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Array ( [0] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6911 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-05-18 17:01:16 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-05-18 16:01:16 [post_content] =>   South Africa’s creeping embrace of Russia leans heavily on the country’s collective perception of history; one that imagines Russia as the saviour that delivered South Africa from Western-sponsored apartheid. Having almost completely abandoned non-alignment and now chairing the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) alliance, Pretoria understands its position is elevated, not undermined, by its proximity to Moscow. The West should be concerned, but claiming moral authority is highly unlikely to win over South Africa’s political classes.   The shadows of history, real or imagined, loom large over South Africa’s Russian dilemma. Old alliances, grudges and obligations seem now to be making themselves felt, and Putin’s potential visit to the BRICS summit in August is presenting President Ramaphosa with an ever growing problem. He must choose whether to continue down the road both he, and the ruling African National Congress (ANC), have determinedly followed in embracing Russian narratives, thereby risking South Africa’s international reputation; or, to firmly pull the handbrake on Moscow’s creeping influence and risk one of its most prominent diplomatic positions in the BRICS alliance. The decision Ramaphosa makes will be pivotal for the future direction of South African foreign policy and other nations across the continent will be keeping a close eye on Pretoria.   The evolution of South Africa’s position to one of relative warmth towards Moscow began with an initial condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine by South Africa’s Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor. In February 2022, Pandor’s department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) expressed its ‘dismay’ at the situation, using a statement – notably since scrubbed from government websites – to urge Russia to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and withdraw.[1] Subsequent statements from DIRCO have emphasised South Africa’s independence and non-alignment, in keeping with its membership of the Non-Alignment Movement, and highlighting what it sees as Western hypocrisy on issues relating to territorial integrity. A solution, said Pandor, ‘will not be found in isolating one party or bringing it to its knees'.[2]   Non-alignment no more? Over the past year of ongoing violence in Ukraine, South Africa’s evocation of history to justify its proximity to Moscow has however developed pace, drawing accusations of historical blindness, moral failing and hypocrisy.   Internationally, South Africa has drawn international condemnation for allowing joint Russian and Chinese naval exercises and recently hosting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Distancing herself yet more from those words on the first day of the invasion, Foreign Minister Pandor has recently declared Russia an ‘old, historical friend’, of whom ‘we cannot become sudden enemies [with] on the demand of others’.[3]   Perhaps this position is less surprising, when given the previously cosy relationship some ANC members appeared to enjoy with Russian representatives in South Africa. Hours prior to Russia’s invasion, Defence Minister Thandi Modise had been pictured at the Russian Ambassador’s Pretoria residence celebrating ‘Defender of the Fatherland Day’.[4] While attending another such gathering, ANC provincial MP Cameron Dugmore recorded a video referring to the event as a celebration of the ‘relationship that started between the ANC and the former Soviet Union, and how that relationship has continued’, and calling for solutions that create a ‘lasting peace’; all while Russia’s imperial eagle looked down on him from a banner in the background.[5]   Criticism of ANC’s apparent continued rapprochement with Russia over the past year has been fierce within South Africa, with the leader of the opposition and the political party Democratic Alliance (DA), John Steenhuisen, accusing the ANC of having ‘picked the wrong side of history’, but it has been fiercer still in the Western press. David Pilling in the Financial Times said South Africa’s position “smacks not of respect for human rights or non-alignment, but rather for might is right.” Brian Pottinger, a prominent South African journalist, wrote in Unherd that the ANC had embraced an ideology of “nostalgia, self-interest and greed”.[6]   A question of Western moral posturing? Nostalgia it seems does rule the day, and Western governments should be wary of moral posturing if they hope to get South Africa back on side. Congolese politician Jérémy Lissouba makes the astute argument that demands from the West for countries to unambiguously pick a side risk misunderstanding the complexity of their positions.[7] For South Africa’s ruling class, real or imagined ties between the former Soviet Union and the anti-apartheid movement remain strong, while painful memories of US and UK support for the apartheid regime remain very much in living memory.   This is not a political class inheriting a generational burden, it is one that actively fought for freedom and bears the scars of fascist violence. Further, as ANC leaders often comment, perceived Western moral grandstanding invokes little sympathy. Minister Pandor argued in an event last September that Western inaction in Palestine undermines its support for Ukraine, “you can’t say because Ukraine has been invaded that suddenly sovereignty is very important, because [according to the US] it was never important for Palestine”.[8] As the terms of Western assistance for Africa have always been so unequal, argues Lissouba, Western affirmations of the UN Charter and Universal Declaration for Human Rights have often been viewed with suspicion as ‘pretences to maintain hegemony in the face of existential threats’.[9]   A spotlight on South Africa in the BRICS Renewed attention will be directed at South Africa if Putin attends August’s BRICS conference. As a full member of the International Criminal Court (ICC) it has the legal obligation to carry out Putin’s arrest. Having wavered before, by failing to arrest Sudanese President al-Bashir in 2015, South Africa would truly damage its international standing by shirking its obligations again – and Ramaphosa’s response has been far from confident. Mirroring Pandor’s flip-flop at the start of the invasion, the President initially stated that the ANC wanted to withdraw from the ICC, followed by a statement hours later that South Africa will remain a member and the comment was made ‘in error’.[10] In recent weeks it has become clear that Ramaphosa wishes to avoid confrontation - deciding to shift to hosting the summit online, despite Putin’s previous acceptance of an in-person invite.[11]   While eyebrows continue to be raised, both within and outside of South Africa, about the country’s continued relationship with the Kremlin, its role as a BRICS member has elevated South Africa’s diplomatic position. South Africa’s membership is a major diplomatic win; and, despite being a far smaller country, both in economy and population, than any other member, its economic ties are strengthening. Between 2017 and 2021, trade with other BRICS members went from R407bn ($22bn) to R702bn ($38bn), and in 2018 65% of all arrivals into South Africa were tourists from other BRICS countries. [12]   What next? Western countries should be wary of a continued drift that may see South Africa and other regional powers put further distance between themselves and the West. Tackling this, however, cannot rely on claims of moral duty or international obligations based on the will of Western superpowers.   Taking a harder approach may go some way – threatening South Africa’s position in the US’s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has brought opposition and government MPs to Washington. However, ‘big stick’ approaches, such as this and the US's ‘Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa’ bill, will only stoke allegations of American imperialism and hypocrisy. While the US signalled their intention to engage with the recent US-Africa Summit, lumping an entire continent together furthered suspicion that African leaders are not receiving due respect or understanding. Meanwhile, the UK’s international development fund is spending twice as much within its own borders as it is across the entire continents of Africa and Asia, and further isolation would damage the UK and EU’s chance to follow AGOA’s example and cement meaningful engagement with African countries.[13]   Moreover, the openings left by the US, UK and EU’s insistence on continued uni-polarity has allowed Russia to pursue its commitments in Africa and strengthen its economic ties, which are approached without interference in domestic affairs or tying aid to good governance.[14] To counteract this, the West does not have to abandon its commitment to democracy but must rather engage equally and respectfully. Many across the entire continent have not forgotten being bussed to Queen Elizabeth II’s funeral, called ‘shithole countries’ by a sitting US president, or witnessing hypocrisy between words and actions on democracy and human rights. In short, something more has to be brought to the table.   Russia’s authoritarianism is a stark contrast to South Africa’s non-racial, rights-based constitution and democracy, so historical support aside they are extremely uncomfortable bedfellows. The US, UK and the European Union should highlight this, bringing South Africa back into the fold by fostering a respectful relationship, not as a former colony, nor as a weapon in a new cold war, but as a democratic nation-state.[15] In turn, this may highlight that Russia’s respect goes only as far as its own economic and strategic interests, creating an opportunity to slow its insidious influence.   Cameron Scheijde is a political communications professional who grew up in Johannesburg, with specialist knowledge of African political affairs. He holds Master’s degrees in African Studies and Political Theory from the University of Oxford, and has formerly worked as an Africa expert for the Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation and as a Researcher for Justice Albie Sachs at the South African Constitutional Court. He can be followed on Twitter @camscheijde.   Disclaimer: The view expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   Image by www.kremlin.ru.   [1] Peter Fabricius, Pretoria scrambles to repair relations with Russia after calling for invasion forces to leave Ukraine, Daily Maverick, February 2022 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-02-27-pretoria-scrambles-to-repair-relations-with-russia-after-calling-for-invasion-force-to-leave-ukraine/ [2] Naledi Pandor, Minister Naledi Pandor on Russia / Ukraine Conflict, South African Government, April 2022 https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-naledi-pandor-russia-ukraine-conflict-8-apr-2022-0000 [3] Eyewitness News, 30 March 2023, https://ewn.co.za/0001/01/01/minister-pandor-says-russia-an-old-historical-friend [4] Tom Eaton, The flip flopping ANC has a lot to be grateful to Russia for, TimesLive, March 2022 https://select.timeslive.co.za/ideas/2022-02-28-the-flip-flopping-anc-has-a-lot-to-be-grateful-to-russia-for/ [5] Eusebius McKaiser, Twitter, February 2022 https://twitter.com/Eusebius/status/1498394725572829188 [6] John Steenhuisen, Address by DA leader, Polity, https://www.polity.org.za/article/da-john-steenhuisen-address-by-da-leader-during-an-urgent-debate-on-the-impact-of-the-russian-federations-invasion-of-ukraine-on-the-south-african-economy-parliament-15032022-2022-03-15, David Pilling, South Africa’s Russia stance shows it has lost the moral high ground, Financial Times, February 2023 https://www.ft.com/content/02085c6c-7ae5-4dd0-817d-7ce3f49ea303 [7] Brian Pottinger, Why South Africa is siding with Russia, Unherd, November 2022 https://unherd.com/2022/11/why-south-africa-is-siding-with-russia/ [8] ​​ Jérémy Lissouba, Relations with Africa, Asia are on the brink of collapse – to Russia’s benefit, Politico, March 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/relations-africa-asia-brink-collapse-russia-benefit/ [9] ​​Ibid [10] Julian Borger, South Africa’s President and Party Sow Confusion over Leaving ICC, The Guardian, April 2023 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/25/south-africas-president-and-party-sow-confusion-over-leaving-icc [11] Kuben Chetty, Putin has confirmed he will attend BRICS summit in Durban says SA’s BRICS sherpa, IOL, April 2023, https://www.iol.co.za/mercury/news/putin-has-confirmed-he-will-attend-brics-summit-in-durban-says-sas-brics-sherpa-4600c86d-ebec-4477-8098-6d0ddb6c20b8; Amanda Khoza, SA’s quiet push for virtual Putin visit to solve ICC arrest warrant dilemma, Sunday Times, 30 April 2023 https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/politics/2023-04-30-sas-quiet-push-for-virtual-putin-visit-to-solve-icc-arrest-warrant-dilemma/ [12]  Cyril Ramaphosa, ‘BRICS partnership has great value for South Africa', BRICS Summit 2022, June 2022, http://brics2022.mfa.gov.cn/eng/tpzx/202206/t20220621_10707340.html [13]  William Worley, Nearly double UK aid spent on refugees at home than on Asia and Africa, Devex, April 2023 https://www.devex.com/news/nearly-double-uk-aid-spent-on-refugees-at-home-than-on-asia-and-africa-105288 [14] SAIIA, ‘Moscow’s Continent: The Principles of Russia’s Africa Policy Engagement’, Occassional Paper 341, March 2023, https://saiia.org.za/research/moscows-continent-the-principles-of-russias-africa-policy-engagement/ [15] NPR, ‘Russia and the West are vying for influence in Africa and Ukraine is a big reason why’, Associated Press, July 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/07/28/1114187972/russia-and-the-west-are-vying-for-influence-in-africa-and-ukraine-is-a-big-reaso [post_title] => South Africa’s slow embrace of Russia should cause alarm for the West [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => south-africas-slow-embrace-of-russia-should-cause-alarm-for-the-west [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-09-07 14:58:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-09-07 13:58:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6911 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [1] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6887 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-05-12 10:49:45 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-05-12 09:49:45 [post_content] => Six leaders of former Soviet states attended the 9 May Parade on Red Square this week to commemorate the end of World War II (WWII) in Europe in 1945.[1] Among them was the leader of Armenia, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The two other countries of the South Caucasus – Georgia and Azerbaijan – did not participate.   While the Russian invasion of Ukraine has elicited a range of reactions from countries around the world, the leaders of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia have found themselves balancing between their aspirations for independent diplomacy and Russia’s enduring influence in their region. These countries view the war in Ukraine through the lens of their own conflicts – Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). The extent of their political dependence on Moscow varies, meaning that their responses to the war have differed as well.   As a country that has had its own conflict with Russia over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, some might have expected that Georgia's response would have been more aligned with that of Western countries. However, the leadership in the capital Tbilisi looked at the events through the prism of the challenges presented before it. The Georgian side, despite expressing its opposition to Russia’s actions, was extremely critical of the Ukrainian leadership, which at one point claimed that in order to lighten their own burden in Kyiv, a  ‘Second Frontline’ should be opened in Georgia.[2]   Azerbaijan, meanwhile, tries to keep a balance between Russia and the West. In many international fora, Azerbaijan has refrained from participating in any decisions against Russia. For example, Azerbaijan opted out of the vote to terminate Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe and similarly from the vote on the United Nations General Assembly's resolution to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council.[3] However, having signed energy deals with both Russia (to import Russian gas to Azerbaijan) and the European Union (to double the flow of gas to Europe in five years), Azerbaijan is in a good position to profit by maintaining this balancing act[4]. Most notably, those in the capital Baku look to Russia in relation to its significant role in the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Thus, while demonstrably showing support for Ukraine's territorial integrity (which is the main line of Azerbaijan's foreign policy regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict), President Aliyev still maintains relatively friendly relations with Russia, including keeping silent when the Azerbaijani honorary consulate in Kharkiv was destroyed by Russian airstrikes in March 2022.   By contrast, Armenia’s position is more difficult. In light of its devastating defeat to Azerbaijan in the second Karabakh War in 2020, Armenia’s response to the war in Ukraine has been more cautious.  The leader of Armenia, Prime Minister Pashinyan, even avoided calling the Russian invasion a war, instead referring to it from the outset as “the events in Ukraine”.[5] Yet he harshly reacted to the disinformation that Armenia had sent Su-30SM multifunctional jets to Russia, demonstrating a desire to make it clear that Armenia is not helping Russia in this war.[6] Nevertheless, Armenia’s relations with Russia are at a historical low, due to the country’s disappointment with Moscow’s actions during the 2020 Karabakh War and inaction during the attack by Azerbaijan on the territory of Armenia proper in 2022, when Russia and other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) stayed silent.[7]   The situation is antagonised further by Azerbaijan’s continued blockade of the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting Armenians of Artsakh to the rest of the world.[8] The tension between Armenia and Russia showed itself once again when Azerbaijan, in a move denounced by Yerevan as a violation of the November 9 Trilateral statement, installed a checkpoint on the Hakari Bridge at the entrance to the Lachin corridor.[9] Amidst the apparent indifference or inaction from the Russian peacekeepers deployed to the region, the United States and France, two key countries involved in mediating the negotiations, have voiced their concerns over Azerbaijan's establishment of the checkpoint on the Lachin corridor, considering that a step that "undermines the ongoing efforts to build confidence in the peace process".[10] A statement by Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2023 called “on the Russian Federation to finally fulfil the obligation under provision 6 of the Trilateral statement by eliminating the illegal blockade of the Lachin corridor”.[11] Indeed, Russia seemingly does not wish to confront Azerbaijan, while President Aliyev looks to gain an advantage from Russia’s war, namely the ability to apply pressure on Armenia.   This situation, and Armenia’s recent shift towards the West, might have a knock-on impact on the country’s stance on the war in Ukraine. However, while the political centre of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has moved to the West (the next round of peace talks are to be held in Brussels), Armenia’s dependence on Moscow remains strong. [12]  This could explain Pashinyan’s decision to visit Moscow on May 9. Nevertheless, this may not be the only reason.   Since 9th May 1992, when Armenian forces entered the town of Shushi (Shusha for Azerbaijanis) in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, May 9 has embodied not only the 1945 victory for Armenians. Every year Armenia’s leaders have congratulated the nation on the 1992 historic victory as well; and prior to the country’s defeat in the 2020 war, Pashinyan was no exception.[13] However, this year Pashinyan noted in his address “In recent years, we celebrate May 9 with bitterness and anxiety. This is primarily related with the severe consequences of the 44-day war of 2020, with the loss of Shushi during the war, with the aggressive policy unfolding around Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia”.[14]   In this context, Pashinyan’s visit to Moscow could be seen as a helpful deviation from the tradition of visiting the Yerablur Military Pantheon, where many of those who died fighting for Nagorno-Karabakh rest. With previous visits resulting in uncomfortable political scandals, avoiding this scenario fits with the adopted policy of Pashinyan’s government to achieve peace at any cost and to prevent angering Azerbaijan, and its patron Turkey, in any way. This aside, Moscow also retains the means by which to pressure Pashinyan to participate in the events in Red Square, in order to show that Putin and Moscow still have friends and are not isolated from the world.[15] Potential coercion and blackmail could be effective, especially given the Azerbaijani attacks on Armenia proper, the Azerbaijani blockade of the Lachin corridor and the Russian military presence in Armenia.[16]   In contrast to Pashinyan, and in a move mostly likely designed to demonstrate that the city is under Azerbaijani control, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva spent 9th May in Shushi*.[17] Interestingly, the President's website made no mention of a visit to a memorial dedicated to the victory of May 9, 1945. The leader of Georgia Irakli Garibashvili meanwhile opted for a third way.[18] He laid a bouquet of flowers at the monument of Meliton Kantaria, a Georgian sergeant in the Soviet Army, and spoke with veterans of WWII. The whole emphasis of the event was Georgians’ participation in WWII, with the May 9 victory seen as a national rather than Soviet celebration.   The varied responses by the countries of the South Caucasus to the war in Ukraine, and their level of engagement with Moscow, clearly reflect their complex relationships with Russia as well as the conflicts within their own region. Understanding these can provide important insights into the political dynamics in the region as well as the broader geopolitical landscape. Yet it is difficult to predict with certainty how this might evolve in the near future. While the complex historical, geopolitical, and security considerations will remain unchanged, some shifts towards the West have already been observed. The ultimate outcome of the war in Ukraine will inevitably have an impact, but the current ties and dependencies on Russia, as well as the unresolved conflicts in the region, will continue to strongly shape each country’s position in the near future.     Naira Sahakyan is a Senior Researcher at the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute and is a Visiting Scholar at the University of Cambridge and part of a Turkish-Armenian Relations research project hosted by Cambridge Interfaith Programme and funded by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. She is also lecturing at the American University of Armenia and Yerevan State University. Follow her on Twitter @NSahakyan   *Editorial note: As referenced earlier in the article, different place names are used – Shushi for Armenians and Shusha for Azerbaijanis.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre nor of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.     [1] RadioFreeEurope, Russia Holds Victory Day Celebrations Amid Fresh Strikes On Ukraine, May 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-president-russia-visit-japarov-putin-victory-day/32400550.html [2] Prime Minister of Georgia Official Website, Keynote Speech Delivered during Interpellation at the Plenary Session of the Parliament of Georgia, March 2023, https://garibashvili.ge/en/n/all/gamosvla_parlamentshi_interpelatsiis_formatshi [3] United Nations UN News, UN Affairs Team, UN General Assembly votes to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council, April 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782 [4] David O'Byrne, Azerbaijan's Russian Gas Deal Raises Uncomfortable Questions for European, Eurasianet, November 2022, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijans-russian-gas-deal-raises-uncomfortable-questions-for-europe; O'Byrne, Azerbaijan and EU Agree to Strategic Energy Partnership, Eurasianet, July 2022, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-and-eu-agree-to-strategic-energy-partnership [5] The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Official Website, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's speech at the National Assembly during the discussion of the performance report of the Government Action Plan for 2021, April 2022, https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2022/04/13/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/ [6] The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Official Website, It is necessary to launch an international mechanism for the monitoring of the border situation, Nikol Pashinyan, March 2022, https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2022/03/31/Cabinet-meeting-Speech/ [7] The Collective Security Treaty Organization is an intergovernmental military alliance in Eurasia consisting of six post-Soviet states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. See - https://en.odkb-csto.org/ [8] Amnesty International, Azerbaijan: Blockade of Lachin corridor putting thousands of lives in peril must be immediately lifted, February 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/azerbaijan-blockade-of-lachin-corridor-putting-thousands-of-lives-in-peril-must-be-immediately-lifted/ [9] Commonspace.EU, Document: Full text of the agreement between the leaders of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, November 2022, https://www.commonspace.eu/news/document-full-text-agreement-between-leaders-russia-armenia-and-azerbaijan [10]  The Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, Azerbaijan – Lachin corridor, April 2023, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/azerbaijan/news/article/azerbaijan-lachin-corridor-23-april-2023; US Department of State Website, Press Release, Actions on the Lachin Corridor, April 2023, https://www.state.gov/actions-on-the-lachin-corridor/ [11] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Press Release, The Statement of MFA of Armenia regarding the installation of an illegal checkpoint by Azerbaijan in the Lachin corridor, April 2023. https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/04/23/statement_lachincorridor/11980 [12] Henry Foy, Armenia and Azerbaijan to resume peace talks in Brussels, FT, May 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/f42c16b6-1c36-4d14-ab51-9d85e1da4d49?fbclid=IwAR3JofpNjlSOgyFv6sWtjwqZlXhA6fhEn5Ip01GvsJ-QNI08OOZ2ipTbysw [13] The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Official Website, Congratulatory Message by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on Victory and Peace Day, May 2019, https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2019/05/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-Congratulations-May-9/ [14] The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Official Website, Congratulatory Message by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on Victory and Peace Day, May 2019, https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2019/05/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-Congratulations-May-9/ [15] Hetq, Yerevan Police Remove Protesters at Yerevan's Yerablur Pantheon, Sep 2022, https://hetq.am/en/article/148531 [16] Natalia Konarzewska, What’s behind the new round of clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, New Eastern Europe, September 2022, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/09/20/armenia-azerbaijan-pelosi-russia-ukraine/; Amnesty International. Azerbaijan: Blockade of Lachin corridor putting thousands of lives in peril must be immediately lifted, February, 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/azerbaijan-blockade-of-lachin-corridor-putting-thousands-of-lives-in-peril-must-be-immediately-lifted/ [17]  President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev Official Website, Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva examined works to be carried out in front of administrative building of Special Representative Office in Shusha, May 2023, https://president.az/en/articles/view/5966 [18] Government of Georgia Official Website, Irakli Garibashvili: I wish to first of all congratulate our heroic veterans on this day, marking the defeat of this huge evil – fascism – and our victory over it, May 2022, https://www.gov.ge/en/news/357782?page=&year= [post_title] => An (In)delicate Dance of Diplomacy? The South Caucasus Response to the Ukraine Conflict [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => an-indelicate-dance-of-diplomacy-the-south-caucasus-response-to-the-ukraine-conflict [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-09-07 14:58:58 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-09-07 13:58:58 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6887 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [2] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6866 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-05-03 00:00:33 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-05-02 23:00:33 [post_content] => World Press Freedom Day provides an opportunity to reflect – not only on the escalating threats to media freedom around the world – but also on the state of efforts to address such threats, and how they can be improved.[1]   If the core goal of media freedom is to hold power to account – then initiatives designed to support media freedom must be subject to the same scrutiny.[2]   One important initiative is the Media Freedom Coalition (MFC).[3] This partnership of over 50 governments advocates collaboratively and proactively for media freedom through a combination of advocacy, diplomatic interventions, encouraging legal reforms, international events, and funding.   Last year, the Foreign Policy Centre supported the publication of a 70 page evaluation of the MFC’s impact during its first two years, titled Reset Required? Evaluating the Media Freedom Coalition after its first two years.[4] The evaluation was conducted by six researchers – including myself – from three different universities, the University of East Anglia, City, University of London and University of the Philippines-Diliman.[5] Our findings were based on over 100 interviews with relevant stakeholders and led us to conclude that the MFC did require a ‘re-set’.[6]   Overall, we concluded that there had been ‘unsatisfactory achievement in most areas with some positive elements’. The report’s lead author, Dr Mary Myers argued that, ‘partly because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the actions of the MFC have not been as rapid, bold or visible as was initially promised’.[7]   We put forward six concrete recommendations in the report with the aim of making the MFC’s work more impactful. These ranged from strengthening the minimum requirement for retaining membership, to improving its financial support, communications strategy, and theory of change.[8]   One year later – on World Press Freedom Day 2023 – we ask whether the MFC has achieved the required re-set?   A year of progress?  In July 2022, the MFC established its own Secretariat.[9] This dedicated team of staff, hosted by the Thomson Reuters Foundation, supports the Coalition through coordination, administration, and communications.[10]   Last month, this new MFC Secretariat published a 2022 Activity Report – highlighting its key actions undertaken in the year – though it also noted that many activities cannot be shared publicly, due to the sensitive nature of the work.[11]   Perhaps the MFC’s most notable achievement in the past 12 months is the granting of over 1,400 emergency visas to journalists and human rights defenders across eight member countries. This was a direct response to one of the main recommendations of the High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom.[12]   Embassies involved in the MFC’s new Diplomatic Network Initiative also carried out 40 different ‘actions’ in 2022 – ranging from rapid response public statements and seminars to high-level dialogue and social media campaigns.[13]   In response to our recommendations, the MFC has also improved its own governance. It has implemented a new internal and external communications strategy, updated its overall objectives, and set up a basic system of monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL).[14] This MEL system has already led to positive changes, such as a more flexible approach to speaking out on cases of concern as seen in Cameroon and the Philippines.[15]   My co-evaluators and I especially welcome the MFC’s response to our recommendation to, ‘ensure that its actions are informed by an understanding of the complex, dynamic and diverse priorities of the journalists and media workers around the world’. The MFC now integrates regular input from civil society organisations, UNESCO, MFC member embassies and local journalists into its work.   In response to this recommendation, the MFC Secretariat has also been having ‘illuminating’ conversations with all member countries, to better understand their perspectives and priorities – and especially to establish how all members can meaningfully engage with the MFC, even if they have limited resources.[16]   Such conversations are crucial for developing a more inclusive agenda for supporting media freedom, which – we argued recently – is vital for tackling the growing threats to journalists around the world.[17]   Re-set achieved?  Does this amount to the ‘re-injection of energy’ into the MFC that our original evaluation argued was required?[18]   Well, the MFC is certainly now moving in the right direction – though the level of activity could still be greater.   However, it is worth noting that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has undoubtedly reduced the capacity of member countries to support initiatives like the MFC over the past 12 months.   Another positive sign is the MFC’s openness to critical, independent scrutiny and willingness to respond directly and explicitly to our evaluation.[19] This demonstrates a commitment to the principles of transparency and accountability that it seeks to promote.   If the growing constellation of international initiatives seeking to reverse the global decline in media freedom are to succeed – they will need to practice what they preach – by remaining open to constructive critique.[20]   Dr Martin Scott is an Associate Professor in Media and Global Development at the University of East Anglia, and one of the co-authors of the original evaluation of the MFC. The evaluation, entitled, “Reset Required: Evaluating the Media Freedom Coalition after its first two years” - by Mary Myers, Martin Scott, Mel Bunce, Lina Yassin, Maria Carmen Fernandez and Rachel Khan can be read here.    Photo credit: MFC   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   [1] UNESCO, World Press Freedom Day 30th Anniversary, 2023, https://www.unesco.org/en/days/press-freedom; UNESCO, Threats to freedom of press: Violence, disinformation & censorship, May 2022, https://www.unesco.org/en/threats-freedom-press-violence-disinformation-censorship [2] Martin Scott, Mel Bunce, Mary Myers, and Maria Carmen Fernandez, Whose media freedom is being defended? Norm contestation in international media freedom campaigns, Journal of Communication, Volume 73, Issue 2, April 2023, Pages 87–100, https://academic.oup.com/joc/article/73/2/87/6964696 [3] Media Freedom Coalition, What is the MFC?, https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/about/what-is-the-mfc/coalition-objectives [4] Dr Mary Myers, Dr Martin Scott, Dr Mel Bunce, Lina Yassin, Maria Carmen (Ica) Fernandez and Dr Rachel Khan, Reset Required? Evaluating the Media Freedom Coalition after its first two years, The Foreign Policy Centre, February 2022, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/reset-required-evaluating-the-media-freedom-coalition-after-its-first-two-years/ [5] UEA, Researching Media Freedom in a Time of Crisi, Academic study of the Global Campaign for Media Freedom, http://pressfreedom.co.uk/ [6] Dr Mary Myers, Dr Martin Scott, Dr Mel Bunce, Lina Yassin, Maria Carmen (Ica) Fernandez and Dr Rachel Khan, Reset Required? Evaluating the Media Freedom Coalition after its first two years, The Foreign Policy Centre, February 2022, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/reset-required-evaluating-the-media-freedom-coalition-after-its-first-two-years/ [7] Martin Scott and Mel Bruce, Global effort to defend journalism needs a reset – here’s how to do better, The Conversation, February 2022, https://theconversation.com/global-effort-to-defend-journalism-needs-a-reset-heres-how-to-do-better-176644 [8] Dr Mary Myers, Dr Martin Scott, Dr Mel Bunce, Lina Yassin, Maria Carmen (Ica) Fernandez and Dr Rachel Khan, Reset Required? Evaluating the Media Freedom Coalition after its first two years, The Foreign Policy Centre, February 2022, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/reset-required-evaluating-the-media-freedom-coalition-after-its-first-two-years/ [9] FCDO and Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, New UK funding to support media freedom around the world, GOV.UK, February 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-uk-funding-to-support-media-freedom-around-the-world-9-february-2022 [10] Thomas Reuters Foundation, Media Freedom, https://www.trust.org/media-freedom/ [11] Media Freedom Coalition Secretariat, Media Freedom Coalition 2022 Annual Report, March 2023, https://media.voog.com/0000/0048/7840/files/MFC%202022%20Activity%20Report.pdf [12] International Bar Association, High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom - Who we are, https://www.ibanet.org/HRI-Secretariat/Who-we-are [13] Temitope.Kalejaiye, What did MFC diplomatic missions do in 2022 to support media freedom?, Media Freedom Coalition, January, 2023, https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/media/news/2022/what-did-mfc-diplomatic-missions-do-in-2022-to-support-media-freedom [14] Dr Mary Myers, Dr Martin Scott, Dr Mel Bunce, Lina Yassin, Maria Carmen (Ica) Fernandez and Dr Rachel Khan, Reset Required? Evaluating the Media Freedom Coalition after its first two years, The Foreign Policy Centre, February 2022, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/reset-required-evaluating-the-media-freedom-coalition-after-its-first-two-years/ [15] Media Freedom Coalition, Statements, https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/media/statements/all [16] Dr Mary Myers, Dr Martin Scott, Dr Mel Bunce, Lina Yassin, Maria Carmen (Ica) Fernandez and Dr Rachel Khan, Reset Required? Evaluating the Media Freedom Coalition after its first two years, The Foreign Policy Centre, February 2022, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/reset-required-evaluating-the-media-freedom-coalition-after-its-first-two-years/ [17] Martin Scott, Mel Bunce, and Mary Myer, Towards an Inclusive Approach to Media Freedom, Centre for International Media Assistance, January 2023, https://www.cima.ned.org/blog/toward-an-inclusive-approach-to-supporting-media-freedom/ [18] Dr Mary Myers, Dr Martin Scott, Dr Mel Bunce, Lina Yassin, Maria Carmen (Ica) Fernandez and Dr Rachel Khan, Reset Required? Evaluating the Media Freedom Coalition after its first two years, The Foreign Policy Centre, February 2022, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/reset-required-evaluating-the-media-freedom-coalition-after-its-first-two-years/ [19] Martin Scott, Mel Bunce, Mary Myers, and Maria Carmen Fernandez, Whose media freedom is being defended? Norm contestation in international media freedom campaigns, Journal of Communication, Volume 73, Issue 2, April 2023, Pages 87–100, https://academic.oup.com/joc/article/73/2/87/6964696 [20] Martin Scott, Mel Bunce, and Mary Myer, Towards an Inclusive Approach to Media Freedom, Centre for International Media Assistance, January 2023, https://www.cima.ned.org/blog/toward-an-inclusive-approach-to-supporting-media-freedom/ [post_title] => Re-set achieved? Reflecting on the last 12 months of the Media Freedom Coalition [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => re-set-achieved-reflecting-on-the-last-12-months-of-the-media-freedom-coalition [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-05-11 20:35:18 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-05-11 19:35:18 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6866 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [3] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6826 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-04-04 09:10:07 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-04-04 08:10:07 [post_content] =>   A year on from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Chief Editor of The Kyiv Post, Bohdan Nahaylo reflects on the war and its wider global implications.   Nobody expected the genocidal war that Russia unleashed against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, to happen. Yes, we saw the build-up of Russian forces on Ukraine’s border and heard the threats from the Kremlin. And there were warnings, of course. We even heard them from the American President. But I think we were all in denial, thinking that this was bluff, sabre-rattling and blackmailing by Moscow and that Putin would never go ahead with such a dastardly, barbaric, deed.   But he did When it happened, we were all caught in shock. In Ukraine, initially, it was not even a case of panic. It was a question of trying to reassure ourselves that we had the will, strength, courage and forces not only to resist but to fight back and defeat such a seemingly powerful and unstoppable enemy.   Ukraine passed this test, and slowly but surely, at an increasingly faster pace, it also began receiving the crucial support that it needed from the West, from those who have become, in effect, de facto, its allies.   Despite the horrific losses of people, immense damage, and temporary loss of territory that Ukraine has suffered as a result of Russia’s war crimes, Ukraine managed not only to stand firm but to regain ground and is poised to achieve victory in the not-so-distant future.   Ukraine’s president and leadership have risen to the historic occasion; its heroic armed forces have made it proud and confident; and the nation has remained united in its determination to defeat the invaders.   And now? We’re at a very delicate stage. Ukraine is desperate for the weapons it needs – the long-range artillery, rockets and fighter planes if possible. Its forces are brave, dependable, and well organised, so this is not a problem. The challenge is to withstand the pressure from the very crude methods that Russia employs in its understanding of warfare by throwing masses of cannon fodder at the Ukrainian forces, and by firing missiles in a cowardly manner from long range into our cities, trying to destroy our infrastructure and also to undermine the morale of the Ukrainians.   But if the weapons Ukraine needs arrive in time from its supporters – and they are certainly beginning to be delivered from a host of diverse but united sources ranging from the US and UK to Poland and other European states – it will withstand any new offensives that Russia attempts to launch in the early spring and then go on the offensive and on to victory.   We’re the heart of the matter Ukrainians are strengthened by the fact that for more than a year Ukraine has been the centre of international attention all over the planet, not only in the countries sympathetic to Ukraine, but in Asia, Latin America, and to some extent within China and India. Even in Russia, with all the distortions notwithstanding, coverage of the Ukrainian issue – and the country’s aspiration to be a sovereign, democratic Western state – is a remarkable achievement in itself. Moreover, the vast number of journalists and politicians visiting Ukraine has also helped the world to discover Ukraine.   For many decades, if not centuries, Ukraine and its people had to endure in their predicament under various rulers in virtual obscurity. Now, finally, to paraphrase Gabriel Garcia Marquez, its One Hundred Years of Solitude have ended. Suddenly Ukraine has been rediscovered as a European nation which was unjustly kept off the radar screen by force of circumstances. On its fate depends so many things, ranging from international security to whether some regions of the world will face food shortages because of Russia’s attempts to block the export of Ukrainian grain, energy shortages, and rising prices.   Moscow would like the world to view its war as a local, backyard, conflict wherein the Kremlin is simply regaining ‘Russian’ imperial territory that it was forced to give up. But the war that Russia has launched against Ukraine clearly has a much greater significance for the entire world. It has undermined the international order, and challenged fundamentals – the very notion of Europe and European security and indeed, international security as we understand it – the very basic principles on which the UN Charter is based.   Russia’s cynical actions have exposed the ineffectiveness of international institutions, such as the UN and the OSCE, that are supposed to prevent wars, invasions, war crimes, genocide and nuclear threats. They have forced the democratic world out of its complacency and united it around the need to defend not only its security but also basic democratic values.   The struggle is not just about our independence Ukrainians are fighting for their independence and their identity, but they’re also defending the idea of a democratic, peaceful, prosperous, united Europe. They are defending European ideals and Europe’s borders, and in doing so are also serving as a catalyst in Europe’s reshaping and consolidation.   After all, we are witnessing a historic reconfiguration of Europe and what it represents. Britain left the EU after Brexit but on account of the war has become a far stronger European autonomous player on the international scene and a staunch supporter of Ukraine. Poland, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, and Romania have also gelled together as a force to be reckoned with. So, in the east of Europe, another healthy and much-needed counterbalance to the would-be domination by Berlin and Paris has emerged. Britain has played a leading role in this regard and its principled stance and sterling support for Ukraine have won the admiration and appreciation not only of Ukrainians but many other nations. Britain, in this regard, has set the tone.   In Eastern Europe, Moldova now has a pro-Western democratic president. And Belarus itself shouldn’t be written off. Remember, Belarus had a ‘quiet’ but game-changing national democratic revolution a few years ago which we should not forget. That peaceful revolt has been suppressed by crude force and there are hundreds of political prisoners in the country. Yes, Lukashenko is a vassal of Moscow and he allows Russian troops to be based in Belarus, but as soon as Moscow’s power is curbed and Russia defeated it is highly improbable that the majority of Belarusians will prefer to remain a colony of their Eurasian neighbour.   China and India, together with many other Asian, South American and African countries, have continued to sit on their fence. Their declared neutrality, or ambivalence, only plays into the hands of Moscow. This is also a moment of truth for them and for all of us.   So, in this unfolding scenario, Ukraine’s struggle and eventual victory with the help of its allies, will have had profound consequences not only for its region, but for Europe as a whole and far beyond. Ukraine’s victory and that of the free world over despotic Russia, and by implication its tacit or explicit supporters, will create the conditions for the establishment of an enhanced international security architecture and for the establishment of Europe’s real borders at the frontiers of Ukraine and Belarus with Eurasian Russia.   It will also force the self-styled ‘non-aligned countries’ implicitly backing Moscow to come clean and show if they are with the forces for freedom or autocracy or cynical self-interest.   And Ukraine’s other task In the revamped new Europe, Ukraine will have not only to rebuild and restore the country, but to renew itself. National unity and the wellbeing of a large, regionally diverse, country consolidated in a modern political nation enjoying proper security and economic growth will be the priority. Old ways will have to be discarded and corruption curbed. Conditionality from Western partners offering financial, technical and military assistance will help in this regard to ensure the governance, openness and accountability needed.   In the Herculean task of self-renewal of the country and the region, Ukraine is confident it will continue to enjoy the mutual benefits of the special new ‘strategic’ partnership that has come into being with Britain. The latter has not only honoured its strategic partnership with Ukraine with financial and military assistance but, in true Orwellian tradition, helped the country face up to the pressure of Russia’s misinformation warfare.   In his historic recent speech before Britain’s political elite in Westminster Hall, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, invoking the image of Winston Churchill, thanked Britain, its leadership and population, for helping Ukraine withstand its darkest hours and move into its finest ones.   Who would have thought that Ukraine and Britain, on different sides of Europe and traditional historical narratives, would one day draw so close. But together, they close the circle, and make of Europe a genuine cohesive entity based on shared mutual values and not simply the proclaimed semblance of things.   Reproduced with the kind permission of the FCDO Association and the Chief Editor of The Kyiv Post.   Image by Office of the President of Ukraine.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   [post_title] => The Moment of Truth: A year on from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-moment-of-truth-a-year-on-from-russias-invasion-of-ukraine [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-09-07 14:59:07 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-09-07 13:59:07 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6826 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [4] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6754 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-02-24 12:00:58 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-02-24 11:00:58 [post_content] => The aggressive occupation policy was started by Russia back in 2014, with the occupation of Crimea and part of the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions. The bloody war in Donbas forged a significant circle of experienced war journalists in Ukraine who went to report from the frontlines. At the same time, it is obvious that since the full-scale invasion in February 2022 every journalist in Ukraine, experienced or not, has become a war journalist.   Journalists have had to realise the level of danger to which they can be exposed on the frontline. There has been a recognition of the line that they cannot cross even for the sake of writing a ‘cool’ article or preparing a ‘cool’ photo report. Unfortunately, this lesson has come at a high price. As of today, 50 Ukrainian journalists and media workers have been killed since the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, eight of them were killed while performing their professional duties. Many more journalists were injured, forced to flee and/or been deprived of personal and editorial property. Some have passed through Russian torture chambers, whilst others currently remain in Russian captivity.   The key, most important professional term for journalists in Ukraine today is the word ‘safety’. In the circumstances in which Russia can indiscriminately attack Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and, at any moment, launch missiles towards not only the frontlines, no resident of Ukraine feels safe. Therefore, every journalist should be ready to act according to pre-prepared security protocols.   Today, we can confidently say that journalism in Ukraine is a profession of courageous people. Our organisation’s slogan, which was ingrained a few years before in the midst of panic due to the epidemic of the coronavirus disease, is “Journalists are Important!”. Today, this slogan has acquired a special meaning, because, for Ukrainians who are trying to save themselves from Russian aggression, objective information really saves lives, helps us to survive, and helps us unite to fight off our occupiers.   Sergiy Tomilenko is the President of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU) [post_title] => One year on: The Ukrainian media’s resilience to Russia’s full-scale invasion [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => one-year-on-the-ukrainian-medias-resilience-to-russias-full-scale-invasion [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-02-24 12:59:20 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-02-24 11:59:20 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6754 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [5] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6743 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-02-24 11:56:41 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-02-24 10:56:41 [post_content] => Russia’s brutal and unjustified war against Ukraine has damaged European security architecture irremediably. One year later, Ukraine is winning, Russia is losing, while the European Union and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are much stronger and united.    After Ukraine, Moldova is perhaps the most affected state, facing multiple challenges - amplified security threats, an unprecedented influx of refugees, massive trade disruptions, economic slowdown with an inflation rate exceeding 30 per cent in 2022, and a severe energy crisis. To increase energy security, Moldova has: connected to the EU's power grid together with Ukraine, sourced natural gas from the market, and stored in Romania and Ukraine, with support from the EU and other international partners.    Russia's hybrid aggression against Moldova has intensified using local political proxies, conducting cyberattacks, weaponising Moldova's energy dependency and promoting disinformation campaigns to destabilise the country. The EU and NATO are helping Moldova to increase its security and defence capabilities. For example, thanks to the EU's Peace Facility, Moldova's defence budget has doubled over the last year. Positive historical developments have also emerged, with Moldova and Ukraine being granted EU candidate status in June 2022.    Amidst new security risks, Russia’s plots to destabilise the country have been exposed with threats from the Kremlin implying Moldova could meet the same fate as Ukraine. In the meantime, a mid-term reshuffle by the governing majority took place. The newly-elected Moldovan government appointed on 16th February 2023, has to further increase the domestic institutional resilience to revive the economy. Moreover, Moldova also needs to expedite the implementation of domestic systemic reforms in the justice sector, as well as the EU approximation process aiming to start EU accession negotiations.    Moldova's resilience in the face of these multiple challenges is growing, but the country must continue to rely on international support to continue to overcome them and continue its path towards becoming part of the EU.   Iulian Groza is an expert in international relations, European affairs and good governance. He is a former Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Moldova in charge for European integration and international law. He was posted to Brussels at the Moldovan Mission to the EU. Currently, Groza leads the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE) - a Moldovan think-tank that aims at supporting the European integration process of the Republic of Moldova. He also is a Board member of the Institute for Strategic Initiatives (IPIS). Since 2022, Groza is of of the representatives of Moldovan civil society in the Supreme Security Council and the National Committee for European Integration chaired by the President of the Republic of Moldova. He holds a University Degree in Law. He also did postgraduate European Studies at Birmingham University and NATO Security Studies at SNSPA in Bucharest. He is fluent in English, Russian and Romanian (native) languages. Groza is a career diplomat and holds a diplomatic rank of Minister-Counsellor. He is also an FCO Chevening Scholar. [post_title] => One year on: The impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine on Moldova [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => one-year-on-the-impact-of-russias-war-in-ukraine-on-moldova [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-02-24 14:11:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-02-24 13:11:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6743 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [6] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6705 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-02-23 00:00:10 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-02-22 23:00:10 [post_content] => Summary: Ukraine is changing the world. The fact that India and Pakistan are selling arms and military consulting services in the Caucasus is symptomatic of the withering of the Russian military-industrial complex. However, Russia’s loss is not straightforwardly a Western triumph.   Russia’s 16 per cent share of the global military procurement market has an uncertain future as the war in Ukraine depletes its arms inventory. This development has global strategic implications as arms trade has been fundamental to Moscow’s claim to global power status. From Myanmar to Venezuela, the draining of Russian arms supply strips the Kremlin of its claim to global power. Russia’s sphere of influence is in this sense up for grabs, including the Caucasus, a region formerly regarded as ‘the Near Abroad,’ where the Kremlin had exclusive rather than merely privileged strategic oversight. Symptomatic of Russia’s strategic retreat is the advent of India and Pakistan as new arms suppliers.    India is in effect ‘stepping in’ for Russia in Armenia. Pursuing a post-colonial policy of self-reliance, New Delhi has insisted on co-production rights of the arms it buys. For decades, Russia has been India’s military-industrial partner, willing to share its most advanced weapons technology, offering good value for money as well as extending credit. As India’s economy grows, New Delhi accounts for ten per cent of the global military procurement market and Russia has claimed over 80 per cent of this Indian pie. The tables were turned as a result of the war in Ukraine. As Russia can no longer supply arms, Moscow’s clients have looked to India to fill the vacuum. India has obliged and post-Soviet Armenia is New Delhi’s first major customer. As Yerevan is transiting from its own reliance to Russia, Ukraine could turn ‘Made in India’ weapons into a global brand.   A reflection of this process can be seen in Baku. As Russia is losing the role of the preeminent arms supplier of post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Turkey is cementing its position, extending to its strategic partner arms, consulting, and training. Part of Ankara’s service package has been subcontracted to Pakistan, a key Turkish defence partner. Islamabad, in turn, is taking the chance to pitch jet fighters co-produced with China to Baku and, perhaps in time, Ankara. In sum, while we think of Ukraine as a polarising force that consolidates Western resolve, the withering of the Russian military-industrial complex is a crisis with disruptive consequences that cannot be fully contained. India, Turkey, France, Israel, and Pakistan are rushing to fill the Russian vacuum, snatch new lucrative contracts, and create partnerships that do not neatly fit our current diplomatic taxonomy of ‘East’ and ‘West.’ As value chains are disrupted, so is the global security system.   Read the full piece here.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   Ilya Roubanis (PhD, European University Institute) is a British-born International Relations analyst of Greek heritage. He is a fellow of the Observatory on Contemporary Crisis (Madrid) and the International Relations Institute in Athens (IDIS). For over a decade, he has worked in the South Caucasus as a government affairs consultant, risk analyst, and journalist.   Image by My Past under (CC). [post_title] => Old enemies make new friends: Caucasus and India-Pakistan rivalry [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => old-enemies-make-new-friends-caucasus-and-india-pakistan-rivalry [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-08-18 13:40:39 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-08-18 12:40:39 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6705 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [7] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6699 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-02-15 17:37:10 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-02-15 16:37:10 [post_content] =>

“The personal, physical, psychological and professional toll of fighting this case has been profound. But it’s not my win, it belongs to the legal team and the 28,887 people who stood alongside me. Banks could [...] appeal against Mrs Justice Steyn’s interpretation of the law. But not the facts.”[1]

– Carole Cadwalladr, June 2022

  STATUS: Ongoing– The case brought by Arron Banks against Carole Cadwalladr was initiated in July 2019, with a preliminary ruling on meaning in December 2019. The full trial was held in January 2022, and the ruling was handed down in Cadwalladr’s favour in July 2022. In February 2023, of the three claims under appeal the Court of Appeal found two in Cadwalladr’s favour and one in Banks. On April 28th, the Court of Appeal ordered Cadwalladr to pay banks £35,000 in damages, costs are yet to be decided.  
  In January 2022, Carole Cadwalladr, best known for her work uncovering the Facebook – Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018 and investigations into campaign funding around the 2016 Brexit referendum, spent five days in the Royal Courts of Justice defending herself against a libel claim brought by millionaire businessman and Leave.EU funder Arron Banks. Banks had filed a case against Cadwalladr in July 2019 regarding two tweets and two public talks she made between April and July 2019.   After a preliminary ruling in December 2019, in which the judge decided the legal meanings of the contested publications, Banks withdrew two of his claims in January 2020.[2] The judge had found the remaining claims, statements made within a TED talk and a tweet that linked to it, to mean that: “On more than one occasion Mr Banks told untruths about a secret relationship he had with the Russian Government in relation to acceptance of foreign funding of electoral campaigns in breach of the law on such funding”.[3] Cadwalladr, however, contested this interpretation, stating in an interview in 2020: “But these are not words I have ever said. On the contrary, I’ve always been very clear that there is no evidence that Banks accepted Russian funding”.[4] Ultimately, this impacted her defence strategy as she would need to prove the truth of the ‘legal meaning’ defined by the judge. As a result, in November 2020, Cadwalladr decided to drop the ‘truth defence’ and she had to pay Banks £62,000 in costs. Much was made of this by Cadwalladr’s detractors to imply she does not believe in her own reporting. Far less widely reported was the Judge’s comments calling Bank’s interpretation of the two claims he ultimately dropped “far-fetched and divorced from the specific context in which those words were used”.   Cadwalladr would ultimately go on to win, but her three-year battle came at great personal cost and was, as she has described, akin to stepping ‘into the pages of a Kafka novel’. The judgment handed down by Justice Steyn in June 2022 was heralded as a landmark case for media freedom, as a test case for the public interest defence. However, the judge also took the unprecedented step of stating she found it “neither fair nor apt” to describe the case as a SLAPP suit. Whilst Banks has strenuously denied that he had pursued a SLAPP, and his lawyers stated during the trial that “to suggest it was issued in bad faith simply to stop her reporting is a complete fabrication”, this is not a view shared by members of the UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition (whose co-chairs outlined why in a guest article for the Bar Council).[5]   Banks decided to sue Cadwalladr as an individual rather than The Observer, which published her original reporting, or TED, the publisher of her talk. It is this type of tactic that can characterise SLAPPs, not simply the merits of the claim. Isolated from institutional support and funding, Cadwalladr had to risk financial ruin and was only able to defend the case thanks to a successful crowdfunding campaign. Moreover, Cadwalladr wrote on twitter after her trial that in her case 180,000 documents had been subject to forensic keyword searches, narrowed down to 20,00, before 4,000 were ultimately handed over to the other side.   Aside from the pressure caused by the legal case itself, the case against Cadwalladr highlighted how there are wider pressures at play. Legal threats and SLAPP cases can feed into broader online harassment and trolling, coordinated or otherwise. Every time there has been a development in Cadwalladr’s case, there was also an influx in online abuse against her. The pattern of abuse Cadwalladr faced has been documented in a case study by UNESCO, which found that “55% of obvious abuse detected [as targeting] Cadwalladr occurs at the personal level. It was highly gendered and designed to hold her up to ridicule, humiliate, belittle and discredit”.[6] The UNESCO study concluded that “the online violence Carole Cadwalladr experienced is a feature of the enabling environment of her online legal harassment”.[7]   In November 2022, Cadwalladr spoke at length for the first time about her case and the impact it had on her at the UK Anti-SLAPP Conference, organised by FPC and our partners the Justice for Journalists Foundation and the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute. The conversation was moderated by Rebecca Vincent, Director of Operations and Campaigns at Reporters without Borders. The full event is available to watch here:   [embed]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A062SLhYhpI&ab_channel=ForeignPolicyCentre[/embed]   On 7th February 2023, Bank’s appeal, relating to three claims, was heard at the Court of Appeal in London, presided over by President of the King’s Bench Division Dame Victoria Sharp, Lord Justice Singh and Lord Justice Warby. [8]   Later that month, on 28th February, the appeal judgment was handed down, which found one claim in Banks’ favour and the other two in Cadwalladr’s. [9] In her original judgment, Judge Steyn had found that Cadwalladr’s public interest defence was no longer applicable after April 2020 (when the Electoral Commission found no evidence that Banks had committed any criminal offence), but that the continued publication of the TED Talk did not cause serious harm to his reputation. The appeal judges overturned this aspect of the ruling, finding that as there was “no public interest defence (nor any other defence) in respect of that period of publication it follows that the claimant is entitled to judgment for damages to be assessed in respect of the publication of the TED Talk” after April 2020.   Notably, the appeal judgment accepts that Cadwalladr is not the publisher of the TED Talk, stating: “Although the defendant has admitted responsibility for the publication of the words complained of up to trial, it is common ground that she is not able to control what the TED organisation does. There is an issue about the extent to which she should seek to persuade it to edit the TED Talk or cease publication of the talk in its current form.”   On 1 March 2023, members of the UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition issued a statement reiterating their support for Carole Cadwalladr and welcoming that the majority of the appeal had been dismissed.[10]  On April 28th, the Court of Appeal ordered Cadwalladr to pay banks £35,000 in damages, costs are yet to be decided.[11]   This case is covered in the London Calling report on pages: 20-21, 23, 62-66, 84 & 87.   [1] Carole Cadwalladr, Arron Banks almost crushed me in court. Instead, my quest for the facts was vindicated, The Guardian, June 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/commentisfree/2022/jun/19/arron-banks-set-out-to-crush-me-in-court-instead-my-quest-for-the-facts-was-vindicated [2] Owen Bowcott, Arron Banks drops two parts of libel claim against Carole Cadwalladr, The Guardian, January 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jan/23/arron-banks-drops-two-parts-of-libel-claim-against-carole-cadwalladr [3] Bailii, England and Wales High Court (Queen’s Bench Division) Decisions, Banks v Cadwalladr, December 2019. [4] Charlotte Tobitt, Carole Cadwalladr drops truth defence in Arron Banks libel battle but insists claims were in public interest, PressGazette, November 2020, https://pressgazette.co.uk/news/carole-cadwalladr-drops-truth-defence-in-arron-banks-libel-battle-but-insists-claims-were-in-public-interest [5] Co-Chairs of the UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition, SLAPP: A question of definition?, The Bar Council, June 2022, https://www.barcouncil.org.uk/resource/slapp-a-question-of-definition.html [6] Julie Posetti et al, Chapter 4 - Carole Cadwalladr: The networked gaslighting of a high-impact investigative reporter, Carole, UNESCO April 2021, https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/the-chilling_chapter4.pdf [7] Ibid. [8] Charlotte Tobitt, Appeal court told Carole Cadwalladr has ‘doubled down’ on Arron Banks ‘covert Russian relationship’ claim, PressGazette, February 2023, https://pressgazette.co.uk/media_law/carole-cadwalladr-arron-banks-libel-appeal/ [9] Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, Banks -v- Cadwalladr, February 28 2023, https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/banks-v-cadwalladr-3/ [10] Index on Censorship, UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition reiterates its support for Carole Cadwalladr, March 2023, https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2023/03/uk-anti-slapp-coalition-reiterates-its-support-for-carole-cadwalladr/ [11] Press Gazette, Charlotte Tobitt, 2nd May 2023, https://pressgazette.co.uk/media_law/arron-banks-wins-carole-cadwalladr-libel-appeal/ & Scribd, Paul Staines, 2nf May 2023, https://www.scribd.com/document/641654987/Cadwalladr-Ordered-to-Pay-Banks-35-000-Damages#   [post_title] => Carole Cadwalladr, Investigative Journalist [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => carole-cadwalladr-investigative-journalist [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-05-05 13:06:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-05-05 12:06:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6699 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [8] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6695 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-02-15 17:36:11 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-02-15 16:36:11 [post_content] =>

“Prigozhin’s SLAPP case against me was one of the most blatant SLAPP cases I’ve encountered, with evidence indicating it was a direct response to EU sanctions against Prigozhin in part referencing Bellingcat’s work as justification for the sanctions. I also found myself in the perverse situation of Prigozhin receiving sanctions relief from the UK Treasury so he could sue me for saying the thing that he was sanctioned for. It’s clear the current UK laws around SLAPPs are not fit for purpose, and urgent reform is needed.”

– Eliot Higgins, November 2022

  STATUS: Concluded – Filed in December 2021, the case was thrown out of court in April 2022. Ongoing questions remain around the granting of licences by the UK Government to allow Yevgeny Prigozhin to pursue the legal case in the UK, despite being under sanctions since 2020.  
  In December 2021, Eliot Higgins had a libel case filed against him in London by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch often referred to as ‘Putin’s Chef’. The claims related to five tweets, published in August 2020, in which the Bellingcat founder had linked to the investigations published by Bellingcat, CNN and Der Spiegel that reported on Prigozhin’s connections with the Wagner Group. None of the media outlets were sued. Prigozhin had been sanctioned by the UK Government in October 2020 for significant foreign mercenary activity in Libya and multiple breaches of the UN arms embargo, which has been linked to the Wagner Group, a private military company.[1] At the time, Prigozhin denied any association with the Wagner Group, which was also sanctioned in March 2022.[2]   At an early hearing, on 23rd March 2022, Edward Miller from Discreet Law LLP successfully applied to withdraw the law firm from representing Prigozhin and asked for said withdrawal to be discussed in private with the judge as it regarded confidential information.[3] The first substantive hearing in the case was scheduled for 13th April 2022 but was postponed due to a last minute request from Prigozhin due to his lack of legal representation. On 18th May 2022, Justice Nicklin struck out the claim from the High Court as Prigozhin repeatedly failed to comply with court orders.[4] According to a press release by Higgins’ lawyers McCue Jury and Partners: “This followed [Prigozhin’s] legal representatives, Discreet Law, withdrawing due—according to Prigozhin—the increased negative attention representing Prigozhin would attract following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine”.[5]   In order for a person under sanctions to be able to pay for legal services in the UK, they would have needed a licence from the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) in HM Treasury. It was initially thought that this licence was given as Prigozhin succeeded in serving Higgins with the lawsuit in London’s High Court, however how this process had happened was unclear until January 2023 (see reference to the openDemocracy article below).[6] However, Higgins’ lawyers also noted in their May 2022 press release: “Discreet Law did not see through the request to HM Treasury for a licence for payment on account of costs that would have enabled Higgins to enforce any costs order issued by the Court against Prigozhin.” This means that Higgins’ was left out of pocket for this failed case against him.   Higgins’ lawyers statement also confirmed that they had made a complaint to the SRA and acknowledged that “Free Speech NGOs, such as FPC and Index on Censorship, recognise Prigozhin’s case against Mr Higgins as a Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPP).”[7] In September 2022, Higgins posted a twitter thread in which he pointed out that Prigozhin has now admitted his involvement with Wagner and cited it as “a perfect example of how crooks like Prigozhin get to game the UK legal system to attack genuine investigative work”.[8]   In November 2022, Eliot Higgins’ lawyer, Matthew Jury, spoke at an evening event Legal intimidation, legal ethics & the role of lawyers? held as part of the UK Anti-SLAPP Conference, organised by FPC and our partners the Justice for Journalists Foundation and the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute. The full event is available to watch here.   In January 2023, the case came to prominence again when openDemocracy published an article titled ‘Revealed: UK government helped sanctioned Putin ally sue British journalist’, in which it was revealed that OFSI had granted licences for Discreet Law to work on behalf of Prigozhin, and moreover agreed for lawyers to travel to St Petersburg to meet with Prigozhin to discuss the case.[9]   FPC’s Director Susan Coughtrie was quoted in the article, stating that the decision-making process for granting licences needed “much closer scrutiny”.   “This could not be more pertinent now, with many more individuals sanctioned in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine,” … “We need assurances from the UK government, which has already committed to addressing SLAPPs, that sanctioned individuals will not be given licence to abuse the UK courts to bully journalists and suppress information in the public interest.”   In a subsequent House of Lords Digital and Communications Select Committee session on the 24th January, FPC’s Director raised Higgins’ case and the concerns around the granting of licences by OFSI to sanctioned individuals to pursue SLAPP cases in the UK. The session can be watched here.   This development in Higgins’ case subsequently provoked considerably outcry in Parliament where it was raised by several MPs and Peers, with David Lammy MP filing an urgent question in the House of Commons asking the Secretary of State for the Foreign Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs to make a statement regarding the UK’s involvement in assisting Prigozhin.[10] In response, the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury, James Cartlidge, stated that the government was committed to SLAPPs reform and regarding sanctioned individuals he added: “we will undertake an internal review to see how such cases are considered in the future.”[11]   This case is covered in the London Calling report on pages: 23, 34, 38-39, 80, & 86-87.   [1] FCDO, UK sanctions Alexey Navalny’s poisoners, Gov.uk, October 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-alexey-navalnys-poisoners [2] FCDO, Foreign Secretary announces 65 new Russian sanctions to cut off vital industries fueling Putin’s war machine, Gov.uk, March 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-announces-65-new-russian-sanctions-to-cut-off-vital-industries-fuelling-putins-war-machine [3] Ibid. [4] Jonathan Ames, ‘Putin’s chef’ loses court case against Bellingcat founder, The Times, May 2022, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/putins-chef-loses-court-case-against-bellingcat-founder-cvnmjghvg [5] McCue, Jury & Partners, Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s SLAPP action against Bellingcat founder is struck out, May 2022, https://www.mccue-law.com/yevgeniy-prigozhins-action-against-bellingcat-founder-struck-out/ [6] CoE’s Safety of Journalists Platform, British Journalist Eliot Higgins Facing SLAPP from Russian Oligarch in London, April 2022, https://fom.coe.int/en/alerte/detail/107637414;globalSearch=true [7] McCue, Jury & Partners, Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s SLAPP action against Bellingcat founder is struck out, May 2022, https://www.mccue-law.com/yevgeniy-prigozhins-action-against-bellingcat-founder-struck-out/ [8] Eliot Higgins, Twitter Post, September 2022, https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/1442501201468264452 [9] Jim Fitzpatrick, Revealed: UK government helped sanctioned Putin ally sue British journalist’, openDemocracy, January 2023, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/prigozhin-government-russia-ukraine-hack-libel-slapp/ [10] House of Commons, Urgent Question: Wagner Group: Sanctions Regime, Hansard, January 2023, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2023-01-25/debates/54EFDF55-C956-45FC-8500-C47444EAF09F/WagnerGroupSanctionsRegime [11] Ibid. [post_title] => Eliot Higgins, founder of Bellingcat, an open source news agency [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => eliot-higgins-founder-of-bellingcat-an-open-source-news-agency [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-02-15 18:43:34 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-02-15 17:43:34 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6695 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [9] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6692 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-02-15 17:35:42 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-02-15 16:35:42 [post_content] =>

“The cases really show just how important it is that there are better defences for journalists. No matter how good the sourcing is on some of these claims, and no matter how great the public interest, the cases are just too expensive to defend. The system is stacked in favour of deep pocketed litigants from the outset. My cases are now pretty well known, but they are just the tip of an iceberg; there are journalists who have been censoring themselves, particularly about the activities of Russian oligarchs, for a very long time…”[1]

– Catherine Belton, March 2022

  STATUS: Concluded – Four cases filed between May-March 2021, meaning hearing in July, during which two cases were settled, one case discontinued in November and the last case settled in December 2021.  
  Catherine Belton and her publisher HarperCollins were subject to several legal cases in connection to the book ‘Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West’, published in 2020. Between March/May 2021, four Russian oligarchs and the Russian state owned oil company, Rosneft, stated their intention to sue. Of these five cases, four made it to a preliminary hearing held in July 2021. During this hearing, HarperCollins decided to settle two of the cases, which had only been brought against them, by the Russian billionaires, Petr Aven and Mikhail Fridman. They claimed the book contained inaccurate personal data concerning them, with Fridman also suing for libel. HarperCollins agreed to make minor amendments to wording within four paragraphs and a footnote in future editions of the book, but there was no acceptance that the texts had been defamatory.   In November 2021, the judgments regarding the ‘legal meaning’ in the cases brought by the Roman Abramovich and Rosneft were handed down by Justice Tipples. In relation to the claims brought by Rosneft, Justice Tipples found that three of the four passages complained about were not defamatory and two days later Rosneft decided to discontinue its claim.[2] In relation to the claims brought by Abramovich, Justice Tipples ruled against Abramovich on one meaning claiming that the book meant that he had a corrupt relationship with Putin. Instead, she found the book said that he was under Putin’s control. However, on other meanings she ruled that the allegations in the book were presented as statements of fact, rather than expressions of opinion, and would have needed to be defended as such at trial.[3]   A month later, on 22nd December 2021, it was announced that Abramovich had decided to settle the case with HarperCollins and Belton.[4] The settlement meant that both sides covered their own legal fees and no damages were awarded, minor amendments were made but the main claims remained intact in the book.[5] As part of the settlement, HarperCollins agreed to make a payment to charity in relation to one error involving Abramovich’s ownership of the company Sibneft. In a statement the publisher offered an apology that “some aspects of the book were not as clear as they would have liked them to have been and are happy to have now clarified the text”, adding: “While the book always included a denial that Mr Abramovich was acting under anybody’s direction when he purchased Chelsea, the new edition will include a more detailed explanation of Mr Abramovich’s motivations for buying the club.”[6] In an additional statement shared by HarperCollins, the publisher commented that they had been “under attack” from five oligarchs and a state owned oil company all with “vast resources at his disposal”, and stressed that “each of these claims has been resolved with no damages or costs payable by HarperCollins”.[7] HarperCollins and Catherine Belton’s lawyer Caroline Kean, a partner at the law firm Wiggin, later commented that while she had “worked on cases as complex as one of these…never ever have we come across a coordinated attack on a book in this way”.[8]   In June 2021, Abramovich had also lodged a defamation action against HarperCollins in Australia and, while that was withdrawn as part of the settlement, HarperCollins asked the Australian courts to rule on whether filing the same claims in two jurisdictions was an abuse of process. It has been estimated that if the libel trial had gone ahead in the High Court and Australia the legal bill was likely to have exceeded over £5 million. While the cases linked to Putin’s People were significant in highlighting the issue of SLAPPs in the UK, they also demonstrated issues within the UK media for reporting on complex legal cases. In March 2022, while giving oral evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Belton noted that “On the Abramovich case, we were able to keep in the book most of the main claims that he attacked. For instance, on the Chelsea purchase, when we settled, Mr Abramovich’s presspeople got most of the UK press to write that we had admitted that it was a false claim and that it had been removed from the book. In fact, that wasn’t the case— far from it. In fact, that claim is still there— the quotes are still there.”[9]   At an event held at the Frontline Club, in February 2022, Arabella Pike, Publishing Director at HarperCollins, has commented on how there were a number of “disobliging” articles in the tabloid press that “utterly distorted” what had happened in court. Pike acknowledged that they were perhaps not adequately prepared for the challenge of informing journalists “up against a deadline to get 800 words up on to a website, within half an hour, [how] to deal with an 80 page, very complex legal judgement.” How a case is reported is important, because otherwise it can play into a spinning exercise by the claimant, which further undermines the journalists’ credibility, even if as in Belton’s case, the changes were very minor and the main thrust of the claims under question remained in the book.   The use of GDPR claims by Fridman and the Aven, was also an interesting aspect to these cases. Belton, again in her oral evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, stated: “In the Fridman and the Aven cases, for instance, they were essentially using GDPR claims…to whitewash their histories… It was a reputation issue for [Aven]. He did not want to be seen as having supported Putin in any way. However, because he personally was behind on the statute of limitations [for libel]—it was already beyond the year, his lawyers issued a data protection claim saying it was inaccurate. It was accurate. It was an issue of reputation rather than accuracy.” Belton added: “The changes we made were absolutely tiny, but again, they made much hay of this in the press, claiming victory even though we had made very small changes indeed. Essentially, these changes were made because we had too many cases to deal with and not because there was anything wrong or we couldn’t defend them.”[10] To note, there is a much longer statute of limitations on filing a GDPR claim of six years, compared to one year for libel cases.   All the claimants who brought cases against Belton and HarperCollins have since been sanctioned in the aftermath of the Russian invasion in Ukraine in February 2022. Speaking to the Committee for the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill in October 2022, Belton explained: “The UK, like many other countries, really welcomed capital from places like Russia with open arms for the past twenty years. It’s certainly a place that Russian oligarchs have flocked to, partly because they want to be part of the UK establishment, but partly because they have obviously taken advantage of our lax legislation and lax regulation… Without enabling journalists, and other financial watchdogs to look at these entities without fear of getting crushed by enormous lawsuits, that are going to cost more than anyone’s budget allows, then we are going to be open to this type of abuse of our system forever.”[11]   In November 2022, Catherine Belton spoke at an evening event “The Great Enabler: SLAPPs, Sanctions and the UK's Kleptocracy Problem” held as part of the UK Anti-SLAPP Conference, organised by FPC and our partners the Justice for Journalists Foundation and the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute. The event was chaired by Edward Lucas, Author and Fellow at CEPA, and speaking alongside Belton were Galina Arapova (Media Defence Lawyer from Russia), Franz Wild, (Editor of The Enablers Project at The Bureau for Investigative Journalists) and Dame Margaret Hodge MP (Chair of the APPG on Anti-Corruption and Responsible Tax).   [video width="1280" height="720" mp4="https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Catherine.mp4"][/video]   The full event is available to watch here.   These cases are covered in the London Calling report on pages: 21, 29, 33-40, 46, 60, 62, 65-66, 68, 84 & 90.   [1] Foreign Affairs Committee, Oral evidence: Use of strategic lawsuits against public participation, HC 1196, House of Commons, Tuesday 15 March 2022, https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/9907/pdf/ [2] Judgement in Rosneft v HarperCollins and Catherine Belton, [2021] EWHC 3141 (QB), November 2021, https://www.judiciary.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2021/11/Rosneft-v-HarperCollins-judgment-241121.pdf [3] Judgement in Abramovich v HarperCollins and Catherine Belton, [2021] EWHC 3154 (QB), November 2021, https://www.judiciary.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2021/11/Abramovich-v-HarperCollins-judgment-241121.pdf [4] Luke Harding, Roman Abramovich settles libel claim over Putin biography, December 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/22/roman-abramovich-settles-libel-claim-over-putin-biography [5] Catherine Belton, Twitter post, Twitter December 2021, https://twitter.com/CatherineBelton/status/1473825261774901252 [6] HarperCollins, Putin’s People: settlement reached in Roman Abramovich v HarperCollins and Catherine Belton, December 2021, https://corporate.harpercollins.co.uk/press-releases/putins-people-settlement-reached-in-roman-abramovich-v-harpercollins-and-catherine-belton/ [7] HarperCollins UK, Twitter post, Twitter, December 2021, https://twitter.com/HarperCollinsUK/status/1473598851307413509/photo/1 [8] Comments by Caroline Kean, at a Frontline Club event (20 min mark). [9] Foreign Affairs Committee, Oral evidence: Use of strategic lawsuits against public participation, HC 1196, House of Commons, Tuesday 15 March 2022, https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/9907/pdf/ [10] Ibid. [11] Catherine Belton, Oral Evidence to the Committee for the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, parliamentlive.tv, October 2022, https://parliamentlive.tv/event/index/e93a30e9-e069-4d0f-9637-5403c7b735b2 [post_title] => Catherine Belton, Journalist and Author of ‘Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West’ [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => catherine-belton-journalist-and-author-of-putins-people-how-the-kgb-took-back-russia-and-then-took-on-the-west [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-02-15 18:26:59 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-02-15 17:26:59 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6692 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [10] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6689 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-02-15 17:34:37 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-02-15 16:34:37 [post_content] =>

“Winning these cases,settling them and making them go away is not a complete victory. There is money that will not be got back that could have been spent on other books… [and] there is always a danger, as I know from conversations with colleagues, that you become an expensive and problematic journalist. In an era when the newspaper business model remains broken and oligarchs are amassing more and more wealth, this inequality of arms is extraordinary.”[1]

– Tom Burgis, March 2022

  STATUS: Concluded – Two cases filed in the UK in August 2021, one thrown out of court and the other retracted in March 2022.  
  Tom Burgis was subject to two legal cases relating to the publication of his book, ‘Kleptopia: How dirty money is conquering the world’, and related newspaper articles published in the Financial Times (FT).[2] The Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Limited (ENRC), whose business dealings are examined in Kleptopia, first initiated a case in the US courts against the US arm of HarperCollins seeking disclosure of wide-ranging information relating to Burgis’ book in September 2020.[3] In August 2021, ENRC launched legal action in the UK, claiming Burgis and HarperCollins had made a series of ‘untrue’ and ‘highly damaging’ allegations made about the company. Burgis was also jointly named in a separate legal case against his employer, the FT, in relation to articles they published related to the issues raised in Burgis’ book. To note, ENRC has initiated more than 18 legal proceedings in the US and the UK, against journalists, lawyers, investigators and the Serious Fraud Office.[4]   At a meaning hearing, held on 2nd March 2022, Justice Nicklin dismissed ENRC’s case against Burgis and HarperCollins finding their claim that Burgis had defamed the company was without merit as only individuals can commit murder, not corporations. The judge awarded £50,000 in costs against ENRC and refused the company permission to appeal.[5] Burgis stated at the time, “It’s harder to imagine a higher public interest than reporting on the deaths of potential witnesses in a major criminal corruption case. I’m delighted that this attack on our journalism has failed”.[6] Meanwhile, HarperCollins reaffirmed its commitment to “defend our authors in the face of legal attacks from those who would seek to use the UK courts to silence them”.[7]   In his oral evidence on SLAPPs at the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in March 2022, Burgis explained that; “What is happening here is that, especially in this moment when we are realising what a terrible threat dirty money is in our democracy, we turn to journalists and say ‘Ride to the rescue, This is your job. Please root out the dirty money wherever it is’, and what do we find? Our greatest obstacles are not GRU [the russian military agency] hit squads or cyber-attack teams; it is firms in London working, day in day out, to attack free speech in the interest of very rich and powerful people who rightly deserve scrutiny”.[8]   Less than two weeks after Justice Nicklin’s judgment, ENRC withdrew its remaining case against Burgis and the FT on 14th March. Roula Khalaf, FT Editor, stated in response: “I’m pleased to hear of ENRC’s decision to withdraw a claim that was always without merit and had put Tom Burgis under enormous strain. The FT and all our reporters, including Tom, will continue to investigate the activities of businesses and individuals, however powerful or wealthy.”[9]   Burgis’ case also sheds light on the psychological effects of these cases, and just how early in the process they begin. As part of his oral evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, he also detailed the tactics used by lawyers in the pre-action stage: “The psychological pressure that these firms begin to bear is really clever. The letters – such as those from Carter-Rusk, Schillings, Mishcon de Reya, Taylor Wessing and so on – are often written in a tone of righteous indignation, where the ‘journalist’ has behaved appallingly and in bad faith. There is never any question of, say, having made an honest mistake. I have spent quite a long time trying to realise why so many journalists – even really courageous ones – will recoil and walk away from a story when a letter from one of these firms comes in. it is because you risk humiliation in the public square. The letters go to your editors, publishers and lawyers, and you are cast as the most monstrous, scheming and corrupt version of yourself. That is how it works, quite apart from the massive threat of the costs''.[10]   In November 2022, Burgis spoke about his experiences on a panel “The UK’s Anti-SLapp Reforms - a big enough step in the right direction?,” at the 2nd UK Anti-SLAPP Conference, organised by FPC with our partners the Justice for Journalists Foundation and the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute.   [video width="1280" height="720" mp4="https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Tom.mp4"][/video]   The full panel discussion is available to watch here.   These cases are covered in the London Calling report on pages: 21, 36-37, 41, 61-62, 64, 66, 68 & 84.   [1] Foreign Affairs Committee, Oral evidence: Use of strategic lawsuits against public participation, HC 1196, House of Commons, Tuesday 15 March 2022, https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/9907/pdf/ [2] Index on Censorship, Index condemns lawsuits brought by ENRC against Tom Burgis, October 2021, https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2021/10/index-condemns-lawsuits-brought-by-enrc-against-tom-burgis/ [3] Reporters ’Committee for Freedom of the Press, In Re: Ex parte Application of ENRC Limited Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Leave to Take Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, December 2020, https://www.rcfp.org/briefs-comments/enrc-harper-collins-section-1782/ [4] Index on Censorship, Index and 21 other organisations condemn lawsuits brought by ENRC against public watchdogs, June 2021, https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2021/06/lawsuits-brought-by-enrc-against-uk-serious-fraud-office-and-dechert-llp/ [5] Dominic Casciani, Journalist wins ‘kleptocrat’ book High Court libel case, BBC News, March 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-60595266 [6] Jane Croft, ENRC drops lawsuit against FT and journalist Tom Burgis, Financial Times, March 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/289f2603-1069-4554-af29-8d0af072edd2 [7] HarperCollins UK, Twitter post, Twitter, March 2022, https://twitter.com/HarperCollinsUK/status/1499050568232353793?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw [8] Foreign Affairs Committee, Oral evidence: Use of strategic lawsuits against public participation, HC 1196, House of Commons, Tuesday 15 March 2022, https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/9907/pdf/ [9] Jane Croft, ENRC drops lawsuit against FT and journalist Tom Burgis, Financial Times, March 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/289f2603-1069-4554-af29-8d0af072edd2 [10] Foreign Affairs Committee, Oral evidence: Use of strategic lawsuits against public participation, HC 1196, House of Commons, Tuesday 15 March 2022, https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/9907/pdf/ [post_title] => Tom Burgis, Investigative journalist and author of ‘Kleptopia: How dirty money is conquering the world’ [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => tom-burgis-investigative-journalist-and-author-of-kleptopia-how-dirty-money-is-conquering-the-world [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-02-15 18:21:29 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-02-15 17:21:29 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6689 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [11] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6686 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-02-15 17:33:53 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-02-15 16:33:53 [post_content] =>

“Over the last 18 months, I have lived the increasingly too-common life of an investigative journalist who splits his time between researching and writing articles and tending to a lawsuit.”[1]

– Scott Stedman, April 2022

  STATUS: Settled – Began in July 2020, with a preliminary judgment on jurisdiction in January 2021 and a Court of Appeal judgment in December 2021. Ahead of a court hearing scheduled for 2 March 2023, it was confirmed that the case had been settled, with written statements being published on the Forensic News website, as well as the Twitter accounts of Scott Stedman and the other involved journalists. The seven articles and one podcast episode that formed the basis of the SLAPP have been taken down and will no longer be publicly available.  
  Forensic News, an investigative news website, its founder Scott Stedman and several of its journalists, all based in the United States, have been subject to legal action in the UK brought by British-Israeli security consultant and businessman Walter Soriano since July 2020. Soriano made five claims in relation to data protection, libel, misuse of private information, harassment, and malicious falsehoods, relating to ten internet publications and various social media postings published between June 2019 and June 2020.   Forensic News started writing about Soriano after he was summoned by the US Senate Intelligence Committee, which was reportedly interested in Soriano’s connections to several people of interest. This included the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, a former business associate of Donald Trump’s campaign chairman Paul Manafort.[2] In evidence given to the US Congress in April 2022, Stedman noted that US based lawyers for Mr Deripaska initially wrote to him and threatened legal action while also demanding that Stedman provide information about his sources. However, legal action against Stedman and Forensic News, based in California, where strong anti-SLAPP legislation is in place, never materialised.[3]   In January 2021, a preliminary ruling on jurisdiction in the UK dismissed the GDPR, harassment and malicious falsehood claims, but allowed Soriano to proceed with his libel claim and privacy claim (although this latter claim only pending the success of a libel claim).[4] In December 2021, in what is believed to be the first appellate decision on the territorial reach of the UK GDPR, the Court of Appeal overturned the earlier ruling and gave Soriano permission to bring a data protection claim.[5] The court held that subscriptions to the news site, facilitated through the Patreon platform – paid in sterling or euros – amounted to ‘stable arrangements’ to satisfy article 3(1) of the GDPR.[6] According to court documents, since opening up its Patreon subscriptions from USD only in August 2020, Forensic News had received 3 Patreon subscriptions in EUR and 3 in GBP.[7]   As a result of losing the December 2021 appeal, Forensic News owes Soriano ‘tens of thousands’ in costs.[8] As Stedman explained in his testimony to Congress: “For over a year, we contested the jurisdiction of the lawsuit. I have never stepped foot in the United Kingdom. Forensic News has no corporate presence in the UK and the vast majority of my readers are in the US”.[9] Yet there is an expectation that the defendants should pay the claimant for losing this appeal, before even reaching a trial. Currently, the cases are only continuing against the outlet, Stedman and one of his colleagues, with the other contributors having decided to settle. Mr Soriano has denied all wrongdoing alleged against him.The next hearing is expected on 2nd-3rd March 2023.   In November 2022, Forensic News founder Scott Stedman spoke on the panel “SLAPPs in today's independent investigative media landscape” held as part of the UK Anti-SLAPP Conference, organised by FPC and our partners the Justice for Journalists Foundation and the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute.   [video width="1280" height="720" mp4="https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Scott.mp4"][/video]   The full event is available to watch here.   This case is covered in the London Calling report on pages: 30-31, 60 & 65.   [1] Helsinki Commission, Helsinki Committee session on ‘Countering Oligarchs, Enablers, and Lawfare’, YouTube, April 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0YPcXB1W8I [2] Index on Censorship, Fifteen organisations condemn lawsuit against Forensic News, deeming it a SLAPP, February 2022, https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2022/02/organisations-condemn-forensic-news-lawsuit-as-slapp/ [3] Helsinki Commission, Helsinki Committee session on ‘Countering Oligarchs, Enablers, and Lawfare’, YouTube, April 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0YPcXB1W8I [4] ​​Bailii, England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions, Soriano v Forensic News, LLC & Ors (Rev1) [2021] EWCA Civ 1952 (21 December 2021), https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2021/1952.html [5] Sam Tobin, Landmark jurisdiction ruling on data protection and libel claims, Law Gazette, December 2021, https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/landmark-jurisdiction-ruling-on-data-protection-and-libel-claims/51110 [6] Ibid. [7] England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions, Soriano v Forensic News LLC & Ors (Rev1) [2021] EWCA/ Civ/2021/ 1952. (21 December 2021), https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2021/1952.html [8] Helsinki Commission, Helsinki Committee session on ‘Countering Oligarchs, Enablers, and Lawfare’, YouTube, April 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0YPcXB1W8I [9] Ibid. [post_title] => Forensic News, a US based investigative news website, its founder Scott Stedman and others [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => forensic-news-a-us-based-investigative-news-website-its-founder-scott-stedman-and-others [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-05-04 14:06:36 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-05-04 13:06:36 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6686 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [12] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6683 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-02-15 17:32:17 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-02-15 16:32:17 [post_content] =>

“We started to do a really basic story, and this is what many people ask, when they look into our case and say ‘Oh, why are you being sued?’ and we kind of ask ourselves the same question… It’s a fairly basic due diligence story. We thought it was a good story, in the public interest… but nothing special really. But then we started to approach the company and ask questions. Quite soon, instead of returning with answers from a PR agency, we got these law firm letters saying we should not proceed with publication”.[1]

– Per Agerman, November 2021

  STATUS: Concluded – The case was filed in November 2020, with a jurisdictional hearing in March 2021, the judgment for which was handed down in May 2022. A follow up hearing was anticipated in spring 2023, but the case was settled out of court in January 2023.  
  Realtid, a Swedish business publication, its editor and two of its journalists were subject to legal action in London for their investigations into the business affairs of the Monaco-based Swedish businessman, Svante Kumlin. Realtid had been investigating Kumlin’s group of companies, Eco Energy World (EEW), ahead of an impending stock market launch in Norway. Although Realtid’s public interest investigation was published in Swedish for a Swedish readership, the case was nevertheless filed in the UK in November 2020.   Swedish freedom of expression campaigners have pointed out that despite the negligibility of Realtid’s readership outside of Sweden, Kumlin chose to pursue claims in foreign jurisdictions but not in Sweden itself. Under Swedish law it is not possible to sue journalists independently of their publication. Two of the journalists, Per Agerman and Annelie Östlund, and the editor-in-chief, Camilla Jonsson, are also being sued personally.[2] Kumlin’s London-based solicitors, TLT, also warned the journalists in the early communication of the potential for criminal defamation proceedings to be pursued in Monaco in what has been seen as exceptionally heavy-handed effort to stop their reporting.   The justification put forward for the libel claim, estimated to be worth more than £13 million, to be heard in the UK is that Kumlin resides in the UK part-time, while his company EEW Energy, listed as a second plaintiff, is registered in London (since 2019). A hearing to decide the jurisdiction admissibility was held on 24th and 25th March 2021, presided over by Justice Julian Knowles. On 11th May 2022, 15 months after the jurisdiction hearing took place, Justice Knowles ruled that the courts of England and Wales do not have jurisdiction over ten of the 13 defamation claims.[3] EEW was precluded from bringing its claim over five different articles on the basis that it did not show that it suffered serious financial loss stemming from Realtid’s publications, is proceeding with the case as an individual on only three of the original eight articles he sued over, but these actions have been restricted to claiming for any harm he suffered in England and Wales. In his judgment Mr Justice Knowles concluded that Kumlin “has failed to displace the general position that his centre of interests is Monaco, where he is habitually resident.”[4]   English courts have appeared to allow libel cases to proceed so long as a foreign claimant can show a reputation in the UK, for example owning a home, business dealing, children in the school in this jurisdiction, or some other personal or business interest will suffice. The bar to meet the criteria to bring a case therefore seems to have become problematically low, not taking into account those with ample funds who cannot only easily set up businesses to purchase businesses in the UK, but also effectively buy residency and eventually citizenship via investment visas.[5] The UK is also home to companies ready to facilitate these services for those rich enough to afford it.[6]   It is worth noting that at the time that case was filed at the High Court against Realtid and its journalists, the UK was still a member of the EU and part to the Lugano Convention, which meant that previously it was more straightforward to bring cases against defendants domiciled in states party to the convention.[7] When the Brexit transition period ended on 31st December 2020, the UK also was no longer subject to the Lugano Convention and as of yet its request to rejoin has not been granted by the EU. This means that moving forward English courts will have to rule on the appropriateness of EU-based claimants bringing action in the UK. This would place a great deal of importance on English Courts to ensure that defamation cases heard in England are there for a legitimate reason and not for the plaintiff to try to take advantage of benefits of the jurisdiction, namely substantial damages and high costs for defendants.[8]   In January 2023, Realtid announced that a settlement had been reached, with Mr Kumlin paying further money towards Realtid's costs, and the publication publishing an apology alongside the 3 remaining articles that were under claim. Its states: "After the publication of this and other articles about Mr Kumlin, and following the resolution of legal action, Realtid wishes to make clear that the article is not intended to suggest that Mr Kumlin, whether directly or through any of the companies mentioned, has engaged in any wrongful conduct and we are happy to apologise to Mr Kumlin for any personal distress caused to him by our reporting. We are pleased to be able to resolve Mr Kumlin’s complaint by this clarification and apology and save as clarified in this statement concerning Mr Kumlin and his activities, we stand by our reporting of this and related articles and have not made any amendments to their content.”[9]   The result of this settlement means that all of the articles remain online with no changes apart from the addition of the apology. The investigative journalists Agerman and Östlund, in comments made to FPC in January 2023, stated that they remain free now to do more research, publish more articles and to speak about their experiences during the case. They have expressed that a settlement had not been their first choice, considering that so many things had gone their way and with the huge support and backing they received from organisations and individuals. However, they also noted, that had it not been for the support of British NGOs, they would have been forced – two years ago – to remove articles that they still see no reason to amend. They would not have had a chance to defend their investigation. This is a chance that is unfortunately not available to every defendant, and even they cannot reclaim the full financial cost nor the emotional or professional impact the case has had on the last two years of their life. As they themselves have aptly noted, press freedom should not be a question of money.   In November 2022, Annelie Östlund spoke about the case and the impact it had  at the UK Anti-SLAPP Conference, organised by FPC and our partners the Justice for Journalists Foundation and the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute.   [video width="1280" height="720" mp4="https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Annelie.mp4"][/video]   The full event is available to watch here.   This case is covered in the London Calling report on pages: 25-26, 43, 86 & 90.   [1] Per Agerman, Speaking at the first UK Anti-SLAPP Conference, November 2021, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oh2V02KRPTU&ab_channel=ForeignPolicyCentre [2] Index on Censorship, SLAPP lawsuit against Swedish magazine Realtid filed in London, December 2020, https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2020/12/slapp-lawsuit-against-swedish-magazine-realtid-filed-in-london/ [3] Bailii, England and Wales High Court (Queen’s Bench Division) Decisions, Kumlin & Anor v Jonsson & Ors [2022] EWHC 1095 (QB), May 2022, https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2022/1095.html&query=(title:(+kumlin+)) [4] Bailii, England and Wales High Court (Queen’s Bench Division) Decisions, Kumlin & Anor v Jonsson & Ors [2022] EWHC 1095 (QB), May 2022, https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2022/1095.html&query=(title:(+kumlin+)) [5] Susan Coughtrie, The UK as a Key Nexus for protecting media freedom and preventing corruption globally, FPC, December 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/the-uk-as-a-key-nexus-for-protecting-media-freedom-and-preventing-corruption-globally/ [6] Transparency International UK, At your Service, October 2019, https://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/at-your-service [7] “The Lugano Convention 2007 is an international treaty negotiated by the EU on behalf of its member states (and by Denmark separately because it has an opt-out) with Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. It attempts to clarify which national courts have jurisdiction in cross-border civil and commercial disputes and ensure that judgments taken in such disputes can be enforced across borders. The UK has applied to accede to the convention as an independent member now that it has left the EU. This would require the agreement of all signatories, but the EU has recommended that member states to say no to the UK’s accession.” -– See: UK in a Changing Europe, What is the Lugano Convention?, May 2021, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-facts/what-is-the-lugano-convention/ [8] Nik Williams, Laurens Hueting and Paulina Milewska, the increasing rise, and impact of SLAPPs, strategic lawsuit against public participation, FPC, December 2020 https://fpc.org.uk/the-increasing-rise-and-impact-of-slapps-strategic-lawsuits-against-public-participation/ [9] Realtid, Realtid och Kumlin har förlikats, January 2023,  https://www.realtid.se/realtid-och-kumlin-har-forlikats/ [post_title] => Realtid, a Swedish business publication, its editor and two investigative journalists [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => realtid-a-swedish-business-publication-its-editor-and-two-investigative-journalists [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-02-15 18:11:15 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-02-15 17:11:15 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6683 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [13] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6680 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-02-15 17:31:27 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-02-15 16:31:27 [post_content] =>

“So, how does a Romanian reporter —or, for that matter, any foreign journalist— get sued in the United Kingdom by an Azerbaijani politician for an article about corruption taking place hundreds of miles away?”[1]

– Paul Radu, February 2020

  STATUS: Concluded – Case filed in 2018 and later withdrawn by the claimant in January 2020, reaching a settlement the eve of the trial.  
  Paul Radu, investigative journalist and co-founder of OCCRP, was pursued through the London libel courts between 2018-2020 by Javanshir Feyziyev, a sitting Azerbaijani MP and businessman named in the investigation The Azerbaijani Laundromat.   The Azerbaijani Laundromat investigation, published by OCCRP in September 2017, revealed a “complex money-laundering operation and slush fund that handled $2.9 billion over a two-year period through four shell companies registered in the UK.”[2] OCCRP reported that between 2012-14 members of Azerbaijan’s political elite used these funds to “pay off European politicians, buy luxury goods, launder money, and otherwise benefit themselves.”[3] This was happening at a time of severe crackdown within Azerbaijan itself, where independent media and wider civil society continues to be subject to tight restrictions.   Despite Radu being a Romanian citizen and OCCRP being registered as an outlet in the US, Feyziyev was able to pursue Radu in UK courts. The plaintiff, despite being a sitting MP in Azerbaijan, appeared to have been able to establish a standing because he has property in the UK and has family members who live here full time. As Radu has himself pointed out: “London is a major real-estate hub that attracts the wealthy and powerful from all over the world — including many people of interest to those reporting on corruption… and it’s not hard to demonstrate a few British IP addresses accessed the investigative materials.”[4]   Part of the reason the UK remains an attractive jurisdiction is that it is seen as easier to win libel cases in than other parts of the world. This is largely because the ‘burden of proof’ in a UK libel case is on the defendant – i.e. it is not up to the plaintiff to prove that the statement in question is false, rather the defendant must prove that the statement is true – which is often a far harder task than it might at first appear.[5] Investigative journalists are usually in the business of presenting facts, rather than drawing conclusions as to what they might mean. However, as Radu notes “[I]n British courts, a judge determines what your carefully crafted wording means to them as a legal matter. They may decide the ‘legal meaning’ was that someone was the new godfather and had taken over the local crime group. Now you have to prove that judge’s legal meaning in court with real proof, even though you never said it, and maybe never meant it.”[6]   During the two years of trial proceedings, OCCRP journalists continued their investigation, collecting new information and strengthening their story. Due to disclosure rules, they were required to share this information with their opponent, who ultimately decided to settle on the eve of the trial in London. Feyziyev made a settlement in terms favourable to OCCRP, which included the original reporting staying online. However, while defending the case the media outlet had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars, as well as significant time, effort and stress diverting them from other investigations. As Radu himself has put it: “Even if you win, you lose.”   In January 2020, the libel case against Radu, was dropped on the eve of the trial opening at the Royal Courts of Justice in London.[7] The agreed settlement meant the articles that had sparked the defamation claim against him stayed on OCCRP’s website albeit with a qualifying statement that the claimant “categorically denies involvement in money laundering or any unlawful activity.”[8] During the two years it took the case to reach the trial stage, OCCRP journalists continued their investigation, collecting new information and strengthening their story, which, due to disclosure rules, they were required to share with their opponent who ultimately decided to withdraw.[9]   OCCRP’s original investigation, together with information that had been sealed in the Javanshir Feyziyev settlement, were later utilised in a National Crime Agency (NCA) investigation into £15 million of allegedly corruption funds held by the UK based wife, son and nephew of Feyziyev.[10] In a civil proceeding, held in November 2021, a lawyer for the NCA presented a detailed analysis to bolster the agency’s argument that the money had flowed through the Azerbaijani Laundromat. In January 2022, a UK court approved the NCA’s seizure of £5.6m from members of Feyziyev’s family.[11] In July 2021, the NCA had also seized £4 million from an Azerbaijani couple, Izzat Khanim and Suleyman Javadov, after they accepted that the money came into the UK unlawfully via the Azerbaijani laundromat.[12]   In November 2022, Paul Radu spoke at an evening event Azerbaijan; SLAPPS, media freedom and the prevention of 'open justice' held as part of the UK Anti-SLAPP Conference, organised by FPC and our partners the Justice for Journalists Foundation and the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute. The event was chaired by FPC’s Director, Susan Coughtrie, alongside panellists: Khadija Ismayilova (an independent investigative journalist from Azerbaijan) Dr Susan Hawley (Executive Director at Spotlight on Corruption) and Martin Bentham (Home Affairs Editor at The Evening Standard).   [video width="1280" height="720" mp4="https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Paul-Full.mp4"][/video]   The full event is available to watch here.   This case is covered in the London Calling report on pages: 20, 23-26, 34, 49, 60, 62, 66, 70-71, 76 & 90.   [1] Paul Radu, How to Successfully Defend Yourself in Her Majesty’s Libel Courts, GIJN, February 2020, https://gijn.org/2020/02/26/how-to-successfully-defend-yourself-in-her-majestys-libel-courts/ [2] OCCRP, The Azerbaijani Laundromat, September 2017, https://www.occrp.org/en/azerbaijanilaundromat/ [3] Ibid. [4] Paul Radu, How to Successfully Defend Yourself in Her Majesty’s Libel Courts, GIJN, February 2020, https://gijn.org/2020/02/26/how-tosuccessfully-defend-yourself-in-her-majestys-libel-courts/ [5] David Carnes, Libel Law: past, present and future, All About Law, December 2019, https://www.allaboutlaw.co.uk/commercial-awareness/legal-spotlight/libel-law-past-present-and-future- [6] Susan Coughtrie, The Uk as a key nexus for protecting media freedom and preventing corruption globally, FPC, December 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/the-uk-as-a-key-nexus-for-protecting-media-freedom-and-preventing-corruption-globally/ [7] Jonathan Price, Jennifer Robinson & Claire Overman, Azerbaijan MP discontinues defamation case against investigative journalist Paul Radu, Doughty Street Chambers, January 2020, https://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/news/azerbaijan-mp-discontinues-defamation-case-againstinvestigative-journalist-paul-radu [8] OCCRP, Azerbaijani Laundromat – Agreed Statement, January 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/azerbaijanilaundromat/the-agreed-statement [9] Paul Radu, How to Successfully Defend Yourself in Her Majesty’s Libel Courts, GIJN, February 2020, https://gijn.org/2020/02/26/how-tosuccessfully-defend-yourself-in-her-majestys-libel-courts/ [10] Miranda Patrucic and Ilya Lozovsky, UK Aims to Seize £15 Million From Family of Azeri Politician, OCCRP, November 2021, https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/15402-uk-aims-to-seize-15-million-from-family-of-azeri-politician [11] Steve Swann and Dominic Casciani, Court approves £5.6m seizure over money laundering, BBC News, January 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-60203664 [12] Martin Bentham, ‘Laundromat’ couple hand over £4m after Evening Standard win, Evening Standard, July 2021, https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/laundromat-couple-izzat-khanim-javadova-suleyman-javadov-4m-pounds-evening-standard-winb944136.html [post_title] => Paul Radu, co–founder of the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => paul-radu-co-founder-of-the-organised-crime-and-corruption-reporting-project-occrp [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-02-15 18:04:45 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-02-15 17:04:45 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6680 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [14] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6663 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2023-02-15 17:30:46 [post_date_gmt] => 2023-02-15 16:30:46 [post_content] =>

“Those wishing to pursue legal action against me in 2017 were advised, according to someone involved in the conversations, that for an outlay of no more than £200,000 I could be forced to issue the sort of retraction that could be spun into a total discrediting of myself and my wider reporting on corruption in Malaysia.”[1]

– Clare Rewcastle Brown, June 2021

  STATUS: Concluded – Libel case filed in London in 2017, settled in Rewcastle Brown’s favour 2019. Rewcastle Brown continues to receive legal challenges in the UK and Malaysia related to her reporting on the 1MDB scandal.  
  Clare Rewcastle Brown, a UK journalist, has been subject to significant legal challenges, while investigating one of the world’s largest financial corruption scandals in Malaysia, known as 1MDB.[2] From 2017-19, Rewcastle Brown was pursued through the London libel courts by the President of Malaysia’s PAS Islamic Party, Abdul Hadi Awang, before the case was withdrawn and a settlement was made in her favour prior to coming to trial.   Hadi Awang was represented by lawyers at the London-based law firm Carter-Ruck, who  according to Rewcastle Brown: “constructed an argument that [she] had implied without saying it that the money had gone directly to the personal use of the actual President of the PAS, who was not named in the article and had only been referred to once before on my platform by a separate writer some months previously.[3] Rewcastle Brown had been subject to several legal threats prior to this, but noted in this case: “Those wishing to pursue legal action against me in 2017 were advised, according to someone involved in the conversations, that for an outlay of no more than £200,000 I could be forced to issue the sort of retraction that could be spun into a total discrediting of myself and my wider reporting on corruption in Malaysia.[4]   By the time the case settled in 2019, the fallout from 1MDB had resulted in bringing down the previous Malaysian government, as well as the arrest (and later conviction) of the former Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib Razak. The believed mastermind of the scandal, businessman Jho Low, is currently on the run from justice in Malaysia, Singapore and the US. Writing about the case in 2020 for FPC, Clare Rewcastle Brown noted that “the PAS President justified his climb-down to the local media acknowledging his lawsuit had been politically motivated from the start and that since it had now served his party’s purpose in the elections he had decided to withdraw. What more damning indictment could there be of a self-admitted SLAPP suit?”[5] Rewcastle Brown has also been subject to legal cases in Malaysia, which led to a warrant being issued for her arrest in September 2021.   Rewcastle Brown has continued to receive well over a dozen legal threats from London law firms representing Malaysian clients and clients linked to 1MDB, such as Al Wazzan who sent Recastle Brown legal threats through the London law firm Taylor Wessing (TW) in 2021. Al Wazzan is an investment advisor, on bail in Kuwait accused of brokering a deal believed to be linked to 1MDB.[6] Rewcastle Brown believes that Al Wazzan’s objective may have been to have any reference to him or his involvement in the 1MDB scandal removed entirely from the English language media, even though his name is universally known and associated with the scandal in Kuwait as a result of Arabic-language media coverage. Rewcastle Brown received three legal letters from Taylor Wessing on behalf of Al Wazzan in relation to five articles she published on her site Sarawak Report. The letters requested the removal of all reference and information, with Taylor Wessing also urging her to “never publish the allegations, or any similar allegations, or any of our client’s private and confidential information again in the future”.[7] They stated that the investigation into Al Wazzan and his release on bail is a “private matter” and insisted that Al Wazzan would still be able to take legal action in the English courts, even though he is currently not permitted to leave Kuwait under his bail conditions. In the letters, the lawyers also said that English language publications (third parties) had already removed reference to Al Wazzan in their coverage in response to similar threats.   After Index on Censorship and ARTICLE 19 submitted a Council of Europe alert on these legal threats, no further communication was received from TW and once the writ had expired, Rewcastle Brown decided to write an article about this experience, which indicated that public exposure of these tactics does have a positive impact to push back against SLAPPs.[8]   Rewcastle Brown has also described in detail the multitude of tactics adopted by UK law firms to attempt to get her to retract her published investigations; “Indeed, from the moment it was launched the [2017] case was used as a relentless propaganda tool against me…leaking privileged information and alleging that judgements had already been arrived at against me.”[9] She has described the psychological toll of being “under surveillance, been computer hacked, stalked, intimidated, sued and made the subject of numerous attempts at entrapment designs to compromise my reputation for integrity” as heavy. Unfortunately, accompanying forms of harassment, alongside legal threats, are a hallmark of SLAPPs cases.[10]   In November 2022, Clare Rewcastle Brown spoke on the panel “SLAPPs in today's independent investigative media landscape” held as part of the UK Anti-SLAPP Conference, organised by FPC and our partners the Justice for Journalists Foundation and the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute.   [video width="1280" height="720" mp4="https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Clare.mp4"][/video]   The full event is available to watch here.   These case are covered in the London Calling report on pages: 23-24, 34, 40, 44-45, 60-61, 64-65, & 90.   [1] Clare Rewcastle Brown, FPC, Unsafe for Scrutiny: A scandal of corruption and censorship: Uncovering the 1MDB case in Malaysia, December 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/a-scandal-of-corruption-and-censorship-uncovering-the-1mdb-case-in-malaysia/ [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. [6] Journalist Clare Rewcastle Brown Subject to Legal Harassment from London Law Firm on behalf of Kuwaiti Investment Advisor, CoE’s Safety of Journalists Platform, June 2021, https://go.coe.int/32Ow3 [7] Ibid. [8] The Sarawak Report: How Foreign Litigants Abuse UK Law Firms To ‘Launder’ Reputations, October 2021, https://www.sarawakreport.org/2021/10/how-foreign-litigants-abuse-uk-lawfirms-to-launder-reputations/ [9] Clare Rewcastle Brown, FPC, Unsafe for Scrutiny: A scandal of corruption and censorship: Uncovering the 1MDB case in Malaysia, December 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/a-scandal-of-corruption-and-censorship-uncovering-the-1mdb-case-in-malaysia/ [10] Ibid. [post_title] => Clare Rewcastle Brown, Investigative journalist and founder of The Sarawak Report [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => clare-rewcastle-brown-investigative-journalist-and-founder-of-the-sarawak-report [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-02-15 17:57:19 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-02-15 16:57:19 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6663 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6551 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-09-09 12:12:10 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-09-09 11:12:10 [post_content] => The staff and board of the Foreign Policy Centre would like place on record our deep sadness on the tragic passing of Her Majesty The Queen.  Throughout her many decades of service to our Country she has been a beacon for many of the values we hold dear, respected and admired around the world. Her deep commitment to the Commonwealth and her work with generations of world leaders made her the greatest ambassador around the world that the United Kingdom could have wished for. Our thoughts are with the Royal Family at this difficult time. [post_title] => Statement from the Foreign Policy Centre on the passing of Her Majesty The Queen [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => statement-from-the-foreign-policy-centre-on-the-passing-of-her-majesty-the-queen [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-09-09 12:12:10 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-09-09 11:12:10 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6551 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [16] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6528 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-08-10 17:38:34 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-08-10 16:38:34 [post_content] => “What’s at stake in Ukraine is the direction of human history. Humanity’s greatest political achievement has been the decline of war. That is now in jeopardy”.

Yuval Noah Harari[1]

  After the horror and shock at Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, and atrocities committed against civilians, the tide seemed to turn with several loud voices arguing that the West should allow Putin to save face, that Ukraine could not win, and that the nuclear and other military threats are likely to materialise. It is no surprise that leftist politicians, some postmodern thinkers and isolationists express such views. But, regretfully, they are appearing in the mainstream thinking as well.   Blame has been placed on politicians for ignoring academic literature and calculations on economic sanctions, specifically with reference to punitive sanctions imposed on Russia since March this year. However, the genuine scientific approach distinguishes itself primarily not by its respect for the literature, but by the reliance on facts and logic as opposed to wishful thinking, opinions, and assumptions. From this perspective arguments by proponents of an immediate compromise on Putin's conditions that would allow for the lifting of the sanctions are deadly flawed.   At the heart of the argument are short-term economic calculations of the pain inflicted by sanctions to Russia and the rest of the World. It is put forward that the goal of the sanctions, whatever it is, is not worth the price paid by the countries imposing them – because they will suffer more in terms of welfare loss than Russia does. This may be so in absolute terms. However, regardless of the real magnitude of such a ratio of the losses, this argument hardly makes any economic sense and should be regarded rather as a manipulation of the truth or distortion of reality.  
Wars are destructive to both conquered people and territories and conquerors. Sanctions against Russia are far from exhausting the impact of war on the economies and people of the countries involved. Recent assessments of the war’s global impacts predict higher commodity prices, additional long-lasting high inflation and increased risks of stagflation, recession, and social unrest.[2] Inflation in the EU has been triggered by government spending, debts and follow-up monetary expansion, incapacity to enforce monetary constraints, including the so called ‘quantitative easing’. However, the war, sanctions and counter-sanctions are likely to result in additional, not yet statistically detected, inflation. It comes from expectations about the future and hedging against perceived upcoming risks – all aggravated by the war. For them one should hold accountable the aggressor and what matters is the general principle: war expense results in higher inflation.   Still, as long as international trade benefits all involved parties, the restrictions put on it incur losses on all parties.   In economics all macro reasoning is based, or should be based, on practical experiences. With embargoes and sanctions one such experience is that they punish everyone but not necessarily (and in the first place) those responsible. This is indeed the story of similar sanctions imposed on regimes similar to Putin's in ex-Yugoslavia, Iraq and Iran. And this is a legitimate point in all criticisms of sanctions, irrespective of the world view, political, geopolitical or methodological background the critique is built on.   However, at least in two of these cases they had political effect: contributed to the regime change in former Yugoslavia, and forced Iran to the compromise on its nuclear program.
  Economics is about rational choices made by economic agents comparing the graduations of cost and benefit of different options from which to choose from. Therefore, a comparison of losses incurred by unrelated agents is pointless because it cannot be used for making a choice by either of them.   Instead, the West as a rational player should compare the losses from sanctions to the opportunity costs, i.e. the costs of not imposing sanctions. More precisely, the total cost of helping Ukraine in defeating Russia, that along with sanctions includes also direct expenses on military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, should be compared to the cost of doing nothing. The latter costs may seem to be zero, but this is wrong.   Let us even put aside the moral component, including not only the West’s humiliation, but, most of all, terrifying atrocities to which the Ukrainians remaining under the Russian occupation are being exposed, exemplified by Bucha. If we remain within the realms of economic logic, a correct calculus should compare the imagined states of the world in two cases: with and without sanctions and help.   In the first case there is a good chance of getting rid of the current Kremlin regime; in the second case this regime has a good chance to strengthen itself by defeating Ukraine and humiliating the West. This second case will be strikingly different from the one before 24th February because the situation has changed irreversibly; this is a fact many people in the world fail to recognise.   In order to understand the difference a shift from pure economics to political economy and even more ‘soft’ social sciences, such as history and political science is necessary. The logic and historical arguments below are developing the suggestion made by Yuval Noah Harari in his pre-war article, where he argues that “what’s at stake in Ukraine is the direction of human history”.[3]   What is at stake? Contrary to the unscrupulous statements, the Kremlin aggression is not about Ukraine's possible NATO membership. Putin in his speech on 21st February has explicitly stated that he considers the existence of independent Ukraine a historical misunderstanding that he will correct by cancelling its statehood. His troops' actions have since then made it very clear that Russia is committed to annihilating Ukraine as an independent state. The Kremlin sees an all-out military aggression as a "legitimate" way to achieve this goal, as well as simply expanding the Russia's territory.   These are essentially fascist ideas, as Timothy Snider has recently explained.[4] Russia is ruled by a fascist regime endowed with nuclear weapons. Moreover, the main subject of its aggression is not the Ukrainian nation, but the liberal Western values it embraces, or, more broadly, the West and its values in general – Putin and his cronies are absolutely explicit in this.[5]   Many left-wing politicians, friends of the Kremlin in Europe, right-wing political scientists and sensible economists do not acknowledge that today's Russia meets almost all the criteria for a fascist state: a cult of the past; an often illusory grandeur and a cult of the dead; sadness at the loss of imperial greatness; resentment at the ‘injustice’ of history; a view that the outside world is hostile; a cult of a single leader; and a belief that ‘justice’ should be restored through war and the conquest of new territories.   The very existence of such a regime poses a concrete threat to the rest of the world because the essence of fascism is aggression augmented with denial of the basic principles of rule of law, international order, human rights, etc.; they are being replaced with the use of force. There are only two ways of dealing with such aggressive and dangerous regimes: either imposing an iron cage on them, or neutralising them. An iron cage here means the need for high military expenditures not only for the fascist country itself but for all potential subjects of its aggression. When such a country possesses nuclear missiles, everybody on Earth is in danger and pays the price. This is simply ignored by short-sighted economic calculations. This price is really enormous, many times above the one of the sanctions, weapons supplied to Ukraine, and all the damages the war brings taken together.   Prof. Harari argues that military expenses as a share of total government spending declined dramatically in the post-WWII world. He attributes this to exactly those revolutionary changes in human culture that fascism challenges. Economists would question if this reduction cannot be confused by the dramatic increase of government spending as a share of GDP that took place simultaneously. Still, this conclusion holds even if we consider only the share of military spending in the GDP, the progress in the last 60 years is remarkable.[6]   Note that, contrary to the widespread misconception, WWII did not put an end to fascism in Snider's meaning. The losers were indeed de-Nazified and demilitarised so that almost no trace of fascism can be observed in their contemporary societies or government politics. But the USSR continued preparing for a new World War, with a belligerent rhetoric, and huge investments in armaments. This was mirrored by large military spending of the potential victims of aggression.   The situation changed after the Cuba missile crisis. The Soviet Union failed to enforce its threats (in spite of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact and then of Afghanistan) and had to admit that war could not be an option – thereby abandoning its principal fascist policy component. Instead, it focused on an economic race with the West that it lost miserably. The arms race continued, however, and the USSR lost it too. When the USSR disintegrated, this allowed the rest of the world to further reallocate resources to enhance welfare spending so that according to the World Bank’s data, from 1960 to the end of the Cold War in 1985 the world’s military spending as share of GDP declined from 6.3% to 4.2%, and then further to 2.4% by 2020.   This happened because for the first time in history the world order became based on the primacy of the respect for the international rules, including internationally recognised borders, universal human rights, and non-intervention in domestic affairs. It was, of course, not completely without wars and deficiencies. But most of the world’s rule breakers, such as Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, or Osama Bin Laden, were acknowledged as "villains" and were eliminated, politically, by means of war and/or in the face of an international tribunal.   In a general sense it was a ‘unipolar world’ with the US acting as a global ‘sheriff’. Such a sheriff may not always be wise and fair, but as long as they remain sane due to real democratic control, such a law and order regime is still a far better option than the rule of force.   There was, however, a notable exemption to the rule. Since 1992, the military spending as a share of GDP for the Russian Federation is twice as high as the world average, and three or more times higher than in neighboring countries, including Georgia until 2004 and Ukraine until 2014. From the post-Communist countries (if not in the Northern Hemisphere), Russian is the only state, which in the last 30 years annexed a territory from a neighboring country (Crimea) and occupied and then recognised the ‘statehood’ of five other territories, one in Moldova, two in Georgia and Ukraine. Like in older Soviet precedents of Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan, the Kremlin did not like the political developments in those countries. As laid out, Putin-led Russia has built a fascist regime on militaristic and imperial sentiments, deliberately provoked by the Kremlin. As a result, every time Putin needs a boost to his public support, he starts a war, with no serious punishment so far. The calculations he has made up to now were politically rational, not economically.   It was the Second Chechen War that brought him to power. Despite striking similarities with Kosovo, the Russian atrocities in Chechnya brought hardly any reaction out of the West. Then Putin explicitly expressed his intentions of toppling the world order, particularly by promising to weaponise oil and gas exports in Munich when in 2007 Russia enjoyed historically high prices on oil and gas markets. This “promise” was met with surprise, at best modest outrage, and sometimes even with understanding.   Putin drew the correct conclusions out of this reaction and when his popularity, which was gained on the back of the price boom, became endangered by the burst in 2008 he successfully upheld it by an outright aggressive war against Georgia. The reaction appeared to be more than modest again, with the infamous ‘reload’ following.   The next time he needed a boost to his popularity, then undermined by income stagnation, augmenting mass corruption and the stolen 2011 elections (see the chart by the Levada Centre data), he annexed Ukrainian Crimea in March 2014 and sent the mercenaries, often supported by regular troops, into Ukraine’s Donbas.[7] This time there was a reaction in the form of economic sanctions, accompanied with excluding Russia from the G8. However, unlike in similar cases of Saddam Hussein’s conquest of Kuwait, or Slobodan Milosevic supporting Serbian separatism in neighboring countries, none of Putin’s acquisitions were reversed and no effective sanctions imposed. Moreover, the West convinced Ukraine not to fight for Crimea. The Russian economy has since stagnated, at least partly due to the sanctions, but these were too weak to force it to change course.   This outrageous violation of international law (including the Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine surrendered its – the third largest in the world – nuclear arsenal in exchange for guarantees of its sovereignty from all other nuclear powers, including Russia, China and the US) effectively destroyed the world order and led to a return back to the pre-perestroika years, if not pre-Cuba era. This led Ukraine to sharp increases in the military spending.   At the time no one else was sober enough to face this sad truth and make the necessary hard choices. The West found excuses for its passivity. It did not start investing in defense and security (e.g. energy one), nor work to counteract the aggressor. Of course, no one could propose attacking a nuclear power with military force. Making it really pay financially for its nefarious actions and depriving it from the possibilities to modernise its weaponry would have been an option. Unfortunately, no state was ready to bear the related cost.  
On the wake of the post COVID-19 recovery of 2021, the EU reinforced its 2018 central nudging plan of a ‘Green Deal’ by redesigned intervention via programs like the ‘Next Generation EU – COVID-19 recovery package’, or the ‘Just Transition Mechanism: making sure no one is left behind’ – the policy instrument that closes coal power plants to substitute the fuel with natural gas (as a transit energy resource). In reality the Green Deal and the enhanced EU addiction to energy supplies, were and to a large extend still are an effective subsidies to natural gas imports from Russia (at 45% import dependency).   The worth of EU’s goods’ imports from Russia grew from EUR 158.5 billion to 162.4 billion and were dominated by fuel and mining products (62% of the total). As to the world, on year on year basis the exports from Russia went up by 72%, to the post-Soviet countries – by almost 77%.[8]   The growth of Russia's economy to the level of 2020 and especially the growth of oil export revenues in 2018 and 2021 (by about 41% and at the highest level since 2006) are the main source of financing the war with Ukraine. According to the World Bank data, in 2021 Russia’s GDP recuperated to USD 1.78, 11th in the world of 196 countries. Relative to the EU, Russian economy was 1/10 of the Union’s GDP. But the West negligence of Kremlin’s disrespect of international law seem to be working well for Russia.
  When the same regime saw its internal support begin to start erode again, it did what it has done before, albeit on a much larger scale – and the hard choice described above reappeared again, but with much more at stake.   What proponents of Russia fail to understand is that the situation for the West changed irreversibly on 24th February, or, in fact, eight years before, when Russia annexed Crimea.   There cannot be a ‘business as usual’ approach with Russia any more. And if the Kremlin regime survives there is an increased risk the whole world order of the last few decades will crash. If the international agreements are as futile as they appear, the world will return to the rule of the strongest. Then, China can grab Taiwan, Serbia can go “de-nazifying” the neighboring post-Yugoslav countries, North Korea can blackmail with its nuclear missiles, and Russia can continue raising the stakes in its confrontation with the West.   Consider the possible scenarios while taking into account the peculiar Kremlin regime:  
  1. Ukraine wins, the West helps and sanctions defeat Russia, and it dismantles its current regime. The pre-war world order is back, and gets strengthened because this is a serious warning for possible future aggressors. There are some risks associated with the Kremlin’s decay, explained in another article, but they are not our subject here.[9] Before the regime falls, the rest of the world pays an uncertain indirect price due to the sanctions and costs of post-war reconstruction (financed hopefully by reparations that Russia will be forced to pay).
  2. Russia defeats Ukraine, eliminates her statehood, wipes out her culture, and successfully expands its own empire. Although the West will never recognise this conquest (as it was the case with the Baltic countries during their occupation by the USSR), sanctions will nevertheless be lifted, because ‘they have no effect’ and ‘Russia should not feel humiliated’. As a result, Putin’s regime internally solidifies, just as it was after the Crimea annexation. It will allow Putin to successfully arrange the power transition in case of his death or serious illness. Russia will get a new momentum for militarisation and learn the lessons from its war against Ukraine: it can do whatever it wants as this is just a matter of being impudent and owning nuclear weapons. The West has to either surrender, which is politically unimaginable, or sharply increase its military spending to the pre-Cuba levels: it would mean an additional 4% of its GDP (USD 3.8 trillion) of unproductive expenditures that would also increase inflation.
  3. A ‘Finnish compromise’ whereby Ukraine retains its sovereignty but loses some territories and has to agree on a neutral status with limitations in its military capacities. Note, however, that the Russian culture does not value compromise. This is one of its most important differences with the West. Russian and Soviet diplomats were taught that there cannot be a win-win solution because everything is a zero-sum game. Therefore, even if ‘nobody wins’ this would be perceived by Putin as a defeat, because he failed to reach his main goal that he publicly declared for this war: the elimination of Ukrainian statehood. At the same time, he will ‘save face’ by presenting Ukraine's territorial and sovereignty concessions as a ‘victory’ for his people, thereby maintaining and enhancing his own popularity. This means that quite soon Russia will restore its military capacities, learn the lessons of its mistakes in the war, and next time increase the stakes further. In other words, just like in case of a Russian victory, we will be in the pre-Cuba world again.
  The real choice the West, therefore, faces is between: 1) increasing the military spending at least 2.5 times, approximately for an additional 4% of GDP (Germany has already raised them by 100 billion euros); or 2) bearing the cost of getting rid of Russia's fascist regime now, which is estimated by CEPR at 0.5% of GDP in the loss from sanctions and about the same amount in military aid.[10] This is altogether about four times less than in the ‘do nothing’ option. It is clear what the rational choice in this case must be. Note that eight years ago this price would have been about 50% lower. If decision-makers avoid this choice again, next time the price will be much higher again.   What about Russia? So far we have focused on the West's calculations. But what about the second actor – Russia? Cannot it be motivated to return to normal behaviour too, or is the regime’s destruction the only way? And, in any case, can the sanctions do the trick?   Unfortunately, there is no pure economic solution to this problem, because, as mentioned above, the very calculations that a fascist regime makes is not economic, but political. Of course, support for the regime depends on its economic performance and expectations of increased future wealth. Unlike democracies however, it is not a leading factor for ideologically indoctrinated people brainwashed by constant propaganda. Not to mention the repressive apparatus that allows for ignoring the peoples' interests to a large extent, if not completely. Otherwise such a regime could not wage a war that is always economically disastrous, apart from the death toll.  
The imperial instinct that Putin exploits is based on presupposition rooted in the Agrarian Age when grabbing of territories increased the metropolis’ wellbeing. In fact, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 was at least followed by major economic downturn and a ruble devaluation. They were mainly caused by oil price fall but the modest sanctions of those times also could have certain effect.   In 1992, the GDP of the Russian Federation was USD 359.5 billion US dollars, and in 2013 – almost USD 2.3 trillion. That is, in 2013 the economy of the Russian Federation was about 1/5 of the economy of the EU then. In 2014, however, Russia's GDP ‘shrunk’ to about two trillion dollars. In 2015, as a result of the international situation, the annexation of Crimea and the orientation to dominate the former USSR through the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Russia's GDP was already USD 1.36 trillion, and in 2016 – 1.27 trillion US dollars. As noted above, size-wise in 2021, the economy of Russia was already 10% of the EU. Nevertheless, the public approval rates of Russian authorities remained at their historical high and only started to deteriorate in 2018.
  Therefore, economic incentives seem futile in preventing or halting wars like the present one, as are expectations that Russia can return to civilised behaviour under its present political regime.   Moreover, if the regime had been at least politically rational, it would never have started the war. For this reason most rational experts, including the authors, failed to predict Kremlin’s horrendous aggression. Russia's behaviour lacks any rationality, which is either due to Putin's illness, his admiration for cults, or misinformation. Therefore, ensuring removal of the Kremlin regime is the only way of returning to the ‘business as usual’ of the last 30 years.   How can this be accomplished? The rest of the world has only two tools: 1) a defeat on the battlefield by the Ukrainian military, if sufficiently equipped; and 2) sanctions. None of these can be sufficient in itself, but put together they have a good chance to break the regime’s backbone.[11]   The orders within the regime’s hierarchy are being fulfilled only as long as the members perceive its time horizon as infinite. Opponents to sanctions have a point that maintaining modest pains result in ‘rallying around the flag’ rather than any pressure in the desired direction. But should the members of formal and, more importantly, informal verticals of power realise that the hierarchy’s days are numbered, they could start behaving more opportunistically. All of them currently would still like to continue serving, and all are fearing the breakup, but with a finite time horizon they would get engaged in the collective one-shot prisoners' dilemma game.   This is exactly how the academic literature describes the premature meltdown of the USSR, which caused, among other things, the deliberate policies of the Reagan administration.[12] Remember that Reagan came to power, partly, on the backdrop of his predecessor's weak reaction to the USSR’s invasion. In-line with the above described logic, if starving out the economy becomes a reality and if the Russian army is defeated, the outcome will likely be a destruction of the Kremlin’s vertical of power. Not of the international economy and rule of law. Coming back to the above discussed scenarios, less economically destructive is the one that promises a restoration of the international order.   The arms race, started by Reagan, appeared unbearable for the USSR, already suffering from the COCOM embargo. At the same time, it lost the war in Afghanistan. On top of this, low energy prices toppled the USSR's budget. The nomenklatura reacted with an avalanche-like destruction of the vertical of power. As a result, the world lived for 30 years without fear of nuclear war, in remarkable peace and stability.   Those times worrying about nuclear weapons ending up in the hands of irresponsible politicians or even terrorists were as strong as now, but in the end only Russia retained its arsenal. Ironically, now it is in the hands of exactly this kind of politician obsessed with anti-Western resentment.   The parallels with the present moment are striking, the main difference being Russia's much broader exposure to international trade than the USSR’s, and, therefore, much higher vulnerability to sanctions. But can those be effective?   This depends on their real purpose. Of course, no sanctions can stop a fascist regime from waging war. Russia is paying a high toll in human lives, which is much more important than welfare, but nevertheless it continues the war. At the same time, it is hard to completely bleed its economy so as to minimise its means to wage war. Sanctions can prevent Russia from producing modern weapons, but it can still operate with old ones.  
Despite widespread disappointment with the sanctions’ effect, it is already being felt by the Russian economy, population and the elites. Apart from personal sanctions, visa and air travel restrictions, and self-sanctions such as banning the Facebook and Instagram social networks, real disposable household incomes already started to fall after some post-COVID recovery in 2021, and so do the budget revenues – and this is on the backdrop of still raising oil prices and only modest sanctions that have taken force so far. Rephrasing Putin “we have even not started” with the major cuts of the Russian oil imports that are to be implemented during the second half of 2022 and 2023 years.   So far a reputation effect has a stronger impact on Russia than the politically imposed sanctions. After the first wave of sanctions was announced, the country had become a reputational cost for about 1,000 companies. They left Russia not because of losing sales in its vast market but because of the high opportunity costs of staying at the expense of dwindling shares on the global markets. For the global consumers any business in Russia has become a stain of irresponsibility and anti-humanism. Russian legislators had set the legal framework for nationalisation abandoned assets and asked the central bank to acquire the banks that left the country. Forgone opportunities and the sunk costs from leaving Russia, obviously, seem less important than potential reputation losses.[13]
  In 2021, Russia's military budget reached USD 61.7 billion, the US’ military spending was USD 778.2 billion, that of NATO members – more that USD 1.1 trillion (before Sweden and Finland entry in the organisation), and China – USD 252 billion. In international comparison, the military spending of the Russian Federation before the invasion of Ukraine was respectively 12, 18 and four times less significant in absolute terms. From the standpoint of a possible future standoff with an arms race the Kremlin’s options are rather limited.   We are not talking about the difference in quality and technology here. Economically backward Russia is also backward in military terms, the rest is nothing more than propaganda for those who criticise sanctions triggered by the war on Ukraine.   All in all: the economic strength of the EU and the West in general will almost certainly weaken Russia economically; militarily her options are also limited. The hardships ahead for the economy and the people of Russia, evolving now gradually, will remain for a long term. Staying firm on sanctions is easier, defends the rule of international law and is a more prosperous course of policy action (for Russia as well, eventually) than what critics of sanctions expect.   However, firm resolve here is essential. If western politicians act cautiously, and keep thinking that they better not irritate Putin too much because they will have to deal with him in the future, then, of course, their indecisiveness will translate into actions that make the Kremlin confident. On the other hand, if the world community acts decisively to neutralise the lawbreaker then there is a good chance of returning to the acceptable previous times.   When a karate champion breaks a brick with his bare hand, he should be absolutely confident and resolute, otherwise his strike will not get through. If he does, the brick gets destroyed, and a man feels only minor, if any, pain. However, if his strike is indecisive, the force he applies cannot break a brick, and he risks a serious trauma. The same here. Putin's last hope is indecisiveness of those he considers as his enemies. The world’s last hope is their braveness and resolve, which they can learn from Ukraine – and (indeed) from Ronald Reagan.   Vladimir Dubrovskiy is a political economist based in Kyiv (Senior Economist at CASE Ukraine).   Krassen Stanchev teaches Macroeconomic Analysis and Public Choice at Sofia University, chairs the board of the Institute for Market Economics and is an ex-MP of the Constitutional Assembly of Bulgaria (1990-1991).   [1] Yuval Noah Harari, Yuval Noah Harari argues that what’s at stake in Ukraine is the direction of human history, The Economist, February 2022, https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/02/09/yuval-noah-harari-argues-that-whats-at-stake-in-ukraine-is-the-direction-of-human-history [2] Coface, Country & Sector Risk Barometer – Q2 2022, June 2022, https://www.coface.com/News-Publications/Publications/Country-Sector-Risk-Barometer-Q2-2022; Gabriel Di Bella et al., Natural Gas in Europe: The Potential Impact of Disruptions to Supply, July 2022, IMF Working Papers, IMF, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2022/07/18/Natural-Gas-in-Europe-The-Potential-Impact-of-Disruptions-to-Supply-520934 [3] Yuval Noah Harari, Yuval Noah Harari argues that what’s at stake in Ukraine is the direction of human history, The Economist, February 2022, https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/02/09/yuval-noah-harari-argues-that-whats-at-stake-in-ukraine-is-the-direction-of-human-history [4] Timothy Snyder, We Should Say It. Russia Is Fascist, The New York Times, May 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/opinion/russia-fascism-ukraine-putin.html?utm_source=pocket_mylist [5] Vladimir Dubrovskiy, How to stop Putin’s war against Ukraine, The Foreign Policy Centre, April 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/how-to-stop-putins-war-against-ukraine/ [6] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook: Armanents, Disarmament and International Security, Military expenditure (% of GDP), The World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS [7] Chart by Levada Center: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1TX21bn3493XohxnFISuz8IwFwy-Ls-j-t47V_Wq9bm0/edit?usp=sharing; Levada Center, see website: https://www.levada.ru/en/ [8] Trading Economics, Russia Exports, https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports [9] Vladimir Dubrovskiy, How to stop Putin’s war against Ukraine, The Foreign Policy Centre, April 2022, https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Commentary-How-to-stop-Putins-war-against-Ukraine.pdf [10] Kornel Mahistein, Christine McDaniel, Simon Schropp and Marinos Tsigas, Potential economic effects of sanctions on Russia: An Allied trade embargo, Vox, May 2022, https://voxeu.org/article/potential-economic-effects-allied-trade-embargo-russia?fbclid=IwAR2Yr6nkDMaMMs8SiIrKVK5oAiFPflSZkggXz7H9kCA1TwDCeufgm72aRE0 [11] Vladimir Dubrovskiy, How to stop Putin’s war against Ukraine, The Foreign Policy Centre, April 2022, https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Commentary-How-to-stop-Putins-war-against-Ukraine.pdf [12] Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, November 2014, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/patronal-politics/4C1B4D49A7F17739E75A5AB7B66E2115; Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions, Harvard University Press, July 1998, https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674836808 [13] Owen Matthews, Sanctions are working – whatever Putin says, The Spectator, August 2022, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/sanctions-are-working--whatever-putin-says?fbclid=IwAR2B722Kymg4cn6ozbaZe6xYPGNoTs_MkbLpVnWKQ_yMFBwgl_HKFNJkKMM Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Sanctions against Russia: Why and how they work, or should work [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => sanctions-against-russia-why-and-how-they-work-or-should-work [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-08-11 09:46:38 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-08-11 08:46:38 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6528 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6513 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-07-27 15:55:15 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-07-27 14:55:15 [post_content] => Putin’s war so far has achieved all the opposite to the declared goals – NATO came even closer to its borders; Ukraine became more militarised; the most loyal to neutrality, Sweden and Finland, applied for NATO membership; and the usually disunited West showed unprecedented unity in application of sanctions. With the continuation of the war debate moves to the issue of whether Putin should be defeated and tried, or should he be brought to the negotiations table with the Ukrainian President, after a rather shocking statement by the French President, Macron, calling “not to humiliate Russia” in Strasbourg. The unprecedented violence, destruction and war on extermination developing in Ukraine hints to a rather personal nature of the unfolding tragedy in Europe.   The increasingly personalistic regime of Putin – which emerged from the failure of reforms, weak civil society, and institutional legacies of the totalitarian and Soviet regime – led to the domination of his psychological factors in Russia’s foreign policy. It can be reduced to a power contest between Putin and the US, (or Biden), where Ukraine is rather a tool and a legitimate and vulnerable target. He perceived it as a legitimate target due to his understanding of the nature of international relations as pure realpolitik and division in the spheres of influence by the great powers. He viewed it as a vulnerable one due to the anticipation of disunity in the West and its pragmatic rather than normative policies, as well as weak capacity and readiness of Ukrainians to resist. On all accounts he faced miscalculations. Yet, the war showed that at least two important actors were not taken seriously enough by the West – the Russian society and the newly independent states.   Reframing approaches Macron was quite late with his appeal not to humiliate Russia. In fact, this is the right time to humiliate, and moreover to defeat it. There is no justification of the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and atrocities against civilians in this war, and Russia’s current behaviour is a direct consequence of the impunity, mixed messages, appeasement and unlimited pragmatic cooperation. The motivation of Putin was to prove that he is also entitled to invade and control other states, as is his perception of what the West does, with the US first of all. The ‘spoilers’’ role is not to resolve, but to violate, and thus raise the status and attention of oneself. However, what was left beyond the centre of attention most of the years of transition, is that there is not only a need of the people to be perceived equal to the others, but also to have a distinct – and dignified – positive identity, which makes them what they are with their culture and history. The domestic debates on identity took place early in Russian society, but often they were reduced to the historical ones and due to the weakness of society, and against the background of failing reform process, it allowed Putin to hijack the debate and fill an identity with the content of his power projection. Yet, there was something the West could have done. Instead of increasingly being concerned with supporting Russia’s regime status and not to “humiliate” it, they could have more openly recognised a positive potential of the people, or society to reform, even with the reference to history and/or culture. The distinct identity, or at the state level – identity – is taking place in interaction with the other states, who send the messages of the normative framework of the status and reputation. Making Russia not great but attractive – is the goal. Putin’s attempts to sketch such an ‘identity’ was about control and power, rather than added value to international relations – recall his interpretation of “dukhovnost” or other similar concepts. It was reinforced by the fact that the latter was understood by the West as purely technocratic exercise – cooperation in peacekeeping and security – or pragmatic economic cooperation. Mixed messages from the outside – speeches about human rights, but impunity in violations, such as those in Chechnya, or participation in the oil and gas deals by former and still influential politicians, the rewards of a ‘co-chairman seat’, or peacekeeping forces in spite of the rather destructive role in secessionist conflicts – allowed increasingly authoritarian Putin to utilise the West and its values as a threat domestically, while its institutions and representatives as enablers internationally. Thus, society was increasingly left behind in the equation of official relations. Society’s need in ideational factors, positive distinct identity, added value in the world affairs and culture were failed to be addressed domestically or were not recognised internationally. Hence the capacity of Putin to fill the void by ‘greatness’ which is measured by military victory and physical size of the country in a hijacked ‘identity’ process. He did not fully overlook the soft power issue in identity – in fact he stressed on a few occasions that Russia is now representing true European values, what he called “reasonable conservatism”. Although he refers to the prominent Russian philosophers’ tradition, it reflects the reality – failure of reforms and authoritarian rule –  which makes Russia unattractive to the societies around Russia, as it indicates its incapacity to play a traditionally modernising and Europeanising role, at least for some regions of the Former Soviet Union and for some periods of history. If there was a positive influence in history, it was about such influence, as our survey just before the war in Ukraine discovered in perceptions in the South Caucasus.[1]   Putin’s perception of power and society’s stance on the war Once the community cannot find its positive distinct identity it is easier for a leader to move to the role of ‘spoiler’, or status void of any normative content, and get support of the lost and disappointed society.   Moreover, power is understood in pre-modern/modern way, untouched by globalisation and technology, in terms of its physical size. Grabbing and collecting the lands as a way to make the country ‘great’ again is a convenient way for elites who failed or are resistant to make qualitative changes in the country. These debates have been taking place in Russia since early 1990s – whether Russia should focus on re-establishment of control over its former ‘periphery’ or on reforms and changes within the country’s borders. Our study on the experience of conflicts in the South Caucasus proved that post-Soviet autocrats are not interested in modernisation leading to the “opening of the post-Soviet minds”, as it will deprive them of a powerful tool of control and distraction from the domestic issues in substance.[2] The similar phenomenon is reflected in the “modernisation effect” typical of the rentier state (such as Russia) described by Michael Ross.[3] Military power has a dramatic quality and spectacular form needed for visualisation of the role of ‘victor’, which constitutes the core of the ‘greatness’ concept of officially narrated identity.   On the other hand, Putin and his proxies with old Soviet thinking are led by cynicism in perception of the nature of international relations as that of realpolitik, with the division of the world in the spheres of influence by the most powerful states. In his behaviour he is guided by the perceived “red lines” established by the foreign policies of the West, first of all by the US, justifying his invasion of Ukraine, which has even greater legitimacy in his eyes, as is in Russia’s “underbelly”, unlike Iraq or Afghanistan for the US.   It is often said nowadays that the West should have been taking Putin’s words and statements seriously, meaning his views on history of the Former Soviet Union states and Russia, signaling Russian imperial intentions and claims, which extended far beyond its current borders, most recently when he compared himself to Peter the Great. However, he also said several times about unique history and culture of Russia, and earlier in his time in office even about the importance of democracy as a way to realise this unique creative potential of Russians, otherwise predicting country’s stagnation.[4] Yet, whatever was a dynamic official rhetoric and way of thinking, the societal united alternative of the identity narrative did not ripe and hold. This is one of the factors explaining the population support of the war. Besides the unreliability of polling data in the politically restrictive conditions, the identification with the official narrative is an attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance formed by need in positive identity – on the one hand, and – a negative information resulting from the actions by the state, which the citizen cling to – on the other, which happens in the absence of an alternative positive distinct identity.   Missed opportunities and the way forward Similarly to the underestimation of society’s basic need for a distinct positive identity and the reduction of Russia’s foreign policy drivers to those of ruling elite’s ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘status’, another underestimation was related to the status of the Former Soviet Union states and their capacity to resist, form alliances, and the potential threat of unresolved conflicts, along with the dangers of appeasement of Russia’s leadership. But Ukraine’s resistance made the West take it more seriously.   Enthusiasm for “re-shaping Eurasia” by the bold policies of the South Caucasus leaders of the 1990s was replaced by the bitter awareness that the West will not counterbalance pressure from Russia –mainly coming through support for secessionist conflicts – in the 2000s. The GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) – the only alliance formed not by the big powers, but from the states themselves – based on the common pro-Western orientation and common security concerns did not turn into a viable regional organisation, partly due to the fear of the West to upset and provoke Russia. The transformation of GUAM into an effective regional military-defense alliance before the countries and NATO became ready for their membership could make the resistance of the Ukrainian people to invasion much stronger and the war shorter. Having understood that they were left alone vis-à-vis Russia’s threat some states, such as Azerbaijan and most recently Georgia, turned to the balanced policies, with those who did not, like Ukraine, paying a high cost for not doing it.   Thus the Western reaction to the war in Ukraine disclosed both long term and short term challenges to its policies. The war, which is rather a deja vu moment in this part of the world after the dramatic experience of violence and wars in the 20th century, demonstrated a failure of deterrence of the potentially dangerous leader in spite of all the signals coming from the smaller states since the end of the Cold War. It has also revealed the destructive power of the regime which fills the void of the failure of society to find its identity, reinforced by the underestimation of its role by the international community, and the sense of impunity and appeasement of the official policies. European Parliament appealed to the Russian society against the decades of identification of the country with the regime, which is as belated, as was Macron’s rather irrelevant appeal not to humiliate Russia. The latter would probably be more relevant to the society than to regime. Indeed, one of the ways to move forward is to credit people with the positive potential to reform, helping them to re-discover a civilised and distinct identity, based on humanism and universal values, rooted in their history and culture. The war in Ukraine is an expression of Russia’s weakness – its incapacity, based on identity, to form a unique contribution to world affairs, which would be attractive to other states and their societies first of all. One of the most powerful driving forces of South Caucasus states’ transformation was the memory (or distinct positive identity) of the pre-Soviet occupation, based on just two years of democratic experience of the modern nation state. Azerbaijan’s unique contribution to world affairs in the early 20th century was building the first democratic republic in the Muslim East and being a source of liberal ideas far beyond its borders. This liberalising influence could be one of the ways to assert a distinct self instead of the imposition of control through either soft or hard power, as is done by Russia’s leader – who has found himself in deadlock of failed reforms, monopoly on power and national identity.   There is nothing unique in the search for national identity. The UK has been going through this process in the pre-Brexit period or in Germany with it serious re-consideration of the traditional Ostpolitik. However, in a decolonised country with non-democratic and weak state institutions the process might be painful and destructive.   While establishing identity at least two conditions are needed – freedoms and interaction with external actors for recognition. Currently the way out of this vicious circle for society is to gain confidence in having a potential positive distinct identity and added value. At this time, when the country is weak, this potential can always be found in one’s own history and culture to support costly moral choices made at a time of war. The participants of our survey stressed the possible role of modernisation, which Russia could have played, when conducting reforms, as in some periods of its history. The range of possible traits can vary from the cultural modernisation of the early 20th century, progressive political reforms in the 19th century (even if short term), scholarship and its influence on the world science, and the roots of freedoms, like in the Novgorod republic (although contested between the two nations). The latter indeed became a point of historical reference for the anti-war protesters in Russia since the end of February 2022, who chose the tricolor flag without red as a symbol of their movement. So even under the current oppressive conditions the society shows its attempts to change the nation and take back the hijacked control over identity formation from the autocrat.   Therefore, the objective of Russia finding its identity and place in the world is still ahead, and is a possibility as the societal protests show. However, it is a challenging task, as after the war in Ukraine is over it will have to go through real reforms, accompanied by transitional justice, holding criminals responsible, and atonement similar to that in the German state and society post-1940s.   [1] Leila Alieva and Bakhtiyar Aslanov, How autocracy impedes de-securitization, or why democracy matters: the case of Nagorno-Karabagh in the eyes of Azerbaijanis, Caucasus Survey 6, no. 3, (2018): 183-202, https://brill.com/view/journals/casu/6/3/casu.6.issue-3.xml [2] Ibid. [3] Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, World Politics 53, no.3, (2001): 325-361, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236710633_Does_Oil_Hinder_Democracy [4] Иван Шаблов, Putin said this during his conversation with the representatives of culture, in 2000 in exchange with a pop-singer Yurii Shevchuk, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/shablovioni/videos/3227457130599986 [post_title] => War as a sign of weakness: Failure of reforms and of reframing the Russian nation [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => war-as-a-sign-of-weakness-failure-of-reforms-and-of-reframing-the-russian-nation [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-27 15:55:15 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-27 14:55:15 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6513 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6497 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-07-19 00:10:49 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-07-18 23:10:49 [post_content] => What can foster peace and unity in societies that are deeply divided along sectarian lines? And what may lead to a reimagining of the political role of sectarian divides? These questions have received increasing attention among academics, policy makers, activists, and donor organisations in recent years, particularly in the wake of a series of large popular protest movements directed against sectarian political elites in countries such as Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon. These protests may contribute to foster stability and political transformation in the long run. To do so, however, their main challenge is to promote alternative identity categories such as nationalism and collective issues that can unify the population across sects and other social divides.[1] The purpose of this essay is to explore the pitfalls and risks associated with using discourses of nationalism to unite citizens against sectarian elites.   The recent decade’s anti-sectarian protest movements across divided societies in the Middle East suggest that appeals to a collective national identity can serve as a powerful weapon against sectarian divides and antagonism.[2] In fact, visions of nationhood have formed the basis of some of the most popular slogans and discourses in these movements. In the Bahraini uprising in 2011, protesters famously chanted that they were “not Shi’a, not Sunni, just Bahrainis”. In the so-called Tishreen Movement, which swept across Iraq in October 2019, a main slogan was, “we want a homeland”. In the Lebanese October Uprising, which took place at the same time, an estimated million people gathered in streets and squares to display the unity of the Lebanese people. The national anthem was played from large sound systems, and the Lebanese flag was painted on city walls across the country. In all three cases, the national flag was turned into a symbol of joint resistance against sectarianism and oppression.   This essay informs discussions about the potential of nationalist protest discourses by examining these in a critical light. While nationalist discourses may contribute to counter sectarianism, they do not present a miracle cure for sectarian divides. Rather, I argue, appeals to nationalism are associated with a series of pitfalls, which observers of contentious politics in divided societies must be attentive to.   The essay uses the Lebanese October Uprising as a case to illustrate these pitfalls, drawing on findings from field research and interviews with Lebanese activists as well as insights from research publications and other secondary sources. It begins with a brief overview of theoretical works on nationalism and sectarianism, which presents three potential pitfalls associated with using nationalist discourses as weapon against sectarianism. This is followed by a discussion of these pitfalls in relation to the Lebanese October Uprising. Finally, the essay concludes with a discussion of how these pitfalls may be addressed.   The scholarly debates on nationalism, sectarianism and de-sectarianisation: Three criticisms Recent years’ studies of sectarianism, de-sectarianisation and identity politics in divided societies have provided important contributions to nuancing the understanding of nationalism in these settings. Altogether, these studies emphasise that nationalist narratives can take multiple forms, many of which are based on exclusive, authoritarian, patriarchal, racist, sexist and antagonist visions of nationhood.[3] Consequently, nationalism is not, per se, democratic and secular. Neither, is it the polar opposite of sectarianism. Rather, envisions of nationalism and national identity often carry sectarian connotations.[4] As Rima Majed emphasises, Arab nationalism has been associated with a Sunni overtone, while Lebanese nationalism has historically been linked with a Christian identity.[5] Moreover, as Raymond Hinnebusch observes, certain forms of nationalism may be exclusionary towards ethnic minorities such as Kurds.[6] Finally, authoritarian regimes often use nationalist narratives against democratic opposition figures, presenting them as a ‘sectional’ interest, which constitutes a threat to the integrity of the nation.[7] This all makes it relevant to critically scrutinise the content of such nationalist discourses and ask “whose nation” they represent[8]   Taking the above insights as point of departure, one can identify three potential pitfalls of nationalist discourses as weapons against sectarianism within the context of popular anti-sectarian protests. The first pitfall is that nationalist discourses may draw a boundary between members and non-members of the state and thus contribute to othering or excluding non-nationals. In contexts where racist and xenophobic attitudes are already socially and politically salient, there is also a significant risk that strong nationalist sentiments may reinforce hostile attitudes against migrants, refugees, or other ethnic minorities. The second pitfall is that protest movements fail to define the content of their nationalist discourse. As there is often no shared sense of nationalism in divided societies, nationalist myths and symbols may become empty and politically passive. The third potential pitfall is linked to the fact that discourses of nationalism can easily be co-opted and distorted by political elites to serve sectarian agendas. A good example is Bahrain, where Shiite protesters and regime challengers were framed as Iranian fifth columnists serving the foreign policy agenda of Tehran.[9] In the following section, I discuss whether and how these pitfalls could be observed in the Lebanese October Uprising.   Pitfalls of nationalist discourses in Lebanon’s October uprising The Lebanese October Uprising, which broke out on October 17th 2019, is the largest mobilisation against sectarian politics in Lebanon. The uprising was triggered by a proposed tax on WhatsApp amidst a severe economic crisis. However, it also directed an explicit critique against the country’s political system, which is based on sectarian power sharing and has contributed to concentrate power in the hands of a small elite, many of whom are former warlords.[10] As mentioned above, nationalist slogans and symbols were omnipresent in the Uprising. Hence, the uprising provides a suitable case for discussing the potential pitfalls of nationalist protest discourses. Before turning to the downsides of these discourses in the uprising, it is important to note that many protesters and observers celebrated the appeals to national unity. My fieldwork data as well as secondary material suggest that the uprising’s nationalist narrative was largely seen as inclusive by protesters and presented as a contrast to the sectarian discourses, which had been promoted by the political elites for decades. However, as I elaborate below, the three pitfalls of nationalist discourses could also be identified in the uprising.   Limiting space for addressing the rights non-Lebanese Nationalist discourses arguably made it more difficult to include calls for the rights of non-nationals living in Lebanon and failed to address problems with xenophobia and racism in the country. Lebanon is home to about one million Syrian refugees, 200,000 Palestinians and about 250,000 migrant workers many of whom work in private households. The situation of the many non-Lebanese has become increasingly dire amid the recent years’ economic crisis. Moreover, non-Lebanese, particularly Syrian and Palestinian refugees have been exposed to racist and xenophobic discourses. More specifically, Lebanese sectarian politicians have long presented a form of nationalism, which rejects the rights of non-Lebanese in the country, with refugees particularly targeted. This anti-refugee discourse was exemplified in a number of tweets posted by Gebran Bassil, former Foreign Minister and son-in-law of Lebanon’s President just a few months before the uprising broke out. These tweets, which sparked a storm on social media, were interpreted as an indirect encouragement for Lebanese employers not to hire Palestinian or Syrian refugees.[11]   However, demands for the rights of non-Lebanese and calls against xenophobia played a minor role in the uprising. As one activist observed, "Most protesters, truth be told, are simply not thinking about refugees at all.”[12] This observation was echoed by several organisers I interviewed as part of my doctoral research. Interestingly, organisers stressed that they deliberately chose not to bring up rights of non-Lebanese, particularly refugees. The dominant discourse of nationalist unity, several of them believed, stood in the way for addressing rights of these groups. The point is also evident in a comment by investigative journalist, Lara Bitar: “Unfortunately, very little space has been made for migrant workers and refugees and I hope that will change. I'm also not too fond of the hyper-nationalist sentiment that's overtaken public spaces and hope for more conversations around it.”[13]   Furthermore, the hyper-nationalism Bitar refers to, may also have made refugees less inclined to join the protests or lose hope that the movement would lead to an improvement of their conditions. In a study of perceptions of the uprising among Lebanese and non-Lebanese residents of Tripoli, Dahrouge et al. found that Syrian respondents did not see the potential for improvement in their conditions, as the demands were mainly targeting the basic living rights of the Lebanese people.[14] Moreover, 53 per cent of Lebanese respondents in their survey shared the opinion that people with other nationalities should not participate in the protests. Finally, there were indications that refugees were anxious about racism and xenophobia in the uprising. In Tripoli, for instance, water and first aid items were left for protesters by Syrian refugees in the city, asking for protesters not to be racist.[15]   The depoliticising effect of nationalist celebrations The risk of nationalism becoming an empty and politically ‘impotent’ approach was addressed in several critical analyses of the October Uprising. For instance, Halawi and Salloukh argue that the uprising gradually mutated into a national carnival.[16] Imagining a national community, they contend, is one thing. Real political change, however, is an altogether different challenge. This point speaks to a wider critique, which was raised by organisers both during and after the uprising, stressing that the carnivalesque atmosphere and the musical performances with flags and nationalist songs, despite being highly popular, also distracted people from discussing substantial political topics. Protesters I interviewed during my fieldwork in Lebanon also expressed frustration that these performances took up the media’s main attention, distracting focus from the political deliberation that took place in the square. Indeed, looking at domestic and international media coverage, some of the most covered events included a human chain from north to South Lebanon and mass DJ concerts in the main square of Lebanon’s second largest city, Tripoli. During my fieldwork in Lebanon in 2021, around two years after the uprising, many interlocutors described the uprising as a missed opportunity for creating clear alternatives to sectarian politics. While it would be incorrect to attribute this shortcoming to the use of nationalist discourses alone, the October Uprising nevertheless illustrates that visions of nationhood can be difficult to translate into political opposition projects.   Co-optation of nationalist discourses Several political figures from opposing camps used nationalist discourses in their counter narratives against the uprising, seeking to present themselves as protectors of Lebanon. When Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah took a stance against the uprising, he claimed to do so in the interest of the Lebanese nation. In a speech on October 25th, he stated that he intended to protect the country from a vacuum, which would lead to chaos, collapse and ultimately civil war.[17] When announcing his resignation in a televised speech on October 29th former Prime Minister Hariri stated that “No one’s bigger than the nation”.[18] Moreover, several politicians and their affiliated media outlets sought to portray the uprising as a dangerous movement backed by foreign powers to drag Lebanon into open conflict.[19] These examples illustrate how discourses of nationalism are fragile to co-option and manipulation by political elites. Overall, one can argue that the October Uprising turned into a battle between civic and sectarian discourses of nationhood.   Ways of addressing the pitfalls of nationalism This essay has explored the pitfalls and risks associated with using discourses of nationalism to challenge sectarian politics in divided societies. While nationalist narratives have been a powerful tool against sectarian division in popular protest movements from Bahrain to Lebanon, nationalism is not per se the opposite of sectarianism. The essay argues that discourses of national unity can be associated with three potential pitfalls: They may lead to othering of non-nationals, contribute to depoliticise movements, and become subject to co-option by sectarian elites. Protesters in the Lebanese October Uprising used a shared vision of nationhood to rally people against sectarian elites. However, the uprising also illustrates the pitfalls of nationalist discourses. This prompts the question how protest movements can promote forms of nationalism that are more inclusive, anti-racist, politically potent and resistant to co-optation. One way could be to combine nationalist narratives with stronger elements of rights-based discourses, stressing the importance of rule of law, good governance, and individual rights.[20] In fact, groups in the Lebanese October Uprising already sought to do so. However, coming up with a shared rights-based approach to nationalism is not easy, given the lack of consensus on questions such as the right to civil marriage and same-sex-relationships. Another strategy could be to promote a form of nationalism which is informed by a political ideology, e.g. socialism as discussed by John Nagle.[21] Finally, a potential strategy could be to downplay the national identity in favor of a shared identity as citizens living within the same state.   Anne Kirstine Rønn is based at Aarhus University, Denmark and has been a SEPAD fellow since 2019. Her research focuses on contentious politics in divided societies, sectarianism and de-sectarianization. In her PhD dissertation, she explores challenges to solidarity in the 2019 Lebanese October Uprising.   [1] Baumann, Hannes. (2011). Introduction: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Arab Revolutions. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11, no.3, (2011): 509-512. Nagle, John. 2016. Social Movements in violently divided societies: Constructing conflict and peacebuilding. London, UK: Routledge. Valbjørn, Morten. Countering Sectarianism: The Many Paths, Promises, and Pitfalls of De-sectarianization. The Review of Faith & International Affairs 18, no. 1, (2020): 12-22. [2] Dodge, Toby, & Mansour, Renad. Sectarianization and De-sectarianization in the Struggle for Iraq’s Political Field. The Review of Faith & International Affairs 18, no. 1, (2020): 58-69. Ismail, Salwa. The Syrian uprising: Imagining and performing the nation. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11, no. 3, (2011): 538-549. [3] Nagle, Social Movements in violently divided societies. [4] Haddad, Fanar. Sectarian identity and national identity in the Middle East. Nations and Nationalism, 26, no. 1, (2020): 123-137. [5] Rima Majed, Lebanon and Iraq in 2019 Revolutionary uprisings against ‘sectarian neoliberalism’, TNI Longreads (Transnational Institute), October 2021, https://longreads.tni.org/lebanon-and-iraq-in-2019 [6] Hinnebusch, Raymond. (2020). Identity and state formation in multi‐sectarian societies: Between nationalism and sectarianism in Syria. Nations and Nationalism 26, no. 1, (2020): 138-154. [7] Baumann, Hannes. Introduction: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Arab Revolutions. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11, no. 3, (2011): 509-512. [8] Valbjørn, Morten. Countering Sectarianism: The Many Paths, Promises, and Pitfalls of De-sectarianization. The Review of Faith & International Affairs 18, no. 1, (2020): 12-22. [9] Mabon, Simon. Protest, Sects, and the Potential for Power‐Sharing in Bahrain. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 20, no. 2, (2020): 161-168. [10] Kraidy, Marwan M. The Lebanese Rise Up Against a Failed System. Current history 118, no. 812, (2019): 361-363. Salloukh, Bassel F., Barakat, Rabie, Al-Habbal, Jinan S., Khattab, Lara W., & Mikaelian, Shoghig 2015. Politics of sectarianism in postwar Lebanon. London, UK: Pluto Press. [11] The New Arab, Lebanese demand foreign minister's sacking over racist tweets, June 2019, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/lebanese-demand-foreign-ministers-sacking-over-racist-tweets [12] Imogen Lambert, Refugees in Lebanon watch protests with hope and caution, The New Arab, October 2019, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2019/10/22/refugees-in-lebanon-watch-protests-with-hope-and-caution [13] Miriam Younes and Lara Bitar, “New Ways of Relating to Each Other" Lara Bitar discusses Lebanon's ongoing protest movement, Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, December 2019, https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/41305/new-ways-of-relating-to-each-other [14] Dahrouge, Elias, Nammour, Jihad, Lotf, Ahmed Samy, Abualroos, Karim., Ait Youssef, Iasmin, Al-Burbar, Eman, Benyahya, Khawla et al. The 17 October 2019 protests in Lebanon: Perceptions of Lebanese and non-Lebanese residents of Tripoli and surroundings. Global Campus of Human Rights 4, no. 1-2, (2020). [15] Imogen Lambert, Refugees in Lebanon watch protests with hope and caution, The New Arab, October 2019, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2019/10/22/refugees-in-lebanon-watch-protests-with-hope-and-caution [16] Halawi, Ibrahim, & Salloukh, Bassel F. Pessimism of the Intellect, Optimism of the Will after the 17 October Protests in Lebanon. Middle East Law and Governance 12, no. 3, (2020): 322-334. [17] Tom Perry and Eric Knecht, Hezbollah warns of chaos, civil war in Lebanon, Reuters, October 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-protests-scuffles-idUSKBN1X41IV [18] Vivian Yee, Lebanon’s Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, Steps Down in Face of Protests, The New York Times, October 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/world/middleeast/saad-hariri-stepping-down-lebanon.html [19] Kareem Chehayeb, Narrative wars: Lebanon’s media take shots at popular protests, Middle East Eye, November 2019, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/information-wars-mar-lebanons-popular-uprising [20] Mabon, Simon. Desectarianization: Looking Beyond the Sectarianization of Middle Eastern Politics. The Review of Faith & International Affairs 17, no. 4, (2019): 23-35. [21] Nagle, Social Movements in violently divided societies. [post_title] => Can national unity cure sectarian division? The potential pitfalls of nationalist protest discourses [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => can-national-unity-cure-sectarian-division-the-potential-pitfalls-of-nationalist-protest-discourses [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-18 23:09:41 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-18 22:09:41 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6497 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6495 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-07-19 00:09:17 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-07-18 23:09:17 [post_content] => Northern Ireland is often described as a ‘deeply divided society’, yet it is recognised that religious difference – Catholic and Protestant – is not the main source of political polarisation.[1] The peace process and the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (GFA) primarily recognised the ethnonational character of antagonistic divisions. The institutions of the Agreement thus place emphasis on accommodating rival claims to national self-determination – Irish unity or UK unionism – and giving parity of esteem to the identities that underlie these ethnonationalist aspirations.[2]   Yet, as one major report published in 2019 concludes, ‘sectarianism remains a serious issue’ in post-Agreement Northern Ireland ‘despite strenuous and continuing efforts on the part of government, voluntary organisations and others to deal with its many manifestations’.[3]   What, then, is sectarianism in Northern Ireland? To what extent has the post-Agreement power-sharing framework acted to either ameliorate or exacerbate sectarianism? And, does sectarian difference adequately capture a society increasingly characterised by hybrid identities and agonistic positions vis-à-vis Northern Ireland’s constitutional position?   Sectarianism Ethnonationalism – while capturing contested expressions of political sovereignty – appears to be inescapable from religion. Religious affiliation continues to have a strong overlap with political and constitutional preferences. The national census is invariably read through the skewed mathematics of sectarian headcounting since it is assumed that a high percentage of Catholics support unity and an equal proportion of Protestants favour maintenance of the union. Elections also tend to be de facto sectarian censuses with the nationalist and unionist political parties drawing their support largely from either the Protestant or Catholic sections of society.[4] More than 90 per cent of Northern Ireland’s children are educated in schools that are largely segregated along religious lines and 94 per cent of Belfast’s public housing is segregated.[5]   The role that religion plays in shaping ethnonational identities and boundaries is debated in scholarly literature. Certainly, religious animus has historically animated sectarianism in Northern Ireland. The partition of Ireland and consequent formation of Northern Ireland in 1921 was purposely designed to ensure a two-thirds sectarian majority of Protestant unionists over Catholic nationalists. Sectarian rhetoric was instrumentalised by political leaders as a means to demonise the ‘other’ and to present themselves as defenders of their group. Religion, in this sense, was fused with ethonationalism. For instance, the primary appeal of Dr Ian Paisley, the leader of both Democratic Unionist Party and the Free Presbyterian Church, played ‘on political and ethnic-national interests based around the antinomies of Britishness (against Irishness) and Protestantism (against Catholicism)’.[6]   Such appeals to sectarian animosity are rarely if at all made today from the established political parties. No serious scholar or policymaker can credibly frame sectarianism in Northern Ireland though the risibly simplistic frame of ancient hatreds of primordial clashed of religious identity that bedevils analyses of conflict in the Middle East.   To understand sectarianism in Northern Ireland is to view the key issues that drive division and antagonism. To return to the beginning, the main cleavage in Northern Ireland is mutually exclusive forms of national self-determination. This dynamic fuelled the conflict known as the Troubles, resulting in 3,500 deaths and in the region of 100,000 serious injuries.[7] Political and social divisions unsurprisingly were intensified in this period, particularly in relation to political polarisation and residential segregation.   The peace process has seen this conflict move away from political violence to expressions of identity, culture, and community being the main ground for dispute. Group based rights have become ‘war by other means’ as nationalist and unionist political demand public recognition and parity of esteem for their respective identities. Sectarianism and sectarian difference are increasingly mediated through conflicts over flags symbols, language equality, and parades.[8]   This turn to group rights as a fundamental line of contestation is best understood as being facilitated by the architecture and language of the Good Friday Agreement. As noted earlier, the Agreement acknowledges not only the legitimacy of rival claims to national belonging; it further stresses the importance of parity of esteem to nationalist and unionist identities. This emphasis on multiculturalism and recognition of different identities is notably challenging in a divided society defined by mutually exclusive claims to statehood. The ultimate form of recognition for groups in divided societies is to have their demand for national self-determination legitimated. With reference to Bourdieu and Wacquant, conflicts of self-determination revolve around the defence of symbolic capital which is only of value within the ethnonational group.[9] Contending claims to self-determination represent zero-sum conflicts to declare the group’s symbolic capital as the only valid currency in the constitution of the state. The main ethnonationalist groups thus construct not only different myth-symbol complexes, but modes of symbolic expression that are largely constituted in antagonism to the ‘other’. Thus demands for one group’s symbolic capital is likely to be seen by the other group as a threat to its legitimacy.[10]   This has certainly been the case in post-Agreement Northern Ireland. Ulster unionists, whose symbolic culture dominated the state from its inception, view the Agreement as inexorably leading to a process in which their cultural capital is eroded by nationalists.[11] A notable example of this was the 2012 protests in Belfast after a motion by Belfast City Council to restrict the flying of the union flag to designated days. The protests, which lasted over four months, resulted in injuries to 160 police officers and 34 rioters receiving custodial sentences.[12] A proposed Irish Language Act to give the Irish language equal status to English in Northern Ireland are opposed by the main unionist parties, who have accused nationalists of ‘using the Irish language as a tool to beat Unionism over the head’. Sectarianism, rather than an expression of religious intolerance, is fundamentally expressed in terms of the cultural and political identities of ethnonationalism.   As part of this post-Agreement culture war over identity new issues have emerged as dividing lines. Most notably, contestation has arisen over LGBTQ rights. Despite the minimal attention to sexuality in the GFA, it is notable that LGBTQ rights increasingly assumed an important area of dispute within the power-sharing assembly. On five occasions between 2012 and 2019 Northern Ireland’s power-sharing Assembly has voted on same-sex legislation and on each occasion the vote has exposed ethnonational cleavages. In particular, while Irish nationalist parties and political representatives have largely voted in support of legalising same-sex marriage, Ulster Unionists have broadly opposed the motion and have used their veto power permitted within power-sharing to stymie such legislation.[13]   Rather than explain differences in relation to same-sex marriage as purely the product of the relationship of some unionist parties to protestant evangelicalism, it must be understood within the context of ethnonational polarisation. The term ‘sextarianism’ captures how sexual difference has increasingly become bound up with expressions of sectarian difference.[14] LGBTQ rights are thus a co-opted issue used as part of a broader culture war.   This demonstrates that sectarianism in Northern Ireland is not simply a marker of immutable ethnoreligious characteristics, but is instead a form of constant boundary marking in which practically anything can become a signal for difference and contestation.   Most significantly, Brexit has developed into a deeply polarising issue in Northern Ireland. Although the majority of people in Northern Ireland voted remain, the vote broadly mapped onto political identities, with nationalist parties supporting remain and unionists supporting the leave campaign.[15] Brexit has become particularly divisive in Northern Ireland over the issue of the Protocol as a mechanism to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and to make sure of the integrity of the EU's single market for goods. The protocol is intensely opposed by unionists who see this it as creating an effective border across the Irish Sea thus undermining Northern Ireland's place within the UK.[16]   The rise of the ‘Others’ While the GFA fundamentally sought to recognise nationalist/unionist identities and claims to self-determination, it also makes provisions for those people who identify as neither nationalist or unionist and/or both British and Irish. Public opinion surveys have demonstrated an upward trajectory of people in Northern Ireland who define themselves as ‘neither’ unionist nor nationalist. In fact, the largest plurality of identification (circa 40 per cent) is now this ‘neither’ category.[17] According to the 2021 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 27 per cent of the population also claim to have no religion. The rise of the ‘neithers’ indicates a population that is increasingly open to complex social and political identities. To an extent, this is reflected in the recent breakthrough of the non-sectarian Alliance Party, which won 17 seats in the 2022 Northern Ireland Assembly elections, more than doubling its tally from 2017.[18] Yet, despite the emergence of ‘neithers’ and non-sectarian parties, it would be mistaken to assume that this represents the settlement of Northern Ireland’s constitutional position. The ascendency of the nationalist Sinn Fein as the largest party in the Northern Ireland Assembly will fuel momentum for a so-called ‘border poll’ on Irish unity.   John Nagle is Professor of Sociology at Queen’s University Belfast. His research focusses on social movements and divided societies. His most recent book is Resisting Sectarianism: Queer Activism in Postwar Lebanon (co-authored with Tamirace Fakhoury).   [1] McGarry, John and O’Leary, Brendan. 1995. Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images. Oxford: Wiley. [2] Nagle, John. Between conflict and peace: An analysis of the complex consequences of the Good Friday Agreement. Parliamentary Affairs 71, no. 2 (2018): 395-416. [3] Duncan Morrow, Sectarianism in Northern Ireland: A Review, Queen’s University Belfast, December 2018, https://niopa.qub.ac.uk/bitstream/NIOPA/11958/1/A-Review-Addressing-Sectarianism-in-Northern-Ireland_FINAL.pdf [4] Evans, Jocelyn and Tonge, Jonathan. ‘Social Class and Party Choice in Northern Ireland's Ethnic Blocs’. West European Politics, no. 32, (2009): 1012–1030. [5] Morrow, Sectarianism in Northern Ireland. [6] Brewer, John and Higgins, Gareth. 1998. Anti-Catholicism in Northern Ireland, 1600–1998: The Mote and the Beam. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. [7] Morrissey, Mike and Smyth, Marie. 2002. Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement: Victims, Grievance, and Blame. London, UK: Pluto Press. [8] Nagle, John. From the Politics of Antagonistic Recognition to Agonistic Peace Building: An Exploration of Symbols and Rituals in Divided Societies’. Peace & Change 39, no. 4, (2014): 468-494. [9] Bourdieu, Pierre and Wacquant, Loic. Symbolic Capital and Social Classes. Journal of Classical Sociology, 13, no. 2, (2013): 292-302. [10] Nagle, From the Politics. [11] McAuley, James W. and Tonge, Jonathan. ‘Britishness (and Irishness) in Northern Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement’, Parliamentary Affairs, no. 63, (2010): 266–285. [12] Nolan, Paul, Bryan, Dominic, Dwyer, Clare, Hayward, Katy, Radford, Katy, and Shirlow, Peter. 2014. The Flag Dispute: Anatomy of a Protest, Belfast, NI: Queen's University Belfast. Northern Ireland Office (1998) Agreement Reached in the Multi–Party Negotiations. Belfast, HMSO [13] Hayes, Bernadette and Nagle, John. Ethnonationalism and Attitudes Towards Gay Rights in Northern Ireland. Nations and Nationalism, no. 22, (2016): 20–41. [14] Maginn, Paul J., and Ellison, Graham. ‘Ulster Says No’: Regulating the consumption of commercial sex spaces and services in Northern Ireland. Urban Studies 54, no. 3 (2017): 806-821. [15] Gormley-Heenan, Cathy, and Arthur Aughey. Northern Ireland and Brexit: Three effects on ‘the border in the mind’. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19, no. 3 (2017): 497-511. [16] BBC, Brexit: What is the Northern Ireland Protocol?, June 2022, www.bbc.co.uk/news/explainers-53724381 [17] Hayward, Katy, Komarova, Milena, & Rosher, Ben. 2022. Political Attitudes in Northern Ireland after Brexit and under the Protocol. Belfast, NI: Queen’s University of Belfast. [18] Cera Murtagh, Northern Ireland is politically divided. Maybe that’s changing, Washington Post, June 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/06/14/northern-ireland-alliance-party-union-republican/ [post_title] => Northern Ireland: Still a deeply divided society? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => northern-ireland-still-a-deeply-divided-society [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-18 23:06:13 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-18 22:06:13 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6495 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [20] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6492 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-07-19 00:08:04 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-07-18 23:08:04 [post_content] => The concepts of sectarianism and ethno-nationalism are used to describe not only the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) but also to qualify issues emerging from decades of failed attempts at post-war reconciliation, which are understood in terms of religious and ethnic antagonisms. This means that the process of settling the conflict aims at ‘fostering dialogue’ between actors whose identities are perceived as always conflictual. Clearly, once group identities are normalised as homogeneous, stable, and threatened/ing the demand for peacebuilding centres on a system capable of ensuring equal and fair representation. Consociationalism has become the preferred choice in such post-conflict scenarios because of how it empowers communities across ethnic lines, and thus guaranteeing that political power and decision-making is equally distributed (on consociationalism in B-H, see Merdzanovic).[1]   Yet consociationalism presents at least two major problems. Firstly, it distributes power among representatives of majority groups only. In the case of B-H, this means that individuals who are not (or do not want to identify as) Bosnian-Croat and Catholic, Bosnian-Serb and Orthodox or Bosniak and Muslim are deprived of political representation falling into the loose category of ‘others’.[2] Secondly, the power-sharing infrastructure (designed to prevent/settle ethnic tensions) strengthens the very borders between communities that peacebuilding projects aim at making porous.[3] This is because political power depends on the strengthening of divisive lines. More so, there is little incentive for those in power to transition to a different political system based on rules that won’t benefit careers built on ethnic antagonism. According to Merdzanovic, the imposed consociational democracy in B-H ‘promotes extremist rather than accommodative behaviour’.[4]   A cursory glance at official documents released by the High Representative (the European Union official leading the process of peace- and state-building in B-H) reveals anger and frustration at a political class unable to engage in dialogue, compromise, and negotiation across ethnic lines.[5] This lack of dialogue translates into political stagnancy, which interferes with desired plans for peacebuilding, democracy, EU membership and full independence from the international protectorate.   If peacebuilding seems to have failed with consociationalism at the state level, myriad initiatives targeting ‘the people’ of B-H explore the potential of bottom-up processes to encourage peace. Because peacebuilding works within the parameters of sectarianism, it cannot but promote the coming together of individuals who are always accounted for as members of ethnic communities. Thus, peacebuilding encourages inter-ethnic understanding, collaboration, and coexistence but it cannot deviate from an understanding of identities as sectarian and thus inherently antagonistic. So, for instance, these programmes often require that participants declare their ethnic belonging so that fair representation can be ensured with the aim of building bridges across ethnic divides.[6] Much critique of these peacebuilding programmes, largely sponsored by international organisations and foreign governments, highlights the limits of projects that cannot and are not interested in changing the system.[7] This type of peacebuilding is not driven by the vision of a shared future but rather as the process of learning to navigate sectarianism, or, at the very least, avoiding violent conflict. We can interpret this as mode of ‘resiliency’, or a coping stratagem for dealing with the reality of ethnic divisions. Yet, to coexist is not the same as to share, as it maintains those divisive lines that encircles homogeneous, stable ethno-national groups always imagined as conflictual.   In this essay, I look at peacebuilding from the grassroots to discuss the ways in which sectarianism is challenged within a system that perpetuates division. Firstly, I account for scholarship that focuses on the everyday to conceptualise how people make sense of ethnic division and enable spaces of coexistence that challenge understandings of ‘divided societies’ as hopelessly fragmented. Secondly, I account for grassroots attempts to reframe political conversations outside sectarianism. Specifically, I look at the 2014 mass protests in B-H and their legacy to comment on efforts to build peace on different terms. The aim of this essay is to discuss the potential of spaces where new ways of being together have emerged from re-configured identities that resist the automaticity of ethnic division. Instead, what is shared – including frustration, hope, and the desire to change the status quo – shapes ways of being/doing peace. I conclude this essay by asking whether we could envision peacebuilding as a more radical act, whose goal is to nurture hope for change rather than resilience.   Everyday life in ‘divided B-H’ The interest in everyday life stems from the desire to explore how people make sense of ethnic divisions in their most mundane activities. Everyday encounters cannot be fully predicted, thus the everyday is also a space for inconsistencies, or how contingency affects the ways we relate to each other and to politics. Azra Hromadzic’s book, Citizens of an empty nation, for example, dives in the lives of high schoolers in Mostar to observe and discuss the ways in which ethno-national belonging becomes divisive (or not).[8] She finds that young people date and mingle across ethnic lines but they know that, outside the safe space of the schools’ bathrooms, these relationships won’t survive. This shows how people navigate sectarianism across ethnic lines without openly challenging them and yet downplaying their normative value. In her ethnography of social spaces where people ‘mix’ in Mostar, Renata Summa explains how, once we stop privileging ethnic divisions as a framework to study ‘divided societies’, we begin to appreciate other ways of organising social life.[9] In fact, she finds that people in the everyday seem more concerned with differences between politicians and ordinary people, native and newcomers, and those who abide to sectarianism or do not. These lines of divisions tell us a lot about class, for example, with the old urban elites refusing to engage with sectarianism in the name of a cherished multicultural past. By exposing different lines of division, as Palmberger argues, we can ‘show complexities [but also] commonalities, shared past and presents that transcend ethno-national lines’.[10] In the everyday, sectarian boundaries are negotiated in ways that exceed ideological positioning, or, what Piacentini calls, ‘opportunistic alignments’.[11]   The everyday is also the space in which to study the dynamics between internationally led peacebuilding projects and local understandings of peace. Björkdahl and Gusic theorise these spaces as frictional peacebuilding.[12] In the everyday, international peacebuilding meets local practices in unpredictable ways, giving rise to resistance but also co-option. Friction, they write, creates ‘messy dynamics [..] unexpected coalitions built on “awkwardly linked incompatibles”’.[13] This is to say that top-down and bottom-up peacebuilding projects and practices co-exist and re-shape each other. To study the everyday allows us to appreciate the spontaneity of collaborative and inclusive practices that testify to the possibility of life together despite sectarianism.   Peacebuilding in grassroots activism Whereas peace in the everyday is discussed in terms of how people adjust to make sense of the present depending on contingencies, grassroots activism reclaims politics from corruption and stalemate, forging a space energised by the hope of radical change. In other words, everyday offers potential for a space that enables coexistence mediated by contingency. From this angle, I look at activist spaces in which anti-sectarianism is intentionally (rather than accidentally) political. In exploring peacebuilding from the grassroots, my aim is also to highlight what other problems become apparent once we question sectarianism as the main problem of ‘divided societies’.   2013 and 2014 are remembered as the years of mass mobilisation in B-H. From February 2014, for two consecutive months, angry citizens occupied streets, squares and administrative buildings in cities and towns across B-H demanding change from corrupt political elites.[14] Global media described the protests as the moment in which people from B-H came together across ethnic lines against the ruling class: the common enemy.[15] After years of international peacebuilding with no definite sign of peace, these protests showed that people could descend into the streets together, moved by anger, frustration, and hope. The protests also demonstrated that people are not apathetic, as often argued, but rather that they lack spaces to engage meaningfully in political conversations overshadowed by sectarianism.   Off the streets, protesters gathered in the plenums – assemblies where horizontal modes of democratic participation were tested. This provided a space for people to voice their concerns – small or big – and for a diverse crowd to vote in order to prioritise the work of the collective. It wasn’t easy, and not without tensions, but, for many, it felt like finally someone was listening.[16]   These protests cannot be understood without accounting for the unrelenting work of activist networks that never ceased to nurture hope in liminal spaces outside mainstream political outlets. They cultivated the hope that things could change radically in a country often addressed as hopeless.[17] It is within these circles that people most strongly condemn how the hyper-focus on sectarianism has disincentivised political participation and thus the possibility for peacebuilding and reconciliation. This is because peace in these circles is not only understood as a matter of inter-ethnic dialogue but also as welfare and wellbeing. In Tuzla, where violent protests began in February 2014, factory workers had been long trying to gain attention after been made redundant by the privatisation of factories once owned by the Socialist state.[18] The protests showed that problems are not ‘ethnic’ but rather that of unemployment, gender discrimination, racism, nepotism, bullying… As Majstorović, Vučkovac and Pepić write, the legacy of the 2014 protests is that now ‘the divisiveness of ethno-national rhetoric is less successful at demobilising political opposition [because] the impoverishment of the people has politicised the economic restructuring [and] issues of social justice have become a constant presence in public discourse’.[19] In this sense, peacebuilding cannot be limited to preventing violent confrontation, or vague notions of ‘power sharing’, but must include a demand for a better life where flourishment is the goal and not survival.     What’s the use of sectarianism? Demanding radical hope for peacebuilding In this essay, I looked at practices of peacebuilding that exceed planned intervention. I discussed how, in the everyday, people make sense of, downplay, or enact divisions that contingently reveal other, equally important, lines of division such as class. I also introduced the 2014 mass protests in B-H to account for grassroots activism as the space where hope for radical change is nurtured. By refusing to accept ethnicity as the only marker of one’s identity, grassroots activism can support conversations about poverty, unemployment, corruption, or mental health that are obscured by a hyper-focus on ethnic identity. In doing so, they reject discourses about resilience as the default mode to navigate immutable ‘divided societies’, and instead inhabit and cultivate spaces of hope: a more radical way to imagine the future. Thus, peacebuilding can also become more courageous and instead of building bridges between ethnic others, it can work with people to nurture dreams beyond sectarianism.   Giulia Carabelli is an urban and cultural sociologist interested in affect theory, grassroots activism, and everyday life. She is lecturer in social theory in the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary, University of London. Giulia’s extensive ethnographic work in the city of Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, has resulted in various publications on the possibility of social change in places of contestation and political stalemate. Her first book, The Divided City and the Grassroots, was published in 2018 by Palgrave.   [1] Merdzanovic, Adis. 2015. Democracy by decree. Prospects and limits of imposed consociational democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ibidem Press. [2] Hromadžić, Azra. “Once we had a house” Invisible citizens and consociational democracy in post-war Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Social Analysis 63, no. 3, (2012): 30-48. Bell, Jared O. Dayton and the Political Rights of Minorities: Considering constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the acceptance of its membership application to the European Union. Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 17, no. 2, (2018): 17-46. [3] Aitken, Rob. Cementing divisions? An assessment of the impact of international interventions and peace-building policies on ethnic identities and divisions. Policy Studies 28, no. 3, (2007): 247-267. [4] Merdzanovic, Azra. “Imposed consociationalism”: external intervention and power sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Peacebuilding 5, no. 1, (2017): 22-35. [5] European Commission, Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report, October 2014, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/bosnia-and-herzegovina-progress-report-2014_en; European Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report, October 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/bosnia_and_herzegovina_report_2020.pdf [6] Carabelli, Giulia. 2018. The divided city and the grassroots. The (un)making of ethnic divisions in Mostar. Singapore: Palgrave. [7] Kappler, Stefanie and Richmond, Oliver. Peacebuilding and culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina: resistance or emancipation?. Security Dialogue 42, no. 3, (2011): 261-278. [8] Hromadžić, A. 2015. Citizens of an Empty Nation: Youth and State-making in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. [9] Summa, Renata. Inventing places: disrupting the “divided city”. Space and Polity 23, no. 2, (2019): 140-153. Summa, Renata. 2021. Everyday boundaries, borders and post-conflict societies. Cham: Palgrave. [10] Palmberger, Monika. Why alternative memory and place-making practices in divided cities matter. Space and Polity 23, no. 2, (2019): 243-249. [11] Piacentini, Arianna. Making an identity choice: “opportunistic alignment” in and beyond consociational systems: evidence from South Tyrol and Bosnia Herzegovina. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 27, no. 4, (2021): 439-455. [12] Björkdahl, Annika. Precarious peacebuilding: friction in global-local encounters. Peacebuilding 1, no. 3, (2013): 289-299. [13] Ibid. [14] Kurtović, Larisa. Conjuring “the people”. The 2013 Babylution protests and desire for political transformation in postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina. Focaal – Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 80, (2018): 43-62. [15] Economist, Protests in Bosnia: On Fire, February 2014, https://www.economist.com/europe/2014/02/15/on-fire; Aleksandar Hemon and Jasmin Mujanović, Stray Dogs and Stateless Babies, New York Times, February 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/opinion/sunday/stray-dogs-and-stateless-babies.html; Soeren Keil, Whatever Happened to the Plenums in Bosnia?, Balkaninsight, June 2014, https://balkaninsight.com/2014/06/16/whatever-happened-to-the-plenums-in-bosnia/ [16] Arsenijević, Damir. 2014. Unbribable Bosnia Herzegovina. Baden-Baden (ed.), Germany: Nomos. [17] Carabelli, Giulia. Love, activism, and the possibility of radical social change in Mostar. Space and Polity 23, no. 2, (2019): 182-196 [18] Emin Eminagić, Protests and Plenums in Bosnia and Herzegovina, CITSEE BLOG, March 2004, http://www.citsee.eu/citsee-story/protests-and-plenums-bosnia-and-herzegovina; Milan, Chiara. 2017. Reshaping Citizenship through Collective Action: Performative and Prefigurative Practices in the 2013-2014 Cycle of Contention in Bosnia & Hercegovina. Europe Asia Studies 69, no. 9, (2017): 1346-1361. Milan, Chiara. 2020. Social mobilization beyond ethnicity. Civic activism and grassroots movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina. New York, US: Routledge. [19] Majstorović, Danijela, Vučkovac, Zoran & Pepić, Aandela. From Dayton to Brussels via Tuzla: post-2014 economic restructuring as europeanization discourse/practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 15, no. 4, (2015): 661-68. [post_title] => Demanding radical hope for peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => demanding-radical-hope-for-peacebuilding-in-bosnia-herzegovina [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-18 23:03:04 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-18 22:03:04 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6492 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6490 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-07-19 00:07:49 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-07-18 23:07:49 [post_content] => On 9th June 2022, an obscure historical epic about the early years of Islam made headlines when leading UK film chain Cineworld made the decision to cancel all screenings in the wake of protests by Muslim groups.[1] The Lady of Heaven purports to tell the “untold story” of Lady Fatima, daughter to the Prophet Muhammed and wife of Ali, the man Shi’a Muslims (not Sunnis) believe was appointed as the first Islamic caliph. Critics say the film, which was written and produced in Britain by controversial Shi’a cleric Sheikh Yasser al-Habib, peddles an “extreme… sectarian narrative” and that it “sets out to damage relations and social cohesion between the various Muslim denominations”.[2] A petition calling for the film to be banned, started by Muslim media platform 5Pillars, had reached over 130,000 signatures as of 14th June.[3] 5Pillars editor, Roshan Muhammed Salih, commented on BBC Newsnight that he was concerned the film “could provoke sectarian violence on the streets of Britain.”[4]   This is not the first time concerns have been expressed over the potential for intra-Muslim sectarianism in Britain. Although historically inter-communal relations between British Sunni and Shi’a Muslims have mostly been immune from sectarian tensions,[5] since at least the early 2000s – and most notably since the 2003 invasion of Iraq – sectarian conflicts elsewhere in the Muslim world have increasingly found expression on British soil.[6] With the fracturing of the 2011 Arab Spring protests along sectarian lines, coupled with the 2014 rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Muslim communities in Britain have been drawn into ongoing geopolitical and identarian debates that have served to reinforce sect-based divisions and stereotypes.[7] Though, as Elvire Corboz cautions in the Introduction to a forthcoming Special Issue on Sunni-Shi’a relations in Europe, “stereotypes do not however translate automatically into antagonistic action by the individuals holding them.”[8] Nevertheless, there is a growing community and academic consensus that intra-Muslim sectarianism does indeed pose a threat in contemporary Britain, and that the entrenchment of communal identity politics along sectarian lines will likely be exacerbated by the domestic context post-Brexit.   In many ways, the furore surrounding The Lady of Heaven offers a microcosm of Sunni-Shi’a relations in contemporary Britain; bitter disagreement and division, as well as the potential for solidarity and mutual understanding. In what follows, I trace a brief outline of some of the contributing factors leading to the sectarianisation of Muslim identity in Britain today, before offering a word of caution, and also – potentially – a ray of hope for the future.   Contextualising Sunni and Shi’a Islam in Britain: Points of convergence, points of difference Muslims in Britain currently make up around five per cent of the UK population;[9] although there are no data regarding the different denominations within Islam, estimates suggest that Shi’a Muslims comprise between ten and 15 per cent of the overall Muslim population, while other minority denominations represent even smaller numbers.[10] As well as the doctrinal and theological differences between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims in the UK (which are not the focus of this report, and about which I have written extensively elsewhere), there are demographic and cultural differences between the two communities, with Sunni Muslims predominately coming from South Asia (most notably Pakistan and Bangladesh), while Shi’a Muslims represent a more diverse community coming from countries including Afghanistan, Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, South Asia, and East African Indians (known as Khoja).[11] For this reason, there are multiple converging factors that contribute to different community identities for both Sunni and Shi’a Muslims in Britain, and the potential for sectarian antagonism is not limited to religious disagreement but bound up with a wider array of factors including socioeconomic status, political differences, cultural solidarity, and differing migration histories.[12]   Despite such differences, however, both Sunni and Shi’a Muslims in Britain share the experience of being part of a minority religious community within the larger British (Christian) majoritarian context in which Islam and Muslims are often cast as other and threatening. Since 9/11 and the 2005 London bombings, the British Government has engaged in a number of counter-terrorism initiatives and policies to combat the perceived threat of home-grown Islamist radicalism that have effectively branded Muslims in Britain as a “suspect community”.[13] These attempts to police the Muslim population through a securitised agenda, coupled with the ethnonormative logic of British multiculturalism, has arguably led to the emergence of a religiously-inflected Muslim political agency in Britain, whereby Muslims identify first and foremost through their religious affiliation.[14] Recent studies of Muslim political identity in the British context have highlighted the trend towards the racialisation of Islam as a primary marker of identity, in which the term “Muslim” has come to function “effectively as an ethno-religious category”.[15] This trend has arguably been exacerbated as a result of the Islamophobic political discourse surrounding Britain’s exit from the EU (‘Brexit’), with cases of hate crime against Muslims noted to have risen in the immediate period following the referendum vote in 2016.[16]   ‘Good’ Muslim, ‘bad’ Muslim: Sectarianism and positive identity formation Within this context, it is possible to see how historically differences within and between Muslim groups in Britain were less politically and socially salient than the shared experience of being part of a marginalised and “suspect” community in relation to wider British society. However, recent scholarship suggests that some Muslim groups have attempted to distance themselves from negative public perceptions of Islam by constructing an alternative Muslim identity within the British context. In particular, the “good Muslim/bad Muslim” dichotomy that has been so potent in contemporary British public and policy discourses constitutes an additional challenge, and has had particular implications for intra-Muslim relations.[17] The pressure on Muslims in Britain to “speak up” against violent extremism has led them to adopt and even reify the binary portrayal of Islam as good/bad, while also using it to categorise themselves and other co-religionists.[18] For example, some Shi’a groups have made use of this public discourse to make claims regarding the normative nature of Sunni (bad) and Shi’a (good) interpretations of Islam (such as claiming that “Shi’a Muslims are the biggest victims of terrorism” in reference to 2014 ISIS invasion of Iraq).[19] While there is evidence to suggest that attempts to construct a positive and emancipatory British Shi’a identity as qualitatively and normatively distinct from the Sunni mainstream are not ideologically sectarian, there nevertheless remains an extent to which these identity constructions harbour the potential to lead to unconscious forms of sectarian bias that could impact intra-Muslim relations.[20]   The recent controversy surrounding The Lady of Heaven perfectly illustrates how theological, political, and normative claims have become blurred in certain iterations of Shi’a identity in the British context. The film represents a very specific and ideologically-charged version of early Islamic history that pits Sunni and Shi’a interpretations against each other. While the film and its backers certainly do not represent the majority of Shi’a Muslim community in Britain, and indeed have been widely condemned by leading Shi’a clerics and community figures, the film’s discursive juxtapositioning of modern-day atrocities committed by ISIS and the suffering of Shi’a Muslims throughout history is a familiar trope in much contemporary Shi’a identity discourse, albeit in a much more extreme and politically-charged form.[21] Against the backdrop of ongoing sectarian (and especially anti-Shi’a) violence in the Middle East and wider Islamic world, Shi’a Muslims in Britain often feel sidelined or marginalised by the Sunni majority, and more needs to be done to bring these communities together to combat perceived grievances and to promote cross-denominational understanding in Britain.   Beyond sectarianism? Rethinking intra-Muslim solidarity and cohesion in contemporary Britain Finally, I would argue that the recent protests against The Lady of Heaven, as well as revealing ideological and sectarian fault-lines within the British Muslim community, also represent the potential for greater intra-Muslim cohesion and understanding. The fact that Muslim organisations from both Sunni and Shi’a denominations issued statements unilaterally condemning the film, and that criticism of the film has not devolved into ideological disagreement, suggests that Muslims from both sects are willing to work together against a perceived common enemy (in this case, a radical interpretation of Islam that does a disservice to Sunni and Shi’a traditions alike). Indeed, there are numerous examples of Sunni and Shi’a Muslims working together in this way, and discourses promoting unity and cohesion between sects have a robust historical lineage in both traditions.[22] In contemporary Britain, it is more often than not the wider societal context that determines whether or not such unity discourses come to the fore, or are displaced in favour of sect-based identity building.   In a recent co-authored paper investigating grassroots initiatives by Shi’a-led organisations to promote an inclusive and cross-sectarian vision of British Islam, Elvire Corboz and I concluded that “it is impossible to understand Sunni-Shi‘a relations in Britain without taking into consideration the wider social and political context that informs relations between Muslim and non-Muslim society.”[23] As outlined above, the content and manifestation of sectarian identities in Britain is not merely a product of doctrinal and ideological differences between different confessional denominations, but a result of multiple converging factors including international geopolitics, transnational Islamic networks, and the securitisation and marginalisation of Islam in Britain. In this sense, predictions of sectarian tension between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims in Britain that overlook the wider societal dynamics contributing to sect-based identity formation will fail to capture the complexities of inter, and intra-communal relations. On the other hand, ongoing public suspicion towards Islam and the entrenchment of Islamophobia in British society has the potential to calcify and incite sectarian differences, rather than placate them. Whether or not fears of sectarian violence on British soil come to fruition thus ultimately depends as much on British society itself as on the diverse Muslim communities who form a part of it.   Dr Emanuelle Degli Esposti is a current Research and Outreach Associate at the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre of Islamic Studies, University of Cambridge, where she specialises in the nexus between minority Islam and European secularism. She holds a PhD and MSc from SOAS, University of London, and a BA from Oxford University. Dr Degli Esposti’s current research examines the public forms of activism undertaken by Shi’a Muslims in Europe, and seeks to illuminate the ongoing encounter between Islam and Europe, as well as the evolving dynamics within and between different Islamic sects. Her work has appeared in journals including Politics, Religion, State & Society, Religions, and Contemporary Islam, and she is currently working on a monograph entitled Not That Kind of Muslim: Sectarian Belongings and the Making of British Shi’ism (forthcoming with the University of Chicago Press).   [1] BBC, Cineworld cancels The Lady of Heaven film screenings after protests, June 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-61729392 [2] 5 Pillars, Lady of Heaven: pure, unadulterated sectarian filth, December 2021, https://5pillarsuk.com/2021/12/24/lady-of-heaven-pure-unadulterated-sectarian-filth/; Ahlulbayt Islamic Mission, Statement: Divisive film intends to fuel tensions between Muslims, June 2022, https://www.aimislam.com/statement-divisive-film-intends-to-fuel-tensions-between-muslims/ [3] Change.org, Remove the lady of Heaven from UK cinemas, https://www.change.org/p/remove-the-lady-of-heaven-from-uk-cinemas [4] 5 Pillars, BBC Newsnight Debate: Roshan Salih vs Malik Shilbak on ‘Lady of Heaven’, June 2022, https://5pillarsuk.com/2022/06/09/bbc-newsnight-debate-roshan-salih-vs-malik-shilbak-on-lady-of-heaven/ [5] Clarkson, Anya. 2013. Addressing Sectarianism and Promoting Cohesion in the British Muslim Community: A Preliminary Report. London: Centre for Academic Shi‘a Studies. [6] Caroline Wyatt, Fears over Deepening Sunni-Shia Divide in UK, BBC, March 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31691120 [7] Degli Esposti, Emanuelle and Scott-Baumann, Alison. Fighting for ‘Justice’, Engaging the Other: Shi’a Muslim Activism on the British University Campus. Religions 10, no. 3, (2019): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10030189; Ali, Zahra. Being a Young British Iraqi Shii in London: Exploring Diasporic Cultural and Religious Identities between Britain and Iraq. Contemporary Islam, (2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-018-0433-y; Scharbrodt, Oliver, Gholami, Reza and Abid, Sufyan. Shi’i Muslims in Britain: Local and Transnational Dynamics. Contemporary Islam, (2017); Degli Esposti, Emanuelle. Fragmented Realities: The ‘Sectarianisation’ of Space among Iraqi Shias in London. Contemporary Islam 13, no. 3, (2019): 259–85, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-018-0425-y; Degli Esposti, Emanuelle. 2019. Living Najaf in London: Diaspora, Identity, and the Sectarianisation of the Iraqi-Shi’a Subject, in Shi’a Minorities in the Contemporary World, (ed.) Oliver Scharbrodt and Yafa Shanneik. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press; Yousuf, Shereen. Right to Offense, Right to Shiaphobia: A Rhetorical Analysis of Yasir Qadhi’s Framings of Offense. Journal of Shia Islamic Studies 9, no. 1, (2016): 39–62. [8] Corboz, Elvire. The Dynamics of Sunni-Shi’a Relations in Europe: Introduction, Journal of Muslims in Europe (forthcoming). [9] Office for National Statistics, Muslim population in the UK, August 2018, https://www.ons.gov.uk/aboutus/transparencyandgovernance/freedomofinformationfoi/muslimpopulationintheuk [10] Pew Research Centre, Estimated Percentage Range of Shia by Country, Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009, http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/; For this reason, this report will focus on inter-communal relations between the two main branches of Islam, Sunnism and Shi’ism, while acknowledging that this doesn’t necessarily capture the full diversity of intra-Muslim relations in Britain. [11] Degli Esposti, Emanuelle. The Aesthetics of Ritual – Contested Identities and Conflicting Performances in the Iraqi Shi’a Diaspora: Ritual, Performance and Identity Change. Politics 38, no. 1, (2018): 68–83, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395717707092; Degli Esposti, Emanuelle. Sectarianising the Subject: Discourse, Identity, and the Self in the Transnational ‘Shi’a Rights’ Movement, n.d., 1–52; Degli Esposti and Scott-Baumann, Fighting for ‘Justice’, Engaging the Other: Shi’a Muslim Activism on the British University Campus; Degli Esposti, Emanuelle. Finding a ‘Shi’a Voice’ in Europe: Minority Representation and the Unsettling of Secular Humanitarianism in the Discourse of ‘Shi’a Rights’. Religion, State & Society, n.d.; Degli Esposti, Fragmented Realities: The ‘Sectarianisation’ of Space among Iraqi Shias in London; Degli Esposti, Living Najaf in London: Diaspora, Identity, and the Sectarianisation of the Iraqi-Shi’a Subject. [12] Degli Esposti and Scott-Baumann, Fighting for ‘Justice’, Engaging the Other: Shi’a Muslim Activism on the British University Campus; Scharbrodt, Gholami, and Abid, Shi’i Muslims in Britain: Local and Transnational Dynamics. [13] Awan, Imran, ‘I Am a Muslim Not an Extremist’: How the Prevent Strategy Has Constructed a ‘Suspect’ Community. Politics and Policy 40, no. 6, (2012): 1158–85, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00397.x/asset/polp397.pdf?v=1&t=j4jvoayg&s=b9178464215709579441902863a930e9ad009233&systemMessage=Wiley+Online+Library+will+be+unavailable+on+Saturday+01st+July+from+03.00-09.00+EDT+and+on+Sund; Yahya Birt, Safeguarding Muslim Children from Daesh and Prevent, The Muslim News, August 2015; Pantazis, Christina and Pemberton, Simon. From the ‘Old’ to the ‘New’ Suspect Community: Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation. The British Journal of Criminology 49, no. 5, (2009): 646–66; Scott-Baumann, Alison. Ideology, Utopia and Islam on Campus: How to Free Speech a Little from Its Own Terrors. Social Justice 12, no. 2, (2017): 159–76, https://doi.org/10.1177/1746197917694183; Thomas, Paul. Failed and Friendless – the UK’s ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Programme. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 12, no. 3, (2010): 442–58, http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/8949/ [14] The term ‘ethnonormativity’, a reformulation of the notion of heteronormativity taken from the literature on gender studies and critical feminism (most notably the work of Judith Butler), is used here to refer to “a deeply embedded set of beliefs about essential sameness and difference that naturalise the notion of ‘ethnicity’ and provide it with the status of a proper (ontological) object” (Aly 2015: 199). Meer, Nasar. 2010. Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan; Modood, Tariq. Muslims and the Politics of Difference. Muslims in Britain: Race, Place and Identities, (2009): 193–209; Morris, Carl. Muslim Identity Politics: Islam, Activism and Equality in Britain. Religion, State & Society 47, no. 3, (2019): 360–61, https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2019.1574443; Al-Azmeh, Aziz and Fokas, Effie. 2007. Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence (eds.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809309; Morris, Carl. The Rise of a Muslim Middle Class in Britain: Ethnicity, Music and the Performance of Muslimness. Ethnicities 20, no. 3, (2020): 628–48, https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796818822541; Cesari, Jocelyne. Muslim Identities in Europe: The Snare of Exceptionalism. Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence, (2007): 49–67. [15] Bloul, Rachel A. D. Anti-Discrimination Laws, Islamophobia, and Ethnicization of Muslim Identities in Europe and Australia. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 28, no. 1, (2008): 7. [16] Awan, Imran and Zempi, Irene. ‘You All Look the Same’: Non-Muslim Men Who Suffer Islamophobic Hate Crime in the Post-Brexit Era. European Journal of Criminology 17, no. 5, (2020): 585–602; Miller, Carl et al.. From Brussels to Brexit: Islamophobia, Xenophobia, Racism and Reports of Hateful Incidents on Twitter. Demos, (2016); Bilgrami, Akeel. Reflections on Three Populisms, 44, no. 4, (2018): 453–62, https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453718772896; Jon Burnett, Racial Violence and the Brexit State, Institute of Race Relations, 2016, https://irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Racial-violence-and-the-Brexit-state-final.pdf [17] Mamdani, Mafmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism. American Anthropologist 105, no. 2, (2003): 475–475, https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.2003.105.2.475.1 [18] Aslan Yildiz, Ali and Verkuyten, Maykel. Inclusive Victimhood: Social Identity and the Politicization of Collective Trauma Among Turkey’s Alevis in Western Europe. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 17, no. 3, (2011): 243–69, https://doi.org/10.1080/10781919.2011.587175; Corboz, Elvire. Shi‘i Discourses on Islamic Unity in the UK: Reconfiguring Majority-Minority Relations within Islam,Presentation at the panel ‘Intra- and Inter-Sect Dynamics and the Study of Sunni-Shi‘i Relations’. BRISMES Conference 2018, King's College London, London UK. June 26 2018. [19] Degli Esposti and Scott-Baumann, Fighting for ‘Justice’, Engaging the Other: Shi’a Muslim Activism on the British University Campus; Degli Esposti, Finding a ‘Shi’a Voice’ in Europe: Minority Representation and the Unsettling of Secular Humanitarianism in the Discourse of ‘Shi’a Rights.’ [20] Degli Esposti, Emanuelle. Forthcoming. ‘Not That Kind of Muslim’: Sectarian Belongings and the Making of British Shi’ism’. Chicago, US: Chicago University Press. [21] Ahlulbayt Islamic Mission, Statement: Divisive film intends to fuel tensions between Muslims, June 2022, https://www.aimislam.com/statement-divisive-film-intends-to-fuel-tensions-between-muslims/ [22] Corboz, A Shi‘i Discourse on Islamic Unity in the United Kingdom: Reconfiguring Majority-Minority Relations within Islam. [23] Degli Esposti, Emanuelle and Corboz, Elvire. ‘From the Margins to the Centre: Shi‘a-led grassroots organisations and inclusive Muslim identity in Britain.’ Journal of Muslims in Europe, (forthcoming). [post_title] => Divided we stand: Intra-Muslim sectarianism and solidarity in post-Brexit Britain [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => divided-we-stand-intra-muslim-sectarianism-and-solidarity-in-post-brexit-britain [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-18 22:59:22 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-18 21:59:22 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6490 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [22] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6488 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-07-19 00:06:16 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-07-18 23:06:16 [post_content] => ‘Sectarianism’ has traditionally referred to group conflict structured by religious differences, especially within the same faith. Study of the phenomenon has largely been confined to zones with violent conflict, especially the Middle East. In a strict sense, sectarianism is conflict between sects, coming from the Latin ‘secta’ or ‘following’, as in a religion. Yet, religious sects are hardly ever composed of intellectual or doctrinal divisions alone. They often map heavily (if not perfectly) onto ethnic, linguistic, class, and regional lines. Religious doctrine often is only peripheral to sectarian conflict.   Sensitivity to the breadth of identities involved in sectarian divides has led to a more inclusive understanding of the concept ‘sectarianism’. Simon Mabon and his collaborators have offered two conceptual innovations. The first is to widen the geographical scope of the study of sectarianism, which is heavily focused on violent religious conflict in the Middle East. Mabon writes, ‘there is nothing inherently “Middle Eastern” about [sectarianism]’, even if the region ‘undeniably’ is at the centre of many of these discussions.[1] The second is to widen sectarianism to apply to communal, identity-based divisions of all kinds, rather than ones simply focused on religious belief. Sectarian identities are not ‘primordial’ but ‘constructed’. They are ‘malleable entities that are often used for political ends’.[2] Crucially, sectarianism depends on the construction of ‘the other’ which entails ‘dehumanisation and scapegoating for political purposes’.[3]   These alterations to the framework of analysis allow for the inclusion of a case study, which is usually overlooked in the study of sectarianism, yet increasingly bears the hallmarks of a society that is riven by identity-based divisions mobilised for political ends: the United States of America. There is a sizeable (and growing) scholarship about the intense social and political divisions within the United States, yet such discussions are almost entirely separated from the conversation about sectarianism. Sectarianism is seen as something ‘other places’ do. This article disagrees. The United States is now clearly divided between sectae (‘followings’), not necessarily of the religious kind but of a similar fervour. Specifically, partisan identity – whether a person is a ‘Democrat’ or a ‘Republican’ – now shapes how Americans view the world, other Americans, and themselves. Americans have increasingly grown to hate supporters of the other party, viewing their capture of political power as not merely unfortunate but illegitimate.   Partisan identity in America About 85 per cent of Americans identify as either Republican or Democrat, about the same proportion who say they believe in God.[4] Party identification is roughly evenly split, with a slight edge to Democratic identifiers. Aggregate party identity in the United States is remarkably stable. In spite of all the ructions of the Trump presidency, for example, there was almost no change in the proportion of Americans who identified as Democrat or Republican throughout his four years in office. Individual partisan identity has also been shown to be highly stable in the United States, even when formal party positions on issues might change substantially. Partisanship is not just an expression of voting intention or an historical catalogue of past voting behaviour. Studies in the US show that party identification is overwhelmingly a product of socialisation – family and friends – and tends to remain consistent through life.   Partisan identity shapes how Americans see the world around them. Voters interpret the same objective economic conditions differently depending on whether their party is in power. Voters ‘update’ or change their views on a whole range of issues, including objective facts, once it becomes clear to them what the view of their party is on an issue. This is sometimes called ‘motivated reasoning’, whereby people will tend to invent a rational basis or explanation for something, even if it is inconsistent with the truth, so that it conforms to their prior assumptions or identity.[5] Importantly, consistent with non-US literature on sectarianisation, partisan motivated reasoning can be made more salient and expansive when given stronger elite cues.[6] In other words, elites can exacerbate sectarian difference in the United States – and they regularly do.   Parties are a normal and inescapable feature of democratic politics. There is virtually no political system in the world which lacks parties. Even when parties are formally banned, proxies for parties, such as candidate-centred lists, soon crop up. As in the US today, parties in many other parts of the world are well-sorted along ideological lines. Voters have a clear choice, and it makes sense to structure the party system around coherent policy offers. In itself, partisanship is not something that should cause concern.   What makes the US different, however, is that voters do not simply disagree with people of the opposing party more than they once did; they hate them much more too.[7] Americans sort socially according to party, not just politically. Americans express a clear preference for living among people who vote like they do.[8] They express strong preference to living with, working with, dating, and socialising with people of the same party. Equally, they express stronger aversion to doing any of these things with a supporter of another party. Americans view opposing partisans as not just wrong but also morally degenerate. ‘Feeling thermometers’ are one way in which political scientists gauge the intensity of voters’ sentiments. The more positive a respondent feels to a person or group, the ‘warmer’ they will place themselves on a thermometer (scaled from 0 to 100). Since the 1970s, affection for co-partisans has hovered at about 75 degrees, but sentiments about supporters of the opposing party have dropped from about 50 degrees (neutral) to 25 degrees (cold).   Ideology (policy) can explain this phenomenon only partially. Studies have shown that even when voters are made aware of shared policy outlook with supporters of the opposing party, they still have strongly negative views of supporters of that party. On the other hand, strong partisans can be remarkably ideologically flexible. A study by Lilliana Mason found that Republicans were content to adopt left-of-centre positions, if they were first told that Donald Trump supported those positions.[9] Evidence suggests that partisans are more strongly motivated about ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ than the substantive policy gains. People will accept less so long as it means the other group gets even less. This is not just a policy disagreement. It’s about sentiment, feeling, and tribalism.   What is driving this sectarianism? Negative partisanship – hatred and social disgust towards the other party – is a form of sectarianism. Partisan identity is strong and remarkably stable, but it is, like other kinds of sectarian identity, ultimately constructed. Partisan identity is used to structure and interpret the world. Perhaps most importantly, partisan identity helps generate a clear sense of an ‘other’ group, which is viewed not just as an opponent in a normal political competition but as an enemy to be blocked from power.   Scholars have differed about why there has been a growth in affective polarisation and negative partisanship. Some have blamed the increasingly partisan media environment. Others have blamed social media echo chambers. These communications-focused accounts tend to portray the process as one of media corporations promoting extreme messages, which radicalise voters who then demand greater radicalism from their representatives. Social factors have also been said to be part of this. As people have moved to communities with like-minded people, echo chambers can form and generate suspicion of outsiders.   Other accounts focus on supply-side factors. Politicians have determined that negative partisanship is a powerful motivator and can boost turnout, even amongst an electorate that is cynical about politics. Voters might feel fairly unenthusiastic about all politicians, but even a jaded citizen might vote to stop a morally abhorrent candidate or party from being elected. Additionally, it is said that ordinary voters are increasingly forced to choose more extreme party nominees due to gerrymandering and the increased prevalence of primary elections. In these narrower contests, ideologically extreme candidates are selected by the party faithful and then stand in safe seats (‘the decline of the marginal district’). Voters are given two extreme visions of the parties and this only reinforces stereotypes and negative perceptions.   This article has proposed that comparative sectarianism is a relatively novel framework by which to understand the growing divide within US society. Scholars of sectarianism grapple with similar questions – identity, race, religion, ideology, belonging, etc. – and consider its implications for politics – inclusion, democracy, and minority rights. Yet, very little of the literature applies this concept to the US case, and it is overwhelmingly dominated by religious themes. While acknowledging the importance of this intellectual context, some of these approaches can be carried over into an analysis of the United States. It is hoped that by seeing negative partisanship as a case of sectarianism rather than simply policy disagreement can help explain other worrying developments in US politics, such as the willingness of political actors to breach established rules and norms to prevent the ‘other side’ from gaining power. In this light, the events of 6th January 2021, to overthrow the US presidential election, become more explicable, if not any less concerning.   Dr Richard Johnson is Lecturer in US Politics & Policy at Queen Mary, University of London. He researches race, elections, and policymaking in the United States. He has published peer-review articles on voting rights, school segregation, racial coalitions, campaign finance, and social media. He is the author of The End of the Second Reconstruction: Obama, Trump, and the Crisis of Civil Rights (Polity, 2020) and US Foreign Policy: Domestic Roots and International Impact (Bristol, 2021).   [1] Mabon, Simon. Sectarianism Beyond the Middle East. Religion, State, & Society 49, no. 2, (2021): 174-280. [2] Mabon, Simon and Lucia Ardovini, Lucia. People Sects, and States: Interrogating Sectarianism in the Contemporary Middle East. Global Discourse 6, no. 4, (2016): 551-560. [3] Ardonivi, Lucia. The Politicisation of Sectarianism in Egypt: Creating an Enemy. Global Discourse 6, no. 4, (2016): 579-600. [4] Lydia Saad and Zach Hyrnowski, How Many Americans Believe in God?, Gallup, 2017, https://news.gallup.com/poll/268205/americans-believe-god.aspx [5] Lodge, Milton and Charles Taber, Charles. 2013. The Rationalizing Voter. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [6] Mabon, Simon. Desectarianization: Looking Beyond the Sectarianization of Middle Eastern Politics. Review of Faith and International Affairs 17, no. 4, (2019): 23-35. Bisgaard, Martin and Slothus, Rune. Partisan Elites as Culprits? How Party Cues Shape Partisan Perceptual Gaps. American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 2 (2018), 456-469. [7] Inyengar, Shanto, Sood, Gaurav & Lelkes, Yphtach. Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization. Public Opinion Quarterly 76, no. 3, (2012): 405-431. Iyengar, Shanto and Krupenkin, Masha. The Strengthening of Partisan Affect. Advances in Political Psychology 39, no. 1, (2018): 201-218. [8] Hui, Iris. Who Is Your Preferred Neighbor? Partisan Residential Preferences and Neighborhood Satisfaction. American Politics Research 41, no. 6, 2013: 997-1021. Gimpel, James and Hui, Iris. Political Fit as a Component of Neighborhood Preference and Satisfaction. City & Community 17, no. 3, (2018): 883-905. [9] Mason, Lilliana. 2018. Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. Chicago, US: University of Chicago Press. Barber, Michael and Pope, Jeremy. Does Party Trump Ideology?. American Political Science Review, (2019): 113:1. [post_title] => Sectarianism in the Divided States of America [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => sectarianism-in-the-divided-states-of-america [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-18 22:53:18 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-18 21:53:18 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6488 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [23] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6486 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-07-19 00:05:54 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-07-18 23:05:54 [post_content] => There has been considerable debate on Indian secularism but very little on Indian sectarianism. India has remained a ‘divided society’ but without sustained sectarian violence. However, in the last eight years of the current rightwing Modi government there has been sporadic and episodic violence between Hindus and Muslims, but also between caste groups, that looks organised. The question that should interest us in the current context is the equation between politically motivated and engineered violence and its sanction in everyday social beliefs and cultural practices. Is it entrenched social prejudices that produce consent for organised violence or is it politically organised violence that is constructing social consent based on how violence manages to re-signify the meaning of cultural codes?   The case of Indian sectarianism is oscillating between historically entrenched cultural practices and politically produced violence. While there are clear moments of convergence between the two, there is also observable dissonance between them. The dissonance takes shape when either the cultural practices resist violence or when violence distorts, or fails, to re-signify the cultural practices to its own imperatives.   Indian sectarianism is further fluctuating between establishing a low-intensity but a durable regime of sectarian conflicts between caste, cultural and religious communities and converting the existing sectarian conflicts into mass hysteria. Some scholars have already made a prognosis that Indian nationalism has entered a ‘genocidal phase’.[1] It also becomes pertinent to ask if the current regime has gained a cultural hegemony around sectarian strife between Hindus and Muslims, then from where does the need for using organised force and violence emerge? If violence is to establish control, then to ‘rule by exception’ seems to be a compulsion of the modern sovereign forms of governance that borders on the pathological. At such a point, sectarian conflicts look to be more political and less to do with social and cultural aspects. When do they flip from the cultural to the political? Do underlying cultural codes and narratives lend silent support or is exception about declaring autonomy from gaining legitimacy in everyday cultural codes such as memory, symbolism, myths and mythology.   Pew Research Centre, in a recent survey on tolerance in India, arrived at some intriguing findings that can potentially unlock some of the dilemmas that this essay begins with. The report argued that Indians in general (both Hindus and Muslims) valued diversity as a principle but preferred what it referred to as ‘living together, separately’.[2] The overwhelming majority of a large sample believed that religious and caste communities should live separately in segregated colonies. This, they believe, is essential to preserve their distinct culture and it is not about discrimination. Is this then a re-signified form in which cultural discrimination tends to reproduce itself in modern societies that are globalised and getting rapidly urbanised? Or could one argue that in light of faceless globalisation it is legitimate and even understandable as to why communities wish to preserve themselves as endogamous groups and pine for familiar surroundings? Could groups exist separately without it necessarily being sectarian and discriminatory?   Consider two instances that could throw some light on the underlying complexity. Well-known journalist, P. Sainath who covered rural India for well over three decades did a story that he aptly titled ‘The Glass War’. He pointed out that wayside highway dhabas (shanty restaurants) in the erstwhile undivided state of Andhra Pradesh followed the practice of offering tea in separate glasses for caste Hindus and other ‘lower’ castes.[3] After the local Dalit movement became socially and politically organised, it led protests against the ‘two glass’ policy of the dhabas. In response, the dhaba owners simply switched to disposable (paper/plastic) glasses that made discrimination invisible or rather unnamable. Sectarian practices were pushed into an intangible realm of intention, symbolism and gestures. It is a case of modern sectarian exclusion, which is easy to feel and experience, but difficult to spell and articulate. Much of modern forms of sectarianism in India are pushed into the dark alleys of silence that seem to erupt into violence of various kinds but whose causation is not easy to locate or identify.   The second instance is that of a recent advertisement in news dailies that invited applicants to buy apartments meant exclusively for the Brahmins in the Southern city of Bangalore.[4] While there was some protest against this it was defended as a way of creating familiar living conditions. In fact, food habits and vegetarianism were offered as legitimate reasons for the segregation that are not necessarily discriminatory against meat eaters. In ancient India, Brahmins lived in exclusive agraharas at the heart of the village where non-Brahmins were not allowed to enter. Vegetarianism has become the new template that is at the heart of potential sectarian conflicts in India. Vegetarianism is also being pushed through new scientific evidence on the health benefits, for example in combatting the COVID pandemic. The phenomenon of mob lynching against Dalits and Muslims has overtly to do with consuming beef and covertly with pushing a dominant narrative for vegetarianism. As part of the current Government’s Swatch Bharat Mission (Clean India Mission) public displays of meat are being prohibited in many places. In this case, sectarian conflicts are couched in deep-seated cultural practices, modern/rational justifications, and multiple significations of health, hygiene, and ecology.   The interaction between the politically organised sectarian violence and culturally embedded sectarian tensions are complexly overlaid. Organised political violence is seeking to ground itself in received and historically practiced cultural motifs. Sectarian violence is seeking cultural justification through creating popular narratives, while cultural discrimination is seeking modern and rational justifications. Further, it needs to be noted that Indian sectarianism of religious discrimination and strife is closely linked to other forms of communitarian practices of caste and gender in particular but also language and ethnicity. Religious violence cannot be understood in self-referential terms. Additionally, it is insufficient to make sense of religion, caste and gender vis-s-vis each other. It is equally important to note what is happening internally to each of these identities. For instance, the category of Dalit is undergoing a change and is becoming sub-divided. It is barely a stable category that is able to hold the various sub-groups within. The mutual and common identification created around the practice of untouchability is giving way to internal diversification. This is creating both mobility and strife. It is creating socio-psychological dynamics that are being tied up in the context of religious sectarianism and also in efforts to create a monolithic order. The fear of losing existing social privileges, even if one is located way below in the pecking order seem to be the over-arching anxiety that is referred to in the author’s previous writings on ‘secular sectarianism’.[5]   The ethic of ‘fear of fall’ has been the generic sentiment of neoliberal reforms that spread across the social domain in India replacing the normative imagination in the popular politics of shared ethos. The story of Indian sectarianism is incomplete without understanding how cultural practices and political strategies of polarisation found resonance in the economic model of development. The ‘Nehruvian consensus’ for accommodation and shared ethos found in the discourses of secularism, centrism and socialism were replaced by individual responsibility and ‘Social Darwinism’ and ‘Animal Spirits’ of the market ideals of inclusive social development with exclusive growth-centric narratives. Social democratic parties, such as the Congress, that introduced the neoliberal economic reforms in the 1990s however continued with the ideals of secularism in the social domain. This strategy to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds was rejected and lost the popular mandate.   What replaced it was a ‘predatory state’ that fine-tuned social ethics to market dynamics. It transformed dormant social prejudices and everyday religious practices of the dominant community into militant self-assertion. It constructed the narratives of ‘historical injury’ and ‘appeasement’ of religious minorities. It transformed the spiritual and otherworldly pursuits of religion into an instrumentalised identity. Discourses of individual self-realisation intrinsic to religion and faith got hooked to the ‘possessive individualism’ of the market. Postcolonial arguments of an Eastern ‘way of life’ where ideals of the sacred as against the profane being central to community, ideals of ‘moral economy’ as against bare interests did not seem to resist their appropriation into an aggressive sectarian logic of the right. In fact, the rhetoric of ‘nationalism’, ‘decolonisation’ and ‘civilisation’ were deployed to counter the critique of growing ‘sectarianisation’. In a recent document on ‘India as a democracy’, prepared by the Policy Planning and Research Division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) after the downgrade of Indian democracy by the global watchdog institutions, it reasserted the ‘Indian way’ on democracy.[6] The document invokes the idea of distinct ‘civilisational ethos’, and argues India is a deeply pluralistic society intuitively an international society. It claimed that the term ‘Vasudhaiv Kutumbakam’ – the world as a family – is deeply entrenched in Indian thinking. Describing Indian democracy as a ‘human institution’, the MEA attempts to place its practice in the ‘civilisational context’ tracing it to ‘panchayats in Ramayana’ and ‘Shanti Parva in Mahabharata’.[7]   Indian sectarianism in its current form is riding on a high dose of symbolism, moral rhetoric and a deep cultural ‘sub-conscious’. Discourses of secularism and constitutionalism have either been appropriated or rendered ineffective. While those struggling to mobilise against the current aggressive sectarianism are not finding a foothold in everyday ethics and emotions, those mobilising sectarianism are struggling to manufacture hysteria. Whether older ideals of secularism and centrism are having an afterlife in this new uneasy equilibrium is something to wait and watch for.   Ajay Gudavarthy is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. His forthcoming book is titled Politics, Ethics and Emotions in `New India` (Routledge, London, 2022).   [1] Arjun Appadurai, Modi’s India Has Now Entered Genocidalism, the Most Advanced State of Nationalism, The Wire, January 2022, https://thewire.in/politics/narendra-modi-india-genocidalism [2] Neha Sahgal, Jonathan Evans, Ariana Monique Salazar, Kelsey Jo Starr and Maolo Corichi, Religion in India: Tolerance and Segregation, Pew Research Center, June 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/06/29/religion-in-india-tolerance-and-segregation/; Ajay Gudavarthy, Understanding the Role of Religion in Indian Public Life, The Leaflet, July 2021, https://theleaflet.in/understanding-the-role-of-religion-in-indian-public-life/ [3] Shyama Venkateswar, Dalits in India 2000, Asia Society, https://asiasociety.org/dalits-india-2000?fbclid=IwAR25tsYLivkwMwuTPVzGJ1Y_wNIheRNdYbDxMa8l-njT-JDlKyijWNpxtzY; Also, refer, Palagummi Sainath, The borderline of caste, The Hindu, April 1999, and Palagummi Sainath, The Hindu, November 1998. [4] Shankara Agraharam, The Vedic Village, https://www.vedicagraharam.com/township/plots/?fbclid=IwAR0PW6yZVnlBu8KOL9srAR7zrT9aDfhThyHKHe2x2_3lZCQBFYQS-RAQCow; N. Bhanutej, Housing apartheid in Indian city, Al Jazeera, February 2014, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2014/2/28/housing-apartheid-in-indian-city?fbclid=IwAR0fD6tFgDTj9ns3rd_cw7H-OD3pAFt-IEPVtUnhxLZoT8KbMuLWFyUvn2g [5] Professor Anindya Sekhar Purakayastha, Subaltern and its Fragments: Aporias of Identity of Politics, Review of Dr Ajay Gudavarthy’s book Secular Sectarianism, Live Encounters, March 2020, https://liveencounters.net/2020-le-mag/03-march-2020/professor-anindya-sekhar-purakayastha-subaltern-and-its-fragments-aporias-of-identity-politicsreview-of-dr-ajay-gudavarthys-book-secular-sectarianism/ [6] Ministry of External Affairs, India: A Dynamic Democracy http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/184_india-dynamic-democracy.pdf [7] Anisha Dutta, New India leaders less from English-speaking world, so judged harshly: MEA paper, The Indian Express, February 2022, https://indianexpress.com/article/express-exclusive/new-india-leaders-less-from-english-speaking-world-so-judged-harshly-mea-paper-7784564/ [post_title] => Indian sectarianism: The cultural and the political [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => indian-sectarianism-the-cultural-and-the-political [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-18 22:50:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-18 21:50:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6486 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [24] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6483 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-07-19 00:04:36 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-07-18 23:04:36 [post_content] => Spoiler alert: this chapter argues that the royal Buddhist kingdom of Thailand is not a ‘land of smiles’, peaceful and harmonious, but a deeply divided nation. A violent racist society riven with social, political, inequalities, divisions and sectarian ethno-religious conflicts. My hypothesis is the predominant cause of social division and political conflict in modern Thailand lies in a post-colonial racist formation of Thai identity fashioned by an elite Bangkok minority and imposed upon the majority and other ethno-religious and regional populations. What is meant to unify – an imagined community of the Thai race and society – actually divides. Thai national identity, goodness, as we shall see, seems to need a bad enemy-other within or without. From the state point of view there is only one way of being Thai and behaving Thai. Peoples deemed to be un-Thai can, and have been, ‘cancelled’; treated as lives unworthy of living.   In Thailand citizens must be polite, servile and submissive to manifest a true authentic civilised Thai identity.[1] To be Thai is to: worship and unconditionally love the King; love and serve the nation and Thai race; and be a Buddhist. This is “kwam pen Thai”: Thai-ness. A person is born Thai and is a Buddhist subject of a king of ‘pure race from pure blood’ who rules in the name of truth, goodness, purity and virtue. Above politics and the law, a supposed ‘god-king’ descended from the heavens, the King is seen as a sacred incarnation of the nation, drawing on the mystical-magical authority of Indian Brahmanism and Buddhism. Thailand is held together as a nation: “based on ethnic and cultural homogeneity organised around the monarchy. Its nationalism organised around race as spiritually led by the King”.[2] The Thai social and political order is a royal theological one with the King at the apex and its center in Bangkok.   Student and street protests of the last two years reveal an open contestation of Thai culture and the role played by the military and monarchy in Thai society. This can be seen as a rebirth of a subaltern “slow-burn civil war” started by the Red shirts.[3] The ongoing war in ‘Deep South’ of Thailand is a symptom of royal racist rule upon Muslims. Conflict in the southern border provinces from 2004 to April 2022 has claimed 7,356 deaths and 20,898 casualties.[4]   Divisions of skin ethnicity and religion Elite Bangkokians, mostly wealthier lighter skinned Sino-Thais, consider people with dark skins as low class, ugly and dirty. Rural ethnic Khmer Lao and Southern Thais tend to have darker skins read as a manifestation of ‘inner badness’. Skin colour signifies a person’s social status and moral worth; this comes from Hindu and Buddhist beliefs and ideals. Beauty and complexion reflect merit, moral purity and goodness. Thais call Southern Thais and Muslims “kaek” – a term that subsumes Southern Asians, Malays and Arabs-as they all have darker skins. Keyes shows historically how “kaek” is associated with the Buddhist figure of Evil: ‘Mara’ and dark bearded demons.[5] Thai Muslims and ethnic Malay Muslims are ‘othered’ by religion and skin colour: un-Thai dark non-Buddhists. Skin colour and religion are racialised. In Thai state racism they do not belong and are treated as lesser Thais or non-authentic Thais.   Likewise, in the body-politic person’s origin in Bangkok, the royal centre and sacred ‘head’ of Thai civilisation, or far away in the rural provinces, the dirty ‘feet’, badges them being uncivilised. Coming from the countryside: the North, the Northeast, or Thailand’s ‘Deep South’ signifies low status. Dark skinned country people, people who do not speak Central Thai, especially Northeasterners, are seen by Bangkok elites as morally inferior, uneducated, ignorant and vulgar: “kon bannok” or ‘rednecks’. Predominantly ethnic Lao and Khmer, they are called derogatory names signifying that they are not Thai and not fully human: “aii Lao” and “kwai” – meaning water buffalo. Rural people (Burmese and Cambodian guest workers too) are seen as only fit to be domestic helpers, sex workers, food vendors and taxi drivers. Everyone in Thailand must conform to one uniform way to be Thai in a ‘hierarchical and essentialist model of nationalism marginalising most of the country’s population as inferior, whilst Bangkokians see themselves as superior racially’.[6]   Thai politics works by both assimilating everyone and dividing people against others. People are either: good or bad people, friend or foe. Are you one of us or one of them? An un-Thai enemy-other? Dissent from Thai-ness is not tolerated and can be met with murder in the name of defending the monarchy and Thai society against dangerous and ungovernable others. Others within national borders but outside the boundaries of Thai-ness. Thai national identity relationally needs an enemy – other to fight in order to be itself.[7] The ‘enemy’ can be inside or outside the nation’s body politic, or, can even be an in ‘inner enemy’ nesting in the very heart of the self. What is specific about Thai nationalism is its reactive negative identification placing Thai’s ‘over and above’ and ‘set apart’ from others. The chief determination of what is Thai identity is negative difference: it is not Vietnamese, Khmer, Lao, Burmese, Malay, Farang, or Khaek. These signify negative attributes, so that only Thai-ness can possesses a full, positive identity and attributes.[8]   Historically, after anti-monarchists, it was communists who were seen as the number one enemy of Thai-ness undermining ‘national security, the institutions of religion and monarchy’. The state passed a law in 1969 making it a crime “to encourage any other person to lose their faith in religion, or any act that destroys the customs and traditions of the Thai race”.[9] People in Thailand are offered the choice: ‘Turn Thai or disappear!’ Many have been disappeared. Political refugee Red shirt activists and government critics; Lese majeste fugitive Surachai ‘Sae Dan’ is feared to have been murdered along with two other men whose bodies were washed up from the Mekong River on 29th December 2019. Prominent Muslim lawyer, Somchai Neelapaijit, critic of martial law in Thailand’s southern provinces, was disappeared in Bangkok on the evening of 12th March 2004. Wanchalearm, a pro-democracy activist, fled to Cambodia after the May 2014 military coup in Thailand. He was abducted by unidentified armed men in Phnom Penh on 4th June 2020.   Thai ‘internal racism of permanent purification’[10] For a Buddhist nation, Thailand has a tragic history of violence. Rather than non-violent peace making and reconciliation, Thailand’s tradition is of ‘serial massacres’ of individuals and populations and their erasure from social memory. A ‘Thanato-politics’ of extermination of un-Thai others within: in 1972 3,000 communist suspects are believed to have been killed by being burned alive in 200-litre oil drums (while the bodies were burning, truck engines were revved to mask the screams of those who were being murdered;[11] ‘hill tribes’ in the North of Thailand napalmed for alleged communist sympathies and drug-related activities; anti-military dictator demonstrators in Black May 1992 murdered by right wing paramilitary group; Buddhist soldiers killed more than a 100 ethnic Malay Thai Muslims in the siege of the ‘Kru Ze’ mosque in Patani Southern Thailand; and at Tak Bai, Narathiwat on 25th October 2004, over 78 unarmed protestors died, mainly from suffocation in the back of army trucks.35 Or, as a high ranking ex-Thaksin government official I interviewed claimed, their execution was ordered. In April-May 2010, over 90 ‘Red Shirt’ anti-coup unarmed demonstrators were killed by soldiers on the streets of Bangkok in a ‘live fire zone’.   The Thai state protects the superiority and purity of the Thai race by killing in the defence of society and race against impure inhuman, animal, and others.[12] Killing, with impunity, in the name of Thai-ness, those badged with being un-Thai are seen as impurities in need of cleansing. In the modern Thai Buddhist state it is racial purity that justifies murder: “the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race…is something that will make life heathier: healthier and purer”.[13] Below we shall see a non-Western form of ‘colonising genocide’ of others within.[14]   To make sense of the notion of a Thai race and Thai racism we have to visit a myth concerning the colonial encounter in 19th Century Siam royal absolutism, Bangkok elites, and state hierarchical racial formations of identity, which deny ethnic diversity and erase differences.   Thai race and racism in a nationalist myth The myth is that Siam was a global unique exception in never being colonised by the West due to its special civilisational characteristics: a superior ‘master race’ presided over by semi-divine monarch who outwitted the French and British in the 19th Century. This is a fiction. Not only that, it is a dangerous illusion as it creates a ‘theology of Thai exceptionalism’, which renders Thais ‘ignorant and narcissistic’.[15] The myth of non-colonisation incites racist views towards other Southeast Asian countries seen as being colonised because they were inferior to Siam.   The colonial encounter and the invention of a Thai race Absolute power was gained by Siamese ruling elites’ ‘self-colonisation’ to meet the bourgeois standards norms, moral and values of Western civilisation. This was ‘achieved by developing an intense form of internal tyranny, namely, racism subjugating the local populations’.[16] The belief in the Thai as superior race, with other races as inferior, masks Siamese Imperialism and its violent ‘internal colonisation’ of ethno-religious populations who were not Thai. Rama V visited colonies of Singapore, Malaya, Burma, India and Java in 1871-2 with a vision ‘to turn his kingdom into a miniature European colony without the Europeans, making it a modern ‘civilised’ Asian state’.[17] Populations were enslaved by the Siamese elites’ self-colonisation as they felt inferior to the west but superior to local ‘barbarians’ ethno-religious subalterns who they needed to make Siam civilised.   King Chulalongkorn adopted the French’s 1893 conquest of the Siamese royal palace by gunboat, by sending a navy warship to the Patani River in Southern Thailand and imprisoned its last Malay Sultan. Siam’s rule over ‘Malay states became a showcase to demonstrate Siam’s ability to modernise/colonise’ because they are a superior race and civilisation that could modernise itself.[18] Siam wished to compete as an equal with the British colonies. It did this by using law to efficiently rule the native populations-displacing Islamic authority in the South. The Malay savages needed Thai-ifying by Bangkok civility. Siam conducted a racialising ‘inner-colonisation’ of ‘savage jungle others’ outside Bangkok. The Thai race to be civilised needs uncivilised bad and inferior enemy-others in order to be good and superior in the name of the ‘protection of the security of the whole from internal dangers’.[19]   Streckfuss’ analysis shows the birth of the notion of a Thai race.[20] The Siamese royal ruling class in resisting the French used and creatively adapted a Western anthropological not biological concept of race against the French to create a new identity of being Thai, and a territorial state, which would become Thailand.[21] French colonialists saw the Siamese as a lesser race, a ‘mixed and tainted’ minority within Siam vis-à-vis others Chinese, Malay, Lao, Cambodians, Vietnamese, and tribal peoples.[22] For French Indo-Chinese rule the non-Siamese should be under the protection of the French as they were racially oppressed by a “Siamese Lilliputian oligarchy”.[23] The Siamese could only rule the lands with Siamese subjects, but this limited Siam to the Chaopraya River basin. The French 1893 treaty laid claim to their ethnic protégés in an ‘annexation by stealth’ of what used to be Lao and Khmer zones in Siam. The French counted Lao and Cambodians as theirs, entitled to French protection. For the ruling Siamese elite the Lao were seen as the same Thai race, but not the Khmer race who the Siamese ruled. The French using race tried to ‘define the racial Siamese minority out of Siam’, whilst the Siamese responded by inventing a Thai race.[24] The kingdom of Siam became the nation-race or Empire of Thai-land. Race – “chaat” was used to form national identity and belonging as Thai, replacing a Siamese identity.[25] Thai royalty extended racial boundaries to existing territorial limits so that the entire population of the country became Thai subjects. Prince Damrong, Minister of the Interior, stated his aim to “make all the people Thais, not Lao, nor Malay at all”. Others were absorbed and assimilated into the Thai race: a Thai-ification. No more Lao provinces and people, as the Bangkok ruling elite “began to erase the Lao-ethnically, historically, and demographically-from Siam”.[26] A myth of a great Thai race was born. Thai as the same race, but different from: Shans, Lao, Peguans, Annamese, Chinese, and “especially Burmese, Malay and Cambodians originally prisoners of war”. Race and nationality fused together ‘subsumed all the people of Thailand into an imagined “Thai-ness”.[27]   The Thai-ification of the Lao population was a key part of a racist process of assimilating and negating differences, changing Siamese heterogeneous multi-ethnic populations into Thai mono-ethnicity and mono-culture.[28] In the early 20th Century in Siam one fifth of the population spoke non- Thai languages and over 50 per cent were ethnic Lao. Government administrators were not allowed to call people in North and Northeastern Thailand Lao, these regions were to be integrated and must speak central Thai. Regional identities and ethnic affiliations were erased in an unequal hierarchy. The Lao-Northeasterners have been ‘ethnically negated and socially marginalised’ in an ethnic cleansing of Thai history: erasing the Lao, as if only the Thai race ever existed.[29]   Faith becomes fate: Race and primordial religiosity Southern Thailand with its Muslim majority population has a long history of resistance to Bangkok’s rule amidst a struggle for autonomy. The provinces of Patanni, Yala and Narathiwat, were a sultanate subjected to internal colonisation into Siam in 1905. The Thai state violently suppressed the Dusun-Nyor revolt by Malay Muslims in 1948 and the Islamic teacher Haji Sulong was disappeared in 1954. Since the massacres of 2004, it appears as a clash of Thai/Buddhist and Muslim groups is occurring in the Deep South.   The work of Michael K. Jerryson and McCargo shows that people learn how to be a Buddhist or a Muslim in southern Thailand in particular ways.[30] Individuals’ ethno-religious identifications and displays of loyalty and affiliation have been constructed as a national security issue by the Thai state and as a means of righteous insurrection by Muslim militants. Mobilising religion transforms security forces into “moral guardians, sacred avengers of the nation, not mere State servants, whose sacred duty is to uphold and protect the integrity of Thai Buddhism.”[31]   Buddhist nationalism incites fury and violence in the South.[32] Malay Muslim insurgents incite hatred and murderous violence against Thais constructed as ‘kafir’ unbelievers, mirroring Thai racism against (Malay) Muslims. Both Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims construct Manichean worlds, each other as incarnations of goodness and badness, in constant negation of a tradition of amicable inter-faith and inter-ethnic community relations. Malay Muslims racist marginalisation and ethno-religious exclusion from Thai-ness drives militants to turn amity into enmity. Islamic religion, like Buddhism, has been politicised to justify killing both Malays, as traitors and collaborators, as well as Thais-as Buddhist oppressors. Southern insurgents resist and rebel as Muslims, their religion is an ethnic marker.[33] Insurgents fight a ‘Patani jihad’ to impose only one way to be Malay-Muslim. Ironically, this is an inversion of the state enforced version of Thai-ness.   McCargo argues that the significance of the southern violent insurgency challenges the legitimacy of the Thai state and “the microcosm of a potentially wide ranging civil conflict in the country”.[34] Solving the conflict, Jerryson argues, will require the “reworking of Thailand’s concept of racial formations,” which act to “displace minority identities by measuring their ethnic and religious identities against the norm of Thai Buddhism.”[35]   Happy endings? Violence in Southern Thailand: Tolerance and truce making? The challenge of coexistence is how well people can they live with ‘otherness’ instead of seeking to convert or integrate the ‘others’? Tolerance of different faiths, histories, cultures and identities is needed in Thailand. Grahame Thompson’s audacious argument is that truce seeking is more important than truth seeking in the pursuit of peace.[36] A fixation on justice will lead to an attitude of attributing blame, whereas a truce situation moderates two parties where there is no winner or loser. Thus, political conflict can be moderated by cultivating a style of conduct “that embodies a studied indifference towards difference.”[37] Buddhist or Muslim absolute and cosmic differences become insignificant: de-escalating violent conflict and depolarising identities among social combatants to attempt to secure social peace. Enduring peace is possible if people can relate to each other in shared common humanity, not as symbols of ethnic and religious communities badged with un-Thai otherness. The Thai state would have to govern through equanimity: ceasing to support royal Buddhist nationalism, the King as God, which excludes Muslims and Malays from being ‘true’ Thais and citizens.   The meaning of Thaksin and the Red Shirt Movement for inclusion Following Ferrara’s astute analysis PM Thaksin and the Red Shirt movement populism arose from addressing social divisions in the North and Northeast embracing those marginalised by the state.[38] Thaksin was deposed by a military coup in 2006 for becoming more charismatic and popular than King Bhumibol (the King already tried to assassinate Thaksin). The subaltern rebellion by the anti-military populist Red shirts against royalist conservative Yellow shirts threatened a ‘slow burn civil war’ because Thaksin’s policies championed diversity and inclusion. Thaksin’s pro-poor rural policies lifted people out being fixed in their place as racially unequal. His power came from below, by popular mandate of the people not an elite imposed from above. Unlike the royal Bangkok elite, Thaksin asked for people's loyalty not by stressing the virtues of hierarchy, or their duty to accept their station in life, but rather by promising greater equality and opportunity for social and economic mobility. Thaksin’s support was not bound or defined by ethnicity, racist exclusion of ‘less than perfectly Thai’ ethno-regional local identities marginalised by the state. What Thaksin offered was “an affirmation of their ethno-regional pride and yearning for recognition” as equal Thai citizens, not racially inferior subjects.[39] What remains to be delineated is the spiritual modality of Thai racism and purification politics to exit being governed in the name of Thai culture.   Tim Rackett read Sociology at Essex University and studied under Ernesto Laclau, and Paul Hirst at Birkbeck College. His doctorate “Transcultural Psychiatry and the Truth of Racism” is an investigation into the relations between reason, power and truth-telling concerning culture and madness in colonial and post-colonial metropolitan racist situations. Tim, for the last 26 years in Southeast Asia, has explored non-Western politics of purification and truth; the rights of ethno-religious minorities-Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand, Kachin refugees in Malaysia; Thai Buddhist nationalism and racism. Tim’s publications include: ‘No ‘Me’’, Mine’, or Religion: Buddhdasa’s Cosmopolitan Planetary Life’ “in ‘Asian-Arab Philosophical Dialogue on Culture of Peace and Human Dignity’ UNESCO Bangkok 2011; ‘States of Mind and Exception: Enactments of Buddhist ontological Truth and purification in Thai religious nationalism in the mid-20th and early 21st centuries’, Journal of Religion and Violence 2014, and ‘Thailand: Exception to the rule or rule by exception?’ Constellations of Southeast Asia ed. Jan Nederveen Pieterse et al. 2017). Currently Tim is working on mapping Khmer Studies.   [1] Jory, Patrick. 2021. A History of Manners and Civility in Thailand. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [2] Streckfuss, David. An ‘ethnic’ reading of ‘Thai’ history in the twilight of the century-old official ‘Thai’ national model. South East Asia Research 20, no. 3, (2012): 419–441. [3] Montesano, Michael J., Chachavalpongpun, Pavin and Chongvilaivan, Aekapol. 2012. Bangkok, May 2010: Perspectives on a Divided Thailand. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. [4] Srisompop Jitpiromsri, Southern Border/Patani 2004-2021: Stepping into the Nineteenth Year Where will peace go in 2022?, DeepSouthWatch, January 2022, https://deepsouthwatch.org/th/node/12816 [5] Keyes, Charles. Muslim 'Others' in Buddhist Thailand. Thammasat Review 13, no. 1, (2009). [6] Streckfuss, David. An ‘ethnic’ reading of ‘Thai’ history in the twilight of the century-old official ‘Thai’ national model. South East Asia Research 20, no. 3, (2012): 419–441. [7] Winichakul, Thongchai. 1994. Siam Mapped. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books. [8] Ibid. [9] Streckfuss, David. 2011. Truth on Trial in Thailand. London, UK :Routledge. [10] Foucault, Michel. 2020. Society Must Be Defended. Penguin Classics. [11] Haberkorn, Tyrell. 2013. Getting Away with Murder in Thailand: State Violence and Impunity in Phatthalung. In State Violence in East Asia, eds. N. Ganesan and Sung Chull Kim. Lexington, US: University Press of Kentucky, 185-208. [12] Foucault, Michel. 2020. Society Must Be Defended. Penguin Classics; Thongchai Winichakul. The “germs”: The reds' infection of the Thai political body, New Mandala, May 2010, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2010/05/03/thongchai-winichakul-on-the-red-germs/#more-9382 [13] Foucault, Michel. 2020. Society Must Be Defended. Penguin Classics. [14] Ibid. [15] Thongchai Winichakul, 2011 “Siam’s Colonial Conditions and the Birth of Thai History”, [16] Jackson, Peter A. The Performative State: Semi-coloniality and the Tyranny of Images in Modern Thailand. Sojourn 19, no. 2, (2004): 219-53 [17] Jackson, Peter A. The Performative State: Semi-coloniality and the Tyranny of Images in Modern Thailand. Sojourn 19, no. 2, (2004): 219-53 [18] Loos, Tamara. 2002. Subject Siam: Family Law and Colonial Modernity in Thailand. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books Cornell University. [19] Foucault, Michel. 2020. Society Must Be Defended. Penguin Classics. [20] Streckfuss, David. 1993. The mixed colonial legacy in Siam: origins of Thai racialist thought, in Sears, L. J. (ed.), Autonomous Histories, Particular Truths: Essays in Honor of John R. W. Smail. Madison, US: University of Wisconsin [21] Ibid. [22] Ibid. [23] Ibid. [24] Ibid. [25] Ibid. [26] Ibid. [27] Ibid. [28] Ibid. [29] Ibid. [30] Jerryson, Michael K. 2011. Buddhist Fury: Religion and Violence in Southern Thailand. New York, US: Oxford University Press; McCargo, Duncan. 2009. Tearing Apart the Land. Singapore: NUS Press; McCargo, Duncan. 2012. Mapping National Anxieties. Denmark: NIAS. [31] Jerryson, Michael K. 2011. Buddhist Fury: Religion and Violence in Southern Thailand. New York, US: Oxford University Press. [32] Ibid.; Rackett, Tim. States of Mind and Exception: Enactments of Buddhist ontological Truth and purification in Thai religious nationalism in the mid-20th and early 21st Centuries. .Journal of Religion and Violence 2, no. 1, (2014 a.); Rackett, Tim. Review of Buddhist Fury M. K. Jerryson. Journal of Religion and Violence 2, no. 3, (2014 b). [33] Askew, Marc. Fighting with Ghosts: Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire". Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 2, (2010): 117-155 [34] McCargo, Duncan. 2012. Mapping National Anxieties. Denmark: NIAS. [35] Jerryson, Michael K. 2011. Buddhist Fury: Religion and Violence in Southern Thailand. New York, US: Oxford University Press. [36] Thompson, Grahame F. 2005. Toleration and the Art of International Governance: How is it Possible to ‘Live Together’ in a Fragmenting International System?, in Habitus: A Sense of Place. Milton Park, UK: Routledge. [37] Ibid. [38] Ferrara, Frederico. 2015. The Political Developoment of Modern Thailand. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press [39] Ibid. [post_title] => Un-Thai lives matter! Thai identity politics as a race war? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => un-thai-lives-matter-thai-identity-politics-as-a-race-war [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-18 22:46:45 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-18 21:46:45 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6483 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [25] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6481 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-07-19 00:03:44 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-07-18 23:03:44 [post_content] => The Muslim-majority countries of Southeast Asia – Indonesia and Malaysia – are known for its ethnically plural societies. This is in part an outcome of Chinese and Indian labour migration to meet the needs of capitalist production in the region during the colonial period. These plural Southeast Asian societies today are shaped by legacies of colonial racial categories and state-led racialisation practices that have effectively essentialised ethnic groups in the region. Central in this is the prevailing colonial-inspired worldview forwarded by ruling elites that racial and religious differences are intrinsic, unstable and divisive in plural societies. Hence, it is common for these Southeast Asian states to implement interventionist and illiberal governance approaches to manage matters of race and religion. This is done on the pretext that inter-ethnic differences can easily result in outbreaks of violence in the absence of such approaches.   This same argument for managing racial and religious pluralism is used by the Indonesian and Malaysian states to adopt interventionist and illiberal approaches to homogenise Islam and strengthen Sunni Muslim groups. Political and religious elites attempt to dilute intra-Muslim group differences, be it through the overt criminalisation of Muslim minority groups and/or through divisive sectarian rhetoric. For example, Shia Muslim minorities are securitised by the state as societal threats on claims of religious deviancy in Malaysia and state actors on similar claims in Indonesia foster Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions.[1] In more recent times, political and religious elites in Indonesia and Malaysia invoke religious orthodoxy arguments to otherise Islamic reformists as ‘liberal’ enemies of an authentic Islam.[2]   These latter forms of intra-Sunni Muslim divisions in which Muslim reformists, who advocate for democratic values of racial inclusion, equality and fairness, are otherised and labelled as religiously ‘deviant’, are typically less considered in studies of sectarianism.[3] This is partly because Islamic reformists in Indonesia and Malaysia usually do not identify nor organise themselves as a distinctive sect in the same way Muslim minority sects such as the Shia and Ahmadiyya do, with their centuries-long history of sedimented theological differences. Nevertheless, when political and religious elites successfully label Muslim reformists as religiously ‘deviant’, they also consequently rigidify the boundaries of socially acceptable beliefs, attitudes and actions of Muslims in ethnically plural societies in ways that intersect with other long-existing social divisions of race, class and gender.   Through reflections on the ruling elites’ othering of ‘liberal’ Muslims as a pejorative category in Malaysian politics and its social implications in Malaysia, this essay explores how racial politics is implicated in and contributes to sectarianism. It contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the complex and intersectional nature of emergent forms of intra-Muslim divisions in ethnically plural Southeast Asian contexts, which will help to inform policy and grassroots initiatives aimed at improving social cohesion.   Colonial roots of racial divisions in Malaysia The local people who lived in the ‘Malay world’ did not initially see themselves as part of a bounded community of Malays.[4] However, British colonial policy driven by the needs of the colonial economy in Malaysia was responsible for enacting policies that heightened racial group distinctions in society. Through the allocation of different racial groups to specialised occupations, the British colonials created racial and class distinctions between the bumiputera group (consisting of Malays and indigenous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak) and the immigrant Chinese and Indian groups. The Malays and indigenous peoples worked in agricultural and fishing occupations while the Chinese worked in trade and commercial labourers and the Indians worked in service and in the plantations.[5] These British colonials regarded each group as separate racial entities that only interacted in the marketplace for specific economic interests and purposes, and largely lived in isolated social units because they lacked common social will and values.[6]   During the later years of colonial rule – in the run up to independence – a competitive attitude developed between the Malay elites and the Chinese and Indian elites as each group sought political power and rights. The Malay elites had little incentive to cooperate with the other minority group elites toward a political framework based on equal rights because the heightened racial differences were accompanied by strong perceptions of unequal class differences. For example, the Chinese were perceived to be economically well off compared to the other groups. In the jockeying for political power during this period, the Malay identity became explicitly marked as Muslim and the religion of Islam was harnessed as a tool for inter-ethnic rivalry and control because this had the benefit of limiting the power of non-Malay groups during negotiations on the new nation-state of Malaysia.[7]   State-led racialisation of non-Malays This racially divided social order structured during the colonial period became entrenched in political and institutional configurations when Malaysia became independent in 1957. The Malay elites in the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) forged a political alliance with Chinese elites from the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Indian elites from the Malayan Indian Association (MIC). The three racial-based political parties negotiated a political understanding where the primacy of the ethno-religious identity of the Malays was enshrined in the 1957 Federal Constitution.   In the constitutional framework, the minority ethnic groups in exchange for the recognition of non-Malay jus soli citizenship rights at independence accepted Malay political dominance.[8] Historically, this colloquial understanding of Malay dominance (ketuanan Melayu) entailed a social compact between the three races wherein the Malays were understood to be indigenous to the land of Malaysia and hence the rightful ethnic group holding political power in accordance with its constitutionally mandated special position.[9] Initially, governmental power was shared between politicians from the three race-based parties, and inter-racial demands were addressed through bargaining and compromises, but this practice was short-lived.   The newly independent Malaysia was fraught with issues of rural poverty that predominantly affected Malays. After an outbreak of post-election violence between the Malays and the Chinese in 1969, the government responded to growing Malay disaffection with an affirmative action policy, the New Economic Policy (NEP), which was intended to help increase Malay participation in the Malaysian economy and to reduce poverty. As race was a governmental criterion for the allocation of scarce resources, the NEP became responsible for heightening racial distinctions between Malay and non-Malay citizens.[10] To stay politically relevant and win Malay votes, Malay ruling elites conflated the notion of ketuanan Melayu with Malay special rights by positioning themselves as defenders of indigenous citizens’ rights.   The notion of ketuanan Melayu and the continued implementation of pro-Malay affirmative action policies that are linked to racial categories effectively racialised the Chinese and Indians minorities in Malaysia as immigrant cultural outsiders in contrast with Malays, who are upheld by the state and its civil society supporters as indigenous cultural insiders.[11]   Sectarianisation of the ‘Liberal’ Muslim other Since the 1998 pro-democracy Reformasi (Reform) movement in Malaysia though, ketuanan Melayu became a polarising point of contention between UMNO Malay elites and reform-oriented opposition politicians. The opposition coalition, which was multi-ethnic and also included Malay politicians, advocated equal treatment for all ethnicities and emphasised needs-based assistance instead of pro-Malay policies; the political push for a new social compact increasingly attracted votes from non-Malay minorities and also Malays in the urban areas between 2008 and 2018.   This context of increasing political competition and mounting electoral losses motivated UMNO elites to reaffirm their commitment to ketuanan Melayu and construct the meaning of ‘liberal’ as ‘anti-Islam’ in an effort to retain political power. Through a sectarianising discourse, they framed ‘liberal’ Malays as a threat by associating them with non-Malay ethnic minorities and, by extension, with secular values to politically de-legitimise them. The state’s religious bureaucracies too were instrumental in bolstering this depiction of the ‘liberal’ threat through propagation of religious sermons. Central in this framing was the divisive argument that ketuanan Melayu, Malay special rights, and Islamic values were threatened by non-Muslim ethnic minorities and their ‘liberal’ Malay Muslim partners who were pushing for pro-democratic reforms.[12]   As political competition increased, the entrenched race-based political system and the constitutional provisions for Malay special position that heightened inter-ethnic differences also facilitated the sectarianisation of the ‘liberal’ Muslim. In the Malaysian context, the racialisation of non-Malays as cultural outsiders and the recent sectarianisation of the ‘liberal’ Muslim other by UMNO elites function together to construct social divisions for political gains.   The social cost of the ‘Liberal’ Muslim label The ‘liberal’ Muslim as a pejorative category in Malaysian politics functions powerfully as a divisive tool when used to signal threat under changing contexts of political competition and socio-political crises. Having been ousted from government in the 2018 general elections, UMNO utilised the pejorative understanding of reform-oriented politicians as the ‘liberal’ other to manoeuvre its way back into the folds of power in less than two years with significant Malay support. New survey data also indicate Malays are more supportive of Malay-led political leadership than an ethnically plural leadership.[13] Therefore, it is likely that the ‘liberal’ other sectarianising arsenal would be used again for political gains because it works.   However, this comes at a social cost. While Malaysia rarely suffers from ethnic violence, there is a marked uptick in occurrences of ethno-religious controversies played out at the national level, which contribute to polarising societal attitudes about inclusive governance.[14] This polarisation contributes to the pejorative understanding of the ‘liberal’ other. This in turn affects the behaviours and choices of civil society actors engaged in inter-religious and inter-ethnic advocacy work.   Recent interviews with Malay Muslim women activists from ideologically different groups – secular, Islamic feminist and Islamic – indicate that self-awareness of the ‘liberal’ other label do influence some of them to modify their behaviours and choices in the course of their advocacy work.[15] Some women activists from the Islamic groups were reluctant to openly endorse certain advocacy positions by Malay activists and civil society groups who have been labelled by Malay politicians and the state religious bureaucracies as ‘liberal’.   For example, one women activist from the Islamic group, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia) praised a prominent Malay women activist-lawyer for her work on helping the Orang Asli (indigenous people) defend for their lands against mining and logging activities in Peninsula Malaysia. However, the woman lawyer-activist was labelled as ‘liberal’ because she strongly opposed the overreach of religious bureaucracies and the UMNO government, and also supported the LBGT community. For the ABIM activist, the label made it impossible for her group to openly support the activist-lawyer’s Orang Asli agenda, even though she personally agreed with it. Women activists from Islamic groups also described being pulled into controversies in Islamic NGO circles after being labelled by other more conservative Islamic groups as ‘liberal’ for engaging with non-Malays in inter-religious activities.   Conclusion: Civil society’s role in mitigating divisions The social cost then arises when the fear of social stigmatisation due to the ‘liberal’ Muslim label makes Muslims from Islamic civil society groups less willing to openly engage and work together with secular civil society groups or reform-oriented individuals on pertinent social issues. Yet such inter-group civil society engagement at the grassroots level is precisely what is necessary to help mitigate the negative consequences of political polarisation in Malaysia. Civil society groups of different ideological leanings (race-based/multi-ethnic groups and religious/secular) groups that can find common ground over specific issues will be better placed to build inter-group solidarity without fear of being drawn into polarising controversies that are ultimately due to the machinations of politicians interested in maintaining their hold on power.   Perhaps as a consequence of Malaysia’s rapid descent into political chaos and amplification of polarising rhetoric by politicians since UMNO’s sudden ouster from power in 2018, there is already an indication that civil society groups are making more attempts to build inter-ethnic and inter-religious bridges. For example, recent research indicates that there is evidence of inter-group engagement and instances of social learning that occur between women activists from the secular, Islamic feminist, and Islamic groups.[16] The prospects for mitigating polarising divisions lie in civil society activists from ideologically different groups recognising and building upon these emerging points of intersection, which will enable them to better hold politicians to account. Therefore, initiatives that promote and facilitate inter-group engagement can be a helpful start in helping civil society actors make these necessary recognitions.   Saleena Saleem is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology at the University of Liverpool. Her research interests are on religion, state, and gender in South-east Asia. Saleena holds a Master of Science in Political Science from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a Master of Science in Business and Economics Journalism and a Bachelor of Arts in Biochemistry and Molecular Biology from Boston University. She held research positions at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, and at the Centre for Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.   [1] Saleem, Saleena. State Use of Public Order and Social Cohesion Concerns in the Securitisation of Non-mainstream Muslims in Malaysia. Journal of Religious and Political Practice 4, no. 3, (2018): 314–335. Formichi, Chiara. Violence, Sectarianism, and the Politics of Religion: Articulations of Anti-Shi’a Discourses in Indonesia. Indonesia 98, (2014): 1–27. [2] Sebastian, Leonard C., Hasyim, Syafiq, and Arifianto, Alexander R. 2020. Rising Islamic Conservatism in Indonesia Islamic Groups and Identity Politics. Milton Park, UK: Routledge. Saleena Saleem, Saleena. Constructing the ‘liberal’ Muslim other: Ethnic Politics, Competition, and Polarisation in Malaysia. Religion, State & Society 49, no. 2, (2021): 109-125. [3] One exception is a recent special issue collection that focuses on exploring emergent forms of sectarian divisions between Sunni Muslim groups in Southeast Asia, which are theologically and religiously more similar than dissimilar (Arifianto and Saleem 2021). Arifianto, Alexander R. and Saleem, Saleena. Introduction: Sectarianisation in Southeast Asia and Beyond. Religion, State & Society 49, no. 2, (2021): 86-92 [4] Milner, Anthony. 2002. The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [5] Hirschman, Charles. The making of Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and racial ideology. Sociological Forum 1, no. 2, (1986): 330–61. [6] Hock Guan, Lee. Furnivall’s plural society and Leach’s political systems of Highland Burma. SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 24, no. 1, (2009): 32-46. [7] Hefner, Robert W. 2001. Multiculturalism and citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, in The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, Robert W. Hefner (ed), Hawaii, USA: University of Hawaii, pp. 1-58. [8] Milne, Robert Stephan and Mauzy, Diane K. 1980. Politics and Government in Malaysia. Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press. [9] The Constitution recognises the special position of the Malays, along with Malay rulers as heads of Islam, and accords Malay as the sole official language and Islam as the state religion; it also provides for special rights to protect the Malays. The special rights are related to the reservation of positions for Malays in the civil service, public scholarships and in public education. These special rights were later extended to the indigenous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak when the two states joined the Malaysian Federation in 1963. [10] Peletz, Michael. 2005. Islam and the Cultural Politics of Legitimacy: Malaysia in the Aftermath of September 11, in Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization, Robert Hefner (ed), Princeton, US: Princeton University Press. [11] Gabriel, Sharmani Patricia. Racialisation in Malaysia: Multiracialism, Multiculturalism, and the Cultural Politics of the Possible. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 52, no. 4, (2021): 611–633 [12] Saleem, Saleena. Constructing the ‘liberal’ Muslim other: Ethnic Politics, Competition, and Polarisation in Malaysia. Religion, State & Society 49, no. 2, (2021): 109-125. [13] Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, New Study Reveals Empirical-based Insights into the Thinking, Behaviour and Living Conditions of Malaysia’s Majority Population, December 2021, https://asia.fes.de/news/malay-pulse [14] Saleem, Saleena. Malaysia 2019: The Politics of Fear and UMNO’s Renewed Relevance. Asia Maior, (2020): 267–286. [15] The interviews were conducted between December 2020 and July 2021 by the author for her PhD dissertation entitled “Mitigating Polarization in Plural Southeast Asian Societies: Trust Building, Social Learning, and Muslim Women Activism in Malaysia”. [16] Findings from author’s PhD dissertation on “Mitigating Polarization in Plural Southeast Asian Societies”. [post_title] => The convergence of racial politics and sectarianism in Malaysia [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-convergence-of-racial-politics-and-sectarianism-in-malaysia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-18 22:42:59 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-18 21:42:59 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6481 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [26] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6478 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-07-19 00:02:22 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-07-18 23:02:22 [post_content] => Watershed political events over the past decade – starting from the 2010-12 Arab Spring; civil wars in Syria and Yemen; the continuing ethnic strife in Iraq, Lebanon, and numerous Muslim-majority societies; and the global rise of populist leaders who utilise ethnic, racial, and xenophobic rhetoric to mobilise political support – have renewed attention toward political sectarianism among scholars and policymakers alike.   While the concept of ‘political sectarianism’ can be applied to explain both inter- and intra-group conflicts involving two or more distinct ethno-religious groups, much of its conceptual and empirical applications over the past decade were applied to cases of ethno-religious conflicts in the Middle East, typically to cases of Sunni-Shiite conflict.[1] Henceforth, scholars are increasingly calling for a broader application of the concept to analyse conflicts between different ethnic and religious groups in other regions of the world.[2]   Of course, the application of ‘political sectarianism’ to other regions beyond the Middle East means that differing types of political contestation, religion-state relations, and regime type which become the basis of ethno-religious conflict in these societies must be taken into account. The historical and sociological contexts that are often being utilised as master-narratives used to justify and prolong the conflict should also be considered in our analysis as well.   For one thing, political sectarianism might not necessarily involve deeply seated theological divisions that are heavily politicised and may escalate into large-scale violence. Instead, it often takes place as a form of micro-level division among different Sunni Muslim groups due to theological, ideological, and ritualistic disagreements.[3] Over time, such disagreements became so significant that religious leaders and politicians from the quarrelling groups began to politicise them in order to gain political advantage or patronage favours from the state.   Sectarianism in Indonesia: The early years Intra-Sunni sectarianism has occurred – albeit with different levels of intensity across different time periods – for nearly a century in Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority nation (239 million Muslims), a state which is also home to approximately 1,300 ethnic groups.[4] The first major point of sectarian tension occurred in the early 20th century when a group of modernist Muslims began to challenge the hegemony of the predominantly traditionalist-leaning clerics, which then were the prominent Islamic authority in Indonesia.   Modernists believed that the customs and rituals of traditionalist Muslims were heretical innovations (bid ’ah) that were contradicting the ‘true’ Islamic interpretations written down in the Qur’an and the sayings of the Prophets (hadith). Modernists also opposed the then prevailing custom that individual Muslims should only listen to the clerics (ulama) and could not practice independent reasoning (ijtihad) and interpret the Qur’an on their own.[5]   In 1912, Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah – the first two modernist Islamic organisations – were established. By the 1920s, modernists had imposed significant challenges to the authority of the dominant traditionalist clerics, prompting the latter to form their own organisation in order to undercut the former’s theological influence. Nahdlatul Ulama (‘The Revival of Islamic Scholars’) was founded in 1926 as the first formal association of traditionalist clerics throughout the then Dutch East Indies.[6] Contestation between the modernist and traditionalist groups continued throughout the 1930s at about the same time the voices of Indonesian nationalists calling for an independent state were getting louder and louder.   When the Japanese Army seized control of Indonesia in 1942 they forced all existing Indonesian Islamic organisations to merge together under a single group called Masyumi. After Indonesia’s independence was declared in 1945, Masyumi became the country’s first Islamic party, becoming a leading political party during Indonesia’s first period as a democratic state from 1950 to 1959.   However, the traditionalist-modernist divide was resurrected in 1952 when the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) broke away from Masyumi, citing the latter’s refusal to grant the Minister of Religion Affairs position to a NU representative.[7] Given the ministry’s significant role in Muslim affairs across Indonesia – ranging from the construction of mosques, Islamic schools (pesantren) and state universities, to the management of annual hajj pilgrims from Indonesia – the ministry is often contested between traditionalists and modernists for the right to formulate policies relevant to Muslim affairs in Indonesia and for its massive budget that becomes a patronage source for multiple Islamic organisations.[8]   The rivalry between Masyumi and NU went on throughout the 1950s. After Masyumi was accused of supporting regional rebellions against the central government in Jakarta – Soekarno – Indonesia’s founding President – disbanded the party and imprisoned many of its leaders.[9] This move made NU the most influential Islamic organisation in Indonesia, and it developed a close alignment with Soekarno as he dissolved the constitutional assembly and parliament in 1959, establishing authoritarian rule in the process.   Sectarianism under Suharto As an alleged coup attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965 severely weakened Soekarno’s rule, NU switched its allegiance to support the Indonesian military (TNI). Ansor – its youth wing – assisted the latter in a repressive campaign against alleged Communist Party members and sympathisers. This led to the deaths of nearly one million Indonesians, mainly in the NU stronghold in rural Central Java and East Java.[10] When Suharto – the TNI’s supreme commander – seized power from Soekarno in 1966, the NU threw its support behind him.   While Suharto was closely aligned with NU during this period, he suppressed the modernists by denying the request from former Masyumi chairman Mohamad Natsir to have it reinstated as a legally recognised political party. In response, Natsir founded a new ‘non-political’ Islamic organisation called the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII).[11] DDII became an umbrella organisation which channelled funds from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern nations modernist organisations, which are increasingly influenced by various transnational Islamic ideologies – from the Muslim Brotherhood to various types of Salafism during the 1960s and 1970s.[12]   While Muhammadiyah – the largest modernist organisation – officially retained its own moderate Islamic outlook, many of its rank-and-file members increasingly came under the influence of one or more transnational Islamist ideologies. Some Muhammadiyah members broke away from the organisation to form new organisations with more Islamist ideological orientations. For instance, the South Sulawesi-centered Wahdah Islamiyah – influenced by the fusion of Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies.[13]   By the mid-1970s, there was a growing rift between NU and the Suharto regime as the former objected to the latter’s effort to enact ‘secular’ laws on marriage and the education system which marginalised the role of Islamic institutions. In 1984, Abdurrahman Wahid – a grandson of NU’s founder – became the organisation’s new leader. While Wahid implemented policies to accommodate the regime at first – by declaring NU’s recognition of Indonesia’s secular nationalist ideology Pancasila (‘five principles’) as the organisation’s sole ideological principle – over time he became one of its leading critics. Wahid also declared that his organisation would follow principles such as democracy, tolerance, and religious pluralism to set itself in contrast to the increasingly authoritarian measures adopted by Suharto during the 1980s.[14]   Hence, by the late 1980s Islam in Indonesia was further divided into three distinctive ideological streams: the traditionalist stream of the Nahdlatul Ulama, the moderate modernist stream of the Muhammadiyah, and the Islamist stream influenced by various transnational Islamic groups. As the Suharto regime slowly declined during the 1990s, both NU and Muhammadiyah were at the front of a growing opposition movement against the regime.[15] While individual Islamist activists were part of the opposition movement, Islamist organisations – still facing state reprisal – largely operated underground up until the regime’s fall in 1998.   After Suharto fell from power, Wahid became Indonesia’s first democratically elected President in 1999. Afterwards, however, sectarian tensions between NU and Muhammadiyah re-emerged as the latter accused Wahid of reneging his promise to share power with other members of the anti-Suharto opposition and filing out his cabinet with NU politicians and other close allies. Growing discontent against Wahid finally resulted in his impeachment in 2001. As a response to their leader’s removal, activists from NU’s youth wing , set fire to several Muhammadiyah-owned buildings in East Java province.[16] However, further sectarian violence was avoided when Wahid agreed to step down peacefully from the presidency.   Contemporary resurgence of sectarianism To avoid further tensions between NU and Muhammadiyah, Indonesian presidents after Wahid generally instituted an informal arrangement to provide a guaranteed ministerial seat to both organisations. While the Minister of Religious Affairs position is reserved for a NU politician, the Minister of Education position is generally reserved for Muhammadiyah.[17] Presidents Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001 to 2004) and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004 to 2014) largely adhered to this informal power-sharing arrangement.   However, this changed when Joko Widodo became Indonesia’s new President in 2014. The new President calculated that as he faced an increasing challenge from an emboldened Islamist movement which threatened his regime’s stability, it was important to align his regime closely with the NU. This is because the organisation has not only consistently promoted its moderate Islamic vision for three decades, but also able to back their ‘moderate Islam’ promotion with hundreds of thousand clerics and religious teachers. As a last resort, NU could deploy a militia force under its youth wing Ansor to quell any threat from hardline Islamist groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) – well-known for its violent tactics deployed against its critics as well as against members of various religious minorities.[18]   The most significant support from Widodo to NU was his support to the latter’s initiative to rebrand its main theological principles into a doctrine called Islam Nusantara (‘Archipelagic Islam’) in 2015. NU engaged in this theological rebranding because it faced increasing competition from various Islamist groups that had been growing rapidly since the fall of Suharto regime nearly two decades earlier, including the Tarbiyah (‘Nurture’) movement inspired by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), part of the global Hizb ut-Tahrir (‘Party of Liberation’) movement that called for Indonesia to be part of a new transnational Islamic caliphate, and dozens of Salafi-influenced groups. All of them are thought to chip away at NU’s claimed followership of approximately 90 million Indonesian Muslims.   Islam Nusantara is supposed to be a restatement of NU’s theological principles to younger followers of the organisation to show the compatibility of classical Islamic teachings with local (mainly Javanese-based) customs and ritual practices and Indonesia’s nationalism enshrined in its Pancasila ideology – all of which are considered to be heretical by the newer Islamist groups. However, its critics – including those from Muhammadiyah – considered it as an effort by NU to impose its own interpretation of Islam in Indonesia’s public discourses, notwithstanding the fact it mainly represented traditions and rituals practiced largely by NU ulama living in Java.[19]   In return, NU leaders declared that their organisation was originally founded in 1926 to unite traditionalist clerics against the reformist agenda of ‘the Wahhabis.’[20] This was a veiled accusation against modernist Islamic organisations like Muhammadiyah that despite its claims of having moderated its ideology, at heart it is still inspired by an agenda inspired by the early 20th century Islamic reformers to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the traditionalist NU ulama.   Beyond these theological disagreements, the renewed sectarian division between NU and Muhammadiyah is also driven by the decision of the Widodo regime to reward NU’s support through political appointments as cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and executives of various state enterprises. This is especially prominent within his second-term cabinet in which NU is represented by Vice President Ma’ruf Amin (formerly the organisation’s supreme leader), Minister of Religious Affairs Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, and three other NU-affiliated ministers.[21] In contrast, only one current minister comes from Muhammadiyah, and the current Minister of Education is a founder of a major Indonesian IT company with no connection to any religious organisation. NU’s close alignment with Widodo has paid off handsomely, while Muhammadiyah is politically marginalised due to the perception that its rank-and-file members are more likely to align themselves to the Islamist cause rather than with the President.   Concluding observations To conclude, renewed political sectarianism in Indonesia has its roots in the theological differences between traditionalists, modernists, and (since the late 1960s) Islamists. While the theological differences between the three groups were not as divergent as the Sunni vs Shia differences – they are still significant to create identifiable sectarian differences between the three groups – based upon: 1) their interpretation of ‘appropriate’ customs, traditions, and ritualistic practices that is compatible with basic Islamic teachings; and 2) their ideological and political outlook – with traditionalists and modernists have largely see their political theologies to be compatible with the Indonesian nation-state based on the Pancasila ideology, while Islamists largely reject such a compatibility.   However, political sectarianism is not always salient throughout much of Indonesia’s post-colonial history. It tends to be more intense during the time where there is an increased theological and political competition among Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and the Islamists as more established groups like NU align with certain political regimes to exclude their rivals from gaining access to political appointments and other state patronage,deploying sectarian rhetoric and divisive strategies to marginalise their rivals. Efforts to de-escalate the sectarian divide between these groups may include power-sharing arrangements like those implemented by successive regimes in the 2000s and early 2010s. More importantly, it should incorporate more meritocratic appointments based on talents and capabilities instead of those based on political loyalties and allegiances to the current regime.   Alexander R. Arifianto is currently a Research Fellow with S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) – Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research expertise is contemporary Indonesian politics and comparative Islamic parties and social movements in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. His articles have appeared in refereed journals such as Journal of Global Strategic Studies; Religion, State, and Society; Asia Policy; Trans-National and Regional Studies of Southeast Asia (TRaNS); Asian Security; and Asian Politics and Policy.   [1] Abdo, Genevive. 2017. The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi’a-Sunni Divide. New York, US: Oxford University Press; Hashemi, Nader and Postel, Daniel. 2017. Sectarianization: Mapping the Politics of the New Middle East. New York, US: Oxford University Press. [2] Mabon, Simon. Afterword: Sectarianisation Beyond the Middle East. Religion, State, and Society 49, no. 2, (2021): 174-180. [3] Arifianto and Saleem. 2021, op cit; Kilinc, Ramazan. From Honourable to Villainous: Political Competition and Sectarianisation in Turkey. Religion, State, and Society 49, no. 2, (2021): 93-108. [4] Ananta, Aris, Nurvidya Arifin, Evi, Hasbullah, M. Sairi, Handayani, Nur Budi and Pramono, Agus. 2015. Demography of Indonesia’s Ethnicity. Singapore, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, p. 20. [5] Noer, Deliar. 1973. The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942. Singapore, Singapore: Oxford University Press; Federspiel, Howard. The Muhammadijah: A Study of an Orthodox Islamic Movement in Indonesia. Indonesia 10, (1970): 57-79. [6] Bush, Robin. 2009. Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, pp. 36-40. [7] Feith, Herbert. 1962. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. [8] Martin van Bruinessen, Comparing the Governance of Islam in Turkey and Indonesia: Diyanet and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Working Paper No. 312, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, May 2018, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/wp312-comparing-the-governance-of-islam-in-turkey-and-indonesia-diyanet-and-the-ministry-of-religious-affairs/ [9] Feith. 1962, op cit. [10] Fealy, Greg and McGregor, Kate. Nahdlatul Ulama and the Killings of 1965-1966: Religion, Politics, and Remembrance. Indonesia 89, (2008): 37- 60. [11] Hefner, Robert W. 2000. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 106-107. [12] Arifianto, Alexander R. The State of Political Islam in Indonesia: The Historical Antecedent and Future Prospects. Asia Policy 15, no. 4, (2020): 116-118. [13] Chaplin, Chris. 2021. Salafism and the State: Islamic Activism and National Identity in Contemporary Indonesia. Copenhagen, Denmark: NIAS Press. [14] Bush, 2009, op cit; Barton, Greg. 2002. Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid. Jakarta, Indonesia: Equinox Publishing. [15] Arifianto, Alexander R. From Ideological to Political Sectarianism: Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and the State in Indonesia. Religion, State, and Society 49, no. 2, (2021): 131. [16] Arifianto. 2021. op cit, p. 132 [17] Alexander R. Arifianto, Jokowi’s Sixth Reshuffle: Securing His Legacy?, RSIS Commentary No. 21-073, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, April 2021, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/jokowis-sixth-reshuffle-securing-his-legacy/ [18] Arifianto. 2021. op cit, p. 135. [19] Ibid, p. 133. [20] Ibid, p. 134. [21] Ibid, pp. 135-136. [post_title] => Implications for debates about sectarianism in Indonesia [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => implications-for-debates-about-sectarianism [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-19 09:08:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-19 08:08:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6478 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [27] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6476 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-07-19 00:01:53 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-07-18 23:01:53 [post_content] => Since the turn of the millennium, Japan has been marked by heated political and public debates about a massive increase in inequality and new forms of social exclusion. A new self-perception of Japan as a ‘gap society’ (kakusa shakai) became dominant. This new narrative represents a rupture to the former self-image as a ‘general middle-class society’ (sōchūryū shakai), according to which Japan was an extremely egalitarian society. However, available research and data does neither fully support the assumption of a much more divided Japanese society in recent decades nor a view of an outstanding equal society in the earlier decades. How can we explain these discrepancies between public discourses and measured inequality? To understand the scope of the recent discussions on inequality and the associated reversal in self-perception, it is first necessary to take a closer look at the earlier model of Japan as a general middle-class society.   This general middle-class discourse, which became increasingly dominant from the 1960s onwards, attested to Japan being an almost uniquely equal society in terms of opportunities and outcomes. Thanks to its extremely meritocratic education system, all male students, regardless of their social background, could achieve potentially educational success and thus paving the way to prosperity and social advancement. For women, the model with its clearly delineated gender roles envisaged an ideal life course of its own. They were supposed to marry such a successful man and to support him in his career by managing the household and family on their own. Above all, in their role as mothers, they ensured the educational success of their own children and thus guaranteed the continuation of the family success story across generations. At the same time, however, Japan was considered also as a heaven of equality in terms of income and wealth distribution compared to the free-market West. In this view, Western societies were characterised by income inequality and widespread poverty like the US or UK, or, as in the case of the Scandinavian countries, by low social inequality and strong social security due to an extremely high tax burden and a comprehensive welfare state. In contrast, in the Japanese system, equal income and wealth distribution was generated, according to the self-image, by socially responsible enterprises run almost like families and the associated low wage differentials between managers and workers. Japan thus appeared, according to the narrative of the general middle-class society, to square the circle by successfully combining fair competition and equal opportunities with high social inclusion for all. In the dominant self-image, Japan was not only an ethnically extremely homogeneous society without significant minorities but was also characterised by social homogeneity and general prosperity in international comparison.   However, not much has remained of this image of Japan as a prime example of growth and equality since 2000, especially in Japan itself. From the mid-1980s onwards, the Japanese economy overheated, which was reflected in very high growth rates combined with unbelievable price increases on the stock and real estate markets. However, the bursting of these speculative bubbles led to decades of economic stagnation and very modest growth from the early 1990s onwards. Especially in comparison to the US, Japan seemed to stand still and steadily lose importance from the 1990s onwards. Even more painful for Japan’s self-image as a global economic power and leading nation in East Asia was the unstoppable rise of the People's Republic of China, which embarked on an impressive modernisation and overtook Japan in terms of economic power within a few years. Even South Korea was far more successful in its economic development, symbolised by the overtaking of Sony by Samsung. This relative decline undermined Japan’s social self-image as a successful economic nation and led to crisis discourses and demands for comprehensive structural reforms. The reformers’ goal was to liberalise and deregulate the Japanese economy for generating new impulses for growth and innovation by unleashing market forces and increasing social competition through greater individual income differences, following the US and UK neoliberal model. There was talk of ‘evil egalitarianism’ (akubyōdō), which led to a sated attitude and undermined the population’s drive and will to achieve. However, this neoliberal reform agenda also led to a new focus on social inequality. Parallel to the reform debates, a public and later also political discussion on the development of social inequality in Japan began around 2000. The debate culminated in the mid-2000s in the new model of Japan as a gap society, which quickly became the dominant self-perception and displaced the previous discourse of Japan as a general middle-class society. The perception of social structures has shifted extremely with this new model. Japan is now characterised in terms of social inequality by an opening of the social gap, an increasing destabilisation in employment and a growth of impoverished low-income households. The new narrative of Japan as a gap society also led to a questioning of the desirability of a neoliberal realignment of Japanese society and the associated social differentiation and exclusion dynamics.   Based on empirical research, the extent and intensity of the debate on social inequality in Japan is surprising at first glance. Like in nearly all advanced industrial countries, an increase in income inequality can also be identified as a trend in Japan in recent decades. However, this development has been very moderate in international comparison, especially to the income concentration among top earners in liberal, Anglo-Saxon countries. Overall, available data shows no strong income concentration and rather a continuity in levels of social inequality in Japan since the 1980s, especially in comparison to the US or UK. These empirical results are also supported by comparative studies on political economy, which show that in Japan a neoliberal reform programme has only been realised in rudimentary form. More detailed analyses on income distribution attribute the moderate increase in inequality in household incomes primarily to the ageing of the population and a change in the composition of households. Thus, in Japan, it is not the rise in wage differentials and an unleashing of market forces, but rather the higher proportion of older workers and retirees, who have higher income differentials than young workers, as well as the increase in single households and senior-only households that are the main factors behind a certain opening in income differentials between households. However, it has also to be stressed that empirical research also does not support the former model of Japan as a heaven of social equality until the later 1990s. Social inequality from the 1950s onwards was much lower compared to Japan’s modern developments up to the 1930s. Still, in international comparison with the other advanced industrialised countries, Japan had a rather above-average inequality in income distribution in the post-war period. The education system was also by no means a meritocratic ideal in which social origin played no role. On the contrary, recent comparative studies show a relatively strong degree of social reproduction across generational lines for Japan.   How can the discrepancy between the fundamental change in the self-image and dominant discourse on social inequality in Japan despite a relatively strong continuity in social structures be explained? A closer analysis and interpretation of social development reveals clear cracks in the old social fabric, which make the resonance of the model of Japan as a gap society comprehensible. First, the collapse of the basis of the former model of a general middle-class society must be emphasised. This self-image of Japan as a general middle-class society developed from the early 1960s onwards. The first years after the wartime capitulation from 1945 to 1960 were marked not only by comprehensive reforms, but also by intense and sometimes violent disputes about Japan’s new direction. Hayato Ikeda (Prime Minister 1960-1964), however, with his income-doubling plan, not only succeeded in steering the economy to a path of almost double-digit annual growth until the early 1970s, but also decisively defused the conflicts in politics and the labour market. He established shared growth as the new social contract between the conservative elite and the population. In this consensus, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) became the guarantor that the population would benefit from the rapid growth of the Japanese economy through increased purchasing power and upward mobility.   In contrast to all large advanced industrial countries in the West, this pact between the LDP and the people continued after the end of the Bretton Woods system and the oil price crisis in the early 1970s. Although also Japanese economic growth subsequently slowed significantly, with almost four percent annual growth, increasing export surpluses, unabated penetration of the high-tech sectors, continued low unemployment and no significant inflation problems, the Japanese economy became a model of success, even for the West. The social upward trend also continued among the population, with the upper middle class of well-educated employees and their families in secure career positions in public administration and large companies expanding strongly during this period. Although the distribution of income may not have been nearly as extraordinarily egalitarian as suggested by the general middle-class model, this was of only secondary importance for self-perception, since the everyday experience of the population was primarily an increase in their own purchasing power, participation in mass consumption and social advancement over generations. To put it bluntly: in daily life, most of the population experienced and realised common growth. The general middle-class society was a reality in everyday life.   However, this shared growth model ended abruptly with the bursting of the speculative bubbles in the early 1990s. From the later 1990s, economic stagnation began to fully impact the labour market and income development. After decades of seemingly unstoppable increases in average household income, it began to decline significantly for a few years and remained at a significantly lower level until the present. In no other advanced industrial country have average incomes stagnated as much as in Japan in recent decades. It may therefore come as no surprise that new existential angst and fears of decline have spread among the middle classes in Japan. In view of their own stagnating income, many from the middle classes are no longer sure whether and to what extent they will remain part of the well-integrated middle of society in the long run. Especially in view of the demand for intensified social competition during the neoliberal reform discussions, many worry whether they themselves or their children will not be among the losers in this struggle.   Moreover, these existential fears are not entirely unfounded. Successful economic development in Japan was accompanied by a welfare model geared towards high growth. Instead of building comprehensive social security systems, resources were invested primarily in generating faster economic development. In other words, in the Japanese growth model, social inclusion was not realised through the establishment of well-developed social safety nets, but through participation in economic growth. Although social security systems have been further expanded and supplemented in recent decades, especially for the elderly, integration into the Japanese welfare model is still dependent on permanent full-time employment. All other workers, especially women, who do not have a standard employment contract are not comprehensively covered for illness, unemployment, or retirement. Unemployment in Japan has remained at a low level over the last 25 years, especially in comparison to many European economies. However, atypical employment has increased sharply and today affects not only married women who are integrated into the social security system through their regularly employed husbands, but also young, unmarried workers, especially female employees, but also increasingly male employees. These people are heading for very low incomes throughout their working lives and old-age poverty after retirement. This explains the uncertainty far into the middle classes, who fear that they themselves or their children could be drawn into this downward spiral of atypical employment and the associated consequences. It may come as no surprise then that poverty and especially old-age poverty have become the most important topic within the debate on increasing social inequality in Japan in recent years. Almost everyone has the impression that they are walking on very thin ice and could be pushed to the margins of society at any time.   In 2012, the new LDP Prime Minister Shinzo Abe gained international attention as a result of his economic programme, Abenomics. Domestically, too, Abenomics triggered high expectations, as it promised to put Japan back on a common growth path with a new monetary policy to generate inflation, with a stimulation of demand via government investment programmes and with structural reforms to strengthen economic competitiveness as its three main components. The new monetary policy is the innovative, but also very controversial part of this economic programme and includes the promise that Japan could return to the good old days of common growth without painful reforms by reversing a failed monetary policy. However, the results of Abenomics have fallen short of expectations. While the economy has grown steadily under the years of Abe government up to 2020 thanks to increasing exports, this growth has not led to wage increases and thus has not reached people’s wallets. The current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (in office since October 2021) has recognised the problem of the continued lack of shared growth under Abenomics. One of his proclaimed goals is to establish a new form of capitalism in which the fruits of growth should not be reserved for a few but should benefit everyone as much as possible: ‘Capitalism is not sustainable if it does not belong to everyone.’ This goal, however, has provoked open criticism, especially within the LDP and the business establishment. The proposed measures and reforms to achieve this goal remain vague. The Kishida government is aware of the problem, but it still must prove that it has bright ideas on how to solve it and that it will be able to implement them in the face of resistance, especially from conservative social circles and from its own party. Social division is an important and much discussed topic in Japan for over two decades, which has reached everyday life of most Japanese, and it will remain a focus in the coming years.   David Chiavacci is Professor in Social Science of Japan at the University of Zurich, Switzerland. His research covers political and economic sociology of contemporary Japan in a comparative perspective. His main focus is on social movements, social inequality as well as on Japan’s new immigration and immigration policy. His recent publications include Re-emerging from Invisibility: Social Movements and Political Activism in Contemporary Japan (Routledge, 2018, co-edited with Julia Obinger), Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Abenomics and Institutional Change (Routledge, 2019, co-edited with Sébastien Lechevalier) and Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia: Between Entanglement and Contention in Post High Growth (Amsterdam University Press, 2020, co-edited with Simona Grano and Julia Obinger).   Further readings Chiavacci David & Hommerich, Carola (eds.). 2017. Social Inequality in Post-Growth Japan: Transformation during Economic and Demographic Stagnation. London: Routledge. Maslow, Sebastian & Wirth, Christian (eds.). 2021. Crisis Narratives, Institutional Change and Transformation of the Japanese State. Albany: SUNY. [post_title] => Gap society as a new narrative of social division in Japan [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => gap-society-as-a-new-narrative-of-social-division-in-japan [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-18 22:40:06 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-18 21:40:06 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6476 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [28] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6439 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-07-01 00:00:11 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-06-30 23:00:11 [post_content] => The Ukrainian war calls into question Russia's ability to act as a security guarantor for Karabakh Armenians. There is little to suggest that Moscow is inclined to challenge Azerbaijan's sovereignty over Karabakh. As the guarantor of the 2020 Ceasefire Agreement, Russia continues to provide the Armenian population in Karabakh with security guarantees, but this is a temporary arrangement, and there are reasons to believe that the evolving situation in Ukraine will erode Russia's commitment. At this point, Armenia can do little else but lobby Moscow for support; the war in Ukraine de-substantiates the Minsk process, while bilateral negotiations in Brussels will not touch upon Karabakh. Following the war in Ukraine, Karabakh Armenians are falling through the cracks of Europe's security architecture.   The nature of the study This article summarises the conclusions of a study based on 25 structured interviews conducted from March to May 2022. These one-to-one interviews engaged Armenian foreign policy analysts, lobbyists and political activists in Paris, London, Berlin, Brussels, Rome, Stockholm, Athens, Berlin, Yerevan and Stepanakert [Az. Khankendi]. The interviewees were selectively targeted to engage all cultural fountains of the Armenian World – Western, post-Soviet and the Middle East – as well as to balance views favourable and critical of the government of Nikol Pashinyan. Beyond this core interviewee group, this study is also indebted to a secondary group of foreign policy analysts and former diplomats engaged as discussants from the United States, the UK, Georgia, Poland and Iran.   This entire project can be distilled into two Armenian dilemmas:
  1. First, Yerevan and the global Armenian community are entirely dependent on Russia for the security of Karabakh Armenians; however, Armenians must engage with Europe and the United States to ensure Karabakh continues to be framed as an international diplomatic issue.
  2. Secondly, Yerevan needs to engage with Ankara and Baku to avoid war, for which Armenia is not prepared; to do so, Yerevan needs to adhere to the nine-point ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia, where it implicitly accepts that Karabakh is an integral part of Azerbaijani sovereign territory.
  Karabakh: neither an international nor a bilateral challenge Historically, the Armenian-majority Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) lay within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Armenia led a successful military campaign from 1988 to 1994, capturing Nagorno-Karabakh and seven Azeri-majority territories west, south and east of the territory.[1] Since 2006 these territories have been de facto ruled by Stepanakert [Az: Khankendi], which in 2017 became the de facto administrative centre of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh. The regime never gained international recognition, not even by Armenia.[2] Instead, Yerevan opted for indirect control over the territories and open-ended negotiations over the status of Karabakh through the OSCE Minsk process.[3] Each year that passed seemed to entrench the status quo until it did not.   In Autumn 2020, Azerbaijani forces launched a military campaign that allowed Baku to regain control over the seven adjacent regions and make inroads into Karabakh, including the towns of Shushi (Az. Shusha) and Hadrut. The 44-day war resulted in the death of including approximately 4,000 service personnel, civilian casualties, and tens of thousands of displacements.[4] In a small country with just under three million people, no family in Armenia was spared loss. For the Armenian world, galvanised as a community through its international campaign for the recognition of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, this was a moment of existential significance.   The Azerbaijani advance ended in November 2020 with a Russian-mediated nine-point agreement referred to in the Armenian World as "the capitulation". Herein lies a demand for Armenia to recognise the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and forego any claims over Karabakh. Until the future of Karabakh Armenians is determined, the sole guarantor of their security is a force of 1,960 Russian peacekeeping troops.[5] The mandate of the Russian force ends in November 2025 and what happens next is anyone's guess. Most Armenian interviewees hope that Russian troops will remain indefinitely, frequently citing Russia's perceived interest in keeping boots on the ground.   However, according to an interviewee with direct knowledge of national security discourse in Yerevan and Stepanakert [Az: Khankendi], the Russian message is that Armenians should be preparing for "reintegration" with Azerbaijan. This message from Moscow tallies with the message from Yerevan. Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan and Foreign Minister Mirzoyan have stated that the Karabakh conflict is not a territorial issue but "a matter of rights". That statement means that the government of Armenia no longer regards Karabakh Armenians as ‘a sovereign people’ but rather as a minority that needs to be protected by international law, if not by Azerbaijani justice.   That means that Karabakh Armenians rely on the internationalisation of the Karabakh question because they can't rely on Armenia. The question then is how the Karabakh question becomes internationalised. Before November 2020, the primary forum for the negotiation of the Karabakh conflict was the Minsk Group, set up in 1992 by the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).[6] This OSCE framework is also the platform through which Russia's peacekeeping mandate in Karabakh gains international legitimacy. That presents Russia with a procedural problem. As noted by Thomas De Waal, Karabakh's 2020 ceasefire agreement gains international legitimacy via the OSCE Tirana statement rather than any subsequent UN Resolution.[7] Therefore, the presence of Russian troops on the ground without the Minsk process would be legally precarious.   Ukraine changes this normative calculation because Russia appears to be divorcing from any need for external recognition for its authority in the ‘near abroad’. The notion of a single security-dispute mechanism emanating from the 1975 Helsinki accords has been fracturing and is now broken. Following the 2014 annexation of Crimean and the more recent invasion of Ukraine, relations between the West and Russia are past the point of no return. As explained by an American diplomat who served in the South Caucasus, as long as Moscow and the West are embroiled in a confrontation in Ukraine, no diplomatic framework that requires Russian-Western cooperation is workable.   An Armenian interviewee in contact with the OSCE co-chairs leaves no room for illusions: "there is no Minsk process." Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov blames OSCE co-chairs France and the United States for disrupting cooperation over Karabakh.[8] Significantly, Russia has been entertaining the idea of a transition to the self-proclaimed three plus three frameworks: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan plus Russia, Turkey and Iran.[9] That may be unacceptable to Armenia and Georgia but points to the fact that Moscow no longer stands behind the Minsk process (CSCE). Increasingly, "might is right", and Russia can carve out a diplomatic community in which Moscow is the sole rule-maker.   Perhaps more significantly, the Minsk process has failed to yield results since November 2020. As noted by a French-Armenian interviewee, no co-Ambassador from the Minsk Group has visited Stepanakert since 2020 [Az: Khankendi]. Statements by co-chairs amount to nothing but wishes for the renewal of bilateral negotiations.[10]   Contrary to speculation, Brussels does not present an alternative to the Minsk process.[11] On April 6 2022, the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met in Brussels and subsequently tasked their foreign ministers to "begin preparatory work for peace talks". As noted by Thomas De Waal, the talks mediated by European Council President Charles Michel entail light touch facilitation rather than arbitration.[12] The precondition for Azerbaijani engagement is Armenia's adherence to the November 2020 ceasefire agreement principles, recognising Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Therefore, Armenia can't put Karabakh on the table, and the EU won't.   Many interviewees believe or hope that Russia will do what Europe won't and step in to arbitrate a solution in which Karabakh Armenians are protected. An Armenian interviewee with intimate knowledge of the negotiation explains that the foundations of the Brussels process were set in Sochi.[13] After all, claims to the contrary are dismissed by the Kremlin.[14] In fact, a former British diplomat confirmed a meeting in London with the Armenian government liaison tasked with debriefing Moscow on the progress of the negotiations. Brussels is not and cannot be about Karabakh, and Moscow knows that.   Perhaps surprisingly, at least two sources in France suggest that President Macron has been advocating for the inclusion of French peacekeepers or military observers in Karabakh. This idea has apparently been pushed back by the foreign ministry. In any event, this would require Paris and Moscow to work together, which does not seem likely. Moreover, French credibility is questioned, as the tendency to instrumentalise the Karabakh conflict for electoral gain is not unheard of in Paris.[15] The 600,000-strong and politicised French-Armenian community is an object of desire in every presidential cycle. Far-right candidates Eric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen have been waving the flag of their support for Armenia during the Presidential campaign, which is not unprecedented.[16] Not to be outdone, the centre-right candidate Valerie Pecresse visited Yerevan and Stepanakert [Az: Khankendi].[17] The pattern may very well repeat itself in five years.   The Armenian opposition in Yerevan reverts to Russia as the only necessary protector of Karabakh Armenians. That assessment has become less realistic as Ukraine forces Russia to cut down on non-essential financial and military expenses.[18] A recent Crisis Group report refers to 1600 Russian soldiers in Karabakh, 360 short of the force specified by its mandate.[19] And then there is the question of what Russian troops in Karabakh are willing to do. After Azerbaijani forces moved to capture the strategic Parukh [Az: Farukh] village in April this year, Moscow issued a rare reprimand, yet no further action followed. In the words of a French-Armenian interviewee, the Parukh [Az. Farukh] village incident attests to the fact that Russian presence “is necessary but not sufficient to maintaining peace in Karabakh”.   Neither international nor bilateral? The war in Ukraine freezes the international dimension of the Karabakh conflict indefinitely. The issue at hand is that Armenia cannot engage bilaterally on the question of Karabakh either, forgoing this right by signing onto the November 2020 ceasefire agreement.   Politically, that is an unmanageable admission for Yerevan. It is no surprise that the Armenian foreign minister Ararat Mirzoyan contradicts Lavrov, hailing the cooperation of all the parties involved in the Minsk process.[20] Traditionally, Armenia leans on Russia for its foreign and security policy and promotes an Armenian human rights agenda with the support of its Western Diaspora. The constant and omnipresent fear articulated by interviewees is that Moscow will “pull a Bush” and ask the “with us or against us” question.   Until that happens, Yerevan will claim that the Brussels process is about the territorial delimitation with Azerbaijan. For Azerbaijan this is a non-issue; Yerevan insists there is a Karabakh issue but that is the subject matter of the Minsk process, which is no longer in effect. Therefore, when it comes to the Karabakh question, the debate in Armenia gravitates around a futile East versus West policy debate: “it’s all about Russia”, explains a globally respectable Armenian intellectual, noting how political discourse revolves around various degrees of owed loyalty to “the elder brother”.   Armenia’s Ukraine position is articulated sotto voce. When the leader of Karabakh Armenians, Arayik Harutyunyan, demands recognition of Luhansk and Donetsk, he sounds more Russian than Armenian. Yerevan abstained from the UN General Assembly vote condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the vote to suspend Russia’s UN Human Rights Council membership.[21] Most Armenian lobbyists interviewed dismiss any allegation that Armenia backed Russia’s invasion as Azerbaijani-Turkish propaganda.[22] In sum, Armenia cannot afford to have a Ukraine policy if the government insists on paying homage to the Minsk process. The government needs to pretend that a balance between East and West is possible; the opposition must pretend that allegiance to Moscow or lack thereof is a choice. If none of these illusions is maintained, Yerevan will be seen to admit that it no longer has a seat at the table where the future of Karabakh is discussed. This is politically untenable.   Fighting it out is not an option. The key to Azerbaijan’s military victory was arguably the diversification of its military arsenal, with support from Israel and Turkey. According to an Armenian defence specialist, even if Armenia had the money for an arms race, Yerevan would be unable to refuse Russia access to strategic technology and data. That means no diversification. A war of attrition in Ukraine makes matters worse as Russia exhausts its stock of ammunition, further diminishing the Armenian ability to replenish its arsenal. In this context, the ambition of rebuilding the Armenian army to end the slippery slope to appeasement seems less credible, even if there is a suggestion that Yerevan is already developing indigenous drone prototypes.[23] Playing for time is not an option as Azerbaijani troops move beyond Karabakh and the current point of contact. Armenia needs to engage with Azerbaijan and Turkey even if Karabakh is not on the table.   Here lie two problems for Baku: first, if the Pashinyan government does not have “a golden bridge” and signs an agreement with no provision for Karabakh Armenians, then the instrumentality of that treaty is reduced. In Yerevan and around the world, this peace agreement will be dismissed as yet another capitulation for Armenians. The second is that Baku does not want to see the renewal of a Russian presence in Karabakh beyond 2025; Azerbaijan would probably want to resolve the question of what happens to Karabakh Armenians before that date.   A challenge that Armenia and Azerbaijan share is that talks in Brussels are taking place in parallel to the war in Ukraine, with both parties unable to calculate the catalytic effect of the conflict. As a diplomatic facilitator, the EU is happy to follow through with the diplomatic agenda set in Sochi. However, amid growing polarisation between Europe and Russia, that appears to be a fragile consensus. The assumption that Russia and the West can address regional security challenges as partners looks increasingly unlikely. In turn, the assumption of a multilateral rules-based order and co-development is likely to suffer, undermining the authority of the Council. The emerging reality is one of competitive regionalisation projects, which should be a concern both for Yerevan and Baku, both of whom have a tradition of multi-vector diplomacy.   A fuller version of this study has been published by the Observatory on Contemporary Crises in Madrid, Spain. You can read it here: https://crisesobservatory.es/the-state-of-play-in-nagorno-karabakh-the-scope-for-second-track-diplomatic-initiatives/    Ilya Roubanis (PhD, European University Institute) is a British-born International Relations analyst of Greek heritage. He is a fellow of the Observatory on Contemporary Crisis (Madrid) and the International Relations Institute in Athens (IDIS). For over a decade, he has worked in the South Caucasus as a government affairs consultant, risk analyst, and journalist.   [1] Joshua Kucera, For Armenians, they are not occupied territories, they are homeland, Eurasianet, August 2018, https://eurasianet.org/for-armenians-theyre-not-occupied-territories-theyre-the-homeland [2] Pierre Alix-Pajot, The Republic of Artsakh’s Pursuit for International Recognition, Le Journal International, February 2018, http://www.lejournalinternational.info/en/la-republique-de-lartsakh-en-quete-de-reconnaissance-internationale/ [3] Andrew Rettman, Referendum to create ‘The Republic of Artsakh’ on Europe’s fringe, February 2017, EU Observer, https://euobserver.com/world/136961 [4] The Economist, Armenia’s Army turns on its prime minister, March 2021, https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/03/04/armenias-army-turns-on-its-prime-minister; RFE/RL, Armenia Abstains from UN Vote on Ukraine, March 2022, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/31734729.html [5] International Crisis Group, New Opportunities for Crisis Mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh, May 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/new-opportunities-mediation-nagorno-karabakh [6] CSCE, About the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, https://www.csce.gov/about-commission-security-and-cooperation-europe; Minsk Process Review: In 1996, the OSCE member states laid out three principles as a legal basis for the peaceful settlement process: 1) territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan; 2) legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be based on self-determination, which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan; 3) guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its population. In November 1998, the Minsk Group proposed that the use of the Lachin Corridor by Karabakh for unimpeded communication between Karabakh and Armenia be the subject of a separate agreement. The Lachin district must remain a permanent and fully demilitarized zone. The basis of the negotiated settlement plan is based on the principles introduced by OSCE Minsk Group in Madrid (November 2007): 1) the return of territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; 2) an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance; 3) a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; 4) the future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will; 5) the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and 6) international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation. These principles are supported by other intergovernmental organizations, which have accepted the exclusive role of the OSCE. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan rejected them but they interpret them differently. [7] Thomas de Waal, Brussels takes the initiative in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, Analyticon, May 2022, https://theanalyticon.com/en/may-2022-en/brussels-takes-the-initiative-in-armenia-azerbaijan-negotiations/; OSCE, Joint Statement by the Heads of Delegation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries, December 2020, https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/472419 [8] Turan, Washington and Paris refused to communicate with Moscow on the Karabakh settlement-Lavrov, April 2022, https://www.turan.az/ext/news/2022/4/free/politics_news/en/3506.htm/001; NEWS.am, Lavrov says US, France annulled OSCE membership: what’ll happen to Karabakh?”, YouTube, April 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T-V4kwd6zGw&ab_channel=NEWSAM [9] NEWS.am, Russian Foreign Ministry: Trilateral agreements are considered by the Russian Federation as a basis for the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, April 2022, https://news.am/rus/news/699005.html [10] OSCE, Joint Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries, December 2021, https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/507320 [11] International Crisis Group, New Opportunities for Crisis Mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh, May 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/new-opportunities-mediation-nagorno-karabakh [12] Thomas de Waal, Brussels takes the initiative in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, Analyticon, May 2022, https://theanalyticon.com/en/may-2022-en/brussels-takes-the-initiative-in-armenia-azerbaijan-negotiations/ [13] Mariam Nikuradze, Armenia and Azerbaijan agree to bilateral commission in Sochi, OC Media, November 2021, https://oc-media.org/armenia-and-azerbaijan-agree-to-bilateral-commission-in-sochi-summit/ [14] Maria Zacharova, Russian Foreign Ministry: Trilateral agreements are considered by the Russian Federation as a basis for the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, NEWS.am, April 2022, https://news.am/rus/news/699005.html [15] Tigran Yegavian, The French Presidential Election and the Armenian Question, EVN Report, April 2022, https://evnreport.com/politics/the-french-presidential-election-and-the-armenian-question/ [16] Ani Meljumyan, French far-right candidate seeks votes in Armenia, Eurasianet, December 2021, https://eurasianet.org/french-far-right-figure-seeks-votes-in-armenia; Marine Le Pen, Twitter Post, Twitter, May 2021, https://twitter.com/mlp_officiel/status/1393135243780055041; Siranush Ghazanchyan, Marine Le Pen says Artsakh Reunion with Armenia Desirable, Public Radio of Armenia, April 2017, https://en.armradio.am/2017/04/19/marine-le-pen-says-artsakhs-unification-with-armenia-desirable/ [17] Azatutyun, Another French Presidential Candidate visits Armenia, December 2021, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/31620016.html; Asbarez, French Presidential Candidate Visits Artsakh; Baku adds her on Black List, December 2021, https://asbarez.com/french-presidential-candidate-visits-artsakh-baku-places-her-onblack-list/ [18] Civil, Moscow says Abhazia, S. Ossetia Shall be less dependent on Russia, March 2022, https://civil.ge/archives/478378; The Kyiv Independent, Ukrainian Armed Forces: Russia plans transfer of troops from Armenia, March 2022, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3433670-rosia-planue-perekinuti-v-ukrainu-svoi-pidrozdili-z-virmenii-genstab.html [19] International Crisis Group, Nagorno-Karabakh: Seeking a Path to Peace in the Ukraine’s War Shadow, Crisis Group Europe Briefing No. 93, April 1993, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b093-seeking-a-path-to-peace_0.pdf [20] Arka News Agency, Armenia sees Karabakh conflict settlement in OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship format – Mirzoyan, April 2022, http://arka.am/en/news/politics/armenia_sees_karabakh_conflict_settlement_in_osce_minsk_group_co_chairmanship_format_mirzoyan_/ [21] Azatutyun, Armenia Abstains from UN Vote on Ukraine, March 2022, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/31734729.html; Naira Nalbadian, Russia Again not Backed by Armenia on UN Vote on Ukraine, Azatutyun, April 2022, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/31793297.html [22] Haber Global, Ermenistan’in SU-20 Yalani Ortaya Cikti! Iste Uydu Goruntuleri, YouTube, April 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rJOieiDlNY0&t=141s [23] Siranush Ghazanchyan, UL-450: Armenian company presents new drones, Public Radio of Armenia, March 2022, https://en.armradio.am/2022/03/20/ul-450-armenian-company-presents-new-drone/ Also see: Inder Singh Bisht, Armenian-Made Kamikaze Drones Undergoing Tests, The Defence Post, February 2021, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/02/12/armenia-tests-kamikaze-drone/ [post_title] => Armenia's Karabakh Dilemmas and the Quest for a Golden Bridge [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => armenias-karabakh-dilemmas-and-the-quest-for-a-golden-bridge [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-07-04 15:05:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-07-04 14:05:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6439 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [29] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6431 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-06-20 00:00:30 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-06-19 23:00:30 [post_content] => Conflict and authoritarianism are on the rise. This won’t surprise anyone reading about events in Ukraine, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and elsewhere. The new UK International Development Strategy (IDS), published in May this year, reveals how the UK plans to deal with this shifting geopolitical landscape. If it is going to prevent future crises and support development, the strategy must steer efforts to address the causes of conflict while avoiding the harms that come from overzealous use of force by the UK or its allies.   The humanitarian impact of insecurity on development is clear – not least its horrendous effects on women and girls. Conflicts create global security challenges that impact the UK: shrinking the pool of democratic states, increasing corruption, impacting the global economy, and creating conditions for transnational crime and armed groups to thrive. But the use of violence in response to transnational security threats can exacerbate these challenges and risks sowing the seeds of future crises and inequalities.   What’s in the International Development Strategy on conflict? The Government includes the need to address conflict in the International Development Strategy to ‘prevent the worst forms of human suffering’. There are also references to tackling the root causes of conflict and security challenges; leadership in the area of women, peace and security; and a new conflict and atrocity prevention hub. But prioritising ‘tackling conflict and insecurity’ is less explicit than in previous aid strategies and in last year’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.[1] However, there are positive links made to climate change where the IDS notes that ‘[w]omen, children and those living in conflict-affected states are most affected’, and the specific focus on women and girls is encouraging despite not recognising gender as a cross-cutting priority issue.   A positive development is the proposed shift in how the UK administers aid for development towards decentralisation and ‘reducing bureaucracy’. The strategy commits that ‘those who benefit from our work must have a voice in what we do, and how we do it’ and reforms ‘must be locally owned’. Ambassadors and High Commissioners will now have more agency to take decisions. Timelines for business cases will be cut and paperwork reduced. There is also an emphasis on a ‘patient approach’ to development. Taken together these could enhance the UK’s approach to conflict prevention: understanding the context to respond effectively and flexibly in collaboration with those caught in conflict as part of a long-term plan for peace. However, there are some potential inherent contradictions in what is being proposed and the strategy risks prioritising shortcuts to security over the long-term investments needed in the partnerships, analysis and political will to tackle underlying drivers of conflict.   The risks of a ‘hard’ security approach Woven throughout the policy – and much more explicit in the recent Mansion House speech by the Foreign Secretary – are hints of ‘harder’ approaches: using the military to build the ‘security and resilience capabilities’ of other nations; improving ‘cyber and physical security’; and partnering with allies like the Gulf states who ‘will address malign dynamics such as terrorism and extremism, serious and organised crime, and irregular migration’.[2] The UK works with security forces across the world to increase their capacity through training, mentorships and providing arms and other military equipment for partner security forces.[3]   The majority of attacks and civilian casualties due to terrorism and organised crime occur in conflict-affected countries. There is a development and security interest in stopping this violence. Yet as a new synthesis of Saferworld research on the war on terror finds, interventions too often perpetuate the same drivers of conflict that the UK and other nations promise to address: corruption, exclusion and abuses.[4] In a bid to tackle ‘terrorists’, the UK and others reinforce the security forces of kleptocratic, patriarchal and authoritarian regimes, who exclude and oppress their people.   One such UK ally is Egypt, whose regime has benefited from UK diplomatic support, military training and arms sales. Meanwhile, the Egyptian military has taken over more of the economy; and used the guise of ‘counter-terrorism’ to abuse and detain human rights defenders, journalists, transgender people and the political opposition. Security forces are accused of abuses against sexual and gender minorities and being complicit in cases of gender-based violence (GBV).[5] Egyptian security forces have failed to halt violations of human rights by the ISIS-affiliated armed group known as Wilayat Sinai or Sinai Province and carry out their own abuses. Many other UK allies fit a similar profile: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or individual groups like the Libyan militias trained as counter-migration ‘coastguard’ by the EU and UK.[6]   These interventions have been a nightmare for development, human rights and democracy. Those trying to deliver humanitarian aid or broker peace have found themselves on the wrong side of the law. Aid was even withheld from rebel areas in Syria to avoid contact with fundamentalist armed groups – increasing risk of starvation for civilians who couldn’t access the relief.[7] The narrow focus on stopping armed groups from recruiting is hindering efforts to build genuine, long-term stability. For example, these initiatives exploit the stereotype of the ‘peaceful mother or sister’ by using women to gather intelligence on their communities – but they don’t support these women to improve their political or economic rights. Women are treated as just another resource, and harmful social and gender norms are another useful tool in the pursuit of short-sighted objectives. The role that masculinities play in conflict, violence and recruitment is usually ignored in these responses.[8]   It is unsurprising that these interventions are exclusionary and top-down – planned in male- and elite-dominated spaces, and failing to seek the participation of civil society. They don’t try to understand the root causes of exclusion, inequality, injustice and insecurity in people’s daily lives, and they ignore minority groups’ experiences, needs and concerns. This is particularly concerning when we know that a country’s economic, political and social development increases with the active contribution of the majority of its population, and that the effectiveness of peace processes depends on the participation and buy-in of the affected groups.[9] So it is in the Sahel, where the international community has poured vast resources into countering armed groups and the ‘threat’ of irregular migration, while state security forces abuse and marginalise communities. The result: underlying conflicts have not been resolved and now the Russian private military company, the Wagner Group, is stepping in to exploit the crisis.   All this leaves the International Development Strategy at risk of trying to walk in two opposite directions: addressing some of the causes of conflict and human suffering while trying to take a short cut to security by addressing the symptoms only.   Where next for the UK’s conflict efforts The Government must now fill in the gaps, iron out the inconsistencies and add detail to the commitments set out in the International Development Strategy. Whatever policies come next, the central theme of them should be addressing the root causes of crises. Support for open societies, particularly for democracy and human rights, is a glaring omission in the IDS, given its prominence in the Integrated Review.[10] Poor governance, marginalisation and corruption are significant drivers of conflict – all issues that open societies help to expose and tackle.   Diplomats and officials now turn to making the strategy a reality. Their choices must mitigate the risks of security partnerships, either by improving training or investing in democratic civilian oversight. And officials should decisively end partnerships where the recipient is more likely to foment conflict than end it. Mitigation is a strategic necessity; it can’t be a box-ticking exercise.   The UK National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security is a reasonable starting point on gender equality. Women’s and girls’ challenges should not be treated in isolation but as part of a set of norms that structure the discrimination and abuse against them and other marginalised groups, including sexual and gender minorities. A gender analysis of the strategy’s priorities would identify the root causes of conflict and violence and how to address them to advance towards a more just, equal and peaceful society. It should be a priority to include women from diverse backgrounds in decision-making processes they are traditionally excluded from.   Finally, we need more detail on the commitments to localisation – the UK must prioritise giving those affected by conflict a greater say and role in ending it. Not as faceless sub-contractors to a grant fed down through layers of INGOs and consortia – but as civil society, communities, protest movements, faith groups, women activists and women’s and girls’ rights organisations – in other words, the people who are best placed to respond to the conflict dynamics they identify and take advantage of the peace opportunities their networks connect them to.   The strategic conflict framework alluded to by Minister Vicky Ford in February must be the vehicle for drawing together the threads left dangling by the International Development Strategy and taking them further.[11] Only by addressing the root causes of conflict and focusing on long-term, equitable peace and development – rather than on short-term threats – can the UK’s approach to conflict be classed as a development strategy.   Lewis Brooks is the UK Policy and Advocacy Coordinator at Saferworld where he leads the organisation's engagement on security, development and conflict policy as well as contributing on themes such as arms export controls and gender, peace and security. He has spent the last 9 years in various advocacy, policy, project management and research roles focused particularly on conflict and human rights. Immediately prior to Saferworld, Lewis was the Head of Policy and Research for the Royal Commonwealth Society - leading their Commonwealth approach to promoting LGBT rights.    Julia Poch Figueras works as a Gender and Peacebuilding Adviser at Saferworld where she focuses on integrating a gender transformational approach into peace and security-related programmes, research, policy and advocacy. She has contributed to several research and analysis on gender, peace and security in several contexts such as Colombia, South Sudan, Uganda and South Asia, and regularly engages in advocacy initiatives on women, peace and security in the UK and the EU.   [1] HM Government, Global Britain in a competitive age, March 2021, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-_the_Integrated_Review_of_Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf [2] FCDO and The Rt Hon Elizabeth Truss MP, The return of geopolitics: Foreign Secretary’s Mansion House speech at the Lord Mayor’s 2022 Easter Banquet, Gov.uk, April 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretarys-mansion-house-speech-at-the-lord-mayors-easter-banquet-the-return-of-geopolitics [3] Abigail Watson and Lewis Brooks, ‘Persistent Engagement’, Persistent Risk: The impact of UK security assistance on rights and peace, Saferworld, October 2021, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1373-persistent-engagement-persistent-risk-the-impact-of-uk-security-assistance-on-rights-and-peace [4] Larry Attree and Jordan Street, No shortcuts to security: Learning from responses to armed conflicts involving proscribed groups, Saferworld, May 2022, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1389-no-shortcuts-to-security [5] HRW, Egypt: Security Forces Abuse, Torture LGBT People, October 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/01/egypt-security-forces-abuse-torture-lgbt-people [6] Ruben Andersson and David Keen, Partners in crime? The impact of Europe’s outsourced migration controls on peace, stability and rights, Saferworld, July 2019, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1217-partners-in-crime-the-impacts-of-europeas-outsourced-migration-controls-on-peace-stability-and-rights [7] David Keen, Syria: playing into their hands, Saferworld, October 2017, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1141-syria-playing-into-their-hands [8] Catherine Powell and Women Around the World, Gender, Masculinities, and Counterterrorism, Council on Foreign Relations, January 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism [9] Donald Steinberg, Peace Missions and Gender Equality: Ten Lessons from the Ground, International Crisis Group, March 2009, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/peace-missions-and-gender-equality-ten-lessons-ground [10] Rowan Popplewell, Why the UK government’s international development strategy is a big gamble, May 2022, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/uk-government-international-development-strategy-gamble/ [11] Vicky Ford MP, Letter to Baroness Anelay of St Johns DBE, Tom Tugendhat MP and Sarah Champion MP, FCDO, February 2022, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/9069/documents/159486/default/ [post_title] => Do militarised responses belong in the UK’s International Development Strategy? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => do-militarised-responses-belong-in-the-uks-international-development-strategy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-06-17 17:49:17 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-06-17 16:49:17 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6431 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [30] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6394 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-04-20 16:07:32 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-04-20 15:07:32 [post_content] => Summary Vladimir Dubrovskiy is a political economist based in Kyiv (Senior Economist at CASE Ukraine). In his commentary, Vladimir shares his understandably raw and personal views on what lies behind Putin’s war against Ukraine and what can and should be done to halt it.   ...Some in the West think Putin is obsessed with Ukraine because he sincerely believes that Ukrainians and Russians are ‘just two branches of the same people’, and there is a small group of ‘Nazi-Ukrainians’ that sway this ‘part of Russia’ towards the West. This is why he is waging his war. But he does not call the rest of the European nations ‘the same people’, and that may mean he is unlikely to go further west and attack NATO countries – especially given that they are much better protected. Therefore, the argument goes, ‘let us sit on the fence and wait until this madness ends, then get back to business as usual – especially because we do need Russian resources’.   There is perhaps some truth in that line of reasoning. Putin seems to be obsessed with what he and his ideologists call the ‘Ukrainian problem’. Putin seems to hate the Ukrainians not for their ethnicity, culture and language (which are, indeed, quite close to the Russian ones, although still distinct), but first and foremost for the difference in values. The freedom and dignity that Ukrainians proved to cherish above all are precisely those European values that are inimical to the Russian system of rules based on a strong patronal ‘vertical of power’. Putin indeed feels threatened by Ukraine, though not in the military sense, but rather through the idea of spreading these values and exemplifying their virtues to the Russian people. Therein lies the main thrust of the Kremlin campaign against Ukraine – but couched invariably as a ‘threat from NATO’.   The main enemy for Putin and his inner circle is the West that ‘defeated’ the USSR in the Cold War and imposed (as the Kremlin depicts it) its ‘unnatural’ values on the Ukrainian and Russian people. The Russians, in his opinion, have mostly withstood this pressure (except for some ‘traitors to the nation’), and some ‘wrong-turns’ in the 1990s. However, ‘the Ukrainian branch of the Russian people’ in Putin’s view emerged as ‘turncoats’ who had succumbed to the West’s soft power and betrayed their ‘common past’. They rejected pro-Moscow Yanukovich in 2014 and instead turned towards Europe. Those ‘traitors’ are detested even more than the main enemy (the West), but the latter perversely remain the ultimate target.   Any approach to tackling Putin and to stopping this war, the author says, has to be premised on a realisation that Russia is already engaged in a war with the West, and not only with Ukraine as part of it. And what has not worked thus far is a policy of pandering to Putin.   The full commentary can be accessed here.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => How to stop Putin’s war against Ukraine [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => how-to-stop-putins-war-against-ukraine [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2023-08-18 13:41:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2023-08-18 12:41:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6394 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [31] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6377 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-04-07 12:13:57 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-04-07 11:13:57 [post_content] => At a FPC event this week, we learnt three things about Britain, its constituent territories and the EU.[1] Firstly, that the UK’s engagement in the EU since Brexit does not adequately or appropriately reflect the multiplicity of perspectives on EU issues around the UK. Secondly, that since Brexit, opportunities for a more structured, UK-wide form of engagement or dialogue with our European partners has dissipated, running the risk that British voices and British experience are excluded from significant debates in and around the EU policy-making space. And thirdly, that a more flexible and inclusive approach to the development of European policy in the UK as we transition to become a ‘third country’ could help to foster more positive working relationships across the UK’s multiple jurisdictions and facilitate a holistic framework for interaction with our nearest trading bloc. The net result was to prompt some innovative thinking about how best to manage Britain’s future relationship with the EU.   The reality is that in a competitive marketplace of voices in Brussels, the UK’s perspectives risk being lost in a cacophony of noise. Now that we no longer have a seat around the negotiating table, the UK’s interests will be best served by strengthening its EU footprint at the present juncture. Effective political engagement starts with good intelligence, and that can easily be facilitated through establishing a robust interface for EU-UK dialogue in the Brussels space.   The UK and the EU since Brexit International relations in the strictest sense remains something that national government is responsible for, and in the UK that is very clear; international relations have always been a reserved competence, never devolved. The EU’s policy portfolio however overlaps considerably with those policy fields which are devolved competences, and in areas such as fisheries and agriculture and various aspects of the environmental and climate change portfolio, there are very clear reasons as to why the devolved authorities in particular have had a legitimate need to be engaged in the European decision-making process.   But Brexit has fundamentally re-configured the opportunity structure for engaging with the EU and Britain’s European partners. So what now? How can we continue to maintain meaningful partnerships between Britain’s nations and regions and the European policy community? What specifically would be the purpose of such engagement? What kind of benefits can direct interactions between the nations and regions of the UK and the European policy community actually deliver?   The UK in the EU’s information ‘marketplace’ There are clear models which demonstrate how a multiplicity of ‘national’ voices can enhance working relations between a state and the EU, rather than damage them. Within the EU institutional ecosystem, that is to say, the numerous forums for dialogue and exchange of ideas on the policy level, most of which have emerged on the basis of a functional need to communicate rather than as a result of EU leadership, there is an expectation that the subnational components of individual states will be present. Regions and local authorities are part of the common currency of EU dialogue in the policy space. They serve as a key means to aggregate particular, locally-based voices and to channel these into the thinking in and around both EU funding programmes, such as those designed to support innovation and research, and on specific policies such as around renewables or technical standardisation processes. But how can we ensure that all parts of the UK are embedded in this practice?   The UK’s total EU representative footprint has shrunk massively in recent years as the reality of scarce public resources has meant that most of the UK’s regional outposts have had to close. Where we do see continued high level engagement is from the UK’s devolved authorities, notably the Scottish and Welsh presences in the city. The Scottish Government’s EU office for instance, has increased the size of its team and continues to focus on core policies of relevance to the delivery of the Scottish Government’s domestic priorities: on net zero and on inclusive growth, for instance. The Brussels office continues to manage Scotland’s effective partnerships with relevant contacts, such as regional representations from EU member states and beyond, with national governments and with other interest associations. By extension, these activities effectively connect the Scottish Government’s policy work with the EU institutions.   Many of our EU partners regretted the UK’s exit from the EU system not just for emotional reasons but for the cold fact that our expertise and our engagement are world class. We could efficiently, effectively and comfortably lead the policy debates in areas such as renewable energy or precision engineering. Our ability to showcase our industrial capacity or our technological expertise in core areas of EU policy was greatly enhanced through a multi-level, multi-venue presence in relevant EU circles. The UK operated not just in the formal processes for engagement with the EU institutions, but within the wider EU ecosystem, where organised interests from across the policy spectrum and across the world debate and exchange on a whole host of issues.   Embracing territorial perspectives on the EU For federal states in the EU, such as Germany, and others with a significant degree of asymmetrical territorial autonomy, such as Spain, direct regional engagement in the European space offers the scope to improve the governance of domestic responsibilities with a significant EU overlap. Their combined substate workforce in Brussels outnumbers that of their national government’s representation. For the UK as a third country, however, the game play might look outwardly different, yet in a practical sense, the incentives for collaboration remain strong. Even at the regional level in non-devolved England there are significant overlaps between domestic policy responsibilities and the EU policy remit; the environmental, social, and economic challenges that substate governments face are often global in scope and require collaborative solutions involving governments, businesses and organisations around the world. The success of policymaking therefore depends on the ability to create and maintain positive relations with individuals, governments, business associations, community groups and academic institutions abroad.[2] For the Scots, the incentive to remain fully plugged into EU policy circles is sustained further by the Continuity Act (2021), which pins Scottish legislation to future EU regulations, thus allowing Scotland to remain aligned with EU rules in key areas of devolved competence such as agriculture, fisheries and the environment.   We can look to the example of Norway for how a ‘third country’ partner engages with the EU’s policy space. All of Norway’s regional players are active with an independent representation in and around the EU institutions, connecting with the EU institutions and other partners on issues relevant to policy delivery and to the wider cooperation set out in Norway’s numerous agreements with the EU. The Canadian provinces, to take a further example, showcase cultural links between themselves and Europe via a Brussels presence, and engage in policy dialogue with interest associations in the city, most recently for instance on the issue of social innovation in housing policy.   Towards a new British model of ‘paradiplomacy’? A more flexible and inclusive European policy As the UK transitions to become a ‘third country’ in its relations with the EU, there remain huge unaddressed questions about how to enhance and strengthen links between all parts of the UK and our nearest neighbours. Since Brexit, there is more need than ever to have a multiplicity of British voices making their voices heard in that system, and looking for ways to exploit the opportunities presented by the EU and deliver real results for people and for businesses back here in the UK is hugely important. There are powerful arguments to support the development of a much more inclusive approach to Britain’s future European policy, one that embraces the multiplicity of perspectives around the UK and harnesses the potential to build positive relationships with our EU partners going forward.   This broader notion of developing a much more multi-level approach to international relations within the UK is regarded in some sectors as something of a ‘parallel’ or ‘paradiplomacy’ on international engagement. In a sense, this is about allowing substate interests from across all of Britain’s jurisdictions to flesh out in a practical sense the broad direction of foreign policy as it is set, offering the detail and the nuance that is often missing from the overarching agreements.   As the UK Parliament also begins its investigation into the British presence in the EU since Brexit, it is worth emphasising that the UK’s constitutional asymmetry should not act as a barrier to meaningful engagement between all parts of the UK and the EU.[3] Indeed, a more flexible approach to multi-level international relations offers the potential to foster the ties that bind us as a multi-national polity in the UK. Cooperation on shared agendas with our EU partners, bolstered by a more effective domestic intergovernmental framework for consensus building, such as is now promised within the new Interministerial Standing Committee system, could allow for the development of a more collaborative approach to European affairs. One that would work to harness the rich breadth of expertise across the UK on issues of European significance.[4] Such an approach, based on mutual respect for respective competences, emphasises cooperation and coordination reduces the incentives for conflictual posturing on European politics. Rather, it focuses squarely on delivering impactful returns to policy agendas here in the UK.   Carolyn is Senior Lecturer in Politics and co-directs the Aston Centre for Europe (@Aston_ACE), an inter-disciplinary hub for policy-relevant research and knowledge transfer on Europe at Aston. She is a project lead in a Europe-wide paradiplomacy network paradiplomacy.ideasforeurope.eu.   Image by Rob984 under (CC).   [1] Aston Centre for Europe and FPC event, Making their voices heard: Relations between the UK’s nations and regions and the EU post-Brexit, FPC, March 2022, https://fpc.org.uk/events/making-their-voices-heard-relations-between-the-uks-nations-and-regions-and-the-eu-post-brexit/ [2] Rodrigo Tavares (2016) ‘Paradiplomacy. Cities and states as global players’, Oxford: OUP [3] UK Parliament EU Scrutiny Committee, The UK’s EU representation: what has changed and how is it working?, UK Parliament, 2022, https://committees.parliament.uk/work/6633/the-uks-eu-representation-what-has-changed-and-how-is-it-working/ [4] Professor Daniel Wincott, UK intergovernmental relations (IGR): machinery and culture changes, UK in a Changing Europe, January 2022, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/machinery-and-culture-of-uk-igr/ [post_title] => Making their voices heard: Relations between the UK’s nations and regions and the EU post-Brexit [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => making-their-voices-heard-relations-between-the-uks-nations-and-regions-and-the-eu-post-brexit [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-04-07 12:13:57 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-04-07 11:13:57 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6377 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [32] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6344 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2022-02-23 00:00:39 [post_date_gmt] => 2022-02-22 23:00:39 [post_content] => We are all rightly focused on massive Russian military build-ups around Ukraine. The most recent, and potentially most menacing, is in Belarus. Grabbing control of Belarus in the process makes sense as a Putin objective. Five reasons point that way, especially when our gaze is locked on events south of this post-Soviet dictatorship.   First, Putin craves regional order and stability. That means having leaders who reliably maintain domestic autocratic order, and comply with building ever-closer working relations with Russia, including Putin’s pet regional project of the Eurasian Economic Union. We know Putin’s fear and revulsion at the (peaceful) removal of previous friendly regimes in other post-Soviet regimes.   The biggest example of that came in 2014 when Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovych failed to keep order and fled to Russia, where the Putin regime gives refuge to other flunked post-Soviet leaders.   Belarus’s President Alexander Lukashenko, clinging to power for almost 30 years, failed that essential Putin test following falsified elections in 2020. Despite violent repression, mass protests continue. Worse, an effective government-in-exile under Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya functions with Western support. Belarus is an embarrassment and a political risk for Putin. That is intolerable already. The fears of Western political contagion that contributed to Russia’s current mobilisation against Ukraine applies to Belarus.   From the Kremlin’s perspective Lukashenko cannot be trusted to run his country. Worse, he could be ousted, with a credible, Western-focused elite ready to take over. Western institutions would embrace Belarus, the only country in Europe still not even a member of the Council of Europe. The Foreign Office’s disclosure in January of a Russian-planned coup in Ukraine, and a similar claim by the Ukrainian Government in November 2021, is a scenario that makes greater sense in Belarus.   Second, despite Lukashenko’s failures, Russian military and security penetration of Belarus is immense. Russian control, even annexation, was easy before, and is simpler with the new Russian presences. It is inconceivable that those Russian deployments and exercises come with no additional control over Belarusian military-security systems. Lukashenko’s inflammatory offer to host nuclear missile tests is belated and nightmarish pandering to his Russian handler. And the Russian forces in Belarus, initially scheduled to depart on 20 February after the live-fire exercises, remain.   Applicable to Belarus is US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s quip, in that case regarding Kazakhstan, that once present Russian troops tend not to leave. Moldova and Georgia had Russian ‘peacekeepers’ on parts of their territory that grew from Soviet-era basing, despite international efforts to curtail them. In Georgia’s case, after 2008, even more Russian personnel and hardware were moved in – with those new Russian deployments in South Ossetia being but a 45-minute drive to Georgia’s capital. While Russia sought to interject its ‘peacekeepers’ into Karabakh as part of its brokered ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1994, Moscow had to wait until 2020 – and then moved so swiftly that its forces deployed as the proverbial ceasefire ink was drying. Now Russian forces are set to stay for five years, and with provisions for extension.   Third, Putin may not win over Ukraine. No Western government has given him a shred of his demands, despite his moments of prestige gained from securing exclusive bilateral talks with the US. If current pressure on Ukraine delivers Putin no meaningful outcome, or even some face-saving measure, then Belarus could also perform as a consolation prize.   Fourth, direct control and even annexation of Belarus affords Russia important strategic advantage. Ukraine would be permanently pressured from its north, and within closest reach of Ukraine’s capital. A Russian-operated Belarus also closes the painful land gap between Russia’s Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia. Additionally, it gives Russian control over the tiny land bridge of the Suwalski Gap, between NATO’s eastern members of Poland and Lithuania; Russia would render those countries even more vulnerable to future threats.   The annexation of Belarus would also bring further political and economic destabilisation to these NATO and EU member states – ones whose political and economic reforms made them role models of transformation in the post-communist world. Better still, this would also be comeuppance for Latvia and Estonia, roughly 40 per cent of whose populations are Russian-speaking and whom Moscow claims were mistreated and that that flagrant abuse of rights was ignored by the double standards of NATO and the EU. Righting seeming historical injustice is important to Putin.   Fifth, as with Ukraine so with Belarus, the Kremlin can claim that it is regaining lost lands and peoples. Belarussians are “small Slavic brothers” in the same, dismissive way that Putin personally has designated Ukrainians. The phrase “two states one people” is used, even on banners in the current Belarusian-Russian joint exercises – but if so, why would one people need two states? The strategic gains of reintegrating Belarus would go hand-in-hand with saviour-like claims that Moscow is heroically reassembling historic brethren and providing ever-lasting protection from the frightful West.   At least the current, brazen Russian military build-up against Ukraine generated relatively consistent Western unity and armed responses. But Putin has masterfully wrongfooted the West, when also not dividing it. The Belarus opportunity would fit among the strategic magic tricks that the Kremlin has engineered in the post-Soviet space. Events in Crimea in 2014 at first seemed a distraction from the revolutionary events in Ukraine’s capital. Kyiv is now settled. Eight years on, Crimea, and Donbas too, remain core theatre.   The Russian leadership certainly feels aggrieved by the post-Cold War order. It wants vengeance and to gain compensatory strategic advantages. It may still be that diplomacy can work. On the Russian side, on 14 February Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that publicly to his President. A week later prospects increased for another US-Russian presidential meeting, subject by the US to no war having started. Within hours the Kremlin seemed to retreat from the idea, and Putin thereafter recognised the breakaway entities of Donetsk and Luhansk. Putin’s longer-term ambitions are unlikely to be satiated by small pieces of Ukraine.   But while we are all necessarily focused on Ukraine, other sinister and destabilising measures may be underway. Let’s hope none occurs with Belarus. European security has been upended enough.   At time of writing, Russian forces supposedly deployed in Belarus for temporary joint training remain in place, formally extended beyond their initial departure. The Kremlin’s logic, past behaviour, and its skills of distraction and of surprise are warnings enough to make the Belarusian scenario worryingly credible.   (A version of this article appeared in The Sunday Post on 20 February 2022.)   Rick Fawn is Professor of International Relations at the University of St Andrews. Among his books are Managing Security Threats along the EU’s Eastern Flanks.   Image by Homoatrox under (CC). [post_title] => Amid Ukraine, keep watching Belarus. That might be Putin’s real sleight of hand [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => amid-ukraine-keep-watching-belarus-that-might-be-putins-real-sleight-of-hand [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2022-02-22 18:16:31 [post_modified_gmt] => 2022-02-22 17:16:31 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6344 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [33] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6310 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-12-15 00:01:42 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-12-14 23:01:42 [post_content] => Citing the Basque Country as an example of inclusive economic growth may, at first, seem to many rather a paradox. In the context of Spain’s model of devolution, the Basque Country, one of Spain’s 17 regions known as ‘autonomous communities’, is more often accused of lacking in solidarity with the rest of the country, given the way the region’s financing model works. For historical reasons, the Basque Country, along with the neighbouring region of Navarre, raises almost all its own taxes under a model of near fiscal autonomy. This system has ended up allowing it to keep more of its wealth within its own region when compared to some of Spain’s other regions with broadly similar levels of GDP per capita like the Madrid Community or Catalonia, which come under a different, revenue-sharing model of devolved funding known as the common financing system.[1]   While acknowledging this, however, it is also possible to recognise that the eternal, often heavily politicised debate about regional financing levels in Spain has obscured awareness of other significant factors about the Basque experience of economic development.   Firstly, within the Basque region itself, economic growth has in fact proved highly inclusive. The region features among the top in Europe not only in terms of GDP per capita, but also in having a low percentage of population at risk of poverty or social exclusion.[2] The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), which has almost consistently governed the region since the first regional elections of the democratic period in 1980, combines a broadly centre-right stance on economic policy with a broadly centre-left one on social policy. It has long treated economic competitiveness and social inclusion as mutually re-enforcing objectives, as have other key actors and institutions involved in shaping the region’s economic strategy. The latest Basque Competitiveness Report published by the Basque Institute of Competitiveness, a research centre linked to the University of Deusto, exemplifies this dual approach with its focus on ‘Constructing Competitiveness for Wellbeing’.[3]   Secondly, fiscal autonomy is not a panacea. While the relatively generous settlement that the region receives under its different financing model inevitably goes some way towards explaining its ability to finance its social spending, that is not the only contributing factor. Effective governance has also played a role. The Basque region was a pioneer in areas such as the creation of a very successful cluster policy in the 1990s, and it has developed a strong system of multi-level governance and network of public-private collaboration over the decades that helps to explain its success. Throughout this process, it has devoted considerable time (and resources) to learning from other models and experiences – for example, the region was one of the first to work with American academic Michael E. Porter in the late twentieth century.[4] While no place-based territorial strategy can ever simply be copied elsewhere, examining the Basque experience can still offer interesting insights for other contexts.   What, then, might we draw from the Basque experience that’s relevant to the UK ‘levelling up’ agenda? This was the subject of a recent Aston Centre for Europe and Foreign Policy Centre event that I chaired, with the participation of four speakers: Dr Edurne Magro, Senior Researcher at Orkestra-Basque Institute of Competitiveness; Bill Murray OBE, adviser on the Spanish economy at Global Counsel; Dr Igor Calzada, Senior Researcher at the Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research and Data (WISERD), Cardiff University; and Henriette Lyttle-Breukelaar, Director of Economic Strategy at Greater Birmingham and Solihull Local Enterprise Partnership. Six key takeaways that emerged from the discussion are as follows:  
  • Stable, predictable financing for local and regional authorities is critical. This is what has enabled the Basque region to engage in a forward-looking type of economic thinking over years and to take forward a whole series of initiatives on social policy and on inclusion. It is also what has allowed it to develop a longstanding network of partnerships between different actors and institutions within the region working towards the goal of inclusive regional competitiveness. This contrasts with the UK experience of short, competitive funding cycles for local government that don’t tend to facilitate longer-term planning and the formation of robust partnerships.
 
  • Local input and distributed leadership are fundamental to strategy design and implementation. The heavily centralised nature of the UK is often cited as one of the main contributing factors to the level of regional inequality.[5] In this regard, the Basque region is an example of how a multi-stakeholder approach to strategy design and implementation at local and regional level can underpin inclusive growth and territorial competitiveness. While the Basque government steers the region’s overall economic and social strategy, input also comes from other tiers of government within the region (local and provincial) and from a network of other relevant public and private institutions, such as the cluster associations and the Basque technology centres. The result is a web of multi-level and multi-layer processes that shape the design and implementation of Basque regional strategy.[6] This is not without considerable coordination challenges that require innovative governance solutions.
 
  • Local and regional empowerment must go hand in hand with accountability. In the Basque Country, accountability stems first and foremost from the region’s fiscal autonomy model, which puts the onus on the Basque authorities to collect taxes. While that level of substate revenue-raising power is specific to the Basque Country (and neighbouring Navarre) for historical reasons and not easily translatable to other contexts, accountability and good governance can be fostered via other mechanisms to promote the effective use of public funds.
 
  • Focus on area-specific strengths and deepen and diversify from that basis. The Basque Country’s economic success stems in no small measure from its decision, back in the 1980s, to build on its existing strengths in industry by pursuing an industry-focused economic transformation at a time when the wider political and academic climate did not look favourably on such a focus. That decision, and the commitment to a positive industrial strategy ever since, has consistently paid dividends.[7]
 
  • A degree of cross-party collaboration is crucial to avoid short-termism. Competition between the Conservatives and Labour has consistently prevented a longer-term, cross-party vision to address the UK’s place-based inequalities. Even within and between some governments of the same colour, studies have shown a lack of institutional and policy stability in this area.[8] Meanwhile, within the Basque region, a degree of cross-party buy-in on the region’s economic and social strategy has been possible, which has contributed to facilitating longer-term planning. In part, this stemmed from a need for parties of different colour to stick together on economic and social policy during the difficult first decades of the democratic period when Basque terrorist group ETA was active. However, coalition politics have also played a role both then and since, favouring more consensual politics in certain areas. Although the Basque Nationalist Party has governed almost consistently in the region since the first elections of 1980 and has therefore dominated policy making, it has never won an outright majority and has almost always had to govern in coalition, usually with the Basque Socialists. While it would be naïve to expect any change in the degree of competition between Conservatives and Labour over inclusive growth strategies, the levelling-up white paper, which is now expected in early 2022, [9] needs to provide the basis for a longer-term framework that goes well beyond the current government term to have a meaningful impact in tackling inequalities.
 
  • A wide diversity of potential stakeholders should be included in the design and implementation of inclusive growth strategies. Civil society has long played a role in shaping the Basque ethos of combined economic and social policy and the region is renowned for its longstanding cooperative tradition. The small size of the region and its level of social cohesion have undoubtedly helped to give an overall coherence to Basque strategy design and implementation. Even the Basque Country, however, cannot rest on its laurels. Transformative alliances between the public sector, the private sector, academia and civil society could evolve to incorporate additional stakeholders and afford a greater role to social innovation.[10]
  Caroline Gray is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Aston University. She specialises in the politics of Spain and wider Europe, focusing on territorial politics and party systems. She is the author of Territorial Politics and the Party System in Spain: Continuity and Change since the Financial Crisis (Routledge, 2020).   [1] For more information about how the different regional financing systems work, see Caroline Gray, Nationalist Politics and Regional Financing Systems in the Basque Country and Catalonia, Bilbao: Diputación Foral de Bizkaia (Doctoral Thesis Collection), 2016, https://conciertoeconomico.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/tesis_gray_nationalists_politics.pdf [2] Mari Jose Aranguren Querejeta, Patricia Canto Farachala, Edurne Magro Montero, Mikel Navarro Arancegul, James R. Wilson and Jesus Mari Valdaliso, Long-term Regional Strategy for Inclusive Competitiveness: The Basque Country Case, 2008-2020, Orkestra-Basque Institute of Competitiveness, Cuadernos Orkestra 05/2021, Bilbao: Deusto University Publications, p. 1, https://www.orkestra.deusto.es/images/investigacion/publicaciones/informes/cuadernos-orkestra/210008-Basque-Country-Territorial-Strategy.pdf [3] Susana Franco and James Wilson (eds.), 2021 Basque Country Competitiveness Report. Constructing Competitiveness for Wellbeing, Orkestra-Basque Institute of Competitiveness, Bilbao: Deusto University Publications, 2021, https://www.orkestra.deusto.es/en/research/basque-country-competitiveness-report [4] Jon Azua, The Competitive Advantage of Nations. A Successful Experience, Realigning the Strategy to Transform the Economic and Social Development of the Basque Country, Orkestra-Basque Institute of Competitiveness, Cuadernos Orkestra 2015/12, Bilbao: Deusto University Publications, https://www.orkestra.deusto.es/images/investigacion/publicaciones/informes/cuadernos-orkestra/Competitive-advantage-nations-Jon-Azua.pdf [5] Luke Raikes, Arianna Giovannini and Bianca Getzel, Divided and connected: Regional inequalities in the North, the UK and the developed world – State of the North 2019, Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), November 2019, https://www.ippr.org/research/publications/state-of-the-north-2019 [6] Jesús M. Valdaliso, The Basque Country: past trajectory and path dependency in policy and strategy-making, in Jesús M. Valdaliso and James R. Wilson (eds.), Strategies for Shaping Territorial Competitiveness (pbk), London and New York: Routledge, 2020 [2015], pp. 113-130 [7] Mari Jose Aranguren Querejeta, Patricia Canto Farachala, Edurne Magro Montero, Mikel Navarro Arancegul, James R. Wilson and Jesus Mari Valdaliso, Long-term Regional Strategy for Inclusive Competitiveness: The Basque Country Case, 2008-2020, Orkestra-Basque Institute of Competitiveness, Cuadernos Orkestra 05/2021, Bilbao: Deusto University Publications, https://www.orkestra.deusto.es/images/investigacion/publicaciones/informes/cuadernos-orkestra/210008-Basque-Country-Territorial-Strategy.pdf [8] Andrew Westwood, Marianne Sensier and Nicola Pike, Levelling Up, Local Growth and Productivity in England, Productivity Insights Paper No.005, The Productivity Institute, December 2021, https://www.productivity.ac.uk/publications/levelling-up-local-growth-and-productivity-in-england/ [9] Alex Forsyth, Levelling up: Government white paper likely to be delayed to 2022, BBC News, December 2021, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-59541369 [10] Igor Calzada, Democratising Smart Cities? Penta-Helix Multistakeholder Social Innovation Framework, Smart Cities, 3(4), 1145-1172, October 2020, https://doi.org/10.3390/smartcities3040057 [post_title] => Levelling up: Six key takeaways from the Basque experience of regional competitiveness and inclusive growth [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => levelling-up-six-key-takeaways-from-the-basque-experience-of-regional-competitiveness-and-inclusive-growth [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-12-15 11:09:25 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-12-15 10:09:25 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6310 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [34] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6266 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-12-06 00:08:16 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-12-05 23:08:16 [post_content] => In the aftermath of the Cold War, the future trajectory of the world seemed assured. The political philosopher Francis Fukuyama even wrote an obituary of the past, proclaiming the end of humanity’s ideological evolution and with it, the ‘universalisation of western liberal democracy as the final form of government.’[1] More than a new beginning, this was the end of history.   This optimism was not unfounded. The West had won. The battle of ideologies produced a teleological triumph for liberal democracy. With the decline of great power rivalries, the prospect of nuclear cataclysm was diminished, while the principle of cooperation among nations espoused by victorious western allies after World War II was vindicated. Institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation, NATO, and the European Commission would be free to spread peace and prosperity throughout the world.   Indeed, if 20th century devastation had taught the world anything, it was that countries had more to gain by working together than by languishing in a distrustful state of isolation. Internationalism was the antidote to destructive nationalism.   However, things have not quite turned out as they were supposed to. Nationalism has made a comeback. World power rivalries are on the rise once again, with Washington, Beijing and Moscow jostling for dominance. Public anger at traditional centres of power has resulted in demands for protection from perceived external threats. Internationalism is being discredited as an antagonistic rather than defensive force, while the language of cooperation is being replaced with calls for tribal solidarity.   Brexit, the election of Donald Trump and the rise of far-right candidates in Germany and Italy are just a few recent examples of how the international rules-based model that has dominated geopolitical relations for 70 years is being challenged – ironically by some of its own architects. However, while shutting out the world may make popular politics at home, it makes terrible diplomacy. As Professor Paul Miller recently explained, ‘if nationalism worries about bigger fish in the ocean, internationalism worries about the poison in the water’.[2]   We are beginning to witness the toxic consequences of state-centric resurgence. The United States’ chaotic retreat from Afghanistan is not only plunging the country into a renewed reign of terror but threatens to destabilise the wider region. A US action, a manifestation of government foreign policy, being constrained by public uncertainty and anxiety. It was hoped that the election of President Joe Biden would prompt a softening of Trump’s ‘America First’ policy, but his actions in office so far demonstrate that this is easier said than done. That it was executed with little consultation with US allies further confirms the derelict state of multilateralism.   The UK is also retreating from the international platform, invoking the pretext of domestic economic difficulties to justify pulling back our soft power globally, with tragic results. We know that the Chancellor’s decision to cut foreign aid spending from 0.7 per cent to 0.5 per cent of GNI represents merely one per cent of his COVID borrowing. The cuts will hardly skim the surface of our financial woes but will almost certainly lead to the deaths of 100,000 children and the suffering of millions more.   Soft power, something the UK has excelled at historically, is one of the most powerful tools in any country’s diplomatic arsenal. Aid is a veritable lifeline and a source of hope. It has helped educate millions of women and girls, brought relief to conflict zones and bolstered fragile health systems. However, the decisions on Afghanistan and foreign aid represent much more than a moral failure.   There is a disturbing paradox at play: populist policies may appeal to narrow nationalist sensibilities, but ultimately they may negate the national interest. It is incontrovertible that the leading issues of the day – climate change, security, coronavirus, poverty, trade, and migration – cannot be dealt with in isolation, because the problems they create in one part of the world will eventually land here at home. Their resolution calls for closer international cooperation. General Mattis famously remarked that ‘the more you cut aid, the more I need to spend on ammunition’.[3] General Mattis was right.   There are other problems. Nationalist feelings often assume authoritarian expressions. The post-Cold War aspiration to expand NATO and the EU to its Eastern European neighbours while promoting liberal agendas has not lived up to expectations. Poland and Hungary, once viewed as the hopes for post-Soviet democracy, are appearing increasingly undemocratic, as clampdowns on media and political opponents become more common.   Meanwhile, Xi’s China is using its economic power to consolidate authority at home, has ominously spread its monied influence abroad and demonstrated that economic integration does not produce the desired democratic results. Russia has revived its own territorial ambitions supported by an increasingly belligerent foreign policy.   Derek Shearer, a former American Ambassador during the Clinton era, described this state of play as a return to ‘great power politics’.[4] This is gravely worrying because it increases possibly the biggest threat to international order: a breakdown in communication and dialogue. When leaders stop talking, they not only risk intensifying suspicion and hostility, but the possibility of catastrophic miscalculations.   The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 – seen as one of the most tense and threatening moments in the Cold War – is a stark case in point. The stand-off sparked by the American Government’s discovery that the Soviet Union were assembling nuclear missiles in Cuba brought President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev eyeball to eyeball – both leaders apparently ready to risk World War III.   The crisis ended when the Soviets accepted a pledge not to invade Cuba in return for the withdrawal of their missiles. On the surface this was an unequal deal with the result that President Kennedy has been hailed the hero of the confrontation. However, Kennedy’s real success lay not in his public displays of power, his real strength was that he maintained communication with his Soviet counterparts despite the immense pressures to go to war. We now know that in the end it was quiet, behind the scenes negotiation and continuing communication which secured the safety of the world.   The important lesson here is that security depended first and foremost on the commitment of two very different leaders to keep talking. The famous hotline established between Washington and Moscow on the heels of the crisis epitomised the importance of this very simple idea that keeping open a line of communication could mean the difference between life and death. In present day terms, the UK has considerable experience at the United Nations and other international institutions, as well as in regional and national fora. Talking to people is always the right thing to do and the UK is well placed to negotiate and assist with conflict resolution and mitigation, with the aim of bringing order to chaos.   I wish to emphasise the word ‘order’ as opposed to ‘peace’ in relation to internationalist pursuits. One of the reasons liberal internationalism is being discredited is a belief that it represents a utopian purpose which cannot be served. World affairs is full of hypocrisy and double standards which none of the existing systems have been able to square. Failed military interventions, notably in Iraq, have convinced many that the best action is inaction. This of course is untrue. One of the tragedies of the hasty exodus from Afghanistan is that our efforts there were working. For all the difficulties the country still faced, Afghanistan of 2021 was unrecognisable from Afghanistan in 2001. Sinews of state and civil society were burgeoning. Public services were being delivered. There was more education, better healthcare and improved financial management. Gender equality, once regarded an elusive dream, became an attainable aspiration. Alas, much of the progress was overlooked. The shadow of past misjudgements continued to loom large in people’s minds, their faith in the international system’s ability to deliver peace and fairness all but lost. However, just as intervention can in hindsight be judged a mistake, so too can non-intervention. The world needs a new strategy.   In the introduction to A World Restored, the eminent Washington strategist Henry Kissinger argued that preoccupations with peacemaking, though noble, were counterproductive since ‘the fear of war becomes a weapon in the hands of the most ruthless’.[5] In Kissinger’s view, peacemaking was a gradual process that required time and the strategic patience to cultivate the right global conditions. The relative stability and state of non-war between Israel and Egypt post 1973 – which eventually led to the Camp David peace agreement – was attributed to this very strategy. Perhaps what the world should be aspiring to, first and foremost, is not universal reconciliation, but global stability.   Kissinger was controversial, but his template could help lift internationalism out of its present malaise. Global leaders need to articulate simple objectives to rebuild the trust on which cooperation depends. They need to make a fresh case for internationalism based not on lofty ideals but on pragmatism, setting out the importance, but also the limits of, positive engagement. The public will come on board if they feel their interests are being defended. The goal should be to build a consensus which would make a pluralistic world creative rather than destructive.   The good news is that we have the structures in place. The UN may not seem as formidable as it once was, but unlike the League of Nations, it is still going. And if it did not exist, we would need to invent it. Countries cannot afford to disengage. Conflict, for example, is in essence development in reverse. Tackling the drivers of conflict through aid and investment will not only help improve the lives of the people directly affected, but help create a safer world. The Cold War may be dead, but the nuclear spectre is far from buried. Fragile states are blighted by war and disease. Extremist forces prey on the most vulnerable. Poverty and inequality abound. These are complex and interconnected challenges which, left unchecked, will eventually lay themselves at our door. All countries, but particularly the UK and the US, must lead the charge for a recalibrated internationalist strategy to address them.   It is important to remember that the tug of war between internationalism and nationalism is not new, but they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In 1926, the Chinese Professor David Yui argued that to love one’s own country was right and natural. Nationalism need not be negative – so long as it does not come at the expense of others. The context he was writing in referred primarily to the link between nationalism and war. But it could also be applied to the questions of how, why and to what extent we should engage today. Yui would no doubt argue that abandoning people in their hour of need on the premise of national self-interest is destructive. Instead, leaders should capitalise ‘on our differing national interests for the common good’.[6]   Similarly the ‘idealist’ Professor Alfred Zimmern reminded audiences in 1923 that the purpose of foreign policy was principally to serve the national interest. If internationalism failed, it was because states ‘followed the least line of effort’.[7] To put it bluntly, it is lazy politics.   The world has changed. The UK has changed. Countries and people are brought ever closer through evolving technologies and the sprint towards globalisation. But if our progress is shared, so are the challenges we all face. That’s why it’s vital we protect the international structures and systems we have worked so hard to establish. For our part, Britain sits at many of the world’s political and cultural crossroads: the UN, Commonwealth, NATO, and the English language. Our influence and experience should not be understated and we should use it to help these institutions reclaim their founding principles, because working together is the only way forward. Internationalism is not a choice between ‘us’ and ‘them’. It is the difference between chaos and order, between evolution and regression. We know where narrow nationalism leads. We must not allow it to be tested to destruction before internationalism is legitimised once more.   Andrew Mitchell was Secretary of State for International Development from May 2010 until he became Government Chief Whip in September 2012. He was appointed to the Privy Council in 2010. Prior to joining the cabinet, he held numerous junior positions in Government (1992-1997) and in opposition (2003-2010). He has been the Member of Parliament for Sutton Coldfield since 2001. Previously he was Member of Parliament for Gedling. A graduate of Jesus College, Cambridge, he is a fellow at Cambridge University; a Visiting Fellow at Harvard University; and an Honorary Professor in the School of Social Sciences for the University of Birmingham. He is a member of the Strategy Advisory Committee at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies.   [1] Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, The National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18, Center for the National Interest, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184 [2] Paul D. Miller, The rebirth of internationalism?, Atlantic Council, October 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-rebirth-of-internationalism/ [3] Mattis’ remarks came in 2013 in response to a question on foreign aid by Senator Roger Wicker. They were often cited during the Trump administration, when Mattis served as Secretary of Defense, when attempts were made to cut the aid budget. Dan Lamothe, Retired generals cite past comments from Mattis while opposing Trump’s proposed foreign aid cuts, The Washington Post, February 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/27/retired-generals-cite-past-comments-from-mattis-while-opposing-trumps-proposed-foreign-aid-cuts/ [4] Peter S. Goodman, The Post-World War II Order Is Under Assault From the Powers That Built It, The New York Times, March 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/business/nato-european-union.html [5] Henry Kissinger, 1923-. A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973. [6] David TZ Yui, Nationalism and internationalism (an address before the Rotary Club of Shanghai, November 26, 1926), Digital repository, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut, https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&context=moore [7] Alfred Zimmern, Are Nationalism and Internationalism compatible?, Foreign Affairs, June 1923, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1923-06-15/nationalism-and-internationalism [post_title] => Cooperation and values at the heart of UK engagement on conflict [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => cooperation-and-values-at-the-heart-of-uk-engagement-on-conflict [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-12-06 01:31:06 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-12-06 00:31:06 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6266 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [35] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6264 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-12-06 00:07:38 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-12-05 23:07:38 [post_content] => UK involvement in peacebuilding and peacemaking has taken steps forwards and backwards over the last ten years. We have a better understanding of conflict, its drivers and relationship to inclusive and sustainable development. We have more tools to understand how conflict is changing and for effective peacebuilding and peacemaking responses.   However, the strategic promise in successive UK government policy documents to prevent conflict and build peace has failed to translate consistently into operational practice and impact. And there are still major gaps in our knowledge and political commitment to peacebuilding, as developments in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen tragically attest. The UK needs to acknowledge our own shortcomings and build on our strengths in order to move forward.   What have we got right and what have we got wrong, and what lessons can we draw to help the UK be a ‘force for peace’ in the coming decade? As we explain detail below, UK foreign policy needs to make three key changes in order to achieve a ‘pivot to peace’:  
  1. Centre peace: peacebuilding and peacemaking should not be in competition with other UK policy priorities for fragile and conflict affected countries, but at the heart of them: addressing violent conflict is a precondition for advancing sustainable stability, not an inevitable product of other policy interventions.
  2. Boost ‘bottom-up’: local peacemaking and peacebuilding deliver – they are not luxuries or add-ons, but key components of an effective peace strategy. Local peacebuilding is severely under-resourced, however, even in comparison with more established forms of peace mediation that are already struggling for recognition and support. Resourcing it properly is the next step.
  3. Prioritise partnership: partnership is key to effective peacemaking and peacebuilding – conflict is too complex and systemic for any one country or institution to tackle single-handedly. Working authentically in local partnership is the hardest, but most important challenge for UK Government and civil society alike to achieve our peace ambitions.
  Detangling the jargon: who is building and making what? To start with, in a field rife with jargon, we need to be clear what we’re talking about. Peacemaking is about resolving violent conflict – peacebuilding about transforming its root causes and drivers. Both can help prevent conflict and are essential for peace.[1] But they are often conflated and confused with other conflict responses, such as peacekeeping, stabilisation and security – activities designed to ‘manage’ or ‘contain’ conflict.   These are all important parts of the conflict response spectrum, but lack of clarity of what approach is being used where, when, how and why is a problem. It can quickly dilute and undermine a long-term focus on tackling drivers of conflict, and on building legitimate institutions and relationships that can sustain peace. Initiatives to manage, contain, resolve and transform violent conflict can easily work against each other unless carefully strategised, managed and coordinated.   We also need to be clear who we are talking about when we refer to the ‘UK’. The 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy commits to ‘harnessing the full range of government capabilities’ to work on conflict and instability, ‘placing greater emphasis on addressing the drivers of conflict’.[2] UK Government leadership and action on peacebuilding is vital. But UK capabilities for peacebuilding reach way beyond Government, to civil society and NGOs, the private sector, academia and Parliament.   The complexity of conflicts requires imagination in terms of who can best help to resolve what across the range of UK knowledge and capabilities. But even more fundamentally, it is the people living in the midst of conflicts who are best placed to understand and transform them. They hold a wealth of (often untapped) peacebuilding knowledge and agency. Our job as the ‘UK’ is to listen and to support them. The concept of working ‘in partnership’ needs a refresh.   The UK as a force for peace – forward steps UK policy frameworks have made important progress over the last ten years in recognising the importance of conflict prevention and resolution to sustainable development, and of inclusive dialogue and negotiation to achieve this. UK-based civil society has often worked closely with Government on the development of thinking on effective conflict response.   In 2011 the UK Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) asserted that tackling conflict and building stability is in the UK’s moral and national interest. It emphasised prevention, using evidence of what works, legitimate institutions and inclusive politics, and the need for dialogue to prevent and manage conflict.[3] BSOS gave way to the (then) Department for International Development’s 2016 Building Stability Framework, which stressed that tackling conflict ‘underpins the fight against global poverty’. It identified five ‘pillars’ of sustainable stability: fair power structures; inclusive economic development; conflict resolution mechanisms, both formal and informal; effective and legitimate institutions, both state and non-state; and a supportive regional environment.[4]   The UK has also been active in global policy. In 2015 the UK Government and civil society championed the inclusion of peace into the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – in particular Goal 16 to promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies, as well as the integration of conflict and gender across the framework. The UK has played a leading role in highlighting the link between gender and conflict, and in championing the global Women, Peace and Security agenda, through four successive UK National Action Plans in 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018. These have included commitments to support women mediators, as well as to increase women’s meaningful participation in decision-making in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.[5]   UK conflict policy and guidance has sought to be more responsive to analysis and evidence of how change really happens. In 2018, the UK Stabilisation Unit – established in 2007 as a ‘centre of expertise on conflict, stabilisation, security and justice’ in the UK Government – presented policy guidance on Elite Bargains and Political Deals, which advanced UK Government thinking about how to support peace processes and political transitions in fragile and conflict affected states, based on an extensive evidence base of case studies. It emphasised the need to align peace deals with the underlying distribution of power and resources, how external support can help make deals ‘stick’, and the importance – and challenges – of including ‘elites and their constituencies’.[6]   Integrated and joint capabilities have been a growing feature of the UK Government approach – from the Conflict Prevention Pool, to the Conflict Stability and Security Fund, cross-government geographic units, and the Joint Assessment of Conflict and Stability (JACS) tool for conflict analysis. Gender has been increasingly integrated into analysis and programming. In 2020 a Mediation and Reconciliation Hub was established in the Stabilisation Unit to enhance the UK Government’s competence and contribution to peacemaking and peacebuilding. And the 2021 Integrated Review commits to a more strategic and integrated approach to tackling political and social drivers of conflict, continuing support to global efforts and developing diplomacy and tools such as mediation.   UK as a force for peace – backward steps Alongside these advances, the last ten years have also seen negative developments, regression and inconsistency in both policy and practice. These range from cuts to aid budgets that facilitate peacebuilding, lopsided strategies and capacities, compressed timeframes and overly securitised responses to conflict, despite the call for an urgent focus on inclusive approaches to conflict prevention by the UN and World Bank in 2018.[7]   Commitments on paper to peacebuilding and peacemaking have not been sufficiently nor appropriately resourced in practice. This is not just a problem for the UK. Globally, peace is chronically under-resourced, even within wider shortfalls in development funding and capacity.[8] It is hard to get support for building peace capacity given the timeframe for making and building peace is years and decades, rather than months. The results of peace efforts are also notoriously difficult (but not impossible) to measure – and to claim credit for. Most recently, in 2021 the Government reduced the budget for the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) by £492 million, of which at least £348.9 million was Official Development Assistance (ODA).[9] And in 2020 the Government decided to reduce ODA from 0.7 to 0.5 per cent of Gross National Income – shortly after announcing an increase in defence spending of over £16 billion.   There are policy tensions between UK aspirations for national security and peace. As others have noted, these are evident in UK defence and security investments in the capabilities of state partners, despite the fact that their repressive behaviour can put civilians at greater risk (think Saudi Arabia and Egypt) and that state-based violence is the cause of the majority of conflict deaths.[10] UK counter-terrorism laws and sanctions can also clash with peacebuilding and conflict resolution objectives, for example when the listing of armed groups as ‘terrorists’ constrains third party contacts to explore scope for reducing violence and for finding political solutions to conflict.[11] In this and other areas, the peacebuilding and conflict prevention intent in UK policy and legislation is ambiguous or lacking, making it difficult for peace objectives to win through other policy trade-offs. The risk, and often reality, is that UK security interventions can at times undermine rather than strengthen the potential impact of peacemaking and peacebuilding, and at worst exacerbate conflict.   In addition, the more recent acknowledgement in government strategies of exclusion as a driver of conflict – and of inclusion as a driver of peace – is not reflected in the attention to and resourcing of peacemaking and peacebuilding capacity at multiple levels of society. Many people maintain an old-fashioned view of peacemaking as an external mediator brokering formal talks between governments and rebels. Political attention and resources tend to focus on this. But conflicts are evolving all the time, bringing an increasing range of challenges, such as the proliferation of armed groups, cross-border conflicts, gender-based violence, misinformation, and localised conflicts. Peacemaking capacity too is changing fast: diverse women and youth are active in mediation, including at local levels; and we are seeing increasing prevalence of private diplomacy and digital mediation. This less conventional, but essential range of peacebuilding capacity gets comparatively less attention and support.   UK as a force for peace: a forward jump? How could the UK, drawing on all its capabilities for peace, be a force for good on peacebuilding and peacemaking in the coming decade and beyond? We have identified three priorities for the UK to better realise its peace ambitions.   Centre peace: Peacebuilding and peacemaking should not be in competition with other UK policy priorities for fragile and conflict affected countries (FCACs), but at the heart of them: we need peacebuilding and peacemaking capacity in order to face existing and new challenges to UK and global security, including to mitigate conflicts exacerbated by climate change, to negotiate the power shifts required to prevent climate catastrophe and to face the social, economic and political consequences of COVID-19. Violent conflict is a key driver of fragility and a major impediment to development. Addressing violent conflict is a sine qua non for advancing sustainable stability in FCACs.   Evidence shows we currently know more about ending war – stabilising a conflict situation – than building peace.[12] But work that addresses deeper drivers of violence, such as supporting the meaningful participation of habitually excluded groups, like young people or women, has also been shown to be make peace processes effective and sustainable.[13] Peacemaking and peacebuilding can contribute to lasting stability that works for everyone.   Our own society here in the UK is fractured and conflicted. We are only just coming to terms with the legacy of our colonial past. Peacebuilders and peacemakers can help negotiate the open societies and civic space required for the ‘just, peaceful and inclusive society’ foreseen in Goal 16 of the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development. The fact that conflict challenges exist does not mean peacemaking and peacebuilding have failed, it means we need them more.   Boost bottom-up: Peacebuilding is critically under-funded compared with other foreign policy instruments – despite it being inexpensive relative to military responses, or the long-term economic impact of conflict. The quality of funding and support matters as much as quantity. Peacebuilding and peacemaking takes time and people, to build trust, and to change attitudes, behaviours and structures that perpetuate violent conflict. Local peacemaking and peacebuilding are particularly under-resourced, despite growing recognition of their importance. As the UN has acknowledged, ‘mediation has to move beyond political and military elites and more effectively include efforts at the local level to help build peace from the ground up’.[14]   Local peacebuilding delivers. It is not a luxury or an add-on. In northeast Nigeria for example, where the Boko Haram insurgency and Islamic State in West Africa continue to wreak havoc on communities, local peacebuilders are facilitating reintegration back into communities of disaffected fighters and others associated with armed groups.[15] Local peacebuilding is also providing avenues for excluded groups to actively engage, such as young people who are often seen primarily as part of the ‘conflict problem’. Conciliation Resources has been supporting Youth Peace Platforms in northeast Nigeria, which have been working with the most vulnerable and excluded, providing space for young men and women to talk, listen and learn new skills for employment and for resolving local conflicts.[16]   UK policy and practical support needs to pivot to people and organisations working at local levels. High-level agreements between elites that do not have broad buy-in are much less likely to last. In Central African Republic (CAR), numerous efforts to negotiate peace at the national level have broken down. The most recent peace accord signed by government and leaders of 14 armed groups in February 2019 seemed to be making headway, but like so many of its predecessors, soon gave way to growing instability. Conflict in CAR is complex and protracted, and finding effective solutions is hard. But peace strategies have too often ignored local drivers of violence and capacities for peace. The logic for ‘boosting bottom-up peace’ is clear. Resourcing it properly is the next step.   Prioritise partnership: Partnership is key to effective peacemaking and peacebuilding. Conflict is too complex and systemic for any one country or institution to tackle single-handedly. But while many people espouse partnership, it is very hard to achieve in practice. Even like-minded international peace NGOs struggle to work together towards shared goals, while maintaining each other’s unique approaches, histories and networks.[17]   But the paramount and perhaps toughest challenge for the UK Government and civil society is to work authentically in local partnership. This requires us all to embrace a very different way of thinking and working, which complements and supports local peace constituencies, nurtures long-term relationships, steps up engagement with diverse women and youth networks, and enables ‘context-sensitivity’ and adaptation. In practice, meaningful local partnership means reducing ‘projectisation’ of peace efforts, finding ways to take calculated risks, and having difficult conversations with people actively involved in violence. Local partnership requires us to ‘decolonise’ our relationships and a root and branch transformation of power – from strategy and programme design, to who is in the room, who is listened to and who gets the funding, and to helping to protect civic space and human rights. Local partnership is hard. But without it we are stuck in self-sustaining cycles of superficial change.   Conclusion: is the UK ready to ‘pivot to peace’? Is the UK ready for such a ‘pivot to peace’? Our research in 2017 suggested that we may be more ready than many people think, and that there is broad public support for peacebuilding if you get the communications right. National surveys of public attitudes towards peacebuilding and dialogue with armed groups to further peace processes show a striking level of public support in the UK as well as in other countries.[18] This suggests that the Government can be more confident in redirecting resources to peacebuilding, including potentially for more controversial activities such as talking to armed groups, and in communicating that to the public.[19]   Pivoting to peace is not about pretending that we have all of the answers. TV and radio news, and social media are full of real time footage of active conflicts that we are struggling to tackle. But we are learning all the time about how to make and build peace – through political settlements, community security, mediation and dialogue, conflict analysis, and managing natural resources, to name but a few approaches. For the UK to take a jump forward as a ‘force for peace’, we need to take some radical decisions about how and how much we are prepared to invest in it. The interests and capabilities of people affected by conflict and working for peace must lie at the heart of all of our policies and practice.   Dr Teresa Dumasy is Director of the Research, Advisory and Policy Department at Conciliation Resources (www.c-r.org). Teresa joined the organisation in 2010. As Director of Research, Advisory and Policy she is a member of the executive management team and oversees Conciliation Resources work on research, gender, policy and monitoring, evaluation and learning and EU facing work. Teresa also plays a coordinating role for NGOs on counter-terrorism laws and sanctions and their impact on humanitarian and peacebuilding work. Prior to joining Conciliation Resources Teresa worked for the UK Government in FCO and DFID. She is a Senior Research Fellow at the Conflict Analysis and Research Centre at the University of Kent.   Dr Alexander (Zand) Ramsbotham is Director of Research and Innovation at Conciliation Resources. Zand joined Conciliation Resources in 2009 as Head of Accord and now leads the organisation’s research, learning and innovation agenda. Prior to joining Conciliation Resources, he was research fellow at the Institute for Public Policy Research, and has worked as specialist adviser to the House of Lords European Union Select Committee in its inquiry into the EU Strategy for Africa, and as head of the Peace and Security Programme at the United Nations Association-UK. He has also been an associate fellow in the International Security Programme at Chatham House.   Image by Rich Taylor/DFID under (CC).   [1] Peacebuilding involves understanding and addressing the underlying drivers of conflict, not its symptoms; it involves everyone from communities to governments; and it is a long-term process of rebuilding relationships, changing attitudes and establishing fairer institutions. [2] HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, March 2021, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-_the_Integrated_Review_of_Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf [3] DFID, FCO and Ministry of Defence, Building Stability Overseas Strategy, 2011, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-stability-overseas-strategy.pdf [4] Marcus Lenzen, Building Stability Framework, Department for International Development, 2016, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5968990ded915d0baf00019e/UK-Aid-Connect-Stability-Framework.pdf [5] FCO, DFID, FCDO, Ministry of Defence and Stabilisation Unit, UK national action plan on women, peace and security 2018 to 2022, Gov.uk, January 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-national-action-plan-on-women-peace-and-security-2018-to-2022 [6] Stabilisation Unit, Supporting Elite Bargains to Reduce Violent Conflict, Gov.uk, 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/765973/Supporting_Elite_Bargains_to_Reduce_Violent_Conflict_-_Summary.pdf [7] World Bank Group, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, 2018, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337  [8] Pauline Veron and Aandrew Sheriff, International funding for peacebuilding: Will COVID-19 change or reinforce existing trends?, ECPDM Discussion paper No. 280, September 2020, https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/ECDPM-Discussion-Paper-280-International-Funding-Peacebuilding-COVID-19-Change-Reinforce-Existing-Trends.pdf [9] Lewis Brooks and Abigail Watson, The UK Integrated Review: the gap between the Review and reality on conflict prevention, Saferworld, March 2021, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/952-the-uk-integrated-review-the-gap-between-the-review-and-reality-on-conflict-prevention [10] Ibid.; Lewis Brooks, Playing with Matches? UK security assistance and its conflict risks, Saferworld, October 2021, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1374-playing-with-matches-uk-security-assistance-and-its-conflict-risks [11] See for example, Conciliation Resources, Proscribing Peace, the impact of terrorist listing on peacebuilding organisations, January 2016, https://www.c-r.org/resource/proscribing-peace [12] Christine Bell, Navigating inclusion in peace settlements, British Academy, June 2017, www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/publications/justice-equality-inclusion-peace-settlements-human-rights-common-good/ [13] World Bank Group, Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, 2018, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337  [14] United Nations, UN Support to Local Mediation: Challenges and Opportunities, Mediation Support Unit, Policy & Mediation Division, November 2020, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UN%20Support%20to%20Local%20Mediation_Challenges%20and%20Opportunities_1.pdf [15] Conciliation Resources, Smart peace: peacebuilding through learning, 2021, www.c-r.org/smart-peace-interactive-learning-resource [16] Conciliation Resources, Creating safe spaces for youth to build peace, August 2018, www.c-r.org/news-and-insight/creating-safe-spaces-youth-build-peace [17] Conciliation Resources, Smart peace: peacebuilding through learning, 2021, www.c-r.org/smart-peace-interactive-learning-resource [18] Conciliation Resources, Public support for peacebuilding, September 2017, www.c-r.org/resource/public-support-peacebuilding; Conciliation Resources, Public attitudes in Japan towards peacebuilding and dialogue with armed groups, October 2020, https://www.c-r.org/learning-hub/public-attitudes-japan-towards-peacebuilding-and-dialogue-armed-groups [19] Conciliation Resources, Public support for peacebuilding, September 2017, https://www.c-r.org/resource/public-support-peacebuilding [post_title] => A ‘Force for Peace’? UK peacebuilding and peacemaking and FCACs [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => a-force-for-peace-uk-peacebuilding-and-peacemaking-and-fcacs [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-12-10 19:42:11 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-12-10 18:42:11 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6264 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [36] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6262 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-12-06 00:06:23 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-12-05 23:06:23 [post_content] => The challenges The role of multilateral institutions, pre-eminently the United Nations (UN), in fragile states is multifaceted. They invariably maintain primary responsibility for the delivery of humanitarian aid – the more fragile a situation the more irreplaceable their role. Insofar as development programming continues to occur the UN will often play a lead or convening role in it. Their staff and, where present, observers will be expected to bear witness and report upon violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Particularly where there is a political mission or Special Envoy in place they will take a degree of responsibility for sustaining peace and maintaining stability: mediating and using their good offices function to convene and facilitate peace talks, and attempting to ensure external interventions are supportive of an agreed upon political process. And where peacekeepers are present they will have a more direct responsibility for maintaining peace, including on occasions by using force in the protection of civilians or in furtherance of a mandate to support a peace process.   These differing objectives frequently come into tension. Notably, the UN has often struggled to balance the need to maintain friendly relations, and therefore access, with host governments to deliver humanitarian and development programmes, and the need to bear witness to human rights violations and apply pressure as part of a political theory of change. Following the catastrophic failure of the UN to strike this balance correctly in the final stages of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009, the UN commissioned the ‘Petrie Report’ which in turn led to the ‘Human Rights up Front’ mechanism to rebalance the political and development aspects of its work.[1] It was therefore galling for the UN, not to mention tragic, when the atrocities in Myanmar’s Rakhine state in 2017 betrayed many of the same failings in the UN response, on occasion even involving the same personnel.[2]   The reasons were straightforward enough. Despite the implementation of Human Rights up Front there had not been a substantial shift in the management of UN in-country interventions to ensure the primacy of political responses. In response to the second scandal of Myanmar, Secretary-General Guterres was able to push through structural reforms to support the primacy of a political strategy set by the UN Secretariat over delivery of development and humanitarian services, and while these reforms were watered down by states and implementation of Human Rights up Front remains incomplete and contested there is now a greater sense of political coherence in the UN’s interventions in fragile states.[3]   Unfortunately, this is far from the only point of tension when it comes to multilateral initiatives in areas of fragility. Another is the somewhat artificial divide that exists between the UN’s special political missions, run out of the UN’s Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and the UN’s peacekeeping missions, run out of the UN’s Department of Peace Operations.[4] Despite the recommendation of the UN’s Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations (the wonderfully named HIPPO report) that the UN de-silo its thinking in this area and instead consider all its interventions as existing on a continuum of peace support operations, and despite a compromise restructuring which saw a part merger of some aspects of both offices, the two entities still operate fairly distinctly with limited cooperation or skill sharing.[5]   This is not just a case of a structural disconnect. The UN’s political missions operate in the fairly conventional and state centric manner of a UN mediator: attempting to increase stability and with an inherent bias towards state actors, which will always be seen as more legitimate by a state led institution such as the UN. UN peacekeeping, likewise accountable to a mandate established by member states in the UN Security Council, broadly operates in the same way. But there is a twist. In recent decades an expectation has been established that the preeminent role of UN Peacekeeping will be the protection of civilians.[6] The threat to the civilians, however, often predominantly comes from state actors, with non-state actors being as likely to be playing a protective role as themselves constituting a threat.[7] There are even circumstances in which the objectives of increasing stability and protecting civilians are antagonistic – greater stability means fewer checks on the power of the state actor to harm civilians.[8]   A tangential, but closely related, point of contention comes when one considers the UN’s role in counter terror operations. In the aftermath of the ‘war on terror’ the UN’s counter-terror work has become increasingly extensive and coherent, now organised under the leadership of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and reaching to an extent where some researchers have deemed it the ‘fourth pillar’ of the UN’s work (the traditional three pillars being peace and security, human rights and development).[9] But counter-terror work is not a natural fit for the UN. For one thing the UN emphasises neutrality in its approach to conflicts, particularly in its peacekeeping work, and its peace and security work primarily operates by mediating between partners it attempts to view as equals. Counter-terror operations are not neutral, nor do they treat parties equally: they label certain non-state actors as the adversary. Furthermore, counter-terror operations frequently take the form of, or closely approximate, warfighting, an activity which is both antithetical to the objectives of the UN Charter and one that the UN is congenitally ill suited to perform. To quote the British born architect of UN Peacekeeping Sir Brian Urquhart, “the moment a peacekeeping force starts killing people it becomes a part of the conflict it is supposed to be controlling, and therefore, part of the problem. It loses the one quality which distinguishes it from, and sets it above, the people it is dealing with.”[10]   Peace in partnership It is against this background of issues that discussions about multilateral partnerships for peacekeeping and peacebuilding have to be understood. The UN’s initiatives in this agenda rarely happen in a vacuum, particularly in Africa where the African Union (AU) and powerful and effective regional economic communities (such as ECOWAS, SADC etc…) play a vital role. In a situation of fragility such as Mali, such interventions will also take place alongside multiple others, such as two EU missions (EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali), unilateral missions (such as the French led Operation Barkhane), and ad hoc regional missions (such as the ‘G5’ mission from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). When one therefore considers a question such as ‘to what extent is the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali conducting conventional peacekeeping and to what extent is it performing counterinsurgency?’, one has to not only consider the conduct of the mission itself (which I would argue mostly does still constitute conventional peacekeeping), but also the fact that in providing stability it creates an enabling environment for these other actors who are most certainly conducting counterinsurgency.   Therefore, while there is broad agreement that peacekeeping and peacebuilding are best when regionally led, and there is a consensus among most that they would like to see the AU and other regional actors take on more of the work with the UN playing a funding and support role, this has led to often insurmountable issues in practice. For example, states have so far resisted calls from the Secretary-General, primarily at the behest of lead donor France, to directly fund the G5. And quite right too, as scholars have argued, if they did they would be using UN funds to directly support the fighting of wars – in contravention of the UN Charter.[11] But how then to follow through on the longstanding demand from many African states for the UN to provide direct funding to African Union peacekeeping missions? The AU defines peacekeeping differently to the UN, and many of its ‘peacekeeping’ activities could be considered warfighting.[12] Is it possible to fund some actions of a peacekeeping mission but not others that cross the line? This has been the logic behind various UN support offices (such as UNSOS in Somalia) which seek to channel funding and support in kind to AU missions while maintaining a degree of separation between the UN and peace enforcement operations. The results are often complex and convoluted.[13]   What is to be done? And what role for the UK? None of these tensions have easy resolutions. Furthermore, even if some extraordinary technical silver bullet did exist in the mind of some policymaker that could perfectly thread these several needles, it would do us no good. The UN’s peacekeeping and peacemaking work has evolved in ad hoc fashion as a result of protracted negotiations between states and other actors. So too, even more so, has multilateral peace support work outside the UN system. The discipline will inevitably continue to evolve in similar fashion: slowly, gradually and unevenly.   Nor should this be seen as an entirely negative thing. Immensely frustrating as multilateral peacebuilding is, it does – for a given value of the term – work. UN Peacekeeping in particular can boast a commendable track record of harm mitigated the presence of peacekeepers is credited with preventing genocide in the Central African Republic in 2014 and empirical studies show that “on average, deploying several thousand troops and several hundred police dramatically reduces civilian killings”.[14] While it is harder to demonstrate the value of the UN’s wider peace and security work (it being notoriously hard to prove the negative of a conflict not happening) one must always bear in mind that for three quarters of a century the UN has achieved its primary objective: preventing World War III.[15] And these successes cannot be disaggregated from the contestation and tension at the heart of multilateral approaches. Maddening as the lack of clarity, coherence, and singularity of purpose can be, these are the inevitable consequences of precisely what gives the approach its strength: the fact that one has established a mechanism for otherwise potentially hostile actors to resolve hard power differences through processes of negotiation leading to compromises. Frustrating as the messiness and incoherence of multilateral conflict management may be, it is nothing compared to the messiness and incoherence of conflict.   One potential reform that I believe is worth pursuing is to attempt to discourage and minimise micromanagement of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities by state led mechanisms. Practitioners operating in a complex and fragile environment need clarity, but if the states that they are answerable to are not able to provide that clarity then flexibility and room to manoeuvre is the next best thing. Locally set policy can also better reflect local conditions, and match them in more granular detail, whereas blanket universal policies are bound to either be too robust for certain circumstances, not robust enough for others, or both.   A classic example of this dynamic came in a recent controversy regarding the use of lethal force by British UN peacekeepers in Mali.[16] While one can argue as to what the correct posture for the mission is, and while of course rules of engagement are a matter of legal and operational necessity, I would strongly suggest that any judgement made in New York is invariably going to be a poorer match for local conditions and circumstances than that of those participating in the incident. We have seen in the past the negative consequences of too rigid a mandate in peacekeeping and the value of mission command flexibility.[17] Of course, with such flexibility comes the opportunity for abuse, unless it is tempered by transparency and accountability. Peacekeepers must always fully account for their actions and must be accountable to, and able to be held to account by, those they keep the peace for. In this regards the UK’s candid communications with respect the incident have been commendable but greater work to place the populations of fragile areas at the centre of UN peace operations, as proposed by the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON), is vital.[18]   More broadly, what role can the UK play? Their role in shaping peacekeeping, and indeed in all negotiations, will of course be limited by the limitations on UK influence, but this remains a sector where the UK has a louder voice than many.[19] Its policy positions with respect to many of the controversies I have outlined above are reasonably thoughtful and nuanced. Certainly they are the least extreme among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council where France and the USA join with Russia and China when it comes to enthusiasm for counter terror operations.   It's also a sector in which the volume of your voice is proportionate to the size of your contribution. The UK has long contributed significantly to peacekeeping both financially and with small but influential members of senior staff in leadership roles. However, increasing resentment among traditional troop contributing countries at the division that exists between those that lead and those that bleed has meant that increasingly this is not enough, and a country such as the UK is expected to put non negligible numbers of troops at potential risk to earn its right to speak with authority.[20] The UK has done this commendably, doubling its traditional contribution of a mini battalion in Cyprus and senior leadership personnel with a series of commitments of a couple of hundred troops: first of a field hospital and then an engineering unit to the UN mission in South Sudan, and now of a long range reconnaissance force to the UN mission in Mali. The UK now contributes a similar number of troops to France, only a few less than China, and considerably more than the paltry contributions of Russia and the USA.   The military in particular have found that such deployments also offer significant additional benefits: unmatched on the job training and career enrichment opportunities; the strengthening of both traditional and new partnerships and the ability to practice work in coalition; enhanced situational awareness in strategic locations; the ability to match influence with rivals both in the areas of deployment and relevant international forums; and the opportunity to get a close look at some other nations’ kit.   An exemplary deployment in Mali: where next? The UK’s deployment to Mali has been widely praised, and rightly so. It provides a requirement the UN needs: enabling the mission to project influence many hundreds of miles from the immediate vicinity of the fortified bases where they had in the past on occasion felt somewhat besieged, and allowing civilian experts to spend significant time out and about among the Malian population. While one can reasonably raise concerns about the purpose and value of the mission as a whole – the reliability of the Malian Government as a host and partner, particularly post-coup; the manner in which the mission works alongside French and G5 counterinsurgency operations; and the appropriateness of a UN mission operating in a counter-terror environment – the work of the long range reconnaissance patrols seems to embody a clear theory of change: dissuading attacks on civilians with a show of force; enabling the investigation of human rights violations by providing security for investigators; and enforcing peace agreements through weapons inspections. A clear and candid communication strategy has made this readily apparent.[21]   The UK will need to maintain a contribution at this level if it is to continue to have the influence it does over UN peacekeeping and wider peacebuilding policy conversations. Given the warm reception and effectiveness of the Mali deployment, currently expected to last until 2023, the UK should be in no rush to look elsewhere. But all commitments must come to an end eventually, and it is right that thought be given to what comes next, or indeed if additional contributions could be made, particularly in light of the Prime Minister’s as yet unfulfilled promise to the House of Commons that the increase in the UK’s defence budget would enable it to “do more on peacekeeping.”[22]   The Integrated Review, the UK’s generational strategy paper on national security and international policy objectives, commits the UK to an “increased commitment to the successor mission to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)”.[23] There’s a number of reasons to doubt whether such a commitment could achieve the same policy objectives as the UK’s deployment to Mali, and thus act as an effective replacement for it. For one thing the scope and nature of the successor mission to AMISOM has not yet been decided, and the process of negotiating that successor has been fraught with difficulty.[24] For another the situation in Somalia is highly complex and prone to risk, perhaps second only to Mali for the complexity of the interrelation between the various external actors, and likely even more deadly. Any UK intervention would have to be very carefully planned to ensure that it is indeed helpful. Finally, it is likely that – as now – any successor mission would place the AU in the lead role with the UN providing logistical, financial and in kind support through a support office.   The UK has already contributed significant numbers of staff to the UN support office in Somalia.[25] It is difficult to see how, in such circumstances, the UK’s as yet undefined contribution could take a form which would see a Mali sized number of additional blue helmeted troops being exposed to a similar level of risk as in Mali so as to give the UK a similar degree of credibility in UN conversations.   The UK might be well served to disaggregate its commitment to supporting the successor to AMISOM and the strategic value of an ongoing higher level of commitment to UN Peacekeeping: providing AMISOM’s successor with the support, most likely political and financial, that it needs, but separately engaging with the UN’s Department of Peace Operations on plans to ensure the maintenance of at least one Mali-sized contribution to its ongoing multidimensional peacekeeping missions.   Recommendations:
  1. That the UK take a ‘needs led’ approach to supporting the successor to AMISOM in Somalia, providing that mission with resources and capabilities it needs, and not contribute for the sake of contributing;
 
  1. That independently from developing a contribution to the successor to AMISOM the UK commit to either renewing its contribution to the UN mission in Mali or offer a contribution, which similarly involves providing several hundred blue helmeted troops equitably sharing risk with other troop contributing countries so as to provide for similar policy benefits; and
 
  1. That the UK use its position on the UN Security Council and involvement with the policy conversations, including the upcoming Seoul defence ministerial to push for:
    • Greater accountability to, and centring of, the communities at the heart of peacekeeping missions, as recommended by the EPON network;
    • To resist any urge for state based mechanisms to micromanage peace operations;
    • To resist state centricity in multilateral responses to areas of fragility and embrace the fact that states can often themselves be part of the problem and non-state actors part of the solution; and
    • To counter any attempt to have UN resources or UN supported missions diverted into counter-terror operations, counterinsurgency, or other forms of warfighting.
  Fred Carver is a freelance researcher working in the field of international relations, with specific expertise on the United Nations, Peacekeeping, Atrocity Prevention, civil wars and political violence. From 2011-2016 he ran the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice, a human rights NGO, and from 2016-2020 he was head of policy at UNA-UK, a campaigning organisation for multilateralism. Prior to that he worked as a researcher specialising in South Asia (primarily Pakistan) and in UK politics.   Image by Sgt Russ Nolan RLC under (OGL).   [1] Charles Petrie, Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka, United Nations Digital Library, 2012, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/737299?ln=en [2] Colum Lynch, For Years, U.N. Was Warned of Threat to Rohingya in Myanmar, Foreign Policy, October 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/16/for-years-u-n-was-warned-of-threat-to-rohingya-in-myanmar/ [3] IISD / SDG Knowledge Hub, “New Year, New United Nations”: Structural Reforms Begin, January 2019, http://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/policy-briefs/new-year-new-united-nations-structural-reforms-begin/; Kenneth Roth, Why the UN Chief’s Silence on Human Rights is Deeply Troubling, Human Rights Watch, April 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/25/why-un-chiefs-silence-human-rights-deeply-troubling [4] United Nations Security Council, Special Political Missions, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/political-missions-and-offices; United Nations Peacekeeping, Where we operate, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate [5] United Nations Peacekeeping, Report of the Independent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, June 2015, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-high-level-panel-peace-operations; IISD / SDG Knowledge Hub, UN Secretary-General Details New Elements of Peace and Security Architecture, November 2018, https://sdg.iisd.org/news/un-secretary-general-details-new-elements-of-peace-and-security-architecture/ [6] Adam Day and Charles T. Hunt, Distractions, Distortions and Dilemmas: The Externalities of Protecting Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, November 2021, Taylor Francis Online, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698249.2022.1995680 [7] Center for Civilians in Conflict, From Mandate to Mission: Mitigating Civilian Harm in UN Peacekeeping Operations in the DRC, January 2017, https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/DRC_REPORT_Web_2016_12_30-Small.pdf; Severine Autesserre, The Crisis of Peacekeeping: Why the UN Can’t End Wars, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/crisis-peacekeeping?cid=otr-authors-january_february_2019-121118 [8] Protection Approaches, Being the difference, November 2021, https://protectionapproaches.org/being-the-difference [9] Ali Altiok and Jordan Street, A fourth pillar for the United Nations? The rise of counter-terrorism, Saferworld, June 2020, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1256-a-fourth-pillar-for-the-united-nations-the-rise-of-counter-terrorism [10] Urquhart, Brian E. 1987. A Life in Peace and War. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. [11] Paul D. Williams, Why a UN Support Office for the G5 Sahel Joint Force is a Bad Idea, reliefweb, June 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/burkina-faso/why-un-support-office-g5-sahel-joint-force-bad-idea [12] Paul D. Williams, Lessons Learned in Somalia: AMISOM and Contemporary Peace Enforcement, Council on Foreign Relations, July 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/lessons-learned-somalia-amisom-and-contemporary-peace-enforcement [13] Paul D. Williams, Lessons “Partnership Peacekeeping” from the African Union Mission in Somalia, International Peace Institute, October 2019, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/1910_Lessons-from-AMISOM.pdf [14] Diane Corner, “Without the UN, there would have been genocide”, UNA-UK, December 2017, https://una.org.uk/magazine/2017-2/without-un-there-would-have-been-genocide; Kelcey Negus, Mounting Evidence: Empirical Studies Show UN Peacekeeping Mission Presence May Reduce Violence Against Civilians, Center for Civilians in Conflict, December 2019, https://civiliansinconflict.org/blog/pk-presence-may-reduce-violence-against-civilians/ [15] Hultman, L., Kathman, J., and Shannon, M. 2019. Peacekeeping in the Midst of War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [16] Louise Jones, Mali: An Alternative View, Wavell Room, October 2021, https://wavellroom.com/2021/10/26/mali-an-alternative-view/ [17] Tony Ingesson, Trigger-Happy Autonomous, and Disobedient: Nordbat 2 Mission Command in Bosnia, The Strategy Bridge, September 2017, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/9/20/trigger-happy-autonomous-and-disobedient-nordbat-2-and-mission-command-in-bosnia [18] Cedric de Coning and Linnea Gelot, Placing People at the Center of UN Peace Operations, IPI Global Observatory, May 2020, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/05/placing-people-center-un-peace-operations/ [19] UNA-UK, Global Britain in the United Nations, https://una.org.uk/global-britain-united-nations [20] Natalie Samarasinghe and Thomas G. Weiss, How “the rest” shape the UN, UNA-UK, October 2018, https://una.org.uk/magazine/2018-1/how-%E2%80%9C-rest%E2%80%9D-shape-un [21] These were mostly available by following the contingent commander at the time @WillJMeddings on twitter. Now troop rotation has seen the Royal Anglians replaced by the Welsh Cavalry it remains to be seen which channels they will use, but following @TheWelshCavalry on twitter is likely to provide a starting point. [22] UK Parliament, Integrated Review, Vollume 684: debated on Thursday 19 November 2020, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2020-11-19/debates/CA347B2B-EE02-40DF-B5CE-1E8FAA07139E/IntegratedReview#contribution-C41740DD-E9B0-410B-8597-98A1DD6E2E10 [23] Cabinet Office, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, Gov.uk, March 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy [24] International Crisis Group, Reforming the AU Mission in Somalia, November 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b176-reforming-au-mission-somalia [25] Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Sir Michael Fallon, UK troops support UN mission in Somalia, Gov.uk, May 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-support-un-mission-in-somalia [post_title] => Multilateral partnerships: The UK and the UN as partners in peacekeeping and peacemaking [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => multilateral-partnerships-the-uk-and-the-un-as-partners-in-peacekeeping-and-peacemaking [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-12-06 01:29:40 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-12-06 00:29:40 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6262 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [37] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6260 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-12-06 00:05:41 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-12-05 23:05:41 [post_content] => The changing international landscape for humanitarian and development assistance in FCACs The UK’s overseas aid in coming years will be conditioned by the UK’s national interest as understood through a political lens, and by other domestic political and institutional factors. The nature of UK aid will also necessarily be influenced by international trends beyond those prevailing in each individual country to which aid is delivered. Among those, we highlight the following for discussion:
  • A trend of increased armed violence and instability;
  • Geopolitical flux and uncertainty;
  • A number of influential transnational factors; and
  • Incoherent approaches to the delivery of aid in fragile and conflict affected countries (FCACs).
  An increase in intrastate violent conflicts, linked to regional factors and violent extremism Armed conflicts are on the rise, following a period of improvement after the end of the Cold War. The 2021 Global Peace Index noted there had been a reduction in peacefulness in nine of the past 13 years.[1] During this period, armed conflicts have in the main been sub-national or internal in their manifestation, that is, the actual fighting has been contained within national borders. But they are often interconnected. For example, the conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya have been fought mainly within the borders of those countries but with the active involvement of outsiders. Meanwhile, many internal conflicts also spread destabilisation and violence beyond national borders, within the immediate region and even farther field. These international connections make military or political resolution harder. Thus conflicts remain unresolved locally, and they persist and further expand. External actors frequently pursue their own wider conflicts in local theatres. These include not only states or groups of states, but also non-state entities such as violent extremist groups, who have responded to their relative weakness in asymmetric conflict by pouring fuel on local conflict dynamics in multiple localities, upping the stakes and entrenching extremist violence more widely.   The humanitarian consequences of conflicts are severe, leading to vast, prolonged or repeated humanitarian aid programmes. These provide succour for those in need, but they can also prolong the conflict. This is because they protect the warring parties from some of the consequences of their actions, allowing them further leeway to continue prosecuting war. Meanwhile such aid is – or can certainly be painted as – intrinsically political; an indication that donors support one or other parties in the conflict.   Longer-term development aid to fragile countries is even more clearly politically charged, as it inevitably interacts with government choices and policies there, and with politics itself, in places where – by definition, if they are ‘fragile and conflict affected’ – political systems are frequently inadequate to permit sufficient dialogue and peaceful political disagreement and opposition. For example, the provision of large sums of development aid by the UK in Nigeria, despite the Government’s human rights record in areas affected by Islamic extremism, is seen by potential recruits to the extremist cause as evidence that ‘the West’ is not on their side.[2] Therefore one of the challenges for aid agencies remains the delivery of ‘conflict sensitive’ aid, i.e. aid is designed and delivered in ways that avoid exacerbating conflicts, and preferably aim to reduce them.   A background of geopolitical uncertainty If most violent conflicts are internal, interstate conflicts have not disappeared. In addition to being prosecuted through proxies in internal conflicts, some interstate conflicts continue to be fought directly, albeit in a context where major powers along with the UN or regional multilateral bodies have been relatively successful in keeping them frozen or at a comparatively low level of military action. Long-running conflicts such as those between Pakistan and India or South and North Korea remain unresolved but mainly at a very low level of action, though some flare up from time to time, as happened in 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia, before Russia re-imposed a ceasefire.   Larger geopolitical conflicts with the potential to develop into direct confrontations also loom increasingly large, especially as the period of US-dominated unipolar geopolitics is ending. US power – or at least its willingness to act decisively – is slowly waning, while China grows in confidence and capacity, and Russia continues to act as though it too has a claim to superpower status. The EU meanwhile is unable to create a mechanism through which its security or diplomatic capacity matches the economic weight it still retains. Regional geopolitics in the Middle East remain influential, notably linked to Israel’s security posture and its treatment of Palestinians, and the enduring enmity between Saudi Arabia and Iran, along with their respective allies.   These complex, fragmented and overlapping conflicts and relationships form part of the background to an aid landscape which is also fragmented, at least compared with the Cold War and immediately post-Cold War periods. Much of the aid programmed by the UN and the main International Finance Institutions (IFIs) remains strongly aligned with that given by western states. All this can therefore still largely be considered under the broad heading of ‘western’ aid in support, broadly speaking, of the more or less liberal SDG agenda – even though western governments also allocate their aid in alignment with specific national interests, and for some, it is linked – explicitly or not – to other forms of support such as military assistance: UK and US military assistance in Somalia being one example of this.   Other players such as the Gulf States, Russia and China use their aid more nakedly in support of access to economic and other strategic resources and opportunities. China’s Belt and Road Initiative illustrates this well.[3] Aid fragmentation is on very clear display in the Horn of Africa, where external powers combining aid with their economic or military goals include the US, the EU, the UK, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in a web of influence that can be quite hard to unravel.[4] China in particular is seen as loading unsustainable debt levels onto many countries, including fragile countries, as part of its aid for infrastructure programme, much of which is in the form of loans.[5] To an extent, different approaches to aid reflect the political systems of the different donors, with western democracies more focused on conditionality linked to good governance, and programmes that aim to improve citizen – responsive governance, while their geopolitical competitors are less concerned about such factors. Aid is therefore an integral part of the narrative about global competition between democratic and autocratic political ideologies which is highlighted in the UK Government’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign.[6]   The challenge for UK aid is therefore to continue to support a liberal concept of ‘progress’, as a way to link its humanitarian and development aid to the foreign policy goals of shaping an evolving geopolitical landscape which maximises cooperation and conflict resolution, but without allowing aid to become simply a tool in a new Cold War.   Transnational factors A third set of salient factors can be grouped under the heading ‘transnational’, as the Integrated Review does. One of these is international crime, whose networks take advantage of (and in so doing frequently worsen) inadequate governance in fragile countries to operate there, notably for the production and transit of illegal drugs and other goods – as for example the use of the vast and hard to police Sahel for trafficking drugs to Europe.   This phenomenon overlaps with another: the large numbers of migrants from poor and fragile countries seeking safety and opportunity in the developed West, often a great personal risk. Migrants often fall into the hands of organised criminal traffickers. Libya is a well-known location for this, where armed political groups operate as criminal enterprises, trafficking migrants seeking entry to Europe.   Organised crime also overlaps with international terrorism. Terror and organised crime groups make common cause in overcoming and corrupting local and national governments; in many cases, Islamist terrorist organisations are themselves involved in trafficking and smuggling, either directly or by effectively licensing and taxing traffickers.   A fourth factor is the phenomenon of, and the need to manage, transnational health risks. This is seen currently and most obviously in the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is expected to further undermine governance and stability in fragile and conflict affected countries as government services fail to support affected communities and potentially increase levels of alienation and armed opposition.[7] But the destabilisation caused by an outbreak of Ebola in fragile and conflict affected countries in West Africa in 2014-16, including long term long term aid partner Sierra Leone, is also well attested.[8]   Finally, it is increasingly clear that fragile countries are particularly vulnerable to further destabilisation due to the impacts of climate change, for example as competition for land and other economic opportunities ramps up in the face of inadequate governance. This is especially true of fragile countries in the tropics, where some of the direct and indirect environmental impacts of warming are expected to be most marked.[9]   Among the implications of these transnational factors: the need for the UK to work closely with others and especially with multilateral organisations and processes, ensuring that responses to these phenomena are conflict sensitive, and are used to promote stability and longer term, positive peace, as well as respond to the specific issue in question.   Incoherent approaches to the delivery of aid in FCACs Given this background, aid resources are increasingly concentrated in fragile countries, and that is expected to remain the case.[10] Yet it is by no means clear that current approaches to aid delivery there are coherent, conflict sensitive or as effective as they could be. Partly, this is because of the instrumentalisation of aid for geopolitical competition, which skews design and other decisions. It is also partly due to ineffective programming and poor collaboration, even among experienced international agencies. These are typically siloed, failing to work in a joined up way, as each responds to its own mandate and perceived organisational interests differently. Because implementing agencies compete with one another for funds and opportunities, this further obstructs collaboration and coherence.   But this is not just a matter of poor operational collaboration. There is a tension at the highest level between two opposing forces. On one hand, it is increasingly acknowledged at high levels – at least in western and UN agencies – that aid agencies should support long term, enduring stabilisation and peacebuilding, in line with the UN’s fundamental raison d’être. This is the thrust of the UN’s Sustaining Peace agenda, to which the UN Security Council, General Assembly and UN affiliated agencies (including development banks) are all in principle signed up. This argues for long-term, sustained support for the development of peaceful societies and states. It acknowledges, on paper at least, that this is a complex, multi-generational endeavour requiring appropriate tools.[11] Yet such tools have not yet been developed, at least not on a commensurate scale. Instead, the existing institutions of aid – its organisations, systems and norms, designed for a different purpose – have been largely left intact, while in principle accepting a significantly amended mandate and role to which they are ill-adapted. This is equally true of donors such as the UK, and delivery organisations.   Meanwhile, and on the other hand, major western donors are largely retreating towards an approach that favours short-term stability, even when this is patently at odds with Sustaining Peace, and with some of the acknowledged features of the peaceful societies they claim they wish to build, such as individual freedoms and a dynamic civil society. In some respects, this is a resurgence of realpolitik perspectives in foreign policy where, in the present context, western donor governments actively support fragile country governments such as that of President El Sisi in Egypt, which trample on freedoms and are not obviously making progress towards long-term peace. This support is justified by western governments so long as the countries concerned are aligned with western interests in respect of issues such as migration or violent extremism, or in the interests of regional stability rather than political uncertainty to which political freedoms might give rise.   Partly, this tendency towards realpolitik also represents a frustration at the failure of high profile ‘nation building’ projects in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan, and the failure of the Arab Spring and similar movements to replace those in power as well as systems of power. Partly, it reflects the genuine difficulty donors have in supporting long-term goals through open ended and unpredictable programming. This is especially the case for democratic donors who have to demonstrate impact for which they are held accountable by parliaments and journalists with limited patience or understanding. Partly too, it reflects the assessment that dealing with some of the complexities analysed above – migration, climate change, epidemics and violent extremism – is simply easier in a context of short term stability, than in the face of the complex and unpredictable dynamics that tend to accompany democratisation and liberalisation. Geopolitical competition creates additional incentives to adopt a realpolitik, rather than be led by the goals of peacebuilding, because western and multilateral aid is so easily outcompeted by less demanding aid from other ‘non-traditional’ sources, which impose less politically difficult conditions.   Finally, the difficulty aid agencies have had in reinventing themselves for the Sustaining Peace model means they are often all too happy to revert – with a sigh of relief, perhaps – to the simpler, technocratic approach to aid they have long been used to. In the absence of a clear operational approach to Sustaining Peace, they have focused attention on technical cooperation under the umbrella of aid frameworks such as the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus. This sets out the needs for better collaboration among agencies delivering different packages of aid, designed for the three broad goals implied by its name.[12] But in practice the Nexus commits them to coordination merely, rather than to developing programming that is coherent with the idea that humanitarian, development and peacebuilding needs and rights co-exist simultaneously in fragile countries and societies, rather than being understood and delivered separately.   Changing UK institutional capacity for humanitarian and development assistance The UK’s institutional capacity to deliver international assistance within the shifting international context is also changing, due to a reduction in aid spending and institutional changes within government.   The UK aid budget The UK is, by any measure, a significant international donor. In 2019, it was the third largest donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA), in absolute terms, within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries after the US and Germany, making a contribution of 19.35 billion USD. As a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI), the UK was sixth of OECD countries with its commitment of 0.7 per cent of GNI.[13]   In 2020, the COVID pandemic saw a significant reduction in UK ODA (minus ten per cent), driven by a decline in GNI.[14] This was followed by a reduction of the commitment to spend 0.7 per cent of GNI on ODA to 0.5 per cent in 2021, leading to an average spending change on ODA of -29 per cent. However, as spending on pandemic related costs, including COVID vaccines donated to other countries and other health related costs count as ODA, some sectors of humanitarian and development assistance suffered significantly steeper cuts than the 29 per cent average. Cuts to the aid budget are set to save around £4.4 billion in 2021, though this constitutes a fraction of the UK Government’s broader pandemic response domestically (£250 billion in 2020-21) or its increase in the defence budget of £4.4 billion in 2021-2022 and a further £4.5 billion in 2022-2023.[15]   The Government has indicated an intention to return to the 0.7 per cent of GNI ODA commitment when the fiscal situation allows. Currently, this is projected to happen in the 2024-2025 fiscal year, depending on certain conditions to be met. How this will translate into the aid budget is not clear, especially given the UK is interested in redefining how it calculates ODA.[16]   Given the size of the UK economy, the UK will remain a significant donor internationally. The sharp decline in aid has significant ramifications for communities which would have otherwise received UK support, particularly in FCACs where the majority of international assistance is directed. This is more than a temporary blip, as well. Aid projects, particularly development or peacebuilding activities, are not able to be turned off and on like switches. They depend on maintaining significant operational capacities among partners (international and national) within recipient countries – which, once unfunded, are difficult to re-establish quickly. They depend also on deep networks and relationships with local stakeholders, authorities and partners, many of which will have been strained or broken by the sudden cessation of projects. This is especially important in FCACs, where trust and a nuanced understanding of complex conflict factors and political economy is essential for effective delivery of aid. These factors have significant consequences for the ability of the UK to deliver humanitarian and development assistance within the short to medium term as spending on ODA recovers.   Changing institutional structures for aid The institutions through which the UK is delivering assistance are also changing. In 2020, the Government announced the merger of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with the Department for International Development (DFID). Proponents of the merger argue both that it makes sense to link aid activities more explicitly with foreign policy and that the separation of aid from other aspects of foreign policy was artificial anyway. Critics suggest that the artificial separation was the strength of DFID, allowing it to get on with the business of addressing poverty effectively with less pressure to tailor activities to foreign policy agendas.   No matter the argument, the merger has happened. The new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has incorporated DFID and has to overcome the inevitable internal distraction of managing the structural and cultural challenges of bringing two organisations with different institutional cultures together (at a time when they are also disentangling long-held aid and diplomatic relationships with the EU). Specifically focused on the problems associated with FCACs, the merger also included the UK’s Stabilisation Unit, uniting that with the conflict capacities in FCDO and DFID within a new Conflict and Mediation Unit.   Also in 2020, the Government announced the Integrated Review completed later that year. The Integrated Review was framed as a pivot in the UK approach to foreign policy, promoting a more joined up and strategic approach to the changing world. The link between aid and other foreign policy tools are made clear, the integrated review promises a new international development strategy in 2022, which will ensure alignment of UK aid with the objectives in the strategic framework of the integrated review.   This is particularly the case with aid related to peace and conflict provided through the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). The Integrated Review refers to the intent: ‘[t]o tighten the focus of the cross-government Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. [The UK] will prioritise its resources on the foundational link between stability, resilience and security, and work with governments and civil society in regions that are of greatest priority to the UK.’[17] It also talks about making CSSF assistance ‘politically smart’, language which connects these ideas to concepts such as the Elite Bargains and Political Deals work of the Stabilisation Unit. This work has merit in providing a framework for better linking structural efforts to address conflict to the political realities of peacemaking.   There is a risk, however, that a focus on ‘politically smart’ aid addressing conflict will practically preference the elite bargains and political deals and neglect the longer-term structural peacebuilding activities which are necessary for meaningful and sustained peace. This concern mirrors a sense that the realpolitik perspective identified earlier in this paper is currently more in vogue and that, in practice, shorter term stability and short-term UK interests will be prioritised over sustainable peace – which is surely in the longer term UK interest. This feels at odds with the idea of the UK as a values-led ‘force for good’, reliant on its soft-power to promote its interests in the world.   A final point relating to institutional capacity needs to be made around partnerships. The UK’s aid sector is not just the domain of the Government. It consists of a large number of partners through which aid is implemented, including multilateral organisations, UK and international NGOs and the private sector. Relating to peace and conflict aid in particular, the UK is a powerhouse – with a strong network of peace focused NGOs and a large pool of experts on which to draw. These capacities are also changing. Reductions in aid spending due to COVID-19 have exacerbated the impacts of a steady increase in focus on ‘value for money’, an important aim in a sector reliant on tax-payer money. However, this has seen a shift towards funding through projects rather than core funding, which limits the ability for organisations like NGOs to maintain capacity and expertise that can be drawn on by the Government to help build peace abroad. There is a broader value of this longer-term capacity to the UK that should not be discounted or lost under the rubric of ‘efficiency’.   Recommendations The UK’s aid activities are changing in response to uncertainty both in the international environment and as a result of domestic institutional changes which have not yet reached their conclusion. As UK aid goes through this process, a few key elements are important for the UK to take into account when looking at how aid will be delivered in FCACs:  
  • The UK is likely to see the largest portion of its aid going towards FCACs, due largely to need, but also to the explicit link made in the Integrated Review between aid and the UK’s strategic priorities. To be effective, this aid needs to be defined and delivered with a clear emphasis on conflict sensitivity and building stability and peace. It needs to be framed – and reported on – showing its explicit contribution to peacebuilding, within a long-term strategic approach in each context.
 
  • The UK’s aid activities need to find the correct balance between efforts aimed at promoting stability, for example through elite bargains and political deals, with the need also to address the structural drivers of violent conflict. ‘Politically smart’ aid should look to create the opportunities, through stability, to then allow for longer-term structural change which is necessary for the evolution of like-minded peaceful societies the UK would like to see. To do so, however, it is necessary to ensure that these politically smart activities are linked to long-term theories of change for conflict transformation and that this theory of change is followed through in consecutive UK political cycles.
 
  • The UK cannot meaningfully act alone in FCACs. The size of its aid programmes, and its expertise in dealing with peace and conflict, provide it with a strong convening capacity around international assistance. The UK should leverage this to maximise the collective impact of international aid towards peace. The UK should invest in making tools like the humanitarian-development-peace nexus more effective for strategic coordination in support of peace, investing in conflict sensitive coordination and advisory mechanisms, and championing conflict sensitive approaches within the broader international humanitarian and development sector. This means going beyond the better coordination, currently the focus of the HDP Nexus, to radically reform parts of the UN aid delivery institutions in line with Sustaining Peace.
 
  • As the UK embarks on defining a new development strategy, and new frameworks for addressing conflict through the FCDO’s new Conflict and Mediation unit, it should ensure that it does not fall into the trap of excluding its wider network of partners. The UK’s capacity to engage in FCACs meaningfully depends on its networks of NGOs and independent experts based in the UK and elsewhere. Certainly, in an environment of aid cuts, it should commit to maintaining a base capacity within those networks.
  Tim Molesworth is the Senior Advisor for Conflict Sensitivity and Peace Technology at the Peaceful Change initiative, a UK based peacebuilding NGO. He has 11 years’ experience working with the UN and NGOs in contexts such as Iraq, Syria, Sudan and Libya on strategic approaches to peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity.   Phil Vernon is an independent advisor with over 35 years’ experience in international humanitarian, development and peacebuilding.   Image by DFID under (CC).   [1] Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2021, June 2021, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GPI-2021-web-1.pdf [2] John Campbell, U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Action, Special Report No. 70, November 2014, https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014/11/Nigeria_CSR70.pdf [3] OECD, China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape, OECD Business and Finance Outlook, 2018, https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf [4] Alexander Rondos, The Horn of Africa - Its Strategic Importance for Europe, the Gulf States, and Beyond, Horizons 6, Winter: 150-160, CIRSD, 2016, https://www.cirsd.org/files/000/000/000/99/01cfafd6447aaa326037d9eb4d427acd326ea71a.pdf [5] Zainab Usman, What do we know about Chinese lending in Africa?, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, June 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/02/what-do-we-know-about-chinese-lending-in-africa-pub-84648 [6] HM Government, Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, March 2021, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-_the_Integrated_Review_of_Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf [7] UN News, COVID-19 pandemic ‘feeding’ drivers of conflict and instability in Africa: Guterres, May 202, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/05/1092222 [8] Conciliation Resources, Responding to Ebola-driven conflict: Dialogue initiatives in Mano River border regions, March 2015, https://www.c-r.org/resource/responding-ebola-driven-conflict [9] Dan Smith & Janani Vivekananda, A Climate of Conflict: The links between climate change, peace and war, International Alert, November 2007, https://www.international-alert.org/publications/climate-conflict/?gclid=Cj0KCQiA-qGNBhD3ARIsAO_o7ynvgtN5zusQuCMjMOj5jzDm3ysSnTJ4u8aVesSnWxSn9uZKbTiXIvkaAtmVEALw_wcB [10] OECD DAC, States of Fragility 2020, OECD, September 2020, https://www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-fa5a6770-en.htm [11] UN. 2015. The challenge of sustaining peace: report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture. New York: UN. [12] The Nexus is identified as a priority within the integrated review. [13] OECD, Development finance data, https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/ [14] OECD, COVID-19 spending helped to lift foreign aid to an all-time high in 2020: Detailed Note, April 2021, https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/ODA-2020-detailed-summary.pdf [15] Sam Hughes, Ian Mitchell, Yani Tyskerud & Ross Warwick, The UK’s reduction in aid spending, IFS Briefing Note BN322, Institute of Financial Studies, April 2021, https://ifs.org.uk/uploads/BN322-The-UK%27s-reduction-in-aid-spending-2.pdf [16] Philip Loft & Philip Brien, The 0.7% aid target, House of Commons Library Research Briefing Number 3714, House of Commons Library, November 2021, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN03714/SN03714.pdf [17] HM Government, Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, March 2021, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-_the_Integrated_Review_of_Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf [post_title] => The changing context for UK humanitarian and development activities in FCACs [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-changing-context-for-uk-humanitarian-and-development-activities-in-fcacs [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-12-06 01:30:23 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-12-06 00:30:23 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6260 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [38] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6258 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-12-06 00:04:07 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-12-05 23:04:07 [post_content] => When we talk about conflict sensitivity, invariably the first words we hear are ‘Do no harm’. In practice, we know that this is an impossible ask. All interventions, however benign or well intentioned, have consequences that create winners and losers. And in the most fragile societies, where relations are already most unjust and unequal, these knock-on effects can have much greater amplification. So we focus on understanding these consequences and how they influence the context.   When we think about the possibilities of using military ‘force for good’, we assuredly cannot presume that no harm will be done. In many ways, the use or threat of violence is the application of harm. It aims to break the will of at least one side of a conflict, to change power dynamics and compel a settlement on different terms. And it is axiomatic that it envisages serious physical harm as a potentially acceptable cost of shifting the status quo.   In the most extreme examples, unleashing such force on a vast scale and the destruction of millions of lives, was the cost that the UK and its allies felt was justified to prevent a Nazi German invasion of the UK, to liberate Europe and to end the holocaust. On a much smaller scale, it was the cost of protecting Bosnian, Kosovar, Timorese, Sierra Leonean or Yezidi civilians from mass atrocities and the price that many believe the UK and other states should have been prepared to pay to avert genocide in Rwanda and carnage in Syria.   In the current century the option to utilise the military as a ‘force for good’ in supposed pursuit of liberal ideals – democracy, human rights, free markets – in illiberal lands, a magic wand for breaking and remaking other countries, has waxed and waned dramatically. Moving from the zero (British) casualty operations in Kosovo and Kurdistan to the megadeath quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan, the increasing harm done by UK military interventions has become ever more apparent over time. Yet the idea that the British Armed Forces have an almost uniquely global role and responsibility to do good is one that almost all senior figures in UK political parties, the media and the military itself cling to. It is integral to this year’s Integrated Review, as it has also been to every security and defence review since at least the Cold War.   This essay asks whether there is still a constructive role for the UK military to play in promoting global peace and security. It looks first at the military posture envisaged for the 2020s by the Integrated Review, then at some of the problematic principles and assumptions that underlie the current approach, suggesting some alternatives. It then examines some types of operation involving military contributions – not all of them violent – with which the UK could be involved, and identifies some of the unique capacities that might help the UK pivot to a more useful international role.   Lost in the grey-zone How the UK military understands its future role is better approached through a study of the Ministry of Defence’s Defence Command Paper and the armed forces’ own Integrated Operating Concept than by studying the Integrated Review itself.[1] Unsurprisingly, the Defence Command Paper apes the Review’s analysis of threat from all sides, not least in a risible infographic on page six that features ‘Over exposure through globalisation’ as its primary interconnecting threat.[2]   Whatever this means, the MOD is clear that it requires a different strategic approach. Secretary of State Ben Wallace writes, “The notion of war and peace as binary states has given way to a continuum of conflict, requiring us to prepare our forces for more persistent global engagement and constant campaigning, moving seamlessly from operating to war fighting.”[3] He clarified this further in a speech in Washington in July, declaring that the armed forces must “compete below the threshold of open conflict” and “no longer be held as a force of last resort”.[4]   The Defence Command Paper pursues the Integrated Review’s logic of competitive advantage to make its case for ‘Persistent engagement overseas’: “In the current threat landscape, and in an era of constant competition, we must have an increased forward presence to compete with and campaign against our adversaries below the threshold of armed conflict, and to understand, shape and influence the global landscape to the UK’s advantage. To pursue our foreign policy objectives and shape conditions for stability, we will rebalance our force to provide a more proactive, forward deployed, persistent presence.”[5]   So the UK will pursue its advantage through having more personnel and equipment in more places for longer, ready for war. Paradoxically, the reduced size army does this by reorganising to have more special operations forces (four new Rangers battalions) and other specialised units deployed ‘persistently’ overseas to train, mentor and accompany allied armed forces against unspecified enemies. The Royal Navy will scatter its ships more widely, and especially into the ‘Indo-Pacific’, from free-roaming aircraft carrier strike groups to offshore patrol vessels based in Singapore and Gibraltar.   This seems like radical stuff – as the MOD rightly says – but it demands some critical unpacking. Are we really unilaterally declaring that everything is now so grey that there is no legal or perceptual threshold between war and peace? If we are already constantly campaigning, do we not need to specify who we are operating against? Because if so, then we are already at war, exactly the situation that normal countries seek to avoid. Or is that we have been at war all along but been unwilling to recognise it?   National interests, national ambitions and national assumptions How does a normal country define its interests? How does it define its own security? These are not trivial questions but ignoring them has been central to British security policy since at least World War II. Victory in that global conflict, a permanent seat at the UN, and two or three centuries of imperial expansion have long persuaded the UK that it has a status above the normal, that of a great power with global interests. A state of global importance. A force for good.   Time and the Treasury have chipped away at this importance. Tensions within Europe, the long march of decolonisation and post-imperial economic dislocation made their mark in the 1960s and 1970s. But the hubris of victory in the Falklands, Gulf and Cold Wars also buoyed much talk of national ambition, of being a lighter country that punches above its weight, of projecting power. So we see in successive defence and security reviews from 1998 onwards the reassertion of the UK’s global interests and the importance of a military with a global expeditionary capability. Increased dependence on and entanglement with the military of the United States is the little mentioned subtext to this revived assertiveness.   What we have lost sight of is how exceptional such a role is. Like the US and France, the UK continues to define itself as a global player with global interests and global responsibilities, even while fretting about the globalisation of Chinese or Russian ambitions. Other larger ‘middle powers’ without permanent UN seats or nuclear weapons – Japan, Germany, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Italy, Canada, and Spain – do not seem to feel the same way. Defence, for virtually all states, means the defence of national territory and population, not the need to be involved in combatting threats thousands of kilometres away.[6] Despite a minor resurgence within the Integrated Review, homeland defence has been but a minor feature of UK security strategy for decades.   As painful as reckoning with the past and privilege can be, it is essential that the UK does understand how exceptional its approach to security is, how this came about, and why this might present problems for its engagement with other parts of the world. A strategic refresh should start not with how the UK can uphold its strategic advantage over other countries, but with how it can work cooperatively with other states to overcome common challenges. It should start from a place of humility that assumes no special rights, interests or privileges. It should work from the assumption that the shared security of people everywhere is a more stable basis for national security than struggling for competitive advantage.   ‘Force for good’? Even starting from such a position of shared or common security, it is possible to recognise that aspects of the threatening world that the Integrated Review describes are grounded in reality. While we may recognise these ‘threats’ as manifestations of deeper underlying diseases like the desperation of poverty, the marginalisation of inequality, and the indignity of autocracy, each requiring very different kinds of intervention to transform conflict, such violent symptoms can often present real problems of how to manage violent conflict and crisis.   The most obvious international role for the military in a cooperative, multilateral context is through contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. The UK was once a leader in such support, not least during the Bosnian intervention of the mid-1990s. That fell away with the shift in emphasis to ‘counter-terrorism’ operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond in the 2000s but was made more of a priority under David Cameron in the 2010s. This has included both deployment of British peacekeepers and the training of other militaries, usually African, to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Even so, unlike some militaries from the Global South, UN peacekeeping still occupies a tiny fraction of the UK military – well under one per cent of personnel.[7]   A few caveats are worth making to UN peacekeeping in the 21st century. While some missions remain genuinely about observing truces, separating armed parties to peace agreements, protecting civilians and overseeing military-to-civilian transitions, in the last decade others have abandoned impartiality and become more enmeshed in active conflict through adopting mandates that exclude certain ‘extremist’ parties from political processes and commit to offensive operations against them.[8] UNAMSIL in Mali and MONUSCO in the DRC are examples. Also controversial has been UN mandating of offensive ‘peace enforcement operations’ by other states or institutions such as the African Union (in Somalia), France (in the Sahel) or even NATO (in Afghanistan and Libya), sometimes in parallel with UN peacekeepers. UK troops are far more likely to have been involved in such operations.[9]   Military forces can also be useful in what are essentially paramilitary policing roles. This can be within UN peacekeeping operations, in which gendarmerie-type units are increasingly in demand for policing roles, or on the high seas. Operations to counter piracy off Somalia and in the Gulf of Guinea have been the focus of much international cooperation in the last 15 years, including such unlikely partners as the US, UK EU, India, Pakistan, China and Japan. Yet most states send vastly complex frigates and destroyers to do there what could be done by patrol vessels of the sort that the UK has just deployed to Southeast Asia. Like helping to patrol unpoliced waters off West Africa against illegal trawlers, this is a role perhaps better suited to paramilitary coast guard patrol vessels and aircraft.   The UK military also has a role in crisis response that has been useful in a number of humanitarian disasters, including rescuing and supplying civilian victims of hurricanes or cyclones in the Caribbean and Philippines, and the heroic medical response to the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone. Possessing transport aircraft, heavy lift helicopters, engineers and robust equipment, field hospitals and a specialised hospital ship (RFA Argus) all give the UK military an advantage in such responses in several regions. While some militaries, notably the Italian, have made integrating such humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) capabilities into their forces a priority, it may be questioned whether a similar capability might not be more efficiently resourced through civilian structures with no primary warfighting role. Or perhaps a more hybrid military-civilian capability akin to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) or the military medical services is the future.   Finally, at the potentially more violent or ‘kinetic’ end of the spectrum of potential operations, there may be cases in which UK forces could contribute, alone or in coalitions, to more potentially lethal missions under the hazy international Responsibility to Protect (R2P). UK-spearheaded civilian protection and militia disarmament operations in East Timor (INTERFET, 1999, led by Australia), Sierra Leone (Operation Palliser, 2000) and Macedonia (Operation Essential Harvest, 2001) give some indications of the factors underlying potential success. Apart from the small physical scale of such contexts and well trained and equipped troops, these factors would include a UN mandate, the broad consent of the local government and/or civilian population, observance of international humanitarian law, and clear strategic objectives, including a military exit strategy and plan for long-term support. Many other UK operations, from Nigeria to Afghanistan, show how disastrously such missions can fail when these preconditions are lacking.   Human security advantages What I have tried to sketch out above is some means by which the UK military could be reoriented to play a constrained but constructive international role in support of peace and human security. It does not presuppose that the British Armed Forces would not also retain a ‘normal’ role in actual defence of national territory and population. This, after all, is why most – but by no means all – countries retain armed forces. Nor does it presuppose that other civilian forms of building and maintaining peace – diplomatic, developmental, and humanitarian – should not be given far greater prominence and resourcing. It therefore aims to suggest how national security at home might co-exist with the promotion of human security abroad. Unlike the Integrated Review, it proceeds precisely from the premise that use of force should be a last resort and that war should be an exceptional state of affairs.   Such a posture is not without precedent internationally and can be seen in, for example, the internationalist positions of such states as Ghana, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden. Yet these are all relatively small countries with very limited military capabilities. The UK, even assuming a significant reduction in military spending, would be operating at far greater capacity: a globally responsible human security provider capable of heavy-lift operations and responses at strategic scale.   For the past two decades much larger British resources have been expended across Western Asia in catastrophic and futile wars of choice that have vastly diminished the security of millions abroad and diminished us as a country. Beyond curtailing such urges and associated forward deployments, a new focus on international cooperation and human security is vital to the UK, if not being a force for good, at least doing far less harm.   Richard Reeve is the Coordinator of the Rethinking Security network. He has worked in peace and conflict research in the UK, Africa and Western Asia for over 20 years, including as Chief Executive of Oxford Research Group, Head of Research at International Alert, research fellow at King's College London and Chatham House, and an editor/analyst at Jane’s Information Group.   Image by DFID under (CC).   [1] Ministry of Defence, Integrated Operating Concept, September 2020, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1014659/Integrated_Operating_Concept_2025.pdf [2] Ministry of Defence, Defence in a competitive age (CP 411), p.6, Gov.uk, March 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-in-a-competitive-age [3] Ibid, p.2. [4] Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Ben Wallace MP, Defence Secretary's speech at the American Enterprise Institute, Gov.uk, July 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defence-secretarys-speech-at-the-american-enterprise-institute [5] MOD (2021) Defence in a competitive age (CP 411), p.15. [6] Celia McKeon, Contrasting Narratives: A Comparative Study of European and North American National Security Strategies, Rethinking Security, March 2018, https://rethinkingsecurityorguk.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/contrasting-narratives-march-2018.pdf [7] As of September 30th 2021, the UK contributed 605 personnel to UN Peacekeeping operations, less than 0.5 per cent of c.140,000 personnel. At most a few hundred more were involved in training other peacekeepers. [8] For discussion of the issues, see Larry Attree and Jordan Street, Incompatible Bedfellows: UN Peace Operations and Counter-terrorism, Saferworld, September 2020, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/909-incompatible-bedfellows-un-peace-operations-and-counterterrorism [9] Contribution of three Chinook heavy lift helicopters to France’s Operation Barkhane in Mali is one current example. [post_title] => Heavy lift human security: The UK military and fragile states [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => heavy-lift-human-security-the-uk-military-and-fragile-states [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-12-06 01:28:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-12-06 00:28:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6258 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [39] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 6254 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2021-12-06 00:03:25 [post_date_gmt] => 2021-12-05 23:03:25 [post_content] => ‘Global Britain’ encapsulates broad principles and aspirations for the UK’s continued influence in the world. The Prime Minister, in his preface to Global Britain in a Competitive Age (often referred to as the Integrated Review), said: “The creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is the springboard for all our international efforts, integrating diplomacy and development to achieve greater impact and address the links between climate change and extreme poverty.”[1]   A growing criticism of ‘Global Britain’ is that the aspirations, in a number of areas, are not backed up by a credible and coherent plan for implementation. Fragile states, and the precarious human rights of their citizens, are, regrettably, no exception to this criticism. The UK Government’s approach to the impact of UK business on conflict and rights in precarious societies relies heavily on the belief of a benign invisible hand of the market, and an appeal to voluntarism -‘do the right thing’ – from both responsible and unscrupulous companies. But high-risk fragile states tend to attract those looking for big rewards at any cost, even fuelling conflict and gaining cheap, pliant communities or labour through collusion with state silencing of human rights defenders.   Fragile states often present opportunities for high return on investment to key sectors of UK business, but also risks. And from the flip side, UK investment can create new jobs for the people of fragile states but also threats to their livelihoods, labour rights and land rights. The outcomes for people’s dignities and freedoms depend greatly on the intentions and approach of the UK company, the willingness of the national government to act as a fair interlocutor between the company and communities and, and the UK Government’s own commitments to uphold responsible investment and business practice.   Globalisation, and the digitalisation of the UK economy, has transformed UK business and its global supply chains. These have become truly global, intensely complex, with short-lived supplier contracts that pass risk and cost down to the poorest and most vulnerable – often women and migrant workers in factories and farms. The pandemic has exposed fragilities in these supply chains, and has exacerbated inequalities of power and wealth in the extended supply chains that characterise many UK business interests in fragile states. The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre is still supporting apparel workers across Asia to gain their unpaid wages for the clothes they manufactured for UK fashion brands in the first phase of the pandemic.   Abuse is far more prevalent in fragile states, with low governance capacities. The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre’s monitoring of abuse by global business from 2015 to July 2021 witnessed 3,303 allegations, of which over half, 1,859, were in the 32 fragile states, plus the Philippines, Colombia and Brazil.   This article seeks draw out some lessons from the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre’s global monitoring and database of human rights in business, focusing on key areas where UK business can play a key role either in building resilience, or exacerbating fragility and risk for communities and workers.   From corporate voluntarism to smart regulation and incentives UK multinationals span the world, and many have links with fragile states. Like most of Europe and North America, the UK Government, for decades, has had a hands-off approach, relying on market forces, voluntary action, and some ‘nudge’ politics to promote responsible business conduct, even in fragile states. But the mood has shifted in the US and Europe recently regarding business incentives and regulation, and the UK risks being left behind. Increasingly the abuse of workers and communities in fragile states with poor governance, and the trafficking of workers from these states to forced labour in fields and factories in global supply chains, are no longer tolerable. The US is debating new regulatory standards and the Customs and Border Patrol have aggressively banned imports of goods suspected of being produced with forced labour. While the EU, and member states, have legislative initiatives to demand companies identify and prevent human rights risks in their operations and supply chains – a move that has special relevance to fragile states where much abuse by unscrupulous business occurs, often in collusion with the state.   Global Britain has some legal strengths to build on, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and UK Supreme Court judgements. There is an increasing trend of victims of corporate abuse bringing civil claims against UK companies for harm caused by their overseas subsidiaries. Recent decisions indicate UK courts willingness to accept jurisdiction in some cases. Critically for abuse in fragile states, foreign claimants’ inability to obtain sustainable justice in their home country, through lack of resources, for instance, will be taken into consideration by the UK courts when assessing jurisdiction. The UK Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Vedanta Resources Plc and Konkola Copper Mines Plc v Lungowe and Ors held that a UK parent company does, under certain conditions, owe a duty of care to people and communities (in this case, Zambian villagers) affected by its overseas subsidiary’s operations and could be held liable for harm.[2] In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the UK courts’ jurisdiction partly because there was a real issue to be tried and partly because “there was a real risk that the claimants would not obtain substantial justice in the Zambian jurisdiction”.   Another positive development is the UK Supreme Court’s 2021 judgement in Okpabi v Shell (concerning alleged oil pollution and damages in Nigeria).[3] The court cautioned against striking out a claim against a parent company at the jurisdiction stage (given the challenges claimants have in accessing evidence). This case will proceed to trial. This should make it easier for foreign claimants alleging parent company liability to have access to UK courts. Royal Dutch Shell is incorporated in the UK as a public limited company, with total assets of 379.3 billion USD in 2020. Shell has been operating in Nigeria since the late 1950s. The legacy the company has left in the country includes distrust and violence, environmental harm, and little to no economic development for many communities surrounding their projects. Allegations against Shell have ranged from exacerbating tribal conflict, complicity in unlawful arrests, and major pollution events.[4] In 2021, Shell was made to pay $45.7 billion naira ($111 million USD) in compensation from an oil spill from a ruptured pipeline in 1970.[5]   It is too early to assess whether increasing access to courts in the UK will actually translate into enhanced access to justice and remedy for victims of corporate abuse. To date there have been no court rulings on the merits. For example, Vedanta settled out of court in January 2021, two years after the UK Supreme Court affirmed the UK courts had jurisdiction; without admission of liability.[6] Nonetheless, this is a promising development. We can expect additional claims will be brought in UK courts going forward.   Transition minerals for clean energy futures A number of fragile states hold key mineral wealth that is strategic to the world’s transition to clean energy. Minerals such as cobalt, copper, lithium, manganese, nickel and zinc are central to success. The International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts a six-fold increase in production of transition minerals by 2030, for lithium it is 40-fold. Prices and production are already surging.[7] Most are concentrated in only a few states, many of which are fragile – Democratic Republic of the Congo (cobalt), Indonesia and the Philippines (nickel), and Bolivia (lithium). And even within these states, the minerals are often concentrated in the last territories of indigenous people whose nations’ existence is intimately linked to the land. Chinese mining companies prevail and are investing heavily, and the UK is being urged to build its stake in these geopolitically strategic minerals as competition heats up for future access. The quality of UK investment will be critical to the people and communities that should also benefit from this boom.   At the Resource Centre we monitor threats and attacks on Human Rights Defenders, a powerful litmus test of fragility. Unsurprisingly, over a third are linked to the extractive sector. Our survey of human rights abuse in transition mineral extraction reveals a similarly concerning picture: more than 300 serious allegations against 115 transition mineral mining companies, ranging from violence, to violation of indigenous land rights, water pollution, health threats, corruption, and a systemic failure to consult local communities.[8]   Irresponsible investments are driving conflict and polarisation. For instance, water-intensive lithium mining in the arid lithium triangle of Chile, Bolivia, Argentina and Chile, the world’s driest environment, has triggered a wave of protests and legal battles over water rights, pitching indigenous communities against multinational mining companies. Nickel production in Indonesia is driving battles over water pollution. Cobalt mining in the DRC is linked to allegations of child labour, large-scale corruption, and the funding of armed groups.   The UK Government cannot rely on voluntarism to prevent abuse. Codes such as the Voluntary Principles for Security and Human Rights encourage leading companies, but unscrupulous companies are, too often, immune to their influence. HMG should use the leadership it gained from COP26 to help build a multilateral commitment to demand companies identify and prevent risks through mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence, building on the example of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. With the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the European Union considering similar legislative initiatives, this could be low-hanging fruit if China can be persuaded to collaborate. The alternative is ballooning protest, legal challenge and loss of investor confidence, which together will act as a critical brake on projects and the fast transition.   UK Modern Slavery Act and fragile states The conditions of fragile states create desperate people. Often facing poverty and repression, people seek routes to a better future elsewhere. Human traffickers, know these souls are a lucrative income source, and adopt strategies to funnel desperate people into conditions of forced labour.   In 2015, the UK Government established the landmark Modern Slavery Act. Its aim was to encourage global business to eradicate modern slavery. It deployed ‘nudge politics’ and voluntarism to shift companies to action on modern slavery. Section 54 requires companies to publish a statement of the steps they have “taken during the financial year to ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place” in its operations or supply chains.[9] The intention was to create a ‘race to the top’ by encouraging businesses to declare their efforts to tackle modern slavery risks, and so increase competition to drive up standards for appropriate and effective response to modern slavery. There is no doubt that the Modern Slavery Act raised the profile of this issue of forced labour in many countries, but has it had an effect on UK companies’ actions to eliminate this scourge from their supply chains?   Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC) hosted the only public repository of statements – the Modern Slavery Registry – for the first six years, to 2021.[10] We assessed compliance of over 16,000 modern slavery statements of some of the largest global companies over the past five years.[11] Unfortunately, the overwhelming evidence is that the approach of the UK Modern Slavery Act has failed in its stated intentions. The provisions of the UK Act itself, based on a requirement to submit a trifling level of reporting which was not monitored or enforced, has failed to drive systemic corporate action to expunge forced labour, even in high-risk sectors. The Act has raised awareness of the prevalence of modern slavery and encouraged a cluster of leading companies and investors to do more. But ultimately, our analysis reveals no significant improvements in the vast majority of companies’ policies, practice or performance.   Despite six years of persistent non-compliance with the minimal demands of the Act by two in five (40 per cent) of companies, not one injunction or administrative penalty (such as exclusion from lucrative public procurement contracts) was applied to a company for failing to report. This stands in stark contrast to more robust approaches, such as the Section 307 of the Tariff Act in the US where goods suspected of being produced with forced labour have been banned from being imported. This has led to rapid and multi-million dollar repayment of recruitment fees to workers in conditions of forced labour by suppliers desperate to enter the lucrative US market.[12]   Critically, the Act has failed to drive systemic improvement in corporate practice to eliminate modern slavery because it does not place any legally binding standards on companies to undertake efforts to effectively address risks of labour exploitation in their business operations. In fact, the Act explicitly states a company may publish a statement that says it has taken no steps to address modern slavery risks during the financial year and still be compliant with the law. The inadequacy of the Act to protect the estimated 25 million victims of forced labour around the world has been highlighted during the COVID-19 pandemic, which has further increased the risk to workers of forced labour. The pandemic has demonstrated how systemic the causes of labour exploitation are, especially in fragile states, and the urgent need for legally binding obligations on companies – properly enforced – that go beyond weak reporting requirements.   Transparency is a necessary, but insufficient condition for systemic corporate change, even for the worst forms of labour abuse. Three policy shifts would more effectively tackle modern slavery in UK companies and their supply chains:
  1. A new piece of legislation to impose legal liability on all companies in all sectors for a failure to prevent human rights abuses in their businesses;
  2. The introduction of import bans for goods suspected of being produced with forced labour; and
  3. The application of these laws to public procurement.
  Migrants, forced labour and the UK’s global hotel brands Fragile states such as Nepal and Ethiopia also seek to augment their slim GDP through the export of migrant labour around the world. Remittances can become an important source of support to impoverished communities and regions where migration by recruitment agencies is better regulated and the employers abide by good labour law. But too often unscrupulous agents charge extortionate fees for the job and travel, leading to debt bondage, and employers and franchises tolerate abuse to provide cheap and pliant labour. Insights on the toleration of forced labour in UK business’s supply chains are highlighted in our survey of international hotel brands gearing up in Qatar for the World Cup 2022. To manage the expected influx of players, supporters and the media, the Gulf state has seen exponential growth of the hotel industry, with an additional 26,000 hotel rooms brought on stream in time for the World Cup. Yet our research shows hotel brands have failed to take necessary action to protect migrant workers, who suffer serious abuses including: extortionate recruitment fees, discrimination, and being trapped in a job through fear of reprisal and intimidation. These occur despite ‘landmark’ labour reforms which promised to end the Kafala system – a fixed term sponsorship which leaves workers wholly dependent on one employer, no matter their treatment, and unable to change jobs.   The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre invited 19 hotel companies, three of them British (IHG, Whitbread, and Millennium and Copthorne), representing more than 100 global brands with over 80 properties across Qatar, to participate in a second survey on their approach to safeguarding migrant workers’ rights in the country. Our survey revealed a widespread lack of action by hotel brands to prevent and exclude forced labour.[13] This reinforced the stream of stories from workers about abuse taking place in hotels, but the survey also highlighted a cluster of companies who have shown greater leadership. IHG Hotels & Resorts is the highest ranked company, whereas Millennium and Copthorne did not respond and were ranked ‘no stars’ due to lack of relevant information on their site.   Our interviews with hotel workers revealed a shocking contrast between many hotels’ public policy commitments and their practical application or enforcement. This was particularly evident in recruitment processes, where eight out of 18 workers reported being charged high fees for jobs (the precursor to forced labour) despite the fact that only IHG provided transparent figures for the number of workers it identified had paid such fees. The interviews revealed discrimination in position and pay based on nationality and far worse treatment of subcontracted workers. Most alarmingly, almost all workers reported being scared to request to change jobs when they saw a better opportunity, with some fearful the hotels would report them to the authorities and subsequently have them deported.   Much of this points to conditions of ‘forced labour’ as defined by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Unfortunately, the responses by brands revealed none conducted worker-centric monitoring of the conditions of subcontracted workers despite this vulnerable group often working long-term for the hotel brand. Huge profits are set to be made by the multinational and national hotel brands which will host these visitors. Meanwhile, migrant workers from fragile states in East Africa, South Asia and South-East Asia, trapped in exploitative contracts and paying back hefty recruitment debts, will serve these visitors. The good news is that the World Players Union, leading footballers, and some national football federations are demanding fair treatment in the luxury hotels, before they make their booking.   Fragile states and the pandemic The pandemic is hitting many fragile and poor states hard. Low income countries had a two per cent vaccination rate on the September 9th 2021, compared to 65 per cent for high income countries. The further economic disruption and social challenges that the pandemic generates are exaggerated further in fragile states by the precariousness of people’s lives and their lack of savings to cope with shocks. The after-effects are likely to last at least a decade as people try to recover from their loss of earnings, as well as friends and family.   Global Britain could be doing far more than it is to ensure its own contracts with the businesses manufacturing the viruses. The UK has enough vaccine to jab everyone five times over, and we are about to give the general population boosters, while countries such as Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique, have vaccinated a fraction of their populations with one dose.   Equally, the G7 Summit this year, chaired by the UK, was a golden opportunity to put in place a rich-country financing plan for developing countries. Yet the chance was allowed to slip away, with tragic human consequences for fragile states, and potentially for the UK too. The pandemic highlights our interconnected world. As Mamta Murthi, the World Bank's Vice President for Human Development, has warned: "The situation that we see right now is absolutely unacceptable, because a large part of the world remains unvaccinated and this is a danger for all of us."[14]   To meet the international targets, we need to move beyond intermittent vaccine donations to fragile and poor states to large-scale, coordinated dose-sharing. As Kevin Watkins has argued: “The EU, the United Kingdom, and the US should immediately share an additional 250 million doses – less than one-quarter of their collective surplus – through COVAX…. with a clear schedule for providing an additional one billion doses by early 2022.[15]   Conclusion ‘Global Britain’ aspires to embrace the UK’s fundamental values of fairness, care for the vulnerable, and promotion of peace and democracy. It has the potential to make this come alive in our relations with fragile states, including through the actions of responsible business. Nevertheless, the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office has a huge challenge to work across government departments to build a coherent and credible plan to realise the vision through trade and investment; business regulations and incentives, including UK tax havens; and vaccination policy. Currently the approach to fragile states appears to suffer from the same high rhetoric and low implementation that may undermine public trust in both the UK and in fragile states.   The UK could begin to demonstrate greater leadership immediately through some bold feasible actions:
  1. Modern Slavery Act: Strengthen the modern slavery act by catching up with Australia and the US with:
    • Obligations to report on mitigation measures and enforcement of transparency;
    • Legal liability if these are inadequate and facilitate forced labour in supply chains; and
    • The introduction of import bans for goods suspected of being produced with forced labour
 
  1. Human rights due diligence: Adapt the landmark Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the EU’s Sustainable Corporate Governance legislation, to develop a legal obligation on companies to demonstrate they have identified salient human rights risks for workers and communities in their operations and supply chains, and taken proper measures to eliminate these risks.
 
  1. Revision of UK Government’s business incentives: Limit public procurement contracts and export credit guarantees to companies that both declare and report alignment with key business and human rights law; from the ILO convention on forced labour to the late John Ruggie’s UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights.
 
  1. Just transition to clean energy: In the aftermath of COP26, seek multilateral agreements with US, China, and EU to adopt minimum standards of corporate respect for human rights across the clean energy supply chain, and especially for fragile states.
  Phil Bloomer became Executive Director of Business & Human Rights Resource Centre in September 2013. Based at the Centre’s London headquarters, Phil is responsible for leading the global organisation, delivering the mission and strategic priorities, and ensuring effective management of programme, personnel, finance, and administration. Prior to joining the Resource Centre Phil was Director of Campaigns and Policy at Oxfam GB, where he was responsible for a team of 170 staff working across policy, advocacy, programme and campaigns. His team’s priorities were food justice, humanitarian protection and assistance in conflict zones, and the provision of essential health and education for all. Previously he was head of Oxfam International’s Make Trade Fair, and Access to Medicines campaigns. Prior to joining Oxfam, Phil spent 11 years in Latin America and worked on human rights dimensions of business, including in food security, resource extraction; mega-projects; and business relations with public and private security in repressive environments.   [1] HM Government, Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, March 2021, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-_the_Integrated_Review_of_Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf [2] The Supreme Court, Judgement – Vedenta Resources PLC and another (Appellants) v Lungowe and others (Respondents), April 2019, https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2017-0185-judgment.pdf [3] The Supreme Court, Judgement – Okpabi and others (Appellants) v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and another (Respondents), February 2021, https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2018-0068-judgment.pdf [4] Onome Amawhe, Long-Dead Oilfield In Nigeria Still Sows Conflict Between Shell and Communities That Watched It Grow, Forbes, November 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/zengernews/2021/11/02/long-dead-oilfield-in-nigeria-still-sows-conflict-between-shell-and-communities-that-watched-it-grow/; Amnesty International, On Trial: Shell in Nigeria, February 2020, https://www.amnesty.de/sites/default/files/2020-02/Amnesty-Bericht-Nigeria-Shell-on-trial-Februar-2020-ENG.pdf [5] William Clowes, Shell to Pay $111 Million to Resolve Long-Running Oil-Spill Dispute in Nigeria, Insurance Journal, August 2021, https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2021/08/17/627485.htm [6] Leigh Day, Vedanta & Konkola Copper Mines settle UK lawsuit brought by Zambian villagers for alleged pollution from mining activities, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, January 2021, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/vedanta-konkola-copper-mines-settle-uk-lawsuit-brought-by-zambian-villagers-for-alleged-pollution-from-mining-activities/ [7] International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook Special Report, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, May 2021, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/24d5dfbb-a77a-4647-abcc-667867207f74/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf [8] Transition Minerals Tracker, see: https://trackers.business-humanrights.org/transition-minerals/ [9] UK Public General Acts, Modern Slavery Act 2015 – Part 6 Section 54, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/30/section/54/enacted [10] Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, Modern Slavery Statements, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/modern-slavery-statements/ [11] Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, Modern Slavery Statements, Briefing & Analysis Reporting, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/modern-slavery-statements/briefings-analysis-of-reporting/ [12] Congressional Research Service, Section 307 and Imports Produced by Forced Labor, Updated May 20 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11360#:~:text=Section%20307%20of%20the%20Tariff,(CBP)%20enforces%20the%20prohibition [13] Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, Luxury hotels check out over migrant worker abuses in Qatar, July 2021, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/media-centre/press-release-luxury-hotels-check-out-over-migrant-worker-abuses-in-qatar/ [14] World Bank Group, The Development Podcast, ‘Absolutely Unacceptable’ Vaccination Rates in Developing Countries, Episode 17, The World Bank, August 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/podcast/2021/07/30/-absolutely-unacceptable-vaccination-rates-in-developing-countries-the-development-podcast [15] Kevin Watkins, Ending “Trickle Down” Vaccine Economics, Project Syndicate, September 2021, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ending-trickle-down-vaccine-economics-by-kevin-watkins-2021-09 [post_title] => UK private sector interests in fragile states [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => uk-private-sector-interests-in-fragile-states [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-12-06 01:30:17 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-12-06 00:30:17 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=6254 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) )
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