The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, provides a welcome opportunity for a comprehensive review of the UK’s positioning in world politics. It comes at a pivotal time, for the UK’s foreign policy direction after Brexit and in a period where the liberal international order is fragmenting.

This essay emphasises the importance of a continued focus in UK foreign policy on the promotion of values and ethical responsibilities beyond its borders. Climate change, human rights abuse, pandemic disease, refugee flows and global poverty, create important moral imperatives for the UK to act towards a world common good. The international landscape continues to be one of shared problems that require a collective response.

The essay argues firstly that the Integrated Review provides an important moment of reflection to consider the precise relationship between values and the narrower national interests. Values and interests are not always harmonious or mutually reinforcing, and clearer mapping of the relationship is important in establishing the credibility of these commitments. Care must be taken that the language of ‘enlightened national interest’ is not used to disguise the pursuit of narrower priorities.

Secondly, the Integrated Review also takes place in a domestic political context of significant societal division on the UK’s positioning towards the outside world and its responsibilities to those beyond its borders. Rifts that became pronounced over Britain’s EU membership continue to limit the likelihood of reliable domestic consensus on foreign policy priorities, whether it is the interests to be pursued, the values to be promoted or the acceptable extent of responsibilities to non-citizens.

Without a reliable domestic foreign policy consensus, governments will find it difficult to marry the ends sought in foreign policy with means that are politically acceptable to diverse opinion groups within the UK.  Whilst the Integrated Review will understandably focus on capabilities for hard and soft power projection internationally, the UK’s internal dynamics will be a key factor in enabling or constraining these capabilities.

The Role of Values in UK Foreign Policy

 The idea of a ‘foreign policy with an ethical dimension’ was prominently associated with foreign secretary Robin Cook and the initial foreign policy of the Labour party, following their 1997 election victory. The foundation of DFID, the production of annual human rights reports, limitation of UK arms sales to authoritarian states, and support for humanitarian intervention were key features of this agenda.[1]

The key precepts of Labour’s ‘ethical’ foreign policy have survived successive changes of government and were embraced as the ‘values’ agenda within Conservative foreign policy, including maintaining the UK’s commitment to international development spending and expanded commitments to civilian protection and the Responsibility to Protect.[2]

For both parties, foreign policy narratives have been shaped around the promotion of liberal values – support for a ‘rule-governed’ international order, the expansion of democracy, the protection of human rights and the promotion of human well-being through international development. Foreign policy informed by these values requires the UK to think beyond its own immediate national interests, to consider ethical responsibilities to people and communities beyond its borders. This has fed through into the current Global Britain agenda, with continued emphasis on the promotion of values, the defence of the rules-based system and acting as a ‘moral compass to champion causes that know no borders’.  Human rights, development and the promotion of democracy remain ostensibly central to this agenda.[3]

The Integrated Review marks an important hinge point for UK foreign policy and an opportunity to better define the role of values in UK foreign policy and their relationship to the national interest. A foreign policy informed by values will be fundamentally important in enhancing its position as a responsible state contributing towards a world common good.

Global problems of climate change, population displacement, large-scale human rights abuse and pandemic disease can neither be contained within state borders, nor solved by individual states alone. Britain’s withdrawal from the EU and the re-assertion of its sovereignty, do not change the realities of the contemporary global problems it faces. Developing an effective response to these problems will continue to require collective action, informed by a worldly moral compass.

What is an ‘enlightened national interest’?

There has been a marked tendency by successive governments to suggest the UK pursues an ‘enlightened’ national interest, where the political and economic interests can be reconciled in a mutually reinforcing relationship with global ethical responsibilities.[4] The UK is not alone in this ambition, with a range of other states having similarly reconstructed their national interest to align with global ethical responsibilities.[5]

There is no intrinsic tension between national interest, the promotion of values and global ethical commitments, whether related to human rights, international development or environmental protection. However, there has been little clarity in recent UK foreign policy on the precise relationship between national interests and global ethical commitments, or how they may support one another. This lack of clarity has been carried forward in the ‘Global Britain’ agenda, which unproblematically marries a ‘buccaneering’ approach to free trade, with continued support for human rights, democratisation and development.

Assuming an automatically mutually reinforcing relationship between national interest and global ethical responsibilities, obscures the common tensions that often emerge between them. Inconsistencies between Britain’s professed support for human rights and its pursuit of narrower national commercial interests have been consistently evident in its sales of weapons to regimes with exceptionally poor human rights records.[6]

Similar tensions have been evident in British advocacy of humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. In both Libya and Syria, concerns for national interest and about the risk of ground-level entanglements have heavily tempered the approach of the UK to violence against civilians. Modes of intervention, to protect civilians or address other security concerns, have been limited primarily to the use of airpower, with questionable overall effect in creating a longer term secure and protective environment.

Compromises between national interests and global ethical responsibilities may be necessary in some cases.  However, continuing to suggest a near symbiotic relationship between Britain’s interests and the values it promotes in its foreign policy, risks strategic incoherence as resources and political will fail to match the ends sought. Acting at odds with the values and global ethical commitments the UKs professes to support, creates an obvious image of inconsistency with the likely consequence of reducing its soft power and ability to promote international norms of conduct.

It is vitally important that the Integrated Review considers how different areas of foreign policy responsibility relate to one another – where national interest and values-based commitments complement one another, and where they may conflict. This would acknowledge more honestly, rather than seek to obscure, the tensions between different priorities in UK foreign policy. Doing so would establish a clearer link between the ends sought and the resources necessary, and create a path towards more consistent and effective foreign policy practices.

Values-based Foreign Policy for a Disunited Kingdom?

Less commonly explored in discussions about future UK foreign policy, is its relationship with shared societal values and the domestic political context within Britain. The tension between national interest and the global ethical responsibilities, sits alongside entrenched internal divisions about Britain’s role in the world. Evidence from before and after the 2016 referendum, reveals significant divides in public opinion on foreign policy priorities, between approaches confined to the pursuit of narrow economic interest and those informed by values-based commitments. Socio-economic class, age and regional location indicate divergent priorities amongst key demographics.[7]

The 2016 referendum itself was an important driver for the emergence of distinctive identity communities within the UK, reflected in polarised attitudes towards global governance, immigration and the appropriate positioning of Britain in world politics. Far from resolving this polarisation, the outcome of the referendum and the protracted withdrawal negotiations have further cemented these identities.

It is impossible to wholly disengage a post-Brexit strategy for UK foreign policy from some of the populist nationalist rhetoric that surrounded of the EU referendum campaign. Hostility to global governance, immigration and rules constraining British sovereignty that characterised strands of the pro-leave campaigns, reflect some commonalities with what has been identified in recent research as a broader global trend in ‘reactionary internationalism’.[8] Reactionary internationalism emphasises the need to unshackle the state from the constraints of the liberal international order. Frequent allusions to Britain’s imperial heritage and metaphors of the UK “re-emerging after decades of hibernation” and “leaving its chrysalis”, in speeches promoting the Global Britain agenda, promote the idea of a state breaking free from external constraints on its sovereignty.[9]  An unresolved tension has emerged, between strands of thinking that emphasise national sovereignty and freedom of action, and other strands which see the appropriate place of the UK at the centre of a rules-based international order that by nature constrains foreign policy and emphasises global ethical responsibilities.

Domestic polarisation and fragile internal consensus on global ethical commitments has particular implications for foreign policy activities that have a large potential financial cost, commitment burden and/or require consistent public support over time. Public spending on international development is a key area of contestation between segments of the public that see development as an important global ethical priority for the UK, and those who feel the money would be better spent on British citizens.

Weak domestic consensus on foreign policy priorities has similar implications for intervention and the use of force in UK foreign policy. Recent research and investigations by the Defence Committee have highlighted the challenges in developing reliable public support for armed humanitarian interventions.[10]

The Integrated Review must clearly consider international conditions and UK capabilities that stand to affect foreign policy. However, it must also appreciate the problem of a divided domestic landscape and consider how a more stable domestic consensus could be developed on foreign policy priorities, practices and Britain’s position in world politics.

The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to do little to develop a more stable domestic consensus. It has the potential to further enlarge the divide between sections of the public who see the need for expanded global connection to respond and recover from the crisis, and those who see it as cause for a strong refocussing on narrower national interests.

Previous investigations by Parliamentary committees have tentatively started to address the way in which the public engages with foreign policy and the importance of a clear narrative about the UK’s foreign policy objectives.[11] The Global Britain agenda appears to be an attempt to provide a unifying narrative, directed at a polarised internal audience, to reconcile conflicting preferences about Britain’s international positioning. However, a narrative generated by foreign policy elites, is unlikely by itself to resolve tensions between divergent and entrenched views about the UK’s national priorities amongst the public. Concerningly, when responding to the Foreign Affairs Committee’s 2018 report on Global Britain, the government neglected to answer the direct question of “what does Global Britain mean to the people of the UK”?[12]

Developing a more stable domestic consensus for future UK foreign policy strategy requires a large-scale programme of public diplomacy, but one directed at the British, rather than overseas publics. The objective of such an exercise would be to better understand the way in which national interest, values and overseas ethical commitments are understood and prioritised by the public. In keeping with the emergence of ‘dialogue-based public diplomacy’, such an exercise must be a process of listening as well as persuasion.[13]

The desired outcome of such a process would be a values-based foreign policy, underpinned by stronger domestic legitimacy and a clearer sense, amongst both the public and policymakers, of how the UK’s foreign policy priorities relate to one another.

Conclusion and Recommendations 

• The promotion of values in UK foreign policy will be fundamentally important in helping to define Britain’s place in the world after Brexit, and to enhance its position as a responsible state contributing towards a world common good.
• UK foreign policy strategy has consistently internalised unresolved tensions between the pursuit of national interests and the global ethical responsibilities created by the promotion of ‘values’. The recurrent suggestion has been that values and interests are mutually reinforcing. However, this assumption obscures the tensions that frequently exist in practice. This risks strategic incoherence as resources and political will fails to match the ends sought.
• The Integrated Review must examine the specific relationship between its understanding of national interest and the values or global ethical commitments it seeks to pursue. The tensions between different priorities in UK foreign policy must be acknowledged and accounted for more openly.
• Current UK foreign policy strategy has also paid very little attention to the absence of a stable domestic consensus on Britain’s role in the world and the significant internal divisions that have endured following the 2016 referendum. The absence of a stable domestic consensus on foreign policy has significant implications for costly or complex foreign policy activities, like armed intervention or stabilisation, which require robust public support. Developing a more reliable domestic consensus in support of UK foreign policy, would benefit from a large-scale programme of public diplomacy directed toward British, rather than overseas publics.

Dr Jonathan Gilmore is a Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Manchester. His expertise centre on British foreign policy, global ethics, humanitarian intervention and comparative defence and security practices. His research has featured in major international academic journals and his book ‘The Cosmopolitan Military’ was published in 2015.

Image by Tasmin News Agency under (CC).

[1] See Robin Cook “British Foreign Policy”, speech given on 12^th May, 1997; Tony Blair, “The Doctrine of the International Community”, speech given at the Economic Club, Chicago, 24^th April 1999

[2] William Hague, “Britain’s values in a networked world”, speech given at Lincolns Inn, 15^th September 2010; Jonathan Gilmore, “Still a ‘Force for Good’? Good International Citizenship in British Foreign and Security Policy”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 17(1), 2015, pp. 106–129; Matt Beech & Peter Munce, “The place of human rights in the foreign policy of Cameron’s conservatives: Sceptics or enthusiasts?”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 21(1), 2019, pp. 116–131

[3] Dominic Raab, “Foreign Secretary’s introduction to the Queen’s Speech debate”, 13^th January 2020; Jeremy Hunt, “An invisible chain: speech by the foreign secretary”, Policy Exchange, 31^st October 2018; HM Government, National Security Capability Review, (London: Cabinet Office, 2018), p. 7

[4] Jonathan Gilmore, “The Uncertain Merger of Values and Interests in UK Foreign Policy”, International Affairs, 90(3), 2014, pp. 541-557

[5] See Alison Brysk, Global Good Samaritans, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)

[6] Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 2013-14: Volume I, (London: TSO, 2013), pp. 29-32

[7] Chatham House/YouGov, British Attitudes Towards the UK’s International Priorities: General Public Survey Results, London: Chatham House, 2014; Edward Elliott and Sophia Gaston, Behind Global Britain: Public opinion on the UK’s role in the world, (London: British Foreign Policy Group/BMG Research/Henry Jackson Society, 2019)

[8] Pablo de Orellana and Nicholas Michelsen, “Reactionary Internationalism: the philosophy of the New Right”, Review of International Studies, 45(5), 2019, pp. 748-767

[9] Boris Johnson, “PM speech in Greenwich”, 3^rd February 2020

[10] House of Commons Defence Committee, Intervention: Why, When and How?, HC952, (London: TSO, 2014);  Graeme Davies and Robert Johns, “R2P from Below: Does the British public view humanitarian interventions as ethical and effective?”, International Politics, 53(1), 2016, pp.118-137; Jamie Gaskarth, “The fiasco of the 2013 Syria votes: decline and denial in British foreign policy”, Journal of European Public Policy, 23(5), 2016, pp. 718-734

[11] House of Commons Defence Committee, Intervention, p. 20; House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations, UK Foreign Policy in a Shifting World Order, HL250, 2018, p.96

[12] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Britain: Government Response to the Sixth Report of the Committee, HC 1236, p. 5

[13] Shaun Riordan, “Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: a New Foreign Policy Paradigm?” in Jan Melissen (Ed.) The New Public Diplomacy, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), pp. 180-195

Summary

• Ethics are a fundamental aspect of foreign policy, not an add-on.
• They should be grounded in the relationship between government and the governed.
• This would involve far more engagement with the public to gauge their needs and wants and align policy accordingly.

What do we mean by ethics?

Ethics are about deciding what the right thing to do is, given the circumstances. Foreign policy involves making these choices continually as part of the normal process of government. As such, ethics are not a ‘dimension’ of foreign policy, nor an optional add-on, they are integral to its operation.

Ethics are distinct from laws or rules. There has been a tendency for law to creep into government decision-making as a proxy for ethical reasoning. Decisions on the use of force are subject to legal approval and that is a useful benchmark for what is appropriate; but morality and legality should not be conflated. Breaking the law could sometimes be the right thing to do, to prevent a greater harm or allow the law to evolve. For example, the Independent International Commission on NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 described the operation as “illegal but legitimate” because diplomacy had run its course and it ended the oppression of the Albanian community. David Cameron rejected the idea that one of the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council could veto military action in Syria in 2013, despite that being enshrined in the UN Charter.[1]

British foreign policy-makers often assert they support a rules-based international system.[2] What the above examples show is that we do so because we assume that those rules align with our values.[3] Where they do not, we are willing to break them. For the most part, this is not a problem since we set many of the rules in our favour and they continue to serve our interests. But, with the rise of China and India and a resurgence of authoritarian rule across the world, we face the prospect of an international order whose rules could be hostile to our values.[4]

In short, ethics, not laws or rules, underpin UK foreign policy.

Whose ethics?

There are many things that influence our sense of right and wrong and what is appropriate behaviour. In the foreign policy realm, two ethical frameworks operate in tandem: Communitarian ethics and Cosmopolitan ethics.[5] For Communitarians, the primary ethical duty of the policymaker is to look after the interests of their citizens. For Cosmopolitans, the aim is to advance the interests of their fellow human beings globally.[6]

After the Cold War, commentators got carried away thinking the second ethic was rendering the first redundant. It was not. States continue to be key actors, even when responding to transnational issues such as the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. Most people still identify with, and value, their national identity.[7] National leaders have to make choices about how to allocate resources but Cosmopolitanism struggles to explain which to prioritise. If all human beings have an ethical claim on us on the basis of their common humanity, then much of what the state does, from border policing and defence to welfare and social security spending could be seen as unethical since it favours one group in particular. Furthermore, whenever and wherever human rights abuses occur, the UK government would be obligated to respond. That is impractical for a medium-sized power which has suffered two catastrophic economic shocks in recent years.

Cosmopolitanism is useful in encouraging policy-makers to adopt a more long term and less parochial view of their interests. Cosmopolitan ethics favour global public goods like international law, security, development and human rights which help to create a better environment for UK people to live, work and travel within. Yet, with fewer resources due to our relative decline, we now have less scope for international action. We therefore need a clearer rationale for why we act.

The logical basis for a reformulated foreign policy is to refocus on the needs and wants of the British public. This Communitarian approach sees the key ethical relationship as being between the government and its citizens.[8] For that to work, the Integrated Review has to establish a more systematic approach to understanding public attitudes and desires and responding to them. The Review also needs to provide a more rigorous framework for defining the public interest, especially when action is necessary to support this against the tide of public opinion.

A Communitarian foreign policy: engaging the public in foreign policy-making

To strengthen the ethical relationship between the public and the government acting on their behalf, foreign policy-makers need to make greater efforts to solicit public opinions. The government’s loss of a parliamentary vote on Syria in 2013 and the referendum result of 2016 suggest the public is having an increasing influence on foreign policy issues. It is therefore imperative to align foreign policy with public opinion in advance; or anticipate opposition so that steps can be taken to alleviate its effects. Furthermore, the extent of immigration in recent decades means that the British population has a huge resource of linguistic and cultural knowledge from which it can draw, with citizens having family links across the world.[9] As such, engaging with the public could bring practical benefits as well as useful challenge to existing foreign policy.

Doing so entails a four stage process. Firstly, foreign policy-makers must listen to public views on foreign policy dilemmas. This can be done through a combination of surveys, evidence calls, opinion polling, focus groups, town hall meetings, public debates and roadshows. They should then reflect on the feedback they receive. This entails cross-referencing feedback from the public with official assumptions, policy and external sources. To demonstrate that they have listened and reflected, they need to explain the logic of the UK’s policy, how it will change or stay the same following feedback, and how it serves the public interest. They then must respond with sensitivity to the domestic impact of policy actions.

In practice, the public will pay varying attention to foreign policy issues and will be affected by them in different ways. There will also be competing interests, either among different sectors and stakeholders, or between them and the broader national interest. The concept of the national interest is notoriously elusive but is best defined in terms of the public good[10] – that is, the collective safety, prosperity and contentment of the political community of the UK.[11] The challenge is to work out how to balance the particular interests of certain sectors of the economy or society with those of the community as a whole.

To do so, policy-makers need to undertake two types of public engagement. Comprehensive engagement, canvassing the views of the general public, and Targeted engagement, soliciting the opinions of key sectors of the community who have a stake in foreign policy issues as they arise. Targeted engagement allows UK policymakers to understand the impact of UK foreign policy on sub-communities, weigh the costs and benefits to those most invested in outcomes and harness their expertise to improve policy effectiveness. However, this feedback then needs to be checked against the collective good and the broader attitudes of the community as a whole, via comprehensive engagement activities.

Adjudicating between ethical claims

The interests of sub-groups and the collective interest will not always converge and so policymakers need to decide which to favour. As defined above, those interests boil down to physical safety, economic prosperity and contentment.[12]

Each of these categories may support or conflict with one another, either within groups or between them. Thus, a policy that brought benefit to the financial sector or arms manufacturers could bring in tax revenue and, in the case of arms, support a defence industrial base that serves national security interests. Yet, it might result in complicity in human rights abuses and have a damaging effect on the UK’s global reputation (and hence the self-esteem of the community as a whole). Obversely, human rights advocacy abroad could lead to minority communities and their families being targeted by hostile states, impacting on their safety – as in the case of the Russian, Hong Kong and Iranian diasporas.

There is no formula for weighing these considerations as it depends on the specific case. Policy may also have long or short term impacts and so time is a complicating factor. What fuller public engagement would do is provide a backdrop and reference point to assessments of the sub-group and collective interest. Policy-makers could then evaluate whether a given policy would have a net positive or negative impact on each and the degree of alignment may give an indication of its desirability. The following table illustrates this:

However, in many cases the collective interest could be marginal (meaning sub-group interests are in effect the collective interest), or it may be appropriate to favour the particular interest of a sub-group, even if it entailed a collective cost, if it produced a significant benefit to that community. The granting of asylum to dissidents is one example. The key factor here would be to regularly and rigorously check the distribution of costs and benefits.

In short, deciding on what is ethical does not simply mean positing a collective interest and favouring that over international or sub-national interests. Rather, it is about weighing the relative impact of policy on different groups and balancing that with some notion of the collective interest, which itself might be fluid. The diagram below gives a flavour of the process. Sectoral interests feed into each of the three areas. Some will be marginalised whilst others will converge and achieve dominance. The dominant configuration shapes a sense of collective interest. At the same time, mass public opinion looms in the background and the external environment interacts with this understanding.

Overall, a Communitarian foreign policy focuses ethical discussion on how decisions affect domestic groups. This looks very different to a Cosmopolitan foreign policy, which would emphasise the impact on international actors. Nevertheless, it does not preclude altruistic behaviour. Britain’s significant aid budget is a source of pride, which promotes domestic contentment. The advantage of a Communitarian approach is it establishes a framework for judging how to allocate resources ethically, one that fits with the UK’s financial constraints.

Risks

The key risks of a Communitarian foreign policy are:

1. the marginalisation of minorities and out groups;[13]
2. an erratic foreign policy, liable to shift when faced with difficulties; and,
3. a refusal to act on the basis of humanitarian need.

The first problem is overcome in the above formulation via the call to engage with and learn from sub-groups, rather than assume their interests are shared with the wider collective.

The second is a challenge, since public opinion can be fickle. But again, this is ameliorated by the emphasis given to reflecting on longer term trends. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that the public interest is not always aligned with public opinion. The latter is canvassed to resist elite capture of foreign policy and challenge assumptions, rather than wholly determine policy. Moreover, paying attention to domestic voices could mean that actions abroad are more sustainable since they align better with domestic attitudes.

Thirdly, Communitarian ethics do not mean that the UK cannot do good in the world. It is clearly in the national interest of a liberal democratic state to live in a stable international order, with more prosperity, less conflict and more freedom. But, our commitment to those public goods should always be linked back to the costs they impose on UK citizens and the benefits they afford them in turn. In doing so, this will set necessary limits on action.

Dr Gaskarth is Reader in Foreign Policy and IR at the University of Birmingham and has published widely on international ethics, British
foreign and security policy, and intelligence.

Image by DFID/Rich Taylor under (CC).

[1] 29 August, Column 1429, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0001.htm

[2] Field, M. ‘Global Britain: supporting the Rules Based International System’, 17 August 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/global-britain-supporting-the-rules-based-international-system; https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/548740/RBIS-S-01_RBIS_Fund_-_RBIS_Programme_Strategy.docx; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/rules-based-international-system-conference; https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldintrel/250/25004.htm

[3] Chalmers, M. ‘Which Rules? Why There is No Single ‘Rules-Based International System’ RUSI Occasional Paper, April 2019, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201905_op_which_rules_why_there_is_no_single_rules_based_international_system_web.pdf

[4] Freedom House reports a 14 year decline in democratic rule, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy

[5] Linklater, A. The Transformation of Political Community. Polity, 1998.

[6] The Ancient philosopher Diogenes of Sinope, when asked where he came from, is said to have replied he was a ‘kosmopolitês’ or citizen of the world.

[7] In a June 2020 YouGov poll, 67% of people felt fairly or very proud to be British, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/travel/survey-results/daily/2020/06/25/31f14/2. In a BFPG survey in June 2020, 54% of respondents self-identified as a patriot compared to 40% as a global citizen, https://bfpg.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/BFPG-Annual-Survey-Public-Opinion-2020-HR.pdf

[8][8] The analogy often provided is that of a “social contract” between government and the governed, associated with Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The domestic basis to foreign policy ethics was recognised by William Gladstone, who put “Good government at home” as the first of his principles of foreign policy, ‘Right Principles of Foreign Policy’, 27 November, 1879.

[9] According to the 2011 census, the most prevalent languages other than English were Polish, 546,174, Panjabi, 273,231, Urdu, 268,680, Bengali (with Sylheti and Chatgaya), 221,403, Gujarati, 213,094, Arabic, 159,290. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/language/articles/detailedanalysisenglishlanguageproficiencyinenglandandwales/2013-08-30

[10] See Edmunds, T. Gaskarth, J. and Porter, R. British Foreign Policy and the National Interest. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014; Kratochwil, F.  ‘On the notion of “interest” in international relations’ International Organization, 36,1,1982: 1-30.

[11] Contentment includes self-esteem, spiritual health, happiness, and a positive international reputation.

[12] This triad was recognised as far back as Thucydides, who noted that people act out of fear, interest or honour. The 2015 NSS/SDSR rendered this as security, prosperity and influence. Influence should not be an end but a means, hence why it has been substituted above by contentment.

[13] Pin-Fat, V. The metaphysics of the national interest and the ‘mysticism’ of the nation-state: reading Hans J. Morgenthau’. Review of International Studies, 2005, 217-236.

In the context of recent changes to the structure of the foreign policy and international aid apparatus, and considering the upcoming Integrated Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy Review, here we examine how members of the public consider two key security matters. First and foremost, what foreign policy role do members of the public think the UK military should play? Second, when it comes to the UK’s overall international role, what weighs more for citizens, protection of national interests or other goals such as promoting democratisation or protecting human rights? Here we address these questions, with an eye on understanding factors that affect the public’s opinion on these matters such as political affiliation, Brexit support, and generational divides.

Roles the UK military should play

In 2018, we asked the public (n=2,565) whether or not the UK should be willing to use military force to achieve ten different goals.[1]

The main take-away point from Table 1 is that there are common consensual goals that broad sectors of the public believe the military should play. Nearly eight in ten respondents believe the military should combat global terrorist organisations, and close to three quarters of the public share the view that the military should play a role in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, as well as support and defend allies. A clear majority of respondents also support the military participating in operations associated with protecting vulnerable populations. Nearly three-quarters of the public (72 per cent) agreed the UK must be willing to participate in a military mission with a UN mandate to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, and seven in ten respondents supported using the military to stop ethnic cleansing. Preventing the rise of a hostile superpower also receives widespread support. When excluding ‘don’t know’ responses, the percentage of respondents agreeing with these statements outnumber the percentage disagreeing by a ratio of 5-1 or more. Ancillary analyses suggest relatively minor differences across respondents who identified with different political parties. The only real divide is over the intensity of agreement: Conservative and Labour party supporters’ levels of agreement are no more than ten percentage points away from each other for all items. A note of caution is warranted in interpreting these results. While the public endorses the use of the military to achieve these goals in the abstract, we can expect that support for any specific mission will be lower as additional considerations such as opportunity costs and the prospects of success will come to the fore, potentially reducing support.

If support drops when a specific deployment is proposed, then we can see the public has particularly strong opposition to using the military to help bring a democratic form of government to other nations (34 per cent) or to contain Chinese military power (36 per cent). Opposition to using the military to install a democratic form of government is likely a reaction to the use of that rationale as a reason to intervene in Iraq. We speculate that support is low for containing Chinese military power because people do not see the Chinese military as (yet) a threat worthy of response. Interestingly, while there is consensus around specific goals associated with the promotion of human rights—stopping ethnic cleansing and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe—there are higher levels of opposition to the more general goal of protecting human rights. An open question is whether the term ‘human rights’ has become politicised in recent discourse in a way that elicits the activation of thinking in terms of trade-offs as opposed to the more consensual goals discussed above. One possibility is that human rights is associated with ‘Europe’ (the European Court of Human Rights is often misunderstood to be part of the EU). Preliminary analysis suggests some support for this view – support for using the military to promote and defend human rights in other countries is approximately 20 percentage points lower for those who support Brexit.

Weighing national interests against ideals

Since consensus may break down when trade-offs are made apparent, we designed two scenarios where supporting an idealistic position has a cost—promoting a democratic leader that does not work well with the UK and putting human rights above the interest of your own nation. Understanding citizens’ views on these matters is especially salient in the context of the recent merger between the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). When the Johnson administration announced such changes in June, some argued the move ensured aid funding could be used to support wider national strategic objectives rather than being constrained by a narrow focus on poverty reduction.[2]

When asked if a dictatorship that usually supports UK interests serves as a better ally than a democracy that usually does not support UK interests, the average response is for individuals to situate themselves towards the mid-point of the scale.[3] That is, people see both idealism and interests as important guideposts for foreign policy. Political ideology plays a role here: left wing voters tend to prefer allying with democracies over interests, and right-leaning voters favour putting support for the UK’s national interests more at the forefront.[4] The Brexit-divide is also present, as members of the public who oppose Brexit lean more towards favouring alliances with fellow democracies. There is also somewhat of a generational divide, with younger voters taking a more idealistic standpoint of allying with a democracy, even if does not usually support British interests.

When the trade-off between national interests and promoting democracy and human rights is presented more generally, we find similar trends.[5] The overall mean leans more towards protecting national interests than the alliance item discussed above, but remains in the centre ground. Left wing voters are more likely to take a more idealistic stance than centrists and members of the public who identify ideologically with the right (particularly the far right, who lean more towards the national interest side of the scale here than in the item discussed above). Brexit supporters privilege national interests. We observe the same generational divide as in the item above, but the differences between younger and older generations are even more pronounced here.

Commentary

The British public has clear ideas about the type of roles they believe the UK military should take on. At a time in which the national security and defence sector is being reviewed and faces the prospect of significant reforms, it is important to consider there is no public appetite for a reduction in the scope of military activities. The public sees important roles for the British military – and, at least in the abstract, these extend beyond protecting Britain and the British. Not surprisingly, there is wide-spread support for maintaining traditional defensive capacities such as combating terrorism. What may be surprising to some is that there is also support for using the military to prevent humanitarian crises or to stop ethnic cleansing. Support for idealism in foreign policy is also seen when examining survey questions that present respondents with explicit trade-offs. Relatively small portions of the public fully embrace a foreign policy based solely on interests at the expense of supporting democracy or human rights. At the same time, interests remain a powerful consideration.

The degree of consensus across the political spectrum is high enough to be considered what political scientists refer to as ‘valence’ issues. Valence issues are common consensual goals that nearly all of the public agrees with—such as a clean environment, or quality roads. However, we also find evidence that suggests such issues may become politicised in the British context and become ‘positional’ issues where different political parties or segments of the population take opposing sides. Examples include whether abortion should be legal or whether the UK’s asylum system should be more or less restrictive. Preliminary evidence suggests this might be the case when human rights are mentioned as a broad category, instead of as something more specific like acting to stop ethnic cleansing.[6]

Often, policies once considered valence issues become positional when politicians ‘fill in the blanks’ and trade-offs become visible to the public or when issues become associated with specific parties and politicians so that they are seen via a partisan lens. Centre-left candidates and parties particularly are vulnerable to this phenomena—examples include the generally pro-environmental Canadian public rejecting the Liberal Party in 2008 when it proposed to replace existing taxes with carbon taxes. [7] In the UK context, we find the public considers trade-offs when weighing pursuing the national interest against more idealistic objectives. Right-leaning and older voters in particular are more predisposed to factor the national interest when considering what foreign policy options the UK should pursue. It is possible that thinking in terms of such trade-offs might increase the likelihood of supporting aligning aid provision to broader national strategic interests (which has been suggested as being part of the rationale for DFID being subsumed by the FCO).

Dr Catarina P. Thomson is Senior Lecturer in Security and Strategic Studies in the Politics Department of the University of Exeter. Her background is in clinical psychology and international relations. Her recent work compares the foreign policy attitudes of security elites and the general public in the UK, Europe, and the United States. Her work has been funded by the American National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Defense’s Minerva Research Initiative, and the Economic and Social Research Council among others.

Prof Thomas J. Scotto is Dean of Learning and Teaching and Professor of Politics in the College of Social Sciences at the University of Glasgow.  His work analysing British and comparative public opinion on foreign policy matters appears in peer reviewed outlets such as International Studies Quarterly, the European Journal of Political Research and Political Behaviour.

Prof Jason Reifler is Professor of Political Science at the University of Exeter. Prof Reifler has published over 40 peer-reviewed articles on topics such as public opinion about foreign policy, factual beliefs and misperceptions, and attitudes towards vaccines. He is PI on the ERC funded project DEBUNKER. He moved to the UK in 2013. He supports Tottenham Hotspur.

Image by DFID under (CC).

[1] Further information on the data can be obtained from contacting Thomas Scotto on thomas.scotto@glasgow.ac.uk.

[2] Malcolm Chalmers, Farewell Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Welcome Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.

RUSI Commentary, June 2020,

https://www.rusi.org/commentary/farewell-foreign-and-commonwealth-office-welcome-foreign-commonwealth-and-development

[3] The item asked was: “Some people think that in the long term, a dictatorship that usually supports UK interests serves as a better ally for the United Kingdom than a democracy that usually does not support UK interests. Where would you place yourself on this scale?” (scale ranged from 0 – “A dictator that usually supports UK interests” to 10 – “A democracy that usually does not support UK interests”).

[4] Survey respondents were told: “People sometimes use the labels ‘left’ or ‘left wing’ and ‘right’ or ‘right wing’ to describe political parties, party leaders, and political ideas. Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means left and the end marked 10 means right, where would you place yourself on this scale?” Respondents were categorised by response as follows: 0-1: “Far Left”; 2-3: “Left”; 4-6: “Centrist”; 7-8: “Right”; 9-10: “Far Right”.

[5] The item asked was: “Some people think that in making foreign policy decisions a more important priority should be protecting UK interests while others believe promoting democracy and human rights should be prioritised. Where would you place yourself on this scale?” (scale ranged from 0 – “Protecting UK interests should receive priority” to 10 – “Promoting democracy and human rights should receive priority”).

[6] For a detailed discussion of these two issue types, see Chapter 2 in Clarke, Harold D., David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart, and Paul Whiteley. 2004. Political Choice in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[7] See, Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan, eds. 2009. The Canadian Federal Election of 2008. Toronto: Dundurn Press.

The maintenance and enhancement of the international rules-based system (IRBS) has been an essential British interest in the 75 years since the end of the Second World War. Having contributed significantly to its construction throughout this period, the UK has been able to secure for itself a position enabling it to punch above its weight internationally. Indeed, the importance of the IRBS to the UK has only increased in a period marked by its own relative decline in power as it withdrew from empire and the era of superpower rivalry began.

As a middle-rank power with ambitions to maintain global reach, the UK today still possesses the capacity to exercise significant international influence, not least through its membership of key international institutions such as the UN Security Council. However, much of this is dependent on the maintenance and integrity of the system – i.e. it derives from the willingness of other states to remain involved in and committed to the IRBS. A rise in nationalism globally, a greater willingness by some states to act unilaterally, notably the US, and the determination of ‘new’ or revisionist powers such as China and Russia to challenge or re-make international structures of governance mean the IRBS that has served the UK so well is more fragile today than at any point since 1945.^[1] The UK has itself contributed to this sense of instability with its withdrawal from the EU and its difficulties in identifying a clear post-Brexit pathway for its foreign policy and diplomacy.

This contribution argues, therefore, that the UK should place a renewed commitment to the efficient, effective and fair functioning of the IRBS at the heart of its post-Brexit foreign policy. This should be accompanied by a clear and unambiguous effort to provide necessary and appropriate international leadership. By doing so it can limit the risk that others see British withdrawal from the EU as part of a broader strategic retreat whilst at the same time buttressing the legitimacy of institutions that remain so vital to the UK’s ability to protect and promote its national interests.

What is the International Rules-Based System?

The IRBS has evolved as a means of developing – to the extent possible – predictability and stability between states as sovereign actors.^[2] At a basic level it can be understood as encompassing three main components: (i) formal structures and institutions – e.g. the UN, IMF, WTO, etc. – and also regional organisations such as the EU, ASEAN and NATO; (ii) rules, treaties and international law – e.g. the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,^[3] the UN Refugee Convention,^[4] or the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);^[5] and (iii) the norms and values that have developed around and through these – e.g. support and promotion of democracy, equality, and human rights. Many of these were deliberately established and/or have evolved primarily since the end of the Second World War as a means of managing and regulating how states interact.

Tensions and disagreements are common, frequently occurring in the interpretation and contestation of norms and values. This can be seen, for example, in the contrast between states’ formal representation and participation in particular organisations on the one hand; and their attitudes to the norms and values that such participation implies on the other. A state may notionally accept the norms and values a particular organisation represents, but strongly reject specific criticism of – or attempts to restrict – its own actions. It may contest the validity of certain norms and values, particularly where it is accused of violating these. A recent example is the controversy surrounding the 2015 appointment of Saudi Arabia’s UN Ambassador in Geneva to chair an independent panel of experts on the UN’s Human Rights Council, with some arguing that Saudi Arabia’s human rights record made it inappropriate for it to hold such a post.^[6]

Such tensions illustrate Prof Malcolm Chalmers’ argument that rather than a single IRBS, we can in fact identify three separate but interacting systems: a Universal Security System, a Universal Economic System and a Western-based system, the latter led for much of the last 75 years by the US and promoting a very particular normative perspective.^[7] The effectiveness of these systems in managing and mediating interactions between states – and the tensions caused by these – reflects the reality that their ‘worth depends on the extent to which they serve the interests and values of the states which sustain them’.^[8] Thus, in the absence of any kind of ‘world government’, the IRBS functions only to the extent that states accept its legitimacy and have confidence in it.

For example, the WTO’s dispute resolution system has effectively collapsed this year due to the ongoing refusal of the US to agree the appointment of new judges to its Appellate Body. The view of the current US Administration is that the WTO does not serve US interests.^[9] In response, however, a group of WTO members led by the EU have established an alternative ‘multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement’ to enable participating states to ‘solve trade disputes amongst themselves’, thereby reflecting their own belief in the value of maintaining the system in some form or other.^[10]

For the purposes of this contribution, the IRBS is discussed as a single entity. However, although space precludes a more detailed discussion of Chalmers’ argument, it does serve to highlight very effectively the complexity inherent in, and ever-changing nature of, the IRBS. Most importantly, it reminds us of the challenges the UK faces in how it engages with and navigates a system characterised by multiple levels and actors, and the potential fragility of the governance structures created to facilitate this.

What approach should the UK take to the IRBS post-Brexit?

How, then, should the UK approach the IRBS and what place should it occupy in the thinking underpinning its post-Brexit foreign policy? First, we must note the important role the UK itself has played in constructing and supporting the IRBS, particularly the key multilateral institutions established after the Second World War including the UN, IMF, NATO and more recently the EU. Support for multilateralism and the maintenance of the IRBS has therefore been part of the DNA of UK foreign policy for decades with this commitment expressed in its economic, trade, defence, development and security policies as well as in its diplomacy.

In turn, the IRBS has been crucial in ensuring the UK’s ongoing international influence and relevance, and thus its capacity to protect, promote and pursue its national interests. We can see this in the strong support the UK received – especially from its European partners – following the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982; and in the broad levels of international solidarity shown following the poisoning of the Skripals in Salisbury by Russian state actors in 2018, which resulted in the expulsion of more than 150 Russian diplomats by 29 countries and organisations.

Second, if the UK is to continue to benefit from the IRBS, its legitimacy must be maintained. This requires other states – and especially the major global powers – to remain invested in it and continue to see its benefits. Here, a brief consideration of the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme is instructive. In a united diplomatic approach, the UK, France and Germany as the ‘E3’ established a diplomatic process to persuade Iran to cease nuclear enrichment and allow IAEA to monitor the development of its nuclear programme. After more than a decade of at times tortuous negotiations, and with the diplomatic process expanded to include the US, China and Russia (the other permanent UN Security Council members), as well as the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, agreement was finally reached in 2015 on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

For all its faults, the JCPOA was a significant diplomatic achievement – at stake, after all, was the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime established under the NPT, a key component of global security governance. Despite the Trump Administration’s 2018 decision to withdraw the US from the JCPOA, the UK has maintained its commitment to the agreement – and thereby to ensuring that not only Iran but also China and Russia remain bound into it.^[11] This was reiterated in a recent statement by the E3 in response to US attempts to reinstate sanctions on Iran: ‘The E3 are committed to preserving the processes and institutions which constitute the foundation of multilateralism. We remain guided by the objective of upholding the authority and integrity of the United Nations Security Council’.^[12] This example demonstrates the importance of constant engagement if the IRBS is to be sustained and the need to work closely with partners – even where, in the case of Russia, relations may be extremely difficult – if the benefits of cooperation and collective rule-making are to be achieved.

It is clear, therefore, that the maintenance of the IRBS is in and of itself a core British interest – a point recognised by the previous May government, which declared: ‘The [IRBS] matters hugely to the UK. Strengthening this system, with the UN at its heart, is a key priority of British diplomacy. It enables global cooperation through which we seek to address international security and economic challenges, and also protects our values’.^[13] It should therefore sit at the heart of the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy.

The ongoing Integrated Review process – examining at all aspects of UK foreign policy – provides a perfect, perhaps once-in-a-generation opportunity to do this. The lack of a comprehensive, strategic vision as to what that foreign policy entails remains problematic. Presented as ‘Global Britain’, to date its rhetorical ambition has not been matched by real clarity or practical detail. For example, statements such as ‘Global Britain will be a force for good and an energetic champion of free trade as it pursues closer ties with international partners and embarks on a new role in the world’ reveal little about the underlying strategy for how this will be achieved.^[14]

A focus on the IRBS provides a means for the UK to fill this intellectual and policy gap. A clear and unambiguous statement of its ongoing commitment to and championing of the IRBS, backed up by a set of concrete actions it will undertake in support – for example, a willingness to take a greater leadership role in supporting the UN’s security and peacekeeping functions – will achieve a number of important objectives. First, it will send an important signal to the international community of the UK’s determination to remain proactive, thereby rejecting any suggestion of a retreat into post-Brexit isolationism. Second, it will provide a clear organisational logic and focal point for policy-makers. The IRBS encompasses both the norms and values that the government currently seeks to promote, for example around human rights, and the institutional structures through which it can do this.^[15] This would allow the wide range of diplomatic actions the UK currently undertakes – for example, its increased activity and profile in the UN Security Council and WTO in recent months and its imposition of the first British ‘Magnitsky’ sanctions on individuals for human rights abuses in July this year – to be explicitly linked to a broader strategy and narrative of international engagement rooted in the exercise of responsible power.

Conclusion

This year the COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated both the importance and fragility of the multilateral system and international cooperation, particularly in the face of unilateral and national(ist) approaches to crisis. In an environment in which great power politics are once again on the increase, the UK’s capacity to act meaningfully and its ability to ensure its international credibility and reputation, will rest in large part on the maintenance of an effective and credible IRBS. As the government seeks to articulate a clear post-Brexit foreign policy vision for the UK, therefore, committing unambiguously in both word and deed to the IRBS must form a central element of its thinking. Doing so will go a long way to answering the key questions of what UK foreign policy is for in the 21st century and what kind of power the UK wishes to be.

Recommendations:

• The IRBS remains a crucial element in how the UK engages with the world and protects its interests internationally – placing it front and centre in the Integrated Review process will give the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy a powerful intellectual and organisational foundation.
• A priority for UK foreign policy post-Brexit must be to demonstrate that it is not withdrawing from its international obligations and will remain an active and responsible power – a focus on sustaining and strengthening the IRBS will send a powerful signal of this commitment to the international community.
• Using the IRBS as a focal point for articulating the core values of UK foreign policy, the UK should identify a set of policy priorities focused: on the leadership role it will seek to play at the UN and in other multilateral settings; how it will champion key aspects of the UN’s humanitarian governance and climate change agendas; and how it will fulfil its obligations to promote and enhance international security as a permanent member of the Security Council, NATO member, etc.

Dr Nicholas Wright researches national and multilateral foreign policy-making at University College London and his work focuses particularly on Britain, Germany and the EU. He has written extensively on the impacts of Brexit on UK foreign policy-making, has provided evidence for a number of parliamentary inquiries and is a regular media contributor nationally and internationally.

^[1] See, for example, Will Moreland, The purpose of multilateralism: A framework for democracies in a geopolitically competitive world, Brookings Institution, September 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-purpose-of-multilateralism/

^[2] Wright, Nicholas. 2019. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK: Co-operation, Co-optation and Competition, New Perspectives in German Political Studies. London: Palgrave. p.1

^[3] United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, February 2020, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm

^[4] UNHCR, The 1951 Refugee Convention, https://www.unhcr.org/uk/1951-refugee-convention.html

^[5] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/

^[6] Tom Brooks-Pollock, Anger after Saudi Arabia ‘chosen to head key UN human rights panel, The Independent, September 2015, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/anger-after-saudi-arabia-chosen-to-head-key-un-human-rights-panel-10509716.html

^[7] Malcolm Chalmers, Which Rules? Why There Is No Single ‘Rules-Based International System’. Occasional Paper, Royal United Services Institute, April 2019, https://rusi.org/occasional-papers/Which-Rules-Why-There-Is-No-Single-Rules-Based-International-System

^[8] Chalmers, vii

^[9] Jennifer Anne Hillman, A Reset of the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body, Council on Foreign Relations, January 2020, https://www.cfr.org/report/reset-world-trade-organizations-appellate-body

^[10] Council of the European Union, Council approves a multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement to solve trade disputes, April 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/04/15/council-approves-a-multi-party-interim-appeal-arbitration-arrangement-to-solve-trade-disputes/

^[11] See, for example: HMG, EU and UN partnership vital for rules-based international system, March 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-and-un-partnership-vital-for-rules-based-international-system

^[12] HMG, E3 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the JCPoA, August 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/e3-foreign-ministers-statement-on-the-jcpoa

^[13] HMG, Government Response: UK Foreign Policy in a Shifting World Order, March 2019,  https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/International-Relations-Committee/foreign-policy-in-a-changing-world/Government-Response-UK-Foreign-Policy-in-a-Shifting-World-Order.pdf

^[14] HMG, Bold new beginning for Global Britain as Foreign Secretary kicks off Asia-Pacific tour, February 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/bold-new-beginning-for-global-britain?utm_source=ffc14be7-7dc8-4bd3-a3c6-7330f26e2c46&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_content=immediate

^[15] HMG, Foreign Secretary’s introduction to the Queen’s Speech debate, January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-introduction-to-queens-speech-debate?utm_source=a3595607-43bc-4211-b8a1-a0cb960369db&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_content=immediate

Of today’s major and emerging crises, the vast majority – including Syria, Yemen, Libya, Myanmar, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Venezuela, and Xinjiang – are driven, at least in part, by the deliberate violent targeting of civilian groups by political elites. Systematic or widespread discrimination against people because of their race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, political affiliation, age, disability or class has not become a challenge of the past but a common phenomenon of our modern world. Identity-based violence occurs in some form or another in all societies and as such, its prevention is something needed everywhere all of the time.[1]

When a state fails to protect populations within its own borders from mass atrocity crimes, the responsibility to safeguard groups at risk falls to the international community. The responsibility is at its heart a collective one and as with effective strategies for tackling other global challenges such as the climate crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic, the prevention of atrocities requires the efforts of many. It also requires states to adopt the means of upholding in its national policy those collective commitments – but unlike other member states the UK risks falling behind in its contributions.

When we talk about preventing mass atrocities (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing), it is crucial to measure expectations of what outside states can do. At the same time, meeting the raised expectations on and of the international community that reflect our increasingly interconnected world demands an honest look at the gaps that exist between assurances made on the global stage to prevent crises and protect people and how states like the UK implement and integrate those commitments through their national policy. This paper sets out the growing need for the UK government to confront past failures to prevent atrocities, from Bosnia to Iraq to Syria, and embed the principles of prevention and collective responsibility through a clear, capable strategy of atrocity prevention into the heart of British policy.

Whatever the outcome of the Integrated Review and new national security strategy, the UK will need the capabilities and systems to meet the projected increase in identity-based violence, which if left unchecked will emerge as one of the defining crises of the next political era. As COVID-19’s economic and political consequences deepen, climate events become more common, and democratic trends continue to move away from broad-based party politics towards exclusionary alliances, widespread and systematic identity-based violence, including mass atrocities, will become increasingly frequent. The same nexus will drive large-scale population movements, which will continue to drive exclusionary populism in developed and developing democracies.

While not a new challenge, the global incidence of mass atrocity crimes have been rising since 2011.[2] Now COVID-19 and its consequences risks a new protracted escalation.[3] Already, the majority of today’s refugees have fled situations of atrocity while the majority of internally displaced people have been uprooted by consequences of climate change; in 2019, nearly 2,000 natural disasters triggered 24.9 million new displacements.[4]

As a state which aspires to global leadership, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and in the interests of a secure nation, Britain can do more to confront this rising challenge. It must do more to narrow the gaps between the commitments it has made on the global stage on this agenda and their practical implementations.

This is a position shared by the British public. Expectations of the electorate continue to move towards the belief that the UK should stand up for the vulnerable abroad (87.4 per cent) and tackle ‘the root causes of migration, violence and instability’ (86.7 per cent).[5] 66 per cent believe it is important that Britain help protect people in other countries from atrocities such as genocide and ethnic cleansing.[6]

All states must shoulder the burdens of preventing such atrocities and of protecting people from violent discrimination but the collective nature of these responsibilities does not dilute the function of the state as means of fulfilling shared obligations; it underscores it. Secretary General Guterres called in 2017 for member states to integrate atrocity prevention into national policy processes in order to, among other activities, ‘conduct their own atrocity crimes risk assessment, identifying any protection gaps and recommending steps to close them.’[7]

And yet despite growing support from ministers, parliament, atrocity prevention experts, wider civil society and the public, the UK still lacks any kind of coordinating mechanism or national strategy of atrocity prevention.

Following the ethnic cleansing and genocide of Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine province in late summer 2017, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee asked the Foreign Office to ‘set out what lessons it ha[d] learned regarding atrocity prevention from these events and how these lessons will be applied in Burma and elsewhere in future.’[8] A year later, reflecting upon the UK’s failures in Syria as well as Myanmar, the Committee called upon the government to ‘act urgently to produce a comprehensive atrocity prevention strategy and implementation plan to ensure it moves beyond words and towards concrete actions.’[9] The Committee recommended that a draft of this strategy should be available for consultation by April 2019. Notwithstanding some important if modest steps in the right direction, no such strategy has yet emerged.[10]

The terms of reference of the Integrated Review identifies ‘increasing instability and challenges to global governance’, acknowledging that ‘2019 recorded the highest number of state-based conflicts since 1946 and, over the last ten years, more than half the world’s population lived in direct contact with, or proximity to, significant political violence.’ Cabinet Office projects that by 2030, 80 per cent of the world’s extreme poor will live in fragile states. This review must acknowledge that current approaches to conflict, stability and development where they focus too much on firefighting and not enough on prevention are not working.

Recent attention upon the atrocities in Xinjiang and growing debate of what more the UK can do – or should have already done – has once again exposed that the absence of such a strategy contributed to delayed, inconsistent, and ad hoc policy responses to another well-documented and ongoing pattern of widespread systemic discrimination and violence that likely meets the threshold of genocide.[11] Without such a strategy – without applying a framework of how to help prevent future atrocities to the human rights crisis in Xinjiang, Myanmar, Syria, Cameroon or Venezuela – it is too easy to miss opportunities to influence and mitigate.  Once the point of violence has been reached, entry points diminish and lives have already been lost but a joined-up strategy will always help map out UK policy options and provide a process for decision-making.

An atrocity prevention strategy, rooted in a commitment to view policy choices from the perspective of making violence less likely, would help encourage more fluid policymaking better able to handle many of the current and future global catastrophic risks the Integrated Review seeks to address  – be they unexpected ‘unknown unknowns’ such as the coronavirus pandemic, or expected challenges such as climate change. For example, a warmer world will change every aspect of how we live our lives, but it is in the fields of atrocity and conflict prevention that we will likely see the first and most explosive consequences. It is no coincidence that one of the largest and most dangerous regions of fragility at the moment is the Sahel area bordering upon the Sahara desert. Multiple conflicts and atrocity risks  in the region, including those such as Mali or Sudan where the UK has a significant investment, have a climate component.[12]

Introducing a national strategy of atrocity prevention would significantly strengthen UK Government capacity to uphold various responsibilities and commitments it has already made to protect populations from mass atrocities and as articulated in the 2005 World Summit declaration and set out in the 1948 UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.[13] It would enhance UK capabilities to fulfil existing priorities such as the prevention of sexual violence in conflict, modern slavery, organised and serious crime, the protection religious freedom and belief, and of civilians in conflict.

Any such strategy would need to seek do three things:

1. Improve communication

UK missions play a key role in identifying early warning signs of mass atrocities and, in coordination with Whitehall and their local partners, devising policy options to respond. Interviews with former and current FCO and DFID staff in Myanmar and the Democratic Republic of Congo have highlighted gaps that exist between UK officials in the field and Whitehall, which mean that the urgency felt by on-the-ground personnel can be lost as the information is passed up through the bureaucracy to Ministers rather than through a distinct alert channel.[14] Introducing a light-touch internal model of emergency communication, accompanied by clear resources such as checklists and rapid analysis frameworks, would facilitate missions to ‘raise the red flag’ to colleagues back home, clarify tools and strategies already available, and improve joined-up communications during periods of exceptional challenge. Establishing an internal communications process would set out how to monitor imminent warning signs, triggering moments, indicators and risk factors; as well as when and how to raise the alarm – both across government and externally – and provide guidance for officials and ministers on policy options.

2. Integrate a means of prevention analysis

Whether by establishing a crosscutting analysis unit or integrating country specific frameworks, embedding the prevention systems and capabilities across government would facilitate intelligence collection and collation. It would enable HMG to conduct risk assessments of UK exposure to the possibility of complicity, undertake scenario planning, engage allies and partners, and develop the capacity to deploy civilian advisors to situations of concern. Prevention analysis is relatively low cost and should not be burdensome, although is strengthened when connected with the intelligence services. [15]

Any uplift in the UK’s current capacities would be an asset. Multiple foreign policy errors can be traced back to the absence of a coherent means of analysis focussed on the dynamics of identity-based violence and mass atrocity. No assessment of the atrocity risks were carried out by the UK government prior to its participation in NATO action in Libya, nor was there any obvious existing internal mechanism that would have been responsible for such scenario planning, precisely because the UK’s disconnected approach to conflict prevention and development. Rather than be seen as a time consuming impediment in periods of urgent crisis such analysis need to become integral to the decision-making process. This gap in the UK’s horizon scanning capabilities meant the cross-government Stabilisation Unit failed to include the Central African Republic in its 2013 risk analysis – despite it being a state extremely prone to atrocity crimes. By December that year, ‘widespread and systematic mass atrocity crimes, including killings on the basis of religious identity, had become a feature of a crisis that was rapidly expanding in scale and scope.’[16]

3. Institutionalise the UK’s commitment to prevent atrocities

‘Establishing an atrocity prevention “seat” at the policy-making table’ would help maximise and coordinate contributions towards effective prediction and prevention across Government.[17] This could take the form of the crosscutting prevention analysis unit or be situated in a better resourced office supporting the focal point for Responsibility to Protect, a position currently occupied by the Head of the Multilateral Directorate in the Foreign Office. In reimagining the bureaucratic architecture of FCO and DFID, the Prime Minister and the new FCDO leadership have an opportunity to ensure UK staff tasked with designing and implementing policy that contributes to fulfilling Britain’s responsibilities to help prevent mass atrocities are able to draw upon the full breadth of the government’s tools and expertise.

With identity-based violence rising worldwide, including in many northern democracies, and with indicators of deeper, long-lasting division worsening across Europe and elsewhere, it has become necessary for states such as the UK to also focus on prevention at home in order to protect their populations, including their migrant populations. The UK also needs to get better at prosecuting suspects of international crimes in its domestic courts and safeguarding its banking system from dirty money. Whether situated in the FCDO or Cabinet Office, such a coordinating office would therefore want to bring in departments such as the Home Office and the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government, the MoJ and the Treasury. At its most simple, the principles and practice of atrocity prevention need to be consciously integrated into job descriptions, job titles, and training of staff so that a prevention-first way of thinking is fully institutionalised across government.

The moment to do more

Outgoing Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, said as he stepped down from the role in August this year: ‘no society is immune from atrocity crimes and their risk factors, and my conviction that the earlier and the deeper the seeds of atrocity crimes prevention are sowed, the better and more sustainable they will bear fruits.’[18] The COVID-19 pandemic should underline this truism.

Prevention does not necessarily require large resources but foregrounds a different way of thinking and making decisions. When the US Atrocities Prevention Board was first established under the Obama administration it was referred to as a mandate without a budget; done well, atrocity prevention should save money as well as lives.[19] Successful implementation of atrocity prevention requires consistent and constant effort but it works. A recent study projects that ‘a 25% increase in effectiveness of conflict prevention would result in 10 more countries at peace by 2030, 109,000 fewer fatalities over the next decade and savings of over $3.1 trillion.’[20] A 75 per cent improvement in prevention ‘would result in 23 more countries at peace by 2030, resulting in 291,000 lives saved over the next decade and $9.8 trillion in savings.’[21]

Programmatic efforts need to be matched by investment in the British diplomatic corps, recognising that without the diplomatic toolbox, whether cosy or coercive, on-the-ground activity will always have limits. Prevention, whether of climate change or mass atrocities, requires a holistic approach that begins in the communities most affected but promotes system changes up to the highest level.

Doing more to help prevent mass atrocities should not be a contentious agenda. Successive UK governments have reiterated their commitment to the goal. For those concerned with Britain’s declining global influence, atrocity prevention has been identified as a specific contribution capable of ‘demonstrating the value of the United Kingdom in international forums.’[22]

Following its 2018 inquiry into the UK’s Responsibility to Protect, the Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that ‘[e]verything we have heard as part of this inquiry has strengthened our belief that an atrocity prevention strategy is now more vital than ever.’ In October that year, then Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt committed to ‘doing more’ on atrocity prevention.’[23] During the 2019 general election, all major political parties committed to doing more to prioritise UK contributions to atrocity prevention and Policy Exchange listed an atrocity prevention strategy as one of its eight priorities for the incoming Foreign Secretary.[24] These calls are backed by a growing coalition of organisations drawn from all corners of the UK civil society.[25]

The UK deserves an international policy capable of predicting and preventing crises as well as responding to them, fit to meet challenges it cannot yet foresee as well as those it can. A prevention-first approach to policy thinking saves lives, money and political capital. It should be a no brainer but finding time for prevention thinking and resources for prevention implementation is difficult when the government faces increasing and urgent demands. As the Prime Minister undertakes the ‘largest review of UK international policy since the Cold War’ and as Whitehall makes preparations to merge the FCO with DFID, Her Majesty’s Government has created a rare opportunity to assess what the risks of the future could look like; to develop an international and national security strategy in-line with those risks; and to rethink the systems and capabilities that are needed to prepare the UK to meet those challenges.

Atrocity crimes represent humanity at its worst, preventing them requires global leadership at its best. This is a calling to which the UK should aspire. The UK must take this rare moment of self-reflection of its international policy to learn from mistakes it made in Myanmar –and before it in Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bosnia, and Rwanda – and embed a national strategy of atrocity prevention in the heart of British policy.

Recommendations

• Establish a cross-cutting analysis unit and internal coordination mechanism
• Resource the office of the focal point for the responsibility to protect
• Embed a communication and alert channel connecting embassies with Whitehall and New York
• Mandate atrocity prevention training for embassy and country-desk staff in at-risk states
• Establish an external atrocity prevention advisory group to help bridge the knowledge gap

Dr Kate Ferguson is a foreign policy expert driving a new approach to preventing identity-based violence in the UK and internationally. In 2014 she co-founded Protection Approaches where she is Co-Executive Director and which works with communities, civil society and governments to transform how identity-based violence is understood and prevented. In 2017 Protection Approaches established and now convenes the UK Atrocity Prevention Working Group, a network of some 25 NGOs, research institutions and experts. Kate is Chair of Policy at the European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Honorary Research Fellow at the University of East Anglia. Her book Architectures of Violence: The Command Structures of Modern Atrocities will be published by Hurst and Oxford University Press later this year. She tweets @WordsAreDeeds. Acknowledgements: I’m grateful for comments from Fred Carver, Nicole Piché, Alex Bellamy and Adam Hug. Mistakes are all my own.

Image by DFID under (CC). 

[1] Protection Approaches, Identity-based violence: our definition, https://protectionapproaches.org/identity-based-violence

[2] UN News Centre, Interview: Amid increasing suffering, responsibility to protect all the more necessary – UN Special Advisor, March 2017, https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/03/553972-interview-amid-increased-suffering-responsibility-protect-all-more-necessary; For a statistical overview of recent trends, see Erik Melander, Organized Violence in the World 2015, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, January 2015, http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:899397/FULLTEXT01.pdf

[3] Kate Ferguson, Atrocity prevention and COVID-19: Opportunities and Responsibilities, Briefing paper, Protection Approaches, April 2020, https://protectionapproaches.org/ap-and-covid; ACLED data, https://acleddata.com/#/dashboard

[4] The top six countries of origin for those granted refugee status in the UK in 1919 were Syria, Iran, Eritrea, Sudan, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, House of Commons Library, “Migration statistics: How many asylum seekers and refugees are there in the UK?”, March 2019, available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/insights/migration-statistics-how-many-asylum-seekers-and-refugees-are-there-in-the-uk/. UNHCR currently estimates that 45.7 million are internally displaced. https://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html; see also UNHCR, COVID-19, Displacement and Climate Change, June 2020 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20COVID-19%20Displacement%20and%20Climate%20Change%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20June%202020.pdf

[5] Attest and Protection Approaches, ‘British society – How do you feel? 2019’, social attitude survey, January 2019

[6] Ibid.

[7] Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention, General Assembly Security Council, August 2017, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/2017%20SG%20report%20on%20RtoP%20Advanced%20copy.pdf

[8] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Violence in Rakhine State and the UK’s response, December 2017, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/435/435.pdf

[9] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, A comprehensive atrocity prevention strategy more vital than ever, says MPs, September 2018, https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/news-parliament-2017/responsibility-to-protect-report-published-17-19/

[10] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK Approach to Preventing Mass Atrocities, 16 July 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-approach-to-preventing-mass-atrocities/uk-approach-to-preventing-mass-atrocities  

[11] Kate Ferguson, What Can the UK do to Help Protect the Uyghurs? Adopt a National Strategy of Atrocity Prevention, ECR2P, August 2020, https://ecr2p.leeds.ac.uk/what-can-the-uk-do-to-help-protect-the-uyghurs-adopt-a-national-strategy-of-atrocity-prevention/

[12] Fred Carver, As the Sahel becomes Sahara, UNA-UK Climate 2020, September 2017, https://www.climate2020.org.uk/sahel-becomes-sahara/

[13] UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 24 October 2005, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf; UN General Assembly, Prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, 9 December 1948, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf

[14] Kate Ferguson, ‘For the wind is in the palm-trees: The 2017 Rohingya atrocities and the UK approach to prevention’, Global Responsibility to Protect, forthcoming 2021; Alexandra Buskie, ‘Strengthening the UK’s approach to atrocity prevention in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Protection Approaches, forthcoming 2020.

[15] Stephen Pomper, Atrocity Prevention Under the Obama Administration, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, February 2018, https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Stephen_Pomper_Report_02-2018.pdf

[16] Evan Cinq-Mars, Too little, too late, Failing to prevent atrocities in the Central African Republic, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, September 2015, https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/too-little-too-late-failing-to-prevent-atrocities-in-the-central-african-republic/

[17] Alex J. Bellamy, Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the Responsibility to Prevent, The Stanley Centre, February 2011, https://stanleycenter.org/publications/pab/BellamyPAB22011.pdf. See also Wilton Park, “Prevention of mass atrocities (WP1645)”, October 2018, Available at https://protectionapproaches.org/wiltonparkreport

[18] UN News, Profile: Taking a lead against genocide ‘no society is immune’ warns Adama Dieng, August 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1070402

[19] Alex J. Bellamy, Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the Responsibility to Prevent, The Stanley Centre, February 2011, https://stanleycenter.org/publications/pab/BellamyPAB22011.pdf

[20] Pathfinders, Forecasting the dividends of conflict prevention from 2020-2030, July 2020, https://530cfd94-d934-468b-a1c7-c67a84734064.filesusr.com/ugd/6c192f_e252b926005c47c39a815cf6da0c3086.pdf

[21] Ibid.

[22] Jess Gifkins, Samuel Jarvis and Jason Ralph, Global Britain in the United Nations, UNA-UK, February 2019, https://www.una.org.uk/sites/default/files/UNA-UK_GlobalBritain_20190207d.pdf

[23] “An Invisible Chain”: Foreign Secretary speaks on Britain’s place in the world at Policy Exchange, Policy Exchange, Oct 31^st 2018, https://policyexchange.org.uk/pxevents/keynote-speech/

[24] Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange, 8 ideas for revitalising UK foreign policy for the post-Brexit age, Policy Exchange, July 2019, https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Britain-in-the-World.pdf; Protection Approaches working group page, https://protectionapproaches.org/ap-working-group, and Protection Approaches’ Manifesto Review, April 2015, https://protectionapproaches.org/news/f/protection-approaches-manifesto-review

[25]Integrating atrocity prevention across UK policy: The need for a national strategy. Submission to the Integrated Review of International Policy from the UK Atrocity Prevention Working Group, August 2020 https://protectionapproaches.org/news/f/submission-to-the-integrated-review-of-uk-international-policy

The core purpose of this short publication has been to try and tease out how the UK Government can decide on the values that should underpin the UK’s evolving ‘Global Britain’ approach and to provide some suggestions of what those values should be. At the conclusion of the current Integrated Review it is to be hoped that the Government will be able to articulate a clear vison of the principles and values it seeks to support and how they fit into its wider strategic approach, something that can be fleshed out through more detailed policies and actions over the subsequent months.

As suggested in the March 2020 joint publication by the Foreign Policy Centre and Oxfam, the Government should seek to develop a succinct ‘Global Britain values statement’.[1] For example, as Kate Ferguson points out in the area of atrocity prevention having a clearly defined strategy can help encourage more fluid and responsive policy-making. Having a clear set of core principles and priorities would make it easier to assess policy compliance and coherence against them, a ‘Global Britain values test’ or benchmarking process. There may be further lessons to be learned from the way in which best performing UK local authorities and government departments have developed processes to implement the 2012 Social Value Act, assessing the wider impact of a decision at the start of the process and considering cohesively how particular actions can help meet wider principled objectives.[2] Learning from best practice in social value would include ensuring that international policy decisions, aid spending, contracting and procurement incorporated:[3]

• clear criteria in determining the (social) value goals the Government wishes to achieve;
• an understanding and explanation of the cost and practicality of targets, including where diplomatically possible transparency about the potential trade-offs;
• a clear definition of the outcomes being sought and that they are, where possible, measurable and reviewable and if necessary overtime renegotiated to meet emerging challenges;
• those implementing a policy or providing a good or service having a clear understanding the goals they are being asked to achieve and the rationale for them – where appropriate co-creating these with the Government;
• consideration of proportionality between the scale and focus of a particular action and its impact on the wider values agenda- with the weighting of values in any decision matrix varying on a case by case basis and with the political priorities of the government of the day;[4]
• a regard for and sensitivity to local perspectives, in the community being worked in and with, whilst making decisions in line with UK and international standards;
• transparent procurement and contracting, with full compliance with anti-corruption and bribery standards both at home and abroad; and transparency of performance including publically available information about how Government money is spent; and
• those involved in decision making including all politicians, officials, contractors and other third parties, abiding by high standards of governance including the Nolan principles for standards in public life (Selflessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty and Leadership), except where there is a clear national security rationale for limiting the ‘openness’ dimension.[5]

Strengthening such an approach would help give UK foreign policy, not an ethical dimension that sits as one of potentially competing criteria, but both an ethical foundation upon which its approach is based and an ethical core running through each policy providing a solid structure around which to build a Global Britain.

As to what those principles and values at the heart of the UK’s future international approach should be that can be enumerated in a Global Britain values statement, the comments by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and the Integrated Review high-level outcomes give a clear and understandable indicator of the Government’s overall direction of travel around ‘free trade, democracy, human rights and the international rule of law’.[6] It should build on the Gaskarth’s idea of the national interest as closely aligned with the concept of ‘public good’ – the collective safety, prosperity and contentment of the political community of the UK, though with space to consider how this relates to responsibilities to people outside its border and to the planet itself depending on the priorities of the government of the day.

This publication makes the case, both ethical and strategic, for focusing on the need to defend liberal democracy and international systems based on rules rather than zero-sum power politics. The UK can build on its strengths and expertise in civil society, academia and the legal sector to ensure human rights, rule of law, conflict and atrocity prevention are at the heart of the UK’s approach. Similarly important should be building on recent progress with its transparency rules to end the UK’s position and reputation as a home for dirty money, while supporting good governance and anti-corruption efforts internationally. These are not only important principles to abide be at home and abroad but they also make clear the importance of accountability and value for money to the British taxpayer.

International perceptions post-Brexit mean that, as Nicholas Wright points out, the UK needs to actively show its vision for and commitment to international institutions and some conception of a rule based international order, albeit recognising its current somewhat fragmented state.[7] The UK can use the policy platform that emerges from the Integrated Review to reaffirm its commitment to multilateralism, both through existing organisations and new collaborations as discussed in future publications in this FPC project. From what can be seen so far, the Government’s approach to the international systems displays a preference for looser, more fluid arrangements with a focus on trade and security (particularly in the digital sphere), adopting broadly a liberal realist[8] or liberal conservative approach to the (liberal) international order.[9] In theory not a million miles from the approach taken when the Conservatives first returned to Government in 2010, but with dramatic changes in practice following the departure from the EU and the closure of DFID. Having a clearly articulated set of principles to govern by would enable UK policy makers, diplomats and aid workers to effectively use the full range of tools available to the new FCDO and across government (including its newly independent trade policy) to better support the UK’s values.

The publication recognises however, the need both to listen to the views of the British people and to work with them on the future direction of policy not only to improve accountability but to enhance the democratic legitimacy needed for policies to be sustained into the long-term, irrespective of who is in power. This should not only include opinion polling and focus groups, but by maintaining and strengthening dialogue with a broad range of civil society and diaspora groups (a clear source of strength for the UK) to retain an iterative dimension to policy making. Once the Government has finalised the core principles it sees as being behind Global Britain, hopefully with such public opinion information informing its thinking, it needs to work to encourage domestic political buy-in not only by consistency in messaging and policy but also through a programme of public diplomacy directed toward the British, rather than overseas publics. This could and should be centred on the strategic importance of defending liberal democracy and open societies as set out above. There is a strong moral and strategic case for a UK foreign policy more firmly rooted in values and prioritising the positive role the UK can play in the world. However, in order to build public trust over the long-term, even over issues where people disagree, when the Government decides to take a decision that it believes is in the national interest but that comes into conflict with its stated values it should be more open and honest about why it is making such a decision in that instance rather than pretending there is no contradiction between the two objectives in every case. This is of course an argument for greater transparency and accountability in decision-making rather than to automatically accept the prioritisation of short-term interests, the opposite of the approach being encouraged.

There are a number of areas which will be focused on more in future publications in the Finding Britain’s role in the World series on which it is important to state the importance of the values dimension here. The UK’s 2021 chairing of the G7 provides an opportunity to refocus the organisation as the group of leading democracies, clearly demarcating its role from that of the G20. This will be addressed in the upcoming ‘Partnerships for the future of UK Foreign Policy’ publication, though in his contribution here Michael Allen rightly calls for cultivating democratic solidarity to confront the authoritarian resurgence with improved collaboration in international forums and through the creation of new arrangements, alliances and ad hoc collaboration. As Allen argues this ‘smaller, deeper order of industrial democracies would (be able to) reaffirm liberal principles while limiting the scope of membership of the liberal order to shore up its integrity legitimacy and resilience’ strengthening organisations like the Community of Democracies as well as new groups.[10] This work needs to be buttressed by ongoing support for international mechanisms that support these values such as the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and its Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Rapporteurs and human rights mechanisms, and the International Criminal Court.

Similarly, the diplomatic power of the UK’s new trade policy, and its ability to support or undermine the values dimension to foreign policy will be addressed in the ‘Projecting the UK’s values abroad’ publication, but mutually beneficial trade deals could become a central part of the UK’s approach to international poverty reduction and support for human rights with the right objectives and safeguarding clauses. The UK’s approach to aid will also be addressed in future publications but there is scope to more clearly align priorities for poverty reduction with human rights and governance objectives, including the targeted use of conditionality on human rights and good governance grounds where appropriate to ensure aid relationships do not distort the protection of our other values. In light of the strategic challenge facing democracy, human rights and the rule based international system there is a strong case for increasing the proportion of aid and other spending by the new FCDO and other departments used to support these objectives. Overall, the promotion of values in UK foreign policy will be fundamentally important in helping to define Britain’s place in the world after Brexit positively and proactively, both strengthening and using its soft power. It should take a whole of government approach using all available tools to supporting its values agenda and vision for Global Britain.

The practical machinery of government questions will also be addressed in more detail in the upcoming publications however, there are a couple of potential changes that might assist in ensuring principles are at the heart of the Government’s future strategy. It should strongly consider Alexander Thier’s suggestion of a ‘department for democracy’ (or more broadly democracy and human rights) at the FCDO giving priority and focus to these central issues of principle that lay within the FCO’s Multilateral Policy Directorate. Similarly, in this publication Kate Ferguson argues for the creation of a cross-cutting analysis unit and internal coordination mechanism that would act as the focal point for the Government’s work on atrocity prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. It is worth noting that the FCDO’s new management board seems to be leaning more towards organisation by region rather than thematic areas, though it must be hoped that there will be scope at the level below this to root the values agenda in its evolving structures. Whatever policies and processes are put in place it is imperative that the UK’s emerging foreign policy has a strong ethical foundation and core to help achieve a coherent and ambitious conception of Global Britain.

Recommendations

In the Government’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy and the future evolution of its foreign policy the UK should:

• actively engage the British public in developing foreign policy, looking to ‘listen, reflect, explain, and respond’ to their concerns to enhance the legitimacy and longevity of decisions, while undertaking targeted ‘public diplomacy’ to them to improve understanding on issues of strategic importance;
• organise a coherent strategic response to the global erosion of liberal democracy and the buckling of the rule-based world order in the face of revisionist powers and systemic decline;
• continue to ‘get its own house in order’ particular on areas of transparency and anti-corruption to enhance its soft power and ability to promote its values;
• cultivate democratic solidarity and partnerships with like-minded consolidated democracies within international institutions, as well as ‘mission-coalitions’ and other forms of ad hoc collaboration;
• support international mechanisms that defend and promote democratic and human rights values, rooted in the principles of informed popular consent and universal capabilities;
• draft a Global Britain values statement that clearly articulates the principles and values it wants to be the ethical foundation of its approach to the world;
• use a Global Britain values test and social value approach to decision making to ensure an ethical core to each foreign policy decision; and
• develop a whole of government approach ensuring that the institutional structures and all available policy tools, including trade policy, can support this agenda.

Image by OPCW under (CC).

[1] Finding Britain’s role in a changing world, FPC and Oxfam, March 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/finding-britains-role-in-a-changing-world/. Image by OPCW under (CC).

[2] Cabinet Office, Social Value Act: information and resources, May 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-value-act-information-and-resources/social-value-act-information-and-resources; Social Value in Commissioning and Procurement, NCVO Know How, July 2019, https://knowhow.ncvo.org.uk/funding/commissioning/procurement/importance-of-social-value-to-commissioning-and-procurement#

[3] Many thanks to the input here of social value and procurement expert John Tizard.

[4] By a case by case approach it means that in practice it a greater proportion of the decision matrix would be devoted to the Government’s values objectives when choosing where to deploy human rights grants funding versus the FCDO catering contract, but in the latter it could and should still seek to incorporate for example climate objectives and labour rights objectives (such as the London Living Wage) as part of the decision as values should be a core part of all decision making.

[5] For more information see: Committee on Standards in Public Life, The Seven Principles of Public Life, Government, May 1995, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-7-principles-of-public-life

[6] Dominic Raab – 2020 Statement on Britain in the World, UK Pol, January 2020, http://www.ukpol.co.uk/dominic-raab-2020-statement-on-britain-in-the-world/

[7] Dr Malcolm Chalmers from RUSI has previously argued that ‘The UK should cease to promote the narrative that there is one single Rules-Based International System. There is not. Efforts to tackle pressing international problems through collective action are more likely to succeed if they involve coalitions between major powers than if they are only based on rules-based systems that lack clear and binding obligations.’ Malcolm Chalmers, Taking Control: Rediscovering the Centrality of National Interest in UK Foreign and Security Policy, RUSI, February 2020, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/202002_whr_taking_control_web.pdf. While perhaps not going as far as Chalmers it is clear that any UK efforts to reinvigorate international cooperation will have to contend with a deeply dysfunctional UN system and WTO, an international approach to climate change currently without its second largest CO2 emitter the US and serious problems facing regional bodies such as NATO, the OSCE and Council of Europe.

[8] For a summary of Liberal Conservatism see: Honeyman, VC orcid.org/0000-0003-2084-1395 (2017) From Liberal Interventionism to Liberal Conservatism: the short road in foreign policy from Blair to Cameron. British Politics, 12 (1). pp. 42-62. ISSN 1746-918X. In the book: Realpolitik: A History by John Bew, (408 pp, Oxford University Press, 2016) the author (currently leading work on the Integrated Review on behalf of the Johnson Government), traces the history of the concept of ‘realpolitik’ to Ludwig von Rochau and to the idea of using pragmatic, non-sentimental means to achieve broadly liberal ends – an approach that seems to chime with the Government’s initial framing of its vision for Global Britain. The possible potential alternative term for some of these tendencies- ‘classical liberal’- being somewhat tarnished by its adoption by some of the more controversial sections of the internet.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Allan was adapting a quote from Miller, Paul D. 2016. American Power and Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy. Washington, DC; Georgetown University Press.