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Пороки перестройки в Узбекистане: Восхождение стекла и блеска

Article by Dilmira Matyakubova

August 3, 2020

Пороки перестройки в Узбекистане: Восхождение стекла и блеска

Страны Центральной Азии стараются построить стратегию национального брендинга путем перестройки своих столиц. Этот процесс можно повсеместно наблюдать в бывших советских республиках: Казахстан построил Астану (ныне Нур-Султан) – столицу современности и прогресса, закрепив наследие в виде имени первого президента Нурсултана Назарбаева; Туркменистан переделывает покрытый белым мрамором Ашхабад Туркменбаши – чтобы навсегда увековечить имя и фигуру «Великого руководителя туркмен», первого президента Сапармурата Ниязова. Постсоветский Узбекистан тоже не остался в стороне от тренда. Хотя предыдущего лидера создание культа личности в материальных пространствах волновало меньше, он скорее остался в памяти как непреклонный лидер, что и привело к формированию таких мест поминовения.

 

Новое правительство при президенте Шавкате Мирзияеве стремится продемонстрировать свой успех, реализуя масштабные проекты по реконструкции города, которые направлены на превращение столицы в современный деловой центр. В 2017 году Кабинет министров издал Постановление «О мерах по улучшению архитектурного облика и благоустройству центральной части Ташкента, а также созданию благоприятных условий для населения и гостей столицы». Это привело к началу реализации городского проекта «Ташкент-Сити» стоимостью 1,3 млрд. долларов США, который занимает центральную часть города и занимает 80 га (3,1 кв. миль).[1]

 

Мирзияев «рассматривает роль города в качестве средства для продвижения нового имиджа бренда страны, «современного» и открытого для иностранного бизнеса и инвестиций»[2]. Он ищет возможности привлечения еще большего количества иностранного бизнеса и инвестиций, создавая для них благоприятные условия в столице. Перепланировка города является одной из таких политических мер. Она направлена на перестройку страны подальше от прежнего авторитарного режима, имевшего инвестиционные ограничения и отсутствие прозрачности в управлении. Подход правительства к планировке, хотя и был направлен на привлечение и удовлетворение международных инвестиций и большего количества туристов, однако, лишен сочувствия и понимания общественной значимости этих проектов для горожан. Хотя для нового правительства представляется разумным формировать определенный имидж, который позволит стране изменить свое место в мире с помощью проектов, ориентированных на инвестиции, его политика создала серьезные социальные и возрастающие политические проблемы, которые в настоящее время являются основной причиной общественного недовольства. Снос и массовые выселения стали главной темой дискуссий в СМИ Узбекистана с конца 2017 года, с момента демонтажа Дома кино советской эпохи. По мнению общественности, многие из новых проектов строятся как фасад прогресса, предназначенный для проведения определенных «важных» мероприятий, а не для удовлетворения потребностей жителей.

 

Целью проекта «Ташкент-Сити» является строительство международного делового центра с индустриальным парком, торговыми центрами, конгресс-центром, высокоэтажными гостиницами, ресторанами и жилыми комплексами. Со всеми этими крупными объектами, словно «город в городе», столица становится фасадом прогрессивной страны. Такие проекты, как «Город Ташкент», наряду с продвижением модернизма и прогресса, маскируют реальность социальных и экономических трудностей и вряд ли могут способствовать повышению экономического и социального благосостояния уязвимых слоев населения, особенно тех, кто пострадал от продолжающихся массовых сносов домов.

 

Из махаллы в небоскреб

 

Перепланировка территории для «Ташкент-Сити» началась со стремительного сноса домов и участков в исторических махаллях (традиционный квартал) Укчи (Лучник) и Олмазор (Яблочный сад) старого города, не оставляя жителям иного выбора, кроме как поспешно искать себе новое жилье. Махалля является местным институтом самоуправления, играющим важную социально-экономическую роль в обществе Узбекистана. Она исполняет и культурную функцию: является центром социального взаимодействия между общинами, связана с местностью и чувства товарищества прочно сохраняются в махаллях.[3] Когда людей заставили покинуть свои махаллы, они не только потеряли свои дома, но и лишились средств к существованию, своих общин, социальных сетей и памяти, связанной с местом. Принудительное выселение без всякого согласования, надлежащей компенсации или расселения широко распространено в Мирзияевском Узбекистане. Ташкент-Сити не просто расчистил пространство для современного города, он истребил эпоху из истории традиционного образа жизни в узбекских махаллях, которая имеет долгую историю, восходящую к XIV веку. Государство владеет землей и имеет право использовать ее для так называемых «государственных и общественных нужд», но имеет ли оно право искоренить историю и стереть с лица земли общественную память? Для правительства, однако, не важно, согласен ли народ на выселение или испытывает ли он эмоциональную привязанность к данному месту. Поскольку это было решение «сверху вниз», оно не предполагало какого-либо участия общественности или обсуждения в какой бы то ни было форме.

 

Olmazor mahalla. Photo: Umida Akhmedova

 

Закрывая двери в свое прошлое и перестраивая столицу, новые ташкентцы, переходя из коммерческих структур в состав правительственной элиты, пытаются создать себе образ, присваивая себе такие культовые названия, как Cambridge Residence, Gardens Residence, Boulevard и др. Это всего лишь имитация локаций, которые имеют сильное историческое наследие и предания, связанные с их названиями, в то время как Boulevard в Ташкент-Сити символизирует недавные и болезненные события для его жителей.

 

Инвестором, который много строит в районе Ташкента, является местная упаковочная компания «Universal Packing Masters» на базе «Murad Buildings» планирует построить на этом участке 266,5-метровый небоскреб под названием «Nest One», с роскошными апартаментами, ресторанами, офисами и т.д.[4] У компании есть девиз «Murad Buildings строит счастье!»  Владелец рекламирует свой грандиозный проект по строительству так называемых «умных домов». Эти дома строятся на той самой земле, откуда до этого люди были насильно выселены из своих домов. Для многих он строит скорее потрясение, нежели счастье.

 

Ситуация Даврона Халикова, бывшего жителя махалли Олмазор, отражает социальные проблемы уязвимого населения, пострадавшего от хаоса. Сидя на лавочке в центре города, Даврон тихо размышляет о том, как оплатить свою следующую арендную плату. Его нынешнего заработка в автосалоне недостаточно для того, чтобы свести концы с концами. Он снимает квартиру с женой и четырьмя детьми, потеряв свой дом во время массового сноса своей махалли в старом городе. Даврон не в состоянии снять или купить жилье на Boulevard «Ташкент-Сити», стоимость которого составила бы 100000 долларов за однокомнатную неотделанную квартиру с площадью 64 м² (квадратный метр).[5] Ему было отказано в предоставлении другого жилья по простой технической причине; он не жил в доме в момент сноса вместе с остальными членами его большой семьи. В связи с большим количеством членов семьи проживающих в одном доме, он решил снять другое жилье в городе. Он подал иск в городской суд, но затем отказался от него, так как считает, что ни правительство, ни судебная система не могут ему что-либо предложить: 

 

«Эта страна для меня больше не родина. Это просто место для жизни на данный момент, пока я не найду себе место где-нибудь за границей». Сейчас меня беспокоит только одно – арендная плата за мою квартиру, которая должна быть выплачена в понедельник. Меня беспокоит судьба моих детей. Я хочу помочь им встать на ноги… Я просто надеюсь на чудо.  Я знаю, что не могу рассчитывать на помощь правительства.»[6]

 

Даврон попробовал обратиться в местные органы власти за помощью в его деле, но ничего не получил. Он не единственный человек, который остался без крова из-за сносов. В ходе стремительной подготовки территории для «Ташкент-Сити», в соседней махалле Укчи были снесены 521 домов, принадлежавших 2165 семьям. По словам юрисконсульт управления «Ташкент Сити», из 2165 семей до начала сноса на этой территории проживало всего 1138 семей. Это означает, что остальные 1027 семей не получили никакой компенсации из-за того, что не проживали в этом районе де-факто.[7] Это значит, что есть такие люди, как Даврон, которые остались без дома. Юрисконсульт также утверждал, что жители махалли выразили желание переехать в многоэтажные квартиры, а не получить земельные участки схожего размера. Однако прошлые интервью свидетельствовали об обратном: многие просили предоставить им дом для проживания всей семьи, на той же или близлежащей территории, они были недовольны предлагаемыми заменами.[8] Государство не осознавало разницу в образе жизни и культуре между теми, кто живет в традиционных поселениях, и теми, кто живет в многоэтажных современных квартирах. В традиционных поселениях многодетные и расширенные семьи часто проживают в одном и том же жилище. Им предлагалось меньшее по размеру распределенное жилье – по принципу законного владельца. Те, кто проживают совместно, также имели права, но их игнорировали, и в итоге они стали бездомными, подверженными стрессу и страданиям.

 

The unfinished part of the Boulevard. Photo: by author

 

Наблюдается явное нарушение законодательства в этом отношении, так как согласно Положению «О порядке компенсации ущерба, причиненного гражданам и юридическим лицам в результате изъятия земли для государственных или общественных нужд», всем жителям, прописанным в недвижимости, гарантируется получение компенсации.[9] Кроме того, произошло принудительное выселение, поскольку большинство семей были вынуждены покинуть территорию в кратчайшие сроки, так как снос начался до переселения всех жильцов. Это происходило путем принуждения жителей к выселению путем создания для них невыносимых условий; они были отрезаны от коммунальных служб, в частности, от электричества и газа, что является очевидным признаком насильственного выселения в соответствии с международным правом[10].

 

Новое Постановление Кабинета Министров «О порядке возмещения убытков гражданам и юридическим лицам в связи с изъятием земельных участков для государственных и общественных нужд», известное местным жителям как «Фашистская ПКМ 911», стало эксплуатационным орудием застройщиков для осуществления своей прибыльной деятельности в виде строительства бизнес-центров, недвижимости, парков развлечений и т.д.[11] Данное Постановление, в отличие от предыдущего, изменило сроки уведомления и сноса, предоставив инвесторам и строительным компаниям больше полномочий на осуществление своих действий. В нем указаны сроки уведомления от трех до пяти дней или просто «по мере необходимости». А это значит, что данные сроки настолько гибкие, что инвесторы могут использовать их в свою пользу. Она позволяет принимать решение о сносе жилого квартала, если 75% жителей дали свое согласие. Остальное инвестор может получить в судебном порядке, как это предусмотрено законодательством. В принципе, инвестор или подрядчик должен пройти ряд юридических действий, которые включают в себя ряд процедур по получению разрешения на совершение действий. Однако на практике применяется только заключительная стадия подачи заявления (получение согласия 75 процентов резидентов), в результате чего количество разрешений на снос возрастает.

 

Кроме того, в постановлении использована фраза «принудительная покупка» недвижимости в случае несогласия жителей, что наделяет государство и застройщиков еще большими полномочиями. Судебные инструменты важны для выполнения на местах положений и обязательств, закрепленных в праве на достаточное жилище (ООН-Хабитат) или прямой отсылкой к Международному пакту об экономических, социальных и культурных правах. Следовательно, в законодательство следует включить положение о принудительных выселениях, приведя его в соответствие с международными нормами и соглашениями для обеспечения права личности на безопасность и права на защиту от принудительных выселений. Новое постановление не соответствует международным нормам, поскольку оно не включает в себя основные права и защиту от принудительных выселений, закрепленные в международном праве в области социально-экономических и культурных прав. Тем не менее, Узбекистан подписал эти соглашения, что налагает на него обязательства по соблюдению установленных норм по обеспечению защиты от незаконных и принудительных выселений и гарантированию достаточного жилища[12]. Судя по всему, правительство Узбекистана не намерено соблюдать подписанные им соглашения, тем самым не выполняя свои обязательства как государство-участник.

 

Новые ташкентцы пытаются «продать» город как что-то, чем он не является, создавая факсимильные копии всемирных образов и популярных мегаполисов, что приводит к удручающим результатам. Ирония заключается в том, что пока население разрушенных махаллей остается без жилья, агентство недвижимости «Dream City Development», которое отвечает за продажу новой недвижимости, постоянно рекламирует продажу новых квартир. Агентство недвижимости выделяет большой пул ресурсов на продажу квартир и коммерческих зданий в «культовых» местах, таких как Boulevard и Gardens Residence на территории «Ташкент-Сити», который теперь называется Dream City. Dream City застраивается на восьми лотах; у каждого лота есть свои инвесторы, имеющие скрытые истоки, но, похоже, связанные с новоявленными бюрократами в правительстве. Источники инвестиций для этих лотов неизвестны и недоступны для общественности. Однако есть веские доводы в пользу того, что эти инвесторы используют оффшорные компании и суррогатных акционеров для сокрытия своего участия в этих лотах. Исследования, проведенные обществом «Open Democracy», выявили иностранных инвесторов, которые могут действовать в качестве прикрытия для местных бизнесменов. Были разоблачены цепочки компаний, которые находятся на передовой линии проекта и тесно связаны с мэром Ташкента Джахонгиром Артикходжаевым.[13] О неоднозначности истинных бенефициаров лотов в Ташкент-Сити, сообщает антикоррупционный активист Томас Мейн:

 

Это показывает, как легко скрыть истинных владельцев проекта – бенефициаров – с помощью компаний, зарегистрированных за рубежом. Безусловно, проект поднимает много тревожных сигналов: источник средств неясен, и 19-летний парень вряд ли окажется истинным бенефициарным владельцем компании, ответственной за проект торгового центра «Ташкент-Сити»[14].

 

Gardens Residence apartments. Photo: by author

 

Пока жилые здания на Boulevard остаются пустыми, агентство недвижимости Dream City Development утверждает, что 80% квартир на Boulevard проданы. По данным агентства, 70 процентов покупателей – ташкентцы, 10 процентов – иностранные покупатели. Остальные 20 процентов доступны для приобретения.[15] Отсутствие социальной инфраструктуры в новом проекте, похоже, не сдерживает потенциальных покупателей. Похоже, что нувориши в «Ташкент- Сити» не будут испытывать потребности в школах или медицинских центрах в непосредственной близости от них. Обилие торговых проспектов, офисов и гостиниц будет достаточно. Предполагается, что квартиры приобретаются как инвестиции, а те, кто их приобретает, не планируют жить в этом районе.

 

Алексей Улько, обозреватель по искусству и культуре, использует термин «новая бюрократия» в отношении людей, которые появились в правительстве и коммерческих структурах, связанных с правительством. По его мнению, эти городские проекты не предназначены для удовлетворения общественных потребностей, а ориентированы на удовлетворение потребностей этой новой элиты, которая стремится подняться по социальной лестнице:

 

«Старые бюрократии жили в неприступных замках, застойных и душных, окруженных старыми верными слугами и выцветшими портретами славных предков». Новая бюрократия больше похожа на финансовые пирамиды, всасывающие в себя все больше и больше новых людей. Нельзя управлять таким предприятием, сидя в мрачном бараке советской постройки, изолированном от остального мира уродливой бетонной стеной. Для этого нужен городской район с высокими, блестящими, дорогостоящими и просторными офисами с тысячами людей, работающих в них, и еще многими тысячами, жаждущими туда попасть: блестящие храмы выдающегося потребления.»[16]

 

Нынешнее правительство использует стратегию «Уничтожить и построить» – быстрое решение для реализации их текущего плана по выкупу земли, уничтожению старых районов и строительству новых в городе. Последствия сноса — это не только практические трудности, но и психологический стресс и сопротивление.

 

Возрастающая ярость разрушения

 

Степень опустошения настолько велика, что она приводит к попыткам суицидов, совершаемых гражданами в знак протеста против сноса домов или нападения на государственных должностных лиц. 14 декабря 2018 года Нозима Эргашева из Кибрайского района публично подожгла себя во время приема граждан в районной администрации, в знак протеста против решения о сносе ее дома. В результате она получила ожог 68% тела.

 

Попытки самоубийства часто встречаются среди людей, чьи дома находятся под угрозой изъятия по причине незаконной застройки сельскохозяйственных угодий. В течение 2018-2019 годов в стране было зарегистрировано 23 000 случаев незаконного захвата земли.[17] Это означает, что 23 000 семей потеряют свои дома из-за того, что государство признало их незаконными и решило забрать землю для так называемых «государственных нужд». Потрясённые такими известиями, люди совершали отчаянные поступки. В феврале 2020 года Мукаддас Мустафаева из Карши подожгла себя в знак протеста против сноса ее дома, а ее отец получил серьезные ожоги в попытке потушить пламя[18].

 

С другой стороны, массовые сносы породили гражданскую активность; граждане переняли иную роль, люди стали все более бдительными и стали размещать материалы, рассказывать о случаях, свидетелями которых они стали. Они стали носителями потенциальных политических изменений. Хотя ситуация со свободой слова и свободой собраний не улучшилась в пост-каримовском Узбекистане и имели место прямые угрозы жизни журналистов и блоггеров, которые открыто обсуждали самые острые проблемы в стране, например, вопросы выселения и массового сноса домов. Случай с Амиром Шарифуллиным, блогером группы Ташкент – СНОС на Facebook, стал лакмусовой бумажкой для нетерпимости правительства к публичной критике. Амир был похищен и избит двумя мужчинами, в результате чего получил серьезные телесные повреждения. Позже один из них был привлечен к административной, а не уголовной ответственности, в то время как другой остался безнаказанным. СМИ считают, что существует очевидная связь между преступниками и структурами государственной безопасности[19].

 

Группа принадлежит и управляется Фаридой Чариф (Шарифуллиной), матерью Амира и активистом в области жилищных прав, которая открыто говорит о вопросах сноса домов и выселения. Группа, объединившая более 20 000 человек, является платформой, на которой ее члены размещают, делятся, обсуждают вопросы, связанные со сносом и выселением. Как считает Амир, похищение было способом угрозы и оказания давления на его мать. Называние случая насильственного похищения «административной ответственностью» и освобождение преступников, по всей видимости, свидетельствует о том, что это скорее всего был акт властей, у которых есть конфликт интересов в вопросах, обсуждаемых в группе. Видимо, лица, не обнаружившие уголовный элемент в этом деле, были недовольны публичной критикой незаконных сносов домов и хотели добиться подавления протестов.

 

От Всемирного наследия к Всемирному Диснею

 

Процессы городского преобразования не ограничиваются лишь переустройством столицы. По всей стране предпринимаются активные действия по развитию туристической отрасли, перестраиваются города областного значения, делая их более привлекательными для туристов. В сознании правительственных чиновников «привлекательность» заключается в строительстве блестящих высотных отелей и бизнес-центров или парков развлечений диснейлендского типа, зачастую изменяя атмосферу вокруг исторических достопримечательностей. Высотные здания появляются в исторической зоне Самарканда, где по закону запрещены здания, состоящие более чем из двух этажей, что свидетельствует о коррупции на всех этапах процесса благоустройства и модернизации во имя туризма. Подтверждением этому служит дело бывшего хокима (мэр) Самарканда Туробжона Джураева, приговоренного к 13 годам лишения свободы за получение взятки в размере 2 000 000 долларов США за разрешение строительства высотных зданий в зоне культурного наследия города, и еще четырех чиновников того же ведомства были наказаны за такое же преступление.[20] Вот что происходит, когда просто переставляешь кресла по кругу. Жураева резко раскритиковал предыдущий президент Каримов и уволил его в 2013 году; он обвинялся в коррупции. Однако в 2017 году он был назначен хокимом Бекабадского района Ташкентской области и в том же году возглавил Самарканд. Это прекрасный пример круговорота власти и непотизма среди коррумпированных чиновников в правительстве, где одни и те же лица возвращаются на новые должности и совершают одни и те же преступления.

 

Samarkand. Photo: M & G Therin-Weise (UNESCO)

 

Осуществление подобного благоустройства ради туризма приводит к массовым разрушениям и непоправимым изменениям. Процесс благоустройства, который, как предполагается, заворожит туристов, является ничем иным, как туристическим китчем. Это процесс массового разрушения и диснеизации исторических памятников, как, например, попытка превратить Шахрисабз в Всемирный парк Диснея, а не в объект Всемирного наследия.

 

В 2016 г. Комитет всемирного наследия рассмотрел вопрос о включении исторического центра города Шахрисабз на юге Узбекистана в Список всемирного наследия, находящегося под угрозой чрезмерного развития и необратимых изменений. Затем Комитет обратился к Центру всемирного наследия ЮНЕСКО и Международному совету по охране памятников и исторических мест с просьбой оценить ущерб и рекомендовать меры по его восстановлению[21]. 

 

Заключения и рекомендации

 

Правительство должно признать, что отсутствие хорошо продуманного плана стало причиной пороков политики ребрендинга, направленной на лишение людей домов, их общин и их благосостояния. Для поддержания общественного благосостояния и обеспечения выгоды населения от планирования, правительство должно вести диалог с народом, чтобы изучить его желания в отношении собственного благополучия, так как представления о благополучии государства и народа, похоже, не совпадают. Похоже, что руководство пытается создать национальный бренд, стремясь побелить свою репутацию и стимулировать туризм и инвестирование в страну. Процесс национального брендинга является довольно сложным, ведь это вовсе не просто связи с общественностью и маркетинг страны для целевой аудитории. Это также означает не только создание привлекательных условий в угоду гостям, но и систематическое и непрерывное стремление к развитию. О странах судят по их управлению, политике, их новым идеям, знаковым действиям и их вкладу в глобальное развитие. До того, как инвестировать в популяризацию себя, своего туризма или новых городов, Узбекистан, как страна, отделенной от выхода к морю двумя государствами, и с тёмной репутацией, должна работать над улучшением своего имиджа посредством продуманных реформ для получения подлинного уважения на мировой сцене. Усиление и обеспечение защиты прав человека, независимости судебной системы, подотчетности, прозрачности в управлении и открытого диалога с людьми позволит ей добиться успеха в создании национального бренда. Вот такие усилия, а не сверкающая, взмывающая к небесам, вычурная столица, затем станут гарантией повышения репутации нации, а не блестящая, парящая, претенциозная столица.

 

Ниже приводятся дальнейшие рекомендации:

 

  • Правительству следует пересмотреть действующее постановление о компенсации ущерба гражданам и изъятии земли, добавив в него важный аспект, касающийся принудительных выселений, приведя законодательство в соответствие с международными нормами и соглашениями, обеспечивающими право личности на безопасность и право на защиту от принудительных выселений;

 

  • Правительству необходимо обеспечить, чтобы жителям до переселения предоставлялась справедливая и адекватная компенсация и замена в соответствии с принципами права на достаточное жилище, и обеспечить их защиту от вымогательства и запугивания; и

 

  • Для обеспечения единогласия в принятии решений и недопущения противоречий между законодательными актами необходимо создать независимый комитет для рассмотрения принятых постановлений и поправок. Этот комитет будет следить за обеспечением соответствия внутренних законов, существенно затрагивающих права и свободы граждан, международным нормам в области прав человека.

 

Photo by Mysportedithttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en

 

[1] Dilmira Matyakubova, Who Is “Tashkent City” For? Nation-Branding and Public Dialogue in Uzbekistan, Voices on Central Asia, June 2018, https://voicesoncentralasia.org/who-is-tashkent-city-for-nation-branding-and-public-dialogue-in-uzbekistan/

[2] Dilmira Matyakubova, Nation Branding, Social Classes and Cultural Heritage in Uzbekistan, Cabar.asia, April 2019, https://cabar.asia/en/nation-branding-social-classes-and-cultural-heritage-in-uzbekistan/

[3] Dilmira Matyakubova, Who is Tashkent City For? Nation branding and Public Dialogue in Uzbekistan, CAP Paper 205 (CAAF Fellows Papers), June 2018, https://centralasiaprogram.org/archives/12455

[4] Про Nest One – About Nest One, https://nestuzbekistan.uz/ru/kurumsal; Murad Buildings and Ozguven announced the first skyscraper’s name in Uzbekistan, UzA, August 2019, http://uza.uz/en/society/murad-buildings-and-zg-ven-announced-the-first-skyscraper-s–29-08-2019

[5] Dream City, A conversation with an agent of ‘Dream City Development’, February 2020,  http://dreamcity.uz

[6] Interview with Davron Halikov, former resident of Olmazor mahalla. March 2020.

[7] «Было много сомнений, но мы сделали это…» – интервью с представителем Дирекции Tashkent City (‘There were many doubts but we did it’…interview with a representative of Tashkent City Directorate), Podrobno.uz, December 2019, https://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/-bylo-mnogo-somneniy-no-my-sdelali-eto-intervyu-s-predstavitelem-direktsii-tashkent-city/

[8] Matyakubova. Who is Tashkent City For? Nation branding and Public Dialogue in Uzbekistan

[9] Положение о порядке возмещения убытков гражданам и юридическим лицам в связи с изъятием земельных участков для государственных и общественных нужд – Regulation on the procedure for compensation of losses to citizens and legal entities in connection with the seizure land for state and public needs, May 2006, https://nrm.uz/contentf?doc=105171_polojenie_o_poryadke_vozmeshcheniya_ubytkov_grajdanam_i_yuridicheskim_licam_v_svyazi_s_izyatiem_zemelnyh_uchastkov_dlya_gosudarstvennyh_i_obshchestvennyh_nujd_(prilojenie_k_postanovleniyu_km_ruz_ot_29_05_2006_g_n_97)&produ

[10] Matyakubova. Who is Tashkent City For? Nation branding and Public Dialogue in Uzbekistan; The Right to Adequate Housing, UN Habitat, Fact Sheet No. 21/Rev.1, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS21_rev_1_Housing_ru.pdf

[11] Ўзбекистон республикаси вазирлар маҳкамасининг қарори, жисмоний ва юридик шахсларнинг мулк ҳуқуқлари кафолатларини таъминлаш ҳамда ер участкаларини олиб қўйиш ва компенсация бериш тартибини такомиллаштиришга доир қўшимча чора-тадбирлар тўғрисида – Regulation on the procedure for compensation of losses to citizens and legal entities in connection with the seizure land for state and public needs, November 2019, https://lex.uz/ru/docs/4597630

[12] The Right to Adequate Housing, UN Habitat. Fact Sheet No. 21/Rev.1.

[13] Kristian Lasslett, Uzbekistan Ltd: private-public interests clash in flagship project, Open Democracy, January 2019,  https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/uzbekistan-ltd/

[14] OpenDemocracy Investigations, Phantom foreign investors for an open new Uzbekistan, openDemocracy, December 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/tashkent-city-project-uzbekistan-phantom-foreign-investors/

[15] Dream City, A conversation with an agent of ‘Dream City Development’, February 2020.

[16] Interview with Aleksey Ulko, writer on Arts and Culture, February 2020.

[17] Uzbek Justice Ministry hints at new wave of illegal buildings demolitions, Fergana News,  February 2020, https://en.fergana.ru/news/115498/

[18] Vladimir Rozanskij, Another woman sets herself on fire to save her home,  AsiaNews, February 2020, http://asianews.it/news-en/Another-woman-sets-herself-on-fire-to-save-her-home-49359.html

[19] AsiaTerra, Why police did not detect corpus delicti in the actions of two recidivists who attacked Amir Sharifullin?, March 2020, http://www.asiaterra.info/news/pochemu-militsiya-ne-obnaruzhila-sostava-prestupleniya-v-dejstviyakh-dvukh-retsidivistov-napavshikh-na-amira-sharifullina

[20] Sputnik News, Ex-khokim of Samarkand region received 13 years in prison for bribes, August 2019, https://uz.sputniknews.ru/society/20190802/12158730/Eks-khokim-Samarkandskoy-oblasti-poluchil-13-let-tyurmy-za-vzyatki.html

[21] World Heritage Convention, Historic Centre of Shakhrisabz, Uzbekistan, added to List of World Heritage in Danger, July 2016, http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1522/

Footnotes
    Related Articles

    Реабилитация здесь и сейчас: Обеспечение правосудия переходного периода в Узбекистане

    Article by Стив Свердлов

    July 31, 2020

    Реабилитация здесь и сейчас: Обеспечение правосудия переходного периода в Узбекистане

    Нам срочно необходима структура, не зависящая от государственной системы исправительных учреждений, которая будет иметь полномочия на разработку средств правовой защиты по отдельным делам, связанным с прошлыми и текущими злоупотреблениями. Формирование подобной комиссии стало бы сигналом о намерении правительства откликнуться на призывы своих граждан к прекращению нарушений прав человека и встать на путь, ведущий к более уважительному отношению к правам человека.

    — интервью с Агзамом Тургуновым, правозащитником, жертвой пыток, находившимся в заключении в 2009-2017 годах.

     

    Гораздо чаще, чем стражи демократии хотели бы признать, смерть диктатора, как правило, практически не приводит к фундаментальному изменению сущности политической системы. Вспомните сирийского Башара Асада в 2000 году, северокорейского Ким Чен Ира в 2011 году и венесуэльского Уго Чавеса в 2013 году. Однако в отдельных редких случаях это может способствовать ощутимым улучшениям в жизни миллионов простых людей. По мнению некоторых, это произошло – по крайней мере, частично и на некоторое время – в случае со смертью Иосифа Сталина в 1953 году. Несомненно, это произошло в августе 2016 года со смертью Ислама Каримова, чье жестокое 27-летнее правление (1989-2016 гг.) в Узбекистане стало синонимом худших форм репрессий, пыток и заключения в тюрьму по политическим мотивам.

     

    На сегодняшний день, почти четыре года спустя после смерти Каримова и прихода к власти Шавката Мирзиёева, правительство Узбекистана в рамках более масштабной и амбициозной программы реформ предприняло ряд решительных шагов для решения некоторых из наихудших нарушений прав человека, связанных с длительным правлением его предшественника.

     

    С сентября 2016 г., почти сразу после смерти Каримова и под многолетним давлением международного сообщества, правительство начало выпускать на свободу политических заключенных, которых по состоянию на июль 2020 г. насчитывалось около 55 человек, включая журналистов и правозащитников, находящихся на протяжении долгого времени под стражей, не говоря уже об освобождении неустановленного числа религиозных узников.[1]

     

    В числе освобожденных – Юсуф Рузимурадов и Мухаммад Бекжанов – двое дольше всех в мире находившихся в заключении журналиста – 19 и 18 лет соответственно, правозащитники Агзам Тургунов и Азам Фармонов, а также мирные политические диссиденты, такие как Самандар Куканов, первый заместитель Председателя парламента Узбекистана после обретения независимости. Незаконно лишенный свободы на 24 года, Куканов является одним из наиболее долго находившихся в заключении политических активистов в мире после Нельсона Манделы.

     

     © Steve Swerdlow, Philippe Dam, Qarshi, November 2018.

     

    Устраняя еще одно наследие, в августе 2019 года Президент распорядился о закрытии пресловутой тюрьмы Жаслык – долгое время являющейся символом эпидемии пыток в Узбекистане и заточения критиков правительства – в соответствии с требованием органов по правам человека Организации Объединенных Наций (ООН), выдвинутым впервые еще 17 лет назад. Рузимурадов, Бекжанов, Тургунов и Фармонов все отбывали наказание в этой тюрьме. Тем не менее, существует сохраняющаяся обеспокоенность по поводу того, что власти не закрыли этот объект окончательно и все еще могут использовать его для содержания подозреваемых.

     

     

    В январе этого года Мирзиёев объявил об отмене прописки, вида на жительство советского образца, который позволял органам власти существенно ограничивать свободу передвижения граждан внутри страны. И покончив с многолетней интернет-цензурой, он распорядился отменить запрет на некоторые сайты с критикой, и при этом ключевой представитель его правительства в СМИ практически признал, что социальные сети и блогеры сегодня являются одними из самых важных арбитров общественного мнения в Узбекистане. Однако несмотря на то, что медийный ландшафт стал более оживленным, некоторые блогеры и журналисты все еще подвергаются преследованиям, даже задержаниям, когда пытаются разглядеть коррупцию или оспаривают действия местных властей.[2] Значительные усилия правительства по искоренению принудительного взрослого и детского труда в хлопковом секторе Узбекистана являются, возможно, наиболее заметной попыткой искоренить нарушения советской и каримовской эпох.

     

    Вышеперечисленные шаги свидетельствуют о значительном прорыве в области прав человека. Но прошлое, особенно когда оно остается без внимания, способно отомстить за благие планы реформ и проникнуть в будущее. Единственным способом обеспечения решительного ухода Узбекистана от тяжелейших нарушений прав человека в эпоху Каримова и дальнейшего улучшения положения с правами человека является принятие правительством на себя обязательств по осуществлению осмысленного процесса оценки прошлого и обеспечения правосудия переходного периода. Правосудие переходного периода подразумевает судебные и внесудебные действия, направленные на установление истины и примирение, а также на обеспечение правосудия и ответственности с тем, чтобы признать и исправить наследие широко распространенных нарушений прав человека, которые стали систематическими при правлении Ислама Каримова.

     

    Помимо этого, в нарушение своих международных и внутренних обязательств, ташкент еще не создал условий для реабилитации освобожденных политических и религиозных заключенных, у многих из которых состояние здоровья остается плачевным из-за тяжелых испытаний, выпавших на их долю в заключении на протяжении десятилетий. Бывшие и до сих пор содержащиеся под стражей политические заключенные Узбекистана заслуживают правосудия и возмещения ущерба за серьезные нарушения прав человека, которым они подверглись, но данный вопрос в Узбекистане пока еще даже не стоит на повестке дня.

     

    В рамках международного права в области прав человека правосудие переходного периода направлено на привлечение виновных к ответственности за нарушения и признание страданий и человеческого достоинства жертв. Оно также нацелено на составление достоверного отчета по прошлому, что никогда не представлялось возможным с момента обретения Узбекистаном независимости в 1991 году. Кроме того, правосудие переходного периода важно для Узбекистана, медленно восстанавливающего после периода тяжелых репрессий, но в котором нарушения прав человека были настолько серьезными и укоренившимися на протяжении жизни целого поколения, что обычная судебная система еще не в силах обеспечить правосудие.

     

    В одной статье трудно детально рассмотреть каждую из них, однако меры правосудия переходного периода в Узбекистане могли бы включать в себя и такие меры: (1) публичное уголовное преследование лиц, виновных в серьезных злоупотреблениях; (2) комиссии по установлению истины, в отношении преследования критиков правительства, в том числе за массовые убийства в Андижане в мае 2005 г.; (3) компенсацию и реабилитацию жертв пыток и заключения по политическим мотивам; (4) институциональную реформу Службы государственной безопасности ( СГБ) и милиции; и (5) сохранение памяти о прошлых злоупотреблениях в виде публичных пространств, памятников и музеев.

     

     © Steve Swerdlow, Tallinn, Vilnius, February 2019, November 2018.

     

    Цель данного труда – предоставить «дорожную карту» для правосудия переходного периода в Узбекистане на основе изучения международной и местной нормативно-правовой базы, уже существующей для поддержки таких начинаний. Он обобщает отважные помыслы бывших политзаключенных, пытавшихся добиться своей юридической реабилитации, одновременно затрагивая более широкий общенациональный диалог о темном прошлом Узбекистана. В нем также упоминаются высказывания некоторых представителей власти, несмотря на свою осторожность, позволяющие дать оценку прошлым и текущим нарушениям прав человека в Узбекистане.

     

    Зверские пытки и смерть андижанца Алижона Абдукаримова в руках правоохранительных органов в мае 2020 года и редкий общественный резонанс, вызванный смертью Абдукаримова, наглядно показывают, насколько трудно искоренить устоявшиеся политику и практику нарушения прав человека без постоянного независимого надзора, парламентского контроля и активного участия независимых СМИ и гражданского общества.

     

    Правосудие переходного периода и реабилитация необходимы в Узбекистане здесь и сейчас. Несмотря на то, что некоторые из вышеперечисленных реформ дали реальные результаты и фактически свергли значительную часть наследия Каримова, правительственные чиновники, включая самого президента Мирзиёева, лишь косвенно ссылаются на репрессии прошлого, предпочитая вместо этого «смотреть в будущее». Такой подход, однако, недостаточен для решения глубинных проблем в области прав человека, которые должны быть устранены, если Узбекистан хочет двигаться вперед.

     

    Правосудие переходного периода и реабилитация имеют важнейшее значение для укрепления уважения к верховенству права и созданию подотчетных учреждений спустя десятилетия, в течение которых ни то, ни другое не существовало. Чрезвычайно трудно будет добиться таких процессов, и для этого потребуется большое политическое мужество. Но в отсутствие отрезвляющего общенационального диалога о прошлых нарушениях – в первую очередь основанного на голосах независимого гражданского общества – трудно представить себе амбициозную программу реформ, которую президент Мирзиёев сделал визитной карточкой успешной или стабильной работы своей администрации на долгосрочную перспективу.

     

    Реабилитация — это право

    В 2005 году Комиссия ООН по правам человека приняла Основные принципы и руководящие положения, касающиеся права на правовую защиту и возмещение ущерба для жертв грубых нарушений международных норм в области прав человека и серьезных нарушений международного гуманитарного права (далее «Основные принципы»).Основные принципы направлены на объединение международного гуманитарного права и права в области прав человека и подчеркивают важность соблюдения обязательства по компенсации на внутригосударственном уровне для жертв злоупотреблений.  В марте 2006 года Основные принципы были приняты Генеральной Ассамблеей ООН, что еще больше укрепило их статус несмотря на то, что формально они не имеют обязательной силы.[3]

     

    Следует подчеркнуть, что в Основных принципах подробно описывается круг возможных мер по компенсации – реституция, компенсация, реабилитация, сатисфакция и гарантии неповторения. Основные принципы, хотя они еще находятся в стадии разработки, уже упоминаются в правовой практике ряда договорных органов по правам человека и фигурируют в нескольких недавно принятых международных правовых документах и внутригосударственном законодательстве, а также применяются рядом комиссий по установлению истины во всем мире.  Основные принципы в значительной степени отражают уже устоявшиеся нормы международного права и вносят важный вклад в их объединение и закрепление.

     

    В отношении жертв грубых нарушений прав человека в Узбекистане, Новак и Макартур утверждают: «как правило, жертвы пыток заинтересованы, прежде всего, не в денежной компенсации, а в других средствах возмещения ущерба, лучше содействующих восстановлению их чести и человеческого достоинства».[4]

     

    В международном праве нет четкого определения реабилитации как формы возмещения. Наиболее близкое выражение данного определения, содержащегося в Основных принципах, заключается в том, что в некоторых ситуациях лица, пострадавшие от серьезных нарушений прав человека или гуманитарного права, должны получить возмещение, в частности, путем реабилитации, то есть физической и психологической помощи, а также социальных и юридических услуг.[5] Следовательно, хотя концепция реабилитации, изложенная в Основных принципах, указывает на формы реабилитации, выходящие за рамки здоровья, она не дает полного определения тому, что каждый из них означает или включает в себя.

     

    Диана Шелтон, ведущий ученый в области возмещения, определяет реабилитацию как право «всех жертв серьезного злоупотребления и их иждивенцев» [sic] и представляет собой «процесс восстановления полного здоровья и репутации человека после травмы в результате серьезного посягательства на его физическую или психическую неприкосновенность […] Она направлена на восстановление того, что было утрачено. Реабилитация направлена на достижение наивысшей физической и психологической способности путем взаимодействия с личностью, семьей, местной общиной и даже обществом в целом.»[6]

     

    Недавно Комитет ООН против пыток придал более неотложный и предметный характер обязательству Узбекистана по обеспечению реабилитации бывших политических заключенных и жертв пыток. В своих Заключительных замечаниях от декабря 2019 года, приветствуя освобождение в Ташкенте «значительного числа» политических заключенных начиная с сентября 2016 года, Комитет призвал правительство «освободить» тех, кто был осужден в ходе несправедливого судебного разбирательства или на основании пыток, предоставить им «возмещение, включая компенсацию и реабилитацию» и «рассмотреть вопрос о создании независимой комиссии для расследования этих вопросов».[7]

     

    © Steve Swerdlow, September 2014.

     

    Бывшие заключенные не имеют доступа к правосудию

    Правительство Узбекистана, не предприняло никаких конкретных действий по реабилитации около 55 освобожденных политических заключенных, включая правозащитников, политических активистов, журналистов и других общественных деятелей, а также многих других религиозных заключенных, хотя и получило признание за их освобождение. Подавляющее большинство освобожденных правительством до сих пор считаются виновными в совершении преступления.

     

    Освобождение осуществляется в форме помилования, досрочного освобождения или амнистии, а не успешной апелляции или каких-либо официальных действий, предпринятых для однозначного признания того, что задержание было противозаконным или необоснованным. Несмотря на то, что ряд правозащитников и журналистов, долгое время находившихся в заключении, отказались официально просить прощения, в качестве условия для освобождения, за преступления, которые они не совершали, на некоторых из них оказывалось такое давление.

     

    Фактически, нынешняя политика Ташкента сводится к отказу официального признания необоснованного или политически мотивированного характера первоначального задержания и последующего тюремного заключения и не дает жертвам шанса на судебное расследование в отношении лиц, виновных в серьезных злоупотреблениях, от которых они пострадали.

     

    Ввиду отсутствия мер со стороны правительства по обеспечению реабилитации, многие освобожденные политические заключенные сами принялись добиваться пересмотра ранее вынесенных им приговоров. В ходе этого процесса они столкнулись с серьезными препятствиями.

     

    «Мы с сожалением сообщаем вам, что ваше личное дело было уничтожено…»

    Ряд освобожденных заключенных сообщают, что они не могут получить материалы суда по своим собственным делам, без которых они не могут подать и оспорить свои первоначальные обвинительные приговоры.

     

    Например, 24 ноября 2016 года был освобожден бывший депутат Самандар Куканов, находившийся в тюрьме 23 года и 5 месяцев в наказание за свою мирную оппозиционную политическую деятельность. «Я отсидел больше, чем любой другой политзаключенный в истории Узбекистана», – сказал Куканов. «За 23 года моего тюремного заключения несколько членов моей семьи были отправлены за решетку, и здоровье моей жены было разрушено. Я больше всего хочу, чтобы меня реабилитировали, потому что я никогда не совершал тех преступлений, за которые меня осудили».

     

    Направив в сентябре 2018 года в Ташкентский областной суд апелляционную жалобу о пересмотре приговора по уголовному делу, Куканов получил письмо, в котором сообщалось, что 6 апреля 2017 года «материалы его уголовного дела» были «уничтожены в установленном порядке» Ташкентским областным государственным архивом. Исходя из этого, в письме говорится, что его просьбы о «полной реабилитации» не могут быть пересмотрены. Позднее это письмо продемонстрировало, что власти пытаются помешать ему начать производство по делу.

     

    На следующий год Куканов продолжил добиваться своей реабилитации в Верховном суде Узбекистана – примечательное слушание, на котором присутствовал автор данного материала. Его адвокаты настойчиво утверждали, что дело было сфабриковано на основе ложных доказательств, что оно являлось местью за мирную оппозицию Куканова Каримову и что обвинительный приговор должен быть отменен в соответствии с «реформами нового президента». Тем не менее, в июле 2019 года Верховный суд отклонил попытку Куканова отменить обвинительный приговор и постановил, что «все обвинения в [первоначальном] деле… были доказаны». Куканов полон решимости продолжать борьбу и вновь подаст апелляцию.

     

    © Steve Swerdlow, Tashkent, June 2019.

     

    Многочисленные правила ООН о реабилитации и компенсации игнорируются

    Сотрудник ООН и бывший государственный чиновник Эркин Мусаев был подвергнут пыткам и неправомерно лишен свободы на 11 лет. Он был освобожден 11 августа 2017 года после того, как Верховный суд принял решение о сокращении срока наказания. В своем докладе о правах человека в Узбекистане за 2007 год Государственный департамент Соединенных Штатов (США) сообщил, что Мусаев был подвергнут пыткам в заключении, в том числе жестоким избиениям по голове, груди и ногам, и в течение двух месяцев содержался без возможности встретиться с адвокатом или другими посетителями.[8] В совместном письме спецдокладчика ООН по пыткам и главы Рабочей группы ООН по произвольным задержаниям тогдашнему президенту Каримову говорится, что в результате одного избиения сотрудниками тюрьмы Мусаеву была сломана челюсть. Кроме того, власти заставили его подписать признание в том, что он занимался шпионажем за США, Великобританию (Великобритания) и ООН.

     

    В мае 2008 года Рабочая группа ООН по произвольным задержаниям пришла к выводу, что тюремное заключение Мусаева является «произвольным» и противоречит нескольким международным договорам, участником которых является Узбекистан. В феврале 2011 года, когда власти перевели Мусаева в тюрьму строгого режима в Навоийской области, на его теле были обнаружены следы ожогов и других травм. В июне 2012 года Комитет ООН по правам человека принял решение о том, что правительство пытало и другими способами жестоко обращалось с Мусаевым и нарушило его права на свободу, безопасность и справедливое судебное разбирательство в соответствии с Международным пактом о гражданских и политических правах (статьи 7, 9 и 14 соответственно). Комитет призвал Узбекистан предоставить ему эффективное средство правовой защиты в связи с этими нарушениями. Однако власти проигнорировали это предписание, и Мусаев оставался в тюрьме до 2017 года.[9]

     

    Попытки Мусаева добиться юридической реабилитации неоднократно срывались. Судебные органы отказывают ему в выдаче приговора по уголовному делу и отказывают в праве на обжалование на том основании, что он не приобщил его к материалам дела. Как и другие бывшие заключенные, Мусаев из-за судимости сталкивался с большими трудностями в поисках достойной работы. За ним следили спецслужбы, и он столкнулся с большими трудностями при реинтеграции в общество после долгих лет заключения.

     

    Примечательно, что наличие двух отдельных предписаний от органов ООН по правам человека, признающих его осуждение незаконным и призывающих предоставить ему компенсацию и средство правовой защиты, не заставило власти Узбекистана полностью оправдать Мусаева, или даже начать новый судебный процесс. И они должны сделать это незамедлительно.

     

    Ограничение движения, слежка

    Другие бывшие заключенные, получившие «условно-досрочное освобождение» по статье 73 Уголовного кодекса Узбекистана, сообщили, что их свобода передвижения ограничена, что за ними ведется наблюдение, и что они обязаны периодически являться в милицию для «профилактических бесед».

     

    Мухаммад Бекжанов, один из наиболее долгое время находившийся в заключении журналистов в мире до своего освобождения в феврале 2017 года, в течение целого года не мог выезжать за пределы своего родного региона – Хорезма на северо-западе Узбекистана. Позже он покинул Узбекистан для воссоединения со своей семьей в США. Но, по его словам, власти не предоставили ему никаких законных способов оспорить обвинительное заключение и вернуть имущество, конфискованное после его ареста и насильственного вывоза из Украины в 1999 году.

     

    Правозащитник Агзам Тургунов и независимый журналист Бобомурод Абдуллаев, оба бывшие политзаключенные, заявили, что с момента их освобождения спецслужбы и милиция ведут за ними слежку и подвергают их даже запугиванию. Тургунов неоднократно задерживался и подвергался штрафам с момента своего освобождения – один раз в августе 2018 года за использование своего телефона для записи мирной акции протеста перед Верховным судом и второй раз в 2019 году. Абдуллаев был задержан службами безопасности в сентябре 2017 года и подвергался пыткам в период предварительного заключения по обвинению в попытке свержения правительства. В мае 2018 года по итогам судебного заседания, на котором присутствовал автор, он был условно освобожден и оштрафован. Хотя судебный процесс над Абдуллаевым создал прецедент в плане степени его открытости и транспарентности, власти так и не провели расследование убедительных утверждений Абдуллаева о применении пыток.

     

    Правозащитник Азам Фармонов, 14-летний срок заключения которого был сокращен при его освобождении в октябре 2017 года, заявил, что в рамках условно-досрочного освобождения он по-прежнему обязан ежемесячно выплачивать правительству часть своей зарплаты, а также, что крайне сложно получить оплату за медицинскую помощь, которую правительство обязано выплачивать бывшим заключенным. «Получение денег, выделяемых правительством на оплату медицинской помощи, настолько сложно, что я просто сдался», – сказал мне Фармонов.

     

    Освобожденные женщины-заключенные также сталкиваются со стигматизацией и трудностями.

    К сожалению, огромные юридические, психологические, физические и финансовые трудности, которые испытывали бывшие политзаключенные Узбекистана, не ограничиваются только мужчинами. Несколько бывших заключенных-женщин, с которыми я встречался, рассказали о жизни после освобождения, в которой они чувствуют себя невидимыми, маргинализированными и еще менее способными получить доступ к правосудию за выпавшие на их долю испытания. В июне 2018 года я встретился с Дилором Абдукодировой в ее доме в Андижане. В 2010 году Абдукодирова была приговорена к 18 годам лишения свободы по возвращении в Узбекистан, для воссоединения со своими детьми. Пятью годами ранее она покинула страну после того как стала свидетелем жестокой бойни в Андижане, когда узбекские правительственные войска застрелили сотни в основном безоружных демонстрантов недалеко от центральной площади города. Абдукодирова отбыла наказание в единственной женской тюрьме Узбекистана в Зангиоте Ташкентской области. Во время пребывания в тюрьме Абдукодирова начала испытывать сильные боли в ногах и бедрах. Когда я беседовал с ее семьей у нее дома, она из-за боли не могла даже посидеть дольше нескольких минут. Абдукодирова заслуживает справедливости, поддержки и финансовой компенсации за неправомерное заточение вдали от семьи. Структуры социальной поддержки и медицинские, психосоциальные услуги, в которых она и другие бывшие заключенные нуждаются, в значительной степени отсутствуют и их необходимо создать без промедления.

     

    Ранние успехи

    Несмотря на многочисленные препятствия на пути достижения справедливости и подотчетности, в Узбекистане были достигнуты некоторые ранние, важные юридические успехи на пути к реабилитации.

     

    Статья 83 предусматривает «Основания для реабилитации»

    Правозащитник Чуян Маматкулов, проживающий в южном узбекском городе Карши, обладает впечатляющей уникальностью: он единственный человек, который когда-либо пытался подать в суд на Ислама Каримова. В ответ на это и многие годы защиты простых граждан в суде в качестве правозащитника, милиция и службы безопасности подбросили Маматкулову наркотики во время его ареста в 2012 году, и в конечном итоге приговорили его к 12 годам лишения свободы. Как и некоторые другие, упомянутые здесь, Маматкулов провел время в Жаслыке, где подвергался жестоким пыткам. Он был освобожден в марте 2018 года.[10]

     

    На вопрос о том, как он оценивает пробные реформы в Узбекистане за последние четыре года, Маматкулов отвечает, что они изменили его жизнь и жизнь его семьи.[11] Однако те годы, что были украдены у него репрессивным государством, разлучая его с женой и двумя дочерями, он никогда не сможет вернуть. Тем не менее, не утратив смелости, Маматкулов возобновил свою правозащитную деятельность и настойчиво добивается собственной реабилитации в судах.

     

    В декабре 2018 года, создавая прецедент для Узбекистана, Верховный суд предоставил Маматкулову право на новый судебный процесс – это был первый случай, когда бывший политзаключенный получил право на новый судебный процесс. Более важная победа наступила в марте 2020 года, когда Каршинский апелляционный суд полностью снял с Маматкулова все обвинения и присудил ему номинальную денежную компенсацию.[12] В решении установлено, что доказательства по делу Маматкулова, в том числе ложные показания сотрудников правоохранительных органов и показания, полученные под давлением от свидетелей, были сфабрикованы. Таким образом, суд постановил, что никаких доказательств, подтверждающих совершение преступления, нет.

     

    На основании статьи 83 Уголовно-процессуального кодекса Узбекистана («Основания для реабилитации») дело Маматкулова представляет собой потенциальную «дорожную карту» в будущих делах. Статья 83 гласит:

     

    Подозреваемый, обвиняемый, подсудимый признается невиновным и подлежит реабилитации, если, в частности:  отсутствует событие преступления, по поводу которого было возбуждено уголовное дело и производилось расследование или судебное разбирательство; отсутствует в его деянии состав преступления; он непричастен к совершению преступления.[13]

     

    Основываясь на полном оправдательном приговоре, Маматкулов в настоящее время добивается полной компенсации по гражданскому делу. Его случай свидетельствует о том, что узбекское законодательство уже дает основание для реабилитации лиц, лишенных свободы на ложных, произвольных или политически мотивированных основаниях. Данная практика может быть систематизирована и применена через механизм или комиссию правосудия переходного периода к более широкой группе бывших политических заключенных.

     

    © Steve Swerdlow, Qarshi, November 2018.

     

    Оправдательный приговор по «шпионскому» делу дает надежду

    Другой случай, дающий луч надежды, – это дело Андрея Кубатина, тюрколога, который был задержан за шпионаж в 2017 году по статье 157 (измена государству).[14] Статья 157 неоднократно использовалась в политических целях для преследования и заключения в тюрьму десятков, возможно, сотен лиц, включая бывших правительственных чиновников, сотрудников ООН, ученых, военных, журналистов и других лиц за шпионаж, якобы совершенный в интересах чередующихся групп стран (США, Великобритания, Россия, Турция, Таджикистан и т.д.). Вызывает озабоченность тот факт, что значительное число лиц были арестованы по обвинению по статье 157 с 2016 года, судимы на закрытых судебных процессах и подвергались пыткам или жестокому обращению.[15]

     

    Благодаря бесстрашной активности его сестры Клары Сахаревой органы власти и суд Ташкента согласились пересмотреть его приговор, сначала смягчив наказание, а в сентябре 2019 года оправдав Кубатина по всем пунктам обвинения.

     

    После оправдательного приговора Элис Уэллс, исполнявшая в то время обязанности главного помощника госсекретаря США по Южной и Центральной Азии и ведущего дипломата Вашингтона по Центральной Азии, написала в твиттере: «Освобождение ученого Андрея Кубатина из тюрьмы – долгожданное событие. Я призываю правительство Узбекистана продолжить тщательный пересмотр предыдущих приговоров по статье 157. AGW».[16] К сожалению, узбекское правительство до сих пор не последовало этому совету. Родственники многих других заключенных по статье 157, все еще находящихся за решеткой, борются за освобождение своих родственников и их последующее оправдание.[17]

     

    Хотя власти не предприняли прямых действий по реабилитации, в марте месяце после трех попыток регистрации местной правозащитной группы «Huquqi Tayanch» («Правовая поддержка»), первой независимой правозащитной неправительственной организации (НПО), зарегистрированной в Узбекистане с 2002 года, появилась надежда на то, что она будет зарегистрирована. Huquqi Tayanch, созданная бывшими политическими заключенными Азамом Фармоновым и Дилмуродом Саидовым, установила реабилитацию и социальную реинтеграцию бывших политических заключенных и жертв пыток в качестве одного из своих ключевых направлений деятельности.[18] Регистрация единственной критичной независимой НПО, к сожалению, является исключением, а не правилом в Узбекистане Мирзияева. Один из основателей Huquqi Tayanch, правозащитник Агзам Тургунов, говорит, что власти настаивали на его исключении из организации в качестве условия ее регистрации. Многочисленным НПО, таким как Гуманитарно-юридический центр в Бухаре и группа мониторинга принудительного труда «Чирок», базирующаяся в Каракалпакстане, было отказано в регистрации Министерством юстиции по надуманным основаниям, несмотря на большую заинтересованность правительства в развитии роли гражданского общества. Давно назрела необходимость перемен в этой области.

     

    Правосудие переходного периода и Андижан

    Любое обсуждение вопросов правосудия переходного периода в Узбекистане было бы неполным без учета самой коллективной травмы в новейшей истории страны и определяющего события 27-летнего правления Ислама Каримова – Андижанской резни.

     

    13 мая 2005 года правительственные войска открыли огонь по тысячам преимущественно мирных демонстрантов на центральной площади города Андижана, расположенного в Ферганской долине на востоке Узбекистана. Протестующие собрались, чтобы выступить против бедности, безработицы и репрессий со стороны правительства и призвать правительство отреагировать на их бедственное положение.

     

    Ранее в день протеста вооруженные люди освободили 23 местных бизнесмена, осужденных за «религиозный экстремизм», и захватили здания местных органов власти. По мере того, как собирались тысячи протестующих, правительственные силы на бронетранспортерах (БТР) и снайперы вели огонь по толпе гражданских лиц без всякого предупреждения и разбора, перекрывая площадь, когда люди пытались спастись бегством, в результате чего погибли сотни людей. Хотя на площади находилась небольшая группа боевиков, подавляющее большинство демонстрантов были безоружны. Затем правительственные войска прошли через площадь и казнили раненых там, где они лежали.

     

    Представители правительства не предприняли никаких очевидных усилий для того, чтобы применение смертоносной силы было сведено исключительно к ситуациям, в которых оно строго неизбежно для защиты жизни людей, как этого требует международное право. Организация Объединенных Наций и другие межправительственные организации установили, что правительство применяло смертоносную силу в чрезмерной степени.

     

    После этой резни узбекское правительство, в стремлении переписать историю того дня и жестоко пресекая любые попытки раскрыть правду о зверских убийствах или добиться привлечения к ответственности, отвергло все усилия, направленные на проведение независимого расследования. Хотя свидетельства очевидцев и другие доказательства указывают на более чем 700 убитых, узбекские власти утверждали, что было убито только 187 человек и обвиняли исламистов и неназванные западные державы в планировании переворота. В последующие месяцы сотни людей были приговорены к лишению свободы до 22 лет в ходе судебных процессов, которые были названы критиками как заказные со стороны правительства, и каждый, кого подозревали, что он участник или свидетель тех событий, становился мишенью для преследований.

     

    Яростное сопротивление Каримова призывам к независимому расследованию резни заставило США и Европейский Союз (ЕС) ужесточить санкции в отношении Узбекистана на несколько лет, что привело к масштабному изгнанию из страны международных неправительственных организаций и глубокой политической и экономической изоляции миллионов простых узбеков. Только со смертью Каримова в августе 2016 года Узбекистан начал медленно выходить из стагнации и глубокой атмосферы страха, последовавшей за андижанскими событиями.

     

    Раскрытие правды и общественная дискуссия об андижанской резне имеют большое значение и спустя 15 лет после событий. В своем публичном выступлении во время исторического визита в Ташкент в мае 2017 года тогдашний Верховный комиссар ООН по правам человека Зейд Раад аль-Хусейн также подчеркнул важность установления ответственности за «ужасные события», произошедшие в тот день в Андижане. «Хотя очень важно смотреть вперед, также важно разобраться с событиями прошлого и добиваться того, чтобы жертвы не были забыты, а их жалобы были удовлетворены», – сказал он.[19]

     

    Небольшое смещение акцента в официальном тоне произошло в начале текущего года, когда заместитель генерального прокурора Светлана Артыкова дала интервью местному отделению Qalampir.uz, в котором она, судя по всему, признала, что была применена чрезмерная сила.  Замечания Артыковой, которая была пресс-секретарем прокуратуры в мае 2005 года, могли быть сделаны только с одобрения сверху.

     

    Отвечая на вопрос о том, применялось ли оружие правительственными силами против гражданского населения, Артыкова ответила, что между войсками и руководством страны не было четкой координации, и что именно поэтому «во время митинга погибло определенное количество граждан».

     

    По словам Артыковой, несколько должностных лиц, признанных виновными в противозаконных убийствах, были осуждены, а некоторые уже вышли из тюрьмы. Это был первый случай, когда какой-либо чиновник Узбекистана утверждал, что какие-либо должностные лица были заключены в тюрьму из-за причастности к андижанским событиям. В минувшем месяце, после ужасной гибели от пыток андижанского бизнесмена Алижана Абдукаримова, депутат парламента Узбекистана от партии «Адолат» (Справедливость) Гулрух Агзамова также упомянула андижанские события, осуждая действия сотрудников органов внутренних дел, применивших пытки.[20]

     

    Эти упоминания об Андижане исходят из официального запроса, но могут свидетельствовать о готовности официальных лиц пересмотреть болезненную историю Андижанской резни. Наряду с важностью обеспечения справедливости и подотчетности в отношении жертв и их семей необходимо создать беспристрастную, независимую комиссию по расследованию и установлению истины для составления достоверного исторического документа, который мог бы способствовать национальному оздоровлению и сплочению. Осмысление трагедии Андижана в открытом, доступном формате имеет важное значение для содействия Узбекистану в переходе к более открытому и демократическому обществу.

     

    Дорожная карта действий: Рекомендации

    Реабилитация и правосудие переходного периода имеют основополагающее значение для всеобщего успешного осуществления программы реформ, которую президент Мирзияев неоднократно делал главной задачей своего правительства на протяжении последних четырех лет. Это объясняется тем, что в основе правосудия переходного периода лежит обязательство признавать человеческое достоинство, устанавливать уважение к верховенству закона путем предоставления возмещения и признания нарушений прав человека, а также предотвращать их повторение.

     

    Президент Мирзиёев и правительство Узбекистана должны официально признать прошлые нарушения, обеспечить конкретные возможности для восстановления нарушенных прав и дать четкий сигнал, что мирная критика политики правительства и исследование прошлого будут действительно цениться в Узбекистане. Политика правосудия и реабилитации в переходный период должна сделать центральной задачей привлечение жертв пыток, правозащитников и независимого гражданского общества, а также обеспечить тесное сотрудничество с парламентом (Олий Мажлисом), Омбудсменом по правам человека, Национальным центром по правам человека, правоохранительными структурами, Министерством юстиции и международными экспертами в области прав человека.

     

    Бывшие политзаключенные призывают власти Узбекистана создать специальную комиссию, состоящую из правительственных чиновников, представителей неправительственных групп и международных экспертов, для решения вопросов реабилитации бывших политзаключенных, изучения дел лиц, все еще находящихся в тюрьме по политически мотивированным обвинениям, и предоставления рекомендаций соответствующим государственным органам. Настало время прислушаться к их призывам и предоставить им комплексную реабилитацию, которая является их правом в соответствии с законодательством Узбекистана и международным правом. По словам правоведа Дианы Шелтон, реабилитация в Узбекистане должна « обеспечить максимальную физическую и психологическую форму, предоставляя возможность каждому человеку, семье, местной общине и даже обществу в целом» и охватывать бывших политических заключенных, жертв пыток и «всех жертв тяжких злодеяний».

     

    Статья 83 Уголовно-процессуального кодекса Узбекистана и дела Чуяна Маматкулова и Андрея Кубатина являются примерным проектом, к которому узбекские суды могли бы прибегнуть при рассмотрении многих дел во всех инстанциях. Парламенту также следует рассмотреть вопрос о принятии отдельного закона о реабилитации. Более полное изучение того, что будет включать в себя этот закон о реабилитации, какие сроки и какие виды жертв он будет охватывать, а также сравнительная международная практика будут предметом отдельной научной статьи.

     

    Правительству следует также внести изменения в расплывчатые и излишне обобщенные положения Уголовного кодекса, касающиеся шпионажа и экстремизма, которые обычно используются для криминализации инакомыслия – статьи 157, 159, 216, 244-1, 244-2 Уголовного кодекса – и привести их в соответствие с международными обязательствами Узбекистана в области прав человека.

     

    Ташкенту следует разрешить проведение независимого мониторинга тюрем и других мест содержания под стражей в Узбекистане для искоренения практики пыток и других форм жестокого обращения, а также ратифицировать Факультативный протокол к Конвенции против пыток. Протокол предусматривает создание системы мониторинга и требует, чтобы независимые органы, ответственные за проведение такого мониторинга, имели возможность в любое время без предварительного уведомления входить в места содержания под стражей. В 2013 году Международный Комитет Красного Креста (МККК) прекратил мониторинг пенитенциарных учреждений Узбекистана, ссылаясь на вмешательство со стороны властей.

     

    Правосудие переходного периода в Узбекистане будет успешным только в том случае, если независимое гражданское общество сможет играть более активную роль в продвижении и осуществлении перемен. Это означает, что Министерство юстиции должно немедленно устранить многочисленные бюрократические препоны, которые препятствуют регистрации многих правозащитных организаций, средств массовой информации и других критически важных НПО, а также нормативные акты, ограничивающие деятельность и деятельность местных НПО, работающих над такими политически чувствительными вопросами, как пытки.

     

    Стив Свердлов является юристом-правозащитником и экспертом по вопросам прав человека в постсоветском регионе. С 2010 по 2019 год Свердлов был старшим исследователем по Центральной Азии в отделе Европы и Центральной Азии Хьюман Райтс Вотч (Human Rights Watch, HRW). Являясь юристом, обладающим двадцатилетним опытом исследовательской и правозащитной деятельности на постсоветском пространстве, Свердлов руководил работой HRW по Узбекистану и Таджикистану, был одним из директоров-основателей представительства HRW в Бишкеке (Кыргызстан) и был одним из первых независимых правозащитников, проводивших обширную полевую работу на территории Узбекистана с момента принятия правительством Узбекистана решения о возвращении правозащитных организаций в страну в 2017 году. В настоящее время он является консультантом Программы развития ООН и Международной организации труда, где проводит тренинги по повышению уровня подготовки правозащитников и журналистов в Центральной Азии. Ранее Свердлов был участником программы Госдепартамента США «Молодые лидеры для государственной службы в России» и работал в качестве наблюдателя за соблюдением прав человека в Союзе советов для советских евреев и Международной организации по миграции в России. До прихода в HRW компания Свердлов занимался юридической практикой в Сан-Франциско в Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, а также работал судебным клерком у Почетного судьи Дина Прегерсона в Окружном суде США Центрального округа Калифорнии.

     

    Cover Photo © Steve Swerdlow, Andijan, June 2018.

     

    [1] Должностные лица правительства сообщили, что тюремные власти также освободили сотни независимых мусульман – людей, исповедующих ислам вне рамок строгого государственного контроля, – которые были заключены в тюрьму по обвинению в экстремизме на длительные сроки тюремного заключения. Однако невозможно независимо подтвердить заявления об этих освобождениях или опросить кого-либо из них, не имея доступа к списку лиц, отбывающих эти приговоры. Власти должны предоставить список всех лиц, которые в настоящее время отбывают наказание по обвинению в экстремизме.

    [2] Амнести Интернэшнл, Блоггинг в Узбекистане: приветствие туризма, глушение критики, июнь 2020 г. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2020/06/blogging-in-uzbekistan-welcoming-tourism-silencing-criticism/

    [3] Основные принципы и руководящие положения, касающиеся права на правовую защиту и возмещение ущерба для жертв грубых нарушений международных норм в области прав человека и серьезных нарушений международного гуманитарного права, Преамбула, принятая Комиссией ООН по правам человека в 2005 году, Документ ООН E/CN.4/RES/2005/35 и принятая Генеральной Ассамблеей 16 декабря 2005 года, документ ООН A/RES/60/147.

    [4] Новак, Манфред и МакАртур, Элизабет. 2008. Конвенция Организации Объединенных Наций против пыток, Комментарий. Оксфорд: Пресса Оксфордского университета, стр. 483.

    [5] Основные принципы и руководящие положения, касающиеся права на правовую защиту и возмещение ущерба для жертв грубых нарушений международных норм в области прав человека и серьезных нарушений международного гуманитарного права, Преамбула, принятая Комиссией ООН по правам человека в 2005 году, Документ ООН E/CN.4/RES/2005/35 и принятая Генеральной Ассамблеей 16 декабря 2005 года, документ ООН A/RES/60/147.

    [6] Шелтон, Дайна. «Средства защиты прав человека в международном праве». Оксфорд: Пресса Оксфордского университета. стр. 275.

    [7] Комитет ООН против пыток, Комитет против пыток, Заключительные замечания по пятому периодическому докладу по Узбекистану, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/UZB/CAT_C_UZB_CO_5_39781_E.pdf

    [8] Государственный департамент США, Отчеты о правах человека по странам, 2007 г, https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007//index.htm

    [9] Мусаева против Узбекистана, Сообщения № 1914, 1915 и 1916/2009, Международный пакт ООН о гражданских и политических правах, июнь 2012 года, http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2012.03.21_Musaeva_v_Uzbekistan.pdf

    [10] Стив Свердлоу и Эндрю Стролейн, За Самаркандом, Лос-Анджелес Отзыв о книгах, март 2019 г., https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/beyond-samarkand/

    [11] Интервью с Чуяном Маматкуловым, Карши, ноябрь 2018 г.; интервью по телефону 22 марта 2020 г.

    [12] Radio Ozodlik, Суд в Кашкадарье полностью оправдал экс-политзаключенного Чуяна Маматкулова, March 2020, https://rus.ozodlik.mobi/a/30496604.html?withmediaplayer=1; Gazeta.uz, “Правозащитник Чуян Маматкулов полностью оправдан,” March 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/03/20/mamatkulov/?utm_source=push&utm_medium=telegram

    [13] Статья 83, Уголовно-процессуальный кодекс Республики Узбекистан, https://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/8932

    [14] Агнешка Пикулицка-Вильчевска, Почему ученый по тюркским языкам заключен в тюрьму в Узбекистане, Аль-Джазира, август 2019 г., https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/turkic-languages-scholar-imprisoned-uzbekistan-190801120104671.html

    [15] Среди нынешних заключенных по статье 157 – бывший узбекский дипломат Кадыр Юсупов, журналист-аналитик Владимир Калошин, нынешние или бывшие военнослужащие Равшан Косимов, Алишер Ачилдиев, Виктор Шин, бывшая сотрудница милиции Алена Ким и бывший директор Института стратегических и межрегиональных исследований при Президенте Рафик Сайфулин..

    [16] См. твит Элис Г. Уэллс, исполняющая обязанности Главного помощника Государственного секретаря по Южной и Центральной Азии, 27 сентября 2019 г., https://twitter.com/State_SCA/status/1177630285644607491

    [17] Недавний подкаст Радио Свободная Европа / Подкаст Меджлиса Радио Свобода рассказывает о многих из этих дел и включает в себя беседу с родственниками заключенного журналиста Владимира Калошина и бывшего дипломата Кадыра Юсупова. См. RFE/RL, Меджлис Подкаст: Шпионские игры в Узбекистане, июнь 2020 г, https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-spies-in-uzbekistan/30670139.html  

    [18] См. Eurasianet, Узбекистан дает надежду на регистрацию НПО, март 2020 года, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-sparks-hope-with-registration-of-ngos

    [19] УВКПЧ, Вступительное слово Верховного комиссара ООН по правам человека Зейда Раада аль-Хусейна на пресс-конференции во время его миссии в Узбекистан, Ташкент, май 2017 г, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21607&LangID=E

    [20] См. Гулрух Агзамова, Ichhki Ishlar – ichichimizdagi ishkalmi yoxud xiyonat?, Adolat, June 2020, http://adolat.uz/partiya/ichki-ishlar-ichimizdagi-ishkalmi-yohud-xiyonat 

    Footnotes
      Related Articles

      Russian Empire: between Historic Myth and Contemporary Reality

      Article by Dr Kevork Oskanian

      July 24, 2020

      Russian Empire: between Historic Myth and Contemporary Reality

      Little more than a century ago, one of Russia’s most famous painters – an active participant in the imperial army’s conquest of Central Asia – caused a scandal in London’s artistic and political circles. Vasily Vereshchagin’s paintings had up to then been exhibited to great general acclaim in various European galleries, but one particular work caused an outcry when shown in the capital of the world’s then most powerful Empire in the 1880s. ‘Suppression of the Indian Revolt by the English’ was particularly brutal in its portrayal of one of the more violent episodes in the British subjugation of India; uniformed soldiers were – anachronistically – depicted assassinating Indian insurgents by ‘blowing them from a gun’. The painting was reportedly purchased by the British government, and made to disappear into the mists of colonial artistic history.[1]

       

      Entangled in the ‘Great Game’, Britain and Russia had been engaged in a long-running power play in the Middle East and Central Asia; and both laid claim to the superior ability of handling, and bringing civilisation to the ‘Asiatic’. Instances of ‘uncivilised’ behaviour – like Vereshchagin’s painting – served to discredit that ability. Such propaganda worked two ways. In fact, in the run up to, and following the Crimean war, and Russia’s bloody forays into the North Caucasus, the British press was replete with accounts of Russia’s ‘oriental’ propensity towards a cruelty and corruption from which its brave noble savages deserved to be saved. A narrative driven in no small part by the rampant Russophobia of a section of British society exemplified by individuals like the 19th-century diplomat, publicist and politician, David Urquhart.[2]

       

      Russia’s confrontation with the British was complicated by a civilisational factor; the Russians’ claim to be part of Western civilisation had always been ambiguous, at best. Since the 18th century’s Petrine reforms, its rulers had craved recognition as a part of an incipient modernity dominated by the West. Their late entry into European International Society made that claim to equal standing suspect, even into the early 20th century. Except during brief periods where interests coincided – for instance, during and immediately after the Napoleonic wars – Russians were always ‘imperfectly civilised’, always part-oriental, a Western perception perhaps best captured in Rudyard Kipling’s 1903 assertion that…

       

      …the Russian is a delightful person until he tucks in his shirt. As an Oriental he is charming. It is only when he insists on being treated as the most easterly of western peoples instead of the most westerly of Easterns that he becomes a racial anomaly most difficult to handle.[3]

       

      The resulting ‘ressentiment’ resulted in the Russians doubling down on their, and their empire’s civilisational specificity;[4] always stuck in a never-ending debate on their identity, conscious of the vast structural impediments to their empire being accepted as a fully civilised equal to Britain’s, or France’s, its policymakers and intellectuals frequently spun this ambiguity into an asset. In fact, they turned this Western argument on their difference, and inferiority, on its head. From the late 19th century, its administrators and scientists claimed that Russia’s familiarity with the ‘Orient’ bolstered its claim to a superior ability to civilise his Eastern kin, a claim that would be voiced by none other than Fyodor Dostoevsky himself:

       

      In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, whereas we shall go to Asia as masters. In Europe we were Tatars, whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans.  Our mission, our civilising mission in Asia will bribe our spirit and drive us there.[5]

       

      The imagining of a distinct civilisational space over a vast, culturally diverse territory thus became an indelible part of Russia’s imperial practice. And, after various permutations – not least in 1917 and 1991 – it would reach the 21st century’s, ostensibly post-imperial world. If Tsarist Russia placed itself, and its empire between the West and the East, the Soviet Union adopted a distinctly Russian variation on a Western Enlightenment ideology, Marxism-Leninism. Meanwhile, Putin’s Russia defines its civilising mission in terms of an ‘authentic’ conservatism that sets it apart from a Europe that has descended into decadence, but entitles it to culturally, politically and economically dominate a claimed sphere of influence with a shared history, and common values, seen as lying in an elusive space between East and West.

       

      The Power of Imperial Myths

       

      The world has moved on. Or has it? If empires competed ideologically and geopolitically in their day, their heirs often engage in the whitewashing of their imperial pasts today. In that sense, Britain and Russia are not that different: apologists of Empire in both societies tell themselves myths about their imperial pasts, myths that minimise their own Empires’ exploitative nature by creating and upholding selective, self-servingly distorted versions of history.

       

      In British apologias, what matters is not the transatlantic triangular trade; the looting of India; the drugs trade in China; or the genocidal extermination of native populations in North America and Australia. Instead, when talking about Empire, the formerly conquered are told they should thankfully remember the abolition of slavery, ‘gifts’ like parliamentary democracy, railways, free trade, the rule of law, and the creation of English-speaking former colonies as beacons of civilisation.[6] It is also often heard that other Empires – the French, the Dutch, and, of course, the Russians – were more exploitative, corrupt, and cruel in the administration of their ‘charges’, a narrative partly reflected in the belief of 32 per cent of the British population that the imperial experience is ‘more something to be proud of’.[7]

       

      Russian apologists, for their part, frequently claim that they – unlike the British – had a greater affinity with ‘their’ subjects of empire, or that the USSR’s stated anti-colonial, emancipatory mission made it, and its leading ethnos – the Russians – fundamentally different from the Western overseas empires, which, following this logic, were more exploitative, more intrusive, more alien and therefore more malignant to their colonies. In fact, as some versions of the myth have it, Russia was a victim rather than perpetrator of empire, at once the driving force behind, and the main loser in the last manifestation of its imperial might: the Soviet Union.

       

      This myth of Russian imperial benevolence and self-sacrifice was repeated in no uncertain terms within a recent report by the Higher School of Economics in Moscow – on the future of Russian foreign policy – where it was confidently stated that:

       

      Support for cultural and civilizational diversity is also a deeply ingrained feature of Russian people who built their empire through integration, rather than conquest, by blending with the elites of component of Russian identity, namely the desire to make the world a better place, and to the best Soviet-era foreign policy tradition, that is, support for anti-colonialism.[8]

       

      The same myth can be heard when Putin states that former Soviet republics left the USSR with gifted Russian lands in their luggage;[9] or when the Russian embassy to Estonia tweets that the Baltic states ‘were privileged’ within a USSR they freely joined (rather than the reality of being annexed after the carve up of Eastern Europe with Nazi Germany under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact);[10] and also when Russian politicians present Chechnya as a success story, having pacified its population through brutal war and by subjecting it to the arbitrary rule of Ramzan Kadyrov.[11]

       

      Historic Myths and Realities

       

      These claims are just as much the stuff of mythmaking as the more exculpatory versions of British imperial historiography. For while it is true that Russia’s multi-ethnic pre-modern empire frequently co-opted the elites of conquered peoples – most notably those of the Tatars, Ukrainians, and Baltic Germans – and also maintained a complex system of ethnically specific privileges, including for Muslim ethnic groups, Russia’s Tsarist empire remained intensely hierarchical, with Jews and indigenous peoples designated ‘inorodtsy’ – literally, ‘aliens’ – at the lowest rung of a complex ethno-cultural ladder.[12]

       

      Tsarist Russia’s empire did display some measure of tolerance, and its territorial contiguity did provide for a more gradual transition from its metropole into its peripheries than in the case of Britain’s, or France’s overseas empires. However, as in any empire, this did not preclude sometimes violently enforced claims of hierarchical authority over often unwilling subalterns. If anything, the move away from purely monarchic legitimacy in the early 19th century, towards an environment increasingly marked by modern nationalism – including Russian nationalism – led to culturally more intrusive policies.

       

      The latter half of the 19th century, therefore, saw a severely repressed revolution in Poland; the banning of the written Ukrainian language; and the genocidal relocation of the Circassians – judged unsuitable for continued incorporation into the Russian empire, all ironically under the rule of a Tsar best known for his freeing of the serfs.[13] The later Romanov empire was thus one that enforced linguistic and cultural Russification in many of its non-Russian regions, and – in contrast to previous periods – inserted an element of what Lenin would refer to as ‘Great Russian Chauvinism’ into its policies.[14]

       

      The 1917 revolution did away with Tsarist Russia’s ‘official imperialism’, but kept Russia – now in its Soviet guise – in an ambiguous relationship to the West. On the one hand, its new ‘civilising mission’ – Marxism-Leninism – was based on a particular version of Western enlightenment thought, with its specific universal claims. On the other hand, it set the USSR apart – and, in fact, against – an imperialist, capitalist, fascist West. But when it comes to the Soviet Union, its characterisation as ‘anti-colonial’, and generous to its non-Russian minorities – eagerly taken over by some in contemporary Russia and beyond – also tells a half-truth.

       

      While its foundational ideology, Marxism-Leninism, indeed rejected and resisted both biological racism and imperialism, that did not preclude a hierarchical world-view from shaping its interactions with what even the early Bolsheviks freely referred to as ‘backward peoples’.[15] The problem was three-fold: (1) a vanguard view of political activity, which reserved judgment on the finer points of ideology to a small, in-the-know party elite; (2) a progressive view of human historical development – which implied that some peoples were more ‘advanced’ than others; and (3) a rigid, essentialist approach to the issue of ethnicity, not least due to the great influence on nationalities issues during the defining first decades of Soviet rule by one Joseph Stalin.[16]

       

      These three elements combined to pervert the Soviet national experiment into the very thing it had opposed at the outset: a hierarchical, at times coercive imposition on often unwilling subjects. Even at the very beginning, those minorities that did not behave according to the expectations of the Marxist-Leninist template were deemed to have been under the nefarious, distorting influence of their bourgeois or feudal overlords. Pliable ‘vanguard’ elites were installed in a manner not much different from what would have been seen in more traditional imperial practice, to legitimise a ‘gathering of the lands’ by the Bolsheviks from Ukraine to Central Asia.

       

      While it is true that during the first decade or so of the Soviet experiment, these co-opted elites did have a major say in the development of ‘their’ particular territories, their autonomy did remain within the strict boundaries of a Marxist-Leninist civilising mission; and, with the advent to power of Stalin, it was curtailed in favour of a move towards centralisation. Before and during World War II, this combined with hierarchy and essentialism, into the at times genocidal mistreatment of minorities deemed – just like their hapless Circassian predecessors in the 19th century – collectively unreliable, or unreceptive to this particular iteration of civilisational progress.[17] A return to Russo-centrism rehabilitated the Russians at the top of a civilisational pyramid,  as the Union’s, and the world’s ‘progressive’ nation, whose earlier imperialism paved the way for the 1917 revolution and the ‘emancipation’ of its charges, a paternalistic vision expanded globally during the Cold War – first towards Central and Eastern Europe, then towards the ‘Third World’.

       

      Russians therefore had a ‘special relationship’ with the USSR; in fact, by the final decades of the experiment, Russian and Soviet identities had largely amalgamated into one. In contrast to other ethnic groups – whose allegiance to the USSR was mediated through their identity as the titular ethnos of ‘their’ territorial sub-divisions – they identified most directly with the Union, and its precepts, as the most prototypical of homo sovieticus.[18] After the fall of the USSR, and the discrediting of liberalism during the tumultuous 1990s, for many Russians this identification, and the leading role in which they had exalted, turned into a resentment at having born a ‘white man’s burden’ in civilising and industrialising its neighbouring brethren, and defeating Nazism, while having nothing to show for it except a weak, corrupt state fraying at its seams.

       

      It is a combination of this resentment, this broken pride, and the connected ‘stab-in-the-back’ myth, with the notion that Russians were ‘born to lead’, that Putin ultimately taps into when writing rather fantastical version of second world-war history, grabbing Crimea from Ukraine, or taking insult at the removal of statues representing Soviet ‘liberators’ of CEE states.[19] From the start of his presidency, Putin understood the importance of restoring Russia’s great power status, the one goal around which there was a broad consensus in the years following the Soviet collapse. Having failed to achieve that great power status by joining the West, he harked back to the patterns exhibited in Tsarist and Soviet times – eking out a distinct civilisational sphere of influence over which Moscow would retain a leading, civilising role.

       

      Again, the smaller nations in that sphere would be shaped according to a template set by Russia, one that put them in a zone between Orient and Occident, within a regional hegemony distinct from the global order dominated by an elite of Western, liberal states. Myths of shared destiny, cultural affinity and Russian self-sacrifice turned any diversions from that template into a to-be-disciplined anomaly, an ungrateful or ignorant deviation. This ideological truth was loosely assembled in the Kremlin from disparate building blocks of Tsarist and Soviet history and identity: Christian Orthodoxy, Soviet Superpower status – but without the Marxist-Leninist aspect – with some old-fashioned nationalism increasingly mixed in as a consequence of a growing alienation between the regime and the West.

       

      From Mythmaking to Policymaking

       

      What makes Russia’s contemporary myths of empire fundamentally different in their contemporary salience from their British counterparts is not their moral inferiority, or relative inaccuracy; after all, imperial apologia is not a Russian monopoly. Instead, it is their full-throated embrace by an authoritarian government and geography that make Russia’s forms of imperial mythmaking and nostalgia more immediately challenging in the present, not least to Moscow’s former imperial subalterns, and, rather counter-intuitively, Russians themselves.

       

      One first crucial difference between the Russian and British post-imperial experiences lies in the possibilities for critique: British imperial myths have long been subject to an open, and increasingly frank, intellectual and broader public debate. The more sinister legacies of Empire can be, and are, actively questioned and challenged, as the latest Black Lives Matter protests clearly show. Such debates existed in Russia during the tumultuous 1990s, but the space for them has now narrowed considerably and perhaps even closed – and not just at the level of stated government policy.

       

      For not only does the Putin regime now engage in propaganda masquerading as historiography, it has inserted a ‘patriotic education’ into its recent constitutional changes as well, and made the upholding of a ‘correct’ view of history the business of the state.[20] That same constitution’s elevation of Russian into the ‘language of Russia’s state-forming people’ moreover uncomfortably harks back to the more ancient Russian imperialist claims as to the Russians’ superior political abilities, a claim repeated both during the Tsarist and Soviet eras, often in arguments against nations deemed incapable of independent statehood – like the Ukrainians.[21] In Russia, imperial apologia has thus been elevated to the level of constitutionally sanctioned orthodoxy.

       

      As an overseas empire, Britain moreover had the advantage of definitively withdrawing from its colonies and dominions, and the option of forgetting about them, at least in terms of existential geopolitics. With its territorial empire, Russia did not have this advantage: it could not simply pack up its archives, lower its flag, withdraw its navies and forget, stuck merely with a post-imperial hangover. In that sense, the claim that its empire, by gist of being territorial, was more ‘organically constituted’ is a double-edged sword. Alongside the dubious claim that a ‘civilisational affinity’ somehow made the mostly forced incorporation of peoples into its territory somehow more acceptable, the territorial nature of its empire also makes its imperial nostalgia much more geopolitically salient.

       

      Former Soviet republics thus cannot be as relaxed as Commonwealth members about memberships in Russian-dominated organisations like the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization; and Russia itself cannot be as aloof and distant from what happens in Tajikistan, or Georgia, as the UK could be about Sri Lanka, or Ghana. And this may very well be part of the reason for Russia clinging onto its imperial nostalgia in the way described above: Russia’s imperial nostalgia will likely maintain a direct, geopolitical relevance long after the formal dissolution of Soviet Empire.

       

      Conclusion

       

      How is this problem to be approached? Many would point to NATO membership, and gradual European integration, as one way out of this post-imperial conundrum for Russia’s neighbours. However, even if these propositions were realistic in the short- to medium-term – given Russia’s willingness to act as a spoiler – they would not change attitudes where they matter most: in Moscow. The problem is precisely that Russian elites are perfectly comfortable playing the geopolitical game; to talk in terms of spheres of influence – even in terms of their denial – arguably validates their status as participants in the business of great power statecraft. It does not question their fundamental precepts. After all, the push and pull of alliances and allegiances was part of the imperial condition to begin with.

       

      NATO and all that can easily be seen as its continuation, are not truly challenging the attitudes underlying claims to hierarchy. Its infringement on Russia’s claimed sphere of influence may actually have hardened attitudes in Moscow towards the maintenance of a great power status cast in distinctly imperious terms, as the maintenance of influence – however imperfect – over a distinct civilisational-geopolitical space. And the West’s current crisis has merely reinforced this belief in a coming ‘polycentric’ world order, however unreasonable that might seem to some Western observers.

       

      Instead, much will depend on measured, long-term pushback on the part of Russia’s former imperial possessions: a dogged insistence on their independent statehood, combined with a realistic assessment of both the possibilities inherent in Western assistance, and the genuine security concerns that keep Russia within its geopolitical mindset. Russia’s rose-tinted imperial narrative – where subalterns are implicitly denied an inherent right to independent political existence, and a myth of a distinct contemporary civilisation based on ‘shared historical experience’ is upheld – can only be fundamentally disrupted through its contradiction by those onto whom it is, first and foremost, projected: Russia’s former subalterns throughout the former Soviet Union.

       

      While myths tend to have a remarkable staying power even in the most open of societies, nothing should be seen as permanent. Russian history in particular has been full of the unexpected, of occasional openings that might have provided openings for such redefinitions in the past – notably in the 1990s – if not for hubris and impatience. At some point, they are bound to recur. In the meantime, such a long-term approach to tackling its ideological detritus of empire will necessitate commodities that have become as rare as they are desirable in the tumultuous early 21st century: prudence, and strategic patience.

       

      No known copyright restrictions on cover photo.

      [1] The Culture Trip, An Introduction to Vasily Vereshchagin in 10 Paintings, updated 20 April, 2018,  https://theculturetrip.com/europe/russia/articles/introduction-to-vasily-vereshchagin-in-10-paintings/; Natasha Medvedev, The Contradictions in Vereshchagin’s Turkestan Series: Visualising the Russian Empire and Its Others (University of California, 2009).

      [2] John Salt, Local Manifestations of the Urquhartite Movement, International Review of Social History 13, no. 3 (1968), https://doi.org/10.1017/s002085900000691x, https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S002085900000691X; Charles King, Imagining Circassia: David Urquhart and the Making of North Caucasus Nationalism, The Russian Review 66, no. 2 (2007), www.jstor.org/stable/20620535

      [3] As cited in Alexander Morrison, Russian Rule in Turkestan and the Example of British India, c. 1860-1917 The Slavonic and East European Review 84, no. 4 (2006): 666, https://doi.org/10.2307/4214360, https://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4214360

      [4] Ayse Zaraköl, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 201-39.

      [5] Fyodor Dostoevsky, A Writer’s Diary: Volume Two 1877 – 1881 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994), 1374.

      [6] e.g. Stephen Glover, If the Left and its BBC cheerleaders have their way, Britain will be forced to renounce its past. So why is no one fighting back, not least our supposedly Tory government?, Daily Mail (London), 11 June 2020, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-8408587/If-Left-way-forced-renounce-past-no-one-fighting-back.html; Imogen Braddick, David Starkey facing backlash over slavery comments as he’s slammed as ‘racist’ by Sajid Javid, Evening Standard (London), 2 July 2020, https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/david-starkey-slavery-comments-sajid-javid-a4487111.html

      [7] Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 294-95.;

      Robert Booth, UK more nostalgic for empire than other ex-colonial powers, The Guardian, 11 March 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/11/uk-more-nostalgic-for-empire-than-other-ex-colonial-powers

      [8] Sergei Karaganov, Protecting Peace, Earth and Freedom of Choice for All Countries. New Ideas for Russia’s Foreign Policy: Report of the HSE University (Moscow: Higher School of Economics National Research University, 2020), 34-45.

      [9] Marko Mikhelson, Putin’s Plan Is A Threat To The Baltic States, UpNorth: the Northern European, 1 July 2020, https://upnorth.eu/putins-plan-is-a-threat-to-the-baltic-states/

      [10] EU vs Disinfo, Being Occupied as a Privilege, updated 24 June, 2020, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/being-occupied-as-a-privilege_baltic_states/.

      [11] AFP, Ramzan Kadyrov: Putin’s feared Chechen strongman, Al Jazeera, 21 May 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/ramzan-kadyrov-putin-feared-chechen-strongman-200521210718045.html

      [12] Eli Weinerman, Racism, Racial Prejudice and Jews in Late Imperial Russia, Ethnic and Racial Studies 17, no. 3 (1994).

      [13] Walter Richmond, The Circassian Genocide (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013).

      [14] Alexander Semyonov and Jeremy Smith, Nationalism and Empire Before and After 1917, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 17, no. 3 (2017).

      [15] E.g. Draft Theses on National and Colonial Questions For The Second Congress Of The Communist International, 1920, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/jun/05.htm; “Minutes of the Congress of the Peoples of the East,  Baku, September 1920,” s.d., 2016, https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/baku/ch01.htm

      [16] Not least because of his highly influential definition of a nation as ‘a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture’; see Marxism and the National Question, 1913, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm

      [17] Terry Martin, The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing, The Journal of Modern History 70, no. 4 (1998).

      [18] L. D. Gudkov, “Soviet Man” in the Sociology of Iurii Levada, Sociological Research 47, no. 6 (2008).

      [19] Pavel Baev, Three Controversial Articles by Top Officials Distort Russia’s Past, Present and Future, Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, no. 89 (22 June 2020). https://jamestown.org/program/three-controversial-articles-by-top-officials-distort-russias-past-present-and-future/

      [20] Polnyi Tekst Popravok v Konstitutsiyu: Za Chto Myi Golosuem?, updated 14 March 2020, http://duma.gov.ru/news/48045/

      [21] Katarzyna Kaczmarska, ‘But in Asia We Too Are Europeans’: Russia’s Multifaceted Engagement with the Standard of Civilisation, International Relations 30, no. 4 (2016).

      Footnotes
        Related Articles

        Religion and Forced Displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World: Executive Summary

        Article by Lucian N. Leustean

        July 23, 2020

        Religion and Forced Displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World: Executive Summary

        This Policy Report examines the relationship between religion-state relations, forced displacement, religious diplomacy and human security in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, with a focus on eight countries in the region, Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine. It engages with four areas: 1) the circulation of ideas on human security between religious and secular courts, monastic settlements, pilgrimage sites and educational establishments; 2) religious strategies in relation to violence, tolerance, transitory environments and resettlement; 3) religious support, protection and mechanisms towards displaced populations, and 4) channels of religious diplomacy advancing human security.

         

        The Policy Report summarises the findings of two British Academy projects running at Aston University that have collected a dataset on ‘Eastern Orthodoxy and Human Security’ composed of 70 interviews with officials in Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine belonging to three main categories, namely: 1) religious practitioners (lay people, lower and higher clergy) in charge of humanitarian programmes; 2) governmental and civil society organisations; and 3) academics working in national universities and academies of sciences.[1] Findings from the interviews have been included in this collection.

         

        This publication seeks to answer a number of important questions:

         

        1. What happens when states fail to support migrants and forcibly displaced populations? How do religious actors (national churches, religious institutions, national and internationally affiliated organisations) and state bodies engage with human security in Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine?
        2. What are the mechanisms of Orthodox support towards forcibly displaced communities in these countries? How does displacement impact upon religious practices, values and political structures?
        3. How does Orthodox diplomacy impact upon state relations in Eastern Europe and Eurasia and, most importantly, between Eastern and Western Europe?

         

        The publication finds that:

         

        1. First, European Union (EU) migration policies and forced migration are highly contentious and have been politicised in predominantly Orthodox countries, entailing a long-term impact on East-West relations. At times, the EU’s approach to migration has been presented as a sign of an ideological clash between East and West.

         

        1. Second, when states fail to offer support for populations affected by violence, religious communities have been one of the first actors to take over state functions and act as providers of human security. In the first months of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Christian and Muslim communities crossed the faith divide mobilised themselves nationally in support of internally displaced people before the Ukrainian government issued a national strategy. In Serbia, faith-based organisations supported Syrian refugees following the Balkan route by working with local authorities and the government before an organised policy response had been implemented. In many cases, authorities turned to religious communities to provide support for migrants as the state did not have the necessary mechanisms to address humanitarian emergencies.

         

        1. Third, in the Donbass region, the ‘buffer zone’ is not just one between military forces but a spiritual and geographical space between religions not only generating violence but also supporting tolerance and reconciliation. In Ukraine, competing Orthodox churches have their own humanitarian networks supporting local populations and displaced population. One of them, the local Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), regards the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a civil war and has been involved in the release of prisoners of war.

         

        1. Fourth, the competition between Orthodox churches continues to reverberate, having an impact not only on relations between religious communities but also directly affecting state support and engagement with human security. The rivalry between the national Orthodox churches in Ukraine, the support of the Ukrainian government for religious independence outside Moscow, and the increasing anti-Westernism of Orthodox clergy faced by a dramatic number of Syrian migrants and migrant camps along the Balkan route, are directly linked to the ways in which state structures address and manage violence, security and social cohesion.[2]

         

        1. The topic of forced displacement is highly contentious not only in countries directly affected by the refugee crisis but also in others in the region. The refugee crisis has led to an internationally-linked Orthodox conservatism characterised by five components: defending a mythical past; fostering close relations with state authorities; anti-Westernism; building conservative networks at local, national and geopolitical levels; and, presenting Orthodox churches as alternative governance structures. For example, in Bulgaria, the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church, the highest religious authority in the country, stood out as the first religious body in the region to publicly challenge the government’s policy towards refugees. In Moldova, during debates in the run up to the presidential elections, the Orthodox Church endorsed the fake news that 30,000 Syrians were about to arrive in the country affecting the balance between the pro-Russian and pro-EU candidates.

         

        1. The exact figures of forcibly displaced populations remain unclear. In many cases, people in need refuse to register with state bodies due to fears of violence and deportation, and they find the means of support from other civil society sources. Contradictory figures are provided by a wide range of national and international organisations, for example, in Greece, Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine.

         

        1. Religious diversity remains one of the most challenging issues in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states. It is without doubt that many religious communities have provided support to populations in need, particularly at local level. However, fear of the ‘other’ and proselytism remain dominant and characterise the ways in which religious communities have responded to humanitarian crises. Religion-state relations are different for each country in the region going back to the role of religious communities in the establishment of modern nation states. Understanding the intricacies of religion-state relations is fundamental to the ways in which religious communities and state authorities support each other in times of both ‘peace’ and ‘crisis’.

         

        1. As a general rule, Eastern Christian churches do not publicise their social activities, putting forward theological arguments that humanitarian activities should not be made public. The transparency of funds used in social programmes has been linked to the social and political legitimacy of each religious confession. This has been particularly poignant in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, with the lack of large-scale humanitarian programmes linked to the ways in which religion-state relations have evolved after the fall of communism.[3]

         

        Based on these findings the publication makes a number of policy recommendations:

         

        1. Religious literacy among political elites in Europe would help counter the politicisation of religion. There should be wider public and policy awareness of the ways in which political messages are delivered by religious channels of communication. The politicisation of religion in the Eastern Orthodox world will continue to shape relations between Russia and the EU. The ongoing conflict in Donbass and increasing regional instability will lead to further employment of religious symbols.

         

        1. There is no (or in a number of cases, very limited) dialogue between Orthodox churches and their social departments working on humanitarian issues. A refugee entering a country on the Balkan route or one of the former Soviet states experiences varied levels of religious and state solidarity and humanitarian support. Cooperation between religious communities (as for example, the support of people in need by religious practitioners from the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church) has produced a tangible result for the migrants in state-run camps. Inter-religious cooperation on humanitarian issues should be encouraged and followed up not only internationally, but also at the national level. External funding to humanitarian programmes should include a wide range of religious actors, not only favouring the predominant religious confession in the country.

         

        1. Religious education in this region should include more references to and examples of both violence and reconciliation. Many clergy depict the EU as an ideological bloc opposing Orthodox values. Opportunities should be funded encouraging religious practitioners and students of theology/religion to travel and study in the EU, which would lead to greater openness and understanding among not only religious leaders but also, and more importantly, within local communities affected by conflict.

         

        1. Religious communities remain key to both violence and reconciliation. Policy makers should be aware of the potential of religious communities to aggravate violence. They should work with both local and top-level religious leaders to generate greater cooperation between state and religious structures benefiting populations in need. For example, the high degree of support since 2014 among the Ukrainian population for the former Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate, now mostly incorporated into the new Orthodox Church of Ukraine, was not only due to the church leadership’s welcoming of European values but also due to its support for Ukraine’s military forces in Donbass.[4] The numbers of military chaplains accompanying the troops has been reflected by the population’s trust in the Kyiv Patriarchate at the expense of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).

         

        Lucian N. Leustean is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Aston University where he has been teaching since 2007. He studied international relations, law and theology in Bucharest, Romania, and completed his PhD in Political Science at LSE. His research has been supported by fellowships from the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Amsterdam (Fellow in residence, 2018-19), the Westminster Abbey Institute (Fellow, 2015-16), and the Transatlantic Academy of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Senior Fellow, 2014-15), and grants from the British Academy, the European Commission and the Economic and Social Research Council. In 2018-21, he is Principal Investigator of a British Academy grant on ‘When States Fail. Forced Displacement, Religious Diplomacy and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World’. The project draws on the findings of the 2018 British Academy Grant on ‘Forced Migration‘.

         

        Cover photo: ‘Cathedral of Talin, Armenia, May 2019’. Copyright: Lucian N. Leustean

         

        [1]The two projects are 2018-2020: ‘Forced Migration, Religious Diplomacy and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World’ (IC2\100047), awarded under the Tackling the UK’s International Challenges 2017 Programme; and ‘When States Fail: Forced Displacement, Religious Diplomacy and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World’ (SDP2\100014), the Sustainable Development Programme, as part of the UK Government’s Global Challenges Research Fund. The projects have organised workshops which brought together academics and policy practitioners in Belgrade, Serbia (June 2018), Kyiv, Ukraine (September 2018) and Yerevan, Armenia (November 2019).

        [2] Findings 1-4 stem from the first British Academy project (2018) which focused on Serbia and Ukraine.

        [3] Findings 5-8 are based the second British Academy project (2018-2020) which focused on Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia and Moldova.

        [4] Most of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate has merged with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, to create the Orthodox Church of Ukraine following the Tomos (decree) of autocephaly (decree of ecclesial independence) by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in Istanbul on January 5th 2019. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate was subsequently revived in 2019 by former UOC (KP) Patriarch Filaret (following the election of Epiphanius I as Metropolitan of the new church).

        Footnotes
          Related Articles

          Religion and Forced Displacement in the Republic of Armenia

          Article by Jasmine Dum-Tragut

          Religion and Forced Displacement in the Republic of Armenia

          Introduction

          After the collapse of the Soviet Union and its newly gained independence in 1991, the Republic of Armenia (RA) underwent profound demographic changes. Since the late 1980s, the country has experienced waves of migration caused by the devastating earthquake of 1988 and the armed conflict with neighbouring Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) region, which resulted in border blockades and harsh economic conditions. Since then, Armenia has been characterised by one of the highest migration rates worldwide, as more than one third of the population lives permanently outside the country. From 2008 to 2012, Armenia was one of the main countries of origin of asylum seekers and economic refugees entering the European Union (EU).[1] The emigration of an estimated one million Armenians since 1988 has been offset by the influx of ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and NK, and, in the last five to six years, from Iraq, Iran and Syria. In addition, repatriated diaspora Armenians have started to return home. In addition, a relatively small proportion of incomers is formed by non-ethnic Armenians, such as refugees from Ukraine, the Far East and a number of African states.

           

          Religion, ethnicity and population

          As part of the Soviet Union, Armenia was the smallest (29,800 km2) but ethnically most homogenous republic. In the last Soviet census in 1989, Armenia, having already been affected by the 1988 earthquake, had a de jure population of 3,304,776 million, of whom two thirds were urban and one third rural. Ethnic Armenians represented the majority of the population (93.5 per cent), followed by Azerbaijanis, Kurds and Yezidis.

           

          After independence, the first Armenian census in 2001 already reflected drastic demographic changes with a population of 3,213,011, composed of 97.9 per cent Armenians with Yezidis as the largest ethnic minority (1.2 per cent). The Azerbaijanis had left or been expelled from the country.[2] After 2001, even greater demographic homogenisation was caused by the emigration of Russian-speaking Armenians and ethnic minorities as a consequence of strict language policies, and a wave of repatriation on the part of incoming diaspora Armenians. The census of 2011 counted 3,018,854 inhabitants, of whom 98.1 per cent were ethnic Armenians, followed by 1.1 per cent Yezidis and 0.3 per cent Russians.[3] In both censuses, the answer to the optional question of ethnic affiliation was recorded according to the respondent’s self-identification.

           

          Table 1: Population decrease in the Republic of Armenia, total numbers[4]

           

          Armenia is also labelled the last Christian bulwark in this region. The oldest Christian state in the world looks, at least in terms of official figures and statistics, to have a predominantly Christian population, with more than 90 per cent belonging to the Armenian Apostolic Church. In the census of 2011, the population was asked about its faith and religious affiliation for the first time after 70 years of Soviet atheist indoctrination. 95.97 per cent of the population described themselves as believers, with 96.55 per cent of these belonging to the Armenian Apostolic Church, the national church of Armenia. The next largest religious groups with 1.01 per cent were the Evangelicals and with 0.87 per cent the followers of Shar-fadin (Yezidism). [5]

           

          The question of religious affiliation was again based on self-identification with a religion or religious denomination, and cannot not be equated with official membership in the respective religious or denominational community or with active practicing of the given faith.

           

          Table 2: Religious affiliation in the Republic of Armenia, Census 2011[6]

           

          However, there is some doubt about the official population figures of Armenia. Due to population movements, mainly from Armenia (caused by both significant labour migration to Russia and Turkey and ongoing emigration), and to a much lesser extent also to Armenia (repatriation or naturalisation of diaspora Armenians), the number of people residing permanently in Armenia appears to be much smaller than the stated figures. The declining birth rate also contributes to the ongoing population decline.[7]

           

          The figures reflecting population distribution in terms of ethnicity, mother tongue and religious affiliation should also be critically examined. Information provided by representatives and associations of the respective ethnic and religious groups differ significantly from the census data.

           

          Religion-state relations

          At various times in the history of Armenia, the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) clearly held the position of national leader, and was strongly committed to preserving national culture and values. In the 1980s, the AAC was also involved in the movement towards regaining independence for Armenia and for the liberation of NK. With the country having achieved independence, the leadership of the republic had to redefine the balance of power in the state, and to formulate internationally recognised legislation concerning religion and religious groups. The 1988 earthquake provided fertile grounds for various ‘foreign’ religious organisations, with some arriving bearing humanitarian aid, and some regarding post-Soviet Armenia as a suitable market place for Evangelisation. Thus, even before the adoption of the first post-Soviet constitution in 1995, the law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations (FCRO) was passed on June 17th 1991 and amended in 1997, 2001 and 2011.[8] This law, the RA Constitution of July 5th 1995, amended in 2005 and 2015, and the Law regarding the relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church (RAHAAC) of February 2nd 2007, form the most relevant legal documents regulating the religious affairs of the republic.[9] They also address the distribution of power between state and church, while also emphasising the role of AAC for the Armenian people:

           

          • The FCRO begins declaring the AAC as the “national Church of the Armenian people” and “an important bulwark for the edification of its spiritual life and national preservation“, but establishes in Article 6.17 the separation of church and state.[10]
          • Article 18 of the Armenian Constitution provides for the separation of church and state, but also defines the “exclusive historical mission” of the AAC.[11]
          • The RAHAAC 2007 recognises in Article 2 the special relationship between the AAC and the state and the AAC as national church, as “an important and indivisible part of the foundation of the national identity“.[12]

           

          The new government following the ‘velvet revolution’ of 2018 declared on various occasions the strict separation between state and government and its will not to interfere in church matters regarding religions minorities. It suspended, however the process of adopting a new draft of the law on religious freedom.[13]

           

          Religion and forced displacement

          The Republic of Armenia is generally regarded as a traditional emigration country. The figures for the last 30 years indicate a continuing trend. This high level of emigration was initially a consequence of the 1988 earthquake, the armed conflict over NK in the 1990s, and economic factors ongoing since independence, and only to a limited extent due to discrimination or persecution based on political, religious or sexual orientation.

           

          The displaced population in RA consists largely of ethnic Armenians, and is composed only of a relatively small proportion of non-Armenian refugees and asylum seekers. In the early 1990s, the young republic was already overwhelmed by the mass influx of 360,000 ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan as a consequence of the NK conflict between 1988 and 1992. Since 2004, Armenia has welcomed hundreds of ethnic Armenian refugees from Iraq, as well as small numbers of ‘alien’ asylum seekers and refugees from the Middle East and Asia. The conflict in the Ukraine has led to a noticeable wave of arrivals since 2014. Since 2012, however, the most significant influx has come from Syria. Some 20,000 people sought shelter in Armenia, mainly ethnic Armenians, and by 2018 about 15,000 of them remained in the country. Following a short escalation of the conflict in NK in April 2016, about 2000 people were displaced from the NK villages of Talish and Mataghis.

           

          Table 3: Total number of asylum applications in the Republic of Armenia, 1999-2018[14]

           

          The Armenian authorities have reacted to the growing issue of displaced persons (DPs) and refugees by implementing corresponding laws and international agreements. In addition, Armenia quickly adopted various regulations to facilitate the status of ethnic Armenian DPs. Nevertheless, the majority of displaced ethnic Armenians, who came mainly from NK, Iraq and Syria, chose the administratively simpler and socially more prestigious residence permit or citizenship. Thus, while more than 15,000 displaced Armenians from Syria had received Armenian citizenship by 2015, just a few of them actually registered officially as asylum seekers or have the status of refugee.[15] Nevertheless, the majority of ethnic Armenians with residence or citizenship status live in refugee-like conditions. Officially, there are 18,085 refugees and asylum seekers registered in Armenia, among them 14,718 from Syria, 1,354 from Azerbaijan, 1092 from Iraq and 573 from NK.[16]

           

          Table 4: Citizenships of asylum seekers arriving in the Republic of Armenia, 2014-18[17]

           

          The relevant legal framework is mainly provided in the Armenian Law on Refugees and Asylum and in the law ‘On the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia’ of 1995 and amended in 2011, laws providing legislation for refugees from Azerbaijan and for ‘foreigners’ in general.[18] The State Migration Service, the National Security Service, Border Guards Troops, the Passport and Visa Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the office of the president of the RA and others are the primary responsible governmental entities.

           

          It is challenging to briefly summarise the role and position of the AAC on the DP issue. The AAC, which for centuries was the most important supporter of displaced Armenians in the diaspora, has significant difficulties in maintaining this function in the RA. Whereas until the early 2000s the precarious economic situation and the deficit of priests were cited as the main causes of inadequate humanitarian aid to DPs, in recent decades serious efforts by individual church NGOs and organisations have been repeatedly hampered due to ‘hunting for souls’ – proselytism – on the part of other churches. The AAC feels threatened in its role as national church by many religious groups, but above all by those who could win numerous ethnic Armenians for their religious communities, according to the AAC, mainly thanks to humanitarian aid campaigns and the active support of both internally displaced persons (IDPs) and DPs who crossed national borders. The mass influx of Syrian Armenians demonstrated that the AAC in Armenia is not prepared for far-reaching humanitarian programs, but still has to rely on both the financial help and the organisational experience of the AAC in the diaspora.

           

          Due to the dearth of coverage of AAC-initiated efforts for DPs in the media and on social media, many of the AAC’s successful refugee projects were and are simply not perceived – either by governmental organisations or by the average Armenian citizen. For example, the efforts of the Armenia Inter-Church Charitable Round Table Foundation (ART), an ecumenical organisation collaborating closely with churches and NGOs with the aim of actively involving the church in social work, are almost unknown.[19] Furthermore, there are many other, smaller NGOs and private initiatives of AAC priests and members that are engaged in supporting displaced Armenians from Syria, but likewise suffer from a lack of public awareness.

           

          Thus, in public opinion, the AAC is involved neither in supporting DPs, IDPs and returnees, nor does it maintain any cooperation with governmental institutions on refugee issues. Allegedly there is also a lack of clear statements by the AAC regarding DPs. The AAC also seems to barely cooperate with foreign, religious NGOs or organisations (e.g. CARITAS), but rather tries to compete with them. This may be due to the fact that in recent years the AAC has claimed to be the sole church of every ethnic Armenian, and that ‘apostates’ are often perceived as less truly Armenian. Thus, while the Armenian state, being bound by international treaties and laws, seeks to treat all DPs equally regardless of ethnic origin or religion, the behavior of the AAC tends to share widespread xenophobia with the population of the RA paired with nationalistic narrowmindedness.

           

          Policy perspectives

          Despite the variety of activities directed at migration and DPs in Armenia, migration policy and above all humanitarian aid are characterised by a lack of coherence, a dearth of accessible information and limited cooperation, particularly regarding interaction between the state and church, or church organisations.

           

          The strict separation between church and state, strongly propagated by the post-revolutionary government of Nikol Pashinyan, should better be limited to political issues in foreign and domestic policy, national security and decisions in education and science, but should not refer to issues of universal human rights, tolerance and humanitarian support for ALL persons living in Armenia.[20]  Better information exchange as well as targeted, joint programmes for refugee and DP aid must be ensured.

           

          In addition to fighting poverty and preventing further large-scale emigration, the support of DPs in Armenia should also be an important issue and priority for the AAC. This help must also reach all DPs, regardless of their origin, religion, language or cultural values. The Church should not fight a battle against proselytism at the expense of the needy; rather clerics must make every effort to support those in need of help and offer them an open ear. This would without doubt also strengthen the position of the AAC in Armenian society, showing that Christian humanitarian action is not limited to one’s own people, but also to strangers and followers of other religions.

           

          Thus, the demand for better coherence, information flow and joint programmes also applies to the AAC and other religious organisations. The AAC should reconsider its opinion about relations with those ‘other’ churches and religious communities in the country, particularly with regard to those which have also committed themselves to helping refugees and DPs in Armenia. The AAC, which has not established comparable humanitarian programmes in its history and pastoral activities, can only profit and learn from the long humanitarian experience of these ‘others’. Though the Armenian saying “Armenians rescue Armenians first and foremost” was very true of Armenian history in the 20th century, it should not prove so not in the history of 21st century Armenia, which is an increasingly multicultural, multi-religious and highly diverse society, in which mutual respect and tolerance are the most important attributes.

           

          Jasmine Dum-Tragut, Armenologist, is head of the Center for the Study of the Christian East and the Department for Armenian Studies, senior scientist at the Department of Biblical Study and Ecclesiastical History, and docent at the Department of Linguistics at the University of Salzburg, Austria. Her latest publications include Far from the Fatherland, in the Fatherland. Fates of Armenian Soldiers in WWI. Exhibition Catalog, AGMI, Tigran Mets, Yerevan 2019; (with D. Winkler) Monastic Life in the Armenian Church, Peter Lang, 2018; and (with U. Bläsing, T.M. van Lint) (eds). A Commemoration Volume for Jos J.S. Weitenberg, Hebrew University Armenian Studies, 15, Peeters Publishers 2019.

           

          Cover photo: ‘Syrian Armenian refugee child praying in Etchmiadzin Cathedral, April 2015’. Copyright: Asadour Guzelian. Printed with author’s permission.

           

          [1] Regional Migration Report: South Caucasus 2013, 121pp. ‘European Asylum: 90% of Armenia’s Citizens Filing Requests Have Been Rejected’ published in the Armenian online newspaper HETQ, February 2017, https://hetq.am/en/article/75451. ‘The number of asylum applicants from Armenia to the EU is declining”, published in Newsworthy, July 2018, https://www.newsworthy.se/en/dashboard/newslead/13072/?token=31b93580-eab2-4924-91ed-55066b5049c0

          [2] ‘Results of Armenian Census 2001’ available at https://armstat.am/census2001/pdfs/12.pdf  (population in general) and https://armstat.am/census2001/pdfs/52.pdf  (Ethnic composition of population).

          [3] ‘Results of the Armenian Census 2011’ available at https://armstat.am/file/doc/99486108.pdf and https://armstat.am/file/doc/99486108.pdf (population in general), https://armstat.am/file/doc/99486253.pdf (Ethnic composition of population).

          [4] For figures of 2001 Census and 2011 Census see footnotes 2) and 3). For figures of all-Soviet census see http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php?reg=13. For 2019 estimate, with live numbers, see https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/armenia-population/

          [5] ‘Results of the census of 2011. Religious belief and affiliation’ https://armstat.am/file/doc/99486288.pdf

          [6] Ibid.

          [7] After a short-term increase in 2013-2014, the crude birth rate has been dropping annually over the last five years, down to 12.3 births per 1,000 capita of population in 2018. For more information see https://www.ceicdata.com/en/armenia/vital-statistics/vital-statistics-crude-birth-rate-per-1000-population. The de jure population in 2018 was estimated at 2,927,700 inhabitants according to the demographic yearbook of the Armenian Statistical Bureau, The Demographic Yearbook of Armenia, 2018, https://www.populationof.net/armenia/

          [8] Law for Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations, full text available at https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5744/file/Armenia_law_freedom_conscience_religious_orgs_1991_am2011_en.pdf

          [9] Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, adopted on December 6th 2015, full text available at https://www.president.am/en/constitution-2015; Law regarding the relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church, 2007, full text available at: https://www.armenianchurch.org/index.jsp?sid=3&nid=724&y=2007&m=4&d=5&lng=en

          [10] ‘Being cognizant of the Armenian Apostolic Church as the national Church of the Armenian people and as an important bulwark for the edification of its spiritual life and national preservation’, available at https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5744/file/Armenia_law_freedom_conscience_religious_orgs_1991_am2011_en.pdf

          [11] Article 18 of the Armenian Constitution states that ‘The Armenian Apostolic Holy Church. 1. The Republic of Armenia shall recognise the exclusive mission of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church, as a national church, in the spiritual life of the Armenian people, in the development of their national culture and preservation of their national identity. 2. The relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church may be regulated by law’. https://www.president.am/en/constitution-2015/. The wording of the first version of 1991 ‘unique mission’ was changed in the amendment as response to the criticism of the Council of Europe.

          [12] ‘Article 2 – Holy Armenian Apostolic Church, 1. The Republic of Armenia recognizes the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church as the national church, with the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin as its headquarters and its hierarchal sees of the Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia and the Armenian Patriarchates of Holy Jerusalem and Constantinople; and the exceptional mission of the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church in the spiritual life of the Armenian people, their national cultural development and preservation of their national identity. […]  Article IV – Legislation Regulating the Relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church. The regulating principles of the relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church are delineated by the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia; its general relationship as delineated by the RA law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” and other laws and international agreements; and its special relationship – as a relationship between the state and national church recognized by the state – as delineated by this law’. https://www.armenianchurch.org/index.jsp?sid=3&nid=724&y=2007&m=4&d=5&lng=en

          [13] This process was also stimulated by a joint paper by the Venice Commission and the OSCE. See: ‘Venice Commission Opinion No. 909/2017, OSCE/ODIHR Opinion No. FORB ARM/319/2018: Joint Opinion on the Draft Law Amending the Law on Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Organizations. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 114th Plenary Session (Venice, March 16th-17th 2018)’ available at https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2018)002-e

          [14] Official figures published by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Development of the Republic of Armenia, Migration Service. http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=146 (figures 1999-2009); http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=145 (figures 2010-2013); and http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=144 (figures 2013-2019).

          [15] ‘15,465 displaced Armenians from Syria were granted Armenian citizenship between 2012 and June 2015’, in Economic integration of Syrian Armenians in Armenia, 2017, 17.

          [16] ‘UNHCR Fact Sheet Armenia’, September 2019, available at https://www.un.am/up/file/UNHCR_Armenia_FactSheet-September2019_ENG.pdf

          [17] Official figures published by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Development of the Republic of Armenia, Migration Service. http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=146 (figures 1999-2009); http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=145 (figures 2010-2013); and http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=144 (figures 2013-2019).

          [18] See ‘Law on refugees and asylum’ available at https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/7181/file/Armenia_law_on_refugees_asylum_am2011_en.pdf; See ‘Law on citizenship in Republic of Armenia’ available at http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=1731&lang=eng; ‘On legal and socio-economic guarantees of the refugees from the Republic of Azerbaijan from 1988-1992 who acquired the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia’, adopted on December 6th 2000. ‘On allocating the apartments built for the refugees displaced from the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1988-1992 to the refugees with ownership right’, adopted November 20th 2002. For a more detailed and complete overview of all Armenian regulations and legislation regarding refugees and asylum please see the website of the Armenian State Migration Service at http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=2; Armenian law ‘On Foreigners’, December 15th 2006, mainly for residence permits for foreigners working and studying in Armenia.

          [19] The website of the Armenia Inter-Church Charitable Round Table Foundation is available at http://www.roundtable-act.am/en/

          [20] Nikol Pashinyan assumed the office as the 16th Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia on May 8th 2018.

          Footnotes
            Related Articles

            Religion and Forced Displacement in Bulgaria

            Article by Daniela Kalkandjieva

            Religion and Forced Displacement in Bulgaria

            Introduction

            The modern Bulgarian state emerged on the map of Europe in 1878. Since then, it has experienced a series of forced displacement acts, either as the receiving state or as the country of origin. Yet whereas the political and economic aspects of these displacements have attracted serious scholarly attention, the religious ones remain unexplored. This knowledge gap is largely the result of the militant atheism that until recently dominated in Bulgarian social sciences. Although the collapse of communism triggered a growing interest in religion, researchers continued to neglect its role in cases of forced migration. The situation changed in 2015 when the influx of thousands of migrants to Bulgaria provoked intense public debates centred on the religious identity of newcomers. Careful reading reveals that the host society is inclined to approach this identity through the prism of historical memories about the experience of its traditional religious communities rather than through the lens of abstract theology. Furthermore, Bulgarian citizens, living in a globalised world, have also been influenced by images and notions stirred by the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the more recent Islamist terrorist acts in Europe.

             

            Religion, ethnicity and population

            The modern Bulgarian state was created as a tributary principality of the Ottoman Empire, with the population of two million inhabiting a territory of 64,000 square kilometres situated between the Danube River and the Balkan mountain range. In 1885, the Principality of Bulgaria united with Eastern Rumelia – an Ottoman autonomous province where the majority of the population was also Bulgarian. This act augmented the territory of Bulgaria to 95,704.5 square kilometres and its population to 3,154,375.[1] Later, the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the First World War (1914-1918), the Treaty of Craiova (1940), and the Paris Peace Treaty (1947) caused further modifications to the state borders. Today, Bulgaria has a territory of 110,371.8 square kilometres and is inhabited by a population of 7,000,000.[2]

             

            The territorial changes were not the only factor determining the dynamics of Bulgaria’s religious and ethnic demography. No less important were the minority policies of the national governments as well as those of neighbouring states towards the Bulgarian minorities there. All these factors have left their imprint on the development of the ethnic and religious composition of modern Bulgaria (Tables 1 and 2). Interpretation of the numbers presented, however, needs to take into account the specific methodologies used in the date gathering. Until 1905, the censuses did not register the ethnic profile of citizens, but only their religious affiliation and mother tongue, e.g., as it used to be under the censuses conducted by the Ottoman authorities. In its turn, the communist regime excluded information about religion from the census.

             

            Finally, the 1992 Census introduced the collection of such data but approached religion as ‘a historically determined belonging of a citizen or that of his/her parents and ancestors to a given group with a specific religious worldview’. Therefore, it is unclear whether the figures registered reflect the family background or the personal religious identity of citizens. In 2001, the census methodology was harmonised with European Union (EU) legislation, and Bulgarians were no longer obliged to register their ethnicity, mother tongue, or religion. Due to the insufficient publicity given to this new situation, however, they took advantage of this right only in 2011, when 21.8 per cent of them declined to answer the questions concerning religion in the census questionnaire. At the same time, Bulgarian citizens were much more open to declaring their ethnicity and mother tongue; less than ten per cent of them omitted the corresponding sections in the questionnaire.[3]

             

             Table 1. Ethnic Demography[4]

             

            Table 2. Religious Demography[5]

             

            Church-state relations

            The role of religion in acts of forced displacement has varied throughout the history of modern Bulgaria, just as the status of local religious traditions and their institutions altered under the successive political regimes. An essential factor in social life after the Liberation of 1878 but suppressed under communism (1944-1989), religion has been gradually regaining its position in society after the fall of the atheist regime. If pre-communist legislation distinguished explicitly between the majority and minority faiths by granting the status of ‘dominant religion’ to Eastern Orthodoxy (1879 Constitution, Article 37), post-communist law-making has adopted a different approach. It expresses a respect for religious freedoms (1991 Constitution, Articles 13.1 & 37), while considering Eastern Orthodoxy as the ‘traditional religion’ of Bulgaria (Article 13.3).[6]  In this regard, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) deserves special attention as the local institutional representative of this religious tradition. Before the communist takeover, its holy synod had exceptional authority in not only within its community of believers, but also generally in the religious affairs of the Bulgarian Kingdom (1879 Constitution, Article 39). Although the communist regime introduced the constitutional separation of the church and state (1947 Constitution, Article 78.2; 1971 Constitution, Article 53.2), it defined the local Orthodox church as a body linked with the history and traditional faith of the Bulgarian people (1949 Law on Religions, Article 3). This vision underwent a further development in 2002 when the newly adopted Religious Denominations Act emphasised ‘the special and traditional role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the history of Bulgaria to establish and develop its spirituality and culture’ in its preamble. Moreover, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was granted ex lege the status of judicial entity (2002 Religious Denominations Act, Article 10.1), while other religious minorities can obtain this status only via court registration (Articles 14-20).

             

            The new legal status allows the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to act as a partner of the state in the sphere of social policies. The position of this religious institution in society is additionally enhanced by its image as the saviour of the Bulgarian people throughout history, especially during the five-century Ottoman rule. This new capacity became evident during the recent refugee crisis when the call of the BOC’s holy synod to stop incoming migrants, who were framed as a threat to Bulgarian national identity and state sovereignty, found broad support in society. The BOC has also emerged as an essential player when it comes to shaping the attitudes of people on issues linked with legislation on family affairs, and played a substantial role in blocking the ratification of the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence by the National Assembly of Bulgaria.

             

            Religion and forced displacement

            An analysis of the role of religion in forced displacement would be incomplete without taking into consideration the previous experience of Bulgarian society. Between 1878 and 1945, 806,000 people found asylum in Bulgaria; 698,000 of them were ethnic Bulgarians who had remained outside the borders of their kin state upon the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.[7] Initially, they continued living in their settlements in the hope that these territories would be unified with Bulgaria in the future. Later on, however, they abandoned their homes due to persecution or military conflicts. As national refugees, all of them were granted Bulgarian citizenship and received significant material support from the Bulgarian state. In its turn, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church took care of their spiritual needs. If they belonged to a different faith, however, they often became subjects of attempts at forceful conversion to Orthodoxy.

             

            This division of labour between church and state was also used in the case of foreign refugees. They consisted mostly of Armenians and Russians. The former sought asylum in Bulgaria after the massacres initiated by the Ottoman authorities in the mid-1890s and the early 1920s, while the latter fled the Bolshevik regime established in Russia. Both were met with empathy by Bulgarian society: the former shared a similar destiny with Bulgarians as victims of Ottoman rule, while the latter were exiles from Orthodox Russia that had liberated Bulgaria from that rule and was now suffering under the godless Bolsheviks.

             

            The Bulgarian state also reached out to help these incomers. It assisted them in receiving Nansen passports (internationally recognised travel documents issued to stateless refugees by the League of Nations from 1922 to 1938). It also offered them the opportunity to obtain Bulgarian citizenship. At the same time, the diverse profile of these refugees resulted in different policies targeting the various groups. The Armenians had generally emigrated with their families and often with their neighbours and priests, and were thus able to establish self-reliant parish-based communities. Their members additionally benefited from the financial support of Armenian diaspora organisations and the Armenian Apostolic Church. They were also skilful craftsmen, who easily found a place in the domestic economy.

             

            The Russians presented a different case: two-thirds of them were former military personnel who lacked the skills necessary for integration in a predominantly agrarian society. Their survival became possible thanks to annual subsidies secured by the Bulgarian state. The money was transferred to such organisations as the Russian Red Cross and the Union of Russian Military Veterans, which in turn distributed this aid among their members in the form of free soup kitchens, medical and educational services, housing and accommodation, etc. After having been defeated in World War I, however, Bulgaria was no longer able to provide the necessary financial support to the hundreds of thousands of refugees who were arriving. Thus, many Russians and Armenians continued to the west to settle in the wealthier victorious states.

             

            In its turn, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church provided moral and material support to both groups of foreign refugees, even though the Armenians belonged to a different branch of Christianity. At the same time, due to its schismatic status, the BOC was not able to offer pastoral care to Orthodox Russians. Therefore, it allowed them to establish a parallel network of parishes under the jurisdiction of the Russian Synod Abroad, which had been set up in interwar Yugoslavia. Additionally, the Bulgarian Church provided them with the churches and monasteries necessary for their religious life.

             

            Table 3. Major Immigration Waves (1878-1945)[8]

             

            Another type of forced migration appeared as a result of the bilateral population exchange agreements which Bulgaria had concluded with Turkey (1913), Greece (1919, 1927) and Romania (1940). They were facilitated by the reciprocal presence of Turkish, Greek, and Romanian minorities in Bulgaria, and of minorities of the corresponding countries in Bulgaria. As a result, the ethnic and religious profile of the displaced persons had a twofold effect: it facilitated their integration in the host state and increased the ethnoreligious homogeneity of its population. In the case of the Orthodox displaced persons (DPs), this exchange also allowed them to leave the jurisdiction of an ‘alien’ Orthodox Church and to join the national one, where they were able to attend liturgy in a familiar language. A no less noteworthy feature of this type of displacement is the settlement of the DPs alongside the state border that was closest to their previous homes.

             

            Table 4. Population Exchange and Forced Resettlement[9]

             

            The next form of forced displacement was influenced by the anti-Semitic policy of the Nazi regime. As an ally of Hitlerite Germany, Bulgaria was involved in the deportation of Jews to extermination camps. During World War II, Bulgarian citizens of Jewish origin were taken from their homes, although their deportation was blocked by the active opposition of the Orthodox Church and many Bulgarians. Unfortunately, this resistance did not prevent the deportation of 11,343 Jews from the areas under Bulgarian occupation (Aegean Thrace, Vardar Macedonia, and Eastern Serbia).

             

            Finally, religion also played a role in cases of forced emigration. According to Bulgarian scholars, about 954,000 people left Bulgaria from 1878 to 1945; about 574,000 of them were Muslims who sought a better standard of living, first in the Ottoman Empire and later in the Turkish republic.[10] Initially motivated by the disadvantageous change in their social status, their exodus continued over the next years for various reasons (discrimination, war, and population exchange), causing constant annual flows amounting to several to tens of thousands of DPs. Most of these émigrés were Turks, but there were also many Tatars, Circassians, Pomaks and Roma. After the Treaty of Neuilly (1919), however, the Bulgarian state started limiting the emigration of Pomaks (Bulgarian speaking Muslims), and took measures to integrate them by means of education. In parallel, the Orthodox Church abandoned its previous policy of forceful conversion of Pomaks to Orthodoxy and focused its efforts on diminishing the influence of Islam on them.

             

            Despite subscribing to a different ideology, the communist regime continued the policies of previous Bulgarian governments towards the Turkish minority, which it regarded as threatening state sovereignty. The Cold War closure of the Bulgarian-Turkish border did not stop Turkish emigration but replaced the annual flows with several big refugee waves. The last of them occurred in the mid-1980s when Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin were forced to adopt Bulgarian names. Officially justified as a means to recover of some alleged Bulgarian roots of this minority, the so-called ‘revival process’ aimed at the assimilation of this group. As a result, in the summer of 1989, 320,000 Turks left Bulgaria; half of them returned after the fall of communism.

             

             

            Table 5. Major Waves of Turkish Minority Emigration and Forceful Displacement[11]

             

            The fall of communism stimulated a new type of emigration from Bulgaria. In the last 30 years, about 1,300,000 citizens of working age (20-59 years) have left Bulgaria, mostly for economic reasons.[12] This high level of net emigration has caused a serious demographic imbalance, which has affected the age profile of the population and its labour force potential. Thus, the quality of immigrants to Bulgaria has become a burning issue. In this regard, special attention is paid to such potential resources for solving the demographic crisis as the post-1989 Bulgarian emigrants, the historical Bulgarian diaspora (especially from Ukraine, Moldova, and North Macedonia), and highly skilled third-country nationals.[13]

             

            From this perspective, the educational level of refugees is far from optimal. According to the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees, in 2016 only 23 per cent of migrants over the age of 14 had secondary or higher education.[14] Also, they regard Bulgaria as a transit country. Until 2012, there was a low influx of migrants, and the annual number of asylum applications was below 1,000. In 2013, however, the refugee crisis caused a rapid growth in the number of asylum seekers, which reached 20,391 applications in 2015. Under these circumstances, Bulgaria’s responsibility as a country that has an external EU border grew as well. The change had a significant impact on the local political elite, shifting its attention to the security aspects of the migration pressure rather than the humanitarian ones. It also stimulated the spread of anti-immigrant rhetoric: initially used by the populists to expand their influence on society, it was soon adopted by mainstream parties as well. Meanwhile, the drop in the migration levels to the pre-crisis ones in the last three years has not stopped the misuse of the refugee issue for political ends.[15]

             

            Table 6. Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees: Data on Asylum Seekers (01.01.1993 – 31.12.2019)[16]

             

            The recent refugee crisis also pointed to a return of religion as a factor in forced displacement. On the one hand, the statements issued by the BOC’s holy synod and individual bishops between 2015 and 2017, played a substantial role in shaping a reserved, and even hostile, attitude towards refugees in Bulgarian society.[17] In particular, the church’s call to close the state borders to migrants from the Middle East and North Africa as religiously alien people who could present a threat to the national identity and state sovereignty of Bulgarians found significant support in society.[18] The impact of this vision was increased by the intertwining of the historical memory of Bulgarians about the five-century subjection of their forefathers to the Ottoman Empire with more recent impressions of the acts of Islamic terrorism in Europe and other parts of the world.

             

            At the same time, the Bulgarian case reveals an alternative involvement of religion in the recent refugee crisis, which was motivated by the ethos of Christian hospitality. It was associated mostly with minority religious communities. Especially active was the Catholic community, where the priests, believers, and religion-based structures such as Caritas played an active part in alleviating the suffering of refugees by providing humanitarian aid. Furthermore, the migrants received moral and material support from non-religious civil society structures such as the Council of Refugee Women in Bulgaria or local branches of international organisations such as the UN Refugee Agency.[19]

             

            Policy perspectives

            The analysis of the role played by religion in forced displacement acts throughout the history of modern Bulgaria outlines three major patterns: pre-communist, communist, and post-communist.

             

            The first of them took shape between 1878 and 1945 when the incoming and outgoing flows of refugees in the Balkans emerged as after-effects of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of young independent states whose governments pursued the creation of ethnically and religiously homogenous nations. As a rule, these processes of migration affected neighbouring states and concerned communities whose centuries-old coexistence had brought about specific modes of collaboration as well as of religious tensions. Besides, the discussed displacements often embraced entire parish/mosque-based neighbourhoods. As a result, their members were able to reproduce their religious and social infrastructure in their new settlements. The fact that most refugees were agrarians who moved together with their families from one rural society to another allowed them to establish self-reliant communities which thus needed less support from the host state and/or international organisations. The refugees from Bolshevik Russia presented the main deviance from this pattern.

             

            From a comparative perspective, the experience described might offer new insights into the understanding of post-Cold War migration as an outcome of the decolonisation process and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Tito’s Yugoslavia. In this regard, the Bulgarian experience points to new directions of research linked with: a) the potential of refugee religious structures to assist or impede the sustainable socialisation of asylum seekers in the host society; b) the role of the institution(s) of the majority faith in the host country as a factor shaping public attitudes towards the newcomers; and c) the division of labour between the state and the religious authorities in dealing with refugees.

             

            Furthermore, while the previous cohorts of refugees contributed towards greater ethno-religious homogeneity of Bulgarian society, the new ones would increase its diversity. This new phenomenon presents a serious challenge to many Eastern European societies, whose pluralist traditions were uprooted under communism. At the same time, the post-1989 democratisation and EU membership of Bulgaria have established a new balance between the local majority and minority religions, thus allowing the development of alternative responses to the refugee challenge.

             

            Daniela Kalkandjieva is a Bulgarian scholar affiliated with Sofia University St Kliment Ohridski. She is the author of The Russian Orthodox Church, 1917-1948: From Decline to Resurrection (Routledge 2015); ‘Russian Ecclesiastical Geopolitics between the Two World Wars’, CAS Sofia Working Papers Series, No. 10 (2018); ‘Eastern Orthodoxy and its Churches in Central and Eastern Europe’ in András Máté-Tóth and Gergely Rosta (eds.), Focus on Religion in Central and Eastern Europe: A Regional View (De Gruyter, 2016), ‘The Bulgarian Orthodox Church at the Crossroads: Between Nationalism and Pluralism’ in Andrii Krawchuk and Thomas Bremer (eds.), Orthodox Christian Encounters of Identity and Otherness: Values, Self-Reflection, Dialogue (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); and ‘А Comparative Analysis on Church-State Relations in Eastern Orthodoxy: Concepts, Models and Principles’, Journal of Church and State, 2011, 53 (4), pp. 587-614.

             

            Cover photo: ‘’Clergy and faithful pleading for mandatory religious education in Bulgarian public schools, St Nevski Cathedral, Sofia, September 2010′. Copyright: Daniela Kalkandjieva.

             

            [1] Annuaire statistique du Royaume de Bulgarie, 1909 (I’année), Sofia: Imprimerie d’état, 1910, pp. 4 & 38.

            [2] Statistical Reference Book 2019, Sofia: National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2019, pp. 14 & 21, available at https://www.nsi.bg/sites/default/files/files/publications/StatBook2019_en.pdf. All websites accessed on 12 December 2019.

            [3] Dimitar Arkadiev, ‘Nyakoi problemi okolo dannite za etnicheskiya sastav na naselenieto v Balgariya ot preboryavaneto 2011 godina’ [The 2011 Census: Some problems related to the ethnic composition of Bulgaria’s population], Paper presented at the National Statistical Institute Conference on the 2011 Census (Sofia, June 17th 2014), available at http://da.uni-vt.bg/pubinfo.aspx?p=6047

            [4] The 1887 Census did not collect data related to ethnicity but only about the mother tongue; Table 1 includes information about the major ethnic groups in Bulgaria which have been affected by acts of forced displacement. Sources: Annuaire statistique du Royaume de Bulgarie, 1909 (I anneé), Sofia: Imprimerie d’état, 1910; Ibid., 1923-1924 (XV-XVI années), Sofia: Imprimerie d’état, 1925; Ibid., 1929-1930 (XXI-XXII années), Sofia: Imprimerie d’état, 1930; Rezultati ot prebroyavane na naselenieto na 31.XII.1946 godina [1946 Census results], Sofia: Darzhavno upravlenie za informatsiya, 1970; Struktura na naselenieto po veroizpovednie [An overview of Bulgaria’s religious demography (1887-2001)], Sofia: National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria, available at https://www.nsi.bg/Census/StrReligion.htm; 2011 Population Census: Main Results, Sofia: National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria, [2012], available at https://www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf

            [5] Table 2 uses the same sources as Table 1.

            [6] Daniela Kalkandjieva, ‘The Bulgarian Orthodox Church: Authoring New Visions About the Orthodox Church’s Role in Contemporary Bulgarian Society’ in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), Orthodox Churches and Politics in Southeastern Europe: Nationalism, Conservativism, and Intolerance, London: Palgrave, 2019, pp. 53-83.

            [7] Vesselin Mintchev, ‘External Migration and External Migration Policies in Bulgaria’, South East Europe Review for Labor and Social Affairs, 1999, 2 (3), p. 125.

            [8] Data collected from the following sources: Mintchev; Detelina Dineva, ‘Bulgarian migration in a historical perspective’ in Anna Mazurkiwicz (ed.), East Central European Migrations During the Cold War: A Handbook, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019, p. 74; Tsvetana Kyoseva, ‘Ruskata emigratsiya i balgarskata darzhava (20-te – 50-te godini na XX v.)’ [Russian Emigration in Bulgaria in the 1920s –1950s], in Georgi Markov, Tatyana Shamray, Luiza Revyakina, Lizbet Lyubenova, Ganka Rupcheva, Ani Zlateva (eds.), Byalata emigratsia v Balgariya [The White Emigration in Bulgaria], Sofia: IK ‘Gutenberg’, 2001, p. 52.

            [9] Data collected from the following sources: Nikola Stanev, Nay-nova istoriya na Balgariya, 1912-1920 [The newest history of Bulgaria, 1912-1920], vol. 2 ‘Voyni za obedinenie’ [Unification wars], Sofia: Pechatnitsa S.M. Staykov, 1925, p.140; Dineva, pp. 70-71.

            [10] Mintchev, p. 125.

            [11] Data collected from Valeri Stoyanov, Turskoto naselenie v Balgariya mezhdu polyusite na etnicheskata politika [Turkish population in Bulgaria between the poles of ethnic policy], Sofia: Lik, 1998.

            [12] Anna Krasteva, The Bulgarian Migration Paradox: Migration and Development in Bulgaria, [issued within the MIND Project and with the support of Caritas Bulgaria, Caritas Europe, and Global Migration Policy Associates (GMPA)], Sofia: Caritas Bulgaria, May 2019, p. 9, available at https://www.caritas.eu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/CommonHomeBulgariaEN.pdf

            [13] National Strategy for Migration, Asylum and Integration (2011-2020) of the Republic of Bulgaria, p.12, available at https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/7202/file/Bulgaria_National_Strategy_Migration_Asylum_Integration_2011_2020_en.pdf

            [14] Albena Nikolova and Nina Chernicheska, Refugees in Bulgaria: Labour Market and Budgetary Costs, Sofia: Ministry of Finances of the Republic of Bulgaria, August 2016, pp. 9-11.

            [15]A.  Krasteva, pp. 16, 34-35; Daniela Kalkandjieva, ‘The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Refugee Crisis’ in Lucian N. Leustean (ed.), Forced Migration and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World, London: Routledge 2019, p. 243.

            [16] The presented data is announced by the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria on its official website at http://www.aref.government.bg/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/2020-01/Charts-website-bg_12.pdf

            [17] D. Kalkandjieva, ‘The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Refugee Crisis’, p. 243.

            [18] Special Address of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox with Reference to the Migration Crisis, September 25th 2015, available at https://bg-patriarshia.bg/index.php?file=appeal_20.xml

            [19] https://caritas.bg/; crw-bg.org; https://www.unhcr.org/bg/

            Footnotes
              Related Articles

              Religion and Forced Displacement in Georgia

              Article by Tornike Metreveli

              Religion and Forced Displacement in Georgia

              Introduction

              Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia has witnessed three large waves of internal forced migration as a result of armed conflicts. The armed conflicts in the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia (1992-93) and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia (1991–2 and 2008) resulted in the displacement of 273,411 people, overwhelmingly ethnic Georgians, from South Ossetia and Abkhazia to Georgian administered territory.[1] In addition to the history of internal displacement, as a result of its location at the geographical crossroad of Europe and Asia, and its experience of domination under the Ottoman and Russian empires, Georgia’s religious field has evolved in the context of a fusion between religious and ethnic identities. In the course of its interactions with political power structures, the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) managed to normatively intertwine the concept of nationhood ‘being Georgian’ with the religious identity of ‘being Orthodox Christian’. Hence, what might seem like a contradiction of the universalism of Christian theology became gradually entrenched through church’s collaboration with the state. Ethnic and religious minorities were excluded from the church’s national project. The two largest minority religious organisations in Georgia, namely the Islamic community and the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), struggled to compete for fundamental rights and liberties. With major religious organisations busy with advancing their organisational interests or challenging existing power relations, internally displaced persons (IDPs) were marginalised in the ongoing process of Georgia’s major economic, social, political transition.

               

              Given Georgia’s situation in the early 1990s, with crumbling state institutions and a dysfunctional state apparatus, the integration or even accommodation of IDPs was not a priority area of policy-making for the Georgian government. This manifested itself in the non-existence of a state integration strategy to address the issues posed by the significant internal population displacement. Only in 2007, by the 47th Decree of the Government of Georgia was the first ‘State Strategy towards IDPs’ adopted. It outlined the mechanisms and objectives of the Georgian state with regard to the integration of IDPs in Georgia’s socio-political life, as well the approach to facilitating dignified living conditions for the internally displaced.

               

              After escaping the two wars of the early 1990s, most IDPs ended up living in so-called IDP settlements, which were often regular schools, old Soviet hotels and kindergartens that had been repurposed to accommodate them. Due to endemic corruption at state-level, the aid programmes designed for Georgian IDPs often failed to reach their target audience. The involuntary character of their migration resulted in an impoverished and socio-politically disengaged population of IDPs in the new settlements. In 2008, however, after the war with Russia, the new IDP population of Georgia received considerable assistance from both Georgian state institutions and from external donors such as USAID and the European Union (EU).[2] The scale of these two waves of internal displacement, as well as their respective proximity to armed conflicts differed significantly. If the Abkhazian war of the early 1990s led to the displacement of (by various estimates) between 200,000 and 230,000 people, the more recent armed conflict in Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia forced 26,885 Georgian citizens to flee their homes in the conflict zone.[3] Lastly, internal displacement and armed conflicts affected all major religious organisations in Georgia in terms of limiting access to their canonical territories (eparchies) and their ability to conduct pastoral duties in the breakaway territories.

               

              Religion, ethnicity and population

              According to the most recent census conducted in Georgia in November 2014, the population of the country is 3.71 million. 57.2 per cent of the population lives in urban areas. Ethnic Georgians constitute the dominant group with a majority of 86.8 per cent. 6.3 per cent of the population are Azerbaijani and 4.5 per cent Armenian, while other ethnic groups (e.g. Russians, Ossetians, Yezidis, Ukrainians, Kists, Greeks, Assyrians and Jews) constitute 2.4 per cent of the total population. The census states that 83.4 per cent of the Georgian population adheres to the Orthodox denomination of Christianity represented by the Georgian Orthodox Church.[4] Muslims are the second largest religious group constituting 10.7 per cent of the total population, while 2.9 per cent of the population belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC).[5] It is essential to map the ethno-religious composition of the capital of Georgia, Tbilisi, which is the largest and most populous city of the state and also accounts for the largest share of IDPs (105,956 people), who live across nine districts of the capital.[6] 89.9 per cent of the population of Tbilisi are ethnic Georgians. Armenians constitute the second largest ethnic group with 4.8 per cent, while Azerbaijanis rank as the third most significant ethnic group of the capital with 1.4 per cent of the total population.

               

              Table 1. Numbers of IDPs in Georgia.[7]

               

              Due to several historical and geographical factors, the majority of the Muslim population of Georgia is distributed predominantly among two regions; the Autonomous Republic of Adjara (hereafter Adjara) and Kvemo Kartli. Adjara, in western Georgia, borders Turkey and has a historical pattern of migration and higher conversion rates to Islam compared to the rest of Georgia. Unlike Kvemo Kartli, where Islam is represented predominantly by Azerbaijani minorities, in Adjara, the majority of the Muslim population are ethnic Georgians. According to the latest census, the total ethnic composition of Adjara is overwhelmingly ethnic Georgian (96 per cent). However, the religious composition is not similarly homogenous. For example, Orthodox Christians constitute 54.5 per cent of Adjara residents, whereas 39.8 per cent are (Georgian) Muslims. The majority of residents of Batumi, the largest city of Adjara, identified as Orthodox (68.7 per cent) or Muslim (25.4 per cent). However, four out of five municipalities in Adjara have a majority Muslim population; specifically Keda (62.1 per cent Muslims versus 31.3 per cent Orthodox), Shuakhevi (74.4 per cent Muslim vs 23.5 per cent Orthodox), Khelvachauri (56.3 per cent Muslim vs 36.4 per cent Orthodox) and Khulo (94.6 per cent Muslim vs 4.1 per cent Orthodox).[8] In terms of the IDP population, Adjara region has 6,830 IDP residents.[9] Kvemo Kartli, which borders both Armenia and Azerbaijan, has the most significant religious minority population of Muslims at 43 per cent, compared with 51.4 per cent Orthodox. Unlike in the mountainous Adjara region, where adherence to Islam does not translate into Turkish or Azerbaijani ethnic belonging, in Kvemo Kartli, ethnic and religious identities are firmly fused with each other. Ethnic Azerbaijanis constitute 41.8 per cent of region’s population, whereas Georgians represent 51.3 per cent. The region’s religious composition is mostly Orthodox Christian (51.4 per cent), compared with 43 per cent Muslim. Another region with a significant Muslim population is Kakheti region in eastern Georgia, where 85.7 per cent profess Orthodox Christianity and 12.1 per cent adhere to Islam, while three municipalities have both a Muslim and Armenian presence. Georgia’s only region where ethnic Georgians are in the minority is Samtskhe-Javakheti with 50.5 per cent ethnic Armenians compared with 48.3 per cent Georgians. Orthodox Christians constitute the majority with 45.2 per cent of the population, although 40 per cent of residents belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church.[10]

               

              Religion-state relations

              The Constitution refers to the Georgian Orthodox Church and defines the relationship between the Georgian state (not the Georgian government) and the church in Article 9 on the relationship between the state and the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia.[11] According to the Constitution adopted by the Parliament in 1995, Paragraph 1 of Article 9 states that “the State declares full freedom of belief and religion, and also recognises the special role of the Apostolic Autocephaly Orthodox Church of Georgia in the history of Georgia and its independence from the State”.[12] Here, a seemingly standard normative text of the Constitution moves in the direction of religious particularism by codifying the special status of the church in Georgian history through the Constitution. Paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Constitution determines the nature of church-state relations:

               

              The relationship between the state of Georgia and the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia shall be determined by a constitutional agreement, which shall be in full compliance with the universally recognised principles and norms of international law in the area of human rights and freedoms.[13]

               

              The same agreement is recognised as a normative act and in line with Law of Georgia on Normative Acts. According to the Law of Georgia on Normative Acts, Article 7 in Paragraph 4 states that the constitutional agreement “…take[s] precedence over any other normative act, unless it contradicts the Constitution of Georgia and the Constitutional Law of Georgia.”[14] This legal framework has shaped Georgia’s religious field ever since the adoption of the Constitutional Agreement in 2002.  The ‘constitutional’ status of the agreement gave it priority over other domestic legislation.

               

              In 2011, the Georgian government under President Mikheil Saakashvili (2004-2013) initiated an amendment to the Civil Code of Georgia granting other religious organisations the right to registration.[15] This entitled other religious organisations with the legal status of either LEPL or non-profit (non-commercial) legal entity, and gave them a legal status equal to that of the Orthodox Church. This legal change was accompanied by a massive rally led by the Georgian Orthodox Church.[16]

               

              Among the major issues of disagreement between the three main religions in Georgia is the ownership of churches, and responses to ambivalent funding practices. If one examines the Georgian government’s funding practices concerning religious organisations between 2004-2013 (Table 2), it is clear that the GOC has overwhelming privilege compared to the AAC and the Islamic community.

               

              Table 2. State Funding of the Georgian Orthodox Church after the Rose Revolution[17]

               

              The increase in the GOC’s funding coincides with a major political crisis, which the Georgian government has undergone since 2007.[18] If one compares the total combined funding that was allocated to the Georgian Patriarchate during the presidency of Saakashvili with the funding available to other religious denominations, one sees a significant difference. Between 2004 and 2013, the GOC received 149,190,000 (GBP 48,438,311), while, for example, the Armenian Church received financial assistance amounting to only 35,624 GEL (GBP 11,566) from 2009 to 2012,[19] although it is the second biggest Christian organisation in Georgia, and the third largest religious minority group. The disproportional trend continued under the Georgian Dream government. In partial and symbolic compensation for the damage to religious communities during the Soviet regime, the Islamic community of Georgia received GEL 1.1 million (GBP 357,142) in 2014 whereas in 2015 this amount to GEL 2.2 million (GBP 714,284). Furthermore, the State Agency for Religious Issues recommended the transfer to the Islamic community of 44 mosques currently in the possession of the Division of Muslims of All Georgia (aka the Department of Muslim Affairs) which the Georgian government created in 2011.[20]

               

              Religion and forced displacement

              To examine how GOC approaches the IDP problematic, it worth reflecting on the critical document that represents GOC’s vision and priorities. The so-called pastoral letters which this section will analyse are annual documents read by the close affiliates of Patriarch Ilia, the spiritual leader of the GOC, at Easter and Christmas. The whole process of reading a pastoral letter is transmitted live by the Georgian Public Broadcaster and the Georgian patriarchate’s TV channel. The official known author of the pastoral letters is Patriarch Ilia himself. The letters constitute the official position of the church on the most important societal themes. A close reading of the Easter and Christmas pastoral letters of the past 40 years since the enthronement of Patriarch Ilia II (1978–2018) reveals that forced migration/IDP themes are referred to considerably less frequently than general themes of human security. The prevalent issues discussed in the pastoral letters alongside territorial questions are abortion, demography and drug abuse.

               

              Overarching themes of solicitude and empathy towards the internally displaced are expressed in his 1994 Christmas pastoral letter, in which the patriarch encourages IDPs from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to ‘not lose faith, hope and love’ and to ‘not be stumbled and pray’.[21] In the same letter, the patriarch refers to the IDPs as refugees, which raises the question of whether the IDPs were referred to in the context of ‘our refugees’ thus distinguishing the internally displaced from ‘us, Georgians’? Or was the patriarch’s refugee reference a terminological insensitivity pointing to the GOC’s position of othering the new migrant groups who had been forcibly displaced? One can only speculate whether or not this reference constitutes an essential feature of the GOC’s vision of nationhood. Similarly, in the 1995 Easter pastoral letter, Patriarch Ilia refers to the restoration of territorial integrity and expresses his hopes and prayers for ‘refugees’. This is yet another dimension of how the GOC connects the concepts of fragmented territoriality with the narrative of the victimisation of IDPs.

               

              No publicly available data shows how the GOC engages with IDPs from an institutional perspective. For example, the GOC’s office runs 90 education and social institutions (seminaries, schools and kindergartens) with 2,000 employees and approximately 18,000 children attending them.[22] Also, the GOC operates between seven and nine orphanages, which house between 1,200 to 1,500 children. The Patriarchate of the GOC has 16 charity and development foundations, ten of which focus on charity, education, and the construction and restoration of churches. Data becomes untraceable due to the constitutional agreement between the Georgian state and the GOC, as a result of which the state institutions have no access to church organisations, and the GOC is not obliged to report their activities[23].

               

              The Armenian Apostolic Church receives considerably less funding than the GOC. Hence, relatively little is known about its activities. From the content analysis of the statements of clerics, and the websites of diocesan departments and cultural centres run by the AAC in Georgia, the primary mission and objective of the AAC’s Department of Youth Affairs is to ‘unite the Armenian youth of Georgia around the Church, to promote Armenian education and inculcate a sense of commitment to the lofty ideals of preservation of national identity’.[24] In addition to helping the academic progress of the ethnic Armenian population of Georgia, the objectives of the department also list the ‘civic education of the youth’ as its primary objective. Along the lines of civic education, the church sees itself as a promoter of human rights education in order to ‘help [the Armenian population] to integrate into Georgian civil society’.[25] The AAC organises various pilgrimages and visits to historical places in Armenia and ‘Artsakh’, which is internationally recognised as Nagorno-Karabakh.

               

              Further activities of the church with youth groups serve what it calls ‘the unification of the Armenian youth studying at different universities’. The mission statement concludes with reference to the patriotic duty incumbent upon this department of the AAC: ‘the patriotic duty of the youth organisation is to take care of the Tbilisi Pantheon of the Armenian Writers and Public Figures ‘Khojivanq’(the Armenia Pantheon of Tbilisi). Voluntary groups of young people organise clean-up activities, plant trees, [and] take care of the Pantheon.’

               

              Institutionally and legally codified strategies diverge from the actual practice and implementation of those action plans. The government is either unable or unwilling to ensure the consistent execution of those integrative strategies. The Georgian Muslim community in Adjara continue to face ‘othering discourses,’ which manifest themselves in public pressures on the practising of their religion. The fusion of Orthodox Christian identity and the concept of Georgianness is strong enough to occasionally legitimise the practice of enforced conversion to Christianity and other discriminatory practices.[26] The official publicly available report on activity between 2013 and 2018 of the Division of Muslims of All Georgia has no reference to forced migration. The report mostly focuses on achievements with regard to advancing the popularity of Islam in Georgia which manifested in:

               

              Fifteen new mosques, over 170 amortised mosques have been repaired…dozens of mosques were provided with the necessary equipment…4 websites owned by the Muslim Division and two internet TV stations…up to 1,000 TV shows. One hundred fifty kinds of books, newspapers, posters and magazines of various kinds have been published in large circulation…more than 50 conferences, 70 seminars…50 trainings.[27]

               

              Due to the lack of access to the internal ruling and policy documents of the GOC, the AAC and the Division of Muslims of All Georgia, the policy paper relies on the available information from the pastoral letters, official websites and annual reports. These institutionalist accounts do not exclude individual humanitarian practices by various priests or imams. However, without ethnographic research, documentation of those practices remains challenging.

               

              Policy perspectives

              As a result of three armed conflicts, Georgia experienced waves of internal displacement. The first two armed conflicts in 1990s coincided with the weakening (if not failure) of Georgian state institutions, a polarised post-war political climate and no real accommodationist state strategy to address new challenges of large-scale displacement. In 2007, almost 15 years after the first large-scale waves of internal displacement, the Georgian government attempted to create a systematic strategy and plan for the IDPs. Following the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, although the scale of internal migration was considerably lower, the government still demonstrated more readiness to act than in the 1990s.

               

              For their part, Georgia’s religious organisations underwent the processes of transformation and institution-building in parallel with the state itself. The competition between the three most significant religious groups – Orthodox Christians, Muslims and Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Christians – manifested itself in disagreements over property rights, funding policies and the overall status of religious organisations in society. This was met by fierce criticism from the GOC leadership and led to protests against the government. Despite the significant financial advantages, which the church maintained along with the clientelist government practices under Saakashvili’s presidency, the status of other religions was something that the GOC claimed to find threatening and challenging to its dominant position on the religious market place. In parallel with liberal inertia that allowed the religious minorities to register and exercise similar legal rights, the Georgian state wittingly or unwittingly engaged in ethno-religious particularism as reflected in the selection of national symbols in general and the flag in particular. Not only did the government ignore the possible preferences of Muslim Georgians with regard to the use of Christian symbols of the national flag, it also completely ignored the Islamic theme in the design of the new flag in the Muslim-Georgian inhabited region of Adjara.

               

              With the secular identity of the Georgian state still in the making, IDPs are little different from other minorities when it comes to integration and accommodation. The ethno-religious markers of distinction are still robust pillars of identity claim-making. Whether one is an IDP, a Georgian Muslim or an ethnic Armenian, the binary category of ‘Georgian therefore Orthodox’ still finds expression in symbols, funding practices and in the execution of the law. Whether, and in which direction this can or will unfold remains to be seen, but minorities – ethno-religious or the internally displaced – continue to challenge the normative status quo in order not to become Georgia’s forgotten ones.

               

              Tornike Metreveli is an International Postdoctoral Fellow and a Lecturer at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. His latest publications include, ‘Rhyming the National Spirit: A Comparative Inquiry into the Works and Activities of Taras Shevchenko and Ilia Chavchavadze’, Nationalities Papers, 2019, 47 (5); ‘The Making of Orthodox Church of Ukraine: Damocles Sword or Light at the End of the Tunnel? RGOW 4-5, Religion & Society in East and West, 2019; ‘The State’s Guardian Angel? The Georgian Orthodox Church and Human Security, in Lucian N. Leustean (ed.) Forced Migration and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World, London: Routledge, 2019.

               

              Cover photo: ‘Morning prayer at the Georgian Orthodox Church of St. George, Zestafoni district, Argveta, October 2019’. Copyright: A. K. Printed with author’s permission.

               

              [1] ‘IDPs figures’, Ministry of IDPs issues, available at www.mra.gov.ge/geo/static/55. All websites were accessed on 9 November 2019.

              [2] Metreveli, 2016.

              [3] Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation of Georgia (2020) IDP Issues – General Information, available at http://mra.gov.ge/eng/static/47 ; UNHRC states that as a result of 2008 war ‘approximately 30,000 remained to face possible long-term displacement’ (UNHRC (2009) Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia: A Gap Analysis, available online from https://www.unhcr.org/4ad827f59.pdf).

              [4] Sakartvelos 2014 tslis mosakhleobis sakoveltao aghtseris dziritadi shedegebi [‘2014 General Population Census Main Results’], 2014, available at http://census.ge/ge/publication, pp. 1-6.

              [5] Ibid, p. 7-9.

              [6] ‘IDPs figures’, Ministry of IDPs issues, available at www.mra.gov.ge/geo/static/55

              [7]  Ibid.

              [8] 2014 General Population Census Main Results, 2014, available at http://census.ge/ge/publication, pp. 18-45.

              [9] ‘IDPs figures’, 2019.

              [10] Ibid, p. 281.

              [11] Websites of Religious Organizations:  The official website of the Georgian Orthodox Church http://patriarchate.ge/geo/; The official website of the Primate of the Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Georgia Apostolic Church https://armenianchurch.ge/en/ ; The official website of the Division of Muslims of All Georgia/Department of Muslim Affairs http://www.amag.ge/

              [12] Art. 9, Paragraph 1.

              [13] Ibid, Art. 9.

              [14] Law of Georgia on Normative Acts, Article 7 – Interrelation of normative acts, Paragraph 4, available from https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/download/90052/12/en/pdf

              [15] Tornike Metreveli ‘Georgian Orthodox Church: Whither the foreign policy role?’, 2018, www.civil.ge, available from https://civil.ge/archives/247434

              [16] Thousands Protest Law on Religious Minorities Legal Status (10/07/2011), www.civil.ge, available from https://civil.ge/archives/121272

              [17] 1 GBP equalled an average 3.08 Georgian Lari (GEL) according to the National Bank of Georgia’s official exchange rate between 2001-2018. The daily exchange rates of Lari against foreign currencies between 2001-2018 are available at https://www.nbg.gov.ge/index.php?m=582&lng=eng; Transparency International, ‘An overview of public financing provided to the Georgian Patriarchate’, August 2nd 2013, available at https://transparency.ge/en/blog/overview-public-financing-provided-georgian-patriarchate

              [18] For a detailed analysis of political events and their context see Metreveli (2016).

              [19] Ibid, p. 11.

              [20] ‘Islami sakartveloshi: politika da integracia’ (Islam in Georgia: Policy and Integration) (2016), Caucasian House publication, Tbilisi: Georgia, p. 40.

              [21] Father Giorgi Zviadadze (ed.), Epistoleni (Pastoral Letters), Tbilisi: Exclusive Print +, 2012. The text has been published in Georgian (my translations), p. 198, sashobao 1994 (Christmas, 1994).

              [22] Transparency International, ‘The companies and other organizations related to the Georgian Orthodox Church’, September 5th 2014, available at www.transparency.ge/en/blog/companies-and-other-organizations-related-georgian-orthodox-church

              [23] Ibid.

              [24] Department of Youth Affairs, 2019, available at https://armenianchurch.ge/en/diocese/department-of-youth

              [25] Ibid.

              [26] Zviadadze, Sophie, ‘The Unbearable Lightness of Being Muslim and Georgian: Religious Transformation and Questions of Identity among Adjara’s Muslim Georgians’, Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia 7, 2018, no. 1, pp. 23-42.

              [27] ‘Sruliad sakartvelos muslimta sammartvelom bolo khuti tslis angarishi tsarmoadgina’ [trans. the Division of Muslims of All Georgia Presents the Report of Past Five Years], 2018, available from http://www.amag.ge/index.php/report/item/459-2018-11-13-07-13-37

              Footnotes
                Related Articles

                Religion and Forced Displacement in Greece

                Article by Georgios E. Trantas and Eleni D. Tseligka

                Religion and Forced Displacement in Greece

                After the fall of the Iron Curtain, Greece, until then a country of emigration, became a receiving country for immigrants primarily from the Balkan region. This migratory inflow diversified in the 2000s, with an increase in irregular migrants from Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Yet the country was met with the most notable humanitarian challenge in 2015, during the largest migration and refugee crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War. The Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) and its non-governmental organisations (NGOs) made a significant contribution to dealing with the increased arrivals of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular immigrants. The influx, albeit fluctuant, still constitutes a challenge today as the numbers continue to rise. Moreover, all institutions involved must be sure to provide relief while improving their efficiency, which requires the solidarity of the European Union (EU) and its Member States. At the same time, Greece is called upon to respond to the challenges while taking into account both the humanitarian aspect, and its obligation to safeguard the external borders of the EU in light of Europe’s populist resurgence. This report suggests that within the framework of deeper European collaboration, Greece will on the one hand have to prioritise the needs of refugees and other vulnerable groups, by definition a task for the OCG, while on the other hand effectively controlling irregular migration.

                 

                Religion, ethnicity and population

                The latest census conducted in Greece in 2011 by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) found that the country’s total resident population is 10,816,286, of which 91.6 per cent are Greek citizens, 1.8 per cent are citizens of another EU state, 6.5 per cent come from third countries, and 0.04 per cent are of unspecified citizenship or stateless persons.[1] The census did not collect data on religious affiliation amongst Greek residents, but according to a PEW Forum quantitative study in 2016 on the Religious Landscape of Central and Eastern Europe, 90 per cent of Greeks identify as Orthodox Christians, four per cent identify with one of the other Christian denominations including Catholicism, two per cent identify as Muslims, while another four per cent were recorded as unaffiliated.[2] However, in another report of the PEW Forum, also in 2016, the percentage of Muslims in Greece appears to be 5.7 per cent, following the 2015 peak of the refugee crisis.[3] The United States’ government estimates that the percentage of Orthodox Christians in Greece ranges between 81 per cent and 90 per cent percent, while four per cent to 15 per cent are atheists and two per cent are Muslims. A remaining three per cent to five per cent of Greece’s total population, includes Orthodox Old Calendarists, Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, members of Ancient Greek polytheistic religions, Scientologists, Bahá’í, Mormons, Sikhs, Buddhists and members of the Hare Krishna movement.[4]

                 

                The lack of concrete, reliable quantitative data on the size of all religious communities that comprise the entirety of Greece’s population makes the study of corresponding social groups difficult. This issue also concerns the lack of qualitative data on what constitute essentially unknown parts of the general population, which hinders the drafting of necessary policies. It follows, that because Greece is not a destination but rather a transit country for refugees and immigrants – although it is not uncommon for them to remain in host structures, reception centres and hotspots indefinitely – the numbers concerning their demographic data are merely estimates. Keeping a tally of migrants is particularly difficult since they tend to move around the country in their search for ways out of Greece and into Central and Northern Europe via the Balkan Route, or because of the poor living conditions in host structures. Furthermore, when their applications for asylum are rejected, they tend to disappear under the radar of the authorities. Limitations also apply because the capacity of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) tracking systems does not always measure up to the size of the migratory movement. Furthermore, the relevant authorities have inadequate access to and information about routes taken by migrants, who do not always cooperate with efforts to count and register them. Data collection can be particularly challenging when dealing with clandestine irregular migration that occurs alongside refugee movement.[5] In sum, any census and statistical study can only account for the permanent, registered and traceable residents of the country. Moreover, the last census took place in 2011, well before the refugee and migrant crisis that peaked in 2015 and continues to date, while the inflows fluctuate in terms of their volume and demographic composition. Indicatively, according to the UNHCR, since 2015 a significant drop has occurred, with the number of arrivals falling from 861,630 in 2015, 177,234 in 2016 and 36,310 in 2017. Yet, a rise in numbers was observed in 2018 with 50,508 arrivals, followed by 71,368 by December 15th 2019.[6]

                 

                Religion-state relations

                The centrality of religion for the Orthodox communities of Southeastern Europe predates the notion of the nation-state itself, whereby, with the emergence of national entities in the region, Orthodoxy was identified with the Greek nation and its psyche, and ultimately became part of its self-image as a collectively perceived constituent element of identity within the context of the Helleno-Christian construct, as part of the nation-building process. It follows that the Greek state has been closely linked to the Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) ever since the founding of the latter (1833), and abides by this special relationship to date, notwithstanding the ideological orientation of consecutive governments.

                 

                In turn, the OCG considers its close relationship with the state a sine qua non and as legitimated, both by history and by its own formative contribution to the Greek-Orthodox particularity. Moreover, the well-being of the state and its people, the safeguarding of the national interest and the preservation of the Hellenic-Orthodox identity is for the OCG a raison d’être.[7] It enjoys, directly or indirectly, the widespread social acceptance and sway required to have a role and a say in the socio-political affairs of the state.

                 

                One year after the fall of the junta regime (1974), the 1952 constitution, which was adopted as an interim solution, was replaced by that of 1975. Within its broader context of reviews, revisions and amendments, it repositioned church–state relations, inclining them towards a more secularist direction. For example, the prerequisite that the president be Orthodox and swear to safeguard the creed was removed. Reference to proselytism was omitted from Article 3 and was inserted in Article 13 as a prohibition of ‘proselytism against any faith’ instead. The revised Article 3 guaranteed freedom of worship while acknowledging Orthodoxy as the ‘prevailing faith’, thus constitutionally rendering the OCG an established church instead of a state institution.[8]

                 

                The constitution of 1975 is of particular significance as it marked the ushering in of the Third Hellenic Republic and the shift to a democratic polity, and it is still in force. It has been amended three times since its adoption; in 1986, 2001 and 2008. Although no changes have been made as regards religious affairs, it is worth noting that the amendment of 2001 was adopted with extensive parliamentary consensus – four fifths of the Members of Parliament – and introduced new fundamental individual rights. Namely, it is stated that ‘everyone has the right…to the protection of one’s genetic identity’, as well as to ‘participation in the Information Community’ and to the electronically produced, exchanged and disseminated information thereof (Article 5 and 5A).[9] As regards church–state relations, Article 3 still defines Eastern Orthodoxy as the prevailing faith by declaring that the ‘predominant religion in Greece is the religion of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ’, while Article 13 on religious freedom, guarantees that ‘the freedom of religious conscience is inviolable’ and that ‘every known religion is free’ and its worship is ‘practiced unobstructed under the protection of the law’, while ‘proselytism is forbidden’.[10]

                 

                Recent discussions and suggestions at parliamentary level regarding the constitutional amendment and revision of Article 3, leading to the separation of church and state, have not yielded fruit so far. Any expectations that the required parliamentary consensus might be reached to that end in the foreseeable future would be misplaced, considering how unpopular such an initiative would likely be, particularly in light of the pronounced linkage between Orthodoxy and the broadly perceived notions of Modern Greek identity and particularity. Indeed, the amendment proposal of SYRIZA in late 2018, when the party was still in government under Alexis Tsipras, suggested that Article 3, among others, should be revised in order to explicitly declare the neutrality of the state towards religion while acknowledging Orthodoxy as the predominant faith, albeit without that constituting its recognition as an official state religion.[11] However, constitutional amendments require the vote of at least 180 of the 300 Members of Parliament, and a consensus as such was not reached as regards Articles 3, 13, 33 and 59, which pertain to the religious neutrality of the state, the religious oath and the discrete separation between church and state. These proposed amendments failed to gain, in particular, the support of New Democracy, the current ruling party, which countered that the constitution is already equipped to guarantee all those principles. [12]

                 

                Religion and forced displacement

                Concerning incoming refugees, there were no formal or regular structures to administer the necessary services to the forcefully displaced Greek population of Asia Minor, with the involvement of the Refugee Relief Fund (RRF), Save the Children Fund and the Red Cross, being merely an ad hoc arrangement following the Greek Catastrophe in Asia Minor (1922) and the subsequent Lausanne Convention of January 30th 1923.[13] The aftermath of the defeat of Greek forces in Asia Minor caused an unprecedented refugee flight from Turkey. Their exact number is difficult to estimate; their volume, combined with the hasty nature of their displacement and ensuing lack of coordination did not allow them to be properly registered upon arrival. However, according to the general population census of May 5th 1928, they amounted to 1,221,849 persons, in a population of approximately five million in total. According to the League of Nations the number of refugees who entered Greece at the time was much higher, probably 1,4 million, but between 1922 and 1928 75,000 died due to extreme poverty and a further 66,000 managed to emigrate to Egypt, parts of Western Europe and the United States.[14]

                 

                The Second World War brought forth another catastrophe, via the displacement of the Jewish Greeks and the Holocaust that eradicated Greek Jewry almost in its entirety. Although the demographic information is not precise, there is a scholarly consensus as regards the estimates. Before the Nazi occupation, the Greek-Jewish population amounted to approximately 80,000 people; during the Nazi occupation, between 60,000 and 65,000 Greek Jews were deported to Auschwitz, with only 2,500 surviving the ordeal. The Jewish community of Thessaloniki, for instance, which numbered approximately 56,000 in 1939, was almost completely obliterated along with its social and cultural life, with only 500 surviving, primarily due to their Spanish citizenship. This tragedy was slightly mitigated in Athens, where Archbishop Damaskinos and the Chief of Police, Angelos Evert, provided several members of the Jewish community with false certificates of baptism and identity cards. Moreover, the community there had an Athenian accent and could thus blend in more with the local population, which also tended to be more sympathetic as compared with that of Thessaloniki, hence, 45 per cent of Athenian Jews, i.e. 3,500 people, survived.[15] Greece’s post-WWII Jewish population was estimated at approximately 10,000.[16]

                 

                Up until the fall of the Iron Curtain, Greece was predominantly a country of emigration, particularly since the late 19th century, and then during the interwar period, followed by a peak in emigration in the post-WWII era, which lasted until the mid-1970s. It is estimated that between 1961 and 1974 two million people emigrated from Greece to seek employment abroad; this number corresponds to one fifth of the country’s total population in 1974.[17] The main destinations were the USA, Australia and Germany. With the repatriation of the Greek Gastarbeiter (guest-workers), and the lack of reintegration provisions on the part of the state, the OCG established the Integration Centre for Migrant Workers (ICMW) in 1978, with the aim of supporting returnees from German-speaking countries.[18]

                 

                Post 1989, the migratory paradigm shifted and western-aligned Greece became a refuge for ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union, with Kazakhstan and Georgia being the main countries of origin. Approximately 160,000 Pontic Greeks entered the country between 1990 and 1993.[19] To exempt the diasporic repatriates from the restrictions on work and residency imposed by law on immigrants of foreign descent, they were acknowledged with the term omogeneis (people of the same lineage) – also known as palinnostountes i.e. ‘returnees of Greek descent’ – and thus differentiated from the allogeneis (people of different lineage), under a law passed in 1991.[20] State structures proved inadequate in dealing with this humanitarian crisis. In addition, irregular migration from Albania in the 1990s constituted the most notable population movement, with the estimates amounting to approximately 600,000 people. The fall of the communist regime in Albania brought forth an interruption in industrial production and the loss of thousands of jobs in the public sector. In 1989, 20 per cent of the Albanian population was between the ages of 15 and 24 and the increased unemployment and economic instability of the state made emigration to the West very attractive for many young Albanians. Greece, as a member of the European Economic Community and later the EU, was the first country of choice for Albanian migrants due to the shared land border, which made crossing safer compared to passage to Italy that required travelling by sea.[21] Furthermore, Greece maintained an open door policy for ethnic Greeks of Albanian nationality, who were treated as omogeneis under the above-mentioned 1991 law, and became the first links of chain migration from Albania.[22] The integration of such numbers, albeit not unproblematic due to the initial lack of social and institutional preparation and planning, happened organically and successfully, which is attested by how inconspicuous the Albanian community is among the general population, regardless of religious creed.[23]

                 

                The character of migratory trends has gradually shifted since the beginning of the 2000s, when an increase in arrivals from Africa, Asia and the Middle East has been observable, alongside an influx from the Balkans. By 2005, the total number of international migrants in Greece amounted to approximately one million, with 200,000 being undocumented.[24] A significant increase in the number of asylum seekers and irregular migrants, particularly from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq and Afghanistan was noted from 2007 onwards, with most arrivals coming by boat through the Aegean Sea. A shift in that pattern was observed from 2010, demonstrated by an increased inflow of irregular migrants from Asia and Africa seeking passage to other EU destinations, and crossing into Greek territory via the land border with Turkey, especially at the river Evros border and constituting approximately 85 per cent of all detected illegal border crossings at EU level. The shift to entry by land resulted from the assistance Greece received from FRONTEX, the EU border and coastguard agency, in patrolling its sea borders.

                 

                Greece sought to cope with the large influx of immigrants with new legislation. Law 3536/2007, ‘Determining matters in migration policy and other issues falling into the competence of the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization’ was introduced as a revision of the main legislative instrument on migration, Law 3386/2005, on the ‘Entry, residence and social integration of third country nationals into the Greek territory’, regulating the unification of residence and work permits, as well as introducing the ‘reflection period’ for victims of trafficking. However, according to data from FRONTEX, Greece remained the major gateway of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers from Africa and Asia. In 2011, the European Court of Justice found that 90 per cent of all irregular entries into the EU had passed through Greek borders. Law 3907/2011 represents a further attempt by the Greek state to establish a realistic migration management system through the independent Asylum Service, the operation of First Reception Centres and the adaptation of Greek legislation to Community Directive 2008/115/EC on the return of irregular migrants.[25]

                 

                In 2015, as the first country of entry to the EU for the majority of these incomers, Greece became the epicentre of the biggest migration and refugee crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War. According to the National Authorities of IOM in Greece, the total number of entries from January 1st 2015 to November 26th 2019 was 1,181,827 persons.[26] While for many migrants Greece remains a transit country en route to Central and Northern Europe, there is still a significant percentage for which Greece is the destination country. In 2018, 11 per cent of EUs total first-time applications for asylum were submitted in Greece, making the country the third most popular destination in the EU after Germany and France. Syrian nationals remain the largest population group of asylum seekers in Europe since 2013. In 2018, asylum applications submitted by Syrians in the EU constituted 13.9 per cent of total applications, followed by those submitted by Afghan (7.1 per cent), Iraqi (6.8 per cent) and Pakistani (4.3 per cent) citizens. In 2018, Greece received nearly 65,000 new applications, of which 13,145 were submitted by Syrians, 11,820 by Afghans, 9,640 by Iraqis, 7,185 by Pakistanis and the remaining by various other nationalities.[27] The emergent pattern from the yearly sum of new arrivals to Greece between 2014 and 2019 shows a gradual increase since 2017 when the numbers were significantly down on the previous years (see Table 1 below).[28] A new peak, like that of 2015-16, can prove immensely challenging from a humanitarian and logistical perspective, not to mention the political dimension for all actors involved, directly and indirectly, including the EU.

                 

                 Table 1. Refugee numbers in Greece, 2014-19

                 

                The OCG, through its own NGOs, has been heavily involved in dealing with the humanitarian aspect of the problem, even before the peak of the Syrian refugee crisis. It did so initially through its existing organisation and structures, which were intended to serve other purposes. For instance, the ICMW, which has been active since 1978 to assist former Greek guest-workers, and Apostoli, (‘Mission’), founded in 2010 to deal with the social problems of the Greek debt crisis.[29] Notably, Apostoli collaborates with the UNHCR within the framework of the ESTIA accommodation scheme and mostly focuses on unaccompanied minors and the vulnerable.[30] Initially its main purposes related to dealing with social problems pertaining to poverty, but its resources and foci were diverted in order to deal with the mounting issues of migrants. In 2012, the OCG founded a new structure, which succeeded the ICMW, under the name Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme (ICMW-ERP), and focuses on asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants.[31] It is funded, among other sources, by the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Greece, the UNHCR and Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe.[32] In summary, its services range from legal assistance, translation, social support, family reunification to international collaborative initiatives, including inter-ecclesiastical programmes.[33]

                 

                As of 2002 the ICMW has been involved in combating human trafficking via its participation in a programme led by the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) and in cooperation with Caritas Europe. It also took part in the STOP programme, as well as in the actions that succeeded it, known as Christian Action and Networking against Trafficking (CAT). [34] In this framework, the ICWM focused on the collaboration with state structures in combatting trafficking and slavery, supporting the victims of and forced prostitution.[35] Notably, the ICMW identified the inadequacy of knowledge and insight on the part of the state with regard to Muslim immigrants in Athens, and criticised this as a root cause of the lack of policies and integration strategies. Moreover, it conducted its own research in order to identify and document informal places of worship as well as the denominational, linguistic, ethnic, national and other qualitative characteristics therein.[36]

                 

                However, following its restructure and rebranding in 2012, which coincided chronologically with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, as stated above, the ICMW-ERP repositioned its purposes and scope. Although special emphasis is placed on the vulnerable groups eligible for international protection and the socially vulnerable, i.e. unaccompanied minors, single-parent families, pregnant women, and persons of poor health etc.[37] According to its statute, its primary target groups are, besides Greek migrant returnees, refugees, asylum seekers and those groups that adhere to a humanitarian legal regime and are eligible for international protection, and those eligible for legalisation.[38]

                 

                Recent examples of the involvement of ICMW-ERP initiatives and cooperation include the programme ‘Rebuild our Lives – Legal Aid for Refugees in Athens’, with the support of Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe, the purpose of which was to provide legal and social support to those eligible for international protection.[39] Also, with the support of the UNHCR, the programme ‘Bringing Families Together 2018 – Legal Counselling / Assistance for Family Reunification of Persons of Concern with Specific Needs’ was realised. Its main purpose was to provide information, legal advice and assistance, translation services, as well as psychological and social support to asylum seekers who wish to be reunified with their families in the framework of Dublin III.[40] Particular emphasis was placed on unaccompanied minors and single-parent families.[41] Moreover, the Federation of Protestant Churches of Switzerland contributed, via the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME), to the ‘Legal Aid for Backlog Cases of Ecumenical Refugee Programme’ that focused on processing long-standing reunification applications, via legal advice and representation of recognised refugees.[42] In addition, the ICMW-ERP, with the help of the Evangelical Church in the Rheinland (Evangelische Kirche im Rheinland) has provided legal and psychosocial support to particularly vulnerable cases.[43]

                 

                It must be noted that the need for successful, essential programmes has been recognised, and hence, alternative funding has secured their continuation. For instance, the Swiss Embassy intervened and secured the funding of legal and psychosocial support for vulnerable cases in relation to family reunification.[44] The same applies to the aforementioned programme ‘Rebuild our Lives’, which is now supported by Bread for the World, a sister organisation of Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe.[45] There is a range of similar examples that denote the role of the OCG in dealing with the refugee and migrant crisis, which is indicative but not exhaustive of its role and initiatives.

                 

                Policy perspectives

                The OCG and its NGOs, as stated above, have made a valuable contribution in dealing with the influx of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular immigrants. This has been attested by its participation in international programmes and the acknowledgement of its crucial role by the Greek government. However, the ongoing immigration and refugee crisis cannot be dealt with by the church and its collaborating organisations alone. It is not even a solely Greek problem, but rather a European one. However, being the entry point to Europe and a hub on the Balkan route, Greece has more complicated responsibilities, while concurrently dealing with the consequences of the debt-crisis, notwithstanding the improvement of economic figures.

                 

                First and foremost, Greece, as an effective humanitarian refuge and in keeping with EU principles and values, has the inevitable duty to provide those in need with legal representation, translation services, safe and dignified lodgings, allowances for initial expenses, regular medical care and emotional support, access to education, language courses and training, as well as opportunities of integration. In tandem with the state, the OCG has been at the forefront of Greece’s response to these tasks, and will continue to be, but such services are certainly demanding in resources. In order to reduce the long backlog, apart from additional funding and the recruitment of trained staff to speed up the processing of cases, the church, in collaboration with the state, will need to continue to prioritise those in need, comprising, among others, vulnerable groups such as unaccompanied minors, families, victims of human trafficking, refugees and generally cases that constitute a humanitarian emergency. This essentially means applying a two-tier system, which distinguishes between vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups at the first reception stage. This distinction is essential as irregular migration burdens the overwhelmed system and its structures at the expense of those genuinely in need, or eligible to apply for asylum.

                 

                For the OCG, dealing with migration as a whole would be an impossible task, which is best left to the state. The church and its NGOs are better versed, structured, equipped and experienced to take the lead on the humanitarian aspect, while prioritising vulnerable groups. Hence, the qualitative division of labour should best be maintained. However, both the ICMW-ERP and Apostoli will have to be reinforced with additional staff and funding so as to reduce the backlog. In order to deal with the humanitarian challenges logistically, the state will need to better monitor the influx, residence and outflow of refugees and immigrants, keep a reliable and up-to-date register and database of this information, and make it available to the church and the corresponding international institutions.

                 

                Furthermore, irregular migration, while not the main cause, has been a catalyst in the resurgence of populism, which erodes support for European integration.[46] Therefore, Greece, as an EU Member State, must help counter populism in Europe by disproving arguments about an open-door policy, and show itself to be in control, by containing en masse irregular migrant movement and thereby its political utilisation and mediatisation. By extension, it must help preserve EU freedom of movement, a privilege often weakened by intra-EU and Schengen border controls and prevent the future suspension of a fundamental EU freedom as such. This entails guarding the national and external EU borders more effectively with the reinforcement of FRONTEX in the Aegean Sea and Thrace. In the same vein, it must coordinate its efforts with other EU Member States in order to speed up the repatriation of those whose asylum application has been rejected and collectively exert unitary pressure on the safe countries of origin to cooperate. Finally, the OCG and the relevant state ministries must insist on the reform or replacement of the Dublin Convention with a more pertinent framework, and insist on EU solidarity as a principle stemming from the equality between Member States.

                 

                Georgios E. Trantas is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom. His recent publications include ‘Greek-Cypriot Religiocultural Heritage as an Indicator of Fundamental Rights and a Means to Cultural Diplomacy’, in Giordan G. & Zrinščak S. (eds.), Global Eastern Orthodoxy: Politics, Religion, and Human Rights (Springer, 2020), ‘The Orthodox Church of Greece: Church-State Relations, Migratory Patterns and Sociopolitical Challenges’, in Leustean L.N. (ed.), Forced Migration and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World (Routledge, 2019), ‘Greek-Orthodox Religioscapes as Domains of Migratory Integration and Hybridisation in Germany and Great Britain: A Comparative Study’, Politics and Religion Journal, (13) 2, (2019), pp.309-332, ‘The Question of a Contemporary Greek-Orthodox Economic Ethic’. Zeitschrift für Balkanologie, 54 (2), (2018), pp.217-228, and Being and Belonging: A Comparative Examination of the Greek and Cypriot Orthodox Churches’ Attitudes to ‘Europeanisation’ in Early 21st Century (Peter Lang, 2018).

                 

                Eleni Tseligka is a Teaching Associate in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom. Her latest publications include From Gastarbeiter to European Expatriates (Peter Lang, 2020) and ‘Greek Diaspora in Germany: Church as the Ecclesia’s Forerunner and Point of Reference’ in Giuseppe Giordan and Siniša Zrinščak (eds.), Global Eastern Orthodoxy: Politics, Religion, and Human Rights (Springer, 2020).

                 

                Cover photo: ‘Tourists and refugees in Monastiraki Square, Athens, May 2014’. Copyright: Georgios E. Trantas

                 

                [1] Hellenic Statistical Authority, ‘Greece in Figures’, (2019), available at https://www.statistics.gr/documents/20181/1515741/GreeceInFigures_2019Q3_EN.pdf . All websites accessed on 2 December 2019.

                [2] Pew Research Center, ‘Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe’, (2017), available at https://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-affiliation/

                [3] Pew Research Center, ‘Europe’s Growing Muslim Population’, (2017), available at https://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/pf_11-29-17_muslims-update-20/

                [4] U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Greece, ‘Report on Religious Freedoms 2018: Greece’, (2019), available at https://gr.usembassy.gov/el/religious-freedom-2018/

                [5]  Global Migration Data Portal, ‘Forced migration or displacement’, (2019), available at https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/forced-migration-or-displacement#data-strengths-amp-limitations

                [6] UNHCR, ‘Operational Portal – Mediterranean Situation’, (2019), available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179

                [7] Georgios E. Trantas, Being and Belonging: A Comparative Examination of the Greek and Cypriot Orthodox Churches’ Attitudes to ‘Europeanisation’ in Early 21st Century [Erfurter Studien zur Kulturgeschichte des Orthodoxen Christentums – BAND 16], Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 2018.

                [8] John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, Modern Greece: A History since 1821, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp.154-55, as well as John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel. From 1821 to the Present, London: Hurst and Co., 2002.

                [9] Syntagma tēs Ellados (Constitution of Greece), Athens: Hellenic Parliament, 2010, p. 21.

                [10]Ibid., pp.19; 26.

                [11] The ‘Coalition of the Radical Left’ (Synaspismos Rizospastikēs Aristeras, Gr.: Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς); Protasē tou Proedrou kai Vouleftōn tēs K.O. tou SYRIZA gia tēn anatheorēsē diataxeōn tou Syntagmatos, symfona me ta arthra 110 tou Syntagmatos kai 119 tou Kanonismou tēs Voulēs (Suggestion of the President and Members of Parliament of SYRIZA for the amendment of constitutional laws, in accordance with articles 110 of the constitution and 119 of the Parliament Regulation, Protocol No.: 4636, Date: 2/11/2018, available at https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/c8827c35-4399-4fbb-8ea6-aebdc768f4f7/%CE%88%CE%B3%CE%B3%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%86%CE%BF%20%CE%B1%CF%80%CF%8C%20%CE%A3%CE%B1%CF%81%CF%89%CF%84%CE%AE%20(215135).pdf

                [12] The oath taken by the members of newly appointed governments ‘in the name of the Holy and Cosubstantial and Indivisible Trinity’. Likewise, heterodox or believers of other creeds take the oath as is customary in their own faiths, while a secular oath is also permitted in the existing constitutional and legal framework; Nea Dēmokratia, Gr.: Νέα Δημοκρατία.

                [13] Tameion Prostasias Prosfygōn, Gr.: Ταμείον Προστασίας Προσφύγων; Concerned strictly with the population exchange, not to be confused with the Peace Treaty of July 24th 1923.

                [14] John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel. From 1821 to the Present, London: Hurst and Co., 2002, pp. 89-100, as well as Renée Hirschon (ed.), Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey [Studies in Forced Migration Vol.12], New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2004. Also, Elisabeth Kontogiorgi, Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia: The Forced Settlement of Refugees. Cary: Oxford University Press, 2006.

                [15] Gail Holst-Warhaft, ‘The Tragedy of the Greek Jews: Three Survivors’ Accounts’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 1999, 13 (1), pp.98-108. Also, Andrew Apostolou, ‘“The Exception of Salonika”: Bystanders and Collaborators in Northern Greece’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 2000, 14 (2), pp.165-196.

                [16] Dan Georgakas, ‘The Jews of Greece: A Chronology’, Journal of Modern Hellenism, 23 – 24, 2007, pp.1-11.

                [17] Dimitris Charalambis, Laura Maratou-Alipranti and Andromachi Hadjiyanni, Recent Social Trends in Greece, 1960-2000, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004.

                [18] Georgios E. Trantas, ‘The Orthodox Church of Greece: Church-State Relations, Migratory Patterns and Sociopolitical Challenges’ in Lucian N. Leustean (ed.). Forced Migration and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World, London: Routledge, 2019, pp. 164-206.

                [19] Lina Venturas, ‘‘Deterritorialising’ the Nation: The Greek State and ‘Ecumenical Hellenism’, in Dimitris Tziovas (ed.) Greek Diaspora and Migration Since 1700: Society, Politics and Culture, Abingdon: Ashgate, 2009, pp.125-140.

                [20] Ibid.

                [21] Kosta Barjarba, ‘Migration and Ethnicity in Albania: Synergies and Interdependencies’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, 2004, 11 (1), pp. 231-239.

                [22] Chain migration is defined as ‘that movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment arranged by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants’. See John S. MacDonald and Leatrice D. MacDonald, ‘Chain Migration, Ethnic Neighbourhood Formation and Social Networks’, The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, (42) 1, (1964), pp. 82-97.

                [23] Ifigeneia Kokkali, ‘Albanian Immigrants in the Greek City: Spatial ‘Invisibility’ and Identity Management as a Strategy of Adaptation’ in Hans Vermeulen, Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Riki van Boeschoten (eds.), Migration in the Southern Balkans, Heidelberg: Springer, 2015, pp. 123–142.

                [24] Ruby Gropas and Anna Triandafyllidou, Migration in Greece at a Glance, Athens: ELIAMEP – Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, October 2005, p.7.

                [25] International Organisation of Migration (IOM), ‘IOM in Greece General Information’, (2019), available at https://www.iom.int/countries/greece

                [26] Interational Organisation of Migration (IOM), ‘Flow Monitoring Europe Arrivals to Greece’, (2019), available from https://migration.iom.int/europe?type=arrivals

                [27] Eurostat, ‘Asylum statistics’, (2019), available from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics

                [28] UNHCR, ‘Operational Portal – Mediterranean Situation’, (2019), available from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179

                [29] Ekklesia, ‘Hē Nea ΜΚΟ tēs Archiepiskopēs “Apostoli” egkainiastēke stis 23 Noemvriou 2010’ (The New Archbishopric NGO “Mission” was Inaugurated on November 23rd 2010’), Ekklesia, 87 (11), 2010, p.901.

                [30] ESTIA is a UNHCR-funded urban accommodation and cash assistance scheme for refugees and asylum-seekers. For further information see UNHCR Greece, ‘ESTIA’, (2017), available from https://estia.unhcr.gr/en/home/

                [31] Orthodox Church of Greece, ‘«Κentro Symparastaseōs Palinnostountōn kai Metanastōn – Oikoumeniko Programma Prosfygōn», Istoriko’ (“Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme”, History) available from http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/koinonia/kspm.html

                [32] An evangelical church social service agency of the German Protestant church and a major humanitarian actor since 1954.

                [33] Additional websites: Official Website of the Church of Greece, http://www.ecclesia.gr/English/EnIndex.html; Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme, http://www.kspm-erp.com/; Mission, http://mkoapostoli.com/; Bread for the World, https://www.bread.org/; Churches’ Commission for Migrant Europe, https://ccme.eu/; Council of Europe – Commissioner for Human Rights https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/country-monitoring/greece ; Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe, https://www.diakonie-katastrophenhilfe.de; Evangelische Kirche im Rheinland, https://www.ekir.de/www/index.php ; Hellenic Republic – Ministry of Citizen Protection, General Secretariat for Migration Policy,  Reception and Asylum, http://asylo.gov.gr/en/ ; Hellenic Statistical Authority, https://www.statistics.gr/en/home

                [34] An EU initiative that dates back to 1996, and targeted human traffickers and sought to protect their victims. For details see European Commission, ‘Prevention and fight against trafficking in human beings – A European Union strategy since 1996’, MEMO/02/191, (2002), available from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_02_191

                [35] Euaggelia Dourida, ‘Ekthesis peri tēs Symmetochēs tēs eis tas Enarktērious Ergasias tēs tritēs Faseōs tou Programmatos Diktyoseōs tōn Ekklēsiastikōn Organōseōn Katapolemēseōs tēs Emporias Anthrōpōn (CATIII)’ (Report on the Participation in the Inaugural Works of the third Phase of the Networking Programme of Church Organisations on Combating Human Trafficking (CATIII)), Ekklesia, 83 (8), 2006, pp. 627–630.

                [36] Antonios K. Papantoniou, ‘Mousoulmanoi Metanastes stēn Athena’ (Muslim Immigrants in Athens), Ekklesia, 86 (5), 2009, pp. 348–359, (pp. 348–351).

                [37] Orthodox Church of Greece, ‘Kentro Symparastaseōs Palinnostountōn kai Metanastōn – Oikoumeniko Programma Prosfygōn, Omades Stochou’ (Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme” Target Groups) on the Official Website of the Church of Greece, available at http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/koinonia/kspm_omades.html

                [38] Ekklesia, ‘Καταστατικό Αστικής μη Κερδοσκοπικής Εταιρείας με την Επωνυμία «Κέντρο Συμπαραστάσεως Παλιννοστούντων και Mεταναστών – Oικουμενικό Πρόγραμμα Προσφύγων»’ (Katastatiko Astikēs mē Kerdoskopikēs Etaireias me tēn Epōnymia “Kentro Symparastaseōs Palinnostountōn kai Metanastōn – Oikoumeniko Programma Prosfygōn”; Statute of the Non-profit Organisation with the Distinctive Title “Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme”) available at http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/koinonia/kesypame_katastatiko.pdf

                According to the UNHCR ‘Risks that give rise to a need for international protection classically include those of persecution, threats to life, freedom or physical integrity arising from armed conflict, serious public disorder, or different situations of violence. Other risks may stem from: famine linked to situations of armed conflict; natural or man-made disasters; as well as being stateless’. See UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Persons in Need of International Protection’, (2017), available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/596787734.html. Also, see the 2011 directive of the European Commission, ‘Who Qualifies for International Protection’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/refugee-status_en.

                [39] KSPM-ERP, ‘Rebuild our Lives – legal aid for refugees in Athens’, available at www.kspm-erp.com/rebuild-our-lives/

                [40] ‘Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person’, according to EUR-Lex, ‘Document 32013R0604’, (2013), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/604/oj

                [41] KSPM-ERP, ‘Bringing Families Together – Legal Info / Counselling for Family Reunification of PCWSN’, available at www.kspm-erp.com/bringing-families-together/

                [42] KSPM-ERP, ‘Legal Aid for Backlog Cases of Ecumenical Refugee Programme’, available at www.kspm-erp.com/legal-aid-for-backlog-cases-of-ecumenical-refugee-program/

                [43] KSPM-ERP, ‘Legal Aid for Vulnerable Cases’, available from www.kspm-erp.com/legal-aid-for-vulnerable-cases/

                [44] KSPM-ERP, ‘Legal and Psychosocial Support’, available from www.kspm-erp.com/programs-new/legal-and-psychosocial-support/

                [45] KSPM-ERP, ‘‘Rebuild our Lives’, available from www.kspm-erp.com/programs-new/rebuild-our-lives-2019-20/

                [46] Stiftung Mercator, ‘Migration: Katalysator nicht Ursache von Populismus‘, (2018), available from https://www.stiftung-mercator.de/de/presse/nachricht/migration_katalysator_nicht_ursache_von_populismus/

                Footnotes
                  Related Articles

                  Religion and Forced Displacement in the Republic of Moldova

                  Article by Andrei Avram

                  Religion and Forced Displacement in the Republic of Moldova

                  Introduction

                  Large-scale emigration has represented the single most important social – and even existential – challenge to the Republic of Moldova since the country proclaimed its independence in August 1991. Between 1989, when the last Soviet census was carried out, and 2018, the population of the young state decreased by almost one million citizens, from 3,657,665 to an estimated 2,681,735 by the end of 2018, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.[1] A similar trend can be noticed in the breakaway region of Transnistria, which counted only 475,100 inhabitants in 2015; a decrease of over 200,000 compared to 1989.[2] The process of migration overwhelmed both state institutions and Moldovan society at large; leaving them faced with the concomitant tasks of democratic state-building and the transformation from a Soviet-style command economy to a market-based system. It was against this backdrop that religious life in the country, especially the majority Orthodox Christian faith, experienced an almost spectacular revival, while also having to respond to the most pressing social issues, including the consequences of migration both within the country and in the ever-growing diaspora.

                   

                  Religion, ethnicity and population

                  The religious demographics of the Republic of Moldova is dominated by Orthodox Christianity, which could have (had) the potential to serve as a unifying factor in the ethnically diverse society, which has been divided almost evenly between supporters of European integration and those who would prefer closer ties with Russia. However, the Orthodox faith has become embedded in societal debates regarding the identity of the Republic of Moldova, which has since 1992 been the venue of competing Orthodox churches, namely the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Metropolis of Bessarabia, subordinate to the Romanian Orthodox Church. The latter represented the reinstatement of a similar structure that existed in the inter-war period when the historical province of Bessarabia (which comprises most of today’s Republic of Moldova, except for Transnistria) had been part of Romania and has been promoting a pan-Romanian identity based on the view that Moldovans are, in fact, Romanians and that the Moldovan nation is a construct from Soviet times. The former takes a more inclusive view of its Moldovan flock, which comprises not only the majority Romanian-speaking population, but also the sizeable, mainly Russian-speaking ethnic minorities. It has also been promoting the worldview of the Russian Orthodox Church, which considers itself to be entrusted with the safekeeping of the identity of the former Tsarist Empire, which included Bessarabia.[3]

                   

                  According to the latest Moldovan census of 2014, 90.1 per cent of the population is Orthodox Christian.[4] A more recent survey from January 2019 gives an even higher figure, finding that 91.4 per cent of respondents were faithful of the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova and 3.7 per cent of the Metropolis of Bessarabia.[5] Moreover, the degree of religiosity is also significant. In a survey carried out in 2014, 31.3 per cent of respondents stated that they went to church either often or at least once a month, a figure that was higher than a decade earlier, when it stood at 22.6 per cent. Furthermore, the proportion of those who never went to church decreased from 25 per cent in 2003 to only 10.3 per cent in 2014.[6] Among religious minorities, only the Baptist faith has a following of more than 1 per cent of the population.

                   

                  The diverging views on identity are also reflected in the statistics regarding the ethnic structure of the country. Thus, 73.7 per cent of respondents declared themselves to be Moldovans in the 2014 census, with a further 6.9 per cent stating they were Romanian. Ethnic minorities include Ukrainians (6.5 per cent), Russians (four per cent), Gagauz (4.5 per cent) and Bulgarians (1.8 per cent). While the religious demography of the internationally unrecognised, so-called Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (known internationally as Transnistria) is similar to that of Moldova as a whole, with approximately 90 per cent of the population belonging to the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova[7] (albeit with no parishes of the Metropolis of Bessarabia), its ethnic fabric is significantly different, with only 28.6 per cent Moldovans, and with Russians comprising 29.1 per cent and Ukrainians 22.9 per cent of the population.[8]

                   

                  Religion-state relations

                  Although the law on religious groups adopted by parliament in May 2007 stipulates both the equality of all religions before the law and public authorities (article 15, paragraph 1), and the principle of state non-intervention in religious affairs (article 15, paragraph 2), the same legal act contains a provision highlighting that the state ‘recognises the significant importance and the primordial role of the Christian Orthodox religion and, respectively, of the Orthodox Church of Moldova in the life, history and culture of the people of the Republic of Moldova’ (article 15, paragraph 5).[9] A similar provision exists in the corresponding Transnistrian ‘law’, albeit only mentioning the role of Orthodoxy and not of the Moldovan church.[10] This may reflect the fact that although the Eparchy of Tiraspol and Dubăsari is subordinate to the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, it is known to have a de facto special status, having been founded as a compromise between the Transnistrian authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church in light of the unrecognised status of the region.[11]

                   

                  The Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova has at times been said to have benefitted from preferential treatment regarding taxation and donations of public property upon which to build churches; allegations which the Moldovan Orthodox Church has consistently denied.[12] The dominant position of the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova is also reflected in its close cooperation with state bodies. Thus, it has concluded several cooperation agreements with institutions such as the Ministry of Labour, Social Protection and Family,[13] the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Justice. In coordination with the Ministry of Labour, for instance, the Metropolis has developed a network of social services, including day-care centers and shelters within churches and monasteries, while the church also provides spiritual guidance to army personnel and police officers, as well as prison inmates.[14]

                   

                  According to its website, the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova has specialised departments for religious education, pastoral work in the army and in the sector of internal affairs, youth work, social and charity work, cultural relations, spiritual work in hospitals and pastoral work in prisons.[15] A similar organisational structure exists within the Eparchy of Tiraspol and Dubăsari.[16] The homepage of the Moldovan Orthodox Church also lists six subordinate social-philanthropic institutions, including an orphanage and social centers.[17] It is not church policy to provide information on social work carried out in individual parishes and eparchies.[18] However, the Metropolis highlights the importance of individual parish social and charity work, as well as the need for cooperation with social, health and educational workers in each community.[19]  The media has in the past noted critically that the activity reports of the above-mentioned structures are not published on the official website of the Moldovan Orthodox Church.[20] The Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, while publishing press releases on individual social activities, maintains that it does not wish to praise its acts of charity.[21]

                   

                  The Metropolis of Bessarabia has not as yet been in a position to conclude cooperation agreements with state institutions, yet it is active in the social field. It channels most of its charity work through the Diaconia Social Mission, which in 2018 had an annual budget of 459.000 euro.[22] Key social projects include support for vulnerable families and single mothers, food and clothing donations, assistance for the integration of orphans, canteens for elderly citizens, children’s and youth camps etc.[23] Notably, Diaconia cooperates with the (small) Roman Catholic community – and Caritas Vienna and Ambrosiana are among the international donors of the organisation.[24] Unlike the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, which has its own Theological Academy in the capital, most future priests of the Metropolis of Bessarabia study in Romania.[25]

                   

                  Religion and forced displacement

                  The first significant wave of migration in the Republic of Moldova took place in 1992, when, during (March – July) and in the immediate aftermath of the short, yet bloody civil war between Chișinău and Transnistria, approximately 100,000 people fled to third countries and 51,289 were registered as internally displaced persons (IDPs) on territory controlled by the constitutional authorities.[26] A significant proportion of IDPs settled in the capital, where some were provided with housing.[27] However, after the end of hostilities the majority of IDPs returned to the Transnistrian region, with only 200 IDP families remaining on the right bank of the Dniester as of 2012. Furthermore, almost all people who had fled to Ukraine (60,000) also returned to their homes.[28]

                   

                  The process of mass emigration from the Republic of Moldova started in 1993 against the background of worsening economic conditions. Indeed, by the end of the 1990s, the country’s GDP had dropped to one third of its pre-independence level, and a World Bank study estimated that in 1999 about 80 per cent of the population were living below the poverty line.[29] Destination countries were mainly Russia and, initially to a somewhat lesser extent, European Union (EU) member states. By 2004, the country had lost almost 300,000 residents compared with 1989 figures. The process of emigration subsequently intensified, reaching an annual figure of approximately 50-60,000 persons.[30] In 2018, remittances constituted 16.2 per cent of the country’s GDP; the 11th highest proportion in the world and the third highest among CIS countries.[31] Notably, whereas in the 1990s migration had been largely a male phenomenon, the intensification of the process of migration and especially the possibility of migration to EU countries, where care workers were sought after, led to a ‘feminisation’ of migration.[32] By 2017, the majority of Moldovan emigrants were women.[33] Moreover, Moldovan emigrants have a relatively high level of education, with 28 per cent being university graduates.

                   

                  The demographic structure of Moldovan emigration has had serious consequences. In a country in which traditionally women were responsible for raising children and caring for elderly relatives, the ‘feminisation’ of migration has generated a wide range of social problems. Furthermore, data provided in 2017 by the Ministry of Education puts the figure of children with one parent abroad at over 77,000.[34] Also, the compound effect of the high level of education of emigrants and the growing number of women leaving the Republic of Moldova has led to staff shortages in the education and healthcare sectors.[35]

                   

                  Moldovan authorities were unprepared for the challenges associated with managing the consequences of emigration at home, and with systematically engaging with the country’s new diaspora. During the early 1990s, a Department of Migration did exist within the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, but the lack of efficiency thereof led to the creation of the State Service of Migration in 2001, the priorities of which were the preparation of a legislative framework on migration management, as well as drafting agreements with other countries regulating the status of Moldovan migrant workers.[36] In 2002, the first such document was concluded between the Republic of Moldova and Italy, and by 2006 a total of 19 similar bilateral agreements had been signed.[37] By comparison, until 2001 such agreements had only existed with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.[38] However, the State Service of Migration was subsequently dissolved and diaspora engagement was – rather strangely – placed under the authority of the Bureau of Interethnic Relations (which is also responsible for national minority policies), before the Bureau for Diaspora Relations was operationalised within the State Chancellery of the Prime Minister in 2013.[39]

                   

                  The Bureau for Diaspora Relations is responsible for coordinating state policies towards the diaspora. Yet despite this role, it has never truly had exclusive competence in this regard, requiring coordination with several ministries, including the departments responsible for labour and social policy, health, education, foreign affairs and internal affairs.[40] The ‘Diaspora 2025’ National Strategy, adopted in 2016, lists six ministries besides the Bureau for Diaspora Relations as having competencies in drafting and implementing policies related to migration.[41] Institutional volatility and the need for complex processes of coordination between various agencies represent one of the challenges in calibrating policies on diaspora engagement, especially since Moldovan administrative culture does not entail loyal cooperation between state bodies. In fact, different state institutions use different methodologies to determine the number of Moldovans abroad, leading to divergent data sets. Furthermore, there appears to be no systematic coordination between what has been the declared objective of Moldovan diaspora policy, namely fostering the return of emigrant workers, and domestic economic, social and labour policies and strategies. The International Organization for Migration notes, for instance, that there are no national assessments of the effects of emigration on the labour market and only sporadic research into the effects on social security.[42]

                   

                  A special note should be made regarding the lack of reliable statistics on the Moldovan diaspora. The difficulty in establishing the number of Moldovan migrants abroad has two main reasons. First of all, the vast majority of Moldovan emigrants still maintain official residency status in Moldova, meaning that more approximate methods of calculating their number are necessary. The most recent methodology, which was presented by the National Bureau of Statistics in July 2019, defines an emigrant as a person who over the past 12 months has spent a total of 9 months outside the country, after having spent 9 months over the past 12 months in the Republic of Moldova.[43] Based on this system of determining the population, the ‘realistic’ number of people living in the country was estimated at 2,681,735[44] – and thus almost one million (!) fewer than in 1989. These numbers also offer only a partial picture, since circular migration represents a significant characteristic of Moldovan emigration patterns. For instance, in 2017 about 160,000 people left the Republic of Moldova, while almost 110,000 returned.[45]

                   

                  A more significant problem is determining the number of Moldovan citizens by country of destination. The main reason for this is the high number of Moldovans who have taken the citizenship of other states. Notably, according to official Romanian statistics, between 2002 and March 30th 2018, 521,025 Moldovan citizens had obtained Romanian citizenship.[46] Since Moldovan citizens cannot work without a permit in the EU and therefore use their Romanian passports when settling in Western Europe, they cannot be statistically separated from Romanian citizens from Romania. Thus, the discrepancies between registered Moldovan citizens and the actual number thereof are quite high. For instance, in 2016 the Italian Ministry of Labour quoted  a figure of about 150,000 Moldovan citizens registered in the country, which is the second most popular destination for Moldovan emigrants, whereas expert estimates put their actual number at almost 240,000. In other countries, the proportion of Moldovans registered as such by the authorities is even lower. In Germany, for instance, the 15,000 Moldovan citizens recorded in 2015 are estimated to represent only between 25 and 30 per cent of their true number, whereas in the United Kingdom about 90 to 95 per cent are in possession of EU passports.[47]

                   

                  Even outside the EU it is hard to pinpoint the number of Moldovan emigrants. In Russia, which remains the single most important destination country, official data from 2016 provided a figure of 487,911 Moldovan citizens residing in the country.[48] Yet since 2006, when Russia introduced a so-called repatriation program, Moldovan citizens, including those who were not of Russian descent, have made use of this path to emigrate, and once having obtained Russian citizenship no longer appear in the respective statistics. This also holds true of Transnistrians, who have facilitated access to Russian citizenship.[49] Their emigration from the region to Russia therefore does not count as immigration from the point of view of the Russian authorities.

                   

                  Despite being overwhelmed by the consequences of mass emigration, Moldovan state institutions do not appear to have systematically engaged with religious communities in order to jointly address the social consequences of emigration, both with regard to its impact on domestic affairs, and when it comes to engaging diaspora communities. In fact, the ‘Diaspora 2025’ National Strategy makes no mention of churches at all. This is especially paradoxical, since one stated objective is related to the consolidation of associations of Moldovans abroad, and in many countries, such as Russia, Italy or Portugal, the first such associations were centered around parishes where Moldovan emigrants converged.[50]

                   

                  Notably, there has not been a systematic, centrally coordinated process of setting up Moldovan Orthodox churches abroad. Rather, individual Moldovan priests settled in Western European countries have over time established new parishes in countries such as Italy, France or Belgium.[51] Only later did the Moldovan Orthodox church start to systematically send priests abroad.[52] For canonical reasons, these cannot be subordinated to the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, but are included in the structure of the Patriarchal Exarchate in Western Europe, which is under the direct jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church. It is only in Italy that in May 2019 the creation of a Moldovan Vicariate under the authority of said Exarchate was authorised by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, thus placing the 37 Moldovan churches in Italy under the authority of the Moldovan bishop Ambrozie of Bogorodsk for the first time.[53] As for the Metropolis of Bessarabia, its faithful in the diaspora are known to join Romanian parishes established by the Romanian Metropolises abroad, e.g. the Romanian Orthodox Metropolis of Western and Southern Europe or the Metropolis of Germany and Central Europe.[54] To a certain extent, the division of Moldovan Orthodoxy at home is thus reflected in the European diaspora as well, although this should not necessarily be overstated since some Moldovans may visit Romanian churches, which exist in a much higher number of places abroad. By contrast, in Russia Moldovans tend to visit local churches of the Russian Orthodox Church, although the building of the first Romanian-speaking church in the Siberian city of Surgut was blessed by Metropolitan Vladimir of Moldova in 2015.[55] Furthermore, since 2015 a church in Moscow – the Church of the Blessed Virgin Mary – has functioned as the Representation of the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova in Russia.[56]

                   

                  Moldovan churches in Western Europe play an important role in maintaining the culture and identity of parishioners, although there seems to be no systematic approach to the engagement of the local diaspora, with activities appearing to be the result of the initiatives of the local priest or community. Among the most widespread activities hosted or organised by Moldovan churches are Sunday or parish schools (e.g. in Mestre, Padua, Turin and Parma in Italy or Faro in Portugal), Romanian-language classes (e.g. in Montreuil in France and Padua in Italy), and the celebration of Moldovan holidays (e.g. Independence Day in Faro).[57] In 2015, Moldovan churches in Italy also organised the Week of the Orthodox Diaspora,[58] although this appears to have been a one-off event, whereas the Romanian Orthodox Church introduced the celebration of the Sunday of Romanian migrants on the first Sunday after August 15th in 2009, which is observed by churches both at home and abroad,[59] and thus also by the Metropolis of Bessarabia.

                   

                  Notably, support for Sunday schools abroad was also included in the programme of the Moldovan government adopted in autumn 2015, with the Bureau for Diaspora Relations sending Romanian-language textbooks to Moldovan associations abroad which provided Romanian classes within the framework of Sunday schools at churches frequented by diaspora citizens.[60] Also, the Bureau for Diaspora Relations, with the financial support of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), has in the past offered grants to associations for so-called Educational Centers, with Moldovan religious communities numbering among the beneficiaries.[61] To a somewhat lesser extent, Moldovan churches also offer social services in order to help migrants adapt to their host country. One example is the church in Montreuil, which offers French classes, as well as other forms of support.[62] However, the social role of Moldovan churches abroad appears to remain limited, with less than 20 per cent of emigrants seeking their church’s help when faced with problems.[63] Paradoxically, in Italy, for instance, Moldovan migrants have appealed to the Catholic Church for support in the social sphere.[64]

                   

                  While information on the activities of Moldovan churches is not available systematically, it is even more difficult to identify specific measures targeted at those left behind in the Republic of Moldova. The above-mentioned approach of the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova regarding the non-publicising of its social activities impedes more in-depth research in this regard. Nevertheless, since it is church policy to support those in need, it can be assumed that the beneficiaries of its social activities include elderly people left behind by their emigrant children, single mothers left behind by emigrant male partners, children left in the care of elderly relatives or other socially vulnerable categories. The church basically compensates for the ineffectiveness of state institutions, which, especially in rural areas, lack the capacity to respond to the consequences of the mass emigration of working-age adults. At an individual level, parishes abroad have also been involved in the collection of goods to be distributed to vulnerable families at home.

                   

                  More systematic information is available regarding the Metropolis of Bessarabia, which supports the families of children whose parents have left the country in search for work, leaving their offspring in the care of grandparents (or other relatives).[65] One Diaconia project even focuses on the creation of ‘a mechanism by which all the community actors (the tutelage authority, religious community, the school, social assistance) could work together to provide assistance to parents who plan to work abroad, [including] consulting services to the person who shall be taking care of the child, and inform[ing] children about protection against any form of violence.’[66] At present, about 1,500 children are monitored within the framework of the project. Through its parishes, which number almost 200, the Metropolis of Bessarabia also provides material and spiritual support, as well as psychological counseling, on an individual case basis, through direct contact with the children and the relatives taking care of them in the absence of their parents.[67]

                   

                  A final mention should be made of the fact that because of the dire socio-economic situation, the Republic of Moldova has not been on the receiving end of migration. According to official information, in 2014 and 2015, a total of 257 Ukrainians and 116 Syrians claimed asylum in the country.[68] Moreover, among the mixed Syrian-Moldovan families that repatriated due to the conflict in the Middle East, the majority subsequently left the Republic of Moldova for Western European countries.[69] This did not prevent the issue of a perceived threat of Muslim immigration from being misused during electoral campaigns for the presidential election (2016) and the local election in Chișinău (2018), with fake news being actively promoted by certain segments of the media, including the possibility of 30,000 Syrian immigrants entering the country should the opposition candidate Maia Sandu become head of state. This approach was possible given the latent Islamophobia in a country in which at least certain segments of the Orthodox Church had protested against the registration of the Islamic League in 2011.[70]

                   

                  Policy perspectives

                  Given the impact of emigration as well as the important role Orthodoxy plays in Moldovan society, a case could be made for a more specific partnership between state institutions and both Orthodox churches regarding both diaspora engagement as well as managing the needs of the people affected by emigration at home. A more systematic division of labour, enshrined or at least included as an option in a future legal framework on migration management, could generate synergy effects especially with a view to conserving the culture and identity of Moldovans abroad, including in particular knowledge of the Romanian language and making use of the expanding network of Moldovan religious communities in the diaspora. It would also be of great use to identify parishes of the Romanian Orthodox Church with significant numbers of believers from the Republic of Moldova. This network could also be a partner of the Moldovan state in providing social assistance for citizens abroad. In order to develop optimal policies, the collection of more systematic information on activities already carried out by diaspora communities centred around churches abroad appears essential.

                   

                  At home, the collection of systematic information on relatives of emigrant citizens left behind is essential. The fact that different institutions provide sometimes significantly different numbers impedes the development of a holistic approach regarding the social needs of the people most affected by emigration. In this sphere it may also be useful to establish, a more specific division of labour between state institutions and religious entities, possibly based on the precedent of existing cooperation agreements between the Moldovan church and state ministries. Furthermore, there should be a more inclusive approach on the part of the Moldovan state towards engaging systematically with other religious communities providing social services, including in particular the Metropolis of Bessarabia, which has a wide-ranging network of projects but without state support, as well as other smaller religious groups active in the Republic of Moldova. Although the latter represent only a small fraction of the country’s population, they do provide social services as well and should be encouraged to share their expertise and best practices. Given the past privileged relationship with the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, the extent to which the current or future Moldovan authorities would be inclined towards a more inclusive approach in this regard remains to be seen, and will depend on the geopolitical orientation shaping government policies regarding its general approach to religious communities in the country.

                   

                  Andrei Avram is Programme Coordinator at the Representative Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) in Romania, based in Bucharest. He also supports the Representative Office in the Republic of Moldova, and in the past served as an advisor with the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs. His publications include ‘Fragmentation, Fluidity and Personalization: Remarks On Shifts in the Pro-European Party Spectrum in the Republic of Moldova After 2014, Modelling the New Europe. An On-line Journal, 2017 (issue no. 23, pp. 31-44) and, with Martin Sieg, ‘Ambivalenz und innenpolitische Brüche: Die rumänische Europapolitik während der EU-Ratspräsidentschaft’, 2019 (Deutsch-Französischer Zukunftsdialog Working Paper, https://www.zukunftsdialog.eu/2019/06/21/ambivalenz-und-innenpolitische-brueche-die-rumaenische-europapolitik-waehrend-der-eu-ratspraesidentschaft/). He is also the author of ‘Orthodox churches in Moldova’ in Lucian N. Leustean (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, 2014, pp. 402-425.

                   

                  Cover photo: ‘Noul Neamț Monastery, Chiţcani, December 2008’. Copyright: Andrei Avram

                   

                  [1] Unless otherwise specified, figures regarding the Republic of Moldova refer to the territory controlled by the central government in Chișinău and do not include the breakaway region of Transnistria, which is referred to separately; ‘Population with usual residence in Republic of Moldova, by sex and age groups, at the beginning of 2019’, National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, available at http://statistica.gov.md/newsview.php?l=en&id= 6416&idc=168. All websites were accessed on 20 October 2019.

                  [2] Alla Ostavnaia, Cartografierea diasporei din Transnistria [= Ciclul de studii: Cartografierea diasporei, IV] (Mapping diaspora in Transnistria), Chișinău: Organizaţia Internaţională pentru Migraţie, Misiunea în Moldova, 2017, 18, available at https://www.iom.md/sites/default/files/publications/docs/Raport%20ROM.pdf

                  [3] Eduard Ţugui, Geopolitica ortodoxiei şi relația stat-biserică în Republica Moldova [= Policy Brief 6] (Geopolitics of Orthodoxy and church-state relationship in the Republic of Moldova), Chișinău: IDIS “Viitorul” and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011, 3, http://www.viitorul.org/files/Policy%20Brief6%20Cult.pdf.  For an overview of the Weltanschauung of the two main Orthodox churches in the Republic of Moldova, see Andrei Avram, ‘Orthodox Churches in Moldova’ in Lucian N. Leustean (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, 2014, pp. 402-425.

                  [4] A complete overview of the census results can be found at http://recensamant.statistica.md/en

                  [5] Institutul de Politici Publice, Barometrul de Opinie Publică. Republica Moldova, ianuarie 2019 (Barometer of Public Opinion. Republic of Moldova, January 2019), Chișinău: Institutul de Politici Publice, 2019, 78, http://ipp.md/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/BOP_02.2019-new.pdf

                  [6] Institutul de Politici Publice, Barometrul de Opinie Publică din Moldova, noiembrie 2003 (Barometer of Public Opinion in Moldova, November 2003), Chișinău: Institutul de Politici Publice, 2003, 91, http://ipp.md/old/public/files/Barometru/2003/bop_final.zip, and Institutul de Politici Publice, Barometrul Opiniei Publice. Republica Moldova, octombrie-noiembrie 2014 (Barometer of Public Opinion. Republic of Moldova, October-November 2014), Chișinău: Institutul de Politici Publice, 2014, 82, http://ipp.md/old/public/files/ Barometru/Brosura_BOP_11.2014_prima_parte-r.pdf

                  [7] Ivan Suvorov, ‘Papskij vizit (Papal visit), newspmr.com press agency, May 5th 2017, http://newspmr.com/novosti-pmr/zakonodatelstvo/16166

                  [8] Ivan Tynjaev, ‘Perepis’ naselenija PMR’ (Census of the population of PMR), newspmr.com press agency, March 9th 2017, available at http://newspmr.com/novosti-pmr/obshhestvo/15927

                  [9] The full version of the law (in Romanian) is available at http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view &view =doc&id=324889&lang=1

                  [10] The full version of the law (in Russian) is available at http://www.vspmr.org/file.xp?file=58405

                  [11] Tatiana Cojocari, ‘Noi gândim în rusă, visăm în rusă’. Demitizarea proiectului de reintegrare a Transnistriei’ (`We think in Russian, dream in Russian`. The demystification of the project of Transnistria’s reintegration) [= LARICS Analysis], Tiraspol, 2017, https://larics.ro/noi-gandim-rusa-visam-rusa-demitizarea-proiectul-de-reintegrare-transnistriei/

                  [12] Consiliul pentru Drepturile Omului, Raport al raportorului special pentru problemele minorităților, realizat în timpul misiunii ei în Republica Moldova (Report of the special rapporteur on minority issues, drafted during her mission in the Republic of Moldova), 2016, 9, https://www.undp.org/content/dam/unct/moldova/docs/pub/Raport%20al%20raportorului%20special%20pentru%20problemele%20minorit%c4%83%c8%9bilor,%20realizat%20%c3%aen%20timpul%20misiunii%20ei%20%c3%aen%20Republica%20Moldova.pdf

                  [13] Throughout the text, the names of ministries may differ, since they are referred to by their official designation at a particular moment in time.

                  [14] US Department of State, Moldova 2018 International Religious Freedom Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2019, 11-12, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOLDOVA-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf

                  [15] ‘Sectoare Sinodale’, Mitropolia Chișinăului și a Întregii Moldove (Synodal Sectors, Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova), available at https://mitropolia.md/sectoare-sinodale/

                  [16] ‘Eparxal’nye otdely, komissii i sovety,’ Tiraspol’skaja-Dubossarskaja Eparxija (Eparchial departments, commissions and councils, Eparchy of Tiraspol and Dubăsari), available at http://www.diocese-tiras.org/page.php?id=77

                  [17] ‘Activitate socială’, Mitropolia Chișinăului și a Întregii Moldove (Social activity, Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova), available at https://mitropolia.md/activitate-sociala/

                  [18] This is explicitly mentioned in the press release regarding the presentation of the yearly report of the Synodal Sector for Social Assistance and Charity from December 2016. See: Sectorul Sinodal Asistenţă Socială şi Caritate, ‘Sectorul Sinodal Asistenţă Socială şi Caritate a prezentat Raportul de Activitate pe anul 2016’ (Synodal Sector for Social Assistance and Charity, ‘The Synodal Sector for Social Assistance and Charity presented its Activity Report for the year 2016’), Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, 22 December 2016, https://mitropolia.md/sectorul-sinodal-asistenta-sociala-si-caritate-a-prezentat-raportul-de-activitate-pe-anul-2016/

                  [19] Sectorul Sinodal Asistenţă Socială şi Caritate, ‘Şedinţa de lucru a Sectorului Sinodal Asistenţă Socială şi Caritate’ (Synodal Sector for Social Assistance and Charity, ‘Working meeting of the Synodal Sector for Social Assistance and Charity’), Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova, June 22nd 2016, https://mitropolia.md/sedinta-de-lucru-a-sectorului-sinodal-asistenta-sociala-si-caritate/

                  [20] Ana Gherciu, ‘Religie vs. activitate socială. Cere și ți se va da’ (Religion vs. social activity. Ask and you shall receive), Timpul (The Times), 3 November 2014, https://www.timpul.md/articol/religie-vs–activitate-sociala–cere-i-i-se-va-da-65465.html

                  [21] Sectorul Sinodal Asistenţă Socială şi Caritate, ‘Raportul’ (Synodal Sector for Social Assistance and Charity, ‘Report’).

                  [22] US Department of State, Moldova 2018 Report, 12; Misiunea Socială “Diaconia” a Mitropoliei Basarabiei, Asistăm cu drag față de aproapele. Raport anual 2018  (We assist with love for our neighbour. Annual report 2018), Chișinău: Misiunea Socială “Diaconia” a Mitropoliei Basarabiei, 33, https://www.diaconia.md/public/files/Diaconia_Raport_2018.pdf

                  [23] Misiunea ‘Diaconia’, Asistăm (We assist).

                  [24] Interviews with an Orthodox Church official and a Roman Catholic official, Chișinău, February, 2019; Misiunea ‘Diaconia’, Asistăm (We assist), 21.

                  [25] Interview with an Orthodox Church official, Chișinău, February, 2019.

                  [26] Valeriu Moșneaga, Asylum-seekers, refugees and displaced persons in Moldova: Problems of recognition, social protection and integration [= CARIM-East Explanatory Note 13/103] (European University Institute and Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2013), 1, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/62725/Explanatory % 20Note_2013-103.pdf?sequence=1

                  [27] Interview with an Orthodox Church official, Chișinău, February, 2019.

                  [28] Moșneaga, Asylum-seekers, 1.

                  [29] Ludmila Roșca, ‘Integrarea socială a migranților prin cunoaștere și comunicare. Abordare holistă,’ (‘The social integration of migrants through knowledge and communication. A holistic approach’) Relații Internaționale Plus, 2017, 2 (12), pp. 52-53.

                  [30] Roșca, ‘Integrarea’ (The integration), 52.

                  [31] The full dataset is available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?most_ recent_value_desc=false.

                  [32] Elena Vaculovschi and Dorin Vaculovschi, ‘Aspecte de gen ale migrației de muncă din Republica Moldova’ (Gender aspects of work migration from the Republic of Moldova), Administrarea Publică, 2018, 1 (97), pp. 94-97.

                  [33] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, International Migration Report 2017 (United Nations: New York, 2017), 9, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/ publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017.pdf

                  [34] Ministerul Afacerilor Interne al Republicii Moldova. Biroul Migrație și Azil, Compendiul Statistic al Profilului Migrațional Extins al Republicii Moldova pentru anii 2015-2017 (Statistical Compendium of the Extended Migration Profile of the Republic of Moldova for the years 2015 – 2017), Chișinău: Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, 2018, 31, http://bma.gov.md/sites/default/files/sites/default/files/atasamente/comunicate/compendiul_statistic_al_pme_pentru_anii_2015-2017.pdf

                  [35] Nelly Filip and Natalia Coșelev, ‘Migrația ca problemă globală și națională’ (Migration as a global and national issue) in Grigore Belostecinic et al. (eds.) ‘Culegere de articole selective ale Conferinţei Ştiinţifice Internaţionale „Competitivitatea şi Inovarea în Economia Cunoaşterii’ (Collection of selected articles of the International Scientifc Conference Competitivity and Innovation in the Knowledge Economy’) Chișinău: Academia de Științe Economice a Moldovei, 2017, 259.

                  [36] Ion Loghin, Republica Moldova și fenomenul migrației în contextul extinderii UE (The Republic of Moldova and the phenomenon of migration in the context of EU enlargement), Chișinău: Departamentul Migrațiune, 2003, 2, http://irp.md/uploads/1195738280.pdf

                  [37] Cristina Haruța, ‘Relația statului de origine cu migranții. O scurtă analiză a unor instrumente de politică publică din Republica Moldova’ (The relationship of the state of origin with migrants. A short analysis of some public policy instruments in the Republic of Moldova), Revista Transilvană de Științe Administrative, 2017, 1 (40), p. 28.

                  [38] Loghin, Republica Moldova și fenomenul migrației (The Republic of Moldova and the phenomenon of migration), 2.

                  [39] Haruța, ‘Relația statului de origine cu migranții’ (The relationship of the state of origin with migrants), 37.

                  [40] Ibid, p. 28.

                  [41] The full text of the Strategy (in Romanian) is available at http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view& view =doc&lang=1&id=363576

                  [42] International Organization for Migration, Migration Governance Snapshot: The Republic of Moldova (2018), 4, https://www.iom.md/sites/default/files/publications/docs/Migration%20Governance%20Snapshot%20The%20Republic%20of%20Moldova.pdf

                  [43] Biroul Național de Statistică al Republicii Moldova, Notă metodologică privind estimarea numărului populației cu reședință obișnuită pentru perioada 2014-2019 (Methodological note regarding the estimate of the population with usual residence for the period 2014 – 2019), Chișinău: Biroul Național de Statistică al Republicii Moldova, 2019, 1, http://statistica.gov.md/public/files/ComPresa/Populatia/2018/Nota_metodologica_pop_resedinta_obisnuita.pdf

                  [44] ‘Population with usual residence in Republic of Moldova, by sex and age group, at the beginning of 2019’, National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, available at http://statistica.gov.md/newsview.php?l=en&id= 6416&idc=168

                  [45] The latter number also includes foreigners establishing residence in the Republic of Moldova. However, in 2017 only 3,712 foreign citizens were registered as having immigrated to the country. See: Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, Compendiul Statistic (Statistical Compendium), 15.

                  [46] Rodica Malic, ‘FALS: Numărul moldovenilor care solicită cetățenie română este într-o continuă scădere; doar 51 de cazuri în 2016’ (FAKE: The number of Moldovans who request Romanian citizenship is in continuous decline; only 51 cases in 2016), stopfals.md news portal, April 13th 2018, https://stopfals.md/ro/article/fals-numarul-moldovenilor-care-solicita-cetatenie-romana-este-intr-o-continua-scadere-doar-51-de-cazuri-in-2016-179997

                  [47] Valeriu Moșneaga, Cartografierea diasporei moldovenești din Germania, Marea Britanie, Israel, Italia, Portugalia și Rusia (Mapping Moldovan diaspora in Germany, Great Britain, Israel, Italy, Portugal and Russia) [Ciclul de studii: Cartografierea diasporei, III], Chișinău: Organizaţia Internaţională pentru Migraţiune, Misiunea în Moldova, 2017, 49-50, 56, https://www.iom.md/sites/default/files/publications/docs/Raport%20ROM.pdf

                  [48] Moșneaga, Cartografierea (Mapping), 45.

                  [49] Ostavnaia, Cartografierea diasporei (Mapping the diaspora), 19.

                  [50] Moșneaga, Cartografierea (Mapping), 127.

                  [51] Interview with a think tank official, Chișinău, February, 2019.

                  [52] Metropolitan Vladimir, ‘Interviul acordat de Mitropolitul Vladimir al Chişinăului şi al Întregii Moldove portalului ortodox ‘Pravoslavie i mir’ (Interview granted by Metropolitan Vladimir of Chișinău and All Moldova to the Orthodox portal ‘Pravoslavie i mir’), interview by Maria Seniciukova, Pravoslavie i mir (translated into Romanian and published on mitropolia.md), April 14th 2011, https://mitropolia.md/interviul-acordat-de-mitropolitul-vladimir-al-chisinaului-si-al-intregii-moldove-portalului-ortodox-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B5-%D0%B8-%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80/.

                  [53] ‘Vikarij Patriaršego ekzarxa Zapadnoj Evropy budet okormlyat’ moldavojazyčnuju pastvu v Italii’ (A vicar of the Patriarchal Exarchate in Western Europe will take care of the Moldovan-speaking flock in Italy), patriarchia.ru press release, May 30th 2019, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5444501.html

                  [54] Official communication from the Metropolis of Bessarabia, in possession of the author, September 2019.

                  [55] Interview with a think tank official, Chișinău, February, 2019; Biroul Relații cu Diaspora, ‘Diaspora moldovenească din Surgut, Federația Rusă’ (The Moldovan diaspora in Surgut, Russian Federation), Moldova de oriunde, no. 2 (December 2016), 67.

                  [56] ‘Istoričeskaja spravka’, Patriaršee podvor’e. Predstavitel’stvo Kishinevsko Kišinevsko- Moldavskoj pri Patriarxe Moskovskom i Vseja Rusi’, (Patriarchal compound. Representation of the Chisinau-Moldavian Metropolis at the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia), available at http://www.vvedenievbarashah.ru/o-khrame/istoricheskaya-spravka

                  [57] Examples of activities carried out by Moldovan Sunday schools in Italy can be found at: https://brd.gov.md/ sites/default/files/document/attachments/02_impactul_activitatii_scolilor_duminicale_in_italia_aliona_purci_0.pdf. Examples of activities carried out by Moldovan churches in Western Europe can be found, inter alia, at https://brd.gov.md/sites/default/files/pro_diaspora_kids_2016.pdf

                  [58] The full programme of the event (in Romanian) can be found at http://piacenza.cerkov.ru/2015/11/03/saptamana-diasporei-ortodoxe-a-republicii-moldova-in-italia/#

                  [59] Gheorghe Anghel, ‘Duminica migranților români’ (Sunday of Romanian migrants), Basilica Press Agency, August 19th 2018, https://basilica.ro/duminica-migrantilor-romani-3/

                  [60] Official communication of the Bureau for Diaspora Relations to the State Chancellery of the Republic of Moldova, 26 May 2015, https://gov.md/sites/default/files/biroul_pentru_relatii_cu_diaspora.pdf

                  [61] ‘Câștigătorii granturilor de 3500 $ pentru Centrele Educaționale din Diasporă’ (The winners of 3500 $ grants for Educational Centres in Diaspora), Biroul Relații cu Diaspora, available at https://brd.gov.md/ro/content/castigatorii-granturilor-de-3500-pentru-centrele-educationale-din-diaspora

                  [62] Valeriu Moșneaga, Cartografierea diasporei moldovenești în Italia, Portugalia, Franța și Regatul Unit al Marii Britanii  (Mapping the Moldovan diaspora in Italy, Portugal, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain) [Ciclul de studii: Cartografierea diasporei moldovenești, II], Chișinău: Organizaţia Internaţională pentru Migraţiune, Misiunea în Moldova, 2017, 102-103, available at https://brd.gov.md/sites/default/files/document/attachments/ 01_cartografierea_diasporei_moldovenesti_in_4_tari_ue_rom.pdf.

                  [63] Moșneaga, Cartografierea diasporei (Mapping the diaspora), 35.

                  [64] Ibid, 78.

                  [65] Interview with an Orthodox Church official, Chișinău, February, 2019.

                  [66] Misiunea “Diaconia”, Asistăm (We assist), 13.

                  [67] Official communication from the Metropolis of Bessarabia, in possession of the author, September 2019.

                  [68] Ministerul Afacerilor Interne al Republicii Moldova. Biroul Migrație și Azil, Compendiul Statistic al Profilului Migrațional Extins al Republicii Moldova pentru anii 2014-2016 (Statistical Compendium of the Extended Migration Profile of the Republic of Moldova for the years 2014 – 2016), Chișinău: Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, 2017, 22, available at http://bma.gov.md/sites/default/files/media/cs_pme_2017.pdf

                  [69] Interview with a Muslim community official, Chișinău, February, 2019.

                  [70] Ibid. Other website resources: http://statistica.gov.md, National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova; http://brd.gov.md, Bureau for Diaspora Relations ; http://bma.gov.md Bureau for Migration and Asylum of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova; http://www.mitropolia.md, Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova; http://www.diaconia.md,  Diaconia Social Mission of the Metropolis of Bessarabia.

                  Footnotes
                    Related Articles

                    Religion and Forced Displacement in Russia

                    Article by Roman Lunkin

                    Religion and Forced Displacement in Russia

                    Introduction

                    The Russian Federation is a unique example of a country where changes in society’s cultural atmosphere and religious consciousness depended more on forced displacement than on inner natural changes. The specifics of the religious situation in Russia include the combination of two historical factors: 1) the unprecedented migration waves that affected the territory of the present-day Russian Federation during the twentieth century, both before and after the revolution of 1917, and 2) the anti-religious campaigns that were more devastating on Russian territory than in the other republics of the Soviet Union.

                     

                    Waves of forced migration, the deportation of entire nations under Stalin, and the migration and emigration of the 1990s all directly affected the religious landscape of Russia. First of all, the ethnic composition of many faiths has changed. For example, the ethnic composition of the Lutheran and Catholic communities changed and became more Russian. Whereas at the beginning of the 20th century it was mainly the German, Polish and Finnish populations that identified as Lutheran and Catholic, from the 1990s ethnic Russians came to make up a larger proportion of adherents to these groups, because of conversions due to the weakness of Orthodoxy, the emigration of Germans, decreasing numbers of Poles and Finns, and, in general, because of the growing interest of Russians in other confessions.

                     

                    During the Soviet period, all faiths were under pressure due to the state’s anti-religious policy. However, the period after perestroika and especially the 1990s was a time of religious growth, and it became evident that the Russian Orthodox Church had lost its monopoly position. One of the manifestations of the new social role of Christian churches in civil society was their active work with immigrants (refugees and labour migrants). As in the European Union during the immigration crisis of 2015-2018, the position of Russian churches regarding immigrants strengthened their role in the public space and in politics, and spurred the development of their social work.

                     

                    Religion, ethnicity and population

                    According to the preamble of the Federal Law on the Freedom of Consciousness and Religious Associations (1997), the state recognises the historical significance of Orthodox Christianity in Russian history and culture, and gives special respect to Christianity and certain other religions, namely Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. The Russian authorities divide ll faiths into ‘traditional’ and ‘nontraditional’.[1] This concept, while absent from the Russian Law on Religious Freedom, has been advanced by the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Rus’ since 2009. Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism are deemed ‘traditional religions’, while even Old Believers, Catholics, various Protestant denominations, and many others are not.

                     

                    The concept of traditional religions not only pits worshippers against each other, it also ignores the religious diversity of Russia. Today there are between five and 15 million practicing Orthodox believers in Russia, ten million Muslims, three million Protestants, 500,000 Buddhists, 200,000 Jews, 150,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses (their organisation was recognised as extremist and banned in 2017), 100,000 Hindus, and 100,000 followers of other religious faiths (e.g., there are about 10,000 Mormons in Russia).[2] Thus, Russia corresponds with the average European level of religiosity among its population, with about 20 per cent participating to some degree in the activity of religious organisations in a country of more than 140 million inhabitants.[3]

                     

                    The ROC has laid claim to the exclusive right to a close relationship with the government, and accuses Catholics and Protestants of proselytising in the canonical territory that it considers its own. According to the Russian Ministry of Justice, ROC organisations are the most numerous in the country: among a total of 31,473 registered religious organisations, there are 19,471 different ROC organisations (dioceses, monasteries and communities), 3479 Protestant and 5340 Muslim organisations.[4] However, field research published by the Keston Institute in 2010s shows that Protestants and Muslims may be twice as numerous as the official figures suggest.[5] For example, evangelicals are now the second largest Christian denomination in Russia after Orthodox Christians in terms of the numbers of practicing believers and presence throughout the country (five to 15 million Orthodox and three million Evangelicals).[6] In fact, in many regions of Siberia and the Far East, the number of Protestant communities and active parishioners is higher than the number of practicing Orthodox believers.

                     

                    The concept of ‘traditional religions’ is based on the fact that each ethnic group has its own culture and its own religion, but this statement contradicts the ethnic composition of modern religious organisations. In Russia, parishioners of the Russian Orthodox Church are mainly ethnic Russians, although Ukrainians and Belarussians, fellow Slavic peoples, also tend to follow Eastern Orthodoxy. At the same time, there are also other ,indigenous peoples of Russia that are historically Orthodox (some coming to the faith in the Middle Ages, others in the 19th century). An important factor is that the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, regularly declares that Russian Orthodoxy is a multinational faith, and is not limited only to Russia, but also includes churches in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, the Baltic countries, Orthodox in Central Asia, Western Europe, the USA, Japan, Southeast Asia and Latin America.

                     

                    Consequently, the Russian Orthodox Church cannot declare itself to be either the only religion of ethnic Russians, or exclusively a religion for ethnic Russians. The Russian Orthodox Church adapted itself to the concept of the ‘Russian world’ after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine crisis in 2014 due to the extreme politicisation of this term that became associated with ‘Russian aggression’ in Ukraine.[7]

                     

                    Religionstate relations

                    After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian legislation on religion was gradually tightened. Until 1997, there was a law on the freedom of conscience, which was adopted under Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990. Article 5 of this law proclaimed the separation of the church (religious organisations) from the state, and that the ‘state doesn’t interfere in the activity of the religious organisations’, ‘the state doesn’t finance religious organisations and the activity for the propaganda of atheism’. Article 8 gives permission for the activity of every religious community without registration.[8] There were no significant restrictions on the registration and missionary activities of religious associations. They could exist in two forms, either as a registered organisation or as a religious group that could operate freely without registration. In 1997, a new version of the law on the freedom of conscience was adopted, which proclaimed a special respect for the four traditional religions (Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism) and introduced a moratorium on new religious organisations, which could henceforth receive full rights as a legal entity only 15 years after their registration as a community. However, most of the new religions (Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, Falun Gong, Mormons, etc.) had already registered in the early 1990s. In addition, numerous new local branches of established Protestant communities circumvented this issue by claiming registration within the framework of their central organisation, and thus acquired the rights of a legal entity without delay.

                     

                    The legislation was furthered tightened with the adoption in 2016 of a package of laws, better known as Yarovaya Law (the official name: The Federal Law of July 6th 2016 no. 374-FZ ‘On amendments to Federal Law ‘On countering with terrorism’ and other legal acts of the Russian Federation in the parts that constitutes the additional measures in countering terrorism and providing societal security’). The regulation of missionary activity (with ‘mission’ defined in the broadest of terms) and penalties for religious organisations preaching in public places without permission were introduced. Religious groups were henceforth obliged to provide information about themselves to local authorities, which has become a form of quasi-registration.

                     

                    Anti-extremist legislation is also directly related to religious policy in Russia. The law on countering extremist activity was adopted in 2002. It contains the broadest possible definition of extremist activity, allowing law enforcement agencies to apply this law to almost any religious movement. Most of all, this law has affected Muslim communities and movements (the Hizb-ut-Tahrir movement, the followers of Said Nursi, etc. are prohibited on the territory of Russia). In 2017, all organisations of Jehovah’s Witnesses were banned under this law, and many of their books and magazines, along with many Islamic ones, were included in the Federal List of Extremist Materials which is available on the website of the Ministry of Justice.[9] The reason for the prohibition of Jehovah’s Witnesses is that they proclaim their religion to be true and criticise representatives of other faiths. The decision to ban them and confiscate their property was an act of intimidation against all other non-Orthodox churches.

                     

                    The social partnership between ‘traditional religions’ and the state was supported in 2009 by President Dmitry Medvedev, who oversaw the introduction of military chaplains in the army, courses on the basics of different religions in schools, and the approval of the discipline of theology in higher education. 2010 saw the adoption of the law on the transfer of religious property to religious organisations, according to which churches can demand the transfer of ownership or use of buildings that were previously (mainly before the 1917 revolution) used for religious purpose; not only for worship, but also as outbuildings in monasteries. The ROC was the main beneficiary of these initiatives. The most successful projects implemented were the introduction of modules about Russia’s ‘traditional religions’ in state schools, the introduction of theology as an academic programme in universities, as well as the large-scale restitution of property to the ROC.[10]

                     

                    Religion and forced displacement

                    There were waves of the Christian migration from outside Russia, such as, firstly, the Lutherans that became the part of Russian society in the 16th century and, secondly, the evangelical groups from Germany that arrived in Russia from the end of the 18th century. The phenomenon of emigration touched the lives of many in Russia from the beginning of the twentieth century. Members of Russian evangelical sects and Old Believers emigrated to Canada, Latin America, and the USA until the late 1980s. The third type of the migration were Stalin’s deportations to Central Asia. The main focus of this study is the impact of these migratory waves on Russian Orthodoxy, which experienced several types of change.

                     

                     Table 1. Number of immigrants. Total number of people living in a country or union republic in which they were not born, by year.[11]

                     

                    Table 2. Migration waves in Russia in 1991-2016[12]

                     

                    The first change concerns the fragmentation of Orthodoxy into official Orthodoxy and Orthodoxy of the Old Rite (Old Believers that separated from official Orthodoxy in the 17th century), which periodically caused waves of migrations from the end of the 17th century to the beginning of the 20th century because of the persecution of the ‘old faith’. Old Believers fled to Moldova, Romania, Poland, and, within Russia, to Siberia and the Far East. Many Old Believers came to China and Latin America, whence they fled from communist China.[13] On January 9th 2018, the Fond podderzhki i sodeistviya staroobryadchestvu ‘Pravda Russkaya’ (Foundation of support and promotion of the Old Rite ‘Russian Truth’) was established.[14] The establishment of this foundation was also undertaken with the support of the authorities. Through this foundation, the authorities intend to actively help Old Believers in Russia. There is also a programme for the resettlement of Old Believers from Latin America and, if desired, from Australia and Canada, on preferential terms in Siberia and the Far East. About 130 families have already moved to the Far East, while several families from Latin America have been granted Russian citizenship by President Vladimir Putin. The appeal to Old Believers has become a symbol of ‘return to the roots’, but an alternative to the ROC.

                     

                    Secondly, the migration waves deprived official Orthodoxy of human and intellectual strength. During the Soviet persecutions after 1917, the best priests, theologians, and the most active believers were killed or left the country. They settled in France, to a lesser extent in other European countries and in the United States. In 1943, a war-time initiative under Stalin  to raise patriotic spirits lead to the revival of the former state church of the Russian Empire but as the Moscow Patriarchate, whose activity was necessarily overseen by Stalin and controlled by the Soviet state. Furthermore, during the Soviet period, the Russian Church did not have the right to conduct social projects or to help people publicly in other ways, and Sunday schools were also prohibited.

                     

                    The Russian Revolution of 1917 brought about a division in Russian Orthodoxy as members of the ‘White’ movement, including intellectuals, emigrated from ‘red’ Bolshevik Russia. The Russian diaspora established the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad that remained an irreconcilable critic of Soviet Russia.[15] The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad unified with the Moscow Patriarchate (MP) in 2007, and most communities of the Russian Archdiocese of the parishes of Russian tradition (about 80 parishes in France, Britain, Germany and Italy) entered the structure of the MP in 2019. This was a key event in the restoration of the Russian World, which, in the view of the ROC, refers to the spiritual identity community including Russia itself and the Russian diaspora abroad. The spiritual and cultural (and canonical after the above-mentioned reunifications) ties with Orthodox of Russian tradition objectively help the Moscow Patriarchate to overcome the Soviet legacy and build church democracy from the inside.

                     

                    Thirdly, migration, deportations and Soviet atheist policies dramatically changed the ethnic character of Christianity, and showed both the ROC and Russian society as a whole that Russians could be Christians outside the framework of the Moscow Patriarchate. Before the 1917 revolution, non-Orthodox Christian churches were virtually inaccessible to the Russian population. At the moment of the collapse of the USSR, Lutherans and Catholics in Russia existed as separate disparate communities in Siberia. The deportations of the Stalin period became a consistent element of national policy, as did the ‘preventive deportations’ during WWII period. About 2.75 million people (Germans, Finns, Greeks, Romanians, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks and others suspected of collaboration or collaboration with the Nazi army) were deported during and after WWII.[16] Although the Lutheran and Catholic communities were formally revived in the early 1990s on the basis of Polish or German cultural societies, or by gathering people with Polish, Lithuanian, etc. roots, these churches quickly became predominantly Russian in terms of the ethnicity of their parishioners. German Lutheranism was also negatively affected by the mass migration of Russian Germans to Germany in the 1990s (about 500,000 Russian Germans and 25,000 Pentecostalists emigrated),[17] so that by the early 2000s the church in Russia was in deep crisis. The beginning of 1990s and early 2000s became the heyday of the evangelical movement throughout Russia, despite the continued emigration of pastors and their families. Many Christian denominations or movements that were only for foreign citizens before 1917, such as the Salvation Army, the Reformed Church and the Methodist Church, disappeared in Soviet times and were revived as Russian churches in the 1990s. The religious boom of 1990s also saw the immigration to Russia of thousands of Ukrainian evangelical missionaries who became Russian citizens, (unlike the evangelists from the USA who mainly left Russia) and came to represent the majority of the pastors of the big Protestant churches in Russia.

                     

                     Table 3. Selected ethnicities and Christian churches in Russia[18]

                     

                    Social work among various categories of migrants has become a clear manifestation of the internal development of the Russian Orthodox Church and the need to be more active in a competitive environment among churches that offer their own interpretations of ‘Russian patriotism’, detracting from the monopoly aspired to the Moscow Patriarchate. The evolution of the worldview of the Russian Orthodox Church has led to a convergence in the views of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Catholic Church on the problems of migration and adaptation, which are generally common to all categories of immigrants (both churches cooperated in helping Christians in the Middle East and helping immigrants integrate in Russia and the EU). In 2016, a joint Orthodox-Catholic humanitarian mission with the support of the Catholic Foundation ‘Kirche in Not’ visited Syria and Lebanon, and in 2017 the head of the Department of External Relations of the ROC, Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk, accompanied the humanitarian mission in Lebanon within the framework of dialogue with the Catholic Church.[19] Pentecostals and Baptists in Russia combine social work with evangelism and conversion, which remain as objectives when attracting the needy to church activities.

                     

                    The difference between the situation in Russia and in the countries of the European Union (particularly Western Europe) is that in Russia, national communities are a part of larger Russian-speaking churches that include refugees from Ukraine or people from Caucuses and Central Asia, while in Europe over the past ten to 15 years independent national churches of immigrants from Africa and the Middle East, Turkey and Latin America have appeared, where native Europeans represent a smaller part of the converts. Many social projects, such as volunteer groups at parish level appeared when the ROC helped the refugees from Ukraine: in 2014-2015 donations amounting to 128 million Russian roubles were collected, and 22,000 refugees received direct help, while in 2015-2016 a joint project of ROC and the Billy Graham Association was undertaken to support refugees in southern regions of Russia.[20] The Orthodox church was the most active institution in the social work among displaced people, but evangelicals (Pentecostals and Baptists) also established special centers[21].

                     

                    Policy perspectives

                    Religious organisations provide a variety of tools to effectively solve social problems, including problems associated with migration. Some churches are able to implement large-scale projects, others are focused on targeted volunteer work. The liberal, secular part of society reacted with disbelief to the work of European churches during the migration crisis, doubting that they could radically change the situation and bring benefit to society. Critics of the ROC also exists in Russia, which is partly a consequence of the Soviet atheist rule, a kind of analogue to European secularisation, in terms of the displacement of religion from public space, politics and the everyday life of people.  At the same time, the academic community, politicians, officials and journalists need to take into account the reality of the new role of religious institutions in society and their social activity. Among the recommendations related to the social work of churches are:

                     

                    First, religious organisations need an individual approach to assessing their capabilities. In this case, grants or state support for the efforts of churches to work with refugees and all those in need will be much more successful in achieving their goals and helping the victims.

                     

                    Second, public authorities, human rights organisations and non-profit organisations working with migrants should establish cooperation with religious institutions. Moreover, the priority should be partnership not so much at the official level, but within specific parishes and communities, and in relation to specific initiatives.

                     

                    Third, the support and strengthening of religious pluralism in society constitutes a de facto recognition of the changed situation in the post-Soviet space. However, overcoming religious xenophobia and stereotypes associated with ethnic religiosity (if you are Russian, then you are inevitably Orthodox, or if Tatar, then only Muslim) remains a problem. For instance, campaigns railing against sects are organised in the mass media, while society knows little about other faiths besides Orthodoxy, and information about Islam or Buddhism is widely distributed only in the corresponding national republics of Russia (in Bashkortostan about Islam, and in Buryatia about Buddhism and shamanism, etc.).

                     

                    Fourth, a significant negative factor in Russia and in the Central Asian republics is the strict control of religious activities, in particular, mission, preaching and the distribution of religious literature. Due to strict legislation and constant checks by security forces, most communities refuse to register, and exist in a semi-underground situation. Such rules do not contribute to the active inclusion of religious institutions in civil society, let alone in social projects. In this case, the state refuses to use even the potential of quite loyal registered associations, although it is unclear what harm they could bring. The regulation of missionary activity and fines cause a latent fear of any preaching and the word of God. The Soviet legacy is reflected in officials’ fear of any religion, as well as the emigration of the most active believers in the 1980s and 90s to Russia from Central Asia, and from Russia on to the West. The liberalisation of legislation in the sphere of freedom of conscience and social partnership between the state and religious associations has become an urgent task that should be solved.

                     

                    Roman Lunkin is the Director of the Center for Religious Studies at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is editor-in-chief of the magazine ‘Contemporary Europe’ and a member of the Russian team of the Keston Institute, Oxford in the project ‘An Encyclopedia of religious life in Russia today’.  His latest publications include ‘The Status of and Challenges to Religious Freedom in Russia’ in Allen Hertzke (ed.) The Future of Religious Freedom. Global Challenges, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 157-180; ‘Reaction of Russian Churches on Ukrainian Crisis: A Prophecy of Democracy’ Rob van der Laarse, Mykhailo N. Cherenkov, Vitaliy V. Proshak, Tetiana Mykhalchuk (eds.) Religion, state, society, and identity in transition : Ukraine. Oisterwijk : Wolf Legal Publishers, 2015, pp. 435-476;  ‘Changes to Religious Life in Crimea since 2014’ in Elizabeth A. Clark and Dmytro Vovk (eds.), Religion During the Russian Ukrainian Conflict, London: Routledge, 2019, pp. 144-156.

                     

                    Cover photo: ‘New Jerusalem Monastery, Moscow, July 2019’. Copyright: Roman Lunkin

                     

                    [1] ‘Vladimir Putin zayavlyaet, chto v Rossii tradicionnye religii mogut rasschityvat’ na podderzhku gosudarstva’ (Putin claims that in Russia traditional religions could rely on the support of the state), 17 December 2001, RIA Novosti, available at https://ria.ru/20011217/36496.html. All websites were accessed on 23 December 2019.

                    [2] Staroobryadchestvo v Rossijskoj Federacii konca XIX — nachala XXI v. (The Old Believers Movement in Russian Federation in XIX-XXI cent.). 04.01.2018URL: http://rpsc.ru/publications/history/chislennost_staroobriadcev_xxi/; https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/regulating-faiths-make-your-preaching-legal

                    Official site of the Russian Orthodox Old Rite Church – http://rpsc.ru . The figures vary depending on the methodology of the poll. Very few people attend church every Sunday, for instance; Estimate based on comparison of censuses and sociological surveys: Sergei Filatov and Roman Lunkin, ‘Statistics on Religion in Russia: The Reality Behind the Figures’, Religion. State & Society, 2006, pp. 33-49; Lunkin Roman, Filatov Sergei. Statistika religioznoj i konfessional’noj prinadlezhnosti rossiyan: kakim arshinom merit’. (The Statistics of the religious and confessional belonging: how to count). Religiya i rossijskoe mnogoobrazie (Religion and Russian diversity). Kestonskij institut, Moscow-Petersburg, Publisher: “Letnij sad”, 2011. S.5-30.

                    [3] Roman Lunkin, ‘Regulating Faiths: Make Your Preaching Legal, The Russia File. A blog of the Kennan Institute’, August 7th 2017. URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/regulating-faiths-make-your-preaching-legal

                    [4] The Information portal on the activity of non-commercial organisations of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, the list of registered organisations on December 23rd 2019,  http://unro.minjust.ru

                    [5] See the results of the field research in the volumes of the ‘Religious Life in Russia Today’ published by the Keston Institute: https://www.keston.org.uk/encyclopaedia; Religiozno-obshchestvennaya zhizn’ rossijskih regionov (Religious and social life in Russian regions). Pod red. S.B. Filatova. Kestonskij institut, Moscow-Petersburg, Publisher: “Letnij sad” T.I, 2014. T.II,2016. T.III, 2018.

                    [6] Lunkin Roman, Filatov Sergei. Statistika religioznoj i konfessional’noj prinadlezhnosti rossiyan: kakim arshinom merit’. (The Statistics of the religious and confessional belonging: how to count). Religiya i rossijskoe mnogoobrazie (Religion and Russian diversity). Kestonskij institut, Moscow-Petersburg, Publisher: “Letnij sad”, 2011. S.5-30.

                    [7] ‘Patriarh prizval ne politizirovat’ ponyatie “russkij mir”’ (Patriarch call not to politicize the notion “Russian world”), 20 July 2015, RIA Novosti, https://ria.ru/20150720/1137980877.html

                    [8] Zakon SSSR ot 01 October 1990 N 1689-1 ‘O Svobode Sovesti i religioznyh organizaciyah’(The Law of the USSR from October 1st 1990 №1689-1 “On Freedom of the consciousness and on religious organizations”). Available at http://www.zaki.ru/pagesnew.php?id=1688

                    [9] The official list on website of Ministry of Justice, available at https://minjust.ru/ru/extremist-materials

                    [10] Roman Lunkin, ‘The Status of and Challenges to Religious Freedom in Russia’ in Allen D. Hertzke (ed.), The Future of Religious Freedom. Global Challenges, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 157-180.

                    [11] Source: Pew Research Center. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/15/international-migration-key-findings-from-the-u-s-europe-and-the-world/

                    [12] Data collected from the website of the Federal State Statistics Service at (https://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b15_107/Main.htm; https://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b16_107/Main.htm; https://gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17_107/Main.htm; https://gks.ru/bgd/regl/b18_107/Main.htm; and https://gks.ru/bgd/regl/b19_107/Main.htm; Many Ukrainians have not sought asylum or received refugee status and have continued to cross the border with Russia freely without registration. These figures related to those who registered as receiving temporary shelter and in total are closer to 1.5 million; Russia, Belarus undertake exhaustive measures to host Ukrainian refugees — CSTO official. TASS. 5 FEB 2016. Available at: https://tass.com/world/854794; UN Refugee Agency: Ukraine, November 1st-30th 2017, ‘Operational Update’: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2017%2011%20UNHCR%20UKRAINE%20Operational%20Update%20FINAL%20EN.pdf; The report states that 524,000 people ‘sought asylum or other legal status in the Russian Federation’. ‘The humanitarian situation of Ukrainian refugees and displaced persons’, Assembly debate on January 27th 2015, https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=21480&lang=en; Chudinovskikh O., Denisenko M. (2017) Russia: A Migration System with Soviet Roots. Migration Policy Institute. Available at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/russia-migration-system-soviet-roots

                    [13] Kononova Marina. ‘Russkaya staroobryadcheskaya diaspora v stranah dal’nego zarubezh’ya: genezis, formirovanie i sovremennoe polozhenie’ (Russian Old Rite Diaspora in the countries abroad: genesis, formation and the present state), November 7th 2014, available at https://samstar-biblio.ucoz.ru/publ/32-1-0-812

                    [14] pravda-russkaya.ru

                    [15] The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad appeared in the 1920s, and by 2007 had about 400 parishes in the USA, Australia, Britain and Germany.

                    [16] Polyan Pavel. ‘Geografiya nasil’stvennyh migracij v SSSR. Naselenie i obshchestvo’ (The geography of the forced migration in USSR. The population and the society). No. 37, 1999, available at http://www.demoscope.ru/acrobat/ps37.pdf

                    [17] Smirnova Tatiana. ‘Migracii i dinamika chislennosti nemeckogo naseleniya Zapadnoj Sibiri v konce XIX – XXI vv.’ (Migration and dynamics of the amount of the German population in Western Siberia in XIX – XXI c.). Izvestiya Altajskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta (The news of the Altai State University). 2007,  56 (4-3), pp. 174-181; V.P. Klyueva, ‘Emigraciya po religioznym motivam: sovetskie pyatidesyatniki v poiskah «luchshej doli»’ (The Emigration for religious reasons: Soviet Pentecostalists in the search of the better fate) Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Istoriya (The news of the Tomsk State University. History).  2018, 6 (2), pp. 438-453.

                    [18] Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic as a part of USSR; Evangelicals indicates the Protestant churches that formed as a legacy of the Reformation between the 17th and 19th centuries (Methodism, Baptism, the Salvation Army, Holiness churches) and evangelical movements of the twentieth century (Pentecostalism, Charismatics); The choice of nationalities in Table 1 is based mainly on the focus of that article, and is not an exhaustive list of all nationalities living in Russia. Consequently, it excludes native peoples of Russia that belong to the Orthodox tradition but have not taken part in migration processes. Also, certainly, the decreasing number of Ukrainians and Belarussians in Russia is a separate issue that awaits scholarly attention.  The non-Russian native peoples of Russia following Orthodoxy include Ossetians (originating from the territory of the Russian federal subject of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and South Ossetia; an unrecognised republic that separated from Georgia in 1991), Udmurts, some Chuvashs living in the Volga region, Finno-Ugric peoples of Russia; Erzya, Moksha, Mari, as well as Komi and Karelians in North-West Russia, etc. Data collected from the 1989 census: http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_nac_89.php Official site of the 2002 census: www.perepis2002.ru; Official site of the 2010 census: https://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm

                    [19] ‘Vystuplenie mitropolita Volokolamskogo Ilariona v Lissabone na temu «Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Cerkov’ i pomoshch’ hristianam Blizhnego Vostoka’ (The speech of Metropolitan Hilarion in Lisbon on the ROC and support to Christians in the Middle East). September 20th 2018. Patriarchia.Ru, available at http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5271038.html

                    [20] ‘128 millionov rublej sobrala Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Cerkov’ dlya mirnyh zhitelej Ukrainy.’ (128 million roubles collected by the Russian Orthodox Church for the peaceful citizens of Ukraine). May 29th 2015, available at http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4101642.html

                    [21] ‘Pomoshch’ bezhencam iz Ukrainy v RF: shtaby, goryachie telefony’ (Support for the refugees from Ukraine in Russia: centres and hot telephone lines), Miloserdie.ru. Orthodox portal on charity. August 8th 2014, available at https://www.miloserdie.ru/article/pomoshh-bezhencam-iz-ukrainy-v-rf-shtaby-goryachie-telefony-internet-resursy/; ‘V Rostove-na-Donu vozobnovil rabotu shtab pomoshchi bezhencam iz Ukrainy organizovannyj YUzhnym eparhial’nym upravleniem ROSKHVE (cerkvi «Iskhod»)’ (In Rostov-on-Don the work of the centre for the support for the refugees from Ukraine organised by the southern diocese of the Russian Pentecostal Union and the “Exhodus” Church restarted). Official website of the Pentecostal Union – Cef.Ru, February 18th 2015, available at  https://www.cef.ru/infoblock/news/read/article/1355228

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