/central-asian-countries-quiet-uighur-persecution-200224184747697.html; The Tashkent Times, Uzbekistan joins countries backing China’s Xinjiang policy, July 2019, https://tashkenttimes.uz/world/4212-uzbekistan-joins-countries-backing-china-s-xinjiang-policy; Joanna Lillis, Twitter Post, Twitter, November 2019, https://twitter.com/joannalillis/status/1190258761094569984?s=11[218] Several EU member states but also Switzerland remains a major outlet for Uzbek Gold; FDFA, Bilateral relations Switzerland – Uzbekistan, https://www.dfae.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/representations-and-travel-advice/uzbekistan/switzerland-uzbekistan.html; OEC, Uzbekistan, https://oec.world/en/profile/country/uzb/; For information about the growing relations between Italy and Uzbekistan see: UZ Daily, Prospects for cooperation with the Confederation of Industry of Italy discussed, May 2020, http://www.uzdaily.com/en/post/57413; Davide Cancarini, Italy and Central Asia, a ‘proxy friendship’ or a serious foreign policy commitment?, FPC, March 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/italy-and-central-asia-a-proxy-friendship-or-a-serious-foreign-policy-commitment/[219] EEAS, New EU Strategy on Central Asia, May 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/62412/New%20EU%20Strategy%20on%20Central%20Asia; U.S. Department of State, United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity (Overview), February 2020, https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-for-central-asia-2019-2025-advancing-sovereignty-and-economic-prosperity/[220] Eurasianet, U.S. experiments with three-way dialogue with Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, May 2020, https://eurasianet.org/us-experiments-with-three-way-dialogue-with-uzbekistan-afghanistan[221] Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey, Uzbekistan aim to boost bilateral trade to %5 bln, February 2020, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-uzbekistan-aim-to-boost-bilateral-trade-to-5-bln-152238[222] UK/Uzbekistan: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement [CS Uzbekistan No.1/2019], https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ukuzbekistan-partnership-and-cooperation-agreement-cs-uzbekistan-no12019[223] Eurasian Inventor, About, https://www.eurasianinvestor.com/about; Ownership of the copyright for Eurasian Investor belongs to CCI Ltd (Corporate Communications International Ltd) whose director Constantine Bridgeman was listed as CEO of Trinity Events and Eurasian Investor is listed a media brand of Trinity Events Group (home to a number of event brands including Adam Smith Conferences); Trinity Events Group website: http://trinity-events.com/en/;  UZ Invest Forum, A Major Two-Day Conference, Uzbekistan: One of world’s most promising economies, http://www.uzinvestforum.com/[224] Matthew Fisher and Robert Garden, Perspectives: Uzbekistan internationalizes legal landscape to entice foreign investors, November 2019, https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-uzbekistan-internationalizes-legal-landscape-to-entice-foreign-investors[225] MDIS Tashkent, Accounting and Finance, http://www.mdis.uz/Undergraduate_Programmes/Accounting_and_Finance[226] Shokhruz Samadov, Twitter Post, Twitter, October 2019, https://twitter.com/ShokhruzS/status/1189166382551830529/photo/1[227] Figures according to Cambridge Assessments.[228] Nikita Makarenko, Twitter Post, Twitter, March 2020, https://twitter.com/nikmccaren/status/1240360400987795461?s=11[229] Grata International, Uzbekistan has announced the quarantine regime, March 2020, https://gratanet.com/news/uzbekistan-has-announced-the-quarantine-regime[230] Umida Hashimova, Uzbekistan Adopts Strict Regulations To Fight COVID-19, The Diplomat, April 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/uzbekistan-adopts-strict-regulations-to-fight-covid-19/[231] Gazeta.uz, Construction at large facilities will resume, April 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/04/14/%D1%81onstr/; AsiaTerra, In Uzbekistan, during the period of “self-isolation” allowed to build large facilities, April 2020, http://www.asiaterra.info/news/v-uzbekistane-v-period-samoizolyatsii-razreshili-stroit-krupnye-ob-ekty?fbclid=IwAR2jRhU84pwJ7sv8PYFp-ZJL2d0VUVdBwUV5y0nkzzaXBI3gGl2CnYrgezY[232] Javlon Vakhabov, Twitter Post, Twitter, April 2020, https://twitter.com/JavlonVakhabov/status/1255909452512931840?s=20[233] Xinhua, Uzbekistan eases COVID-19 restrictions, Asia & Pacific, May 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/asiapacific/2020-05/07/c_139038018.htm; Reuters, Uzbekistan extends duration of coronavirus curbs, but eases some, May 2020, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-uzbekistan/uzbekistan-extends-duration-of-coronavirus-curbs-but-eases-some-idUKKBN23609G; Almaz Kumenov and Ayzirek Imanaliyeva, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks cautiously, anxiously, eye return to familiar patterns, Eurasianet, May 2020, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhs-kyrgyz-uzbeks-cautiously-anxiously-eye-return-to-familiar-patterns[234] Mena FN, Uzbekistan to resume international flights, domestic train services soon, June 2020, https://menafn.com/1100323425/Uzbekistan-to-resume-international-flights-domestic-train-services-soon[235] Development Strategy Center and CERR, Information on measures to combat the effects of coronavirus in Uzbekistan, May 2020, https://strategy.uz/index.php?news=935[236] Information via Telegram Channel @koronavirusinfouz; Reuters, Uzbekistan extends duration of coronavirus curbs, but eases some, May 2020, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-uzbekistan/uzbekistan-extends-duration-of-coronavirus-curbs-but-eases-some-idUKKBN23609G; BBC News, Coronavirus UK map: How many confirmed cases are there in your area?, (continuously updated), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51768274[237] Radio Ozodlik, Tashkent teachers used as “trolls” praising Mirziyayev’s quarantine policy, Ozodlik, April 2020, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30577701.html[238] Ria.ru, Uzbekistan criminalizes fakes about COVID-19, March 2020, https://ria.ru/20200326/1569193853.html; HRW, Central Asia: Respect Rights in Covid-19 Response, April 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/23/central-asia-respect-rights-covid-19-responses[239] Navbahor Imamova, Twitter Post, Twitter, May 2020, https://twitter.com/Navbahor/status/1266209297630978048?s=20; Navbahor Imamova, Twitter Post, Twitter, May 2020, https://twitter.com/Navbahor/status/1266242126448189444?s=20[240] Podrobno.uz, It is estimated that Uzbekistan could receive about $ 38 million in fines during quarantine. Ahead, at least three more weeks of self-isolation, April 2020, https://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/uzbekistan-zarabotal-na-shtrafakh-vo-vremya-karantina-poryadka-38-millionov-dollarov-vperedi-minimum/[241] Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, Human Rights Activists Isolated for 14 Days After Monitoring Cotton Fields, June 2020, https://www.uzbekforum.org/human-rights-activists-isolated-for-14-days-after-monitoring-cotton-fields/[242] See the essay in this collection by Eldor Tulyakov[243] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan: President nixes helicopter money idea, appeals to business community, April 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-president-nixes-helicopter-money-idea-appeals-to-business-community; Irina Matvienko, Facebook Post, Facebook, April 2020, https://www.facebook.com/100001488784857/posts/3009477632445167/?d=n[244] Kindness/Freedom, The campaign to forcibly transfer money to the fund initiated by the President will intensify, Ozodlik, April 2020, https://www.ozodlik.mobi/a/mirziyoyev-saxovat-xayriya-majburiylik/30581316.html[245] Ibid.; Bruce Pannier, Crony Charities Spring Up in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Amid COVID-19 Crisis, RFE/RL, May 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/crony-charities-spring-up-in-kazakhstan-uzbekistan-amid-covid-19-crisis/30588640.html[246] Office of the Chief Economist, Fighting COVID-19, Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, World Bank Group, Spring 2020, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33476/9781464815645.pdf?sequence=5[247] Alisher Ruziohunov, Twitter Post, Twitter, May 2020, https://twitter.com/ARuziohunov/status/1262420778127163393?s=20; bne IntelliNews, Long Read: The Growers – a handful of countries in New Europe are coping with the coronacrisis and are still expanding, May 2020, https://www.intellinews.com/long-read-the-growers-a-handful-of-countries-in-new-europe-are-coping-with-the-coronacrisis-and-are-still-expanding-184035/[248] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan shores up food defences as coronavirus rages, April 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-shores-up-food-defenses-as-coronavirus-rages[249] Bruce Pannier, Mirziyoyev Steps Up As COVID-19 Crisis Increases Contact Among Central Asian Leaders, RFE/RL, April 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/mirziyoev-steps-up-as-covid-19-crisis-increases-contact-among-central-asian-leaders/30523898.html[250] RFE/RL, Sokh Exclave: Two Decades of Simmering Tension, January 2013, https://www.rferl.org/a/sokh-exclave-two-decades-of-simmering-tension/24817411.html[251] Muso Bobohodzhiev, As a result of the confict, about 175 people were injured on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border on both sides,Asian-Plus, June 2020, https://www.asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/incidents/20200601/v-rezultate-konflikta-na-uzbeksko-kirgizskoi-granitsi-raneni-okolo-175-chelovek-s-dvuh-storon;  BBC Uzbek, Sukh: Isn't Uzbekistan ready to talk to Kyrgyzstan?, June 2020, https://www.bbc.com/uzbek/uzbekistan-52968894[252] BBC News, Uzbekistan: Why are the Sukhis dissatisfied with the governor? Uzbekistan (Video), June 2020, https://www.bbc.com/uzbek/uzbekistan-52903225[253] Fergana.News, Shavkat Mirziyoyev reminds Uzbeks of a thousand-year neighbourhood with Kyrsgyzstan, June 2020, https://fergana.agency/news/118877/; Podrobno.uz, Mirziyoyev sent business ombudsman for 2 months to Ferghana region to study problems of entrepreneurs, June 2020, https://podrobno.uz/cat/economic/mirziyeev-otpravil-biznes-ombudsmana-na-3-mesyatsa-v-ferganskuyu-oblast-izuchat-problemy-predprinima/; Eurasianet, Uzbekistan pledges huge investments in troubled exclace, June 2020; https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-pledges-huge-investments-in-troubled-exclave?utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=dlvr.it[254] Hydropower & Dams, Investigations underway following Sardoba dam breach in Uzbekistan, The International Journal on Hydropower & Dams, May 2020, https://www.hydropower-dams.com/news/investigations-underway-following-sardoba-dam-breach-in-uzbekistan/[255] BBC Uzbek, Sardoba tragedy: Has the allocated aid money become "familiar"?, June 2020, https://www.bbc.com/uzbek/uzbekistan-53020042 and Mehribon Bekieva, Andijan farmers who did not transfer money to liquidate the consequences of emergencies in the Syrdarya region are threatened with land acquisition, Ozodlik, June 2020, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30687634.html [post_title] => Introducing Mirziyoyev’s Uzbekistan [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => introducing-mirziyoyevs-uzbekistan [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-07-20 17:24:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-07-20 16:24:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4761 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[1] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4692 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2020-07-14 00:01:25 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-07-13 23:01:25 [post_content] => Spotlight on Uzbekistan has sought to examine the state of the reform process in the country across a wide range of areas, the perhaps unsurprising headline conclusion is that a lot has been done, and there is a lot still to do. The reform process is real, but so are the significant holes in it. To meet the aspirations set out in several of President Mirziyoyev’s proclamations a lot of work still needs to be done to create an open economy, pluralist politics and a free society, rather than the easier but less worthwhile transformation from Karmiov’s closed, autarkic authoritarian state to a sleek, shiny but oligarchic one. Mirziyoyev’s real end goal is still somewhat unclear- whether he intends only a limited authoritarian modernisation (as seen in neighbouring Kazakhstan where the limits of such a transition are now becoming ever more starkly exposed) or whether something more ambitious is planned, and whether that greater ambition extends to eventually becoming a fully functioning democracy and market economy. Since 2016 there has been appreciable economic progress for several sectors of society, a reduction in state interference in everyday life, and a notable increase in some freedoms, particularly for an emerging group of, predominantly Tashkent based, activists and experts who willing choose in some way to engage with the Government’s reform project. This has been genuine progress, which has garnered Uzbekistan much good will from the international community. However the lingering suspicion remains that, as Kristian Lasslett argues, while ‘modest accommodations have also been made to civil society by the Mirziyoyev government this appears to be driven more by reputational concerns that impact on investor/business confidence, rather than a conversion to liberal politics.’ Mirziyoyev’s desire to project a pro-business image, his connections to leading business people and nascent privatisation efforts have created new opportunities for politically connected individuals. He has also used this business elite influence to help solidify his power base against pressures from the old security elite. So how Uzbekistan addresses this emerging challenge will be critical to the overall success of the reform process. If the next few years merely see a reshuffling of political and economic power to new elites, under the cover of rhetoric about the reforms, it will create new structural problems and ultimately undermine how the ‘new’ Uzbekistan is seen around the world. Corruption, criminalising gay people and forced labour (despite real progress on the latter) are still major drags on Uzbekistan’s international image. The new freedoms, particularly in terms of freedom of speech have created a space for ‘constructive criticism’, where government delivery and the performance of officials and legislation can broadly be criticised. However, the ability of powerful figures to apply informal pressure or action in the civil courts remains and certain topics including harsh criticism of the President is still off limits. Under this approach of ‘managed freedom’ the Government may be more responsive but it is not accountable, other than to the limits imposed by public opinion in a country still slowly emerging from the heavy hand of Karimov. The response to recent crises, both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Sardoba Dam collapse, have highlighted the successes and failings of the new system. Decisive initial activity which helped control the virus spread and evacuate those displaced by the flood; a flurry of slightly disjointed regulatory and financial measures (though Uzbekistan is far from alone in this) were put in place that helped provide some economic stabilisation; extraordinary new powers (particularly on freedom of movement and assembly) have been used more responsibly than they would have been under Karimov but with still some abuse at the local level; a reticence to be open to past failings (in the case of Sardoba); and innovations such as the Sakhovat va Komak (‘Generosity and Assistance’) fund that have delivered important benefits to the worst affected by the crisis but have facilitated old habits around enforced or pressured participation in this national effort. In the difficult times ahead the Government will need to take further steps to make itself more accountable to the public and more effective in its operation to minimise the risk of social unrest as the country tries to put the economy back on track whilst absorbing large numbers of workers returning from Russia. Refining the ReformsWhen it comes to taking the reform process to the next stage the Presidential administration needs to try to stop acting like a shark who needs to keep pushing forwards in order to survive. The frenetic top down activity is not sustainable and its effectiveness is declining. Spending a bit more time getting legislation right the first time through early consultation with stakeholders will help reduce the need for clarifying decrees and further updates. More time for Parliament to scrutinise legislation and advise on Presidential decrees could be helpful for both institutions. There could also be a role for an independent committee, perhaps involving the new Civic Chamber, to review decrees, to help ensure they are aligned with international standards and do not contradict each other. Much has been written, both in this publication and elsewhere, about the need to improve the capacity in the Uzbek civil service and this will involve both culture and personnel changes. With some reforms lost in the long chain between Presidential Decree and implementation there is a need to change the internal incentive structures to allow greater space for risk taking, innovation and if necessary failure, to stop facilitating a culture of buck passing to avoid the wrath of the President that could grind down a new generation of officials. Instead there is a need to encourage them to find ways to implement change. As Yuliy Yusupov argues ‘Uzbekistan needs a fundamental administrative reform’ that will involve ‘the reconsideration and redistribution of the structure, tasks, functions and responsibilities of central authorities, as well as of administrative bodies at the sectoral level.’ There will need to be further steps taken, including the transparency initiatives set out below, to prevent officials being captured by sectoral special interests. Overstaffing and the ‘stamp culture’ need to be tackled to free up resources to be used more efficiently elsewhere in the public and private sector, including increasing resources for the social safety net that may become ever more critical when dealing with the COVID-19 aftermath. The need to improve recruitment has been identified by the Government as a strategic priority to expand administrative capacity. This should involve further steps to encourage recruitment based on merit rather than connections, improving salaries to encourage talent to join and to encourage the return of higher skilled professionals from the diaspora. Navbahor Imamova argues that in order to address the capacity gap ‘Uzbekistan needs a transparent, fair and professional recruitment system dedicated to hiring from abroad by establishing a central recruiting body, which should announce vacancies, act as a centralised clearing-house for applications, and provide a single point-of-contact for those seeking opportunities’. However, it is important that capacity constraints are not used as a universal excuse to cover times when political will is lacking or when the Government wishes to shield the President from criticism by blaming his officials. Kate Mallinson and Yuliy Yusupov have made a number of suggestions in their essays for furthering the reform of the wider economy that include strengthening ownership rights of land users to allow resale, sublease or borrowing against it and reviewing and implementing arbitration decisions in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. There remains the need to move away from protecting import monopolies owned by politically connected figures to developing a system of industrial support focused on more universally accessible tax incentives and other systems open to businesses irrespective of how well connected the owners are. Democracy and accountabilityIf Uzbekistan is serious about making gradual moves towards democracy, or even achieving in its more limited short term goal of improving Parliamentary scrutiny, it will not be enough simply to loosen the regime’s control over the current parties and politicians. Uzbekistan will have to remove its prohibitive controls on new party formation (currently requiring signatures of 40,000 eligible voters with no more than eight per cent from one region) and allow independent candidates to stand. Creating a more open and competitive political environment is also necessary to make Mirziyoyev’s long promised but yet to be fully delivered reforms to local government effective. Direct elections of khokims could be transformative in improving local accountability and the performance of regional and local government but not if the process is merely rubberstamping the result of a rigged political decision made at the very top. If such local changes are not imminent, the President needs to be more assertive in removing rather than just berating government appointed local officials who are not meeting the needs of their residents. Local Kengeshs need to be supported both operationally (such as through internationally recognised scrutiny training) and more importantly politically (preventing reprisals if and when local representatives speak out) to be able to exercise meaningful scrutiny over the role of their khokims. Reforms of the planning system could include a requirement for Khokimiat to publically consult on masterplans and other decisions about proposed developments ahead of their adoption, and transferring the real power of decision making (rather than just ratifying the Khokim’s decision) on planning decisions to the Kengeshs where their final decisions could be made in public meetings so residents can both watch and have their say. Local khokims and Kengeshs must be more proactive in ensuring all legal procedures are followed when it comes to new developments in their local area, with a particular focus on preventing intimidation in the processes (notionally) in place to ensure resident consent for new buildings and in ensuring developers pay the compensation on time and in full. Matyakubova’s essay argues for revising the current decree to give stronger safeguards against forced evictions in line with international norms. Any revised legislation could include measures to safeguard payments to residents such as revised requirements for Khokimiat’s to publically certify that all residents had received the full legal compensation before construction is allowed to begin. National and local government should work together to develop a national heritage listing system for historic buildings to give greater protection against rapacious local developers. Particularly in the context of both the state’s ownership of land and the construction boom, more must be done to make developers contribute to the development of new social infrastructure in the new projects in partnership with the Khokimiat. If, as some fear, many of these new developments will contain a number of properties bought for investment purposes rather than permanent accommodation (or if post-pandemic they remain unsold) then further steps should be taken to simplify and professionalise the rental market. The recent reforms to the Propsika system have helped move things in the right direction but still leave too many people reliant on temporary registration. At all levels of government Uzbekistan could benefit from two things: more women and greater transparency. There is a clear need to appoint women to Cabinet posts and as regional khokims, while developing a clear pathway for women to move through the administrative structures, building on the recent comparative success in increasing women’s representation in Parliament. There is an urgent need for clear codes of conduct for politicians to declare any personal or financial links to schemes they are involved in approving or scrutinising, and transparency on if state funds are supporting businesses linked to elected officials. There is no explicable reason why the new disclosure requirements being proposed for Uzbek civil servants should not be applied to or adapted for use by holders of public office (particularly politicians and judges), so that they can be transparent about their external sources of income and relevant assets to restrict the scope for conflict of interest, and so that the public can know how their representatives are funded. Corruption and cottonGreater transparency for public officials needs to be combined with greater transparency in public procurement, with information about prospective and successful tenders made more openly in order to help make further inroads into tackling corruption. Systems have to change because at present it often seems that addressing individual instances of corruption or poor performance by Uzbek officials is correlated with the degree to which such problems create a public outcry, rather than directly based on the merits of the case. The recent increase in media freedom to address some forms of corruption and lower-level bureaucratic performance helps act as a pressure release valve, a mechanism through which issues that are causing widespread resentment at a local level can be raised to the leadership in Tashkent, and action can be taken to prevent such tensions building into pressure that could unsettle the wider political balance. Corruption is one of the biggest systemic risks the regime faces, particularly in these challenging times As Kristian Lasslett says ‘if a global recession is sparked, leading to serious downturn in Central Asia, the more predatory forms of racketeering observed in the Karimova case study may grow in appeal. If this coincides with diminished standards of living for the general population, these structural antagonisms could indeed provide the kindling for more radical forms of political challenge to the status quo’. Uzbekistan could also build international confidence in its wider commitment to tackling corruption by joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). It can and should also take further steps to make public the ownership information relating to all businesses (including their beneficial owners) in the Government’s new clusters, to assuage concerns that these structures are simply providing new opportunities for politically connected individuals to game the system for financial gain, and to help ensure that the power of the state is not being used at local level to assist them with their operations through forced labour. If not handled as a strategic priority corruption risks derailing the Uzbek reform process, which would vindicate critics who see the post-2016 period as merely being about providing new ways for the elite to enrich itself. Greater transparency over the management of clusters is essential in the context of completing and defending the gains made in tackling forced labour in the cotton sector. Pressure to lift the international boycott of Uzbek cotton had been growing in the wake of progress made in reducing forced labour but it has intensified further since the start of the pandemic. Arguments in favour of ending the boycott focus on the economic gains from opening international markets to being able to raise cotton picker wages and modernise the sector, thereby helping end the remaining forced labour more swiftly. While cotton campaigners worry, particularly in the context of unknown risks of the cluster model, that ending the boycott whilst more than 100,000 forced workers remain would remove the pressure to complete the job. The only realistic way out of this conundrum lies in a compromise that provides reassurance that future incidences of forced labour will be properly brought to light and addressed by the Government. This will require allowing local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), working in concert with international partners, to work freely to monitor the harvest and expose wrongdoing. The boycott needs to be brought to an end to secure the long-term survival of the sector and assist the Uzbek economy at this time of need, but to ensure international confidence this will at minimum require the registration of cotton monitoring NGOs and local independent trade unions, notably those of activists currently involved in monitoring for both the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and Cotton Campaign. Doing this would help build confidence in lowering the warning level on forced labour from red to amber, in the knowledge that if there is retrenchment, pressure on cotton exports could be renewed.[1] Putting the requisite political pressure on the Ministry of Justice to expedite these registrations should be a small price for the Government to pay to end this black mark on Uzbekistan’s reputation and protect the economy. Rights and freedomsAny measures to register cotton-monitoring NGOs must form part of a wider process of independent NGO registration in order to meaningfully develop civil society in Uzbekistan. The Ministry of Justice clearly has the ability to register independent NGOs, even with the laws that exist now, yet instead it pursues a policy of bureaucratic obstructionism to use minor form filling errors, both real and imaginary, to reject documents and stall processing indefinitely leading to a de facto bar on independent NGO registration. As set out above this could be resolved with the necessary political will and the Government needs to urgently make it happen. However, a revision process for the now delayed new NGO code could help move things further forward by removing spurious and burdensome reporting requirements, and the need for advanced approval for day-to-day activities; by lifting limits on international funding and other restrictions on contact with international organisations; by making government funding opportunities more transparent; and by producing guidance notes and example forms to help NGOs avoid wrangling over form filling. While NGOs are currently heavily restricted, journalists have experienced much greater freedoms, albeit within the boundaries of ‘constructive criticism’ discussed throughout the publication. Achieving true media freedom will require working to remove these boundaries, such as the regime needing to become more tolerant of direct criticism of the President and those close to him. That liberal regime figures talk about the evolution of the sector to achieve greater independence through greater professionalism still shows that they see their role as defining the terms of engagement in a way that seems incompatible with full media freedom. The bounds of fair comment by the media should instead be framed within the bounds of both robust public debate and fairer but functioning anti-defamation laws.[2] At present the proposed changes to the laws on ‘slander and insult’ that would remove the risk of prison have stalled, but the current draft would also see a substantial increase in the level of fines which, in an unreformed court system, could further add to the existing problem of aggrieved parties seeking to use the threat of financial ruin to silence criticism. One route to tackling the financial pressures on journalists investigating powerful forces would be, in the context of NGO liberalisation, allowing the development of donor funded investigative journalism such as Kloop in neighbouring Krygyzstan or the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project internationally, adding to rather than replacing emerging journalistic initiatives in Uzbekistan. Reforming the courts is a key part of delivering progress on rule of law and it will be critical to underpinning real change across so many areas, from human rights to corruption, media freedom and Uzbekistan’s economic performance. Important steps to take include extending the new asset transparency requirements for civil servants to the judiciary while taking further steps to increase their official salaries and extend their term of office as part of measures to try to tackle both graft and institutional pressures on judges. Measures being taken to increase the number of independent lawyers (particularly registered advocates who can appear in court), including the expansion of legal education in Uzbek universities and improving the prestige of the profession, are very welcome and must sit alongside further steps to reduce the power of the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) in determining the outcome of the legal process and raising the chance of acquittal in court through fair trials. Further reform of the PGO needs to sit alongside continuing reform of the security services to end the continuing risk of arbitrary arrest and torture. As recent events show there is still work to do to fulfil the President’s promises on the eradication of torture and mistreatment of suspects, something which should see further pressure on the Government to allow independent monitoring of Uzbekistan’s prisons and other places of detention and to ratify the UN’s Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture. The Government should also amend the vague and overbroad criminal code provisions relating to espionage and extremism that give too much leeway to the security services and are commonly used to criminalise dissent – particularly Articles 157, 159, 216, 244-1, and 244-2. As well as transforming the investigation of major crimes steps need to be taken to limit the routine abuse of administrative code punishments that lead to 15 day imprisonment for minor or invented infractions by activists. This should form part of a wider culture change (slowly underway but far from complete) to end the harassment of activists (including political activists, local bloggers or would be independent NGO activists) who fall outside the boundaries of ‘constructive criticism’. The Ombudsman’s office needs to continue its steps towards independence and receive the necessary funding required to investigate abuses, while avoiding it sometimes being overlooked in favour of the National Human Rights Centre’s more outward facing role. Removing the all-encompassing pressure of the Karimov presidency has helped people to start to address important questions around identity, belief and personal behaviour. It has provided opportunities for women to talk more openly about their desire for greater opportunities in the economy and public life, about the endemic culture of domestic abuse and to critique family structures that often subjugate younger women. At the same time there has been a slight loosening of restrictions on religious activity and many religious prisoners have been freed, though the authorities should make available a list of all persons currently serving sentences for extremism-related charges to help make clear the extent of recent changes. Expanding both freedoms in parallel creates certain challenges when rights may be seen to come into conflict and the process needs to be handled with care. For example, it is important that the Uzbek Government takes steps to end the restrictions on religious dress (which de facto creates a ban on the hijab and long beards) and to allow registration of independent religious organisations, while simultaneously taking steps to reassure women’s groups that action will be taken against rising social pressures against women choosing to wear jeans, shorts or skirts, which is as much - if not more - the product of traditionalist/nationalist sentiments being expressed openly on social media with issues of toxic masculinity as it is of growing religiosity. Uzbek leaders can also help by promoting a positive and open conception of Uzbek national identity and patriotism, potentially further revising ideas around the national concept of Manaviyat. Alongside creating a society where individuals are free to choose what they wear and think, all Uzbeks need the right to be able to openly and legally love who they love by ending the ban on male homosexuality that forces people into the shadows or exile and promotes the extortion of those at risk of arrest. Transitional justiceAs the Government of Uzbekistan becomes more self-confident about the progress of the reforms and the country’s place in the world, it needs to show a more self-confident approach towards discussing its own past. As Steve Swerdlow argues ‘President Mirziyoyev and the Uzbek government should acknowledge past abuses officially, provide concrete avenues for redress, and send a clear message that peaceful criticism of government policies and scrutiny of the past will be genuinely valued in Uzbekistan’. This has to be part of a national conversation involving those who suffered, human rights defenders, international experts and all relevant organs of the state. As Swerdlow suggests this should involve the creation of an inclusive national commission and a new law on Rehabilitation that builds on but goes further than Article 83 of Uzbekistan’s Criminal Procedure Code. Part of this historical reckoning should include the coming to a new accommodation with its critics in exile. There needs to be a pathway back for and reconciliation with human rights and political activists who left under Karimov. Allowing their safe return and softening the Government’s reactions to jabs from these activists, such as Nadejda Atayeva who in this collection gives a more critical assessment of the current situation than the other authors, would be a clear sign that the Government is in the reform process for the long haul. This in turn might help mollify some of the understandable cynicism about the state of the reform process by exile groups who have been persecuted for years by the Government of Uzbekistan. In turn, those who have so far been rejected by the new system may come to view some of the changes more positively, knowing that not everything is a fraud. The internal logic of a reform process that accepts Uzbekistan needs urgent and radical change implies that those who raised concerns about how it was before had a point and they should not be beyond the political pale today. The government’s current focus on supporting new independent journalists, state backed civil society initiatives and possibly in time more independent political figures and NGOs to grow organically in the ‘new’ Uzbekistan may have a forward looking dimension, but it creates the clear risk (both real and perceived) that they lack the freedom to fully hold the Government to account on all issues. Uzbekistan and the worldHow Uzbekistan relates to the outside world has been one of the biggest changes under Mirziyoyev, with the country becoming an active player in Central Asia while working to improve relationships with the main regional players (Russia and China) as well as engaging with the West. As a strategic approach it makes sense, replacing an approach under Karimov which alternated between a prickly multi-vector approach to ward off Russia and a no-vector approach of isolationism, with a more proactive, outward-looking but balanced policy. The debate about the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) clearly has a geo-political dimension (for Russia it remains primarily a political project), but the decision over Uzbek membership needs to be driven by whether it delivers real economic benefits for Uzbekistan in terms of its trade within Central Asia and its economic relationships with Russia (a calculus that may have changed if the reduction of migrant work remains supressed into the long-term post-pandemic). The parallel push for World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership should not meaningfully interfere with decision making on the EAEU (given that all but Belarus are also WTO members) and will help diversify Uzbekistan’s options. Western partners such the European Union, United States and United Kingdom (UK) can have an important part to play in engaging with Uzbekistan, providing partnerships than can help potentially balance (though not replace) Uzbekistan’s need to work with Russia and China. Years of diminishing regional engagement have reduced the West’s leverage but some remains and it needs to be focused on supporting Uzbekistan to keep moving forward on its reforms rather than retrenching. This does involve the scaling up of both technical and financial assistance, while ensuring that international partners and institutions on the ground retain the capacity to criticise when and where things are going wrong as well as championing what is being done right. Western jurisdictions need to take further action to prevent their financial systems being used to shelter illicit Uzbek wealth. In the UK for example this needs to involve prosecuting mysterious companies which submit false or improper filings, reforming the rules around ‘Scottish Limited Partnerships’ and applying further pressure for the transparency in the Crown dependencies. Regarding the important emerging partnerships in the education sector, if Western institutions and organisations are putting their names to campuses, courses and curriculums they need to play an active role in ensuring that student and academics working in those systems have greater academic freedom than would be possible in the wider Uzbek system. This is particularly relevant in higher education, and if the situation on Uzbek campuses does not move closer to achieving standards comparable with their own institutions they should rethink the partnerships. The international community faces a tricky balancing act, rewarding reformers for their efforts and ensuring these partners have the political capital within the Government to keep moving forwards, while not ignoring or excusing the considerable problems the country still faces. A clear test of this balancing act is the how to respond to Uzbekistan’s candidacy for the UN Human Rights Council and its bid for the Asian Games. A few years ago, the recommendation from independent observers would have been simple, it would not have been appropriate for Uzbekistan to get these honours. Now, in the context of ‘a lot done, a lot still to do’ finding an answer is more challenging. A potential solution would be making support for Uzbekistan’s membership of the Human Rights Council and hosting the games conditional on a human rights health check by international partners (both NGOs, institutions and international partner governments), and further action by the Uzbek Government on issues raised in this publication including NGO registration and torture in order for the international community to be able to give the green light. Recommendations Based on the findings of the research in this publication and the details set out in the conclusion above, in order to help Uzbekistan continue to fulfil the promise of recent reforms and address the outstanding problems there are a number of recommendations for action by the Government of Uzbekistan and the international community. The Government of Uzbekistan should seek to:

• Continue reforming the civil service to improve structures and capacity while being more measured and consultative when creating new legislation and decrees.
• Develop a more competitive political environment in Uzbekistan by removing restrictions on registering new parties and allowing independent candidates to stand for election.
• Reform local government by requiring the direct elections of Khokims, with greater public consultation about developments and giving Kengeshs real power to decide on planning decisions. Empower it to take action on compensation and forced evictions, to ensure developers contribute to social infrastructure and help protect historic buildings.
• Require transparency for all holders of public office including politicians and judges with declarations of external sources of income and assets, while making public the ownership details of firms involved in the new ‘clusters’.
• Move beyond ‘constructive criticism’ to true freedom of expression and association by delivering new anti-defamation laws without the threat of prison or massive fines, allowing independent NGOs to register and helping them do so.
• Help facilitate the end of the boycott of Uzbek cotton by urgently registering cotton monitoring NGOs and independent trade unions.
• Continue the reform of the Prosecutor General’s Office and security services to prevent the harassment of activists and political opponents.
• Deliver transitional justice and greater openness about the Karimov legacy helping the rehabilitation of victims of past abuse.
• Continue to expand both religious and social freedoms that prioritise individual choice over community pressure, with more women in senior government positions, action on domestic violence, ending laws against the LGBTQ community and stopping the pressure on independent religious groups.

 International institutions and Governments should seek to:

• Continue their engagement with the Government of Uzbekistan whilst ensuring they remain open to criticism and pressure where necessary as well as praising successes.
• Support an international human rights health check ahead of decisions to elect Uzbekistan to the UN Human Rights Council or award it the right to host the 2027 Asian Games.

 [1] If the garment industry were to end the Pledge on Uzbek cotton, reinstating it in the event of renewed forced labour would be challenging as supply lines would have been re-established. However, some of this will need to be mitigated by explicit commitments from major garment companies of their continuing opposition to the practice being sought and triggered in the event of relapse.[2] And for broadcast television within the bounds of internationally recognised regulations that give greater scope for public debate. [post_title] => Conclusion and recommendations: A road map for future reforms in Uzbekistan [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => conclusion-and-recommendations-a-road-map-for-future-reforms-in-uzbekistan [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-07-14 00:21:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-07-13 23:21:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4692 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[2] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4555 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2020-03-03 00:09:10 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-03-03 00:09:10 [post_content] => The United Kingdom is preparing for its post-Brexit place in the world at a time when the principles of liberal democracy and the rules-based world order are facing their greatest challenges in a generation. In a fast-changing world with new powers rising, old institutions struggling and future challenges emerging – from AI to climate change – having a clear approach to values in British foreign policy is not just about doing what we think is right or supporting institutions, norms and rules that the UK often played a key role in creating, but also about actively helping to shape the systems the UK will have to work within for decades to come. The UK’s standing going forward will depend more on its future contributions to global solutions, rather than relying on past glories. This requires facing up to the ways in which the current international order has entrenched unequal power relations and the UK’s own privileged position.Securing the national interest in an uncertain world will mean helping to set a framework for the international system that can produce mutually beneficial solutions to global challenges in ways that address longstanding disparities in the voice and protection afforded to people around the world. It cannot be achieved through a transactional approach that prioritises short-term, narrowly defined security and economic gains. The UK has an opportunity to articulate a powerful vision for ‘Global Britain’ that is defined by commitments to human rights, inclusive representation at home and abroad, and making a substantial impact on poverty and inequality. Failure to actively stand up for its values will be seen as a sign of weakness and decline at a time when there is uncertainty about Britain’s standing and future role in the world.This requires a joined-up approach to foreign policy where decisions about diplomacy, trade, security and international development are all equally rooted in the internationalist values of democracy, human rights, free and fair trade and the international rule of law that the UK has long championed. All major policy and spending decisions with an international dimension should be measured against these values. The UK’s future role in the world will be determined by the decisions it takes now about trade deals, how and how much it spends on international development, in its responses to violations of human rights and international norms and rules, and by the role the UK plays in multilateral institutions.As a medium-sized power, albeit one with considerable assets, the UK will need to show it is still willing to work collaboratively with partners, and to creatively and meaningfully use available tools of influence to shape the future direction of the international system and to respond effectively to specific crises and abuses of its values. The scale and scope of the challenges facing the world will require stronger partnerships with existing allies as well as investment in new and different partnerships with countries that share the UK’s values.Key recommendations to the UK Government:

• Agree a ‘Global Britain’ values statement of the principles underpinning its role in the world.
• Develop a ‘Global Britain Test’ that assesses the impact of policies against its principles.
• Engage with and reform the multilateral and global institutions the UK remains a part of.
• Defend the independence of DFID, the 0.7% GNI pledge on aid and the focus on reducing poverty.
• Show the UK still has the confidence and stature to stand up for its values by supporting those who defend them, and speaking out and taking action when they are abused.
• Show climate leadership with effective diplomacy for COP26 in Glasgow and more domestic reform.
• Deliver on new financial transparency commitments and further actions on tax havens.
• Improve parliamentary and public scrutiny of new trade negotiations, and ensure Parliament has a final vote on any new trade deals.

 Editors:Adam Hug became Director of the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) in November 2017. He had previously been the Policy Director at the FPC from 2008–2017. His research focuses on human rights and governance issues, particularly in the former Soviet Union. He also writes on UK and EU foreign policy.Dr Abigael Baldoumas is a humanitarian policy advisor for Oxfam GB. She holds a DPhil in Political Science from Oxford University on the role of social movements in shaping public policy in the UK. She has worked in international development since 2012. Her work focuses on forced displacement, gender justice and rights-based humanitarian response.Katy Chakrabortty is the head of advocacy at Oxfam GB. She has been at Oxfam since 2009, and as well as political relations work she has played a major role in Oxfam's Even it Up campaign against extreme economic inequality. Her background is in political campaigning and parliamentary advocacy, having previously worked for the Electoral Reform Society, Amnesty International and DeHavilland.Dr Danny Sriskandarajah joined Oxfam GB as chief executive in January 2019 from CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance of which he was Secretary General for six years. Prior to that he was Director General of the Royal Commonwealth Society, Interim Director of the Commonwealth Foundation and held various posts at the Institute for Public Policy Research.Photo credit: Lighthouse and sunset, Isle of Skye. Image by Frank Winkler from Pixabay.  [post_title] => Finding Britain's role in a changing world: Executive Summary [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => finding-britains-role-in-a-changing-world-executive-summary [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-03-09 15:40:13 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-03-09 15:40:13 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4555 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[3] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4539 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2020-03-03 00:08:36 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-03-03 00:08:36 [post_content] => The world we are inBritain steps out into the post-Brexit world at a time of international turmoil. For over a decade liberal democracy has been in decline, as competing authoritarian and populist models have gained further traction in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis that shook confidence in the post-Cold War international order.[1] Climate change, persistent inequality and rapidly changing technology pose difficult questions to which the United Kingdom will need to find answers. Leaving the European Union does not see the UK ‘picking up where it left off’ in 1973; rather it finds itself in an environment where global power is more dispersed, and the direction of travel is uncertain. The UK’s future standing will depend more on its contributions to global solutions, rather than relying on past glories.[2] This requires facing up to the ways in which the current international order has entrenched and replicated unequal power relations between countries, as well as the UK’s own privileged position.The UK remains one of the largest economies in the world, the third biggest international aid donor, the sixth highest country in terms of international military spending and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, as well as a member of the Commonwealth, NATO, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE) and a host of other international bodies.[3] The City of London remains a global financial centre, facilitating trillions of pounds in investment. The combination of a significant concentration of international media organisations, world-class universities, major international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and cultural impact through film, television, music, literature and sporting competitions with a global audience gives the UK a soft-power presence that currently far exceeds its population size or economic clout. The UK has grown used to leveraging its networks to amplify its power, seeking to act as a bridge between the United States, the EU and other partners, but now these ties are loosening. The UK has chosen to leave the EU, removing itself from both the occasional strictures of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Single Market; ultimately this will take it out of the rooms where important decisions are made, both in Brussels and in the collaborative processes between EU member state embassies in countries around the world.At the same time, the UK’s other central alliance looks to be at its most fragile at any time in the post-war era. Irrespective of the turbulence of the Trump presidency, the US has been gradually but inexorably shifting its focus to the Pacific and growing more reticent to carry its current share of the burden for European security. The recent escalation between the US and Iran, over the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, highlighted an area where the UK had been trying to forge a different path to Washington before having to hedge its position in the face of US pressure. The extreme polarisation of US political debate has made action on climate at a federal level a partisan issue, limiting the scope for international collaboration.The number of people living in extreme poverty worldwide has fallen from 1.9 billion in 1981 to 800 million in 2015.^[4] Increased aid and debt relief were a part of this achievement, with the UK standing out as one of the few countries to scale up Official Development Assistance (ODA) over this period.[5] But in many ways, this has been the easy part, with a huge boost to poverty reduction delivered by the economic growth of China and other Asian countries. Now, ‘finishing the job’ to eradicate extreme poverty and delivering the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030 will require action to tackle the more structural challenges of climate change, protracted conflicts, and particularly gender and economic inequality – alongside the shrinking of civic and humanitarian space.[6] These are areas where the answers, if they do get to the root causes of poverty, are not always immediately win-win.The traditional mechanisms of the post-Second World War settlement, from the Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) to NATO and the UN system, are all creaking under the weight of institutional inertia, political pressure and lack of public trust. The very idea that a single rules-based international system still exists is in question,[7] while the Brexit debate itself drew attention to the potential trade-offs between the benefits of global rules and ongoing democratic accountability at the level of the nation state. Systems based on consensus, such as the OSCE, or with the potential for the use of veto power, such as the UN Security Council, have found their decision-making hamstrung by the growing divisions between key stakeholders protecting their own interests.Accompanying this are the difficulties the UK faces in extricating itself from the EU and starting to negotiate a new relationship with Europe, highlighting the central role that rules and regulations play in international relations. The ability to trade freely is dependent on the compatibility of regulations and mutual recognition of their implementation. Rules are, however, increasingly being set by regional power blocs, with firms wanting to do business in major markets required to conform to the standards set by these blocs irrespective of their domestic rules and preferences. Russia’s efforts to create its own regulatory sphere through the Eurasian Economic Union, and China’s attempts to promote integration with its own standards regarding other Asian economies that fall within its gravitational pull, have a clear strategic purpose – extending their political influence and restricting economic opportunities for potential competitors such as the US and EU – in addition to any direct economic benefits. This continued growth of regional regulatory blocs has taken place at a time when attempts to set the rules at a global level have stalled or gone into reverse, as exemplified by the challenges faced by the WTO in the wake of the failed Doha round of liberalisation and the paralysis in its trade courts under pressure from the US and other actors.[8]A brief recent history of values in UK foreign policyIn 1997, the Labour government arrived in office after a Conservative government that had been seen to be slow in responding to the humanitarian crises in the Balkans and Rwanda, and with a development policy that had been tarnished by perceptions of ‘tied aid’. Its first Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, set out an approach that has been seen to define the ‘values-based’ approach to foreign policy. In Cook’s landmark speech launching the new Mission Statement for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in 1997, the term ‘ethical’ is only used twice and first appears in the line: ‘Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves.’[9] This commitment to having an ethical dimension in the FCO Mission Statement was part of a much broader set of objectives promoting multilateralism and internationalism. Yet detractors (and campaigners who wished to create pressure for it to be true) would amplify the ‘ethical’ claim to argue that the government was aiming for the much harder-to-achieve goal of an ‘ethical foreign policy’. As a result, any failure to meet such a standard due to competing priorities, realpolitik or missteps led to cynicism about the UK’s intentions. While many of the promises detailed in Cook’s speech, such as an annual human rights report, became part of the warp and weft of the FCO’s practice, the legacy of Iraq and the response to the War on Terror under Cook’s successors saw UK foreign policy fall short of meeting the (mis)perceived goal of an ethical foreign policy.In 2010, William Hague sought to define the foreign policy agenda of the incoming coalition government, attempting both to move on from the previous Labour government and reassure the public (and their Liberal Democrat coalition partners) that the incoming administration was different to the perception of previous Conservative governments. Hague used the phrase ‘enlightened self-interest’, and while commercial priorities would grow in importance through the ‘Prosperity Agenda’, sometimes at the expense of day-to-day human rights priorities, there were signature campaigns such as the leadership in delivering a UN Arms Trade Treaty and the Preventing of Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative.[10]Today the FCO runs the Magna Carta Fund for Human Rights and Democracy, which provides a number of larger grants to support human rights around the world, while smaller and locally focused grant funding is managed by UK embassies and High Commissions in-country. It continues to produce an annual Human Rights and Democracy Report that outlines the government’s view of the state of human rights across the world.[11] Protecting the freedom and safety of journalists was a major theme of the FCO under Jeremy Hunt, featuring a joint initiative with Canada. Other key themes that have dedicated delivery teams are the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative and its work on Freedom of Religion and Belief (with a particular emphasis on persecuted Christians). Under Dominic Raab there has been enthusiasm expressed for utilising ‘Magnitsky’-style personal sanctions to tackle individual human rights abusers.The very establishment of a stand-alone Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997 – coming a few years after aid scandals such as the Pergau Dam affair ­­­– was an expression of values in foreign policy made manifest in the machinery of government.[12] Followed up in 2002 by the International Development Act, it was established that UK aid must ‘contribute to poverty reduction’. What should have been a tautologous statement has actually been an important backstop against the ever-present temptation from all governments to use the ring-fenced aid budget (0.7 per cent of UK Gross National Income (GNI)) to plug budget holes in other departments. From 2013 to 2019, the amount of UK aid spent by departments other than DFID has risen from 10 per cent to 28 per cent, with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), the FCO and Home Office overseeing pots of international aid, alongside the National Security Council, which is responsible for cross-government funds like the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) and the Prosperity Fund.[13] This trend looks set to continue as the current Government seeks to ensure that UK development assistance is deployed in the national interest.[14]The broad consensus in UK foreign policy-making that has persisted since at least the 1990s has supported the idea of a rules-based international order, democracy, free trade, multilateral collaboration and collective security. These are all areas where at times there has been a gap between rhetorical goals and concrete actions, but now more than ever these goals are being challenged both ideologically and in practice.Britain in the world todayDuring the Theresa May government, under the guidance of National Security Adviser and Head of the Civil Service Mark Sedwill, there was an attempt to align the whole of government behind its foreign and security policies known as the Fusion Doctrine.[15] There were significant cultural roadblocks to achieving this whole-government approach, as a fusion approach can only succeed if significant work is done consistently at both ministerial and administrative levels to ensure the machinery of government is pointing in the same direction to meet the same goals. This can be even more challenging for a values-led foreign policy, when the short-term priorities (such as securing trade deals or day-to-day security) can seem paramount in the ever-churning political cycle. For example, the Home Office and FCO have struggled to remain on the same page around issues including providing visa access for at-risk human rights activists or allowing experts to attend conferences in the UK. The Home Office has made it hard for family members of those at risk around the world to reach the UK, including those who have worked with the British government as interpreters in war zones or for institutions such as the BBC World Service.[16]The phrase ‘Global Britain’ did not appear in the Conservatives’ 2019 Election Manifesto (though the word ‘global’ was used 11 times), but it resurfaced in the Foreign Secretary’s January 2020 remarks on the Queen’s Speech. The Prime Minister has gone further to insist that the UK must be transformed, like ‘Clark Kent turning into Superman’, upon leaving the EU into a ‘supercharged champion’ of global free trade.^[17] So, for certain audiences at least, the government’s rhetoric is of Britain becoming an enhanced rather than a diminished global player. However, at its heart, the pro-Brexit coalition that helped deliver the Conservative government’s large parliamentary majority is founded on two competing visions of Britain’s role in the world and openness to it. It brings together both those seeking a retrenchment from globalisation in order to buttress more traditional ideas of community against the pace of change, and the supporters of ‘Britannia unchained’, a Britain unencumbered by the rules-based constraints of membership of the EU to become even more globalised and open. Balancing the competing interests of this support base going forward will pose a significant political and strategic challenge now that the shared aim of leaving the EU has been realised.Following the 2019 General Election, the government announced an Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review.[18] In principle, the proposed review and its stated intention to deliver a more effective, efficient and joined-up foreign policy is a positive step. The authors in the following volume are also arguing for greater policy coherence, but rather than narrowly-defined self-interest setting the policy agenda, they are making the case for a values-based foreign policy. The ongoing debate over DFID’s status as an independent department exemplifies the tensions at the heart of ‘Global Britain’, not least whose interests it will serve.[19] While DFID retained Cabinet representation in the latest reshuffle, at junior ministerial level the merger with the FCO is now complete.[20] Multiple reviews have found DFID to be one of the most effective and transparent aid agencies globally, suggesting national security and trade interests rather than value for money or effectiveness are the driving forces behind plans to subsume DFID back into the FCO.[21] Evidence to date from Australia, Canada and Norway shows that subsuming aid departments into a single foreign policy department decreases rather than increases global influence.[22] Britain’s own experience demonstrates the very real pitfalls of misusing development assistance.[23] DFID’s statutory mandate to fight poverty, its international reputation, and its proven track record in the efficiency and effective delivery of international assistance are essential components of Britain’s soft power.There have been a number of instances where a narrow, security-focused approach to the UK national interest has overridden the stated global values of the UK, such as the increasing use of development aid for promoting UK economic interests, the damaging ‘instrumentalisation’ of humanitarian aid as a tool to address security concerns – which can muddy humanitarian principles to the detriment of those in need – or the hypocrisy of spending vast amounts of aid money in Yemen whilst selling arms to Saudi Arabia that exacerbate the conflict. Instrumentalising development assistance to deliver narrow, short-term interests will only serve to further undermine what remains of the international rules-based order.The UK has recommitted to its NATO target of spending two per cent of GDP on defence, but it is as yet unclear what strategic goals it is seeking to achieve. The attitude of Trump and Macron to NATO, combined with the UK’s departure from the EU, will strengthen those within the EU that would seek to position it, rather than the North Atlantic alliance, as the primary coordinating body for European defence and security cooperation, further isolating the UK.[24] Similarly, overtures by Macron that would seek to bring Russia further into the fold on European security are unlikely to be seen positively in London in the absence of movement from Moscow on Ukraine and other areas of outstanding concern.[25] The UK needs to develop a clear idea of what it believes NATO’s role to be, both within Europe and out, and what it wants to do within the alliance. Fatigue with overseas deployment in the wake of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya persists, and increased Russian belligerence would seem to make a reorientation to European defence a natural move, but existing spending commitments such as the aircraft carrier programme, new cyber-threats and continuing pressures on the public finances may limit the scope for a major reorientation.The competing pressures on the Government following an election where foreign policy (other than Brexit) barely featured raise questions over whether it has the political bandwidth and institutional capacity to respond to all the challenges it faces. Hosting the UN climate talks (COP26) in November is an opportunity to demonstrate that the UK is still able to lead in multilateral spaces as well as show the character of the UK’s leadership post-Brexit. The appointment of Alok Sharma, the new Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to lead the UK’s presidency is welcome, and the UK has a positive story to tell about climate leadership on domestic emissions targets and climate finance to the world’s poorest people – but that is not enough.A successful COP requires strong international diplomacy, effective working relationships with allies, a commitment to putting the voices of those most impacted front and centre, and a roadmap to deliver tangible outcomes. Technological optimism is not enough, and the UK will need to demonstrate a willingness to take hard decisions that deliver global goods at the expense of narrow self-interest. The government will need to show it has the capacity to deliver a successful COP alongside the host of trade negotiations and other agreements necessitated by Britain’s departure from the EU.The UK will no longer be able to easily pool resources with other EU states or automatically expect to have the same level of information-sharing available to its embassies. Worryingly, it has been suggested that UK diplomats have been told to sit apart from their former EU colleagues as a show of independence, potentially straining the interpersonal relationships and restricting the ability to act flexibly that diplomats are likely to need to compensate for lost institutional networks.[26] The FCO and other outward-facing government departments are likely to need extra resourcing to build the capacity they will need to act independently, and it is far from clear that this will be a priority for the government. Furthermore, the speed with which the government is pushing for new trade deals with countries outside the EU will make it hard for some of the more value-orientated goals set out in this essay collection to be delivered. Indeed, even when seeking to roll over the terms of existing EU deals there may be pressure to water down the strength of the human rights clauses, with a lack of effective parliamentary scrutiny, as Ruth Bergan and Dr Emily Jones point out in their essay. There are clear questions around whether the UK has the necessary political clout to fight its corner when negotiating environmental protection rules with the US or human rights clauses with countries who do not share our values or where we have short-term financial or security interests, particularly given the political and economic pressure to get the deals signed as the UK loosens its relationship with the EU.Putting values at the heart of a new UK foreign policySecuring the national interest in an uncertain world has to be about helping set the long-term framework of the international systems in which the UK operates rather than simply a transactional approach that helps get the country through the short-term security and economic challenges to which political incentives are often aligned. Given the increasingly authoritarian and populist turn in countries across the world, the UK (and other like-minded nations) has two main choices: either to acquiesce to this trend as inevitable, or redouble its efforts, in concert with others, to stem the erosion and ensure a future for a reformed liberal democracy at the nation-state level and a more inclusive international system. As a medium-sized power, in spite of all the assets it has, Britain would struggle to turn the tide on its own, even if its short-term political incentives encouraged it to do so. The UK will need to strengthen its engagement with existing partners and institutions as well as look at new ways to work with those who share its values.Particularly post-Brexit, showing the UK’s commitment to multilateralism is an essential part of reassuring the international community that it is still a reliable partner. This would include taking the Council of Europe and OSCE more seriously as forums for engagement in the European and post-Soviet spaces, in addition to NATO, while working to reform all three. This willingness to work within as well as reform multilateral spaces will be even more crucial as the UK seeks to redefine its relationships with the Commonwealth and the Global South. To be taken seriously as a future partner, the UK must tread carefully and intentionally remedy the historic power imbalances institutionalised in the UN and Bretton Woods institutions. In the absence of deliberate action, ‘Global Britain’ could too easily be (mis)interpreted as ‘Empire 2.0’.If the UK (and its allies) is serious about reforming the international order while defending the need for one, it must clearly address the gap between governments and the governed that has been so exploited by populist forces. This means outing and standing against the systemic injustices and inequalities that are the root cause of poverty, and disenfranchisement globally and domestically. It requires a bold re-articulation of the current challenges centred on common causes rather than fuelling the zero-sum narrative of winners and losers (against groups such as immigrants). There has to be greater representation of young people, women, ethnic minorities and the economically marginalised, as set out by a number of authors in this collection, including Marissa Conway. This means opening up foreign policy to wider public scrutiny and acknowledging that win-win solutions are possible, but not easy and not immediate. The economic, social and technological dislocations that are happening are not unique to any one segment of the UK, nor to the UK itself, and there is a need for them to be managed with sensitivity and greater support given to communities undergoing change. Failure to do so will only further fuel an anti-liberal, anti-rights backlash. However, these dislocations should be addressed while, and in part by, tackling the inequalities inherent in the current international rules-based order and in some of the UK’s existing policies.The UK needs to be consistent in the application of its stated values to its enemies and allies alike, as well as to itself. Dominic Raab’s announcement of the greater use of targeted sanctions against individuals involved in human rights abuses, using the ‘Magnitsky’ clause in the 2018 Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, is to be warmly welcomed.[27] However it is notable that the countries being briefed as likely to be covered in the first roll-out include Russia, North Korea and Libya. The test of the government’s commitment will be whether human rights abusers from countries with stronger ties to the UK, such as Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, face such sanctions.[28] The UK should also ensure that the Arms Trade Treaty is applied equally to arms sales to friends and allies as well as enemies. The same applies to global economic rules. In addition to partaking fully in the OECD-BEPS discussions, including about a minimum effective corporate tax rate, the UK must continue to improve the standards of tax transparency in its Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies.[29] The UK cannot claim to uphold the international order while allowing exceptions when it is convenient.In international development a values-led approach is best manifested by maintaining the primacy of poverty reduction as the guiding principle behind aid decisions. The instrumentalisation of aid in service of security or trade objectives would undermine the effectiveness of British aid, which is a key element of Britain’s soft power. Strengthening local ownership, investing in civil society and country capacity to tackle inequalities, and implementing a rights-based approach to development is the best way to deliver development objectives and to contribute to other global goods. The Sustainable Development Goals represent a new model of multilateral decision-making, rooted in the agency of affected populations rather than charity. They also offer Britain a source of untapped solutions to domestic policy challenges.Returning to an imagined golden era of UK foreign policy is not an option. The flaws, inconsistencies and injustices contained within the existing world order have made challenges to it inevitable. The essays in this collection therefore both seek to re-establish the importance of longstanding global norms, rules and multilateral decision-making, whilst also exploring ways to do things differently: with new alliances based on common values; with approaches that explicitly seek to reflect the experiences of the most marginalised people; and with new approaches to emerging strategic problems. They give some ideas on how the UK can find a role in this changing world.What our authors sayBaroness Anelay writes that we are living through a time of worldwide disruption and change. Against that backdrop, the United Kingdom left the European Union on 31^st January 2020 and now has the opportunity to give substance to the mantra of ‘Global Britain’. As the UK navigates our way forward, our strength will lie in maintaining our values grounded in human rights. The times may indeed be changing, but our values should remain constant.Rt Hon Tobias Ellwood MP believes that the UK is emerging from a decisive election victory, with a cautious optimism returning to the nation. He writes that now the Government is turning its attention to developing and promoting ‘Global Britain’, we must ask ourselves what role we are going to play in response to the complex security threats this new decade brings. He believes we face a pivotal moment where, if we choose, the UK can provide the thought leadership, soft power and occasional hard power that can inspire other nations to work with us on reviving the Western project against rising authoritarianism. To do so now will require investment in different strategic areas, but the long-term security and economic benefits of this investment mean he believes that this is a price the nation would deem worth paying.Rt Hon Lord McConnell argues that the multilateral rules-based system has never been more important, but it is undermined from all sides. He writes that the UK must work with others to support it, but that we can also help lead a longer-term debate and mobilisation for reform. He believes it is time for new diplomatic alliances to build 21^st century multilateral institutions, promote basic values and create a safer, fairer and cleaner world.Ruth Bergan and Dr Emily Jones write that post-Brexit, the UK has an extremely ambitious trade agenda: it will begin negotiating its own trade deals for the first time in more than 45 years and take up independent membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this essay, the authors argue that the UK has a unique opportunity to do things differently. It can choose to align trade policy with wider societal goals by making inclusion, equity and sustainability the hallmarks of UK trade policy. It can showcase transparent and inclusive decision-making by introducing gold-standard processes for public and parliamentary engagement in trade policymaking. As it also embarks on hosting COP26, it has a huge opportunity to pioneer new ways of aligning trade and environmental policies, helping to drive work at the WTO and assessing its own trade policy against climate and environmental goals. Finally, it can make sure bilateral and multilateral agreements are aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals and supportive of developing country regional integration plans.Dr Teresa Dumasy, Jonathan Cohen and Richard Reeve write that investments by states in improving global security are failing; in 2020 the world feels a fragile and insecure place. In the UK alone, there are huge differences in the way people experience insecurity. These realities raise important questions for the UK Government about the nature and understanding of security and of the UK’s contribution to it. Ambiguity in the perception of ‘national interest,’ and tension between the UK’s presumed national and transnational interests and those of individual humans and humanity at large call for a reframing of security. The essay puts forward ‘shared security’ as an underpinning value for our future security, defence and foreign policy, and people-focused peacebuilding as a central pillar of shared security practice.Caroline Lucas MP argues that, looking ahead to the crucial climate summit which the UK will co-host in Glasgow in November, the opportunity is there for the UK to show true climate leadership, but it will have to significantly step up its diplomatic effort to achieve what is needed at COP26. She argues that this will have to be accompanied by honesty and integrity in domestic climate policy, ‘getting our own house in order’, recognising the obligation to move further and faster than other countries, supporting them financially to adapt and cover losses, and transferring the technology needed to give everyone a just future in the face of this climate emergency.Theo Clarke MP explores the mutually reinforcing contributions UK aid has made to global development and security, highlighting the central role the Department for International Development (DFID) has played in making Britain a global leader and authority on development. UK aid helps to create a safer, healthier, more prosperous world, and this benefits Britain. Development aid, alongside diplomacy, defence and trade, must continue to play a key role in Britain’s post-Brexit foreign policy.Stephen Twigg argues that the UK has an opportunity to show leadership to tackle Global Goal 10 on inequality. He suggests a number of measures that DFID could take to strengthen its work in this area, including legislative change and a focus on inequality in the next Spending Review and Voluntary National Review. As well as addressing income inequality, he also sets out the case for a renewed commitment to tackling inequality based on gender and disability.Marissa Conway argues that fresh on the heels of Brexit, the landscape of British foreign policy is infused with uncertainty. She poses the question of how we will craft our legacy now that we are outside the structures of the EU. The UK has the opportunity to be a leader in building peace through its foreign policy, not by means of claiming power over others, but by adopting a strong ethical framework to guide its decision-making in order to set a new international standard for placing human rights at the centre of policy. And she writes that there is no better way to do so than by adopting a Feminist Foreign Policy.Sophie Howe explores how Wales, through the Well-being of Future Generations Act 2015, is putting values and the needs of future generations at the top of the agenda in an uncertain world. She urges the rest of Britain to follow in their footsteps. The current system is failing and needs to change. Acknowledging the continued power of vested interests, the risks of political inertia and the hard work required, she argues for brave political leadership that creates the conditions and political infrastructure for progressive change, so future leaders and their societies can tackle the challenges they face based on values of cooperation, responsibility sharing and inclusion.Editors:Adam Hug became Director of the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) in November 2017. He had previously been the Policy Director at the FPC from 2008–2017. His research focuses on human rights and governance issues, particularly in the former Soviet Union. He also writes on UK and EU foreign policy.Dr Abigael Baldoumas is a humanitarian policy advisor for Oxfam GB. She holds a DPhil in Political Science from Oxford University on the role of social movements in shaping public policy in the UK. She has worked in international development since 2012. Her work focuses on forced displacement, gender justice and rights-based humanitarian response.Katy Chakrabortty is the head of advocacy at Oxfam GB. She has been at Oxfam since 2009, and as well as political relations work she has played a major role in Oxfam's Even it Up campaign against extreme economic inequality. Her background is in political campaigning and parliamentary advocacy, having previously worked for the Electoral Reform Society, Amnesty International and DeHavilland.Dr Danny Sriskandarajah joined Oxfam GB as chief executive in January 2019 from CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance of which he was Secretary General for six years. Prior to that he was Director General of the Royal Commonwealth Society, Interim Director of the Commonwealth Foundation and held various posts at the Institute for Public Policy Research.[1] Freedom House, Democracy in Retreat: Freedom In The World 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019[2] Perceptions of the UK’s historic role in the world, both positive and negative, will of course influence how our future actions are perceived by international partners.[3] In nominal GDP terms the UK is the 6^th largest economy in the world behind the US, China, Japan, Germany and India (see Centre for Economics and Business Research, World Economic League Table 2020, December 2019, https://cebr.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/World-Economic-League-Table-Report-2020-Final.pdf); This refers to spending compliant with the OECD’s rules of ODA (see Donor Tracker: United Kingdom donor profile, https://donortracker.org/country/united-kingdom). It is worth noting, for example, in relation to aid that China’s massive spending on the Belt and Road initiative and other international assistance falls outside of the ODA rules. UK Ministry of Defence, Finance and economics annual statistical bulletin: international defence 2019, September 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-defence-expenditure-2019/finance-and-economics-annual-statistical-bulletin-international-defence-2019[4] World Bank estimates are available at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povDuplicateWB.aspx, based on a $1.90 poverty line. The most recent estimates for global poverty refer to 2013.[5] Deborah Hardoon and Jon Slater, Inequality and the end of extreme poverty, Oxfam GB, September 2015, https://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/inequality-and-the-end-of-extreme-poverty-577506[6] Sustainable Development Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg1[7] Dr Malcolm Chalmers from RUSI argues that ‘The UK should cease to promote the narrative that there is one single Rules-Based International System. There is not. Efforts to tackle pressing international problems through collective action are more likely to succeed if they involve coalitions between major powers than if they are only based on rules-based systems that lack clear and binding obligations.’ Malcolm Chalmers, Taking Control: Rediscovering the Centrality of National Interest in UK Foreign and Security Policy, RUSI, February 2020, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/202002_whr_taking_control_web.pdf[8] Jamey Keaten and Paul Wiseman, World trade without rules? US shuts down WTO appeals court, AP News, December 2019, https://apnews.com/a08cc387ff5c1af859e6f17020e29a91[9] Robin Cook, Mission Statement for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London 1997, British Political Speech, http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=292[10] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/preventing-sexual-violence-in-conflict-initiative[11] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights and Democracy Reports, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/human-rights-and-democracy-reports[12] World Peace Foundation and The Fletcher School, Tufts University, The Pergau Dam ‘Arms for Aid’ Scandal, https://sites.tufts.edu/corruptarmsdeals/the-pergau-dam-arms-for-aid-scandal/[13] Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; Independent Commission for Aid Impact, The current state of UK aid: A synthesis of ICAI findings from 2015 to 2019, June 2019, https://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/The-current-state-of-UK-aid_Synthesis-of-ICAI-findings.pdf[14] Stephen Bush, In appointing Anne-Marie Trevelyan, Boris Johnson has completed Theresa May’s revolution, New Statesman America, February 2020, https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2020/02/appointing-anne-marie-trevelyan-boris-johnson-has-completed-theresa-may-s[15] William McKeran, Fusion Doctrine: One Year On, RUSI, March 2019, https://rusi.org/commentary/fusion-doctrine-one-year; Owen Barder, What I Would Like to Hear from the UK Development Secretary: Making the “Fusion Doctrine” Work for the Poor, Center for Global Development, April 2018, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/what-i-would-hear-uk-development-secretary-making-fusion-doctrine-work-poor; UK Government, Reviewing the UK’s national security strategy: The National security Capability Review and the Modernising Defence Programme, July 2019, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/jtselect/jtnatsec/2072/207206.htm; Reuters, The fusion doctrine: in an age of terror and hybrid warfare, UK must deploy all capabilities to defeat enemies, says PM May, South China Morning Post, March 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/2139246/fusion-doctrine-age-terror-and-hybrid-warfare-uk-must-deploy-all; Geoffrey Lyons, Roundtable: Addressing national security challenges through the Fusion Doctrine, Civil Service World, April 2019, https://www.civilserviceworld.com/articles/feature/roundtable-addressing-national-security-challenges-through-fusion-doctrine[16] Eleanor Gruffydd-Jones, Afghan interpreters’ UK immigration rules ‘anguish’, BBC News, January 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-46825201. Information relating to difficulties faced by the families of World Service journalists was raised at a meeting of the London Leadership Council of the Committee to Project Journalists in April 2019.[17] Christo Mitkov, UK election 2019: the parties’ competing visions for Britain’s place in the world, The Conversation, November 2019, https://theconversation.com/uk-election-2019-the-parties-competing-visions-for-britains-place-in-the-world-127890; Foreign and Commonwealth Office and The Rt Hon Dominic Raab MP, Foreign Secretary’s introduction to the Queen’s Speech debate, January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-introduction-to-queens-speech-debate; Boris Johnson, Boris Johnson: Britain must become the Superman of global free trade, The Spectator, February 2020, https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2020/02/boris-johnson-britain-must-become-the-superman-of-global-free-trade/[18] Forces Network, Boris Johnson Pledges Security, Defence And Foreign Policy Review, December 2019, https://www.forces.net/news/boris-johnson-pledges-security-defence-and-foreign-policy-review[19] James Landale, Cabinet reshuffle: International development and Foreign Office merger? BBC News, February 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51507273[20] Ibid. 17.[21] ICAI, https://icai.independent.gov.uk/; Molly Anders, UK aid brand at risk from cross-government funds, says IDC report, Devex, June 2018, https://www.devex.com/news/uk-aid-brand-at-risk-from-cross-government-funds-says-idc-report-92877; Publish What You Fund, The 2018 Aid Transparency Index, http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/the-index/2018/[22] Abby Young-Powell, What happens when an aid department is folded? Devex, December 2019, https://www.devex.com/news/what-happens-when-an-aid-department-is-folded-96262[23] From Poverty to Power, How to stop the Foreign Office gobbling up DFID?, Oxfam Blogs, January 2020, https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/how-to-stop-the-foreign-office-gobbling-up-dfid/[24] Julian Borger, Trump re-election could sound death knell for NATO, allies fear, The Guardian, December 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/02/nato-donald-trump-second-term; The Economist, Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead, November 2019, https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead[25] Ian Bond, NATO: Brain dead, or just resting? Centre for European Reform, December 2019, https://www.cer.eu/node/8210/view-email[26] David Wilcok, ‘It’s like something from school’: Irish leader Leo Varadkar clashes with Dominic Raab over ‘petty’ order for UK diplomats not to SIT with former EU friends at the international events as they spar over post-Brexit trade, Mail Online, February 2020, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7957667/They-not-friends-Dominic-Raab-orders-UK-diplomats-not-SIT-EU-states.html[27] UK Government – Legislation, Sanctions and Anti-Money laundering Act 2018, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/13/contents/enacted[28] George Parker, UK to begin crackdown on human rights abusers, Financial Times, January 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/38cd4b7e-32fd-11ea-a329-0bcf87a328f2[29] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.Photo credit: Lighthouse and sunset, Isle of Skye. Image by Frank Winkler from Pixabay.  [post_title] => Finding Britain's role in a changing world: Introduction [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => finding-britains-role-in-a-chaning-world-introduction [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-03-09 15:39:53 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-03-09 15:39:53 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4539 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[4] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4503 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2020-03-03 00:01:50 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-03-03 00:01:50 [post_content] => The extent to which the United Kingdom is to be taken seriously on the world stage post-Brexit will depend significantly on whether it has the confidence to stand up for what it says it believes in, or risk its focus on trade being seen as a sign of weakness and inexorable decline. There is a widely shared fear, particularly in the short to medium term as the UK completes its conscious uncoupling from the European Union, that commercial considerations will overwhelm other priorities. If the UK is seen to ignore its stated values and wider strategic interests in pursuit of new trade deals, the Brexit process will have diminished the UK’s standing in the world rather than marking the start of a new and more vibrant chapter. The UK must aspire to be more than simply a cold, wet Dubai.A whole-government approach to the UK’s foreign policy is to be welcomed. However, it is important to ensure that the UK’s values do not get lost amid inter-departmental wrangling; they must instead be mainstreamed to all those involved in policy-making and delivery. A joined-up government should not come at the expense of the world’s poorest people or those facing human rights abuses and conflict.The UK has an opportunity to articulate a powerful vision for ‘Global Britain’ that is defined by commitments to human rights, inclusive representation at home and abroad, and by the ways it uses resources to have the greatest impact on poverty and inequality. The current Foreign Secretary has said that the ‘guiding lights’ for the current integrated policy review ‘will be free trade, democracy, human rights and the international rule of law’.[1] Different stakeholders and political actors will have different views about what should be contained in such a statement of values, but whatever the government decides, a clear, concise declaration that enumerates the key principles would be very helpful. Authors in this collection have set out potential principles for such a declaration including ensuring policy alignment with the Sustainable Developments Goals (SDGs); ensuring wider representation of women, young people and marginalised communities (both from the UK and our partners in the Global South) in the policy development process; and ensuring that policies uphold longstanding goals around support for democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Baroness Anelay has written about the need to incorporate the ‘Ruggie Principles’ on business and human rights into the UK trade agenda.[2] Stephen Twigg has spoken in detail about the need for a clear set of indicators on economic inequality and the centrality of gender to development to assess policy impact. Marissa Conway makes the case that a feminist foreign policy would provide a strong ethical framework to guide decisions and set a new international standard. The Government’s Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review should help define and refine these principles into a clear and codified statement of the values of ‘Global Britain’ that would give an unambiguous signal to the international community and to stakeholders across the Government.Building on such a statement of values, the Government should consider enhancing existing consultation practices by setting a ‘Global Britain’ values test for all major policy and spending decisions with an international dimension, including trade deals. This would set out the Government’s impact assessment of how each decision will affect the goals enumerated in the ‘Global Britain’ values statement and examine its implications for the needs of future generations and the most vulnerable people in the world. The results of this assessment should then be published ahead of decisions being taken to encourage feedback, input and scrutiny from Parliament, key stakeholders and the wider public.Keeping in mind the ideals of good governance, transparency and accountability that the UK looks to promote abroad, the Government should think carefully about how it develops new decision-making processes. It should rethink its current approach that limits parliamentary accountability and public scrutiny over trade deals. Given past critiques of decision-making in the EU when the UK was a member, new processes in Westminster should not be less publicly accountable than the processes for scrutiny by the European Parliament, Member States and public that it has just left. As proposed by Ruth Bergan and Dr Emily Jones, the government should publish its draft negotiating mandates (with headline information about priorities); the International Trade Select Committee or a new Trade Scrutiny Committee needs to be involved in regular dialogue with ministers and officials with scope for proper scrutiny on the progress of ongoing negotiations; and the agreed trade deals should be subject to a proper debate and approval vote in Parliament.[3] Similarly, new UK trade deals should have at least as strong human rights clauses as the deals being done by the EU and where possible it should seek to strengthen them.While developing its own foreign policy independent of the EU, the UK still needs to show it is willing to work with like-minded partners. This will not only involve seeking to build a strong foreign policy and security partnership with the EU as part of the post-Brexit process, but it should also seek to enhance or create a range of bilateral mechanisms with Member States that augment, but do not seek to replace, relationships with the EU, such as UK-France defence cooperation under the Lancaster House Treaties and continued involvement in the E3 group on Iran.[4] As Lord McConnell argues, the UK must also seek to deepen relations with countries who share similar values and not-dissimilar strategic positions, such as Canada, Japan and New Zealand, with the UK-Canadian joint Campaign on Media Freedom being an important example of the potential for joint working.[5] The UK will also need to retain an active presence at international forums to project its continuing global role – as Rt Hon Tobias Ellwood points out, the absence of senior ministers from the February 2020 Munich Security Conference was not seen as a good sign by Britain’s international partners.Alongside new state-level alliances, the government should reaffirm its commitment to working in partnership with civil society. Civil society networks reinforce and deepen state-level cooperation. Many of the authors in this collection highlight the role of civil society in tackling so many of the challenges facing the world today: Baroness Anelay on delivering international development goals; Jonathan Cohen, Dr Theresa Dumasy and Richard Reeve on peacebuilding and security; Marissa Conway on shaping values-based foreign policy; Ruth Bergen and Dr Emily Jones on trade; and Sophie Howe on sustainable societies. Globally, restrictions on civil society space are increasing,[6] but the government should ensure that its own actions, including counter-terrorism agendas, do not inadvertently restrict civil society space further.A clear focus on continued engagement in the UK’s neighbourhood aligns with its capabilities, the threats it faces and its opportunities. Given the pressure on Europe’s eastern flank from Russia, the UK should continue to show its support for the Baltic States and other NATO Member States, as well as with Ukraine. There will also be scope to show renewed and enhanced engagement with NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE), working within them to reform their processes and ensure that they meet both their founding objectives and the values and priorities which the UK is seeking to promote.[7] It will be important to ensure that the contentious domestic debate about the way in which the European Convention on Human Rights is incorporated into British law through the Human Rights Act takes place in a way that does not undermine the UK’s commitment to the Convention itself nor the UK’s membership of the CoE, or further encourage other CoE members to ignore their responsibilities under the Convention.[8]One way to show that the UK is not being overly cowed by commercial constraints will be ensuring that UK ambassadors feel supported and encouraged to speak out on human rights and other abuses taking place in the countries where they are posted. Such actions should often be coordinated with other like-minded partners to benefit from strength in numbers, whilst not being afraid to show leadership where necessary. Ministerial statements should follow a similar approach. While the UK is not in a position to dictate terms to countries abusing human rights and other international values, such statements are often of significant value to local activists working to defend their rights.With the spectre of a no-deal Brexit removed, immediate concerns about existing EU funding for UK non-governmental organisations (NGOs) through 2020 have been alleviated.[9] However, it remains unclear how and in what form the £1.5 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) that is currently dispensed through EU mechanisms will be repatriated. As has been argued by a number of authors, not least Baroness Anelay and Theo Clarke MP, our development expertise and aid budget remain major global assets in building a values-based foreign policy. The government’s integrated review should be an opportunity for development expertise to have influence across our foreign policy, creating policy coherence for development, and therefore maintain a values-based and long-term strategic vision for our foreign policy that helps create a more peaceful, prosperous, and equitable world for all. Proposals to subsume the Department for International Development (DFID) under the auspices of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) should be shelved, and the government should ensure that aid spending across all departments retains a strong poverty focus – in line with the International Development Act. At an operational level, DFID could explicitly consider the impact of development programming on economic inequality. This could, for instance, result in greater focus on supporting the public provision of health, high quality education and social protection.The UK is an international centre of excellence for peacebuilding, with experienced NGOs and academic experts who have until recently received a significant proportion of their project funding through pooled EU grants. It will be important to ensure that as funding streams are repatriated to direct UK control this expertise is maintained and developed. This may mean reviewing and revising existing UK mechanisms for funding peacebuilding to ensure that they are agile and appropriate for civil society peacebuilding work. Similarly, existing support for the FCO’s human rights and governance initiatives, both through embassies and through centrally coordinated schemes should be built upon and enhanced, rather than risk marginalisation behind economic and trade priorities. Wherever possible such mechanisms should be flexible enough to support smaller and specialist NGOs and experts, rather than being more accessible to large consultancies as can be the case.As the Foreign Secretary has already announced, one way to show leadership on human rights issues would be to increase the use of ‘Magnitsky’ sanctions against human rights abusers who have some financial connections to the UK. The use of these and other financial instruments, such as Unexplained Wealth Orders, are to be warmly welcomed but it is important to ensure they are being used consistently based on the level of wrongdoing rather than the strategic alignment of their country of origin.[10] To assist with this process, it will be vital to ensure the full implementation of the Registration of Overseas Entities Bill, as set out in the Queen’s Speech, which will finally create the long-awaited beneficial ownership register for UK properties owned by offshore-entities, as well as the wider 2019–2022 Economic Crime Plan.[11]As is made clear by the essays on trade from Ruth Bergen and Dr Emily Jones, as well as by Baroness Anelay, it is impossible to separate global political foreign policy from international economic issues. The promotion of an international rules-based order also requires the UK to lead in setting and enforcing fair global economic rules that work for everyone and that deliver positive outcomes in line with the SDGs as well as international commitments on climate change and human rights. Baroness Anelay’s suggestion to include economic issues in the remit of the National Security Council is one part of a solution, but it also requires articulating solutions to global economic challenges that put the rights and needs of people at the centre. It will mean putting our own house in order as well as working to make the global economic rules as fair as possible. The ongoing OECD-BEPS discussions, including a minimum effective corporate tax rate, are one opportunity for the UK to engage positively to strengthen international governance. Meanwhile, the UK should ensure its own Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies continue to reform to achieve higher standards of tax transparency.[12]The United Nations Climate Summit in Glasgow (COP26) represents a chance for real climate leadership from the UK Government and is the first big test of a values-based vision for ‘Global Britain’. As Caroline Lucas MP argues, this will be dependent on investment in the hard work of diplomacy to raise the ambition of other nations’ plans to reduce emissions, getting our own house in order at home, and a relentless focus on a just way forward for the countries and communities worst affected. Beyond the COP, policy coherence is key. As Caroline Lucas sets out clearly, the government cannot continue to finance fossil fuel projects overseas while claiming climate leadership. The UK’s trade regime could be a powerful expression of its commitment to environmental and sustainability policy, as Ruth Bergen and Dr Emily Jones make clear. The government should review all trade provisions in its trade agreements to ‘stress test’ them against climate goals as well as human rights commitments, potentially using the suggested ‘Global Britain’ values process outlined above.In a fast-changing world with new powers rising, old institutions struggling and future challenges emerging, having a clear approach to values in British foreign policy is not just about doing what we think is right but about ensuring we are actively helping to shape the international systems, norms and rules that the UK will have to work within for decades to come. The threats to the idea of liberal democracy from increasingly confident authoritarian states and internal strains and inequalities in established democracies are real, and need to be addressed to halt and reverse its decline. As a medium-sized power, albeit one with considerable assets, the UK will need to show it is still willing to work collaboratively with partners, and to use the tools of influence available to it to creatively and meaningfully shape the future direction of the international system and to respond effectively to specific crises and abuses of its values.RecommendationsBased on the findings of this publication that values should be an important part of the foundations of future UK foreign policy, we would like to make a number of recommendations.The UK Government should:

• Agree a clear ‘Global Britain’ values statement of the principles underpinning the UK’s role in the world.
• Use the values statement to develop a ‘Global Britain Benchmark’ that assesses the impact of new policies against these principles.
• Demonstrate a renewed commitment to engage with and reform the regional and multilateral institutions the UK remains a part of, while building new partnerships for the future.
• Defend and maintain the spirit as well as the fact of its commitment to allocate 0.7 per cent Gross National Income (GNI) to international development assistance by:
• Keeping a separate Department for International Development with a Secretary of State for International Development;
• Ensuring aid spending across all departments retains a strong poverty focus – in line with the International Development Act; and by the
• Coordination and sharing of best practice on aid spending, which would see other government departments meeting higher standards on aid transparency.
• Show that the UK still has the confidence and stature to stand up for its values by supporting those who defend them, and speaking out and taking action when they are abused, by:
• Encouraging ambassadors and ministers to condemn human rights abuses wherever they occur;
• Actively using and equitably applying new ‘Magnitsky’-style personal sanctions;
• Fully implementing new measures to improve financial transparency, and take further action on tax havens; and
• Increasing and improving UK funding for peacebuilding and human rights.
• Remain actively committed to the promotion of human rights, defence and security in the European neighbourhood, of which the UK is still a part.
• Take decisive and immediate action to demonstrate climate leadership, including:
  • Announcing a high-ambition Nationally Defined Contribution (NDC) for COP26 and working with countries around the world to aim for increased ambition in their NDCs, in time to know how much is left to do to close the gap between current plans and the aim of limiting warming to 1.5°C;
  • Scaling up resources to impacted communities, including a new goal for climate finance for adaptation, and leading efforts to find new and additional sources of finance for loss and damage;
  • Immediately stopping all new support for fossil fuels (oil, coal and gas) and phasing out existing investments;
  • Implementing policies at home that demonstrably put us on track for net zero as soon as possible, without using international offsets, and recognising that – without the inclusion of consumption emissions – this is only part of the job.
• Ensure efforts to address international economic issues are joined up with global political foreign policy by:
  • Including economic issues within the remit of the National Security Council; and
  • Partaking fully in the OECD-BEPS discussions, including on a minimum effective corporate tax rate, as well as ensuring that the UK’s own Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies continue to reform to meet higher standards of tax transparency.

 Adam Hug became Director of the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) in November 2017. He had previously been the Policy Director at the FPC from 2008–2017. His research focuses on human rights and governance issues, particularly in the former Soviet Union. He also writes on UK and EU foreign policy.Dr Abigael Baldoumas is a humanitarian policy advisor for Oxfam GB. She holds a DPhil in Political Science from Oxford University on the role of social movements in shaping public policy in the UK. She has worked in international development since 2012. Her work focuses on forced displacement, gender justice and rights-based humanitarian response.Katy Chakrabortty is the head of advocacy at Oxfam GB. She has been at Oxfam since 2009, and as well as political relations work she has played a major role in Oxfam’s Even it Up campaign against extreme economic inequality. Her background is in political campaigning and parliamentary advocacy, having previously worked for the Electoral Reform Society, Amnesty International and DeHavilland.Dr Danny Sriskandarajah joined Oxfam GB as chief executive in January 2019 from CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance of which he was Secretary General for six years. Prior to that he was Director General of the Royal Commonwealth Society, Interim Director of the Commonwealth Foundation and held various posts at the Institute for Public Policy Research.[1] FCO and The Rt Hon Dominic Rabb MP, Foreign Secretary’s introduction to the Queen’s Speech debate, January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-introduction-to-queens-speech-debate[2]Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, UN "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework and Guiding Principles, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/un-secretary-generals-special-representative-on-business-human-rights/un-protect-respect-and-remedy-framework-and-guiding-principles[3] For more background see: Trade Justice Movement, Securing democracy in UK Trade policy, November 2017, https://www.tjm.org.uk/documents/briefings/0870_TJM_SECURING_DEMOCRACY_2019_PRF1.pdf[4] Ministry of Defence, UK and France defence cooperation, September 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-and-france-defence-cooperation; Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street and The Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP, E3 statement on the JCPoA: 12 January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/e3-statement-on-the-jcpoa-12-january-2020[5] There are of course a number of caveats raised about the lack of clear actions being taken from the work so far as highlighted by campaign groups such as: Article 19, UK: Government must take more action on media freedom, September 2019, https://www.article19.org/resources/uk-government-must-take-more-action-on-media-freedom/; Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Liberty is under attack as journalists are silenced, say MPs, UK Parliament, September 2019, https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/news-parliament-2017/global-media-freedom-report-published-17-19/[6] Danny Sriskandarajah, Under threat: five countries in which civic space is rapidly closing, Open Democracy, January 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/openglobalrights-openpage/under-threat-five-countries-in-which-civic-space-is-rapi/[7] See for example the ideas set out in: Adam Hug, Institutionally blind? International organisations and human rights abuses in the former Soviet Union, The Foreign Policy Centre, February 2016, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/institutionallyblind/; and Adam Hug, Institutionally Blind: The next steps in reforming the Council of Europe and the OSCE, The Foreign Policy Centre, November 2017, https://fpc.org.uk/institutionally-blind-next-steps-reforming-council-europe-osce/[8] David Maddox, Attorney General vows to change Human Rights Act and limit power of Supreme Court judges, Daily Express, February 2020, https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1242879/attorney-general-suella-braverman-human-rights-act-supreme-court-judges-cabinet-reshuffle[9] DFID, EU-funded programmes under the withdrawal agreement, January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/eu-funded-programmes-under-the-withdrawal-agreement[10] Home Office, Circular 003/2018: unexplained wealth orders, February 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/circular-0032018-criminal-finances-act-unexplained-wealth-orders/circular-0032018-unexplained-wealth-orders[11] Transparency International UK, Measures to tackle dirty money in UK property market a major step in fight against corruption, December 2019, https://www.transparency.org.uk/press-releases/registration-of-overseas-entities-bill-queens-speech-2019/; HM Treasury and Home Office, Economic crime plan 2019 to 2022, July 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/economic-crime-plan-2019-to-2022[12] The OECD and G20 are working on a new Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) framework to address corporate tax avoidance. See https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/Photo credit: Lighthouse and sunset, Isle of Skye. Image by Frank Winkler from Pixabay.  [post_title] => Finding Britain's role in a changing world: Conclusions and Recommendations [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => finding-britains-role-in-a-changing-world-conclusions-and-recommendations [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-03-17 08:16:35 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-03-17 08:16:35 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4503 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[5] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4106 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2019-09-26 09:25:58 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-09-26 09:25:58 [post_content] =>

This Norwegian Helsinki Committee and Foreign Policy Centre publication seeks to draw attention to the human rights situation in some of Europe’s most contested but least well known places: Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Crimea. When unrecognised states or disputed territories are on the agenda it is usually about the unresolved nature of their conflicts with the countries they have tried to leave, and the role of external patronage and tight security grip exercised by Russia and (in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh) by Armenia, or indeed assessing the risks of ceasefire violations. These issues, and the thorny questions of status, provide the backdrop to this publication but this essay collection’s primary focus is what can be done to improve the human rights situation despite these challenges. It brings together a range of different perspectives, both from the ground and from international experts.

The publication has three central observations. Firstly, that it is essential that more is done to support the work of local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), journalists and lawyers to help them build their capacity and to improve collaboration between them in challenging circumstances. It addresses how the international community needs to find ways to encourage the de facto authorities not to close civic space or place restrictions on NGO activity.

Secondly, there is a need to improve access to international law and international monitoring processes. The publication highlights the importance of the European Convention on Human Rights, whose rights and responsibilities apply in the unrecognised states as a result of all the recognised state parties to the conflicts being signatories, both the states with de jure sovereignty and particularly for the powers that act as ‘patrons’ or occupiers. More can be done to support lawyers both on the ground and internationally in taking cases to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and courts operating under universal jurisdiction in third countries. Effective documentation of human rights abuses may also open up opportunities for the use of ‘Magnitsky’ legislation or other personal sanctions on human rights abusers from or operating in disputed territories. More must be done to enable United Nations (UN), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe and other international human rights monitoring missions to overcome wrangling over ‘status’ issues to conduct their work in these territories.   

Thirdly, that issues of conflict resolution and human rights come together in the vital issues of protecting both the rights of internally displaced person (IDP) communities (particularly the very large Azerbaijani and Georgian IDP populations) and the human rights of ethnic Georgians, Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and Moldovans who are still trying to live in the disputed territories which have mainly been home to them since before the conflicts began. The international community must ensure these issues are an important part of their dialogue with the de facto authorities, as well as improving assistance to countries managing the needs of their IDP communities.

Key Recommendations

To the de facto authorities and recognised state governments

• Abide by all international human rights standards and allow access for monitoring missions;
• End pressures on NGOs, including those working with international partners or donors;
• Protect the rights and welfare of IDPs and minority groups;

To the International Community and Global Civil Society

• Prioritise human rights issues in dialogue with the de facto authorities and the state parties;
• Support capacity-building for civil society, journalists and lawyers in unrecognised states;
• Improve access to international legal mechanisms (e.g. ECtHR) and universal courts;
• Use sanctions, including ‘Magnitsky’ type provisions, against rights abusers in de facto states;
• Improve support for IDP communities.

[post_title] => Disputed Territories, Disputed Rights: Executive Summary [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => disputed-territories-disputed-rights-executive-summary [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-09-26 09:26:28 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-09-26 09:26:28 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4106 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[6] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4034 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2019-09-26 09:11:10 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-09-26 09:11:10 [post_content] =>

If the defence of human rights is to be truly universal it is important to examine whether and how these rights can still be protected even in spaces that fall at the margins of the international system. The authors in this Norwegian Helsinki Committee and Foreign Policy Centre publication aim to shine a spotlight on the human rights situations in some of Europe’s most contested but least well understood spaces: Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Crimea. The international community’s focus on managing these conflicts can sometimes overlook the need for the inhabitants of these areas to enjoy the same rights and freedoms from persecution as those in established states.

A very brief history

This publication seeks, as much as possible, to avoid trying to tackle the huge and vexed issues around conflict resolution, the ongoing humanitarian tragedy of internally displaced persons (IDPs) or the status of de facto entities and their wider place in the world, which are much more fully addressed elsewhere.^[1] Nevertheless they are issues that frame and shape the discussion so it is important to briefly set out the backgrounds to the conflicts. Each of these conflicts has their own unique challenges and dynamics but nevertheless there are some shared roots that underpin them.

The existence of these conflicts and (broadly) unrecognised entities can trace their roots back to the way the patchwork of ethnicity and territory during Soviet times swiftly unravelled upon the Union’s collapse. Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh have all separated themselves from the larger entities to which they were attached during Soviet times. The flowering of national identity, and with it often radical nationalism, amongst the peoples of the collapsing Soviet Union manifested itself at many different and competing levels. The reassertion of national identity at the level of the former republics, now independent countries, came into conflict with the parallel flowering of identities amongst the national minorities and autonomous regions that sat within their borders, whose relationships with their regional centres and majority populations had been traditionally mediated and managed by Moscow. The newly emerging states saw the presence and divergent priorities of autonomous units within their territory as a challenge to their ability to consolidate their control of the state and national legitimacy. Efforts by these new states to define and build their national identities through cultural markers (such as national religious institutions) and to promote national languages in place of Russian or minority languages further widened the disconnect between local majorities and minorities.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was an ethnic Armenian-majority political entity situated entirely within the borders of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). The movement to, unsuccessfully, persuade the Soviet Union to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh from the control of the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR known as the Karabakh Committee was an important mobilising block within the rising Armenian national consciousness during the 1980s. The Armenian leadership of the Oblast called on the USSR in 1988 to transfer control of the territory from Azerbaijani to Armenian control and organised a local referendum that was boycotted by the Azerbaijani community. Tensions grew between Armenian and Azerbaijani communities across the region with significant inter-communal violence (in 1988 in Sumgait and 1990 in Baku against long-established Armenian minority communities) and significant transfers of population between the two republics. Following on running disputes and shortly before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in November 1991 the Parliament of the Azerbaijani SSR dissolved the legal status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast^[2], triggering the Oblast’s leadership to declare independence. War was shortly joined by both the de facto authorities and the new states of Armenia and Azerbaijan, with significant loss of both combatant and civilian life, including the massacre of Azerbaijani civilians at Khojaly. By the time of the ceasefire declaration on May 5^th 1994 the Armenian forces had been victorious, taking control of Nagorno-Karabakh, creating a new de facto administration called the Republic of Artsakh based out of Stepanakert and occupying the surrounding seven districts of Azerbaijan, forcing the Azerbaijani populations of those regions to flee as IDPs and who have since been unable to return, 644,000 in total.^[3] In addition to the IDPs the flow of refugees between Armenia and Azerbaijan comprised 360,000 ethnic Armenians who arrived in Armenia from Azerbaijan^[4]  and around 250,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis who arrived from Armenia from 1988 to 1994.^[5]  

Tensions along the line of contact remain fierce with sniper fire and border skirmishes claiming 20 to 30 lives each year, both military and civilian, with a notable flare-up in 2016 leading to even greater casualties (up to 300) and a small territorial advance by Azerbaijani forces.^[6] The continuing risk of such incidents flaring into a wider conflagration remains ever present. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group under the auspices of the three co-chairs from France, Russia and the United States, brings together the Governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia for talks. Ceasefire monitoring is conducted under the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and his small staff of field advisers, but with the parties remaining far apart the overall international effort remains predominantly a conflict management rather than a resolution process. The de facto authorities of the self-styled ‘Republic of Artsakh’ are not represented at the talks.

Abkhazia had the status of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic with a greater freedom of local governance at the time of the USSR’s collapse than the other entities under examination here. Ethnic Abkhaz had a strong and separate identity but at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union they only accounted for 17 per cent of the population withGeorgians forming a narrow majority of those living in the area.^[7] Tensions around the status of the region were exacerbated by the centralising tendencies of the new nationalist President of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, leading it to take steps towards independence. However it was during the chaos and conflict in the wake of Gamsakhurdia’s ouster that saw a military expedition against a pro-Gamsakhurdia militia by Georgian army commander Tengiz Kitovani, who decided to lead an assault on Abkhazia’s capital Sukhumi that triggered the outbreak of war. The war would see around five percent of the Abkhaz population either killed or injured. The majority of the Georgian population in Abkhazia fled or were expelled (over 200,000 IDPs)^[8] in a victory for Abkhaz forces backed by elements of the Russian military and fighters from the north Caucasus.^[9] The de facto authorities gained control over most of the territory of the region save for the Kodori Gorge which remained under Georgian jurisdiction and would prove a source of insecurity and tension between all stakeholders until 2008. The territory has also seen periodic waves of expulsion/flight and then return of portions of the pre-war Georgian population in Abkhazia, most notably to the Gali region adjacent to areas of full Georgian control, where between 45,000 and 55,000 Georgians are now believed to be living in the present day (fluctuations tend to happen around harvest time).^[10]

In the 1990s the conflict in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast between separatist forces and the Georgian government was somewhat overshadowed by the conflict in Abkhazia but was subject to similar trends and forces, with local autonomy clashing with the centralising tendencies of the new Georgian state and a resurgent Georgian national identity and nationalism. Again the war was won by separatist forces, with the local South Ossetian forces backed by local Russian military units, but Georgia was able to exercise considerable control both directly and informally over significant portions of the South Ossetian countryside until 2008. Between 1996 and 2004 the Ergneti market on the Georgian side of the (then) loose boundary line with South Ossetia served as a bustling meeting place between the two communities, bonding over the sale of contraband goods. The closure of Ergneti as part of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s anti-smuggling drive was seen as a significant blow to local community relations.

The situation in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia changed dramatically as a result of the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008. Escalating geo-strategic tensions between Georgia and Russia, that manifested themselves in 2008 through Russia’s lifting of sanctions against the de facto Governments, increased Russian military activity in both entities and a series of attacks between Georgian forces and their Abkhaz and South Ossetian counterparts took place. After shelling and a number of skirmishes in early August, Georgian President Saakashvili ordered full-scale military action which initially took control of significant sections of South Ossetia from the de facto authorities. Russian forces declared war on Georgia, an action which it argued was in response to the death of its peacekeepers in the region, leading to a conflict from August 7^th to 12^th 2008. This conflict saw up to 850 dead,^[11] the withdrawal of Georgian forces from the entirety of South Ossetia (including all areas it had held prior to 2008), the expulsion of Georgian forces and authorities from Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, a significant new flow of Georgian IDPs from both regions^[12] and for a brief period the Russian occupation of Georgian towns including Gori and Zugdidi. Shortly after the ceasefire on August 26^th 2008 Russia formally recognised the independence of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, setting the stage for the status quo in both regions today. ^[13]

Transnistria’s break from Moldova was mainly political but also spurred by linguistic and cultural divides. In 1990 the leadership of Tiraspol, the Russian speaking second largest city in the Moldavian SSR attempted to claim independence from its Moldovan counterparts, joining with other areas on the east (left) bank of the Dniester River to proclaim membership of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. After the fall of the Soviet Union this area claimed independence amid the backdrop of movements in Moldova to increase ties with Romania, to transition linguistically from Russian to Romanian and from Cyrillic to the Latin script. A short military conflict took place between March and July 1992, with separatist forces achieving victory with support from Russia’s 14^th Army and a mix of Cossacks and other irregular forces. Since the conflict a tri-lateral peacekeeping force and command structure between Moldova, Russia and the de facto authorities has managed the de-militarised zone at the international border with Ukraine. Compared to the current state of other conflict areas examined in this publication there has been a considerable degree of normalisation and engagement between the de facto authorities and their Moldovan counterparts, with trade, both legal and black-market, continuing and the political leadership of the breakaway region traveling freely to and from Chisinau airport as noted by Alina Radu in this publication.^[14]

Crimea at different times held both ASSR and Oblast status and sat within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic before its transfer to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954. Crimea’s Tatar population was expelled from the region in the 1940s under Stalin and were only able to return in the twilight days of the Soviet Union. Crimea’s status had been the subject of some debate both before and after the collapse of the USSR, with the Crimean Supreme Council attempting to declare independence in 1992 and trying to vote for greater autonomy in 1994. However after this initial burst of activism tensions subsided and began to be folded into the broad linguistic, political and cultural tensions within Ukraine. In the wake of the 2013-14 Euromaidan protests and the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ that saw President Yanukovych removed from office, the tensions over the post-independence territorial settlement resurfaced dramatically. Previous divisions provided an organising hook around which to frame the Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of Donbass. Russia sent troops operating clandestinely without insignia (known as ‘little green men’) into Crimea on February 27^th 2014 to capture major installations and surround Ukrainian military forces. The Russian backed ‘de facto authorities’ under the leadership of Sergey Aksyonov, who had previously led the small Russian Unity party in the Crimean Supreme Council^[15], pushed through a referendum on Crimea’s status on March 16^th 2014, boycotted by its opponents and rejected by the international community, which saw a declaration of support for joining Russia as a Federal Subject (Republic), although with thin turnout in substantially lower numbers than claimed by the Kremlin. The Russian authorities completed the annexation on March 18^th 2014 declaring the creation of the Republic of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. The conflict saw the displacement of some ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars from Crimea as IDPs. 

Where we are today

These conflicts have remained unresolved until the present day, with de facto authorities becoming more entrenched year by year. International attempts at mediation, primarily through the OSCE, have floundered between the Scylla and Charybdis of competing, and often opposing, rights to self-determination and territorial integrity, the involvement of parties to the conflict (primarily Russia) in the mediation mechanisms and the IDP issue.

So as Dr Dennis Sammut points out in his piece perhaps the greatest humanitarian and human rights challenge falls outside the scope of this specific publication^[16], the IDPs left in the wake of these conflicts. The numbers of IDPs and refugees^[17] are greatly contested as noted above but remain in the hundreds of thousands^[18], providing an enormous logistical strain on the governments taking care of them and a so far irreconcilable issue in the attempts at conflict resolution. This essay collection is not the best place to elucidate or litigate the IDP or conflict issue as there are already a number of major publications exploring this vital topic.^[19]

The publication’s aim is to focus on the situation on the ground in and around these disputed territories and what the status quo means for residents living under the control of the de facto authorities. In a number of cases there are new dynamics and potential uncertainties. Focusing on the human rights standards within the disputed territories the annual Freedom House rankings provide their usual brief pen picture of the situation with Abkhazia^[20] and Nagorno Karabakh^[21] listed as partially free, while Transnistria^[22], South Ossetia^[23] and Crimea^[24] are listed as not-free.

Abkhazia has seen internal tensions that, as well as personal rivalries, partially contain divisions between those wishing to build up its independent institutions and those wishing to promote (or who see no alternative to) closer integration with Russia, with Moscow more clearly supporting the latter project since the 2008 war. In 2014 when President Alexander Ankvab was forced to resign after public protests against corruption and mismanagement, then opposition leader Raul Khajimba defeated Aslan Bzhania in an election between candidates both seen as closer to Russia than Ankvab but where the victor’s supporters were alleged to have been influential in removing ethnic Georgians from the voter rolls.^[25] Particularly in the area of security it is an open secret that the de facto authorities are expected to defer to Russian demands and with a significant presence of Russian security personnel on the ground.

In April 2019 Aslan Bzhania, who was seen as a front runner in the 2019 de facto Presidential election, along with his bodyguards were hospitalised in Moscow with a mystery illness that was subsequently identified by a German laboratory as  mercury (and other toxic metal) poisoning.^[26] Bzhania’s position towards the Russians has shifted overtime and in 2016 he was arrested by the Russian security services while he was seeking to build pressure on Khajimba to resign, so overall he was seen to be more wary over Moscow’s integration efforts towards Abkhazia than the current leadership.^[27] With Bzhania’s health still recovering, including continued difficulty breathing, his ally Alkhas Kvitsinia stood as the main opposition candidate. Also worth noting is that a few weeks prior to the first round Khajimba had a well-publicised meeting with President Putin, seen as an indication of Russian backing.

In the closely fought first round the incumbent President Khajimba received around 26 per cent of the vote to Kvitsinia’s just over 25 per cent, while the ally of former President Ankvab, former deputy minister Oleg Arshba, was narrowly beaten into third with just below 25 per cent.^[28] In the horse trading that followed the first round former President Ankvab had endorsed the candidacy of Kvitsinia in return for an agreement for Ankvab to become Prime Minister in the event of victory. However despite this alliance Khajimba was able to defeat his rival by a mere 999 votes on September 8^th 2019.^[29]

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and other formal international human rights mechanisms have had access to Abkhazia (and South Ossetia) rejected by the de facto authorities.^[30] However unlike their Ossetian counterparts the Abkhaz authorities have allowed some forms of international access. Former Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, in partnership with the International Crisis Group’s Magdalena Grono, were tasked by the European Union (EU) to undertake a review of the human rights situation in the disputed territory and were granted access. Their report became stuck in wrangling over the language used to discuss status issues between Georgia and the EU,^[31] leading the authors in exasperation to release their findings independently via the Olaf Palme Centre.^[32] Their report covered a broad range of issues noting the need for reform of detention facilities, corruption in law enforcement (particularly the traffic police-a common problem in the wider region) and that NGOs were seeing the narrowing of civic space and had received less funding and greater pressure since the 2008 conflict. Their report also drew attention to the problem surrounding property rights, particularly in relation to ethnic Georgians and IDPs, findings that were also echoed by the UN who have also identified that the practice of demolishing the ruins of houses owned by IDPs had restarted in 2017.^[33]While still freer than the other unrecognised states assessed in this publication the general view (in-line with the Hammarberg and Grono report) is that the overall civic space in Abkhazia has gradually been shrinking in recent years, with increasing pressure put on those working with international partners, though a formal foreign agents law has been avoided.^[34] A recent paper by Olesya Vartanyan of the International Crisis Group shows how the ethnic Georgian community in the Gali region have been struggling to deal with the increasingly closed crossings and the implementation of new Abkhaz residence permits which limits their ability to visit Georgian controlled territory.^[35]

Despite its position as one of the more closed societies being explored in this collection South Ossetia’s electoral politics is surprisingly competitive with active parliamentary elections and incumbent presidents losing to rivals in both 2001 and 2017.^[36] Freedom of expression is limited with local media under the control of the de facto authorities and pressure on independent journalists and activists taking place. As with a number of neighbouring states in the region the use of criminal defamation has been used to intimidate critics in South Ossetia, such as social media activist Tamar Mearakishvili.^[37] In 2017 Jehovah’s Witnesses were classified as an extremist organisation, creating a de facto ban on their activities and highlighting freedom of religion concerns. Schools teaching in the Georgian language are being phased out, discriminating against the Georgian minority community remaining within South Ossetia and echoing similar changes in Abkhazia.^[38] According to the UN the introduction of a ‘foreign agents’ law in 2014, mirroring the similar Russian legislation, has significantly closed the space for civil society in South Ossetia leading to the closure of NGOs and reduced engagement in ‘track two’ dialogue with international NGOs around confidence and peacebuilding.^[39] The Russian presence in South Ossetia is more pronounced than in Abkhazia, not least as the result of the linkages with North Ossetia, where many South Ossetians have moved to find work^[40].

Until recently the politics of Nagorno-Karabakh has perhaps been more stable and less competitive than in Abkhazia,^[41] an environment shaped by the military pressure from Azerbaijan and the close political relationship with its patron Armenia, from which it receives over 60 per cent of its budget.^[42] Local human rights challenges remain similar to those elsewhere in the region, such as corruption, executive influence over the judiciary and a limited space for independent civil society. Also in Nagorno-Karabakh a 2017 constitutional referendum sanctioned increased presidential powers, abolished the post of prime minister, and postponed elections until 2020 for incumbent leader Bako Sahakyan, a move described by opponents as a ‘constitutional coup’.^[43]

While not changing the fundamental position in respect to the conflict, the impact of the ‘Velvet Revolution’ in Armenia has created political uncertainty in the relationship between Yerevan and the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. Prime Minister Pashinyan is the first leader of Armenia whose political identity is not extricable linked with Karabakh.^[44] The political tensions inside Armenia, such as between Pashinyan and former President Kocharyan^[45], are pitting the new Armenian government against a Karabakhi political elite who had previously dominated public life in both Yerevan and Stepanakert.^[46] Pashinyan even accused the current de facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh of conspiring to hand over territory to Azerbaijan in an effort to discredit him.^[47] Amid the tensions between Yerevan and Stepanakert and in the wake of June 2018 demonstrations by citizens opposing abuses by the Nagorno Karabakh security services de facto President Sahakayan announced he would not be standing for re-election.^[48]

The upcoming de facto 2020 Presidential election in Nagorno-Karabakh could be potentially more competitive than previous ballots,^[49] which were personality contests within the ruling regime rather than featuring significant genuine opposition. With relations with the new Armenian government providing a potential dividing line, and presenting both opportunities for reform and for destabilisation, given the old guard are likely to try and protect their position against radical change.^[50]Overall the human rights situation is improving with people more able to speak out and make critical Facebook posts, with the previous threat of retribution including arrest significantly reduced.

The situation of Crimea remains somewhat different to its counterparts in that it has been annexed by a metropolitan state, a member of the UN Security Council at that. While the vast majority of states have not recognised this annexation as legitimate, the fact that Russia formally deems Crimea to be part of its territory requires it to place the same human rights safeguards and legal protections over it (for what they are worth) that apply in the rest of the Russian Federation, including recourse to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Previous Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) publications have touched on some of the major human rights challenges facing the local population, particularly for those unhappy with the annexation. The 2017 ‘Closing the Door’ publication showed how Crimean Tatar political leaders^[51], in particular, have been targeted. One tool for increasing pressure on the Tatar community has been the prosecution of members of religious groups, such as the proselytising Tablighi Jamaat movement and the non-violent extremist groups Hizb ut-Tahrir, which are legal in Ukraine but outlawed in Russia.^[52]

Relations between the de facto Transnistrian Authorities and the Moldovan Government are less tense than the other relationships addressed here. Back in 2013 Thomas Hammarberg, then in the capacity of being a UN Senior Expert, was able to provide a comparatively comprehensive overview of some of the human rights challenges faced by the region.^[53] The international community was allowed access to help deliver a ‘Human Rights Joint Action Programme 2016-2018’ in the Transnistrian region as a partnership between OHCHR, UNDP, UNAIDS and UNODC, focusing on important but less politically challenging issues identified by Hammarberg such as: disability rights, tackling HIV/AIDs, rights of prisoners and domestic violence.^[54] Corruption, language rights and space for independent civil society and media remain significant challenges.

All the longstanding disputed states that maintain their independence have created human rights ombudsman or similar offices akin to their counterparts in the metropolitan states. The Ombudsperson in Abkhazia since March 2018 is the widely respected former co-director of The Center for Humanitarian Programmes, Asida Shakryl^[55], but like its counterpart, the Presidential Commission of Human Rights in South Ossetia, it has been described as ‘hollow in terms of their real powers and importance’ by the European Parliament research division, though Shakryl’s status and expertise helps offset this to a certain degree.^[56] The Ombudsman in Nagorno-Karabakh has an active engagement on issues relating to the conflict and has made efforts to strengthen its institutional legitimacy, such as through membership of the European Ombudsman Institute, but until now has played a limited role. The Transnistrian Commissioner for Human Rights, Vyacheslav Kosinsky, reported to a plenary session of the deputies of the Transnistrian Supreme Council that his office received 871 appeals for assistance in 2018.^[57] However  looking at the cases he raised highlights how the remit of these offices are often extremely broad as they are acting as ombudsman in fields as broad as consumer protection, employment rights and monitoring government performance in its administration of social security payments.^[58] While it is somewhat understandable given the size of populations to consolidate this activity into one office, it means the ability to focus time on more challenging human rights issues, including abuse of power, is more restricted. 

A number of the de facto authorities have used references to international human rights conventions as at least a notional ambition for local practice and certainly as a signal to the international community. For example Transnistria has unilaterally pledged to respect the two UN Covenants on human rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Similarly Abkhazia’s de facto constitution recognises and guarantees ‘the rights and freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil and Political rights, and other universally recognised international legal instruments’.^[59] Despite such unilateral efforts and attempts at local capacity building, as Illya Nusov points out in his essay given the level of control they wield the ultimate legal responsibility lies with the ‘patrons’ of these de facto states, Armenia for Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia for the remainder, and to a lesser, more narrowly defined way, with the countries from which these de facto authorities are attempting to secede from.

What our authors say

The essay by Gunnar M. Ekelove-Slydal, Ana Pashalishvili and Inna Sangadzhiyeva discusses methods of strengthening respect for human rights in Abkhazia, Transnistria, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh. Based on case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it concludes that both the patron and the parent states as well as de facto authorities are obliged to uphold human rights to the extent that they have effective control over the territory. The authors argue that supporting development of civil society groups and training of journalists and lawyers to work together on human rights issues may be the most effective strategy to improve human rights. Many issues can be solved in status-neutral ways such as improving prison conditions, health care, education, social services, and housing; eliminating discrimination; and increasing respect for fundamental freedoms. International actors should increase support for such co-operation.

Ilya Nuzov writes a contribution that addresses the international law aspects of responsibility for violations of international human rights law committed in Eastern Europe’s ‘grey zones’. It provides an overview of the human rights obligations of non-State actors and States vis-à-vis the individuals in the ‘grey zones’. It argues the contested nature of these ‘grey zones’ under public international law, arising among others from disputed sovereignty and territorial control, results in the obfuscation and fragmentation of human rights obligations between state and non-state actors, causing ambiguities and gaps with respect to the attribution of international responsibility for violations. The essay examines these gaps in light of the available mechanisms of redress on the international level against both individuals and entities that commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and other abuses, and suggests gap-filling alternatives.

Dr Dennis Sammut explains some of the history and background to the current unresolved conflicts. He explores the particular role played by Russia as both a conflict party and a putative peacemaker. The essay seeks to explore the similarities and differences between these unrecognised states and other micro-states. He sets out the case both for non-recognition and for engagement, while arguing in favour of greater European involvement in efforts to move the situation forward.

Caucasian Knot’s essay acquaints readers with the current situation of non-profit and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in the ‘unrecognised’ states of Southern Caucasus, and examines the history and peculiarities of the electoral process in these territories. It provides a brief overview of the most well-known NGOs and the main areas of their activities. It looks at the interactions between NGOs and de facto state structures including what civil initiatives are supported by officials, and in which areas people need to overcome the bureaucracy's pressure. It provides a special focus on the electoral practices in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, in the context of the international ‘non-recognition’, examining the level of civil control during voting, the status of international observers, and cases of abuse by the authorities.

Rustam Anshba’s contribution focuses on the Georgian-Abkhazian unresolved conflict over the status of Abkhazia. He gives a very brief overview of the present day status of the conflict, before focusing on the issues that are related to the limitations and constrains the young population of Abkhazia are facing on a daily basis. The lack of development and long-term isolation have lasting negative effects on the younger post-war generation, which in the future will be faced with the question on how to resolve the ongoing conflict. His essay concludes with open-ended questions and ideas on how to engage with the population of Abkhazia and build skills and capacity to address the conflict related issues in the future. 

The essay by Caucasian Knot and Alan Parastaev argues that the non-recognition of independence of South Ossetia by the international community is the main reason for the underdevelopment of the human rights sphere in this region. It looks at the positive steps taken by the Ombudsman's office and the President's institutions in resolving humanitarian issues at various stages of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. The research also looks at the main problems and difficulties faced in the formation of full-fledged institutions for the protection of human rights and independent NGOs; absence of monitoring, isolation from international organisations, the general level and peculiarities of legal awareness, and pressure from law enforcement agencies.

Mariam Uberi’s research shows that the continued violations of the ceasefire agreement between Russia and Georgia has resulted in Russia’s creeping ‘borderisation’ into Georgia. The human dimension of the conflict has had a devastating effect on both communities living alongside the administrative boundary line (ABL) of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, restricting their freedom of movement, access to their livelihood and sometimes resulting in unlawful death. The essay examines the political and legal responses from the Georgian authorities and its efforts to safeguard human rights of its citizens exposed to economic, social and human vulnerabilities post-conflict.

The essay on Nagorno-Karabakh by The Norwegian Helsinki Committee seeks to shed light on perceptions of the people living there about their future, especially prospects of strengthening rule of law, democratisation and human rights after the so-called 2018 ‘velvet-revolutions’ in Armenia. It points to both Soviet heritage and militarisation due to the conflict with Azerbaijan playing a negative role in obstructing democratic and economic developments, although civil society groups, journalists and many ordinary people seem to have been inspired to press for reforms by recent events in Armenia. The essay argues for a people-centred approach to improve the situation for residents and internally displaced people both in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Azerbaijan.

Anton Nemlyuk’s essay touches upon the effective way human rights activists, journalists and lawyers work together when protecting human rights in Crimea. It notes that the opportunities to get access to the international human rights mechanisms are limited in the occupied territories. It makes the case that in Crimea the court system has a political function, prosecuting those who are not loyal to Russia.

Alina Radu’s essay draws attention to the ways in which access to the Moldovan legal system is an important part of taking cases of human rights abuse in Transnistria to the European Court of Human Rights. It also draws attention to the lack of media freedom in the areas controlled by the de facto authorities. 

---

Photo by ECFR, Life in the Grey Zones, Reports from Europe’s breakaway regions, https://www.ecfr.eu/wider/specials/life_in_the_grey_zones. Photo has been modified from original for this publication.

[1]  For example see Thomas de Waal, Abkhazia: Stable Isolation, Uncertain Ground: Engaging with Europe’s De Facto States and Breakaway Territories, Carnegie Europe, December 2018, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/12/03/abkhazia-stable-isolation-pub-77842

[2] Law of the Azerbaijan Republic of November 26, 1991 No. 279-XII, About abolition of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region of the Azerbaijan Republic, https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=2890

[3] See information  from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre at http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/azerbaijan, the International Crisis Group, Azerbaijan’s IDP Burden, February 2012, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/azerbaijan/azerbaijan-s-idp-burden; and FCO, Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS) in South Caucasus: The Numbers Game, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/384760/South_Caucasus_II__2_.pdf

[4] Jennifer Clark, Some 65,000 refugees from Azerbaijan gain Armenian citizenship, UNHCR,  https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2004/2/40239bba4/65000-refugees-azerbaijan-gain-armenian-citizenship.html

[5] EU Commission and UNHCR, Azerbaijan: Analysis of Gaps in the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, October 2009,  https://www.unhcr.org/4bd7edbd9.html

[6] Laurence Broers, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Defaulting to War, Chatham House, July 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/nagorny-karabakh-conflict-defaulting-war

[7] Jared Ferrie, Can they ever go home? The forgotten victims of Georgia’s civil war, The New Humanitarian, May 2019,  https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/05/27/Abkhazia-georgia-civil-war-forgotten-victims

[8] By 2007 Georgian official figures listed 247,000 IDPs from the Abkhazia conflict in the 1990s  (a figure including subsequently born dependents) see Laurence Broers, Out of the margins: Securing a voice for internally displaced people: Lessons from Georgia, Conciliation Resources, December 2009, https://m.c-r.org/resources/out-margins-securing-voice-internally-displaced-people-lessons-georgia . Also see the Georgia IDP Project, Homepage, https://georgia.idp.arizona.edu/

[9] Ibid.  

[10] Thomas Hammarberg and Magdalena Grono, Human Rights in Abkhazia Today, July 2017, https://www.palmecenter.se/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Human-Rights-in-Abkhazia-Today-report-by-Thomas-Hammarberg-and-Magdalena-Grono.pdf. See also https://www.c-r.org/downloads/CR_The-Realm-of-the-possible_Gal-i_43_webEn.pdf for more information about life in Gali.

[11] ECHR, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia – Report, Volume I, September 2009, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf. Section 2.7 of this Human Rights Watch report documents the controversy over assessment of casualty numbers putting the civilian casualty figures probably in the 300-400 range,  https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/01/23/flames/humanitarian-law-violations-and-civilian-victims-conflict-over-south

[12] According to data from Georgia immediately after the 2008 conflict up to 279,000 Georgians claimed to have been displaced from Abkhazia, however most of these (247,000) were those who were originally displaced in the 90s. For South Ossetia the longer-term displaced population was believed to be just over 19,000 as of 2009, though again there remains fluidity on the ground. For further information see Laurence Broers, Out of the margins: Securing a voice for internally displaced people: Lessons from Georgia, Conciliation Resources, December 2009, https://m.c-r.org/resources/out-margins-securing-voice-internally-displaced-people-lessons-georgia .

[13] RFE/RL,  Russia Recognizes Abkhazia, South Ossetia, August 2008, https://www.rferl.org/a/Russia_Recognizes_Abkhazia_South_Ossetia/1193932.html

[14] After the initial displacement of IDPs during and immediately post-conflict, ethnic Moldovan IDPs have mostly reintegrated into Transnistrian or Moldovan society with only 200 families/households still identified as being IDPs as of 2013- see  Zuzanna Brunarska and Agnieszka Weinar Asylum seekers, Refugees and IDPs in the EaP countries: Recognition, Social Protection and integration - An Overview, European University Institute, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/45683667.pdf

[15] The most recent Crimean Supreme Council elections in 2010 had been dominated by President Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions and the Ukrainian Communist Party with Aksyonov’s Russian Unity Party holding only 3 of the 100 seats. See Interfax Ukraine, Regions Party gets 80 of 100 seats on Crimean parliament, November 2011, https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/52929.html

[16] One about which.

[17] Refugees were mainly ethnic Armenians and Azeris who fled between the two metropolitan states in the 90s.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Some examples of relevant research include: Laurence Broers, Out of the margins: Securing a voice for internally displaced people: Lessons from Georgia, Conciliation Resources, December 2009, https://m.c-r.org/resources/out-margins-securing-voice-internally-displaced-people-lessons-georgia; Conciliation Resources,  Displacement in Georgia:  IDP attitudes to conflict, return and justice, April 2011, https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Displacement%20in%20Georgia_Policy%20Brief_201104_ENG.pdf;  OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons on his follow-up mission to Georgia (10–14 June 2013), June 2013, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session26/Documents/A_HRC_26_33_Add_1_ENG.doc;
International Crisis Group, Tackling Azerbaijan’s IDP Burden, February 2012, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/azerbaijan/tackling-azerbaijan-s-idp-burden; OSCE, Conflict-related Displacement in Ukraine, July 2016, https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/261176?download=true

[20] Freedom in the World 2019, Abkhazia, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/abkhazia

[21] Freedom in the World 2019, Nagorno-Karabakh, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/nagorno-karabakh

[22] Freedom in the World 2019, Transnistria, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/transnistria

[23] Freedom in the World 2019, South Ossetia, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/south-ossetia

[24] Freedom in the World 2019, Crimea, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/crimea

[25] Polina Devitt and Jason Bush, Abkhazia elects opposition leader as president, Reuters, August 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-abkhazia-election/abkhazia-elects-opposition-leader-as-president-idUSKBN0GP09K20140825;  and Donnachia O Beachain, Dubious Election Produces a Divisive New President in Abkhazia, Global Observatory, September 2014, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/09/dubious-election-divisive-new-president-abkhazia/

[26] Abkhaz parliament confirms opposition leader was poisoned, presidential elections may be rescheduled. Jam News, Abkhaz parliament confirms opposition leader was poisoned, presidential elections may be rescheduled, May 2019, https://jam-news.net/abkhaz-parliament-confirms-opposition-leader-was-poisoned-presidential-elections-may-be-rescheduled/

[27] Liz Fuller, Russia Reportedly Detains Abkhaz Oppositionist Following New Demand for Khajimba’s Resignation, RFE/RL, December 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-detains-abkhazia-opposition-figure-follow-khajimba-resignation-demand/28155105.html

[28] Giorgi Lomsadze, Abkhazia presidential election heads to runoff, Euasianet, August 2019, https://eurasianet.org/abkhazia-presidential-election-heads-to-runoff

[29] Inal Khashig, Incumbent Abkhaz President Khajimba wins second term in surprise victory, JAM-News, September 2019,  https://jam-news.net/incumbent-abkhaz-president-khajimba-wins-second-term-in-surprise-victory/

[30] Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on cooperation with Georgia, September 2018, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1443533/1930_1537260340_g1824969.pdf

[31] Jonathan Steele, The Abkhazia human rights report the EU doesn't want you to read, August 2017, https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/abkhazia-human-rights-report-eu-doesnt-want-you-read

[32] Thomas Hammarberg and Magdalena Grono, Human Rights in Abkhazia Today, July 2017, https://www.palmecenter.se/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Human-Rights-in-Abkhazia-Today-report-by-Thomas-Hammarberg-and-Magdalena-Grono.pdf

[33] Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on cooperation with Georgia, September 2018, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1443533/1930_1537260340_g1824969.pdf

[34] Examples of some of the issues are document in articles including Inal Khashig, NGOs and journalists accused of treason in Abkhazia, June 2017, https://jam-news.net/ngos-journalists-accused-of-treason-in-abkhazia/ JAM-News, Abkhaz officials banned from participating in international meetings organized by NGOs, June 2018, OC-Media, Challenges faced by NGOs in Abkhazia, May 2017, https://oc-media.org/challenges-faced-by-ngos-in-abkhazia/

[35] Olesya Vartanyan, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/abkhazia-georgia/easing-travel-between-georgia-and-breakaway-abkhazia

[36] Donnacha Ó Beacháin, Electoral Politics in the De Facto States of the South Caucasus, CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 94, April 2017, http://www.laender-analysen.de/cad/pdf/CaucasusAnalyticalDigest94.pdf

^[36] Ibid.

[37] Amnesty International Public Statement, Georgia: De facto authorities in a disputed region stifle freedom of expression, August 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR5669742017ENGLISH.pdf

[38] Maxim Edwards, No More Georgian in South Ossetia’s Schools?, Eurasianet, September 2017, https://eurasianet.org/no-more-georgian-in-south-ossetias-schools

[39] Ibid. 

[40] Thomas De Waal, Abkhazia and the Danger of ‘Ossetianization’, Moscow Times, July 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/07/16/abkhazia-and-the-danger-of-ossetianization-a66437

[41] Donnacha Ó Beacháin , Elections without recognition: presidential and parliamentary contests in Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabakh, Caucasus Survey, Volume 3 – Issue 3, September 2015, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23761199.2015.1086571?scroll=top&needAccess=true

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ter-Petrossian as chair of the Karabakh Committee, Kocharyan who served as Prime Minister and President of Nagorno-Karabakh before transitioning to the same roles in Armenia, and Sargsyan who served as military leader and minister of defence for Karabakh before becoming Minister of Interior and Security, Minister of Defence and then Prime Minister-twice- and President of Armenia.

[45] Covering historical crimes and relations with the judiciary

[46] In the tumult in Yerevan surrounding the attempts to prevent the release of Kocharyan on bail, Armenian police stopped a car containing Vitaly Balasanyan, the secretary of the National Security Council of the NKR and ally of Kocharyan, under suspicion of having illegal weapons in his car leading to a tense standoff. Panorama, Pashinyan comments on Artsakh leaders’ petition for Kocharyan’s release, May 2019, https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2019/05/08/Pashinyan-Artsakh-leader-petition/2111736

[47] Joshua Kucera and Ani Mejlumyan, Armenia: After ex-president released, premier opens conflict with judges and Karabakh leaders, Eurasianet, May 2019, https://eurasianet.org/armenia-after-ex-president-released-premier-opens-conflict-with-judges-and-karabakh-leaders

[48] Weekly Staff, Artsakh President Bako Sahakyan Not to Seek Reelection in 2020, The Armenian Weekly, June 2018, https://armenianweekly.com/2018/06/12/artsakh-president-bako-sahakyan-not-to-seek-reelection-in-2020/

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ani Mejlumyan, Race for Karabakh leadership gets off to early start, Eurasianet, February 2019, https://eurasianet.org/race-for-karabakh-leadership-gets-off-to-early-start

[51] Eugenia Andreyuk and Philipp Gliesche, Crimea: Deportations and forced transfer of the civil population, Foreign Policy Centre, December 2017, https://fpc.org.uk/crimea-deportations-forced-transfer-civil-population/

[52] Ibid. and Halya Coynash, 5-year sentence demanded in Russia’s “safari hunt of Muslims” in occupied Crimea, KHPG, January 2019, http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1547933586&w=crimea

[53] Thomas Hammarberg, Report on Human Rights in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova, UNDP, February 2013,https://www.undp.org/content/dam/unct/moldova/docs/pub/Senior_Expert_Hammarberg_Report_TN_Human_Rights.pdf

[54]Embassy of Sweden, Impressive results for Human Rights in Transnistria!, January 2018, https://www.swedenabroad.se/fr/ambassade/moldova-chisinau/current/news/impressive-results-for-human-rights-in-transnistria/

[55] Conciliation Resources, Asida Shakryl: partnering for peace in the Georgian-Abkhaz context, May 2018, https://www.c-r.org/news-and-insight/asida-shakryl-partnering-peace-georgian-abkhaz-context

[56] Directorate-General for External Policies - Policy Department, The frozen conflicts of the European Eastern Neighbourhood and their impact on the respect of human rights, European Parliament, 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578001/EXPO_STU(2016)578001_EN.pdf

[57] The Supreme Council of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, Taken into consideration, May 2019, http://en.vspmr.org/news/supreme-council/prinyat-k-svedeniyu.html

[58] Novosti Pmr, Ombudsman answered questions of ‘Pridnestrovie’ daily readers, May 2018,https://novostipmr.com/en/news/18-05-22/ombudsman-answered-questions-pridnestrovie-daily-readers

[59] Ibid; and Thomas Hammarbeg and Magdalena Grono, Human Rights in Abkhazia Today, Palme Center, July 2017, https://www.palmecenter.se/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Human-Rights-in-Abkhazia-Today-report-by-Thomas-Hammarberg-and-Magdalena-Grono.pdf

[post_title] => Introduction: Addressing human rights challenges in Eastern Europe’s grey zones [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => introduction-addressing-human-rights-challenges-in-eastern-europes-grey-zones [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-10-02 13:36:18 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-10-02 13:36:18 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4034 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[7] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 3857 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2019-07-12 10:25:05 [post_date_gmt] => 2019-07-12 10:25:05 [post_content] =>

Turkmenistan is a country often overlooked on the world stage. When attention is paid the focus tends to be either on the size of its bountiful gas reserves or on the eccentricities of its leadership. This research however shines a spotlight on a country in the middle of a sustained economic crisis that has seen hyper-inflation in the lives of ordinary people and widespread food shortages. This economic crisis has in turn led to the regime’s repression becoming ever tighter and its personality cult becoming ever more grandiose. 

While investors may be initially attracted to Turkmenistan due to its enormous gas wealth it has huge structural challenges. It is a ‘Potemkin economy’, with marble facades, respectable official gross domestic product (GDP) figures and tightly regulated state shops, which mask a huge and chaotic black economy. Potential investor risks include: the whims of the President, leading to arbitrary behaviour by a sclerotic bureaucracy; a high risk of non-payment for goods or services; endemic corruption; insecurity of legal title or contracts; the lack of rule of law and independent judiciary; and reputational risks from being associated with severe human rights abuses.

This research documents the vast range of Turkmenistan’s human rights abuses but draws particular focus to the issues of forced labour, ‘disappeared’ activists in the prison system and restrictions on independent journalists and human rights activists. While exerting international pressure on the regime is hard, the publication argues that the current economic turmoil creates new opportunities to leverage engagement and investment for vital reform on a ‘more for more’ and ‘less for less’ basis.

Given the human rights crisis the research argues that the European Union (EU) should adopt the European Parliament’s proposed human rights benchmarks for Turkmenistan and that these principles should be applied by all international institutions working with Turkmenistan. It suggests that the United Kingdom (UK) should reconsider the position of Prime Ministerial Trade Envoy to Turkmenistan and whether it should be expending political capital on promoting trade ties through the Turkmenistan-UK Trade & Industry Council (TUKTIC). It also argues that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) should not expand its lending in Turkmenistan, avoiding expansion to the public sector or state enterprises. The international community should push for a strongly mandated International Labour Organisation (ILO) presence to map, monitor and reduce the extent of forced labour. Pressure must be placed on Turkmenistan to abide by its UN and international investment treaties, and to allow greater access to UN Special Rapporteurs and international NGOs.

Key recommendations to the Government of Turkmenistan:

• Notify all families about the condition of their imprisoned loved ones and allow visitor access
• Free political prisoners and jailed journalists
• Improve prison conditions and end the use of torture in the detention system
• End forced labour in the cotton harvest
• Allow access by UN Special Rapporteurs and other UN mandate holders, as well as visas for representatives of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
• Enhance judicial independence in the criminal and commercial sector, while honouring its international treaty obligations  

Recommendations to the international community:

• Ensure the EU adopts and applies the European Parliament human rights benchmarks
• Require the EBRD’s lending to Turkmenistan to reflect the need to improve human rights and avoids expansion to the public sector in the absence of genuine reforms
• Push for the presence of the ILO with a strong mandate to tackle forced labour
• Reconsider international trade promotion efforts to Turkmenistan, such as the UK’s TUKTIC

Photo by David Lundberg, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.

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Turkmenistan is a country often overlooked and one that has often courted its own isolation. When international attention is paid the focus tends to be either on the size of its bountiful gas reserves, the sixth largest in the world, or on the eccentricities and excesses of its leadership. This research seeks to shine a spotlight into a country that despite the former, and in no small part because of the latter, finds itself in the middle of a sustained economic crisis that has seen hyper-inflation in the lives of ordinary people and widespread food shortages. This economic crisis has in turn led to the regime’s repression of its people becoming ever tighter. Turkmenistan has always been a country that takes the standard tropes of authoritarian rule in Central Asia and takes them to extremes, turning it ‘up to 11’ when it comes to the scale and scope of its abuses. However its current woes have seen the personality cult of its leadership and the intrusion into the lives of its citizens both rise to new heights as the regime seeks to maintain control of the situation. This publication examines the country’s recent history, political structures, economic performance and international relations to try to understand how Turkmenistan reached this point and discusses what can be done to improve the situation.

A brief history of Turkmenistan

The area covered by modern day Turkmenistan has historically been inhabited by tribes of pastoral nomads, notionally falling under the influence of the Seljuk Empire, the Mongol Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara and the Russian Empire before their incorporation into the Soviet Union. The largest group is the Teke, including the Mary Teke and the Ahal Teke subgroups, the latter which had dominated political life before and after the Soviet Union and to which current President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov is a member and former President Saparmurat Niyazov was affiliated, alongside the majority of senior officials.^[1] The others include the Yomut (with historic links to fishing and modern linkages in the oil and gas sector), Ersari, Chowdur and Saryk. Under the Soviet Union Turkmenistan was established as a Soviet Socialist Republic in 1925 and attempts were made not only to share power more widely amongst the existing clan structures but to build a sense of shared Turkmen identity. This was met with limited success and was an identity to be subsumed within the larger Soviet identity. Demands for local control had been on the rise as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) unravelled, for example with the Supreme Soviet of Turkmenistan claiming the sovereignty of its laws over those of the USSR in 1990, but its identity remained relatively inchoate.^[2]  The Agzybirlik (unity) movement of local intellectuals helped spark a revival in the Turkmen language and in the promotion of tribal cultural practices, before being banned as a potential source of political competition.^[3]

So the structural challenges facing President Niyazov, who was elected as the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Turkmenistan in January 1990 and declared as President of Turkmenistan in October 1991 before formally achieving recognised independence that December, was the same as those facing many of the other leaders of the newly independent Soviet successor states, keeping the country together and independent from domination by its larger neighbours. These strategic challenges remain central to the present day, to some extent providing the method to the madness of the leadership cults that have helped define Turkmenistan.

Niyazov had been one of the least reforming members of the final pre-independence Soviet leadership, backing the coup against Gorbachev and initially resistant to calls for independence. However once independence came he took to the task of not only building a new state but of trying to create a shared national history and national identity, inextricably weaving it around his own personality and presenting himself as the embodiment of those national ideals. He drew inspiration from the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, whose honorary surname means ‘Father of the Turks’, in shaping the identity of Turkic peoples, and in 1993 would give himself the honorific he is most widely remembered by, Turkmenbashi (‘Head of the Turkmen’).

The Ruhnama (‘the book of soul’), written by Niyazov in two volumes released in 2001 and 2004, which would be seen as totemic of the excesses of his rule, was at its origin a collection of Turkmen history and folklore that aimed, at least in part, to provide a previously non-existent national story.^[4] The publication of course was used to glorify Niyazov and his family and to outline what could be loosely described as his thoughts on politics and morality. During his leadership knowledge of the contents and even the ability to recite passages was a standard part of the curriculum and a requirement for passing exams, even for obtaining a driving licence or joining the civil service. These requirements were only phased out gradually after his death.^[5] Between 2002 and 2008 the stories from the Ruhnama were used as names for months of the year, including directly naming January as ‘Türkmenbaşy’ and September ‘Ruhnama’.  A giant mechanical monument of the book was built in Ashgabat that opens at 8pm each night with a light display and a reading of a passage of its content.^[6] The idiosyncratic attachment to Turkmen folklore was also on display in the US $50 million Turkmenbashi’s Land of Fairy Tales theme park in Ashgabat.

Other grandiose projects include the US $75 million golden Arch of Neutrality, a tripod topped by a golden statue of Niyazov that rotated to constantly face the sun, originally in the centre of Ashgabat. Other than glorifying Niyazov the arch sought to celebrate Turkmenistan’s loudly declared international neutrality, uniquely endorsed by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1995, and aimed to demonstrate to its larger neighbours, Iran and Uzbekistan as well as to Russia and the West, that it posed no threat to their interests and therefore should be left alone. The arch was moved to a new location away from the Presidential Palace in 2010 but is still standing.^[7]

At a more direct human level under Niyazov ballet, opera and gold teeth were banned, alongside beards for the young and a prohibition of smoking in public places, an anti-smoking campaign that has been intensified under his successor.

The extent of the bizarre behaviour was so extreme that there was, and is, a tenancy to believe anything and often overlook its purpose and the more prosaic problems. A 2004 story about an ‘ice palace’ provides an illustrative example where a number of international sources heard President Niyazov announce that he wanted to build a ‘palace of ice’ that could house a 1,000 people and assumed he was proposing building a giant igloo.^[8] The reality, a €135 million 10,000 seater Winter Sports Complex and ice rink, may not necessarily be the best use of public money in a country with such challenges and clearly speaks to a desire to deliver large, ‘statement’ public projects, but it is in keeping with authoritarian practice elsewhere in the region. ^[9] Under both of Turkmenistan’s Presidents such grand projects are often underused or empty despite the significant economic and social cost, such as from the home demolition programmes discussed below. In a closed society it is simple to project and maintain an image that even, if it does not persuade the entire population, makes the regime’s rule seem all encompassing and inevitable.

Upon taking office in 2006 at Niyazov’s death President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s initially maintained key elements of Niyazov’s personality cult whilst gradually toning them down or side-lining them. This was not however to make space in a meaningful sense for liberalisation but to provide room to develop his own personality cult.

At time of writing President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s public behaviour is becoming increasingly erratic and as widely mocked internationally as his predecessor. Stunts aiming to show the vitality of the President have ranged from videos of a solo gym session with Berdimuhamedov to the internationally mocked footage of him weightlifting a solid gold bar at a cabinet meeting. These displays dovetail in with the campaign to eradicate smoking by 2025, and other efforts aimed to make healthiness a mandatory part of Turkmen culture.^[10] A focus on horses and horsemanship is both a strong reference to Turkmenistan’s nomadic heritage and a personal obsession of the President, who is regularly portrayed riding and preforming ‘feats of skill’ atop a horse, as now immortalised by a large gold and marble statue of him in Ashgabat.^[11] The bizarre musical performances, sometimes featuring his grandson, lack an equivalent rationale although one of his more recent efforts was about his favourite horse.^[12] The President’s public escapades are all set to the backdrop of furious clapping from whichever group of people has the misfortune of being forced to watch on. Like his predecessor he has collected self-bestowed honorifics, from the ‘people’s horse breeder’ to the more regularly used ‘Arkadag’ (the protector).

Though their outlandishness may provide a distraction, both externally and to some extent internally, the personality cults of Turkmenistan’s leaders highlight how the regime operates and what it means for those living and working in Turkmenistan.^[13] Erratic behaviour atop a highly centralised political power structure that dominates the economic, social and political life of the country, creates a paranoid approach to governing. This structure, where the whim and caprice of the leader leads to overreactions and excesses by the cabinet and government functionaries, fearful of finding themselves on the wrong side of the leadership, has obvious repercussions for the lives of Turkmenistan’s citizens and presents huge risks for those seeking to invest in the country. So despite the perception of stability and regimented order, bureaucratic chaos swirls under the surface, buffeted by an increasingly bleak economic picture to which there are no easy answers.

An economy in crisis

Turkmenistan’s economy is reliant on gas with total proved reserves of 19.5 trillion cubic metres or 9.9 per cent of total world reserves.^[14] It also has a smaller amount of oil, though at 10.6 million tons per year this only marginally exceeds domestic consumption (7.1million tons per year). Based on internationally comparable statistics it is also the world’s 9^th largest cotton producer.^[15] The economy is heavily centralised and state dominated. Its performance is so weak as not to be listed in the World Bank’s 189 country ‘Doing Business’ rankings, a metric often touted by other authoritarian regimes as a sign of their effectiveness.^[16] The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) describes it as being the ‘least competitive economy among the EBRD’s countries of operations’ and argues that a ‘heavy state presence dominates economic decision-making’ and that ‘corporate governance is hampered by a lack of managerial independence even in private firms’.^[17]

Currently Turkmenistan is in the grip of its worst economic crisis since the immediate post-independence period, driven in part by low gas prices, the suspension of gas exports to Russia between 2016 and 2019 (when they have notionally been reinstated) and poor harvests.^[18] The headline GDP growth figures and other metrics do not convey the scale of the challenge. As the UK’s Department of International Trade dryly puts it ‘no reliable economic data are published in Turkmenistan. Most sources cite figures which the government releases to the international financial institutions. These do not always square with observation on the ground.’^[19]

For example the World Bank recorded growth of 6.2 per cent in 2018 and projects a slight decline to 5.6 per cent in 2019 and 5.1 per cent in 2020.^[20] The Asian Development Bank forecast a slightly higher 6 and 5.8 per cent for 2019 and 2020.^[21] However these notional growth figures are not enough to overcome even the official rate of inflation based on official statistics which is running at 9.4 per cent in 2018 and is projected to be 9 per cent and 8.2 per cent for 2019 and 2020 respectively. However given the combination of the lack of credible official statistics, currency pressures (as discussed below) and an enormous black market many experts, such as Professor Steven Hanke of the Cato Institute, placed the real rate of inflation as experienced by consumers outside of the tightly rationed state sector as being as high as 294 per cent as of June 2018.^[22]

At the heart of this inflation crunch is the collapse in the real exchange rate of the manat, Turkmenistan’s currency. While the manat’s official exchange rate has remained pegged at 3.5 manat to the dollar in the summer of 2018 the unofficial exchange rate, through which citizens of Turkmenistan can meaningfully access dollars, fell from 10 manat to the dollar at the start of 2018 to 29 manat to the dollar by June 2018.^[23] As of spring 2019 the black market rate was still hovering at around five times the official rate (18 manat to the dollar) according to the EBRD.^[24] Inflation and product scarcity has been driven by the dramatic reduction in gas revenue and the hard currency that it had previously brought into Turkmenistan’s import reliant domestic economy, as well as the poor domestic harvests discussed below. The resulting currency controls and shortage of physical cash in circulation have seen the amount of money that Turkmen citizens can take out of their bank accounts or receive via money transfer significantly reduced, with limits of between 400-700 manats.^[25] Access to hard currency is more limited to outlets such as the State Bank for Foreign Economic Activity. Those Turkmen able to travel abroad (or to send their bank cards abroad) face retractions in withdrawing money from their bank accounts but when they are able to do so there is a significant money making opportunity by being able to obtain dollars or other international currencies at the official state rate and being able to convert these currencies back home into manats at the black market rate.^[26]Attempts to regain control of the domestic currency situation by moving transactions to a Turkmenistan only debit card system have had limited success.

The currency and inflation crises have hit sectors particularly reliant on imported components. For example the chief executive of Coca Cola Turkmenistan is believed to have committed suicide due to financial problems caused by the bottler facing raw material shortages and black market price spikes, which was making Coca Cola unaffordable for most Turkmen.^[27]

The government resources are highly strained. One of the casualties of economic crisis has been the provision of previously free electricity, water and natural gas that were phased out by the start of 2019.^[28] Furthermore in January 2019 President Berdimuhamedov announced the privatisation of much of the state run transportation system, though it is unclear if it will be open to international investment.^[29] Irrespective of the nature of ownership clearly reform of the sector is needed as for example in February 2019 the European Aviation Safety Agency withdrew permission for the state run Turkmenistan Airlines to fly within the EU for safety reasons, leaving thousands of travellers stranded.^[30]

Foreign investment risk and corruption

The current economic environment combines with deep and longstanding structural problems to create an environment for foreign direct investment (FDI) that is fraught with risk. For example the lack of available funds and hard currency feed into a major problem of underpayment and non-payment. This has been a major problem for international investors with the Turkmen government and its business subsidiaries prioritising payments on the basis of political connections (including corruption) and strategic importance, leaving some debts for work completed unpaid for years. For example Turkish construction company, the Cakiroglu Grup,^[31] suspended operations in Turkmenistan in the summer 2018 due to non-payment of several million dollars, owed to it for up to five years.

Where businesses have had success in Turkmenistan it has tended to be firms that are not making significant capital investment in the country, those that are not reliant on sustained market stability and access to it to obtain a return, or where their services are essential for the government to extract their own revenue.^[32] For example the farming equipment manufacturer, John Deere, has had a long-standing relationship with Turkmenistan, with a current phased deal due to export 1350 combine harvesters, tractors and ploughs.

The official regulatory environment has a degree of stability on paper due in part to the founding laws in many sectors mostly unchanged since the immediate post-Soviet period. These are for the most part poorly drafted but their lack of revision (or reform) does provide some perverse reassurance in an uncertain environment. However the system remains reliant on working with government officials both officially and through informal channels (both legal and illegal) to get things done. It is at this level where the Berdimuhamedov regime’s practice of regularly and repeatedly reprimanding, side-lining and shuffling officials, from senior ministers to junior functionaries, in order to blame them for the governmental failings creates a fundamental instability of interlocutors. For most firms this just creates instability, political risk and further adds to the opportunities for corruption. However some argue that this gives some larger investors greater ability to shape the agenda of joint project boards as the internationals partners have the understanding of issues that incoming officials can often defer to. As Eimear O’Casey’s article in this collection argues there is also the de facto requirement for international investors in Turkmenistan to be members of the ‘Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs’ to contend with.^[33] The union is run by the President’s long-time friend Alexander Dadayev. ^[34]

Unsurprisingly for a system reliant on official fiat, corruption is an endemic feature of Turkmenistan’s economic life, with Transparency International ranking it 161^st out 180 countries surveyed.^[35] Relatives of the ruling family have been seen to benefit from state expenditure. For example, despite the current economic crisis at least US $2.3 billion is being spent on a ‘Turkmen Autobahn’, an 8 lane motorway between Ashgabat and Turkmenabat that is being funnelled through a consortium of four companies, two of which are mostly unknown and of the other two one is being run by the President’s brother-in-law and his nephew and the other by a former Construction minister. The joint venture firm is being supported by Austrian technical advisers Vienna Consulting Engineers (VCE) ZT GmbH.^[36]

As the UK Government puts it, in Turkmenistan ‘the law does not adequately protect contracts, and can be changed by decree or ignored with impunity by vested interests. Both domestic and foreign businesses can be forced out of the market for specious, or undisclosed, reasons.’^[37] Turkmenistan’s legal system is extremely inexperienced in dealing with matters of commercial law, not that their lack of capacity would be the primary issue when trying to take on politically connected or state affiliated defendants. It has been argued that were international companies more willing to attempt to try the cases through the Turkmen legal system this would be an important capacity building exercise and may create openings for political pressure to unblock cases. Few international investors have been willing to act as a training exercise for the Turkmen legal system, instead preferring opportunities for international arbitration to seek redress when they believe their rights have been abused. The World Banks’ International Center for the Settlement of Arbitration Disputes (ICSID) is where many of the larger disputes are litigated, with five cases currently pending.^[38] If Turkmenistan is serious about trying to attract increased FDI in the absence of robust domestic mechanisms it will need to show investors that it is complying with the provisions of bilateral investment treaties and other international frameworks such as the 2010 EU-Turkmenistan Interim Agreement on trade and trade related matters and the US-Central Asia Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).^[39]

Despite the UK listing the country as a country of concern in its human rights report, detailing the deep structural challenges in its trade advice and the self-evident economic chaos, one of its main points of ongoing diplomatic and political interaction in Turkmenistan is through the Turkmenistan United Kingdom Trade and Industry Council (TUKTIC), established by the British Embassy in Ashgabat and the Government of Turkmenistan in 2010.^[40] TUKTIC receives sponsorship from British firms interested in the Turkmen market such as Shell, BP, Buried Hill, De La Rue, Aggreko, JCB, Petrofac and Rolls Royce, with organisational support from the Mayfair based Strategy International and Business Expertise International who run the Central Asia and Transcaucasus Business Information Group (CATBIG).^[41] TUKTIC works closely with Baroness Nicholson who serves as the UK Prime Minister’s Trade Envoy to Turkmenistan.^[42] Warm words of praise for the regime including praise for Ashgabat’s marble buildings, and only tangential comments about the importance of human rights frame the nature of the relationship.^[43]

The EBRD is currently finalising its country strategy for Turkmenistan covering the period 2019-2024, a strategy described as ‘engaged but calibrated’.^[44] Its involvement so far has wholly been in Turkmenistan’s private sector with loans to what it classes as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) such as breweries Berk and Yager, Turkmenistan’s Coca Cola bottling company, the TOPAK paper company and PVC window manufacturer Turkmen Penjire.^[45] Human Rights Watch, Transparency International and the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) have argued that the EBRD should adopt the European Parliament’s proposed benchmarks on human rights in Turkmenistan and not expand lending to the public sector until there is clear progress against them, a conditional approach that this author would endorse.^[46] At present the EBRD is considering a conditional expansion to support municipalities, a risk given the extent of forced labour amongst local government workers, with possible long-term expansion into transport and energy projects. Question marks remain even over existing support to the local private sector which needs to be set in the context of the deeply corrupt and politically beholden nature of large swathes of the Turkmen private sector.

Record harvests or wide spread hunger?

The common Turkmen story of authoritarian self-promotion, imaginary statistics and barely discussed chaos come together in the regular announcement of record crop yields. The 2018 harvest figures were dutifully announced by cabinet Deputy Chairman Esenmyrat Orazgeldiev who reported that Turkmenistan had harvested some 1.099 million tons of cotton, more than the target figure of 1.050 million tons. However, opposition websites have claimed the records from the Agriculture and Water Resources Ministry, showed the real amount collected as being less than half that at 450,000 tons,^[47]while the International Cotton Advisory Committee puts the 2018 cotton production figure at 300,000 tons.^[48] These lower figures tally much more closely with the patterns relating to forced labour discussed below. Similarly it is believed that the wheat harvest had failed by only achieving a yield of 538,000 tons (rather than the 1.6 million target) of which 30 per cent was unfit for consumption.^[49] Given the lack of external verification it is difficult to know for sure the real situation but given the widespread reports of rising food prices, rationing, drought, salt penetration into arable land and salt storms it seems plausible.^[50]

The reduction in domestic production combined with imports being hard to come by and the currency crisis mean that staple food products are no longer subsidised, as set out above, but have also been subject to supply shortages. Lines to receive bread have been reported since the autumn of 2017 as well as increased rationing since the spring of 2018. As of a recent report, state run stores have been limiting flour sales to 50 kilogram per family per month. ^[51]

The prodigious black market has seen food bypass the state run stores where prices are nominally regulated, but instead be sold at significant mark ups. For example chicken legs at almost double the official price led to rioting in the summer of 2018.^[52] Official vendors have taken to requiring passports or other identity documents to prevent people from taking multiple rations. ^[53] Despite this the President has announced that the recent generous harvest has enabled Turkmenistan to become an exporter of wheat. Neither of the two most relevant UN agencies, the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organisation, have a presence on the ground in the country to provide independent verification or assistance.

Trapped?

As Bruce Pannier’s essay points out the food shortages are believed to have led to further restrictions on internal movement, with those from the regions finding it difficult to visit Ashgabat since October 2018 and those trying to bring food out of the city being penalised. This builds on pre-existing restrictions that make it difficult for citizens of the regions to change their residency to allow them to live in Ashgabat. Further efforts to stem population inflow have included Presidential decrees urging Ashgabat officials to choose existing Ashgabat residents for employment rather than those currently residing outside the city.^[54]

Turkmens are not only being restricted in their internal movement but face challenges when leaving. Despite exit visas being ostensibly removed in 2004, citizens of Turkmenistan often find it difficult to get out of the country. The substantial Migration Service blacklist that had targeted regime critics has grown to encompass other groups trying to leave as the economy has worsened.^[55] In 2018 it was widely reported that potential economic migrants, particularly from outlying regions such as Dashoguz and Lebap, that are particularly struggling, were being prevented from boarding planes.^[56] A particular focus had been placed on stopping those trying to exit to Turkey and Dubai where there are communities of Turkmen migrant workers, leading to an expansion of migrants heading to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and a growth in people smuggling on the border with Uzbekistan.^[57] Where workers have gone abroad the regime is putting pressure on their families in order to demand their return.^[58] These restrictions provide a significant opportunity for bribery by the migration service with reports from RFE/RL that the going rate for bribes to make it past passport control had risen from the old rate of US $200 to an extortionate rate of 60,000-70,000 manat ($3300-$3800 at the black market rate).^[59]

For a long time Turkmen students have faced significant restrictions in studying abroad. In 2009 restrictions were placed on attending the American University of Central Asia (AUCA) in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), KIMEP in Almaty (Kazakhastan) and then on attending the American University of Bulgaria.^[60] This restriction was itself a concession after earlier attempts to impose a blanket ban on attendance to all foreign ‘private universities’, a term covering everything from elite US institutions to placements like AUCA. This was a move impacting around 150 students at AUCA and many others beyond,  particularly from ethnic minority groups, who had been able to study abroad in large part due to international funding grants and scholarships. The restrictive climate towards international study has continued ever since and in April 2019 the Government of Turkmenistan published a list of international universities (and courses) whose degrees would be recognised from September 2019. The list excludes many universities where students from Turkmenistan are currently studying including no institution from Tajikistan leaving the estimated 4,000 students based there in limbo.^[61] No university in Western Europe or the United States is listed, though there is a somewhat nebulous exception stated that qualification from the ‘Top 1,000’ most respected universities in the world will, as an exception, be recognized, though without any clarity as to how these institutions would be identified. Given the limited nature of Turkmenistan’s domestic education system, replete with rote learning and a narrow focus on official texts (including the pronouncements of their leaders), this approach limit’s the country’s pool of highly skilled workers essential for improving its productive capacity. It also ignores the experiences of neighbouring Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan who have both used internationally trained young workers to enhance their bureaucracies and internationally focused businesses without undermining the authoritarian character of those states.

How many citizens have actually been able to permanently leave Turkmenistan is the subject of much debate and uncertainty. Recent claims, which need to be treated with some caution, have been as high as almost two million, around a third of the official population figures, not including short-term labour migrants.^[62] There certainly are risks for family members who remain in Turkmenistan with pressure placed upon them to encourage migrant relatives to return to the country, an atmosphere that militates against the further development of an open-remittance system, something that would be helpful for the economy but embarrassing for the regime. At present the official figures suggest that less than 1 per cent of GDP is sourced from remittances, though the reality is likely to be higher.^[63] Of course if the Turkmen diaspora was to come out of the shadows more there might also be opportunities for mobilising dissent that the regime would find unwelcome.

Home Demolition

Turkmenistan is not alone in conducting home demolition as part of delivering major vanity projects^[64], however it has been seen to do so on a massive scale, brutally (with residents sometimes given only hours’ notice of eviction) and often for no apparent purpose. In 2015 Amnesty International documented the displacement of up to 50,000 people in Ashgabat.^[65] One of the main drivers for demolition of neighbourhoods and the related construction boom was the Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games (AIMAG) 2017, whose Olympic village was believed to have cost US $5 billion to build, along with a US $2.3 billion new international airport and the related construction and beautification works. ^[66] A common thread is the lack of support given to those displaced by these schemes, even in situations where their land title and other legal rights were clear, again drawing attention to the lack of effective property rights and rule of law.

Forced Labour

Turkmenistan remains reliant on the widespread use of forced labour to bring in its cotton harvests. At the heart of the process is the continuation of the Soviet-era practice of Subbotnik work (‘Saturday’ work) where civil servants and other government linked professions such as doctors, dentists, teachers, students and military personnel are required to pick cotton under threat of dismissal, salary reductions, or other penalty. For example the 2016 cotton harvest was believed to involve about 49,000 teachers. ^[67]The luckier workers are bussed in and out from local fields in a day. Others, often from lower status jobs or sectors such as the postal service or energy companies, may be required to be posted over night or for longer stretches in squalid makeshift accommodation in more remote farms. Those on higher salaries are able to pay people to pick cotton on their behalf. 

As a practice it is both ubiquitous and a source of official embarrassment. One farcical example recently saw such workers asked to hide for several hours ahead of the arrival of the President’s motorcade. ^[68] Not only is the practice immoral and the source of significant disruption to the lives of Turkmenistan’s citizens, but clearly requiring large swathes of public sector workers to undertake arduous manual labour leaves institutions either closed or understaffed, and with exhausted workers, undermining bureaucratic efficiency.

At the heart of the problem is a rigid and centralised national harvest quota system that springs from the mouth of the president down to regional governors and local officials, whom do their best to deliver, irrespective of how ridiculous the quota figure is. The local quota is then parcelled up amongst schools, hospitals and other public institutions, whose staff are then given their own personal quotas (such as 50 kilogram per person per day).

Local administrators face losing their jobs if they fail to deliver and farmers face the threat of land being taken away if quotas are not met. So perversely the poor harvest in 2017 saw an increase in forced labour due to the pressure on local farmers and administrators to show they were doing all they could to meet their unreachable quotas despite ever diminishing returns from labour.

Child labour is notionally prohibited but children may end up working the fields alongside their parents during school holidays and other times when childcare is not available or where they are under pressure to meet their quotas. There have been isolated reports the local administrators have required school children to participate in a coordinated fashion during school holidays.^[69]

Groups such as Anti-Slavery International, the Cotton Campaign and the Responsible Sourcing Network through their Turkmen Cotton Pledge and Investor Statement have been increasing awareness of the forced labour problem in Turkmenistan’s cotton industry.^[70] While the pressure has yet to have the transformative change that similar action is seen to have had in Uzbekistan their work is increasing pressure on companies that might seek to use cotton from Turkmenistan, such as the US $300 million exported to Turkey each year.^[71] In May 2018 US Customs and Border protection officials announced that they would be formally banning the import of goods made with or containing cotton from Turkmenistan.^[72]

There have been a number of announcements about efforts to increase mechanisation in Turkmenistan’s agricultural sector, not least in the announcement of the purchase of hundreds of mechanised cotton harvesters from John Deere mentioned above. However there have been limited signs so far that this equipment has been deployed in significant enough numbers to alter Turkmenistan’s approach to forced labour. ^[73]

Unlike in Uzbekistan the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has yet to establish a presence on the ground in Turkmenistan. While there is understandable concern that without guarantees on freedom to operate such a presence could be used as a fig leaf or propaganda tool but if an ILO office was able to provide a proper mapping and monitoring of forced labour in the country then it would have potentially important transformative effect. Negotiations have been underway for several years but seem focused around a less ambitious agenda of monitoring more general compliance with the ‘Decent Work and Economic Growth’ Sustainable Development Goal.

Human rights

The country is ranked 119^th out of 129 countries in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index^[74] and 204^th out of 210 in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index.^[75] The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) most recent Human Rights and Democracy Report listed Turkmenistan as one of its Human Rights Priority Countries and summaries its key concerns as ‘the continuing allegations of torture and poor prison conditions, a lack of freedom of opinion and expression (including access to information), limited freedom of religion or belief, significant gender discrimination, and a failure to protect the rights of LGBT people.’^[76] Turkmenistan has historically been the worst performing country in the human rights blackspot that is Central Asia. 

Unsurprisingly the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE ODIHR) report on the 2018 Parliamentary elections stated that Turkmenistan ‘lacked important prerequisites of a genuinely democratic electoral process. The political environment is only nominally pluralist and does not offer voters political alternatives. Exercise of fundamental freedoms is severely curtailed, inhibiting free expression of the voters’ will. Despite measures to demonstrate transparency, the integrity of elections was not ensured, leaving veracity of results in doubt’.^[77]

47 of the deputies in the 125 Mejlis were elected from the President’s Democratic Party of Turkmenistan with the remainder been elected on behalf of Parties representing large stakeholder groups:  the Organisation of Trade Unions of Turkmenistan with 33 deputies, the Women's Union of Turkmenistan with 16, The Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs 14 deputies, the Magtymguly Youth Organisation with eight deputies and seven other ‘citizens’ representative who are all fully loyal to the President. 

Turkmenistan’s prison system can be a black hole for those imprisoned on long sentences, with family and friends unable to contact loved ones for many years. The Prove They Are Alive campaign argues that hundreds of people have been victims of enforced or involuntary disappearances within the Turkmen prison system with a list of 121 specific named cases. Of these named cases there has either been no verifiable information about their whereabouts and condition since trial or for some since arrest; no contact with or information provided to their family; and/or no access to legal representation, external medical experts and international monitoring organizations.^[78] The group have also documented prison beatings and other forms of torture amid unsanitary and inhuman conditions in the prison system.^[79]

Gulgeldy Annaniyazov was initially arrested in 1995 over a peaceful protest, served four years of a 15 year sentence but fled to Kazakhstan in 2002 after years of surveillance and harassment. Under pressure from the Turkmen authorities he was arrested under claims of traveling on a false passport but was able to obtain asylum in Norway in 2002 after international pressure. After unfortunately misreading the political climate in the wake of Turkmenbashi’s death he returned to Ashgabat in 2008, was promptly arrested and then disappeared without any contact until 2015, when in a report to the UN Human Rights Council Government officials stated that he was serving an 11 year sentence for illegal border crossing and holding false documents. However shortly before his notional release date this year his sentence was extended by a further five years. ^[80]

Turkmenistan’s security services are active in trying to suppress protest by exiled activists. Akmukhammet Baikhanov was attacked the street in Moscow in what was seen to be a failed abduction attempt shortly after the publication of a report about his experiences in the notorious Ovadan Depe jail.^[81] The Central Asian Political Exiles (CAPE) database has identified 40 well known activists at risk,^[82] while we know pressure is placed on the relatives of those not even involved in politics to encourage their return.

Turkmenistan has only recently appointed a human rights ombudsman. Embarrassingly significant sections of the ombudsman Yazdursun Gurbannazarova’s first report were borrowed from a Master’s thesis about the ombudsman of Kazakhstan.^[83] The content of her work so far unsurprisingly contains mostly reports of relatively uncontroversial issues, such as direct requests for assistance in housing issues, overturning court decisions and the migration service rather than the more challenging human rights abuses.^[84]

Turkmenistan’s women face increasing enforcement of rules requiring them to wear traditional national clothing, a long embroidered dress. This is particularly being enforced amongst public sector workers who have also faced instructions not to dye their hair, wear nail varnish, or use eyelash and nail extensions. They also face periodic efforts to prevent them from driving or from buying and smoking cigarettes. The rules managing personal behaviour fluctuate depending on the whims of the leadership and how they are interpreted by functionaries at any given time.^[85]

The LGBTI community in Turkmenistan remains heavily repressed by the state. Consensual sex between men remains criminalised and subject to a two year prison sentence.^[86] It remains one of the eight countries in the world where ‘law enforcement officials, working in tandem with medical personnel subject men and transgender women who are arrested on homosexuality-related charges to forced anal examinations, with the purported objective of finding “proof” of homosexual conduct’.^[87] The legal situation provides a significant bribery and extortion opportunity for law enforcement officials and LGBTI people are at risk of assault, including ‘honour’ based violence from family members and their local communities.

Freedom of Media and Speech

For a long period Turkmenistan has been amongst the most repressive states for journalists, alongside North Korea and Eritrea. However in 2019 Turkmenistan found itself at the coveted bottom spot as the lowest ranked country in the Reporters without Borders (RSF) World Press Freedom rankings. Freedom House’s Freedom and the Media 2019 report concurs by placing Turkmenistan in its worst ranked group of countries.^[88] RSF note that over the last three to four years the situation has deteriorated with further crackdowns on journalists and efforts to limit access to media.

Nominally as part of the wide ranging efforts at ‘beautification’ outlined above there has been major crackdown on satellite dishes, which were banned in Turkmenistan in 2015.^[89] Satellite is the main point of access to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Turkmen service ‘Radio Azatlyk’, the most widely accessed source of independent news on the country, and it is no surprise that as the economic situation on the ground has deteriorated the Government is intensifying its efforts to block access to independent news. Satellite dish removal is particularly important in the context of Turkmenistan’s persistently low internet penetration rate, believed to be less than 20 per cent. ^[90]

Turkmenistan is believed to be using German technology, from Rohde &Schwarz who have an office in Ashgabat, to flag and block websites and spyware and to monitor phone and internet use.^[91] It is also believed to be able to identify users that are deploying a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to avoid censorship and are targeting them for reprisals. The scope of sites and apps that are blocked at any one time is evolving but RFE/RL and news sites run by Turkmen exiles such as Turkmen News and^[92] Chronicles of Turkmenistan remain heavily restricted, while encrypted messaging apps such as Signal and WhatsApp are currently blocked.^[93]

For those brave enough to work on the ground as journalists for, or activists who collaborate with, RFE/RL or the exile websites the human cost can be steep. Saparmamed Nepeskuliev, a freelance contributor to RFE/RL has recently completed a three year prison term for drugs charges that were denounced as politically motivated by the UN and the international community. ^[94] Nepeskuliev was accused of possession of tramadol, banned in Turkmenistan, something he claims was planted in his hotel when working a story. He was held for weeks without contact with the outside world prior to his conviction. Former RFE/RL affiliated freelancer Soltan Achilova, who now works for the Chronicles of Turkmenistan, has been given a travel ban that bars her from leaving the country, while in the past she has been assaulted and harassed by the security forces numerous times, including recently in both 2016 and 2018.^[95]Gaspar Matalaev, an activist who provided photographs documenting child labour in the cotton harvest to Alternative News of Turkmenistan (the forerunner to Turkmen News), is currently serving a three-year sentence in a labour camp on bogus fraud charges.^[96] Further back RFE/RL contributor Ogulsapar Muradova died in custody in 2006, with the UN Human Rights Committee finding the Government responsible for her death in a 2018 ruling.^[97] 

Civil Society

The UK FCO’s 2017 Human Rights and Democracy Report bluntly noted that ‘in Turkmenistan, independent human rights NGOs were unable to operate’.^[98]As Turkmenistan transitioned directly from Soviet to local authoritarians so there was limited space for independent civil society to gain a foothold in the 1990s and the subsequent regime consolidation has limited the space for government critical civil society action to a few very brave activists. For example, with the Government conducting mass extermination of stray dogs and cats, notably around the Asian Indoor Games in 2017, animal rights activist Galina Kucherenko^[99] was arrested and detained for her activism. Similarly one of the few independent civil society activists who works openly in Turkmenistan Natalya Shabunts, also faced harassment for her work in attempting to stem the dog cull, having previously been under house arrest and constant surveillance for her activities.^[100]

This is not to say there are no civil society organisations at all, as with many other authoritarian states there is a limited space available for those addressing sport and cultural, and in a more tightly defined way, women’s and environmental issues, provided that any activity does not challenge the structures of power in Turkmenistan. Large centrally organised groups such as the Magtymguly Youth Organisation, the Women’s Union of Turkmenistan and the National Centre of Trade Unions of Turkmenistan remain major organising blocks in the civic space and partners for international donors. As set out above they also provide the frameworks for the ‘alternative’ political parties recently elected to the Mejlis.^[101] The national Red Crescent Society of Turkmenistan is a major provider of healthcare services in the country and its executive director is Gulnabat Dovletova, a sister of the President. ^[102]

The legal environment for NGOs remains restrictive with registration with the Ministry of Justice required and with penalties for unregistered groups. Any organisation seeking to operate nationally must have 400 members in order to receive registration. Foreign funding also needs to be documented with the Ministry of Justice. Notice of holding a large event requires formal permission that must be given no earlier than 15 days before such an event and no later than 10 days creating significant risks and restrictions on free assembly. ^[103]

There have been some limited collaborations between Turkmenistan’s official civil society and state institutions with international organisations. Examples include the UN Development Programme (UNDP) on environmental issues,^[104] and with the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and University College London (UCL) over the archaeological excavation and preservation of the ancient city of Merv.^[105]International donors USAID and the German development agency GIZ also are active on the ground. The OSCE’s presence is limited to a ‘centre’ in Ashgabat involved primarily security matters such as the training of border patrol agents under the leadership of Ambassador Natalya Drozd from Belarus.

Freedom of Religion

As with many other Central Asian states religion is tightly regulated through a centralised state controlled Turkmenistan Muslim Religious Board (Muftiate). In Turkmenistan it is taken to even greater extremes with regards to interference in personal religious life. The official religious institutions did not publicly announce the start of Ramadan and there was no coverage about it on state media. There have been a number of reports that people have felt unable to observe the fast or meet for Iftar meals due to the risk of being perceived as extremist, with city curfews that can prevent people being away from home after 11pm and a general government aversion to groups of people congregating causing problems around breaking the fast.^[106] There have even been reports of police attempting to intimidate and block worshipers from attending Mosques.

The use of anti-extremism legislation and language has been used to arrest and imprison non-violent religious groups such as five followers of Turkish Cleric Said Nursi who were jailed for 12 years in the summer of 2018.^[107] Despite the country’s widely publicised neutrality there is compulsory military service of two years for men aged between 18-27 and with no mechanism of alternative service there has been regular jailing of conscientious objectors, with 12 objecting Jehovah’s Witnesses in Seydi Labour camp as of June 2019.^[108] The fallout from the 2016 attempted coup in Turkey has seen pressure in Turkmenistan increase on the Gulen movement, including over 100 members and school teachers arrested with some sentenced to long-periods in prison.^[109] The 2016 law on religion required all religious groups to re-register with the authorities, which was used to close down a number of groups, and it imposed a restriction on registration for groups with fewer than 50 members.^[110]

Younger men face potential police harassment and fines if those under 40 are found to have a beard^[111], something that has its roots in a 2004 decree by former President Niyazov but is used primarily today to limit outward signs of religious piety.^[112] The conservative cultural practices in relation to women and LGBTI rights noted above are as much rooted in the regime’s conception of traditional Turkmen culture than the specifically in Islam, devotion to which could potentially undermine a citizen’s ability to prioritise support for the President’s personality cult.

The regional dimension and gas politics

For years, Turkmenistan’s enormous gas reserves and strategic location made it an important part of discussions around a potential Trans-Caspian pipeline that would connect Central Asian gas resources directly to the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor, without using Russian networks. This would spark periodic western interest in Turkmen gas as a silver bullet for Europe’s energy security woes but the project has been stalled for a generation. Often talked about but never appearing it is the Godot of international projects. Historically the sticking points have been opposition from Russia and Iran that centred on disputes over ownership of the Caspian seafloor that in part acted as a cover for their fears over competition and the diversion of gas away from their own pipeline networks and markets. After 25 years of wrangling the five littoral states surrounding the Caspian signed the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in 2018, which while not resolving all potential legal issues does provided a framework that could allow the construction of such a pipeline.^[113] However this has finally taken place at a time where the European energy security situation is rapidly changing due to the expansion of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals which when combined with the related weak gas prices makes it widely seen as an uneconomic project to deliver.

The gas fields that would provide any Trans-Caspian route are predominantly in the east of Turkmenistan and the export focus for these fields has been eastward rather than westward through two main routes: the Chinese built and very real Central Asia–China pipeline network; and the as yet illusory Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India pipeline (TAPI).

China has been Turkmenistan’s primary, and at times only, gas export market for the last ten years. Chinese demand for natural gas, oil and other resources has placed Turkmenistan as an important part of Beijing’s Belt and Road strategy that seeks to further develop economic ties, improve infrastructure and increase political influence in the wider region. As the result of a push for cleaner burning fuel Chinese gas demand is growing rapidly, by 30-40 billion cubic metres (BCM) per year, something which should be good news for its largest gas supplier Turkmenistan. However China is rapidly expanding its access to LNG and the Asian LNG market is experiencing a major supply glut, with spot prices falling by 60 per cent since the summer of 2018 making it more competitive against land based suppliers, giving Beijing more options.^[114] It means that while China may well have increased demand for gas, this does not translate to a need to pay more for it. Indeed reports suggest that it has been able to persuade its Turkmen counterparts to lower their prices in 2017 although all details of the deal remain secret.^[115] In the first quarter of 2019 analysts have suggested there may have been a significant (26 per cent) spike in exports,^[116] after a previously depressed supply in 2018.^[117]

However, at least in the short-to-medium term, sales of gas to China are not seen as a major source of revenue due to a significant portion of the sales believed to be servicing and paying down debts Turkmenistan owes China, including for the development of the Galkynysh Gas Field (formerly South Yolotan) and the infrastructure that connected it to Chinese gas markets.^[118] The Chinese building the infrastructure themselves and sending Turkmenistan the bill at least ensured that the project was delivered swiftly and efficiently. Other projects seen as helpful to the development of China’s Belt and Road strategy, including new port facilities at Turkmenbashi, are believed to have been funded by Chinese investment. Not all of the loan amounts given have been made public but as Dr Luca Anceschi’s essay suggests the figures are believed to be around or above US $10 billion.

Like its spiritual cousin the Trans-Caspian TAPI remains mostly on the drawing board, game changing in theory but far from being put into practice. If ever completed the project could be transformative for Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and South Asia as a whole. It could provide access to markets for 33 BCM of Turkmen gas per year, it could enable Pakistan to resolve its gas shortages, provide opportunities for gasification in Herat and other Afghan cities along the route (as well as much needed transit fees) and provide opportunities to further diversify India’s growing gas market. The Government of Turkmenistan has made a series of confusing and contradictory claims about progress on the sections within its territory. In February 2018 the CEO of the Turkmen consortium working on the project announced that work in Turkmenistan had been completed, yet later that year announcements were made of more deliveries of materials, notably 35 km of pipeline, needed to complete the building works.^[119] In April 2019 a contract for further 214km of piping was announced, while a Turkmen State News Agency story about the success of the gas sector in Turkmenistan noted that work on the Turkmen sections of TAPI were under construction.^[120] Progress reports for the Afghan section of the project are just as vague, with little sign that significant progress is being made. Helpfully for the security of project on the Afghan side, though yet another area of concern from a human rights perspective, Turkmenistan has long cultivated a working relationship with the Taliban, as evidenced by them forcing up to 150 Afghan Army Soldiers, who had fled over the boarder after losing a confrontation with Taliban, back into Taliban custody and it is believed for many to their deaths.^[121]

Unhelpfully for Turkmenistan Pakistan appears to be seeking to reduce the proposed gas sale price before taking any action to build pipeline on its territory, potentially stalling notional plans to break ground in October 2019 and completion by the end of 2020.^[122] India too has been attempting to renegotiate the price structure which was set in 2013 between the four participating states at 55 per cent of the current oil price plus transit fees.^[123] India also may need to further expand its LNG options to give a diversity of supply options before it allows itself to become reliant on a route coming from Pakistan.

At present Turkmenistan is the project manager and notionally committed to providing 85 per cent of the project’s equity, investment capital it self-evidently lacks.^[124] The Islamic Development Bank has provided US $700 million loan but this is far from enough to enable project completion, with potential UAE or Saudi financial backing and an experienced project manager perhaps required to turn it from pipedream into reality.^[125]

With the Chinese export routes not providing significant cash in hand and TAPI far from complete the government of Turkmenistan has been searching around for other options to diversify its export routes. As of April 2019 it was announced that gas supplies to Russia had resumed, albeit with very little detail.^[126] It subsequently transpired that an initial short-term deal was in place for 1.2 BCM of gas, ahead of a more substantial five year deal that would restore supplies of 5.5 BCM per year going to Russia announced in July 2019. This amount, while helpful to the desperate Turkmen economy, pales in comparison to the 40 BCM that it used to supply before the first round of tensions in 2009 over a gas explosion, or even the 10-11 BCM it exported between 2011 and 2015 before the dispute over prices that led to the 2016-19 export freeze.^[127] Most analysts believe that the restoration of Russian gas supply is first and foremost ‘political gas’, a supply Gazprom doesn’t really need but which helps to bring Turkmenistan back into closer alignment with Russia in return for hard currency that Turkmenistan desperately needs. While the details of the deal remain confidential, given the current sale price for Gazprom gas to its neighbours and on European Markets it is likely that the unit price Turkmenistan is getting will be well below the levels it received in the 2000s, not least when factoring in Turkmenistan’s weak bargaining position. ^[128]

US engagement with Turkmenistan is limited compared to that of some of its neighbours due to relatively few US players in the Turkmen energy sector and Turkmenistan’s wider military and diplomatic posture of neutrality. However President Trump has publically urged progress on the Tran-Caspian Pipeline, while its incoming Ambassador to Ashgabat has identified border security, particularly with Afghanistan and Iran, as being on the US agenda. ^[129]

Strong relations between Turkmenistan and the UAE have seen Dragon Oil, owned by the Emirates National Oil Company, become one of the more successful players in the Turkmen energy market. As mentioned above Dubai has been a focus for Turkmen migrant workers and the close relations enable Ashgabat to put pressure on migrants to return.

The EU’s engagement in Turkmenistan has been seen as relatively limited, but is likely to expand as it has recently opened a delegation in Ashgabat to give it a full diplomatic presence in the country. The newly updated EU-Turkmenistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) is pending ratification by the European Parliament. The relationship is also framed by the new EU-Central Asia strategy, with a better than expected focus on human rights but unambitious on trade.^[130] The new EU Special Representative to the region in Peter Burian is also well-respected.^[131]

The European Parliament is importantly seeking to set a series of concrete human rights benchmarks as its condition for the ratification of the EU-Turkmenistan PCA.^[132] The EU has conducted 11rounds of its standard format human rights dialogues with Turkmenistan, such as in March 2019. However no public mention about the economic or human rights crisis was made by EU High Representative, Federica Mogherini, at the opening of the new EU Delegation in Ashgabat, though she was more forthcoming at the subsequent EU-Central Asia summit in Bishkek.^[133]The EU has been undertaking education initiatives and is running a joint project aimed at supporting SME’s in partnership with the EBRD.^[134]

What our authors say

Bruce Pannier argues that it is clear Turkmenistan’s economy has been in sharp decline for more than four years, but the full extent of the country’s economic problems remains unknown. Turkmenistan’s government claims the country continues to prosper. Authorities regularly tout growth and continue to spend lavishly on vanity projects – white marble hotels and government buildings, even a golf course. Independent verification of such claims is impossible as Turkmen authorities severely restrict the entry of foreigners into the country. But Turkmenistan’s people have found ways of telling to people outside the country, the story of the situation inside Turkmenistan. Their tale is one of chronic shortages of basic goods, rationing, lines outside stores and banks, cuts in benefits, and rising prices.

Eimear O’Casey examines the challenges facing businesses in the country.  She outlines the entrenched nepotism, cronyism, lack of recourse to justice and increasing reputational concerns that define the investment environment. She cites examples of the formal and informal obstacles that have faced foreign businesses as they seek to navigate the country’s opaque and restrictive regulatory climate, and argues that increasing pressure on the economy in recent years, rather than encouraging liberalisation or reform, has only reinforced these barriers.

Dr Luca Anceschi explores the nexus between Turkmenistan’s foreign economic relations and the country’s national gas industry, which represents the core sector of the Turkmen economy as a whole. The rentier logic of economic development promoted by the regimes that led Turkmenistan since the collapse of the USSR entrenched a relationship of dependency on natural resources that, at international level, translated into a dependency on energy export infrastructure, and pipelines more in particular. This brief article looks at four pipelines—some already existing, some nothing more than a project—to describe the precarious economic juncture at which Turkmenistan has found itself since the commercialisation of its gas ties with the People’s Republic of China.

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Photo by David Lundberg, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.

[1]According to the 2008 US State department cables released by WikiLeaks at the time 26 of 31 top Government of Turkmenistan officials are descended from the Ahal  Teke tribe see WikiLeaks, Turkmenistan: Ahal Teke Tribe Dominates Government, January 2008, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ASHGABAT55_a.html

[2] Facts and Details, Turkmenistan Becomes Independent, http://factsanddetails.com/central-asia/Turkmenistan/sub8_7a/entry-4803.html and David Roger Smith, Edward Allworth, Denis Sinor, Viktor Borisovich Zhmuida and Gavin R.G. Hambly, Turkmenistan, Encyclopaedia Britannica,  https://www.britannica.com/place/Turkmenistan#ref342789

[3] Something that similar groups in Armenia, Azerbaijan and elsewhere would become.

[4] Suparamat Niyozov, Ruhnama, 2001-2004  http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/eBooks/Asia/BOOKS/Ruhnama%20Niyozov.pdf

[5] Atlas Obscura, Giant Ruhnama, https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/giant-ruhnama

[6] See Louis Lafferty, Ruhnama Statue Opening-Turkmenistan, YouTube, December 2011,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1WhLZp_ocg also read Chronicles of Turkmenistan, Turkmenistan Is Finally Putting the ‘Ruhnama’ Behind Them, August 2014, https://en.hronikatm.com/2014/08/turkmenistan-is-finally-putting-the-ruhnama-behind-them/

[7] Richard Orange, Turkmenistan rebuilds giant rotating golden statue, Daily Telegraph, May 2011,  https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/turkmenistan/8533427/Turkmenistan-rebuilds-giant-rotating-golden-statue.html

[8] Monica Whitlock, Turkmen leader orders ice palace, August 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3554626.stm [Plans for an accompanying ski resort have been put on hold due to economic conditions]

[9] Turkmenistan.ru, Winter sports Center to be built in Ashgabat, August 2009, http://www.turkmenistan.ru/ru/node/26521

[10] Chronicles of Turkmenistan, Turkmenistan still experiences a shortage of cigarettes, January 2017, https://en.hronikatm.com/2017/01/turkmenistan-still-experiences-a-shortage-of-cigarettes/; BBC News, Turkmenistan: The regime that throws cigarettes on bonfires, December 2016,  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-38266078 and Bruce Pannier, The Perils Of Smoking Cigarettes In Turkmenistan, RFE/RL, May 2016,  https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-turkmenistan-smoking-crackdown/27728410.html

[11] Shaun Walker, A horse, a horse … Turkmenistan president honours himself with statue, The Guardian, May 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/25/horse-turkmenistan-president-statute-berdymukhamedov

[12] ITV, Turkmenistan president all singing and dancing in bizarre video 'dedicated to his horse’, April 2019, https://www.itv.com/news/2019-04-30/turkmenistan-president-gurbanguly-berdymukhamedov-singing-grandson-horse/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JsNioEnxeNs

[13] Most citizens are not thoroughly inured to the excesses of their leaders

[14] BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html

[15] Statistica, Cotton production by country worldwide in 2017/2018 (in 1,000 metric tons),  https://www.statista.com/statistics/263055/cotton-production-worldwide-by-top-countries/

[16] World Bank Group, Doing Business 2019: Training for Reform, October 2018, https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca/brief/doing-business

[17] EBRD, Turkmenistan Country Strategy 2019-2024,   https://www.ebrd-consultations.com/assets/Country-Strategies/Turkmenistan/67961d1592/turkmenistan-strategy-2019.pdf

[18]Bruce Pannier, Is Turkmenistan Being Pulled Into Russia's Orbit?, RFE/RL, January 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/iqshloq-ovozi-turkmenistan-pulled-into-russia-s-orbit/29713898.html

[19] UK Government, Overseas Business Risk – Turkmenistan, June 2019,   https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-business-risk-turkmenistan/overseas-business-risk-turkmenistan

[20] World Bank Group, Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, Spring 2019 : Financial Inclusion, April 2019,  https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31501

[21]Turkmenistan: Rebuilding bridges, April  2019, https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistan-rebuilding-bridges and https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/492711/ado2019.pdf

[22] Kanat Shaku, Bread sellers demand passports as Turkmenistan’s economic crisis goes from bad to worse, BNE News, June 2018, https://www.intellinews.com/index.php/bread-sellers-demand-passports-as-turkmenistan-s-economic-crisis-goes-from-bad-to-worse-143613/

[23] Ibid.

[24] EBRD, Turkmenistan Country Strategy 2019-2024,  https://www.ebrd-consultations.com/assets/Country-Strategies/Turkmenistan/67961d1592/turkmenistan-strategy-2019.pdf

[25] Turkmen News, Turkmenistan: Customers Pay Bribes to Withdraw Cash, February 2019, https://en.turkmen.news/news/turkmenistan-customers-pay-bribes-to-withdraw-cash/

[26] Turkmen News, Turkmenistan: In the conditions of economic crisis, people are fighting for their money, June 2019,  https://turkmen.news/news/valyutnyy-krizis-turkmenistan/

[27] Eurasianet, Turkmenistan: Suicide of Coca-Cola executive casts more gloom, February 2019, https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistan-suicide-of-coca-cola-executive-casts-more-gloom  

[28] RFE/RL, Turkmenistan Cuts Last Vestiges Of Program For Free Utilities, September 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/turkmenistan-cuts-last-vestiges-of-program-for-free-utilities/29511308.html

[29] Turkmenistan: More Cuts and Bad Business, The Diplomat, February 2019,  https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/turkmenistan-more-cuts-and-bad-business/

[30] BBC News, Banned Turkmenistan Airlines leaves thousands stranded, February 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-47115732

[31] Turkmenistan: More Cuts and Bad Business, The Diplomat, February 2019,  https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/turkmenistan-more-cuts-and-bad-business/

[32] An example of this latter case would be the oil and gas services company Petrofac has had an extended presence in the country

[33] CIS Legislation, LAW OF TURKMENISTAN About the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Turkmenistan, May 2011, http://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=43515

[34] WikiLeaks, TURKMENISTAN: LOCAL BUSINESS COUNCIL MEETING TOOK PLACE, January 2009,  https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ASHGABAT110_a.html

[35] Transparency International, Turkmenistan, https://www.transparency.org/country/TKM

[36] Turkmen News, Turkmen President’s Brother-in-Law Involved in Construction of $2.3bn Expressway, July 2019,  https://en.turkmen.news/news/turkmen-president-s-brother-in-law-involved-in-construction-of-2-3bn-expressway/ and Chronicles of Turkmenistan, Turkmenistan’s Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, which received a $3 billion government loan for the construction of motorway, seeks additional investments in Austria, September 2018,  https://en.hronikatm.com/2018/09/turkmenistans-union-of-industrialists-and-entrepreneurs-which-received-a-3-billion-government-loan-for-the-construction-of-motorway-seeks-additional-investments-in-austria/

[37] UK Government, Overseas Business Risk – Turkmenistan, June 2019,  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-business-risk-turkmenistan/overseas-business-risk-turkmenistan

[38] Catherine Putz, Turkmenistan Faces 2 New Arbitration Cases, October 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/turkmenistan-faces-2-new-arbitration-cases/

[39] UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub - Turkmenistan, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/country-navigator/223/turkmenistan

[40] UK Government, Turkmenistan United Kingdom Trade and Industry Council in Ashgabat, April 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/turkmenistan-united-kingdom-trade-and-industry-council-in-ashgabat

[41] Strategy International, Turkmenistan-UK Trade & Industry Council (TUKTIC),  January 2018, https://www.strategyinternational.co.uk/programme/2018/1/22/9g7ea13aggryxpmnhnxlnw97o5q5u3

[42] UK Government, Trade Envoys, https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/trade-envoys

[43] Abassador Thorda Abbott-Watt, Britian and Turkmenistan, August 2018, http://www.ocamagazine.com/britain-and-turkmenistan

[44] EBRD, Turkmenistan Country Strategy 2019-2024,  https://www.ebrd-consultations.com/assets/Country-Strategies/Turkmenistan/67961d1592/turkmenistan-strategy-2019.pdf

[45] Svitlana  Pyrkalo, EBRD loan supports Turkmen brewer Berk’s move into snacks, September 2016,  https://www.ebrd.com/news/2016/ebrd-loan-supports-turkmen-brewer-berks-move-into-snacks.html; Svitlana  Pyrkalo, EBRD funds first private mill for production of recycled cardboard in Turkmenistan, July 2013, https://www.ebrd.com/news/2013/ebrd-funds-first-private-mill-for-production-of-recycled-cardboard-in-turkmenistan.html; Svitlana  Pyrkalo. EBRD finances first PVC profile maker in Turkmenistan, January 2017, https://www.ebrd.com/news/2017/ebrd-finances-first-pvc-profile-maker-in-turkmenistan.html

[46] IPHR, Joint Letter: Turkmenistan Country Strategy Review by the EBRD, June 2019,  https://www.iphronline.org/joint-letter-turkmenistan-country-strategy-review-by-the-ebrd.html  

[47] Bruce Pannier, Turkmenistan's Unreal Harvest, February 2019, RFE/RL, https://www.rferl.org/a/turkmenistan-s-unreal-harvest-wheat-cotton/29772430.html

[48] International Cotton Advisory Campaign, Cotton this month, January 2019,  https://www.icac.org/Content/PublicationsPdf%20Files/4b1e0c03_e012_4e94_abf2_e1afd5404b2d/cotton-this-month-e1_18.pdf.pdf

[49] Bruce Pannier, Turkmenistan's Unreal Harvest, February 2019, RFE/RL, https://www.rferl.org/a/turkmenistan-s-unreal-harvest-wheat-cotton/29772430.html

[50] Alternative News of Turkmenistan, As grain harvest ends in Turkmenistan, media are silent about harvest victory, July 2018, https://habartm.org/archives/9318 and Alternative News of Turkmenistan, Once fertile Dashoguz turns into Turkmenistan’s salty wasteland, April 2018, https://habartm.org/archives/8956

[51] RFE/RL, Turkmen Leader Hails 'Generous' Harvests Despite Food Shortages, May 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/turkmen-leader-hails-generous-harvests-despite-food-shortages/29947575.html

[52] Alternative News of Turkmenistan, Security services quell a riot in a Turkmen market, July 2018, https://habartm.org/archives/9324

[53] Kanat Shaku, Bread sellers demand passports as Turkmenistan’s economic crisis goes from bad to worse, BNE News, June 2018, https://www.intellinews.com/index.php/bread-sellers-demand-passports-as-turkmenistan-s-economic-crisis-goes-from-bad-to-worse-143613/

[54] Alternative News of Turkmenistan, Apartheid "in Ashgabat." President-approved document discriminates residents of regions, February 2018, https://habartm.org/archives/4564

[55] Eurasianet, Turkmenistan protests too much as citizens are halted from leaving country, April 2019, https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistan-protests-too-much-as-citizens-are-halted-from-leaving-country

[56] Pete Baumgartner, Turkmenistan Clips Wings Of Citizens Fleeing Economic Woes, April 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/turkmenistan-clips-wings-of-citizens-fleeing-economic-woes/29170508.html

[57] RFE/RL, Turkmenistanis now go to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to earn money, April 2018, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/29142683.html

[58] RFE/RL, Turkmen authorities discuss measures to bring Turkmen migrant women home, March 2018, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/29124851.html

[59] RFE/RL, At Ashgabat airport, passengers are removed from flights, "assistance" is more expensive to leave, March 2019, https://rus.azathabar.com/a/29833886.html

[60] Eurasianet, Turkmenistan: Students Slapped with Five-Year Travel Ban, November 2009, https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistan-students-slapped-with-five-year-travel-ban and Rebecca Stonawski, (Not) Leaving Turkmenistan? A Survey of Students from Turkmenistan at the American University of Central Asia, April 2012, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.2304/power.2012.4.2.196

[61] Pete Baumgartner, 'Killing Hope': Turkmenistan's List Of 'Accepted' Universities Deals (Another) Blow To Students, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), April 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/killing-hope-turkmenistan-s-list-of-accepted-universities-deals-(another)-blow-to-students/29901588.html

[62] Farangis Najibullah, Escape From Turkmenistan: Almost 2 Million Have Fled, But The President Looks The Other Way, June 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/escape-from-turkmenistan-almost-2-million-have-fled-but-the-president-won-t-hear-of-it/29987972.html

[63] The World Bank lists it as 0.0%, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS, but other sources also suggest lower than 1% Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Remittance Inflows to GDP for Turkmenistan, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDOI11TMA156NWDB and Turkmenistan-Migrant Remittance, https://countryeconomy.com/demography/migration/remittance/turkmenistan

[64] Azerbaijan for example -see Adam Hug (ed.),  Spotlight on Azerbaijan, May 2012, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/spotlight-on-azerbaijan/

[65] Amnesty International, Turkmenistan: Satellite images reveal how mass forced evictions blight upcoming Asian Games, October 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/10/turkmenistan-satellite-images-reveal-how-mass-forced-evictions-blight-upcoming-asian-games/

[66] Human Rights Watch, Turkmenistan: Hosting Asian Games Amid Widespread Repression, July 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/07/turkmenistan-hosting-asian-games-amid-widespread-repression

[67] Anti-Slavery International, Turkmen cotton and the risk of forced labour in global supply chains,  April 2019, https://www.antislavery.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Turkmenistan-Turkey-report.pdf

[68] Fergana News, Subbotnik participants in Turkmenistan were forced to hide from the president, May 2019, http://fergana.agency/news/107520/

[69] Solidarity Centre, Children, Pregnant Teachers Forced to Pick Turkmenistan's Cotton, February 2018,  https://www.freedomunited.org/news/children-teachers-turkmenistan-cotton/

[70] Responsible Sourcing Network, Turkmen Cotton Investor Statement, June 2019, https://www.sourcingnetwork.org/turkmen-investor-statement

[71] Anti-Slavery International, Forced Labour Tainted Cotton: from Turkmenistan via Turkey,  April 2019, www.antislavery.org/forced-labour-tainted-cotton-from-turkmenistan-via-turkey/

[72] Responsible Sourcing Network, U.S. Customs Halts Imports of Forced Labor Cotton and Cotton Goods from Turkmenistan, May 2018,  https://www.sourcingnetwork.org/press-release-turkmenistan-imports

[73] Alternative News of Turkmenistan, Cotton pickers struggle with low pay, poor crop in southern Turkmenistan, November 2018, https://habartm.org/archives/9737

[74] Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, BTI 2018- Turkmenistan Country Report, https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/TKM/

[75] Freedom House, Freedom in the World Index 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores

[76] FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: the 2018 Foreign and Commonwealth Office report, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/806851/human-rights-democracy-2018-foreign-and-commonwealth-office-report.pdf

[77] OSCE, Turkmenistan Parliamentary Elections, 25 MARCH 2018 ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/382915?download=true

[78] Prove They Are Alive, The Disappeared List, http://provetheyarealive.org/the-disappeared/

[79] Prove They Are Alive, Ovadan Depe Medieval Torture in modern Turkmenistan, http://provetheyarealive.org/ovadan-depe-medieval-torture-in-modern-turkmenistan/

[80] Rachel Denber, End A Dissident’s Ordeal in Turkmenistan, Human Rights Watch, May 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/13/end-dissidents-ordeal-turkmenistan

[81] Exeter Central Asian Studies Network, Central Asian Political Exiles (CAPE) database- Bayhanov, Akmukhammet,  https://excas.net/exile/bayhanov-akmukhammet/ and The Borgen Project, The realities behind human rights in Turkmenistan, July 2017,  https://borgenproject.org/human-rights-in-turkmenistan/   

[82] Exeter Central Asian Studies Network, Central Asian Political Exiles (CAPE) database, https://excas.net/exiles/

[83] Eurasianet, Turkmenistan: What’s left of rights?, June 2018, https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistan-whats-left-of-rights and Alternative News of Turkmenistan, The Turkmen Ombudsman submitted her first report. Half of the document – plagiarism, June 2018, https://habartm.org/archives/9222

[84] Turkmen News, Housing, Court Rulings — Main Targets of Public Complaint, Turkmen Ombudswoman’s Report Shows, July 2019, https://en.turkmen.news/news/turkmen-ombudswoman-2018-report/

[85] Amnesty International, Turkmenistan- Submission to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, July 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur61/8474/2018/en/ and Turkmenistan still experiences a shortage of cigarettes, Chronicles of Turkmenistan, January 2017, Turkmenistan still experiences a shortage of cigarettes, https://en.hronikatm.com/2017/01/turkmenistan-still-experiences-a-shortage-of-cigarettes/

[86] Amnesty International Public Statement, Amnesty International urges  Turkmenistan to resolve all enforced disappearances and end criminalization of same sex relations, September 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR6191262018ENGLISH.pdf

[87] Human Rights Watch, Dignity Debased- Forced Anal Examinations in Homosexuality Prosecutions, July 2016, https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/12/dignity-debased/forced-anal-examinations-homosexuality-prosecutions

[88] Sarah Repucci, Freedom and the Media: A Downward Spiral, 2019,  https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-media/freedom-media-2019

[89] Chris Forrester, Satellite dishes banned in Turkmenistan, April 2015, https://advanced-television.com/2015/04/22/satellite-dishes-banned-in-turkmenistan/

[90] Freedom House had listed it at 15% in 2017 according to the Freedom of the Press 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/turkmenistan while others put the figure at 18% in 2018 according to a  We are Social/Hootsuite, Digital 2018, https://www.slideshare.net/DataReportal/digital-2018-turkmenistan-january-2018 and a similar figure for 2016 from the CIA World Factbook-Turkmenistan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tx.html

[91] RFE/RL, German Tech Firm's Turkmen Ties Trigger Surveillance Concerns, February 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/german-tech-firm-s-turkmen-ties-trigger-surveillance-concerns/29759911.html and Human Rights Watch, Turkmenistan: Report of Inquiry to German Cybersecurity Firm, June 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/25/turkmenistan-report-inquiry-german-cybersecurity-firm

[92] Who are supporting the FPC with this project.

[93] Committee to Protect Journalists, Turkmenistan journalist Soltan Achilova barred from traveling abroad, March 2019, https://cpj.org/2019/03/turkmenistan-journalist-soltan-achilova-barred-fro.php

[94] RFE/RL,  Jailed, Harassed RFE/RL Correspondent Leaves Turkmenistan, March 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/jailed-harassed-rfe-rl-correspondent-leaves-turkmenistan/29839464.html    

[95] RSF, Turkmenistan bans journalist Soltan Achilova from travelling abroad, March 2019, https://rsf.org/en/news/turkmenistan-bans-journalist-soltan-achilova-travelling-abroad and RFE/RL, RFE/RL Correspondent Forcibly Detained In Turkmenistan, May 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/rferl-correspondent-achilova-detained-brutalized-security-forces-turkmenistan/29220474.html

[96] Gaspar Matalaev is a relative of the editor of Turkmen News, the FPC’s partner for this project. Joanna Ewart-James, Gaspar Matalaev: serving time for reporting on forced labour in Turkmenistan’s cotton fields, Independent, February 2018,  https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/campaigns/voicesindanger/serving-time-for-reporting-on-forced-labour-in-cotton-fields-a8194961.html

[97] Human Rights Watch, Turkmenistan: UN Blames Government for Activist’s Death, August 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/09/turkmenistan-un-blames-government-activists-death

[98] FCO, Human Rights and Democracy: the 2017 Foreign and Commonwealth Office report, October 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2017/human-rights-and-democracy-the-2017-foreign-and-commonwealth-office-report

[99] RFE/RL, Jailed Turkmen Animal Rights Activist Visited By Daughter After Days Held Incommunicado, December 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/turkmenistan-kucherenko-animal-rights-activist-arrested/28912076.html

[100] Eurasianet, Has Turkmenistan Learned to Love Dogs? (Hint: No), August 2017, https://eurasianet.org/has-turkmenistan-learned-to-love-dogs-hint-no and Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Rights Activists Say World Must Act on Turkmenistan Abuses, March 2011,  https://iwpr.net/global-voices/rights-activists-say-world-must-act-turkmenistan-abuses

[101] Turkmenistan, Results of the elections to the National Parliament, December 2013, http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/_eng/?id=3069

[102] Chronicles of Turkmenistan, Turkmen Red Crescent to be funded by residents, February 2017, https://en.hronikatm.com/2017/02/turkmen-red-crescent-to-be-funded-by-residents/ and Red Crescent Society of Turkmenistan, https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/where-we-work/europe/red-crescent-society-of-turkmenistan/

[103] The International Center for Not for Profit Law, Civic Freedom Monitor: Turkmenistan, July 2018,  http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/turkmenistan.html

[104] UNDP, Turkmenistan, http://www.tm.undp.org/content/turkmenistan/en/home.html

[105] UCL, Ancient Merv Project, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/archaeology/research/ancient-merv-project

[106] Forum 18, TURKMENISTAN: In Ramadan, Muslims fear "extremism" accusations, May 2019, http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2481

[107] Felix Corley, TURKMENISTAN: Appeals against 12-year jail terms fail, July 2018, http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2399

[108] CIA, World Factbook- Turkmenistan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tx.html and Felix Corley, TURKMENISTAN: Second 2019 conscientious objector jailing, Forum 18,  June 2019,  http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2483

[109] Naz Nazar, The tragic echoes of Turkey’s anti-Gülen campaign in Turkmenistan, Open Democracy, April 2018,  https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/anti-gulen-campaign-in-turkmenistan/

[110] Felix Corley, TURKMENISTAN: Appeals against 12-year jail terms fail, July 2018,  http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2399

[111] The Chronicles of Turkmenistan, Turkmenistan re-launches the anti-beard campaign, January 2019, https://en.hronikatm.com/2019/01/turkmenistan-re-launches-the-anti-beard-campaign/

[112] Monica Whitlock, Young Turkmen face beard ban, BBC News, February 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3486776.stm

[113] Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: New Opportunities and New Challenges, November 2018, http://knowledge.freshfields.com/en/Global/r/3848/the_new_convention_on_the_legal_status_of_the_caspian_sea and Robert Cutler, Third time lucky for Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline?, Petrolium Economist, June 2019, https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-economics/europe-eurasia/2019/third-time-lucky-for-trans-caspian-gas-pipeline

[114] Chen Aizhu and Henning Gloystein, China gas demand to surge in 2019, but maybe not enough to sop up LNG glut, Reuters, April 2019, https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-gas-beijinggas/china-gas-demand-to-surge-in-2019-but-maybe-not-enough-to-sop-up-lng-glut-idUKKCN1RK0BW

[115] Chen Aizhu and Henning Gloystein, China gas demand to surge in 2019, but maybe not enough to sop up LNG glut, Reuters, April 2019, https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-gas-beijinggas/china-gas-demand-to-surge-in-2019-but-maybe-not-enough-to-sop-up-lng-glut-idUKKCN1RK0BW

[116] Sam Bhutia, Twitter traffic- Turkmenistan’s Goods Exports to China, May 2019,   https://twitter.com/sam_bhutia/status/1130819093286641664/photo/1

[117] Expert views on the reason for this vary from unexpectedly reduced Chinese demand given the rise of LNG and capacity/supply problems, notably in November 2018- for the latter see Chu Daye and Zhang Hongpei, Natural gas supply shortage from Turkmenistan driving up prices in China amounts to ‘hype’: NDRC, Global Times, January 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1135213.shtml. It is possible that both factors were in play. 

[118] Eurasianet, China Figures Reveal Cheapness of Turkmenistan Gas, October 2016, https://eurasianet.org/china-figures-reveal-cheapness-turkmenistan-gas

[119] Bruce Pannier, Analysis: TAPI And Other Turkmen Tales, December 2018, RFE/RL  https://www.rferl.org/a/tapi-turkmen-tales-pipeline-qishloq-ovozi-pannier/29632356.html and Bruce Pannier, Another Turkmen Pipe Mystery, RFE/RL, April 2019,  https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-tapi-turkmen-pipe-mystery/29862029.html

[120] State News Agency of Turkmenistan, Turkmenistan is actively developing new forms of international energy business, February 2019,  http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/?id=18454

[121] Najim Rahim and Rod Nordland, Taliban Capture About 150 Afghan Soldiers After Chase Into Turkmenistan, New York Times, March 2019,  https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/world/asia/afghanistan-soldiers-taliban-turkmenistan.html

[122] Khalid Mustafa, Pakistan links TAPI work initiation with gas price review, The News, June 2019, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/481480-pakistan-links-tapi-work-initiation-with-gas-price-review

[123] The Economic Times, India seeks re-negotiation in gas price from TAPI pipeline, August 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/india-seeks-revision-in-gas-price-from-tapi-pipeline/articleshow/65497724.cms?from=mdr

[124] Business Recorder, Equity in TAPI: proposal approved by ECC, December 2015,  https://fp.brecorder.com/2015/12/201512191257147/

[125] Alex Forbes, Turkmenistan sees light at the end of the tunnel, June 2019, https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/upstream/exploration-production/2019/turkmenistan-sees-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel

[126] NEBIT-GAZ, Turkmenistan resumed natural gas supplies to Russia, April 2019, http://www.oilgas.gov.tm/blog/2653/turkmenistan-vozobnovil-postavki-prirodnogo-gaza-v-rossiyu

[127] RFE/RL, Gazprom Reaches Five-Year Gas Deal With Turkmenistan, July 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/gazprom-reaches-five-year-gas-deal-with-turkmenistan/30035528.html

[128] A discussion between Dr Luca Anceschi, Bruce Pannier, political analyst Sam Butia and energy analyst Laurent Ruseckas, https://twitter.com/anceschistan/status/1144606148273852417?s=11

[129] Dr Victoria Clement, What Are US Interests in Turkmenistan?, The Diplomat, June 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/what-are-us-interests-in-turkmenistan/

[130] Sam Bhutia, The EU’s new Central Asia strategy: What does it mean for trade?, Eurasianet, June 2019, https://eurasianet.org/the-eus-new-central-asia-strategy-what-does-it-mean-for-trade

[131] EEAS, Joint Communication on the EU and Central Asia: New opportunities for a stronger partnership, May 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/62411/joint-communication-eu-and-central-asia-new-opportunities-stronger-partnership_en

[132] IPHR, The EU adopts important benchmarks, as repression continues in Turkmenistan, May 2019, https://www.iphronline.org/the-eu-adopts-important-benchmarks-as-repression-continues-in-turkmenistan.html and the European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2019 on the draft Council and Commission decision on the conclusion by the EU and the European Atomic Energy Community of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a Partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Turkmenistan, of the other part (12183/1/2011 – C8-0059/2015 – 1998/0031R(NLE)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0146_EN.html?redirect

[133] European External Action Service, Mogherini Full Intervention, July 2019, https://twitter.com/eu_eeas/status/1147545602391248897

[134] EU Project: Support to the Education Sector in Turkmenistan, https://education-turkmenistan.eu/

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This report has shown Turkmenistan to be a country teetering on the edge of catastrophe. An obsession with appearance that speaks to a need for public display and regimented control, masking and managing a regime under enormous pressure as years of economic turmoil place unprecedented strain on a rigid but potentially brittle political structure. Hunger and hyper-inflation are being managed by further increasing the scale of human rights abuse and the level of intrusion into people’s lives.

Investors may be initially attracted to Turkmenistan due to its enormous gas wealth but as the EBRD, the UK Department of International Trade and many others have noted it has huge structural challenges. It is to some extent a ‘Potemkin economy’, with marble facades, respectable GDP figures and a tightly regulated state shops, masking a huge and chaotic black market economy. Potential investors face a range of risks including: the political whims of the President, leading to arbitrary behaviour by a sclerotic bureaucracy whose rotating cast of officials live in fear of displeasing the leader; a high risk of non-payment for goods or services rendered; endemic corruption; insecurity of legal title or contracts; the lack of rule of law and independent judiciary; and reputational risks from being associated with severe human rights abuses and the use of forced labour. At the very least this should give investors cause to pause and, even if they are unwilling to rethink their investment, it should be seen as a necessity to carry out thorough due diligence into any local partners in Turkmenistan to reduce exposure to expropriation and corruption risks. While the international community itself has been slow to implement necessary transparency initiatives, such as the EU’s Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive or the UK’s Beneficial Ownership Register, if Turkmenistan is serious about wanting to attract international investment it should take steps to create clarity about the ownership of its domestic firms to improve the investment environment. In the absence of effective domestic remedies Turkmenistan will need to demonstrate it is complying with the provisions of the bilateral and international investment treaties it is a signatory to.

Turkmenistan’s relative isolation and economic reliance on China and Russia have led some to despair over the lack of influence and leverage that can be brought to bear with the regime to improve the human rights situation. While this position clearly sets some limits on the scope of international influence it must not be a reason not to try to achieve change, not least given that the current economic turmoil means that Turkmenistan is looking for international sources of revenue more than ever before, creating new opportunities for engagement on a ‘more for more’ and ‘less for less’ basis. As a number of civil society organisations have argued the new European Parliament human rights benchmarks provide a helpful basis on which to measure and test engagement with Turkmenistan.^[1] As this research has set out Turkmenistan’s human rights challenges are multitude but there are clear areas to focus on, including forced labour, ‘disappeared’ activists in the prison system, prison conditions in general and restrictions on independent journalists and human rights activists. Turkmenistan needs to do more to facilitate access by UN Special Rapporteurs and other UN mechanisms, the most recent of which was in 2009, and to enable representatives of international NGOs to obtain visas to visit the country. It needs to do more to show that it is complying with its UN treaty obligations on human rights.[2]

International engagement with Turkmenistan’s carefully curated NGOs, education and health institutions can have a place but it must not be misconstrued or spun as an example of increased openness or progress. It is a transaction that may help provide a tangible benefit to a group of people in Turkmenistan but it is unlikely to be a tool to diffuse democratic values or encourage systemic reform. There remains a case, except in areas that deliver directly to the welfare of the people of Turkmenistan, for reconsidering projects pending (or making them conditional on) improvements in human rights and/or refocusing funding to other countries in the wider region that are making progress. The international community should avoid engagement for engagement’s sake as while contact can make minor differences to individual behaviour around the margins it can seek to normalise authoritarian practice rather than achieving long-term systemic change. To use an analogy, even though glaciers can bring down mountains that doesn’t mean that they are the most efficient means of doing so or that they are the most effective use of water. So without tangible improvements in current behaviour by the government, the international community should re-evaluate its existing interactions with Turkmenistan.

For example the UK needs to consider the appropriateness of its most high profile engagements with one of the most authoritarian regimes on earth being overwhelmingly trade focused. It should look again at the suitability of designating Turkmenistan one of the 56 countries to which it has a formal trade envoy. It could examine whether the Turkmenistan-UK Trade & Industry Council (TUKTIC) should still be a country priority given both the human rights and economic situation in the country, the risks posed to investors and the limits such a business first approach creates for the UK’s ability to push for real reforms alongside European and other international colleagues.

In part, beyond the remit of this publication, there is a strong case that the EBRD should refocus its lending to the countries in the region that are at least trying to abide by the criteria set out in Article 1 of the bank’s founding charter, which calls on it to only work with ‘Central and Eastern European countries committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economics’.^[3] If this is to mean anything  there has to be a clear demonstration of the difference between how Turkmenistan is treated and those who are at least taking some steps towards democracy. The current revision of the EBRD’s country strategy provides an opportunity to achieve this differentiation. As with other organisations the EBRD should apply the EU Parliament benchmarks to its approach to engagement with Turkmenistan. It should resist plans to expand its lending to certain areas of the public sector, given the state of repression and the ubiquity of forced labour amongst public sector and state enterprise workers.

The forced labour situation in the cotton sector needs sustained pressure and independent monitoring. If a robust mandate can be agreed between the ILO and Turkmenistan then the ILO establishing a presence on the ground in Turkmenistan should be supported in order to map and monitor the scale of forced labour and to take action to prevent it. Establishing a strongly mandated ILO presence should be one of the primary requirements for international community engagement with Turkmenistan.

One area for potential additional engagement with Turkmenistan that should not undermine the objectives set out above would be in the provision of or access to food, in the relatively unlikely scenario that the regime was able to admit that there was a problem. There may be scope for additional support by the UN’s World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization, as well as other international assistance, to prevent the spread of hunger and malnutrition in the country.

While the range of potential issues to address is vast there are a number of specific recommendations that can be made to assist in urgently improving the situation in Turkmenistan.

Recommendations to the Government of Turkmenistan:

• Notify all families about the condition of their imprisoned loved ones and allow visitor access
• Free political prisoners and jailed journalists
• Improve prison conditions and end the use of torture in the detention system
• End forced labour in the cotton harvest and allow independent monitoring
• Allow visa access by UN Special Rapporteurs and other UN mandate holders, as well as representatives of international NGOs
• Take steps to improve transparency around company ownership
• Enhance judicial independence in the criminal and commercial sector, while honouring its international treaty obligations  

Recommendations to the international community:

• Ensure the EU adopts and applies the European Parliament human rights benchmarks for Turkmenistan
• Require the EBRD’s lending to Turkmenistan to reflect the need to improve human rights and avoid expansion to the public sector in the absence of genuine reforms
• Push for an ILO presence in Turkmenistan with a strong mandate to tackle forced labour
• Reconsider international trade promotion efforts to Turkmenistan, such as the UK’s TUKTIC trade missions
• Support access to asylum and other forms of exile for activists and their families fleeing persecution by Turkmenistan’s regime

---

Photo by Peretz Partensky, published under Creative Commons with no changes made.

[1] IPHR, The EU adopts important benchmarks, as repression continues in Turkmenistan, May 2019, https://www.iphronline.org/the-eu-adopts-important-benchmarks-as-repression-continues-in-turkmenistan.html. and the European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2019 on the draft Council and Commission decision on the conclusion by the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a Partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Turkmenistan, of the other part (12183/1/2011 – C8-0059/2015 – 1998/0031R(NLE)), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0146_EN.html?redirect

[2] UN Human Rights, Turkmenistan,  https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/ENACARegion/Pages/TMIndex.aspx; It has ratified 13 UN treaties and optional protocols as set out here at the UN Treaty Database https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=180&Lang=EN

[3] EBRD, Political Aspects of the Mandate of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,  https://www.ebrd.com/downloads/about/aspects.pdf

[post_title] => Conclusions and recommendations [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => conclusions-and-recommendations-2 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-09-24 11:12:53 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-09-24 11:12:53 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=3883 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[10] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 2679 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2018-07-18 00:14:40 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-07-18 00:14:40 [post_content] => This publication examines the growing influence of illiberal, anti-Western and socially conservative civil society groups, popular movements and political forces in five post-Soviet states: Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. It finds that illiberal social attitudes remain prevalent across the region, particularly in relation to LGBTI rights, and that they are increasingly being used as opportunities for political mobilisation within these societies. While there have been attempts to create illiberal civil society groups that mirror pro-Western/liberal NGOs or think-tanks, they remain significantly less influential than the institutions and groups linked to the dominant religious organisations in these countries such as the Orthodox Church, or political factions with influence over state resources.What is clear, however, particularly in Ukraine and Georgia, is that there has been a significant rise in far-right and nationalist street movements, alongside smaller but active homophobic gangs. These ‘uncivil rights movements’ still lack broad public support but their political energy and rate of growth is influencing the wider politics of the region. It is clear that illiberal civil society is on the rise in these five countries but it is growing in its own way rather than simply aping its liberal counterparts.Russia has an important role in the rise of illiberal civil society across the region, in particular, the way it has disseminated and promoted the concept of ‘traditional values’; however it is important to recognise that while some groups have direct or indirect contact with Russia, many do not and that the primary drivers of such activity are to be found in the local societies of the countries at hand. The Russians are being increasingly joined by US evangelical groups who see opportunities to promote a shared traditionalist agenda in the region. Attempts by the EU and other international actors to encourage or require countries to implement measures on anti-discrimination or tackling domestic violence have been used effectively by illiberal civil society groups, religious institutions and political factions as a rallying point for illiberal opposition.The publication argues that there is a need to more robustly tackle corruption and malpractice by politicians who may be notionally liberal or pro-European but who are bringing these concepts into disrepute. Civil society should work to identify the ‘moveable middle’ groups in society who are currently skeptical about liberal social values but are not passionate in their opposition to them and who might be open to engagement and persuasion.The publication makes a number of recommendations:The Governments of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan should: • Take urgent measures to tackle corruption and improve transparency; • Investigate attacks on minorities and scrap any partnerships with nationalist groups involved; • Protect the ability of liberal civil society groups to operate freely without intimidation; • Disband any armed militias affiliated with political parties or extremist groups.The international community should: • Increase political pressure and sanctions on the activities of ostensible ‘pro-European’ or ‘liberal’ allies whose corruption or malpractice brings such principles into disrepute; • Insist on action to tackle hate crimes and offer greater support and resources to do so if political willingness to act can be ensured; • Look for opportunities for diplomatic dialogue with the dominant religious institutions; • Continue to refine and improve ‘myth-busting’ and anti-propaganda responses; • Support efforts to improve survey and research data about illiberal civil society attitudes; • Work with liberal-minded NGOs to find new ways to engage the ‘movable middle’. [post_title] => The rise of illiberal civil society: Executive summary [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-rise-of-illiberal-civil-society-executive-summary [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-13 15:37:09 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-13 15:37:09 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=2679 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[11] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 2682 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2018-07-18 00:12:26 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-07-18 00:12:26 [post_content] => From Trump to Duterte, from Orbán to Erdogan, from Putin to PiS, socially conservative, nationalist and populist political forces are on the rise across the globe. The claim that we are living through a crisis for liberal democracy seems less hyperbolic by the day. After almost two decades which saw the advance of liberal democracy in the wake of the cold war, the period since the 2008 financial crisis undermined faith in and the perceived inevitability of the ‘Western model’, just as Russia (actively) and China (somewhat more passively) are displaying alternative economic and political models. It is a time of uncertainty fuelled not only by political instability but increasing concerns over rapid economic, technological and social change. It is this latter dimension – the pace of social change and reactions to it – that are at the heart of this publication which examines the extent of the counter-reaction.This publication assesses the growing influence of illiberal, anti-Western and socially conservative civil society groups, popular movements and political forces in five post-Soviet states – Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova – looking at who they are and what they are seeking to achieve and trying to understand why. These countries have been selected as they remain the five freest societies in the region that are not already part of the European Union (the Baltic States), and they are the sites of geopolitical competition for influence between the ‘West’ (predominantly the EU but also the historically the US) and Russia. As societies at the more open end of the regional spectrum, they all have the ability for groups of citizens to come together to advocate for political change in relative freedom. These countries also have well established ‘liberal’ non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that often receive funding from international donors including western nations and institutions, as well as private philanthropy such as the Open Society Foundations, the supporters of this publication.This research is primarily focused on the activity of four, often overlapping, types of group:

• NGOs, think tanks and other research institutes that promote socially conservative values, both in relation to domestic policy and as a reason for closer ties with Russia, but whose form and function ostensibly mirrors that of liberal civil society
• Socially conservative pressure or campaigning groups
• Far-right or radical nationalist groups
• Groups linked to religious institutions (which may well include a number of the above)

Social attitudes: the power of religion and traditionAll of the five societies under examination in this publication can be defined as broadly retaining socially conservative social values and traditions, despite their varying degrees of openness to engagement with the West. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, these countries have been developing – both rediscovering and creating – their national identity. In the context of emerging national identity and the desire for stability in the wake of the political and economic upheavals of the early 90s, it can become easy for individual rights to be seen as a threat to social cohesion (as well as entrenched power structures), something that is particularly pointed in the context of four of these five countries having either an active or unresolved territorial conflict.Furthermore since the collapse of Soviet atheism religious identification and observance has boomed, with faith returning to the public square in a significant way. The identity of the dominant faith group has been used as a tool to define national identity across the region, either formally with special provisions in constitutions such as in Georgia and Armenia for the dominant church, or informally with politicians using religion as a way to define the identity of the nation, notably in Kyrgyzstan and Moldova.The dominant religious organisations are the most trusted institutions in the five countries examined, with trust levels far exceeding those of civil society and secular politicians. For example, 70% of Georgians rather or fully trust their religious institution;^[1] despite having one of the most established and active NGO sectors in the region, the comparable figure for NGOs is only 23%.^[2]In Georgia and Armenia, the churches are independent institutions. While the Georgian Church leadership is more pro-Russian than the country as a whole, has good relations with the Russian Orthodox Church and shares a distaste for Western social liberalism, it operates on its own terms and has become an extremely powerful force for social mobilisation and political influence. While the Armenian Church has traditionally been a less proactive and more passive part of the previously ruling elite, it stakes a claim to be the keeper of Armenian identity, a role it played for centuries after the destruction of the Armenian state of antiquity. Neither church has a dependent relationship with its Russian counterpart: the Georgian Church is autocephalous (self-governing) within Eastern Orthodoxy, and Armenia’s Apostolic Church is part of the separate Oriental Orthodox church family. This is unlike the situation in Moldova and Ukraine where the largest branches of the Orthodox Church are branches of the Russian Orthodox Church, though in Ukraine its dominance is being challenged by the rival Kiev Patriarchate. In Kyrgyzstan, Islam remains dominated by the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, a centralised Muftiate with close relations to the state.As this publication makes clear, these religious institutions are the most-powerful non-governmental actors[3]in their societies and there are clear links with pressure groups on conservative social issues. While overall levels of religious identification and practice have risen, this rise in religious sentiment dovetails with longer-standing cultural attitudes prevalent in these societies, helping to provide a firm foundation for a cultural backlash against liberalising legislation often encouraged by ‘outside powers’, such as the EU through its Eastern Partnership processes.Persistent hostility to LGBTI rights has been a common feature across the region. In Moldova, 87% of people in 2016 saw homosexuality as not being justified, up from 85% in 2008.[4] Similarly, the 2014 World Values survey showed that 86% of Georgians, 95% of Armenians and 68.5% of Kyrgyzstanis believed homosexuality was never justifiable.[5] There is also data in a number of countries suggesting that there are not the dramatic variations in views by age seen in Western societies (where young people are dramatically more liberal), with Eric McGlinchey’s essay highlighting that levels of homophobia in Kyrgyzstan are broadly static across the age spectrum and data suggesting that examples of extreme homophobia may be higher amongst young Georgians than the older generations.^[6] Both Georgia and Kyrgyzstan[7] have taken steps explicitly to outlaw gay marriage in their constitutions. The one bright spot in the data has been the significant improvement in Ukrainian attitudes on LGBTI rights in the wake of pro-European reorientation brought about by the Maidan protests and the Revolution of Dignity, despite the clear rise in far-right pressure discussed in this publication. Research by the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) shows that in 2017 56% of Ukrainians supported equal rights protections for LGBTI people while only 21% were opposed, with 59% supporting workplace discrimination laws to protect them.[8] Ten years earlier only 34% of Ukrainians were willing to support equal rights protections for LGBTI people.[9]Despite its legality during most of the Soviet-era, there are signs that cultural acceptance of abortion remains far from certain. 67% of Georgians believed that ‘an abortion can never be justified’[10] while in Moldova the similar figure was 53%.[11]The essay contributions in this collection show how women’s health issues, issues around sex education, domestic violence, and in the case of Kyrgyzstan bride kidnapping and polygamy, are being used as wedge issues by conservative and religious groups. The term ‘gender’ has been adapted by illiberal actors as a shorthand conflate a range of liberalising measures from attempts to promote gender equality to LGBTI rights as something to resist.[12]Local politics and external actorsThe ‘traditional values’ debate is one rooted in power and influence. Given that illiberal social attitudes towards LGBTI rights, immigration and women’s role in society have significant domestic support, it is far from unusual that political figures would seek to harness such forces, in some cases out of genuine support and often for more cynical motives to provide a compelling narrative to distract from state capture and corruption. A number of our authors highlight how leading figures of notionally pro-European governments have been seen to utilise illiberal forces to achieve their political ends, including the close relationship between Georgian Dream and the Georgian Church, Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov’s relationships with far-right militias, and the murky relationship in Moldova between pro-European government power broker and oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc and the socially conservative, pro-Russian President Igor Dodon.The nature of and tools for Russian influence in promoting illiberal values in the post-Soviet Space have been addressed in detail in the previous Foreign Policy Centre publications Sharing Worst Practice and The Information Battle.[13] These publications show how Russia has tried to promote a ‘traditional values’ agenda that places the Russian political model as a guide for emulation by those in the region wary about the pace of social change, supportive of the Orthodox Church, opposed to LGTBI rights and sympathetic to a vision of a male-headed nuclear family. It disseminates these messages through its media, both domestic television rebroadcast across the region and targeted tools such as the Sputnik News Agency, whose messages are then adapted and repeated by local channels and websites. Media penetration is buttressed by the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church and a series of soft-power foundations and organisations that promote Russian values abroad, such as the state-backed Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation and the private initiatives of oligarchs close to the Kremlin. When starting this project one of its goals was to seek to analyse the extent of Russian involvement in orchestrating local activities by traditionalist groups. Given the opaque nature of the funding structures of many of the groups analysed,[14] it has been difficult to definitively map direct Russian involvement; however the essay contributions identify a number of groups which are seen to have close ties (in some cases a direct financial relationship) with the Russian government and Russian institutions. For the most part, however, the approach by local groups is emulation or imitation rather than direct control, with a few examples of movements as ‘franchises’, such as the operationally separate but closely related ‘Occupy Paedophilia’ organisations.As Kristina Stoeckl shows in her essay about the World Congress of Families, Russian influence is increasingly dovetailing with the efforts of a number of radical US evangelical groups that are seeking to form a common front against the spread of liberal values, particularly on LGBTI rights and abortion. [15] Work by Melissa Hooper in previous FPC publications[16] and others such as Chris Stroop[17] and Casey Michel[18], highlight this evolving collaboration to promote illiberalism in the post-Soviet space and across Europe, trends that predate but are magnified by the impact of the Trump presidency on the relationship between the US right and Russia.The Five Countries: GeorgiaIn this collection, our three Georgian authors clearly set out the web of interlocking personalities and organisations that have developed a series of illiberal NGOs and institutes. This is the clearest example of mimicking the form of liberal civil society from all five case studies, perhaps unsurprising given Georgia’s comparatively well-established and active NGO sector providing a model for emulation. The authors confirm the analysis clearly expressed in past Foreign Policy Centre publications that the Georgian Orthodox Church is the most powerful illiberal force within Georgian society.[19] It is clearly the most proactively influential of the religious institutions within the five countries assessed in this publication, and it is probably fair to see it as being the most influential non-state[20] actor within an individual society from across the five countries assessed.As in Ukraine, the issue of direct Russian involvement in Georgian society is particularly fraught, with the wounds of the 2008 conflict still raw. However, there has been a limited thawing in relations, in part led by contact between the Georgian Church and its Russian counterparts, despite Georgia’s continued steps towards the European Union. Research in 2015 by Nata Dzvelishvili, [21] which is expanded upon in her contribution to this collection, by the Media Development Initiative in 2017[22] and Transparency International Georgia in 2018[23] have helped map some of the potential links between an intertwined set of Georgian organisations and donors and partners in Russia. Some Georgian groups do directly advocate improving ties with Russia; however, it is clear that analysts believe there remain links between Russia and organisations that promote opposition to liberal values who frame such activity as ‘pro-Georgian’ rather than ‘pro-Russian’. This is seen as an attempt in the short term to undermine Western influence, an approach that has a greater potential audience than explicitly pro-Russian activity.Of particular concern is that the three Georgian authors clearly identify a growing presence on the street of burgeoning nationalist, far-right movements that pose a major challenge to the promotion of liberal values in Georgia. These groups are building on the momentum of past protests by the Church and its allies against the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia (IDAHOT)[24] but they have been broadening out their attacks to a wider selection of liberal targets from nightclubs to vegan restaurants. [25] There seems some evidence of links between members of the emerging nationalist protest groups and Russian groups, just at a time when Russia has cracked down on its domestic far-right movements.[26]UkraineThe debate over the extent of the involvement of the Ukrainian far-right in the Maidan movement, the Revolution of Dignity and its aftermath can be a painful one. This is in part because of the narrative, projected to the (physical) exclusion of all others to the citizens of Crimea and Donbass, by the Russian government, intelligence service and media outlets, was the ludicrous and slanderous narrative that ‘the fascists have taken Kiev’. It is also due to the deep emotional investment in the Maidan Movement from across large sections of Ukrainian society, particularly amongst liberal civil society. In this context, the analysis provided by Volodymyr Ishchenko here and elsewhere[27], which argues that the far-right had a greater involvement than some observers are willing to recognise, can be challenging for those who see the Maidan as a decisive national moment for liberal social change.While the extent of its involvement is clearly a matter of heated debate, Ukrainian far-right groups were clearly disproportionately involved in the physical confrontation elements of the protest movement, notably at the denouement when Yanukovych’s security forces ended up shooting protestors – the act that led to his ouster. Furthermore, from the example of protest movements elsewhere in the world, it can be argued that organised groups with clear agendas, structures and experienced members tend to have an outsized role in the coordination of protest action, irrespective of their size relative to the overall number of people ultimately participating in the protest or movement. ^[28] As a result they may come into contact with new recruits and more broadly their influence may, as a result of their attachment to a popular cause particularly over time, shape the mainstream debate in their direction. This ability to influence the wider political environment is particularly relevant in a society where political parties are primarily personality-led rather than built on firm ideology and organisational structures. Such analysis should be tempered by the recognition that the coalition of forces that came together to support the Maidan was extremely broad, from LGBTI Rights activists to Catholic and Kiev Patriarchate Orthodox priests, while many of the public faces of the movement tended to be a mix of mainstream pro-European politicians and more liberal activists.What is undoubtedly true is that, while the power and presence of the far-right were strengthened by involvement in the revolution, the outbreak of conflict and the far right’s direct participation in leading pro-government militias, both inside and outside official Ukrainian government structures, has dramatically enhanced their position. Volodymyr Ishchenko’s essay analyses in detail the rise of the three largest organisations:

• the Azov Battalion and its affiliated organisations (including the National Corps political party and a vigilante group)[29] which are seen as having ties to the current Minister of Interior Arsen Avakov
• the Right Sector far-right coalition (including its Tryzub –Trident- militia, whose members see themselves as heirs of World War II guerrilla movement the Ukrainian Insurgent Army)[30]
• the Svoboda (Freedom) party a far-right populist, socially conservative party and organisation, whose influence has somewhat waned with the rise of Azov.[31]

Not only are such groups and their affiliates active on the battlefield in Donbass, but they are seeking to play a role domestically too. For example, despite the Azov-affiliated vigilante group National Druzhyna being involved in intimidation and violence against civil society groups and minorities as noted below, it is seeking under provisions of the law ‘On the participation of citizens in protection of public order and the state border’ to involve 600 of its activists in a legally sanctioned ‘civic formation’ that would seek to shadow the police and notionally assist them in tackling anti-social behaviour and public order issues.[32]There is also c14, a group often accused of being neo-Nazis, whose structures mirror Azov and which recruits actively amongst football club ‘ultras’, formerly had been affiliated with Svoboda. Its primary focus has been on targeting Russians and institutions seen as pro-Russian, since its time leading street battles against pro-Yanukovych gangs at the time of Maidan.[33] It has been listed by the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium as a domestic terrorist group,[34] been involved in attacks on Roma camps across Ukraine[35] and yet it has also been the recipient of government funding from the Youth and Sports Ministry for ‘national-patriotic’ education projects.[36]As with other countries in the region, there are a number of Ukrainian organisations that seek to copy the model of the Russian Occupy Paedophilia movement such as the White Lions, Heritage and perhaps the most notable group Fashion Verdict.[37]These groups deal in entrapment, public humiliation and violence against LGBTI individuals and groups. [38]Efforts to promote the rehabilitation and promotion of nationalist groups from Ukraine’s past, such as the World War II nationalist movement the Ukrainian Insurgent Army that fought against both the Soviets and the Nazis, has been supported by more mainstream organisations such as the government-funded ‘Ukrainian Institute of National Memory’.^[39]Despite the substantive improvement in public attitudes towards LGBTI rights and some legislative progress in the post-Maidan period, these anti-LGBTI groups and the larger far-right groups are becoming increasingly brazen in their attacks on LGBTI people and on organisations working with them. Incidents have included an attack on the international human rights groups Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch in a Kiev incident in May 2018[40] and the disruption in April of a Freedom House event in Poltava by the National Corps.[41] As Vyacheslav Likhachev puts it, while these groups are unlikely to achieve direct political power for themselves, they are, however, aggressively trying to impose their agenda on Ukrainian society, including by using force against those with opposite political and cultural views. They are a real physical threat to left-wing, feminist, liberal, and LGBT activists, human rights defenders, as well as ethnic and religious minorities.’[42]In addition to these violent extremists, a number of non-violent anti-LGBTI groups and movements such as the All Together-for a family! The movement led by evangelical activist Ruslan Kukharchuk are emerging.^[43]The All Together for a Family 2017 two-day festival claimed an attendance of 30,000,[44] with musicians, clowns and other family-friendly entertainment to complement the religious preaching and anti-LGBTI activism. There is also the Orthodox conservative group Katehon, relatively small but heavily engaged in homophobic protests in Ukraine and with alleged ties to the much larger conservative group in Russia with the same name. There is also the Orthodox conservative group Katehon, relatively small but heavily engaged in homophobic protests in Ukraine and with alleged ties to the much larger conservative group in Russia with the same name.The mainstream religious institutions in Ukraine have been somewhat more muted in their attacks on LGBTI rights than their counterparts elsewhere. However, the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCCRO), the umbrella body comprising most of the church groups in the country, does actively promote an annual All-Ukrainian March for the protection of the rights of children and families.^[46] Of the major institutions however, it is only really the Moscow Patriarchate which has institutionally spoken out actively against the Equality March and taken a more proactive position.^[47]Given the understandable sensitivities around anything to do with Russia, despite emulating some of the rhetoric and behaviours of the Russian-inspired ‘traditional values agenda’, Ukrainian conservative and religious groups are often looking towards a concept of ‘traditional European values’ that they seek to return to as the country reorients westwards, as opposed to the liberalising tendencies of the EU as in institution. It is worth noting of course that tensions over language rights and historic territorial sensitivities may be limiting the potential for collaboration with the emerging European illiberal forces in Hungary and Poland, a position that may evolve in a more collaborative direction over time.As Andrew Wilson of ECFR has pointed out, at time of writing in summer 2018, the post-Maidan political environment looks pretty bleak.[48] Continuing political dominance by oligarchs and their supporters has provided fertile ground for anti-elite populists who may seek to fuse their anti-corruption messages to other less savoury populist causes. Such a febrile political environment can only encourage the radical groups identified here to further expand their memberships and influence.MoldovaOf the five countries under analysis Moldova is the country where the tensions between Russian and Western influence, liberal and illiberal social and political forces are most delicately balanced. What at first glance may seem like a standoff between a pro-Russian President and a pro-European Government with their respective outriders in civil society, is, in fact, a good deal murkier.The geopolitical fault lines are real and significant, although they are sometimes exaggerated and often used cynically by the ruling elites of both factions to preserve a political system that concentrates their hold on power and access to resources and in ‘rents’. The ingrained anger against corruption in the ruling government, including forces close to it such as former PM Vlad Filat being involved in a $1 billion bank fraud, has helped to undermine the credibility of pro-European forces in Moldova.At time of writing the EU has frozen a €100m euro aid package as a result of the Moldovan Supreme Court’s decision to nullify the election of a pro-European Mayor of Chisinau who narrowly beat the candidate of President Dodon’s pro-Russian socialist party. The court decision is seen to have been influenced by forces close to billionaire power broker Vladimir Plahotniuc[49] , of whom would be Mayor-elect Andrei Nastase is a longstanding critic. While the power behind Prime Minister Pavel Filip’s Democrat Party and the Deputy President of the Socialist International, many Moldovan observers argue that Plahotniuc has close ties with President Dodon, a ‘binomial’: Plahotniuc-Dodon has become a short hand for the oligarchic nature of the ruling elites.[50]The EU’s decision is part of a somewhat belated shift in taking concerns about malpractice by its notional allies in the ‘pro-European’ Moldovan government increasingly seriously, given that claims of corruption against the government have been used successfully to undermine support for Europeanisation by both pro-Russian political forces and illiberal civil society actors alike. However it is worth noting that the largest EU political grouping, the centre-right European People’s Party (not always on the side of the angels when it comes to democratic values in the region), has taken as new observer members the two main pro-European but ‘anti-system’ opposition parties, 2016 Presidential Candidate Maia Sandu’s Action and Solidarity Platform and Nastase’s Dignity and Truth platform. Subsequently, EPP President Joseph Daul has been vocal in criticism of the government and in particular the decision to overturn Nastase’s Mayoral win. [51]EU-required legislation and reforms have provided some of the main cultural flashpoints for the mobilisation of illiberal civil society, most notably the 2014 Anti-Discrimination Law. In their essays both Mihaela Ajder and Dumitru Sliusarenco look at the ways in which illiberal political organisations, civil society groups and the Moldovan Orthodox Church have actively challenged efforts to bring in equalities legislation and pushed back against groups pushing for LGBTI and women’s rights.ArmeniaWhile, as set out above, Armenian social attitudes remain deeply conservative, the debates on LGBTI issues or women’s rights have been somewhat more muted than in some of their neighbouring countries, lacking the passionate intensity of the debate in Georgia or the sharp geopolitical divides of Moldova. The Armenian Apostolic church, traditionally close to past Armenian governments and its oligarchic elite, has so far not shown concerted efforts to dominate debates over social policy, pursuing a more ‘quietist’ approach, in part with one eye on how its actions be would be seen by US- and French-based diaspora donors.There is a reasonably small sector of research institutes whose work is often focused directly at internally to government or to an international audience (notably the diaspora) with limited levels of public engagement in their own country.^[52] Armenia has also an array of more nationalist organisations either focused on Nagorno-Karabakh and others, such as Aragats Akhoyan’s Return Foundation looking west to Turkey, operating with support both from the state and the diaspora.It is clear that until now the state has been the dominant institution in promoting nationalist and sometimes socially conservative positions. Anna Pambukhchyan’s essay shows how the state sought to directly engineer popular mobilisation behind its ‘nation army’ concept, bringing together government institutions and agencies with the backing of the church to push a controversial values agenda. Perhaps the longstanding co-option of nationalist positions and rhetoric by the state has somewhat closed the political space for the emergence of street-based far-right organisations along the lines seen in Ukraine and Georgia.Like elsewhere in the region there have been cases where internationally supported equalities legislation received a backlash from illiberal campaign groups. In autumn 2017 conservative groups targeted the Armenian government’s attempt to pass legislation against domestic violence. Perhaps unsurprisingly the legislation was attached to the conditions for the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed on 24^th November 2017. These protests ^[53] were led by the For the Sake of Sovereignty Restoration organisation headed Hayk Nahapetyan and the Pan Armenian Parental Committee headed by Arman Boshyan^[54], a group that was active the 2013 ‘Anti Gender Protests’^[55] and has a Facebook following of over 18,000 likes. Boshyan is also President of the pro-Russian Yerevan Geopolitical Club.^[56]Arman Gukasyan, leader of a small NGO called International Humanitarian Development, also used the protests against the law as a way of getting public attention, having previously gained notoriety in 2015 claiming that Western-funded NGOs were fomenting a ‘colour’ revolution^[57] and became the editor of the ‘Stop-G7’ website dedicated to attacking LGBTI rights and their supporters including the EU and Western donors. ^[58]In the wake of the 2018 Velvet Revolution that brought liberal opposition politician Nikol Pashinyan from the streets to the office of Prime Minister, it is clear that Russia will be reconsidering the extent of its soft-power engagement in Armenia. Given Armenia’s security dependency on Russia, Russian control of leading companies and, until recently, a broadly Russia-sympathetic political elite whose governance style followed a similar model, Moscow has not engaged particularly intensively or effectively in promoting its values agenda in the country. Leading Armenian policy analyst Richard Giragosian has described Russia’s soft power in Armenia as ‘neither soft nor powerful’ and that Moscow was taking its dominant position in Armenia for granted^[59], particular given the 2015 public protests against the Russian owned  energy monopoly (the Electric Yerevan Movement) and over the killing of an Armenian Family by a Russian solider.However, the sudden collapse of Serzh Sargsyan’s government, in a botched attempt to replicate Putin’s 2008 switch from President to the role of Prime Minister, and his government’s replacement by a reformist group with cautiously pro-Western inclinations has shifted the terms of the debate.The change in Armenia has not gone unnoticed in Azerbaijan, which has been strengthening its relationship with Moscow in recent years as its engagement with the West suffered setbacks over human rights, with some Russian politicians arguing that Azerbaijan should supplant Armenia as Russia’s primary partner in the South Caucasus.^[60] While new Prime Minister Nikol Pashayan shows no sign of wanting to radically shift Armenia’s geostrategic position, going out of his way to reassure Russia about the strength of their partnership and his narrow focus on domestic reform, Yerevan-based analysts are confident that Russian interests may start to play a more active role in Armenian civil society to hedge against future overtures to the West. Particularly given that the anti-corruption crackdown on the business elite close to the formerly ruling Republican Party is likely to lead to resentment against the new government from the groups being targeted it is an open question as to how such forces might choose to retaliate by challenging the popularity of Pashayan’s administration. There are already signs that nationalist activists such as Arthur Danielyan, Narek Malyan, Narek Samsonyan who were involved in the ‘Army Propaganda Team’ to support the nation army concept and with connections to ex-defence minister Vigen Sargsyan are now mobilising to attack the new government as being too liberal (and LGBTI friendly) and not patriotic enough through a new online channel called Adekvad (Relevant).[61] Any snap parliamentary elections may provide an opportunity to assess how both Russia and the old elite are responding to the new political environment.KyrgyzstanThe one Central Asian state under examination in this collection displays a number of shared characteristics. As set out in the essay contributions by Rsykeldi Satke and Eric McGlinchey, new nationalist movements have emerged in the last decade, most notably Kalys (Justice), Erkin El and Kyrk-Choro (Forty Knights). Kalys, led by Jenishbek Moldokmatov, staged protests in favour of an anti-gay propaganda law, publically challenged Western funded NGOs and burning a photo of a Ukrainian blogger who they claimed was an LGBTI activist. Erkin El, led by Mavlyan Askarbekov, protested against sex education leaflets, claiming they were ‘destructive brochures that ruin the minds of youth.[62] Kyrk-Choro, the most eye catching (in their traditional felt kalpak hats and often riding on horses echoing the forty knights of the Epic of Manas – the mythological tale after which they are named), has been active in attacking ethnic minority groups, such as ethnic Uzbeks, Uyghurs and Chinese migrant workers^[63], as well as those seen as promoting LGBTI or women’s rights. ‘Patriot’ groups linked to Kyrk-Choro have been involved in attacking Kyrgyz women perceived to be dating foreigners – particularly when they are working in Russia as migrant workers. They also claim inspiration in their recent actions from the Ukrainian Right Sector.^[64]These overt nationalist groups are seen as a ‘lunatic fringe’^[65]; while we live in times when groups and personalities can move swiftly from the fringe to mainstream, at present these are not the primary non-governmental actors in reinforcing conservative attitudes. As elsewhere in the region it is religious institutions (including their popular social support networks) and clerics, particularly in South Kyrgyzstan, that are the driving force for such change. Both the Grand Mufti Maksat Hajji Toktomushev and the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan have issued Fatwas against same-sex relations, with the Mufti challenging Human Rights Watch and other NGOs by calling on the authorities “to pay special attention to the activities of some public organizations that disseminate social discord while using humanistic ideas.” ^[66]With some similarities to Georgia, there is some evidence to suggest that levels of religiosity and conservative social attitudes are higher among young people than older generations who lived through Communist-era official atheism. A 2015 USAID study argued that ‘older people tend to view religion, particularly Islam, with suspicion, and are concerned about the spread of more austere forms of Islam into the Kyrgyz Republic. Younger people, on the other hand, seem to be identifying more with religion. In UNDP’s analysis of young people, 68% of respondents identified themselves first as Muslims and second as citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic’.[67]As part of the drawdown from Afghanistan the US closed Manas air force base in 2014 under pressure from both former President Atambayev and the Russians. Since that period Western influence has been seen to decline in comparison to Russian and Chinese economic and political influence. There are limited political tools to change this situation, particularly as the country falls outside the range of the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative.What our authors say:Nata Dzvelishvili discusses how a pro-Russian narrative has been renamed as ‘pro-Georgian’, yet its objective still implies a discrediting of the West and stimulating euroscepticism. Some pro-Russian NGOs have stopped functioning, though the number of media organizations remains unchanged. However, there is an apparent increase in the number of Facebook pages that promote anti-Western sentiments, focusing on the cultivation of nationalist ideas and using the fear of losing national values and traditions to distribute anti-Western information, which is mostly homophobic, xenophobic or misinformation. The growth of nationalist aspirations has affected public attitudes and driven legislative changes. The State Security Service has recognized the peril of Russian propaganda, but hasn’t specified the exact responsibly for the distribution of anti-Western or nihilistic sentiments in the country which has dramatically increased.Eka Chitanava and Katie Sartania examine the rise of socially conservative, illiberal groups in Georgia, who have recently become increasingly active in public spaces, media and social networks. These groups try to shape the modern concept of Georgian nationalism. Chitanava and Sartania attempt to start mapping urban and digital frontiers of social hostilities and put the events in social and political contexts. Their essay briefly provides general profiles of those involved, their demands and targets of their physical and verbal violence. Extremism against liberal groups is not a new phenomenon in Georgia and there are some ideological and institutional affiliations with the Georgian Orthodox Church. The frontline of the conflict between social groups is a public space which embodies political power and cultural hegemony. The article employs the concept of a ‘revanchist city’, where who wins the public space, has his or her national identity reaffirmed.Mariam Ubari argues that Georgia has witnessed a significant rise in violence and aggression towards liberal groups since 2017. The rise of Neo-Nazi groups has been consolidated as a protest in response to the government’s migration policies or as need to protect national identify from the emerging threats in Georgia. Some ultra-right groups have Russian backing, whilst within others with an openly fascist ideology- no direct Russian links can be established. The Georgian Orthodox Church officially supports the Euro- Atlantic aspiration of the Georgian state, but the behaviour of its clergy and Church policies sometimes suggest otherwise.Volodymyr Ishchenko’s essay looks at the Ukrainian far right, meaning a range of Ukrainian ultranationalists including parties, organizations and informal groups committed to the ideology of radical Ukrainian nationalism, who see the nation as of absolute value and the nation-state as a tool to realize the nation’s will. Contrary to the position of moderate Ukrainian national-democrats, the radical nationalists see liberal-democratic values as a danger to Ukraine rather than embracing them. Pro-Russian ultranationalists did exist in Ukraine, however, they used to be by far weaker even before Maidan uprising and has become completely irrelevant after the start of the war in Donbass in 2014, with exception of in the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Lugansk. Instead, Ishchenko argues that the strength and political impact of Ukrainian radical nationalists has been systematically underestimated, even as they are significantly contributing to the fragility of the post-Maidan political settlement and have become a real threat to political freedoms and human rights in Ukraine.Mihaela Ajder‘s contribution catalogues and analyses the range of different groups that seek to challenge liberalism in Moldova. These include far-right organisations and conservative pressure groups that have been building a following in Moldova, often through attacks on and pressure against LGBTI groups and other minorities. However, the most powerful group active on conservative issues remains the very influential Moldovan Orthodox Church. Ajder places these players in the context of a Moldovan political environment lacking in trust due to years of corruption and mismanagement that breeds the societal resentment in which reactionary groups can thrive.Dumitru Sliusarenco and Ion Foltea write that the Republic of Moldova is a former Soviet Union country facing many difficulties in its transition to democracy. One of the important causes of these is the growing influence of illiberal and conservative groups, which promote an anti-Western values agenda. They are linked in particular with the two largest socially conservative forces in Moldovan society: the Socialist Party and the Moldovan Orthodox Church. The values pursued by these organisations and ‘illiberal civil society groups’ with ties to them can be seen as endangering human rights and fundamental freedoms.Anna Pambukhchyan’s essay provides a short introduction to the ‘nation-army’ concept, a nationalist education and social mobilisation project that was introduced to the Armenian public in October 2016. The concept which despite being the core of the Armenian defence agenda for one and a half years was never down written on paper. This led to misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the concept. This paper analyses the essence of the concept and argues that rather than being natural ideology it was an artificially created top-to-bottom propaganda tool that was spread through society to deflect criticism over the former Governments’ failure to tackle corruption in the military.Dr Eric McGlinchey writes that Kyrgyzstan, the only democratic-leaning post-Soviet Central Asian state, has seen periodic upticks in uncivil society. Extreme ethno-nationalism, anti-LGBT rhetoric, and militant Islam have all found a voice among elements of the Kyrgyz polity. One shared driver is behind each of these forms of illiberalism: competitive politics. Illiberalism sells in Kyrgyzstan, just as illiberalism is now popular in Europe and the United States. Kyrgyzstan, along with its European and North American counterparts, demonstrates that democracy is no sure guarantee against illiberalism. Only through sustained and local advocacy for human rights and civil liberties can competitive polities offer enduring safeguards for civil society.Ryskeldi Satke argues that in these challenging times of transition in a politically unstable region, the rights of women in Central Asia can no longer be ignored as the women’s rights movement picks up speed elsewhere around the globe. He suggests that the international community and donor states that are providing crucial aid and political support to Kyrgyzstan must address the blatant disregard of the rights of women. It is important for policymakers in the West and international development organizations to implement proactive policies on gender equality and women’s rights in Kyrgyz Republic and the wider region.Kristina Stoekl examines the development of the World Congress of Families looking at the way radical US evangelicals are developing partnerships with conservatives from Russia and elsewhere in the post-Soviet space to promote illiberal values and push back against LGBTI rights and other liberalising social measures. She charts the development of the organisation and looks at the preparations for the meeting in September 2018 in Chisinau.[1]Caucasus Research Resource Centre, Trust-Religious Institutions respondent belongs to, Caucasus Barometer 2017, http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2017ge/TRURELI/[2]Caucasus Research Resource Centre, Trust-NGOs, Caucasus Barometer 2017, http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2017ge/TRUNGOS/ The same number 23% distrust NGOs, with the majority (39%) unsure either way.[3] Though in some cases the divide between ‘church’ and state has become blurred.[4] Ovidiu Voicu, Jennifer Cash and Victoria Cojocariu, Church and State in the Republic of Moldova, The Center for Public Innovation and Soros Foundation Moldova, 2017, http://www.soros.md/files/publications/documents/Studiu_Biserica%20si%20Stat_EN.pdf[5]Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. World Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled Datafile Version: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp The figure in Kyrgyzstan was notably lower because respondents gave less intense negative answers rather than a significant positive score, with only 4.9% of Kyrgyz respondents saying homosexuality could be to some extent justifiable.[6] CRRC, Five data points about homophobia in Georgia five years after a homophobic riot, OC Media, May 2018, http://oc-media.org/five-data-points-about-homophobia-in-georgia-five-years-after-a-homophobic-riot/[7] Bruce Pannier, What's In Kyrgyzstan's Constitutional Referendum?, December 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-constitutional-referendum-whats-at-stake/28164053.html[8]ILGA-RIWI Global Attitudes Survey, October 2017, https://ilga.org/ilga-riwi-global-attitudes-survey[9]Nash Mir Centre, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, Situation of LGBT in Ukraine in 2010-2011, 2011, https://www.stiftung-evz.de/fileadmin/user_upload/EVZ_Uploads/Handlungsfelder/Handeln_fuer_Menschenrechte/Stop_Hate_Crime/Projekte/report2011cover-e.pdf[10]Caucasus Research Resource Centre, JUSABOR- justified/never justified: having an abortion, Caucasus Barometer 2017, http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/cb2017ge/JUSABOR/[11]Ovidiu Voicu, Jennifer Cash and Victoria Cojocariu, Church and State in the Republic of Moldova, The Center for Public Innovation and Soros Foundation Moldova, 2017,http://www.soros.md/files/publications/documents/Studiu_Biserica%20si%20Stat_EN.pdf[12] Samson Martirosyan, The ‘Gender Equality Law’ Hysteria in Armenia, The Armenian Weekly, September 2013, https://armenianweekly.com/2013/09/20/the-gender-equality-law-hysteria-in-armenia/[13] Adam Hug (ed.), Sharing worst practice: How countries and institutions in the former Soviet Union help create legal tools of repression, Foreign Policy Centre, May 2016, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/sharingworstpractice/ and Adam Hug (ed.), The information battle: How governments in the former Soviet Union promote their agendas & attack their opponents abroad, Foreign Policy Centre, March 2017, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/infobattle/[14] While NGO donor transparency is desirable care needs to be taken to avoid encouraging requirements that would echo Russian ‘Foreign Agents’ laws.[15] Southern Poverty Law Centre, How the World Congress of Families serves Russian Orthodox political interests, May 2018,https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/05/16/how-world-congress-families-serves-russian-orthodox-political-interests[16]Adam Hug (ed.) ibid[17] Christopher Stroop, Between Trump and Putin: The right-wing international, A crisis of democracy and the Future of the European Union, May 2017, http://www.politicalresearch.org/2017/05/11/between-trump-and-putin-the-right-wing-international-a-crisis-of-democracy-and-the-future-of-the-european-union/#sthash.VY50H59S.jdSQT3Ub.dpbs[18] Casey Michel, The Rise of the ‘Traditionalist International’: How the American Right Learned to Love Moscow in the Era of Trump, March 2017, http://www.rightwingwatch.org/report/the-rise-of-the-traditionalist-international-how-the-american-right-learned-to-love-moscow-in-the-era-of-trump/?_ga=2.228502877.1900447021.1531651021-399355175.1531651021 ‘Traditionalist International’ had been a working title for this research before the FPC became aware of its use by Michel and that our research findings more clearly emphasised the local dimensions of illiberal mobilisation.[19] Adam Hug (Ed.)Traditional religion and political power: Examining the role of the church in Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova, Foreign Policy Centre, October 2015, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/orthodox/[20] While there is much debate about the closeness of church and state in Georgia, the perception is not that the state controls the church but there are concerns around the extent of the Church’s influence over the state.[21] Nata Dzvelishvili and Tazo Kupreishvili. Russian influence on Georgian NGOs, May 2015 https://www.academia.edu/36353738/Russian_Influence_on_Georgian_NGOs_and_Media[22] Media Development Fund,  Kremlin Influence Index 2017, http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/library/67/file/eng/dm_iik_engl-compressed.pdf[23] Transparency International. ‘Anatomy of Georgian Neo-Nazism’’, May 2018, http://www.transparency.ge/en/blog/anatomy-georgian-neo-nazism[24]JAM News, Georgian ultra-rightists promise to prevent Tbilisi from celebrating International Day Against Homophobia, May 2018, https://jam-news.net/?p=102509[25] Matthew Collin, Georgian techno fans and extremists clash in Tbilisi in fight for club culture, Guardian, May 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/music/2018/may/14/georgian-techno-fans-extremists-clash-tbilisi-fight-club-culture and Georgian vegan cafe attacked by 'sausage-wielding nationalists', Guardian, May 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/31/georgian-vegan-cafe-attacked-by-sausage-wielding-nationalists[26] Mariya Petkova, The death of the Russian far right, Al Jazeera, November 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/11/death-russian-171123102640298.html[27] Volodymyr Ishchenko, Denial of the Obvious: Far Right in Maidan Protests and Their Danger Today, Vox Ukraine, April 2018, https://voxukraine.org/en/denial-of-the-obvious-far-right-in-maidan-protests-and-their-danger-today/[28]For example in a UK context you could note the disproportionate influence of small far and radical left groups in organised protests in the UK. The Socialist Workers Party for example is a tiny organisation, yet their placards are a major feature of all most any left-leaning public demonstration because they are well organised and turn up to each protest with huge numbers of posters and placards with their name and slogans on that are handed to any rally attendee who will take them. Similarly such small groups can play dominant roles in the coordination or executive bodies of ‘popular front’ organisations with a notionally much broader reach and remit.[29] Open Democracy, The rise of Azov, Denys Gorbach and Oles Petik, February 2016https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/denys-gorbach-oles-petik/rise-of-azov[30] Information about Tryzub is available on this website http://banderivets.org.ua/[31] The Svoboda Party website is here: http://svoboda.org.ua/. Their facebook page has 57k likes.[32] Hromadske international, What’s Behind Ukraine’s Shocking “National Druzhyna” Militia?, February 2018, https://en.hromadske.ua/posts/whats-behind-ukraines-shocking-national-druzhyna-militia[33] Hromadske International A Fine Line: Defining Nationalism and Neo-Nazism in Ukraine, May 2018, https://en.hromadske.ua/posts/does-neo-nazism-exist-in-ukraine[34] Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, C14 aka Sich – Ukraine,  https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/c14-aka-sich-ukraine[35] Halya Coynash, Ukrainian neo-Nazi C14 vigilantes drive out Roma families, burn their camp, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, April 2018, http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1524441220[36] Christopher Miller, Ukrainian Militia Behind Brutal Romany Attacks Getting State Funds, June 2014,  https://www.rferl.org/a/ukrainian-militia-behind-brutal-romany-attacks-getting-state-funds/29290844.html[37] Hromadske International, Russian Anti-Gay Vigilantes Find New Home in Ukraine, May 2017, https://en.hromadske.ua/posts/russian-anti-gay-vigilanties-find-new-home-in-ukraine[38] Stephanie Marie Anderson, 6 things 'Gaycation' taught us about Ukrainian LGBT+ culture, SBS, https://www.sbs.com.au/topics/sexuality/fast-lane/article/2017/01/21/6-things-gaycation-taught-us-about-ukrainian-lgbt-culture[39]Mariya Shchur, Are scholars from the Institute of National Memory “whitewashing” the history of Ukraine? Volodymyr Vyatrovych responds to Josh Cohen’s article in Foreign Policy, RFE/RL via Euromaidan Press, May 2018, http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/05/04/92324/  http://www.memory.gov.ua/[40] RFE/RL, Amnesty Says Attack On Gay Event In Kyiv Shows Police Inaction, May 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/attack-on-lgbti-event-in-kyiv-highlights-police-inaction-says-watchdog/29221677.html[41] Via the twitter feed of Bellingcat’s Aric Toler, https://twitter.com/AricToler/status/981572464609148928[42]Vyacheslav Likhachev, Far-right Extremism as a Threat to Ukrainian Democracy, Freedom House, May 2018,  https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/ukraine%20brief%20final.pdf[43]LGBT Human Rights Nash Mir Center, On the Rise: LGBT situation in Ukraine in 2017, 2018, http://gay.org.ua/publications/lgbt_ukraine_2017-e.pdf. The organisation’s website is http://vsirazom.ua/ and Ruslan’s personal site is available in English, http://ruslanstory.com/en.[44]Ruslan Kukharchuk, United Together – For the Family! A national movement in Ukraine, July 2018, http://evangelicalfocus.com/yourblog/3556/United_Together_For_the_Family_national_movement_in_Ukraine

[46] Religious Information Service of Ukraine, Ukrainian Churches call to join on June 2nd the All-Ukrainian March for the Protection of the Rights of Children and Families, May 2018, https://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/confessional/auccro/71031/

[47] LGBT Human Rights Nash Mir Center, On the Rise: LGBT situation in Ukraine in 2017, 2018, http://gay.org.ua/publications/lgbt_ukraine_2017-e.pdf[48] Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian elections: Poroshenko and proliferating populists, ECFR, May 2018, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_ukrainian_elections_poroshenko_and_proliferating_populists[49]Eugen Tomiuc, Moldova's Andrei Nastase: The Man Who Would Be Mayor -- Or More, RFE/RL, July 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-andrei-nastase-the-man-who-would-be-mayor-or-more/29336544.html[50] Kamil Całus, Moldova’s odd couple: Plahotniuc and Dodon, New Eastern Europe, June 2017, http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/06/01/moldova-s-odd-couple-plahotniuc-and-dodon/[51]EPP, Plahotniuc-Dodon cartel have robbed Moldovan citizens of their last democratic right, June 2018, http://www.epp.eu/press-releases/plahotniuc-dodon-cartel-have-robbed-moldovan-citizens-of-their-last-democratic-right-enro/[52] Yevgenya Jenny Paturyan, Think Tanks in Armenia: Who Needs their Thinking?, On Think Tanks, October 2015, https://onthinktanks.org/articles/think-tanks-in-armenia-who-needs-their-thinking/[53] Joshua Kucera, Armenia: EU Officials Making Tactical Retreat in Values War, Eurasianet, October 2017, https://eurasianet.org/s/armenia-eu-officials-making-tactical-retreat-in-values-war[54] Pan Armenian Parental Committee website (in Armenian) http://hanun.am/[55] Anna Nikoghosyan, In Armenia, gender is geopolitical, Open Democracy: Russia, April 2016 https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/anna-nikoghosyan/in-armenia-gender-is-geopolitical[56] Anna Nikoghosyan, The paradox of Armenia’s domestic violence law, Open Democracy: Russia, November 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/anna-nikoghosyan/paradox-of-armenia-s-domestic-violence-law[57] Arman Ghukasyan, Sakunts has confirmed the findings of our survey, July 2015, https://www.aravot-en.am/2015/07/27/171285/[58]Arthur Minasyan and Olya Azatyan, The battle against the Kremlin’s online homophobic propaganda, Global Information Society Watch,  http://www.giswatch.org/en/country-report/economic-social-and-cultural-rights-escrs/armenia[59]Richard Giragosian, Soft power in Armenia: Neither soft, nor powerful, ECFR, August 2015, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_soft_power_in_armenia_neither_soft_nor_powerful3094 and Malgosia Krakowska, Giragosian: Russia is taking Armenia for granted, Georgia Today, November 2017 http://georgiatoday.ge/news/8296/Giragosian:-Russia-is-taking-Armenia-for-granted[60] Joshua Kucera, Following Armenian uprising, Azerbaijan’s sabre rattling grows louder, July 2018, https://eurasianet.org/s/following-armenian-uprising-azerbaijans-saber-rattling-grows-louder[61] Their Facebook page is at https://www.facebook.com/adekvadism/ and their Youtube at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC-BYUsHHERUWbi3LwI4-2VA?sub_confirmation=1[62] Eurasianet, Kyrgyzstan: Conservatives Cite ‘Family Values’ to Fight Sex Ed, November 2013, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67744[63] Based on concerns about increasing Chinese economic influence.[64] Gulzhigit Ermatov, Understanding Illiberal Sentiments of Kyrgyz Youth in Marlena Laruelle (ed.), Kyrgyzstan: Political Pluralism and Economic Challenges, The George Washington University Central Asia Program, 2017, http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Kyrgyzstan_.pdf[65] In the blunt assessment of a head of a leading Western organisation based in the country.[66] RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service, Toktomushev, Known For Antigay Fatwa, Elected Kyrgyz Grand Mufti, March 2014,  https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-antigay-mufti-approved/25284924.html[67] USAID, Youth of the Kyrgyz Republic: Values, Social Mood and Conflict Behaviour, 2014https://www.usaid.gov/documents/1861/youth-kyrgyz-republic-values-social-moods-and-conflict-behavior-report-research [post_title] => Introduction: The Rise of Illiberal Civil Society? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => introduction-the-rise-of-illiberal-civil-society [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-13 15:38:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-13 15:38:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=2682 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[12] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 2730 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2018-07-18 00:01:23 [post_date_gmt] => 2018-07-18 00:01:23 [post_content] => The contributions to this collection make a number of important observations about the social and political landscape in Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan. With the partial exception of Ukraine, illiberal social attitudes remain stubbornly high and entrenched across the societies of the region, particularly in relation to LGBTI rights. This is despite some attempts to introduce important legislation to improve women’s and LGBTI rights, which, while necessary, have provided a focal point for mobilisation in support of less tolerant views by socially conservative forces. This includes in particular both politicians and religious institutions, with the support of conservative or pro-Russian media outlets.[1] While the attractiveness of such ideologies may be boosted by wider global trends, particularly within the post-Soviet space, they are often playing to longstanding national sentiments, which make them attractive for those looking to promote themselves within the local power politics of these countries.What the findings of this collection suggest is that political and social forces challenging liberal ideas have been emboldened in these five countries, they still predominately utilise traditional mechanisms of institutional power (such as the church or mosque or existing political elites) rather than fully mimicking the form and function of liberal civil society. At this stage many of the attempts to create illiberal NGOs or think tanks remain comparatively marginal in the political debates on socially conservative causes, or act as window dressing for politicians and priests rather than being the driving force of campaigns.That campaign groups or think tanks have a strong relationship with individual political figures or major donors is common practice across the world. The somewhat dependent nature of these organisations in the five countries highlights their institutional fragility and that the politicians, priests and oligarchs involved are the driving forces for the promotion of illiberal values. Other groups are very much ‘one-man bands’ (it still usually is men) providing a platform for a particularly vocal academic or activist to gain media attention, often lacking even a basic web presence or formal registration, and prone to dissolving and reforming. A number of the same faces appear again and again in different groups. While it can be tempting to dismiss some of the more garish and vocal illiberal activists as marginal figures, they are acting to promote messages that unfortunately have a wider resonance, and around the world we live in times where the fringe positions can quite quickly become mainstream.What this publication shows that the illiberal energy is on the street rather than in the conference hall. This is an ‘uncivil rights movement’ of overlapping far-right, radical nationalist and anti-LGBTI groups, rather than a simple cut and paste from the technocratic liberal NGO playbook. That the rise of the far and radical right has been most noticeable in the countries that have moved closest to the West – Ukraine and Georgia – is of relevance not only as a reaction to liberalising efforts in those societies but because these are countries with deeply strained relations with Russia. Indeed the active conflict with Russia has been one of the main drivers of far-right support in Ukraine.The Russian dimension in this debate can sometimes be amplified to unhelpful levels. The overall findings of this publication make the case that Russian influence is absolutely real, particularly indirectly in terms of ‘norm diffusion’ (promoting and spreading illiberal ideas) and in certain cases media penetration. Moscow does directly support some groups on the ground, with varying degrees of intensity and success (as of course their Western opponents do); however their engagement, both real and perceived, can often be seen to undermine local conservative causes, particularly in the conflict contexts of Georgia and Ukraine. It also leaves these groups open to the same accusation nationalists and others level at Western-backed liberal groups that they are being controlled by outside forces. Overall Russia may help set the tone of debate, but it is not the puppet master of all that Western liberals and their local allies might decry in the region.Expecting harmonious collaboration and dialogue between liberal and illiberal civil society in these countries is in many cases unrealistic given the levels of political polarisation, where neither side believes anything could be gained from such dialogue. In truth, liberal and conservative or left and right leaning NGOs, academics and activists in more established democracies often (and increasingly) remain in their own silos, talking to their own audiences for much of the time. However the spaces for interaction are perhaps even more limited in these post-Soviet societies. Changing this will require long-term engagement, identifying well-structured opportunities either through international institutions or respected academic institutions, to bring more emollient liberal and conservative groups together on less controversial topics to attempt to find areas of common ground. As part of this the EU and other international actors should continue to increase their direct engagement with the Orthodox Church and other institutions to reduce the opportunity for accidental misunderstanding of their intentions, while accepting a probably permanent divergence of priorities in relation to social policy and human rights. [2]As this publication shows, many governments have been unwilling or slow in reacting to the challenges posed by illiberal street and extremist movements. For example, when faced with pressure from religious or far-right counter-protestors, the Moldovan and Georgian governments have chosen to remove the liberal protestors on the grounds of protecting their safety rather than ensuring their right to free speech by adequate policing of the nationalist counter-demonstrators. It is vitally important to end the culture of impunity where attacks by radical groups are not effectively investigated or prosecuted, due to either nationalist patrons in government or incompetence and lack of interest by the police.[3]These governments must protect liberal civil society campaign groups from the increasing intimidation and in some cases attacks they face from these far-right groups. Furthermore the international community must insist as a condition of continued support that the governments of the region prohibit the state funding of or collaboration with extremist groups, such as the relationships of the Ukrainian state with Azov and C14. More robust measures to tackle corruption must be undertaken to avoid growing cynicism in society, particular in relation to corruption by governments and politicians who claim to be liberal and pro-European.We know that evidence-based rebuttals and myth-busting only go so far, and there is a clear need to build a case for equal rights that wins hearts as well as minds. While illiberal social attitudes are widespread within these societies, there remains a clear need to identify how best to build arguments in favour of LGBTI and women’s rights and liberal values of equality that resonate outside elite circles. There is scope for further data-driven research to identify the sections of society who may be described as ‘the moveable middle’;[4] those who may well hold conservative social views but who do not prioritise them or who may be open to changing their opinions over time with the right message and evidence. There is clearly further scope for comparative work on the situation in Eastern Europe,^[5] notably in Poland and Hungary, where the slide towards illiberalism has been dramatic.The findings of this project make clear that illiberalism is on the rise as a political and social force in these five post-Soviet countries, and that this situation is influenced by the wider trends across the region and the world, but is rooted in the local environments of each country. It identifies that there is a rise of illiberal civil society, but while there has been some growth in illiberal NGOs and think-tanks they have yet to mirror their liberal counterparts. Where there has been a significant growth has been in nationalist, far-right and anti-gay street movements ,whose growing size and self confidence in their agenda has a significant knock-on effect across society. Russian influence on the development of illiberal civil society in the region is an important factor but a far from all-encompassing one, while US evangelicals continue to expand their influence. The research is clear that by far the most influential organisations in the respective societies in relation to the rise of illiberalism are religious institutions – the Orthodox Church and major Islamic bodies – which can collaborate with illiberal or opportunist politicians to pose a major threat to equality and human rights in the region.While individual authors make recommendations relevant to each country, the publication makes a series of recommendations for action:The Governments of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan should:

• Take urgent measures to tackle corruption and improve transparency ;
• Ensure that attacks on minorities are properly investigated and scrap any formal or informal partnership with nationalist groups that have conducted them;
• Protect the ability of liberal civil society groups to operate freely without intimidation;
• Disband any armed militias affiliated to political parties or extremist groups.

The international community should:

• Increase political pressure and be willing to sanction the activities of ostensibly ‘pro-European’ or ‘liberal’ allies when their corruption or malpractice brings such principles into disrepute;
• Insist on action to tackle hate crimes and offer greater support and resources to do so if political willingness to act can be ensured;
• Look for opportunities for diplomatic dialogue with the dominant religious institutions to reduce the opportunity for unnecessary misunderstanding about respective priorities;
• Continue to refine and improve ‘myth-busting’ and anti-propaganda responses, while recognising the limits to such an approach;
• Support efforts to improve survey and research data about illiberal civil society attitudes;
• Work with liberal-minded NGOs to find new ways to engage the ‘movable middle’ sections of public opinion.

 [1] For the most part discussion of local and regional media influences is not the focus of this publication. For a more detailed analysis please see the contributions to: Adam Hug (ed.), The information battle: How governments in the former Soviet Union promote their agendas & attack their opponents abroad, March 2017, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/infobattle/[2] Adam Hug (ed.) Traditional religion and political power: Examining the role of the church in Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova, October 2015, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/orthodox/[3] https://eurasianet.org/s/georgian-fascists-step-into-the-spotlight[4] A concept used by a number of experts at a private roundtable that the editor coordinated.[5] See Human Rights House, Resisting Ill Democracies in Europe, December 2017, https://humanrightshouse.org/articles/launch-resisting-ill-democracies-in-europe/ [post_title] => Conclusions and recommendations [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => conclusions-and-recommendations [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-13 15:49:23 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-13 15:49:23 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=2730 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[13] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 2185 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2017-12-04 00:20:05 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-12-04 00:20:05 [post_content] => The expert contributors to this essay collection describe an extremely challenging situation for political and NGO activists, along with other at-risk people from the former Soviet Union (FSU) who are trying to claim asylum or get temporary refuge from persecution. In the face of rising populism and the continuing pressures of the Mediterranean migrant crisis it is becoming even harder for activists from the region to get protection. The publication notes with concern the wildly variable asylum acceptance rates across different European countries for applicants coming from the same former Soviet Union countries. It shows that some states are deliberately allowing onward transit to neighbouring countries who are more willing to offer asylum, and that for example Poland is preventing large numbers of people from Tajikistan and Chechnya from crossing their border with Belarus to claim asylum. The publication raises concern about the increased use of ‘safe third country’ (where people are returned to the country they transited through) and ‘internal protection alternative’ (where people are told to move to supposedly safer areas of their country of origin) processes to return people to Russia or Belarus, where they may be at risk of being forcibly returned to their country of origin or face targeting from the Russian or Chechen security services. Where asylum applicants are identified as being at genuine risk they should not be made to return to Russia or Belarus, which cannot be trusted to give them protection. In relation to this, the UK and a number of other European countries need to play a more proactive role, directly working with Russian civil society groups to facilitate LGBTI Chechens to be able to claim asylum. Western countries also need to improve the ways in which they assess the risk faced by family members of activists who may be being targeted by their home regimes. The publication also examines the deteriorating situation inside Russia for those from Central Asia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union who are trying to seek shelter from their home regimes. It explores the surprising continued cooperation between the Ukrainian and Russian security services over extraditions. It also investigates the way in which Crimean Tatars and other opponents of the Russian occupation of Crimea are being deported from the area. Western nations and the international community should: 

• Refrain from mandatory use of safe third country concepts for those deemed to be at risk in their country of origin. Russia and Belarus should not be considered safe third countries for citizens of other post-Soviet states.
• Resist the obligatory use of the internal protection alternative. It should not be applied in Russia, particularly not in relation to at-risk citizens from Russia’s North Caucasus republics such as Chechnya.
• Work with Russian NGOs to provided safe routes for LGBTI Chechens to receive asylum in the UK and other countries which are not yet providing direct support.
• Take appropriate measures to ensure people can apply for asylum at border crossings, with particular note to the Poland-Belarus border.
• Improve the ways in which they assess the risk to the family members of activists and look to provide additional opportunities for those under threat.
• Persist with efforts within INTERPOL to deliver on recently enacted reforms that restrict the ability of states in the former Soviet Union to use its mechanisms to harass opponents abroad.
• Work to ensure all Council of Europe member states fully abide by European Court of Human Rights rulings in relation to protection against refoulement (being returned to face persecution).
• Address deportations and the transfer of population from Crimea within resolutions and other human rights decisions, while looking at the use of enhanced sectoral and individual sanctions in relation to this issue.

[post_title] => Closing the Door: Executive summary [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => closing-door-executive-summary [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-13 16:00:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-13 16:00:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=2185 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[14] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 2188 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2017-12-04 00:19:03 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-12-04 00:19:03 [post_content] => It is not a good time to be seeking refuge from authorities who wish you harm. The cumulative impact in recent years of the Mediterranean migrant crisis, increasing fear of terrorist attack, and rising nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiment have all helped to frame an international approach to asylum, extradition and temporary refuge that is increasingly unsympathetic to those seeking assistance. Some governments have been fanning the flames of political pressure against migrants, while others who have traditionally been welcoming to those seeking asylum are beginning to reach the limit of their willingness and their capacity to help. From the rise of the radical-right AfD in Germany, seen as a response to Merkel’s decision to provide sanctuary for up to a million refugees, to the wider implications of immigration forming the driving force behind the UK’s move to leave the European Union, this is a debate that has real consequences. Inside the former Soviet Union, too, anti-migrant tensions further encourage the Russian government to put expediency and collaboration with the regimes of Central Asia over returning those at risk ahead of the country’s commitments under European Human Rights law. So across Europe and the former Soviet Union (indeed the world) negative public attitudes towards migrants, stoked by populist politicians and press, help create an environment where there is public pressure to reject claims for asylum and send back individuals who may be at real risk of harm upon return to their home countries. As the paper in this publication by Claire Rimmer Quaid and Minos Mouzourakis shows, there are dramatically different acceptance rates across the main European receiving countries. For example, in relation to the main European recipients of asylum claimants from Tajikistan, the 2016 protection rate ranges from 11% of those who went to Poland for assistance, to 81% in Austria.[1] At the same time across the former Soviet Union the human rights picture has for the most part continued to decline, most notably in Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Russia, from which there was an increase in asylum applications to European countries in the most recent 2016 figures compared to recent years.[2] Not only has the internal political and human rights climate worsened, making it more likely that civil society and opposition activists may seek to leave for their own safety, but in the wake of the St Petersburg bombing in April the atmosphere in Russia towards migrants from Central Asia (who include those utilising freedom of movement within the CIS to avoid political pressure at home), and indeed Russian citizens from the North Caucasus, has got more fraught, as the two contributions by  Daniil Kislov and Ernest Zhanaev, and Daria Treninina and Kiril Zharinov show. The primary focus of this publication is on the ways in which European and other Western countries are responding to those activists and other at-risk groups from the countries of the former Soviet Union. In numerical terms the countries of the FSU are far from being the most common countries of origin for those seeking international protection in the West, the numbers being dwarfed by the total flows from Syria and other flows received across the Mediterranean, although Russia accounts for 2% of total EU asylum applicants, making it the ninth most common country of origin.[3] Nevertheless this publication highlights a number of significant challenges in relation to those seeking shelter from the repression they face by the governments of the former Soviet Union. The publication also brings to attention the surprising continued collaboration between Ukraine and Russia on extradition and the way in which Russia is deporting minority groups and political opponents from occupied Crimea. It also seeks to build on the work of the previous Shelter from the Storm and No Shelter publications to look at the risks people from elsewhere in the former Soviet Union face within Russia.[4] Safe third countries and internal protectionAs governments wrestle with the domestic challenges posed by asylum requests, an increasing focus has been placed on trying to abide by their international obligations to ensure applicants remain safe whilst ‘passing the buck’ elsewhere. Firstly of concern is how the ‘safe third country’ concept is being applied to countries a person may have passed through before arriving in the country where they lodge their asylum application. The principle is that this provision should only be applied where the country they passed through could have adequately provided them with international protection. In the context of this publication, however, it is clear that the transit countries for many activists and at-risk persons from the former Soviet Union are countries with dubious human rights records of their own and a history of collaboration with their home country security services, most notably Russia, Belarus and Turkey. In early 2016 Norway classified Russia as a ‘safe third country’ in an attempt to reduce the number of people crossing its land border with Russia[5]as part of an overall package of restrictive measures that has seen the number of applicants drop by 95%. Bulgaria has also classified Russia as a safe third country for several years.[6]In 2016 the Estonian government attempted to apply the safe third country concept to asylum applicants who transited through Russia; however this was thrown out by its courts who deemed that there ‘are serious obstacles in the Russian Federation with effective access to its asylum procedure as well as substandard protection of rights of asylum seekers, including respect of the principle of non-refoulement’.[7] As shown in the No Shelter publication Turkey is not able, or in some cases willing, adequately to protect citizens from the former Soviet Union from the predations of their home country security services, with notable cases relating to Tajikistan. Yet under the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan for refugees, the returns programme attempting to stem the flows of migrants across the Mediterranean, Turkey has been designated as a safe third country – a designation that could put Tajikistanis and others at potential risk in future.[8] Georgia and Armenia increasingly being added to ‘safe country of origin lists, where the presumption is made automatically to return nationals from those countries.[9]Following the concerns set out in the previous No Shelter publication about Georgia’s vulnerability to pressure from Azerbaijan’s security services, the subsequent abduction in late May of Azerbaijani journalist Afgan Mukhtarli would suggest the need for a reappraisal. It is important to ensure that this trend does to extend to adding the country to safe third country lists where they exist. Similarly it cannot be assumed that Armenia would be able to fully provide international protection were Russia seeking the return of one of one its nationals. The situation in Poland is highlighted by Elena Kachanovich-Shlyk and Yan Matusevich in their essay contribution showing the particular risks that citizens from Chechnya and Tajikistan face at the Poland-Belarus border, also spelling out the significant risks faced by those forced to wait in Belarus. Human rights organisations are also concerned that Poland is looking to create lists of safe countries of origin and safe third countries that could potentially include the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Ukraine.[10] As Kachanovich-Shlyk and Yan Matusevich show in relation to Belarus, and many in this and past publications have shown in relation to Russia, the level of security service collaboration and poor human rights protections in these countries mean that returnees face a clear and unavoidable risk of refoulement, i.e. being transferred back to their country of origin, often outside legal processes, to face the risk of torture and ill treatment. Similarly, as shown in this publication, the No Shelter publication and a range of others, it is beyond doubt that Chechen security services are able operate without restriction, often approaching impunity, across the whole of the Russian Federation, as well as being increasingly active outside its borders. Yet a number of European countries still consider it appropriate to use Internal Protection Alternative (IPA)/ internal flight mechanisms, whereby asylum applicants are made to return to other ‘safe’ parts of their country of origin, as a first option for Chechens. For example Germany and Poland have directed Chechen applicants to ‘unspecified urban areas, or areas where Chechen communities are established elsewhere in Russia’, even though the latter scenario may actually put those from minority groups more at risk.[11] Finland has applied a test of whether the Chechen applicant is ‘publically known’ to determine whether internal flight might be applicable, while many others operate on a case-by-case basis assessing the suitability of this process for those who might be at risk.[12] LGBTI ChechensOf particular current relevance to the suitability of the internal flight approach and the wider response to asylum applicants from the former Soviet Union is the situation regarding LGBTI Chechens. 2017 has seen Chechnya’s small LGBTI community targeted with shocking brutality by the local regime of Ramzan Kadyrov.[13]While politically discouraged, homosexuality is not illegal within the Russian Federation, of which Chechnya remains part. While Chechen citizens therefore remain notionally under Russian constitutional and legal protections, in practice they are at the mercy of a local regime operating semi-autonomously even elsewhere in the Federation or beyond. The Kadyrov regime is known to have undertaken a spate of kidnappings and detentions in what have been described as concentration camps, and there are claims of extrajudicial killings, including by family members of LGBTI people at the encouragement of the authorities. Not only is the Russian government attempting to deny and deflect that such practices are occurring, but a July 2017 report by the Russian LGBT Network also shows that there is collaboration between the Chechen and Russian security services in relation to Chechens who have fled to other parts of Russia, despite the fact that being LGBTI is not a crime in Russia and therefore not within the remit of law enforcement.[14] This cooperation apparently has included the disclosure of the addresses of safe houses elsewhere in the Russian Federation. This again highlights the dangers of applying the internal protection/internal flight principle in the context of Chechens being returned to Russia. Given the UK’s strong statements against the actions of the Chechen authorities, its global commitments to LGBTI rights, and both a comparatively welcoming environment for LGBTI people and sizable communities of Russian speakers without a major Chechen diaspora, it should be well placed to provide protection to LGBTI Chechens seeking shelter. However, while Germany, France, Lithuania and Canada worked directly with local NGOs to facilitate asylum procedures, is disappointing that the UK has so far refused to work with Russian LGBTI organisations to help find safe havens for LGBTI Chechens at risk.[15] What our authors say Closing the Door contains contributions from a range of leading experts in the field of asylum and extradition: Claire Rimmer Quaid and Minos Mouzourakis discuss current issues for those from the former Soviet Union seeking international protection in Europe and how changes to the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) may affect them in future. They note that current obstacles faced by some asylum seekers from the region include widely divergent chances of obtaining asylum depending on the country of destination; the Internal Protection Alternative (IPA) being invoked to deny refugee status to persons at risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason in part, but not all, of their country of origin; physical barriers to accessing EU territory; the use of “safe third country” and “safe country of origin” concepts; and the risk of refoulement. Proposals to change the CEAS as they stand mean these obstacles could continue and become worse in some cases, for example in the case of a mandatory examination of the internal protection alternative by Member States. Elena Kachanovich-Shlyk and Yan Matusevich explain that Poland has been a major destination for asylum seekers from Russia's North Caucasus, and recently from Tajikistan. Most asylum seekers transit through Belarus and then lodge an application for international protection at the Polish border crossing Terespol, which for years has been the most accessible and affordable route for those fleeing persecution. Since 2016, however, the Polish Border Guard has started to systematically deny the right to lodge an application for asylum in Terespol. The problem persists despite ongoing legal pressure, including from the European Court of Human Rights. Denial of the right to ask for asylum not only contradicts Polish, EU and international law, but also puts asylum seekers in a situation of uncertainty and potential danger both in Belarus or back home. What is more, those who manage to apply for international protection face the reality of the low recognition rates and the increasing number of forced returns to Russia. This article looks at the reasons why so many asylum seekers prefer to make numerous attempts (even up to 50!) to cross the border rather than settle in Belarus, apply for asylum there or return back home. Dr Leila Alieva argues that the dramatic fate of political refugees and asylum seekers from energy-rich authoritarian Azerbaijan shows their increasing vulnerability under the influence of regional and global trends. Their increasingly difficult position also reflects the growing tension between international norms and interests of states worldwide. This tension is more profound in the regions with weaker democracy, such as the former Soviet Union, where norms on protection of refugees become hostage to the strategic cooperation between the neighbouring states. Nevertheless Dr Alieva believes that in Europe the issue should also be watched to prevent possible effects of the refugee crisis, increasing illiberal trends, and the EU’s (and UK’s) internal problems on the status and safety of asylum seekers escaping from Azerbaijan, which is tied to Europe by close economic partnership. Dr Edward Lemon, Dr Saipira Furstenberg and Dr John Heathershaw explain that following the banning of Tajikistan’s leading opposition party, the Islamic Renaissance Party, in 2015 and the widespread crackdown on dissenting voices in the country, hundreds of citizens have fled and sought asylum in the European Union. While the government of Tajikistan had cooperated with the local authorities to have activists detained and returned to the country from Russia and Turkey, when targeting exiles in the EU it has fewer options. Faced with these limitations, the authoritarian regime of Tajikistan is increasingly trying to silence its dissidents abroad by threatening and targeting family members on the basis of their association with the individual in exile. The government has subjected them to public humiliation, detained them, confiscated their passports, and seized their property. Given the situation, it is imperative that foreign governments place greater pressure on the government of Tajikistan to halt these human rights abuses and for countries in the EU to grant asylum to exiles from Tajikistan and their family members. Bruno Min discusses how issues around the recent arrests of journalists and writers from Azerbaijan, Central Asia and Turkey have highlighted how INTERPOL Red Notices and Diffusions continue to be misused by certain states that use international cooperation mechanisms to export human rights abuses. The adoption of various reforms by INTERPOL is a positive sign that the organisation is aware of this challenge, and that it is trying to address it, but it is apparent that the success of these reforms will depend heavily on the roles that INTERPOL, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, and civil society play towards ensuring their effective implementation. There should also be further efforts to ensure that abuses of other international cooperation mechanisms are identified and prevented. Eugenia Andreyuk and Philipp Gliesche argue that in Crimea, occupied by the Russian Federation, deportations and state-driven transfers of civilian populations are used to achieve loyalty to Russia from the local population. Forced Russian citizenship automatically granted to the whole population of the peninsula enables the de facto authorities to deport anyone who refuses it. They write that the deportations took place including those living permanently in Crimea. The other forms of population transfer have included a planned policy of persecution of disloyal groups of population, such as Crimean Tatars, Crimean Muslims, Ukrainians and others to encourage their (often forced) displacement to the mainland of Ukraine. Going in the other direction Russia is encouraging ‘loyal’ Russian nationals to settle in Crimea. Halya Coynash believes that both the major political changes of recent years in Ukraine and Russia’s ongoing aggression and occupation of Crimea have created new challenges and highlighted the disturbing lack of reform within Ukraine’s SBU and Migration Service. With a million and a half Ukrainians forced to flee their homes, Ukraine is not in a position to take in large numbers of refugees, but its track record on asylum seekers is, nevertheless, pitiful. Recent statements from Migration Service officials suggest that there is awareness of the mounting repression in Russia and the number of Russians who are or could be in danger for their support of Ukraine and/or opposition to Russia’s undeclared war. This has not so far been reflected in the attitude towards Russian asylum seekers, and a change in policy towards such people, and a rejection once and for all of old methods of SBU collaboration with the Russian Security Service, are urgently needed. Daria Trenina and Kiril Zharinov’s essay deals with the problem of the lack of effective remedies in Russia at the national level able to prevent expulsion of aliens to countries where they might be subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The authors show that although the Russian legal system provides some remedies in theory, they do not work in practice in the majority of expulsion cases. Particular attention is paid to the recent alarming trend of using deportation procedure instead of extradition or administrative expulsion, which hardly provides any legal guarantees at all. As a conclusion the authors suggest a number of practical recommendations aimed at improving the situation. Daniil Kislov and Ernest Zhanaev discuss the reality of external migration to Russia, providing case studies of asylum seekers and terror suspects. It also discusses the atmosphere of xenophobia and corruption that has been partially encouraged federal officials. It reveals details of continuous abuse of vulnerable migrants in Russia and indulged by the governments of Central Asia.  [1]UNHCR Global Trends 2016 Survey Annex, Table 12 Asylum applications and refugee status determination by origin and country/territory of asylum, http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2016/ [2]Tajikistan’s figures have increased substantially in 2015 and further into 2016 while the Russian figures for 2016 were the highest since its 2013 peak. http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers [3]European Asylum Support Office, Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2016, 2017 https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Annual-Report-2016.pdf [4]Adam Hug ed. No Shelter: the harassment of activists abroad by intelligence services from the former Soviet Union, Foreign Policy Centre, November 2016, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/noshelter/ and Adam Hug ed. Shelter from the Storm? The asylum, refuge and extradition situation facing activists from the former Soviet Union in the CIS and Europe, Foreign Policy Centre, April 2014, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/shelter-from-the-storm/ [5]Lizzie Dearden, Refugee crisis: Number of asylum seekers arriving in Norway drops by 95%, The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-number-of-asylum-seekers-arriving-in-norway-drops-by-95-a7114191.html [6]European Migration Network, Ad-Hoc Query on safe countries of origin and safe third countries, Requested by the BG EMN NCP on 10th October 2014 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/ad-hoc-queries/return/2014.615_emn_ahq_list_of_safe_countries_of_origin_(wider_diss).pdf [7]European Asylum Support Office, Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2016P.101 https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Annual-Report-2016.pdf [8]The case of Turkey is not a significant focus of this publication and it is worth noting that non-Europeans do,  Bill Frelick, Is Turkey Safe for Refugees, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/22/turkey-safe-refugees and Orçun Ulusoy, Turkey as a safe third country, March 2016, Oxford Faculty of Law, https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/03/turkey-safe-third [9]European Asylum Support Office, Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2016,  https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Annual-Report-2016.pdf;see also European Commission, AN EU ‘SAFE COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN’ LIST https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_safe_countries_of_origin_en.pdf [10]ECRE, Poland: Draft amendment to the law on protection of foreigners – another step to seal Europe’s border, Op-ed by Polish Helsinki Committee, March 2017, https://www.ecre.org/poland-draft-amendment-to-the-law-on-protection-of-foreigners-another-step-to-seal-europes-border-op-ed-by-polish-helsinki-committee/ [11]ECRE, Asylum Aid et al., Actors of Protection and the application of the internal protection alternative (see p 58), July 2014, https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ECRE-Asylum-Aid-DCR-and-HHC_Actors-of-Protection-and-the-Application-of-the-Internal-Protection-Alternative_July-2014.pdf [12]European Migration Network, Ad-Hoc Query on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation, 2013, http://emn.ee/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/503_emn_ahq_on_asylum_seekers_from_the_russian_federation_01nov2013_wider_dissemination.pdf [13]Benjamin Butterworth, Chechnya: Names of 27 men slaughtered and buried in bloody night revealed as gay purge continues, July 2017, http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2017/07/11/chechnya-names-of-27-men-slaughtered-and-buried-in-bloody-night-revealed-as-gay-purge-continues/ [14]Russian LGBT Network, LGBT Persecution in the North Caucasus: a Report, July 2017, https://www.ilga-europe.org/sites/default/files/chechnya_report_by_rus_lgbt_n_31_july_2017.pdf [15]As confirmed to the author by a leading Russian NGO working directly on the issue. See also Aleksandra Eriksson, Only five countries are helping gay Chechens leave Russia, EU Observer, July 2017, https://euobserver.com/lgbti/138680 [post_title] => Introduction: Closing the door on those in need [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => closing-door-introduction [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-13 16:01:07 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-13 16:01:07 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=2188 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 2259 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2017-12-04 00:07:01 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-12-04 00:07:01 [post_content] => The contributors to this essay collection have described some of the main challenges that activists and other at-risk people from the former Soviet Union face in trying to seek asylum or temporary refuge. Given the wider stresses and strains from the Mediterranean migrant crisis and the rise of nationalist governments in a number of European countries, the ability to achieve international protection in Europe (and now post-Trump in the United States) is getting more difficult, even as the human rights situation in a number of the countries in the region continues to deteriorate. No ShelterAs highlighted in the paper by Minos Mouzourakis and Claire Rimmer Quaid and shown in the introduction, different European receiving countries have dramatically different acceptance rates. For example Russians are more than four times as likely to be accepted for asylum in Austria than they are in Germany. Different countries may receive different types of population flow depending on factors including the main entry point (for example a land border with an FSU country compared to arrival by air) and local demographics leading to different mixes of economic migrants and genuine applicants. However such wide variations reflect clear policy by the receiving state not only around evidence and the risk an applicant faces but, put bluntly, around the country’s desire to push the ‘problem’ elsewhere. Elena Kachanovich-Shlyk and Yan Matusevich show that Poland’s artificially low recognition rate assumes that asylum seekers will deliberately transit through it to elsewhere in the EU, while the problem of preventing people from entering and applying is creating a real problem at the Belarus boarder. The findings of this publication^[1] make it very clear to European countries revising their asylum procedures that it is completely inappropriate for Russia and Belarus to be considered as ‘safe third countries’ for those believed to be at risk in their country of origin elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Experience has clearly shown that Russia, and to a certain extent Belarus, cannot be relied upon to provide international protection to nationals from countries with which they have close political ties or a history of security service cooperation. The designation of Georgia and Armenia as ‘safe countries’ should not be stretched to being considered a safe third country for Azerbaijani and Russian nationals respectively, given the risks that they could face from their home country’s security services. Norway, Finland, and Bulgaria should look to end their blanket adoption of the safe third country principle in relation to Russia, while Poland, Estonia and others should stop moving towards adopting such a position. Similarly it is completely inappropriate to apply the internal protection alternative to citizens from Russia’s North Caucasus republics, most notably Chechnya, who are genuinely at risk from their local security services or other powerful groups within those societies. Chechnya’s security services for example are able to work with their Russian Federal counterparts to threaten the security of Chechen nationals and other opponents of Kadyrov irrespective of where they are in within the Russian federation, and increasingly beyond its borders. With this in mind the UK and a number of other European and countries need to play a more proactive role, directly working with Russian civil society groups to help LGBTI Chechens to be able to claim asylum in their countries. Family matters The family dimension to the asylum and refugee picture is often one of the most challenging, with family reunification a politically and practically fraught process. Setting to one side for the purposes of this publication the huge challenges in this regard relating to the wider group of asylum seekers and refugees, there at least needs to be greater scope for enhancing the existing collaboration between embassies in the applicant’s home country and immigration officials to properly assess the level of specific risk faced by the family members of identified activists and other targeted people from the countries of the former Soviet Union. The respective contributions by Alieva and by Furstenberg, Lemon and Heathershaw remind us of the widely known fact that repressive regimes routinely target families and other loved ones those who dare to speak out against them, to pressure them into silence or in some cases to force those in exile to return to face punishment. However as this threat to family members increases in countries such as Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, it is becoming harder to offer them opportunities to rejoin the activist or other at-risk person who has already received refugee status. Immigration authorities need to understand the growing risks activists’ families face, and should provide greater opportunities for family reunification in these circumstances. Similarly, as Alieva points out, there is a need for a more intelligence-led approach to providing support in cases where the applicant is themselves the family member of an activist still based in-country who is bravely continuing to operate on the ground. While some activists are willing to take huge risks with their own safety and wellbeing, immigration authorities need to be able to identify when there is a real risk that their sons, daughters or other relatives may be targeted for repressive treatment as a form of leverage against the activist, and be able to give international protection to these family members in such circumstances. Getting a clearer picture A way for immigration officials to better understand the challenges faced by families and indeed activists themselves is by improving the formal country information that they use to inform their decision-making. Firstly the UNCHR has not conduced an in-depth country report on Russia since 2012, as part of its 2011 Global Report, despite Russia being a major source and transit country for those claiming asylum. The same applies to many other countries in the region and there may be scope for updating such information to help advise countries in developing their approaches to sensitive topics such as the application of safe third country and internal protection alternative principles. The same lack of systematised information can be found at the country level too. The UK Home Office does not have Country Policy and Information Notes on any of the countries in the region, even though Russia does send ^[2] a reasonable number of applicants (between 125 and 200 most years) to the country every year. The low numbers from other FSU countries are in part a reflection on the high thresholds the UK sets that deter people from applying. Recommendations In order to address the growing challenges identified in the publication the authors and editor have made a number of recommendations for action^[3]: The UK, European and other western countries should:

• Refrain from a mandatory use of safe third country concepts for those deemed to be at risk in their country of origin. Russia and Belarus should not be considered safe third countries for citizens of other post-Soviet states.
• Resit the obligatory use of the Internal Protection Alternative. It must not be applied in Russia, particularly not in relation to at risk citizens from Russia’s North Caucasus republics such as Chechnya.

• Work with Russian NGOs to provided safe routes for LGBTI Chechens to receive asylum in the UK and other countries that are not yet providing direct support.
• Take appropriate measures to ensure people can apply for asylum at border crossings, with particular note to the Poland-Belarus border.
• Improve the ways in which they assess the risk to family members of activists and look to provide additional opportunities for those under threat.
• Look to provide more official country information from both the UNHCR and national immigration authorities.

• Persist with efforts within INTERPOL to deliver on recently enacted reforms to restrict the ability of states in the former Soviet Union using its mechanisms to harass opponents abroad.
• Work to ensure all other Council of Europe member states fully abide by European Court of Human Rights rulings in relation to protection against refoulement (being returned to face persecution).

• Address deportations and the transfer of population in Crimea within resolutions and other human rights decisions, looking at the use of enhanced sectoral and individual sanctions in relation to human rights violations in Crimea. Support the Ukrainian government and civil society organizations in assisting internally displaced persons from Crimea.

 Donors and NGOs should:

• Increase support to the organisations taking care of asylum seekers, activists and scholars at risk.

 Ukraine should:

• Review, restrict and potentially revoke security cooperation with the Russian Federation in relation to extradition procedures.

 Russia should:

• End deportations of Crimean residents who refuse to adopt Russian citizenship or who otherwise oppose the occupation.
• Reform deportation order procedures to consider the risk of harm posed by returning people to their country of origin, ensuring that appeals against an order must be completed before it is actioned. Make it easier for people to access asylum procedures including protection against the refoulement of holders of ‘temporary asylum’ and other interim statuses.
• Abide by rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to asylum and extradition, including interim measures taken to stop deportations.

[1] Building on the findings of the No Shelter, Shelter from the Storm and Sharing Worst Practice publications[2]UK Government, Country policy and information notes, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/country-policy-and-information-notes#p[3] The list here is compiled by the editor from a mix of recommendations in individual articles and his own suggestions. All of them together may not necessarily represent the views of individual authors. Similarly they may not represent the views of the Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Closing the Door: Conclusions and recommendations [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => closing-door-conclusions-recommendations [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-13 16:09:27 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-13 16:09:27 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=2259 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[16] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 1474 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2017-11-24 21:03:45 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-11-24 21:03:45 [post_content] => The Council of Europe (CoE) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are two regional bodies that bring together European, post-Soviet (and in the case of the OSCE) North American states to address fundamental issues relating to human rights and security. Here in the UK beyond periodic political attacks on the European Court of Human Rights[1], little is known by the public about their activities. However particularly in the countries of the former Soviet Union these institutions can play a significantly more central role in influencing political change, yet both are organisations under significant strain.This paper is based on the findings of an expert roundtable that took place in July 2017 bringing together academics, human rights activists and officials[2] to debate the challenges facing these two organisations, building on the research conducted in the Foreign Policy Centre’s February 2016 publication Institutionally Blind: International organisations and human rights abuses in the former Soviet Union[3].OverviewBoth institutions are facing significant tensions over geopolitics and allegations of influence and corruption. In June 2017 the OSCE overcame months of deadlock between liberal and authoritarian state actors over who should fill key positions within the organisation, with the approach to the OSCE’s human dimension as a significant stumbling block and with all candidates requiring consensus. Switzerland's former OSCE envoy Thomas Greminger has been appointed Secretary General, Iceland's former foreign minister Ingibjorg Solrun Gisladottir becomes head of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), former OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier becomes the High Commissioner on National Minorities and French former Socialist Party leader Harlem Desir takes over as Representative on Freedom of the Media[4]. The deadlock was broken too on the 18 months of wrangling over the 2017 annual budget finally approved on 1^st June 2017, half way through the year^[5]. The financial pressures faced by the human dimension bodies such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) remain acute, while the crisis in Ukraine has taken up a lot of the institution’s focus and time.The CoE has been rocked by a corruption scandal in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), a crisis that observers had long seen coming, as set out in the Institutionally Blind publication and most notably in reports by the European Stability Initiative in its Caviar Diplomacy series. Luca Volontè, former chair of the Centre-Right European People’s Party grouping at PACE is being investigated for allegations that he received a bribe of £2.39 million from groups linked to the Government of Azerbaijan[6], while current PACE President Pedro Agramunt has been stripped of his powers. Although the trigger for Agramunt’s defenestration has been the result of a visit to Syria as guest of the Russians, it follows years of concerns over his tendency to overlook human rights violations in well-resourced states, notably in relation to Azerbaijan and the issue of political prisoners.The future of both institutions as key players in supporting democracy and good governance remains uncertain at a time when liberal institutional values are being pressured by resurgent authoritarianism and ‘illiberalism’ across the region, particularly in the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe; increasingly insular and economically focused politics in Western nations and the related reduction of Western influence in the post-Soviet space. This paper does not seek to address all of the challenges that the OSCE and Council of Europe face in relation to human rights issues but focuses on the priorities raised by experts at the roundtable.Parliamentary AssembliesThe role of PACE and the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE (OSCE PA) are a major focus of NGO and activist concern about the operation of these institutions and their impact on human rights standards. The key issues of the roundtable matched those of the 2016 publication, the need for transparency and accountability, so that what Parliamentarians do in these institutions does not happen in the dark, that their participation does not get used as an opportunity for personal enrichment, whether through legal (but unethical) business deals or corrupt practices.There is some hope amongst experts that the probe into the PACE corruption scandal has the potential to be a significant lever for change. The investigation is being led by internationally respected judges, including the UK’s Sir Nicolas Bratza (former President of the European Court of Human Rights), and has been given a wide remit to address structural problems in the organisation. The scandal too has given an opportunity for Parliamentarians themselves to speak up about the problems the organisation faces, with the UK’s Roger Gale MP noted as playing a positive role in response to the crisis.Furthermore the CoE’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) was invited by PACE to play an active role in strengthening the organisation’s code of conduct[7]. Its assessment of the code, published in June 2017, has been widely praised by activists for drawing attention to significant shortcomings in its current formulation and implementation[8]. The report criticised the supervision PACE provides of its members as ‘weak’ and ‘excessively discretionary’ with no sanction against members so far recorded. The GRECO report calls for mechanisms to remove immunity and for greater awareness raising around existing standards. Despite the focus on corruption at PACE it was noted that the OSCE PA doesn’t even have a code of conduct against which to hold its members to account.Roundtable participants wanted to see new ways to increase public awareness of the activities of Parliamentarians who take part in the two Parliamentary Assemblies, with the lack of scrutiny noted as a potential reason why positions taken by members of the Assemblies can often diverge from their national foreign policy. There was a focus on the desire for votes at PACE and OSCE PA to be recorded via national level transparency and accountability mechanisms, such as for example through the ‘They Work for You’ website in the UK. While there have been steps to record information about voting behaviour by the institutions themselves and regional level resources, such resources are likely only to be accessed by experts rather than a politician’s constituents.Where Parliamentarians are doing a good job using their roles at OSCE and the Council of Europe effectively, roundtable participants felt that there needs to be scope for civil society to praise their efforts, albeit perhaps in a targeted way to NGO supporters, as not all MPs, even when they are doing the right thing, are keen to have their involvements overseas publicised to all their constituents. It was also noted that a number of members of national delegations may be from unelected or indirectly elected chambers such as the UK House of Lords, limiting the scope for public pressure.Improving the status of delegations within Parliaments remains another important tool in order to encourage the involvement of active, high quality members. It was noted that in the UK the status of the delegations is not high but that the former Europe Minister David Lidington took an active role in meeting with the delegation ahead of plenary sessions, and his successors have also looked to provide regular meetings, particularly with the delegation chairs. There needs to be scope to more widely promote within Parliament what the delegations can do, increasing the links with relevant Parliamentary Committees, and dispelling misperceptions to help recruit better candidates for the available posts. In the UK it has been noted that there is higher than usual competition for places amongst Labour politicians in the new 2017 UK Parliament[9]. The UK Parliament’s role in providing clerking services to the OSCE PA was noted as an opportunity for influencing its operation and its rules of procedure.The Council of Europe’s attempts to apply political sanctions to Russia after its actions in Crimea by the withdrawing of voting and other rights from Russian delegates at PACE has triggered a refusal by Russia to pay its £33m annual subscription to the organisation as a whole, a source of political tension to come and of further pressure on already stretched budgets[10]. The Council of Europe will be forced to wait 2 years before formal enforcement action can be taken against the Russians for this action, though other options are being considered to break the deadlock.The Venice Commission and the OSCE High Commissioner on National MinoritiesBoth the Council of Europe and OSCE are home to a range of specialist mechanisms that contain vital technical expertise, which can support efforts to promote good governance, democracy and human rights in the organisation’s respective regions. The roundtable drew attention to some specific issues related to two of these mechanisms.The CoE’s European Commission for Democracy through Law (known as the Venice Commission) is one of the most widely respected bodies in the two institutions, drawing support both from Governments and the expert and activist communities. Seen as a ‘lode star for the rule of law in the region’ it is not regularly criticised by authoritarian regimes, unlike other human rights focused bodies. However, while this is a reflection of the quality of the legal work undertaken to scrutinise proposed legislation across the region, it is also perhaps a reflection that a positive report from the Venice Commission around the written text of national legislation can be used to promote an image of compliance with international human rights standards, irrespective of whether such laws are implemented in an appropriate manner. Scope to fully scrutinise post-legislative implementation requires political will in other parts of the Council of Europe and other bodies, something that is often lacking. Furthermore, there is a noted tendency that officials and politicians often defer to the Venice Commission when a contentious issue is being scrutinised as a way of avoiding having to take a stand on controversial issues.The treatment of the previous OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Astrid Thors, by the Russians has been the source of much anger within the expert community. Thors was seen to be denied the opportunity of a second term of office due to robust statements in relation to the situation in Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, where she hewed close to the line put out by the ODIHR in a public way not previously seen by holders of this security-focused post, who had previously levelled their criticisms behind closed doors[11].Election monitoring The OSCE’s ODIHR sets the gold standard for election observation in the region, as the only group with a significant long-term presence ahead of ballots taking place and the political independence to take critical stances based on the evidence found. The Institutionally Blind publication had been clear that ‘the OSCE must defend the role of ODIHR in providing long-term election observation, ensuring that it remains an assessment mechanism judging countries election practices, rather than simply becoming a method for information exchange.’ The roundtable audience were broadly in agreement on this, however some notes of caution were sounded over both the high cost of delivering the method of observation that ODHIR provides and the way in which regimes in the region are becoming ever more adept at promoting their own local or regional (e.g. CIS) observers to provide a more pro-Government spin on the election process, sometimes co-opting Western Parliamentarians to give a veneer of international respectability to the narratives fed to their compliant medias. The all too regular role of PACE and OSCE PA observation missions in diluting strong ODIHR messages on political grounds have been well documented by the FPC, ESI and others.ODIHR observation faces three particular practical problems. Firstly, forces at the OSCE Permanent Council, most notably Russia, have blocked additional funding to support ODIHR in delivering its missions. This has been exacerbated by the wider budget struggles ODIHR faces, where, for example, extra Warsaw-based staff posts have also been blocked by Russian veto. Secondly, OSCE member states are not providing the number of observers (both long-term and short-term) that ODIHR believes it requires to do its job properly. For example, the ODIHR mission to the (highly contentious) 2016 US Presidential election only received a quarter of the long-term observers that were requested, with local consulates and Embassies having to make up the gap through short-term observers.Despite the concerns about the extent to which authoritarian regimes have become adept at diluting the impact of critical ODIHR observation missions, the independent research they produce can still have an impact and can make independent civil society feel that there is some solidarity with their experience from the international community. Clearly there is more other institutions and civil society can do to focus attention on the implementation of observation findings. Roundtable participants also argued that it was unwise and counter-productive for PACE and/or the OSCE PA to send observation missions to countries where ODIHR believes it is unable to operate freely.The third problem that the OSCE faces is the lack of implementation of the recommendations which appear in the final report of an ODIHR Election Observation Mission. In the absence of an agreement to provide an obligatory report, all states should be encouraged to voluntarily make a statement as to what they have done to implement the EOM recommendations to the Permanent Council, as some states do already.The future of field officesThe number of field offices for both the OSCE and Council of Europe have been on the wane due to push-back from host countries and geopolitical wrangling at ministerial level[12]. For example, following a decision in May 2017, the OSCE will no longer have a field presence in the South Caucasus due to the withdrawal of the OSCE Office in Yerevan due to an Azerbaijani veto of an extension to its mandate[13]. Even where downgraded missions or offices are able to be on the ground (as ‘project offices’ or ‘project coordinators’), their ability to support independent civil society is limited. The Institutionally Blind publication called for a greater political focus on defending the ability of the CoE and the OSCE to have a meaningful presence on the ground across the region. However, it is clear that at present these organisations are absent from a number of countries, and in several countries where they do have a presence, they are not able to operate freely.Roundtable participants were critical of the level of organisational priority given to the country presences, with some Heads of Office and Ambassadors seen as diplomats serving their last post before retirement, lacking the vigour or political will to fight their corner on human rights issues. In challenging political environments, independent civil society has sometimes seen officials reticent to meet with them or speak out on controversial issues. Funding and holding activities that only involve GONGOs (sometimes the only organisations that are officially registered) is seen to undermine the standing of the Council of Europe and OSCE amongst those most active on human rights issues.There is a significant debate around whether having any presence in a repressive country is ‘better than nothing’, a platform for future activity and soft engagement, both with the regimes and with civil society. Outspoken activity clearly creates a risk that the permission for the office to exist in a country would be withdrawn. However the roundtable participants argued that the OSCE and CoE need to reassess this approach. They gave two particular examples, the Council of Europe’s office in Azerbaijan and the OSCE Project Coordinator in Uzbekistan, as offices that should be closed, with their presence seen as counter-productive to the reputation and goals of their respective organisations. Therefore both the OSCE and Council of Europe should review the activities of their field offices and consider whether it may be better to withdraw their presence on the ground, at least in capacities relating to human rights and governance reform. The alternative model could be that international donors (such as the EU or UK) directly support the creation of ODIHR project offices for particular countries/regions based out of Warsaw, following the recent EU-backed model ODIHR is developing for the Western Balkans[14].Final thoughtsThe discussion at the roundtable ranged widely across the challenges facing the region. It noted a number of additional challenges.The first related to the future role of the UK in these organisations. Concerns were raised that ‘Brexit’ could lead to the current Conservative Government reopening its long-held plans to implement a British Bill of Rights and seek to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, and thereby from the Council of Europe. Despite the Conservative Party’s 2017 manifesto pledge not to withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights in the current parliament[15], given the Prime Minister’s past belief that the UK should withdraw from the Convention[16] and separate political statements that the reason for not withdrawing is due to the focus on achieving Brexit, it is clear that as and when the UK leaves the EU, the discussion around the future of its membership of the Council of Europe will reopen in earnest. However, in the wake of the UK’s departure from the European Union, the OSCE and Council of Europe will become the main pan-regional bodies that the UK remains involved with, making them even more important forums for collaboration and engagement amongst ministers, Parliamentarians and officials.The second relates more broadly to the future of these institutions. Created in a different time and in different political contexts, the question of whether they continue to have relevance remains a live issue. Perceptions of corruption need to be cleared from the Council of Europe if it is to reestablish its standing as the European continent’s institutional champion for human rights. The OSCE will continue to be dogged by the challenge of gaining consensus for most of its activities and appointments. With Russia unlikely to relent on that point in the near future, creative ways will need to be found to fund the important work delivered by existing institutions such as the ODIHR.As noted above, the future of the UK and Russia in the Council of Europe is far from certain. Similarly, the extent to which Central Asian states stay engaged in Western-facing organisations as US and European regional influence wanes, remains an open question. So the outlook remains cloudy for these institutions, however there remains significant scope for civil society and ethically-minded politicians and officials to help deliver institutional change that can still have an important impact on the standards of human rights, democracy and good governance across the former Soviet Union, Europe and beyond.Recommendations

• Resolve the institutional budget freeze, or find creative solutions to directly fund the activity of the ODIHR and other special mechanisms from EU, UK and other donor funding.
• Provide adequate staffing for election observation missions and to fill other posts from Western diplomatic services.
• Improve transparency and accountability of the work of national politicians in the international Parliamentary Assemblies.
• Fight for better functioning field offices, but where they cannot operate independently and effectively, they should be withdrawn and their functions delivered directly from Strasbourg (CoE), Vienna (OSCE) and Warsaw (ODIHR).

[1] Often conflated with the EU and its European Court of Justice[2] In this paper where there are references to ‘some experts/activists/participants’ this means that this position is based on comments made at the July roundtable by specific people (or groups of people) who were speaking under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution.[3] Adam Hug (ed.), Institutionally blind? International organisations and human rights abuses in the former Soviet Union, Foreign Policy Centre, February 2016, http://fpc.org.uk/publications/institutionallyblind[4] Reuters, OSCE member states, including Russia, reach deal to fill vacant posts, July 2017,http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-security-osce-idUSKBN19W1KM[5] The previous 2016 budget had been approved on 31^st December 2015  see OSCE Funding and Budget, http://www.osce.org/funding-and-budget, OSCE, Permanent Council approves OSCE budget for 2017, June 2017, http://www.osce.org/chairmanship/320921 and OSCE, DECISION No. 1197APPROVAL OF THE 2016 UNIFIED BUDGET, December 2015,  http://www.osce.org/pc/215416?download=true[6] Jennifer Rankin, Council of Europe urged to investigate Azerbaijan bribery allegations, The Guardian, February 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/feb/01/council-of-europe-urged-investigate-azerbaijan-bribery-allegations[7]PACE, Corruption allegations at PACE: Bureau decides on three-step response, January 2017, http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-EN.asp?newsid=6514&lang=2&cat=13[8] GRECO, Assessment of the Code of Conduct for Members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, June 2017, https://rm.coe.int/assessment-of-the-code-of-conduct-for-members-of-the-parliamentary-ass/1680728008[9] Perhaps reflecting the current state of that party’s Parliamentary politics with some who would otherwise have been considered for Shadow Ministerial posts now looking for new roles in the Parliament.[10] Tom Batchelor, Russia cancels payment to Council of Europe after claiming its delegates are being persecuted over Crimea, Independent,  June 2017,  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-cancels-council-of-europe-payment-members-persecuted-a7816951.html[11] Melissa Hooper, Russia and the OSCE: Anatomy of a takedown, Human Rights First, September 2016,http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/russia-and-osce-anatomy-takedown-0  See also Christian Nünlist, The OSCE and the Future of European Security, Center for Security Studies (CSS), February 2017, http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/214edaf2-cb54-4191-a9de-7dcc719e6a96 Finnish Broadcasting Company, Daily: Russia blocks re-appointment of Finn as OSCE Minorities High Commissioner, August 2016, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/daily_russia_blocks_re-appointment_of_finn_as_osce_minorities_high_commissioner/9131135[12] OSCE, Closed field operations and related field activities, http://www.osce.org/closed-field-operations[13] US Mission to the OSCE,  Statement on the Closure of the OSCE Office in Yerevan, May 2017, https://osce.usmission.gov/statement-closure-osce-office-yerevan/[14] OSCE, EU Commissioner Hahn, ODIHR Director Link launch project supporting democratic elections in Western Balkans, June 2017, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/325751[15] Christopher Hope,  Britain to be bound by European human rights laws for at least another five years even if Tories win election, Daily Telegraph, May 2017 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/18/britain-bound-european-human-rights-laws-least-another-five/[16]Anushka Asthana and Rowena Mason, UK must leave European convention on human rights, says Theresa May, April 2016, The Guardian,https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/25/uk-must-leave-european-convention-on-human-rights-theresa-may-eu-referendum [post_title] => Institutionally Blind: The next steps in reforming the Council of Europe and the OSCE [post_excerpt] => This paper is based on the findings of an expert roundtable that brought together academics, human rights activists and officials to debate the challenges facing the OSCE and Council of Europe. [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => institutionally-blind-next-steps-reforming-council-europe-osce [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-13 16:10:32 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-13 16:10:32 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => http://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/?p=1474 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 1513 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2017-03-21 21:50:56 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-03-21 21:50:56 [post_content] => The information battle examines the ways in which the governments of former Soviet Union (FSU) look to shape international narratives about themselves by using media, social media, advertising and supportive organisations to promote their worldview and challenge the people, institutions and ideas that oppose them. This publication examines the influence of Russian media content in the former Soviet Union and in the wider world. This is delivered through the impact of Russian domestic TV channels reaching Russian speaking audiences in the region, the developing role of the news agency Sputnik and the international broadcaster RT. It examines how these outlets are used not only to promote Russian political narratives but to challenge Western approaches and sow confusion about what is going on in the world. It offers ideas for how independent broadcasters and international outlets can provide effective alternatives. Despite cracking down on Western backed NGOs at home, the governments of the former Soviet Union are seeking to directly influence the European and US political debate through NGOs, think tanks and lobbying organisations. This publication looks at how to improve the transparency and accountability of such actions. Repressive regimes that use advertising and the hosting of international events to promote themselves, are increasingly being challenged by human rights defenders through the publicity such activities bring. The publication argues that, in what is increasingly becoming a battle involving the use of soft power and information, Western institutions have been losing ground and must take action in order to meet the challenge. Recommendations To the donor and NGO community

• Fund the creation of new, independent Russian and local language news content, news coordination and dissemination
• Provide increased funding for independent consortiums of investigative journalists
• Support in depth independent survey work in the countries of the former Soviet Union to assess the audience reach of both domestic and Russian media outlets
• Facilitate non-partisan support of Parliamentary engagement on issues relating to the former Soviet Union, including country visits

 To Western governments and regulators

• Track the spread of misleading and untrue content emanating from Russian sources, working with civil society to rebut it where appropriate
• Actively monitor online threats to Western based critics of regimes in the former Soviet Union
• Strengthen lobbying registry requirements, including looking to expand the scope of the UK’s statutory register and delivering the proposed formal EU lobbying register
• Re-examine the governance structures of the US Broadcasting Board of Governors

 To international broadcasters

• Expand the range of voices asked to provided comment on Western networks

Collaborate with independent partners in the post-Soviet space to develop content [post_title] => The Information Battle : Executive Summary [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => information-battle-executive-summary [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-13 16:12:58 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-13 16:12:58 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => http://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/?p=1513 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 1515 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2017-03-21 21:49:26 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-03-21 21:49:26 [post_content] => Events can move a debate quickly. When initially developing the idea for this essay collection in the summer of 2014^[1], it was clear that the role of media and social media activity originating from the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the links between lobbyists and regimes from the region were issues of growing importance. However it would have been difficult to predict the extent to which much of this debate would become part of mainstream political discourse. The 2016 US Presidential Election saw allegations of Russian government directed hacking and the use of social media to influence political debate; the now ubiquitous term ‘fake news’ bandied about to encompass everything from state directed propaganda, to poor journalism or just stories that one disagrees with; and the rise of anti-establishment forces across Europe and the United States who are gaining ground both in the political debate and at the ballot box, who find common cause with political forces in Russia, all make now an important time to address these issues. Countries in the post-Soviet space using soft power tools to influence the agenda beyond their borders is not a new phenomenon, and the flow of ideas and information is very clearly not one-way traffic with Western countries using these tools in the FSU for decades. This publication examines the ways in which the governments of FSU countries look to shape international narratives about themselves by using media, social media, advertising and supportive organisations to promote their worldview and challenge the people, institutions and ideas that oppose them. In recent years, governments from the region have sought to influence international and Western debate to encourage investment and or tourism, to increase their international standing (or at least create a perception of enhanced prestige they can package back to a domestic audience) or to deflect or rebut criticisms about their own behaviour. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have been particularly active in attempting to promote themselves internationally in a positive light, while Georgia was an enthusiastic early adopter of Western public relations and lobbying as part of developing a distinctive national brand. Other states, particularly some of the more closed states of Central Asia, have focused more narrowly on engaging with economic stakeholders and Parliamentary groups to attempt to manage the debate on their own terms. Armenia has utilised its complicated relationship with its influential diaspora to counter-balance the influence of rivals with deeper pockets. Russia, however, has significantly more ambitious goals for its international engagement. As a number of contributions in this publication show, it seeks to proactively change the international ideological and political environment through its use of broadcast media, both through an overt and covert online presence and through its support of organisations and institutions in Europe and beyond that share their values. It seeks to build on^[2] and subvert the style of Western values promotion practiced both during the Cold War and its aftermath, but instead of promoting liberal democracy Russia prioritises supporting ‘traditional values’ and ‘state sovereignty’ across the globe. Furthermore, this publication shows that the goal is also to discredit Western behaviour and models of political organisation, in order to blunt Western criticism of their actions on the grounds of hypocrisy and muddying the waters of global discourse through saturating the debate on particular issues with a high volume of ‘alternative facts’. Media impactWith respect to the use of broadcast media the focus of attention in this publication is understandably on the role of Russia given the small and often poorly developed media institutions across the rest of the region. The Russian influenced media landscape under discussion in this publication falls into three main areas: the level of access to domestic Russian television in the region (including in the Baltic States), the impact of the Russian state news agency Sputnik and the global role of Russia’s internationally focused television channel RT. The Soviet and Russian imperial legacies have left Russian as a shared language across much of the region particularly for the older generation, as well as for ethnic Russians and minority groups^[3] in the rest of the region. All countries in the region except Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan have either active or passive Russian usage at over 50 per cent of their populations.^[4] Rasto Kuzel’s contribution to this collection gives an important overview of how Russia’s domestic channels (often through their international counterparts)^[5] and local channels that directly rebroadcast content^[6], form the core of Russian language media consumed within Russia’s immediate environs, including the countries of the EU’s Eastern Partnership and its three Baltic member states. Russian television penetration is lower in Azerbaijan and Central Asia through a mix of lower Russian language use and more restrictive media environments. The primary point of access for these channels is through cable and satellite packages, though internet access is growing. Both Russian state and commercial channels have higher production values and more diverse content than the local offerings in the region, making these channels an attractive viewing option, which in turn provides access to Russian news narratives and, often already shared cultural norms. As addressed in the contribution by Ben Nimmo, the second dimension is the role of the Sputnik news agency - a combined newswire service, radio station, website and multi-media content provider that replaced the international arm of the Russian news agency RIA Novosti in 2013.^[7] Sputnik provides 6 newswire services, three in English (one international, one Russia focused and one covering Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic States) and one each in Spanish, Chinese and Arabic. It produces its own content in 30 languages directly to 34 countries, with a significant focus on Russia’s immediate neighbourhood. Sputnik’s English service may have 1,091,238 Facebook likes and its content via its public facing outlets and its wire service may resurface on blogs and smaller websites on the alt-right and radical left (depending on the story), however the agency’s real value is in the lower volume news markets in the FSU and Eastern Europe, where easily accessible and usable national language content can be used by local broadcasters, newspapers and websites. So just as wire stories from traditional news agencies disperse across the media landscape, repackaged and rebranded but their core the same story, so now do Sputnik stories proliferate on different sites across the region.^[8] Sometimes this is the result of a direct ideological choice. For example in Georgia, a country with low direct penetration of Russian channels due to strategic tensions, Sputnik content has been utilised by a number of emerging domestic outlets such as Obieqtivi TV, ^[9] Iberia TV, Asaval-Dasavali newspaper and websites such as News Georgia, Saqinformi and Georgia and World^[10] that challenge the country’s Western-focused foreign policy and EU backed social reforms. In others, state channels will adopt Russian narratives and news stories when they dovetail with the approach of their national governments. However such content is also being used by hard-pressed newsrooms and websites to fill time or space in their output. The third dimension of the media dissemination strategy is one best known in the West - RT (formerly Russia Today). RT describes itself as ‘an autonomous non-profit organization’^[11], with a budget of 19 billion rubles (around £264 million at time of writing)^[12] and claims an audience reach of 70 million viewers per week and 50 million unique online users each month. This puts it broadly on a par with the BBC World Service in terms of expenditure (£254 million for the BBC World Service in 2014-15) if not yet in terms of reach (246 million World Service users across all platforms).^[13] RT runs three 24hr channels in English (with specific US and UK offerings, the latter being available on free-to-air terrestrial television), Spanish and Arabic, with web content in German, French and Russian. It positions itself to cover ‘stories overlooked by the mainstream media, provides alternative perspectives on current affairs, and acquaints international audiences with a Russian viewpoint on major global events’.^[14] Its willingness to provide a platform for more voices perceived as outside the political and social mainstream, from political views on the radical right and left, to controversial academics to outright conspiracy theorists and theories has found a niche in an increasingly fragmented media market place where such views struggle to be heard on the traditional broadcasters. Both Sputnik (branded as ‘Telling the untold’) and RT (‘Question More‘) do provide an understandably sympathetic approach to the actions of the Russian government amid the mélange of different viewpoints. However there is strong suspicion that at least in part the aim is ‘not to convince people, but to confuse them, not to provide an alternative viewpoint, but to divide public opinions and to ultimately undermine our ability to understand what is going on and therefore take decisions if decisions need to be made’.^[15] The ideological approach is as much about muddying the political waters, by focusing allegations of Western hypocrisy to suggest that everyone is the same and sowing confusion, rather than simply building up pro-Russian arguments. Until very recently Western competition in the post-Soviet space has been in retreat. The worsening media freedom environment has removed the ability to partner with local stations to rebroadcast content within a number of FSU countries.^[16] However also with budgets and priorities still being set as if victory in the Cold War had delivered the initially promised freedom, thereby making such services obsolete. Furthermore, the multi-language offerings have tended to remain focused on radio, building on the long-range broadcast networks developed during the Cold War, for a media market place where TV remains the dominant source of news, though all have active online content provision. The multi-language BBC World Service has seen its budget cut in recent years, particularly since 2010, and as of 2014 responsibility for annually funding this work passed from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office to being directly funded from the license fee along with the rest of the BBC’s non-commercial output.^[17] The service remains predominantly radio and online focused though it runs two TV channels (BBC Persian and BBC Arabic), with a significant proportion of its provision focused on Commonwealth Countries. The BBC Russian service currently operates only on the internet, having given up transmitting on medium and short wave radio in 2011, though some of its online content and news is rebroadcasted on independent Russian channel Dozhd (Rain) TV.^[18] However a recent one-off government grant is facilitating development on an upcoming digital television project.^[19] As with the Russia service the BBC’s Ukrainian and Azeri services went online only in 2011. The BBC’s Kyrgyz service however maintains output online, on radio and via television, with the World Service stating that up to 3 million people watch BBC Kyrgyz’s output via Kyrgyzstan’s Public TV and half a million through the Radio Broadcasting Corporation of the Kyrgyz Republic, highlighting opportunities available with willing domestic partners.^[20] The BBC’s Uzbek service website and radio output is blocked by the authorities in Uzbekistan but it continues to make its content accessible on a range of platforms. US international public broadcasting outputs fall under the auspices of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) whose funds are derived from a grant from the US Congress. Voice of America runs a number of English language TV stations globally, as well as a mixture of web TV and radio in a number of different languages including Russian, Ukrainian, Azeri, Armenian, Uzbek and Georgian. However in the post-Soviet space and Eastern Europe, the second BBG organisation is often the central focus. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/ RL) operates 26 language services to 23 countries (FSU countries, minus the Baltic states, but plus the Balkans, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and for a number of minority Russian languages).^[21] RFE/RL services are rebroadcast on some domestic stations, where the media environment permits, but its radio content is available via region-wide shortwave transmission, on some satellite services as well as online. RFE/RL and VOA have recently launched a new 24hr news service called Current Time which claims 32 cable affiliates in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Germany and Israel, as well as online and satellite access, expanding on a service that has developed since 2014.^[22] German broadcaster Deutsche Welle provides radio content in Russian, Ukrainian and a number of eastern European languages, while Radio France International maintains a Russian service. Online actionThe halcyon days when the internet was seen as an almost magical tool to open up access to information in closed societies have long gone. While it continues to provide opportunities for opposition voices to be heard, and indeed for the international media organisations discussed above to provide access to their content, they are very much not alone in this space. Internet penetration in the region is growing. As of 2016 within the members of the CIS the proportion of internet users stood at 66 per cent, with individual country figures from 2015 ranging from Turkmenistan and Tajikistan at 15 and 19 per cent respectively through to Russia and Kazakhstan on 73 per cent with Azerbaijan at 77 per cent.^[23] The regions’ authoritarian regimes are learning to utilise the medium to disseminate their own narratives, and are proving increasingly adept at influencing the online debate in their countries, in their diasporas and increasingly in the West. The Russian Government’s use of paid and organised trolls to criticise opponents, challenge narratives and provide misleading or false alternative information has been well documented.^[24] These paid trolls, operating both on Russian and Western comment sites and social media operate with varying degrees of sophistication, some profiles built up to show evidence of a more diverse online life as if they were real, others narrowly focused on the task at hand. In the space beyond the paid-for trolls lie the enthusiastic (and organised) amateurs. In the gap left by the collapse of former nationalist youth movement Nashi, formerly trailblazing trolls, has been the pro-Putin group Set (Network),^[25] who have been active online in trying to promote pro-government messages and rebut attempts by others to challenge their narratives online.^[26] In addition, beyond the direct endorsement of the Kremlin networks are a range of new domestic nationalist movements that gain notoriety through online activism and real world stunts to create viral content.^[27] Arzu Geybulla’s contribution references the role of the pro-government youth movement, the IRELI Public Union that used to be reasonably sophisticated in its trolling of those who disagreed with the government. However following the loss of key activists, the group’s online activism is now eclipsed by less subtle pro-regime activism from the youth branch of the ruling Yeni (New) Azerbaijan Party. A key tactic online continues to be challenging any focus on domestic human rights, arguing instead that the focus should be around Nagorno Karabakh and the conditions facing Azerbaijan’s Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).^[28] In a contribution for Open Democracy on this theme Arzu documents the way in which her and other activists in exile, particularly those involved with Emin Milli’s Berlin-based Meydan TV^[29], have been targeted by organised twitter mobs with links to the ruling party. Meydan is forced to block around 50 users per day from its Facebook page over trolling and has faced repeated Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks to attempt to shut down their web presence. For years human rights defenders in Azerbaijan have had their emails hacked and social media presence monitored and recent work by Amnesty International has documented some of these instances, including how those now based abroad such as Leyla and Arif Yunus have been targeted. Amnesty have documented the use of ‘Spear Phishing’, targeted email spoofing fraud attempts, as well as customised malware.^[30] Political activists criticising their opponents online, in sometimes abusive language, is far from just the prerogative of post-Soviet regimes. However the degree of official sanction and organisation makes it worth noting as part of the tools available to governments in the region to promote their agendas and attack dissenting voices. Making their mark on the worldInfluencing the media is only one of the ways in which countries of the FSU seek to influence global narratives to their advantage. The first of other ways is through the use of advertising and event hosting to position their nations on the world stage, shape how they are perceived by the casual observer and enable their governments to use international prestige as a mechanism for boosting domestic support. Azerbaijan has become one of the most prodigious hosts and promoters in the region. It turned its surprise victory in the 2011 Eurovision song contest into an opportunity to showcase itself to the world through the Baku 2012 Eurovision Song Contest. The event was surrounded by glossy promotion to show off the results of Azerbaijan’s oil-fuelled economic transformation. This was followed by the 2015 European Games in Baku, a new competition created by the European Olympic Associations to compete with the pre-existing European Championships in athletics and other disciplines. In 2016 Baku hosted the European Grand Prix and plans to host a regular Azerbaijan Grand Prix from 2017 onwards. Group games and a quarter-final at the 2020 European Football Championships will also take place in Baku. Major construction projects were initiated to help facilitate these, including the new Baku National Stadium (built to host the European Games and the upcoming 2020 football matches), Baku Crystal Hall (built in less than a year to host Eurovision) and the Grand Prix circuit on the streets of Baku. These projects have been the catalyst for large investments in infrastructure, often with opaque procurement practices and a somewhat cavalier approach to planning policy,^[31] that have helped feed the narrative of Baku as a boom town. As well as the higher profile events, Azerbaijan has also been active in hosting small to medium size events where organisers are in need of finding a willing partner to pay for the event. Examples include the 2012 Internet Governance Forum, the 2016 United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, the 2016 World Sailing Championships and the 2016 Chess Olympiad; these will be followed by future events such as the 2018 European Trampoline Championships^[32], the 2019 Summer European Youth Olympic Festival^[33] and the 2020 European Mens’ Artistic Gymnastics Championships. When the world is not coming to Baku, Baku has been increasingly coming to the world through sponsorship and advertising. Azerbaijan’s state owned oil company SOCAR became an official sponsor of the 2016 European Championships, to complement its existing sponsorship of the International Judo Federation, the Montreux Jazz Festival, the World Economic Forum (Davos) and regional initiatives such as the Georgian Chess Federation.^[34] Understandably, SOCAR was one of the core sponsors of the inaugural 2015 Baku European Games. SOCAR’s strategy can be seen to have at least some commercial dimension given that it is involved in the retail sale of petroleum through filling stations in Georgia, Romania, Ukraine and Switzerland as well as Azerbaijan, though clearly its promotion strategy serves a broader strategic purpose. Azerbaijan’s sponsorship of Atlético Madrid helped to raise its national profile, coming as it did with that team’s rise to European prominence in 2014.^[35] Advertising has been combined with soft-focus journalism in glossy magazines^[36] and breathless reports about the physical transformation of Baku.^[37] Even Azerbaijan’s grandest efforts however were dwarfed by Russia’s preparations for the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, that as well as being an advert for Russian soft power acted as the focal point for a massive investment and stabilisation programme for Russia’s volatile North Caucasus region. A headline figure of around $50 billion was floated as the potential total investment with a tenuous link to the games, including substantial opportunities for corruption.^[38] Russian state-owned Gas monopoly Gazprom has become a substantial player in European football as one of the core sponsors of the UEFA Champions League^[39] and of Schalke in the German Bundesliga, in addition to its support for Red Star Belgrade and Zenit St Petersburg. Though the company has a range of subsidiaries active in Europe, its approach would seem to be designed to provide reassurance that Gazprom was a firm and reliable fixture in the European landscape rather than a state-owned firm of a potentially hostile power whose dominance of certain European gas markets creates a potential security risk. Its focus on Germany, where it also sponsors Europe’s second biggest theme park Europa-Park, is unsurprising given that country’s strategic importance and its cooperation with the Nordstream gas pipeline project that runs between the two nations.^[40] Kazakhstan has tried to position itself as an honest, reliable broker on the world stage. Its longstanding hosting in Astana of the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, a conference of its own creation, has helped to set that tone.^[41] This project is in part about projecting the narrative that Kazakhstan is a stable, moderate Islamic country, one that is non-aligned in the sectarian conflicts besetting the Middle East, an approach that has helped it play a mediation role over Syria. Its positioning as a mature, stabilising presence was integral to its decision to host the 2010 OSCE Summit. In a broader and more investment-focused dimension, Astana is hosting the 2017 Expo. In terms of national branding it is also worth looking at the Astana Pro Team, bankrolled by Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund, Samruk-Kazyna, that helped put the country’s newish capital on the international map.^[42] The top level international cycling team now forms part of the wider ‘Astana Presidential Club’ that brings it together with FC Astana, boxing, motorsports and basketball organisations to deliver what its website describes as the ‘development and promotion of international image of Astana and Kazakhstan based on national multisport brand (sic). The aims of the project are entering the world sports space…’^[43] All of this international work serves a dual purpose; trying to improve national prestige and profile - in part with the aim of encouraging foreign direct investment or tourism, such efforts are also designed to be reflected back to a domestic audience as visible signs of national progress and prestige. It enables the governments in question to argue that if the country is viewed positively from abroad this equates to an implicit endorsement of its practices. Whether such prestige spending can be sustained in the medium to long-term, given the impact of reduced oil prices in recent years, will remain to be seen.^[44] Furthermore, particularly since Azerbaijan’s 2012 Eurovision experience, such international ventures are increasingly seen as opportunities for the human rights record of the host country to come under increased scrutiny by NGOs and the media, limiting the opportunities for positive PR, at least in the Western media. Shaping the political debateAs documented in the FPC’s Sharing Worst Practice publication in this Exporting Repression series and elsewhere, in recent years there has been a substantial increase in pressure on independent NGOs and think tanks across the former Soviet Union.^[45] This is particularly the case for those who receive funding from Western governments and foundations, which have been targeted under variations of the Russian Foreign Agents Law, that creates onerous specific reporting requirements and forces organisations to announce that they are a ‘foreign agent’ in all written and verbal statements. Despite this trend at home FSU governments are active in attempting to influence the political debate in Europe and the United States through the use of public affairs firms and lobbying organisations, the support of sympathetic politicians, academics, NGOs and think tanks. A number of the contributions here address different dimensions of the challenge with Dr David Lewis and Melissa Hooper focusing on European research and lobbying groups with links to governments in the region, while Ana Dvali and Revaz Koiava look at the way in which the Georgian Government under the leadership of then President Mikheil Saakashvili was used to help reframe how the country was viewed in Western capitals. The earlier Institutionally Blind publication in this series has addressed the issue of Western politicians being involved in pro-regime groups and sympathetic election monitoring missions, though Lewis and Hooper expand on those issues here. ^[46] In addition to the Russian, Kazakhstani and Azerbaijani cases addressed by other authors it is worth noting that US and European lobbying firms have played an active role supporting different factions and oligarchs in Ukrainian politics since the Orange Revolution, with the same firm sometimes representing entirely different viewpoints from one year to the next,^[47] with both Trump and Clinton Election Campaign Managers Paul Manafort and John Podesta having previous links to President Yanukovych’s party and groups such as the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine.^[48] Some of the more closed Central Asian regimes have focused on support for small scale friendship groups such as the British Uzbek Society.^[49] FSU governments are not the only voices from the region that try to shape the international narrative about their countries. In a similar fashion, opposition forces from the region have sought to support events and analysis from those with a more critical take on what is going on. For example, a number of groups linked to jailed billionaire Mikael Khodorkovsky and his former company Yukos Oil engaged with think tanks and other organisations that took a more critical line on Putin’s Russia.^[50] Since his release Khodorkovsky and his family have developed a number of organisations including the Open Russian Foundation and the affiliated research arm the Institute of Modern Russia to influence the debate on Russia, who partner with other think tanks to host events.^[51] Opposition groups and out-of-favour oligarchs work with public affairs firms to protect their personal and legal interests and attempt to influence Western public opinion in a more regime critical direction. Countries from across the former Soviet Union are making use of Western-style soft power tools to influence public opinion and promote their interests, even when they are restricting the reach of Western organisations within their own borders. This essay collection seeks to give an overview of the developing landscape, assess the key issues and put forward new approaches on how best to respond to the challenge. What our authors say Rasťo Kužel looks at the popularity of Russian media in the former Soviet Union countries. He points out the differences in the role and reach of the main Russian channels in Armenia, Belarus and Moldova, compared to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine.  He concludes that while it is not easy to estimate the real impact of Russian propaganda in these countries, it is clear that the lack of objective reporting, as well as a lack of diverse views among Russian-speaking audiences, poses a real challenge across the region. Kužel believes that if national media enjoyed high levels of trust and popularity in the Eastern Partnership countries, it would serve as a good tool against Russian media propaganda and criticises the fact that governments in these countries have done very little or nothing to encourage the existence of an independent, vibrant and competitive media landscape, essential for providing a variety of news and views. Natalya Antelava writes that in Ukraine, the international media was not ready for the disinformation onslaught and was involuntarily aiding the alternative narrative constructed by the Kremlin. The mistakes of Western media outlets in Ukraine offer valuable lessons to all journalists covering the ‘post-fact’, ‘post-truth’ world. Dr Justin Schlosberg critically reflects on the respective editorial missions of both RT and the BBC, drawing on a comparative case study analysis of coverage during the second Euromaidan conflict in Ukraine. Amid a global news paradigm where truth and reality are becoming ever more contested, he argues for a new approach to global news ethics that avoids some of the problems inherent in both the concepts of ‘impartiality’ and ‘alternative news’. Ben Nimmo argues that Russia’s disinformation efforts in Sweden and Finland have met with mixed success. The local language variants of the Sputnik internet channel failed to penetrate or win a substantial following, and were perceived as a Kremlin propaganda tool. They closed down after less than a year. In the aftermath, evidence has emerged of a shift in policy towards a more indirect approach, using local voices which endorse official Russian government positions and policies, largely from the political fringes. This approach is still evolving; however, growing public awareness of the concept of information war and the role of political extremes in it means that the Kremlin’s information projects continue to face scepticism. Dr David Lewis writes that while modern authoritarian states still imprison journalists and close down newspapers, they increasingly rely on more sophisticated ways to suppress criticism and skew narratives in their favour. Post-Soviet states such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan use slick media and lobbying operations to boost their image at home and abroad. They often hire Western PR companies to promote their views in international media, to lobby European and American politicians, and to discredit political opponents. Authoritarian states create their own think tanks and non-governmental organisations, but use such groups to promote government views. They often rely on pliant or supportive Western academics and politicians to channel official views, or to act as uncritical election monitors. Non-democratic states have also learned to use social media to their advantage, both as an effective method of surveillance and as a new platform for their messaging. Lewis argues that the international activism of Eurasia’s authoritarian states deserves more critical attention. Melissa Hooper argues that the Russian government’s use of various media and messaging tools to disrupt the application of universal human rights norms in the EU and US, and declare democracy a failed experiment, includes a new front. This is the use of seemingly-independent think tanks and foundations to put forth xenophobic ideas that target migrant, Muslim, LGBTQ, and other minority communities as threats to those who ‘belong’. These think tanks and foundations are not independent, however, they are funded by the Russian government either directly, or by Russian-government-partnered oligarchs who act as agents to spread the Kremlin’s ideologies. Organisations such as the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation or the World Public Forum produce messaging that sacrifices the rights of minorities as they aim to demonstrate that the current EU and US democracies are failing and unsafe, and in need of replacement – which Russia can offer. For all these reasons, the EU and US governments, or at least intelligence agencies and civil society, should work together to document the funding and influence that are the source of these anti-human rights and non-evidence-based proposals. Ana Dvali and Revaz Koiava examine how the international promotion of Georgia intensified after the 2003 Rose Revolution. The new United National Movement Government of Georgia set ambitious goals and remained committed to trying to promote the country’s image as a democratic and reformist state around the world, something its supporters believe had a great impact on the country's development. However, critics argue that the image the government tried to create was far from reality, and the substantial amount of funds spent on promotion were a waste. The situation changed after 2012; the new Georgian Dream government has focused less on international promotion and spends fewer resources to shape international opinion. They compare the international promotion strategies of the two governments; in particular, how they have interacted with various international actors and which instruments they used to raise international awareness of the Georgian national brand. Arzu Geybulla explores the ways in which authoritarian regimes from the former Soviet Union use lobbying and nation branding to promote their achievements and blunt criticisms. She focuses on the cases of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, using the idea of the ‘brand state’. The essay also looks at the efforts these governments make online to harass their opponents. Richard Giragosian writes the Republic of Armenia’s relationship with its global Armenian diaspora has always been complex, and at times, even confrontational. Yet, despite a degree of misunderstanding and a deep cultural divide, this relationship is both symbiotic and significant.  While the diaspora was deeply engaged in providing economic support to the Armenian state through the 1990s, the combination of entrenched corruption and a closed economy has ended that period of financial support and investment, though remittances particularly from those temporarily working in Russia still provide a major source of funds. The politically sophisticated Armenian diaspora, well-integrated and politically active in several Western countries, play an important role in support of Armenian foreign policy. Despite occasional differences, especially over attempts to normalise relations with Turkey, the diaspora’s diplomatic leverage gives the Armenian state a distinct advantage, particularly in contrast to their Azerbaijani and Turkish rivals. But Armenia has failed to fully harness the natural advantage of its global diaspora, and the diaspora has never fulfilled expectations of more direct engagement in such critical issues as democratisation and sustainable economic development in Armenia.[1] This collection is part of the wider Exporting Repression Series of publications and events first proposed in 2014 and work on the series first began in the early summer of 2015.[2] And indeed also update and refine its own Cold War approach to propaganda and soft power.[3] Who may be less likely to speak the national language of their home countries, particularly if they went to school in the Soviet-era.[4] A Arefjef, Russian Language at the turn of the 20^th-21^st Century, Centre for social forecasting and marketing-Moscow, 2012, https://www.civisbook.ru/files/File/russkij_yazyk.pdf (information found via the EED). It is worth noting however that active use of Russian is below 25 percent in Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Lithuania.[5] These international versions primarily rebroadcast domestic content with major outlets including Channel One Russia Worldwide (Pervyi Kanal) including its specific Baltic service (Pervyi Baltiyskiy Kanal), RTR Planet (RTR Planeta), NTV World (NTV Mir).[6] Examples include in Moldova Prime (Pervyi Kanal), RTR Moldova (Rossiya 1) and TV7 (NTV) among others. In Belarus they include ONT (Pervyi Kanal), STV (Ren TV), Belarus RTR (RTR), NTV Belarus (NTV). In Kyrgyzstan NTV Kyrgyzstan, in Lithuania REN Lietuva (REN).^[7] Sputnik, Products and Services, https://sputniknews.com/docs/products/index.html[8] Other Russian language wire service content is available from Russian domestic services such as TASS, the domestic RIA Novosti (ria.ru) from which Sputnik was hived off, and business focused service Interfax.^[9] Co-founded by Irma Inashvili the Secretary General of the anti-Western and pro-Russian Alliance of Patriots of Georgia (APG) party, with other party activists on its board Media Meter, see Obieqtivi,  http://mediameter.ge/en/media-profiles/obieqtivi and also http://www.obieqtivi.net/[10] Nata Dzvelishvili and Tazo Kupreishvili, Russian Influence of Georgian NGOs and Media, Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, June 2015, https://idfi.ge/public/upload/IDFI/media.and.NGO.pdf and Tamar Kinturashvili, Anti-Western Propaganda: Media Monitoring Report 2014-15, Media Diversity Institute,  http://www.media-diversity.org/en/additional-files/documents/Anti-Western_Propaganda_Media_Monitoring_Report.pdf^[11] RT Management, http://rt.com/about-us/management/ Nevertheless there is no real pretense that it is not a state backed broadcaster with funding from sources around the Russian Government.[12] RT’s own about us management page states RT’s 2016 funding to be 19 billion rubles, while on its own myth busting section it challenges Newsweek for using a dollar version of this figure, instead claiming that the 2016 budget is 17 billion rubles https://www.rt.com/facts-vs-fiction/. Its broadcast reach figures are sourced from research it commissioned from French Survey firm IPSOS.[13] UK National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General presented to the BBC Trust Value for Money Committee, June 2016, https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/BBC-World-Service-1.pdf Note this does not include the budget or viewing figures for BBC World News or many of the BBC’s other international entertainment focused TV offerings that operate on a commercial basis.[14] About RT, https://www.rt.com/about-us/^[15] Mike Wendling and Will Yates, NATO says viral news outlet is part of "Kremlin misinformation machine, February 2017, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-38936812[16] Including Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia as well as much of Central Asia.[17] The license fee is a mandatory payment for using a television or watching live broadcasts online in the UK that is collected directly by the BBC. The English language BBC World News channel, with a 75million global reach is commercially funded and organised separately from the World Service.[18] The beleaguered Dozhd TV has had its broadcast access in Russia reduced in recent years. During the 2000s the BBC’s Russia service’s ability to be rebroadcast via domestic radio partners dwindled due to the increasingly restricted media environment.[19] Tara Conlan,BBC World Service to receive £289m from government, November 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/nov/23/bbc-world-service-receive-289m-from-government This funding, £289 million over 5 years, will cover services across the world including ‘new radio services in North Korea, Ethiopia and Eritrea; a better TV service in Africa; additional language broadcasts via digital and television in India and Nigeria; better regional content for the BBC Arabic Service, improved digital and TV services in Russia and for Russian speakers; and improved video across its output.’[20] BBC, BBC Kyrgyz marks 20 years on air with special content - and 3 million weekly reach on TV, June 2016,http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/2016/bbc-kyrgyz-20-years[21] RFE/RL Language Services,  http://pressroom.rferl.org/p/6087.html[22] Broadcasting Board of Governors, Current Time, February 2017, https://www.bbg.gov/2017/02/07/current-time-independent-russian-language-news-network/[23] ITU, ICT STATISTICS Home Page, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/default.aspx Some of these higher figures need to be treated with caution given concerns about the standards of statistical collection in these restrictive countries.[24] Max Seddon, Documents Show How Russia’s Troll Army Hit America, June 2014, https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america?utm_term=.jlBoWJdZ#.ep4zYXNM Shaun Walker, Salutin' Putin: inside a Russian troll house,  Guardian, April 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/putin-kremlin-inside-russian-troll-house See also NATO Stratcom, Internet Trolling as a hybrid warfare tool: the case of Latvia, http://www.stratcomcoe.org/internet-trolling-hybrid-warfare-tool-case-latvia-0[25] Anna Nemtsova, Vladimir Putin's biggest fan club: Media-savvy youth group Set is churning out propaganda and clothing to promote Russia's leader, December 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/vladimir-putins-biggest-fan-club-media-savvy-youth-group-set-is-churning-out-propaganda-and-clothing-9901715.html[26] Tom Balmforth, 'We fight for democracy' – Russia's pro-Kremlin youth respond to propaganda warning, February 2015, Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/03/russia-ukraine-pro-kremlin-youth-respond-propaganda-warning[27] An example would include Maria Katasonova and the People’s Liberation Front whose sympathies are linked to the international ‘alt-right’ and who have been active in challenging independent NGOs and participating in pro-Trump trolling around the 2016 US Election. See https://www.ft.com/content/d53f326e-54db-11e6-befd-2fc0c26b3c60 and https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-01-20/youth-movement-will-be-partying-friday-make-america-great-again-russia[28] It should be noted of course that Armenia has an active nationalist presence on social media, both from within the country and in the diaspora with a similar focus on Nagorno Karabakh (albeit from the opposite perspective) and Genocide Recognition.[29] Arzu Geybulla, In the crosshairs of Azerbaijan’s patriotic trolls, November 2016, https://opendemocracy.net/od-russia/arzu-geybulla/azerbaijan-patriotic-trolls[30] Claudio Guarnieri, Joshua Franco and Collin Anderson, False Friends: How Fake Accounts and Crude Malware Targeted Dissidents in Azerbaijan, Amnesty International, March 2017, https://medium.com/amnesty-insights/false-friends-how-fake-accounts-and-crude-malware-targeted-dissidents-in-azerbaijan-9b6594cafe60#.bw6r2ievd[31] See for example Human Rights Watch, Azerbaijan: Illegal Evictions Ahead of Eurovision, February 2012,https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/17/azerbaijan-illegal-evictions-ahead-eurovision[32] Trend News Agency, Baku to host European Men's Artistic Gymnastics Championship, February 2017,http://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/society/2717249.html[33] Dan Palmer, Baku to host 2019 Summer European Youth Olympic Festival, January 2017, http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1045735/baku-to-host-2019-summer-european-youth-olympic-festival^[34] SOCAR, Make Your Debut, http://makeyourdebutsocar.com/en_gb/about-socar[35] Owen Gibson, Azerbaijan's sponsorship of Atlético Madrid proves spectacular successMay 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/may/01/azerbaijan-sponsorship-atletico-madrid-spectacular-success[36] As well as puff pieces in Western lifestyle magazines, Azerbaijan’s first daughter Leyla Aliyeva was even able to persuade Conde Nast to set up its own Azerbaijan focused glossy, Baku Magazine, http://www.baku-magazine.com/magazine/[37] Azerbaijan’s Amazing Transformation (Discovery Channel), June 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YBSB_2CM7UA[38] Paul Farhi, Did the Winter Olympics in Sochi really cost $50 billion? A closer look at that figure, Washington Post, February 2014,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/did-the-winter-olympics-in-sochi-really-cost-50-billion-a-closer-look-at-that-figure/2014/02/10/a29e37b4-9260-11e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story.html?utm_term=.aa33a3c30ac4[39] It’s we light up football adverts are an integral part of the match television coverage https://www.gazprom-football.com/en/Home.htm. See also Jack Pitt Brook, Chelsea vs Schalke: Controversial Gazprom deals cast cloud ahead of Champions League game, Independent, September 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/european/chelsea-vs-schalke-controversial-gazprom-deals-cast-cloud-ahead-of-champions-league-game-9736801.html[40] Though again it is worth being clear that Gazprom has a number of subsidiaries active in the German market.^[41] Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, http://www.religions-congress.org/index.php?lang=english[42] Akmola became Kazakhstan’s Capital in December 1997 with its name changed to Astana in May 1998. The Astana cycling team was founded in 2007[43] Astana President’s Professional Sports Clubhttp://www.astanaproteam.kz/modules.php?name=astana&page=kazakhstan-club&pid=65[44] Heaping on the Caviar Democracy, 1843 Magazine (The Economist), https://www.1843magazine.com/features/heaping-on-the-caviar-diplomacy[45] Adam Hug (ed.), Sharing worst practice: How countries and institutions in the former Soviet Union help create legal tools of repression, May 2016, http://fpc.org.uk/publications/sharingworstpractice[46] Adam Hug (ed.), Institutionally blind? International organisations and human rights abuses in the former Soviet Union, February 2016, http://fpc.org.uk/publications/institutionallyblind[47] Andrew Rettman, Ukraine chief seeks friends in EU capital, EU Observer, October 2010, https://euobserver.com/foreign/31161 APCO Worldwide for example has provided support to the Presidential Administrations of both President Yushchenko and President Yanukovych as well as to the Premiership during the term of Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, http://www.odwyerpr.com/story/public/4873/2015-06-29/apco-gives-pr-support-embattled-ukraine.html and http://www.smi-online.co.uk/documentportal/speakerprofile/148501.pdf[48] See Luke Harding, How Trump's campaign chief got a strongman elected president of Ukraine, August 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/16/donald-trump-campaign-paul-manafort-ukraine-yanukovich and Eli Lake,Ukraine’s D.C. Lobbyists in Disarray as Dictator Flees,http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/02/25/ukraine-s-d-c-lobbyists-in-disarray-as-dictator-flees.html[49] Corporate Europe Observatory, Spin doctors to the autocrats: How European PR firms whitewash repressive regimes, January 2015, https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/20150120_spindoctors_mr.pdf[50] This engagement during this period included with the Foreign Policy Centre.[51] See for example: Henry Jackson Society, Event: ’25 Years On: Russia Since the Fall of the Soviet Union’, December 2016, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2016/12/07/event-25-years-on-russia-since-the-fall-of-the-soviet-union/ [post_title] => The Information Battle Introduction: A battle for hearts and minds [post_excerpt] => Editor Adam Hug introduces the key themes of the Information Battle publication. [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => introduction-battle-hearts-minds [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-13 16:13:47 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-13 16:13:47 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => http://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/?p=1515 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 1545 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2017-03-21 21:20:10 [post_date_gmt] => 2017-03-21 21:20:10 [post_content] => ‘For now we see through a glass, darkly.’^[1] Through increasingly sophisticated and high budget media outputs, glossy adverts, high-profile events and well connected lobbyists, authoritarian regimes from the former Soviet Union (FSU) have learned how to play the Western game, albeit with varying degrees of success. The traditional message that the governments of the FSU were sending to the world was ‘we are just like you’, arguing that they were countries on a rapid transition path to becoming liberal democracies and open market economies, despite whatever evidence to the contrary might exist. However in recent years the framing has become increasingly ‘you are just like us’, particularly from Russian sources but also too from others in the region such as Azerbaijan who chafe against EU and US criticism on human rights standards whilst Western firms continue to seek to make money from them. Addressing the challenge of Russian backed media and online content within the Western world requires a recognition of the significant challenges facing the European and US media industries. The scale and scope of the challenges facing the media from an increasingly fragmented market of news consumers, where old models of revenue generation are dying, lies beyond the remit of this publication. However, part of the issue relevant to this publication is that Russian media is filling a number of gaps in the market. Identifying Western shortcomings and hypocrisy may flow from a rich heritage of Russian ‘Whataboutism’^[2], but there is clearly a notable section of the viewing public who yearn for more systemic critiques of Western societies, seeing traditional critical journalism as still coming from inside existing elites. RT and Sputnik provide opportunities for some of the more radical voices on the left and right who struggle to get airtime on traditional outlets dominated by voices from more ‘mainstream’ parties and perspectives. As large sections of the internet clearly show, there remains a robust market for conspiracy theory. At a time of increasing diversity of political views, Western broadcasters need to think more carefully about how to provide opportunities for new voices to be heard in debates, if they wish to be able to adequately rebut the critiques provided by RT and others.^[3] However the Russian approach goes far beyond providing platforms to outsiders and flagging up hypocrisy, both real and imagined. Its goal can be to confuse, frustrate and demoralise. Peter Pomerantsev^[4] likens it to ‘a hall of mirrors’ where reality feels ‘malleable, spongy’, where the same actors are used in a variety of different roles (‘soldier’s mother’, ‘Kharkiv resident’, ‘Odessa resident’, etc.) with broadcasts with little regard given to whether such deceptions would be identified, where the approach was not even attempting to present a different version of the truth or ‘alternative facts’ but to bury the audience in a blizzard of conflicting information. Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews described the approach as the ‘firehose of falsehood’, that they say is designed to entertain, confuse and overwhelm the audience through an approach that is ‘high-volume and multichannel; rapid, continuous, and repetitive; lacks commitment to objective reality; (and) lacks commitment to consistency’.^[5] Such outlets build on the traditional media’s approach to try and provide balance, pitting opposing views against each other irrespective of how widely held or evidence-based they are, taking it to a post-modern, ‘post-fact’ extreme.^[6] ‘Question more’, becomes ‘question everything’ including the concept of truth itself. In a number of cases, the battle of ideas becomes an information war. Regularly the victims of Russian hacking^[7], the three Baltic States have particular sensitivities about Russia’s courting of Russian minorities that make up 25.6 percent of Latvia’s, 25.1 percent of Estonia’s and 4.8 percent of Lithuania’s population.^[8] As small states they have so far lacked the resources, and in some cases the political will, to provide programming in Russian, leaving the field open for Russian channels broadcasting across the border, though the recently created Estonian ETV+ Russian language channel has potential to partially address this. While 81 percent of ethnic Russians in Estonia say they trust information provided by Russian News Channels, only 26 percent of ethnic Estonians say they trust the same content, heightening the risk of political differences being further exacerbated along an ethnic divide. Given the state of war between Russia and Ukraine since 2014, Ukraine has banned the broadcast of Russian channels, however satellite firm compliance remains intermittent and a substantial proportion of Eastern Ukraine remains able to receive the signal. More broadly, the febrile atmosphere in European and US political culture at present, while clearly not ‘created’ by Russian initiatives, is clearly being exploited through the mechanisms discussed in this publication, sometimes to the extent of becoming a genuine security challenge. The trust deficit is not going to be bridged by responding to propaganda from the former Soviet Union with propaganda from the West or its allies. A multi-level approach is needed. There is clearly an important space for myth busting, fact checking and propaganda exposing tools, to try to challenge and push back against the flood of erroneous or confusing information. A lie may still be able to get half way across the world before the truth has got its boots on but through effective use of social media, efforts to debunk obvious untruths can be disseminated swiftly. Ukrainian site Stop Fake, founded by Kyiv Mohyla Journalism School staff and students, provides one of the most effective and innovative services, casting a critical eye over some of the claims made in the Russian and Russian-backed media. Such work is now being augmented by official channels such as the work of the EU’s East Stratcom Taskforce who are coordinating a network of experts in government institutions and civil society to compile the EU Disinformation Review in both Russian and English.^[9] The involvement of such institutions does show that policy makers are beginning to take the challenge seriously but their work must not crowd out non-governmental organisations whose independence is an important weapon in the information battle. All those involved in such work need to act collaboratively to ensure that information and analysis is widely shared. Secondly, the need for independent, evidence-based investigative journalism is extremely high given the challenges set out in this publication, yet its availability has been decreasing due to the erosion of resources in newsrooms. Filling the emerging gap is of critical importance and part of the solution has been the use of donor-supported coalitions of independent journalists who conduct the research themselves before partnering with news organisations to publish their findings. Some of the most important examples of these are the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. The donor model has its own flaws, in terms of funding stability and ensuring that they can follow their own journalistic priorities rather than focusing on the priorities of the person who pays the bills, challenges they share with colleagues in traditional media outlets. Facts may be essential but they are not sufficient. As Natalya Antelava points out there is a need to explain the stories behind the facts. Narratives matter and for a mainstream audience often production quality matters too. Again here consortia of investigative journalists may be better placed to get to the depth and scope of story required but nevertheless pressure needs to be put on editors and proprietors to support in-depth reporting rather than simplistic pieces to camera. Specifically looking at the media challenges in the post-Soviet Space, the European Endowment for Democracy has made a number of important recommendations in a major report entitled Bringing Plurality and Balance to the Russian Language Media Space, edited by contributor to this collection Justin Schlosberg.^[10] The EED recommends the creation of five new structures:

• A regional Russian language news hub (or proto news agency) to share high-quality news on a membership or affiliate basis, which also includes collecting citizen journalist and stringer material, facilitating collaborative investigations, fact checking and providing translations
• A ‘content factory’ - a cooperative of regional broadcasters, jointly commissioning quality programmes in Russian that would be available to all members free of charge. Content should include quality documentaries and entertainment, including film, drama and social reality shows, focusing on local issues. Commissioning and buying content, it could be a ‘marketplace’ of programming for the Russian-language media
• The creation of a centre of media excellence to improve research and information
• A basket fund of governmental and private donor money to support media initiatives
• A future multimedia distribution platform, with a global brand, to ensure that the produced content reaches the widest possible audience

 If properly implemented, these recommendations could help provide the architecture to help local media outlets, both public and private, develop content that viewers might prefer to the existing Russian offerings. International public broadcasters such as the BBC and PBS should consider what documentary and entertainment content could be provided at accessible rates to independent broadcasters in the region, potentially through such a content marketplace mechanism as well as providing such content to the nascent BBC World Service and BBG television services in the region. The fusion of popular entertainment and news, although in retreat on Western domestic channels, has been shown to be an effective way under other authoritarian regimes^[11] of ensuring interest in a channel and ultimately securing viewers for news and current affairs output. Further thought should also be given to the ability of such content to be provided in local languages, where feasible and necessary, to further boost the diversity of independent quality content. Where possible, the emerging Russian language television offerings from the BBC World Service and the BBG need to obtain greater access to satellite transmission to give them a chance of reaching older viewers, in addition to growing their web presence. These organisations need to ensure that their governance structures provide them with clear independence from their home governments. The recent decision in the 2016 US National Defense Authorization Act has transformed the role of the Board of the Broadcasting Board of Governors from managing the organisation into an advisory role, with a Chief Executive directly appointed by the US President in greater control. Irrespective of any organisational advantages of having someone in operational charge, the case since 2015 when the board appointed its own Chief Executive,^[12] direct Presidential appointment could be seen to undermine the organisation’s operational independence. There is a lack of comprehensive and publically accessible region-wide data about Russian media penetration or indeed the popularity of domestic media channels. An accurate ratings system only functions in some states in the region, in others such figures do not include satellite broadcasts and in others accurate data is not accessible at all. There is a strong case for region-wide survey work that can give an accurate analysis of media reach, particularly in the South Caucasus and where possible Central Asia where information gaps exist. When responding to the issues of lobbying, advertising and regime promotion, similar principles apply, with the need to improve transparency and public scrutiny. Human rights organisations have become adept at using major sporting or cultural events hosted by repressive regimes as a way of raising awareness about the problems that country faces. There are also opportunities for strengthening UK and EU lobbying registration, which in most cases remains voluntary.^[13] Moving this to a broader mandatory basis could help ensure that those working on behalf of foreign governments (and others) are open about their dealings with politicians and officials. Independent NGOs and donors should consider providing greater support to Parliamentarians to coordinate the activities of country interest groups and where appropriate arrange country visits for them, as otherwise this support is provided by pro-regime lobbing groups or Embassies. Increased public awareness of Russian and other government activity in the European NGO environment is important but it must not bleed into the kind of ‘foreign agent’ hysteria that FSU governments utilise to shut down Western and internationally supported NGOs at home. Laws must be applied effectively but equally to all groups rather than specifically targeting those supported by foreign governments or oligarchs, with efforts to improve transparency wherever possible. As with a more effective approach to media, progress in these areas will be assisted by a healthy dose of self-criticism focused on Western organisations and institutions complicit in helping post-Soviet regimes burnish their international reputations. In what is increasingly becoming a battle over the use of soft power and information, Western institutions have been losing ground. Western governments, NGOs, donors and the general public need to become more aware of the challenges they now face and must take action in order to protect and strengthen their domestic institutions and societies, while enhancing support for human rights in the former Soviet Union.Recommendations^[1] To the donor and NGO community

• Fund the creation of new, independent Russian and local language news content creation, news coordination and dissemination
• Provide increased funding for independent consortiums of investigative journalists
• Support in depth independent survey work in the countries of the former Soviet Union to assess the audience reach of both domestic and Russian media outlets
• Facilitate non-partisan support of Parliamentary engagement on issues relating to the former Soviet Union, including country visits

 To international broadcasters

• Expand the range of voices asked to provide comment on Western and international networks
• Collaborate with independent partners in the post-Soviet Space to develop content

 To Western governments and regulators

• Track the spread of misleading and untrue content emanating from Russian sources, working with civil society to rebut it where appropriate
• Actively monitor online threats to Western-based critics of regimes in the former Soviet Union
• Strengthen lobbying registry requirements, including looking to expand the scope of the UK’s statutory register and delivering the proposed formal EU lobbying register
• Re-examine the changes to the governance structures of the US Broadcasting Board of Governors

These recommendations represent the ideas put forward by the editor based on the research provided in this publication. Individual contributing authors express their own views within the publication and make further individual recommendations. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors alone and do not represent the views of The Foreign Policy Centre or the Open Society Foundations.^[1] The Bible - King James Version, 1 Corinthians 13:12. Translated in less poetic versions as ‘What we see now is like a dim image in a mirror’ (Good News Bible).[2] Where any criticism of human rights standards in the Soviet Union not answered but deflected back by pointing out flaws in the West. A brief primer on Whataboutism is provided by The Economist, Whataboutism, January 2008, http://www.economist.com/node/10598774[3] In this author’s view this need for greater diversity relates specifically to non-violent or discriminatory political viewpoints rather than a need for greater airtime for fringe science, academic or conspiracy theories.^[4] Peter Pomerantsev Inside the Kremlin’s hall of mirrors, April 2015,https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/09/kremlin-hall-of-mirrors-military-information-psychology?CMP=share_btn_fb[5] Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It, 2016, http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html^[6] Peter Pomerantsev, Why we are post fact, Granta, July 2016, https://granta.com/why-were-post-fact/[7] Linda Kinstler, How to Survive a Russian Hack: Lessons from Eastern Europe and the Baltics, February 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/russia-disinformation-baltics/515301/^[8] Central Statistics Bureau of Latvia, http://www.csb.gov.lv/sites/default/files/skoleniem/iedzivotaji/etniskais_sastavs.pdf; Statistics Estonia, Population by nationality, 1^st January by year, http://www.stat.ee/34267 and Alvydas Butkus Lithuanian population by nationality http://alkas.lt/2015/12/16/a-butkus-lietuvos-gyventojai-tautybes-poziuriu/Broadcasting Board of Governors, Role of Russian Media in the Baltics and Moldova, February 2016, https://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2016/02/BBG-Gallup-Russian-Media-pg2-02-04-164.pdf[9] See both https://euvsdisinfo.eu/ and Questions and Answers about the East StratCom Task Force,https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/2116/%20Questions%20and%20Answers%20about%20the%20East%20StratCom%20Task%20Force^[10] European Endowment for Democracy, Bringing Plurality and Balance to the Russian Language Media Space, June 2016. A summary of its findings is available at https://www.democracyendowment.eu/news/bringing-plurality-1/[11] The example of the highly successful privately run independent Iranian Satellite TV station Manoto TV is a useful case study, https://www.manototv.com/[12] Ron Nixon, U.S. Seeking a Stronger World Media Voice, January 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/us/broadcasting-board-of-governors-names-chief-executive.html?_r=0[13] The UK runs a statutory scheme, the Register of Consultant Lobbyists, which only covers those who lobby Government Ministers and Civil Service Permanent Secretaries. The wider industry runs a voluntary scheme, the UK Lobbying Register (UKLR). At an EU level only registered lobbyists are given passes to the Parliament and Commission, though this can be easily worked around. [post_title] => The Information Battle Conclusion: Winning the battle of ideas [post_excerpt] => Through increasingly sophisticated and high budget media outputs, glossy adverts, high-profile events and well connected lobbyists, authoritarian regimes from the former Soviet Union (FSU) have learned how to play the Western game, albeit with varying degrees of success. The traditional message that the governments of the FSU were sending to the world was ‘we are just like you’, arguing that they were countries on a rapid transition path to becoming liberal democracies and open market economies, despite whatever evidence to the contrary might exist. However in recent years the framing has become increasingly ‘you are just like us’, particularly from Russian sources but also too from others in the region such as Azerbaijan who chafe against EU and US criticism on human rights standards whilst Western firms continue to seek to make money from them. [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => conclusion-winning-battle-ideas [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-13 16:27:47 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-13 16:27:47 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => http://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/?p=1545 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[20] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 2295 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2016-11-21 12:00:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-11-21 12:00:48 [post_content] => This publication shows how repressive regimes from the former Soviet Union, most notably Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan operate outside their borders to challenge dissenting voices. The exiles and activists targeted primarily include: members of opposition political parties and movements; independent journalists, academics and civil society activists; former regime insiders and their family members; banned clerics and alleged religious extremists, including alleged members of proscribed terrorist groups. This publication shows that these groups are at risk not only of physical and online surveillance and harassment, but vexatious extradition attempts, INTERPOL Red Notices, attacks, kidnapping and other forms of illegal rendition, and even assassination. Security services from the former Soviet Union are adept at using the language of terrorism and state security to restrict the activities of their political opponents, triggering both formal cooperation agreements within the region through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the longstanding personal networks between security service leaders, ‘the RepressIntern’ as Dr Mark Galeotti puts it, to put pressure on the opponents of fellow repressive regimes. The report shows that Russia has been particularly supportive of neighbouring regimes seeking the return of their nationals who are deemed to be troublesome, both through legally sanctioned extraditions and extra-legal forms of rendition or kidnapping, the latter particularly taking place when the individuals had sought protection from the European Court of Human Rights. The security services from the former Soviet Union are particularly adept at operating within their diaspora communities in Russia, Turkey and across Europe. In the latter case, European security services need to play a more active role in monitoring the activities of these foreign security services on their soil, particularly within diaspora communities. Where possible, attempts should be made to assist exiles in protecting their emails, telecommunications and social media from hacking. Western courts and immigration systems need to remain vigilant to resist extradition attempts that would expose individuals from the former Soviet Union to the risk of torture, unfair trial and imprisonment or worse upon their return. The case for reform of INTERPOL to stop Red Notices being used as a tool to target regime opponents abroad remains an important issue despite recent progress, noting in particular the recent case of Tajik opposition leader Muhiddin Kabiri. Recommendations for Western policy makers

• Continue to reform the Interpol Red Notice system
• Remain vigilant to politicised extradition attempts and preserve the principle of non-refoulement
• Further investigate, through Western security services, networks of informants and agents that operate on behalf of the security services of the former Soviet Union on European soil
• Support exiles who are facing hacking and other attempts to steal their personal information
• Ensure that surveillance equipment, software and technical support are subject to export controls and are not provided by Western firms to repressive regimes in the region
• Suspend plans to upgrade trade and diplomatic arrangements with those states known to target activists in exile

[post_title] => No Shelter: Executive summary [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => no-shelter-executive-summary [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-14 12:04:01 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-14 12:04:01 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=2295 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 2297 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2016-11-21 11:50:36 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-11-21 11:50:36 [post_content] => The repressive nature of many governments in the former Soviet Union and how that they repress those who attempt to challenge these systems has been repeatedly and well documented, including through the Foreign Policy Centre’s Exporting Repression series of which this essay collection is part. Intimidation, surveillance, bureaucratic restrictions on activities, arrest and imprisonment on dubious charges, kidnapping, torture and killings are all techniques believed to have been used against those who are seen as a threat to a number of regimes in the region. What is less well understood is that for some people who are able to go into exile, leaving the country is not the end of living in fear that they are being monitored or potentially at risk of harm from representatives of the security services of their home country. Within the former Soviet Union, more often than not, this harassment is being performed with the collusion, or at least the acquiescence, of the government of the host country. Understanding the problemThe authors in this publication identify the four core groups who are targeted by the security services:

• Former regime insiders and their family members;
• Members of opposition political parties and movements;
• Independent journalists, academics and civil society activists;
• Banned clerics and alleged religious extremists, including alleged members of proscribed terrorist groups.[1]

 As touched upon in the Foreign Policy Centre’s 2014 publication Shelter from the Storm[2], the status of these individuals varies by country and by situation. Many of the people discussed in this publication are those taking advantage of visa-free movement within the Commonwealth of Independent States[3] to remove themselves from immediate pressures in their home state, with Russia the most common initial destination, given its sizable diaspora communities from the rest of the region. For those heading to the West the challenge remains whether or not to formally claim asylum, a move that makes the break with the home nation more permanent and impacts upon their activism, given that across Western Europe opportunities for short-term study and work opportunities, previously an important alternative, are becoming more difficult to access in a tightening immigration environment. As a number of authors in this collection show, the ways in which the system works to put pressure on exiles, at least within the region, relies on both formal and informal processes. As discussed in Shelter from the Storm, the 1993 ‘Minsk’ Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters[4] provides a legal framework to facilitate the return of people to other CIS member states. Shared priorities over combatting both religious extremism and any potential challenges to regime control are embedded in organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)[5]. Both the CSTO and SCO provide opportunities for training and information sharing on a formal basis[6], with the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) playing a role in coordinating counter extremism efforts (as defined by the participating regimes), while the CSTO is playing an active role in dealing with dissent online as discussed below. However, as Mark Galeotti sets out in his contribution, the shared KGB heritage, the ‘Repressintern’ networks of many of the senior personnel within the national security services, creates informal networks that really help to drive this collaboration, even when they are operating in an extra-legal capacity. As clearly set out in the FPC’s Sharing Worst Practice publication, a common, overly broad set of values and definitions of threats to state (and regime) security further helps to underpin regional security service collaboration.Russia and UkraineThe role of Russia in this particular publication is both as a primary actor and an accomplice to the actions of others, but it is this latter role that is the primary focus of this publication. Much has already been written on the extent to which Russia projects its power overseas and indeed the use of the security services in the region is steeped in Cold War imagery. Galeotti sets out the overview of Russia’s security infrastructure in his contribution. As touched on by a number of authors, the Russian intelligence services have been implicated in a number of suspected assassinations and suspicious deaths overseas. The most famous case perhaps being the assassination in London of former FSB agent turned dissident Alexander Litvinenko, although Arzu Geybulla also notes the suspicious circumstances surrounding the death of whistleblower Alexander Perepilichny which is currently under investigation in the UK. During the Yanukovch era, Russian security services had some cooperation from the domestic security services to put pressure on exiles seeking shelter in Ukraine, a country that served as an emergency escape route for Russians seeking a quick exit. Perhaps the most prominent case was that of Leonid Razvozzhayev, the Left Front political activist, in October 2012. After being implicated in an alleged plot to overthrow Vladimir Putin in a Russian TV documentary, Razvozzhayev fled to Ukraine to seek refuge. He arrived at the Kiev office of the UNHCR requesting to make an application for asylum. After a discussion with UN officials he left his belongings, saying that he would go to the cafeteria. He did not return and was next seen two days later leaving a Moscow court claiming that he had been kidnapped and tortured, a claim he repeated subsequently. With the two nations’ security services currently facing off across the battle-lines of a hybrid war, the relationships are fundamentally different. In fact, the issue of kidnapping has become an issue for both sides along the line of contact (between Ukraine and the separatists) and the Russia-Ukraine border, with competing claims that those captured were taken across the border or that they had moved into hostile territory either accidentally or deliberately.^[7] Most of these conflict issues, while a fascinating insight into security service tactics, fall beyond the primary remit of this publication. It is not only national-level Russian security services that operate abroad. Chechnya has developed a wide range of both official and informal channels to intimidate its nationals and neutralise opposition abroad. That President Kaydyrov’s use of social media is not limited to Instagramming pictures of his missing cat or his children cage fighting,^[8] with heavy monitoring of online criticism and the willingness to follow through with violence against his critics, is explained in graphic detail in the contribution by Civil Rights Defenders. Those seeking sanctuary in Russia are supposed to benefit from the protections of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), where the court has been clear in its resistance to allowing the extradition of persons to the countries of Central Asia where they would be at significant risk of refoulment. In the last year however, the power of the court in Russia has been watered down by the December 2015 law asserting the primacy of the Russian constitution and constitutional court rulings[9]. In practice however, the Russian security services have shown little regard for such principles prior to this change. They have been willing to collude with the Central Asian security services to illegally return people to their country of origin, even when those persons are subject to specific rulings from the ECtHR, such as in the cases of the Uzbek nationals Yusup Kasymahunov who was kidnapped in 2012 and the attempted kidnapping of Murod Yuldashev in 2013.^[10] Central AsiaIt is the experience of Central Asian exiles that forms the heart of this publication, experiences less widely explored in the media and wider literature than those of Russia. As shown in this publication, the two greatest offenders are Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, whose security services have shown that they are able to be active not only within disaspora communities within Russia but also further afield, from Turkey to Western Europe. As both the contributions by Edward Lemon and by John Heathershaw, Rosa Brown and Eve Bishop show, Tajikistan’s security services have become increasingly active in trying to extend repression beyond their borders since they began an increasing crack down and consolidation of regime power at home over recent years. Given Uzbekistan’s track record as perhaps the most repressive regime in the region, it is no surprise that it seeks to extend its reach to critics abroad. Both states utilise the threat, both real and perceived, of radicalisation to target those who become recruited by both radical and more moderate (both secular and Islamic) opposition groups within the diaspora communities, particularly in Russia, and those who had been previously active in such groups whilst in their home states. In the case of Uzbekistan, the threat of recruitment to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is used, a group whose role has become increasingly detached from Uzbek politics since 2001 but still forms part of the alleged basis for cracking down on religious groups. As Lemon points out, the secular opposition Group 24, the recently banned Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT) and Islamic proselytising movement Tablighi Jamoat are most active in Tajik migrant communities, though they are listed alongside ISIS and AL Qaeda as extremist threats to the state of Tajikistan[11], thereby helping to frame pressure on political dissidents within the framework of treaties such as the Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism[12]. As Tajikistan’s security services become more active and the Russians remain supportive of such actions, those at most risk are looking for alternative places to seek refuge. Poland, one of the easiest EU member states for people to access directly from Russia, has seen a surge in Tajik asylum seekers, rising from almost zero prior to 2014, to 104 asylum seekers that year, to 527 in 2015 and 660 in the first half of 2016 alone[13]. While the focus is on cases relating to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, it is also worth noting the way in which Kazakhstan’s security services have operated. The overall number of known incidents against exiles are lower than its two neighbours and for the most part Kazakhstan has attempted to use formal legal channels to exert pressure on exiles who the regime finds troublesome, as Heathershaw et al note, there have been a few severe incidents against high profile opposition figures and former regime officials. Most notably these have included members of the opposition Alga Party, the Respublica opposition newspaper linked to Alga and the associates of controversial banker and opposition leader Muktar Ablyasov, who was convicted of contempt of court in the UK Courts in 2012[14]. INTERPOL Red Notices were issued and extradition proceedings attempted for figures such as Muratbek Ketebayev who was initially detained by Spanish Authorities despite having refugee status from Poland, though the case was ultimately thrown out. Ablyasov’s family were controversially extradited from Italy, before being returned after international outcry[15], whilst Ablyasov himself is fighting attempts at extradition to Russia ordered by the French Government, on the grounds that further extradition to Kazakhstan would be likely to follow, in addition to concerns about receiving a fair trial in Russia[16]. Jos Boonstra, Erica Marat and Vera Axyonova suggest in a 2013 FRIDE paper that the reasoning behind Kazakhstan’s decision to close down its old external security service, the Barlau, and create a new service directly answerable to the President was in order to improve its performance in tracking opponents of the regime overseas[17]. South CaucasusIn their contributions both Arzu Geybulla and Giorgi Gogia discuss the situation of Azerbaijan, currently the state in the South Caucasus with the most hostile human rights environment, the former focusing on the experience in exile, the latter on those left behind. Although there are claims of potential involvement in suspicious deaths, the majority of the complaints raised by activists surround basic surveillance, harassment and pressure on relatives, the latter being detailed in Gogia’s contribution. Activists have spoken of a sense of being followed on the streets of Berlin and other major Western cities, having their email and social media accounts periodically hacked and described how their families in Azerbaijan have faced enormous pressures, from losing jobs to being jailed. Georgia, as the least restrictive country in the Caucasus and Central Asia with reasonably straightforward transport links to Azerbaijan and Armenia, has often been the first port of call for Azerbaijanis wishing to remove themselves from government pressure. However, increasingly its government has become under pressure from Azerbaijan not to play host to Azeri dissidents and opposition figures. While the Georgian authorities are seen as being unlikely to collude in attempts to render activists back to Azerbaijan illegally, the authorities have let it be known that they cannot give guarantees to be able to ensure their safety. Furthermore, the Government of Georgia will potentially respond to Red Notices and other formal extradition requests for suspects, though these will be subject to significantly freer legal hearings than would be possible back home, as Geybulla explains in the case of Azerbaijani activist Dashgin Alagarli. Surveillance and Western issuesThe dissident experience, whether within their home country or in exile, inculcates a sense of extreme caution, verging on paranoia, about the extent to which their activities are under surveillance. The threat though is very real, whether it is through security services physically keeping tabs on their movements or monitoring emails, phone calls and social media. As authors have made clear in this collection, this monitoring takes place not only on public sites such as Youtube and semi-private social media such as Facebook, through which dissidents share information, but also through private, nominally secure communications systems such as Skype, an example being the cases of Uzbek nationals Kudrat Rasulov and Fazliddin Zayniddinov whose Skype conversation transcripts were produced in court as evidence against them[18]. Furthermore, the Kazakhstani security services are believed to have used professionally produced spyware to target opposition figures based in the West, such as the publishers of the Respublica newspaper[19]. The use of Russian-style System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM) systems for monitoring internet and telecommunications installed directly into telecommunication companies’ networks[20] appear to be being augmented in a number of countries by Western technology to access online systems based outside the region. According to Privacy International, a number of Western and Israeli companies are providing the technology that underpins these monitoring operations with Trovicor Intelligence Solutions from Germany (and formerly Siemens) believed to be potentially providing services to Tajikistan and both the Israeli-based NICE systems and the Israel branch of US firm Verint International are known to provide monitoring services to both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan^[21]. The behaviour of the West more broadly in terms of internet surveillance, such as the US PRISM system uncovered by Edward Snowden that requires internet companies to provide access to user data[22], undermines the ability to challenge regimes in the region about the use of mass surveillance to put pressure on dissidents. However, this is not the only area where Western practice has perhaps undermined its ability to push for reform. The Bush administrations’ extraordinary rendition programme in the mid-2000s can be seen as providing a permission framework for kidnapping and other forms of illegal rendition that take place within the region. There is some evidence that the US transferred dozens of prisoners to Uzbekistan in the 2000s, for detention and interrogation, despite the widespread use of torture[23]. What is also clearly the case is that, prior to the 2005 Andijan massacre, and to a lesser extent afterwards, the US and its allies cooperated with the security services and military of Uzbekistan, in support of activities around Afghanistan, and helped support Tashkent’s internal narratives around the threat posed by the IMU and other terrorist groups that have been used as a pretext for far wider crackdowns against opposition and religious voices[24]. Cooperation has included the transfer of military vehicles following the withdrawal from Afghanistan, along with equipment and training for customs and border officials[25]. The EU as well has invested significant resources into funding and training the sections of Central Asian security services involved in border management and counter-narcotics through the Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA) programme, while the OSCE has been involved in attempts at police reform in Tajikistan[26]. The omens from the impending arrival of President Trump are not promising in terms of exerting a positive influence in such matters, with claimed plans to reintroduce extra-legal measures including torture in the fight against terrorism and a further deprioritising of human rights in US foreign policy. This is to be set alongside an increasingly inward-focused EU and a UK absorbed by the post-Brexit trade and political environment. As discussed in this essay collection and previous FPC publications[27], the INTERPOL Red Notice system is used as a method to make life difficult to exiles by restricting travel to third countries and putting them at potential risk of extradition proceedings, particularly if they do not have refugee status. While recent work by Fair Trials International^[28] suggests that under new leadership INTERPOL is looking to reduce the number of politically motivated Red Notices[29] that are being issued, there is still more work to do. For example, as John Heathershaw et al explain, the August 2016 case of Tajik opposition leader Muhiddin Kabiri[30] shows there are still serious cases where authoritarian regimes are able to use the INTERPOL system to harass their opponents abroad, even when the chances of extradition from Western countries remains limited to non-existent. It is of further concern that the reforming efforts of Secretary General Jürgen Stock may now be undermined by the appointment of former Chinese Vice-Minister for Public Security Meng Hongwei as the organisation’s President[31]. What our authors say Dr Mark Galeotti argues that as Vladimir Putin seeks to assert Moscow’s hegemonic authority over post-Soviet Eurasia, one instrument at his disposal has been to offer repressive regimes the opportunity to target dissidents in Russia and also the assistance of his formidable intelligence agencies abroad, building on historic Soviet era links. Thus, Moscow has helped not only monitor and harass opposition activists in Europe in particular, it also appears to have assisted in at least some assassinations. However, this kind of collaborative repression appears to win lasting support only from the most toxic of regimes, and thus the long term value of what he dubs the ‘RepressIntern’ appears limited. Civil Rights Defenders write that Chechens who run afoul of the Russian republic's autocratic leader Ramzan Kadyrov find there are few places where his security forces cannot reach them. Kadyrov uses both traditional strong-arm tactics and electronic surveillance to keep tabs on Chechen refugees, economic migrants, journalists, and political exiles from the Middle East to Vienna and Strasbourg. Those accused of committing real or imagined crimes against the state - as well as their friends and families - find that international borders are not significant impediments to Kadyrov's ability to terrorise, torture and murder Chechens with seeming impunity. The author of this piece is a Chechen human rights activist living abroad. They are writing anonymously, with support from Civil Rights Defenders for their and their family’s safety. Dr John Heathershaw, Rosa Brown and Eve Bishop introduce the University of Exeter’s Central Asian Political Exiles (CAPE) database project, which details 125 cases of extra-territorial security measures being used against political exiles from the five Central Asian republics. Their data demonstrates that the concentration of cases come from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (95 of the 125 in total). They draw attention to how informal measures, such as intimidation, take place alongside formal measures of charges, notices, arrests and renditions across three distinct ‘stages’ of extra-territorial security. The data show an increasing number of these cases, driven partly by Tajikistan’s extensive campaign against its secular and religious opposition. While many cases take place within the post-Soviet space, a significant minority occur in EU states, including cases of attempted assassination and suspicious death. Certain patterns are discernible for exiles as they move along the three stages of extra-territorial security pressure from being put on notice/surveilled (stage one), to arrests or other forms of detention (stage two) to ultimately attempted rendition or physical attack (stage 3). For example, a repeated practice in Russia from stage 2 to stage 3 is to detain and release a Central Asian exile who then disappears for some time before lawyers and relatives finally discover that the exile is in custody in his/her home country. This pattern suggests a high degree of coordination between Central Asian and Russian security services which collaborate in illegal security measures. Dr Edward Lemon examines the ways in which the security services of Tajikistan have operated beyond state borders, primarily in Russia and Turkey, attacking, intimidating, monitoring, kidnapping and assassinating opposition members in exile. Such incidences have increased dramatically in recent years as the government has outlawed opposition movements, most notably Group 24 and the Islamic Renaissance Party, forcing members to leave the country. This opposition in exile poses a limited threat to the regime of Emomali Rahmon. But returning activists to face trial in Tajikistan has become a priority for the government. Lemon profiles those who have been targeted, looks at the tactics adopted by the authoritarian Tajik regime and examines the ways those targeted have been able to use the legal system to resist being forcibly returned. Nadejda Atayeva’s  analysis illustrates how the government of an oppressive country, in this case Uzbekistan, uses an ever more aggressive variety of methods to muzzle civil society activists abroad and how it abuses the Western open sources, social media, and INTERPOL mechanism to track down activists, migrant workers, and other groups of citizens who have spent over three months abroad. Based on these observations, she insists that there is an urgent need to carry out reforms in the systems of the UNHCR and the INTERPOL to tackle their misuse as well as ensuring greater protection of personal data of activists abroad. Arzu Geybulla argues that if threats, intimidation and persecution of political activists and journalists at home were not already enough, these men and women often continue to face threats even after leaving their home countries. In most of these cases leaving persecution behind by fleeing the home country becomes a relative concept, as the secret service apparatus, in most if not all of the former Soviet Union states, continues to use measures and methods to keep dissidents on high alert and in fear of imminent danger to their lives and the lives of their loved ones. Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are just a few of the countries whose political émigrés continue to face persecution and even murder when abroad. Giorgi Gogia writes that Azerbaijan wages a vicious crackdown on critics and dissenting voices by arresting and prosecuting human rights defenders, youth activists, critical journalists and opposition political activists, as well as by adopting laws and regulations restricting the work of independent groups and their ability to secure funding. The Azerbaijani authorities have also arrested, prosecuted, and harassed activists’ family members with the apparent aim of compelling the activists to stop their work. The authorities have often targeted the relatives of outspoken journalists and activists who have fled abroad out of fear of persecution and continued their vocal activism in exile. In some cases, relatives in Azerbaijan have publicly disowned or renounced their relationships with their close relatives abroad, possibly as a means to avoid retaliation by the authorities for their relatives’ vocal criticism. [1] Some of whom may indeed be seeking to violently replace their home government. Terrorism poses a real threat to Central Asian states but it is one that is exaggerated for regime purposes.[2] Adam Hug (e.d.) Shelter from the Storm, Foreign Policy Centre, April 2014, The asylum, refuge and extradition situation facing activists from the former Soviet Union in the CIS and Europe, http://fpc.org.uk/publications/shelter-from-the-storm[3] Along with bilateral agreements between members on work permits[4] CIS, Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters, 1993, http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/migration/4de4edc69/convention-legal-aid-legal-relations-civil-family-criminal-cases-adopted.html[5] Adam Hug (e.d.) Sharing Worst Practice: How countries and institutions in the former Soviet Union help create legal tools of repression, May 2016, http://fpc.org.uk/publications/sharingworstpractice[6] PanArmenian.net, Agreement on CSTO member states' special services training enters into force, December 2009,  http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/40030/[7] See for example https://www.rt.com/news/315182-ukraine-russia-border-kidnapping/ and https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/29/ukrainian-pilot-nadia-savchenko-russian-court[8] Kadyrov currently has over 2 million followers on Instagram https://www.instagram.com/kadyrov_95/ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/20/chechen-leader-kadyrov-instagram-cat[9] BBC News, Russia passes law to overrule European human rights court, December 2015,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35007059[10] Fergana News, Uzbek citizen Yusup Kasymahunov kidnapped in Russia, December 2012, http://enews.fergananews.com/articles/2802;  Yuldashev v. Russia, Application no. 1248/09, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights,8 July 2010, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c3716732.html http://www.refworld.org/topic,50ffbce40,50ffbce45a,4c3716732,0,ECHR,,.html ; Elena Ryabinina, Refugees in Russia: Is there a light at the end of the tunnel?, March 2013, http://hro.rightsinrussia.info/archive/refugees-idps/asylum/expedite[11] Edward Lemon, The long arm of the despot, February 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/edward-lemon/long-arm-of-despot The IRPT are a gradualist group that does not officially support the overthrow of the regime, although Group 24 do.[12] Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, June 2001, via the Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/shanghai-convention-combating-terrorism-separatism-extremism/p25184[13] Yan Matusevich, The Quiet Tajik Refugee Crisis, The Diplomat, August 2016, http://thediplomat.com//2016/08/the-quiet-tajik-refugee-crisis/[14] For reasons of transparency it should be noted that in 2010 the FPC hosted a public seminar with Ablyasov, whilst members of the Respublica newspaper including Muratbek Ketebayev supported the Kazakhstan at a Crossroads project that ran from 2009-2011.[15] BBC News, Kazakh dissident Ablyazov's family allowed back in Italy, December 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25528466[16] Jim Armitage, Mukhtar Ablyazov: Kazakh billionaire to be extradited to Russia from France, The Independent, October 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/mukhtar-ablyazov-kazakh-billionaire-to-be-extradited-to-russia-from-france-a6691731.html[17] Jos Boonstra, Erica Marat and Vera Axyonova, Security Sector Reform in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: What Role for Europe?, May 2013, http://fride.org/download/EUCAM_WP14_SSR_Kazakhstan_Kyrgyzstan_Tajikistan.pdf[18] Edin Omanovic and Mari Bastashevski, Private Interests: Monitoring Central Asia, Privacy International, November 2014, https://www.privacyinternational.org/?q=node/429[19] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan Said To Be Hacking, Spying On Dissidents, August 2016, http://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-kazakhstan-said-hacking-spying-dissidents/27897226.html[20] Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan show that Ukraine under Yanukovych had access to a SORM system in their book The Red Web, 2015 Public Affairs Books. Privacy International show that Uzbekistan also operates a SORM system, The Right to Privacy in Uzbekistan, July 2015, https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/PI%20submission%20Uzbekistan.pdf[21] Edin Omanovic and Mari Bastashevski, Private Interests: Monitoring Central Asia, Privacy International, November 2014, https://www.privacyinternational.org/?q=node/429[22] Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others, June 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data The UK’s GCHQ is also believed to have undertaken similar work.[23] Don Van Natta Jr, U.S. Recruits a Rough Ally to Be a Jailer?, New York Times, May 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/01/world/us-recruits-a-rough-ally-to-be-a-jailer.html?_r=0 See also the Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalising Torture, February 2013, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf[24] Reid Standish, Where the War on Terror Lives Forever,  http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/02/war-on-terror-forever-islam-karimov-uzbekistan-legacy-imu-isis-central-asia/[25] AsiaBizNews, Uzbekistan Gets Equipment for Customs Police Training, http://www.asiabiznews.net/asia-tender-business-news/Uzbekistan/115136-Uzbekistan-Gets-Equipment-for-Customs-Police-Training.htmlhttp://www.asiabiznews.net/asia-tender-business-news/Uzbekistan/115136-Uzbekistan-Gets-Equipment-for-Customs-Police-Training.html[26] Jos Boonstra, Erica Marat and Vera Axyonova, Security Sector Reform in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: What Role for Europe?, May 2013, http://fride.org/download/EUCAM_WP14_SSR_Kazakhstan_Kyrgyzstan_Tajikistan.pdf[27] Adam Hug (e.d.) Shelter from the Storm, Foreign Policy Centre, April 2014, The asylum, refuge and extradition situation facing activists from the former Soviet Union in the CIS and Europe, http://fpc.org.uk/publications/shelter-from-the-storm[28] See Institutionally blind? International organisations and human rights abuses in the former Soviet Union, Foreign Policy Centre,  February 2016, http://fpc.org.uk/publications/institutionallyblind[29] Red Notices act to seek the location and arrest of a person wanted by a judicial jurisdiction or an international tribunal with a view to his/her extradition.[30] Asia Plus, Tajikistan conducts negotiations with Interpol member nations over extradition of IRPT leader, July 2016, http://www.asiaplus.tj/en/news/tajikistan-conducts-negotiations-interpol-member-nations-over-extradition-irpt-leader[31] Benjamin Hass, New Interpol head is Chinese former deputy head of paramilitary police force, The Guardian, November 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/10/new-interpol-head-is-chinese-former-head-of-paramilitary-police-force [post_title] => No Shelter Introduction: The harassment of activists abroad by intelligence services from the former Soviet Union [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => no-shelter-introduction-harassment-activists-abroad-intelligence-services-former-soviet-union [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-14 12:08:40 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-14 12:08:40 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=2297 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[22] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 2313 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2016-11-21 11:00:53 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-11-21 11:00:53 [post_content] => This publication has shown in significant detail how repressive regimes from the former Soviet Union, most notably Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan operate outside their borders to challenge dissenting voices. The security services from the former Soviet Union are adept at using the language of terrorism and state security to restrict the activities of their political opponents, triggering both formal cooperation agreements within the region and the longstanding personal networks between security service leaders, ‘the RepressIntern’ as Galeotti puts it, to put pressure on the opponents of fellow repressive regimes. They are particularly adept at operating within diaspora communities in Russia, Turkey and across Europe. International policy makers should be clear that the targeting of exiles by their home regimes is a regular occurrence and an issue that needs specific attention. While both the migrant crisis and increased backlash against immigration create challenges for Western policy makers, more needs to be done to provide the protection that many exiles require. This involves Western security services playing a more active role in monitoring the activities of former Soviet security services on their soil, particularly within diaspora communities. Where possible this should include being aware of and responding to attempts by foreign security services to hack into the emails, telecommunications and social media of exiles from the former Soviet Union in order to help protect activists’ personal data and thereby help protect them, their families and associates from harm. Western courts and immigration systems need to continue to be vigilant to resist extradition attempts that would expose individuals from the former Soviet Union to the risk of torture, unfair trial and imprisonment or worse upon their return. This clearly applies to overtly political cases but also to cases where allegations of radicalisation are involved, given the propensity of Central Asian and other regimes to use this issue as cover for targeting political opponents. Based on the information provided by Nadejda Atayeva in this collection, there would seem to be a case to look at halting deportations to Uzbekistan, even in cases where there is no direct link to political activity, given the risk that those returning may be harassed or forced into giving false evidence. The case for reform of INTERPOL to stop Red Notices being used as a tool to target regime opponents abroad remains an important concern, despite recent progress, noting in particular the recent case of Tajik opposition leader Muhiddin Kabiri. There is little sign that post-Soviet regimes who are exporting repression through the use of their security services abroad are paying a political or economic price for their actions. The approval in November 2016 of the long-delayed Uzbekistan Textiles deal by the European Parliament Trade Committee does not seem to show that any penalties are being levied on Uzbekistan for the behaviour described in this publication or elsewhere. The full European Parliament still has the opportunity to hold Uzbekistan to account by rejecting the current deal when it meets in December 2016[1]. Similarly, EU member states seem so far to be ratifying the planned EU-Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement while talks continue for a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Azerbaijan. From this author’s perspective it makes little sense to approve trade enhancements with regimes who are actively harassing their political opponents on European soil, in addition to their repression at home^[2]. Recommendations for Western policy makers

• Continue to reform the Interpol Red Notice system to avoid the system being used to harass exiled dissidents
• Remain vigilant to politicised extradition attempts and the need to preserve the principle of non-refoulement
• Consider halting deportations of Uzbek nationals given reports of the persecution of non-political exiles upon their return
• Further investigate, through Western security services, the networks of informants and agents that operate on behalf of the security services of the former Soviet Union in European countries with sizeable Central Asian diasporas, such as Poland and Germany.
• Support exiles who are facing hacking and attempts to steal personal information
• Ensure that surveillance equipment, software and technical support are subject to export controls and are not provided by Western firms to repressive regimes in the former Soviet Union
• Suspend plans to upgrade trade and diplomatic arrangements with those states known to target activists in exile

 [1] Reuters, EU lawmakers back Uzbekistan trade deal opposed by anti-slavery activists, November 2016,http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-uzbekistan-forced-labour-idUSKBN1351M7[2] For more please see Institutionally Blind: International organisations and human rights abuses in the former Soviet Union, February 2016, http://fpc.org.uk/publications/institutionallyblind [post_title] => No Shelter: Conclusion and Recommendations [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => no-shelter-conclusion-recommendations [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-14 13:25:45 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-14 13:25:45 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=2313 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[23] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 2317 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2016-05-24 10:55:49 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-05-24 10:55:49 [post_content] => The findings of Sharing worst practice: How countries and institutions in the former Soviet Union help create legal tools of repression highlight the clear similarities in the types of repressive practices being undertaken by countries across the former Soviet Union. First and foremost this is a function of the nature of their domestic political systems, whether they be authoritarian, semi-authoritarian or troubled democracies, they all feature ruling elites keen to maintain their position of political dominance. Shared concerns, from popular protest and current economic weakness to the age of the regime leaders are at the heart of encouraging similar legislation and forms of repression across the region. The expert contributors to the publication agree that the current situation in the region combines a mix of different influences: Russian and other neighbouring countries’ encouragement to draft repressive legislation (either through bilateral diplomacy or supported by regional instructions), the autonomous emulation of worst practice (building on both regional and global trends) or self-generated bad practice (building on their Soviet legacy and current authoritarian systems). The balance of this mix differs in each country in the region depending on local circumstances and their strategic outlook. Russia is not the author of all the repressive legislation in the region but it has significant direct influence and helps shape and promote an emerging conservative regional values agenda, alongside what David Lewis describes as the ‘Moscow Consensus’ of a strong commitment to state sovereignty that is attractive to repressive regimes. Russia’s approach mimics Western structures and techniques but combines them with anti-Western discourse, deep media manipulation, management of civil society and a fusion of the political and economic elite, often through the families of the President or senior ministers. Russia promotes these ideas effectively through its significant regional Russian media penetration and through proxy groups, from NGOs to the Orthodox Church, promoting a conservative, traditional values-agenda that it argues is more in keeping with the history and culture of the region, than Western alternatives. Though there may be some encouragement for repressive action through regional institutions and bilateral diplomacy, regimes in the region will seek ideas for legislation and practice that help sustain their political and structural control, templates of which are willingly provided by Russia and other countries in the region. For example, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan need no direction from Russia or indeed China to clamp down on dissent but remain open to new methods of how to do so. For the most part regional institutions act to reinforce the status quo, promoting authoritarian cultural norms rather than developing rules-based systems, echoing their domestic political environments where informal power structures have influence far in excess of codified law and formal procedures. Such structures reinforce and expand the primacy of national sovereignty narratives and frame challenges to a regime as a threat to sovereignty and independence of the country. So while there is some ‘sharing of worst practice’ amongst the countries of the former Soviet Union, for the most part it is authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes informally collaborating and perhaps more importantly learning from each other about methods that can help them consolidate their own power, that are primarily driving the spate of similar looking repressive legislation and practice that spreading across the region. [post_title] => Sharing Worst Practice Executive Summary [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => sharing-worst-practice-executive-summary [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-14 14:07:16 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-14 14:07:16 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=2317 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[24] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 2319 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2016-05-24 10:50:21 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-05-24 10:50:21 [post_content] => Sharing worst practice: How countries and institutions in the former Soviet Union help create legal tools of repression examines the extent to which governments across the former Soviet Union (FSU) collaborate in the development of repressive practices that underpin their rule. It looks at the development of ‘copycat’ legislation and behaviour within the region, examining to what extent this is the result of direct collaboration, independent emulation of such restrictive practices and where such actions are extensions of past poor practice within a particular country. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, some states made tentative steps to open up their societies in the early 90s, others such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan never even began down that path.[1] Of those who did initially seek to move away from the Soviet authoritarian model, a number were plunged into civil conflict out of which arose more restrictive forms of Governments (such as in Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia). The 2000s brought what were described as colour revolutions to Georgia (Rose Revolution, 2003), Ukraine (Orange Revolution, 2004/5) and Kyrgyzstan (Tulip Revolution, 2005), bringing to power pro-Western governments in Tbilisi and Kiev. The growing repressive streak in the Georgian government under Saakashvili saw it removed in elections in 2012, while in Ukraine the failings of the Orange Revolution leadership (and of the West) paved the way for the victory in 2010 of their 2004 opponent Viktor Yanukovych and his subsequent ousting in 2014 following the Maidan protests. Put simply, across the region beyond the Baltic states, there has been no consistent progress towards reform in those that have undergone political change, and the recent region-wide trends have been far from positive. After the chaos of the 1990s, the region has seen the rise of a resurgent Russia seeking to restore its regional influence and dominance, the waxing and waning of US influence in Central Asia in response to the war in Afghanistan, and China making rapid economic and tentative political gains particularly in Central Asia, while the EU has been expanding its offer of partial integration, through the development of its neighbourhood policy - the Eastern Partnership. The influence of these external actors is an important part of this publication, examining the extent to which the promotion of the values agenda of these major powers shapes political and legislative agendas in the region. Russia: Role model or ringleader? Russia, once imperial master and dominant Soviet partner for the states of the region, continues to loom large across the human rights landscape. Through its leadership role in regional institutions and its often strong bilateral links, including security service and judicial collaboration, it plays a significant part in the promotion of practices that undermine human rights. Russia’s role as the primary export market and source of remittances from migrant workers for many in the region, combined with its role as security guarantor through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) provides it with considerable in-built leverage. Russian media and websites have significant penetration across the region, promoting Moscow’s news agenda and socially conservative cultural attitudes. Russian soft power is further projected through think-tanks and NGOs in receipt of Russian funding, assisted by local law makers with strong ties to Russia^[2] and in a number of countries through the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. Russia proactively promotes the twin themes of Russkiy Mir (Russian World), a project of linguistic and cultural values projection, and the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’, providing attempts at ideological depth to its support of existing regimes and opposition to Western engagement, in what it sees as its ‘near abroad’ or sphere of influence. This use of soft-power helps set a political tone rather than directs a specific course of action. Russia continues to play the lead role in a range of post-Soviet successor agreements including the CIS, whose Minsk Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters[3] provides a legal framework for cooperation between security services facilitating potential abuses in extradition and other areas[4] and the CSTO. These regional bodies, as with the SCO discussed below, for the most part do not seek to bind or determine the activities of member states. However, at a political level they provide a forum for sharing and entrenching shared approaches to issues of security, governance and human rights, while at a technical and practitioner level, meetings held under the auspices of these groups provide opportunities for bureaucrats and security officials to meet and exchange ideas. These bodies seek to influence rather than direct, and for the most part they entrench and strengthen existing behaviours by the regimes of the region. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is rapidly emerging as Russia’s preferred mechanism for promoting regional integration under its terms. It is a project with considerable Russian political momentum and a more ambitious scope perhaps than previous agreements. While nominally economic in character, the greater the potential integration in one area, the greater the scope for informal influence and pressure in other areas. For example, Russia is believed to be putting pressure on Armenia and Kyrgyzstan to implement restrictions on internet freedom in line with Russian practice. While Soviet nostalgia may persist, as Eka Iakobishvili notes a desire for the certainties of such rule remains notable amongst older generations particularly in Central Asia, this does not translate into a meaningful desire to subsume their newly regained (or created) national identities entirely into a Russian-led regional project. The regimes of the region for the most part value their independence, if not for anything else than for their ability to independently generate rents from local control without direct Russian competition. It has been notable however, that non-Russian EEU members have recently been trying to revive diplomatic ties with the EU and US to try to counter-balance Russian influence and maintain their independence and strategic room for manoeuvre. Kazakhstan, perhaps the second most powerful state within the EEU, is particularly wary of attempts to impinge on its international freedom of action and, with a sizable Russian minority and internal concerns over Russian media penetration for example, it has reasons to be watchful.[5] It is perhaps unsurprising that December 2015 saw Kazakhstan agree an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU.[6] It is not alone, Armenia has revived its talks with the EU over visas and other cooperation, Kyrgyzstan has amended or withdrawn Russian inspired legislation and even Belarus has sought to defy Moscow on sanctions against Ukraine (as the others have), attempted to play peacemaker (hosting the Minsk Agreements) and negotiating the end of most EU sanctions following dialogue and political prisoner releases.[7] While this publication examines a broad range of themes, two notable trends have been seen across the region in recent years: increasing pressure on NGOs and particular restrictions on LGBTI rights activists. While in both cases these issues are building on pre-existing political and cultural norms, they are both in part taking inspiration from recent Russian legislative developments. NGO legislationThe rash of new anti-NGO legislation may have gained its momentum from the regional regimes’ responses to the events of the Arab Spring, the 2012 Russian Presidential Elections and the Maidan protests in Ukraine. However, new legislative efforts re-building on a firm bedrock of restrictive practices against NGOs across the region going back to the Soviet period, in a number of cases strengthened in the mid-2000s following the series of ‘colour’ revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Informal bureaucratic barriers to NGO registration and management have existed for a considerably longer, with regime critical groups often waiting months or years for basic bureaucratic tasks to be completed by government officials. However, whereas previously in several countries NGOs that were being informally blocked from official registration could operate on an unregistered basis, not receiving taxation or other benefits of registered status but operating legally, recent legislation as explored by Kate Levine, has sought to close down this work-around, requiring the registration of all significant payments irrespective of official status. The use, or attempted use, of the Soviet-era term ‘foreign agent’ as part of civil society restriction attempts has its genesis in Russia, whose 2012 legislation, as examined in a number of the contributions contained herein, set down a firm marker against civil society groups receiving foreign funding. [8] The framing of human rights NGOs as political tools of Western powers seeking to undermine the independence of sovereign states is neither new nor restricted to this region, though both the Soviet legacy and Russian-promoted narratives bolster the influence of such thinking. As David Lewis points out, the extended essay by Azerbaijani Presidential Administration chief Ramiz Mehdiyev attacking Western, most notably US, NGOs as a threat to national sovereignty in 2014 is illustrative.[9] Mehdiyev is a Russia sympathetic voice within the Azerbaijani elite, but part of an administration seeking balanced relations with both Moscow and the West which jealously guards its own independence and control, a veteran of the Soviet-era practice but with new reasons to fear the influence of independent civil society groups undermining the regime. Across the region a mixture of relative societal poverty, the link between the wealth of individuals and proximity to the regime and the often extreme pressure preventing potential donors or sponsors from working with regime-critical NGOs provides a formidably tough environment for NGOs to find alternative sources of local funding. Developing methods of blocking or restricting foreign funding and unregistered NGOs makes it very difficult for them to survive financially and may place activists in ambiguous legal positions as they search for alternative routes to funding, putting them at risk of prosecution. LGBTI rights Across the region there have been attempts to promote legislation restricting the ability of LGBTI activists, or indeed ordinary citizens, to discuss issues related to homosexuality, framing it in terms of the protection of children.[10] As Melissa Hooper explains, the Russian Federal law ‘for the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values’ adopted in 2013, followed years of local efforts at similar regulations and forms the template for similar, so far failed or pending, legislative attempts in Armenia, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.[11] Not only would such legislation significantly restrict public education, it is designed to prevent discussion of LGBTI issues in wider society because all freely available media and public platforms could potentially be accessed by minors. While homosexuality was in legalised in a number of states during the 1990s and early 2000s, this was often in part as a result of preparations for (or conditions of) membership of the Council of Europe, or other international pressure, rather than a deep-rooted domestic desire for reform. Male homosexuality remains illegal in long-standing pariah countries Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Culturally conservative and homophobic attitudes are an ingrained part of the social fabric across much of the region, providing fertile ground for socially conservative values promotion. For example, in a 2011 Caucasus Barometer survey, 96% of Armenians, 87% of Georgians and 84% of Azerbaijanis stated that ‘homosexuality can never be justified’, with little to no variation by age group.[12] LGBTI matters provide a perfect cultural ‘wedge’ issue for Russian television and other institutions, contrasting ‘traditional’ Russia with a decadent West. While basic anti-discrimination legislation has been part of EU requirements for visa liberalisation, Russian-led propaganda has promoted the idea that Eastern Partnership Countries would be required to adopt same-sex marriage, despite equal marriage being legal in only 11 EU member states. Recent attempts to crack down on LGBTI rights and groups represents both sharing and already shared worst practice. Western worst practiceIt is not only the countries of the region that are complicit in the development and spread of bad ideas and behaviour. The first publication in the FPC Exporting Repression series, Institutionally Blind: International organisations and human rights abuses in the former Soviet Union, addressed some of the ways in which Western politicians and institutions collude in downplaying human rights abuses in FSU.[13] It also looked at the ways in which Western indifference or opposition to international human rights institutions, such as the long-running British debate over its continued membership of the European Convention on Human Rights, helps influence narratives rejecting restrictions on ‘sovereignty’.[14] Similarly, some of the increasingly sophisticated public relations and communications strategies deployed by regimes in the region are often learnt from or organised in the West, the subject of an upcoming publication in the series entitled The Information Battle. In this publication, Melissa Hooper explores the role played by the US-based religious right in the promotion of Russian initiatives restricting LGBTI rights in the region. However, it is worth noting in addition that, in the security sphere Western actors, most notably the US, played a direct and significant part in sharing worst practice in the period after 9/11. In his 2014 book Great Games, Local Rules, Alexander Cooley documents how Uzbekistan was used in the mid-2000s as a hub for the interrogation and, in all likelihood, torture of terrorist suspects in the custody of the CIA and other US intelligence agencies.[15] Detainees suspected of involvement in terrorism may also have been rendered to Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and other states. That US intelligence agencies were willing to flout the principle of non-refoulement in the mid-2000s does make it significantly harder for Western voices, even those in no way involved in the practice, to be taken as sincere by governments in the region when challenging cases of detainee transfer and the kidnapping of activists back to countries suspected of torture, or indeed the practice of torture itself.[16] The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and state security As Western influence on the security landscape fades in the wake of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, China’s role continues to develop. In his contribution to this collection, Thomas Ambrosio points out that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) provides a mechanism for encouraging cooperation between the two authoritarian big-beasts, Russia and China, concerning influence in Central Asia, where China’s rapidly growing economic involvement has the potential to create competition with Russia. However, both the major powers share a similar approach to tackling threats to their political control, whether that be from peaceful opposition or extremist violence, often seeking to elide the two concepts. As a number of authors explain in this publication, security legislation is often used to pressure NGOs and activists, particularly those representing minority groups or pious (but non-violent) religious communities. The national security and stability rationale is also used to underpin the restrictions on NGO funding from the West, particularly in the wake of events in Ukraine as the Russian government’s argument is that these events were driven by NGOs funded by Western security services, as noted by Levine and others. The structural approach to law of the SCO embeds the primacy of national sovereignty over internal rules and norms. As Cooley noted, while the US in the Bush era sought ways to circumvent international law when dealing with prisoners of war from non-state actors (‘enemy combatants’) and other prisoners in the ‘War on Terror’, China and Russia through the SCO have sought to override such obligations by formally placing state (and regime) security concerns above any formal rights requirements through regional treaties that aim to override UN and other obligations. Ambrosio examines the impact of the organisation’s agreements, such as the Convention on the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism on the regional order and the role of its Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) that works under considerable secrecy to coordinate and strengthen national security services.[17] The SCO structures are light on bureaucratic depth and, as a regional organisation designed to help resist efforts to undermine national sovereignty/hold regimes accountable for breaches of human rights best practice, the level of sovereignty pooling is limited to non-existent. This ‘national first’ approach is evident, for example in their approach to online freedom. At the 2014 SCO Summit in Danshube its members strengthened their approach to restricting online access with the declaration stating that internet governance should be based on the principle of respect ‘for national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. ’[18] The stated aim would be ‘preventing the use of information and communications technologies which intend to undermine the political, economic and public safety and stability of the Member States, as well as the universal moral foundations of social life, in order to stop the promotion of the ideas of terrorism, extremism, separatism, radicalism, fascism and chauvinism by the use of the Internet’. To do this they would ‘support the development of universal rules’, only of course if such rules enshrined the right of states to police internet access as they wish, for their own benefit. This publication brings together a range of different international experts to assess the different areas of authoritarian collaboration and learning that help to shape repressive behaviours in the region.What our authors sayDavid Lewis argues that across the former Soviet Union, a new type of authoritarianism has become the default political system. From Azerbaijan to Tajikistan, political development in most post-Soviet states reflects a ‘Moscow Consensus’, a set of ideas and principles that underpin a particular regional form of authoritarianism. Although these regimes mimic liberal ideas such as civil society and democratic elections, in practice they are highly concentrated authoritarian systems, centred on a single leader. ‘Political technologists’ construct narratives to legitimise the system, while intelligence and security agencies constrain any independent journalism or political activism. Politics and business are fused into a single system of power that ensures control over any independent entrepreneurs and enrichment for a small elite. These states insist on their own sovereignty, but rely on offshore companies to manage personal wealth, and use Interpol and foreign courts to track down opponents in exile. So far, such regimes have been remarkably resilient, partly because democratic initiatives in the region have failed to offer a convincing alternative. But as the economic model of the Moscow Consensus comes under strain, unresolved social and political problems are likely to become an increasing challenge for governments in Eurasia. Eka Iakobishvili discusses how countries and institutions in the former Soviet Union help create legal tools of repression. She uses the example of the ‘NGO law’ to demonstrate how totalitarian regimes in former Soviet countries share worst practices whilst trying to maintain their power. Eka argues that the closer the ties former Soviet countries have maintained with the Russian Federation, the stronger the political influence has been. Moreover, Eka goes beyond the current legal and political discourse to suggest that historical understandings of the shared history of law-making in post-Soviet countries is important when studying the post-Soviet legal culture and the ways in which ‘friendly experience-sharing’ takes place. Though keen for a change from the early stages, the crisis of seeking an identity has haunted these nations with civil unrests, dictatorial regimes and widespread social nihilism fuelled by corruption and disrespect for the rule of law. Russia’s attempts to retain control over the former Soviet states goes hand in hand with the creation of a number of regional bodies aimed at promoting economic growth and maintaining security in the region. This is also combined with a shared interest in curbing civil society and muting the opinions of dissenters as a way of maintaining power. Eka argues that all these together, as well as Russia’s continued support for some of the most fragile countries in Central Asia, aligned with longing for the certainties of Soviet rule, and most importantly, the shared practice of law, make it easy for laws to travel and for worst practices to be shared. Joanna Hoare and Maisy Weicherding write that NGOs in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have faced an increasingly hostile environment over the last two years. This is due in part to authorities in these countries adopting tactics borrowed from Russia, namely a combination of concerted efforts to smear and delegitimise NGOs as ‘foreign agents’, legislation designed to control and restrict their activities and sources of funding, and the punitive use of tax and other bureaucratic inspections. That said, to get the full picture as to why civic space in these countries is shrinking, it is important to look beyond Russia’s influence. Melissa Hooper writes that Russia has begun to incorporate a ‘traditional values’ agenda as part of its foreign policy platform. Coinciding with policy developments within Russia, it has pushed other nations to enact laws restricting the rights of LGBT persons, limiting information available to minors about ‘non-traditional relationships’, and protecting the rights of parents over their children.  We see evidence of this pressure on the borders of the EU (Armenia, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia), where governments must decide whether to ally themselves with the values of democracy and individual rights and accept support from the EU, or implement policies that limit LGBT rights and Western influence in the name of protecting the ‘traditional family’. Russian messaging has exacerbated this divide by describing it as a ‘culture war’ between traditional values protected by Russia and the EU’s ‘Gayropa, where foreign policy centers on hedonistic policies that prioritise gay marriage. So far, all of these countries have rejected propaganda laws put forward in late 2012 and 2013, immediately after Russia passed its own law. Some specifically did so in order to obtain funding from the EU. However, opportunities still exist in this region for Russian influence and ‘traditional family values’ to take hold – especially in Georgia and Ukraine where local orthodox churches wield great political power – like the Russian Orthodox Church – and themselves advocate for these policies, and especially where Russian language media holds sway. In Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the combination of a conservative society and a reliance on Russian language media, has led governments to seriously consider propaganda laws and other Russian-style policies. Playing into Russian foreign policy priorities is the historical notion of Russkiy Mir, or the unification of the Russian-speaking world under Russia.  Factors contributing to and supporting Russian leadership in the traditional values sphere are Russia’s control of content in Russian language media and the development of relationships between Russian political conservatives and the Russian Orthodox Church and conservative politicians and religious figures in the West, especially the United States. Kate Levine argues that the ability of civil society organisations to seek, secure and use resources, including foreign funding, is a fundamental component of their right to exist and effectively operate. International human rights bodies have affirmed this right. However, in recent years, there has been an alarming increase in the number of states seeking to use the law to severely limit access to foreign funding for NGOs. Evidence of this trend has been documented globally, as well as in the former Soviet Union. This article focuses on repressive laws designed to restrict access to foreign funding and ultimately stifle the work of independent civil society in Russia and Azerbaijan, and attempts to introduce similar provisions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. The implementation of these laws has made it significantly more difficult for local human rights NGOs to survive, and has required them to divert valuable time and resources away from their core work of protecting human rights. Further, some foreign donors have either been banned from operating locally, or have chosen to withdraw for fear of being found to violate the repressive national legal framework. This article highlights some of the consequences of these laws, the reactions of some of the affected NGOs and international organisations, and considers the possible motives of the states concerned. Katie Morris argues that freedom of expression is in decline in most states of the former Soviet Union, although the extent and focus of repression differs according to country. The Ukraine crisis precipitated a renewed assault on freedom of expression: having already brought traditional media to heel, authoritarian leaders are now focusing on extinguishing the few remaining spaces for free expression – particularly the internet, frequently justifying their actions on the grounds of national security. This essay explores how increasingly restrictive legislative environments and the expansion of digital technologies, particularly surveillance, are being used to censor expression. New restrictions do not just target well known journalists or dissidents, but increasingly ordinary people, often expressing themselves online, creating a chilling effect that encourages self-censorship. Michael Hamilton examines the sharing of bad practices in the legal regulation of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in ‘hybrid regimes’ in the former Soviet Union. Whilst noting persistent concerns about the excessive use of force by law enforcement officials, and repeated failures to adequately protect assembly participants from violent counter-demonstrators, the essay focuses instead on three recurring characteristics of the legal framework: excessive discretion conferred on regulatory authorities (powers); notification requirements that are tantamount to authorisation requirements (procedures); and the imposition of disproportionate sanctions for relatively minor infractions of the law (penalties). Although there are clearly regional exceptions, the essay argues that there has broadly been a failure to embed the principle of proportionality in the legal framework governing the right to freedom of peaceful assembly (especially in relation to these powers, procedures and penalties). It is suggested that this failure is underpinned by a regulatory mind-set focused primarily on the management and control of assemblies, rather than their facilitation. Thomas Ambrosio writes that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) purports to be a broad-based international organisation formally tasked with promoting multilateral cooperation within Central Asia. While it has done this by creating institutional links between its members and ensuring that that the region does not become an arena for geopolitical competition between Russia and China, a deeper look at this organisation illustrates that, at a fundamental level, it is dedicated to preserving the political status quo in Central Asia. This essay examines forty-eight SCO documents and utilises social network analysis to depict the legal framework which has emerged since the SCO's formation in 2001. It shows that authoritarian practices are deeply embedded in the core of this framework under the guise of combating the so-called 'Three Evils' of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Consequently, those factors resisting democratisation at the domestic level are reinforced by a non-democratic regional order.[1] The Baltic states, annexed by the Soviets during the Second World War, provide a clear exception to the rule as their transition into broadly stable democracies and EU member states has been so dramatic as to place them outside the scope of this publication.[2] Not that Russia should be restricted from providing support to organizations in the region, simply that appropriate rules on NGOs should apply to both Western and Russian backed organisations equally. It is worth noting that the recent decision to dramatically water down the restrictive provisions from the Kyrgyz anti-NGO legislation took place after its initial proponents, legislators strong Russian links, were not returned in Parliamentary elections . Anna Lelik, Kyrgyzstan: Sting Removed From Foreign Agents Bill, Eurasianet, April 2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/78261[3] See for example, The Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters,  http://nbe.gov.ge/files/documents/MINSKI.pdf[4] As documented in Adam Hug (ed.), Shelter from the storm?, Foreign Policy Centre, April 2014, http://fpc.org.uk/publications/shelter-from-the-storm[5] Joanna Lillis, Journalists Fret as Russian Media Swamps Kazakhstan, November 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70971[6] Yet to be ratified.[7] For more see Dr Rilka Dragneva and Dr Kataryna Wolczuk, The Eurasian Economic Union - What kind of alternative to the Eastern Partnership, in Adam Hug (ed.), Trouble in the Neighbourhood, Foreign Policy Centre, February 2015,  http://fpc.org.uk/publications/trouble-in-the-neighbourhood[8] Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Russia’s Foreign Agent law: Violating human rights and attacking civil society, June 2014,http://nhc.no/filestore/Publikasjoner/Policy_Paper/NHC_PolicyPaper_6_2014_Russiasforeignagentlaw.pdf[9] Contact.Az, Mehdiyev Accuses US of ‘Color Revolution’, December 2014,http://www.contact.az/docs/2014/Politics/120400098728en.htm#.VMaWXS7QCjG For the full text in Russian visit http://www.1news.az/chronicle/20141203110515850.html[10] There are echoes of the 1998-2003 UK legislation ‘Section 28’ which prohibited local authorities, public bodies  and schools from taking measures that would ‘intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality’, which though without creating a criminal offense restricted the ability of schools and other organisations debating issues relating to LGBTI issues. The Russian legislation however takes this prohibition to society as a whole rather than just about the use of public money.[11] Human Rights First, Spread of Russian-Style Propaganda Laws, March 2016, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/spread-russian-style-propaganda-laws EU member state Lithuania is the only state in the wider region to recently pass and maintain such legislation.[12] Caucasus Research Resource Centre, Attitudes towards homosexuality to in the South Caucasus, July 2013, http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/attitudes-towards-homosexuality-in.html[13] Adam Hug (ed.), Institutionally blind? International organisations and human rights abuses in the former Soviet Union, Foreign Policy Centre, February 2016, http://fpc.org.uk/publications/institutionallyblind[14] Most recently British Home Secretary Theresa May, a front-runner in the long-race to replace David Cameron as UK Prime Minister, recently called for Britain to leave the convention and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.[15] Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia, January 2014, Oxford University Press. EU member states including the UK were used for over flight and refueling purposes as part of this programme.[16] As documented in the FPC’s 2014 Shelter from the Storm publication.[17] Richard Weitz, Uzbekistan: A Peek Inside an SCO Anti-Terrorism Centerhttp://www.eurasianet.org/node/65960[18] INCYDER Information Security Discussed at the Dushanbe Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, October 2014, https://ccdcoe.org/information-security-discussed-dushanbe-summit-shanghai-cooperation-organisation.html [post_title] => Introduction: Sharing worst practice in the former Soviet Union [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => introduction-sharing-worst-practice-former-soviet-union [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-14 14:12:41 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-14 14:12:41 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=2319 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[25] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 2340 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2016-05-24 09:30:57 [post_date_gmt] => 2016-05-24 09:30:57 [post_content] => The findings of this publication show that there are clear similarities in the types of repressive practices being undertaken by countries across the former Soviet Union. First and foremost this is a function of the nature of their domestic political systems, whether they be authoritarian, semi-authoritarian or troubled democracies, they all feature ruling elites with at least some interest in extracting rents for themselves and their allies from their political dominance. Shared concerns from popular protest and current economic weakness to the age of the regime leaders are at the heart of encouraging similar legislation and forms of repression. All contributors to the publication agree that the current situation in the region is a mix of different influences: Russian and other neighbours’ encouragement to draft repressive legislation (either through bilateral diplomacy or supported by regional instructions), the autonomous emulation of worst practice (building on both regional and global trends) or self-generated bad practice (building on their Soviet legacy and current authoritarian systems). The balance differs in each country in the region depending on local circumstances and their strategic outlook. Russia is not the author of all the repressive legislation in the region but it has significant direct influence and helps shape and promote an emerging conservative regional values agenda, alongside what David Lewis describes as the ‘Moscow Consensus’ of a strong commitment to state sovereignty, that is attractive to repressive regimes. Russia’s approach mimics Western structures and techniques but combines them with anti-Western discourse, deep media manipulation, management of civil society and a fusion of the political and economic elite, often through the families of the President or senior ministers. Russia promotes these ideas effectively through its significant regional Russian media penetration and through proxy groups, from NGOs to the Orthodox Church, promoting a conservative, traditional values agenda that it argues is more in keeping with the history and culture of the region, than Western alternatives. Though there may be some encouragement for repressive action through regional institutions and bilateral diplomacy, regimes in the region will seek ideas for legislation and practice that help sustain their political and structural control, templates of which are willingly provided by Russia and other countries in the region. For example, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan need no direction from Russia or indeed China to clamp down on dissent but remain open to new methods of how to do so. For the most part regional institutions act to reinforce the status quo, promoting authoritarian cultural norms rather than developing rule based systems, echoing their domestic political environments where informal power structures have influence far in excess of codified law and formal procedures. Such structures reinforce and expand the primacy of national sovereignty narratives and frame challenges to a regime as a threat to the independence of the country. So while there is some ‘sharing of worst practice’ amongst the countries of the former Soviet Union, both formally through regional institutions and through Russian diplomacy. However it is authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes informally collaborating and perhaps more importantly learning from each other, about methods that can help them consolidate their own power, that are primarily driving the spate of similar looking repressive legislation and practice that spreading across the region.Recommendations for international policy makers and civil society 

• Strengthen support for creative and flexible funding streams, through organisations such as the European Endowment for Democracy, given the pressures on NGO funding and traditional grant-making under new legislation in the region;

 

• Protect the future of Russian and local language broadcasting and web resources by the BBC World Service, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and other credible outlets, whilst supporting diaspora media initiatives to facilitate access to independent information and an alternative world view to challenge the ‘Moscow Consensus’;

 

• Reach out to a wider pool of organisations, including trade unions in the region, tackling social welfare and migration issues to help build a wider support base for reform in former Soviet societies and to show that donors share local concerns;

 

• Incentivise further the compliance (and penalise non-compliance) with UN treaties and with the European Convention on Human Rights, supporting these alternative, pre-existing and more positive legal and values models. States in the region should be further encouraged to invite and facilitate access for UN and Council of Europe Special Rapporteurs and specialist bodies such as the OSCE-ODIHR Assembly Monitoring project. Where their recommendations are implemented this should be rewarded;

 

• Reassess and strengthen schemes providing legislative, legal and technical support to governments and institutions in the former Soviet Union. There may be potential for further dialogue at a technocratic level with the, somewhat limited, bureaucratic structures of regional organisations such as the CIS, SCO and the emerging EEU, albeit with little hope of short term success. This must be set in the context of recognising the limits of technical programmes in countries that lack a genuine will to reform. Therefore particular effort should be put into Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova where some political incentive exists to achieve change;

 

• Reverse the downgrade of human rights promotion in EU policy towards the former Soviet Union and look at ways to reinvigorate both ‘more for more’ and ‘less for less’ conditionality and the promotion of European soft-power. Ensure new agreements, such as the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Kazakhstan or a possible agreement with Azerbaijan are not ratified without improvements in their human rights situations. Without further compromising on principle, the EU should work to reduce the geo-politicisation of Eurasia’s politics, showing that engagement with the EU and ties with Russia need not be mutually exclusive;

 

• Reform European and US behaviour by avoiding complicity in torture and unlawful actions in the fight against terrorism and preventing abuse of shared international institutions. There is a particular need to tackle corruption, money laundering and tax evasion, including the use of Western capitals such as London by post-Soviet elites. Such efforts can help rebuild Western credibility as a positive role model for change and encouraging the sharing of best practice.

[post_title] => Sharing Worst Practice Conclusion: Shared interests, similar practices [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => sharing-worst-practice-conclusion-shared-interests-similar-practices [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-14 14:57:00 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-14 14:57:00 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=2340 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[26] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 661 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2013-10-25 10:13:21 [post_date_gmt] => 2013-10-25 10:13:21 [post_content] => The BRICS and the Gulf states have been at the centre of FCO efforts, with concerns on human rights sometimes dialled back to promote business engagement and strategic collaboration, while in a number of embassies staff roles were switched to help deliver the UK’s prosperity agenda.Very clearly domestic political considerations are now shaping relations with the EU, despite the first 18 months of coalition when the FCO managed to keep a lid on some of the main divisions on Europe, with the ‘referendum lock’ the sole bone thrown to the backbenches. Beneath the current political rhetoric and referendum debate, over the last year FCO officials have been working across government to coordinate the politically and diplomatically perilous Balance of Competences Review. The FCO is trying to balance a series of competing tensions. It needs to deliver something that can be used by the Conservatives as part of the intellectual basis for a shopping list of post-2015 renegotiation demands, while not actually delivering such a list in order to maintain Coalition unity. It must placate the governments of other member states who are concerned about the purpose of the review while dodging flack from the centre-right commentariat about perceived institutional pro-European bias. Despite being placed in an unenviable position, early signs are that civil servants are delivering as thoughtful and measured a process as possible that will leave it to the politicians to divine and define the political significance of its findings.Effectively using the still impressive diplomatic arsenal at the FCO’s disposal can make the difference between success and failure. One of the defining differences between Cameron’s relative success in the 2013 EU budget negotiations and his attempted veto in December 2011 (a short-term political success but not a diplomatic one) was that rather than turning up with a negotiating strategy formed at the last minute without a chance to find potential allies, the FCO was able to do its job properly, working with EU partners (most notably the Germans) to forge a common position. A further manifestation of the Europe debate can be seen in attempts to boost the FCO’s international reach through a tie-up with Canada over co-locating new embassies. This was poorly received by European partners as it was seen to be rejecting the opportunity to work more closely on the diplomatic front with the EU’s European External Action Service (EEAS), which has a presence in 59 more non-EU countries than the Canadians, and other member states on consular activity. Similarly the UK has been very wary about expanding the remit of EEAS into new areas, committed as it is to preventing perceived competence creep. So far the FCO is managing to make its way through a challenging period of cutbacks, including the damaging changes to the World Service, with its capability mostly intact and perhaps its status vis-à-vis DfID increased under the Coalition. But while Europe and the economy dominate the domestic political debate, these demands will shape the actions of the FCO and the practice of UK foreign policy.The original article is available in the House Magazine's Guide to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. [post_title] => FCO in focus [post_excerpt] => The FCO originally seemed destined to be a relative backwater for the Coalition – despite the presence of a Conservative Big Beast in William Hague – with Government priorities clearly focused on the economy and the domestic agenda. To that end, greater impetus has been given to the FCO’s role in supporting British trade promotion efforts. While never far from the minds of any British government, initial scruples around repeating the old ‘batting for Britain’ approach were soon put on the back burner with the Africa Minister turning up early on in Sudan with a trade delegation despite ICC indictments and the similar slightly awkward appearance of David Cameron in post-Arab Spring Cairo with business people in tow. [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => fco-in-focus [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2019-06-21 16:29:45 [post_modified_gmt] => 2019-06-21 16:29:45 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/fco-in-focus/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[27] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 645 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2013-02-14 14:15:17 [post_date_gmt] => 2013-02-14 14:15:17 [post_content] => This challenging environment not only makes the task of Catherine Ashton's new European External Action Service more difficult - it means it is more necessary than ever to help the EU make an impact on the increasingly crowded world stage. The Foreign Policy Centre paper Europe in the world: can EU foreign policy make an impact? sets out a range of different expert views about how the union's outward looking institutions are faring - and some of the key challenges the EU faces in making a difference in the neighbourhood with its key strategic partners.The two years since the founding of the EEAS have seen the new service get off to a rocky start as it struggled to cope with the logistical challenges of building a cohesive new service out of disparate components in an atmosphere where existing players, such as the European Commission, were keen to ensure they still had a key role to play in external affairs. However, there are signs that the organisational side of the EEAS is now beginning to make some headway as staff and new ways of working begin to bed in.Given the challenging international environment, the EEAS is rightly focusing on how it improves EU performance with strategic partners such as the BRICS and the United States. Here, it needs to balance the differing needs of member states; assisting the national diplomacy of larger countries and helping the smaller ones get on the radar. To do this, it needs to set a limited number of strategic goals for its own work while providing an effective platform to assist national diplomacy. The second key impact area for European foreign policy is in its neighbourhood, both eastern and southern, where it has an opportunity to take a greater lead; particularly where bilateral interest is weak. There is scope for greater emphasis on ensuring agreements are upheld by partner countries, particularly in respect to human rights and democratic values - where the EU needs a more consistent approach.The Lisbon reforms and the development of the EEAS had the key goal of enabling the EU to take swifter and more coordinated international action so that it can punch its weight in the world. While some progress has been made there are two key components to further progress. First, getting all the key elements of the union's machinery facing in the same direction is key. This could mean deepening existing efforts to coordinate activities between the commission and the EEAS, giving Ashton a greater say over the commission's external decision making - particularly in Europe's neighbourhood. A formal deputy for Ashton may also help spread the workload and mute complaints when she cannot be in two places at the same time.The second task is to get all of the member states on the same page. While the idea of certain member states, particularly Britain, giving up their veto over further aspects of foreign policy is unlikely to get very far - developing existing efforts to bring about consensus by cooperation and effective diplomatic work may bear more fruit. Where one or two member states are not onboard with a proposed common foreign and security policy initiative supported by a clear majority of member states, developing the existing powers of abstention may help cut the Gordian knot without resorting to new majority voting powers. Currently a 'constructive abstention' binds the hands of member states not to do anything that might be seen to contradict the EU's actions, creating both a practical problem if member states disagree with the policy and a principal one if they disagree that it is a matter for the union.Developing a form of non-binding abstention, initially on an informal basis prior to any future treaty change, may help avoid always moving at the speed of the slowest member while protecting national sovereignty. Ultimately, as with a number of EU issues, what can make a real difference is continuing to improve the competence - organisational performance – of the union's external-facing activities rather than simply providing Europe with more competences or new powers. If Europe wants to make an impact on the world stage, both member states and EU institutions need to work constructively with the EEAS to help it deliver.This was first published on Public Service Europe [post_title] => The EEAS needs cooperation from member states [post_excerpt] => When leaders first floated the idea of creating a single diplomatic service for the European Union - merging the roles of the member states' foreign affairs chief (the high representative for common foreign and security policy)with the European commissioner for external relations - they were not expecting the turbulent times we live in today. The eurozone crisis, disagreement among member states over the future of the European project and the rapid rise of competing centres of power in the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa - and beyond have all somewhat taken the shine off the EU's international prestige. [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-eeas-needs-cooperation-from-member-states [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-27 14:20:09 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-27 14:20:09 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/the-eeas-needs-cooperation-from-member-states/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[28] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 625 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2012-01-04 13:37:51 [post_date_gmt] => 2012-01-04 13:37:51 [post_content] => The UK has a number of on-going goals at the UN, none of which have much chance of an early resolution. For example, expanding the permanent representation on the Security Council to more accurately reflect the global balance of power in the world today rather than that of 1945 has been the policy of successive UK governments. Yet the practical challenges remain as intractable as ever. Adding further nations with veto powers would make an already dysfunctional body almost entirely unworkable. The main alternative, supported by the UK, is creating new (second-class) permanent members, always in the room but without a veto, with the most likely candidates being: India, Brazil, Japan, Germany (the G4 group) and an African seat for which South Africa and Nigeria would compete. Membership for each of those countries would spark a reaction from neighbourhood rivals, some of whom form part of the ‘uniting for consensus group’ opposed to any fundamental reform that cannot command overwhelming support, while the lack of a veto would still rankle.Britain’s sensitivity over its continued membership of the P5 will continue to guide its actions - pushing for reform while resisting attempts to merge the UK and French seats under an EU umbrella, an unthinkable move given Conservative antipathy to the concept of an EU foreign policy, rather than just wildly implausible as before.The Human Rights Council is a much maligned body, noted as often for the dubious human rights credentials of some of its members (voted for by regional neighbours) and its focus on the Israel/ Palestine conflict as its wider contribution to global human rights practice. In a small victory for common sense, Libya was kicked off the council after the conflict broke out this year but this still begs the question what it (and others such as Saudi Arabia) was doing there in the first place. The council’s new(ish) Universal Periodic Review at least gives all member states the chance to cross-examine countries on their human rights records and here the UK can play an important role in pushing for greater direct involvement of the voluntary sector, both within countries under review and internationally. The UK also needs to push for stronger action against those countries that refuse to grant access to the Human Rights Council’s special rapporteurs. The UK can continue to push for wider support of the Responsibility to Protect principles, building on the arguments accepted at the UN in the Libya case, although Russian and Chinese scepticism will continue to limit its broader applicability.The findings of DfID’s recent Multilateral Aid Review effectively articulated an agenda for reform of UN specialised agencies by identifying areas of organisational weakness and explicitly linking funding to performance. This approach has led to the withdrawal of funding from four UN agencies, including the politicised and contentious decision to cease UK funding of the ILO, while two others were put in ‘special measures’.The UN can be an infuriating institution but is an essential one in which Britain has traditionally played an important role. Yet, there is little evidence to suggest there is scope for rapid progress. For example, while political change in the Arab World may lead to new democracies, they are unlikely to be much more supportive of Western-style interventionism than their predecessors. The UK should continue to work diligently behind the scenes to achieve gradual progress. Sadly there is little scope for Britain to successfully spend significant political capital to ‘spearhead’ a major campaign for UN reform.First published in Politics First Magazine Issue 4 (http://www.politicsfirst.org.uk/2011/should-britain-be-spearheading-a-campaign-to-reform-the-un/) [post_title] => Should Britain be spearheading a campaign to reform the UN? [post_excerpt] => As the coalition government (at least in its Conservative majority) on balance appears to show a greater preference than its predecessor for bilateral rather than multilateral approaches to international engagement, it is perhaps time for a brief re-appraisal of Britain’s approach and objectives at the largest multilateral grouping of them all, the UN. [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => should-britain-be-spearheading-a-campaign-to-reform-the-un [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-27 15:16:22 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-27 15:16:22 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/should-britain-be-spearheading-a-campaign-to-reform-the-un/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[29] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 617 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2011-09-08 14:06:21 [post_date_gmt] => 2011-09-08 14:06:21 [post_content] => The recent essay collection, The new British politics and Europe: Conflict or cooperation?, co-published by the Foreign Policy Centre puts forward some ideas in answer to this question. Put simply, the real challenge for pro-Europeans is to address the EU as it is, warts and all, and develop a campaign that seeks to build public understanding and acceptance of the principle of European engagement through persistent, practical examples of how action at an EU level can address problems that are relevant both to people's everyday lives and to the important domestic political issues of the day. To fill the void left by the 2005 collapse of Britain in Europe, what is needed is a pro-European organisation in the same mould as eurosceptic group Open Europe. That would be a dynamic pressure group which is both pragmatic and reformist but which can promote the basic central premise that the EU can be (and often is) a platform for solving transnational issues that matter to Britain, while understanding that Europe isn't the answer in and of itself. Pro-Europeans need to adopt both the same guerrilla warfare tactics used by their opponents and channel the energy of sympathetic bloggers and other independent researchers, giving a sense of energy and drive that has been sorely lacking on the pro-side of the argument in recent years.Amongst some in the wider community of pro-Europeans, there remains a desire for a 'big vehicle' to get behind to mobilise public opinion in a more positive direction. This must stop. In the UK, such a vehicle is not going to come naturally and this desire c lead to a dangerous flirtation with the idea of an 'in or out' referendum, something that would create more heat than light and would be unlikely to settle the issue for any great length of time - an engineered crisis that would risk becoming a real one in today's volatile political environment.Mainstream pro-Europeans must clearly show that they are committed to a Europe of nation states that pragmatically work together to face common problems. The flirtations with federalism by some more ardent europhiles should be knocked on the head. Pro-Europeans must at all times show that they understand that sovereignty and legitimacy flow from the people alone, up to the various tiers of government and that the goal of politicians is to assess the best level at which to manage political issues on behalf of their populaces. Subsidiarity, Subsidiarity, Subsidiarity.Continually complaining about the eurosceptic bias in the print media isn't going to get anyone very far. No matter how effective a pro-European campaign may become, there will always be more negative stories about EU activities than positive ones, and this is not in and of itself linked to the anti-European sentiments of a handful of newspaper proprietors. It is fairly simple; the EU is, in effect, a tier of government. We do not express surprise that press coverage of domestic politics or government action tends to focus on the comparatively few areas of controversy rather than the majority of cases where it goes about its day to day business. To be honest there are few people who are more intrigued by puff pieces than they are by incisive critiques. To place stories about the EU's ability to solve important cross-border challenges, it remains essential to spell out the nature of the problems it is looking to tackle in fairly explicit detail in order to set the scene for how action at a European level might help.The British public is never going to love the EU. Just as with any other level of UK government, there will always be a degree of inherent scepticism about the institution, as befits our national character. So the goal for British pro-Europeans must be to finally gain British public acceptance of the EU as part of the furniture of UK governance, shifting the focus to the content of EU action and where it should do more and where it should do less.September 2011 Originally published at the <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/adam-hug/getting-britains-proeurop_b_944735.html Huffington Post UK> [post_title] => Getting Britain's Pro-Europeans off the Floor and Fighting Back [post_excerpt] => It's difficult to think of a more tricky time to support Britain's continued active participation in the European Union. The EU's standing has rarely been lower in the minds of the UK public, with only 27 % of people believing our membership has been broadly beneficial for the country, with 60% disagreeing. Turmoil in the Eurozone has put a severe strain on the EU and the UK coalition government, divided over the issue, is content to sit on the side-lines and keep the EU off the domestic agenda, pleasing neither Conservative backbenchers nor pro-Europeans. Even some longstanding keepers of the flame for greater British involvement in the EU, such as Martin Kettle and Sir Stephen Wall seem to have thrown in the towel. So what is a pro-European to do? [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => getting-britains-pro-europeans-off-the-floor-and-fighting-back [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-27 15:17:08 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-27 15:17:08 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/getting-britains-pro-europeans-off-the-floor-and-fighting-back/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[30] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 816 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2011-04-06 16:48:47 [post_date_gmt] => 2011-04-06 16:48:47 [post_content] => 2010 stands as a landmark year in the history of Kazakhstan and for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It will be the first time a Central Asian nation takes the leadership role of a major international political organisation, but also Kazakhstan will be the first non-democracy to become the OSCE's Chairman-in-Office. Kazakhstan will be under the international spotlight to an extent it has not seen since independence. Against that backdrop the Foreign Policy Centre is publishing a series of three detailed background papers assessing a number of key issues in Kazakhstan that will be followed by a pamphlet. The first paper, focusing on human rights and democracy, is now available to download. [post_title] => Kazakhstan at a Crossroads: Human Rights and Democracy [post_excerpt] => 2010 stands as a landmark year in the history of Kazakhstan and for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It will be the first time a Central Asian nation takes the leadership role of a major international political organisation, but also Kazakhstan will be the first non-democracy to become the OSCE's Chairman-in-Office. Kazakhstan will be under the international spotlight to an extent it has not seen since independence. Against that backdrop the Foreign Policy Centre is publishing a series of three detailed background papers assessing a number of key issues in Kazakhstan that will be followed by a pamphlet. The first paper, focusing on human rights and democracy, is now available to download. [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => kazakhstan-at-a-crossroads-human-rights-and-democracy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-27 15:32:10 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-27 15:32:10 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/kazakhstan-at-a-crossroads-human-rights-and-democracy/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[31] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 812 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2011-04-06 11:48:59 [post_date_gmt] => 2011-04-06 11:48:59 [post_content] => In the second report in our three paper Kazakhstan at a Crossroads series supported by the Civil Activity Fund, Adam Hug explores some of Kazakhstan's recent economic problems and the challenges the country faces reforming its economic governance for the benefit of citizens and international investors alike. The report looks at issues including the politicisation of corruption, resource nationalism and internet restrictions. It argues that continued engagement with Kazakhstan must address fundamental governance concerns as well as short-term economic gains. [post_title] => Kazakhstan at a Crossroads: Governance, Corruption & International Investment [post_excerpt] => In the second report in our three paper Kazakhstan at a Crossroads series supported by the Civil Activity Fund, Adam Hug explores some of Kazakhstan's recent economic problems and the challenges the country faces reforming its economic governance for the benefit of citizens and international investors alike. The report looks at issues including the politicisation of corruption, resource nationalism and internet restrictions. It argues that continued engagement with Kazakhstan must address fundamental governance concerns as well as short-term economic gains. [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => kazakhstan-at-a-crossroads-governance-corruption-international-investment [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-27 15:19:11 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-27 15:19:11 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/kazakhstan-at-a-crossroads-governance-corruption-international-investment/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[32] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 606 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2011-03-22 14:31:10 [post_date_gmt] => 2011-03-22 14:31:10 [post_content] => This time, and at subsequent protests, former President Levon Ter-Petrossian’s activists were joined by unexpected reinforcements from the Heritage party, which had provided the sole independent voice in parliament before declaring a boycott due to the ruling coalition’s new electoral pact.Despite, or rather because of, the recent turbulence, it is imperative that the EU plays a greater role in supporting Armenia towards a more democratic and stable future. In December 2010, President Serzh Sargsyan committed his party and government to the pursuit of European values and standards. The EU needs to offer him support in this endeavour. But it must be prepared to hold Armenia to account if it fails to deliver promised reforms. So far, despite the many worthwhile projects the EU supports in Armenia, its work is often lower profile than comparable engagement by Russia and the US. Europe needs to show more clearly to the Armenian public that it is actively engaged and applying pressure for reform.The Foreign Policy Centre's Spotlight on Armenia sets out ideas about what has gone wrong in Armenia and how the international community can help Armenians to fix it. The report identifies three key areas of domestic reform where EU pressure could really help deliver progress.Firstly, there is a need to open up a media environment where television channels are all in pro-government hands and the independent station A1+ has been repeatedly refused a licence, despite the best efforts of the European Court of Human Rights, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and international pressure groups. Perhaps uniquely, Armenia’s planned switch to digital TV will result in fewer channels being available than at present, further reducing opportunities for pluralism. Ending the government’s restrictive approach to frequency allocation and presidential appointments to the board of the TV regulators are important first steps to increasing media freedom in Armenia.In the courts, some judges remain too open to pressure from the executive and powerful individuals to achieve the desired result in politically or economically sensitive cases. Bribery is widespread, particularly in civil cases, while judicial salaries remain among the lowest in the former Soviet Union. With an acquittal rate well below one percent, the application of the rule of law is weak and at times arbitrary. Again, a mixture of EU pressure and support needs to be applied to curtail the president’s role in judicial selection, to raise salaries and increase the transparency of disciplinary procedures that would help end Armenia’s perceived lack of judicial independence and increase public trust in the rule of law being upheld.Improving Armenia’s democratic processes are essential if future elections are not to be marked by the problems of 2008, the source of much of the perceived credibility problems of the current government. Ending the direct appointment by the president of regional governors, who are believed to interfere in the electoral process, would be beneficial in its own right. But work also needs to be done on enabling a wider group of election observers to be involved and on reforming the electoral commission. The international community has a key role to play here, particularly in the run-up to any early parliamentary elections that may be coming up later this year where the early and widespread deployment of OSCE observers will be essential in establishing credibility.The EU’s influence in the region is not helped by the recent removal of the role of the special representative for the south Caucasus that, irrespective of an organisational rationale within the European External Action Service, sends an unfortunate signal that the region is less of a priority for Brussels. This perception will need to be countered in the near future to ensure that any reputational damage is not permanent. In order for Armenia to move further down the road towards the stated goal of European standards, Brussels should more clearly link progress on the association agreement and the incentives of a "deep and comprehensive free trade area" pact, visa liberalisation and increased aid to identifiable progress against the democracy and good governance benchmarks the EU has set for Armenia.This was first published by E!Sharp at http://www.esharp.eu/Web-specials/Ensuring-Armenia-meets-its-commitment-to-European-values [post_title] => Ensuring Armenia meets its commitment to European values [post_excerpt] => Bright future? Europe has diverse incentives to deploy to help consolidate democracy in Yerevan.Over the past few weeks, Armenia has experienced a level of political turbulence not seen since 2008, as large crowds gathered to commemorate the third anniversary of the March 1 post-election protests that were strongly suppressed by the Armenian government, a move fiercely condemned by the international community.[post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => ensuring-armenia-meets-its-commitment-to-european-values [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-27 15:17:39 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-27 15:17:39 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/ensuring-armenia-meets-its-commitment-to-european-values/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[33] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 800 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2011-01-04 17:07:16 [post_date_gmt] => 2011-01-04 17:07:16 [post_content] => This third paper in the Kazakhstan at a Crossroads series explores some of Kazakhstan's international relationships with the EU, Russia and China. [post_title] => Kazakhstan at a Crossroads: Kazakhstan and the world [post_excerpt] => This third paper in the Kazakhstan at a Crossroads series explores some of Kazakhstan's international relationships with the EU, Russia and China. [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => kazakhstan-at-a-crossroads-kazakhstan-and-the-world [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-27 15:18:17 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-27 15:18:17 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/kazakhstan-at-a-crossroads-kazakhstan-and-the-world/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[34] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 600 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2010-12-16 10:52:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2010-12-16 10:52:48 [post_content] => First, it is imperative to bridge the planning divide that sees so many Arab majority areas either unrecognized or with obsolete official plans. Ensuring that every community has current and accurate plans would help ease the dramatic shortage of housing available to the Arab community, and end the impasse whereby unapproved building takes place to meet local demand at the risk of prosecution and demolition.It would also help encourage business development by making investment more secure and facilitate government funding.Previous government initiatives to rectify this problem have stalled, so it is to be hoped new initiatives by the Authority for Economic Development of the Arab Sector have more success and are the start of much more work in this area. If needed, the EU or European Investment Bank could provide financial support, while extra capacity could be mobilized among planners internationally to help boost local capacity and support the work of local NGOs already active in this area.The government’s rejection of the 39 rabbis’ recent missive is to be welcomed, but words alone are not enough. It must take concerted action to ensure equal access to housing and land. This would involve a major housebuilding program in Arab-majority areas, and further reform of the allocation practices of the Israel Lands Administration, Jewish National Fund and housing providers.Tackling the inequality in the provision of discretionary state development funding, where Arab municipalities receive less than 5 percent of the total, and ending the 32% gap in social welfare spending will be essential components of a strategy to reduce deprivation among Arab communities, whose members are more than three times more likely than Jews to live below the poverty line.IN THE workplace, having missed its 2008 target of achieving 10% representation by the Arab community in the civil service by a 4% margin, it is imperative that the government redouble its efforts to achieve this proportion by the new 2012 deadline.In the private sector, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission can play an important role, but it needs to be able to expand its capacity and become more independent.The case remains for an official equality commission with a wider remit to promote equality across society through education and advocacy. Although such bodies are common in other democracies, an Israeli version seems a long way off. Nevertheless, partnership work across society with equality bodies in other countries can still make a positive contribution, as is already the case between the EEOC and the Northern Ireland Equality Commission.In the Knesset, recent attempts at discriminatory legislation have further undermined trust in the political system among members of the Arab community.The extremely low percentage of Arab-Palestinian and Beduin citizens voting for mainstream parties in 2009 should have been a warning to the political class about the polarization of its politics, but the current coalition has been taking forward issues that were once at the fringes.Moderate forces in political life must firmly reject measures that inflame community tensions, limiting free speech and legitimate debate about the country’s future.The EU and other international partners must be similarly robust in their opposition to attempts to restrict their financial support for NGOs in this sector that would be in breach of the commitments made in the EU-Israel Association Agreement and Action Plan.The need for robust debate about how to deliver equality for the Arab community must not be abused to provide fuel for extremist attempts to undermine either the country or any of its citizens. Many of these important issues have been relevant for decades, and it is deeply unfortunate that Israel did not take the opportunity provided by the Or Commission more than seven years ago to address them.Israel is not alone in facing challenges between majority and minority communities, so it is essential that progressive forces both here and beyond work together, sharing best ideas about how to move forward.The work of the US and UK Jewish community task forces on Arab issues can help the international community engage in an informed and supportive manner. In partnership, we must redouble our efforts to bring about a future where the pledge of Israel’s founders to give its Arab community the rights of “full and equal citizens” can be fulfilled.This was an Op-Ed article in the Jerusalem Post on Thursday 16th December http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=199597 [post_title] => Full and Equal? [post_excerpt] => For too long, the challenges facing Israel’s Arab citizens have been obscured for international observers by the all-too-pressing concerns of the conflict. But this is gradually changing due to recognition of the growing tensions between the country’s Jewish and Arab communities. It is against this backdrop that the Foreign Policy Center has published its new report, “Full and Equal Citizens: How to deliver equality for Israel’s Arab community,” as part of our work on minority rights across the world. It makes a number of recommendations. [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => full-and-equal [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-27 15:34:27 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-27 15:34:27 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/full-and-equal/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[35] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 592 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2010-02-01 08:27:24 [post_date_gmt] => 2010-02-01 08:27:24 [post_content] => In the slightly warmer climes of the Balkans the two pillars of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia, are making their own unsteady paths towards EU membership. Just before Christmas Serbia’s pro-European President Boris Tadic formally requested membership, that once signed off by the council will give the green light for the accession process to rumble into action. Alongside the usual requirements for regulatory convergence to meet Serbia has to make progress on two major outstanding issues before it can join the club. Belgrade is still, somewhat unenthusiastically, hunting for two war criminals the former Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic, former President of the civil war era Republic of Serbian Krajina. Furthermore it has still to reconcile itself to Kosovo’s independence, with Tadic reiterating Belgrade’s position that the country remains an integral part of his nation while celebrating Orthodox Christmas in a church in an area of Western Kosovo dominated by the Serb minority. Nevertheless Belgrade now seems to be in an informal race with Ankara to see which of these challenging but critically important accessions can be completed first. Plainer sailing can now be expected for its northern neighbour Croatia after Slovenia lifted objections last year relating to a still on-going border dispute over the Bay of Piran.Back in Brussels, as work is underway putting together the new Commission and readjusting the institutional architecture following the creation of Cathy Ashton’s new position of High Rep, Barosso’s new Commission has put together the responsibilities for the neighbourhood away from the Baroness and into the remit of Enlargement Commissioner designate Stefan Füle. As an enthusiastic supporter of both enlargement and greater engagement with the neighbourhood I should welcome this initiative with open arms. Yet it runs the risk of creating new divided loyalties and responsibilities, with staff taking direction from Füle, yet likely to be part of the future European Action Service run by Ashton, when the whole process was supposed to reduce institutional clutter and overlap. Furthermore while there is considerable merit in strengthening neighbourhood policy to a point where participation in the longer term can act as either a staging ground for, or indeed an alternative to, membership for countries whose membership aspirations remain a distant dream such Ukraine and Georgia, it creates a risk. If not managed carefully, creating a direct continuum between neighbourhood and enlargement policy runs the risk of creating a dumping ground where Turkey’s membership aspirations could yet be parked. [post_title] => Joining the club [post_excerpt] => (First published in BN Magazine http://www.bnmagazine.co.uk ) Joining the EU can be a tricky business, even if you are not a large and Islamic country straddling the continent’s old geographic divide. Brussels is at serious risk of getting mud on the red carpet it rolled out to welcome Iceland, the once fiercely independent banking black hole, into the club, as President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson jeopardized the country’s repayment deal with the UK and Netherlands over the collapse of the Icesave bank by putting it to a public vote in February. With the public less fearful of total economic collapse, the need to appease European member states seems less pressing, with polls showing that voters are likely to reject the deal and are not currently sold on joining the EU, if even if they are happy for negotiations to proceed. [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => joining-the-club [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-27 16:08:46 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-27 16:08:46 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/joining-the-club/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[36] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 756 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2009-09-02 12:38:22 [post_date_gmt] => 2009-09-02 12:38:22 [post_content] => The Foreign Policy Centre made a submission to the UN UPR of Iran on the basis of its two most recent Iran publications 'From Cradle to Coffin: A Report on Child Executions in Iran' and 'A Revolution without Rights: Women, Kurds and Baha'is Searching For Equality in Iran'.The FPC's information featured significantly in the UN Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights summary of stakeholder submissions. Click here to see the UN OHCHR report. [post_title] => The Foreign Policy Centre Submission for the United Nations Universal Periodic Review: Iran [post_excerpt] => The Foreign Policy Centre made a submission to the UN UPR of Iran on the basis of its two most recent Iran publications 'From Cradle to Coffin: A Report on Child Executions in Iran' and 'A Revolution without Rights: Women, Kurds and Baha'is Searching For Equality in Iran'.The FPC's information featured significantly in the UN Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights summary of stakeholder submissions. To see the UN OHCHR report visit: http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session7/IR/A_HRC_WG6_7_IRN_3_E.pdf [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-foreign-policy-centre-submission-for-the-united-nations-universal-periodic-review-iran [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-27 16:14:51 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-27 16:14:51 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/the-foreign-policy-centre-submission-for-the-united-nations-universal-periodic-review-iran/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[37] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 580 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2009-08-12 21:25:45 [post_date_gmt] => 2009-08-12 21:25:45 [post_content] => Following US Vice President Joe Biden’s recent visit and this month’s anniversary of the war with Russia, the international spotlight is briefly back onto Georgia. The country faces an uncertain future. The optimism and excitement generated by the 2003 Rose revolution and the first few years of rapid reform has dissipated. The events of November 2007 on the streets of Tbilisi and August 2008 in Tskhinvali have shaken the West’s previously almost reflexive support for President Mikheil Saakashvili, prompting international soul-searching about the road ahead.Georgia’s decline in the eyes of the international human rights community has been marked by falling rankings in several key areas. According to the 2009 Freedom House “Nations in Transition” report, Georgia today is less democratic than in any period in the last ten years, with rankings for democratic governance, electoral process and civil society all slipping since 2008. The decline in press freedom has been a particularly worrying trend. Reporters without Borders ranked Georgia 120th in its 2008 Press Freedom Index, a significant fall from its 2007 ranking of 66th. Rising international disquiet has mirrored growing domestic discontent, particularly following a severe crackdown on demonstrators in November 2007 when the government used excessive force to disperse largely peaceful demonstrations. The country has been wracked by street protests ever since, most notably again in April 2009.It is important to see Georgia for the country it is rather than the one we would like it to be. Since Saakashvili took over in 2003, Georgia has been one of the better performing transition countries rather than a new fully fledged democracy. With that in mind, the EU’s new Eastern Partnership provides an important opportunity to help Georgia recommit to reform and the transition to full democracy by developing clear human rights benchmarks and conditionality.Under the Eastern Partnership, the EU should develop a more detailed set of benchmarks than currently exist. To assess compliance with these benchmarks, the EU should establish a permanent governance and human rights monitoring team attached to its existing presence in Georgia. This should act as the core around which additional personnel and resources can be attached for election, media and other monitoring purposes during key periods.Ultimately, improvements in the EU’s human rights and governance benchmarks and monitoring should not only deliver increased moral and political pressure for reform, they should also be clearly linked to the economic aid and trading relationships that the EU develops with Georgia. The Eastern Partnership offers countries the opportunity to upgrade their Partnership and Cooperation Agreements to full EU Association Agreements that include “deep and comprehensive free trade agreements”. Such free trade agreements should be contingent on meeting a set level of performance against the human rights and governance benchmarks. Georgia’s need for funds to weather the economic crisis gives the EU another important lever to help ensure significant reform takes place by linking support to improvements in human rights.To supplement the aid and trade incentives and penalties, the EU should re-examine and develop the existing governance facility of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The facility, which provides extra funding to top reforming countries, is a good idea in principle but the size of the “carrot” is just €50 million per year across all ENP countries. For it to have a significant effect, the size of the pot needs to grow substantially.The EU’s role in Georgia goes beyond conditionality and monitoring. It has a vital role in providing technical assistance and political engagement. Both the EU and the US need to work pragmatically with the current government while trying to bridge the divide between Saakashvili and his opponents. The international community must make clear to the opposition that it recognises that the human rights situation in Georgia has deteriorated and that urgent action is being taken to address these issues. At the same time the opposition needs to be told that repeated street protests must not be seen as the means of achieving political change in Georgia.Political engagement must be matched by technical support. The international community should work to strengthen the independence of the media regulator, the Georgian National Communications Commission, by calling for an end to the president’s final approval of commissioners, strengthened parliamentary scrutiny and the addition of international representatives to the commission.In the wake of the withdrawal of the OSCE mission and its role in supporting police reform, the EU needs to step in to fill the gap. There is scope for improvement in police training and oversight, and an independent police complaints authority should be created. Similarly in the legal sphere, representatives of the bar and NGOs should be brought onto the High Council of Justice to enhance judicial independence.The EU has the opportunity to take the lead in supporting reform in Georgia, underpinning its commitment to European values through a monitored mix of incentives and penalties. By doing this it can set the template for the new Eastern Partnership – and become a more effective player in its neighbourhood.“Spotlight on Georgia”, a new pamphlet edited by Adam Hug, was recently published by the Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Keeping Georgia on Europe's mind [post_excerpt] => The EU has the tools to nurture democracy in Tbilisi, argues Adam Hug, FPC Policy Director, in an article for E!Sharp: http://www.esharp.eu/Web-specials/Keeping-Georgia-on-Europe-s-mind [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => keeping-georgia-on-europes-mind [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-27 16:16:51 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-27 16:16:51 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/keeping-georgia-on-europes-mind/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[38] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 553 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2009-01-09 11:07:37 [post_date_gmt] => 2009-01-09 11:07:37 [post_content] => Central to improving the situation in Gaza and across Palestine is the need for an agreement that enables Fatah and Hamas to find a working relationship. For while undoubtedly Hamas has been damaged as a military force in this operation, it remains a political organisation with the support of a significant minority of the Palestinian people with a legacy of its 2006 parliamentary election victory. An agreement would not only bring greater stability to Palestinian society, it would provide the basis for a return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, an essential requirement for long-term peace and security between Israel and the strip. The bitter infighting in the wake of Hamas’ 2006 victory that lead to the schism between Gaza and the West Bank in 2007 was not only the result of inflexible positions of Hamas, Israel and Fatah combined with the clumsy nature of international community’s response which damaged Palestinians economically without undermining Hamas politically, it was also the result of a wider systemic problem within the Palestinian Authority. The PA’s strongly presidential system created for President Arafat, watered down at the height of Second Intifada under intense international pressure to enable Mahmoud Abbas to take up the newly created post of Prime Minister, which in turn provided a platform for Hamas to form a government lacks the necessary separation of powers to operate with competing parties controlling differing institutions. The situation is further complicated by the international negotiating role on behalf of the Palestinian people everywhere being operated through the PLO.There is a pressing need to come up with a successor to the Mecca Agreement that briefly offered hope of reconciliation between the two parties in 2007. The agreement called for the creation of a national unity government and would have allowed Hamas to join the PLO while allowing President Abbas, as Chairman of the PLO to continue negotiating a long-term settlement with Israel on the basis of previous agreements. A new deal might enable fresh presidential and parliamentary elections to be held, a significant bone of contention between the two parties, with Hamas arguing that President Abbas’s term expires at the end of January. It may ultimately lead to Hamas being able to join the PLO, enabling final status negotiations to move forward on behalf of a unified Palestinian platform. An agreement could also limit the level of friction in future situations where the presidency and legislative council are split between the parties.Not only is a new deal an important step to enable an eventual final status agreement, progress is needed now to enable the PA’s return to Gaza in some form which may well be a requirement of any ceasefire agreement. PA control of the border crossings, potentially alongside the return of EU monitors or a new international force if Egyptian and Hamas objections can be somehow be over come, is seen as an essential step to enable the regular opening of Gaza’s borders in the long-term. Furthermore as Israel understandably will not tolerate continued weapons smuggling at Rafah so the PA or international force in coordination with Egypt must have the necessary power to identify and destroy tunnels, which may only achievable in the context of a wider agreement.There is an element of wishful thinking that the incoming Obama administration will completely transform US Middle East policy from its current chilling detachment. However expectations are high that the new administration will be significantly more engaged in pushing for a peace agreement and ensuring Israel pays greater attention to the humanitarian situation facing the Palestinians over the longer-term. Increased diplomatic pressure will be required to shape a political environment where the Israeli public is willing to accept the necessary steps on settlements and Jerusalem.Until the recent conflict Israel seemed destined to elect a hard-line rejectionist block in elections due on February 10th headed by a rejuvenated Likud Party, led by former PM Benyamin Netanyahu one of the key contributors to the failure of the Oslo Process. The current conflict has boosted the chances of the Kadima-Labor coalition although a Likud victory remains the most likely outcome given the continued strength of the religious and ultra-nationalist parties.Obama’s team will have to move hard and fast to make clear that the US will not welcome an Israeli Government that rejects or seeks to indefinitely postpone the creation of a Palestinian State. It must make clear it will not placidly accept further delay in reaching a final status agreement based on the ‘Clinton Parameters’ established in the final days of the last Democratic administration.Although the Israeli public does not take direction from the White House it would help shape the political environment in the 21 days from the inauguration to the Israeli elections. While a fresh Kadima-Labor victory would give the new administration hope that progress could be made on final status issues, a hard-right coalition would require a more radical shift in US policy to achieve any discernible progress in the coming years. Whether the Obama administration would be willing to use US economic and military assistance as leverage to bring a rejectionist Israeli government to the table, a tactic last used meaningfully by George Bush senior in 1991, may prove one of the most important foreign policy challenges facing the new administration come February. [post_title] => When the dust settles in Gaza [post_excerpt] => With an aerial bombardment, Israeli troops on the streets of Gaza, a humanitarian crisis and frustrated diplomats, the parallels between the current crisis and the events of summer 2006 are pretty clear. That history has repeated itself with added ferocity and loss of life is testament to the diplomatic and political failure to which Israel, the Palestinians, the US, EU and neighbouring states have all been party. The bitter cycle of rocket attacks and economic blockade set against a backdrop of warring factions and glacial progress towards a final status agreement gives little credit all round.The pressure from within the Israeli Government for mission creep to achieve the complete obliteration of Hamas appears to be subsiding as Egyptian and French diplomacy begins to make some progress, the scale of the humanitarian crisis and its global political impact becomes clearer to the Israelis and the task of finding suitable Hamas targets becomes progressively more difficult. As hopes of a possible resolution begin to flicker into view, thoughts are turning to what must be done to prevent this happening again.[post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => when-the-dust-settles-in-gaza [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2017-11-27 16:18:21 [post_modified_gmt] => 2017-11-27 16:18:21 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.clearhonestdesign.com/when-the-dust-settles-in-gaza/ [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[39] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 549 [post_author] => 3 [post_date] => 2008-11-28 14:24:53 [post_date_gmt] => 2008-11-28 14:24:53 [post_content] => After years when even committed Atlanticists have nervously tried to keep their distance from a politically toxic Bush Administration, with British ministers such as Lord Malloch Brown announced that the incoming Brown Government would be ‘no longer joined at the hip’ to the Americans, politicians from around the world are now jostling to stand as close as possible to the President-elect.One of Obama’s first challenges is to translate his political capital into European troops on the ground in Afghanistan where he is committed to a ‘surge’-like policy of increased troop deployment and political engagement of Pashtun groups previously sympathetic to the Taliban. This at a time when there are growing calls for the deployment of an EU force in the DRC and with the countries who have already made significant deployments such as Britain are facing overstretch.Similarly, following the inconclusive G20 talks, there will be the need for the new US administration to take a leading role in coordinating the fiscal stimulus packages and overhaul the global financial architecture. This will involve swiftly building a strong working relationship with Gordon Brown who has taken unofficial leadership of the global response to the crisis as Bush fades away. Promisingly, Obama and Brown share favourite tools. Obama’s pledge to cut taxes for 95% of Americans by reversing Bush’s tax cuts, likely to form the major plank of any Obama fiscal stimulus, will in fact largely be driven by tax credits, the Clintonian mechanism heavily favoured by the Prime Minister.The choices Obama makes on his economic team will be critical not only to the response to the economic and financial crises. The protectionist language used on the campaign trail by Obama and his fellow Democrats have given some cause for concern that the US may seek to pull up the drawbridge in an attempt to save US jobs. While there is likely to be a cooling of support for free trade, particularly in light of the current economic situation, the centrist track records of all names floating for senior roles at Treasury or on the Council of Economic Advisors such as Tim Geithner, Jamie Dimon, Larry Summers, Robert Rubin and Paul Volker would suggest that a radical retrenchment is unlikely.Similarly the international community will hope that the Poznan Climate Change Conference in December marks the swan song of an obstructionist US position on climate change and that the incoming administration will join the race to a final deal to replace the Kyoto Protocol at next winter’s Copenhagen Summit. It has yet to be seen if the economic crisis will limit some of Obama’s ambitions for tackling climate change but there are encouraging signs in some of the strangest places. The proposed $50 billion bailout for the motor industry would be tied by Democrats to helping the US car giants to develop new fuel efficient vehicles, looks like an example of how Obama will try to use fiscal stimuli to support the development of green technology as well as kick start the economy.Given the bailouts for the financial services sector and Detroit, commentators have been questioning the ability of the new administration to deliver the comprehensive package of healthcare reforms it campaigned for. Many of the proposed mechanisms in the Obama healthcare plan are familiar to British observers: an overhaul of IT systems including the transfer of medical records from paper to computer, publishing performance data and encouraging competition between providers. However the more radical element of the plan is to enable universal coverage through the creation on a National Health Insurance Exchange, offering a new state backed insurance scheme based on the Federal Employees Benefits Programme used by members of congress alongside existing insurance packages. This would be supported with a range of tax credits for families and small businesses and requirement on larger firms to provide insurance or contribute to the costs of the national plan. DC chatter sees campaign co-chair and former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle as the front runner for the position as the new administration’s Secretary for Health and Human Services. It will need an experienced hand such as Daschle to manage the legislative obstacles likely to be thrown in the path of reform by the health insurance industry and manage expectations with the likely delays to elements of the package enforced by the economic crisis.The challenges Obama faces are grave but the combination of international goodwill, a promising team of built from Obama’s savvy campaign operatives and experienced Clinton hands and a sense of purpose borne from adversity gives hope that these challenges can be met.This article was first published at <http://www.publicservice.co.uk/feature_story.asp?id=10891 Public Servant>. [post_title] => Obama faces the toughest challenges since FDR [post_excerpt] => As the celebrations die down, and the ticker tape is cleared away, the political reality of Barak Obama’s transition is becoming clearer. Pundits argue with some accuracy that President-elect Obama will enter office with a daunting in-tray, perhaps as tough a set of problems as any new leader has faced since FDR. Two unresolved wars, a financial crisis, an economic slump, an unstable trade deficit and large portions of US debt owned by China and other countries, not exactly top of the US’s Christmas list, are just some of the challenges the new administration has to look forward to. However, he faces these challenges with a level of goodwill internationally that has no recent comparison. 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