Array ( [0] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5372 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-16 00:02:47 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-15 23:02:47 [post_content] => The contemporary world of international relations is marked by two major countervailing trends. First, is a number of complicated existential threats, like climate change and pandemics, which require earnest international coordination and collaboration to address. Second, is a trend in the opposite direction toward isolationism and nationalism, with the quintessential examples being Brexit and ‘America First’. On top of these trend lines, with COVID-19, we have seen cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns launched by adversarial state actors; the domestic deployment of the Canadian and Australian militaries, among other national forces, to protect vulnerable populations; the disruption and vulnerability of just-in-time global supply chains; worrying domestic political tensions and fractures in many states; and an erosion of international cooperation. All of this is taking place amid ongoing tectonic geopolitical shifts, bookended by an overdue discussion about data, tracking, commercial surveillance and the attention economy. Given this, there are two key and congruent lessons to be learned from COVID-19. First, is the urgent need to reconceptualise doctrines of national security. Second, is to develop a better appreciation of where alliances with likeminded states can be found in the tumultuous sea of global affairs. A notable feature of existing national security doctrine is the willingness to identify pandemics as a national security threat, without building a sufficient response capability, and while largely decoupling this threat from a traditional understanding of the role and functions of security and intelligence systems. In our view, this needs to change, and change needs to be driven by exchanges among like-minded states and, ultimately, by public debate. One important forum for discussions of a new approach to national security is the Five Eyes alliance (comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the United States). The Five Eyes partnership has, over the past decade, expanded its scope beyond intelligence sharing to incorporate dialogue on key geopolitical and economic concerns. While it is a small and tight club of ‘Anglosphere’ states, it could serve as an important sounding board. Within this context, it is important to note that the UK produced its first national security strategy in March 2008, which took a quite broad view of national security.[1] It set out a new understanding of national security for the UK, explained in this way:“In the past, the state was the traditional focus of foreign, defence and security policies, and national security was understood as dealing with the protection of the state and its vital interests from attacks by other states. Over recent decades, our view of national security has broadened to include threats to individual citizens and to our way of life, as well as to the integrity and interests of the state. That is why this strategy deals with transnational crime, pandemics and flooding — not part of the traditional idea of national security, but clearly challenges that can affect large numbers of our citizens and which demand some of the same responses as more traditional security threats, including terrorism.” This was a bold statement. It elevated the understanding of the threats posed by pandemics and climate change impacts to a high level and, just as important, argued that the approach to these non-traditional security threats contained many elements similar to those deployed against more traditional concerns, including terrorism. These elements included monitoring (intelligence collection) and risk assessment, the development of response capabilities and the inculcation of societal resilience. Subsequent iterations of the British national security strategy suggest the bold new outlook never fully took hold. The most recent update to the British national security strategy was produced in 2018.[2] Pandemics were included in a general category of national security threats, labelled “diseases and natural hazards affecting the UK.” Discussion of specific responses to pandemic threats was off-loaded to a separate biosecurity review, produced in July 2018.[3] The UK Biological Security Strategy extolled the capabilities and systems available within the UK while calling for greater integration of effort, sustained attention to the threat and support for developing countries to help improve their capabilities. Disease outbreaks were identified as a major globalised threat to society while accidental release of a virus or deliberate biological attacks were seen as less likely (high impact but low probability). The UK strategy maintained a traditional distinction between the role of intelligence services in collecting information regarding deliberate threats (largely from malicious state actors), and the conduct of epidemiological intelligence by civilian public health authorities and experts in Britain and through international partnerships. The key role played by the WHO’s Health Emergencies Programme was acknowledged alongside Britain’s financial contribution to it.[4] The WHO was described as having “a world leading surveillance and information network filtering 5000 disease signals a month looking for outbreaks of pandemic potential.” It is safe to say that key assumptions built into the 2018 UK Biological Security Strategy, such as the distinction between state-sponsored biological threats and naturally occurring pandemics, and the singular reliance on the WHO for global surveillance, have been made dangerously obsolete by COVID-19. The creation of a new Joint Biosecurity Centre in May 2020 to act as an intelligence fusion and response mechanism is one early indicator of new thinking.[5] Where does Canada fit? The answer is: on the margins. Canada has never produced an overarching biosecurity strategy, unlike Britain and the United States. Its one attempt at a national security strategy was produced 16 years ago and has been forgotten. The 2004 Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy deserved a better fate.[6] It might have served as a useful construct if it had been sustained and adapted to a changing national security environment. Its emphasis on an ‘all-hazards’ understanding of national security threats, its identification of intelligence as the country’s first line of defence against all manner of threats, its attention to public health threats in the aftermath of the severe acute respiratory syndrome epidemic, and its call for closer integration of public health and national security were all important attributes. But this concept of national security withered away, to be replaced by more sectoral attention to individual threats posed by terrorism, cyberattacks and violent extremism. A long-overdue reappraisal of Canadian strategic approaches to national security will have to emerge in a post-COVID-19 environment. The groundwork needs to be laid in a clear-eyed appraisal of the Canadian Government’s response to the pandemic and the nature of the role played by security and intelligence agencies, which has been largely obscured by doctrines of secrecy, failures of transparency and glib political messaging. Canada should not be content to continue to sit on the margins of strategic thinking about national security. As Canada revamps its own approach to national security, there are things it can learn from efforts by its Five Eyes partners – and the UK in particular. There is also an opportunity to build on the long history between the UK and Canada, as both push into an increasingly uncertain and unstable world. At risk of stating the obvious, states do not have ‘friends’, they have interests. But, if they did – Canada and the UK would be the best of friends. They have a common language. A similar culture. Plus, a range of shared experiences. However, more pointedly, they also have a number of comparable interests in the conduct of global affairs. Both Canada and the UK are too small to throw their weight around, like China and the United States. Both benefit from a stable rules-based global order and from certainty within international institutions (as much as that is possible). During this period of upheaval, it will be imperative for countries like the UK and Canada to work together to advance their mutual interests in a range of international fora, from the G20 to the ITU. After all, in tough times, it is nice to know who your friends are. Aaron Shull is CIGI’s managing director and general counsel, acts as a strategic liaison between CIGI’s research initiatives and other departments while managing CIGI’s legal affairs and advising senior management on a range of legal, operational and policy matters. Aaron is an expert on cyber security issues. He coordinated the CIGI essay series Governing Cyberspace during a Crisis in Trust. Prior to joining CIGI, Aaron practised law for a number of organizations, focusing on international, regulatory and environmental law. He has taught courses at the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and was previously a staff editor for the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Wesley Wark is a CIGI senior fellow and an adjunct professor at the University of Ottawa's Centre on Public Management and Policy, where he teaches professional courses on security and intelligence topics. He recently retired from the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, where he had taught since 1988. He served two terms on the prime minister of Canada’s Advisory Council on National Security (2005–2009) and on the Advisory Committee to the President of the Canada Border Services Agency from 2006 to 2010. More recently, he provided advice to the minister of public safety on national security legislation and policy. He has appeared on numerous occasions before parliamentary committees and comments regularly for the media on national security issues.  Image by FCDO under (CC). [1] The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world, Cabinet Office, March 2008, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228539/7291.pdf[2] National Security Capability Review, HM Government, March 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf[3] UK Biological Security Strategy, HM Government, July 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/730213/2018_UK_Biological_Security_Strategy.pdf[4] WHO in emergencies, World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/emergencies/en/[5] Joint Biosecurity Centre, Gov.uk, May 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/joint-biosecurity-centre[6] Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, Public Safety Canada, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/scrng-en.aspx [post_title] => The UK and Canada: National Security and collaboration in uncertain times [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-uk-and-canada-national-security-and-collaboration-in-uncertain-times [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:20:19 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:20:19 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5372 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[1] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5368 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-16 00:01:50 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-15 23:01:50 [post_content] => Every few years, Western leaders raise the idea of democracies working in 'alliance' or 'concert' on global challenges. The late US Senator John McCain, an esteemed supporter of transatlantic cooperation, included a 'League of Democracies' in his 2008 presidential campaign platform.[1] And President-Elect Joe Biden ran for office in 2020 with a written pledge to convene a 'Summit of Democracy' in his first term.[2] When American President Donald Trump suggested including Russia in the G7 this year, the UK proposed instead a ‘D10’ gathering of democracies.[3] This suggestion of adding Australia, India, and the Republic of Korea to form a group of ten democratic nations turned attention again to relevance of values-based multilateral groups. Close cooperation between democracies is especially urgent. For years, Russia and China have been seeking to export their authoritarian model of governance around the globe. Moscow’s ongoing violation of Ukraine’s sovereign borders and Beijing’s deployment of ‘warrior wolf’ diplomacy finds expression in undiplomatic behaviour and aggressive actions.[4] During the COVID-19 pandemic, they have argued that only complete state control over personal liberty and democratic freedoms can successfully solve problems like a global health crisis. Their disregard of the global rules-based order serves as a stark reminder for UK diplomats and foreign policymakers of the need for strengthened ties with other democracies. Whether the democratic model of governance can prevail over its authoritarian rivals will have profound implications for the international order for the rest of the 21^st Century. For two decades, the UK has engaged with a multilateral coalition of democracies committed to defending the rule of law, human rights, and democratic values: The Community of Democracies. Towards a Community of Democracies20 years ago, the UK joined 106 other nations in Poland in what was then the largest gathering of countries identifying as electoral democracies. The gathering produced an historic 19-point statement called the Warsaw Declaration, named after its host city, that committed participants to the protection of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy; such explicit support for the essential values of democracy had seldom been so central in previous international agreements.[5] The Warsaw Declaration is a 'checklist' for established democracies to ensure adherence to fundamental democratic principles while also providing transitioning political systems a 'roadmap' to democracy. Principle One of the declaration states that the will of the people for its government is to be expressed through regular, free, and fair elections. The right of every person to equal access to education forms Principle Six. Principle Seven supports freedom of the press to collect, report, and disseminate information, news, and opinions subject only to legal restrictions in a democratic society. Other principles in the Warsaw Declaration address freedom of peaceful assembly, equal protection of the law for minorities, independent judiciaries, and the right of those elected to form a government. But the Warsaw Declaration, and the Community of Democracies (CoD) that emerged from the gathering in Poland, almost didn’t happen. Some thought it wholly unnecessary. In the three decades before the year 2000, electoral democracies had risen in number from 30 primarily Western-based governments to nearly 120 nations spread across every region on earth. In foreign ministries around the world, diplomats asked, ‘Why do we need a summit about democracy?’ ‘Aren’t democracies ascendant, especially following the dissolution of the Soviet Union?’ Regional-based bureaus expressed concern a membership body of democracies would cause more problems than it was worth. Would there be friction as a result of creating a new ‘club’ of nations that invited some countries but excluded others? And would governments truly commit to democracy as an overriding principle if their specific interests failed to benefit? Months of planning by meeting organisers, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, sought to address these concerns. In the end, the states in attendance represented a generously broad array of political systems, from the established parliamentary democracy of the UK, to the Russian Federation and Indonesia only two years after emerging from decades of one-person rule. The diversity of democracy, as represented in the three-day conference, was widely acknowledged. The generally held assumption was that participants might be at different places along the democratic path but the worldwide direction towards representative government was a linear process. Publicly, Geremek tempered the celebratory atmosphere of the year 2000 by cautioning that ‘democracy doesn't only move from triumph to triumph,’ but would face ongoing and new challenges.[6] Indeed, the notion of an inevitable path of democracy as the ideal global governance system has cracked. Today, Russia, Egypt, and other countries have turned away from democracy and even well-established democracies are struggling with serious governing challenges. That the conference produced the Warsaw Declaration was an immense achievement. Despite the variety of states in attendance, participants agreed that certain unalienable principles had to be present for any political system to claim the label of democracy. For Foreign Minister Geremek, a noted intellectual and Solidarity activist, it was personally important to connect the name of the city he loved with a community of democracies, overcoming its previous association with Soviet totalitarianism (the Warsaw Pact).[7] Role of the UKIf you Google the UK’s foreign policy statements over the past several years, the word ‘democracy’ shows up often. There is also official and regular acknowledgement by UK diplomats of the vital role of civil society in fostering and maintaining democracy. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO- now Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office FCDO since September 2020) has been a consistent participant in the Community of Democracies Ministerial Conferences since its inception. British policymakers recognise the role the group can play as part of its multilateral efforts. While the UK sees the value of universal membership-based bodies such as the UN and its agencies like the WHO, it also recognises the importance of a values-based coalition like the Community of Democracies to defend human rights and democracy. “In a world where democratic values are under attack on many fronts, the countries which believe in those values must stand together and resist the forces that threaten them,” said then FCO Minister for Human Rights Baroness Anelay of St. John’s DBE in 2016 when the UK sought to expand its role with the Community of Democracies by applying for membership to its 28-member Governing Council.[8] Three months later, the UK application was unanimously approved, and it joined the council as a member state. The FCDO’s Human Rights and Democracy unit serves as the primary interlocutor between Whitehall and the Community of Democracies. Former Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt once said the UK should be part of an “invisible chain, linking the world’s democracies.”[9] An example of the UK’s engagement with the Community of Democracies is the work to advance democratic consolidation in transitioning countries such as The Gambia. This year, CoD partnered with the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, another pro-democracy organisation supported by the FCO, in a virtual training program in Banjul for women’s empowerment. The FCO has joined its diplomats to Community of Democracy high-level delegations, and funded a CoD publication on ‘Best Practice in Community of Democracies' Member States' Engagement with and Protection of Civil Society.’ The UK has much to share with other democracies about its own experience. As Baroness Anelay has said, the UK and others must “work to perfect our own democracies—for there is always work to be done at home.” During the UK’s six-month chairmanship of the Community of Democracies, an FCO-hosted Governing Council meeting in London in 2019 was briefed about how the process of devolution, for example in regard to Wales, is a route to increasing democratic participation. Lessons learned were shared by experts of the Constitution Group of the Cabinet Office. The Minister for the Constitution, Chloe Smith MP, spoke to the best practices and the work still to be done of ensuring all citizens eligible to vote were able to vote. The FCO host illustrated another essential issue—democratic resiliency—with a presentation by the Maldives’ Foreign Minister Abdullah Shahid, who discussed his country’s return to elected and constitutional government through peaceful means. Shahid was joined by the Minister for Africa, Harriett Baldwin MP, who spoke about the human rights aspect of UK foreign assistance. A significant change to CoD practice was introduced by the UK host, that of adopting an Outcome Statement in twice-annual Governing Council meetings. Previous ‘declarations’ occurred in bi-annual Ministerial Conferences but at the 29^th Governing Council the FCO guided a Statement on Media Freedom and Violence against Journalists to adoption by the Governing Council.[10] This Statement was designed to complement FCO work in other multilateral venues on the issue. Renewed commitmentOf the many multilateral bodies in which the UK participates, the Community of Democracies is unique in significant ways. Unlike the Commonwealth, or NATO, or the G7, the membership of the intergovernmental body is not based upon economic, regional, linguistic, or historic criteria, but on the universal human rights and democratic values of the Warsaw Declaration. And, although composed of an intergovernmental coalition of like-minded nations, the Community of Democracies differs from related-bodies in its substantial inclusion of civil society in its operations. A recent example of the mutually beneficial relationship between the UK and Community of Democracies is the Bucharest Anniversary Statement, which provides the member states’ view on the COVID-19 pandemic.[11] The statement articulates that the response to the global health crisis must not be worse than the virus itself; authoritarian regimes should not use the pandemic as an excuse to consolidate power, punish political enemies, and restrict basic human rights. Rather, it recognises that “Times of crisis can also be an impetus for change. The mobilization of civil society, innovations to democratic processes, and demands for reformed institutions and increased accountability point to opportunities for positive developments emerging from the pandemic.” As a values-based organisation, the Community of Democracies provides additional opportunities for the newly-configured Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office to continue to declare and defend its support of human rights and the rule of law. The Community of Democracies welcomes the UK’s involvement with its democratic allies to confront ongoing global challenges to democracy. Thomas E. Garrett has worked in politics and advocacy for more than three decades. Elected Secretary General of the Community of Democracies in September 2017, he was re-appointed to a second three-year mandate as Secretary General in September 2020. Prior to the Community of Democracies, for 23 years he supported democratic transitions for the US-based International Republican Institute, in the field as chief of party in Ukraine, Mongolia and Indonesia and in the Washington, DC headquarters as director of Middle East programs and then vice president for global programs. Garrett holds a bachelor’s degree in political science and a master’s degree in international relations.  Image by FCDO under (CC). [1] John McCain, An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom, November/December 2007, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2007-11-01articles/enduring-peace-built-freedom[2]Joseph R. Biden, Why America Must Lead Again, March/April 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again[3] Tim Montgomerie, How a new alliance of democracies could counter Russia and China, September 2020, https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2020/09/how-new-alliance-democracies-could-counter-russia-and-china[4] Zhiqun Zhu, Interpreting China’s ‘Warrior-Wolf’ Diplomacy, May 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/interpreting-chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomacy[5] The Warsaw Declaration, October 2016, https://community-democracies.org/app/uploads/2016/10/2000-Warsaw-Declaration-ENG.pdf[6] John Lancaster, Democracy Assembly Convenes in Warsaw, June 2000, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/06/27/democracy-assembly-convenes-in-warsaw/1063c09b-f6d5-408f-bb5e-85b42547eed8[7] Madeleine Albright speech, Tribute to Bronislaw Geremek, September 2008, https://www.ned.org/docs/geremek_tributes.pdf[8] Rt. Honorable Baroness Anelay of St. Johns DBE, speech to the 22nd Meeting of the Governing Council of the Community of Democracies[9] Rt.  Honorable Jeremy Hunt MP speech, October 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/an-invisible-chain-speech-by-the-foreign-secretary[10] Outcome Statement on Media freedom and Violence against Journalists, January 2019, https://community-democracies.org/outcome-statement-of-the-29th-meeting-of-the-cod-governing-council[11] 20^th Anniversary Bucharest Statement, June 2020, https://community-democracies.org/app/uploads/2020/06/20th-Anniversary-Bucharest-Statement-.pdf [post_title] => Another look at values-based multilateralism [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => another-look-at-values-based-multilateralism [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:20:32 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:20:32 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5368 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[2] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5335 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-15 09:30:47 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-15 08:30:47 [post_content] => Transnational repression, commonly meaning the targeting of political opponents living abroad, is a phenomenon that in recent years has increasingly come to the attention of a global audience.[1] Due to a recent as well as projected increase in cases of transnational repression, as part of what has been called a ‘third wave of autocratisation’, countering practices of transnational repression must become a priority for democratic governments in order to show a real commitment to their democratic principles.[2] The interference of intelligence services of authoritarian countries heavily undermines not only principles of free speech for recent immigrants into democratic countries, but also constitutes a significant breach of sovereignty of the country that the repression takes place in.[3] Thus, this article will be focusing on how democratic governments can counter transnational repression, showing the impact of integration into society, especially for victims of newly emergent methods of transnational repression. It will highlight this through contrasting cases of victims of transnational repression: Russian activists applying for asylum in the West and former Russian intelligence officers. Background: Aims and practices of transnational repression Considering aims, there is a clear desire of authoritarian states to return to the original version of Hirschman’s conception of exit and voice, in which these two aspects are mutually exclusive and there can be no voice after exit.[4] Nowadays, in a modern interconnected world with technological advances through which émigrés ‘might raise [their] voice[s] all the louder from the outside’ after their exit, it therefore is in the interest of an authoritarian state to suppress this voice.[5] This takes place through a series of escalating methods that stop when the aim is either achieved or the ‘cost’ for the oppressing country becomes too high.[6] These methods can be divided into long-standing, and newly emergent methods. The long-standing practices include e.g. assassinations and kidnappings, as well as general harassment and physical attacks both on an activist as well as their family.[7] With advances in technology however came new methods taking repression into the digital realm, creating methods that are low-cost and easy for a country to employ. While these are plentiful, a key aspect to highlight is the use of social media and digital communications against émigrés.[8] Limiting access, spreading disinformation and propaganda via bots alongside targeted hacking attempts are some of the ways activists, depending on their level of integration into society, are targeted and disproportionately affected by.[9] Modern practices of transnational repression have thoroughly ‘challenged the liberating promise of the Internet and social media, demonstrating instead that globalised technologies and networks can facilitate, rather than undermine, authoritarianism’ as Moss describes.[10] Another aspect connected to the advent of the digital age is the increase in abuse of Interpol ‘Red Notices’.[11] This tool created by Interpol to aid in bringing criminals to justice internationally has been increasingly employed incorrectly by authoritarian governments in order to pursue political opponents after their emigration/escape from the country, especially since the process for setting them up was moved online recently.[12] While ‘Red Notices’ are removed once they have been ruled to be politically motivated, it is important to note that there is no punishment for creating a politically motived Red Notice. They can severely affect a new immigrant’s life before they are deleted, and in some cases even after this, especially in countries that have a negative view of immigration.[13] This can leave an immigrant stranded in a foreign country in many ways should they not be integrated into society in the way e.g. a former intelligence officer is. Comparative AnalysisFocusing on social media the digital realm first, it is important to note that this used to be seen as a vital tool in preventing ‘network erosion’ after exit but has since been hijacked by authoritarian governments to conduct repression.[14] Generally, activists are putting themselves into a position in which they are unprotected, and easily attacked by their home country without fear of sanctions, since the violations of sovereignty usually associated with transnational repression do not apply in this context.[15] They can become subject to hacking attempts that deface their websites and attempt to access compromising private information, often in an attempt to defame the activist and prevent them from forming networks and becoming part of the society of their new country.[16] For example, a website could be hacked to display opinions that clash with the values of the country the activist has moved into, and therefore assign them a reputation of being an extremist, or hateful, and limiting their reach as people will be less willing to listen to them. Their voice will have been silenced, or severely limited, and the aim of transnational repression achieved. In the case of someone who is better integrated into society, such as the former intelligence officer Oleg Gordievsky, any defamation is less likely to have an effect on the life of the person, as it would be to some extent expected and accusations were less likely to be believed.[17] Further, in the case of Gordievsky he was never in a position in which he was vulnerable to hacking due to operating in protected channels of communication and defamation was limited to within Russia.[18] Further, another clear danger of the reliance on technology in activism has to be considered. Once someone becomes active in the digital realm, especially when resorting to private social media accounts, there is an immediate danger of hacking of the account and thereby discovering contacts inside the home country, which are then likely to be targeted in acts of coercion-by-proxy.[19] In order to keep their friends and families safe, activists often engage in an act of self-silencing, limiting their own voice to avoid being targeted by hacking attempts and bots, again achieving the key aim of transnational repression.[20] With a stronger integration into society, for example in the way of organisations giving newly-immigrated activist a platform to report on their experiences and conduct their activism away from private social media, their connections within the country are kept secret much better, and activists are less likely to self-silence. Returning again to the previously mentioned practice of Red Notices, the aspect of vulnerability of recent and lesser-integrated immigrants again has to be highlighted. The mere pressure of being targeted by a Red Notice, and knowledge of the fact that they are often acted on before it can be established that they are political is enough for many immigrants to again silence themselves in an attempt to stay hidden. Further, as can be seen in the case of activist Petr Silaev, the position of being detained naturally impedes the conduct of activism too, if only through the removal of access to e.g. the internet while in detention or being unable to take part in events like in Silaev’s case.[21] In another case of a man pursued by Russia for political reasons, Alexey Kharis, not only did the Red Notice result in lengthy detention, but also led to the removal of his visa and a long delay in the processing of his request for asylum in the US.[22] This is again a very common result of a Red Notice that impedes the articulation of voice, as the immigrant is forced to turn most of their energy to meeting basic needs while not being granted asylum and therefore remaining unable to work in their new country. They are also unlikely to be heard much before at least being awarded refugee status. Despite this being common for immigrants from Russia into the west, someone as well-connected and well-known for their anti-government work as Gordievsky is unaffected by these issues. Red Notices against him would not be taken seriously by any democratic government as they would be immediately assumed to be political and discarded, and as a spy, he was immediately granted asylum in the UK. While there is an obvious difference between this case and that of a well-connected immigrant, there is nonetheless a key advantage to being more integrated into society when a Red Notice is issued: the better the person being targeted is connected, the more resources they have available to fight an unlawful Red Notice, as can be seen between the case of the better-integrated Silaev, who was released after intervention by the UN, and the lesser-integrated Kharis who spent many months in detention.[23] By addressing the issues that have been discussed through quicker and deeper integration of migrants into society, the low-cost methods of transnational repression that authoritarian governments use regularly are rendered mostly ineffective. The voice of immigrants after exit can then only be limited by physically violent and extreme measures such as kidnapping and assassination, as was attempted in the case of Gordievsky.[24] Considering the case of another former spy, Sergei Skripal, it is apparent that these extreme measures are no sustainable option for the Russian intelligence services though. After he was poisoned in Salisbury in 2018, there was a public outcry alongside a strong government response, resulting in the expulsion of Russian diplomats from multiple European countries, thereby severely impacting relations between the countries.[25] RecommendationsThus, the question remains how exactly governments can remove the opportunity of low-cost methods of transnational repression, and raise the cost to a point where it becomes unsustainable for an authoritarian country to pursue. While there is no complete or perfect solution to this, a starting point would be introducing better checks and regulations for Red Notices, potentially including a penalty for submitting an unlawful notice. Working quicker to delete them once they are proven false, as well as ensuring that a Red Notice alone cannot be grounds for asylum denial would also help victims of transnational repression, as for example Kharis would not have had his visa revoked.[26] Further, it would be good practice from democratic countries to be highly critical of Red Notices from authoritarian countries that regularly abuse them, especially if charges for a person have seemingly come out of nowhere and immediately after emigration from the country; giving the accused immigrant the benefit of the doubt over a regime that is known to pursue political opponents in this way. Further, addressing the digital aspects that have been discussed, a designated and internationally-connected government service for recent immigrants who feel that their activism might put them at risk could be very helpful, both in officially recording that attacks against them are likely as well as signposting them to relevant NGOs that can provide guidance and a platform for them. By including activists in international networks and connecting them to more official channels for their activism they are less likely to have to put themselves in danger of being attacked through e.g. social media and their voice is more likely to be heard. This would also show an increased willingness of governments to uphold their democratic values and counter repression of people in their country, taking a stand against authoritarianism. ConclusionIn conclusion, it has become apparent in this article that through better inclusion of migrants into society the cost of transnational repression against them is raised for the authoritarian country that pursues them. Through comparing the cases of intelligence officers and activists, it was seen that well-connected intelligence officers face significantly less frequent attacks from their home country than lesser-connected activists do, and that there is a larger pushback when they are attacked since the method of repression is usually more extreme. By countering the low-cost methods of transnational repression that are frequently employed on activists, the cost of transnational repression is raised, as it becomes impossible for an authoritarian regime to silence the voice of an émigré without risking large-scale consequences. While there will always be a risk of transnational repression for activists fleeing an oppressive regime, the key to mitigating it lies in quicker and deeper integration into the society of the democratic country they have moved to. Sarah Lehmkuehler is a recent graduate from the MA Conflict, Security and Development at the University of Exeter, where she wrote her dissertation on the topic of changes and continuities in practices of transnational repression by the Russian intelligence services. She has a long-standing interest in combining human rights with intelligence studies, inspired by her BA at Aberystwyth University that first introduced her to the topic. She can best be contacted at sl792@exeter.ac.uk. [1] Cooley, A. ‘The International Dimensions of the New Transnational Repression’, Written Testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe “Tools of Transnational Repression”, September 2019, p.1., https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/COOLEY%20Alex%20-%20Testimony.pdf[2] V-Dem, Our Work, https://www.v-dem.net/en/our-work/research-projects/v-aut/[3] For more information on how practices of transnational repression violate principles of sovereignty, see: Garvey, J.I. ‘Repression of the Political Emigre - The Underground to International Law: A Proposal for Remedy’, Yale Law Journal, 90:1 (1980), p.79[4] Hirschmann describes an individual in a political situation he/she disagrees with as having two options: Exit, meaning emigrating from a country and leaving the situation; or voice, meaning voicing dissenting opinions and attempting to change the situation. For more information on this see: Hirschman, A. Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970)[5] Hoffman, B. ‘Bringing Hirschman back in: “Exit”, “Voice” and “Loyalty” in the Politics of Transnational Migration’, The Latin Americanist, 54:2 (2010), p.60[6] ‘Cost’ in this article does not refer to financial cost, but rather consequences such as sanctions or diplomatic incidents with other countries.[7] For a more complete list, see: Cooley, A. ‘The International Dimensions of the New Transnational Repression’, Written Testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe “Tools of Transnational Repression”, September 2019, p.1., https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/COOLEY%20Alex%20-%20Testimony.pdf[8] For a more complete description, see: Lucas, E. ‘The Spycraft Revolution’, Foreign Policy, April 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/27/the-spycraft-revolution-espionage-technology/[9] Moss, D. ‘The ties that bind: Internet communication technologies, networked authoritarianism, and ‘voice’ in the Syrian diaspora’, Globalizations, 15:2 (2018), pp.265-282[10] Ibid., p.267[11] A ‘Red Notice‘ is a request submitted by one country for the police forces of other countries to assist in locating, temporarily detaining and extraditing a wanted criminal. See: Interpol, ‘Red Notices’, Interpol online, https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/Red-Notices[12] Mackinnon, A. ‘The Scourge of the Red Notice: How some countries use Interpol to go after dissidents and debtors.’, Foreign Policy, December 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/03/the-scourge-of-the-red-notice-interpol-uae-russia-china/[13] For examples and a brief description of this see: Grossman, S. ‘How Abusive Red Notices Affect People in the U.S. Immigration System and Steps That Can Be Taken Within the U.S. and at Interpol to Protect Victims’, Written Testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe “Tools of Transnational Repression, September 2019, p.2., https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/GROSSMAN%20Sandra%20-%20Testimony.pdf; for a more academic approach see: Lemon, E. ‘Weaponizing Interpol’, Journal of Democracy, 30:2 (2019)[14] Moss, D. ‘The ties that bind: Internet communication technologies, networked authoritarianism, and ‘voice’ in the Syrian diaspora’, Globalizations, 15:2 (2018), p.266[15] Adamson, F.B.; Tsourapas, G., ‘At Home and Abroad: Coercion-by-Proxy as a Tool of Transnational Repression’, in Perspectives on “Everyday” Transnational Repression in an Age of Globalization, edited by Schenkkan, N.; Linzer, I.; Furstenberg, S.; Heathershaw, J. (Washington D.C., Freedom House, July 2020), p.10., https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/07092020_Transnational_Repression_Globalization_Collection_of_Essays_FINAL_.pdf[16] Michaelsen, M. Silencing Across Borders: Transnational Repression and Digital Threats against Exiled Activists from Egypt, Syria, and Iran (The Hague, Hivos, February 2020), p.20., https://www.hivos.org/assets/2020/02/SILENCING-ACROSS-BORDERS-Marcus-Michaelsen-Hivos-Report.pdf[17] Oleg Gordievsky is a former KGB colonel who was an influential double agent for Britain during the Cold War. Much of his most significant work was conducted after his escape/extradition to the West, as his ‘voice’ had a tremendous reach after ‘exit’. For more information, see: Gordievsky, O. Next Stop Execution (London, Lume Books, 2nd edition 2018)[18] He was tried in absentia in order to be painted in a negative light for Soviet citizens. See: Gordievsky, O. Next Stop Execution (London, Lume Books, 2nd edition 2018), p.392[19] Adamson, F.B.; Tsourapas, G., ‘At Home and Abroad: Coercion-by-Proxy as a Tool of Transnational Repression’, in Perspectives on “Everyday” Transnational Repression in an Age of Globalization, edited by Schenkkan, N.; Linzer, I.; Furstenberg, S.; Heathershaw, J. (Washington D.C., Freedom House, July 2020), p.10., https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/07092020_Transnational_Repression_Globalization_Collection_of_Essays_FINAL_.pdf[20] Michaelsen, M. ‘The Digital Transnational Repression Toolkit, and Its Silencing Effects‘, in Perspectives on “Everyday” Transnational Repression in an Age of Globalization, edited by Schenkkan, N.; Linzer, I.; Furstenberg, S.; Heathershaw, J. (Washington D.C., Freedom House, July 2020), p.7., https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/07092020_Transnational_Repression_Globalization_Collection_of_Essays_FINAL_.pdf[21] Petr Silaev is a Russian anti-government activist who fled Russia after being targeted by the authorities and was granted refugee status in Finland. He was later detained in Spain on grounds of a Red Notice, while being away from his usual networks. See: Fair Trials International, ‘Spotlight: Petr Silaev’, pp.1-2., https://www.fairtrials.org/wp-content/uploads/Spotlight-Petr-Silaev1.pdf; Fair Trials International, Case Study: Petr Silaev, Fair Trials International online, https://www.fairtrials.org/case-study/petr-silaev; He missed events related to his latest book, limiting the reach of it and thereby limiting his voice. See: Fair Trials International, ‘Spotlight: Petr Silaev’, p.2., https://www.fairtrials.org/wp-content/uploads/Spotlight-Petr-Silaev1.pdf[22] Kharis, A. as quoted in ‘Tools of Transnational Repression: How Autocrats punish dissent overseas’, Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, September 2019, pp.71-72., https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/ToolsOfTransnational.pdf[23] He missed events related to his latest book, limiting the reach of it and thereby limiting his voice. See: Fair Trials International, ‘Spotlight: Petr Silaev’, p.2., https://www.fairtrials.org/wp-content/uploads/Spotlight-Petr-Silaev1.pdf; Kharis, A. as quoted in ‘Tools of Transnational Repression: How Autocrats punish dissent overseas’, Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 12 September 2019, pp.71-72., https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/ToolsOfTransnational.pdf[24] Neil, E.; Hendrix, P. ‘Deadly Payback’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 0:1-3 (2020), p.4[25] Urban, M. The Skripal Files: Putin, Poison, and the new spy war (London, Macmillan Publishers, 2018), pp.198-199[26] Kharis, A. as quoted in ‘Tools of Transnational Repression: How Autocrats punish dissent overseas’, Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, September 2019, pp.71-72., https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/ToolsOfTransnational.pdf [post_title] => Countering Transnational Repression: The importance of integrating new immigrants into society [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => countering-transnational-repression-the-importance-of-integrating-new-immigrants-into-society [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:20:52 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:20:52 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5335 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[3] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5313 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-09 00:07:32 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-08 23:07:32 [post_content] => Those wishing to pursue legal action against me in 2017 were advised, according to someone involved in the conversations, that for an outlay of no more than £200,000 I could be forced to issue the sort of retraction that could be spun into a total discrediting of myself and my wider reporting on corruption in Malaysia. The logic was clear. I am a freelance journalist living in London who had uncovered one of the world’s largest financial scandals known as 1MDB, which was at the time threatening to bring down the Malaysian government, due to face elections in May 2018, then a few months away. The Prime Minister of the day, Najib Razak, has now been convicted of the first seven of some 42 charges related to 1MDB and so already faces 12 years imprisonment with further cases underway. At the time, he was strongly motivated to discredit me in the run up to the election to protect himself from just such an outcome by gaining victory. Of course, it was not Najib who sued me. The Prime Minister could not afford to be cross-examined over 1MDB and the other corruption matters I had reported on in a London court, because the evidence was overwhelming and had by then also been laid out in detail by the FBI. However, he had secret political allies in the form of the opposition PAS Islamic Party whose new leaders had agreed to work with him with a view to forming a coalition once the election was over. The dynamics of that alliance had become overwhelmingly obvious to observers such as myself and I had referred in an article to the large sums of money that senior sources in Malaysia suspected were being channelled at that time into the ‘upper echelons’ of this party order to smooth the secret relationship.^[1] Voters were being kept unaware of the controversial collusion, given it followed decades of rivalry between the two parties. One of the prime movers in that covert relationship, a former Deputy President of PAS, has now also been charged in Malaysia for his alleged criminal breach of trust fronting a supposed Islamic charity, which was being funded by Najib to the tune of millions. My article had mentioned no names but focused on the public interest concern that a blatantly corrupt Prime Minister was plainly ‘wooing’ a political party with cash although it was still purporting to its supporters to be part of the opposition movement. To facilitate the litigation, Carter Ruck of London constructed an argument that I had implied without saying it that the money had gone directly to the personal use of the actual President of the PAS, who was not named in the article and had only been referred to once before on my platform by a separate writer some months previously. After all, a libel case requires an individual whose reputation is alleged to have been besmirched. The point of this case, as my inside informants had confirmed, was to put me under financial pressure and to force me to settle with an apology, which could then be broadcast as an admission in the Malaysian media before the election that I was a politically motivated liar who had produced a farrago of falsehoods relating to the Prime Minster and 1MDB. Indeed, from the moment it was launched the case was used as a relentless propaganda tool against me in just this manner, leaking privileged information and alleging that judgements had already been arrived at against me. As anticipated, the attack was financially devastating. I was to lose my savings and my pension defending the case, despite the generous tens of thousands of pounds raised by huge numbers of well-wishers across Malaysia who contributed what they could to my defence. The miscalculation was that I would as a consequence buckle at a time when the truth of my reporting was being strengthened by further evidence each day that passed. Given the importance of the issue to the entire future of a nation about to see its first ever peaceful transfer of power through the ballot box, I refused to be bullied into the expected settlement and the Carter Ruck bill clocked upwards well past the million mark (to the annoyance of the litigants who had understood that I would be dealt with more cheaply). Najib lost the election in May 2018 and proceedings began against him. Meanwhile, his remaining UMNO party promptly entered into the coalition with PAS that I had reported was secretly underway and which had in turn prompted this very libel suit.^[2] I moreover obtained hard evidence of financial transfers from UMNO to PAS as well as recordings and documents, which confirmed my reference to the collusion between the parties.^[3] It was therefore entirely unsurprising that as the trial loomed near in early 2019 emissaries from PAS reached out to me and a settlement was arrived at, which involved no retractions on my part and a hefty contribution to my legal costs.^[4] Carter Ruck was side-lined from these negotiations until the final stages, when their Malaysian clients instructed them to pull the case in London. By then PAS’s London legal bills had reached well in excess of one and a half million pounds in return for a well-deserved public humiliation. Back in Kuala Lumpur the PAS President justified his climb-down to the local media acknowledging his lawsuit had been politically motivated from the start and that since it had now served his party's purpose in the elections he had decided to withdraw. What more damning indictment could there be of a self-admitted SLAPP suit?^[5] Nevertheless, the odds had been on a different outcome. A less committed journalist and indeed most news organisations, which face dozens of these sorts of SLAPP suits every year, would most likely have buckled at the start as the plaintiffs’ lawyers had clearly anticipated I would do – Malaysia is a long way away from what most London readers care about and the costs of defending public interest journalism have become prohibitive thanks to these sorts of cases which flourish in the London courts. The aforementioned is just one example of the raft of legal threats I continue to face, like other freelance and investigative journalists who are seeking to alert the global community to criminality and corruption that threaten law and order and the democratic process not only in vulnerable emerging nations but also in our own, despite supposedly more robust institutions. The growth industry known as ‘reputation management’ involves a web of largely UK-based facilitators acting together to protect some of the world’s most powerful, wealthy and dangerous individuals from rightful scrutiny and discovery by our free media. At the pinnacle are a clutch of specialist law firms whose relationships with such clients are legally privileged who operate in combination with a network of public relations consultants, corporate investigators and private protection agencies hired to wage war on journalists in particular. I have been targeted by all these groups of ‘professionals’ in my capacity as a London-based journalist who has annoyed foreign crooks. I have found myself under surveillance, been computer hacked, stalked, intimidated, sued and made the subject of numerous attempts at entrapment designed to compromise my reputation for integrity. Websites have been constructed by PR agents in London purporting to be based in Malaysia, again dedicated to attacking my honesty and reputation.^[6] Networks of writers in the US have been engaged to characterise my fact based, anti-corruption exposes as some form of aggressive ‘socialism’ based on lies.^[7] The contracts funding these exercises in deception have been worth tens of millions to companies such as Bell Pottinger and FBC Media (both now folded following exposure), whilst numerous law firms have engaged in various gradations of legal threats against me – a single ‘Letter Before Action’ is worth thousands of pounds to the law firm and if a writ is served the meter really starts ticking for their client and their target.^[8] When in 2018, I sought to publish a book about my investigations into 1MDB - long after Najib’s key financial fixer, Jho Low, had become an international fugitive facing multiple warrants for his arrest - yet another prominent UK libel law firm, Schillings, contacted my publisher on the fraudster’s behalf to threaten proceedings not only against them but also every bookshop in the UK that carried the book. This was in anticipation of an account that would be unflattering to their client and therefore, they said, prejudicial to his chances in any of the courts of law that he was seeking to avoid. A similar threat was issued against a separate book about Jho Low written by two Wall Street Journal journalists and even their major publisher, the US publishing giant Hachette, duly withdrew from releasing the book in the UK until my allegations had remained uncontested for a year. I was thus forced to self-publish and defy this further example of the blatant abuse of British libel law to protect a world class crook hiding in China and more wealthy and powerful institutions than myself, who were reluctant to risk the financial consequences of standing up to him. It deeply concerns me that truthful reporting in the public interest is being so effectively undermined by the lack of restraints on this industry. Journalists already face huge hurdles when they challenge influential figures, and inevitably imperfections can arise in the coverage of matters which powerful forces want hidden. This should be taken into account and only malicious and recklessly negligent reporting should be open to prosecution, because the public interest is at stake. Presently, the bar is set far too low. The case constructed on behalf of PAS was a classic of the genre, in that it was an artificial contrivance designed to suggest that a foreign politician whose name had not been mentioned in the article concerned had been besmirched in the UK where his identity was barely known. My legal advisors were certain such a case would not withstand the full judicial process and that my defences were clear. However, that was not the object. At an early point in the trial, the judge questioned if the plaintiffs would appeal if he struck out half their case. The counsel hired by Carter Ruck leapt to assure the judge that his clients would indeed contest any early dismissal of their case, at which the judge turned towards the court and explained it would be cheaper to therefore pursue the entire case from High Court to Appeal Court to Supreme Court – several millions of pounds worth of litigation which wealthy crooks seeking to avoid exposure can and do regularly treat as a necessary business expense to game our systems, but which journalists and news organisations cannot afford to counter. One of my own lawyers put it this way: “you have truth on your side, but they have the money. That puts you in by far the weaker position the way our laws are presently constructed.” If we want to maintain our democracies and indeed support those striving for democracy elsewhere, we need to curtail this overwhelming advantage to the deep pocketed litigant in our libel courts and strengthen the position of journalists trying to do the job we need them to do to protect our systems and shed light on infamy. SLAPP cases need to be identified and thrown out early on. Failure to do so has given rise to a corrosive abuse of our systems by often foreign litigants who all too frequently barely even possess a reputation to protect in this country. It has become a dangerous weapon against free speech, accountability, transparency and the rule of law not just in this country, but across the world. Clare Rewcastle Brown is a UK investigative journalist, born in Sarawak Malaysia. In 2010, Rewcastle Brown founded The Sarawak Report (sarawakreport.org) and its sister organisation Radio Free Sarawak. The Sarawak Report has been heralded for its “impact on the political debate” in Malaysia, with the New York Times calling Rewcastle-Brown “one of the most effective voices calling attention to deforestation in Malaysia”. In 2015, Sarawak Report was recognized by the Index on Censorship for being a “champion against censorship”. Radio Free Sarawak has won the IPI International Press Institute’s Free Media Pioneers Award 2013 and the Communication for Social Change Award 2014. Rewcastle Brown’s reporting has been at the forefront of exposing the corruption related to Malaysia’s 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB).  Image by Firdaus Latif under (CC). [1] As Najib Denies All Over 1MBD, Let’s Not Forget His Many Other Criminal Connections – COMMENT, Sarawak Report, August 2016, https://www.sarawakreport.org/2016/08/as-najib-denies-all-over-1mdb-lets-not-forget-his-many-other-criminal-connections-comment/[2] Shannon Teoh, Malaysian parties Umno and PAS sign unity pact, The Straits Times, September 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/thousands-attend-as-malaysian-parties-umno-and-pas-sign-unity-pact[3] PAS Needs To Own Up Over It’s New Multi-Million Ringgit Cash Donors, Sarawak Report, April 2018, https://www.sarawakreport.org/2018/04/pas-needs-to-own-up-over-its-new-multi-million-ringgit-cash-donors/[4] How Hadi Contradicted Himself And PAS Officials During Court Case, Sarawak Report, February 2019, https://www.sarawakreport.org/2019/02/how-hadi-contradicted-himself-and-pas-officials-during-court-case/[5] Emmanuel Santa Maria Chin, Hadi claims told to bin suit against Sarawak Report over RM90m claim, Malay Mail, March 2019, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2019/03/07/hadi-claims-told-to-bin-suit-against-sarawak-report-over-rm90m-claim/1730013; Hadi Admits Case Was “Political” – No Longers Cares To Fight For His ‘Reputation’ In UK, Sarawak Report, March 2019, https://www.sarawakreport.org/2019/03/hadi-admits-case-was-political-no-longers-cares-to-fight-for-his-reputation-in-uk/[6] David Pegg, Melanie Newman and Oliver Wright, The arms company, the oligarch and the ex-PM’s sister-in-law: lobby firm’s Wikipedia hit list, Independent, December 2011, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/arms-company-oligarch-and-ex-pm-s-sister-law-lobby-firm-s-wikipedia-hit-list-6274541.html; Ian Burrell, Dead people’s identities ‘stolen’ for fake Twitter accounts to smear journalist, Independent, November 2015,https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/dead-people-s-identities-stolen-fake-twitter-accounts-used-smear-human-rights-journalist-a6730811.html[7] Ian Burrell, Comment isn’t free when the bloggers have a hidden (and lucrative) agenda, Independent, September 2012, https://www.independent.co.uk/hei-fi/business/ian-burrell-comment-isn-t-free-when-bloggers-have-hidden-and-lucrative-agenda-8101960.html; Malaysia’s Poison Blogger Exposed In The US!, Sarawak Report, August 2012, https://www.sarawakreport.org/2012/08/malaysias-poison-blogger-exposed-in-the-us/[8] Ed Caesar, The reputation-laundering firm that ruined its own reputation, New Yorker, July 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/25/the-reputation-laundering-firm-that-ruined-its-own-reputation [post_title] => A scandal of corruption and censorship: Uncovering the 1MDB case in Malaysia [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => a-scandal-of-corruption-and-censorship-uncovering-the-1mdb-case-in-malaysia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-23 18:58:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-23 17:58:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5313 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 1 [filter] => raw )[4] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5311 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-09 00:06:05 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-08 23:06:05 [post_content] => If you were to read only one paragraph to get a feeling of what`s wrong with the setting we have to work in here in Russia, consider this one. Just by articulating these words, I potentially expose myself to the charge of treason. According to the Russian Penal Code deeds that fall under it, consist of “providing financial, technical, consultative or other ways of assistance to a foreign state, an international or foreign organization or its representative.”[1] “Other ways” it is. The only point our investigators would actually need to prove is that FPC publications – or this particular one - are "directed against Russia's security". That would be perfectly enough. Considering the non-defined term “security” has a multitude of meanings and the fact that Russian prosecutors are known for their exceptional resourcefulness the option cannot really be excluded. And that means a closed trial with a sentence ranging from 12 to 20 years in prison. I can also be legally stamped as an individual “exercising the duties of a foreign agent”. This would equate me to a “foreign agent NGO” which subjects a person or organisation to a number of bureaucratic and legal hardships.[2] To be fair one doesn`t need to come up with his own article to achieve this statute. A mere Facebook-repost or retweet from a page of a “foreign agent media” (let`s say RFE/RL) would be sufficient providing you have ever got a penny (can be a gift too) from foreigners or a Russian entity that in turn has received a penny from a foreign one.[3] No relation between the action and the payment is required.[4] The wording of this law is so broad that it actually contains a peculiar legislative expression “might be recognized” that makes its application officially voluntarist. [5] Those two theoretical repercussions clearly show both the direction Russian policymakers have taken in recent years and the approach they have adopted. Any influence from abroad, and now even contact with foreigners, are perceived by the State as a menace. The countermeasures consist of a constantly growing pile of vaguely formulated impracticable pieces of legislature. In a way, those laws are not intentioned to be abided by. Their main purpose is to have a legal pretext to prosecute any citizen or organisation at will and at any given moment. And while the examples above relate to cross-border cooperation the same convenient “no man without a guilt” logic can be traced to many other contemporary Russian laws: on mass gatherings, on electoral procedures, on extremism, on Internet regulations and media licensing. The only thing left to do is to hand pick the ones to be enforced. In some unforeseen cases where current legislation is not applicable, there is no shortage of tamed judges to cover up for it. This strategy of “universal guilt – selective repressions” is, of course, primarily aimed at all forms of dissent. Therefore, the main victims are institutions and individuals that have enough power and recognition to raise their voices against all sorts of injustice or corruption. This makes media and journalists one of the prime targets. Silencing faultfinders was Putin`s trademark style from the very beginning. It has just got uglier over time. Back in 2001, one of the first things Putin arranged as a President was a crackdown on an independent TV station NTV – and its effective nationalisation.[6] It took several years to consolidate the rest of the TV-stations with political broadcasting. However, the Kremlin`s fight for media dominance was far from over and with Putin`s third term the bell rang for the rest – not only most of the small regional newspapers but also the prominent and well-established federal news holdings. Once independent and powerful media, like Kommersant, Vedomosti, RBC, Forbes or Lenta.ru, were all reduced to the shadow of their own former glory. The owners are now either directly connected to Putin`s inner circle or unwilling to take risks of crossing the lines drawn by Kremlin media-strategists, with the best journalists fired or gone.[7] Very few traditional media outlets managed to keep independence but even those have to make regular compromises to survive. There are several ways of forcing the Russian-based media into self-censorship even if the Kremlin or its proxies do not directly control it. Obviously, the owner can be pressured. Recent history knows some brutal examples such as police raid on owner`s headquarters.[8] But that`s rare. In most cases a more subtle behind-the-scenes chat is more than enough – experienced media managers have learned their lessons. There is a formal way too. According to Russian law, the registration of a media can be revoked if it gets two official “warnings” in one year.[9] Pretexts galore, it doesn`t pose much of a problem for a regulator to find one.[10] To minimise the risks many new media, including our iStories, have opted to be registered abroad. This actually suits the Kremlin – as its eternal argument of the foreign interference becomes easier to sell. The Russian Government obviously noted the trend and responded accordingly. The above-mentioned legislation on “media acting as foreign agents” have been adopted. It was supplemented by a much harsher law on “undesirable organizations” that gives the Russian Government the power to ban the activities of foreign or international NGOs, under vaguely defined security pretexts and without any judicial review. No Russian citizen is allowed to cooperate with one. This law has already been deployed to ban the Open Russia movement, founded by exiled critic and former prisoner of conscience Mikhail Khodorkovsky. One of its former employees is currently under trial facing six years in prison for taking part in an educational seminar.[11] Police routinely raid the premises belonging to Open Russia and the MBKh media outlet, also financed by Khodorkovsky, as well as the homes of the journalists collaborating with them.[12] The Internet became a battleground too. A decade ago, its users were considered a puny minority and therefore the Internet was left to thrive according to its own self-administered rules. The crackdown on conventional media coincided with the development of technology bringing the number of Russian Internet users in 2020 to 118 million[13] – roughly three quarters of the population. A lot of media outlets have minimised their offline presence and gone predominantly online. Therefore, something had to be done to make the virtual world as manageable as the real one. With the arrival of Putin`s third term legislative pressure started to mount in this aspect too. The concept of a “sovereign Internet” was hammered out and partially implemented.[14] It gives government full control over the infrastructure of the Russian segment of the Web. On top of it, we now have a whole pile of “offline” laws amended to make virtual acts and words as punishable as real-world offences. That made most active internet users – including media and journalists - subject to blocks or even prosecution. I.e. these days one can easily get a prison sentence for a tweet containing a call to come to an “unsanctioned” demonstration – according to Russian judges that can make you an organiser of such a rally.[15] Extrajudicial Internet blocking of the entire website of a stubborn media became an option. The first time that Internet users with a Russian IP-address were denied access to an officially registered media outlet was Grani.ru in 2014.[16] This online daily was blocked over content, which allegedly promoted acts of mass disorder together with two other opposition media sites. The offending material was not specified thus leaving the editorial board with no option to remove it in order to restore access. This block has been in place ever since despite the recent ruling of the European Court of Human Rights that had found it to be in violation of Article 10 (right to freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights.[17] Construction of ‘The Great Russian Firewall’ is almost certain to continue. Russian power players dream big. For example, the head of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (country’s main federal level investigative body) Alexander Bastrykin advocates for this to be “the experience of the countries that are resisting USA and its allies”. Meaning China. Bastrykin lauds Chinese law banning all electronic media that have foreign residents among its shareholders. According to Bastrykin such media are not allowed into the Chinese segment of the Internet and Chinese media need an explicit permission from the Ministry of information to cooperate with them. National media is to be administered by Chinese citizens only. The servers of the electronic media are to be maintained on the territory of China. “These practices could be adopted in Russia”, - concluded Bastrykin.[18] Obviously, the good old ways are still employed as well. Oligarchs with ties to the Kremlin, be it Deripaska, Kerimov or Sechin, routinely and without much of a problem sue media organisations (including the foreign ones) in Russian courts forcing them to retract the mention of facts that are sometimes well-known for decades.[19] Some legal attacks are aimed not at the truth but at the journalists themselves. Among the most recent examples, is the trial of a journalist from Pskov Svetlana Prokopieva who was found guilty of justifying terrorism because she suggested that the suicide bombing of the FSB headquarters in the city could be related to the social and political situation in Russia and the restrictions on political and civil liberties.[20] Ivan Safronov, a former reporter for Russian business daily Kommersant, was fired over an article about a possible reshuffle of President Vladimir Putin’s close allies last year.[21] Several months later, he was arrested and charged with treason.[22] He is now awaiting a closed trial, facing up to 20 years in prison. Quite like his son, Safronov`s father, also named Ivan, was a well-known military correspondent who was presumably killed in 2007.[23] 24 journalists have been murdered since Putin`s first inauguration in 2000. Only one case was fully investigated.[24] Dozens more colleagues have been attacked, beaten and intimidated. Now poisoned too.[25] And even if we cannot say the Kremlin is the one to arrange all of these it is directly responsible for the atmosphere of impunity that makes the physical assault of a journalist a valid problem-solving option for powerful people. The combination of those ‘good old’ methods with the new ones described above produce the intended chilling effect. Many journalists and media organisations that used to deal with political reporting have changed occupation, others switched to more innocent subjects or resorted to self-censorship. It`s hard to blame them. Imagine living in a room with a hydraulic ceiling that goes down several inches a year. And it is getting faster with time. You have witnessed it crushing the tallest ones. You saw it forcing the strongest ones to crawl. You are scared to grow for it will come at you earlier. However even if you keep a low profile your turn will definitely come. It`s not a question of ‘if’ but ‘when’. The necessity of sustaining a high level of pressure leads to dreadful outcomes. A month ago, a colleague burned herself to death in front of a regional police headquarters.[26] She was one of the last independent journalists in the Nizhny Novgorod region and she was struggling for years with her self-authored and self-published outlet Koza-Press. That also meant constant police and judicial pressure - court hearings, accusations, smear campaigns, etc. She was selling hand-made wooden scarfs weaved at night to pay the state-imposed fines. One day she got her front door knocked down by police, her flat searched, her computer confiscated. The next day she took a canister of gasoline and killed herself. Her last Facebook post says: "Russian Federation is to be held accountable for my death."[27] So it goes. Despite all this, new investigative media continue to appear in Russia. Well, technically these are mostly registered abroad but their journalists are Russian-based. One of these young but ambitious outlets is iStories where I work. We only launched this year but our staffers are experienced investigative reporters that were part of international teams that published many cross-border projects such as the Panama Papers, the Paradise Papers, Russian Laundromat, FinCen Files, and the like.[28] We were privileged to collaborate with many colleagues and that is exactly the ‘cooperation instead of rivalry’ model that we are trying to develop on Russian soil. A lot of our texts are published as a joint effort with other Russian language media. “If we don’t band together then we will gradually disappear”, as our editor in chief Roman Anin says.[29] We are also a member of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), a consortium of investigative centers, media and journalists operating in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Central America. Being a part of this network gives us tremendous opportunities in terms of cross-border research. Yes, we mostly investigate corruption in Russia. The fact that it is raging on all levels of the Russian state hierarchy is widely recognised. And while some foreign colleagues tend to traditionally perceive it as a ‘tumor’ that metastasised across various state organs I would rather think of it as a skeleton, the very carcass that holds those organs together. This metaphor could better explain why almost no revelation of journalists in this sphere, no matter how profound and well documented it is, produce any effect inside Russia. No criminal proceedings to be started, no firing of culprits to be expected. The most candid quote that reflects the overall approach to problems by many Russian bureaucrats belongs to the former head of State Duma commission on security and corruption prevention (and now the vice-speaker of the Duma) Irina Yarovaya who claimed that a struggle against corruption can potentially endanger the sovereignty of the Russian state.[30] More often than not, and it was proven by numerous investigations, the very same Russian state servants that talk so much about ‘sovereignty’ and ‘patriotism’ tend to keep their numerous assets abroad – most notably in the UK and its dependent offshore jurisdictions. Their flats are in London, their mansions are in the British countryside, their jets are registered at the Isle of Man, their money flowing through Jersey and BVI companies. And that is why internal UK policies on the transparency of ownership and money flows become important for us here, sitting 2,500 km away from Downing Street. In recent years, the UK did make a few steps in this direction including the obligatory statement of a person with ‘significant control’ for a company or an announced publicly accessible register of ultimate owners of companies that own or buy property in the UK. Still there are many grey zones that no investigative journalist can access – some in the UK, many more in the affiliated territories. The faster the UK would proceed on the declared path to transparency dragging its offshore allies behind it, the better job we could do. This in its turn would certainly benefit British people – the pumping of criminal money to and through the UK is certainly not in its best interests. As Arthur Schlesinger wrote: “The obligation of history is to provide as full and exact a reconstruction of the past as possible—as the obligation of rational society is to offer its citizenry the most accurate possible information about the purpose and performance of its leaders.”[31] We try our best but we could definitely use some help from the UK in this area. Alas, there are some worrying trends involving the UK too. The notorious persecution of Wikileaks`s editor Julian Assange is directed from across the ocean but UK has been playing a pivotal role in it. The very existence of this unprecedented trial as well as its handling by UK authorities has been criticised by many world renowned figures and organisations – from leaders of states to lawyers, from journalists to Nobel prize laureates.[32] This persecution is “raising serious concern over the criminalization of investigative journalism in violation of both the US Constitution and international human rights law”, - believes Professor Nils Melzer, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, -“In 20 years of work with victims of war, violence and political persecution I have never seen a group of democratic States ganging up to deliberately isolate, demonize and abuse a single individual for such a long time and with so little regard for human dignity and the rule of law.”[33] Another saddening development to be mentioned is the mounting pressure of the Five Eyes on the tech companies and repeated calls to effectively break the existing encryption algorithms or compliment the currently secure software with backdoors.[34] The trade-off between an existing liberty and a promised safety is a dubious one in itself. For us here it might actually mean losing both. Whatever little means of resisting the extremely invasive state - with its constant wiretapping and digital watch, with its regular physical surveillance and occasional confiscation of hardware - we still have, encryption is one of them. Secure messengers, encrypted emails and hard drives not only protect ourselves but our sources too. There is no way the encryption could be dismantled only for the benefit of the ‘good guys’, there is no way any backdoor would not be exploited by authoritarian governments, be it Russia or Saudi Arabia. Compromised encryption is going to inflict exceptional damage upon investigative reporting worldwide and at the end of the day it will backfire against the very same countries that call for it now. Dmitry Velikovsky, is an investigative reporter with iStories and OCCRP. Over the past two decades, Velikovsky has worked in several roles as an observer, field reporter, producer, and fixer. He was previously a staffer for the “Russian Reporter” magazine and “Novaya Gazeta” newspaper, but his stories have also been published in many other Russian-language media as well as in The Washington Post and Aftonbladet. As a local producer, he has occasionally worked with major broadcasting corporations such as BBC, Vice, France24, RTS, CCTV, NPR and TV3. Velikovsky has won several awards as a result of his work including the Sigma Award for best data-driven reporting (2020) – as a part of OCCRP team that worked with the Troika Laundromat project; the George Polk Award (2018) - as a part of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists team that worked with the Paradise Papers project; a Pulitzer prize (2017) – as a part of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists team that worked with the Panama Papers project; the Best Documentary Peace Award (2014) of Gothenburg Independent Film Festival for “Mediastan”. Image by Roger H. Goun under (CC). [1] Criminal Code of the Russian Federation Article 275. High Treason, “The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation” dated 13/06/1996 N63-FZ (as amended on 27.10.2020), http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/2ca391674eeaa02069722fa3f13cbb41cce0a95d/[2] Russia: “Foreign Agents” Bill Threatens Journalists, Human Rights Watch, November 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/18/russia-foreign-agents-bill-threatens-journalists[3] Register of foreign mass media performing the functions of a foreign agent, Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, https://minjust.gov.ru/ru/documents/7755/[4] Ivan Davydov, Why does Russia need a new “foreign agent” law?, openDemocracy, December 2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/why-does-russia-need-a-new-foreign-agent-law/[5] Article 6. Application of the Law, Law of the Russian Federation of 27.12.1991 N 2124-1 (as amended on 01.03.2020) “On the Mass Media”, http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_1511/ed21796e6c484ea926224dc5dfaa42db31cc7c46/[6] Vladimir Gusinsky interview with CNN’s Jill Dougherty, Putin accused of NTV plot, April 2001, CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/04/20/spain.gusinsky/index.html[7] Tatyana Lysova, Anastastia Yakoreva, and Ivan Golunov [Summary by Kevin Rothrock], ‘Conspiring with these people’ How Rosneft trapped one of Russia’s top business newspapers and left the nominal owner with $15.1 million in profits. A joint investigation., Meduza, May 2020, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/05/12/conspiring-with-these-people; Nadia Beard, Fears for journalistic freedoms as editor of news website Lenta replaced, The Calvert Journal, March 2014, https://www.calvertjournal.com/articles/show/2162/lenta-editor-replaced-timchenko-goreslavsky; Tom Balmforth, Russian reporters resign en masse in row over Putin ally report, Reuters, May 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-kommersant-idUSKCN1SQ1JV[8] Maria Tsvetkova and Polina Devitt, Russian editors ‘fired over stories that irked officials’, Reuters, July 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-newspaper/russian-editors-fired-over-stories-that-irked-officials-idUSKCN0ZT0EU[9] Article 16. Termination and suspension of activities, Law of the Russian Federation of 27.12.1991 N 2124-1 (as amended on 01.03.2020) “On the Mass Media”, http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_1511/a09e5b6a2f72859bb32b82c3d1f4133cb2e0557d/[10] Article 4. Inadmissibility of abuse of freedom of mass information, Law of the Russian Federation of 27.12.1991 N 2124-1 (as amended on 01.03.2020) “On the Mass Media”, http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_1511/285787630b41d4963964c4c89fada1196a65cf3e/[11] Russia: Prisoner of conscience Anastasia Shevchenko’s trial starts, Amnesty International, June 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/russia-prisoner-of-conscience-anastasia-shevchenkos-trial-starts/[12] Reuters Staff, Police raid Russian opposition groups before local elections, Reuters, September 2020, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-politics-opposition-raid-idUKKBN2601IM[13] We Are Social, Digital in 2020, https://wearesocial.com/digital-2020[14] Sovereign Internet: Fragmentation of the Web and Self-Isolation Under the Aegis of Security, Roskomsvoboda, May 2016, https://roskomsvoboda.org/16825/[15] The court arrested Navalny for 30 days for repeated violation of the rules of the rally, Zona Media, June 2017, https://zona.media/news/2017/06/12/navalny_arest[16] Graniru website: https://graniru.org[17] Judgment Kharitonov v. Russia and three other applications – official decisions to block websites, Press Release – Chamber Judgements, June 2020, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-6729158-8971586%22]}; Grand Chamber Panel’s decisions – November 2020, Press Release – Referrals to Grand Chamber, November 2020, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press#{%22sort%22:[%22kpdate%20Descending%22],%22itemid%22:[%22003-6856322-9188155%22]}[18] “It’s time to put up an effective barrier to information war”, Kommersant Vlast, April 2016, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2961578[19] Billionaire Suleiman Kerimov wins lawsuit against ‘Vedomosti’ and ‘Forbes’, Meduza, November 2020, https://meduza.io/en/news/2020/11/20/billionaire-suleiman-kerimov-wins-lawsuit-against-vedomosti-and-forbes; Deripaska wins lawsuit against The Times, The Daily Telegraph and The Nation in court in Krasnodar, Svoboda, October 2019, https://www.svoboda.org/a/30236466.html; Chris Benevento, Russia: The Empire Strikes Back as “Darth Vader” Wins Case Against OCCRP Partner, OCCRP, October 2016, https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/5714-russia-the-empire-strikes-back-as-darth-vader-wins-case-against-occrp-partner[20] Polina Sadovskaya, (Kovaleva), Case against journalist Svetlana Prokopieva exemplifies broken Russian system, Pen America, June 2020, https://pen.org/case-against-journalist-svetlana-prokopieva-exemplifies-broken-russian-system/[21] Tom Balmforth, Russian reporters resign en masse in row over Putin ally report, Reuters, May 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-kommersant-idUSKCN1SQ1JV[22] Russian journalist Ivan Safronov charged with treason; journalists arrested at protests for his release, CPJ, July 2020, https://cpj.org/2020/07/russian-journalist-ivan-safronov-charged-with-treason-journalists-arrested-at-protests-for-his-release/[23] Luke Harding, Russian journalist who angered country’s military falls to death, The Guardian, March 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/mar/06/russia.lukeharding[24] 24 Journalists Killed in Russia between 2000 and 2020, CPJ data, CPJ, https://cpj.org/data/killed/?status=Killed&motiveConfirmed%5B%5D=Confirmed&type%5B%5D=Journalist&typeOfDeath%5B%5D=Murder&coverages%5B%5D=Business&coverages%5B%5D=Corruption&coverages%5B%5D=Crime&coverages%5B%5D=Culture&coverages%5B%5D=Human%20Rights&coverages%5B%5D=Politics&coverages%5B%5D=Sports&coverages%5B%5D=Unknown&cc_fips%5B%5D=RS&start_year=2000&end_year=2020&group_by=year[25] Dan Sabbagh and Luke Harding, Kremlin meant to kill Navalny, western security agencies believe, The Guardian, November 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/16/kremlin-alexei-navalny-western-security-agencies-novichok[26] Sarah Rainsford, Irina Slavina: Final protest of Russian journalist who set herself on fire, BBC News, October 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54478319[27] Irina Slavina, Facebook post – Please blame the Russian Federation for my death, Facebook, October 2020, https://www.facebook.com/slavirina/posts/3539650582765000[28] The Panama Papers, OCCRP, April 2016, https://www.occrp.org/en/panamapapers/; The Paradise Papers, OCCRP, November 2017, https://www.occrp.org/en/paradisepapers/; The Troika Laundromat, OCCRP, March 2019, https://www.occrp.org/en/troikalaundromat/; An ICIJ Investigation - FinCEN Files, ICIJ, Latest News – October 2020, https://www.icij.org/investigations/fincen-files/[29] Howard Amos, Unite or disappear: Russian media startip ‘istories’ wants journalists to join forces – before it’s too late, The Calvert Journal, May 2020, https://www.calvertjournal.com/articles/show/11808/istories-russian-media-start-up-investigative-journalism[30] Anastasia Kornya, Fighting corruption can be dangerous to national sovereignty, Vedomosti, March 2015, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2015/03/27/borba-s-korruptsiei-mozhet-bit-opasna-dlya-natsionalnogo-suvereniteta[31] Arthur Schlesinger JR., Twenty Letters to a Father, The Atlantic, November 1967 Issue, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1967/11/twenty-letters-to-a-father/303396/[32] Rachel Elbaum and Michele Neubert, Release WikiLeak’s Julian Assange, say current and former world leaders, NBC News, September 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/release-wikileaks-julian-assange-say-current-former-world-leaders-n1240597; Signatories, Lawyers for Assange, https://www.lawyersforassange.org/en/signatories-all.html; Gavin Rea, Open Letter to the U.K government to free Julian Assange, ECPMF, July 2020, https://www.ecpmf.eu/open-letter-to-the-u-k-government-to-free-julian-assange/; Heads of State Nobel Prize, Don’t Extradite Assange, September 2020, https://dontextraditeassange.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Final-Politicians.Signatory.Listdocx.pdf[33] UN expert criticizes States for ‘ganging up’ on Wikileaks’ Assange; warns against extradition, fearing ‘serious’ rights violations, UN News, May 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1039581[34] The intelligence sharing alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US; Dale Walker, EU inches closer to ban on end-to-end encryption, ITPro, November 2020, https://www.itpro.co.uk/security/357699/leaked-memo-suggests-eu-ban-on-end-to-end-encryption-imminent [post_title] => Investigative journalism in today’s Russia, and why the UK’s stance could actually make a difference [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => investigative-journalism-in-todays-russia-and-why-the-uks-stance-could-actually-make-a-difference [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-23 18:59:10 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-23 17:59:10 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5311 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[5] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5309 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-09 00:05:01 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-08 23:05:01 [post_content] => When you are a journalist from the poorest country in Europe, you have to write stories about poverty. When you see the poverty deepening for years, while the state elite becomes rich, you have to start investigative reporting. And you have to follow the money. That is the way you discover that money from the poorest people in Europe flies into rich capitals, including London. Is this for the sake of the ordinary people? No, it isn't. It is not easy to find the money of the Moldovan poor hidden by the Moldovan rich in London. To do that, a reporter has to go through many challenges: from finding the databases, to paying for the databases, to then finding the money to pay and having enough to pay for the time needed to do the research, and at the end of it to find out that the entity in London was created by another two to three entities in offshore areas where reporters do not have access to the data. Where is Moldova? And why is this important for London? Well, it is a tiny corrupt state and yes, it might be dangerous for the British. Let me give an example. At a distance of 2,500 km from London, there is a small village named Pitushca. A beautiful, green location, with sunny weather, hosting some 3,000 nice people that are growing juicy vegetables, the sweetest grapes and are baking that puffy crispy bread. It is the village of my childhood and I have only the best words for its people. Why might it be dangerous for the British? Imagine you reside happily on Byng Street at Canary Wharf in London, a luxurious and safe area, in one of the wealthiest and safest countries, Great Britain (GB). One evening you come back from the office thinking about dinner and the calm evening you could have after a busy day. You step down from the taxi, open the door of the building and someone nearby shoots you and gets away.  This is what happened in 2012 exactly on that street on 20 March 2012.^[1] Later investigative reporters wrote that the man with the gun was from Pitushca, Moldova, and his name was Vitalie Proca.^[2] And it was not an accident, but a long-time planned and well-organised operation. Why did a Moldovan man come 2,500 km to kill someone in London? Because of big Moldovan money and Moldovan people in GB. The man who was shot in March 2012 survived and later told his side of the story. He is a Russian national, with a controversial CV full of financial scandals, but this was the way he got to control the Universal bank in Chisinau, capital of Moldova. Maybe you have heard about this bank if you heard about the stolen billion from Moldova. Universal bank is one of those three Moldovan banks that washed the money from Moldova through some Latvian banks and yes, through British business entities to some unknown private accounts. I remember working with my colleagues on this story and the feeling of being in an informational cage. The billion dollar theft was completed in 2014, but already in 2013 we were publishing articles about strange financial operations between Chisinau, Moscow and London. Already at that moment, we were writing that the main Moldovan bank got under control of a Russian business that is controlled by a dormant company in London.^[3] Could we learn more about that dormant company? No, it was a British offshore company. And the bank was Moldovan. We continued to write stories and to find a lack of information in British registers. Finding out that a Latvian citizen was managing about 50 offshore companies in Great Britain involved in the washing of money from Moldovan banks was the only information we could have access to.^[4] Normally, as reporters, we talk to people that are accused of anything, just to give them a voice and to have all parts of a story exposed. The frustration is that people from British offshore companies never accepted the request to answer to a Moldovan reporter, while accepting to operate with a huge amounts of Moldovan money. You cannot have their contacts, opinions, voices, you cannot have correct information. And by this, you never know the whole truth and you cannot inform society on topics of the highest interest. That stolen billion in 2014 was not the only billion brought from the poorest in Moldova to London. And now, we have to go back to Pitushca, to that sunny village with the sweetest grapes and peaceful residents. Vladimir Plahotniuc, the most known Moldovan oligarch was born in Pitushca. And he got to visit London and to have important discussions with British experts in the name of the Moldovan society, about democracy and development.^[5] But he also got properties and businesses in London. Why is this a problem? Because now he is wanted by Moldovan prosecutors but he fled the country in June 2019 and never came back to give answers about the accusations of stolen money and many other illegal activities.^[6] However, before leaving Moldova, back in June 2019, he first opened a business in London in his name.^[7] It seems legal for everyone to create a business and it is good to have access to this data. But when you look at the data as a reporter, sometimes you have more questions than answers. Documents relating to this British business states that he is a Czech national and was born in February 1966. According to his Moldovan passports he was born in January 1966. Could a person have different birthdays? Could it be a different person? A reporter should have the possibility and capacity to check information and to inform societies correctly. And when a person is accused of financial crimes and opens businesses in other countries it should be made easy for societies to be informed and for justice departments to make investigations. In this case, it was not possible. We understand that any entity has the right to be protected by law, and this is a sacred right for anybody who opens a business or buys a property in Great Britain, including a Moldovan. But there are examples where the British authorities decided to reveal information about the luxury and exuberance of some Moldovans who spend huge amounts of money in London. A prime example is that of the colorful story about the young son of a former Moldovan Prime Minister spending more than £1,000 a day, which would not have been possible without this press release from the National Crime Agency (NCA).^[8] “Freezing orders for three HSBC accounts held by 22-year-old Vlad Luca Filat were granted in May 2018 – under new forfeiture provisions introduced by the Criminal Finances Act 2017 – after NCA financial investigators suspected the funds derived from illegal activity by his father, Vladimir Filat, the ex-Prime Minister of Moldova”, says the press release. Did that money come back to Moldova? Not yet. Is this the only kid of rich corrupt officials from Moldova that is offered expensive goods in Great Britain? No. Journalists have published various stories of children of oligarchs, judges, etc., but so far we have had only one press release of this kind from the NCA.^[9] One of the funniest (and very sad) stories of money circulation between Great Britain and Moldova happened recently in 2020. Moldovan border officials discovered 1.6 million euros hidden in a truck. It is a huge amount of money, and according to the law it should be declared, not hidden. I would say that in the modern world it is not necessary to carry money in big bags, when there are bank accounts and tiny cards. The driver said to authorities he does not know where the money came from; and after that the authorities should confiscated it. But then, surprise, a London based young man said that the money was his. He is 32 years old and he says it is a small part of what he earned.^[10] After investigative reporters had a look through his story - it is full of manipulations, previous penal problems and obscure angles. The Moldovan justice system has not reached an end with this case yet, which speaks also about the capacity of its judicial system. All the aforementioned stories are just a few insights into the efforts reporters make to reveal the phenomena of washing money, and crimes that reach from Moldova to GB. However, they did not reveal the stressed life, all the troubles and difficulties doing this job creates. Firstly, reporters in a poor country face financial and economic constraints: no healthy market, no advertisement, poor circulation of newspapers, political control on TV licenses, very limited access to information. But, that is the easy part. Investigative journalists face so many forms of threats, from physical attacks, smear campaigns by trolls on social media, hateful attacks stemming from media controlled by politicians, DDoS[11] attacks, and lots of court cases where corrupt judges are suing journalists because of complaints of corrupt officials. Then there is the lack of response from police and prosecutors to complaints from reporters. There is a permanent feeling of insecurity and lack of protection. Such an endless list of problems may discourage people, but not investigative reporters. In 2020, we cover more and more stories about Moldovan money kept by corrupt local officials in British businesses, including in offshores jurisdictions. The access to offshores information is not possible other than through offshore leaks. But it is time to make deep changes in communication and access to information, for the sake of both societies. While corrupt people in Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Great Britain cooperate so easily, being creative in doing bad things to democracy everywhere, why should civil society, investigative reporters and governmental officials not cooperate and work to reveal all those crimes? The money is stolen from Moldovans but Brits are paying the price as well: impoverished Moldovans leave the country and migrate, some of them to Great Britain as well. Many of them are working honestly to save themselves and their families left at home in Moldova, but for many the British state has to contribute with social payments, education, and other forms of support and inclusiveness. We should work for transparency for every step of that long journey from Pitushca to London. Alina Radu is the Manager of the biggest investigative reporting group in Moldova -Ziarul de Gardă (ZdG). ZdG is affiliated to GIJN (Global Investigative Journalism Network),WAN-IFRA (World Association of Newspapers -through Moldovan Association of Independent Press), SEEMO (SouthEastEuropean Media Network), RLNE (Russian Language Media News Exchange).ZdG covers Moldova, Romania, former Soviet countries, conflict areas, corruption and human rights –worldwide. [1] Luke Harding and Miriam Elder, Attack on Russian banker in London leaves trail of clues back to Moscow, The Guardian, March 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/30/russian-banker-london-clues-moscow[2] Mihai Munteanu, Luke Harding, Ion Preașcă, Iurie Sănduță, Cristi Ciupercă, A Murderer’s Trial, Rise Project, March 2013, https://www.riseproject.ro/investigation/a-murderers-trail/[3] “Sleeping Beauty” at BEM, Ziarul de Garda, September 2013, https://www.zdg.md/investigatii/ancheta/frumoasa-adormita-la-bem/#more-61793[4] Alina Radu, The Moldovan billion through three Latvian banks, Ziarul de Garda, October 2015, https://www.zdg.md/investigatii/ancheta/miliardul-moldovenesc-prin-trei-banci-letone/[5] Alina Radu, What did Vlad Plahotniuc do in London?, Ziarul de Garda, May 2018, https://www.zdg.md/stiri/politic/ce-a-facut-vlad-plahotniuc-la-londra/[6] Nicoleta Braghis, Oligarch Plahotniuc on Moldova’s Authorities’ Radar: Where is the Former Democrats Party’s Leader Now?, Ziarul de Garda, October 2020, https://www.zdg.md/en/?p=5319[7] Any size tire replacement 24/7 LTD, Companies House, https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/12032830/officers[8] Arina Livadari, This is the luxurious lifestyle of Moldova’s ex-PM’s son. All three bank accounts of Vlad Luca Filat were frozen, Moldova.org, February 2019, https://www.moldova.org/en/luxurious-lifestyle-moldovas-ex-pms-son-three-bank-accounts-vlad-luca-filat-frozen/; Son of Moldova’s ex-PM renting £1000 per day Knightsbridge apartment forced to hand over nearly half a million pounds, National Crime Agency, February 2019, https://public-newsroom-nca-01.azurewebsites.net/news/son-of-moldovas-ex-pm-renting-gbp-1000-per-day-knightsbridge-apartment-forced-to-hand-over-nearly-half-a-million-pounds?fbclid=IwAR1DjIO1QFGOAyMwrIp66k6rZZUUbDNtSGJcqgyIhZTMgyTULuWAcHAPTIc[9] Inna CÎVÎRJIC, Luxury rent in London for the daughter of Judge Muruianu, Rise Moldova, May 2017, https://www.rise.md/articol/chirie-de-lux-in-londra-pentru-fiica-judecatorului-muruianu/[10] Julieta Savițchi, The secret “owner” of the 1.6 million euros from Leuseni customs, Anticoruptie, May 2020, https://anticoruptie.md/ro/investigatii/justitie/taina-proprietarului-celor-16-milioane-de-euro-de-la-vama-leuseni[11] Denial of Service Attacks – attacks on websites, effectively shutting down access. [post_title] => Chișinău to London: A story about big money and small information [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => chisinau-to-london-a-story-about-big-money-and-small-information [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-23 18:59:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-23 17:59:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5309 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[6] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5305 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-09 00:04:12 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-08 23:04:12 [post_content] => In February 2018, Europe was shocked by the murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancé Martina Kušnírová. Kuciak, who worked for the Slovak news outlet Aktuality.sk, had collaborated with Czech investigative journalist Pavla Holcová on large scale corruption cases like the Panama Papers or the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) led investigation into Italian organised crime in Slovakia. A few months after Kuciak’s assassination, journalist Peter Sabo joined Aktuality.sk. In the course of their investigative work, both Holcová and Sabo have come across cases that highlight the dubious role UK companies and persons play in the facilitation of financial crime and corruption. Slovakia - Peter Sabo - Aktuality.skOn 25 June 2020, I found a bullet in my mailbox. It was a terrifying experience as just over two years ago an investigative journalist from the same newsroom - Aktuality.sk - Ján Kuciak and his fiancé Martina Kušnírová were assassinated. I joined Aktuality.sk after Jan and Martina were killed not as a replacement, but because I wanted to continue in Jan’s great work together with his colleagues. It is a strange feeling to find a bullet in your own mailbox. Initially there is fear, and I think that is a normal bodily reaction. After a few hours and days, however, you start to realise a different feeling, one that is quite the opposite, a strange sensation of pride and satisfaction. You know that you are doing your job as a journalist well when somebody, who is not exactly your fan, is expressing it in a different, twisted and scary way. Yet that is something we as journalists do, we stand in the frontline against corruption, mafia and injustice. Our only weapon is the publication of facts, in the form of stories, and delivering them to the public. This weapon can be very effective. However, there are vast ways in which this weapon can become tangled and made effectively inoperable. As we see progression in technologies, as we move from the ‘real’ world to the online one, this evolution does not only affect media and journalists, but also crime and mafia. As Slovakia is a small country, in the heart of Europe, with (at least some) digitalisation and publication of vital state owned data, such as a companies’ registry, beneficial owners register, and landowners’ register, we have pretty strong open-source investigation tools. Quickly, members of organised crime groups, corrupt politicians and oligarchs learned that these tools create the kind of publicity that can harm their businesses. And at this point, the existence of a united Europe and globalisation kicked in. Even the smallest and most insignificant crook can establish a company somewhere else around the world  for just a few euros and let people in Slovakia think that behind some suspicious company is a rich foreign investor, but actually it is just another (shell) company in Cyprus, the UK or Panama. At the end of the day, we do not know who owns certain companies and who is cashing out money from, let's say for example, a dubious oil business. For investigative journalists this poses a serious problem. If ‘big’ countries like the UK let people cover their dirty businesses it creates problems also for the rest of Europe. For example, the UK is one of the main operating countries for VAT fraudsters. As uncovered in a cross-border investigation I co-authored in 2019 called Grand Theft Europe in the EU, six billion euros were stolen from VAT.^[1] In many cases, these frauds are going through the UK, with UK companies used as middlemen or effectively out channels for VAT frauds. For example, UK citizens, companies and banks have been tied to large scale carbon trade VAT frauds. In just eight weeks in 2009, fraudsters claimed back £300 million from the UK Revenue and Customs (HMRC) before it stopped paying up and HMRC is still pursuing that money through the courts.^[2] Anecdotally, the country following behind the UK as the next worst offender is Slovakia - at least in customs frauds involving China.^[3] However, this information is already well-known. Digging deeper to demonstrate how Slovak oligarchs are exploiting the UK rules one could point to the recent case involving Norbert Bodor. A Slovak oligarch, Bodor is currently being held in the custody of Slovak police on corruption charges and on suspicion of being the head of an organised group that had co-opted Slovak police into their own organised criminal group.^[4] Bodor was caught sending four million euros to a fictive and fraudulent bank, which built its advertising on the fact they would not share any information with authorities and would cover the client - which is illegal in the EU. Therefore, if somebody is trying to use this type of a bank it should at least raise some doubts about this type of financial transactions. Bodor has tried to explain this transaction as an investment into a startup in Ireland. In addition, dubious contracts were provided by the co-defendant operating as the ‘bank’ in this scheme. It was not a surprise to see that a UK-based notary and another UK-based company acting as a middleman were also mentioned in these contracts. While a Dutch prosecutor later found that the UK notary writings were forged, the role of UK companies featuring in even most palpable frauds endures.^[5] Yet another example is a corruption case in Turks and Caicos (TCI), a British overseas territory. These exotic islands have come through a full-scale corruption case over the last decade in which practically the whole local government apparatus was involved. The local government was such an integral part of the scheme that the UK provided their own investigators and prosecutors to solve this crime. A 2008-2009 commission led by Sir Robert Auld, a former Lord Justice of Appeal, found a ‘high probability of systemic corruption in government and the legislature and among public officers in the Turks & Caicos Islands’, which had consisted largely of bribery by overseas developers.^[6] His preliminary investigation identified that a Slovak oligarch, Mario Hoffmann, was involved. Hoffman was bribing government officials to get land in the Caribbean in order to start a 600 million euros project to build a hotel resort with golf course.^[7] Subsequently, a special investigation and prosecution team (SPIT) led by Special Prosecutor Helen Garlick was established. As a result of the SPIT’s investigations a number of former officials, including the former TCI Prime Minister, were charged and in December 2015 a trial against them started, which has still not reached a conclusion.^[8] For Hoffmann’s part, however, the criminal case against him was dropped in 2012 when he agreed to make a deal in which he paid millions in retribution.^[9] He also agreed to stop his development plans and relinquish his special status on TCI. Basically, he made a deal in which he bought his freedom and innocence - at least in the eyes of the UK jurisdiction. The problem is that the money came from Slovakia. It means Slovak laws were violated and also the source of the crime took place in Slovakia. But so far Hoffmann has dealt with this crime only in respect to TCI. As Slovak law does not acknowledge the same way of ‘deal-making’ that was accepted by the TCI Government, and in turn UK investigators, one would expect that Hoffmann will be prosecuted and in the end sentenced in Slovakia. However, as the British authorities have either not responded, or provided limited answers, to information and legal assistance requests from the Slovak special prosecution office, the oligarch has still evaded justice and continues to operate in Slovakia without concern.^[10] Question is - what is the problem? Is it just a lack of communication by the British authorities? Or laziness? Or ignorance about a small EU country? Or is the case not very appealing to the UK? At this point, we do not know. Czech Republic - Pavla Holcová - Investigace.czFor years now, the UK has been known as a European country with probably the highest density of enablers of organised crime. We, as journalists, are still hitting the same schemes: Limited Companies, formation agents and formation houses, same addresses in London or Edinburgh where thousands of companies have a postal address but have never really shown any presence there. Even though any country in the world can be used as a tool to anonymise ownership of the company, the UK and its offshore territories have a special place on the map of organised crime top destinations. And please, do not come along with an old song of tax benefits and tax optimisation. Real organised crime members or corrupted politicians do not really care about paying taxes. But they do care about anonymity, economic stability and enforcing the law - simply they do not want to lose the funds they manage to steal from state budgets, collected on bribes or siphoned off state companies. This is why many of them invest into London real estate. I often hear from the Czech authorities that they see the money flows coming from the UK or going through Czech accounts to the UK. Even if the Czech see those payments as suspicious and start to investigate, UK authorities usually do not provide any useful information, rather the opposite. “The transaction is OK, you don't need to investigate any further.” And this is just the UK - the last piece of mosaic in long and complicated financial schemes used by organised criminal groups - including those created by corrupted officials (as seen in Slovakia). The really painful experience is to deal with the UK offshore territories, where the essential information about ultimate beneficial owners of the companies involved in terrorism, money laundering, contract killing, stealing from the state budgets of the poorest countries and stashing bribes should be found. Should be, but isn´t. Many of those territories, which are still bound to the UK and have their legal system based on UK law, simply use the fact that the lack of transparency in their business registries is the core of their national income per capita. The problem is not the technology itself. There are quite transparent, digitised and user friendly business registries and the update and accuracy of the information is required by the law. But those rules of transparency are applied only to local citizens. Any foreign entity, after paying the proper fees, can use the benefit of old school paper and the pen registry, archived in big halls and rooms stuffed with rotting documents. Do you need your information? Go and find it. Impossible. Anonymity granted. Some such offshore companies come with a bank account, others with bank accounts and permanent residency. The best ones also come with a passport - a passport where you can choose your new name, new identity. After a harsh worldwide criticism, British Virgin Islands will introduce a public register of company owners in 2023 (why rush it, right?). Andrew Fahie, BVI’s Premier and Minister of Finance, told the island’s House of Assembly that the Government would work “towards a publicly accessible register of beneficial ownership for companies,” albeit “subject to reservations.”^[11] Based on my experience as a journalist, making initiatives ‘ subject to reservations’ creates potential loopholes for those rich enough to work around. Peter Sabo is an investigative reporter based in Bratislava. Prior to joining the Slovak news outlet Aktuality.sk in May 2018, Sabo worked in the business sector and has a bachelor degree in Applied Informatics and Automation in Industry from Slovak University of Technology.  Based in Prague, Pavla Holcová is an investigative journalist and founder of independent outlet Investigace.cz. In 2013, she joined OCCRP and is a regional editor for Central Europe. Holcová has contributed to major cross-border projects such as the Panama Papers, the Paradise Papers, the Russian Laundromat, and the Azerbaijani Laundromat. Together with her colleague Ján Kuciak, she exposed ties between the Slovak government and Italian mafia. She has also investigated massive illegal arms sales to Syria during the war, explored links between the global cocaine trade and Balkan organized crime groups, and identified illegal real-estate investments by politicians. In November 2016, Pavla was selected among a hundred New Europe changemakers and a hundred people changing Central and Eastern Europe for the better. In 2018, she was selected for the European Young Leaders initiative.  Image by Axelspace Corporation under (CC). [1] Peter Sabo and Laura Kello, Grand Theft Europe: Threads of the emission mafia also lead to Slovakia, Aktuality.sk, May 2019, https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/689008/grand-theft-europe-nitky-emisnej-mafie-vedu-aj-na-slovensko/; Peter Sabo, White horses and mysterious boxes. How VAT is handled in Europe, Aktuality.sk, May 2019, https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/689536/biele-kone-a-tajomne-schranky-ako-sa-v-europe-kseftuje-s-dph/; Grand Theft Europe: A cross-border investigation, Correctiv, May 2019, https://correctiv.org/en/top-stories/2019/05/07/grand-theft-europe/[2] How major banks turned a blind eye to the theft of billions of pounds of public money, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, May 2019, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2019-05-07/how-major-banks-turned-a-blind-eye-to-the-theft-of-billions-of-pounds-of-public-money[3] The Union is asking Slovakia for more € 300 million for customs fraud, Aktuality.sk, September 2018, https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/621476/pre-colne-podvody-ziada-unia-od-slovenska-vyse-300-milionov-eur/; Martin Turcek, More hundreds of millions of sanctions? Customs fraud continues, Slovakia does not solve it, Aktuality.sk, July 2020, https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/811083/dalsie-stamilionove-sankcie-colne-podvody-pokracuju-slovensko-ich-neriesi/; The European Commission is recovering money from the UK for customs fraud. Is Slovakia in danger of a similar fate?, Parlamentne Listy.sk, September 2018, https://www.parlamentnelisty.sk/arena/256873/europska-komisia-vymaha-peniaze-od-velkej-britanie-za-colne-podvody-hrozi-podobny-osud-aj-slovensku/; Marian Koren and EURACTIV.sk, Customs fraud: Commission sends second alert to Britain to pay 2.7 billion euros, EURACTIV.sk, September 2018, https://euractiv.sk/section/danova-politika/news/colne-podvody-komisia-zaslala-britanii-druhu-vystrahu-ma-doplatit-27-miliardy-eur/[4] Peter Sabo and Laura Kello, Oligarch Bodor invested in Penta’s business, which took many years to merge, Aktuality.sk, August 2020, https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/813020/oligarcha-boedoer-investoval-do-biznisu-penty-ich-spojenie-trvalo-dlhe-roky/;[5] Peter Sabo, Dutch prosecutor: Bodor tried to hide his assets, transactions show signs of money laundering, Aktuality.sk, September 2020, https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/825602/holandsky-prokurator-boedoer-sa-snazil-skryt-svoj-majetok-transakcie-nesu-znaky-prania-spinavych-penazi/[6] Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Mark Simmonds, Turks and Caicos Islands Commission of Inquiry 2008-2009, Gov.uk, December 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/turks-and-caicos-islands-commission-of-inquiry-2008-2009[7] Martin Turcek and Peter Sabo, The oligarch got rid of the corruption scandal for millions. Now he can catch up with him, Aktuality.sk, October 2019, https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/659879/skutok-sa-stal-uplatky-hoffmanna-v-karibiku-podla-kovacika-neboli-trestnym-cinom-prokurator-pripad-stopil/[8] Turks and Caicos Islands Special Investigations and Prosecution Team: https://tci-sit.org/[9] Mario Hoffman Pays TCIG $7million to Settle Salt Cay Cases Salt Cay Cases, Turk & Caicos The Sun, August 2012, https://suntci.com/mario-hoffman-pays-tcig-million-to-settle-salt-cay-cases-salt-cay-cases-p124-106.htm[10] Requests for information were made by Slovak authorities directly to the TCI government or to the UK through Eurojust (the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation). See: Martin Turcek and Peter Sabo, The oligarch got rid of the corruption scandal for millions. Now he catch up with him, Aktuality.sk, October 2019, https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/659879/skutok-sa-stal-uplatky-hoffmanna-v-karibiku-podla-kovacika-neboli-trestnym-cinom-prokurator-pripad-stopil/[11] David Pegg, British Virgin Islands commits to public register of beneficial owners, The Guardian, October 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/01/british-virgin-islands-commits-public-register-beneficial-owners-tax-haven [post_title] => Tracking corruption from the heart of Europe to UK Overseas Territories: murder, death threats and a wall of silence [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => tracking-corruption-from-the-heart-of-europe-to-uk-overseas-territories-murder-death-threats-and-a-wall-of-silence [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-23 18:59:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-23 17:59:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5305 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[7] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5301 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-09 00:03:37 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-08 23:03:37 [post_content] => The UK has a notorious reputation as a safe haven for the world’s dirty money and for the people who are looking to hide, clean and spend it. A confluence of factors contributes to this: weak supervision of money laundering in key sectors, the abuse of UK companies in corrupt schemes and challenges to the seizure of corrupt assets being just a few. On top of this, UK professionals have been rolling out the red carpet for the world’s corrupt and criminal individuals for decades. Last year, Transparency International UK analysed over 400 corruption cases spanning 116 countries, amounting to economic damage in excess of £325 billion.[1] With the data available, we identified 582 firms and individuals offering services in the UK – often unwittingly – to corrupt individuals. This included UK professionals from a wide range of sectors, including finance, law and accountancy. 81 law firms and 62 accountancy firms, including all of the big four, showed up in our data. Our analysis also highlighted how unregulated sectors such as universities and charities – which are not subject to anti-money laundering rules – have become targets for those looking to clean dirty money. For example, we identified 177 schools and other education institutions that have offered services to high-risk individuals. When speaking with compliance professionals, we discourage them from taking the fact that their client was photographed with senior politicians last month, is a noted donor to a prestigious UK university or is involved in philanthropic activities as a reason to dismiss doing enhanced due diligence checks. These are specific tactics used by corrupt and criminal individuals to launder their reputations – in part because they want to have influence in the UK and they want a certain lifestyle – but also for the precise reason that professionals are less likely to ask questions if clients are seen to move in prestigious circles. Our research adds to a growing body of evidence that points to the UK’s complicity in global corruption. The scale of dirty money in the UK is almost beyond imagination, with billions of pounds in suspect funds already invested into our property market and estimates of around £100 billion in illicit wealth impacting the UK each year. The law enforcement response to this is vital for denying criminals of their ill-gotten gains and removing impunity for the corrupt who stash their wealth here. However, due to limited resources and the complexity of money laundering schemes used, the police simply cannot be expected to trace and recover every penny of dirty money. An ‘enforcement gap’ risks the UK lacking a credible deterrent against the corrupt continuing to hide their money here. This is what makes the role of journalists uncovering corrupt funds entering the UK so vital. Investigations of this kind require expertise to trace money across borders, with an understanding of the UK financial system as well as corruption in origin jurisdictions. Journalists have shown themselves to be adept at following these money trails, with exposés like the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s (OCCRP) series of laundromat investigations highlighting billions of pounds in suspicious funds flowing through the UK from former Soviet states.[2] In addition to informing the public about the UK’s dirty money problem, these investigations are routinely used by law enforcement and regulators to inform their own inquiries. The OCCRP’s Azerbaijani Laundromat investigation was extensively referenced in the National Crime Agency’s (NCA) evidence for their first use of unexplained wealth orders.[3] Journalists’ investigations into corruption and money laundering also play a key role in the UK’s defences against illicit wealth. The private sector – widely seen as the first line of defence against money laundering – are often reliant on the presence of ‘adverse media articles’ when carrying out due diligence on clients. If a media investigation raises too many red flags about a prospective or current client, private sector firms may choose not to take on that individual, or identify further suspicious activity, which is then reported to the police. The financial benefits provided by journalists in the fight against corruption and money laundering are incalculable. What is certain however is that their work is crucial in giving the corrupt no place to hide, no one to help them and no impunity. Transparency International UK works with journalists from across the UK and around the world, helping to uncover dirty money here as well as working together to push for stronger measures to tackle corruption. One of the most effective ways Transparency International UK collaborates with journalists is working with those who have identified corruption overseas and are looking to trace the funds to the UK. After more than five years researching the weaknesses in the UK’s anti-money laundering system, we are well placed to help track down how funds have entered the UK and where they may be hidden. As a result of our investigatory work, we face similar risks to journalists working to uncover corruption and money laundering, including receiving letters from those we have highlighted requesting we remove content naming them. Transparency International’s chapters around the world face altogether more severe threats, working in dangerous environments to expose corruption of often repressive regimes. Journalists’ investigations have been vital in underlining the systemic problems which make the UK a safe haven for corrupt wealth. Stories like the Panama Papers reaffirmed the need for transparency over who owns offshore companies which hold UK property. Just a month after this investigation, the UK Government’s commitment to this measure was reaffirmed at the 2016 London Anti-Corruption Summit. Further investigations highlighting the use of secretive companies to hide suspicious wealth in UK property help hold Government’s feet to the fire on this commitment. Similarly, it is unlikely to be a coincidence that two days before the FinCen files raised the ongoing issue of UK shell companies’ use in financial crime, the UK Government announced the next stage in an overhaul of the company formation system.[4] The recent government commitments to empower Companies House to verify the data it receives and support investigations into suspicious activity come in the wake of years of work by Transparency International UK and others highlighting the abuse of UK companies for corruption and high-end money laundering. These changes are crucial to further the identification of corrupt assets in the UK. Improving the quality and availability of information around who owns companies and property in the UK would be of direct benefit to journalists and Transparency International UK’s efforts to uncover corruption and returning stolen funds to where they belong. Greater accuracy relating to UK company information will help identify where those with suspect funds are using British companies to manage their assets. Journalists from overseas will also be able to better understand who controls UK companies carrying out economic activity in their countries, which has been a major problem for some jurisdictions including Uzbekistan.[5] A register showing the true owners of overseas companies owning UK property will also be a major benefit to journalists and NGOs alike searching for stolen wealth hidden in the UK property market. This register, and the subsequent journalistic investigations it will enable, will also help UK law enforcement identify targets for asset recovery efforts. However, at present these reforms are nothing more than commitments waiting in the wings. There is some way to go to convert the promises into practice. TI-UK is urging the Government to legislate on pledged reforms at the earliest opportunity, as well as ensure that they are adequately resourced once in place. New legislation will be ineffective if there are limited funds available to enforce it. Only time will tell whether the Government has the political will to ensure that the UK fosters an environment conducive to uncovering corruption, rather than hiding it. Ben Cowdock is the Investigations Lead in the UK Anti-Corruption Programme at Transparency International UK (TI-UK). He became a research officer for TI-UK in January 2016. He is responsible for leading research into corrupt money entering the UK. Ben joined TI-UK as an intern in September 2015, helping support the work of the UK advocacy and research team. He holds an MA in Governance and Corruption from the University of Sussex. Rachel Davies Teka is the Head of Advocacy at TI-UK and focusses on the UK-related work on money laundering, political corruption, and open governance. Rachel is Co-Chair of the Bond Anti-Corruption Group, a collection of like-minded British NGOS who work on the issues of corruption, and sits on the steering group for the UK Open Governance Partnership Civil Society Network. [1] Transparency International UK, At Your Service: Investigating how UK businesses and institutions help corrupt individuals and regimes launder their money and reputations, October 2019, https://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/at-your-service[2]  OCCRP, The Russian Laundromat, August 2014, https://www.occrp.org/en/laundromat/; OCCRP, The Azerbaijani Laundromat, September 2017, https://www.occrp.org/en/azerbaijanilaundromat/; OCCRP, The Troika Laundromat, March 2019, https://www.occrp.org/en/troikalaundromat/[3] Edward Robinson, Gavin Finch and Stefania Spezzati, Crooked Banker Tapped Professionals to Manage Web of Dirty Money, Bloomberg, March 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-03-05/crooked-banker-tapped-professionals-to-manage-web-of-dirty-money#:~:text=Election%20Results%20Watch-,Crooked%20Banker%20Tapped%20Professionals%20to%20Manage%20Web%20of%20Dirty%20Money,Smerelda%20is%20a%20billionaires'%20paradise[4] Justin Parkinson, FinCEN Files: One of the world's 'dodgiest addresses' is in leafy Hertfordshire, BBC, September 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-54204053; Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Corporate transparency and register reform, Government, September 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/corporate-transparency-and-register-reform[5] Kristian Lasslett, How a Central Asian business empire dines out on British secrecy, openDemocracy, June 2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/how-central-asian-business-empire-dines-out-british-secrecy/ [post_title] => How UK anti-corruption groups work with journalists to push for change [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => how-uk-anti-corruption-groups-work-with-journalists-to-push-for-change [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-23 18:59:48 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-23 17:59:48 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5301 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[8] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5299 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-09 00:02:27 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-08 23:02:27 [post_content] => Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) are legal actions that are taken not necessarily with the goal of winning in court, but which instead aim to intimidate, to induce fear, to tire and consume the financial and psychological resources of the target. SLAPPs are initiated by influential elites, often state actors, business entities or powerful individuals, and their targets include journalists, human rights defenders, civil society organisations, activists, academics and anyone else who expresses an opinion on a public matter that is uncomfortable for this elite. The desired outcome is to silence the speaker and have a chilling effect on other critical and dissenting voices. A Europe-wide problemSLAPPs are not defined aspects of law themselves. Instead, they can be characterised by the manner in which a range of laws concerning typically defamation, but also other torts, labour laws, privacy and data protection, are used by litigants to threaten parties into silence, either through the retraction of published public interest reporting (oftentimes coupled with extensive punitive threats) or the coerced commitment to not publish in the first place. A few examples may serve to demonstrate the scope of SLAPPs being used against journalists across Europe: In Poland, since the Law and Justice (PiS) party came to power in 2015, the country’s second-largest daily newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza has received over 55 legal threats as a result of its work. The cases are brought by powerful state actors such as the Deputy Prime Minister and PiS chairman, Jarosław Kaczyński; the state television broadcaster, Telewizja Polska S.A.; and, other state-owned companies and individuals with close ties to the governing party. The claims in the cases against Gazeta Wyborcza include civil defamation and infringement of personal interests, which is also protected under the Polish Civil Code.[1] In 2019 Inès Léraud, a French independent journalist, was sued for defamation by Christian Buson, a Breton agri-food business owner following her investigation, published as graphic novel Green seaweed - the forbidden story, into the proliferation of seaweed in Brittany. The case was dropped a few days before the start of the trial. Recently, another defamation case was brought against Léraud by the business tycoon Jean Chéritel, CEO of the Chéritel group. The trial is due to start in January 2021.[2] In Malta, currently 25 civil defamation cases are still active against Daphne Caruana Galizia, an investigative journalist who was assassinated on 16 October 2017. At the time of her death, she was facing 47 civil and criminal libel suits filed in various jurisdictions, including Malta and the US.[3] Recently, new legal threats have also been received by the Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation. On 20 and 26 October 2020, the Foundation received two letters from Maggesi Maggi Mazza & Partners, an international law firm representing Domenico Lagrotteria and Vincenzo Giuliano, two businessmen mentioned in articles written by Caruana Galizia, who base part of their claim to have those articles removed on the European Union (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).[4] In addition to civil cases, criminal defamation cases are also used as part of a wider strategy to limit public pariticipation. For example, in Slovenia three journalists from the investigative news website Necenzurirano (Uncensored) are facing a total of 39 vexatious defamation lawsuits. The criminal defamation complaints were filed throughout August and September 2020, by Rok Snežić, a tax expert and unofficial financial advisor to the Slovenian Prime Minister. The targets of the lawsuits, journalists Primož Cirman, Vesna Vukovic and Thomas Modica, currently each have 13 cases open against them. If found guilty, the journalists face fines or up to a year in prison. On 25 September, the Slovenian Association of Journalists (DNS) published a statement expressing concern about what it called the “systematic persecution” of the portal’s journalists by Snežić.^[5] A threat to the EU legal orderSLAPPs are not only a Europe-wide issue but they also represent a threat to the EU’s legal order. First, they are a threat to democracy and human rights, by impairing the right to freedom of expression of those who speak up in the public interest and through their chilling effect and impact on public interest activities more broadly. Furthermore, to the extent that they distort and abuse the system of civil law remedies, SLAPPs undermine the mutual trust between EU legal systems and as such, pose a threat to access to justice and judicial cooperation. Additionally, because they undermine scrutiny by independent watchdogs, SLAPPs are a threat to the effective enforcement of EU law, including in connection to the internal market and the protection of the EU budget, which cannot be monitored solely by the European Commission. Lastly, SLAPPs are a threat also to the freedom of movement, as they discourage potential targets from confidently operating in jurisdictions where the risk of SLAPPs is higher. According to a recent study commissioned by the European Commission, SLAPPs are “increasingly used across EU member states, in an environment that is getting more and more hostile towards journalists, human rights defenders and various NGOs.”^[6] Moreover, no EU member state has enacted targeted rules to provide protection against SLAPPs. To address this gap in protection, a broad coalition of civil society organisations have been advocating for the EU to undertake a number of complimentary steps.^[7] In particular, the EU must: reform the Brussels I (recast) and Rome II Regulations to end forum shopping and regulate applicable law in defamation cases; morally and financially support the victims of SLAPPs; and, enact an anti-SLAPP Directive. An anti-SLAPP Directive is needed to establish harmonised EU-wide minimum standards of protection, including appropriate procedural safeguards, supportive and protective measures for targets, as well as deterrent and awareness-raising provisions. Among other things, the Directive should ensure that procedural tools exist in all EU member states to allow courts to consider a motion for dismissal as soon as possible after proceedings are initiated. If the court is satisfied that the claim arises from the defendant’s public participation on matters of public interest, moreover, the burden of proof should be reversed, leaving it to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the action has a reasonable prospect of success and that it was not initiated or maintained for an improper purpose. Further, the Directive should include provisions that ensure that SLAPP litigants who see their claim dismissed are ordered to pay costs to the defendant on a full indemnity basis. Deterrent measures may further also include the imposition of penalties and measures to ensure publicity of court decisions that expose SLAPPs. After some initial recalcitrance, there has been a growing recognition among actors within the EU institutions that there is a need and competence for the EU to act. In response to a letter from Members of the European Parliament, Vice-President of the European Commission Vera Jourova recognised that journalists and civil society organisations “should use their expertise and time in being the needed watchdogs for our democracies, not in fighting abusive litigation.”^[8] The European Commission has indicated that the European Democracy Action Plan, to be launched in December 2020, will contain some measures addressing SLAPPs and it has committed to “take action to protect journalists and civil society against strategic lawsuits against public participation” in its 2021 work programme.^[9] Beyond the EUSeveral texts adopted at the Council of Europe also explicitly refer to the problem of SLAPPs and other forms of intimidating or vexatious litigation against journalists and media outlet, including the Committee of Ministers 2018 Recommendation on the roles and responsibilities of internet intermediaries and the 2012 Declaration on the desirability of international standards dealing with forum shopping in respect of defamation, to ensure freedom of expression. In October 2020, Human Rights Commissioner Dunja Mijatovic stated the need to devise a comprehensive response, comprising the prevention of SLAPPs by allowing their early dismissal, the introduction of measures to punish abuse and practical support to those who are sued.^[10] She also pointed out that already, the European Court of Human Rights has stressed that States are required to create a favourable environment for participation in public debate by all, enabling everyone to express their opinions and ideas without fear. This is particularly relevant in light of Brexit and the fact that SLAPPs have long called London their home. The Town Named Sue offers wealthy and influential claimants a number of promises: significant amounts awarded as damages, prohibitive legal costs to dissuade a full and robust defence, and the proliferation of law firms willing to ferry cases to court or issue threats of legal action against a growing number of organisations, including journalists, media outlets, scientists, academics, campaign groups and individual members of civil society. Defamation law in England and Wales was reformed in 2013. This brought forward a number of much needed reforms including the establishment of a serious harm threshold, a public interest defence, a single publication rule and the tightening up of jurisdictional checks to ensure that “England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place in which to bring an action in respect of the statement.”^[11] However, the reform evidently did not go far enough, as England remains a legal jurisdiction commonly deployed for SLAPPs. However flawed the current status quo, 2021 will bring a number of unknowns. While Section 9 of the Defamation Act (2013) is intended as a check on international claimants using England and Wales as a legal jurisdiction, the section explicitly excludes claimants domiciled in EU member states or contracting parties to the Lugano Convention. When the Brexit transition period ends on 31 December 2020 and in light of the state of negotiations on the future relationship between the UK and the EU at the time of writing, this could potentially open the door to English courts having to rule on the appropriateness of EU-based claimants bringing actions in the UK. This would place a great deal of importance on English courts to ensure that defamation cases heard in England are there for a legitimate reason and not for the plaintiff to try to access the benefits of the jurisdiction, namely substantial damages and high costs for defendants. As mentioned, with the English jurisdiction come the English law professionals. A case study in the continued influence of UK law firms is Malta and the multitude of SLAPP actions and threats directed at Maltese journalists. When in 2017 Henley & Partners, Malta’s concessionaire for its citizenship by investment programme, threatened Daphne Caruana Galizia with a defamation action in English courts through the London-based law firm Mishcon de Reya, that choice of jurisdiction was not incidental.^[12] On her blog, written less than six months before she was assassinated, Caruana Galizia reported on the contents of leaked emails between Henley & Partners Chairman, Christian Kalin, the then-Maltese Prime Minister and his Chief of Staff regarding this threat: “Keith Schembri and Joseph Muscat instructed Henley & Partners to go after me in the UK courts so as to intimidate me and ruin me financially.”^[13] Henley & Partners threatened similar action against The Shift News through their lawyers in the USA and UK and this choice of jurisdictions was also deployed by Turab Musayev, who instructed a US-based law firm, Lambert Worldwide and a UK-based law firm, Atkins Thomson to send legal letters to Times of Malta, Malta Today, Malta Independent, Lovin Malta and The Shift News in relation to their reporting and journalistic enquiries.^[14] The time is nowAt a time when media freedom and the right to information are increasingly under pressure across Europe, there is a clear and urgent need for policy and legislative intervention at the supranational and national levels that addresses strategic lawsuits against public participation. Such intervention must include financial and other support to the victims of SLAPPs and the establishment of procedural safeguards and jurisdictional rules designed to rectify the power imbalance between plaintiff and defendant that SLAPPs exploit to the detriment of public participation. Powerful elites must no longer be allowed to abuse the judicial process to silence their critics. Nik Williams coordinates the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) at the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), which monitors and responds to violations of media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries. He holds an MSc in International Public Policy from University College London (UCL). Previously, Williams led Scottish PEN's campaigning and advocacy, focusing on defamation reform, anti-SLAPP, free expression, digital rights and surveillance policy. Laurens Hueting is Advocacy Officer for the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF). Previously, Hueting worked in legal and programme coordination roles for PEN International, ARTICLE 19 and the International Commission of Jurists. He holds an LLM in European law from Maastricht University and degrees in law and in history from Ghent University. Paulina Milewska is anti-SLAPP researcher at the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom. Prior to joining ECPMF, Milewska was board member of Wysokie Obcasy foundation and deputy coordinator of the project initiated by the U.S. Embassy in Poland - American Center Warsaw. [1] MFRR supports Gazeta Wyborcza Poland who has received over 55 threats of legal action, Media Freedom Rapid Response, https://www.mfrr.eu/poland-mfrr-supports-gazeta-wyborcza-against-slapp-actions[2] France: journalist Ines Leraud targeted by vexatious lawsuit, Mapping Media Freedom, May 2020, https://mappingmediafreedom.ushahidi.io/posts/23335[3] Malta: 25 active defamation cases against Daphne Caruana Galizia, Mapping Media Freedom, October 2020, https://mappingmediafreedom.ushahidi.io/posts/23543[4] Malta: Legal threats based on GDPR issued against Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, Mapping Media Freedom, November 2020, https://mappingmediafreedom.ushahidi.io/posts/23595^[5] Roberta Knoll, “We will not yield to pressure”, ECPMF, November 2020, https://www.ecpmf.eu/22-slovene-editors-write-joint-public-letter/^[6] Petra Bard, Judit Bayer, Ngo Chun Luk and Lina Vosyliute, Ad-Hoc Request SLAPP in the EU Context, EU-Citizen: Academic Network on European Citizenship Rights, May 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/ad-hoc-literature-review-analysis-key-elements-slapp_en.pdf^[7] Advocacy, Ending Gag Lawsuits in Europe – Protecting Democracy and Fundamental Rights, ECPMF, June 2020, https://www.ecpmf.eu/ending-gag-lawsuits-in-europe-protecting-democracy-and-fundamental-rights/^[8] Vera Jourova, Letter by Vera Jourova, Vice-President of the European Commission to Members of the European Parliament, 2020, https://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/content/download/6026/55176/version/1/file/Jourova+letter+on+SLAPP.pdf^[9] Secretariat-General of European Commission, 2021 Commission work programme – key documents, European Commission, October 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2021-commission-work-programme-key-documents_en^[10] Human Rights Comment: Time to take action against SLAPP, Commissioner for Human Rights, October 2020, https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/time-to-take-action-against-slapps^[11] Defamation Act 2013, UK Public General Acts, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/section/9^[12] Henley and Partners threatens legal action against The Shift, The Shift, December 2017, https://theshiftnews.com/2017/12/24/henley-and-partners-threatens-legal-action-against-the-shift/; Juliette Garside, Murdered Maltese reporter faced threat of libel action in UK, The Guardian, June 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/01/murdered-maltese-reporter-faced-threat-of-libel-action-in-uk^[13] Daphne Caruana Galizia, Why it was in November that the Prime Minister’s chief of staff instructed Henley & Partners to threaten to ruin me financially by suing me in a London court, Running Commentary, May 2017, https://daphnecaruanagalizia.com/2017/05/november-prime-ministers-chief-staff-instructed-henley-partners-threaten-ruin-financially-suing-london-court/^[14] Henley and Partners threatens legal action against The Shift, The Shift, December 2017, https://theshiftnews.com/2017/12/24/henley-and-partners-threatens-legal-action-against-the-shift/; Malta: British/Azeri  entrepreneur threatens defamation actions against five media outlets, Mapping Media Freedom, July 2020, https://mappingmediafreedom.ushahidi.io/posts/23406 [post_title] => The increasing rise, and impact, of SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-increasing-rise-and-impact-of-slapps-strategic-lawsuits-against-public-participation [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-23 18:59:53 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-23 17:59:53 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5299 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 29 [filter] => raw )[9] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5295 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-09 00:01:03 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-08 23:01:03 [post_content] => “As we forge a dynamic new vision for a truly global Britain, this Government are [sic] absolutely committed to the United Kingdom becoming an even stronger force for good in the world,” Dominic Raab said when he announced the first sanctions under the Global Human Rights Sanction Regime to the House of Commons earlier this year.^[1] The UK’s decision to sanction 20 Saudi nationals involved in the death of journalist Jamal Khashoggi was widely commended, but was subsequently undermined by reports that Defence Minister Ben Wallace had phoned his Saudi counterpart to apologise for the sanctions.^[2] In fact, despite having pledged to “counter threats to media freedom” both “globally and locally” at the Global Conference for Media Freedom in July 2019, the UK government has repeatedly undermined its pledge at home.^[3] Since the start of 2020 alone, journalists from at least four media outlets were denied access to a government briefing in February, a journalist was banned from asking questions at a government press briefing in May, and in September an investigative news outlet was blacklisted by a government department seemingly as a result of their reporting of the UK’s role in the Saudi-led coalition.[4] That’s to say nothing of the ongoing detention of Julian Assange or the Brexit-related legislation that would, by the government’s own admission “break international law”, which prompted the resignation of Amal Clooney from her role as Special Envoy on Media Freedom. A UK Industry Aimed at Silencing Investigative Journalism One of the most pervasive issues faced by investigative journalists is not as overt as being denied, banned, or blacklisted by the government. Vexatious legal threats and actions are insidious, frequently being used to quash investigations yet rarely brought to light. “I would say that over the years I have had hundreds of threatening letters from lawyers. They are intended to frustrate any attempts to tell the truth about things,” said Meirion Jones of The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Many of these, he says are brought by wealthy individuals trying to silence their reporting. “If you make billions and billions of dollars a year, spending a few million on a case to try and shut down criticism is nothing.” There is little doubt that the scale of these vexatious lawsuits – known as strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) – is increasing, an increase supported by a London-based industry aimed at silencing investigative journalism. “It does appear that there are specialist PR/legal entities, especially operating out of London, who respond to journalistic requests with legal threats,” said Scottish investigative journalist Chris Smith.^[5] “I’ve been doing this for 30 years – that’s definitely a big change in the last while.” Journalists based outside the UK are not immune from receiving communications from these specialist PR/legal entities. Of the investigative journalists recently surveyed by the Foreign Policy Centre for their report into the pressures faced by journalists uncovering financial crime and corruption, 67 per cent in the US and 48 per cent in Europe reported receiving legal communications from UK-based PR/legal firms.^[6] Journalists in the Middle East North Africa and Africa also reported receiving such communications from the UK (25 per cent and 20 per cent respectively). “British law firms have a reputation for muscling in on journalists and silencing critics with the threat of ruinous court action,” MaltaToday’s executive editor Matthew Vella said, amid legal threats to his own publication in 2018.^[7] Similarly, in an interview with Index on Censorship earlier this year, Jesper Nymark of the Danish investigative media outlet Danwatch said that they have also received such communications from British lawyers. “We can publish something in Danish without any legal risk but if we publish the same in English for example, we have experienced getting [legal letters] from British and Irish companies via a UK attorney.” Far from being “an even stronger force for good in the world”, the UK is harbouring an industry that profits from the intimidation of journalists and suppression of information. It must take action – including legislative action – to protect journalists from wealthy and powerful individuals who are bending the laws to their interests. Several jurisdictions, including states in Canada, Australia, and the United States, have already introduced anti-SLAPP legislation. Such legislation, if implemented effectively, protects those facing a SLAPP from excessive costs and unduly time-consuming legal processes, while simultaneously safeguarding an individual’s entitlement to defend any infringements on their rights in the courts. The EU is considering similar legislation. The UK should do the same. Economic Factors Are Further Undermining Investigative Journalism While reform of legislation will be important – even essential – to protecting press freedom, it will not be a silver bullet. “These are all issues really fundamentally to do with the economic crisis within the newsprint industry,” said freelance journalist Chris Smith. Already struggling before the pandemic, many news outlets are facing an existential threat due to lack of funding. In a recent survey by the Reuters Institute, more than a third of news media organisations said that they expected a “severe drop of 30% or more” in their 2020 revenues.^[8] When funds are depleted, investigative reporting which is time-consuming and therefore costly is often the first to go. Some investigative journalists, particularly freelancers, are finding the current situation unsustainable. “I had a really good [investigative] story recently for which I was paid £250. It took me two weeks to do it,” Smith said. “You can get £250 for a story you did in a day. So why would you do that? And then if you’re also getting legal threats. Why? It would make no financial sense for a freelance journalist in particular to do that.” Even the BBC has not escaped the crisis. With the announcement of 520 job losses in July, the investigative programme Newsnight was reported to have been subject to hefty cuts.^[9] The reduced funding was, at least in part, due to the drop in commercial income caused by the pandemic but it came after months of government vitriol, including multiple hints from ministers about the scrapping the license fee – the BBC’s primary source of funding.^[10] “The real pressure – the real lever that politics holds is on funding,” said Noel Curran of the European Broadcasting Union (of which the BBC is a member) in a recent seminar on public service broadcasting, stressing the need for decisions on funding to be taken out of politicians’ hands in order for public service media be fully independent.^[11] “People from outside of the UK look at the debate around the future of the BBC, which makes it sounds like its existential - like it’s an existential debate - and they are absolutely baffled,” Curran said, underlining the fact that the BBC is among the most trusted sources of crisis news in the UK.^[12] The National Committee for the Safety of Journalists: A Step in the Right Direction?The establishment of a National Committee for the Safety of Journalists in 2020 is positive as it gives press freedom organisations, including Index on Censorship, the opportunity to regularly voice their concerns directly to the government. The Committee will have a key role in drawing up a National Action Plan for the safety of journalists, due to be published in Spring 2021, which the government hopes will be a model for other countries. The establishment of the Committee is a step in the right direction, but the government has undermined its progress by repeatedly refusing to be interviewed by the media. Shortly after being elected, the government began boycotting the BBC’s flagship Today programme on the basis that the show speaks to a “pro-Remain metropolitan bubble”. No sooner had the boycott of the Today programme ended, than the boycott of ITV’s Good Morning Britain began in response to an “unnecessarily confrontational” interview with the health secretary about his handling of the pandemic.^[13] Moreover, one of the issues that Index on Censorship has raised at the Committee is that of the UK’s lacklustre engagement with the Council of Europe Platform to promote the Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists.[14] The Platform enables Council of Europe member states to be alerted in a timely and systematic way to media freedom violations, to take prompt action when necessary, and to update the Platform thereafter.^[15] So far this year there have been twelve media freedom alerts in relation to violations in the UK. Only five have received a response. Neither a National Committee nor a National Action Plan can make up for lack of engagement with existing mechanisms aimed at defending media freedom. If the UK wants to be an example to other countries, it must lead from the front. Northern Ireland: A Country of Pressing ConcernThe situation facing the media in Northern Ireland is of particular concern. Despite accounting for less than three per cent of the UK’s population, it’s notable that Northern Ireland accounts for a third of the UK’s alerts on the Council of Europe Platform so far this year, all of which arise from violent threats from paramilitary organisations. In October, journalist Patricia Devlin filed a complaint to the Police Ombudsman due to what she feels has been the failure of the police to adequately investigate serious threats to her and her family, including her new born baby, as a result of her work. Having spent decades reporting on Northern Ireland, journalist Ed Moloney knows all too well the physical dangers associated with investigating paramilitaries.^[16] But in 2016, he also experienced legal threats in the form of a lawsuit was filed against him after he asked someone he was investigating to provide a comment on racketeering allegations. “I had been writing about the IRA for a long long time and I got quite a lot of information about them over the years,” explained Moloney, who published A Secret History of the IRA in 2002. “They had all sorts of reasons to come for me.” Mr Moloney believes that this was a case of libel laws being used to pursue a vendetta against him as a result of his journalism. The legal action against Moloney was ultimately dropped in June 2020, but it nonetheless succeeded in wasting valuable time, money, and energy. “The libel laws in Northern Ireland are anti-diluvian. They are really so backward,” Moloney said. Northern Ireland’s defamation law is mostly determined by legislation conceived in the 1950s and 1960s when, as Lord Lexden pointed out as he was making the case for reform in 2013, “computing was in its infancy”.^[17] This legislation remains in force despite calls for measures equivalent to the provisions of the Defamation Act 2013 to be introduced.^[18] The Defamation Act 2013, which applies to England and Wales, has helped stem the flow of lawsuits by introducing a serious harm threshold and placing restrictions upon the types of cases that can be brought to court in that jurisdiction. Similar provisions must be brought forward in Northern Ireland. Conclusion“To focus on solving problems at home is not enough,” the government’s media freedom pledge states, but improving media freedom and safety of journalists domestically is a prerequisite to being seen as a bona fide actor in advancing media freedom internationally. The government must empower journalists to investigate and report in the public interest by ensuring that any threats against them are thoroughly investigated and the perpetrators brought to justice. It should reform laws or adopt new measures to prevent journalists from facing legal harassment as a result of their work. It must respect the role of the public broadcaster and ensure that adequate funding is available to public interest investigative journalism, which is essential to a healthy democracy. “Where governments are not the source of the problem, they often fail to provide the solutions needed to counter the actions of those who attack media freedom,” the pledge says. The UK government must pay heed to ensure that their Global Pledge on Media Freedom is more than just a Brexit-era PR campaign. Jessica Ní Mhainín is Index on Censorship’s Senior Policy Research and Advocacy Officer. She has experience in international human rights advocacy through her work at Front Line Defenders and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). She holds a Master’s degree in EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies from the College of Europe (Bruges), where she specialised in peace and conflict studies.  Image by FCO under (CC). [1] Dominic Rabb, Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, Volume 678: debated Monday 6 July 2020, Hansard, UK Parliament,  https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2020-07-06/debates/24B78A01-061C-48A8-AA92-8E53C17516E3/GlobalHumanRightsSanctionsRegime?highlight=media%20freedom#contribution-6023AE47-5B98-4500-9204-5F73E302897A[2] Jon Stone, UK government accused of phoning Saudi Arabia to apologise after imposing human rights sanctions, Independent, July 2020, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/uk-saudi-arabia-human-rights-ben-wallace-yemen-war-crimes-a9611221.html[3] FCO and FCDO, Policy Paper: Global pledge on media freedom, Gov.uk, July 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-pledge-on-media-freedom/global-pledge-on-media-freedom[4] Some Media Outlets Denied Access to a Government Briefing, United Kingdom, n° 11/2020, Council of Europe, February 2020, https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/detail-alert?p_p_id=sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_col_id=column-4&p_p_col_count=1&_sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet_alertId=58681722; OpenDemocracy Journalist Banned from Asking Questions at UK Government’s Daily Press Briefings, United Kingdom, n° 62/2020, Council of Europe, May 2020, https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/detail-alert?p_p_id=sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_col_id=column-4&p_p_col_count=1&_sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet_alertId=65156158; Investigative Media Outlet “Declassified UK” Blacklisted by the Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, n° 100/200, Council of Europe, September 2020, https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/detail-alert?p_p_id=sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_col_id=column-4&p_p_col_count=1&_sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet_alertId=70791320[5] Journalist’s name has been changed as he asked to remain anonymous.[6] Unsafe for Scrutiny, FPC, November 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/unsafe-for-scrutiny/[7] MaltaToday Staff, UK legal threat against MaltaToday over Azeri-Pilatus connection report, MaltaToday, May 2018, https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/86652/uk_legal_threat_against_maltatoday_over_azeripilatus_connection_report#.X60eNtP7RQK[8] Prof. Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, Federica Cherubini and Dr. Simge Andi, Few winners, many losers: the COVID-19 pandemic’s dramatic and unequal impact on independent news media, Reuters Institute and University of Oxford, November 2020, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/few-winners-many-losers-covid-19-pandemics-dramatic-and-unequal-impact-independent-news-media#menu[9] Jim Waterson, BBC announces further 70 job cuts in news division, The Guardian, July 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/jul/15/bbc-announces-further-70-job-cuts-in-news-division[10] Elizabeth Howcroft and Costas Pitas, Government hints BBC licence fee could be scrapped, Reuters, February 2020, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-bbc-licence/uk-to-consult-on-decriminalising-bbc-licence-fee-evasion-idUKKBN1ZZ00X; Tim Shipman, No 10 tells BBC licence fee will be scrapped, The Times, February 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/no-10-tells-bbc-licence-fee-will-be-scrapped-hzwb9bzsx[11] Noel Curran, The value and the future of public sector media, Reuters Institute and University of Oxford, November 2020, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/calendar/value-and-future-public-service-media[12] Noel Curran, The value and the future of public sector media, Reuters Institute and University of Oxford, November 2020, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/calendar/value-and-future-public-service-media[13] Kate Ng, Government minister confronted on air by GMB reporter over cabinet refusing to appear on show, Independent, May 2020, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/good-morning-britain-piers-morgan-robert-buckland-boycott-itv-a9523736.html[14] Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists, Council of Europe portal, https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom[15] The Platform has 14 civil society partner organisations, including Index on Censorship.[16] Admin, The Official IRA planned the murders of journalists Ed Moloney and Vincent Browne, Village, May 2020, https://villagemagazine.ie/the-official-ira-plot-to-murder-an-irish-times-journalist/[17] Defamation Act 2013: Northern Ireland, Volume 746: debated on Thursday 27 June 2013, Hansard, UK Parliament, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2013-06-27/debates/13062786000273/DefamationAct2013NorthernIreland[18] Andrew Scott, Reform of defamation law in Northern Ireland, LSE Research Online, August 2016, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67385/1/Scott_Reform%20of%20defamation%20law_2016.pdf [post_title] => The UK and media freedom: An urgent need to lead by example [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-uk-and-media-freedom-an-urgent-need-to-lead-by-example [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-23 18:59:58 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-23 17:59:58 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5295 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[10] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5274 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-08 09:30:27 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-08 08:30:27 [post_content] => As pundits and world leaders start to interpret what kind of foreign policy platform President-elect Joe Biden will enact, there is good reason to look back on his eight years as Vice President under Barack Obama to see just how his extensive foreign policy experience is and why it led one media profile to ask if he was the most influential Vice President in history.[1] Joe Biden initially rebuffed Obama’s request that he be vetted as a potential running mate, believing he could be more influential as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee than as Vice President. Biden also later revealed that when discussing the running mate offer with his family it was his sons who argued that his foreign policy experience would help the ticket - and arguably it did.[2] During his eight year stint as Vice President, Joe Biden travelled to over two dozen countries as America’s envoy to help solve diplomatic crises.[3] Yet before being selected as Obama’s running mate, Biden was perceived as ‘a victim of terminal logorrhoea’, creating a reputation as an affable but serial gaffe-maker.[4] It soon became clear, however, that out of the three shortlisted vice presidential candidates (Virginia Governor Tim Kaine, Indiana Senator Evan Bayh, and Biden) that it was the Delaware senator that had the most foreign policy experience. Biden had been in the Senate for 36 years by that point, including four years as Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee. This foreign policy experience was important for Obama to harness as a way of countering criticism at his inexperience on the international stage. With a staff that included five foreign policy assistants Biden clearly staked a claim to be Obama’s most vocal foreign policy advocate – something the President himself acknowledged. When asked in 2014 where he felt his Vice President’s greatest impact had been, Obama replied: ‘On the foreign policy front, I think Joe’s biggest influence was in the Afghanistan debate.’[5] Just a week before their inauguration in January 2008, President-elect Obama sent Biden on a fact-finding mission to both Iraq and Afghanistan to assess the state of the two wars the new administration was going to inherit. This utilisation of Biden as a foreign policy point-man would be a trend that would continue for much of their term of office. Six months into his presidency, Obama gave Biden the responsibility for overseeing the American military withdrawal from Iraq - a war that Biden described as ‘the most frustrating issue of my forty year career in foreign relations.’[6] However, it was the war in Afghanistan – the original theatre of battle in the War on Terror – that came to dominate Obama’s foreign policy horizon. Biden immediately became the ‘in-house pessimist’ on Afghanistan and sought ways to minimise American involvement.[7] After receiving commanding officer Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s request for additional troops in Afghanistan in August 2009, President Obama spent the next two months chairing ten formal meetings in which key members of the administration, including Biden, discussed a review of the Afghan war strategy. Biden exploited his participation in these meetings as a way of demonstrating his influence in the foreign policy domain, even if it meant creating friction with other cabinet members. In these meetings Biden received the active encouragement of Obama to argue the case for an overt counter-terrorism approach to Afghanistan (which emphasised the targeted killing of key Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders) in contrast to the counter-insurgency option preferred by Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (which emphasised nation-building as a prelude to a reduction in violence). Biden and Gates clashed repeatedly over Afghanistan, especially over the need to inject a ‘surge’ of troops into the country. Gates claimed in his memoirs that Biden was deliberately stoking ‘distrust’ between the White House and senior military officers over the way forward in Afghanistan.[8] Once Obama had set the course for a ‘surge’ in Afghanistan of an additional 30,000 extra troops Gates went further by accusing Biden of disloyalty by actively working to show that the President ‘had been wrong…and that the war on the ground was going from bad to worse.’[9] In March 2011 Biden convened a meeting at the Vice President’s residency inside the grounds of the Naval Observatory to discuss the Afghan strategy. Biden placed himself at the centre of this ‘off-campus’ debate in order to press Gates for a drawdown in troop numbers. The Defense Secretary resented Biden using his position as Vice President to muscle in on foreign and defense policy issues and for ‘poisoning the well with the President with regard to… Afghanistan.’[10] Despite these high profile clashes with Defense Secretary Gates (whose side-swipe at Biden in his memoirs for being ‘wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades’ grabbed headlines upon publication) Vice President Biden still enjoyed an enormous level of leverage over the direction of foreign policy in the Obama White House.[11] Biden would claim after he left office that Obama ‘did not look over my shoulder’ once he had tasked him with large foreign policy portfolios.[12] Like Dick Cheney before him, Biden continued to regularly attend the Principal’s Committee of the President’s top national security team.[13] He also tried to cultivate a diplomatic philosophy, which held that ‘all foreign policy is a logical extension of personal relationships.’[14] This was his way of building close working connections with world leaders ahead of talks – and is a trait we can expect to see manifest again once Biden enters the Oval Office in January. Andrew Mumford is a Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham and a former fellow at the Eccles Centre for American Studies at the British Library. Twitter: @apmumford Image by Gage Skidmore under (CC). [1] Michael Hirsh, Joe Biden: The Most Influential Vice President in History?, The Atlantic, December 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/12/joe-biden-the-most-influential-vice-president-in-history/266729/[2] Joe Biden. 2017. Promise Me, Dad. Pan Macmillan. https://www.panmacmillan.com/authors/joe-biden/promise-me-dad/9781509890088[3] Jody C. Baumgartner, The Vice Presidency in the Twenty-First Century, Pepperdine Law Review, Volume 44, Issue 3 Symposium: The United States Vice Presidency: In History, Practice and the Future, Article 4, 2017, https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2442&context=plr[4] John Heilemann and Mark Halperin, Game Change: Obama and the Clintons, McCain and Palin, and the Race of a Lifetime, Harper Collins, October 2010, https://www.harpercollins.com/products/game-change-john-heilemannmark-halperin?variant=32205918076962[5] Evan Osnos, The Biden Agenda: Reckoning with Ukraine and Iraq, keeping an eye on 2016, The New Yorker, July 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/07/28/biden-agenda[6] James Traub, After Cheney, The New York Times Magazine, November 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/29/magazine/29Biden-t.html; Joe Biden. 2017. Promise Me, Dad. Pan Macmillan. https://www.panmacmillan.com/authors/joe-biden/promise-me-dad/9781509890088[7] Peter Baker, Biden No Longer a Lone Voice on Afghanistan, The New York Times, October 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/world/14biden.html[8] Robert M. Gates. 2015. Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. Penguin Random House. https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/217977/duty-by-robert-m-gates/[9] Ibid.[10] Ibid.[11] Ibid.[12] Joe Biden. 2017. Promise Me, Dad. Pan Macmillan. https://www.panmacmillan.com/authors/joe-biden/promise-me-dad/9781509890088[13] Evan Osnos, The Biden Agenda: Reckoning with Ukraine and Iraq, and keeping an eye on 2016, The New Yorker, July 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/07/28/biden-agenda[14] Steve Clemons, The Biden Doctrine: Has the vice president made a lasting contribution in foreign policy?, The Atlantic, August 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/08/biden-doctrine/496841/ [post_title] => The Foreign Policy of Joe Biden: Assessing His Vice Presidential Legacy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-foreign-policy-of-joe-biden-assessing-his-vice-presidential-legacy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:21:28 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:21:28 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5274 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[11] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5249 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-03 00:08:43 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-02 23:08:43 [post_content] => The NSxNG approach to making future UK foreign policy and wider national strategy In the context of Brexit and COVID-19, there is a growing sense that we need to collectively build ‘a new normal’ with a more uniting national narrative, and to ‘relaunch’ a refreshed Britain not just domestically but on the world stage. But to do that, we will need more than a new strategy document developed in the traditional way (closed-door, top-down) and closely held at the heart of Government. The national strategy we need will shape and define our country’s role in the world after a crossroads moment in our national story. The country – all generations, all ages – will have jointly experienced a period of uncertainty unprecedented in recent decades. As a result, many people are more willing to move beyond short-term self-interest and divisive narratives to focus on a better shared future. The time is thus ripe for a new approach to designing a long-term, outward-facing national strategy for the UK. Two of the most critical tools of future foreign-policy making will be structured long-term thinking (strategic foresight) and public participation (giving citizens a voice). In policymaking, these two are most effectively used in conjunction – as participatory foresight. Such approaches are – as yet – poorly utilised in national strategy development in the UK Government. While other areas of policymaking in the UK are opening up to public voice and participation, national strategy has remained an elite, government-led, behind-closed-doors endeavour. We at the School of International Futures (SOIF) and our partners in the National Strategy for the UK’s Next Generations (NSxNG) programme – who include the Democratic Society, the APPG for Future Generations, Today for Tomorrow, the University of Cambridge Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, Agora think-tank, Restless Development, Shout Out UK, RUSI and the Kings College London’s Grand Strategy Centre – are working to bring a diverse public voice, and in particular the voices of future generations, into the process of shaping our country’s future place in the world. Following the completion of a pilot phase focused on engaging public thinking about the UK’s future global role, we are launching a full programme in 2021. Our pilot phase activities engaged over 500 young people across the UK and included a ‘tester’ Citizens’ Assembly session, a series of structured futures workshops, historians’ seminar series, and an online survey. The NSxNG coalition unite around the belief that a resilient, long-term future national strategy (which would maximise the UK’s future position in the world across all the tools at our disposal) should:

1. First, represent the interests of future as well as current generations of UK citizens
2. Second, be participative, supporting all citizens to have a voice in national futures
3. Build a more meaningful, united and plausible national narrative
4. Draw on past, present and future insights about the UK’s role in the world – using the tools of applied history, public participation and strategic foresight.

 There is now strong interest both inside and outside the UK Government in: a) thinking from first principles about Britain’s role in the world, and b) designing a new long-term national vision and positioning that puts at its heart the needs, wellbeing and interests of future generations. Why focus on the long-term and the UK’s next generations? Being on the front foot in planning for the long-term can be hard, when confronted by major strategic shocks such as COVID-19 that dominate the short-term horizon and will have long-term implications. However, all-consuming current crises, however volatile and uncertain the present, the UK cannot afford strategic paralysis and a reactive posture. Strategic confidence and a proactive global posture for the UK require an open, structured approach to understanding the long-term global environment, the threats and opportunities it presents, and the UK’s possible role in it. Looking ahead only five to ten years – tempting in turbulent times – makes it harder for policymakers to think genuinely differently. We need to look out at least 25 years (a generation). SOIF’s work in long-term futures thinking with a range of international governments and organisations (from the UN to the OECD, Malaysia to Germany, Oman to Chile) demonstrates that a shorter time horizon also encourages linear thinking (people are typically tempted to forecast continuation, or worsening, of the current situation). Considering our future on a longer time horizon and exploring alternative scenarios opens up more optimistic dynamics and opportunities. Meanwhile, there is a growing recognition (both in the UK and internationally) of the need to build intergenerational fairness into policymaking, expanding our moral responsibility ‘forward’ to the future generations who will inherit the long-term consequences of our actions. Focusing on the next generations allows us to think through the human implications of decisions made today. It makes long-term consequences (often unintended) immediate and tangible. It makes a compelling moral case for long-termism. The global environment to 2045: why national strategy must be long-termAny scan of the horizon-scanning literature suggests that the next 25 years will bring changes in our external environment that will impact the UK significantly: from environmental and ecosystemic impacts, to emerging technology, shifting demography and value shifts that will have impact nationally as well as globally.[1] At the same time, when we step back and survey the long-term trajectory of the UK’s global role – as the participants in our NSxNG programme have been invited to do – the stark but unavoidable conclusion is that the UK’s global influence is declining relative to others’, and our ability to shape the external environment in which we operate diminishing. The UK’s political leaders – of any stripe – will be under increasing pressure to demonstrate impact and influence in addressing ongoing global challenges: poverty, development, peacekeeping, hybrid conflict, social justice, biodiversity, human rights, and governing emerging technologies such as AI. Government cannot navigate these emerging pressures and uncertain expectations in isolation, or by focusing on the short term. Only by taking a long-term strategic horizon and incorporating citizen engagement can Government develop a resilient national strategy that will equip the country to navigate this complex and ever more challenging environment. The role for public participation as a tool of foreign policy The British people are a key part of our national resilience. If our national security paradigm is – as many in the field tell us - expanding to be more centred on human security; if our national resilience and security depends ever more on the people (whether in terms of public health, innovation, cyber threats, disinformation, or polarised discourse), then the people need to be co-creators of policy. Harnessing the creative input and energy of citizens is not a nice-to-have but a must-have in uncertain times. We must build beyond one-off ‘set-piece’ national conversations or events to thicken the ‘connective tissue’ between Government and the public on national strategy issues (see Recommendations below). Participative conversations about the future require insights about the past. As forecaster Paul Saffo puts it: “To look ahead, one must first look back twice as far”.[2] Meanwhile, the development of future National Security Strategy should be expanded to be treated as the development of Whole-of-Nation Strategy, moving beyond the artificial division of foreign and domestic policy issues and apparatus. Technology, health, migration, data, reputation connect what happens at home to abroad, and are critically important for our posture and position overseas. Effectively linking the domestic and international requires both a whole-of-government approach (across Whitehall departments) and local engagement (in communities). Messages for the UK Government from the ‘next generations’ Five key messages emerged from our recently concluded pilot into a ‘Next Generations’ approach to making national strategy. They demonstrate the ambition, but also the realism, with which young people look at the UK’s future role. 

1. It is time for an honest reassessment – perhaps a ‘managed, relative decline’. This emphasis on tackling head-on the issue of relative decline underlines the urgent need to work on a new national narrative that can inspire pride and hope in the UK’s future global role. That narrative work must emerge from a more participative approach to the development of national strategy.
2. The UK must make the hard choices - and reorient fast to survive. Our work with young people to date in this programme has revealed an appetite for honest language and clear choice-making. Whatever choice is made about the UK’s future role, our respondents underlined that the world is changing fast and the UK cannot afford decades agonising over its own role.
3. Keep putting values at the centre – acting as a force for good and steward for a rules-based system. We heard a strong sense that values and multilateral engagement must remain at the core of what the UK contributes – but that we must also address the domestic issues that undermine our moral authority. Participants emphasised that the UK has a global role to play, convening others — or leading — on climate change, social justice, welfare, challenging aggression, responsible innovation, mediating conflict, and disrupting the spread of corruption and misinformation.
4. Build the assets to support UK influencing, especially on innovation. The UK has significant soft power levers, including through our networks, ideas, innovation and influence. A stronger role in ‘innovation diplomacy' and building effective governance regimes should be supported by investing more in UK research, science and tech and building a strong base in innovation exports; improved social security; a ‘green transition’; and doubling down on education.
5. Recognise we must put our own house in order domestically. Participants stressed that our future global role would hinge on ‘domestic’ issues such as devolution, State of the Union, health, the economy, social security, social mobility, affordable housing.

 Recommendations: making national strategy in a new wayFirst and foremost, we recommend that the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy marks not the end-point of the national strategy development process for the years ahead, but the beginning of a five-year National Strategy journey to build a new national narrative and the supporting apparatus of government – such that the UK is better equipped to deliver integrated, future-facing and agile national strategy and policymaking. Progress in three key areas is necessary to sustain this journey. The UK needs: 1. Political consensus around the need for public dialogue on the UK’s future role in the world – with our political leaders committed to the outputs of such a dialogue. Including:

• Bringing political leaders, including next generation leaders, together to listen to public narratives that are optimistic but realistic;
• Building a broad-based bipartisan understanding of the challenges and opportunities of the UK's 2045 operating environment (trends, drivers, uncertainties, shocks); and
• Develop cross-party approaches and mechanisms for responding to citizens' proposals.

 2. To conduct an independent public dialogue on National Strategy that is well-designed and conducted. Including:

• Use public participation to set high-level parameters, principles and direction.
• Move beyond polling to listen to and understand public perspectives, drawing on expert input and data alongside modes of participative engagement (such as Citizens' Assemblies; injecting discussions of the UK’s place/role in the world into existing local and community forums).
• Look specifically at how different generations and communities see the UK’s past, present and future role in the world and how to give younger Britons a greater sense of national pride and role in our future national story.

 3. To build a national security apparatus that is orientated to support whole-of-government, agile and future-facing national strategy, and that encourages stewardship of future generations' wellbeing. This cuts across many areas, but should include:

• Building in the obligation to consider future generations' wellbeing (setting new obligations on Ministers to act for the long-term, designating Select Committees and other oversight bodies - such as an ombudsman or Future Generations Commissioner).
• Widening out to a concept of National Strategy that cuts across the whole of government and beyond. Taking previous approaches to integration across Government departments (such as Fusion and One HMG) much further into a truly cross-Whitehall strategic endeavour. Align domestic ministries (DfE, BEIS, HO, MOJ) and local authorities behind the UK's National Strategy.
• Introducing incentives into the civil service that drive behaviour and culture change towards more citizen engagement on national strategy/security and foreign policy issues (incorporate notions of ‘stewardship’ and ‘wellbeing of future generations’ into purpose and mission of civil service; develop a participatory long-term policy making guide for the Civil Service.
• Review existing institutions, structures and processes to ensure they are long-term future-oriented. Reorient the Treasury and machinery of government (including NAO, Select Committees) around a long-term, systems approach, and a new National Strategy Council that replaces the NSC. Strengthen the work of existing institutions and teams with long-term perspectives, like MOD’s DCDC, BEIS GO-Science and the Government Foresight network.
• Capability and skills development within the national strategy community and civil service. Broaden policymakers’ use of Horizon Scanning and Foresight. Radically improve the teaching of strategic thinking skills to civil servants, Ministers and MPs. Empower young people through an improved civic education offer, including on thinking about the long-term future.

 If we make these changes, we can equip the UK not only to make national strategy better in the future, but to make more impact on the world stage in a generation’s time. Cat Tully is the founder of SOIF, the School of International Futures. Cat has extensive experience as a practitioner, helping governments, civil society and businesses to be more strategic, more effective, and better prepared for the future. Prior to setting up SOIF, Cat was Strategy Project Director at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Senior Policy Adviser in the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Before working in government, she worked in strategy and international relations across the not-for-profit and business sectors, including Christian Aid, Technoserve, and Procter and Gamble. Cat has also worked for the UN, the EU Commission and the World Bank. She is a trustee of the Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development, a global board member of Academics Stand Against Poverty, a member of United Nations Learning Advisory Council for the 2030 Agenda, and a member of the Advisory Group of the British Foreign Policy Group.Sophie Middlemiss (SOIF). Sophie leads on SOIF's NSxNG Programme and its wider policy work. She joined SOIF from a decade in the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, where she worked in the Strategy Unit, as a Ministerial speechwriter, and on UK policy towards Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and India.  As a strat comms consultant, she has written for global figures including Bill Gates, Kofi Annan and Mo Ibrahim and been published in TIME, Newsweek and The Observer. She has also worked for the OSCE in Kosovo, joined election observation missions in Macedonia and Ukraine, and written for Rough Guides / Berlitz on travel in Russia, Hungary and (in a forthcoming book) Serbia.  [1] Global Trends. Paradox of Progress, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, United States, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/global-trends-home; Guidance: Global Strategic Trends, The sixth edition of Global Strategic Trends, Ministry of Defence, October 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-strategic-trends; and Global Trends to 2030. Challenges and Choices for Europe, European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), April 2019, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/ESPAS_Report.pdf[2] Paul Saffo, Six Rules for Effective Forecasting, Harvard Business Review, July 2007, https://hbr.org/2007/07/six-rules-for-effective-forecasting [post_title] => The UK needs a national strategy for the next generations to guide future foreign policy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-uk-needs-a-national-strategy-for-the-next-generations-to-guide-future-foreign-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-12-04 11:08:51 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-12-04 10:08:51 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5249 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[12] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5246 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-03 00:07:03 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-02 23:07:03 [post_content] => The Government’s current Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy seeks to position the UK after Brexit and in the context of a Biden-administration taking office. My suggestion to this new direction is for the UK to position itself as a global force on democratic values. It demands bold steps as seen with the UK’s handling of Hong Kong and secondly, it should be undertaken both through the proposed novel D-10 grouping and in a broader alliance of democracies, particularly on how to set the digital standards. Naturally, such an approach does demand consistency at home, so that UK’s own democratic practices underpin the global approach. These last years, the UK’s bandwidth has been consumed by Brexit. Undoubtedly, the effects of the departure will linger for years to come. The author being a Dane, will miss the UK inside the EU. Yet there is no doubt that the referendum on leaving the EU was also a radical democratic exercise. And on that basis, it is now time to shape a new future for the UK. The focus on Brexit has clouded a discussion of the novel ways the UK can contribute globally. The EU has many merits, but quick and bold-decision making is not one of them. The UK is now unhindered to be able to take quicker actions on its own. The UK’s swift actions following China’s implementation of the draconian National Security Law, which basically turned off the lights for Hong Kong’s remaining freedoms, stands out. By speaking truth to raw authoritarian power and calling out the Chinese breach of the Sino-British Joint declaration, the Johnson government took the needed moral high ground. And equally so by following it up with granting up to three million Hong Kong citizens with BNO-passports the right to prolonged residency in the UK and a path to full citizenship. The EU did not come out as forcefully. And the US forfeited its natural leading role on democracy promotion by President Trump’s overall transactional approach and in the case of Hong Kong. This example underlines the kind of role a ‘Global Britain’ should carve out for itself in the international system. Moreover, with a Biden-administration in Washington, there will be new-found demand for the UK playing such a role. That is why the concept of the D-10 – basically expanding the G-7 with the democracies of India, Australia and South Korea, is very timely but so far has remained a slogan without concrete follow up. The UK’s upcoming chairmanship of the G-7 allows it, to put it into practice. Meanwhile, President-Elect Biden also has a much stronger focus on democracy promotion and seeks to restore the US to a leading role among democracies. As part of his electoral platform, a Summit of Democracy is planned which will also include cooperation with civil society and with the technology sector, where our public democratic debate is increasingly, in particular during the pandemic, conducted online. Earlier, President-Elect Biden was also part of the efforts of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation chaired by former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen. Biden spoke at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit in 2018. He was a driving force in establishing the associated Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity and its Election Pledge against election interference and disinformation. Biden signed as a presidential candidate. The next natural step would be to build an international alliance on election interference and more broadly on the rules of the road for our digital democracies. That could be one component for the D-10 to tackle. During the four years of fruitless discussion under President Trump around Russian election interference, China expanded its capabilities to thwart civil liberties through ubiquitous surveillance and face recognition tools. The situation in Xinjiang is the pinnacle of this nefarious approach. And globally, Chinese-run tech companies have expanded. There is a tension here with unfettered free trade and investments flows. Chinese companies often bring along the authoritarian standards of the motherland. The Huawei discussion about allowing that company to build the next 5-G generation of our wireless societies showed that democracies need to safeguard their critical infrastructure. After some initial flip-flopping, the UK took the correct and secure path on this by blocking Huawei. Both that is just a surface symptom of the bigger digital divide between the superpowers, China and the US. This battle for digital supremacy will not end with Trump’s departure from the White House. It is entrenched in the US administration and in Congress across the aisle. These days that is a rare occurrence. And many more topics lure in this battle for digital supremacy from facial recognition, artificial intelligence, to quantum computing. The UK can play a role in settings such standards and mediating between the US and EU regulation. Working with Japan, who has already lead initiatives on securing data flows could be beneficial. Yet there are also growth opportunities for the UK in becoming a hub for such democratic digital standards. A new report shows that ‘safety tech’ businesses is on the rise soon making UK the safest place to be online with more than 70 companies in London, Leeds, Cambridge and Edinburgh holding a quarter of global market share.[1] What is likely to change is that President Biden is expected to seek cooperation with allies to meet the challenge from China and other authoritarians in the technological realm. Trump’s brute tactics of announcing on Twitter, a sudden and uncoordinated ban on TikTok, will be a thing of the past. Instead allies, such as the UK, will likely be tasked by a new administration on how to help craft digital rules which ensure democratic standards around privacy and data collection are respected. In a certain way, this allies-first approach can become more demanding. Under Trump, allies would not always have to take a stance on Trump’s moves on China because he did not seek to coordinate or amplify them through allies. A Biden-administration will. Thus, the UK must be bold and pro-active on this agenda of a concerted democratic pushback on China’s digital authoritarianism. Looking at the many prominent members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China from the UK, it seems to indicate that, at least in Parliament, the moral backbone would be intact for such an approach even it could as a minimum lead to China threating the UK as it has done systemically with Australia, Canada, Sweden and other democracies over the years. Only by the UK working through a united front of democracies, will it be possible to dent China’s aggressiveness. As Tom Tugendhat MP, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, suggested in an article that historically, the UK Royal Navy was a front runner on establishing the rules of the sea waves. Now a similar approach means pulling partners together to shape the modern equivalent- the digital realm.[2] Such initiatives on behalf of the world’s democracies would also have a good underpinning. In the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee’s report, ’A brave new Britain? The future of the UK’s international policy’, an international survey by the British Council shows that a ‘substantial majority of respondents saw the UK as prioritising human rights and democracy in its foreign policy.[3] This was especially pronounced in responses from Commonwealth countries’. This indicates that the UK could also galvanise Commonwealth countries as a unique asset in developing cooperation among democracies. As my former colleague Ben Judah eloquently put it, jumping from G-7 to D-10 under UK stewardship could become ‘a grand strategy for the democracies that will work to keep China in check, India close, and the US steady in the turbulent years to come.’[4] That is also what I suggest that ‘Global Britain’ should carve out a new role for itself. Jonas Parello-Plesner is the Executive Director of the Alliance of Democracies Foundation chaired and founded by former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.  Image by FCO under (CC). [1] New report reveals UK as world leader in online safety innovation, Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and Caroline Dinenage MP, Government, May 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-report-reveals-uk-as-world-leader-in-online-safety-innovation[2] Tom Tugendhat, Britian must play a key role on an increasingly competitive world stage, Raction, October 2020, https://reaction.life/britain-must-play-a-key-role-on-an-increasingly-competitive-world-stage/?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=a264c5e4f2-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_10_22_05_09&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-a264c5e4f2-190445165[3] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, A brave new Britain? The future of the UK’s international policy, Fourth Report of Session 2019-21, House of Commons, October 2020, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/3133/documents/29251/default/?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=a264c5e4f2-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_10_22_05_09&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-a264c5e4f2-190445165[4] Erik Brattberg and Ben Judah, Forget the G-7, Build the D-10, Foreign Policy, June 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/10/g7-d10-democracy-trump-europe/ [post_title] => How the UK becomes a global force for Democracy and Freedom [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => how-the-uk-becomes-a-global-force-for-democracy-and-freedom [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-12-02 21:58:53 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-12-02 20:58:53 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5246 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[13] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5240 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-03 00:06:06 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-02 23:06:06 [post_content] => Ever since the referendum, Boris Johnson, Theresa May and other Conservative Party politicians have presented Brexit as the first step toward building a new ‘Global Britain’. As Johnson declared in a speech in late 2016, pointing to China, “as Global Britain, our range is not confined to the immediate European hinterland as we see the rise of new powers.” But despite these promises, there has been little to no broader foreign policy debate in the country. Instead, Britons seem to have become caught between three temperaments. There are the catastrophists, who argue the UK will become irrelevant on the international stage as a result of Brexit; the nostalgics, who see a powerful Britain through the lens of a great colonial power; and the denialists, who refuse to accept that Britain must adapt to a changing global context. All are characterised by a surfeit of emotion and deficit of strategy⎯ and none have answers to the key questions their government must now answer if the UK is serious about remaining a global power. 2021 could go down in history as a turning point in British foreign policy. Downing Street hopes to finally have the capacity to deliver on ‘Global Britain’ and take it centre stage, with the UK chairing both the G7 and co-hosting the UN Climate Change Conference in Glasgow. The Government will publish a new national strategy, dubbed the Integrated Review, which will generate a roadmap of the UK’s long-term foreign policy commitments and priorities. And just last month, the Government pledged a £16.5 billion increase in the UK’s defence budget. But more needs to be done to make British foreign policy a success: it needs a long-term vision where it clearly sets out priorities and ambitions, and must ensure that it can deliver on them. This essay builds on the ideas set out in an earlier article co-authored for the World Politics Review.[1] A realistic BritainThe UK remains an important player on the global stage. Despite low productivity, the British economy remains dynamic, as London has the highest concentration of fast-growing companies among cities in Europe.[2] The UK is still a respected partner with an extensive diplomatic footprint few can match, spanning most countries in the world. It plays a vital role in European security due to its top-class intelligence services and military presence in Europe and abroad. British officials play agenda-setting roles on the international stage, including at the G7, G20, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the UN Security Council. As a stakeholder in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, and thanks to the strength of its own financial jurisdictions, most of all the City of London, the UK has had enormous regulatory sway over the global financial system. The British government also remains a policy leader on everything from international development, to anti-corruption efforts, to the fight against climate change. Still, it is undeniable that Britain’s reputation, leadership and influence in global affairs have all taken a hit. Since 2016, both of Britain’s most important partnerships, with Europe and the US, have come under huge stress. The complexity of Brexit has meant that much of the UK’s focus over recent years has been on untangling itself from the EU, rather than on crafting a new strategic partnership with the bloc. A month away from the end of the transition period, it is still unclear on what terms the UK will be cooperating with the EU from 1 January 2021. Biden’s victory also changes things. After years of EU bashing under Trump, Biden has promised to repair the transatlantic relationship. His appointment for Secretary of State, Tony Blinken, has singled out the EU as one of the US’ most important partners. This raises important questions for the UK: what role does it want to play in the transatlantic relationship now that it has left the EU, but is still very much part of Europe? A focused BritainIf you want to imagine what ‘Global Britain’ could be, a close look at Britain’s stand over Hong Kong this summer is a good place to start. In terms of actions, allies and openness, the measures taken by London contained the ingredients of what British foreign policy has been in the past and could be in the future: confident, values-driven and capable of swift action. When news broke in May that Beijing was considering levying unprecedented restrictions on Hong Kong through a new national security law, the British government moved quickly to oppose the move and respond. Not only did the UK shift its geopolitical posture toward China, but it played a leadership role by setting the policy of opposing Beijing’s overreach, and getting like-minded countries, like France and Germany, to back it. British diplomacy also engaged strategically with allies, first gathering Australia and Canada and then the US to support its cause—demonstrating that the Anglosphere countries could work as an ‘action group’ to push back against China, and swiftly. The UK’s decision to offer a pathway to citizenship to more than three million Hong Kong citizens was met with widespread acclaim in US policy circles, as it combined a principled defence of the rule of law with greater openness to immigration from Asia. British policy has not reversed China’s strategy toward Hong Kong, but it has sent a strong signal that the UK remains an independent player able to stand up for its interests and values. These events, and the UK’s role in them, reveal that the country has an opportunity to participate in the reshaping of geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific. Australia, France, Germany and the US are all looking at new ways to engage there, but there is currently no global grouping structured around meeting the challenge of China’s influence, the way that NATO checks Russian ambitions. Britain has a unique opportunity to encourage one, if it leverages its strengths to create goodwill and work with allies, like it did for Hong Kong. Steps toward this are happening already. There has been a sharp uptick this year in ministerial meetings of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance between the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. They have gone beyond its usual intelligence-sharing remit to discuss collaboration in the fight against the pandemic, and there is a mutual desire to deepen this cooperation further. Another proposal that has generated interest in Washington—and could be another conduit for action in the Asia-Pacific—is the potential D10 grouping, an alliance of ten democracies made up of the members of the G7, plus Australia, India and South Korea.[3] The UK will also need to strengthen bilateral alliances. First, a successful ‘Global Britain’ would need to build an alliance with Japan. Luckily, London is knocking on an open door. Not only has Tokyo agreed in principle to Britain’s first post-Brexit free trade deal, it also wants Britain to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership ⎯ the successor to the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Trump scuppered after taking office in 2017 ⎯ and has expressed a keen desire to join Five Eyes. The second alliance is with Australia. First and foremost, a ‘Global Britain’ will need to take a more realistic approach to its collective ties with Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Some Brexiteers dream of a new bloc around ‘CANZUK’ akin to the European Economic Community; this is an imperial fantasy. But there is still much that Britain could do to share burdens and coordinate foreign policy and security with Australia. Opportunities could include developing joint agendas and proposals for the future of Five Eyes and the G7. Given the bipartisan consensus within the US on the need for a tougher approach to China, this UK-Australia dialogue could eventually develop into an annual ‘G-Group’ style meeting for the UK, Australia and Canada to coordinate where they stand vis-á-vis the US. The UK and Australia could also make new, joint security investments and deployments in the Asia-Pacific, and allow close-to-free movement between the two countries, as well as between the UK and New Zealand. The UK should also continue working closely with Canada. The two governments recently coordinated their responses to Hong Kong, Belarus’ flawed election and the recent flare-up between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and have co-funded a new Global Media Defence Fund at the UN. This could similarly grow into new joint security investments and deployments to meet threats posed by Russia and a new close-to-free movement travel agreement with Ottawa. In terms of agility, Britain has much to learn from Tokyo, Canberra and Ottawa, as well as Oslo, about being a successful middle power, even if some in the UK still aspire to great-power status. Japan, for example, exists outside regulatory blocs, but has run a focused strategy supported by a successful domestic industrial policy, while Norway has chosen to concentrate its international efforts on conflict resolution and mediation. These are models for what ‘Global Britain’, with the right domestic reforms, could eventually be. Much closer to home, the UK should aspire to become the EU’s partner of choice. The EU is also exploring the idea of smaller groupings, where one or a group of member states work together to tackle a specific foreign policy issue, like capacity-building in the Sahel or establishing safer routes for asylum-seekers. There may be scope for greater British involvement and input into the design of these projects, especially on issues where the UK and EU share common interests. London should embrace the EU’s offer of a comprehensive security and foreign policy deal—and push for one that gets it as close as possible to achieving permanent ‘observer status’ in its policymaking. Britain should not be afraid to push for new formats too. It could, for example, consider broadening the remit of its E3 partnership with France and Germany beyond discussing Iran, to include European and international security. And where the UK is already influential, like in NATO and the UN, it should push for reform. A ‘Global Britain’ that invests in as many channels of influence as possible could come to enjoy privileged partnerships ⎯ or, to use a dated but still emotive term, ‘special relationships’ ⎯ with both Washington and Brussels. Finally, Britain should seek to join as many multilateral trade agreements and bodies as possible. In addition to joining the CPTPP, it should launch a broader strategy in Asia to reinforce, associate or where possible even join key security bodies, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum; ‘the Quad’, a security dialogue among Australia, the US, India and Japan; and the recently proposed Resilient Supply Chains Initiative involving Australia, India and Japan.[4] These ties will also help the UK react to heightened competition between the US and China. By expanding its alliances into the Global South, as well, the UK could buttress its ability to bring countries together. On tackling epidemics, for example, Britain could help countries that have strong research facilities, like the US, France, Germany and Switzerland, coordinate with countries that have frontline experience handling public health crises and new outbreaks, like South Africa. Through other alliances, it could put forward new ideas and launch multilateral regulatory processes on a range of issues that are vital for British interests, from eliminating kleptocracy and money-laundering, to adapting to climate change, to building better supply chains and new critical infrastructure like 5G. This is what ‘Global Britain’ can be: a mid-sized country that reinforces the multilateral system through close alliances with the US and the EU, and new, deeper ties with democracies in the Asia-Pacific. Building trust and credibility with these allies can help the UK make up for its post-Brexit loss of regulatory influence and its vulnerability to US diktats over 5G and other emerging technologies. And at a time when many countries appear to be marching toward more individualism, Britain could choose to play a vital role in strengthening the multilateral system, and ensuring it is a fair and robust one. A Britain that deliversUltimately, though, the UK will be judged not by what it promises on the international stage, but by what it does. The Government’s recent threat to breach the Withdrawal Agreement it negotiated with the EU less than a year ago has been seized upon by critics at home and abroad as proof that the country is heading toward political isolation. The House of Lords has removed the controversial provisions – though the Government has said it would reintroduce them unless talks with the EU over the Northern Ireland Protocol made progress. This has not gone down well in Brussels. And in his phone call to the Prime Minister, President-elect Biden warned that the Brexit outcome must respect the Good Friday Agreement. The Chancellor’s recent announcement that the UK would reduce aid spending from 0.7 per cent to 0.5 per cent of GDP has also disappointed partners across the developing world. Building a good reputation can take years, but it can be lost in a matter of days. In the long-run, this behaviour could have serious consequences for the way the UK is perceived internationally, and damage the attractiveness of its domestic market for foreign direct investment. It might even prevent the British government from negotiating trade deals in the future. To create a ‘Global Britain’, the UK, above all, will need to command the trust of other countries. It will need to continue to invest in its diplomatic network, and it must be mindful of the tone it uses to convey its global ambitions. The UK must ensure that it has the means to live up to those ambitions. COVID-19 will inevitably redirect the Government's purse, with knock-on effects on public finances. British leaders will need to make careful and considered choices about where to invest and reallocate funding, ensuring that they prioritise the issues and regions singled out in its foreign policy review. The UK will also need to be honest about trade. Even if, by some miracle, it replicates all the deals the EU has with its trading partners and secures new deals with the US, India, China and the Gulf states, those arrangements would only increase Britain’s GDP by 0.2 per cent after 15 years, according to government projections.[5] If the UK is serious about becoming an export-oriented economy that is productive and grows in the long-run, its trade deals will need to be supported by a strong and well-considered industrial strategy. The UK will need to protect some other budget lines; for example, it should continue to protect funding for the BBC World Service and the British Council, which are vital tools of soft power. It could do more to protect journalists abroad, perhaps through the Global Media Defence Fund with Canada. It should also quickly move to restore aid spending to 0.7 per cent. Beyond that, the UK should increase its efforts to support and fund research on artificial intelligence, quantum computing and life sciences to remain competitive in these areas with the tech powerhouses of the US and China. The UK must also make sure that it can act decisively. Johnson’s decision in June to merge the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development into one foreign policy department may be one step in the right direction, as it will centralise decision making, staffing and budgeting. But the Government must think about how to hone and hold onto that expertise. These offices typically experience very high levels of staff turnover, with officials often choosing to work on very different policy briefs every three years. This has long contributed to a loss of institutional memory and some short-sightedness, as demonstrated by the UK’s decision to drastically reduce the size of its Soviet desk shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. To avoid this kind of thing happening again, the UK should consider building up its in-house expertise, as well as drawing on foreign policy expertise outside of government, in think tanks, universities, civil society and the private sector. Finally, the UK needs a much more inclusive public debate to generate support for foreign policy. Successive governments have not always done a good job of explaining what they were doing on the global stage or why it mattered. While Johnson’s government has promised a ‘Global Britain’ that delivers for Britons all across the country, it still must demonstrate how its new foreign policy plan will benefit the UK as a whole, especially Scotland and the other devolved governments. With the Brexit saga slowly drawing to an end, Britain needs to think about its future. The world needs the UK to be an agile actor, with the right resources and strong networks to be effective on the global stage. When it comes to strategy, political promises and vision are not enough; it will also need to show leadership, trustworthiness and a commitment to being a force for good in the world. British leaders will need to have a strong sense of the country’s significant strengths and weaknesses, as well as a determination to use that knowledge to the greatest advantage. The longer Britain waits, the harder it will be to convince the global community that it is serious about the role it wants to play. This essay was adapted from an article In the Aftermath of Brexit, What Can ‘Global Britain’ Be? published by World Politics Review in October 2020. Ben Judah is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “This is London: Life and Death in the World City.”Georgina Wright is a senior researcher on the Brexit team at the Institute for Government and a visiting fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. [1] Ben Judah and Georgina Wright, In the Aftermath of Brext, What Can ‘Global Britain’ Be?, World Politics Review, October 2020, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29149/how-a-global-britain-could-cope-with-the-brexit-consequences’[2] Maxine Kelly, FT 1000: the fourth annual list of Europe’s fastest-growing companies, Financial Times, March 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/691390ca-53d9-11ea-90ad-25e377c0ee1f[3] Erik Brattberg and Ben Judah, Forget the G-7, Build the D-10, Foreign Policy, June 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/10/g7-d10-democracy-trump-europe/[4] Amitendu Palit, The Resilient Supply Chain Initiative: Reshaping Economics Through Geopolitics, The Diplomat, September 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/the-resilient-supply-chain-initiative-reshaping-economics-through-geopolitics/[5] EU Exit: Long-term economic analysis, HM Government, November 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/760484/28_November_EU_Exit_-_Long-term_economic_analysis__1_.pdf [post_title] => 2021 – A pivotal year ahead for ‘Global Britain’ [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => 2021-a-pivotal-year-ahead-for-global-britain [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-12-02 21:55:31 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-12-02 20:55:31 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5240 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[14] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5237 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-03 00:05:34 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-02 23:05:34 [post_content] => The global pandemic has put pressures on public services and on government revenue streams all around the world. Immediate measures being discussed include wealth taxes on those most able to contribute, and excess profits taxes on the few businesses that have benefited from state interventions to protect public health, such as Amazon. Underpinning such measures, and future possibilities for both revenue-raising and ending impunity for corruption, is the agenda for financial transparency and integrity. The State of Tax Justice 2020 report identifies global revenue losses of $427 billion, due to the combination of corporate profit shifting and offshore tax evasion by individuals. Both types of tax abuse rely on a lack of financial transparency to go undetected. Together, as COVID-19 continues to thrive in each region of the world, they result in the loss of revenues equivalent to the annual salary of a nurse – every second.[1] From the late 1990s to the mid-2010s, successive UK governments sought to project positive values abroad in the area of financial transparency, accountability and integrity. While that played differently under different governments, there was a common thread – a golden thread, if you will – around the importance of establishing the true ownership of assets and income streams, in order to fight corruption and to protect tax revenues. For a variety of reasons including the legacy of the British Empire, that was always a complicated agenda. The UK has, in truth, pursued an ambivalent approach. Various policies designed to attract capital – both the shifted profits of multinational companies and the proceeds of outright corruption, have co-existed with efforts to limit at least some aspects of these behaviours. Nonetheless, the approach was largely successful in providing leadership opportunities to the UK and – to a degree – in supporting broader international progress. Events of recent years have complicated the position still further, but there remains a potentially powerful opportunity if the UK can make progress in cleaning out its own house in the coming years. Specifically, the UK’s chairing of the powerful G7 group of countries in 2021 provides a platform immediately in the wake of Brexit becoming a reality, to re-establish a role at the forefront of efforts to promote financial transparency and integrity. The problematic context is that the UK, together with its Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, is the largest international actor in the provision of both financial secrecy and in profit shifting by multinational companies. The State of Tax Justice 2020 identifies the UK and its network as responsible for $160 billion of tax losses around the world annually, or more than a third of the global revenue losses due to cross-border tax abuse by companies and individual.^[2] The opportunity to project positive values will depend on taking genuine, substantive steps to curb these abuses – and working internationally to propagate the advances. The ABC of transparency, and UK leadership The Tax Justice Network’s ABC of transparency is a central element of the policy platform laid out after the organisation’s formal establishment in 2003, and provides a broad structure in which to understand the main areas of policy progress over recent decades. While initially derided as utopian, each element of the platform has subsequently been adopted onto the global policy agenda. ‘A’ stands for the automatic exchange of financial information between countries, ensuring that the tax authorities in one country receive annual information on the foreign financial accounts of their tax residents. This area has arguably seen the greatest progress. The previous standard of information exchange ‘upon request’ has largely been consigned to history. The OECD Common Reporting Standard includes more than 100 signatories, including all significant financial centres except the USA, and provides for multilateral, automatic exchange. This has helped tax authorities around the world identify, and tackle, tax evasion. The ‘B’ of the ABC relates to beneficial ownership transparency, and specifically the introduction of fully accessible, public registers of the ultimate beneficial owners of companies, trusts and foundations. The emphasis on beneficial owner is to distinguish from the legal owner, which is often simply another legal vehicle. To understand the potential for corruption, tax abuse and other crimes, it is necessary to know the identities of the warm-blooded human beings who stand behind legal entities. 80 countries have so far committed to disclosing beneficial ownership information.^[3] The ‘C’ refers to public, country by country reporting by multinational companies. This measure, based on an original draft accounting standard developed by the Tax Justice Network, effectively creates a transparency level playing field with small and domestic businesses that publish their annual accounts.^[4] The measure, adopted into an OECD standard for all large multinationals in 2015, requires data on the economic activity, profits declared and tax paid, in each jurisdiction of operations. Publishing this data would lay bare the patterns of profit shifting, allowing both multinationals and the jurisdictions responsible for profit shifting to be held accountable. The OECD data remains privately provided to tax authorities only and has significant technical weaknesses; but the leading setter of sustainability standards, the Global Reporting Initiative, has now introduced a fully robust standard for voluntary public reporting which is seeing enthusiastic adoption from leading companies including Vodafone, Philips and Shell. The UK’s role in progress in each area has been valued. In broad strokes, the Labour government of Tony Blair elected in 1997 had taken the important step of recognising the threat posed to international development by the financial secrecy offered by ‘tax havens’. The 2000 White Paper on Globalisation put down an important marker in this area, and coupled with the Oxfam report of the same year on the revenue losses imposed by havens, played a catalytic role in energising what became the international movement for tax justice.^[5] The Blair government also initiated the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which played a role in the gradual development of higher standards of disclosure of multinational companies’ payments to governments. In terms of the ABC, the contributions are more specific and more recent. First, on automatic information exchange, the UK and its extended network of Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies are among the signatories of the OECD Common Reporting Standard. In addition, the UK repeatedly pushed under David Cameron to ensure the full inclusion of lower-income countries, so that the benefits of the new transparency being created for OECD members would not be denied to others. The UK has shown perhaps the greatest leadership on beneficial ownership, with David Cameron making the creation of the UK register for companies a central component of his ‘golden thread’ approach that underpinned both the G8 summit and his subsequent international statesmanship, including a 2016 anti-corruption summit where a number of additional countries committed to introduce company registers. The EU also acted on this agenda, committing to public registers not only for companies but also for trusts and foundations, while the UK government has been much more reluctant to take action on trusts. A backbench amendment in the UK parliament also led to a (pending) requirement for public registers for companies in the Overseas Territories.[6] Lastly, the UK’s involvement in the rise of greater corporate transparency at country level dates back to the EITI but goes further. In 2016, an amendment to the Finance Bill made the UK government the first to legislate to make OECD country by country reporting data public. As yet, however, the Treasury has refused to make use of the powers granted, and it appears increasingly likely that the EU will move first.  A Global Asset Registry: Recommendations from the UK pilotCritical to both international anti-corruption efforts and the prospects for effectiveness of wealth taxes, the proposal for a global asset registry relates to the creation of a searchable register, containing both public information and information accessible only to relevant tax and legal authorities, showing the beneficial ownership of all significant asset classes.[7] This would be achieved by enabling connectivity between existing registers, and creating additional data sources where necessary; and with the potential to extend within countries and across borders. In 2019, the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation (ICRICT) undertook a scoping study of asset ownership information available in the UK (with a final report due out in December 2020).^[8] The UK was in part chosen because of its relatively advanced position in some areas, and the report found that most assets that could be subject to a national asset registry are already required to register some ownership information with a government authority (e.g. land, cars, yachts, jets and stock of non-listed companies) or at least their ownership information is centralised by one or few private players, such as the central securities depository (for some listed stock and other financial assets) or the seven custodians offering vaulting services for gold and other precious metals. However, the report identified shortcomings, including the fact that government registries are not always centralised, or they may have incomplete information (e.g. no price or value information), or they may contain no public access to ownership information. In addition, there is no registry at all (either by the government or a private actor) for art objects, antiques, jewellery, cash and crypto-assets such as bitcoins. The study makes a series of recommendations to address the gaps in UK asset transparency. In addition to the creation or expansion of registers, and the inclusion of price and value data, the study highlights the need for information to be published online for free, in open data format; and, importantly, for the publication of more comprehensive statistics, for example by income level, and type of asset for those assets that are considered confidential, such as bank accounts. A complementary measure would be to require self-reporting of wealth information on worldwide assets, potentially based on a threshold. This would be easy to implement because the UK already requires most of this information under inheritance tax. It would also allow the estimation of wealth, both to measure inequality and in case there is a future decision to levy a wealth tax. Regardless of the approach to be implemented, the scoping study considered that the UK is well positioned to establish a national asset register containing ownership information at the beneficial ownership level, for a number of reasons. First, there is political commitment towards becoming a champion in transparency and open data, as shown by the UK’s leadership in publishing companies’ beneficial owners in online public registries where information is available for free and in open data format. Second, the UK already has experience and interest in analysing and measuring wealth, as shown by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) publications based on the Wealth and Assets Survey and wealth statistics published by the UK tax authorities (HMRC) based on inheritance tax returns. Third, the UK has the technology and capabilities to process and apply advance analytics to millions of data from different sources, as exemplified by HMRC’s “Connect” software used to detect tax misreporting. Finally, the report notes that the UK’s recent experience with Unexplained Wealth Orders demonstrates the intention to take action, in response to the information it collects, by freezing and confiscating assets whenever the owner cannot explain how they were acquired.  Opportunities at the G7 and beyondPost-Brexit, the UK faces major challenges in many areas, including in establishing a new regime for its international trade. With the decision to end the independence of the Department for International Development and to set aside the aid commitment of 0.7 per cent of national income, the prospects for influence and international policy leadership appear limited. But the history of the UK’s positioning on critical issues of financial transparency points to a potential opportunity. Eight years on the UK’s chairing of the G8 group of countries in 2013, the 2021 meeting of the G7 provides a global moment to re-establish the country’s role in promoting financial transparency. Bold steps on transparency at home would be needed to set the basis; but the possibilities are clear and feasible. All major UK political parties are committed in principle to tackling tax avoidance and tax evasion, and polling for Tax Justice UK shows that 84 per cent of people want politicians to close loopholes to stop big companies and wealthy people avoiding paying tax, rising to 91 per cent for Conservative voters.[9] In respect of the automatic exchange of financial information, the UK can set a standard for the publication of aggregate data on the financial account holdings of UK tax residents in each other jurisdiction, alongside the values reported to HMRC – providing an immediate accountability check on the extent of undeclared assets and related income streams, as well as identifying the most high-risk jurisdictions for non-declaration. The Australian and German governments have taken some steps in this area; the UK could create the standard. Adding in aggregate data on the holdings in UK financial institutions of tax residents of other countries would be world-leading, and a valuable service especially to those lower-income countries still excluded from the OECD exchange of data. In terms of beneficial ownership, the UK should implement without further delay its stalled commitment to create a public register of the beneficial owners of foreign companies owning UK property, and could then build on its existing lead and announce steps towards joining up and addressing the gaps in the various ownership registers, setting a course for the broader asset transparency envisaged in the proposals for a global asset register to fight corruption and tax abuse.[10] And on country by country reporting, the UK could simply make use of the existing legislation and require multinationals to publish their OECD standard data – with effectively zero additional compliance costs, and the potential to bring in significant revenues.^[11] Finally, continuing to assist the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories to achieve the same standards would be valuable – while also indicating the need for financial support for these jurisdictions to pursue alternative development paths. This should be the bare minimum to reflect the UK’s historic and continuing responsibility for encouraging so many of these jurisdictions to pursue offshore financial services. That policy stance, based on reducing UK aid spending and bolstering the City of London’s pre-eminence by encouraging illicit inflows, reflected the scant regard of policymakers at the time for the economic distortions and needless inequalities that resulted, as part of the broader damage of the ‘finance curse’.[12] Taking the opportunity to promote positive values of financial transparency, with the platform of the G7 chair in 2021, will not be easy – but could fundamentally reposition the UK, support its dependent territories to find new economic futures, and make a major contribution to global financial transparency and to curbing the scale of international corruption and tax abuse. Recommendations

• The UK should leverage its chairing of the 2021 G7 and its preeminent position in international finance by taking leadership on financial transparency, with commitments to:
  • publish aggregate data on the automatic exchange of financial information to curb further the threat of bank secrecy;
  • extend, improve and connect public registers of beneficial ownership to eliminate anonymous ownership of assets; and
  • put into practice the existing legislation to require public country by country reporting from multinational companies, to curtail profit shifting.
• The UK should ensure the rollout of all these measures across its network, by working with the Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies - including through substantial financial support to repair the damage of the UK’s having promoted their offshore financial secrecy role over decades, and to assist the transition to alternative economic development paths.

 Alex Cobham is chief executive of the Tax Justice Network, and a commissioner for the Scottish Government’s Poverty and Inequality Commission. Recent publications include The Uncounted (Polity Press, 2019); and Estimating Illicit Financial Flows (OUP, 2020, with Petr Janský).Andres Knobel is a senior researcher at the Tax Justice Network. He has also worked as a consultant on financial secrecy for the Inter-American Development Bank, ICRICT and the UN High-Level FACTI Panel.Robert Palmer is the Executive Director of Tax Justice UK, which works to ensure the UK’s tax system is fair and effective. Previously he helped establish the Open Data Charter secretariat. While at Global Witness, Robert led a global campaign to tackle the laundering of the proceeds of corruption, including by championing beneficial ownership transparency.  Image by Diliff under (CC). [1] Tax Justice Network, Global Alliance for Tax Justice and Public Services International, State of Tax Justice 2020, Tax Justice Network, 2020, https://www.taxjustice.net/reports/the-state-of-tax-justice-2020/^[2] Tax Justice Network, Global Alliance for Tax Justice and Public Services International, State of Tax Justice 2020, Tax Justice Network, 2020, https://www.taxjustice.net/reports/the-state-of-tax-justice-2020/^[3] Open Ownership: https://www.openownership.org/^[4] Richard Murphy, A Proposed International Accounting Standard: Reporting Turnover and Tax by Location, Association for Accountancy and Business Affairs, 2003, http://visar.csustan.edu/aaba/ProposedAccstd.pdf; Alex Cobham, Petr Janský and Markus Meinzer, A half-century of resistance to corporate disclosure, Transnational Corporations 25(3), 1-26, 2018, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaeia2018d5a2_en.pdf^[5] HMG, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor, White Paper on International Development, HMSO, 2000, https://dera.ioe.ac.uk/4613/1/whitepaper2000.pdf. Ruth Mayne and Jenny Kimmis, Tax Havens: Releasing the hidden billions for poverty eradication, Oxford, 2000, https://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/tax-havens-releasing-the-hidden-billions-for-poverty-eradication-114611[6] BBC, Ministers back down on tax haven company registers, May 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43965546[7] See e.g. the work of the UK Wealth Tax Commission at https://www.ukwealth.tax/, including its forthcoming report; and the recent Treasury Select Committee evidence session dedicated to the potential: https://committees.parliament.uk/event/2744/formal-meeting-oral-evidence-session/.^[8] Andres Knobel, Pilot study for a UK Asset Registry–Phase 1: An assessment of available asset ownership information, ICRICT, December 2019, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a0c602bf43b5594845abb81/t/5dfa0c37437fa7242cbe3793/1576668258459/Pilot+stydy+for+a+UK+Asset+Registry-Phase1-revised+version.pdf[9] Tax Justice UK, Talking Tax: How to win support for taxing wealth, Tax Justice UK, https://www.taxjustice.uk/uploads/1/0/0/3/100363766/talking_tax_-_how_to_win_support_for_taxing_wealth.pdf[10] Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Draft Registration of Overseas Entities Bill, Gov.uk, July 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/draft-registration-of-overseas-entities-bill^[11] Tax Justice UK, Simple tax avoidance measure could raise £2.5 billion, Tax Justice UK, 2018, https://www.taxjustice.uk/blog/simple-tax-avoidance-measure-could-raise-25bn[12] On the UK government decisions and on the damage of an excessively dominant financial sector, including for the UK itself, see Nick Shaxson: 2011, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men who Stole the World, London: Palgrave Macmillan on the development of the UK’s network; and 2018, The Finance Curse: How Global Finance is Making Us All Poorer, London: Bodley Head. [post_title] => Could the UK project positive values on financial transparency? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => could-the-uk-project-positive-values-on-financial-transparency [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-12-02 21:49:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-12-02 20:49:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5237 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 5 [filter] => raw )[15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5233 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-03 00:04:12 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-02 23:04:12 [post_content] => Four years on from the vote to leave the European Union (EU) much has been written about the UK’s international role in a post-Brexit world. Only recently, however, has the climate crisis emerged as potentially the strongest candidate around which the UK could forge a genuine leadership role in the world and make the vision of ‘Global Britain’ a reality.[1] As the host and president of the G7 and as the host (in Glasgow) of the international climate summit, COP26, the UK has been handed a golden opportunity to demonstrate leadership on tackling the climate crisis. To make the most of this opportunity, the UK must ensure that it gets its own house in order in terms of delivering ambitious domestic commitments on decarbonisation, as well taking some essential actions at the international level in building progressive partnerships, embedding a net zero mentality in aid, trade and finance, and through carving out a future role in the shaping of international agreements and institutions. The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, to be published in early 2021, also presents an opportunity to set out how the UK intends to champion ambitious action on climate through a pivotal year and in the years to come.[2] The UK as a ‘climate leader’ isn’t new, but its role needs renewingThe idea of the UK being a world leader on climate is, of course, nothing new. Governments of all parties have ensured that over the past decade and more the UK has been able to lead the way with groundbreaking commitments, legislation and policies on climate. These include the groundbreaking Stern report in 2006, which looked at the economics of climate change, the world leading Climate Change Act passed in 2008 and being the first major economy to commit to a legally binding net zero 2050 target.[3] However, while the net zero target passed last year marked a shift back towards the centrality of climate within UK policymaking, the previous few years had seen some weakening in terms of commitment and delivery. Perhaps most symbolically in 2013 when the then Prime Minister David Cameron called to ‘get rid of all the green crap’ and more importantly inadequate progress is being made in terms of meeting the 4^th and 5^th carbon budgets, both stepping-stones towards the overall reduction of the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions.[4] Why the UK and why now?Nevertheless, the coming year offers a significant opportunity for the UK to renew itself as a global leader on climate. The question is, why the UK and why now? The case for renewing the UK’s role as a global climate leader is strong. Firstly, as the fifth largest historic emitter of carbon emissions in the world and as one of the prime exporters of an economic model that has proved to be unsustainable in environmental terms, the UK has a responsibility to ensure that its foreign policy recognises its historic legacy.[5] Secondly, there is the UK’s record on leveraging international climate action. From the climate change act to the net zero target, the UK’s visible action and leadership over the years in tackling the climate crisis has made a difference in spurring action from other countries. Thirdly, there are the reputational and soft power benefits. At a time when the UK’s standing in the world has been diminished as a result of its decision to leave the EU, as well as the threats to break international law as part of the UK Internal Market Bill, there is a need to rebuild partnerships and confidence in the UK as a trusted international actor – action on the climate crisis provides such an opportunity.[6] Moreover, the Government itself has recognised that such action provides an opening to enhance the UK’s soft power.[7] Fourthly, there are the economic benefits. The discussions on moving to net zero emissions has shifted worldwide from being a preoccupation of environmentalists to a recognised necessity of economists and policymakers. We’re now moving into a third phase as many countries around the world see the transition to a net zero economy as one of boundless opportunity, an investment and not a cost.[8] In the past few months alone, China, South Korea and Japan have all committed to new net zero targets.[9] The race to net zero has begun and if the UK is to seize the economic opportunities on offer then it cannot afford to be left behind. Finally, there is the confluence of events in 2021 that should make climate diplomacy a top tier priority for the UK government. Next year the UK will ascend the G7 Presidency, host the vital climate summit in COP26 and Joe Biden will be sworn in as the 46^th President of the United States. As host of both major events, the UK has the opportunity to demonstrate its ‘internationalism and green credentials’ according to the conservative MP Tom Tugendhat, chair of the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, and cement relations with the incoming democratic President who has been crystal clear in his determination to make tackling the climate crisis a domestic and international priority.[10] If the UK is to put words into action, and place climate at the heart of its foreign policy, what does it need to do in practice? Leading by the power of exampleAs the host of COP26 in 2021, the UK can help inspire the rest of world and leverage greater ambition and delivery from other developed countries. But to do so, the UK must get its own house in order first. The legal commitment to net zero by 2050 was a necessary but, on its own, insufficient means of doing so. The policy and investment needed to deliver must swiftly follow. The Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, announced some bold measures in his recent ‘10-point plan for a green industrial revolution’ but it fell well short of a strategy to deliver on our legal commitments.[11] The UK must go further in terms of its targets, policies and investments. This should include an ambitious ‘Nationally Determined Contribution’ (NDC) – commitments by each country under the 2015 Paris Agreement to reduce emissions and adapt to the impacts of global heating - this would imply a reduction of at least 72 per cent in emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels according to new research by WWF.[12] This should be backed by the creation of new institutions including a ‘Net Zero and Just Transition Delivery Body’ charged with developing a national strategy and sectoral plans to deliver on our climate commitments.[13] All of this must be supported by a significant increase in investment in projects ranging from sustainable public transport, such as the electrification of rail and bus networks, to nature investments including tree planting and peatland restoration. Only by getting the UK on track to meet its net zero commitments will it credibly be able to call itself a global leader on climate and maximise its influence through its foreign policy. Building progressive partnerships and shaping climate politicsThe UK also has an important role in building progressive partnerships and shaping global climate politics. Although diplomatic success can be hard to determine, some have pointed to evidence of the UK’s impact in the past from the introduction of carbon market pricing in China to power sector reform in India.[14] Some ambassadors have also pointed to the closer bilateral relationships between the UK and countries in Latin America, leveraged through climate diplomacy.[15] As host to the G7 and then COP26, the UK will have an outsized platform and opportunity to wield influence and use its diplomatic expertise to drive progress on international climate action.[16] In this regard, there is much to be learnt from France’s approach in achieving the 2015 Paris Agreement where its skillful diplomacy delivered a groundbreaking international agreement on climate.[17] Putting this into practice will require concerted effort to build key progressive partnerships and shape climate politics. Working closely with key allies like the EU and particularly the US where Joe Biden has placed a high priority on climate action, the UK should seek to create focused campaigns on key issues including through groupings such as the Climate Ambition Alliance.[18] An important sign of progress will be the summit hosted by the UK government on 12^th December at which Boris Johnson has called on world leaders to ‘announce genuinely transformational net zero targets and bold climate finance pledges’.[19] Ensuring this happens in practice will rely not just on the strength of the UK’s diplomacy but also its own NDC commitment as outlined above. Other areas that the UK should focus its diplomatic attention include key projects, such as the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.[20] This immense infrastructure project poses significant challenges to the world’s ambitions. The UK will need to work with key partners to influence China at every stage from financing to the laying of the infrastructure. Finally, the UK should step-up its commitment to acting as a ‘supporting partner’ in providing policy, financial and technological assistance to those nations most affected by the climate crisis.[21] A key tenet of foreign and aid policy should be working with such less industrialised countries to build their capability and local institutions in order to accelerate their climate mitigation and adaptation efforts.[22] Climate progress through progressive trade policyBetween 1990 and 2016, the UK reduced greenhouse gas emissions released within its national borders by 41 per cent, but those emissions from goods consumed in the UK but produced elsewhere fell by only 15 per cent.[23] Indeed, the UK’s consumption emissions in the 1970s were just 0.2 per cent higher than our territorial emissions, whereas they are 37 per cent higher today.[24] But the UK also has much broader environmental impacts, the evidence suggests that if everyone in the world were to live like the average UK citizen, then we would need 2.5 planets worth of resources to sustain us.[25] In other words, much of the UK’s wider impacts on the climate and our environment are currently being offshored. As the UK seeks to strike its own trade deals outside of the EU for the first time in four decades, there is an opportunity for the UK to embed high environmental standards including robust standards on greenhouse gas emissions, as well as high product and labour standards, within any future trade agreements. The UK’s relationship with the US will be central to making this approach a reality. In comparison to trading giants including the EU, China and the US, the UK is relatively small in global trading terms. But if the UK is able to lever similar commitments to high standards from countries with close diplomatic ties, the UK could punch above its weight in delivering progressive climate action. Moreover, the shape of the UK’s Emission Trading Scheme, which will be in place from 1^st January 2021, could also be central to the UK’s approach to emissions reductions both at home and abroad.[26] Financing the transitionThe funds that the UK spends abroad through climate finance will be central to cementing its role as global climate leader. In that regard, the decision to cut Official Development Assistance (ODA) (international aid spending) from the world leading 0.7 per cent of GDP to 0.5 per cent for an undefined period is both a terrible signal in terms of the UK’s supposed leadership and is also terrible climate policy. The UK has a committed a proportion of its ODA to both the mitigation of and adaptation to the climate crisis so a cut in the ODA budget is likely to feed into a reduction in the UK’s spending on climate action abroad. In light of this, the Government should now seek to do a number of things through its contribution to international climate finance. First, the Government should commit at the earliest opportunity to reinstate the 0.7 per cent target. Second, the need to mitigate and adapt to the climate crisis should be mainstreamed across the whole of the ODA budget and not just those parts dedicated to climate action. Third, the Government should make a significant contribution to the international Green Climate Fund and in doing so, seek to leverage similar commitments from international partners. The UK could use an increased financial pledge to recognise its status as the fifth largest contributor to cumulative emissions by explicitly linking its historic contribution to the scale of its financial commitment. The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) has calculated that a contribution of circa £20 billion between now and 2030 would be commensurate with the UK’s historic contribution and the level of emissions reduction that such a figure could bring about through supporting less industrialised nations to mitigate and adapt to global heating.[27] The Government could also build on this commitment by extending such a ‘fair share’ approach to its other environmental impacts across the world.[28] As a global financial centre, the UK has significant influence throughout the world on the direction of sustainable private finance. In recognition of this role, the Government has made making progress on this agenda a key priority for COP26 and the Chancellor, Rishi Sunak, has made some recent announcements on the disclosure of climate risks and the issuing of green gilts.[29] But in many commentators’ eyes this is the bare minimum that needs to be done.[30] The Government could for instance go further by requiring all firms to set themselves binding targets for emissions reductions as well as to disclose all of the emissions that arise from their supply chains and consumers use of their products. Finally, the Government should confirm its intention to phase out UK Export Finance (UKEF) – the Government agency which provides export credit guarantees to companies trading abroad – support for fossil fuel projects, a practice which is wholly incompatible with global leadership on climate. Furthermore, UKEF should also seek to actively increase investment into low-carbon and climate compatible opportunities abroad such as offshore wind and decommissioning. International agreements and institutionsThe UK has long held an influential role in the shaping, reform and creation of international institutions and agreements. In the pre-Brexit era, most of the UK’s influence was through successful shaping of the EU’s positions, amplifying Britain’s influence in the world, within institutions such as the UNFCCC (although the UK acted on its own behalf withing the relevant international institutions for aviation and shipping and remained influential).[31] In the post-Brexit era, the UK must seek to maintain its influential role on international agreements and institutions. As IPPR has previously argued, this could include seeking reforms of the World Bank, IMF and other multilateral development agencies and funds to increase their policy focus on and financial investment climate and environmental matters.[32] It will also entail the UK increasing its international profile as a country seeking to drive further climate ambition, as well as seeking to retain a strong influencing role in the determination of EU positions. ConclusionTackling the climate crisis has now become a significant priority for the UK within domestic policy, which means that driving progress internationally is fundamentally in the national interest. Moreover, as previous experience has demonstrated it is a powerful tool in building the UK’s soft power as well as its reputation around the globe. It will also provide economic opportunities and benefits to British companies at home and abroad. Perhaps most importantly, however, is the impact that the UK can have as a high-profile champion of ambitious climate action around the world. 2021 could be a crucial year in redefining what the UK’s role is in the world; it is an opportunity that we, and the world, cannot afford to miss. Recommendations

• Lead by the power of example: If the UK wishes to be a leader on tackling the climate crisis abroad, then it must get its house in order at home. That must include more ambitious commitments for climate action through its Nationally Determined Contribution, as well as the necessary policies and investments to deliver in practice.
• Building progressive partnerships and shaping climate politics: The UK must seek to use climate diplomacy to lever greater climate ambition internationally. This will involve forming close partnerships and coalitions with international partners, focusing on key projects to influence such as the Chinese Belt and Road initiative and acting as a ‘supporting partner’ to less industrialised nations.
• Climate progress through progressive trade policy: The UK must use its new freedoms to strike trade deals to pursue commitments to high environmental standards including robust standards on greenhouse gas emissions.
• Financing the transition: The UK should commit to reinstating the 0.7 per cent ODA target and mainstream climate action as a priority across the entire ODA budget and wider UK foreign policy. The UK should also make a contribution to the Green Climate Fund which is commensurate with its historic contribution to the climate crisis. The Government should also drive more ambitious action as the world’s financial centre on sustainable private finance and bring an end to support for fossil fuel projects abroad.
• International agreements and institutions: The UK must seek to maintain its influential role on international agreements and institutions in relation to climate, including seeking progressive reform of institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and other multilateral development agencies in relation to climate and environmental matters.

 Luke Murphy is Head of the Environmental Justice Commission and Associate Director for the Energy, Climate, Housing and Infrastructure Team at the IPPR. Image by Number 10 under (CC). [1] HMG, Global Britain: delivering on our international ambition, Gov.uk, September 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/global-britain-delivering-on-our-international-ambition[2] Boris Johnson, PM statement to the House on the Integrated Review, November 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-to-the-house-on-the-integrated-review-19-november-2020[3] Nicolas Stern. 2006. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, Cambridge University Press. https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/publication/the-economics-of-climate-change-the-stern-review/[4] Rowena Mason, David Cameron at centre of 'get rid of all the green crap' storm, The Guardian, November 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/21/david-cameron-green-crap-comments-storm; IPPR. 2020. Faster, further, fairer: Putting people at the heart of tackling the climate and nature emergency, interim report of the IPPR Environmental Justice Commission, http://www.ippr.org/publications/faster-further-fairer[5] Laybourn-Langton L and Rankin L. 2019. Our responsibility: A new model of international cooperation for the era of environmental breakdown, IPPR. http://www.ippr.org/research/publications/our-responsibility[6] Georgina Wright, UK threats to break international law make a Brexit deal even more difficult, September 2020, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/break-international-law-brexit-deal-difficult[7] Written evidence submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (CLI0010) https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/3939/pdf/[8] Camilla Cavendish, Climate diplomacy is winning its fight against a zero-sum mindset, The FT, November 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/e1127520-43f4-4324-9e08-59ac87648ca8[9] David Hackett and IIona Millar, A new global paradigm for global climate action, November 2020, https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2020/11/biden-victory-ushers-in-race-to-the-top[10] Leslie Hook, Katrina Mason and Derek Brower. Biden focuses on US climate diplomacy with key role for John Kerry, The FT, November 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/31d93942-6481-4e64-ba85-a6871a142862[11] HMG press release, PM outlines his Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution for 250,000 jobs, November 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-outlines-his-ten-point-plan-for-a-green-industrial-revolution-for-250000-jobs[12] WWF, COP26: The UK’s 2030 Climate Target to Cut Emissions, November 2020, https://www.wwf.org.uk/updates/cop26-climate-target-cut-emissions[13] IPPR. Faster, Further, Fairer.[14] Pete Betts, Summary Report of the International Advisory Group to the Committee on Climate Change in Relation to its Work on the UK’s Long-Term Emissions Goal, May 2019, https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/International-Net-Zero-Advisory-Group-Chair-Report.pdf[15] Ibid[16] ECIU, UK diplomacy and influence ahead of COP26, October 2021, https://eciu.net/analysis/briefings/international-perspectives/uk-diplomacy-and-influence-ahead-of-cop26[17] Fiona Harvey, Paris climate change agreement: the world's greatest diplomatic success, December 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-diplomacy-developing-united-nations[18] Climate Ambition Alliance: Nations Renew their Push to UpscaleAction by 2020 and Achieve Net Zero CO2 Emissions by 2050, December 2019, https://cop25.mma.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Alianza-11122019-INGL%C3%89S.pdf[19] HMG News Story, PM: ‘Climate action cannot be another victim of coronavirus’, September 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-climate-action-cannot-be-another-victim-of-coronavirus[20] Ibid.[21] Laybourn-Langton et al. Our responsibility.[22] ibid[23] ECIU. UK diplomacy and influence ahead of COP26.[24] IPPR. Faster, Further, Fairer.[25] O’Neill D W, Fanning A L, Lamb W F and Steinberger J K (2018) ‘A good life for all within planetary boundaries’, Nature Sustainability, 1:88–95, doi: 10.1038/s41893-018-0021-4[26] Lindsay Edwards, UK greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme order published, November 2020, https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/news/uk-greenhouse-gas-emissions-trading-scheme-order-published[27] Laybourn-Langton et al. Our responsibility.[28] Ibid.[29] Alok Sharma, President Alok Sharma at launch of COP26 Private Finance Agenda, February 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cop26-president-alok-sharma-at-launch-of-cop26-private-finance-agenda; HMT, Chancellor sets out ambition for future of UK financial services, News Story, November 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/chancellor-sets-out-ambition-for-future-of-uk-financial-services[30] Leslie Hook and Matthew Vincent, Green business reporting rules at risk of pale response, The FT, November 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/ad01f2c9-9eb0-4db6-9898-220c688d16c2[31] Pete Betts. Summary Report of the International Advisory Group.[32] Laybourn-Langton et al. Our responsibility. [post_title] => An environmental dimension to UK foreign policy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => an-environmental-dimension-to-uk-foreign-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-12-02 21:45:01 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-12-02 20:45:01 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5233 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[16] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5229 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-03 00:03:21 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-02 23:03:21 [post_content] => In January, for the first time in nearly 50 years, the UK will ‘take back control’ of its trade policy from the EU. During and since the referendum campaign, Brexit-supporting politicians have presented voters with a narrative of Britain’s place in the world as a buccaneering, free-trading nation. While this narrative can reasonably be queried (the British Empire was arguably as much a protectionist cartel as a force for open trade), it has been the justification for leaving the EU’s customs union and single market and beginning new trade negotiations with the US, Australia, New Zealand and the Trans-Pacific area, while also renegotiating trading relationships with the EU, Japan, Canada and elsewhere.^[1] Regardless of the irony of leaving the world’s largest trading bloc in order to seek more trade, it is clear that trade will be a key part of the government’s ambitions for Brexit. Much less clear is what these ambitions will entail in practice: while the government is keen to strike new deals, they lack an overarching strategy and they have found themselves at odds with farmers, environmental groups, businesses, consumers and trade unions over the potential impact of these deals on all sorts of issues, from chlorinated chicken to the NHS. And yet, it is true that Brexit is an opportunity for the UK to rethink the role of trade in the 21st Century, to build consensus across different groups in the UK, and to develop a trade policy which benefits both people and the planet. The UK has a unique opportunity to reimagine a socially and environmentally just trade policy. Achieving this will require strategic thinking about what values we want to underpin the UK’s trade negotiations. Rather than rushing into negotiations, it will require democratising our processes for negotiating trade deals and setting clear lines on the environment and human rights. These three pillars - democracy, the environment and human rights - should form the core of our trade policy after Brexit. With them, our trade policy can be genuinely progressive and world-leading; without them, our trade policy poses a risk to our environment, sustainable development, and millions at home and abroad whose lives are affected by UK trade. 

1. Democracy

Despite the rhetoric of ‘taking back control’, the government has done very little to empower British MPs, or indeed British civil society and ordinary citizens, to influence trade policy after Brexit. This risks creating a culture of mistrust between the public, businesses, MPs and government, and a lack of transparency about what is on the table in trade agreements. The absence of an overarching trade strategy from the Department for International Trade, with clear objectives and principles, also means that businesses and civil society are left in the dark about the government’s objectives for new deals. The UK would do well to learn lessons from TTIP - the proposed EU-US mega trade deal - which was met with significant opposition from European citizens, leading to its eventual collapse despite years of negotiations and political will from Brussels and Washington DC. TTIP collapsed in part due to public anger about the lack of transparency in the negotiation of the deal, as well as frustration that their own elected representatives could do little to scrutinise or stop the deal. The lack of transparency also meant that politicians struggled to assuage citizens’ concerns about US food standards, the impact of TTIP on public services including the NHS, and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS, which allows firms to sue governments for introducing regulations). Ultimately, this meant TTIP caused a breakdown in trust between citizens and government officials who were in charge of negotiating trade deals. We should not be surprised that trade deals create a lot of anxiety among ordinary citizens, whose lives are touched in all sorts of ways by FTAs - from the food on supermarket shelves to the provision of health services to the protection of personal online data. Trade agreements can also lead to dramatic economic shifts and privilege certain industries over others, leading to economic uncertainty, which so often hits the poorest the hardest. These are all reasons for why it is essential that our post-Brexit trade policy builds consensus and commands democratic support. Polling shows that British voters have particular concerns about the impact of trade deals on food and environmental standards, as well as concerns about public health and protecting the NHS. 80 per cent of voters would not accept chlorine-washed chicken or hormone-fed beef, and a majority of voters in areas which supported leaving the EU in the 2016 referendum - including those on lower incomes - support regulation on businesses to maintain high standards.^[2] Polling also shows that consumers do not want animal welfare standards lowered and this is consistent across regions, age and socio-demographic groups, including 76 per cent of C2DEs and 74 per cent of ABC1s, showing that even consumers with lower incomes still value high standards.^[3] It is important that these concerns of ordinary voters are reflected in the development of our trade policy after Brexit. This is perhaps why five parliamentary committees, including the International Trade Committee and the Lords Constitutional Committee, have called for fundamental reform to the way trade deals are negotiated. As things stand, MPs get no guaranteed debate or vote on new trade deals, there are no requirements on transparency, and the government can begin, conduct and conclude negotiations without notifying MPs or the public. In order to build consensus and ensure that the UK’s post-Brexit trade policy is fully transparent and democratic, the government should set out legislation which includes:

1. Before negotiations: Publication of the government’s negotiation objectives and a guaranteed debate and vote for MPs on these objectives.
2. During negotiations: A high level of transparency, with regular release of negotiating texts after each round.
3. After negotiations: A guaranteed debate and vote for MPs on the final deal.
4. Throughout the process: Regular engagement with civil society, including environmental groups, businesses and trade unions, and the publication of an independent Sustainability Impact Assessment.

 The process set out above would put democratic values at the heart of the UK’s trade policy after Brexit. Other trade policy concerns - ranging from the environment and data to development and human rights - can be dealt with far more effectively if the underlying framework is democratic, open and transparent. This should be a key priority for the government as it embarks on a new chapter in Britain’s long trading history. 

2. The environment

Climate change presents the biggest challenge facing humanity, and is also a top priority for this government, which has committed to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Next year, the UK will host the COP 26 conference, which provides an opportunity for a radical new climate agreement between the world’s leading economies. A Joe Biden presidency in the US makes this vision even more tangible. However, despite broad consensus about the importance of tackling climate change, there have been few attempts to ensure that the UK’s post-Brexit trade policy is in line with these ambitions. Trade policy impacts directly on the environment in a number of ways. In a general sense trade deals tend to act as a blunt instrument, aimed at increasing trade overall. This is problematic because it can lead, for example, to growth in high-carbon industries. However, the specific provisions of trade agreements can also mitigate against climate action. Two particularly important avenues are environmental regulation, including regulatory cooperation, and the use of investor courts to challenge environmental policies. Environmental regulationApproaches to regulation differ significantly between countries and the EU and the US have emerged as two different poles: the former gives greater weight to the precautionary principle, the latter to a ‘science-based’ approach. A significant policy choice for the UK as it negotiates new trade agreements is therefore which pole it chooses to align with, but it has yet to take a clear position. A number of provisions at the WTO already constrain the ability of member countries to regulate, for example by requiring that regulation be “no more trade-restrictive than necessary” for achieving “legitimate policy objectives.”^[4] These rules have, for example, already seen Canada scale back its renewables programme. Trade deals tend to go further and increasingly aim to align regulations between countries, which can create a downward pressure on standards which are designed to protect the environment and lead to a ‘race to the bottom’. This is because trade deals are designed to promote trade rather than achieve environmental objectives: environmental chapters of trade agreements tend to be unenforceable, while regulations which limit trade - even if designed for important, environmental reasons - can be legally challenged and the findings of dispute settlement bodies enforced. Furthermore, trade deals increasingly include the establishment of ‘regulatory cooperation chapters’. In order to implement these chapters, regulatory cooperation ‘councils’ are established as forums for regulators from the different parties to meet and cooperate in the development of regulations in ways that promote trade rather than raise standards, sometimes with special access for business groups.^[5] Investor courts (ISDS)The UK is a signatory to various agreements that contain investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions, which allow investors to sue governments for introducing regulations, which harm their profits. ISDS has been used to challenge all sorts of environmental policies around the world; including a US firm challenging a ban on fracking under the St.Lawrence river in Quebec, a Swedish energy firm challenging water pollution regulations in Germany, various mining firms challenging restrictions on mining across the Global South, and threats to challenge measures to phase out fossil fuel use in the Netherlands.^[6] Evidence shows that ISDS has led to the US delaying the introduction of environmental regulations. A better way?Whilst the trade system has not so far responded adequately to the climate crisis, the foundation stones for action already exist. In the first paragraph of the founding agreement of the WTO, signatories recognise that trade rules should allow for “the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.”^[7] And whilst they are neither binding nor enforceable, there is an increasing trend to include environmental chapters in trade agreements. Some countries are already choosing to build on these foundations to create a new model for trade agreements: New Zealand has teamed up with Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland to negotiate an ‘Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability’ (ACCTS). ACCTS is the first serious multilateral attempt at ensuring that trade does not lead to environmental damage. The UK should consider joining the deal and pushing for it to go further in terms of coverage and the enforceability of its provisions. There are a number of tangible steps the UK could take to put climate at the heart of our post-Brexit trade policy. First, the UK’s new trade deals should be subordinate to our environmental commitments - including the Paris Climate Agreement. Shared ambitions on climate, biodiversity, energy, food and other standards should not be confined to the preamble or separate chapters of trade deals, which are unenforceable, but should be given equal enforceability. These chapters should make clear that trade deals are subject to the implementation by both parties of multilateral environmental agreements and that if trade measures put the parties in breach of those agreements, a specific process with potential sanctions will be triggered. Mechanisms that could be used to achieve enforceability might include: a process of mediation seeking to address issues amicably, a transparent arbitration process with opportunities for a broad range of stakeholders from both countries to engage and, as a last resort, the potential for unilateral sanctions to be imposed, for example the suspension of trade preferences including raising tariffs. Similarly, the UK should have a policy of conditionality, such that we only sign deals with countries that have signed and are implementing the Paris Climate Agreement. This would ensure that trade is prioritised with partners who share our values, and also provide an incentive for new partners to commit to climate action. It  could be applied flexibly for developing countries, or for partners who can demonstrate good progress, with accompanying support to help those that need it. The UK should then undertake an environmental audit of the provisions of its rollover agreements with a view to ensuring all aspects of deals are aligned with its climate ambition and design the detail of its trade agreements to ensure that they support climate action. Some elements of trade deals are already clearly in contradiction with such action. Public outrage about ISDS, as well as opposition from environmental NGOs, has already encouraged some countries to rethink the investment provisions in their trade agreements. South Africa has cancelled all Bilateral Investment Treaties, New Zealand no longer includes ISDS provisions in its trade deals and countries like India and Malaysia are designing alternative approaches. The UK should similarly exclude ISDS from existing and future agreements. This would ensure that companies cannot challenge regulations which are essential for tackling climate change, including those on emissions, fracking, energy production and transport. Second, the UK should commit to avoiding regulatory cooperation in trade deals, as it is currently done, and instead seek standard-raising cooperation in alternative forums with full transparency and engagement from civil society. For instance, committing to dynamic alignment with the EU on environmental standards will be crucial after Brexit. 

3. Human rights

The third pillar of a sustainable trade policy is human rights. The rise of authoritarian regimes, notably China, as well as division and fragmentation in Western democracies, pose a threat to human rights around the world. Trade is intertwined with human rights, and global supply chains can fuel large-scale abuses - from the mass incarceration of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang to modern day slavery in India. Evidence shows that Western multinationals are often indirectly implicated in these abuses: for example, recent research identified 83 well-known brands which benefit from the use of Uyghur workers caught in potentially abusive labour transfer programs, including Nike, Adidas, Google and Marks & Spencer.^[8] Similar concerns have been raised about labour rights in supply chains across Asia, Africa and South America. Human rights are also intrinsically connected to sustainable development. As the world reels from the economic and public health impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and prepares to confront the catastrophic impacts of climate change, developing countries are by far the most vulnerable. The UK has long been a global leader in international development, and Brexit could be an opportunity to build on this. Moreover, a poorly designed trade policy risks undermining the UN Sustainable Development Goals. However thus far there is little evidence that the Conservative government is taking up this opportunity. It has rolled over the EU’s preference scheme for the world’s poorest countries, which should help to provide continuity as the UK exits the EU. However, it has not taken the opportunity to improve these schemes, for example by offering more generous rules of origin to help support regional trade and make it easier for producers to benefit from the schemes. It has also agreed trade deals with Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire, rather than negotiating with regional blocs; this is hugely problematic as it will disrupt trade in the EAC and ECOWAS regions. Finally, the Government has not yet clarified whether it will seek to pursue negotiations on issues beyond goods, something that most developing countries have long resisted. Trade policy has significant implications for trade and sustainable development. In addition to abuses in supply chains, trade deals can hinder the ability of governments to raise standards in areas such as labour rights, gender rights, economic justice and public health. ISDS cases have been used to challenge minimum wage rises and health measures such as bans on plain packaging for cigarettes and the introduction of a sugar tax.^[9] Provisions in areas such as services and procurement tend to be blind to the different impact of changes in those areas on men and women. Liberalisation of services can lead to increased privatisation or reduced provision of ‘less lucrative’ services or in poorer areas, which can in turn lead to increases in cost or a requirement for greater care in the home, the burden of which is more often borne by women.^[10] The UK must put human rights and sustainable development at the heart of its post-Brexit trade policy. In practice, this will require a number of changes: first, trade negotiations with developing countries must prioritise the countries’ development objectives and be done in such a way as to facilitate regional trade; for instance, the UK should offer the same preferences and opportunities to all countries in the East Africa trade bloc, rather than negotiate trade agreements which have the potential to lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ on standards and tariffs. In order to achieve this, the Department for International Trade needs to continue to operate in partnership with former DfID staff in the newly formed Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). Second, the UK must develop a clear strategy for its relationship with developing countries through a transparent process which engages with civil society in the UK and developing countries, including trade unions, NGOs and businesses to ensure a broad range of interests are represented. Lastly, prioritising human rights will require looking beyond trade. The UK should support recent efforts at the UN for a Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights and consider primary legislation to enforce compliance amongst British companies operating overseas, as well as bilateral action with the EU. As things stand, human rights chapters in trade agreements tend to be unenforceable, and the UK is very willing to conduct trade with countries whose leaders have been accused of gross human rights abuses, such as Saudi Arabia.^[11] As with climate change, enforceable chapters in trade deals as well as rights-based conditionality for trade will be essential for ensuring that our trade policy protects human rights. Taking back controlBrexit gives the UK a once in a lifetime opportunity to reimagine our trade policy. Now is the time to decide what values should be enshrined at the heart of our trading system and pursue cooperation with our neighbours in addressing the global challenges ahead. Chief among these are climate change, the defence of human rights and sustainable development. The UK must take these challenges seriously and join with countries and initiatives that are already seeking to address them. Taking back control of trade policy, if done well, could lead to a better future for people and the planet. Ruth Bergan is Senior Adviser at the Trade Justice Movement. She has worked in trade policy for over ten years and has written in-depth reports on trade with the US and developing countries, investment protection provisions and the implications of trade policy for action in areas including climate change and gender equality. She has previously worked in the areas of labour rights in international supply chains, migration and gender equality. David Lawrence is Senior Political Adviser at the Trade Justice Movement. He previously worked in Parliament for a Labour MP and studied at Oxford and the London School of Economics. He has written on trade, politics and foreign policy for the Independent, Politics Home and Foreign Policy Centre. ^[1] See, for instance, analysis done by Ha-Joon Chang on the British Empire’s use of tariffs; Chang, Ha-Joon. 2002. Kicking Away the Ladder: An Unofficial History of Capitalism, Especially in Britain and the United States. Challenge 45:63–97.^[2] YouGov, Results - US Trade Deal, June 2020, https://docs.cdn.yougov.com/1xr2pyf6fi/YouGov%20-%20US%20trade%20deal%20Results.pdf; Unchecked UK, Attitudes of Younger Leave Voters to Regulation and Deregulation, May 2020, https://www.unchecked.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Attitudes-of-Younger-Leave-Voters-to-Regulation-and-Deregulation.pdf^[3] Agriland, RSPCA poll reveals 75% want ban on lower welfare standard imports, August 2020, https://www.agriland.co.uk/farming-news/rspca-poll-reveals-75-want-ban-on-lower-welfare-standard-imports/^[4] World Trade Organization, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1995, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm^[5] David Lawrence, Dynamic Alignment and Regulatory Cooperation between the UK and the EU after Brexit, Trade Justice Movement, September 2019, https://www.tjm.org.uk/documents/briefings/TJM-Dynamic-Alignment-and-Regulatory-Cooperation-after-Brexit.pdf^[6] Details on ISDS cases brought against environmental regulations can be found in: Ruth Bergan, Shaping Future UK Trade Policy: Investment Protection Provisions, Trade Justice Movement, September 2020, https://www.tjm.org.uk/documents/briefings/Shaping-Future-UK-Trade-Policy-Investment-Protection-Provisions.pdf^[7] World Trade Organization, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm^[8] Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, China: 83 major brands implicated in report on forced labour of ethnic minorities from Xinjiang assigned to factories across provinces; Includes company responses, March 2020, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/china-83-major-brands-implicated-in-report-on-forced-labour-of-ethnic-minorities-from-xinjiang-assigned-to-factories-across-provinces-includes-company-responses/^[9] Ruth Bergan, Shaping Future UK Trade Policy: Investment Protection Provisions, Trade Justice Movement, September 2020, https://www.tjm.org.uk/documents/briefings/Shaping-Future-UK-Trade-Policy-Investment-Protection-Provisions.pdf^[10] Trade Justice Movement, Patriarchy and Profit: A feminist analysis of the global trade system, September 2018 https://www.tjm.org.uk/resources/reports/patriarchy-and-profit-a-feminist-analysis-of-the-global-trade-system^[11] Patrick Wintour and Luke Harding, UK on collision course with Saudis over new human rights sanctions, The Guardian, July 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/jul/06/dominic-raab-to-annouce-uk-sanctions-against-human-rights-abusers [post_title] => Three pillars for a sustainable trade policy after Brexit [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-pillars-for-a-sustainable-trade-policy-after-brexit [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-12-02 21:37:32 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-12-02 20:37:32 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5229 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5225 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-03 00:02:26 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-02 23:02:26 [post_content] => Turn off the lights in Moscow? This is just one of the possible uses of offensive cyber operations (OCOs) briefed to the press by senior British defence sources.[1] Put simply, OCOs ‘project power to achieve military objectives in, or through, cyberspace.’[2] In everyday language, we are talking about ‘cyber attacks’ – from knocking websites offline to disabling computers on a network, shutting down a power grid, manipulating centrifuges in uranium enrichment facilities, or undermining an adversary’s air defences. Over the last decade, the UK government has talked more openly about its cyber capabilities.[3] The latest step was the Prime Minister’s recent avowal of the National Cyber Force (NCF), which has been operational since April.[4] Uncertainty remains, however, about the role of OCOs in wider UK strategy and how our political leaders are navigating the complex choices involved in deciding when to use cyber operations to secure national objectives and project British values overseas. For example, should OCOs only target an adversary’s defence and security infrastructure, or should the UK follow the contemporary trend in targeting civilian infrastructure, as implied in the Moscow scenario briefed to the press? There is a burgeoning academic literature on covert action as an instrument of state policy.[5] There is also an extensive and growing literature on the legal and strategic issues raised by state and non-state cyber operations.[6] Cyber operations during an armed conflict are covered by the existing law of armed conflict, and should abide by the principles of necessity, distinction, proportionality and unnecessary suffering. Much cyber activity, however, takes place beneath this threshold. Domestic legislation – the Intelligence Services Act (1994) and the Investigatory Powers Act (2016) – provides the process for senior ministers to authorise operations such as equipment interference where these are deemed to be necessary, proportionate and have a sound legal basis in the interests of national security, economic well-being, and the detection or prevention of serious crime. The joint nature of the NCF, combining personnel from GCHQ, the Ministry of Defence and other agencies, is an efficient use of limited expertise in this field: it houses under one roof, so to speak, the capability to operate under these different operational authorisations.[7] Whilst the UK has committed to abiding by international law in its conduct of cyber operations, there is legal uncertainty about when precisely OCOs should be regarded as reaching the level of a use of force.[8] Must they cause injury or physical damage, or could, for example, serious economic damage or the degradation of military infrastructure be sufficient to be interpreted as a use of force? Whilst there is an international debate about the legal status of OCOs as a use of force or as an otherwise prohibited intervention in the sovereign affairs of another state, less attention has focused on the specifically ethical dimensions of political decisions to approve OCOs.[9] This piece aims to stimulate further ethical debate about OCOs as the NCF emerges as an instrument of the UK’s wider national security strategy. Whilst there is not yet a substantial literature applying moral philosophy to this issue, there is no shortage of theories and traditions to draw on. One obvious step would be to apply the principles of ‘just war’ theory directly to cyber operations, another to frame discussion around acceptance or rejection of a realist approach to cyber dilemmas facing political leaders, according to which the UK should develop formidable offensive cyber capabilities and be prepared to use them to enhance national power and security. As a shortcut, I employ Max Weber’s distinction between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility, and the importance of the latter in exploring the challenges of political leadership.[10] Put simply, as voters we do not expect our elected leaders to make decisions solely on the basis of their personal beliefs. They should be mindful of a duty to act in accordance with the best interests of the nation – and perhaps with some broader conception of the common good, including global public goods. Defining the national interest is, of course, a contested, inherently political act. Nonetheless, political leaders are morally responsible for the consequences of their actions and omissions in pursuit of their conception of the national interest, however imperfectly articulated or socially divisive it might be.[11] Political leaders are not the only moral agents involved in this OCO process. Officials and military officers have responsibilities for: shaping the processes that determine strategic priorities for intelligence collection, effects operations and the development of capabilities; producing submissions and plans for specific OCOs; and shepherding the equities process to determine whether vulnerabilities uncovered by UK cyber operators are retained for offensive or surveillance purposes, or are disclosed to enable patching, enhancing the global public good of systemic cyber security.[12] A typology of offensive cyber and its ethical dilemmasAt this point, it is perhaps useful to explore a typology of activities that are pursued under the umbrella term OCO. In a recent speech, former National Cyber Security Centre chief executive Ciaran Martin proposed an escalating ‘five tier structure of cyber warfare’, conveniently forming a mnemonic acronym, HACKS.[13] Martin’s lowest level is hacking in support of national security objectives, gaining access to adversaries’ electronic devices, possibly degrading or deleting content. The second tier is ‘adversarial infrastructure destruction’ in which digital infrastructure, such as a terrorist organisation’s online propaganda network, is destroyed. The third tier is ‘counter-influence’ operations, essentially the use of OCOs to achieve deterrence. The fourth tier is ‘kinetic’ attack, a cyber operation that causes significant damage to specific infrastructure, for example disrupting the electricity supply to a city (the Moscow example above) or taking a television network off the air. Finally, the fifth and highest tier is system-wide, all-out cyber attacks on military and civilian targets during an armed conflict that sees cyber used as part of integrated operations.[14] The HACKS model is useful because it highlights the spectrum of severity on which any OCO can be placed. It also demonstrates the variety of ethical dilemmas posed by different OCOs, where some proposed operations are likely to command more universal agreement that they are morally justified. Few would argue against (appropriately authorised) cyber operations that disrupted the digital command-and-control infrastructure used to direct a terrorist attack or to mastermind a global ransomware campaign. Far more would question whether it could ever be ethical, or indeed lawful, for the UK to attack an adversary’s national power grid or civilian air traffic control system. Another way of thinking about this is to simplify Martin’s structure – losing the HACKS mnemonic in the process, alas – so that the typology of OCOs is reduced to three tiers: skirmishing; strategic ‘cyber solo’ operations; and cyber operations integrated with non-cyber operations during an armed conflict.[15] At the basic level of skirmishing, states and other actors are competing for advantage in cyberspace. When a hostile state actor, terrorist or organised crime group uses digital infrastructure directly or indirectly to harm the UK – whether that harm is electoral interference, disinformation, preparation for an armed attack, or running a ransomware campaign – then the Government should have a relatively easy time justifying the necessity and proportionality of a counter-cyber operation to degrade, disrupt or destroy the digital infrastructure used by these hostile actors. Skirmishing could aim to pre-empt an attack, prevent a ransomware campaign, or punish a hostile state actor or its proxy, increasing the ‘tactical friction’ and ‘strategic cost’ faced by the UK’s cyber adversaries.[16] This tier includes operations to take down disinformation websites, as has been recently reported in efforts to counter anti-vaccine ‘fake news’.[17] The dilemma is harder if an adversary’s digital infrastructure is hosted in a state unaware of the malign activity. Ordinarily, we would expect the UK government to work with the government of that state to resolve the issue, but, in extremis, there would be a clear ethical case that it would be proportionate and necessary to conduct a specific and limited OCO to eliminate an imminent threat, even though that constituted a covert breach of the other state’s sovereignty. The second tier, strategic ‘cyber solo’ operations can be split into two: a lower tier that tries to deter adversaries by signalling that the UK has the capability to use cyber operations against adversaries’ infrastructure, perhaps restricted to defence- and security-related infrastructure, but perhaps not; and a higher tier that actually involves using such capabilities, for example to enforce a red line when the lower tier of deterrence had failed. The interesting thing about this tier is that it inhabits the challenging grey zone of cyber operations that hover below the threshold of armed conflict. Even where the intention is only signalling and not to conduct an attack, the decision must be very carefully considered – not least for the potential that a pre-positioned implant is misinterpreted by the adversary as an indicator of an imminent attack, precipitating a crisis. Depending on the choice of infrastructure targets, this tier also raises broader ethical questions about the sort of internet that the UK should be trying to promote. Does it really want to be in the business of targeting civilian infrastructure, even if only for deterrent effect? Bearing in mind that, for deterrence to be credible, the adversary needs to believe that you will be willing to carry out the attack.[18] This tier of the typology also poses ethical questions about the second-order consequences, or system effects, of targeting infrastructure: does it undermine the rules-based approach to the Internet that the UK upholds elsewhere? Is there value, in other words, to acting in a more Kantian fashion, refusing to pursue civilian infrastructure targeting that, if universalised as the practice of all cyber-capable states, would exacerbate threats to critical infrastructure around the world? The third tier of OCOs, cyber operations as part of an armed conflict, represent the highest level of possible damage but, paradoxically, pose the fewest new ethical dilemmas. This is because, as the UK has repeatedly emphasised, it considers cyber operations to be subject to the same body of law as other operations during an armed conflict. All such operations can, therefore, be assessed by traditional ethical principles of military necessity, proportionality, discrimination between military and civilian targets, and the requirement to avoid unnecessary suffering. This is the tier in which the UK can rely most confidently on the ethical principles that have evolved over decades of warfare. This simplified typology encompasses a broad range of tactical, operational and strategic decisions about whether or not to use OCOs. It isn’t clear yet what the proposed balance of missions is for the NCF: will it be primarily a cyber skirmishing force, a deterrent against hostile state actors, or a developer of OCOs to support integrated operations during armed conflict? As outlined above, whatever the priorities of the NCF, each of these decisions is implicitly ethical. An effective ethic of cyber responsibility requires deliberation, technical and strategic understanding that depend on agency (the role and character of individuals) and structure (the impact of routines and processes). These issues may or may not be addressed in the integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy. Whether or not they are, the National Security Council (NSC) and Prime Minister should have been using the review’s process to reflect carefully on Britain’s use of OCOs, which would require the application of moral reasoning. Optimising the ethic of cyber responsibilityOne of the biggest challenges facing government is how to structure its underlying processes to provide sufficient support for political leaders to take informed ethical decisions about OCOs in support of national security, economic well-being or countering serious crime. There are already strategic processes that produce requirements and priorities for intelligence coverage, effects operations and capability development, and these will naturally shape the NCF’s priorities. Even with the reported increase in the defence budget, difficult decisions still must be made about the balance of investment between the three tiers of possible missions outlined above. Another issue is raised by the limited pool of top cyber talent: with finite expertise to allocate to different missions, government must decide how to structure its wider cyber workforce, across not only OCOs but also digital espionage and the cyber security work of the NCSC. A democratic state should configure its structures and processes of decision to guarantee that the relevant moral issues surface sharply in pre-decision debates in the presence of the appropriate (and appropriately-informed and actively-participating) accountable elected figures. Similarly, there is an argument that enhanced legislative oversight might help improve the quality of executive deliberation about OCOs, notwithstanding the need for operational secrecy.[19] This issue was highlighted in contrasting approaches to US OCOs under the Obama and Trump administrations. The Trump administration reportedly relaxed the tightly-controlled authorisation process exercised by the Obama White House.[20] Trump’s process afforded greater latitude for both US Cyber Command and the Central Intelligence Agency’s clandestine cyber operations.[21] The contrast between administrations highlights the existence of a spectrum on which we can place any executive, according to the relative depth and rigour of its OCO processes. Notwithstanding criticism of Obama’s process as inflexible, it is clear that he took seriously the ethics of cyber responsibility. Under Trump’s more devolved process, the importance of the responsible leadership exercised by unelected individuals arguably increased, for example head of US cyber command General Paul Nakasone.[22] Whilst the incoming Biden administration might not reset the authorisation process back to the strictures of the Obama era, it may nonetheless reassert a more prominent and hands-on role for the White House in active management of OCOs. This would be equally desirable in the British case, especially where questions exist about the current Prime Minister’s attention to detail and priorities.[23] A well-formed OCO process should clarify the important ethical dimensions, so that political leaders better understand the decisions they are being asked to take. Insofar as operational urgency permits, these decisions should be taken in the collegial environment of a committee, chaired by the Prime Minister and including the Attorney General and the relevant authorising ministers (the foreign secretary and defence secretary). Something like this process may already exist and even be used prudently by the Prime Minister. It is not imperative that the process be publicly avowed. Operational secrecy is manifestly necessary. But better communication might improve public confidence in the ethics of UK OCOs and that government is striking the right balance between OCOs and the public good of cyber security. Ciaran Martin’s recent speech helped to advance such a public debate about the need to consider the cyber security implications of Britain’s emerging offensive cyber strategy.[24] Former cabinet secretary Lord Sedwill recently claimed that OCOs were part of a ‘series of discreet measures’ taken by the UK against Russian leaders and their interests after the 2018 Salisbury attack.[25] A hypothetical decision to approve cyber operations against, say, financial infrastructure to target illicit wealth might have been justified, in principle, as a deterrent or retributive act, necessary to protect national interests. This decision – in the grey middle tier of our cyber typology – should, however, balance expected national gains against wider ethical considerations such as the integrity of the financial system – a global public good, from which everyone benefits, including UK citizens. Adverse reputational impact on the UK as a lawful actor, if such an operation was exposed, should also be assessed. This approach would be consistent with the principles that the Government has previously stated would guide its cyber operations, but ambiguity – perhaps deliberate – remains about UK decision making in practice. Operational exposure or compromise of a capability can lead to more than reputational damage. What happens if capabilities developed to enable British cyber operations are leaked, leading to their use by hostile actors? This hypothetical has a disturbing basis in fact: the widely-reported loss and disclosure of US National Security Agency hacking tools that led to waves of cybercrime, most notably the WannaCry ransomware that ravaged networks across the globe, including the National Health Service.[26] This is a striking example of the potential damage to the public good of cyber security when, rather than disclose vulnerabilities, states secretly buy or develop them for digital surveillance or OCOs. In principle, there is nothing uniquely cyber-related about this dilemma: it would be dangerous if, for example, lax security at a military facility led to weapons and ammunition falling into hostile hands. The reason that the cyber debate is more urgent is that this has already happened, and the very nature of cyber operations is that adversaries can potentially detect and re-purpose cyber tools for their own ends. There are valid reasons of state for maintaining offensive cyber capabilities, just as there are reasons for retaining digital surveillance capabilities. There is, however, an equal need for rigorous, reflective processes to determine when to prioritise offensive or surveillance objectives over those of cyber security. Decisions about the size and structure of national cyber forces are inherently political. They reflect an executive’s risk appetite, prioritisation of objectives, and understanding of the system effects of approved operations. In some ways, ethical dilemmas are identical to other domains, e.g. the choice between counterforce (military) and countervalue (civilian) targeting. But in others, particularly the middle tier of our typology, the precision and non-lethality of OCOs potentially obscures their second-order effects. For example, a targeted operation against one bank account, or the non-disclosure of a vulnerability to use it for a specific offensive cyber operation, can be seen to achieve a specific and limited national objective, but how should political leaders weigh the broader implications and risks, such as eroding a global public good – cyber security or the integrity of financial infrastructure? As one former senior GCHQ official noted after the NCF announcement, offensive cyber has its place in national strategy, but it should not distract from the imperative to improve cyber security.[27] RecommendationsAn effective ethic of cyber responsibility requires active and informed political leadership. This entails clear and sustained commitment from political leaders, but also that the right processes are available to ensure that the underlying risks are understood. Technical knowledge is needed to make informed decisions, but these decisions are ultimately political and freighted with moral considerations. To this end, a ministerial cyber sub-committee of the NSC should be reconstituted and it should meet regularly to review the totality of cyber strategy, including updates on current OCO. It should act as a forum for deliberation and decision about the dynamic balance between the different aspects of national cyber strategy. The ethical case for tier 1 (cyber skirmishing) and tier 3 (cyber operations during armed conflict, supporting integrated operations) missions is most compelling. There is a strategic imperative for both missions and it will be for ministers to decide how to balance these competing priorities for the NCF’s capability development and operational activities. Tier 2 operations, including deterrent signalling of capabilities to undermine critical infrastructure, are ethically and legally more complex, to say nothing about their strategic efficacy. More research is needed about how the NCF might best incorporate tier 2 missions within its remit, without prejudice to its other missions. The current vulnerabilities equities process, which only escalates the hardest cases to secretary of state level, should in future be placed formally under the NSC cyber sub-committee, to provide regular ministerial review of the findings of the official equities process. This improvement in ministerial engagement with the equities process is arguably worthwhile given the possibility of more disagreement in future at official level, as the NCF becomes a more active player in generating and seeking to retain vulnerabilities for offensive purposes. As the equities process diverges from its origins as a predominantly espionage- or security-focused debate, GCHQ-driven system, there is the potential for sharper disagreements about releasing or retaining vulnerabilities – particularly between NCSC and NCF if the latter pursues tier 2 targeting of civilian infrastructure. Given the strategic significance of these questions, it is right that ministers should take a more active interest in this process. At this broader strategic level, it would also be advantageous to streamline existing ministerial cyber responsibilities. Whilst the most sensitive cyber operations will continue to be authorised by the foreign or defence secretaries, in dialogue with and after input from the Prime Minister’s and Attorney General’s respective offices, there is a strong argument for improving the quality of more continuous ministerial engagement with overall cyber strategy by creating a network of joint ministers of state across several departments with cyber-relevant operational and policy remits, e.g. between the Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), the Home Office and Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. Cyber issues are complex and interconnected: a network of ministers empowered to focus more intensely on these issues, understanding the cross-departmental overlaps and dilemmas, would improve the quality of ministerial involvement in and active management of this process. Regarding wider oversight, it is welcome that the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) will assume oversight of the NCF. This will, however, surely require uplift in the resources and independent expertise at its disposal, notwithstanding the Prime Minister’s stated belief that it is already ‘well equipped’ to perform this task.[28] The ISC should also draw more of its secretariat from outside the operational community which it oversees. Whilst the mechanics of ISC oversight of the NCF are presumably still a work in progress, the Committee should also consider the benefits of conducting (and publishing some of the findings of) an annual review of the equities process, providing further oversight and improving public confidence in the accountability of that significant part of UK cyber strategy. As with other areas of defence strategy, the UK does not have the resources to exercise cyber power in the same league as the US. It must carefully balance its investment and deployment of top talent across all cyber missions. There are limits to what the UK can realistically achieve. Its allocation of resources must be guided by an incisive strategic assessment of national priorities. Such a strategic audit of the offensive cyber workforce and its mission priorities should be conducted following the agreement of national strategic objectives in the integrated review, as part of the next iteration of national cyber strategy due in 2021.[29] It should also be actively overseen by the proposed ministerial cyber sub-committee of the NSC. Furthermore, this review should be pursued explicitly within an alliance context. As with the FIVE EYES partnership in digital espionage, the UK should collaborate and, as far as possible, deconflict with the US and other close partners to ensure that the alliance derives optimum value from the UK investment in offensive cyber capability development and its conduct of OCOs. ConclusionIn an ideal world, all cyber-capable state actors would agree not to target civilian critical infrastructure or to undermine the integrity of global public goods in cyberspace. Achievement of such agreement would be an incontestable victory for multilateral cyber diplomacy, delivering better norms of cyber competition between states – notwithstanding the severe difficulties that would await any formal verification process. In reality, however, unless adversaries – and perhaps also allies, in keeping with the interdependent nature of cyber competition – change their behaviour, it is possible that tier 2, primarily deterrent operations might well form an important part of the new NCF’s mission.[30] With this caveat, the UK is arguably better off prioritising its limited high-end cyber resources on tier 1 and tier 1 missions, concentrating on counter-cyber skirmishing and the development of counterforce capabilities to support integrated operations during armed conflict, rather than pursuing a countervalue approach to targeting civilian infrastructure. This is consistent with international law, as well as with British values and the liberal way of war, described by John Stone as being ‘concerned with breaking things as an alternative to killing people’.[31] In exercising the ethic of cyber responsibility, our political leaders should apply a principle of ‘minimum effective offensive cyber capability.’ The global public good of cyber security, from which everyone benefits, should be prioritised wherever possible. This is particularly the case in the equities process, only retaining the capabilities to conduct a carefully selected number of offensive operations and weighing seriously the potential risks that these capabilities would pose if the escaped into the wild. That these capabilities should be well protected is a given, but their very engineering should reflect on the damage caused by uncontrolled, self-propagating viruses. A responsible state cyber power should act in a more restrained and discriminating manner. The UK should be able to compete with and successfully deter less responsible or restrained cyber powers, such as Russia, without compromising our principles and pursuing a similar turn countervalue targeting of civilian infrastructure.[32] Dr Joe Devanny is a lecturer in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, and deputy director of the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s. He writes here in a personal capacity. Joe was previously programme director for security at Ridgeway Information, a King’s spinout company, and a research fellow at the International Centre for Security Analysis, part of the Policy Institute at King’s. Prior to this, Joe was a postdoctoral researcher on the contemporary history of Whitehall, a joint project between King’s and the Institute for Government. Before this, Joe was a UK civil servant working on national security issues.Image by Cabinet Office under (CC). [1] Caroline Wheeler, Tim Shipman and Mark Hookham, UK war-games cyber attack on Moscow, The Sunday Times, October 2018, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/uk-war-games-cyber-attack-on-moscow-dgxz8ppv0[2] Ministry of Defence. 2016. Cyber Primer (2^nd Edition). Shrivenham: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre: 54.[3] David J. Lonsdale. 2016. Britain's Emerging Cyber-Strategy. The RUSI Journal 161, no.4: 52-62.[4] Gordon Corera, UK's National Cyber Force comes out of the shadows, BBC News, November 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/amp/technology-55007946[5] Elizabeth E. Anderson. 1998. The Security Dilemma and Covert Action: The Truman Years. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 11, no.4: 403-427; Austin Carson and Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2017. Covert Communication: The Intelligibility and Credibility of Signaling in Secret. Security Studies 26, no.1: 124-156; Austin Carson. 2018. Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; and Rory Cormac. 2018. Disrupt and Deny: Spies, Special Forces, and the Secret Pursuit of British Foreign Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[6] Michael Schmitt (ed.). 2017. Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen and Ryan C. Maness. 2018. Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Ben Buchanan. 2020. The Hacker and the State: Cyber Attacks and the New Normal of Geopolitics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; and the various contributions to the Fall 2020 edition of the Texas National Security Review, https://tnsr.org/volume-3-issue-4/[7] Marcus Willett, Why the UK’s National Cyber Force is an important step forward, International Institute of Strategic Studies, November 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/11/uk-national-cyber-force[8] Jeremy Wright, Speech: Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century, May 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century; Jeremy Wright, Speech: Attorney General’s speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, January 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/attorney-generals-speech-at-the-international-institute-for-strategic-studies[9] Randall R. Dipert. 2010. The Ethics of Cyberwarfare. Journal of Military Ethics 9, no.4: 384-410; Edward T. Barrett. 2013. Warfare In A New Domain: The Ethics Of Military Cyber-Operations. Journal of Military Ethics 12, no.1: 4-17; and David J. Lonsdale. 2020. The Ethics of Cyber Attack: Pursuing Legitimate Security and the Common Good in Contemporary Conflict Scenarios. Journal of Military Ethics 19, no.1: 20-39.[10] Max Weber. 2000. The Profession and Vocation of Politics. In Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 309-369.[11] Arnold Wolfers. 1952. “National Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol’. Political Science Quarterly 67, no.4: 481-502; Bob Jessop. 2015. The State: Past, Present, Future. Cambridge: Polity: 51.[12] An outline of the UK equities process, its decision and oversight arrangements, has been published by GCHQ: The Equities Process, November 2018, https://www.gchq.gov.uk/information/equities-process[13] Ciaran Martin, Cyber-weapons are called viruses for a reason: Statecraft and security in the digital age, King’s College London, November 2020, https://thestrandgroup.kcl.ac.uk/event/ciaran-martin-cyber-weapons-are-called-viruses-for-a-reason-statecraft-security-and-safety-in-the-digital-age/[14] UK Ministry of Defence. 2020. The Integrated Operating Concept 2025: 10.[15] Dipert, The Ethics of Cyberwarfare: 403; David Betz and Tim Stevens, 2011. Cyberspace and the State: Toward a Strategy for Cyber-Power. London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies: 97.[16] The quoted phrases are taken from the Command Vision of US Cyber Command, which provides a concise statement of the current US offensive cyber strategy. See: US Cyber Command, Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority: Command Vision for U.S. Cyber Command, April 2018, https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20Vision%20April%202018.pdf[17] Lucy Fisher and Chris Smyth, GCHQ in cyberwar on anti-vaccine propaganda. The Times, November 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/gchq-in-cyberwar-on-anti-vaccine-propaganda-mcjgjhmb2  [18] Martin makes both these points eloquently in his speech: Cyber-weapons are called viruses for a reason, 10.[19] Joe Devanny, Richard Brown, Grant Christopher, Michael Endsor and Matthew Zelina, Written evidence by the International Centre for Security Analysis, King’s College London, to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy’s Inquiry on Cyber Security: UK National Security in a Digital World, UK Parliament, 2017, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/national-security-strategy-committee/cyber-security-uk-national-security-in-a-digital-world/written/47199.pdf[20] John Bolton. 2020. The Room Where it Happened: A White House Memoir. New York: Simon & Schuster: 174-175.[21] Zach Dorfman, Kim Zetter, Jenna McLaughlin and Sean D. Naylor, Exclusive: Secret Trump order gives CIA more powers to launch cyberattacks, Yahoo News, July 2020, https://news.yahoo.com/secret-trump-order-gives-cia-more-powers-to-launch-cyberattacks-090015219.html[22] Garrett M. Graff, The Man Who Speaks Softly—and Commands a Big Cyber Army, Wired, October 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/general-paul-nakasone-cyber-command-nsa/[23] Rory Stewart, Lord of misrule: Boris Johnson: an amoral figure for a bleak, coarse culture, The Times Literary Supplement, November 2020, https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/boris-johnson-tom-bower-book-review-rory-stewart/[24] Martin, Cyber-weapons are called viruses for a reason.[25] Tom Newton Dunn. 2020. UK Targets Putin Allies. The Times, 24 October 2020, Times2 1, 4.[26] Lily Hay Newman, The Leaked NSA Spy Tool That Hacked the World, Wired, March 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/eternalblue-leaked-nsa-spy-tool-hacked-world/; Nicole Perlroth and Scott Shane, In Baltimore and Beyond, a Stolen N.S.A. Tool Wreaks Havoc, New York Times, May 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/25/us/nsa-hacking-tool-baltimore.html[27] Conrad Prince, On the Offensive: The UK’s New Cyber Force, RUSI, November 2020, https://rusi.org/commentary/offensive-uk-new-cyber-force[28] Boris Johnson, HC Deb, 19 November 2020, c.496,[29] John Gearson, Philip Berry, Joe Devanny and Nina Musgrave, The Whole Force by Design: Optimising Defence to Meet Future Challenges, Serco Institute/King’s College London, October 2020: 69.[30] Paul M. Nakasone, A Cyber Force for Persistent Operations, Joint Force Quarterly 92, January 2019, http://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/2019_01_22_JFQ_CyberRoleForPersistentOperations_ Nakasone.pdf[31] John Stone. 2013. Cyber War Will Take Place! Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no.1: 106.[32] Andy Greenberg. 2019. Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin's Most Dangerous Hackers. New York City: Random House. [post_title] => The ethics of offensive cyber operations [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-ethics-of-offensive-cyber-operations [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-12-02 21:31:59 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-12-02 20:31:59 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5225 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5218 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-12-03 00:01:10 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-12-02 23:01:10 [post_content] => For the last 23 years, since the birth of the Blair government, a key aspect of British foreign policy, and indeed Britain’s global reputation, has been its overseas development aid (ODA) policy. Blair’s creation of the Department for International Development (DFID) and the increasing budget for that department not only made ODA a key plank within Britain’s foreign policy, but also massively increased Britain’s visibility within the development field, building new relationships with developing nations and many former colonies. By increasing investment in the developing world, Britain was able to create new trade opportunities, rehabilitate its international reputation in the developing world and push its international priorities within a soft power agenda. However, the ODA budget has been under increasing pressure for over a decade, now being reduced to 0.5 per cent GNI following the Autumn Spending Review for the foreseeable future, because of both economic pressures and ideological disagreement in some quarters, primarily the political right. Boris Johnson announced in June 2020 that DFID would be merged into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), a move long favoured by many within the FCO and the Conservative cabinet. This article will consider what the implications of this change are likely to be and how the good work of DFID can be continued within the FCO, or whether it will be fatally undermined. The aims of mergerFor supporters of the merging of DFID and the FCO, it is logical for both departments to work as one. If the FCO oversees Britain’s policy ‘overseas’ then Britain’s relationship with developing nations should be part of that. As Johnson highlighted in his speech announcing the merger ‘we tolerate a risk of our left and right hands working independently’.[1] The potential for mixed messages, alongside concerns over value for money are both longstanding arguments for the merger and were both mentioned by Johnson in the House of Commons announcement. With two separate government departments, both acting with different priorities at their heart, the possibility for mixed messaging and conflicting activity is evident. Johnson argued that this conflict, coupled with an overly generous ODA budget meant that UK aid was a ‘giant cashpoint in the sky’.[2] With the merging of the FCO and DFID, the newly created FCDO will have a much larger budget than the previous FCO even with the reduction to 0.5 per cent GNI, allowing the UK to strategically spent aid money, not necessarily in the poorest countries or on projects, which address the most pressing global need, but on projects which advance the UK’s interests overseas. Quoted in the Guardian newspaper, Oxfam GB’s Chief Executive Danny Sriskandarajah stated: ‘Effectively what he’s saying is, we’re going to use our aid budget to pursue security and diplomatic aims. Those are noble aims, but that’s not what aid is for’.[3] For the Johnson government, aid is another tool at their disposal for pushing Britain’s global agenda and interests, which may be unpalatable for some supporters of Britain’s previous ODA policy, but are not necessarily out of line with the actions of many other Western nations, including Canada and Australia, where self-interest and ODA are very closely linked. The path forward for aidThe merging of DFID into the FCO has two potentially huge implications. Firstly, by removing the DFID Secretary of State (with those former responsibilities now falling to the FCDO Ministers), the influence and power of Britain’s development aid agenda is reduced, becoming one voice amongst many competing voices. Secondly, the budget of DFID has dwarfed the FCO budget since its creation (standing in 2019 at £15 billion for DFID and £2.4 billion for the FCO).[4] It is likely that this departmental merging will allow the FCDO to spend money allotted to ODA spending in a wide variety of ways, some development orientated, some less so. If the British government want to preserve their hard-won developmental credentials, and that is not necessarily the case, they could ring-fence the newly reduced development budget ensuring that the FCO elements within FCDO do not either directly or indirectly influence ODA spending. However, that seems unlikely considering Johnson’s comments that he wants to the two hands of overseas Britain to work together.[5] Another potential option for the new department, which might benefit both Britain and the developing nations which it donates aid to, is an explicit statement of Britain’s interests and priorities. ‘Joined up government’, as described by previous Prime Ministers, is a laudable aim, with different government departments working in unison to achieve a singular policy agenda. One way of trying to achieve this is being explicit on what that policy agenda is and potential ways of achieving it. However, if your aims are not altruistic or wedded to global goals (such as the UN Millennium Goals, for example), a public statement outlining your priorities might do more harm than good. A more private statement, shared only within government, would certainly be helpful in outlining your aims, and this is something, which the new FCDO will almost certainly produce. The subsuming of DFID into the FCO raised concerns amongst those in the development field. Indeed, in response to Johnson’s announcement of his plans, 188 charity organisations wrote to the Prime Minister asking him to reconsider his decision as it was an ‘unnecessary and expensive distraction’.[6] To date, there has been little work by the Johnson government to allay these concerns but it is possible that, once the complex issues of COVID-19 and Brexit have been dealt with, a clarification of Britain’s development aid agenda may be developed. However, there has been no indication that the Government are keen to allay fears or that the merging is simply an administrative reshuffle. Instead, the merger has been presented as a policy change, meaning that the Johnson government may well have abandoned many of the priorities and relationships, which DFID has focused on since 1997. The reduction in ODA funding certainly seems to be playing to the Conservative base and indicates that Britain’s relationship with the developing world is not one which they prioritise, even after Brexit. Beyond Johnson  Inevitably, Johnson will eventually leave office, as will the Conservatives. Looking beyond the current government, the future of Britain’s relationship with developing nations will be extremely important in a post-Brexit world. While, to some, development aid may be driven by altruism, charitable urges or even colonial guilt, one advantage of Britain’s donor status has been the impact on Britain’s bi-lateral relationships. By building (or buying) good will and strong working relations, ODA funding is a way of Britain creating new markets and new trading links in a strong global marketplace. Any future government will need to consider how important these linkages are, and how much they are willing to pay for them in the future. Once that decision has been made, they will then have to sell that idea to the British public. The 0.7 per cent spend on ODA is enshrined in law, but the reduction to 0.5 per cent GNI ODA under Johnson, with no specific date on when the figure may rise, suggests that development aid is no longer universally accepted by MPs from both main parties as being beneficial to the UK. It is possible, particularly in the light of the financial hardships, which are expected following COVID-19 and Brexit, that a future government might argue that development aid spending was a luxury which Britain cannot afford permanently. The real question is – is Britain’s ODA policy a luxury, which Britain cannot live without? It seems likely that the merger of DFID and the FCO will eventually enable or encourage a strategic plan on British foreign policy. The merging of the two departments happened while the current strategic planning exercise was ongoing, rather than waiting for its recommendations on completion. Such a planning exercise would be incredibly useful, allowing Britain to really ‘join up’ some elements of its foreign and development aid policy. While altruism is a noble pursuit, many nations have, at least in some part of their ODA policy, an element of self-interest, and ODA and self-interest do not have to run counter to each other. The situation in Yemen had demonstrated the strange juxtapositions, which governments can so easily fall into. Why would a nation such as the UK provide development aid to a nation ravaged by war, while at the same time, providing the very weapons which are being used to terrorise the population? Securitisation has become a key battleground within the developing world and there is some disquiet over developed nations, such as the UK, using their ODA budgets to ‘clean up’ their military activity overseas. Without a clear line of sight, a clear commitment to the developing world and a desire to deal with short-term problems and ‘bumps in the road’ in the pursuit of longer-term benefits, these two policies usually end up being uncomfortable bedfellows, and unfortunately immediate financial benefit usually wins out over longer term potential benefits, even economic ones. As we enter a new Brexit world, the issue of ‘Global Britain’ also needs some attention here. If Britain is, as successive Prime Ministers have suggested (for example, May at the Conservative Party Conference, Johnson as reported in the New York Times), keen to build trade linkages with members of the Commonwealth and the wider world, cutting development budgets or downgrading the importance of aid projects could be hugely counterproductive.[7] While conditional aid was eliminated from DFID practices in 1997, it would be foolhardy to believe that the spending of millions of pounds of British money in developing nations on important infrastructure projects and societally vital programmes has not been in Britain’s long-term economic interest. Indeed, in 2012, the coalition government introduced a new design for aid being sent from the UK. Each sack, box or pallet was emblazoned with a new ‘Union Jack’ flag, with the words ‘UK Aid’, ensuring all recipients knew who to thank for their charity.[8] The developing world is a growing market and that means there is more competition than ever to monopolise new markets. Without the relationships which DFID and British aid have nurtured, those relationships will be much harder to come by. Even if aid funding returns to the 0.7 per cent level, it is likely that different priorities and accounting will change the nature of funding without a Secretary of State to defend it, meaning that the ‘Global Britain’ brand, and the associated benefits which Johnson is so keen to collect, may well be damaged, the very opposite of his intentions in subsuming DFID into the FCO. In the much longer term, as is so often the case in government, it is possible that this newly merged department may once again be two separate ministries. DFID could be resurrected again as it was in 1997 (the original Overseas Development Ministry had been created until Wilson but was merged by Heath into the Foreign Office in the early 1970s). However, to do that you would need to have a party and a leader, as you did in 1997, who are really committed to their ODA policy and are clear about what they want that policy to achieve. Without such a commitment, and the money and political capital required to push through such a separation, particularly in the light of resistance from the FCO which would be extremely likely, any plan for separation would fall apart quickly, potentially disabling Britain’s ODA plans. ConclusionThe merging (or subsuming) of DFID into the FCO was a move long expected by those within the development world. Relentless pressure has been put on DFID since 2010 (and perhaps before), driven by external economic pressures on Britain, cuts in domestic spending, reporting of corruption or the mishandling of DFID funding and ideological objections. Spending large amounts of money overseas is a difficult policy to justify when children are slipping into poverty in the UK, even if that poverty is relative. It certainly is real to those experiencing it. Despite this, DFID and its 0.7 per cent funding has been relatively protected, first by the Cameron government and then the May government, despite expectations to the contrary. The merging of DFID into the FCO was, in some senses, inevitable, and it seems likely that this is a practical outcome of a downgrading of the development aid policy, with the Johnson government keen to pursue more direct investment opportunities. The reduction in the aid budget to 0.5 per cent GNI certainly suggests that foreign aid is not central to the wider foreign policy priorities of the Johnson government.  This means the longer term, but potentially more sustained, building of good will, which ODA funding produces, appear to be being sacrificed and downgraded. With the economic damage of COVID-19 and Brexit, Britain’s ODA budget is already expected to contract in the financial year 2020/21 and the long-term financial future of the policy could be in jeopardy. Like so many projects, its future is dependent on how long Johnson remains in Downing Street and how long the Conservatives remain in office. A Labour government might well be expected to be more sympathetic to protecting and ringfencing ODA funding and policymaking. Commenting on the proposed merger of DFID and the FCO, leader of the Labour Party, Sir Keir Starmer tweeted that ‘abolishing one of our best performing and most important departments diminishes Britain’s place in the world’.[9] However, with worsening economic conditions and global uncertainty, even that is not guaranteed, and it may well be that the merger of DFID and the FCO becomes a permanent feature, at least for the next decade or more. With other nations waiting in the wings to build relationships in developing nations and reap the financial rewards, the developing world cannot and will not wait. Dr Victoria Honeyman is an Associate Professor of British Politics at the University of Leeds. She writes extensively on the Labour and Conservative parties, particularly focused on British Foreign Policy and Britain’s Overseas Development Aid Agenda. Her last article focusing on the Blair government, ‘New Labour’s Overseas Development Aid Policy: charity or self-interest?’ was published in Contemporary British History. She also works extensively with the media appearing on programmes on BBC Radio Four and Five, BBC Breakfast and France 24. Image by UK Government under Open Government License. [1] International Development and Foreign Office to Merge, BBC News, June 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-53062858[2] Amy Jones and Harry Yorke, Boris Johnson scraps overseas aid department, heralding end to ‘giant cashpoint in the sky’, Daily Telegraph, June 2020, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/06/16/lockdown-uk-news-update-boris-johnson/[3] Heather Stewart and Patrick Wintour, Three ex-PMs attack plan to merge DFID with Foreign Office, The Guardian, June 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jun/16/foreign-office-and-department-for-international-development-to-merge[4] International Development and Foreign Office to Merge, BBC News, June 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-53062858[5] International Development and Foreign Office to Merge, BBC News, June 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-53062858[6] Peter Stubley, Boris Johnson urged to reconsider ‘unnecessary and expensive’ DFID merger by almost 200 charities, The Independent, June 2020, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-dfid-foreign-office-overseas-aid-charity-a9578321.html[7] Theresa May calls for ‘truly global  Britain’, BBC News, October 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-37535867; Mark Landler, Boris Johnson’s ‘Global Britain’: Inspired vision or wishful thinking?, The New York Times, July 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/world/europe/johnson-brexit-hong-kong.html[8] New logo: Flying the flag for UK aid, Government website, June 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-logo-flying-the-flag-for-uk-aid[9] Widespread criticism of the government’s plan to merge DFID with FCO, BOND, June 2020, https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2020/06/widespread-criticism-of-the-governments-plan-to-merge-dfid-with-fco [post_title] => Downgrading DFID – How will Britain’s Overseas Development Aid Agenda change now DFID is part of the FCO? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => downgrading-dfid-how-will-britains-overseas-development-aid-agenda-change-now-dfid-is-part-of-the-fco [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-12-02 21:25:54 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-12-02 20:25:54 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5218 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 1 [filter] => raw )[19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5133 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-11-02 00:00:16 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-11-01 23:00:16 [post_content] => Let’s be clear: violence against journalists can stop. It ends with accountability. If States fulfill their duty to protect journalists; if States meet their international commitments, journalists will be able to do their jobs freely and safely. International human rights law contains binding obligations to guarantee the safety of journalists. Additionally, in the last ten years there has been an unprecedented increase of international soft law. Implementation and accountability, however, are gaps that must be filled. Do this and the safety of journalists will be guaranteed, along with citizens’ access to the information needed to take decisions about their lives and the future of their democracies. The right to freedom of expression: A right of allThe right to freedom of expression is protected in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as in regional human right treaties. Article 19 of the ICCPR requires States to guarantee everyone the right to freedom of expression, including the “freedom to seek, receive, or impart information or ideas of any kind”, regardless of frontiers, and through any media of a person’s choice, including online.[1] While the scope of this right is broad, Article 19(3) provides for its restriction in limited circumstances. States must show that any restriction satisfies a strict three-part test. Restrictions must be provided by law, based on a precisely drafted law, and be accessible, to enable individuals to modify their conduct accordingly; in pursuit of a legitimate aim, as per Article 19(3) for the rights or reputations of others, the protection of national security, public order or public health or morals; and necessary and proportionate, where the state must demonstrate in a specific and individualised fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the necessity and proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the threat. The ICCPR contains a number of other obligations relevant to the safety of journalists, including the right to life (Article 6) and the freedom from torture (Article 7). States are also obliged to guarantee individuals’ freedom from arbitrary detention (Article 9) and ensure the right to a fair trial (Article 14). The ICCPR also requires States to guarantee freedom from “arbitrary or unlawful” interference in one’s privacy, of particular importance for protecting journalists’ private communications, their access and use of anonymity and encryption tools.[2] Moreover, it sets out the right of all people to equality and non-discrimination (Article 2), further developed by the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) that creates specific obligations for States to end discrimination against women, defined as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction” based on sex characteristics which has the effect or purpose of restricting or negating women’s enjoyment of human rights, such as the right to freedom of expression.[3] Other binding treaties, such as the International Convention on the protection of all persons from enforced disappearance, sets out specific obligations that can address the increasing enforced disappearances of journalists in reprisal for their work. International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which governs the law of armed conflict, also has a say. Journalists, media professionals and associated personnel are specifically protected by IHL as civilians, provided they take no action adverse to this status. This means that any deliberate attack against a journalist by a party engaged in an armed conflict constitutes a war crime, and those responsible must be brought to account.[4]  The Security Council has reaffirmed these obligations through resolutions on the protection of journalists in armed conflict.[5] The safety of journalists: an increasing matter of soft lawSoft Law is not toothless. International commitments made by States are not empty words and States must be held accountable. In the last ten years alone, a dozen resolutions have been passed in the UN system, including UNESCO, specifically on the safety of journalists. This was not always an issue of particular concern in the UN system. Since the 1970’s, when there were many intense debates about the protection of journalists covering conflict situations,[6] it was not until 2012 when the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) started to pass biennial resolutions on the safety of journalists.[7] 2012 was also the year of the first ever UN strategy: the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity.[8] Since 2012, ensuring a safe environment for journalists made its way to two resolutions by the UN Security Council in 2006 and 2012, and to one UNESCO resolution focused on impunity in 1997.[9] UNESCO, the UN agency with the mandate to promote the right to freedom of expression has also played an increasing role. In 1997, it passed the first resolution focused on impunity on crimes against journalists and asking the UNESCO Director General to condemn the physical attacks against journalists. Since then, there has been a condemnation for every killing of a journalist. This information is collected in the database of the UNESCO Observatory of Killed Journalists.[10] Based on these condemnations, in 2006 UNESCO started to request States to provide information on the judicial inquiries. Information is published in a biennial report on this issue.[11] At the regional level, intergovernmental organisations have also looked at the protection of journalists. In Europe, for example, the Council of Europe (CoE) adopted a very comprehensive Recommendation on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors[12] and an implementation guide that provides guidance and examples on how to translate into action what is agreed on paper.[13] Almost tens year earlier, the CoE had adopted a declaration specifically on the protection and promotion of investigative journalism “convinced that the essential function of the media as public watchdog and as part of the system of checks and balances in a democracy would be severely crippled without promoting such investigative journalism.”[14] In 2018, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also passed a Decision on the safety of journalists recognising the importance of investigative journalism and that the ability of the media to investigate “without fear of reprisal, can play an important role in our societies, including in holding public institutions and officials accountable.”[15] All of these texts have increasingly included additional aspects and nuances on the issue of the safety of journalists. While at the beginning concerns were around physical safety and impunity, resolutions have increasingly recognized the importance of legal, digital and psychological protection, as well as the need to approach the problem with a gender lens, among other considerations. Behind these improvements, there are also years of work by civil society groups, journalists’ associations and media to collect and analyse data to be used for evidence-based advocacy in the international sphere. So, what have States committed to?Resolutions on the safety of journalists commit States, based on their existing international human rights law obligations, to act on three fronts: prevention, protection and prosecution and remedy, as follows: [16] Prevention:

• Create and maintain a free and safe enabling environment for journalists, media workers and civil society, as they play a vital role enhancing the safety of journalists;
• Condemn all attacks against journalists and the prevailing impunity;
• Refrain from denigrating, intimidating or threatening the media and journalists, or using misogynist language towards women journalists, that undermining trust in media;
• Ensure national laws, policies and practices are fully in compliance with obligations under international human rights law and do not interfere with journalists’ independence;
• Refrain from the misuse of overbroad or vague laws to repress legitimate expression, including defamation and libel laws, laws on misinformation and disinformation or counter-terrorism and counter-extremism legislation as well;
• Ensure business entities and individuals are not using strategic lawsuits against public participation to exercise pressure on journalists;
• Cease to and refrain from intentionally preventing or disrupting access to or dissemination of information offline and online;
• Respect freedom of journalists to have access to information held by public authorities.

 Protection:

• Establish early warning and rapid response mechanisms against threats;
• Take measures to address sexual harassment and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence;
• Protect journalists, in particular those covering protests and elections;
• Allow encryption and anonymity and refrain from employing unlawful or arbitrary surveillance techniques;
• Protect journalists’ confidential sources;
• Enhance information-gathering and monitoring mechanisms, also those by civil society.

 Prosecution and remedy:

• Ensure the conduct of impartial, prompt, thorough, independent and effective investigations into all alleged violence, threats and attacks;
• Create special investigative units or independent commissions, and consider appointing a special prosecutor;
• Adopt specific gender-sensitive protocols and methods of investigation and prosecution;
• Support capacity-building, training and awareness-raising in the judiciary and among law enforcement officers and military and security personnel on international standards and commitments related to freedom of expression and the safety of journalists;
• Ensure that victims and their families have access to appropriate restitution, compensation and assistanc

 And who is a journalist after all?One of the controversies that led to the fail attempt by the UN to pass a resolution on the safety of journalists in the seventies was the definition of a journalist. In 2011, the Human Rights Committee, a quasi-judicial body consisting of 18 independent human rights experts elected by UN member states responsible for providing guidance on States’ obligations under the ICCPR, shed light on this particular matter.[17] It describes ‘journalism’ as a function shared by a wide range of actors, including bloggers and others who self-publish information online or offline, avoiding a restrictive or formal definition of who deserves protection as a journalist, and making clear that schemes for registering or licensing of journalists are incompatible with States’ obligations. In conclusion, the risks and attacks identified in this report are happening because States are not fulfilling their obligations and commitments. In many cases, governments or public officials are behind it. The more we know about international standards and commitments, the more we can hold governments accountable. The more we know, the more we can ensure the safety of journalists and the smooth functioning of our democracies, because without journalism there can be no democracy. Silvia Chocarro is Head of Protection at ARTICLE 19. @silviachocarroCover image, with changes under CC. [1] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Art.19, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx#:~:text=Article%2019&text=Everyone%20shall%20have%20the%20right,other%20media%20of%20his%20choice.[2] ARTICLE 19, Ending Impunity. Acting on UN Standards on the Safety of Journalists, November 2019,  https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/SOJ-Web.pdf[3] ARTICLE 19, Freedom of Expression and Women’s Equality, Ensuring Comprehensive Rights Protection, October 2020, https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Gender-Paper-Brief-1.pdf[4] International Committee of the Red Cross. Customary International Humanitarian law, Rule 34, Journalists, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule34[5] UN Security Council. Resolution 1738 on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (S/RES/1738), 2006, https://undocs.org/S/RES/1738(2006) & UN Security Council, Resolution 2222 on Protection of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity (S/RES/2222), 2015, https://undocs.org/S/RES/2222(2015)[6] Chocarro, Silvia. The United Nations’ Role in Promoting the Safety of Journalists from 1945 to 2016. In The Assault on Journalism. Building Knowledge to Protect Freedom of Expression. Edited by Ulla Carlsson and Reeta Pöyhtäri. Nodicom. Gothenburg, 2017 Page 45-61 https://www.nordicom.gu.se/sv/system/tdf/publikationer-hela-pdf/the_assault_on_journalism.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=38302&force=0[7] UNESCO, Basic Texts Related to the Safety of Journalists, https://en.unesco.org/themes/safety-journalists/basic-texts[8] UNESCO, UN Plan of Action on The Safety of Journalists, 2012, https://en.unesco.org/un-plan-action-safety-journalists[9] UNESCO, Resolution 29 on Condemnation of Violence against Journalists, 1997, https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/ipdc_resolution_29.pdf[10] UNESCO, Observatory of Killed Journalists, 2018, https://en.unesco.org/themes/safety-journalists/observatory[11] UNESCO Director-General Report on the Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity, 2020, https://en.unesco.org/themes/safety-journalists/dgreport/2020[12] Council of Europe. Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors, 2016, https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016806415d9#_ftn1[13] Council of Europe. Implementation Guide to Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 on the Protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors, 2020, https://rm.coe.int/safety-implementation-guide-en-16-june-2020/16809ebc7c[14] Declaration Decl-26.09.2007 by the Committee of Ministers on the protection and promotion of investigative journalism, 2007, https://rm.coe.int/1680645b44[15] OSCE, Decision No. 3/18 on the Safety of Journalists, 2018, https://www.osce.org/files/mcdec0003%20safety%20of%20journalists%20en.pdf[16] This is a selection of commitments, mainly from HRC resolutions.[17] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34 on Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression (CCPR/C/ GC/34), 2011, https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/GC34.pdf [post_title] => The Safety of Journalists, a Matter of International Human Rights Standards and Soft Law [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-safety-of-journalists-a-matter-of-international-human-rights-standards-and-soft-law [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-02-23 19:00:18 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-02-23 18:00:18 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5133 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[20] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5103 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-10-16 09:29:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-10-16 08:29:48 [post_content] => Since October 4^th, Kyrgyzstan has been shaken by a wave of unprecedented protests triggered by rigged parliamentary elections.[1] The country plunged in political turmoil with various divided political forces fighting for power and supporters. On October 4^th, 16 parties stood in the parliamentary election, only four parties passed the seven per cent threshold for entry into parliament. Although Kyrgyzstan has established a plural parliamentary party system, in reality powerful leaders are able to use this system to advance their own agenda. The two leading parties were Birimdik and Mekenim Kyrgyzstan, both have close ties with the current President and are connected to the powerful group leaders. The President’s younger brother, Asylbek Jeenbekov, is a member of Birimdik. Meanwhile, the powerful Matraimov family, who were the target of a high-profile corruption scandal[2] last year, supports Mekenim.[3] On Monday 5^th October, 12 opposition parties jointly declared that they would not recognise the results of the vote as the winning parties have either abused administrative resources or bought the votes.[4] Following the election results, peaceful protests that started in Bishkek have turned into a battle between the protesters and the law enforcement agencies. During the first night, the riot police used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse the crowds of people. According to the Health Minister’s official data, one person was killed and at least 686 injured during that night.[5] By three am on October 6^th, the presidential building had been taken by the protesters.[6] Some of them then freed several politicians from prison including former President Almazbek Atambayev, former Prime Minister Sapar Isakov and Sadyr Japarov. The political unrest in the country forced the Central Election Commission to cancel the election results and have prompted the resignation of Prime Minister Kubatbek Boronov and his cabinet.[7] Jeenbekov also offered to resign once a date for fresh elections had been set and parliament and his office had confirmed changes in government.[8] In the next few days, as the President of the country went into hiding, the opposition factions made grabs for power.[9] While some attempted to seize administrative seats in the Government, others have tried to resolve the power vacuum legitimately by either impeaching the President or appointing a new Prime Minister through the Parliament. However, this proved to be a challenging task. The first time MPs gathered to appoint Sadyr Japarov as the Interim Prime Minister of the country. However, it was considered illegitimate due to procedural issues of having no quorum.[10] The second time, while discussing impeachment of Jeenbekov, some of the MPs had left, without reaching the necessary number of votes to pass the motion.[11] When the leaders of the extra-parliamentary opposition finally made the decision to designate Omurbek Babanov for the post of Interim Prime Minister, Japarov and his supporters had already snatched the power from the opposition by resorting to violence and intimidation.[12] On October 9^th, peaceful protests led by Babanov (joined by Atambyev) were attacked on the Ala-Too square by Japarov and his supporters.[13] Although most people were assaulted by stones and bottles, there was one gunshot towards the car of Atambayev. On October 10^th, in an extraordinary session, thehas voted to appoint Sadyr Japarov, as the country’s Prime Minister. This time, Japarov secured the backing of the ruling coalition with more than 80 lawmakers from the 120 legislators of the parliament attending the extraordinary session.[14] In the meantime, the political vacuum in the country has created tensions in other cities. Throughout the country, many coal and gold mines were attacked, looted and equipment destroyed in the first couple of days of the protests. As more people travelled from other regions to Bishkek, it created fear among the city dwellers. Starting from October 6^th, residents and activists of the city have formed vigilante groups (druzhinniki) to deter any possible looters that accompanied previous uprisings.[15] The current protests in Kyrgyzstan also bring disconcerting flashbacks on the wave of protests that took place in 2005 and 2010. In 2005, the Tulip Revolution led to the ousting of the Askar Akayev's fall from power. The revolutionaries alleged corruption and authoritarianism by Akayev, his family and supporters. When Kurmanbek Bakiyev became Kyrgyzstan's head of state the promises of democratic change and reforms quickly faded away to give space to corruption and cronyism. Five years later he was overthrown by what is known as the ‘April Revolution’. Bakiyev’s removal from power was bloody and were followed by violent and deadly ethnic clashes in the south of the country. Although the recent protests are also about the same issues of corruption, political nepotism, and deteriorating economy, there are differences between the past and the current political unrests. First, this year’s protests are taking place against the background of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has exacerbated economic crisis and ravaged the country’s healthcare system.[16] The Government’s handling of the pandemic left citizens in anger and disarray. The pandemic was largely eased by the help of local volunteers who filled the Government’s gaps in dealing with the crisis in the country of 6.5 million people.[17] During the pandemic there was a huge grassroot movement to help people left out of the healthcare system with transportation and medicine, led by younger generation of Kyrgyz citizens. Secondly, the organisation of protests has changed in comparison to previous years. The advancements in communication and media have helped the protestors to organise collective action. The proliferation of rapid information through media and social media channels such as YouTube, Telegram and Facebook, has made it easier for individuals to share updates and deploy rapid mobilisation. Additionally, as explained by the anthropologist, Aksana Ismailbekova: ‘the role of media has been important not only in allowing people to share information with each other, but allowing previously marginalized groups to participate in the conversation’.[18] Third, and perhaps the most significant change, is that this year’s protests have been led by a younger generation of activists who demanded ‘old corrupt politicians’ to stay away from the Government. Most of these activists have taken part in grassroot activities since July 2020 amid the pandemic and then have made decisions to run the parliamentary elections with some of the pro-reform parties. The parties that have not gone through the seven per cent threshold. Fourth, in contrast to the previous protests, the opposition factions were not united as it happened in 2005 and 2010.[19] Before October 9^th, the opposition led by pro-reformist parties (Respublika, Ata Meken, Bir Bol, Reforma) could not agree on the main candidate for temporary Prime Minister to form the provisional government before the next election. Fifth, the role of organised crimes in the country backing politician has been a prominent feature of the country’s past and current political upheavals. In some cases, state-crime relations are so entangled that it is difficult to distinguish between them[20]. Already during the first Revolution in 2005, the role of several key influential criminals in organizing and financing anti-Akaev demonstrations was apparent. Criminal groups were also involved in June 2010 inter-ethnic clashes in Osh[21]. The state-crime relations reached unprecedented levels during Bakiyev’s time when prominent organised groups had infiltrated the political establishment by having seats in the parliament and government[22]. During Atambayev’s presidency, there was not such a direct connection between organised criminal groups and the state. However, it was under his ruling that underground contraband economy and money laundering was established. Some official state representatives (Matraimov for instance was a deputy head of the State Customs Service) by forming allies with the trading business between China and Kyrgyzstan, other Central Asian countries, have developed an underground economy that have led to loss of huge amount of money in the state budget. But it was during Jeenbekov’s presidency that these groups have co-opted the government to secure the smooth running of their business operations. In the current context, it is suggested that Japarov has become connected to the Matraimov’s family, one of the wealthiest and most powerful families in Kyrgyzstan. It was the Deputy speaker Mirlan Bakirov, a member of Mekenim (My Homeland), a party allegedly funded by Rayimbek Matraimov who proposed Japarov for the role of prime minister[23]. Additionally, some MPs accuse Japarov to be connected with Kamchibek Kolbaev one of the country’s most notorious criminal leader. Several lawmakers reported that they have been threatened by the Kolbayev’s criminal group[24]. As of Wednesday 14^th October, the President has ratified the parliamentary vote, which makes the appointment of Sadyr Japarov to the post of Prime Minister official.[25] Although Japarov’s candidacy and its legitimacy is contested by the international community, lawmakers and internal factions, its appointment sets Kyrgyzstan to an uncertain path. Sadyr Japarov is a former adviser to former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and a fervent nationalist.[26] His previous political demands for nationalisation of ‘Kumtor,’ one of the largest gold mines in the country, are now uniting many people from rural regions from both north and south to fight foreign influence in the extractive sector and gain ownership over natural resources .[27] In the these past few years, nationalist and anti-foreign narratives have become useful tools for country’s politicians to gather supporters. Yet despite these uncertainties, what the current political turmoil demonstrates, is that we should not underestimate the role of youth movements in organising political upheavals. The young generation in Kyrgyzstan involved in politics of the country has a specific policy agenda which runs through formal party structures[28]. Many of them aspire to improve political governance in the country. The unreliability of the state to provide for its people, drove the population to rely on themselves and their community. As a result of systematic political crisis, independent and self-organised youth led networks have emerged offering alternative forms of governance which fulfil the services provided by the state. The failure of the state to adequately perform its self-defined function and respond to the needs of the population seeded autonomous social values and activism. As the regional analyst Erica Marat notes: “with every cycle of political turmoil and government dysfunction, civic networks only grow stronger”.[29] While it is still not clear who is in charge of the country, following Jeenbekov's resignation on Thursday 15^th of October, one thing is certain: the Kyrgyz population is in search for its political identity and has divergent views on the country’s governance.  Saipira Furstenberg, University of Exeter- is currently affiliated with the University of Exeter as a research associate. She previously taught politics modules at Oxford Brookes University. Her research interests are in post-Soviet region of Central Asia, extra-territorial politics, international dimensions of democracy and global governance. Gulzat Botoeva, University of Roehampton - is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Roehampton. She is a sociologist working on topics of illegal and informal economies (drug production, illegal gold mining and illegal monies) in a post-Soviet context. She has published with Theoretical Criminology, The International Journal of Drug Policy, and Central Asian Survey journals. Image by Izvestia under (CC). [1] Colleen Wood, Is This the Beginning of Kyrgyzstan’s Next Revolution? Foreign Policy, October 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/07/beginning-kyrgyzstan-next-revolution-election-protests-bishkek/[2] OCCRP,The Matraimov Kingdom, OCCRP October 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/the-matraimov-kingdom/[3] RFE/RL, OCCRP, and Kloop, Plunder And Patronage In The Heart of Central Asia, RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty, November 2019 (Update June 2020), https://www.rferl.org/a/30284703.html[4] Bruce Pannier, Backlash Against Kyrgyz Parliamentary Election Results Comes Instantly, RFE/RL, October 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/backlash-against-kyrgyz-parliamentary-election-results-comes-instantly/30876459.html[5] Facebook Post, October 2020, https://www.facebook.com/minzdravKR/posts/3360992854020014[6] Agencies, Kyrgyzstan protesters storm parliamentary building over election result, The Guardian, October 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/05/kyrgyzstan-election-120-taken-to-hospital-following-result-protest[7] RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, Kyrgyzstan Annuls Results Of Parliamentary Elections After Night Of Deadly Protests, RFE/RL, October 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/building-housing-kyrgyz-parliament-president-s-office-catches-fire-after-day-of-protests/30877477.html#:~:text=BISHKEK%20%2D%2D%20Kyrgyzstan%20plunged%20into,Jeenbekov%20described%20as%20a%20coup[8] President of the Kyrgyz Republic, October 2020, http://www.president.kg/ru/sobytiya/novosti/17973_prezident_sooronbay_gheenbekov__kak_tolko_strana_vstanet_na_put_zakonnosti_gotov_uyti_s_posta_prezidenta_kirgizskoy_respubliki[9] Kyrgyzstan’s President Jeenbekov ‘ready to resign’, TRT World, October 2020, https://www.trtworld.com/asia/kyrgyzstan-s-president-jeenbekov-ready-to-resign-40408[10] Kyrgyz parliament votes to appoint Sadyr Japarov as prime minister, Tass, October 2020, https://tass.com/world/1209355[11] RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, Kyrgyz President Holds Talks With Lawmakers On Crisis, Impeachment, RFE/RL, October 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-president-warns-of-political-vacuum-as-rival-opposition-parties-struggle-amid-protests/30881629.html; Four parties nominate Babanov as prime minister, KABAR, October 2020, http://en.kabar.kg/news/four-parties-nominate-babanov-as-prime-minister/[12] Ayzirek Imanaliyeva and Peter Leonard, Kyrgyzstan: Police and protesters clash in post-election melee, Eurasianet, October 2020, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-police-and-protesters-clash-in-post-election-melee[13] Peter Leonard, Kyrgyzstan: Politician’s mob rampage draws army onto the streets, Eurasianet, October 2020, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-politicians-mob-rampage-draws-army-onto-the-streets[14] DW, Парламент Киргизии повторно избрал премьером Садыра Жапарова, October 2020, https://www.dw.com/ru/parlament-kirgizii-vtorichno-izbral-premerom-sadyra-zhaparova/a-55273645[15] Tatiana Shvacheva, People’s guards are being set up in Bishkek, YouTube, October 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8FHM6C-pdPs&feature=emb_logo&ab_channel=%D0%A2%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%A8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B0[16] Kamila Eshaliyeva, Is Kyrgyzstan losing the fight against coronavirus?, openDemocracy, July 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/kyrgyzstan-losing-fight-against-coronavirus/[17] Daria Litvinova, Volunteers came to the rescue as virus raged in Kyrgyzstan, AP News, July 2020, https://apnews.com/article/kyrgyzstan-ap-top-news-understanding-the-outbreak-international-news-photography-08aee6d2f32ba0eca8f5b3ae88b49fd5[18] Aksana Ismailbekova, Intergenerational Conflict at the Core of Kyrgyzstan’s Turmoil, The Diplomat, October 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/intergenerational-conflict-at-the-core-of-kyrgyzstans-turmoil/[19] Bruce Pannier, Is a hidden power in Kyrgyzstan undermining the opposition’s drive for change?, October 2020, https://rus.azattyq.org/a/a-hidden-force-in-kyrgyzstan-hijacks-the-opposition-s-push-for-big-changes/30892873.html[20] Erica Marat, Kyrgyz Government Attempts to Crack Down on Organized Crime, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 40, February 2011, https://jamestown.org/program/kyrgyz-government-attempts-to-crack-down-on-organized-crime/[21] Eurasianet, What Role Did Crime Kingpins Play in Southern Kyrgyzstan’s Violence?, July 2010, https://eurasianet.org/what-role-did-crime-kingpins-play-in-southern-kyrgyzstans-violence[22] Erik Leijonmarck & Camilla Asyrankulova, The Role of Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Kyrgyzstan’s Ethnic Crisis, Policy Brief No. 39, October 2010, https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2010_leijonmarck-asyrankulova_the-role-of-organized-crime.pdf[23] Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Who is Kyrgyzstan’s new prime minister, Sadyr Japarov?, Aljazeera, October 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/15/who-is-kyrgyzstans-new-prime-minister-sadyr-japarov[24] OCCRP, Kyrgyz MPs say Organized Crime Installed New Prime Minister, October 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/13223-kyrgyz-mps-say-organized-crime-installed-new-prime-minister[25] Kyrgyzstan election: President accepts new prime minister, BBC News, October 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54534474[26] Aida Kasymalieva about what happened in the state residence and who gave commands to the deputies, Kaktus Media, October 2020, https://kaktus.media/doc/423280_aida_kasymalieva_o_tom_chto_proishodilo_v_gosrezidencii_i_kto_daval_komandy_depytatam.html; Ayzirek Imanaliyeva, Kyrgyzstan: Former convict appointed prime minister, Eurasianet, October 2020, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-former-convict-appointed-prime-minister[27] Niva Yau and Dirk van der Kley, The Growth, Adaptation and Limitations of Chinese Private Security Companies in Central Asia, The OXUS Society, October 2020, https://oxussociety.org/the-growth-adaptation-and-limitations-of-chinese-private-security-companies-in-central-asia/[28] Eurasianet, Kyrgyzstan: Does parliament have room for reform?, September 2020, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-does-parliament-have-room-for-reform[29] Erica Marat, The incredible resilience of Kyrgyzstan, openDemocracy, October 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/incredible-resilience-kyrgyzstan/ [post_title] => Political unrest in Kyrgyzstan: between old and new hopes [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => political-unrest-in-kyrgyzstan-between-old-and-new-hopes [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-10-16 10:20:08 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-10-16 09:20:08 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5103 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 1 [filter] => raw )[21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5030 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-09-29 09:06:28 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-29 08:06:28 [post_content] => On 16 June 2020, the Prime Minister announced that DFID and the FCO will merge into the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. This decision has united development and diplomacy in one new department, fusing together the majority of Britain’s international policy and programming. In so doing, the PM brought an end to just over two decades of autonomy for the UK’s international development assistance effort, during which time DFID developed a reputation for being the most effective aid agency in the world.[1] Intriguingly, this decision was made ahead of the ‘Integrated Review’, not as a result. There is a certain irony that a department that prided itself on using evidence as the cornerstone of its decision making was denied the opportunity to make an informed case to justify its existence. In the absence of such a process, we can only take the PM’s own words at face value, and conclude that the underpinning logic behind the merger is that by consolidating all assets, capabilities and instruments of foreign policy within one department the UK will be better able to both promote and protect national values and interests overseas, as well as project greater influence internationally. Thus, through greater internal consolidation and coherence it will achieve enhanced international effect. So far, so logical in theory. Few would dispute that economies of scale can often be achieved through unification, and that if time spent on tiresome internal bureaucratic bickering could be reoriented towards external effort HMG would be all the better for it. The creation of the FCDO is a further advancement of the ‘integrated’ or ‘full spectrum’ approach strongly advocated by the Conservatives since their election victory in 2010.[2] The concept itself is not new – the ‘comprehensive approach’ was a term regularly cited by the Labour Government during their term of office. However, the shift from ‘comprehensive’ to ‘integrated’ is a subtle but important one, and is an area in which HMG, like many Western governments, has experienced challenges.[3] Over the past decade, many HMG country teams in both Whitehall and at post claimed to be delivering ‘comprehensively’. Usually this amounted to the articulation of HMG’s objectives for that particular country in the form of a UK country strategy, signed off by the Ambassador or High Commissioner, with limited external consultation with external stakeholders. The division of responsibility for the objectives contained within that document were then allocated to the various different departments at post, each of whom would have their own staffing and funding streams designed to deliver against those aims, as well as their own internal institutional incentives to plough their own furrow. The result was often somewhat less than the sum of its parts, and in some cases, there was limited appetite from any of the departments involved to expend effort or resources delivering for each other. Two reasons oft cited by senior Government officials outside of DFID for this lack of collective delivery were that DFID had the lion’s share of the resources, and that their staff were primarily motivated by the interests of the poor in the countries of focus rather than the UK national interest. Upon re-election in 2015, the Conservatives adopted a twin-track approach to resolving these complaints: the increasing reallocation of Official Development Assistance (ODA) away from DFID to other departments, and in so doing, a softening of poverty reduction as the prime focus of ODA spending. Hence, in the past five years, DFID’s share of ODA spending across government has reduced from 95 per cent to just under 75 per cent. The primary route through which these alternative ODA allocations were channelled was collective funding streams, such as the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) and Prosperity Fund. However, these also have not always promoted integrated working. Both these cross-Whitehall funds allocate resources departmentally, so despite being collective funding streams, it is rare that programmes were actually delivered jointly between government departments. Thus, at best HMG would generate a collective approach at the strategic level but have operational siloes for delivery, and at worst, where strategies had been developed on the basis of the totality of the activities being delivered rather than on the basis of a clearly articulated set of overarching objectives, would yield duplicatory or occasionally contradictory activity between departments. The creation of FCDO provides several opportunities in this regard. The intent behind the integrated approach that has seen the creation of the FCDO therefore is for there to be greater collective analysis, which leads to more coherent strategic objective setting, followed by enhanced collective operational delivery. As such, a priority for FCDO should be to ensure that when country strategies are updated they are informed by current analysis and reflect the views of the new integrated department, as well as HMG more widely. The second is that these strategies are subject to greater input from and discussion with informed external stakeholders. Thirdly, the risk of incoherence between country strategies could be reduced through a greater investment in regional approaches from which country specific objectives cascade. This is already being implemented in regions like North Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. It will be no longer acceptable for the former departments that comprise the FCDO to deliver their objectives in isolation; instead where their skills, knowledge and experience can make a positive contribution to wider diplomatic or development endeavours these should be prioritised if HMG’s collective priorities require it. It is for this reason that the option of ‘full integration’ has been selected for FCDO, which will see no duplication of either thematic, geographic, or functional effort within the new department. Every section of the FCDO will have both DFID and FCO staff operating within it, and the days of buildings separating DFID and FCO staff at home and abroad will soon be over. Whilst there is an inherent logic to such an approach, the transition to a new organisational culture will not be straightforward. There are significant differences between DFID and FCO staff that will require institutional incentives to overcome in order to maximise coherence. The first issue is in whose interest are those in the department working? Much to the frustration of UK diplomats posted to developing countries, their DFID colleagues were guided primarily by the International Development Act (2002), which mandated them to act primarily in the interests of the poor within the population, rather than in the interests of the UK.[4] This resulted in many a heated discussion within Embassies and High Commissions as to where allegiances lay. Further, because many DFID staff were development professionals rather than career civil servants, tensions arose where there were contradictions between policy outcomes informed by technical expertise and established best practice and those which were primarily driven by UK political interest. FCDO will need to find a means to incorporate development into the wider foreign policy specialism of the new department. It will be imperative as FCDO evolves to achieve clarity as to the mission and values of the new department, and to ensure that wherever possible the interests of the UK and those with whom we seek to partner align. Where this is not possible however, and UK interests differ from those with whom we work, it will be necessary to ensure that staff involved in such scenarios are clear of their objectives and are willing to deliver accordingly. Without such clarity, there is significant risk of UK effort being undermined. The second issue will be for FCDO to articulate an institutional culture, which seeks to preserve the strengths and alleviate the weaknesses of both of its parents. Again, this will not be straightforward. As one would expect, the FCO was a department that placed primacy on geography and context, and hence was staffed with diplomats with linguistic and cultural, rather than thematic expertise. Beyond languages, the FCO prides itself on a level of ‘gifted amateurism’ that sees bright and motivated staff apply themselves to a number of tasks using a set of core competences in which they are honed. DFID on the other hand placed precedence on thematic or programmatic expertise, and therefore prioritised proficiency in health, education, or governance issues over geographical knowledge. There is a level of intellectual rigor to the advisory cadres, which sees subject matter expertise often take precedent over broader management and inter-personal skills. Given this approach, it is perhaps unsurprising that both departments had management and leadership challenges. It became apparent in FCO that the individualistic skills and experience required to excel in diplomacy did not always readily translate to wider organisational and leadership and management positions. DFID similarly recognised that an extensive knowledge of a thematic area also did not compensate for the wider inter-personal and emotional intelligence skills necessary for either leadership roles or cross-Whitehall skirmishes. The future FCDO will require geographical, thematic, strategic, managerial, programmatic, political, and bureaucratic skills to be successful, but how they will be fused together in FCDO’s embryonic stages will provide a strong indication to staff as to which will take precedence in the future. Staff will be watching initial appointments carefully, on the basis of which they will determine their own suitability in their new department. The formation of FCDO could provide a helpful opportunity to establish alternative diplomatic, development and departmental management career tracks within the organisation as a means of ensuring that those in leadership roles are assigned positions appropriate to their skill set. The third issue will be the balance of effort afforded to content and process both at home and abroad. By the time of its demise, DFID had smothered itself in process and became obsessed by results, with the ability of the department to be innovative, take risks and learn from failure significantly diminished. Whilst this was largely due to the burden of the 0.7 per cent target,  the intense media and public scrutiny that accompanied it, and a permanent political sword of Damocles hanging over the department,  this ponderous and inflexible approach was the other factor that prompted the reallocation of ODA to other government departments. In contrast, whilst the FCO embraced the allocation of in excess of £2bn worth of ODA onto its baseline via the CSSF and Prosperity Fund, it cannot be said that the department had adequately developed the infrastructure to accompany such large allocations of programme funding. Whilst this had the initial advantage of genuine innovation and experimental activity being implemented, over time significant criticism was directed by Parliament and the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) regarding transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of their programming. The knack moving forwards will be finding a happy medium between DFID’s ‘oil tanker’ approach of large, often complicated, and cumbersome programming, and a nimbler, problem focused approach seen within the CSSF’s better interventions. Ironically, DFID could learn from itself in this regard, as many of the approaches it used during its first decade to provide proof of concept, create catalytic effect, and fill the space between what was required in the short-term and the more lumbering approaches of the EU, UN and World Bank are exactly what is needed today. It will also be necessary for the FCDO’s programmatic delivery systems to retain DFID’s focus on value for money whilst also learning from the FCO’s more insurgent approach through the CSSF to procure swiftly when required and evolve over the course of delivery where needed. The final challenge will be establishing consensus on FCDO timeframes. Whitehall joked that 2030 to DFID meant the year, whereas to the FCO it was half-past eight in the evening. As an organisation primarily focused on understanding, engaging, and influencing, it is perhaps inevitable that the FCO’s outlook was more pragmatic and short-termist, whereas DFID’s was longer-term given the intractable nature of the problems with which it engaged. It will be necessary for FCDO to embrace both approaches, and continue to provide their political masters with timely responses to political imperative, whilst also retaining focus on longer-term more strategic challenges. Developing systems that are able to cope with the ‘tyranny of the now’ whilst not allowing the urgent to be all encompassing will be a priority for the FCDO leadership in its formative stages. Such an approach will be important for programming also – one dangerous consequence of the ‘results’ over ‘development’ mantra of recent years has been an obsession with focusing solely on activities which can be counted, or changes which can be swiftly delivered rather than the underlying problems that have created such symptoms in the first place. If the UK is to meaningfully engage in international activity it will be important that FCDO does not limit itself to simply pursuing short-term symptoms, but instead affords attention to root causes. In conclusion, achieving successful integration will not be easy. It will be resource intensive, involve compromise, and will need to adapt approaches to suit the differing institutional cultures and incentives of the departments that have merged to form the FCDO. Despite this, the benefits of fully utilising the range of tools and approaches HMG has at its disposal clearly outweigh the challenges. It is clear that the political appetite and imperative for integration will not abate, and as such, there is a need to embrace the political direction provided, and to ensure that as government structures and systems evolve, so that the best of both DFID and the FCO align to ensure that the FCDO continues to play a constructive role in the promotion and protection of British values and interests overseas. Recommendations:

• FCDO should use the opportunity of its formation to undertake extensive internal and external consultation to achieve collective agreement on the future mission and values of the new department. Such a process would provide an opportunity to restore confidence among staff, partner and beneficiary governments, and the extensive range of external FCDO stakeholders that the department is clear on its vision and mandate.
• Building on the NSC led country and regional strategy process, effort should be expended in updating all country and thematic strategies in line with FCDO/HMG (rather than DFID or FCO) objectives. Strategies should be informed by updated political and developmental analysis, and should involve informed external stakeholder consultation.
• Consideration should be given to an FCDO specific competency framework that seeks to align diplomatic and developmental expertise with civil servant core competences, and within this process assess whether multiple diplomatic, development and management career tracks are appropriate and what mandatory skills are required for all three specialisms.
• Specific investments should be made internally on training and promotion of the new FCDO culture and working practices, rather than risk operational siloes emerging between former FCO and DFID staff.
• As part of the re-alignment of Official Development Assistance (ODA) within FCDO, consideration to be given to creating dedicated pools of funding for smaller, innovative, and/or catalytic programming, as well as clarifying levels of political risk appetite (including for failure) for UK funded interventions.

 Mark White is a Director at First Call Partners. He is a security and justice, governance, conflict and peacebuilding specialist with 15 years’ experience of designing, managing and evaluating complex DFID and HMG programmes. He has worked in a range of fragile and conflict affected states in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, North Africa and the Former Soviet Union. Mark was formerly Principal for Governance, Security & Justice at Coffey International Development, Deputy Head of the UK Government’s Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, and Deputy Head of the UK Stabilisation Unit.  Image by DFID under (CC).[1] Better Aid Score Cards, One, https://scorecards.one.org/dashboard.html[2] William McKeran, Fusion Doctrine: One Year On, RUSI, March 2019, https://rusi.org/commentary/fusion-doctrine-one-year[3] The Comprehensive Approach, Parliament UK, July 2010, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/comp/m01.htm[4] International Development Act 2002, Legislation UK, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/1/contents [post_title] => Protecting the UK’s ability to defend its values [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => protecting-the-uks-ability-to-defend-its-values [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:22:06 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:22:06 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5030 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[22] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5028 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-09-29 09:05:53 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-29 08:05:53 [post_content] => Over the last few decades, the UK has secured a strong reputation for its role in advancing global development as a major donor of aid and a leader in promoting effective and impactful policy and practice. Global poverty has halved over the course of the Millennium Development Goals and we now live in a world where ending extreme poverty altogether is believed possible. The COVID-19 pandemic is going to knock us off course − to what extent will depend on the actions governments take today. As economies head into recession, the UK has already announced cuts of £2.9 billion for 2020 alone and the International Monetary Fund June 2020 World Economic Outlook allows us to predict that the global aid budget could fall to US$141 billion in 2021 − a drop of US$12 billion compared to 2019.[1] It is therefore crucial to ensure an approach guaranteeing every penny of aid is spent as effectively as possible and Britain’s legacy in poverty eradication and sustainable development is maintained. A new vision for the UK’s role in the world, set out by the Government’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, must ensure the FCDO maintains DFID’s culture of transparency and commitment to poverty eradication. There is also an opportunity to strengthen the coherence, coordination and collaboration that will enhance the impact and effectiveness of Britain’s aid spending. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, Brexit, unprecedented numbers living in humanitarian crises, and the climate emergency, a truly ‘Global Britain’ must take this opportunity to demonstrate that it can and will deliver shared stability and prosperity that leaves no one behind. Protecting the UK’s world-leading reputation through transparency and a focus on povertyThe UK has set a high bar for what development agencies can achieve. The UK is a widely trusted and respected development actor across the world. At the heart of the UK’s approach has been a commitment to transparency and a clear, strong mandate on poverty reduction. Transparency is critical for UK aid spending in two key ways. First, the British people must have confidence in the new department to spend aid well and trust it to deliver both value for money and impact that justifies taxpayers’ money being spent on international objectives. Second, governments of countries receiving aid, other aid donors, implementing partners and aid beneficiaries need to have visibility on what is being spent, where, and by whom. Open, timely and forward-looking information about UK aid spending and commitments is essential to maximise its impact and effectiveness. Aid is one of many resources going into countries − full visibility of what it is for and where it is spent is essential for country governments to make decisions on how they allocate precious domestic resources. Furthermore, the FCDO will be responsible for administering over £13 billion of taxpayers’ resources compared to the FCO’s £2.4 billion. DFID’s culture of transparency must be carried over to the FCDO to ensure scrutiny, effective spending and good resource management are at the heart of the new department. DFID consistently ranked highly for transparency – in 2020 it ranked 9th in the world compared to the FCO which ranked 38th. The new department must be brought up to DFID standards.[2] The commitment to put evidence at the heart of decision-making by the FCDO is critical and will set the right direction for government ministers to follow independent advice from expert bodies such as the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI). The Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, the Rt Hon Dominic Raab has already confirmed that ICAI will continue to play its role in scrutinising UK aid spending.[3] Additional parliamentary scrutiny of UK’s aid spending must also be confirmed − to have oversight of all UK aid spending across all government departments, starting with the FCDO. In terms of maintaining a mandate to focus on poverty, reaching the very poorest has been and continues to be the primary objective of UK aid. Not only is this morally right, it is a vital part of achieving shared global prosperity, stability and a peaceful world for all. We know that investing in health and education both improves lives and enhances human capital to benefit sustained economic growth.[4] Social protection offers a safety net that prevents people from becoming entrenched in chronic poverty and ensures they stand the best chance at having a decent future as well as making a positive contribution to wider society. Empowering women and girls is vital for their wellbeing, ensures sustainable poverty reduction, and drives social progress. So, to focus on the poorest and elevate them up in sustainable ways is a win-win. A mandate to focus on poverty reduction and tackle inequalities to ensure no one is left behind must underpin the new department’s global objectives in how it delivers on its development priorities. Without this, evidence suggests that poverty reduction quickly becomes diluted − the FCO, for example, has traditionally targeted significantly lower proportions of its aid spending than DFID on poverty (nine per cent vs 61 per cent on the poorest countries) and gender equality (24 per cent vs 65 per cent  where gender is significant or primary objective).[5] Building Britain’s standing and impact through greater coherence in policy and practiceEnsuring the FCDO builds on the solid foundations laid by DFID to make sure development is an equal partner alongside diplomacy and other key areas will be critical to the success of this merger. Coherence across policy and practice in the department and beyond is essential. The world is watching as the UK takes a new course following Brexit and UK taxpayers are going to want high levels of transparency and accountability on government spending as the economy shrinks as a result of COVID-19. Coherence has been an ambition of development and foreign policy for many years but the silos that limit the ability to respond effectively to the people and places most in need have not been satisfactorily resolved. Some progress has been made, but the merger offers the opportunity to make significant headway across Whitehall. The Rt Hon Dominic Raab spoke of ‘artificial lines’ that exist between aspects of government policy, and that bringing them into alignment is key.[6] There is indeed the need for a new, shared, ambitious international strategy, that gives the new department a clear mandate, and a clear statement of the problems it is seeking to fix. There must also be strong scrutiny and accountability mechanisms to ensure this principle translates into practice. The Government must develop a new strategy that puts coherence across government at the centre to ensure a truly Global Britain that delivers an agenda of building a sustainable, stable and prosperous world. As a result, the FCDO could become a leading department that coordinates and collaborates across government. It could, with its network of relationships and reach through diplomacy and defence, help bring together development agendas and ensure coherence with trade and climate policy. 2021 will be an important year for the UK to demonstrate coherence of policy as the Government hosts the G7 gathering and co-hosts with Italy COP26 Climate Change Conference. So, with urgency, artificial silos between policy areas need to be bridged through better coordination between and within departments, sectors and in countries. When it comes to development cooperation, recent research on the UK’s progress on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus indicates key areas the FCDO should focus on.[7] First is overarching policy and operational strategy where all policy frameworks must include an explicit steer to build in complementarity, coherence and collaboration with operational guidance to ensure top-level policy feeds right down to local level implementation. The second is systematically ensuring integration of interdependent policy areas in aid programming. The coherence that this should create then needs to be measurable and held to account. Third is operational structure, leadership and staffing. It will be critical that the highest level of FCDO management makes coherence a cross-organisational collective priority and ensures there are dedicated staff with the skills and responsibilities to support and catalyse colleagues and partners to implement this shift. In terms of how the Government works with external stakeholders, the UK should be much more responsive to developing country leadership to align with country plans and priorities and strengthen local ownership of development. There must be strong alignment to shared and globally agreed goals. The FCDO must see itself as a true partner to those with whom we must work to tackle the significant global challenges we are faced with today in a way that is sustainable and truly responsive to needs. Conclusions and recommendationsThe merging of DFID and FCO has caused alarm bells for many about what this might mean for the future of the UK’s approach to global development and commitment to poverty eradication. The FCDO can and should protect the best of DFID’s culture − maintaining high levels of transparency, scrutiny and accountability and retaining UK aid’s poverty mandate. Going further and developing a new global strategy with coherence at its heart, and collaboration and coordination central to its implementation, may well achieve what DFID and many other countries’ development agencies have struggled with to date. This is a unique opportunity for the UK government to grow Britain’s standing further as an exemplar of best practice in global development and beyond. The FCDO would do well to remember the formula of four ‘C’s − Culture, Coherence, Coordination and Collaboration − to maintain Britain’s world-leading status in global development and beyond:

• Culture of transparency - maintain the strong commitment within the department itself and with the partners FCDO works with
• Coherence - strengthen the coherence of policy nationally, internationally, and with the SDG agenda
• Coordination - facilitate cooperative working across Whitehall on critical agendas including trade and climate
• Collaboration - work in close partnership with stakeholders and strengthen local ownership of development

 Harpinder Collacott is the Executive Director of Development Initiatives (DI), leading DI’s work to ensure data-driven evidence is used to combat poverty, reduce inequality, and increase resilience. Her experience before heading up DI includes working with the War Crimes tribunal for Sierra Leone, in the philanthropic sector focusing on international human rights, and in various researcher roles for think tanks and in the UK and European parliaments. She is a graduate from the London School of Economics and the University of Cambridge. [1] Amy Dodd, Rob Tew, Anna Hope, Covid-19 and financing projections for developing countries, Development Initiatives, June 2020, www.devinit.org/resources/covid-19-and-financing-projections-developing-countries/[2] Aid Transparency Index 2020, Publish What You Fund, 2020, www.publishwhatyoufund.org/the-index/2020/[3] DFID, FCO and FCDO, Press release: Foreign Secretary commits to more effective and accountable aid spending under new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Government, August 2020, www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-commits-to-more-effective-and-accountable-aid-spending-under-new-foreign-commonwealth-and-development-office[4] World Bank Group, The Human Capital Project, World Bank, October 2018, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30498[5] Amy Dodd, Anna Hope, Rob Tew, Merging DFID and the FCO: Implications for UK aid, Development Initiatives, June 2020 www.devinit.org/resources/merging-dfid-and-fco-implications-uk-aid/[6] Rt Hon Dominic Raab, DFID-FCO Merger, Hansard Volume 677, June 2020.[7] Sarah Dalrymple and Sophie Swithern, Key questions and considerations for donors at the triple nexus: lessons from UK and Sweden, Development Initiatives, December 2019, www.devinit.org/resources/questions-considerations-donors-triple-nexus-uk-sweden/ [post_title] => Four ‘Cs’ for Britain to protect and build its standing as world-leading player in global development [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => four-cs-for-britain-to-protect-and-build-its-standing-as-world-leading-player-in-global-development [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:22:25 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:22:25 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5028 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[23] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5026 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-09-29 09:04:56 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-29 08:04:56 [post_content] => The UK has a proud record of support for open societies, open economies and open democracies around the world. In July this year, the UK’s first round of Magnitsky-style sanctions showed a determination to prioritise action against human rights violators and stand up for democratic freedoms. This type of leadership is vital given the rising tide of authoritarianism, civic unrest, attacks on basic freedoms, and closing civic space for journalists and civil society － all of which have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. For the UK to become a greater force for good in the future, the Government will need to lead by example with domestic reforms that enhance the UK’s own democracy, and by developing a more coherent approach to democracy support overseas. The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, the 2020 Comprehensive Spending Review, and the 2021 G7 Presidency all provide excellent opportunities for the UK to restate its core values and build on its recent role as a leader and anchor point for multilateral efforts to support democracy and good governance. As Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Chair of the World Health Organisation's ACT-Accelerator programme, recently reminded us all:[1]The world will not be rid of COVID-19 until we have a safe and effective vaccine available to everyone. We will not recover from the far-reaching economic impact of the pandemic without a new social compact between governments and citizens based on transparent, accountable and trustworthy governance. Citizens around the world are demanding a post-COVID-19 social compact based on better governance, especially in countries with poor records on democratic freedoms and human rights - as recent events in Lebanon have so tragically demonstrated. The UK government has been one of the most generous donors in tackling the health and economic crisis of COVID-19, but can complement this in the next phase of the recovery with support to governance reforms that enable a more sustainable long-term recovery, and also enhance the effectiveness of UK aid spending overall. Governments in many countries have lost the trust of their citizens due to corruption and waste in procurement of medical equipment, mis- and disinformation campaigns online and failing public services. To turn this situation around, we urgently require open and accountable systems to enable citizens to participate in the management of scarce public resources, from effective tax administration, through procurement and expenditure management, to efficient public services. A transparent and accountable government will promote self-reliance and help aid-dependent nations to strengthen institutions, the rule of law and establish credibility with investors that will lead to greater domestic resource mobilisation and financial independence. There is overwhelming evidence that an open and accountable government contributes to tax confidence and higher payment rates, lessens tax evasion, raises and improves the quality of social spending, and lowers the cost and improves competition and quality in public procurement, ultimately resulting in improved public services. Countries that achieved strong improvements in fiscal transparency levels were able to increase their Millennium Development Goal (MDG) spending faster and saw better progress in meeting these goals. Openness also increases the transparency, accountability and quality of aid spending, while reducing overall dependence on aid, and strengthens the tax bond between citizens and government, improving civic cohesion, open markets, and democracy. This vision of rebuilding and refreshing the compact between government and citizens starts with action in the UK. The UK has been an early champion of many leading transparency practices and policies, such as opening up opaque company ownership structures, open budgeting and contracting, extractives transparency, open data, and the Bribery Act. Implementation of these reforms has been mixed, and for the UK to have credibility as a renewed champion for democracy and openness internationally, it must get its own house in order too. This should include greater vigilance of foreign interference in the UK’s elections, and an expansion of innovative democratic practices such as citizen assemblies and participatory budgeting which give citizens a greater say in how they are governed beyond the ballot box. The dividends of leading by example will extend to UK companies operating overseas. Support to reforms that help promote fair competition, for example in the public procurement process, will help prevent bribery undercutting well-run UK companies. UK companies are also well positioned to take advantage of the need for digitalisation, better procurement and open data that the pandemic has highlighted. New global anti-corruption and governance norms - such as open contracting, public registers of beneficial ownership and open budgets - will strengthen the international rules-based order, and disadvantage governments whose comparative advantage is tax avoidance, worker oppression and environmental degradation. Internationally, the UK government has a once-in-a-generation opportunity to position itself at the front of a much-needed renewed global coalition of democracies, which stand up for the international rules-based order and can show the world a more hopeful path away from authoritarian or illiberal democratic models. UK citizens believe their country is a force for good in the world, and are highly sceptical of the respective governance models of Russia and China. With some notable exceptions, however, traditional champions of liberal democracy have been distracted in recent years, allowing authoritarian leaders space to export their playbook and contributing to the 14 straight years of decline in global freedom reported by Freedom House.[2] Undoubtedly, the Brexit vote and its fallout have meant the UK is one of the traditional champions who have been distracted. There is now an opportunity to take some specific steps that would renew UK leadership:

• Put open societies, open economies and open democracies at the heart of the new FCDO priorities.
• Ensure that the FCDO prioritises support to countries in moments of democratic transition, or where reform efforts are underway that could help lift countries out of low-income status onto the road to self-reliance (including FCO-DFID priority countries like Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria).
• Ensure support to open societies, open economies and open democracies features prominently in the spending review.
• Promote a G7 priority that liberal democracies work together more effectively to support open societies and open economies (including on trade), and create a stronger coalition to push back against rising authoritarianism.
• Ensure UK values are strong and present across all multilateral fora, including the UN’s special session on anti-corruption, the G20 and the Sustainable Development Goals.

 These steps will build on the UK’s track record of leadership across policy areas that support healthy democracies, including protecting civic space and media freedom, open governance, anti-corruption, extractive industries and inclusion. These are essential components of the UK’s own democracy, and should form the backbone of the FCDO’s priorities, including:

• Speeding up recovery from COVID-19 by building public resources or fiscal accountability systems to track COVID-19 emergency relief packages, procurement, spending and service delivery. This includes support to independent civil society organisations and free media that are able to hold governments to account.
• Standing up for civic space and media freedom, including building on the UK-Canada Media Freedom Summit of 2019 so that reforms to increase transparency lead to a more accountable government through scrutiny, and providing support for civil society working on democratic reforms in places like Hong Kong, Armenia and Ethiopia who are either transitioning to liberal democracy or at risk of backsliding.
• Support for open government and a coalition of governments to promote stronger rule of law institutions, including the Open Government Partnership, which was co-founded by the UK government in 2011 and has advanced over 4,000 specific reforms to enhance democracy and tackle corruption in 78 member countries, and support the implementation of SDG 16.
• Support for anti-corruption reforms that promote an international rules-based system in which UK businesses can engage, and which promote open markets and tackle money-laundering, terrorist financing and elite capture. Key anti-corruption themes include open contracting reforms for public procurement to address government’s number one corruption risk, especially in the time of COVID-19, and open budgets, which enable citizens to shape priorities and follow the money, and facilitate the identification and recovery of stolen assets. Reforms should extend to public registers of beneficial ownership as pioneered by the UK since 2013, which provide a means to know who owns and controls companies.
• Support to developing countries to ensure oil, gas and mining resources are openly and fairly governed, enabling countries to finance their own recovery, increase economic resilience, and create stable operating environments for UK companies abroad. Maintain UK leadership in global initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, founded by the UK in 2003, and provide independent support for credible civil society institutions that promote open dialogue on extractive governance. Such support is essential to ensure that countries accelerate the transition to green energy, reduce dependency on fossil fuels, and access the minerals that are critical to renewable energy sources.
• Increase support for gender-responsive and inclusive citizen engagement involving underrepresented groups (including people living with disabilities and youth) as well as in procurement, which is central to how governments spend their money. Some of these communities have been among the hardest hit by the pandemic, and it is critical to ensure that they are supported to have a voice at the table to inform policies on reform and recovery.

 The decision to create a combined foreign and development office was undoubtedly a controversial one. DFID has a proud record of supporting governance and anti-corruption work around the world, in service of reducing extreme poverty, while the Foreign Office has provided impressive leadership on issues like media freedom and civic space. The opportunity of the new department is to bring more coherence across all of these policy areas, and place them at the centre of the UK’s bilateral and multilateral partnerships. This will inevitably result in some tough decisions, for example around arms sales to autocratic and repressive regimes, but if this approach is combined with a commitment from the Government to stepping up democratic reforms within the UK, then the UK could genuinely become a greater force for good in the world. Joe Powell is the Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the Open Government Partnership. He leads OGP’s global engagements, including working with the OGP Steering Committee, OGP Summits and linking OGP with other multilateral processes. He previously worked for the ONE campaign, where was managing ONE’s global campaign for increased transparency in the extractive industries. As Senior Policy and Advocacy Manager at ONE, Joe also led global advocacy on the G20 and policy development for the 2013 G8. Prior to working at ONE Joe launched an online current affairs platform called ‘Uganda Talks’ for the Independent, a weekly East African news magazine, and worked for Action Aid Uganda. He studied at Makerere University. Joe holds a BS from the University of Cambridge. Image by DFID under (CC).[1] Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala,To beat Covid-19, Governments Need to Open Up, 11 July 2020 https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-07-11/covid-19-economic-recovery-requires-more-transparent-governments[2] Sarah Repucci, Freedom in the World 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy, Freedom House, February 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy [post_title] => Reforming the UK to be a greater force for good [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => reforming-the-uk-to-be-a-greater-force-for-good [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:22:54 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:22:54 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5026 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[24] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5023 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-09-29 09:03:59 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-29 08:03:59 [post_content] => It can be hard to understand sometimes where the UK government sits on human rights in its foreign policy. Sometimes it takes a leading role in championing rights. At other times human rights appear to be missing in action. This inconsistent approach  undermines the UK’s foreign policy objectives and sends a confusing message about its global role after Brexit. Having a clear strategy on human rights would make its efforts to promote them more effective and help the UK meet its wider foreign policy goals. There is no doubt that promoting respect for human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law are objectives for the newly merged FCDO. They are mentioned explicitly in its foreign policy priority outcomes on diplomatic leadership and multilateralism and implicit in some of its other priorities, including Europe, conflict and stability, and Euro Atlantic security. The importance of respect for human rights in UK foreign policy is a regular theme of statements by the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and other minsters including through reference to Global Britain: the idea of the UK, and its commitment to the rules-based international order, as a force for good in the world. The FCO, now FCDO, produces an annual report on human rights around the world, and cites countries  about which the UK is “particularly concerned about human rights issues, and where [it] consider[s] that the UK can make a real difference.”[1] The UK leads a number of international inter-state initiatives on human rights including the Equal Rights Coalition for LGBT rights and the Media Freedom Coalition. It has recently created a global human rights sanctions system that allows the UK to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals and entities responsible for gross human rights violations, with initial designations relating to Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Myanmar, and Russia.[2] Yet the UK’s approach to promoting human rights in its foreign policy is inconsistent and sometimes contradictory at times in mutually reinforcing ways. First, there is inconsistency across its bilateral relations. The UK takes strong positions on human rights in some countries, while on others it tends to downplay the same concerns, including countries that it lists as priorities for promoting human rights. The UK is rightly strong on human rights abuses in Russia, Venezuela, Syria and South Sudan. Yet it is reluctant to speak out forcefully on abuses on Bahrain and Egypt (both FCDO human rights priority countries), Turkey (which ought to be), and Rwanda. In some cases, UK policies towards a particular country contain contradictions, with some strands of policy aiming to improve respect for rights while others undermine them. On Yemen, the UK has played a leading role in humanitarian and peace efforts. Yet it has battled in the UK courts to be able to continue to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia, despite the Saudi-led coalition’s horrific record of abuse in Yemen.[3] The UK has also done little to pressure the Saudi-led coalition to take real steps towards accountability for those abuses, despite having a formal leadership role on Yemen in the Security Council. UN-appointed rights investigators have said the UK’s arms sales make it potentially complicit in war crimes in Yemen.[4] On China, the UK has offered a safe haven for Hong Kongers with UK ties in the face of Beijing’s crackdown on freedom in Hong Kong, and spoken out at the UN on Hong Kong and Xinjiang. But the UK has been reluctant to support human rights sanctions on officials responsible for those abuses or multilateral action that might create accountability for Beijing’s abuses. The result is the impression that the UK cares about human rights in China but is unwilling to take tough, transformative action. Second, there is inconsistency between positions the UK takes in multilateral bodies and those it takes in bilateral relations. The UK is often keen to support human rights in UN bodies, including on Saudi Arabia. But in its bilateral relations with those countries, human rights can get short shrift. In other cases, the UK appears reluctant to use its position of leadership at the UN to address serious rights abuse in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, even while raising these abuses bilaterally with those countries’ governments. That undermines the force of joint efforts and allows other states to discount the UK’s contributions in those fora. The UK also fails consistently to stand behind multilateral bodies that promote human rights, notably the Council of Europe. Third, there is inconsistency between support for human rights through global thematic priorities such as media freedom, prohibition of torture, and protection for human rights defenders and the UK’s willingness to pursue those priorities when applied to specific countries – in particular to speak out publicly about persecution of human rights defenders and journalists. If the UK’s own objectives to advance human rights internationally are to be met, what really matters is how the UK responds when those principles are put to the test - when  Saudi state agents were implicated in the grisly murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi, for example. Or when journalists from Iwacu newspaper in Burundi were jailed for doing their jobs, or when a human rights defender like Osman Kavala is jailed for years in Turkey without any real charge and in defiance of a European Court of Human Rights ruling. Fourth, there is an inconsistency between UK leadership internationally and its actions at home. The UK is a co-chair of Equal Rights Coalition and sees itself as champion of LGBT issues in other countries. Yet, despite considerable progress in some areas of LGBT rights, its efforts to protect the rights of transgender people at home have faltered and it went to court to prevent the use of ‘X’ as a non-binary gender marker on UK passports. The UK seeks to promote justice, rule of law, and the importance of democratic institutions around the world. Yet since 2019, the Government suspended parliament, has obstructed proper functioning of parliamentary committees seeking to scrutinise its record, pledged to weaken judicial review and shown a willingness to break international law to sever its ties with the European Union. International justice provides a further illustration. The UK is a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and has historically backed international justice in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. More recently it has pushed for accountability over Syria and Libya. Yet the UK government is actively contemplating immunising historic abuses by its own forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.[5] The UK has been among a handful of ICC member countries pressing for arbitrary limits to the court’s budget at a time when its workload is growing. It has also called for timelines for completion of the prosecutor’s preliminary inquiries, one of which concerns the allegations of abuse involving UK forces in Iraq. This is not good enough from a country that helped create and codify international humanitarian law. Taking a consistent approach matters because it is a demonstration that the UK’s engagement with the world is rooted in deep values. With those values under attack by governments in many parts of the world, including in democracies, defending them only when it is convenient risks emboldening authoritarian populists. It is much harder for the UK to be critical of power grabs by Orban, Erdogan, or Duterte if it fails consistently to stand up for those values at home and abroad. Acting more consistently does not mean pretending the UK never has countervailing interests in a particular context or ignoring the need for the UK to work with states with questionable rights practices to advance common interests – climate change and COVID-19 among them. It means recognising that a world in which increasing numbers of states respect the rights of their inhabitants, the rule of law and have strong democratic institutions is a world that is in the UK’s strategic interest. Having a clear human rights strategy would ensure greater policy coherence on human rights, democratic institutions and rule of law across UK foreign policy in ways that could help the UK meet its policy objectives. Having such a strategy could facilitate a common approach across Whitehall, including the newly merged FCDO, the National Security Council and Department for International Trade, and between the actions of UK diplomatic posts and those in London. It would also facilitate democratic scrutiny of UK human rights policy by Parliament. The Integrated Review provides an ideal opportunity to commit to and develop such a strategy. Having one could help the UK truly be a force for good in the world. Benjamin Ward is UK Director of Human Rights Watch. He has served as Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch's Europe and Central Asia Division, and a researcher for the organization on Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. Before joining Human Rights Watch in 1997, Ward worked for the United Nations in Somalia and New York, and in Bosnia for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. He was admitted to practice as a barrister in England & Wales in 2003, and holds a bachelor's degree in government from the London School of Economics and a master's degree in international affairs from the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs. Image by FCO under (CC).[1] FCO, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon and The Rt Hon Dominic Raav MP, Human Rights and Democracy Report 2019, Government, July 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2019[2] FCO and The Rt Hon Dominic Raab MP, UK announces first sanctions under new global human rights regime, Government, July 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-first-sanctions-under-new-global-human-rights-regime[3] UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia unlawful, court rules, BBC News, June 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48704596[4] Patrick Wintour, UK, US and France may be complicit in Yemen war crimes – UN report, The Guardian, September 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/03/uk-us-and-france-may-be-complicit-in-yemen-war-crimes-un-report[5] Benjamin Ward, The UK is inconsistent in its commitment to human rights. If we truly want to be a force for good in this world, greater cooperation is vital, Fabian Society, May 2020, https://fabians.org.uk/leading-the-world/ [post_title] => The value of a UK strategy on human rights [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-value-of-a-uk-strategy-on-human-rights [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:25:05 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:25:05 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5023 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[25] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5018 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-09-29 09:02:51 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-29 08:02:51 [post_content] => The UK’s security, prosperity and influence in the world is generated through a complex mix of soft and hard power; an open economy and a strong military, a significant aid programme and cultural and educational institutions which are admired the world over, our people and our values. Through each of these elements, we say to the world that we are a partner, which is trustworthy and easy to work with. One which demonstrates generosity and respect in sharing the best we have to offer. A strategic view of sources of hard and soft power is a vital part of any nation’s foreign policy, particularly at a time of an upheaval caused by technical changes, a rebalancing of economic and geo-political power, and of course of a global pandemic. Crucially, a country’s soft power both enables and legitimises the UK’s hard power, providing the vital foundations of international reputational resilience that is at the heart of any national foreign policy. Our soft power is crucial to the UK’s international credibility and capacity to effect change. Whether it is persuading other countries to sign a trade deal, agreeing to collective targets for reducing carbon emissions, promoting British and universal values or deterring rivals from hostile acts, trust matters. And trust is built on experience, example and attraction. International relations theory talk of realism in which the strength of the economy and size of the military create power, influence and security. If one cannot trust the neighbours one should carry a big stick. Theory also talks of institutionalism in which a rules-based international system in underpinned states working together through multilateral institutions and global issues addressed through multilateral action. By working together, the collective resources are deployed for the national and common interest. Constructivism on the other hand believes that shared values and experiences create a cohesive community with common norms and common beliefs. One is less likely to invade a country one has an affinity with. All three theories of course have merit and all are indeed true. As the British Council’s first annual report, written in 1940 in the heat of war, put it creating a basis of friendly knowledge and understanding between people leads to a sympathetic appreciation of one’s foreign policy. Indeed, it is the role of the prudent state to foster this interchange of knowledge ideas and discoveries, in time of war and in time of peace. If this was the view of Churchill’s government in the 1940s, it is no less valid today. Foreign Policy needs to look at problems through all three lenses. How do hard power capabilities help be they kinetic or sanction based? What about diplomacy and aid? And what is the role of soft power assets which created affinity, influence and understanding through leveraging the UK’s education, science, and creative assets through our people and our institutions. A good foreign policy stance needs hard capabilities, playing well with partners, and high levels of connection, relationship and trust. The Government’s Integrated Review aims to take this holistic approach, assessing and redefining the UK’s international capabilities with a view to developing a full spectrum, ‘smart power’ strategy to deliver the Prime Minister’s vision of Global Britain. However, even the most comprehensive strategies are only turned into reality when they are backed up by investment and it is this necessity, which creates the critical interdependence between the Integrated Review and the Comprehensive Spending Review in the Autumn. Combined, these dual reviews represent a once in a generation opportunity to reset the UK’s international capabilities. However, rarely has a Foreign Secretary - or a Chancellor, for that matter – had a greater set of external challenges to contend with to get the job done, not least the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the UK and global economy. What then for Global Britain? How can the UK afford to make real the vision of a Britain that is a leading power, both worthy and capable of holding on to its seat at the top table of leadership and its place at the top of the league table of soft power nations? How can the ambitious aims and objectives of Global Britain be achieved against the backdrop of a contraction of the economy and ever rising demands in health, welfare and social care? Economic data this week does appear to show a modest bounce back but, even if the COVID-19 recession is followed by a mercifully rapid recovery, the challenges of an ageing population and other long-term structural issues will continue to put huge pressure on limited resources. Add to this the fact that the Government will be navigating its way through all of this at the same time as pressing ahead with the Prime Minister’s ambition to level up the entire country and the scale of the challenge becomes clear. In making the case for Global Britain, the Government’s own communications hint at the difficulties and opportunities that lie ahead, and the need for greater agility and adaptability: the shifting global context, a new relationship with Europe, and the need to deliver more with finite resources, requires us to evolve and enhance how we achieve our goals. We need to use government assets more cohesively and efficiently to maintain our global standing. Global Britain is about reinvesting in our relationships, championing the rules-based international order and demonstrating that the UK is open, outward looking and confident on the world stage.[1] This goal may be difficult but it is absolutely the right ambition. As a precursor to the outcomes of the Integrated Review, the Government has forged the FCDO as a means of using ‘finite resources… more cohesively and efficiently’. Such a move will allow for greater strategic alignment and cohesion across the UK’s international capabilities. It will in all likelihood generate savings that will go some way but not all the way to levelling up the UK’s foreign policy tools across all three lenses. Cuts are the default in a recession, but the case can be made for breaking with precedent and actually increasing investment in the UK’s international footprint. It is widely recognised that defence spending promotes scientific innovation, generates economic activity and supports thousands of UK jobs in places like Barrow-in-Furness and Dunbartonshire. Similarly, investing in soft power has a direct, measurable economic impact. A study by the University of Edinburgh found that cultural institutions, like the British Council and Goethe-Institut are unsurprisingly highly influential in attracting international students and international tourists.[2] A quarter of all international students who come to the UK cite the British Council as being a key driver of their decision to study in the UK. That is worth billions to UK education and to the cities, towns and communities, which house them. Equally, cultural relations underpins the propensity to trade with the UK and the propensity for the UK to be the destination of foreign direct investment (FDI). The more countries that host a state’s cultural institute, the better the return for the parent state. A one per cent increase in the number of countries a cultural institution from a given country covers results in an increase of almost 0.66 per cent in FDI for that country. In 2016 when the study was undertaken, such an increase was calculated as being worth an additional £1.3bn for the UK, significantly more than the entire turnover of the British Council. In addition, it prompts a 0.73 per cent increase in international students choosing to come to the country. Again, using the figures from 2015/16 the researchers calculated that this would be equivalent to almost 3,200 additional international student enrolments at UK institutions. The hard-nosed economics of these gains means that the tax receipts and additional economic activity generated by the increases in FDI and students are more than enough to justify an increase to the grant-in-aid Government funds the British Council with, particularly if it allowed for some additional non-ODA money to ramp up our engagement with the developed world, which is the source of much of our education exports and our FDI. Over the long term, investment in soft power builds trust, increases attractiveness and bolsters the UK’s reputational resilience. The strategic use of long-term commitments and arms-length expertise to build relationships before they are transactionally useful creates conditions favourable for diplomacy, greatly increasing the likelihood of success in negotiations around bilateral trade, collective security or multilateral action on global challenges like climate change. A forthcoming study by IpsosMORI has found that across the G20 69 per cent of people who had been involved in a British Council programme said they trust the people of the UK, compared with 63 per cent who had been involved in a non-British Council cultural programme, and 58 per cent who had never been involved in a UK cultural relations activity. That trust is hugely important to the UK’s prosperity – 15 per cent of people who say they trust the UK say they intend to do business or trade with the UK, compared to only eight per cent who say they distrust the UK.[3] The activities of the British Council are especially impactful on levels of trust in the UK government. On average trust in government stands at 64 per cent for those that have had a cultural relations experience with the British Council versus 51 per cent for those that have had a non-British Council cultural relations experience and 48 per cent who have not had any kind of cultural relations experience with the UK. According to Joseph Nye, the guru of soft power academic and the inventor of the term ‘soft power’, investing in diplomacy and soft power is more important than ever before in this new world, networks and connectedness become an important source of power and security. In a world of growing complexity, the most connected states are the most powerful.[4] Nye was referring to the US but what applies to the US, still the world’s leading superpower, applies even more strongly to a middle power like the UK which faces significantly greater competition for influence within its larger class of rivals. Being a middle power can be uncomfortable when caught between rival great powers, but it can also be a path to success. Nimbleness, openness, a willingness to engage and collaborate characterise the successful middle power. South Korea punches above its weight in the G20 and other international fora because it finds common ground with others to forge mutually beneficial alliances. This is the model for Global Britain. It is a focus on networks, mutuality and the common good, on building familiarity, trust and attraction. And the best way to build trust in the UK is to help people experience it. The Integrated Review and Spending Review provide a once-in-a-generation opportunity to recalibrate the UK’s international engagement and chart a fresh course outside of the EU. While the economic realities require hard decisions of Ministers, instead of asking the question as to whether the UK can afford Global Britain, we should actually be asking can the UK afford not to invest in it? For me, the business case is overwhelming and the evidence is clear. To realise the Government’s ambitions and make a success of the many international opportunities available to the UK while simultaneously addressing the very real threats to our security and prosperity will require additional funding for the overall UK effort overseas. Effective deterrence of revanchist powers will only be possible with increases in the MoD and Intelligence budgets. Likewise maintaining the UK’s comparative advantage in soft power and its reputational resilience depends on continued support for the cultural and educational assets that contribute so much to the UK’s international appeal. At the heart of that work sits the British Council which provided with appropriate funding can deploy those assets in the UK’s interests, connecting the best of this country to potential friends, partners and allies around the world. The UK’s national power is - or at least should be - greater than the sum of its many hard and soft assets. Strategic alignment backed up with sustainable finance for the whole spectrum of UK capabilities are the recipe to ensure a successful Global Britain. Sir Ciarán Devane took up the role of Chief Executive of the British Council in January 2015. Ciarán has focused on ensuring that all stakeholders understand and value the contribution that soft power, cultural relations and the British Council makes to security, prosperity and influence, and that the organisation and staff are aligned behind that vision. Image by Biswarup Ganguly under (CC).[1] FCO and FCDO, Global Britain: delivering on our international ambition, Government, June 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/global-britain-delivering-on-our-international-ambition[2] Professor J.P. Singh and Stuart MacDonald, Soft Power Today: Measuring the Influences and Effects, Commissioned by the British Council from the University of Edinburgh, October 2017, https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/3418_bc_edinburgh_university_soft_power_report_03b.pdf[3] Alice Campbell-Cree and Mona Lotten, The value of trust: How trust is earned and why it matters, British Council, June 2018, https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/the_value_of_trust.pdf[4] Joseph S. Nye, The Other Global Power Shift, Belfer Center, August 2020, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/other-global-power-shift [post_title] => Can the UK afford not to invest in Global Britain? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => can-the-uk-afford-not-to-invest-in-global-britain [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:25:25 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:25:25 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5018 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[26] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 5014 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-09-29 09:01:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-29 08:01:00 [post_content] => The higher education sector is one of the UK’s strengths, which is sometimes presented as part of British soft power. In fact, our universities are increasingly international institutions whose teaching and research, personnel, funding, and even campuses are global. Universities have their own ‘foreign policies’ where they decide with whom to cooperate and trade, where their members may travel, and so on. However, these activities rest on the protection of the academic freedom which forms the fundamental basis for disseminating knowledge and fostering independent thinking of students and staff members, and requires self-governance and academic job security to ensure this independence.[1] The phenomenon of the ‘internationalisation’ of universities is a broadly positive force for UK institutions. But these partnerships make them increasingly reliant on income from state sponsors and donors in countries where academic freedom is unknown or severely curtailed. According to Scholars at Risk (SAR), there has been an increase of academic persecution around the world: between September 2018 and August 2019, there were 324 attacks on higher-education communities in 56 countries.[2] In parallel, an erosion of universities’ financial and institutional autonomy has been recorded in liberal democracies.[3] The need for funding has forced many major universities to collaborate with governments in authoritarian states, whose policies delimit the space for freedom of expression and thinking by controlling what is taught, researched, and discussed on university campuses and in online partnerships.[4] The internationalisation of the university presents an opportunity for authoritarian states to assert their influence across borders. Authoritarian influencing in universities constitutes an attempt to shape their research and teaching agendas and thus threatens the academic integrity of the institution.[5] Transnational repression in this context occurs when individuals—typically but not exclusively students or faculty from an authoritarian state—are subject to repressive measures against their academic freedom and wider human rights. There are four areas of internationalisation that are vulnerable to authoritarian influencing and/or transnational repression: international partnerships and funding; expatriate students and faculty; fieldwork; and overseas campuses. Our findings suggest a fraught environment where authoritarian influencing and transnational repression combine with market dynamics and national security responses to put academic freedom at risk. International partnerships and fundingThe UK’s leading universities have accepted sponsorship from authoritarian regimes accused of human rights violations and links to terrorism, with hundreds of millions of pounds funneled into British higher-education institutions to establish research centers and other kinds of partnerships.[6] Such actions, which may first occur as benign, might have an outward-facing political agenda to gain international respectability. More importantly, they represent new mechanisms for authoritarian regimes to influence the structures of research and be recognised, informally and internationally, as legitimate. The universities that are most vulnerable to such mechanisms are those relying most heavily on foreign income sources. In 2011, the London School of Economics (LSE) infamously accepted a £1.5 million donation from a charity run by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.[7] Meanwhile, Sheikh Dr. Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, the ruler of Sharjah—one of the most conservative emirates in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—has given more than £8 million to the University of Exeter over the course of twenty years.[8] In 2012, the University of Cambridge received a £3.7 million donation to establish a professorship for Chinese development studies, funded by a charity controlled by China’s former prime minister Wen Jiabao.[9] Such one-off donations, often for capital projects, garner headlines. However, a less visible but more prevalent form of authoritarian influencing occurs through state scholarship programs for study and faculty visits. These are important to universities as they support students paying fees at the lucrative international fee level. At present, UK universities host more than 100,000 Chinese students, which represent an important part of universities’ revenue streams.[10] Chinese authorities, for instance, have threatened to withhold Chinese students from the University of Oxford in an unsuccessful bid to force the school’s chancellor, Chris Patten, to cancel a visit to Hong Kong.[11] While there are few examples of overt censorship, there are academic testimonies that self-censorship is increasingly widespread.[12] Without a transparent system of recording donations and allowing university faculty and students to hold the institution to account, the integrity of the university can be called into question. Expatriate students and facultyThe students and faculty on state scholarship programs, such as Kazakhstan’s Bolashak program, are routinely subject to surveillance by their home government security services and often exercise self-censorship accordingly.[13] Unless academic freedom is explicitly protected in these arrangements, collaborations with authoritarian regimes end up curtailing the freedom of academic staff and students to express their views on politically and socially sensitive topics, as well as their freedom to teach and conduct research on topics that are thought to be at odds with the state sponsors’ visions. Sponsorships by foreign regimes create obligations that may encourage UK-based academics and students to steer their research agenda to avoid controversies with their donors. The spectrum of countries mentioned by respondents also goes beyond what we would normally think of fully-fledged authoritarian states. It includes: “very strong pressure placed on UK institutions by the Israeli embassy”; cases of Russian co-authors pulling out of conference presentations “out of fears of repercussion from [their] home university”; Saudi Arabian students asked “to report to their embassy once a month”; and China’s surveillance of student societies, which “influences students’ choices of dissertation topics away from controversial ones.”[14] However, more common is an indirect threat to academic freedom in the form of self-censorship. One academic stated that he has “observed self-censorship among state-funded Turkish students . . . who avoided making critical comments about their country’s politics in front of their Turkish peers and were worried about their MA dissertations being read by their funding institution or others in their country of origin.” Students from China, too, were said to be “clearly worried that they would be reported on by other Chinese students.” Sometimes, these faculties would themselves indicate the need to tone down criticism of what is taught in the classroom, as per this testimony: “I have censored in classes with Chinese students as I have received difficult pressure from them not to assign anything critical of China.”[15] Fieldwork and partnership with foreign researchersRestrictions on academic freedom are also found in the practice of research and data collection. This may take the form of depriving academic critics of their personal liberty and individual freedoms or banning those scholarly activities that are not aligned with the regime’s vision. Scholars have been attacked, killed, detained, or prosecuted conducting fieldwork, with the recent cases of the long-term detention and maltreatment of Durham’s Matthew Hedges and the killing of Cambridge’s Giulio Regeni garnering worldwide attention.[16] Much more commonplace than these high-profile cases is the fact that a large part of the world remains a politically unfree environment for academic research, a phenomenon increasingly discussed in the academic literature on fieldwork in practice.[17] Scholars working on sensitive topics are often forced to limit the scope of their investigations due to the difficulty of obtaining visas or the risk of endangering their fieldwork contacts. While conducting fieldwork, foreign academics work with local research assistants, translators, and other academic partners. However, local partners are often subject to far greater state surveillance and pressure from authorities.[18] The responses of the UK security services may be counter-productive where they are treat these issues as matters of security. One academic noted that “British intelligence, specifically MI5, asked me to secretly debrief students returning from China about their Chinese contacts,” while another mentioned “Home Office pressure regarding activism—perhaps not explicit pressure but investigation into [our] activities.”[19] Such actions merely feed the perception that UK-based students and staff are agents of the British state. Overseas campusesThe internationalisation and commercialisation of universities has increased the outsourcing of higher education abroad. The opening of campuses overseas has raised a number of controversies due to the choice of host countries, which have oftentimes coincided with states oppressing civil liberties and human rights. According to data compiled by the Cross-Border Education Research Team (C-BERT), as of 2017, most UK overseas campuses are based in China (9), in Malaysia (6), and in Middle Eastern countries (11).[20] The establishment of these branches is, in the majority of cases, financially subsidised by the foreign government. Yet, sometimes this support comes with restrictions on subjects to be taught or researched. In most cases, the university selects a range of topics to be taught that are not controversial, posing no challenge to the domestic political or social order. As noted by John Nagle, Reader in Sociology at the University of Aberdeen, who spent four months as a visiting professor at the UAE’s national university: “Rather than encouraging critical thinking, education in the UAE rests on a technocratic logic. Education is supposed to help its society resolve tricky social problems and maintain the status quo.”[21] ConclusionsThe internationalisation of higher education has enabled authoritarian states to exert new forms of influence and effectively ‘transnationalise’ everyday forms of censorship and political repression to students and faculty both at home and abroad. Many of these forms of influence appear to be indirect, in that they derive from self-censorship or risk management. These include the risk of the loss of the right to travel, of the right to host students, or of the likelihood of receiving donations. Evidence remains scattered, and further research on this under-studied topic is ongoing by the authors. The risk to academic freedom, however, is not solely from such states. These risks are enhanced by market mechanisms that generate unregulated competition between universities over the funding they offer and national security responses from democracies, which directly restrict academic freedom.[22] Neither market forces nor a security-based approach is likely to help protect academic freedom from transnational repression and authoritarian influencing. What can be more effective is the establishment of a code of conduct – on foreign donations and campuses, on protecting expatriate students and faculty, and on training and support for fieldworkers – such as the draft proposed by the Academic Freedom and Internationalisation Working Group. Ultimately, adoption of such common standards and measures must be transparent, allowing for a relationship of accountability between university leaders and their students and staff. This is article is a revised and abbreviated version of “The Internationalization of Universities and the Repression of Academic Freedom”, Freedom House, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/internationalization-universities-and-repression-academic-freedom/.  John Heathershaw is Professor of International Relations at the University of Exeter and Principal Investigator of the DfID-Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence project “Testing and evidencing compliance with beneficial ownership checks”.Saipira Furstenberg is a Research Associate in the Politics Department at the University of Exeter.Tena Prelec is a Research Fellow in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford as part of the project “Testing and evidencing compliance with beneficial ownership checks”. Image by Antoine Taveneaux  under (CC).[1] The UK University and College Union’s statement on academic freedom outlines five rights: freedom in teaching and discussion; freedom in carrying out research without commercial or political interference; freedom to disseminate and publish one’s research findings; freedom from institutional censorship, including the right to express one’s opinion publicly about the institution or the education system in which one works; and, freedom to participate in professional and representative academic bodies, including trade unions.[2] Scholars at Risk, Academic Freedom Monitoring Project, Free to Think, November 2019, https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Scholars-at-Risk-Free-to-Think-2019.pdf[3] Scholars at Risk, Academic Freedom Monitoring Project, Academic Freedom & China’s Quest for World-Class Universities, September 2019, https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Scholars-at-Risk-Obstacles-to-Excellence_EN.pdf[4] Kevin Kinser, Global campuses, academic freedom has its limits, The Conservation, October 2015, https://theconversation.com/on-global-campuses-academic-freedom-has-its-limits-46920[5] Thorsten Benner, An Era of Authoritarian Influence, GPPI, September 2017, https://www.gppi.net/2017/09/15/an-era-of-authoritarian-influence[6] Foreign Affairs Committee, Oral evience: Autocracies and UK Foreign Policy, HC 109, House of Commons, October 2019, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/autocracies-and-uk-foreign-policy/oral/106581.pdf[7] Jeevan Vasagar, Gaddafi donation to LSE may have come from bribes, inquiry finds, The Guardian, November 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2011/nov/30/gaddafi-donation-lse-bribes-inquiry[8] Exclusive: MPs demand British universities stop accepting donations from dictatorships, The Telegraph, August 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/2017/08/12/exclusive-universities-should-not-accept-donations-dictatorships/[9] Ibid.[10] British universities must stand up to Chinese pressure, Financial Times, November 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/df27ad90-017d-11ea-b7bc-f3fa4e77dd47[11] Ibid.[12] Saipira Furstenberg, Tena Prelec, and John Heathershaw, The Internationalization of Universities and the Repression of Academic Freedom, Freedom House, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/internationalization-universities-and-repression-academic-freedom/[13] Adele Del Sordi, “Sponsoring student mobility for development and authoritarian stability: Kazakhstan’s Bolashak programme,” Globalizations 15, no. 2 (2018).[14] Saipira Furstenberg, Tena Prelec, and John Heathershaw, The Internationalization of Universities and the Repression of Academic Freedom, Freedom House, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/internationalization-universities-and-repression-academic-freedom/[15] Saipira Furstenberg, Tena Prelec, and John Heathershaw, The Internationalization of Universities and the Repression of Academic Freedom, Freedom House, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/internationalization-universities-and-repression-academic-freedom/[16] Emma Snaith, Matthew Hedges: British academic jailed by UAE for ‘spying’ says government did not do enough to help him, The Independent, May 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/matthew-hedges-uae-spy-durham-government-foreign-office-a8900546.html; Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Ruth Michaelson, Cambridge University professor at centre of row over Giulio Regeni death, The Guardian, January 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/03/cambridge-university-professor-row-giulio-regeni-death[17] For example, Berit Bliesemann de Guevara and Morten Boas, Doing Fieldwork in Areas of International Intervention: A Guide to Research in Violent and Closed Contexts, Bristol University Press, June 2020, https://bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/doing-fieldwork-in-areas-of-international-intervention[18] Kirsten Roberts Lyer and Aron Suba, Closing Academic Space, ICNL, March 2019, https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Uni-restrictions-rpt-final-March-2019.pdf[19] Saipira Furstenberg, Tena Prelec, and John Heathershaw, The Internationalization of Universities and the Repression of Academic Freedom, Freedom House, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/internationalization-universities-and-repression-academic-freedom/[20] Cross-Border Education Research Team, A Robust Hub for Cross-Border Education, http://cbert.org/[21] Academic freedom: I spent four months at UAE’s national university – this what I found, The Conversation, October 2018, https://theconversation.com/academic-freedom-i-spent-four-months-at-uaes-national-university-this-is-what-i-found-105254[22] The US has begun to dramatically restrict links with China and arrested a number of U.S. academics, while Australia has introduced stronger new guidelines; The University Foreign Interference Taskforce – Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector, Australian Government, https://www.education.gov.au/ufit [post_title] => The UK’s internationalised universities and the protection of academic freedom [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-uks-internationalised-universities-and-the-protection-of-academic-freedom [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:25:59 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:25:59 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=5014 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[27] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4968 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-09-08 09:06:53 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-08 08:06:53 [post_content] => Revising and reviving a values-based foreign policy at a time of unprecedented global fragility, complexity and uncertainty is an intimidating proposition. The strategic environment has radically shifted from the heady optimism of the post-Cold War unipolar moment, the apparent hegemony of an international order based on the assumed harmony of liberal values, democratic governance, and free markets, and the conviction that a potent blend of economic globalisation and technological innovation was rendering authoritarian states ever more anachronistic and unsustainable. It was in that context that an ethical dimension to foreign policy appeared appropriate, even inevitable, alongside a ‘doctrine of an international community’ as the political corollary of a process of globalisation generating interdependence and creating the space for a ‘global alliance for global values’ - the presumed universal values of the liberal West – vouchsafed by the rules-based international order. When “values and interest merge,” the traditional dilemma of balancing security and idealism is resolved. “If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our interest too. The spread of our values makes us safer.”[1] Yet recent analyses and debates on both sides of the Atlantic suggest a profound crisis of confidence in the resilience of democratic institutions and the liberal values on which they rest. On the other hand, by puncturing the comfortable orthodoxies of the post-Cold War era, the current democratic recession and the COVID-19 pandemic may provide an opportunity for a reappraisal, revival and reassertion of liberal democratic ideas and institutions. Like Moliere’s women characters who spoke prose without realising it, foreign policy practitioners invariably if unwittingly employ ethical criteria in decision-making. But is the UK’s bipartisan consensus that a values-based foreign policy is both feasible and desirable still sustainable? Is it feasible to cultivate an explicitly values-based approach or ethical foundation to foreign policy when the nature and validity of those values and fundamental principles are contested, both within and beyond liberal democracies? The principles that drive British foreign policy are “obsolete,” according to a former Defence and Foreign Secretary. Policy-makers have been guided by a range of erroneous assumptions – that globalisation is immutable and global governance is replacing geopolitical rivalry, for instance – in need of revision, Sir Malcolm Rifkind wrote in the preface to a recent report.[2] The UK needs “a thorough re-appraisal of the dominant assumptions that have guided our strategic thinking,” the report added. “As wider state competition intensifies, Britain needs to re-empower itself to compete with revisionist and expansionist powers.” A leading US strategist echoes the demand of a “new set of assumptions” to underpin foreign policy. “Contrary to the optimistic predictions made in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, widespread political liberalisation and the growth of transnational organisations have not tempered rivalries among countries.” Likewise, “the uncomfortable truth,” is that “visions of benevolent globalization and peace-building liberal internationalism have failed to materialise, leaving in their place a world that is increasingly hostile to American values and interests.” The current US administration’s ‘principled realism,’ based on the defence rather than the evangelical promotion of values, reflects the reality that ‘geopolitics is eternal.’ “A main objective of US strategy, therefore, should be to prevent the accumulation of activities and trends that harm US interests and values, rather than to pursue grand projects such as trying to determine how China or other countries should govern themselves” (my emphasis).[3] Trump has reignited debate “on some concepts that we thought were settled” and forced the foreign policy establishment to reconsider “first principles,” said another former foreign policy adviser.[4] Liberal values are being “challenged intellectually and politically by states within and outside the West,” adds a prominent European analyst. The four central assumptions about the beneficent impact of free trade and economic interdependence, innate human rights, the universality of democracy and multilateralism are under dispute, reflecting a growing conviction that “Western universalism was just a false front for Western particularism.”[5] Such analyses reflect a concern – on both sides of the Atlantic and within Europe – that the appeal of liberal values is waning, that the optimistic consensus of the post-Cold War international liberal order has fractured, and that the resurgence of illiberal and autocratic powers has ushered in an era of geopolitical competition. Furthermore, “Westlessness” has dissipated democracies’ cohesion and identity, prompting some to argue that we are witnessing “the decay of ‘the West’ as a relatively cohesive geopolitical configuration anchoring a normative model of global order in which commitments to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law are central,” in short, as a champion of global constitutionalism.[6] Undermined by the internal threat of ascendant illiberal, nativist and populist forces, liberal democracies also confront the external challenge of an authoritarian resurgence. Russia, China, and other illiberal actors have employed an innovative repertoire of techniques – from disinformation to influence operations - to take advantage of democracies’ openness and pluralism while advancing an autocratic model of governance and set of values as an alternative to liberal democratic norms and institutions. The latest in a series of “transformational changes that left many nations unmoored from old certainties,” COVID-19 is, with the Cold War, “one of the two greatest tests of the U.S.-led international order since its founding,” says the US Council on Foreign Relations. “Nothing else since that time approaches the societal, political, and economic effects of the virus on populations around the world.”[7] The COVID-19 pandemic has further sapped the “strategic position, credibility, and moral authority” of the world’s most powerful democracy, according to another analysis, which notes that traditional US allies “are losing faith in American leadership while illiberal regimes are growing in number, stature, and audacity.”[8] The pandemic is deepening and accelerating the democratic downturn, as authoritarian and illiberal actors take advantage of the crisis to further erode liberties and undermine democratic institutions, according to a recent open letter signed by 62 former world leaders, 13 Nobel Laureates and 73 pro-democracy institutions.[9] COVID-19 has demonstrated that “the blithe assumption in much of the West that liberal democracy is self-evidently superior to other forms of governance is unwarranted and self-defeating.” The transition to the post-American era is taking place in “a growing strategic, political, and normative void — a new world disorder….. characterised primarily by a lack of clarity (or agreement) about the rules of the international system [and] the steady de-universalisation of norms.”[10] The crisis will “sharpen great power rivalries and hasten the shift in the global balance of power from west to east,” with China most likely to emerge “as a bigger global player in political as well as economic terms,” with Europe’s democracies much diminished, the Economist Intelligence Unit adds.[11] The challenge of forging a credible values-based foreign policy is all the more problematic and intimidating given the global regression evident in the declining number of democracies and the growing fragility of democratic institutions and culture: 

• A 2020 survey of 210 states registered a 14th consecutive year of decline in freedom, as measured by political rights and civil liberties.[12]
• Only 5.7 per cent of the world’s population live in a ‘full democracy’ and more than a third under authoritarian rule.[13]
• Some 52 per cent of citizens are dissatisfied with the quality of democracy, compared with 44 per cent who are satisfied, highlighting the fragility of democratic values.[14]
• Autocracies comprise a majority of the world’s political regimes, with 92 countries hosting 54 per cent of the world’s population. Almost 35 per cent of the world’s population - 2.6 billion people - live in autocratising states across all regions, including G20 nations.[15]

 Perhaps more profoundly, the halt to the forward march of democratic governance has punctured the West’s complacent post-Cold War teleological assumptions that history was moving in an inexorably liberal direction, that autocracies were as unsustainable as they were anachronistic and that a robust international consensus underpinned the norms, rules and institutions of the global order. Consequently, the world is “now immersed in a fierce global contest of ideas, information, and norms.”[16] The rise of illiberal forces within democratic states potentially undermines their credibility in advancing ethical foreign policies, as “populists undermine the informal norms and values critical for liberal democracies to flourish,” notably the vital norms of forbearance (restraint in exercising institutional prerogatives) and tolerance (acceptance of opposition and criticism). Populism emerged from a ‘cultural backlash’ against long-term socio-economic trends across the West, while in Central and Eastern Europe; it took the form of an ‘illiberal counterrevolution’ against the liberal norms that animated the post-1989 transitions. The domestic crisis of confidence translated into greater timidity and insularity in foreign policy. “Where the years after the Cold War saw growing civilian protection internationally and a surge in accountable government nationally, so today we see the reverse,” not least in Syria, as the “crisis of Western values” at home acquired “a bloodier, more violent face” abroad.[17] The prevailing mix of uncertainty, volatility and interdependence in the global system enhances the fragility of democratic institutions and values. Such ‘Black Swan’ events as a global pandemic, cyberattacks or nuclear terrorism could “lead to fundamental changes in the principles and laws that govern liberal democratic states and the international sovereign state system,” notes a former US State Department Policy Planning director (writing prior to the outbreak of COVID-19). Indeed, we have already witnessed how unanticipated large migrant flows “upset the balance of political and ideational interests that has helped to sustain liberal democracy.”[18] How should the UK respond to the wider international crisis of liberal democracy (in a values context)Just as Voltaire observed that the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, Roman nor an empire, many critics say the same of the liberal international order. Yet crises generate opportunities and the current democratic regression provides an occasion for the reconsideration and reassertion of core liberal values. With China and Russia making considerable investments in media and other forms of ideological infrastructure in an effort to revise the established conventions and norms of the prevailing liberal international order, the defence and promotion of values has become a new terrain of strategic competition. The traditional cleavage between a ‘realist-conservative’ approach to foreign policy that highlights the objective, morally neutral pursuit of the national interest, and the ‘idealist-liberal’ insistence that values should shape policy preferences is breaking down. While all states claim to pursue the ‘national interest,’ notions of identity and culture, including values, are central to how it is defined. With respect to foreign policy, values are not ethical principles per se but “principles that influence political beliefs and action.”[19] The conventional dichotomy of interests vs. values in foreign policy is anachronistic and unhelpful in an era when revisionist authoritarian regimes engage in various forms of ideological conflict – from the Kremlin’s ‘information warfare’ to China’s United Front influence operations -  to subvert democracies from within and to undermine the established norms of the liberal international order. In this age of great power competition, authoritarians aim to sap the moral appeal of liberal values in order to legitimise own autocratic rule, to expand their spheres of influence and to present a countervailing force against the expansion of open societies. In any case, as a leading US diplomat recently observed, a propos foreign policy analysts’ preoccupation with realism v. idealism, offshore balancing, primacy and hegemony, “The concepts from international relations and doctrines help frame debates, but they do not offer policy makers guidance about what to do.” Practitioners, he added, “considered strategic reference points – about georgraphy, economics, power and politics – but prized flexibility, adaptability and trying what might work.”[20] One reason why British practitioners have traditionally shied away from hubristic foreign policy doctrines in favour of pragmatism and empiricism. The new era of strategic competition is likely to enhance the salience of values in foreign policy. “A state’s values are not just part of its foreign policy,” according to a ‘realist’ geopolitical analyst, “they are paramount to it.” Indeed, without “a belief in its own values, a foreign policy of any kind is nearly impossible to execute.” Because they are advanced “through the projection of power, understanding a world of competing powers requires a discussion of values,” not least because “once a great state or empire loses such a belief in its own values, it must proceed into decline.”[21] In an era of strategic competition, the projection of a nation’s values is a low-cost source of comparative advantage. Few states will admit to practicing a morally bereft Realpolitik, with even autocratic regimes claiming to represent and advance a values-based approach to foreign policy. The Kremlin instrumentalises the Russian Orthodox Church in its claim to represent the ‘traditional values’ of Christianity, alongside Putin-friendly ideologues such as Alexander Dugin advocating the “blood and soil” values of nationalism to receptive illiberal forces abroad as part of the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to “discredit and damage Western liberal institutions and values.”[22] While the West purports to promote the universal values of the Enlightenment, China’s ostensibly Communist regime insists it has a comparable civilisational narrative rooted not in the principles of Marxism-Leninism but in the Confucian idea of ‘harmony’. In practice, however, Beijing’s ‘coercive diplomacy’ and projection of its ‘sharp power’ entails the “rigorous, ruthless advancement of China’s interests and values at the expense of those of the West.”[23] By exercising sharp power, “the repressive values of authoritarian systems—which encourage top-down authority, censorship, and the monopolization of power—are projected outward,”[24] undermining democracies’ sovereignty, institutional integrity, and values— in effect, “marketing dictatorship.”[25] Authoritarian regimes have been notably successful within international institutions, to such a degree that “norms privileging state security, civilizational diversity, and traditional values over liberal democracy now enjoy significant backing, and they are reshaping the international environment,” raising questions about the utility of multilateral forums as a channel for advancing values-based foreign policy.[26] This new contest of values is a rebuke to the triumphalist delusions of the 1990s that economic, cultural and political ‘liberalisation’ was inexorably ascendant, that Europe would soon be ‘whole, free, and at peace’ and that China would eventually be incorporated as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the liberal international order. But while liberal democracies face new constraints and challenges to efforts to assert or defend established international norms, intensifying competition between rival values systems demands an explicit and unapologetic assertion of what the UK represents, including the culture or way of life we aspire to protect and project, and the active promotion of our values ​​as an instrument of influence. It was during the post-Cold War heyday of liberal interventionism or ‘muscular liberalism’, that some Western leaders “claimed to infuse their actions with moral considerations that go beyond, and help to redefine, the national interest of their respective countries,” as manifested in humanitarian interventions and human rights conditionalities in foreign aid, for instance. The ‘golden era’ of the rules-based world order from 1989 to 2009 saw a raft of normative institutions and innovations, including the International Criminal Court, new UN peacekeeping missions, and the expansion and consolidation of women’s and LGBT rights. Yet while few dispute the benign intent and impact of value-driven social movements such as Doctors Without Borders, “What remains controversial is the extent to which governments can transmogrify into moral actors in international society.”[27] Especially when the strategic context has radically shifted, placing democratic states on the defensive. By traditional realist logic, “combining ethics and foreign policy is a category mistake, like asking if a knife sounds good rather than if it cuts well, or whether a broom dances better than one that costs more,” notes one analyst. “So, in judging ….foreign policy, we should simply ask whether it worked, not whether it was moral.”[28] Yet it is precisely the practical, real-world outcomes of values-based foreign policy that has generated skepticism, if not pushback, among practitioners and public alike. The US administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama each adopted foreign policies that privileged the promotion of American values over vital national security interests, not least in their efforts to democratise foreign states, and all three presidents failed.[29] Similarly, the huge human and financial costs of the international community’s engagement in Afghanistan caused other analysts to insist that the ‘liberal world order’ is not an entity of fixed principles but comprises two different strains: a ‘liberalism of imposition’ - activist, interventionist, and committed to the aggressive promotion of liberal values; and a ‘liberalism of restraint’ - moderate, empathetic, and non-interventionist.[30] Consequently, over the past decade, US foreign policy has witnessed a transition from transformational diplomacy to transactional relations, an approach that shamelessly elevates economic and security interests over ideals.[31] Even the administration’s critics concede that the end of the era of Pax Americana places the US – like other democracies –at a watershed and confronting fresh strategic choices. “Does the United States reaffirm itself to the cause of freedom, human dignity, and democracy at home and abroad—or allow it to be chipped away? Does it compromise the values, promises, and foundational liberties etched in the US Constitution because of the latest insult or opportunity that arises?”[32] Developments in the US also suggest the need to reconsider the domestic consensus or social contract underpinning foreign affairs and, by extension, the credibility of a values-based foreign policy. There is an emerging bipartisan view that US foreign engagement should be reviewed with a “focus on how foreign policy connects to the doorstep issues of average Americans” which would also reflect “renewed suspicion of losing sovereignty or decision-making to bodies beyond voters’ reach and control.”[33] With the multipolar alternative to the post-war liberal rules-based order yet to take definitive form; it is imperative that the UK plays a role by asserting its interests and values in shaping its institutional contours and content. Whether or not ethical principles in foreign affairs are, as former UK foreign minister William Hague suggested, “part of our national DNA,” concern for democracy and human rights, “while not always in the mainstream of British policy-making historically”, has been a consistent strand of foreign policy in support of such values as national self-determination – from the Greeks in the 1820s and Gladstone’s support for Italian unification through Versailles and the Balkans more recently.[34] The insistence that values and interests are readily conflated, merged or otherwise reconciled tends to disguise the political considerations driving policy choices.[35] Yet the likely efficacy of a values-based foreign policy rests on more than the bipolar choice between geopolitical calculations and humanitarian principles, but on balancing the three dimensions of intentions, means and consequences, perhaps by means of an ‘ethical scorecard.’[36] The primary principles of British foreign policy include a commitment to rule of law, not least to international law as embodied in treaties and the application of human rights law through such institutions as international courts and dispute resolution forums. But for a more comprehensive list, we might consider the ‘strategic priorities’ outlined in the 2005/06 FCO budget lines for ‘Delivering Foreign Policy/Administration’ since “the principles encompassed in these objectives are as close as it may be possible to come to an explicit statement of the UK’s national interests as they relate to our foreign policy”:[37] 

• Making the world safer from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction
• Protection of the UK from illegal immigration, drug trafficking and other international crime
• An international system based on the rule of law, which is better able to resolve disputes and prevent conflicts
• An effective EU in a more secure neighbourhood
• Promotion of UK economic interests in an open and expanding global economy
• Sustainable development underpinned by democracy, good governance and human rights
• Security of UK and global energy supplies
• Security and good governance for the UK’s overseas territories

 The policy-implementation of these principles is, of course, problematic. In some circumstances, they may clash, in line with Isaiah Berlin’s observation that desirable vales may be incompatible. Nevertheless, given these provisos, priorities for advancing a values-based foreign policy in the new environment of strategic competition should include: 

• Cultivating democratic solidarity: Confronting the authoritarian resurgence requires a renewed commitment to democratic solidarity – to enhance deeper cooperation with fellow democracies (not least in such fora as the UN Human Rights Council) and with liberal forces in civil society and liberal to establish a liberal bulwark. This demands a multidimensional approach, employing the tools of ‘transformational diplomacy’ in bilateral relations, multilateral institutions and ad hoc networks.
• Reforming global governance: In a world of strategic competition, growing inequality, and rapid technological innovation, “where ideologies as well as pathogens spread with viral ferocity….the stakes are too high and the consequences too dire to simply stick with what worked in the past and hope for the best.”[38] A values-based foreign policy that seeks to defend liberal norms and democratic institutions requires institutional innovation and political creativity. Western policymakers deluded themselves that the trade and economic benefits of globalisation and the moral magnetism of their soft power would eventually convert autocratic rivals into liberalise partners.[39] Yet the record of multilateral institutions, from the UN to the WTO, shows that relatively few states respect the liberal principles that maintain the international system. Consequently, a ‘smaller, deeper liberal order’ of industrialised democracies would “reaffirm liberal principles while limiting the scope and membership of liberal orderto shore up its integrity, legitimacy, and resilience,” argues a former National Security Council official in the Bush and Obama administrations.[40]
• Reform the Community of Democracies: British diplomats are reportedly promoting a new forum of leading democracies, the D-10, designed to establish a bulwark against resurgent authoritarianism.[41] This initiative echoes recent for a formal D-10 to function as a “steering committee of the democratic coreof the rules-based global system”, alongside an Alliance of Free Nations, a free world technology alliance and a Free World Free Trade Agreement to “strengthen coordination among democracies and facilitate the sharing of best practices across democracies.”[42] The UK should work with its partners to expand G-7 activities and membership, adding consolidated democracies such as Australia and South Korea, converting the G-7 into a D-10 to refashion a global order that defends liberal principles.[43] The UK should act as a catalyst in reforming and complementing the current Community of Democracies (CD) into a more streamlined, action-focused hub by tightening membership criteria and establishing an action agenda on the theme of Defending Democracy, providing expertise and technical assistance on such shared strategic challenges as electoral interference, disinformation, corruption and kleptocratic influence. In collaboration with the Alliance for Democracies and the Club of Madrid, it would constitute a forum for established democracies to support and ‘socialise’ leaders of emerging democracies.
• Promote ad hoc collaboration among democracies to address strategic challenges: Autocratic powers like Russia and China have formed alternative organisations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), to elevate the principles of sovereignty and ‘civilisational diversity’ to counter prevailing international liberal norms. The SCO has even acted as a pole of attraction for established democracies such as India and NATO member Turkey, which has promoted the SCO as an alternative to EU membership. Given the limitations of formal multilateral institutions in defending liberal norms and holding transgressors of international law to account, international cooperation on major global challenges is likely to be driven primarily by ‘mission-driven coalitions’ and similar flexible arrangements of like-minded states. [44] Regional groupings for which democracy is a defining criterion of membership, such as the Organization of American States, the African Union, and NATO, and the EU are suited “to act on challenges where democratic principles make a qualitative difference, such as corruption, development, humanitarian crises, and cybersecurity.”[45]

 If a state’s global ‘soft power’ draws on three principal resources - culture, political values, and foreign policy – the UK is in an enviable position relative to most other states.[46] The UK still sits at the hub of Winston Churchill’s “three majestic circles” of Europe, the global Commonwealth and the transatlantic axis or ‘Anglosphere’ - a pivot of more strategic value than a mere bridge between Europe and the US through which the UK can deploy its global assets. “A global language. Global businesses and NGOs. And global networks….Britain as a global hub, promoting our values and interests on the global stage.”[47] Taking advantage of its strategic position at the nexus of robust European, Atlantic and Commonwealth networks - the UK is well-positioned to act as the catalyst for a new constellation of democracies – complementing and consolidating current alliances such as NATO and the G-7. Embedded in a firm commitment to core democratic values, such initiatives would serve as the institutional embodiment of liberal democratic norms, while constituting a potent countervailing power to autocratic states and malign non-state actors alike. Michael Allen is a Special Assistant at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, D.C. and editor of the NED’s Democracy Digest blog. Image by www.kremlin.ru under (CC). [1] Blair, T. 2006. ‘A Global Alliance for Global Values’, Foreign Policy Centre. See also T. Blair, ‘The Principles of a Modern British Foreign Policy’, speech delivered at Lord Mayor's Banquet, Guildhall, London 10 November 1997.[2] Rogers, James. 2020. Core Assumptions and British Strategic Policy: Towards the Next Foreign, Security and Defence Review, Henry Jackson Society.[3] Nadia Schadlow, The End of American Illusion: Trump and the World as It Is, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2020-08-11/end-american-illusion. Schadlow is a principal author of the current US National Security Strategy.[4] Masha Gessen. Under Trump the language we use to create political reality is crumbling, The New Yorker, April 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/under-trump-the-language-we-use-to-create-political-reality-is-crumbling[5] Ivan Krastev, The Missionary Who has to Become a Monastery, Center for Liberal Studies/Robert Bosch Stiftung/Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, 2019, http://www.robertboschacademy.de/content/language2/downloads/Policy-Paper-Hypocrisy-2019-Final.pdf[6] 2020 Munich Security Report, Munich Security Conference. Mattias Kumm, Jonathan Havercroft, Jeffrey Dunoff, Antje Wiener, The End of ‘the West’ and the Future of Global Constitutionalism, Global Constitutionalism, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2017, pp. 1-11, p. 2.[7] Robert D. Blackwill and Thomas Wright, The End of World Order and American Foreign Policy, Council of Foreign Relations Special Report #86, May 2020, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/the-end-of-world-order-and-american-foreign-policy-csr.pdf[8] Kelly Magsamen, Max Bergmann, Michael Fuchs and Trevor Sutton, Securing a Democratic World: The Case for a Democratic Values-Based U.S. Foreign Policy, Center for American Progress, September 2018, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/09/05/457451/securing-democratic-world/[9] A Call to Defend Democracy, NED, June 2020, https://www.ned.org/call-to-defend-democracy/[10] Bobo Lo, Global Order in the Shadow of the Coronavirus: China, Russia and the West, Lowy Institute, July 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/global-order-shadow-coronavirus-china-russia-and-west[11] Geopolitics after COVID-19: is the pandemic a turning point?, EIU, April 2020, https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1339299717&Country=Albania&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=International+relations[12] Sarah Repucci, Freedom in the World 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy, Freedom House, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy [13] 2020 Democracy Index, The Economist Intelligence Unit.[14] Richard Wike and Shannon Schumacher, Democratic Rights Popular Globally but Commitment to Them Not Always Strong. Pew Research Center, February 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/27/democratic-rights-popular-globally-but-commitment-to-them-not-always-strong/[15] Autocratization Surges–Resistance Grows: Democracy Report 2020, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, University of Gothenburg, https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/f0/5d/f05d46d8-626f-4b20-8e4e-53d4b134bfcb/democracy_report_2020_low.pdf[16] Larry Diamond, America's Silence Helps Autocrats Triumph, Foreign Policy, September 2019,  https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/06/americas-silence-helps-autocrats-triumph-democratic-rollback-recession-larry-diamond-ill-winds/[17] Anne Applebaum, The West Has Lost Confidence in Its Values. Syria Is Paying the Price, Washington Post, September 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-west-has-lost-confidence-in-its-values-syria-is-paying-the-price/2019/09/06/b8b73dee-d0ac-11e9-b29b-a528dc82154a_story.html[18] Krasner, Stephen. 2020. How to Make Love to a Despot: An Alternative Foreign Policy for the Twenty-First Century, New York: Liveright, p.36.[19] Krishnan Srinivasan, James Mayall and Sanjay Pulipaka (eds). 2019. Values in Foreign Policy: Investigating Ideals and Interests. London: Rowman and Littlefield.[20] Zoellick, Robert B. 2020. America in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy. Location 9170.[21] Robert D. Kaplan, Ibid, Srinivasan, et al. p.xxi.[22] Laqueur, Walter. 2015. Putinism: Russia and Its Future with the West; London: Dunne. Shandra, Alya and Robert Seely, The Surkov Leaks, The Inner Workings of Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine, RUSI, July 2019. https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201907_op_surkov_leaks_web_final.pdf[23] Charles Parton, China–UK Relations Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference?, RUSI, February 2019, https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/china-uk-relations-where-draw-border-between-influence-and[24] Walker, Christopher. "What Is "Sharp Power"?" Journal of Democracy, vol. 29 no. 3, 2018, p. 923. doi:10.1353/jod.2018.0041.[25] Brady, Anne-Marie. 2007. Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, London: Rowman & Littlefield.[26] Alexander Cooley, “Authoritarianism Goes Global: Countering Democratic Norms,” Journal of Democracy 26 (July 2015): 49–63.[27] Chandler, David and Volker Heins (eds.). 2016. Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy Pitfalls, Possibilities and Paradoxes. London: Routledge.[28] Nye, Joseph. 2005. Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics. New York: Public Affairs.[29] Mandelbaum, Michael. 2016. Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era. New York: Oxford University Press.[30] Sørensen, Georg. 2011. A Liberal World Order in Crisis: Between Imposition and Restraint, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 37.[31] The normally sympathetic Wall Street Journal wrote of Trump’s response to the murder of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi that ‘we are aware of no President, not even such ruthless pragmatists as Richard Nixon or Lyndon Johnson, who would have written a public statement like this without so much as a grace note about America’s abiding values and principles.’[32] Ian Bremmer and Joe Kennedy III, Time for a New U.S. Foreign Policy Narrative: A Better Alternative to Trump's "America First", Foreign Affairs, April 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-04-30/time-new-us-foreign-policy-narrative[33] Nikolas K Gvosdev, Can a 'Trumpian' Foreign Policy Stick?, The National Interest, November 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-trumpian-foreign-policy-stick-95196[34] –Cited in Edmunds, Timothy, Jamie Gaskarth; Robin Porter (eds). British Foreign Policy and the National Interest. Identity, Strategy and Security., London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 125[35] Ibid, p.124[36] Nye, Joseph. 2020. Do Morals Matter: Presidents and Foreign Policy From FDR to Trump. New York: Oxford University Press, (especially Context of choices and Ethical Scorecards, pp.35-42).[37] Edmunds, et al, op. cit, 124.[38] Schadlow, op. cit.[39] Leonard, Mark. 2006. Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century. New York: Public Affairs.[40] Miller, Paul D. 2016. American Power and Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy. Washington, DC; Georgetown University Press.[41] Ben Judah, Surprise! Post-Brexit Britain’s foreign policy looks a lot like the old one, Washington Post, July 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/13/surprise-post-brexit-britains-foreign-policy-looks-lot-like-old-one/[42] Jeffrey Cimmino, Rebecca Katz, Matthew Kroenig, Josh Lipsky and Barry Pavel, A global strategy for shaping the post-COVID-19 world, Atlantic Council, July 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/a-global-strategy-for-shaping-the-post-covid-19-world/[43] G. John Ikenberry, The Next Liberal Order: The Age of Contagion Demands More Internationalism, Not Less, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/next-liberal-order[44] Ibid.[45] Center for American Progress[46] Nye, ibid.[47] BBC News Channel, Miliband urges Labour enthusiasm, January 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7197467.stm [post_title] => Prospects for an ethical foundation for a foreign policy in the context of democratic regression and authoritarian resurgence [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => prospects-for-an-ethical-foundation-for-a-foreign-policy-in-the-context-of-democratic-regression-and-authoritarian-resurgence [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:26:22 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:26:22 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4968 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[28] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4965 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-09-08 09:06:24 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-08 08:06:24 [post_content] => The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, provides a welcome opportunity for a comprehensive review of the UK’s positioning in world politics. It comes at a pivotal time, for the UK’s foreign policy direction after Brexit and in a period where the liberal international order is fragmenting. This essay emphasises the importance of a continued focus in UK foreign policy on the promotion of values and ethical responsibilities beyond its borders. Climate change, human rights abuse, pandemic disease, refugee flows and global poverty, create important moral imperatives for the UK to act towards a world common good. The international landscape continues to be one of shared problems that require a collective response. The essay argues firstly that the Integrated Review provides an important moment of reflection to consider the precise relationship between values and the narrower national interests. Values and interests are not always harmonious or mutually reinforcing, and clearer mapping of the relationship is important in establishing the credibility of these commitments. Care must be taken that the language of ‘enlightened national interest’ is not used to disguise the pursuit of narrower priorities. Secondly, the Integrated Review also takes place in a domestic political context of significant societal division on the UK’s positioning towards the outside world and its responsibilities to those beyond its borders. Rifts that became pronounced over Britain’s EU membership continue to limit the likelihood of reliable domestic consensus on foreign policy priorities, whether it is the interests to be pursued, the values to be promoted or the acceptable extent of responsibilities to non-citizens. Without a reliable domestic foreign policy consensus, governments will find it difficult to marry the ends sought in foreign policy with means that are politically acceptable to diverse opinion groups within the UK.  Whilst the Integrated Review will understandably focus on capabilities for hard and soft power projection internationally, the UK’s internal dynamics will be a key factor in enabling or constraining these capabilities. The Role of Values in UK Foreign Policy  The idea of a ‘foreign policy with an ethical dimension’ was prominently associated with foreign secretary Robin Cook and the initial foreign policy of the Labour party, following their 1997 election victory. The foundation of DFID, the production of annual human rights reports, limitation of UK arms sales to authoritarian states, and support for humanitarian intervention were key features of this agenda.[1] The key precepts of Labour’s ‘ethical’ foreign policy have survived successive changes of government and were embraced as the ‘values’ agenda within Conservative foreign policy, including maintaining the UK’s commitment to international development spending and expanded commitments to civilian protection and the Responsibility to Protect.[2] For both parties, foreign policy narratives have been shaped around the promotion of liberal values - support for a ‘rule-governed’ international order, the expansion of democracy, the protection of human rights and the promotion of human well-being through international development. Foreign policy informed by these values requires the UK to think beyond its own immediate national interests, to consider ethical responsibilities to people and communities beyond its borders. This has fed through into the current Global Britain agenda, with continued emphasis on the promotion of values, the defence of the rules-based system and acting as a ‘moral compass to champion causes that know no borders’.  Human rights, development and the promotion of democracy remain ostensibly central to this agenda.[3] The Integrated Review marks an important hinge point for UK foreign policy and an opportunity to better define the role of values in UK foreign policy and their relationship to the national interest. A foreign policy informed by values will be fundamentally important in enhancing its position as a responsible state contributing towards a world common good. Global problems of climate change, population displacement, large-scale human rights abuse and pandemic disease can neither be contained within state borders, nor solved by individual states alone. Britain’s withdrawal from the EU and the re-assertion of its sovereignty, do not change the realities of the contemporary global problems it faces. Developing an effective response to these problems will continue to require collective action, informed by a worldly moral compass. What is an ‘enlightened national interest’?There has been a marked tendency by successive governments to suggest the UK pursues an ‘enlightened’ national interest, where the political and economic interests can be reconciled in a mutually reinforcing relationship with global ethical responsibilities.[4] The UK is not alone in this ambition, with a range of other states having similarly reconstructed their national interest to align with global ethical responsibilities.[5] There is no intrinsic tension between national interest, the promotion of values and global ethical commitments, whether related to human rights, international development or environmental protection. However, there has been little clarity in recent UK foreign policy on the precise relationship between national interests and global ethical commitments, or how they may support one another. This lack of clarity has been carried forward in the ‘Global Britain’ agenda, which unproblematically marries a ‘buccaneering’ approach to free trade, with continued support for human rights, democratisation and development. Assuming an automatically mutually reinforcing relationship between national interest and global ethical responsibilities, obscures the common tensions that often emerge between them. Inconsistencies between Britain’s professed support for human rights and its pursuit of narrower national commercial interests have been consistently evident in its sales of weapons to regimes with exceptionally poor human rights records.[6] Similar tensions have been evident in British advocacy of humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. In both Libya and Syria, concerns for national interest and about the risk of ground-level entanglements have heavily tempered the approach of the UK to violence against civilians. Modes of intervention, to protect civilians or address other security concerns, have been limited primarily to the use of airpower, with questionable overall effect in creating a longer term secure and protective environment. Compromises between national interests and global ethical responsibilities may be necessary in some cases.  However, continuing to suggest a near symbiotic relationship between Britain’s interests and the values it promotes in its foreign policy, risks strategic incoherence as resources and political will fail to match the ends sought. Acting at odds with the values and global ethical commitments the UKs professes to support, creates an obvious image of inconsistency with the likely consequence of reducing its soft power and ability to promote international norms of conduct. It is vitally important that the Integrated Review considers how different areas of foreign policy responsibility relate to one another – where national interest and values-based commitments complement one another, and where they may conflict. This would acknowledge more honestly, rather than seek to obscure, the tensions between different priorities in UK foreign policy. Doing so would establish a clearer link between the ends sought and the resources necessary, and create a path towards more consistent and effective foreign policy practices. Values-based Foreign Policy for a Disunited Kingdom? Less commonly explored in discussions about future UK foreign policy, is its relationship with shared societal values and the domestic political context within Britain. The tension between national interest and the global ethical responsibilities, sits alongside entrenched internal divisions about Britain’s role in the world. Evidence from before and after the 2016 referendum, reveals significant divides in public opinion on foreign policy priorities, between approaches confined to the pursuit of narrow economic interest and those informed by values-based commitments. Socio-economic class, age and regional location indicate divergent priorities amongst key demographics.[7] The 2016 referendum itself was an important driver for the emergence of distinctive identity communities within the UK, reflected in polarised attitudes towards global governance, immigration and the appropriate positioning of Britain in world politics. Far from resolving this polarisation, the outcome of the referendum and the protracted withdrawal negotiations have further cemented these identities. It is impossible to wholly disengage a post-Brexit strategy for UK foreign policy from some of the populist nationalist rhetoric that surrounded of the EU referendum campaign. Hostility to global governance, immigration and rules constraining British sovereignty that characterised strands of the pro-leave campaigns, reflect some commonalities with what has been identified in recent research as a broader global trend in ‘reactionary internationalism’.[8] Reactionary internationalism emphasises the need to unshackle the state from the constraints of the liberal international order. Frequent allusions to Britain’s imperial heritage and metaphors of the UK “re-emerging after decades of hibernation” and “leaving its chrysalis”, in speeches promoting the Global Britain agenda, promote the idea of a state breaking free from external constraints on its sovereignty.[9]  An unresolved tension has emerged, between strands of thinking that emphasise national sovereignty and freedom of action, and other strands which see the appropriate place of the UK at the centre of a rules-based international order that by nature constrains foreign policy and emphasises global ethical responsibilities. Domestic polarisation and fragile internal consensus on global ethical commitments has particular implications for foreign policy activities that have a large potential financial cost, commitment burden and/or require consistent public support over time. Public spending on international development is a key area of contestation between segments of the public that see development as an important global ethical priority for the UK, and those who feel the money would be better spent on British citizens. Weak domestic consensus on foreign policy priorities has similar implications for intervention and the use of force in UK foreign policy. Recent research and investigations by the Defence Committee have highlighted the challenges in developing reliable public support for armed humanitarian interventions.[10] The Integrated Review must clearly consider international conditions and UK capabilities that stand to affect foreign policy. However, it must also appreciate the problem of a divided domestic landscape and consider how a more stable domestic consensus could be developed on foreign policy priorities, practices and Britain’s position in world politics. The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to do little to develop a more stable domestic consensus. It has the potential to further enlarge the divide between sections of the public who see the need for expanded global connection to respond and recover from the crisis, and those who see it as cause for a strong refocussing on narrower national interests. Previous investigations by Parliamentary committees have tentatively started to address the way in which the public engages with foreign policy and the importance of a clear narrative about the UK’s foreign policy objectives.[11] The Global Britain agenda appears to be an attempt to provide a unifying narrative, directed at a polarised internal audience, to reconcile conflicting preferences about Britain’s international positioning. However, a narrative generated by foreign policy elites, is unlikely by itself to resolve tensions between divergent and entrenched views about the UK’s national priorities amongst the public. Concerningly, when responding to the Foreign Affairs Committee’s 2018 report on Global Britain, the government neglected to answer the direct question of “what does Global Britain mean to the people of the UK”?[12] Developing a more stable domestic consensus for future UK foreign policy strategy requires a large-scale programme of public diplomacy, but one directed at the British, rather than overseas publics. The objective of such an exercise would be to better understand the way in which national interest, values and overseas ethical commitments are understood and prioritised by the public. In keeping with the emergence of ‘dialogue-based public diplomacy’, such an exercise must be a process of listening as well as persuasion.[13] The desired outcome of such a process would be a values-based foreign policy, underpinned by stronger domestic legitimacy and a clearer sense, amongst both the public and policymakers, of how the UK’s foreign policy priorities relate to one another. Conclusion and Recommendations 

• The promotion of values in UK foreign policy will be fundamentally important in helping to define Britain’s place in the world after Brexit, and to enhance its position as a responsible state contributing towards a world common good.
• UK foreign policy strategy has consistently internalised unresolved tensions between the pursuit of national interests and the global ethical responsibilities created by the promotion of ‘values’. The recurrent suggestion has been that values and interests are mutually reinforcing. However, this assumption obscures the tensions that frequently exist in practice. This risks strategic incoherence as resources and political will fails to match the ends sought.
• The Integrated Review must examine the specific relationship between its understanding of national interest and the values or global ethical commitments it seeks to pursue. The tensions between different priorities in UK foreign policy must be acknowledged and accounted for more openly.
• Current UK foreign policy strategy has also paid very little attention to the absence of a stable domestic consensus on Britain’s role in the world and the significant internal divisions that have endured following the 2016 referendum. The absence of a stable domestic consensus on foreign policy has significant implications for costly or complex foreign policy activities, like armed intervention or stabilisation, which require robust public support. Developing a more reliable domestic consensus in support of UK foreign policy, would benefit from a large-scale programme of public diplomacy directed toward British, rather than overseas publics.

 Dr Jonathan Gilmore is a Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Manchester. His expertise centre on British foreign policy, global ethics, humanitarian intervention and comparative defence and security practices. His research has featured in major international academic journals and his book 'The Cosmopolitan Military' was published in 2015.  Image by Tasmin News Agency under (CC). [1] See Robin Cook “British Foreign Policy”, speech given on 12^th May, 1997; Tony Blair, “The Doctrine of the International Community”, speech given at the Economic Club, Chicago, 24^th April 1999[2] William Hague, “Britain’s values in a networked world”, speech given at Lincolns Inn, 15^th September 2010; Jonathan Gilmore, “Still a ‘Force for Good’? Good International Citizenship in British Foreign and Security Policy”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 17(1), 2015, pp. 106–129; Matt Beech & Peter Munce, “The place of human rights in the foreign policy of Cameron’s conservatives: Sceptics or enthusiasts?”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 21(1), 2019, pp. 116–131[3] Dominic Raab, “Foreign Secretary’s introduction to the Queen’s Speech debate”, 13^th January 2020; Jeremy Hunt, “An invisible chain: speech by the foreign secretary”, Policy Exchange, 31^st October 2018; HM Government, National Security Capability Review, (London: Cabinet Office, 2018), p. 7[4] Jonathan Gilmore, “The Uncertain Merger of Values and Interests in UK Foreign Policy”, International Affairs, 90(3), 2014, pp. 541-557[5] See Alison Brysk, Global Good Samaritans, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)[6] Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 2013-14: Volume I, (London: TSO, 2013), pp. 29-32[7] Chatham House/YouGov, British Attitudes Towards the UK’s International Priorities: General Public Survey Results, London: Chatham House, 2014; Edward Elliott and Sophia Gaston, Behind Global Britain: Public opinion on the UK’s role in the world, (London: British Foreign Policy Group/BMG Research/Henry Jackson Society, 2019)[8] Pablo de Orellana and Nicholas Michelsen, “Reactionary Internationalism: the philosophy of the New Right”, Review of International Studies, 45(5), 2019, pp. 748-767[9] Boris Johnson, “PM speech in Greenwich”, 3^rd February 2020[10] House of Commons Defence Committee, Intervention: Why, When and How?, HC952, (London: TSO, 2014);  Graeme Davies and Robert Johns, “R2P from Below: Does the British public view humanitarian interventions as ethical and effective?”, International Politics, 53(1), 2016, pp.118-137; Jamie Gaskarth, “The fiasco of the 2013 Syria votes: decline and denial in British foreign policy”, Journal of European Public Policy, 23(5), 2016, pp. 718-734[11] House of Commons Defence Committee, Intervention, p. 20; House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations, UK Foreign Policy in a Shifting World Order, HL250, 2018, p.96[12] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Britain: Government Response to the Sixth Report of the Committee, HC 1236, p. 5[13] Shaun Riordan, “Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: a New Foreign Policy Paradigm?” in Jan Melissen (Ed.) The New Public Diplomacy, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), pp. 180-195 [post_title] => Developing domestic foundations for a values-based UK foreign policy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => developing-domestic-foundations-for-a-values-based-uk-foreign-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-05-06 12:56:32 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-05-06 11:56:32 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4965 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[29] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4956 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-09-08 09:05:59 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-08 08:05:59 [post_content] => Summary

• Ethics are a fundamental aspect of foreign policy, not an add-on.
• They should be grounded in the relationship between government and the governed.
• This would involve far more engagement with the public to gauge their needs and wants and align policy accordingly.

 What do we mean by ethics?Ethics are about deciding what the right thing to do is, given the circumstances. Foreign policy involves making these choices continually as part of the normal process of government. As such, ethics are not a ‘dimension’ of foreign policy, nor an optional add-on, they are integral to its operation. Ethics are distinct from laws or rules. There has been a tendency for law to creep into government decision-making as a proxy for ethical reasoning. Decisions on the use of force are subject to legal approval and that is a useful benchmark for what is appropriate; but morality and legality should not be conflated. Breaking the law could sometimes be the right thing to do, to prevent a greater harm or allow the law to evolve. For example, the Independent International Commission on NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 described the operation as “illegal but legitimate” because diplomacy had run its course and it ended the oppression of the Albanian community. David Cameron rejected the idea that one of the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council could veto military action in Syria in 2013, despite that being enshrined in the UN Charter.[1] British foreign policy-makers often assert they support a rules-based international system.[2] What the above examples show is that we do so because we assume that those rules align with our values.[3] Where they do not, we are willing to break them. For the most part, this is not a problem since we set many of the rules in our favour and they continue to serve our interests. But, with the rise of China and India and a resurgence of authoritarian rule across the world, we face the prospect of an international order whose rules could be hostile to our values.[4] In short, ethics, not laws or rules, underpin UK foreign policy. Whose ethics?There are many things that influence our sense of right and wrong and what is appropriate behaviour. In the foreign policy realm, two ethical frameworks operate in tandem: Communitarian ethics and Cosmopolitan ethics.[5] For Communitarians, the primary ethical duty of the policymaker is to look after the interests of their citizens. For Cosmopolitans, the aim is to advance the interests of their fellow human beings globally.[6] After the Cold War, commentators got carried away thinking the second ethic was rendering the first redundant. It was not. States continue to be key actors, even when responding to transnational issues such as the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. Most people still identify with, and value, their national identity.[7] National leaders have to make choices about how to allocate resources but Cosmopolitanism struggles to explain which to prioritise. If all human beings have an ethical claim on us on the basis of their common humanity, then much of what the state does, from border policing and defence to welfare and social security spending could be seen as unethical since it favours one group in particular. Furthermore, whenever and wherever human rights abuses occur, the UK government would be obligated to respond. That is impractical for a medium-sized power which has suffered two catastrophic economic shocks in recent years. Cosmopolitanism is useful in encouraging policy-makers to adopt a more long term and less parochial view of their interests. Cosmopolitan ethics favour global public goods like international law, security, development and human rights which help to create a better environment for UK people to live, work and travel within. Yet, with fewer resources due to our relative decline, we now have less scope for international action. We therefore need a clearer rationale for why we act. The logical basis for a reformulated foreign policy is to refocus on the needs and wants of the British public. This Communitarian approach sees the key ethical relationship as being between the government and its citizens.[8] For that to work, the Integrated Review has to establish a more systematic approach to understanding public attitudes and desires and responding to them. The Review also needs to provide a more rigorous framework for defining the public interest, especially when action is necessary to support this against the tide of public opinion. A Communitarian foreign policy: engaging the public in foreign policy-makingTo strengthen the ethical relationship between the public and the government acting on their behalf, foreign policy-makers need to make greater efforts to solicit public opinions. The government’s loss of a parliamentary vote on Syria in 2013 and the referendum result of 2016 suggest the public is having an increasing influence on foreign policy issues. It is therefore imperative to align foreign policy with public opinion in advance; or anticipate opposition so that steps can be taken to alleviate its effects. Furthermore, the extent of immigration in recent decades means that the British population has a huge resource of linguistic and cultural knowledge from which it can draw, with citizens having family links across the world.[9] As such, engaging with the public could bring practical benefits as well as useful challenge to existing foreign policy. Doing so entails a four stage process. Firstly, foreign policy-makers must listen to public views on foreign policy dilemmas. This can be done through a combination of surveys, evidence calls, opinion polling, focus groups, town hall meetings, public debates and roadshows. They should then reflect on the feedback they receive. This entails cross-referencing feedback from the public with official assumptions, policy and external sources. To demonstrate that they have listened and reflected, they need to explain the logic of the UK’s policy, how it will change or stay the same following feedback, and how it serves the public interest. They then must respond with sensitivity to the domestic impact of policy actions.  In practice, the public will pay varying attention to foreign policy issues and will be affected by them in different ways. There will also be competing interests, either among different sectors and stakeholders, or between them and the broader national interest. The concept of the national interest is notoriously elusive but is best defined in terms of the public good[10] – that is, the collective safety, prosperity and contentment of the political community of the UK.[11] The challenge is to work out how to balance the particular interests of certain sectors of the economy or society with those of the community as a whole. To do so, policy-makers need to undertake two types of public engagement. Comprehensive engagement, canvassing the views of the general public, and Targeted engagement, soliciting the opinions of key sectors of the community who have a stake in foreign policy issues as they arise. Targeted engagement allows UK policymakers to understand the impact of UK foreign policy on sub-communities, weigh the costs and benefits to those most invested in outcomes and harness their expertise to improve policy effectiveness. However, this feedback then needs to be checked against the collective good and the broader attitudes of the community as a whole, via comprehensive engagement activities. Adjudicating between ethical claimsThe interests of sub-groups and the collective interest will not always converge and so policymakers need to decide which to favour. As defined above, those interests boil down to physical safety, economic prosperity and contentment.[12] Each of these categories may support or conflict with one another, either within groups or between them. Thus, a policy that brought benefit to the financial sector or arms manufacturers could bring in tax revenue and, in the case of arms, support a defence industrial base that serves national security interests. Yet, it might result in complicity in human rights abuses and have a damaging effect on the UK’s global reputation (and hence the self-esteem of the community as a whole). Obversely, human rights advocacy abroad could lead to minority communities and their families being targeted by hostile states, impacting on their safety – as in the case of the Russian, Hong Kong and Iranian diasporas. There is no formula for weighing these considerations as it depends on the specific case. Policy may also have long or short term impacts and so time is a complicating factor. What fuller public engagement would do is provide a backdrop and reference point to assessments of the sub-group and collective interest. Policy-makers could then evaluate whether a given policy would have a net positive or negative impact on each and the degree of alignment may give an indication of its desirability. The following table illustrates this:  However, in many cases the collective interest could be marginal (meaning sub-group interests are in effect the collective interest), or it may be appropriate to favour the particular interest of a sub-group, even if it entailed a collective cost, if it produced a significant benefit to that community. The granting of asylum to dissidents is one example. The key factor here would be to regularly and rigorously check the distribution of costs and benefits.In short, deciding on what is ethical does not simply mean positing a collective interest and favouring that over international or sub-national interests. Rather, it is about weighing the relative impact of policy on different groups and balancing that with some notion of the collective interest, which itself might be fluid. The diagram below gives a flavour of the process. Sectoral interests feed into each of the three areas. Some will be marginalised whilst others will converge and achieve dominance. The dominant configuration shapes a sense of collective interest. At the same time, mass public opinion looms in the background and the external environment interacts with this understanding. Overall, a Communitarian foreign policy focuses ethical discussion on how decisions affect domestic groups. This looks very different to a Cosmopolitan foreign policy, which would emphasise the impact on international actors. Nevertheless, it does not preclude altruistic behaviour. Britain’s significant aid budget is a source of pride, which promotes domestic contentment. The advantage of a Communitarian approach is it establishes a framework for judging how to allocate resources ethically, one that fits with the UK’s financial constraints.  RisksThe key risks of a Communitarian foreign policy are:

1. the marginalisation of minorities and out groups;[13]
2. an erratic foreign policy, liable to shift when faced with difficulties; and,
3. a refusal to act on the basis of humanitarian need.

 The first problem is overcome in the above formulation via the call to engage with and learn from sub-groups, rather than assume their interests are shared with the wider collective. The second is a challenge, since public opinion can be fickle. But again, this is ameliorated by the emphasis given to reflecting on longer term trends. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that the public interest is not always aligned with public opinion. The latter is canvassed to resist elite capture of foreign policy and challenge assumptions, rather than wholly determine policy. Moreover, paying attention to domestic voices could mean that actions abroad are more sustainable since they align better with domestic attitudes. Thirdly, Communitarian ethics do not mean that the UK cannot do good in the world. It is clearly in the national interest of a liberal democratic state to live in a stable international order, with more prosperity, less conflict and more freedom. But, our commitment to those public goods should always be linked back to the costs they impose on UK citizens and the benefits they afford them in turn. In doing so, this will set necessary limits on action. Dr Gaskarth is Reader in Foreign Policy and IR at the University of Birmingham and has published widely on international ethics, British foreign and security policy, and intelligence. Image by DFID/Rich Taylor under (CC). [1] 29 August, Column 1429, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0001.htm[2] Field, M. ‘Global Britain: supporting the Rules Based International System’, 17 August 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/global-britain-supporting-the-rules-based-international-system; https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/548740/RBIS-S-01_RBIS_Fund_-_RBIS_Programme_Strategy.docx; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/rules-based-international-system-conference; https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldintrel/250/25004.htm[3] Chalmers, M. ‘Which Rules? Why There is No Single ‘Rules-Based International System’ RUSI Occasional Paper, April 2019, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201905_op_which_rules_why_there_is_no_single_rules_based_international_system_web.pdf[4] Freedom House reports a 14 year decline in democratic rule, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy[5] Linklater, A. The Transformation of Political Community. Polity, 1998.[6] The Ancient philosopher Diogenes of Sinope, when asked where he came from, is said to have replied he was a ‘kosmopolitês’ or citizen of the world.[7] In a June 2020 YouGov poll, 67% of people felt fairly or very proud to be British, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/travel/survey-results/daily/2020/06/25/31f14/2. In a BFPG survey in June 2020, 54% of respondents self-identified as a patriot compared to 40% as a global citizen, https://bfpg.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/BFPG-Annual-Survey-Public-Opinion-2020-HR.pdf[8][8] The analogy often provided is that of a “social contract” between government and the governed, associated with Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The domestic basis to foreign policy ethics was recognised by William Gladstone, who put “Good government at home” as the first of his principles of foreign policy, ‘Right Principles of Foreign Policy’, 27 November, 1879.[9] According to the 2011 census, the most prevalent languages other than English were Polish, 546,174, Panjabi, 273,231, Urdu, 268,680, Bengali (with Sylheti and Chatgaya), 221,403, Gujarati, 213,094, Arabic, 159,290. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/language/articles/detailedanalysisenglishlanguageproficiencyinenglandandwales/2013-08-30[10] See Edmunds, T. Gaskarth, J. and Porter, R. British Foreign Policy and the National Interest. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014; Kratochwil, F.  ‘On the notion of “interest” in international relations’ International Organization, 36,1,1982: 1-30.[11] Contentment includes self-esteem, spiritual health, happiness, and a positive international reputation.[12] This triad was recognised as far back as Thucydides, who noted that people act out of fear, interest or honour. The 2015 NSS/SDSR rendered this as security, prosperity and influence. Influence should not be an end but a means, hence why it has been substituted above by contentment.[13] Pin-Fat, V. The metaphysics of the national interest and the 'mysticism' of the nation-state: reading Hans J. Morgenthau’. Review of International Studies, 2005, 217-236. [post_title] => Communitarian foreign policy: Ethics and public opinion [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => communitarian-foreign-policy-ethics-and-public-opinion [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:37:34 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:37:34 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4956 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[30] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4948 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-09-08 09:03:43 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-08 08:03:43 [post_content] => In the context of recent changes to the structure of the foreign policy and international aid apparatus, and considering the upcoming Integrated Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy Review, here we examine how members of the public consider two key security matters. First and foremost, what foreign policy role do members of the public think the UK military should play? Second, when it comes to the UK’s overall international role, what weighs more for citizens, protection of national interests or other goals such as promoting democratisation or protecting human rights? Here we address these questions, with an eye on understanding factors that affect the public’s opinion on these matters such as political affiliation, Brexit support, and generational divides. Roles the UK military should play In 2018, we asked the public (n=2,565) whether or not the UK should be willing to use military force to achieve ten different goals.[1]  The main take-away point from Table 1 is that there are common consensual goals that broad sectors of the public believe the military should play. Nearly eight in ten respondents believe the military should combat global terrorist organisations, and close to three quarters of the public share the view that the military should play a role in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, as well as support and defend allies. A clear majority of respondents also support the military participating in operations associated with protecting vulnerable populations. Nearly three-quarters of the public (72 per cent) agreed the UK must be willing to participate in a military mission with a UN mandate to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, and seven in ten respondents supported using the military to stop ethnic cleansing. Preventing the rise of a hostile superpower also receives widespread support. When excluding ‘don’t know’ responses, the percentage of respondents agreeing with these statements outnumber the percentage disagreeing by a ratio of 5-1 or more. Ancillary analyses suggest relatively minor differences across respondents who identified with different political parties. The only real divide is over the intensity of agreement: Conservative and Labour party supporters’ levels of agreement are no more than ten percentage points away from each other for all items. A note of caution is warranted in interpreting these results. While the public endorses the use of the military to achieve these goals in the abstract, we can expect that support for any specific mission will be lower as additional considerations such as opportunity costs and the prospects of success will come to the fore, potentially reducing support. If support drops when a specific deployment is proposed, then we can see the public has particularly strong opposition to using the military to help bring a democratic form of government to other nations (34 per cent) or to contain Chinese military power (36 per cent). Opposition to using the military to install a democratic form of government is likely a reaction to the use of that rationale as a reason to intervene in Iraq. We speculate that support is low for containing Chinese military power because people do not see the Chinese military as (yet) a threat worthy of response. Interestingly, while there is consensus around specific goals associated with the promotion of human rights—stopping ethnic cleansing and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe—there are higher levels of opposition to the more general goal of protecting human rights. An open question is whether the term ‘human rights’ has become politicised in recent discourse in a way that elicits the activation of thinking in terms of trade-offs as opposed to the more consensual goals discussed above. One possibility is that human rights is associated with ‘Europe’ (the European Court of Human Rights is often misunderstood to be part of the EU). Preliminary analysis suggests some support for this view – support for using the military to promote and defend human rights in other countries is approximately 20 percentage points lower for those who support Brexit. Weighing national interests against idealsSince consensus may break down when trade-offs are made apparent, we designed two scenarios where supporting an idealistic position has a cost—promoting a democratic leader that does not work well with the UK and putting human rights above the interest of your own nation. Understanding citizens’ views on these matters is especially salient in the context of the recent merger between the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). When the Johnson administration announced such changes in June, some argued the move ensured aid funding could be used to support wider national strategic objectives rather than being constrained by a narrow focus on poverty reduction.[2] When asked if a dictatorship that usually supports UK interests serves as a better ally than a democracy that usually does not support UK interests, the average response is for individuals to situate themselves towards the mid-point of the scale.[3] That is, people see both idealism and interests as important guideposts for foreign policy. Political ideology plays a role here: left wing voters tend to prefer allying with democracies over interests, and right-leaning voters favour putting support for the UK’s national interests more at the forefront.[4] The Brexit-divide is also present, as members of the public who oppose Brexit lean more towards favouring alliances with fellow democracies. There is also somewhat of a generational divide, with younger voters taking a more idealistic standpoint of allying with a democracy, even if does not usually support British interests.  When the trade-off between national interests and promoting democracy and human rights is presented more generally, we find similar trends.[5] The overall mean leans more towards protecting national interests than the alliance item discussed above, but remains in the centre ground. Left wing voters are more likely to take a more idealistic stance than centrists and members of the public who identify ideologically with the right (particularly the far right, who lean more towards the national interest side of the scale here than in the item discussed above). Brexit supporters privilege national interests. We observe the same generational divide as in the item above, but the differences between younger and older generations are even more pronounced here. Commentary The British public has clear ideas about the type of roles they believe the UK military should take on. At a time in which the national security and defence sector is being reviewed and faces the prospect of significant reforms, it is important to consider there is no public appetite for a reduction in the scope of military activities. The public sees important roles for the British military – and, at least in the abstract, these extend beyond protecting Britain and the British. Not surprisingly, there is wide-spread support for maintaining traditional defensive capacities such as combating terrorism. What may be surprising to some is that there is also support for using the military to prevent humanitarian crises or to stop ethnic cleansing. Support for idealism in foreign policy is also seen when examining survey questions that present respondents with explicit trade-offs. Relatively small portions of the public fully embrace a foreign policy based solely on interests at the expense of supporting democracy or human rights. At the same time, interests remain a powerful consideration. The degree of consensus across the political spectrum is high enough to be considered what political scientists refer to as ‘valence’ issues. Valence issues are common consensual goals that nearly all of the public agrees with—such as a clean environment, or quality roads. However, we also find evidence that suggests such issues may become politicised in the British context and become ‘positional’ issues where different political parties or segments of the population take opposing sides. Examples include whether abortion should be legal or whether the UK’s asylum system should be more or less restrictive. Preliminary evidence suggests this might be the case when human rights are mentioned as a broad category, instead of as something more specific like acting to stop ethnic cleansing.[6] Often, policies once considered valence issues become positional when politicians ‘fill in the blanks’ and trade-offs become visible to the public or when issues become associated with specific parties and politicians so that they are seen via a partisan lens. Centre-left candidates and parties particularly are vulnerable to this phenomena—examples include the generally pro-environmental Canadian public rejecting the Liberal Party in 2008 when it proposed to replace existing taxes with carbon taxes. [7] In the UK context, we find the public considers trade-offs when weighing pursuing the national interest against more idealistic objectives. Right-leaning and older voters in particular are more predisposed to factor the national interest when considering what foreign policy options the UK should pursue. It is possible that thinking in terms of such trade-offs might increase the likelihood of supporting aligning aid provision to broader national strategic interests (which has been suggested as being part of the rationale for DFID being subsumed by the FCO). Dr Catarina P. Thomson is Senior Lecturer in Security and Strategic Studies in the Politics Department of the University of Exeter. Her background is in clinical psychology and international relations. Her recent work compares the foreign policy attitudes of security elites and the general public in the UK, Europe, and the United States. Her work has been funded by the American National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Defense's Minerva Research Initiative, and the Economic and Social Research Council among others.Prof Thomas J. Scotto is Dean of Learning and Teaching and Professor of Politics in the College of Social Sciences at the University of Glasgow.  His work analysing British and comparative public opinion on foreign policy matters appears in peer reviewed outlets such as International Studies Quarterly, the European Journal of Political Research and Political Behaviour.Prof Jason Reifler is Professor of Political Science at the University of Exeter. Prof Reifler has published over 40 peer-reviewed articles on topics such as public opinion about foreign policy, factual beliefs and misperceptions, and attitudes towards vaccines. He is PI on the ERC funded project DEBUNKER. He moved to the UK in 2013. He supports Tottenham Hotspur. Image by DFID under (CC). [1] Further information on the data can be obtained from contacting Thomas Scotto on thomas.scotto@glasgow.ac.uk.[2] Malcolm Chalmers, Farewell Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Welcome Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.RUSI Commentary, June 2020,https://www.rusi.org/commentary/farewell-foreign-and-commonwealth-office-welcome-foreign-commonwealth-and-development[3] The item asked was: “Some people think that in the long term, a dictatorship that usually supports UK interests serves as a better ally for the United Kingdom than a democracy that usually does not support UK interests. Where would you place yourself on this scale?” (scale ranged from 0 – “A dictator that usually supports UK interests” to 10 – “A democracy that usually does not support UK interests”).[4] Survey respondents were told: “People sometimes use the labels 'left' or 'left wing' and 'right' or 'right wing' to describe political parties, party leaders, and political ideas. Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means left and the end marked 10 means right, where would you place yourself on this scale?” Respondents were categorised by response as follows: 0-1: “Far Left”; 2-3: “Left”; 4-6: “Centrist”; 7-8: “Right”; 9-10: “Far Right”.[5] The item asked was: “Some people think that in making foreign policy decisions a more important priority should be protecting UK interests while others believe promoting democracy and human rights should be prioritised. Where would you place yourself on this scale?” (scale ranged from 0 – “Protecting UK interests should receive priority” to 10 – “Promoting democracy and human rights should receive priority”).[6] For a detailed discussion of these two issue types, see Chapter 2 in Clarke, Harold D., David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart, and Paul Whiteley. 2004. Political Choice in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[7] See, Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan, eds. 2009. The Canadian Federal Election of 2008. Toronto: Dundurn Press. [post_title] => Seeing ‘I’ to ‘I’: British support for idealism and interest-based approaches to foreign policy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => seeing-i-to-i-british-support-for-idealism-and-interest-based-approaches-to-foreign-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:37:20 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:37:20 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4948 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[31] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4944 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-09-08 09:02:46 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-08 08:02:46 [post_content] => The maintenance and enhancement of the international rules-based system (IRBS) has been an essential British interest in the 75 years since the end of the Second World War. Having contributed significantly to its construction throughout this period, the UK has been able to secure for itself a position enabling it to punch above its weight internationally. Indeed, the importance of the IRBS to the UK has only increased in a period marked by its own relative decline in power as it withdrew from empire and the era of superpower rivalry began. As a middle-rank power with ambitions to maintain global reach, the UK today still possesses the capacity to exercise significant international influence, not least through its membership of key international institutions such as the UN Security Council. However, much of this is dependent on the maintenance and integrity of the system - i.e. it derives from the willingness of other states to remain involved in and committed to the IRBS. A rise in nationalism globally, a greater willingness by some states to act unilaterally, notably the US, and the determination of ‘new’ or revisionist powers such as China and Russia to challenge or re-make international structures of governance mean the IRBS that has served the UK so well is more fragile today than at any point since 1945.^[1] The UK has itself contributed to this sense of instability with its withdrawal from the EU and its difficulties in identifying a clear post-Brexit pathway for its foreign policy and diplomacy. This contribution argues, therefore, that the UK should place a renewed commitment to the efficient, effective and fair functioning of the IRBS at the heart of its post-Brexit foreign policy. This should be accompanied by a clear and unambiguous effort to provide necessary and appropriate international leadership. By doing so it can limit the risk that others see British withdrawal from the EU as part of a broader strategic retreat whilst at the same time buttressing the legitimacy of institutions that remain so vital to the UK’s ability to protect and promote its national interests. What is the International Rules-Based System?The IRBS has evolved as a means of developing - to the extent possible - predictability and stability between states as sovereign actors.^[2] At a basic level it can be understood as encompassing three main components: (i) formal structures and institutions - e.g. the UN, IMF, WTO, etc. - and also regional organisations such as the EU, ASEAN and NATO; (ii) rules, treaties and international law - e.g. the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,^[3] the UN Refugee Convention,^[4] or the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);^[5] and (iii) the norms and values that have developed around and through these - e.g. support and promotion of democracy, equality, and human rights. Many of these were deliberately established and/or have evolved primarily since the end of the Second World War as a means of managing and regulating how states interact. Tensions and disagreements are common, frequently occurring in the interpretation and contestation of norms and values. This can be seen, for example, in the contrast between states’ formal representation and participation in particular organisations on the one hand; and their attitudes to the norms and values that such participation implies on the other. A state may notionally accept the norms and values a particular organisation represents, but strongly reject specific criticism of - or attempts to restrict - its own actions. It may contest the validity of certain norms and values, particularly where it is accused of violating these. A recent example is the controversy surrounding the 2015 appointment of Saudi Arabia’s UN Ambassador in Geneva to chair an independent panel of experts on the UN’s Human Rights Council, with some arguing that Saudi Arabia’s human rights record made it inappropriate for it to hold such a post.^[6] Such tensions illustrate Prof Malcolm Chalmers’ argument that rather than a single IRBS, we can in fact identify three separate but interacting systems: a Universal Security System, a Universal Economic System and a Western-based system, the latter led for much of the last 75 years by the US and promoting a very particular normative perspective.^[7] The effectiveness of these systems in managing and mediating interactions between states - and the tensions caused by these - reflects the reality that their ‘worth depends on the extent to which they serve the interests and values of the states which sustain them’.^[8] Thus, in the absence of any kind of ‘world government’, the IRBS functions only to the extent that states accept its legitimacy and have confidence in it. For example, the WTO’s dispute resolution system has effectively collapsed this year due to the ongoing refusal of the US to agree the appointment of new judges to its Appellate Body. The view of the current US Administration is that the WTO does not serve US interests.^[9] In response, however, a group of WTO members led by the EU have established an alternative ‘multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement’ to enable participating states to ‘solve trade disputes amongst themselves’, thereby reflecting their own belief in the value of maintaining the system in some form or other.^[10] For the purposes of this contribution, the IRBS is discussed as a single entity. However, although space precludes a more detailed discussion of Chalmers’ argument, it does serve to highlight very effectively the complexity inherent in, and ever-changing nature of, the IRBS. Most importantly, it reminds us of the challenges the UK faces in how it engages with and navigates a system characterised by multiple levels and actors, and the potential fragility of the governance structures created to facilitate this. What approach should the UK take to the IRBS post-Brexit?How, then, should the UK approach the IRBS and what place should it occupy in the thinking underpinning its post-Brexit foreign policy? First, we must note the important role the UK itself has played in constructing and supporting the IRBS, particularly the key multilateral institutions established after the Second World War including the UN, IMF, NATO and more recently the EU. Support for multilateralism and the maintenance of the IRBS has therefore been part of the DNA of UK foreign policy for decades with this commitment expressed in its economic, trade, defence, development and security policies as well as in its diplomacy. In turn, the IRBS has been crucial in ensuring the UK’s ongoing international influence and relevance, and thus its capacity to protect, promote and pursue its national interests. We can see this in the strong support the UK received - especially from its European partners - following the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982; and in the broad levels of international solidarity shown following the poisoning of the Skripals in Salisbury by Russian state actors in 2018, which resulted in the expulsion of more than 150 Russian diplomats by 29 countries and organisations. Second, if the UK is to continue to benefit from the IRBS, its legitimacy must be maintained. This requires other states - and especially the major global powers - to remain invested in it and continue to see its benefits. Here, a brief consideration of the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme is instructive. In a united diplomatic approach, the UK, France and Germany as the ‘E3’ established a diplomatic process to persuade Iran to cease nuclear enrichment and allow IAEA to monitor the development of its nuclear programme. After more than a decade of at times tortuous negotiations, and with the diplomatic process expanded to include the US, China and Russia (the other permanent UN Security Council members), as well as the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, agreement was finally reached in 2015 on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). For all its faults, the JCPOA was a significant diplomatic achievement - at stake, after all, was the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime established under the NPT, a key component of global security governance. Despite the Trump Administration’s 2018 decision to withdraw the US from the JCPOA, the UK has maintained its commitment to the agreement - and thereby to ensuring that not only Iran but also China and Russia remain bound into it.^[11] This was reiterated in a recent statement by the E3 in response to US attempts to reinstate sanctions on Iran: ‘The E3 are committed to preserving the processes and institutions which constitute the foundation of multilateralism. We remain guided by the objective of upholding the authority and integrity of the United Nations Security Council’.^[12] This example demonstrates the importance of constant engagement if the IRBS is to be sustained and the need to work closely with partners - even where, in the case of Russia, relations may be extremely difficult - if the benefits of cooperation and collective rule-making are to be achieved. It is clear, therefore, that the maintenance of the IRBS is in and of itself a core British interest - a point recognised by the previous May government, which declared: ‘The [IRBS] matters hugely to the UK. Strengthening this system, with the UN at its heart, is a key priority of British diplomacy. It enables global cooperation through which we seek to address international security and economic challenges, and also protects our values’.^[13] It should therefore sit at the heart of the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy. The ongoing Integrated Review process - examining at all aspects of UK foreign policy - provides a perfect, perhaps once-in-a-generation opportunity to do this. The lack of a comprehensive, strategic vision as to what that foreign policy entails remains problematic. Presented as ‘Global Britain’, to date its rhetorical ambition has not been matched by real clarity or practical detail. For example, statements such as ‘Global Britain will be a force for good and an energetic champion of free trade as it pursues closer ties with international partners and embarks on a new role in the world’ reveal little about the underlying strategy for how this will be achieved.^[14] A focus on the IRBS provides a means for the UK to fill this intellectual and policy gap. A clear and unambiguous statement of its ongoing commitment to and championing of the IRBS, backed up by a set of concrete actions it will undertake in support - for example, a willingness to take a greater leadership role in supporting the UN’s security and peacekeeping functions - will achieve a number of important objectives. First, it will send an important signal to the international community of the UK’s determination to remain proactive, thereby rejecting any suggestion of a retreat into post-Brexit isolationism. Second, it will provide a clear organisational logic and focal point for policy-makers. The IRBS encompasses both the norms and values that the government currently seeks to promote, for example around human rights, and the institutional structures through which it can do this.^[15] This would allow the wide range of diplomatic actions the UK currently undertakes - for example, its increased activity and profile in the UN Security Council and WTO in recent months and its imposition of the first British ‘Magnitsky’ sanctions on individuals for human rights abuses in July this year - to be explicitly linked to a broader strategy and narrative of international engagement rooted in the exercise of responsible power. ConclusionThis year the COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated both the importance and fragility of the multilateral system and international cooperation, particularly in the face of unilateral and national(ist) approaches to crisis. In an environment in which great power politics are once again on the increase, the UK’s capacity to act meaningfully and its ability to ensure its international credibility and reputation, will rest in large part on the maintenance of an effective and credible IRBS. As the government seeks to articulate a clear post-Brexit foreign policy vision for the UK, therefore, committing unambiguously in both word and deed to the IRBS must form a central element of its thinking. Doing so will go a long way to answering the key questions of what UK foreign policy is for in the 21st century and what kind of power the UK wishes to be. Recommendations:

• The IRBS remains a crucial element in how the UK engages with the world and protects its interests internationally - placing it front and centre in the Integrated Review process will give the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy a powerful intellectual and organisational foundation.
• A priority for UK foreign policy post-Brexit must be to demonstrate that it is not withdrawing from its international obligations and will remain an active and responsible power - a focus on sustaining and strengthening the IRBS will send a powerful signal of this commitment to the international community.
• Using the IRBS as a focal point for articulating the core values of UK foreign policy, the UK should identify a set of policy priorities focused: on the leadership role it will seek to play at the UN and in other multilateral settings; how it will champion key aspects of the UN’s humanitarian governance and climate change agendas; and how it will fulfil its obligations to promote and enhance international security as a permanent member of the Security Council, NATO member, etc.

 Dr Nicholas Wright researches national and multilateral foreign policy-making at University College London and his work focuses particularly on Britain, Germany and the EU. He has written extensively on the impacts of Brexit on UK foreign policy-making, has provided evidence for a number of parliamentary inquiries and is a regular media contributor nationally and internationally. ^[1] See, for example, Will Moreland, The purpose of multilateralism: A framework for democracies in a geopolitically competitive world, Brookings Institution, September 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-purpose-of-multilateralism/^[2] Wright, Nicholas. 2019. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK: Co-operation, Co-optation and Competition, New Perspectives in German Political Studies. London: Palgrave. p.1^[3] United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, February 2020, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm^[4] UNHCR, The 1951 Refugee Convention, https://www.unhcr.org/uk/1951-refugee-convention.html^[5] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/^[6] Tom Brooks-Pollock, Anger after Saudi Arabia 'chosen to head key UN human rights panel, The Independent, September 2015, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/anger-after-saudi-arabia-chosen-to-head-key-un-human-rights-panel-10509716.html^[7] Malcolm Chalmers, Which Rules? Why There Is No Single ‘Rules-Based International System’. Occasional Paper, Royal United Services Institute, April 2019, https://rusi.org/occasional-papers/Which-Rules-Why-There-Is-No-Single-Rules-Based-International-System^[8] Chalmers, vii^[9] Jennifer Anne Hillman, A Reset of the World Trade Organization's Appellate Body, Council on Foreign Relations, January 2020, https://www.cfr.org/report/reset-world-trade-organizations-appellate-body^[10] Council of the European Union, Council approves a multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement to solve trade disputes, April 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/04/15/council-approves-a-multi-party-interim-appeal-arbitration-arrangement-to-solve-trade-disputes/^[11] See, for example: HMG, EU and UN partnership vital for rules-based international system, March 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-and-un-partnership-vital-for-rules-based-international-system^[12] HMG, E3 Foreign Ministers' Statement on the JCPoA, August 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/e3-foreign-ministers-statement-on-the-jcpoa^[13] HMG, Government Response: UK Foreign Policy in a Shifting World Order, March 2019,  https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/International-Relations-Committee/foreign-policy-in-a-changing-world/Government-Response-UK-Foreign-Policy-in-a-Shifting-World-Order.pdf^[14] HMG, Bold new beginning for Global Britain as Foreign Secretary kicks off Asia-Pacific tour, February 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/bold-new-beginning-for-global-britain?utm_source=ffc14be7-7dc8-4bd3-a3c6-7330f26e2c46&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_content=immediate^[15] HMG, Foreign Secretary's introduction to the Queen’s Speech debate, January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-introduction-to-queens-speech-debate?utm_source=a3595607-43bc-4211-b8a1-a0cb960369db&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_content=immediate [post_title] => The UK and the international rules-based system [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-uk-and-the-international-rules-based-system [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:37:08 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:37:08 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4944 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 1 [filter] => raw )[32] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4939 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-09-08 09:01:28 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-09-08 08:01:28 [post_content] => Of today’s major and emerging crises, the vast majority – including Syria, Yemen, Libya, Myanmar, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Venezuela, and Xinjiang – are driven, at least in part, by the deliberate violent targeting of civilian groups by political elites. Systematic or widespread discrimination against people because of their race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, political affiliation, age, disability or class has not become a challenge of the past but a common phenomenon of our modern world. Identity-based violence occurs in some form or another in all societies and as such, its prevention is something needed everywhere all of the time.[1] When a state fails to protect populations within its own borders from mass atrocity crimes, the responsibility to safeguard groups at risk falls to the international community. The responsibility is at its heart a collective one and as with effective strategies for tackling other global challenges such as the climate crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic, the prevention of atrocities requires the efforts of many. It also requires states to adopt the means of upholding in its national policy those collective commitments – but unlike other member states the UK risks falling behind in its contributions. When we talk about preventing mass atrocities (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing), it is crucial to measure expectations of what outside states can do. At the same time, meeting the raised expectations on and of the international community that reflect our increasingly interconnected world demands an honest look at the gaps that exist between assurances made on the global stage to prevent crises and protect people and how states like the UK implement and integrate those commitments through their national policy. This paper sets out the growing need for the UK government to confront past failures to prevent atrocities, from Bosnia to Iraq to Syria, and embed the principles of prevention and collective responsibility through a clear, capable strategy of atrocity prevention into the heart of British policy. Whatever the outcome of the Integrated Review and new national security strategy, the UK will need the capabilities and systems to meet the projected increase in identity-based violence, which if left unchecked will emerge as one of the defining crises of the next political era. As COVID-19’s economic and political consequences deepen, climate events become more common, and democratic trends continue to move away from broad-based party politics towards exclusionary alliances, widespread and systematic identity-based violence, including mass atrocities, will become increasingly frequent. The same nexus will drive large-scale population movements, which will continue to drive exclusionary populism in developed and developing democracies. While not a new challenge, the global incidence of mass atrocity crimes have been rising since 2011.[2] Now COVID-19 and its consequences risks a new protracted escalation.[3] Already, the majority of today’s refugees have fled situations of atrocity while the majority of internally displaced people have been uprooted by consequences of climate change; in 2019, nearly 2,000 natural disasters triggered 24.9 million new displacements.[4] As a state which aspires to global leadership, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and in the interests of a secure nation, Britain can do more to confront this rising challenge. It must do more to narrow the gaps between the commitments it has made on the global stage on this agenda and their practical implementations. This is a position shared by the British public. Expectations of the electorate continue to move towards the belief that the UK should stand up for the vulnerable abroad (87.4 per cent) and tackle ‘the root causes of migration, violence and instability’ (86.7 per cent).[5] 66 per cent believe it is important that Britain help protect people in other countries from atrocities such as genocide and ethnic cleansing.[6] All states must shoulder the burdens of preventing such atrocities and of protecting people from violent discrimination but the collective nature of these responsibilities does not dilute the function of the state as means of fulfilling shared obligations; it underscores it. Secretary General Guterres called in 2017 for member states to integrate atrocity prevention into national policy processes in order to, among other activities, ‘conduct their own atrocity crimes risk assessment, identifying any protection gaps and recommending steps to close them.’[7] And yet despite growing support from ministers, parliament, atrocity prevention experts, wider civil society and the public, the UK still lacks any kind of coordinating mechanism or national strategy of atrocity prevention. Following the ethnic cleansing and genocide of Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine province in late summer 2017, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee asked the Foreign Office to ‘set out what lessons it ha[d] learned regarding atrocity prevention from these events and how these lessons will be applied in Burma and elsewhere in future.’[8] A year later, reflecting upon the UK’s failures in Syria as well as Myanmar, the Committee called upon the government to ‘act urgently to produce a comprehensive atrocity prevention strategy and implementation plan to ensure it moves beyond words and towards concrete actions.’[9] The Committee recommended that a draft of this strategy should be available for consultation by April 2019. Notwithstanding some important if modest steps in the right direction, no such strategy has yet emerged.[10] The terms of reference of the Integrated Review identifies ‘increasing instability and challenges to global governance’, acknowledging that ‘2019 recorded the highest number of state-based conflicts since 1946 and, over the last ten years, more than half the world’s population lived in direct contact with, or proximity to, significant political violence.’ Cabinet Office projects that by 2030, 80 per cent of the world's extreme poor will live in fragile states. This review must acknowledge that current approaches to conflict, stability and development where they focus too much on firefighting and not enough on prevention are not working. Recent attention upon the atrocities in Xinjiang and growing debate of what more the UK can do – or should have already done – has once again exposed that the absence of such a strategy contributed to delayed, inconsistent, and ad hoc policy responses to another well-documented and ongoing pattern of widespread systemic discrimination and violence that likely meets the threshold of genocide.[11] Without such a strategy – without applying a framework of how to help prevent future atrocities to the human rights crisis in Xinjiang, Myanmar, Syria, Cameroon or Venezuela – it is too easy to miss opportunities to influence and mitigate.  Once the point of violence has been reached, entry points diminish and lives have already been lost but a joined-up strategy will always help map out UK policy options and provide a process for decision-making. An atrocity prevention strategy, rooted in a commitment to view policy choices from the perspective of making violence less likely, would help encourage more fluid policymaking better able to handle many of the current and future global catastrophic risks the Integrated Review seeks to address  – be they unexpected ‘unknown unknowns’ such as the coronavirus pandemic, or expected challenges such as climate change. For example, a warmer world will change every aspect of how we live our lives, but it is in the fields of atrocity and conflict prevention that we will likely see the first and most explosive consequences. It is no coincidence that one of the largest and most dangerous regions of fragility at the moment is the Sahel area bordering upon the Sahara desert. Multiple conflicts and atrocity risks  in the region, including those such as Mali or Sudan where the UK has a significant investment, have a climate component.[12] Introducing a national strategy of atrocity prevention would significantly strengthen UK Government capacity to uphold various responsibilities and commitments it has already made to protect populations from mass atrocities and as articulated in the 2005 World Summit declaration and set out in the 1948 UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.[13] It would enhance UK capabilities to fulfil existing priorities such as the prevention of sexual violence in conflict, modern slavery, organised and serious crime, the protection religious freedom and belief, and of civilians in conflict. Any such strategy would need to seek do three things: 

1. Improve communication

UK missions play a key role in identifying early warning signs of mass atrocities and, in coordination with Whitehall and their local partners, devising policy options to respond. Interviews with former and current FCO and DFID staff in Myanmar and the Democratic Republic of Congo have highlighted gaps that exist between UK officials in the field and Whitehall, which mean that the urgency felt by on-the-ground personnel can be lost as the information is passed up through the bureaucracy to Ministers rather than through a distinct alert channel.[14] Introducing a light-touch internal model of emergency communication, accompanied by clear resources such as checklists and rapid analysis frameworks, would facilitate missions to ‘raise the red flag’ to colleagues back home, clarify tools and strategies already available, and improve joined-up communications during periods of exceptional challenge. Establishing an internal communications process would set out how to monitor imminent warning signs, triggering moments, indicators and risk factors; as well as when and how to raise the alarm – both across government and externally – and provide guidance for officials and ministers on policy options.  

2. Integrate a means of prevention analysis

Whether by establishing a crosscutting analysis unit or integrating country specific frameworks, embedding the prevention systems and capabilities across government would facilitate intelligence collection and collation. It would enable HMG to conduct risk assessments of UK exposure to the possibility of complicity, undertake scenario planning, engage allies and partners, and develop the capacity to deploy civilian advisors to situations of concern. Prevention analysis is relatively low cost and should not be burdensome, although is strengthened when connected with the intelligence services. [15]Any uplift in the UK’s current capacities would be an asset. Multiple foreign policy errors can be traced back to the absence of a coherent means of analysis focussed on the dynamics of identity-based violence and mass atrocity. No assessment of the atrocity risks were carried out by the UK government prior to its participation in NATO action in Libya, nor was there any obvious existing internal mechanism that would have been responsible for such scenario planning, precisely because the UK’s disconnected approach to conflict prevention and development. Rather than be seen as a time consuming impediment in periods of urgent crisis such analysis need to become integral to the decision-making process. This gap in the UK’s horizon scanning capabilities meant the cross-government Stabilisation Unit failed to include the Central African Republic in its 2013 risk analysis – despite it being a state extremely prone to atrocity crimes. By December that year, ‘widespread and systematic mass atrocity crimes, including killings on the basis of religious identity, had become a feature of a crisis that was rapidly expanding in scale and scope.’[16] 

3. Institutionalise the UK’s commitment to prevent atrocities

‘Establishing an atrocity prevention “seat” at the policy-making table’ would help maximise and coordinate contributions towards effective prediction and prevention across Government.[17] This could take the form of the crosscutting prevention analysis unit or be situated in a better resourced office supporting the focal point for Responsibility to Protect, a position currently occupied by the Head of the Multilateral Directorate in the Foreign Office. In reimagining the bureaucratic architecture of FCO and DFID, the Prime Minister and the new FCDO leadership have an opportunity to ensure UK staff tasked with designing and implementing policy that contributes to fulfilling Britain’s responsibilities to help prevent mass atrocities are able to draw upon the full breadth of the government’s tools and expertise. With identity-based violence rising worldwide, including in many northern democracies, and with indicators of deeper, long-lasting division worsening across Europe and elsewhere, it has become necessary for states such as the UK to also focus on prevention at home in order to protect their populations, including their migrant populations. The UK also needs to get better at prosecuting suspects of international crimes in its domestic courts and safeguarding its banking system from dirty money. Whether situated in the FCDO or Cabinet Office, such a coordinating office would therefore want to bring in departments such as the Home Office and the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government, the MoJ and the Treasury. At its most simple, the principles and practice of atrocity prevention need to be consciously integrated into job descriptions, job titles, and training of staff so that a prevention-first way of thinking is fully institutionalised across government. The moment to do moreOutgoing Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, said as he stepped down from the role in August this year: ‘no society is immune from atrocity crimes and their risk factors, and my conviction that the earlier and the deeper the seeds of atrocity crimes prevention are sowed, the better and more sustainable they will bear fruits.’[18] The COVID-19 pandemic should underline this truism. Prevention does not necessarily require large resources but foregrounds a different way of thinking and making decisions. When the US Atrocities Prevention Board was first established under the Obama administration it was referred to as a mandate without a budget; done well, atrocity prevention should save money as well as lives.[19] Successful implementation of atrocity prevention requires consistent and constant effort but it works. A recent study projects that ‘a 25% increase in effectiveness of conflict prevention would result in 10 more countries at peace by 2030, 109,000 fewer fatalities over the next decade and savings of over $3.1 trillion.’[20] A 75 per cent improvement in prevention ‘would result in 23 more countries at peace by 2030, resulting in 291,000 lives saved over the next decade and $9.8 trillion in savings.’[21] Programmatic efforts need to be matched by investment in the British diplomatic corps, recognising that without the diplomatic toolbox, whether cosy or coercive, on-the-ground activity will always have limits. Prevention, whether of climate change or mass atrocities, requires a holistic approach that begins in the communities most affected but promotes system changes up to the highest level. Doing more to help prevent mass atrocities should not be a contentious agenda. Successive UK governments have reiterated their commitment to the goal. For those concerned with Britain’s declining global influence, atrocity prevention has been identified as a specific contribution capable of ‘demonstrating the value of the United Kingdom in international forums.’[22] Following its 2018 inquiry into the UK’s Responsibility to Protect, the Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that ‘[e]verything we have heard as part of this inquiry has strengthened our belief that an atrocity prevention strategy is now more vital than ever.’ In October that year, then Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt committed to ‘doing more’ on atrocity prevention.’[23] During the 2019 general election, all major political parties committed to doing more to prioritise UK contributions to atrocity prevention and Policy Exchange listed an atrocity prevention strategy as one of its eight priorities for the incoming Foreign Secretary.[24] These calls are backed by a growing coalition of organisations drawn from all corners of the UK civil society.[25] The UK deserves an international policy capable of predicting and preventing crises as well as responding to them, fit to meet challenges it cannot yet foresee as well as those it can. A prevention-first approach to policy thinking saves lives, money and political capital. It should be a no brainer but finding time for prevention thinking and resources for prevention implementation is difficult when the government faces increasing and urgent demands. As the Prime Minister undertakes the ‘largest review of UK international policy since the Cold War’ and as Whitehall makes preparations to merge the FCO with DFID, Her Majesty’s Government has created a rare opportunity to assess what the risks of the future could look like; to develop an international and national security strategy in-line with those risks; and to rethink the systems and capabilities that are needed to prepare the UK to meet those challenges. Atrocity crimes represent humanity at its worst, preventing them requires global leadership at its best. This is a calling to which the UK should aspire. The UK must take this rare moment of self-reflection of its international policy to learn from mistakes it made in Myanmar –and before it in Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bosnia, and Rwanda – and embed a national strategy of atrocity prevention in the heart of British policy. Recommendations

• Establish a cross-cutting analysis unit and internal coordination mechanism
• Resource the office of the focal point for the responsibility to protect
• Embed a communication and alert channel connecting embassies with Whitehall and New York
• Mandate atrocity prevention training for embassy and country-desk staff in at-risk states
• Establish an external atrocity prevention advisory group to help bridge the knowledge gap

 Dr Kate Ferguson is a foreign policy expert driving a new approach to preventing identity-based violence in the UK and internationally. In 2014 she co-founded Protection Approaches where she is Co-Executive Director and which works with communities, civil society and governments to transform how identity-based violence is understood and prevented. In 2017 Protection Approaches established and now convenes the UK Atrocity Prevention Working Group, a network of some 25 NGOs, research institutions and experts. Kate is Chair of Policy at the European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Honorary Research Fellow at the University of East Anglia. Her book Architectures of Violence: The Command Structures of Modern Atrocities will be published by Hurst and Oxford University Press later this year. She tweets @WordsAreDeeds. Acknowledgements: I’m grateful for comments from Fred Carver, Nicole Piché, Alex Bellamy and Adam Hug. Mistakes are all my own. Image by DFID under (CC).  [1] Protection Approaches, Identity-based violence: our definition, https://protectionapproaches.org/identity-based-violence[2] UN News Centre, Interview: Amid increasing suffering, responsibility to protect all the more necessary – UN Special Advisor, March 2017, https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/03/553972-interview-amid-increased-suffering-responsibility-protect-all-more-necessary; For a statistical overview of recent trends, see Erik Melander, Organized Violence in the World 2015, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, January 2015, http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:899397/FULLTEXT01.pdf[3] Kate Ferguson, Atrocity prevention and COVID-19: Opportunities and Responsibilities, Briefing paper, Protection Approaches, April 2020, https://protectionapproaches.org/ap-and-covid; ACLED data, https://acleddata.com/#/dashboard[4] The top six countries of origin for those granted refugee status in the UK in 1919 were Syria, Iran, Eritrea, Sudan, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, House of Commons Library, “Migration statistics: How many asylum seekers and refugees are there in the UK?”, March 2019, available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/insights/migration-statistics-how-many-asylum-seekers-and-refugees-are-there-in-the-uk/. UNHCR currently estimates that 45.7 million are internally displaced. https://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html; see also UNHCR, COVID-19, Displacement and Climate Change, June 2020 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20COVID-19%20Displacement%20and%20Climate%20Change%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20June%202020.pdf[5] Attest and Protection Approaches, ‘British society - How do you feel? 2019’, social attitude survey, January 2019[6] Ibid.[7] Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention, General Assembly Security Council, August 2017, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/2017%20SG%20report%20on%20RtoP%20Advanced%20copy.pdf[8] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Violence in Rakhine State and the UK’s response, December 2017, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/435/435.pdf[9] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, A comprehensive atrocity prevention strategy more vital than ever, says MPs, September 2018, https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/news-parliament-2017/responsibility-to-protect-report-published-17-19/[10] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK Approach to Preventing Mass Atrocities, 16 July 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-approach-to-preventing-mass-atrocities/uk-approach-to-preventing-mass-atrocities  [11] Kate Ferguson, What Can the UK do to Help Protect the Uyghurs? Adopt a National Strategy of Atrocity Prevention, ECR2P, August 2020, https://ecr2p.leeds.ac.uk/what-can-the-uk-do-to-help-protect-the-uyghurs-adopt-a-national-strategy-of-atrocity-prevention/[12] Fred Carver, As the Sahel becomes Sahara, UNA-UK Climate 2020, September 2017, https://www.climate2020.org.uk/sahel-becomes-sahara/[13] UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 24 October 2005, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf; UN General Assembly, Prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, 9 December 1948, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf[14] Kate Ferguson, ‘For the wind is in the palm-trees: The 2017 Rohingya atrocities and the UK approach to prevention’, Global Responsibility to Protect, forthcoming 2021; Alexandra Buskie, ‘Strengthening the UK’s approach to atrocity prevention in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Protection Approaches, forthcoming 2020.[15] Stephen Pomper, Atrocity Prevention Under the Obama Administration, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, February 2018, https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Stephen_Pomper_Report_02-2018.pdf[16] Evan Cinq-Mars, Too little, too late, Failing to prevent atrocities in the Central African Republic, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, September 2015, https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/too-little-too-late-failing-to-prevent-atrocities-in-the-central-african-republic/[17] Alex J. Bellamy, Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the Responsibility to Prevent, The Stanley Centre, February 2011, https://stanleycenter.org/publications/pab/BellamyPAB22011.pdf. See also Wilton Park, “Prevention of mass atrocities (WP1645)”, October 2018, Available at https://protectionapproaches.org/wiltonparkreport[18] UN News, Profile: Taking a lead against genocide ‘no society is immune’ warns Adama Dieng, August 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/08/1070402[19] Alex J. Bellamy, Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the Responsibility to Prevent, The Stanley Centre, February 2011, https://stanleycenter.org/publications/pab/BellamyPAB22011.pdf[20] Pathfinders, Forecasting the dividends of conflict prevention from 2020-2030, July 2020, https://530cfd94-d934-468b-a1c7-c67a84734064.filesusr.com/ugd/6c192f_e252b926005c47c39a815cf6da0c3086.pdf[21] Ibid.[22] Jess Gifkins, Samuel Jarvis and Jason Ralph, Global Britain in the United Nations, UNA-UK, February 2019, https://www.una.org.uk/sites/default/files/UNA-UK_GlobalBritain_20190207d.pdf[23] “An Invisible Chain”: Foreign Secretary speaks on Britain’s place in the world at Policy Exchange, Policy Exchange, Oct 31^st 2018, https://policyexchange.org.uk/pxevents/keynote-speech/[24] Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange, 8 ideas for revitalising UK foreign policy for the post-Brexit age, Policy Exchange, July 2019, https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Britain-in-the-World.pdf; Protection Approaches working group page, https://protectionapproaches.org/ap-working-group, and Protection Approaches’ Manifesto Review, April 2015, https://protectionapproaches.org/news/f/protection-approaches-manifesto-review[25]Integrating atrocity prevention across UK policy: The need for a national strategy. Submission to the Integrated Review of International Policy from the UK Atrocity Prevention Working Group, August 2020 https://protectionapproaches.org/news/f/submission-to-the-integrated-review-of-uk-international-policy [post_title] => Putting atrocity prevention at the heart of British foreign policy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => putting-atrocity-prevention-at-the-heart-of-british-foreign-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:36:39 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:36:39 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4939 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 6 [filter] => raw )[33] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4917 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-08-21 09:30:14 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-08-21 08:30:14 [post_content] => А вот и армейская машина с огромным громкоговорителем, похожим на советскую реликвию, выкрикивая всем известные карантинные указания, типа «Оставайтесь дома. Выходите только по необходимости. Берегите себя», - чтобы сообщество соблюдало и повиновалось. Наверху автомобиля находится солдат, который, судя по всему, делает вид, что защищает громкоговоритель своим оружием, пока он издает какую-то адскую какофонию объявлений и патриотической музыки, вы закрываете уши, дабы не оглохнуть от его ужасного звука. В Узбекистане, где «мирное небо» - это почти священная фраза, часто используемая Каримовым для оправдания спокойствия и стабильности своего режима, народу велено вести себя мирно и не нарушать стабильность.[1]  Этот призыв к миролюбию и покорности усилился во время блокировки. Армии Узбекистана нечем заняться, кроме как разъезжать по городу, распространяя эти нелепые призывы. Текст песни, который следует за объявлениями, звучит: «Мы посвятим себя (или принесем себя в жертву) тебе, Узбекистан, мы никому не отдадим тебя, Узбекистан...» (словно существует угроза нападения) популярной певицы Каримовских времен, Юлдуз Усмановой. Вот в таком виде бойцы Национальной гвардии стоят с оружием в руках на перекрытых дорогах.  Глупость и абсурдность ситуации напоминает Летающий цирк Монти Пайтона, но поскольку Узбекистан известен как псевдо-полицейское государство, ситуация не является эпизодом Монти Пайтона. Моменты кризиса - это, пожалуй, лучшая возможность проверить эффективность работы правительств. Это также лакмусовая бумажка для проверки политической позиции государства, будет ли оно бороться с кризисом на демократической основе, с сопереживанием и уважением к собственному народу, или же оно будет форсировать авторитарную тактику, навязывая ограничения, основанные на мнимых правилах. Похоже, что правительство Узбекистана вначале хорошо справлялось с пандемией. Прошло почти пять месяцев с тех пор, как правительство ввело «самоизоляцию», в соответствии с которой людям старше 65 лет запрещалось выходить из дома и разрешалось другим людям выходить из дома только в ближайшие аптеки или магазины.[2] Система здравоохранения страны не смогла вместить в больницах растущее число инфицированных или проводить тесты на КОВИД-19, однако государство пытается скрыть свою неспособность справиться с кризисом с помощью искаженной статистики и заниженной отчетности. И логика, и математика не дают оснований считать действительным то, что число случаев составляет 33 323, а число смертей - всего 216.[3] Эту выдумку поддерживают национальные телеканалы, которые продолжают фокусировать свои репортажи на количестве выздоровевших пациентов. Узбекское правительство претендует на эмоциональную зрелость для восприятия независимой критики и готовность к откровенному диалогу со своим народом, а затем продолжает преследовать блогеров, выражающих независимое мнение по актуальным вопросам.[4] Истинный облик нового правления, однако, начал проявляться вскоре после провозглашения 2017 года «годом диалога с народом». Этим оно начало развязывать язык средствам массовой информации, чьи уста были долгое время заткнуты, открывать двери в соседние страны и в мир и освобождать некоторых политических заключенных. Однако выяснилось, что идея правительства, готового к переменам, является всего лишь частью фасада неаутентичного образа прогрессивной страны. Обещанный «диалог с народом» не состоялся. До сих пор свобода прессы трепещет и запугана. Маски «реформаторов» так называемого «нового Узбекистана» уже отпали, и истинное лицо власти обнажило всю его чудовищность. Термин «принудительный» сопровождает многие фразы в Узбекистане. Принудительный труд, принудительный «хашар» (общественная работа), принудительное выселение (что законодательно не признается проблемой), принудительная «самоизоляция.»[5] Это лишь указывает на принудительный характер авторитарного государства, основной смысл существования которого заключается в поддержании стабильности режима с помощью силы, а не в защите благосостояния и свобод граждан. Правительство с апреля ввело правила «самоизоляции». Оно отказалось от «чрезвычайного положения», при котором определенные обязанности по обеспечению основных социально-экономических потребностей населения, насильно отправленного на самоизоляцию, были бы возложены на него.[6] Как и в обычных полицейских государствах, власть военных демонстрируется путем применения силы во время такого кризиса, как этот, сея страх среди тех, в ком нарастает гнев. Государство демонстрирует свою военную мощь, передвигаясь в городах, в то время как раздраженные люди, находясь в вынужденной изоляции, наблюдают за ними. Патрули полиции и подразделения Национальной гвардии вышли на улицы городов и начали задерживать граждан и собирать с них штрафы за нарушение воображаемых правил карантина. Термин «самоизоляция», идентичный термину «карантин», не существует в национальном законодательстве, но используется в качестве основы для введения ограничений.[7] Понятие карантина, однако, существует в указе президента о мерах по смягчению последствий пандемии для экономического сектора.[8] Уставшая от скуки, полиция, наконец, получила определенные задачи, наказывая, по крайней мере, одного «непослушного» водителя в день и налагая штрафы, чтобы получить больше очков для продвижения по службе. Парадокс заключается в том, что им говорят, что это помогает увеличить поступления в государственный бюджет.[9] Пороки болтливых языков При том, что Узбекистан никогда не был приверженцем свободы самовыражения или независимого мнения, запугивание журналистов и блогеров, критично освещающих вопросы, связанные с пандемией, еще более усилилось. Введение строгих правил о ношении маски относится не только к пандемии. С метафорической точки зрения, это - затыкание ртов, глушение правды, подавление потенциального сопротивления. Те, кто выступает за справедливость, воспринимаются как угроза заветной стабильности под «мирным небом». Независимый журналист Бобомурод Абдуллаев был задержан 9 августа в Бишкеке по запросу узбекского правительства.[10] Абдуллаев писал в прошлом для Информационного агентства «Фергана» и Института по освещению войны и мира (IWPR) под псевдонимом Усмон Хакназар. В сентябре 2017 года он был задержан с обвинениями в публикации статей, направленных на свержение конституционного строя в стране. Во время содержания под стражей Абдуллаев подвергался пыткам и был освобожден в мае 2018 г.[11] Абдуллаев подозревается в написании критических статей под псевдонимом Кора Мерган (Черный снайпер).[12] Как считает организация Human Right Watch, если журналист будет экстрадирован обратно в Узбекистан кыргызскими властями, то пытки для него неизбежны. Местный блогер Миразиз Базаров был вызван в отделение Службы государственной безопасности после того, как написал открытое письмо в адрес МВФ и АБР с просьбой прекратить предоставление кредитов Узбекистану на борьбу с пандемией, так как эти средства, скорее всего, расходуются не на те цели, на которые они предназначались.[13] Узбекистан получил и продолжает получать помощь от этих организаций на борьбу с пандемией.[14] Однако, учитывая повальную коррупцию среди правительственных чиновников, часть помощи списывается, а не направляется на поддержку населения или наращивание потенциала.[15] По сообщениям из нескольких регионов, чиновники Агентства по санитарно-эпидемиологическому благополучию разворовывают средства, выделенные на борьбу с коронавирусом.[16] Министерство финансов пообещало публиковать отчеты о расходах по займам при обращении с запросом. Однако на их сайте отсутствует какая-либо информация, связанная с займами или их использованием. Попытки правительства контролировать мысли и обеззараживать взгляды путем блокирования, фильтрации и ограничения платформ социальных сетей обходятся стране в 1 559 500 долларов США в день и 2 339 250 долларов США из-за ограничения Facebook, Twitter и Instagram, пока страна борется с пандемией.[17] Ограничение свободы самовыражения и свободы средств массовой информации выходит за рамки блокирования интернета. Журналистов допрашивают в связи с освещением вопросов, связанных с пандемией. Поздним вечером 25 июля в Нукусе журналистка Лолагуль Калыханова была доставлена сотрудниками спецслужб в прокуратуру. Телефон и ноутбук Калихановой были конфискованы, и ее попросили дать им доступ к ее ноутбуку. Журналистка была обвинена в размещении ложной информации о предполагаемой смерти председателя Жокаргского совета Республики Каракалпакстан Мусы Ерниязова от коронавирусной болезни. Ерниязов скончался от болезни, связанной с ковидом, через несколько дней после ареста Калихановой.[18] С тех пор были допрошены, по крайней мере, шесть журналистов.[19] Ложные сведения являются незаконными, но, по всей видимости, Калиханова не знала о том, что информация была неверной, и не размещала ее намеренно или умышленно. Тем не менее, это не дает полномочий прокуратуре конфисковать личное оборудование гражданина и получить к нему доступ. Была нарушена неприкосновенность частной жизни и безопасность журналиста. Мир имеет дело с тем же прежним Узбекистаном. Разница в том, что появились более дружелюбные лица и улыбки, говорящие о желании перемен. В отличие от подхода при прежнем диктаторе Каримове, нынешняя власть предпочла прикрыть свою популистскую тактику более дружелюбным лицом. Посредством хорошо организованного пиара и оплаты лоббистов за рубежом такие тираны, как азербайджанский Алиев и самовлюбленный первый президент Казахстана Назарбаев, сумели сохранить свою сомнительную репутацию.[20] Президент -реформатор Узбекистана не является исключением в плане отбеливания своей репутации. На самом деле, он использует большие ресурсы для найма лоббистов и пиарщиков для отбеливания пятен в состоянии прав и свобод человека в стране.[21] Популистская тактика также включает в себя проведение «свободных и справедливых» выборов, публичная ругань или выговор со стороны президента коррумпированным, неэффективным и подхалимствующим чиновникам, а затем их перевод на различные должности без публичного объявления (или сохранение их на своих постах, несмотря на некомпетентность, как в случае с мэрами Ташкента и Ферганы).[22] Примером может служить исполняющий обязанности мэра Самарканда; Талант Эсиргапов был обвинен в подлоге в июне 2019 г. в коррупционном деле, связанном с градостроительной деятельностью, но судебного разбирательства по его делу так и не было проведено. В настоящее время он работает в Агентстве по развитию малого бизнеса и предпринимательства при Министерстве экономики.[23] На первый взгляд, существует «новый», преобразующийся Узбекистан. Затем есть Узбекистан за стеклом и блеском. Позади блеска видно, что это «реформистское» правительство не сдержало свои громкие обещания, которые оно дало в начале пути. Многим стало ясно, что это не тот лидер, за которого они «проголосовали», или которого хотели бы оставить. Даже самые сентиментальные и бьющие в грудь патриоты ругают систему, видя, что власть, которой они так доверяли и за которую болели, удручающе похожа на старую репрессивную систему, что является полным предательством. Власти, оказалось, наплевать на них и на их благополучие. Забота о простых людях никогда не стояла на повестке дня автократов. Тем временем Мирзияев поздравляет диктатора Лукашенко с его «триумфом» на подтасованных выборах, за которым последовали массовые акции протеста, в ходе которых были задержаны тысячи людей и убиты двое.[24] Вряд ли крупномасштабные акции протеста, подобные тем, что имели место в постсоветской Беларуси, произойдут в Узбекистане в ближайшем будущем после кровавой расправы в Андижане в 2005 г., о которой Лукашенко напомнил своему народу.[25] Впрочем, если такое все же произойдет, то следует ожидать, что узбекское правительство отреагирует так же жестоко, как белорусский диктатор, поскольку стабильность режима, а не свободы и благосостояние нации, является основной целью такого рода автократических правителей. Украина и Беларусь, возможно, приблизились к переменам, от которых Узбекистан все еще весьма отдален, поскольку продолжает устранять потенциал для оппозиции или политического плюрализма. Если такие организации, как МВФ, АБР и Всемирный банк, продолжат оказывать помощь стране для поддержания ее криворукого режима, вместо того, чтобы призывать к установлению прозрачности и верховенства закона, маловероятно, что люди в этой стране увидят свет свободы и справедливости в ближайшее время. Photo: by author[1] Islam Karimov, the first president of Uzbekistan (1991-2016)[2] Citizens over 65 years of age strictly forbidden to leave their homes during quarantine, Kun.uz, April 2020, https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/04/01/citizens-over-65-years-of-age-strictly-forbidden-to-leave-their-homes-during-quarantine[3] Coronavirus info, Telegram channel, August 2020, https://t.me/koronavirusinfouz. See also: https://coronavirus.uz/uz[4] The State Security Service was interested in the blogger who called the ADB to stop giving uncontrolled loans to the government of Uzbekistan, Asia Terra, July 2020, http://www.asiaterra.info/news/sgb-zainteresovalos-blogerom-prizvavshim-abr-prekratit-beskontrolnuyu-vydachu-kreditov-vlastyam-uzbekistana[5] Dilmira Matyakubova, The perils of rebuilding Uzbekistan: The rise of glass and glitter, The Foreign Policy Centre, July 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/the-perils-of-rebuilding-uzbekistan-the-rise-of-glass-and-glitter/[6] Editorial, How Uzbekistan deals with the pandemic challenges: lessons for the future, CABAR, July 2020, https://cabar.asia/en/how-uzbekistan-deals-with-the-pandemic-challenges-lessons-for-the-future/[7] Ilkhamov, “Self-isolation” regime – how lawful is it?, Ozodlik, April 2020, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30532690.html[8] Measures to ease the negative effects of the coronavirus pandemic and the global crisis on economic sector, Lex.uz, March 2020, https://lex.uz/ru/docs/-4776265[9] Khurmat Babadjanov and Ozodlik, In Tashkent, traffic police inspectors ordered to detain at least one driver every day for “disobeying” the police, Rus Ozodlik, April 2020, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/30570967.html?fbclid=IwAR3Y-nDJXgrwtzulGwDFcvNQl8YmKfB7ws04yvghVBprS9sg0zwrvPTVcXQQ[10] Kyrgyzstan: Don’t Return Asylum Seeker to Uzbekistan, Human Rights Watch, August 12 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/12/kyrgyzstan-dont-return-asylum-seeker-uzbekistan[11] Journalist Bobomurod Abdullayev released from courtroom (video), Ozodlik, May 2018, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/29213066.html[12] Uzbekistan’s attempt to arrest journalist elicits concern, Eurasianet, August 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistans-attempt-to-arrest-journalist-elicits-concern[13]  Miraziz Bazarov: Open letter to IMF and ADB, July 2020, http://www.asiaterra.info/mneniya/miraziz-bazarov-otkrytoe-pismo-mvf-i-abr. See also: https://www.facebook.com/mbazarov/posts/3147666611956322[14] ADB provides $500 million loan to mitigate health and economic impacts of COVID-19 in Uzbekistan, Tashkent Times, June 2020, https://tashkenttimes.uz/finances/5443-adb-to-provide-us-500-mln-to-uzbekistan-to-mitigate-coronavirus-impact, See also: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/05/18/pr20220-uzbekistan-imf-executive-board-approves-us-375m-disbursement-address-impact-covid19[15] Mahalla officials in Shakhrikhan misappropriated 82 million soums allocated to low-income families, Kun.uz, July 2020, https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/07/23/mahalla-officials-in-shakhrikhan-misappropriated-82-million-soums-allocated-to-low-income-families[16] Tanzila Narbayeva: Funds allocated for the fight against coronavirus are being misappropriated, Kun.uz, August 2020, https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/08/07/tanzila-narbayeva-funds-allocated-for-the-fight-against-coronavirus-are-being-misappropriated[17] Entry of check Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, August 2020, https://netblocks.org/cost/[18] Uzbekistan: Journalists detained for sharing link to news article, Eurasianet, July 2020, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-journalists-detained-for-sharing-link-to-news-article[19] Uzbek authorities interrogate journalists, confiscate equipment over retracted COVID-19 report, Committee to Protect Journalists, July 2020, https://cpj.org/2020/07/uzbek-authorities-interrogate-journalists-confiscate-equipment-over-retracted-covid-19-report/[20] Mark Swenet, ‘Reputation laundering’ is lucrative business for London PR firms, The Guardian, September 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/sep/05/reputation-laundering-is-lucrative-business-for-london-pr-firms[21] Dinara & Co publishing, P.R. agency, Together We Make History, https://dinara.co/. See also: https://rus.azattyq.org/a/30788054.html[22] Shavkat Mirziyoyev reprimands Alisher Shadmanov and Jakhongir Artikhodjayev, Kun.uz, July 2020, https://kun.uz/en/news/2020/07/15/shavkat-mirziyoyev-reprimands-alisher-shadmanov-and-jakhongir-artikhodjayev[23] Against the former acting mayor of Samarkand the criminal case is initiated, Uz.sputninews.ru, June 2019, https://sptnkne.ws/pK4a; A phone conversation with the staff of the agency for Development of Small Business and Entrepreneurship, Ministry of Economy, Tashkent, June 2020.[24] Press-service of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Twitter, August 2020, https://twitter.com/president_uz/status/1292855341600964608; Belarus election: Second Belarus protester dies as UN sounds alarm, BBC News, August  2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53760453[25] For Belarus Leader, a Fading Aura of Invincibility, The New York Times, August 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/world/europe/belarus-Aleksandr-Lukashenko-election.html?searchResultPosition=2 [post_title] => За Блеском: Пандемия и Гражданские Свободы в Узбекистане [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => %d0%b7%d0%b0-%d0%b1%d0%bb%d0%b5%d1%81%d0%ba%d0%be%d0%bc-%d0%bf%d0%b0%d0%bd%d0%b4%d0%b5%d0%bc%d0%b8%d1%8f-%d0%b8-%d0%b3%d1%80%d0%b0%d0%b6%d0%b4%d0%b0%d0%bd%d1%81%d0%ba%d0%b8%d0%b5-%d1%81%d0%b2%d0%be [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-11-24 14:04:12 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-11-24 13:04:12 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4917 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[34] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4898 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-08-04 14:05:52 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-08-04 13:05:52 [post_content] => This new publication shines a spotlight on Uzbekistan and finds that the much talked about reform process is real, but so are the significant holes in it. Please see below essays from the publication that have been translated into Russian:

• Экономические реформы в Узбекистане: достижения, проблемы, перспективы, Автор: Юлий Юсупов

• Пороки перестройки в Узбекистане: Восхождение стекла и блеска, Автор: Дильмира Матякубова

• Реабилитация здесь и сейчас: Обеспечение правосудия переходного периода в Узбекистане, Автор: Стив Свердлов

  [post_title] => Spotlight on Uzbekistan: Russian translations [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => spotlight-on-uzbekistan-russian-translations [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2020-08-04 14:05:52 [post_modified_gmt] => 2020-08-04 13:05:52 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4898 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[35] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4895 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-08-04 10:00:09 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-08-04 09:00:09 [post_content] => Узбекская экономическая модельУзбекистан, как независимое государство, появился на карте мира в 1991 году. В стране начались реформы, которые должны были создать основы для функционирования рыночной экономики. Однако в 1996 году экономический курс был сильно изменен в сторону усиления государственного вмешательства в экономику и политики импортозамещения. Государство с целью ускорения индустриального развития перераспределяло огромные потоки материальных, финансовых, валютных и трудовых ресурсов через: 

• прямое распределение ресурсов, административное регулирование товарных цен, процентных ставок и обменного курса,
• высокие налоги и государственные расходы,
• ограниченный доступ к выгодному для покупателей валюты официальному обменному курсу (отличающегося от рыночного обычно в 2-3 раза)[1],
• создание искусственных монополий посредством ограничения доступа на рынки новых игроков и предоставления налоговых, кредитных и прочих льгот отдельным предприятиям или группам предприятий,
• прямое («ручное») управление предприятиями,
• ограничение импорта тарифными и нетарифными барьерами.

 Как результат – крайне низкие уровень экономической эффективности и темпы экономического роста, высокий уровень незанятости и внешней трудовой миграции, широкое распространение коррупции. Таблица 1. ВВП на душу населения, в долл. США[2], номинальный рост - в разах.

	1995	2018	Рост		1995	2018	Рост
Китай	610	9771	16,0	Молдова	477	3227	6,8
Азербайджан	397	4721	11,9	Монголия	632	4122	6,5
Вьетнам	277	2567	9,3	Индия	374	2010	5,4
Армения	456	4212	9,2	Беларусь	1371	6290	4,6
Литва	2169	19153	8,8	Россия	2666	11289	4,2
Грузия	578	4717	8,2	Таджикистан	214	827	3,9
Латвия	2322	17861	7,7	Кыргызстан	364	1281	3,5
Казахстан	1288	9813	7,6	Украина	936	3095	3,3
Эстония	3131	23266	7,4	Узбекистан	586	1532	2,6

 Из-за проводимой политики были свернуты рыночные реформы, рыночные механизмы частично были заменены на командно-административное регулирование. Ограничение конкуренции, высоки издержки ведения бизнеса, незащищенность прав собственности и сделок не позволяли создавать конкурентоспособные производства. Невероятные по размерам льготы, высокий уровень монополизма стимулировали коррупцию, получение быстрой рентной прибыли и вывоз денежного капитала. Искусственное удешевление капитала (для завоза оборудования предоставлялись конвертация по выгодному официальному курсу, дешевые кредиты, освобождения от налогов) и дорогой труд (из-за высоких налогов на фонд оплаты труда) привели к использованию капиталоемких производств вместо трудоемких, что среди прочих обстоятельств способствовало крайне низкому уровню занятости в официальном секторе. Так по результатам социологического опроса, проведенного летом 2018 г. (более ранних данных нет) при количестве трудовых ресурсов около 18,8 млн. человек, занятость в официальном секторе экономики составила 5,3 млн. человек (менее 30% рабочей силы), в неформальном секторе – также примерно 5,3 млн. человек (включая 1,6 млн. занятых на временных разовых и сезонных работах), число внешних трудовых мигрантов превысило 2,6 млн. человек[3]. Был достигнут очень высокий уровень прямого государственного вмешательства в экономику. Подавляющее большинство крупных предприятий и финансовых учреждений находятся в государственной собственности. Многие предприятия контролируются государством через контрольные пакеты акций или так называемые «золотые акции». Размер государственной собственности из-за отсутствия соответствующей статистики невозможно определить, но по некоторым оценкам он превышает 50% от всех производственных активов страны. Более 80% активов банковского сектора также принадлежит государству[4]. Расходы консолидированного бюджета Узбекистана составили по итогам 2018 г. 35,2% от ВВП в 2018 г., а с учетом квазифискальных расходов государственных предприятий объем государственных расходов составил не менее 41,2% от ВВП[5]. Эти два показателя в 1,5-2 раза превышают аналогичные показатели успешно развивающихся стран с сопоставимым уровнем ВВП на душу населения и даже выше аналогичных показателей многих высокоразвитых стран мира (см рисунок 1). Рисунок 1. Доходы государственного бюджета и внебюджетных фондов к ВВП отдельных стран Азии, в %, в 2015 годуИсточник: www.adb.org Время реформЭкономика Узбекистана нуждается в кардинальном, системном и последовательном реформировании, смене всей системы общественных институтов. Ключевая задача – создание условий для нормальной работы эффективных рыночных механизмов. С приходом к власти нового президента страны в Узбекистане начались экономические реформы. Самые ключевые из них: 

• унификация обменных курсов, либерализации валютного рынка, введение конвертации по текущим операциям (лето-осень 2017 г.);
• устранение ряда административных барьеров на пути трансграничного движения товаров и людей (прежде всего с соседями Узбекистана) и снижение таможенных платежей (2017-18 гг.);
• реформа банковского сектора и денежного обращения (2017-18 гг.);
• радикальная налоговая реформа (2019 г.),
• сокращение ряда административных издержек ведения бизнеса.

 По ряду других важных направлений уже намечены реформы, которые должны были начаться в 2020 г.: административная реформа, аграрная реформа, реструктуризация и приватизация государственных предприятий, новый этап банковской реформы и пр. Однако из-за эпидемии коронавируса сроки и характер этих реформ находятся под вопросом. Далее о некоторых реформах, как реализующихся, так и не реализованных, более подробно. Либерализация внешнеэкономической деятельностиДо 2017 г. правительство Узбекистана осуществляло политику активного протекционизма, ограничивая импорт отсутствием свободной конвертации национальной валюты, высокими таможенными платежами и нетарифными барьерами. Кроме того, существовали существенные формальные и неформальные барьеры для свободного трансграничного движения людей и капиталов. Все это лишало Узбекистан возможностей полноценно участвовать в международном разделении труда, создавать конкурентоспособные производства. Как уже говорилось выше, в 2017-18 гг. правительство страны ввело свободную конвертацию по текущим операциям, устранило ряд административных барьеров на пути движения товаров и людей, снизило таможенные платежи, что является важнейшими достижениями проведения реформ в Узбекистане. Однако с декабря в 2018 г. правительство под давлением отраслевых лоббистов в определенной степени начало возвращаться к политике импортозамещения и протекционизма: были увеличены ранее сниженные таможенные платежи по определенному кругу кодов ТН ВЭД, введены новые нетарифные барьеры перед импортом[6]. Причем нулевые и низкие таможенные тарифы по одним категориям товаров сочетаются с довольно высокими тарифами по другим категориям, что позволяет удерживать средний таможенный тариф примерно на уровне сопоставимым со средними тарифами стран ЕАЭС. В результате, в отраслях с высокими тарифными и нетарифными барьерами создаются условия для монополизации рынков отельными компаниями[7]. Весной 2020 г. в связи с эпидемией коронавируса на ряд товаров первой необходимости таможенные платежи были отменены, правительство планирует сократить таможенные платежи и на товары для бизнеса. Есть надежда, что и после эпидемии тенденция либерализации внешнеэкономической деятельности продолжится. Правительство объявило о своем желании быстрее вступить в ВТО. Вступление в ВТО неизбежно приведет к сокращению многих тарифных и нетарифных барьеров на пути импорта. Реформа банковского сектораДо 2017 г. банковско-кредитный сектор был одним из самых зарегулированных секторов экономики Узбекистана. Банки не обладали какой-либо коммерческой самостоятельностью, их деятельность, включая определение размеров процентных ставок, жестко регулировалась Центральным банком, альтернативные кредитные учреждения существовали в очень ограниченном количестве. Денежная система была дефрагментирована, существовали жесткие ограничения на наличное денежное обращение, что порождало разную стоимость разных видов денег. За последние годы произошли дерегулирование и коммерциализация банковского сектора Узбекистана. Центральный банк существенно перестроил свою деятельность в плане контроля и регулирования коммерческих банков, регулирования денежного обращения и валютного рынка. Банки стали более клиентоориентированы, значительно снизилась стоимость, улучшилось качество и расширился спектр банковских услуг. Были сняты административные ограничения на покупку валюты и оборот наличных денежных средств. Однако, более 80% банковских активов все еще принадлежит государству, правительство активно выдает через банки льготные и «плохие» кредиты (навязанные государственными ведомствами) преимущественно государственным предприятиям[8]. Конкуренция в кредитном секторе все еще развита слабо, доступ новых игроков ограничен, небанковский сектор представлен лишь небольшим числом микрофинансовых организаций и ломбардами. При этом власти декларируют стремление провести разгосударствление сектора, приватизировать часть активов государственных банков, отказаться от практики льготного кредитования, расширить доступ зарубежных банков в сектор. Ряд важных реформ планировалось провести в 2020 г. Однако эпидемия коронавируса срывает эти планы. Особенно опасно для намеченных реформ сохранение практики льготного кредитования, административного вмешательства в выдачу и пролонгацию кредитов (что зачастую почти неизбежно в условиях острого экономического кризиса). Налоговая реформаКлючевые проблемы налоговой системы Узбекистана, сформировавшейся в предыдущие два десятилетия, были следующими[9]: 

• обременительная для бизнеса общая высокая налоговая нагрузка на экономику (об этом говорилось выше), особенно высокие налоги на фонд оплаты труда;
• очень сложные правила налогообложения, увеличивающие издержки налогового администрирования и создающие неравные правила игры для бизнеса (большое число налогов, разных режимов налогообложения, разных правил исчисления одних и тех же налогов для разных категорий налогоплательщиков, много отличий от мировой практики в определении налогооблагаемой базы, наличие огромного количества исключений, дополнительных правил, льгот, в том числе индивидуальных, при уплате налогов);
• крайне неравномерное распределение налоговой нагрузки между упрощенным и общеустановленным режимами налогообложения[10] (переход предприятия с упрощенного режима на общеустановленный увеличивал налоговую нагрузку в несколько раз), а также между разными отраслями экономики;
• широкое применение налогов с выручки (с оборота), негативно влияющих на общественное разделение труда и формирование длинных цепочек создания добавленной стоимости (по мере продвижения товара по цепочке, одна и та же стоимость облагается многократно, причем чем длиннее цепочка, тем выше налоговая нагрузка).

 Данные проблемы стили ключевыми причинами низкого уровня официальной занятости населения, не позволяли осуществлять глубокую переработку сырья, создавать конкурентоспособные производства за счет использования преимуществ от экономии на масштабах и узкой специализации, заставляли бизнес уходить в «тень», дробиться на части, разрушали конкурентную среду. С 1 января 2019 г. в Узбекистане начата налоговая реформа, в ходе которой уже удалось решить (частично или полностью) многие из указанных выше проблем[11]. Особенно важными достижениями можно считать: 

• радикальное сокращение налогов на труд (в 1,5-2 раза);
• существенное сокращение налоговой нагрузки на предприятия общего режима налогообложения (самые главные - снижение ставки НДС с 20 до 15%, ликвидация отчислений в Государственные целевые фонды с выручки – 3,2%);
• существенное сокращение сферы влияния налогов с оборота (до реформы эти налоги платили практически все предприятия, теперь средние и крупные предприятия их не платят совсем, а мелкие фирмы могут выбирать между налогом с оборота и НДС);
• начата работа по ликвидации огромного числа налоговых льгот и исключений, выравнивания условий налогообложения для всех субъектов экономики.

 Ряд ошибок подготовки и начальной стадии проведения реформы были устранены последующими корректировками во второй половине 2019 г. В частности, был снижен НДС с 20 до 15%, начался отказ от предоставления налоговых льгот и исключений, были усовершенствованы некоторые механизмы уплаты НДС. В тоже время сохраняются относительно высокие издержки налогового администрирования и общий высокий уровень перераспределения доходов через бюджет и квазибюджетные фонды. В связи с эпидемией коронавируса части бизнеса предоставлены налоговые каникулы, сокращается ряд неэффективных бюджетных и квазибюдженых расходов. Есть надежда, что после эпидемии удастся закрепить некоторые позитивные шаги в сторону сокращения участия государства в экономике. Административная реформаТекущая модель государственного управления в Узбекистане характеризуется чрезмерной централизацией принятия решений, неразвитостью институтов саморегулирования, что обуславливает “ручное управление” социально-экономическими и политическими процессами в стране. Имеют место слабая работа механизмов сдержек и противовесов, а также значительная неформальная зависимость законодательной и судебной властей от исполнительной власти. Ключевая проблема государственного управления и экономической политики в Узбекистане заключается в том, что органы исполнительной власти продолжают активно использовать административные методы управления, несовместимые с эффективным функционированием рыночной экономики. Активное государственное вмешательство – главный фактор высоких транзакционных издержек для национального бизнеса и широкого распространения коррупции, а, следовательно, низкой конкурентоспособности отечественной продукции. Соответственно главная цель административной реформы – значительное сокращение государственного участия, изменение функций и методов государственного регулирования в экономике. Узбекистан нуждается в кардинальной административной реформе, основанной на изучении международного опыта и функциональном анализе, в результате которой будут: 

• пересмотрены, перераспределены структура, задачи, функции и полномочия центральных органов власти, а также органов управления на отраслевом уровне;
• сокращены, упрощены и оптимизированы процедуры оказания государственных услуг;
• пересмотрены принципы финансирования социальной сферы[12] (в сочетании с реформами образования, здравоохранения и пенсионной системы);
• кардинальным образом перестроена система государственной службы;
• перераспределены функции, полномочия и финансовые возможности между центральными и местными органами власти. При этом необходимо провести кардинальную реформу самих местных органов управления, включая решение вопросов разделения властей на местном уровне, повышения ответственности местных органов власти перед населением.

 К сожалению, до настоящего времени в Узбекистане реализовывались лишь отдельные элементы административной реформы. В планы правительства активизировать реформу в 2020 г. неизбежно вносит корректировки эпидемия коронавируса. Регулирование бизнеса, защита прав собственности, развитие конкуренцииРуководство Узбекистана в последние годы многое сделало для улучшения условий ведения бизнеса, сокращения транзакционных издержек. Это связанно прежде всего с сокращением налоговой, таможенной и административной нагрузки, с упрощением процедур экспортно-импортных операций и получения разного рода разрешений, с совершенствованием работы системы денежного обращения и банковского сектора. В тоже время в регулятивно-правовой сфере сохраняется много проблем, связанных с непрозрачностью, противоречивостью и неэффективностью законодательства, крайне слабой судебно-правовой защитой собственности и сделок, отсутствием реального разделения властей и механизмов сдержек и противовесов[13]. Другая важная проблема, связанная с несовершенством регулятивно-правовой базы, – высокий уровень монополизации рынков, неравные правила ведения бизнеса. Конкуренция разрушается искусственными барьерами доступа на рынок новых предприятий, высокими тарифными и нетарифными барьерами для импорта, широким распространением индивидуальных и групповых (например, для членов отраслевых ассоциаций) льгот. Крайне медленно проходят реформы (в основном пока ограничиваются планами) так называемых «естественных монополий» (энергетика, коммунальные службы, транспорт), а также сектора добывающей промышленности. Здесь доминирую государственные предприятия и практически отсутствует конкуренция. Между тем в большинстве таких отраслей вполне можно создать здоровую конкурентную среду и привлечь туда частных инвесторов. Реформы аграрного сектора и системы ирригацииСельское хозяйство – один из ведущих секторов экономики Узбекистана. Почти половина населения страны живет в сельской местности. В 2019 году вклад аграрного сектора в ВВП Узбекистана составил 25,5%[14]. При этом сельское хозяйство - самый зарегулированный со стороны государства секторов экономики. Права собственности основных крупных сельхозпроизводителей, фермеров, защищены крайне слабо, методы регулирования их деятельности де факто взяты из советского прошлого, рынки многих видов сельхозпродукции, производственных ресурсов и услуг для сектора не развиты. Сельское хозяйство отчаянно нуждается в реформировании, однако пока никаких значимых изменений здесь не произошло[15]. Ключевая особенность аграрного сектора Узбекистана заключается в том, что имеются две сельскохозяйственные культуры, производство которых осуществляется преимущественно для государственных нужд, – хлопок и пшеница. В последние годы произошло некоторое сокращение земель, выделяемых в обязательном порядке под хлопчатник, в пользу, прежде всего, производства плодоовощной продукции. Но при этом на хлопок и пшеницу все еще приходится около двух третей от всех земель, выделенных под посевные площади, сады и виноградники. Действующие механизмы формирования государственного заказа и система ценообразования делают выращивание хлопка и пшеницы невыгодным для значительной части фермеров. Кроме того, существующая система квотирования земли под обязательные для фермеров культуры не позволяет им оптимизировать структуру производства с учетом особенностей почв и климата, доступности воды, квалификации персонала и пр. Зачастую, на землях, отведенных под хлопчатник и пшеницу, более продуктивно выращивать другие культуры. Система административного регулирования отрасли распространяется и на рынки ресурсов. Сельскохозяйственная техника, горюче смазочные материалы, удобрения, корма, семена, биологические и химические средства защиты растений и пр. поставляются фермерам государственными компаниями-монополистами. Цены на некоторые ресурсы зачастую субсидируются. Количество ресурсов, которое можно приобрести по более низким (субсидируемым) ценам, ограничено. Земля, принадлежащая фермерам выведена из хозяйственного оборота, права на ее использования не могут быть перепроданы, она не может быть заложена (для получения кредита) и даже передана на законных основаниях в субаренду. Плодородие почв из-за неэффективного их использования постоянно падает, происходит деградация земель. Для доставки воды на сельскохозяйственные угодья используется сложная, дорогостоящая и находящаяся в плачевном технологическом состоянии система ирригации. При этом отсутствуют действенные стимулы для эффективного использования воды конечными потребителями, лицами и организациями, ответственными за водную инфраструктуру. Основные расходы по доставке воды для агропроизводителей покрываются из государственного бюджета. Платежи агропроизводителей за услуги по доставке воды не имеют прямой привязки к объемам ее потребления. Их размеры недостаточны, чтобы стимулировать экономное водопотребление. Как результат имеют место огромные потери воды при ее доставке и использовании. Сектор нуждается в кардинальной реформе, основное содержание которой следующее: 

• Отказ практики плановых заданий по производству хлопка и пшеницы, формирование и развитие свободных и конкурентных рынков этих товаров.
• Формирование и развитие свободных и конкурентных рынков ресурсов и услуг для агропроизводителей.
• Укрепление прав владения землей землепользователями, предоставление возможностей для перепродажи прав на владение землей, сдачу ее в субаренду и в залог.
• Введение принципов платного водопользования, механизмов государственно-частного партнерства в управлении ирригационной системой.

 В конце 2019 г. была принята стратегия развития аграрного сектора, в которой говорится о необходимости кардинальных реформ. В начале 2020 г. президент объявил о планах отмены обязательного государственного заказа в течение 2020-23 гг. Предполагается также развитие конкурентных рынков агропродуктов, ресурсов и услуг для аграрного сектора, развитие правовой базы использования земли. Кроме того, обсуждается проект Концепции развития водного хозяйства, предполагающий реформирование сектора[16]. В тоже время в связи с предстоящей отменой обязательного государственного заказа возникает вопрос возможности перераспределения части земель, находящихся в распоряжении фермерских хозяйств. В последние десятилетия произошло несколько перераспределений посевных земель бывших колхозов и совхозов. Причем все эти перераспределения осуществлялись совершенно произвольно без каких-либо общественных обсуждений и одобрений. В результате в настоящее время большая часть посевных земель находится в распоряжении (на основе договоров аренды) у очень незначительной части сельских жителей (фермеров). Подавляющее же большинство сельского населения имеют в пользовании лишь небольшие участки (дехканские хозяйства). При этом необходимо иметь в виду, что в некоторых регионах имеет место сложная демографическая ситуация, перенаселение и высокая безработица в сельской местности. В глазах большинства сельских жителей такое распределение земли нелегитимно. Проблема становится весьма актуальной в связи с предстоящим отказом от государственного заказа, что сделает фермеров реальными хозяевами большей части плодородной и орошаемой земли сельскохозяйственного назначения. Один из вариантов решения этой острой проблемы: воспользоваться тем, что в договорах аренды указывается, что фермер не имеет право свободно распоряжаться землями, выделенными под хлопок и пшеницу. По сути это не его земли. И раз государство отменяет госзаказ, есть возможность пересмотреть договора и перераспределить земли, ранее квотируемые под госзаказ, в пользу других сельских жителей (например, через аукционы). При перераспределении земли, особенно при определении размеров участков земли, подлежащих передаче новым хозяевам, необходимо учитывать значительное количество экономических и социальных обстоятельств, том числе: влияние размеров хозяйств на продуктивность сельскохозяйственной деятельности, занятость и доходы сельских жителей, а также интересы смежных секторов экономики, демографическую ситуацию в регионах и пр. Проблемы и перспективы реформРуководство страны все еще находится под сильным влиянием философии и практики импортозамещения и протекционизма, а также традиций «ручного управления» экономикой. Нет понимания важности отделения функций государственного управления от практики ведения бизнеса, необходимости выполнения государством роли «арбитра», определяющего правила игры для бизнеса, а не являющегося непосредственным участником хозяйственных процессов. Нет единой команды реформаторов, четко и одинаково понимающей цели и направления реформ, методы их осуществления. Зато весьма сильны позиции отраслевых и индивидуальных лоббистов, отстаивающих корпоративные и частные интересы. Многие сложности связаны с крайне низким средним уровнем профессионализма, инициативности и экономической грамотности государственных служащих. Долгое время, а) действовавшая система отбора и продвижения кадров, б) отсутствие политической конкуренции, в) низкая зарплата в органах государственной власти (за исключением силовых структур), осуществляли «отрицательный отбор» чиновников, оставляя на руководящих постах безынициативных исполнителей чужой воли с низкой квалификацией и высокой степенью склонности к коррупции. С таким кадровым потенциалом крайне трудно проводить кардинальные реформы и надеяться на значительное улучшение качества государственного управления. И все же реформы в стране идут, пусть не всегда последовательно и системно. При относительно успешной реализации хотя бы части необходимых реформ, есть надежда на формирование более-менее действенных инклюзивных рыночных институтов, на создание условий для устойчивого экономического развития, формирование «среднего класса» и гражданского общества. «Средний класс» и гражданское общество станут в будущем социальной опорой для дальнейших экономических, правовых и политических реформ. В заключении хотелось бы отметить, что существует острая объективная потребность в экспертной и организационной поддержке реформ в Узбекистане со стороны международных организаций, правительств зарубежных стран, международного экспертного сообщества. Без нее стране будет довольно сложно выстроить и реализовать эффективную стратегию реформ, позволяющих сформировать принципиально новую социально-экономическую систему. Информация об автореЮлий Юсупов. Директор Center for Economic Development – неправительственной некоммерческой организации, занимающейся исследованиями в области экономического развития, экономической политики, бизнес консалтинга (www.ced.uz). Осуществляет исследования и консультации в вопросах экономического развития и экономической политики (по широкому кругу направлений), а также маркетинговые исследования и консультации бизнесу (по широкому спектру рынков) в странах Центральной Азии. В качестве независимого эксперта нанимается различными международными организациями: UNDP, EBRD, IFC, World Bank, USAID, GIZ, JICA, OSCE, UNICEF, IFAD, UNESCO и др., в том числе активно привлекается в качестве международного консультанта, главным образом по проектам и программам EBRD (более 40 проектов). Автор ряда учебных пособий и монографий, более 20 опубликованных аналитических отчетов, более 150 статей в периодических изданиях и сборниках. АннотацияПравительство Узбекистана в 1996 году взяло курс на усиление государственного вмешательства в экономику и реализацию политики импортозамещения. Результаты весьма плачевны. Однако с 2017 г. в стране начались кардинальные реформы. За это время многое удалось сделать, но предстоят еще большие изменения. В публикации описаны достижения, проблемы реализации и перспективы реформ. Акцент делается на внешнеэкономической деятельности, банковском секторе, налоговой системе, правовом регулировании бизнеса, аграрном секторе, административной реформе. [1] Валюта распределялась по официальному курсу не на свободном рынке, а между «избранными» покупателями в соответствии с решениями чиновников, которые руководствовались: а) определенными государственными программами приоритетами развития тех или иных отраслей, б) коррупционными интересами.[2] Источник: https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators#.[3] https://kun.uz/ru/69289201. Цифра числа внешних мигрантов, видимо, существенно занижена.[4] https://nuz.uz/ekonomika-i-finansy/45851-transformaciya-bankovskogo-sektora-strategicheskie-vyzovy-dlya-uzbekistana.html[5] http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/556421586324506269/Uzbekistan-Public-Expenditure-Review[6] Дополнительные требования к свойствам импортных товаров и условиям их продажи, отличные от требований к местным товарам, либо трудно достижимые для импортеров.[7] http://ced.uz/publitsistika/chem-obernetsya-rost-tamozhennyh-platezhej/[8] http://ced.uz/vazhnoe/sushhestvuyushhaya-kreditnaya-politika-sluzhit-istochnikom-inflyatsii-delaet-dorogimi-kredity-dlya-chastnogo-biznesa-i-razrushaet-konkurentsiyu/[9] https://www.fergananews.com/articles/9965, см. также другие публикации: http://ced.uz/samoe-glavnoe-predstoyashhee-sobytie-2018-goda-nalogovaya-reforma/[10] Предприятия с небольшой численностью работников (от 25 до 200 – в зависимости от отрасли) имели право работать в упрощенном режиме налогообложения с гораздо более низкой налоговой нагрузкой, чем при общем режиме налогообложения.[11] Налоговая реформа проводится в соответствии с Концепцией, утвержденной Указом Президента Республики Узбекистан: http://uza.uz/ru/documents/o-kontseptsii-sovershenstvovaniya-nalogovoy-politiki-respubl-30-06-2018.[12] Финансирование социальной сферы в настоящее время осуществляется в соответствии с штатным расписанием и не привязано к результативности деятельности учреждений.[13] Публикации по теме: http://ced.uz/administrativnaya-reforma/[14] Данные Государственного комитета Республики Узбекистан по статистике.[15] http://ced.uz/issledovaniya/agrarnyj-sektor-uzbekistana-osobennosti-klyuchevye-problemy-neobhodimost-reform/, другие публикации по теме: http://ced.uz/uzbekistanu-neobhodima-agrarnaya-reforma/[16] http://ced.uz/sobytiya/defitsit-vody-smozhet-li-uzbekistan-sozdat-effektivnuyu-sistemu-upravleniya-vodnymi-resursami/ [post_title] => Экономические реформы в Узбекистане: достижения, проблемы, перспективы [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => %d1%8d%d0%ba%d0%be%d0%bd%d0%be%d0%bc%d0%b8%d1%87%d0%b5%d1%81%d0%ba%d0%b8%d0%b5-%d1%80%d0%b5%d1%84%d0%be%d1%80%d0%bc%d1%8b-%d0%b2-%d1%83%d0%b7%d0%b1%d0%b5%d0%ba%d0%b8%d1%81%d1%82%d0%b0%d0%bd%d0%b5 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:36:18 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:36:18 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4895 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[36] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4882 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-07-31 10:00:11 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-07-31 09:00:11 [post_content] => Нам срочно необходима структура, не зависящая от государственной системы исправительных учреждений, которая будет иметь полномочия на разработку средств правовой защиты по отдельным делам, связанным с прошлыми и текущими злоупотреблениями. Формирование подобной комиссии стало бы сигналом о намерении правительства откликнуться на призывы своих граждан к прекращению нарушений прав человека и встать на путь, ведущий к более уважительному отношению к правам человека.-- интервью с Агзамом Тургуновым, правозащитником, жертвой пыток, находившимся в заключении в 2009-2017 годах. Гораздо чаще, чем стражи демократии хотели бы признать, смерть диктатора, как правило, практически не приводит к фундаментальному изменению сущности политической системы. Вспомните сирийского Башара Асада в 2000 году, северокорейского Ким Чен Ира в 2011 году и венесуэльского Уго Чавеса в 2013 году. Однако в отдельных редких случаях это может способствовать ощутимым улучшениям в жизни миллионов простых людей. По мнению некоторых, это произошло - по крайней мере, частично и на некоторое время - в случае со смертью Иосифа Сталина в 1953 году. Несомненно, это произошло в августе 2016 года со смертью Ислама Каримова, чье жестокое 27-летнее правление (1989-2016 гг.) в Узбекистане стало синонимом худших форм репрессий, пыток и заключения в тюрьму по политическим мотивам. На сегодняшний день, почти четыре года спустя после смерти Каримова и прихода к власти Шавката Мирзиёева, правительство Узбекистана в рамках более масштабной и амбициозной программы реформ предприняло ряд решительных шагов для решения некоторых из наихудших нарушений прав человека, связанных с длительным правлением его предшественника. С сентября 2016 г., почти сразу после смерти Каримова и под многолетним давлением международного сообщества, правительство начало выпускать на свободу политических заключенных, которых по состоянию на июль 2020 г. насчитывалось около 55 человек, включая журналистов и правозащитников, находящихся на протяжении долгого времени под стражей, не говоря уже об освобождении неустановленного числа религиозных узников.[1] В числе освобожденных - Юсуф Рузимурадов и Мухаммад Бекжанов - двое дольше всех в мире находившихся в заключении журналиста - 19 и 18 лет соответственно, правозащитники Агзам Тургунов и Азам Фармонов, а также мирные политические диссиденты, такие как Самандар Куканов, первый заместитель Председателя парламента Узбекистана после обретения независимости. Незаконно лишенный свободы на 24 года, Куканов является одним из наиболее долго находившихся в заключении политических активистов в мире после Нельсона Манделы.  © Steve Swerdlow, Philippe Dam, Qarshi, November 2018. Устраняя еще одно наследие, в августе 2019 года Президент распорядился о закрытии пресловутой тюрьмы Жаслык - долгое время являющейся символом эпидемии пыток в Узбекистане и заточения критиков правительства - в соответствии с требованием органов по правам человека Организации Объединенных Наций (ООН), выдвинутым впервые еще 17 лет назад. Рузимурадов, Бекжанов, Тургунов и Фармонов все отбывали наказание в этой тюрьме. Тем не менее, существует сохраняющаяся обеспокоенность по поводу того, что власти не закрыли этот объект окончательно и все еще могут использовать его для содержания подозреваемых.  В январе этого года Мирзиёев объявил об отмене прописки, вида на жительство советского образца, который позволял органам власти существенно ограничивать свободу передвижения граждан внутри страны. И покончив с многолетней интернет-цензурой, он распорядился отменить запрет на некоторые сайты с критикой, и при этом ключевой представитель его правительства в СМИ практически признал, что социальные сети и блогеры сегодня являются одними из самых важных арбитров общественного мнения в Узбекистане. Однако несмотря на то, что медийный ландшафт стал более оживленным, некоторые блогеры и журналисты все еще подвергаются преследованиям, даже задержаниям, когда пытаются разглядеть коррупцию или оспаривают действия местных властей.[2] Значительные усилия правительства по искоренению принудительного взрослого и детского труда в хлопковом секторе Узбекистана являются, возможно, наиболее заметной попыткой искоренить нарушения советской и каримовской эпох. Вышеперечисленные шаги свидетельствуют о значительном прорыве в области прав человека. Но прошлое, особенно когда оно остается без внимания, способно отомстить за благие планы реформ и проникнуть в будущее. Единственным способом обеспечения решительного ухода Узбекистана от тяжелейших нарушений прав человека в эпоху Каримова и дальнейшего улучшения положения с правами человека является принятие правительством на себя обязательств по осуществлению осмысленного процесса оценки прошлого и обеспечения правосудия переходного периода. Правосудие переходного периода подразумевает судебные и внесудебные действия, направленные на установление истины и примирение, а также на обеспечение правосудия и ответственности с тем, чтобы признать и исправить наследие широко распространенных нарушений прав человека, которые стали систематическими при правлении Ислама Каримова. Помимо этого, в нарушение своих международных и внутренних обязательств, ташкент еще не создал условий для реабилитации освобожденных политических и религиозных заключенных, у многих из которых состояние здоровья остается плачевным из-за тяжелых испытаний, выпавших на их долю в заключении на протяжении десятилетий. Бывшие и до сих пор содержащиеся под стражей политические заключенные Узбекистана заслуживают правосудия и возмещения ущерба за серьезные нарушения прав человека, которым они подверглись, но данный вопрос в Узбекистане пока еще даже не стоит на повестке дня. В рамках международного права в области прав человека правосудие переходного периода направлено на привлечение виновных к ответственности за нарушения и признание страданий и человеческого достоинства жертв. Оно также нацелено на составление достоверного отчета по прошлому, что никогда не представлялось возможным с момента обретения Узбекистаном независимости в 1991 году. Кроме того, правосудие переходного периода важно для Узбекистана, медленно восстанавливающего после периода тяжелых репрессий, но в котором нарушения прав человека были настолько серьезными и укоренившимися на протяжении жизни целого поколения, что обычная судебная система еще не в силах обеспечить правосудие. В одной статье трудно детально рассмотреть каждую из них, однако меры правосудия переходного периода в Узбекистане могли бы включать в себя и такие меры: (1) публичное уголовное преследование лиц, виновных в серьезных злоупотреблениях; (2) комиссии по установлению истины, в отношении преследования критиков правительства, в том числе за массовые убийства в Андижане в мае 2005 г.; (3) компенсацию и реабилитацию жертв пыток и заключения по политическим мотивам; (4) институциональную реформу Службы государственной безопасности ( СГБ) и милиции; и (5) сохранение памяти о прошлых злоупотреблениях в виде публичных пространств, памятников и музеев.  © Steve Swerdlow, Tallinn, Vilnius, February 2019, November 2018. Цель данного труда - предоставить «дорожную карту» для правосудия переходного периода в Узбекистане на основе изучения международной и местной нормативно-правовой базы, уже существующей для поддержки таких начинаний. Он обобщает отважные помыслы бывших политзаключенных, пытавшихся добиться своей юридической реабилитации, одновременно затрагивая более широкий общенациональный диалог о темном прошлом Узбекистана. В нем также упоминаются высказывания некоторых представителей власти, несмотря на свою осторожность, позволяющие дать оценку прошлым и текущим нарушениям прав человека в Узбекистане. Зверские пытки и смерть андижанца Алижона Абдукаримова в руках правоохранительных органов в мае 2020 года и редкий общественный резонанс, вызванный смертью Абдукаримова, наглядно показывают, насколько трудно искоренить устоявшиеся политику и практику нарушения прав человека без постоянного независимого надзора, парламентского контроля и активного участия независимых СМИ и гражданского общества. Правосудие переходного периода и реабилитация необходимы в Узбекистане здесь и сейчас. Несмотря на то, что некоторые из вышеперечисленных реформ дали реальные результаты и фактически свергли значительную часть наследия Каримова, правительственные чиновники, включая самого президента Мирзиёева, лишь косвенно ссылаются на репрессии прошлого, предпочитая вместо этого «смотреть в будущее». Такой подход, однако, недостаточен для решения глубинных проблем в области прав человека, которые должны быть устранены, если Узбекистан хочет двигаться вперед. Правосудие переходного периода и реабилитация имеют важнейшее значение для укрепления уважения к верховенству права и созданию подотчетных учреждений спустя десятилетия, в течение которых ни то, ни другое не существовало. Чрезвычайно трудно будет добиться таких процессов, и для этого потребуется большое политическое мужество. Но в отсутствие отрезвляющего общенационального диалога о прошлых нарушениях - в первую очередь основанного на голосах независимого гражданского общества - трудно представить себе амбициозную программу реформ, которую президент Мирзиёев сделал визитной карточкой успешной или стабильной работы своей администрации на долгосрочную перспективу. Реабилитация — это правоВ 2005 году Комиссия ООН по правам человека приняла Основные принципы и руководящие положения, касающиеся права на правовую защиту и возмещение ущерба для жертв грубых нарушений международных норм в области прав человека и серьезных нарушений международного гуманитарного права (далее «Основные принципы»).Основные принципы направлены на объединение международного гуманитарного права и права в области прав человека и подчеркивают важность соблюдения обязательства по компенсации на внутригосударственном уровне для жертв злоупотреблений.  В марте 2006 года Основные принципы были приняты Генеральной Ассамблеей ООН, что еще больше укрепило их статус несмотря на то, что формально они не имеют обязательной силы.[3] Следует подчеркнуть, что в Основных принципах подробно описывается круг возможных мер по компенсации - реституция, компенсация, реабилитация, сатисфакция и гарантии неповторения. Основные принципы, хотя они еще находятся в стадии разработки, уже упоминаются в правовой практике ряда договорных органов по правам человека и фигурируют в нескольких недавно принятых международных правовых документах и внутригосударственном законодательстве, а также применяются рядом комиссий по установлению истины во всем мире.  Основные принципы в значительной степени отражают уже устоявшиеся нормы международного права и вносят важный вклад в их объединение и закрепление. В отношении жертв грубых нарушений прав человека в Узбекистане, Новак и Макартур утверждают: «как правило, жертвы пыток заинтересованы, прежде всего, не в денежной компенсации, а в других средствах возмещения ущерба, лучше содействующих восстановлению их чести и человеческого достоинства».[4] В международном праве нет четкого определения реабилитации как формы возмещения. Наиболее близкое выражение данного определения, содержащегося в Основных принципах, заключается в том, что в некоторых ситуациях лица, пострадавшие от серьезных нарушений прав человека или гуманитарного права, должны получить возмещение, в частности, путем реабилитации, то есть физической и психологической помощи, а также социальных и юридических услуг.[5] Следовательно, хотя концепция реабилитации, изложенная в Основных принципах, указывает на формы реабилитации, выходящие за рамки здоровья, она не дает полного определения тому, что каждый из них означает или включает в себя. Диана Шелтон, ведущий ученый в области возмещения, определяет реабилитацию как право «всех жертв серьезного злоупотребления и их иждивенцев» [sic] и представляет собой «процесс восстановления полного здоровья и репутации человека после травмы в результате серьезного посягательства на его физическую или психическую неприкосновенность [...] Она направлена на восстановление того, что было утрачено. Реабилитация направлена на достижение наивысшей физической и психологической способности путем взаимодействия с личностью, семьей, местной общиной и даже обществом в целом.»[6] Недавно Комитет ООН против пыток придал более неотложный и предметный характер обязательству Узбекистана по обеспечению реабилитации бывших политических заключенных и жертв пыток. В своих Заключительных замечаниях от декабря 2019 года, приветствуя освобождение в Ташкенте «значительного числа» политических заключенных начиная с сентября 2016 года, Комитет призвал правительство «освободить» тех, кто был осужден в ходе несправедливого судебного разбирательства или на основании пыток, предоставить им «возмещение, включая компенсацию и реабилитацию» и «рассмотреть вопрос о создании независимой комиссии для расследования этих вопросов».[7] © Steve Swerdlow, September 2014. Бывшие заключенные не имеют доступа к правосудиюПравительство Узбекистана, не предприняло никаких конкретных действий по реабилитации около 55 освобожденных политических заключенных, включая правозащитников, политических активистов, журналистов и других общественных деятелей, а также многих других религиозных заключенных, хотя и получило признание за их освобождение. Подавляющее большинство освобожденных правительством до сих пор считаются виновными в совершении преступления. Освобождение осуществляется в форме помилования, досрочного освобождения или амнистии, а не успешной апелляции или каких-либо официальных действий, предпринятых для однозначного признания того, что задержание было противозаконным или необоснованным. Несмотря на то, что ряд правозащитников и журналистов, долгое время находившихся в заключении, отказались официально просить прощения, в качестве условия для освобождения, за преступления, которые они не совершали, на некоторых из них оказывалось такое давление. Фактически, нынешняя политика Ташкента сводится к отказу официального признания необоснованного или политически мотивированного характера первоначального задержания и последующего тюремного заключения и не дает жертвам шанса на судебное расследование в отношении лиц, виновных в серьезных злоупотреблениях, от которых они пострадали. Ввиду отсутствия мер со стороны правительства по обеспечению реабилитации, многие освобожденные политические заключенные сами принялись добиваться пересмотра ранее вынесенных им приговоров. В ходе этого процесса они столкнулись с серьезными препятствиями. «Мы с сожалением сообщаем вам, что ваше личное дело было уничтожено...»Ряд освобожденных заключенных сообщают, что они не могут получить материалы суда по своим собственным делам, без которых они не могут подать и оспорить свои первоначальные обвинительные приговоры. Например, 24 ноября 2016 года был освобожден бывший депутат Самандар Куканов, находившийся в тюрьме 23 года и 5 месяцев в наказание за свою мирную оппозиционную политическую деятельность. «Я отсидел больше, чем любой другой политзаключенный в истории Узбекистана», - сказал Куканов. «За 23 года моего тюремного заключения несколько членов моей семьи были отправлены за решетку, и здоровье моей жены было разрушено. Я больше всего хочу, чтобы меня реабилитировали, потому что я никогда не совершал тех преступлений, за которые меня осудили». Направив в сентябре 2018 года в Ташкентский областной суд апелляционную жалобу о пересмотре приговора по уголовному делу, Куканов получил письмо, в котором сообщалось, что 6 апреля 2017 года «материалы его уголовного дела» были «уничтожены в установленном порядке» Ташкентским областным государственным архивом. Исходя из этого, в письме говорится, что его просьбы о «полной реабилитации» не могут быть пересмотрены. Позднее это письмо продемонстрировало, что власти пытаются помешать ему начать производство по делу. На следующий год Куканов продолжил добиваться своей реабилитации в Верховном суде Узбекистана - примечательное слушание, на котором присутствовал автор данного материала. Его адвокаты настойчиво утверждали, что дело было сфабриковано на основе ложных доказательств, что оно являлось местью за мирную оппозицию Куканова Каримову и что обвинительный приговор должен быть отменен в соответствии с «реформами нового президента». Тем не менее, в июле 2019 года Верховный суд отклонил попытку Куканова отменить обвинительный приговор и постановил, что «все обвинения в [первоначальном] деле... были доказаны». Куканов полон решимости продолжать борьбу и вновь подаст апелляцию. © Steve Swerdlow, Tashkent, June 2019. Многочисленные правила ООН о реабилитации и компенсации игнорируютсяСотрудник ООН и бывший государственный чиновник Эркин Мусаев был подвергнут пыткам и неправомерно лишен свободы на 11 лет. Он был освобожден 11 августа 2017 года после того, как Верховный суд принял решение о сокращении срока наказания. В своем докладе о правах человека в Узбекистане за 2007 год Государственный департамент Соединенных Штатов (США) сообщил, что Мусаев был подвергнут пыткам в заключении, в том числе жестоким избиениям по голове, груди и ногам, и в течение двух месяцев содержался без возможности встретиться с адвокатом или другими посетителями.[8] В совместном письме спецдокладчика ООН по пыткам и главы Рабочей группы ООН по произвольным задержаниям тогдашнему президенту Каримову говорится, что в результате одного избиения сотрудниками тюрьмы Мусаеву была сломана челюсть. Кроме того, власти заставили его подписать признание в том, что он занимался шпионажем за США, Великобританию (Великобритания) и ООН. В мае 2008 года Рабочая группа ООН по произвольным задержаниям пришла к выводу, что тюремное заключение Мусаева является «произвольным» и противоречит нескольким международным договорам, участником которых является Узбекистан. В феврале 2011 года, когда власти перевели Мусаева в тюрьму строгого режима в Навоийской области, на его теле были обнаружены следы ожогов и других травм. В июне 2012 года Комитет ООН по правам человека принял решение о том, что правительство пытало и другими способами жестоко обращалось с Мусаевым и нарушило его права на свободу, безопасность и справедливое судебное разбирательство в соответствии с Международным пактом о гражданских и политических правах (статьи 7, 9 и 14 соответственно). Комитет призвал Узбекистан предоставить ему эффективное средство правовой защиты в связи с этими нарушениями. Однако власти проигнорировали это предписание, и Мусаев оставался в тюрьме до 2017 года.[9] Попытки Мусаева добиться юридической реабилитации неоднократно срывались. Судебные органы отказывают ему в выдаче приговора по уголовному делу и отказывают в праве на обжалование на том основании, что он не приобщил его к материалам дела. Как и другие бывшие заключенные, Мусаев из-за судимости сталкивался с большими трудностями в поисках достойной работы. За ним следили спецслужбы, и он столкнулся с большими трудностями при реинтеграции в общество после долгих лет заключения. Примечательно, что наличие двух отдельных предписаний от органов ООН по правам человека, признающих его осуждение незаконным и призывающих предоставить ему компенсацию и средство правовой защиты, не заставило власти Узбекистана полностью оправдать Мусаева, или даже начать новый судебный процесс. И они должны сделать это незамедлительно. Ограничение движения, слежкаДругие бывшие заключенные, получившие «условно-досрочное освобождение» по статье 73 Уголовного кодекса Узбекистана, сообщили, что их свобода передвижения ограничена, что за ними ведется наблюдение, и что они обязаны периодически являться в милицию для «профилактических бесед». Мухаммад Бекжанов, один из наиболее долгое время находившийся в заключении журналистов в мире до своего освобождения в феврале 2017 года, в течение целого года не мог выезжать за пределы своего родного региона - Хорезма на северо-западе Узбекистана. Позже он покинул Узбекистан для воссоединения со своей семьей в США. Но, по его словам, власти не предоставили ему никаких законных способов оспорить обвинительное заключение и вернуть имущество, конфискованное после его ареста и насильственного вывоза из Украины в 1999 году. Правозащитник Агзам Тургунов и независимый журналист Бобомурод Абдуллаев, оба бывшие политзаключенные, заявили, что с момента их освобождения спецслужбы и милиция ведут за ними слежку и подвергают их даже запугиванию. Тургунов неоднократно задерживался и подвергался штрафам с момента своего освобождения - один раз в августе 2018 года за использование своего телефона для записи мирной акции протеста перед Верховным судом и второй раз в 2019 году. Абдуллаев был задержан службами безопасности в сентябре 2017 года и подвергался пыткам в период предварительного заключения по обвинению в попытке свержения правительства. В мае 2018 года по итогам судебного заседания, на котором присутствовал автор, он был условно освобожден и оштрафован. Хотя судебный процесс над Абдуллаевым создал прецедент в плане степени его открытости и транспарентности, власти так и не провели расследование убедительных утверждений Абдуллаева о применении пыток. Правозащитник Азам Фармонов, 14-летний срок заключения которого был сокращен при его освобождении в октябре 2017 года, заявил, что в рамках условно-досрочного освобождения он по-прежнему обязан ежемесячно выплачивать правительству часть своей зарплаты, а также, что крайне сложно получить оплату за медицинскую помощь, которую правительство обязано выплачивать бывшим заключенным. «Получение денег, выделяемых правительством на оплату медицинской помощи, настолько сложно, что я просто сдался», - сказал мне Фармонов. Освобожденные женщины-заключенные также сталкиваются со стигматизацией и трудностями.К сожалению, огромные юридические, психологические, физические и финансовые трудности, которые испытывали бывшие политзаключенные Узбекистана, не ограничиваются только мужчинами. Несколько бывших заключенных-женщин, с которыми я встречался, рассказали о жизни после освобождения, в которой они чувствуют себя невидимыми, маргинализированными и еще менее способными получить доступ к правосудию за выпавшие на их долю испытания. В июне 2018 года я встретился с Дилором Абдукодировой в ее доме в Андижане. В 2010 году Абдукодирова была приговорена к 18 годам лишения свободы по возвращении в Узбекистан, для воссоединения со своими детьми. Пятью годами ранее она покинула страну после того как стала свидетелем жестокой бойни в Андижане, когда узбекские правительственные войска застрелили сотни в основном безоружных демонстрантов недалеко от центральной площади города. Абдукодирова отбыла наказание в единственной женской тюрьме Узбекистана в Зангиоте Ташкентской области. Во время пребывания в тюрьме Абдукодирова начала испытывать сильные боли в ногах и бедрах. Когда я беседовал с ее семьей у нее дома, она из-за боли не могла даже посидеть дольше нескольких минут. Абдукодирова заслуживает справедливости, поддержки и финансовой компенсации за неправомерное заточение вдали от семьи. Структуры социальной поддержки и медицинские, психосоциальные услуги, в которых она и другие бывшие заключенные нуждаются, в значительной степени отсутствуют и их необходимо создать без промедления. Ранние успехиНесмотря на многочисленные препятствия на пути достижения справедливости и подотчетности, в Узбекистане были достигнуты некоторые ранние, важные юридические успехи на пути к реабилитации. Статья 83 предусматривает «Основания для реабилитации»Правозащитник Чуян Маматкулов, проживающий в южном узбекском городе Карши, обладает впечатляющей уникальностью: он единственный человек, который когда-либо пытался подать в суд на Ислама Каримова. В ответ на это и многие годы защиты простых граждан в суде в качестве правозащитника, милиция и службы безопасности подбросили Маматкулову наркотики во время его ареста в 2012 году, и в конечном итоге приговорили его к 12 годам лишения свободы. Как и некоторые другие, упомянутые здесь, Маматкулов провел время в Жаслыке, где подвергался жестоким пыткам. Он был освобожден в марте 2018 года.[10] На вопрос о том, как он оценивает пробные реформы в Узбекистане за последние четыре года, Маматкулов отвечает, что они изменили его жизнь и жизнь его семьи.[11] Однако те годы, что были украдены у него репрессивным государством, разлучая его с женой и двумя дочерями, он никогда не сможет вернуть. Тем не менее, не утратив смелости, Маматкулов возобновил свою правозащитную деятельность и настойчиво добивается собственной реабилитации в судах. В декабре 2018 года, создавая прецедент для Узбекистана, Верховный суд предоставил Маматкулову право на новый судебный процесс - это был первый случай, когда бывший политзаключенный получил право на новый судебный процесс. Более важная победа наступила в марте 2020 года, когда Каршинский апелляционный суд полностью снял с Маматкулова все обвинения и присудил ему номинальную денежную компенсацию.[12] В решении установлено, что доказательства по делу Маматкулова, в том числе ложные показания сотрудников правоохранительных органов и показания, полученные под давлением от свидетелей, были сфабрикованы. Таким образом, суд постановил, что никаких доказательств, подтверждающих совершение преступления, нет. На основании статьи 83 Уголовно-процессуального кодекса Узбекистана («Основания для реабилитации») дело Маматкулова представляет собой потенциальную «дорожную карту» в будущих делах. Статья 83 гласит: Подозреваемый, обвиняемый, подсудимый признается невиновным и подлежит реабилитации, если, в частности:  отсутствует событие преступления, по поводу которого было возбуждено уголовное дело и производилось расследование или судебное разбирательство; отсутствует в его деянии состав преступления; он непричастен к совершению преступления.[13] Основываясь на полном оправдательном приговоре, Маматкулов в настоящее время добивается полной компенсации по гражданскому делу. Его случай свидетельствует о том, что узбекское законодательство уже дает основание для реабилитации лиц, лишенных свободы на ложных, произвольных или политически мотивированных основаниях. Данная практика может быть систематизирована и применена через механизм или комиссию правосудия переходного периода к более широкой группе бывших политических заключенных. © Steve Swerdlow, Qarshi, November 2018. Оправдательный приговор по «шпионскому» делу дает надеждуДругой случай, дающий луч надежды, - это дело Андрея Кубатина, тюрколога, который был задержан за шпионаж в 2017 году по статье 157 (измена государству).[14] Статья 157 неоднократно использовалась в политических целях для преследования и заключения в тюрьму десятков, возможно, сотен лиц, включая бывших правительственных чиновников, сотрудников ООН, ученых, военных, журналистов и других лиц за шпионаж, якобы совершенный в интересах чередующихся групп стран (США, Великобритания, Россия, Турция, Таджикистан и т.д.). Вызывает озабоченность тот факт, что значительное число лиц были арестованы по обвинению по статье 157 с 2016 года, судимы на закрытых судебных процессах и подвергались пыткам или жестокому обращению.[15] Благодаря бесстрашной активности его сестры Клары Сахаревой органы власти и суд Ташкента согласились пересмотреть его приговор, сначала смягчив наказание, а в сентябре 2019 года оправдав Кубатина по всем пунктам обвинения. После оправдательного приговора Элис Уэллс, исполнявшая в то время обязанности главного помощника госсекретаря США по Южной и Центральной Азии и ведущего дипломата Вашингтона по Центральной Азии, написала в твиттере: «Освобождение ученого Андрея Кубатина из тюрьмы - долгожданное событие. Я призываю правительство Узбекистана продолжить тщательный пересмотр предыдущих приговоров по статье 157. AGW».[16] К сожалению, узбекское правительство до сих пор не последовало этому совету. Родственники многих других заключенных по статье 157, все еще находящихся за решеткой, борются за освобождение своих родственников и их последующее оправдание.[17] Хотя власти не предприняли прямых действий по реабилитации, в марте месяце после трех попыток регистрации местной правозащитной группы «Huquqi Tayanch» («Правовая поддержка»), первой независимой правозащитной неправительственной организации (НПО), зарегистрированной в Узбекистане с 2002 года, появилась надежда на то, что она будет зарегистрирована. Huquqi Tayanch, созданная бывшими политическими заключенными Азамом Фармоновым и Дилмуродом Саидовым, установила реабилитацию и социальную реинтеграцию бывших политических заключенных и жертв пыток в качестве одного из своих ключевых направлений деятельности.[18] Регистрация единственной критичной независимой НПО, к сожалению, является исключением, а не правилом в Узбекистане Мирзияева. Один из основателей Huquqi Tayanch, правозащитник Агзам Тургунов, говорит, что власти настаивали на его исключении из организации в качестве условия ее регистрации. Многочисленным НПО, таким как Гуманитарно-юридический центр в Бухаре и группа мониторинга принудительного труда «Чирок», базирующаяся в Каракалпакстане, было отказано в регистрации Министерством юстиции по надуманным основаниям, несмотря на большую заинтересованность правительства в развитии роли гражданского общества. Давно назрела необходимость перемен в этой области. Правосудие переходного периода и АндижанЛюбое обсуждение вопросов правосудия переходного периода в Узбекистане было бы неполным без учета самой коллективной травмы в новейшей истории страны и определяющего события 27-летнего правления Ислама Каримова - Андижанской резни. 13 мая 2005 года правительственные войска открыли огонь по тысячам преимущественно мирных демонстрантов на центральной площади города Андижана, расположенного в Ферганской долине на востоке Узбекистана. Протестующие собрались, чтобы выступить против бедности, безработицы и репрессий со стороны правительства и призвать правительство отреагировать на их бедственное положение. Ранее в день протеста вооруженные люди освободили 23 местных бизнесмена, осужденных за «религиозный экстремизм», и захватили здания местных органов власти. По мере того, как собирались тысячи протестующих, правительственные силы на бронетранспортерах (БТР) и снайперы вели огонь по толпе гражданских лиц без всякого предупреждения и разбора, перекрывая площадь, когда люди пытались спастись бегством, в результате чего погибли сотни людей. Хотя на площади находилась небольшая группа боевиков, подавляющее большинство демонстрантов были безоружны. Затем правительственные войска прошли через площадь и казнили раненых там, где они лежали. Представители правительства не предприняли никаких очевидных усилий для того, чтобы применение смертоносной силы было сведено исключительно к ситуациям, в которых оно строго неизбежно для защиты жизни людей, как этого требует международное право. Организация Объединенных Наций и другие межправительственные организации установили, что правительство применяло смертоносную силу в чрезмерной степени. После этой резни узбекское правительство, в стремлении переписать историю того дня и жестоко пресекая любые попытки раскрыть правду о зверских убийствах или добиться привлечения к ответственности, отвергло все усилия, направленные на проведение независимого расследования. Хотя свидетельства очевидцев и другие доказательства указывают на более чем 700 убитых, узбекские власти утверждали, что было убито только 187 человек и обвиняли исламистов и неназванные западные державы в планировании переворота. В последующие месяцы сотни людей были приговорены к лишению свободы до 22 лет в ходе судебных процессов, которые были названы критиками как заказные со стороны правительства, и каждый, кого подозревали, что он участник или свидетель тех событий, становился мишенью для преследований. Яростное сопротивление Каримова призывам к независимому расследованию резни заставило США и Европейский Союз (ЕС) ужесточить санкции в отношении Узбекистана на несколько лет, что привело к масштабному изгнанию из страны международных неправительственных организаций и глубокой политической и экономической изоляции миллионов простых узбеков. Только со смертью Каримова в августе 2016 года Узбекистан начал медленно выходить из стагнации и глубокой атмосферы страха, последовавшей за андижанскими событиями. Раскрытие правды и общественная дискуссия об андижанской резне имеют большое значение и спустя 15 лет после событий. В своем публичном выступлении во время исторического визита в Ташкент в мае 2017 года тогдашний Верховный комиссар ООН по правам человека Зейд Раад аль-Хусейн также подчеркнул важность установления ответственности за «ужасные события», произошедшие в тот день в Андижане. «Хотя очень важно смотреть вперед, также важно разобраться с событиями прошлого и добиваться того, чтобы жертвы не были забыты, а их жалобы были удовлетворены», - сказал он.[19] Небольшое смещение акцента в официальном тоне произошло в начале текущего года, когда заместитель генерального прокурора Светлана Артыкова дала интервью местному отделению Qalampir.uz, в котором она, судя по всему, признала, что была применена чрезмерная сила.  Замечания Артыковой, которая была пресс-секретарем прокуратуры в мае 2005 года, могли быть сделаны только с одобрения сверху. Отвечая на вопрос о том, применялось ли оружие правительственными силами против гражданского населения, Артыкова ответила, что между войсками и руководством страны не было четкой координации, и что именно поэтому «во время митинга погибло определенное количество граждан». По словам Артыковой, несколько должностных лиц, признанных виновными в противозаконных убийствах, были осуждены, а некоторые уже вышли из тюрьмы. Это был первый случай, когда какой-либо чиновник Узбекистана утверждал, что какие-либо должностные лица были заключены в тюрьму из-за причастности к андижанским событиям. В минувшем месяце, после ужасной гибели от пыток андижанского бизнесмена Алижана Абдукаримова, депутат парламента Узбекистана от партии «Адолат» (Справедливость) Гулрух Агзамова также упомянула андижанские события, осуждая действия сотрудников органов внутренних дел, применивших пытки.[20] Эти упоминания об Андижане исходят из официального запроса, но могут свидетельствовать о готовности официальных лиц пересмотреть болезненную историю Андижанской резни. Наряду с важностью обеспечения справедливости и подотчетности в отношении жертв и их семей необходимо создать беспристрастную, независимую комиссию по расследованию и установлению истины для составления достоверного исторического документа, который мог бы способствовать национальному оздоровлению и сплочению. Осмысление трагедии Андижана в открытом, доступном формате имеет важное значение для содействия Узбекистану в переходе к более открытому и демократическому обществу. Дорожная карта действий: РекомендацииРеабилитация и правосудие переходного периода имеют основополагающее значение для всеобщего успешного осуществления программы реформ, которую президент Мирзияев неоднократно делал главной задачей своего правительства на протяжении последних четырех лет. Это объясняется тем, что в основе правосудия переходного периода лежит обязательство признавать человеческое достоинство, устанавливать уважение к верховенству закона путем предоставления возмещения и признания нарушений прав человека, а также предотвращать их повторение. Президент Мирзиёев и правительство Узбекистана должны официально признать прошлые нарушения, обеспечить конкретные возможности для восстановления нарушенных прав и дать четкий сигнал, что мирная критика политики правительства и исследование прошлого будут действительно цениться в Узбекистане. Политика правосудия и реабилитации в переходный период должна сделать центральной задачей привлечение жертв пыток, правозащитников и независимого гражданского общества, а также обеспечить тесное сотрудничество с парламентом (Олий Мажлисом), Омбудсменом по правам человека, Национальным центром по правам человека, правоохранительными структурами, Министерством юстиции и международными экспертами в области прав человека. Бывшие политзаключенные призывают власти Узбекистана создать специальную комиссию, состоящую из правительственных чиновников, представителей неправительственных групп и международных экспертов, для решения вопросов реабилитации бывших политзаключенных, изучения дел лиц, все еще находящихся в тюрьме по политически мотивированным обвинениям, и предоставления рекомендаций соответствующим государственным органам. Настало время прислушаться к их призывам и предоставить им комплексную реабилитацию, которая является их правом в соответствии с законодательством Узбекистана и международным правом. По словам правоведа Дианы Шелтон, реабилитация в Узбекистане должна « обеспечить максимальную физическую и психологическую форму, предоставляя возможность каждому человеку, семье, местной общине и даже обществу в целом» и охватывать бывших политических заключенных, жертв пыток и «всех жертв тяжких злодеяний». Статья 83 Уголовно-процессуального кодекса Узбекистана и дела Чуяна Маматкулова и Андрея Кубатина являются примерным проектом, к которому узбекские суды могли бы прибегнуть при рассмотрении многих дел во всех инстанциях. Парламенту также следует рассмотреть вопрос о принятии отдельного закона о реабилитации. Более полное изучение того, что будет включать в себя этот закон о реабилитации, какие сроки и какие виды жертв он будет охватывать, а также сравнительная международная практика будут предметом отдельной научной статьи. Правительству следует также внести изменения в расплывчатые и излишне обобщенные положения Уголовного кодекса, касающиеся шпионажа и экстремизма, которые обычно используются для криминализации инакомыслия - статьи 157, 159, 216, 244-1, 244-2 Уголовного кодекса - и привести их в соответствие с международными обязательствами Узбекистана в области прав человека. Ташкенту следует разрешить проведение независимого мониторинга тюрем и других мест содержания под стражей в Узбекистане для искоренения практики пыток и других форм жестокого обращения, а также ратифицировать Факультативный протокол к Конвенции против пыток. Протокол предусматривает создание системы мониторинга и требует, чтобы независимые органы, ответственные за проведение такого мониторинга, имели возможность в любое время без предварительного уведомления входить в места содержания под стражей. В 2013 году Международный Комитет Красного Креста (МККК) прекратил мониторинг пенитенциарных учреждений Узбекистана, ссылаясь на вмешательство со стороны властей. Правосудие переходного периода в Узбекистане будет успешным только в том случае, если независимое гражданское общество сможет играть более активную роль в продвижении и осуществлении перемен. Это означает, что Министерство юстиции должно немедленно устранить многочисленные бюрократические препоны, которые препятствуют регистрации многих правозащитных организаций, средств массовой информации и других критически важных НПО, а также нормативные акты, ограничивающие деятельность и деятельность местных НПО, работающих над такими политически чувствительными вопросами, как пытки. Стив Свердлов является юристом-правозащитником и экспертом по вопросам прав человека в постсоветском регионе. С 2010 по 2019 год Свердлов был старшим исследователем по Центральной Азии в отделе Европы и Центральной Азии Хьюман Райтс Вотч (Human Rights Watch, HRW). Являясь юристом, обладающим двадцатилетним опытом исследовательской и правозащитной деятельности на постсоветском пространстве, Свердлов руководил работой HRW по Узбекистану и Таджикистану, был одним из директоров-основателей представительства HRW в Бишкеке (Кыргызстан) и был одним из первых независимых правозащитников, проводивших обширную полевую работу на территории Узбекистана с момента принятия правительством Узбекистана решения о возвращении правозащитных организаций в страну в 2017 году. В настоящее время он является консультантом Программы развития ООН и Международной организации труда, где проводит тренинги по повышению уровня подготовки правозащитников и журналистов в Центральной Азии. Ранее Свердлов был участником программы Госдепартамента США «Молодые лидеры для государственной службы в России» и работал в качестве наблюдателя за соблюдением прав человека в Союзе советов для советских евреев и Международной организации по миграции в России. До прихода в HRW компания Свердлов занимался юридической практикой в Сан-Франциско в Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, а также работал судебным клерком у Почетного судьи Дина Прегерсона в Окружном суде США Центрального округа Калифорнии. Cover Photo © Steve Swerdlow, Andijan, June 2018. [1] Должностные лица правительства сообщили, что тюремные власти также освободили сотни независимых мусульман - людей, исповедующих ислам вне рамок строгого государственного контроля, - которые были заключены в тюрьму по обвинению в экстремизме на длительные сроки тюремного заключения. Однако невозможно независимо подтвердить заявления об этих освобождениях или опросить кого-либо из них, не имея доступа к списку лиц, отбывающих эти приговоры. Власти должны предоставить список всех лиц, которые в настоящее время отбывают наказание по обвинению в экстремизме.[2] Амнести Интернэшнл, Блоггинг в Узбекистане: приветствие туризма, глушение критики, июнь 2020 г. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2020/06/blogging-in-uzbekistan-welcoming-tourism-silencing-criticism/[3] Основные принципы и руководящие положения, касающиеся права на правовую защиту и возмещение ущерба для жертв грубых нарушений международных норм в области прав человека и серьезных нарушений международного гуманитарного права, Преамбула, принятая Комиссией ООН по правам человека в 2005 году, Документ ООН E/CN.4/RES/2005/35 и принятая Генеральной Ассамблеей 16 декабря 2005 года, документ ООН A/RES/60/147.[4] Новак, Манфред и МакАртур, Элизабет. 2008. Конвенция Организации Объединенных Наций против пыток, Комментарий. Оксфорд: Пресса Оксфордского университета, стр. 483.[5] Основные принципы и руководящие положения, касающиеся права на правовую защиту и возмещение ущерба для жертв грубых нарушений международных норм в области прав человека и серьезных нарушений международного гуманитарного права, Преамбула, принятая Комиссией ООН по правам человека в 2005 году, Документ ООН E/CN.4/RES/2005/35 и принятая Генеральной Ассамблеей 16 декабря 2005 года, документ ООН A/RES/60/147.[6] Шелтон, Дайна. «Средства защиты прав человека в международном праве». Оксфорд: Пресса Оксфордского университета. стр. 275.[7] Комитет ООН против пыток, Комитет против пыток, Заключительные замечания по пятому периодическому докладу по Узбекистану, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/UZB/CAT_C_UZB_CO_5_39781_E.pdf[8] Государственный департамент США, Отчеты о правах человека по странам, 2007 г, https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007//index.htm[9] Мусаева против Узбекистана, Сообщения № 1914, 1915 и 1916/2009, Международный пакт ООН о гражданских и политических правах, июнь 2012 года, http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2012.03.21_Musaeva_v_Uzbekistan.pdf[10] Стив Свердлоу и Эндрю Стролейн, За Самаркандом, Лос-Анджелес Отзыв о книгах, март 2019 г., https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/beyond-samarkand/[11] Интервью с Чуяном Маматкуловым, Карши, ноябрь 2018 г.; интервью по телефону 22 марта 2020 г.[12] Radio Ozodlik, Суд в Кашкадарье полностью оправдал экс-политзаключенного Чуяна Маматкулова, March 2020, https://rus.ozodlik.mobi/a/30496604.html?withmediaplayer=1; Gazeta.uz, “Правозащитник Чуян Маматкулов полностью оправдан,” March 2020, https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/03/20/mamatkulov/?utm_source=push&utm_medium=telegram[13] Статья 83, Уголовно-процессуальный кодекс Республики Узбекистан, https://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/8932[14] Агнешка Пикулицка-Вильчевска, Почему ученый по тюркским языкам заключен в тюрьму в Узбекистане, Аль-Джазира, август 2019 г., https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/turkic-languages-scholar-imprisoned-uzbekistan-190801120104671.html[15] Среди нынешних заключенных по статье 157 - бывший узбекский дипломат Кадыр Юсупов, журналист-аналитик Владимир Калошин, нынешние или бывшие военнослужащие Равшан Косимов, Алишер Ачилдиев, Виктор Шин, бывшая сотрудница милиции Алена Ким и бывший директор Института стратегических и межрегиональных исследований при Президенте Рафик Сайфулин..[16] См. твит Элис Г. Уэллс, исполняющая обязанности Главного помощника Государственного секретаря по Южной и Центральной Азии, 27 сентября 2019 г., https://twitter.com/State_SCA/status/1177630285644607491[17] Недавний подкаст Радио Свободная Европа / Подкаст Меджлиса Радио Свобода рассказывает о многих из этих дел и включает в себя беседу с родственниками заключенного журналиста Владимира Калошина и бывшего дипломата Кадыра Юсупова. См. RFE/RL, Меджлис Подкаст: Шпионские игры в Узбекистане, июнь 2020 г, https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-spies-in-uzbekistan/30670139.html  [18] См. Eurasianet, Узбекистан дает надежду на регистрацию НПО, март 2020 года, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-sparks-hope-with-registration-of-ngos[19] УВКПЧ, Вступительное слово Верховного комиссара ООН по правам человека Зейда Раада аль-Хусейна на пресс-конференции во время его миссии в Узбекистан, Ташкент, май 2017 г, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21607&LangID=E[20] См. Гулрух Агзамова, Ichhki Ishlar – ichichimizdagi ishkalmi yoxud xiyonat?, Adolat, June 2020, http://adolat.uz/partiya/ichki-ishlar-ichimizdagi-ishkalmi-yohud-xiyonat  [post_title] => Реабилитация здесь и сейчас: Обеспечение правосудия переходного периода в Узбекистане [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => %d1%80%d0%b5%d0%b0%d0%b1%d0%b8%d0%bb%d0%b8%d1%82%d0%b0%d1%86%d0%b8%d1%8f-%d0%b7%d0%b4%d0%b5%d1%81%d1%8c-%d0%b8-%d1%81%d0%b5%d0%b9%d1%87%d0%b0%d1%81-%d0%be%d0%b1%d0%b5%d1%81%d0%bf%d0%b5%d1%87%d0%b5 [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:35:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:35:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4882 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[37] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4842 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-07-23 00:08:35 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-07-22 23:08:35 [post_content] => This Policy Report examines the relationship between religion-state relations, forced displacement, religious diplomacy and human security in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, with a focus on eight countries in the region, Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine. It engages with four areas: 1) the circulation of ideas on human security between religious and secular courts, monastic settlements, pilgrimage sites and educational establishments; 2) religious strategies in relation to violence, tolerance, transitory environments and resettlement; 3) religious support, protection and mechanisms towards displaced populations, and 4) channels of religious diplomacy advancing human security. The Policy Report summarises the findings of two British Academy projects running at Aston University that have collected a dataset on ‘Eastern Orthodoxy and Human Security’ composed of 70 interviews with officials in Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine belonging to three main categories, namely: 1) religious practitioners (lay people, lower and higher clergy) in charge of humanitarian programmes; 2) governmental and civil society organisations; and 3) academics working in national universities and academies of sciences.[1] Findings from the interviews have been included in this collection. This publication seeks to answer a number of important questions:  

1. What happens when states fail to support migrants and forcibly displaced populations? How do religious actors (national churches, religious institutions, national and internationally affiliated organisations) and state bodies engage with human security in Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine?
2. What are the mechanisms of Orthodox support towards forcibly displaced communities in these countries? How does displacement impact upon religious practices, values and political structures?
3. How does Orthodox diplomacy impact upon state relations in Eastern Europe and Eurasia and, most importantly, between Eastern and Western Europe?

 The publication finds that:  

1. First, European Union (EU) migration policies and forced migration are highly contentious and have been politicised in predominantly Orthodox countries, entailing a long-term impact on East-West relations. At times, the EU’s approach to migration has been presented as a sign of an ideological clash between East and West.

 

2. Second, when states fail to offer support for populations affected by violence, religious communities have been one of the first actors to take over state functions and act as providers of human security. In the first months of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Christian and Muslim communities crossed the faith divide mobilised themselves nationally in support of internally displaced people before the Ukrainian government issued a national strategy. In Serbia, faith-based organisations supported Syrian refugees following the Balkan route by working with local authorities and the government before an organised policy response had been implemented. In many cases, authorities turned to religious communities to provide support for migrants as the state did not have the necessary mechanisms to address humanitarian emergencies.

 

3. Third, in the Donbass region, the ‘buffer zone’ is not just one between military forces but a spiritual and geographical space between religions not only generating violence but also supporting tolerance and reconciliation. In Ukraine, competing Orthodox churches have their own humanitarian networks supporting local populations and displaced population. One of them, the local Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), regards the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a civil war and has been involved in the release of prisoners of war.

 

4. Fourth, the competition between Orthodox churches continues to reverberate, having an impact not only on relations between religious communities but also directly affecting state support and engagement with human security. The rivalry between the national Orthodox churches in Ukraine, the support of the Ukrainian government for religious independence outside Moscow, and the increasing anti-Westernism of Orthodox clergy faced by a dramatic number of Syrian migrants and migrant camps along the Balkan route, are directly linked to the ways in which state structures address and manage violence, security and social cohesion.[2]

 

5. The topic of forced displacement is highly contentious not only in countries directly affected by the refugee crisis but also in others in the region. The refugee crisis has led to an internationally-linked Orthodox conservatism characterised by five components: defending a mythical past; fostering close relations with state authorities; anti-Westernism; building conservative networks at local, national and geopolitical levels; and, presenting Orthodox churches as alternative governance structures. For example, in Bulgaria, the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church, the highest religious authority in the country, stood out as the first religious body in the region to publicly challenge the government’s policy towards refugees. In Moldova, during debates in the run up to the presidential elections, the Orthodox Church endorsed the fake news that 30,000 Syrians were about to arrive in the country affecting the balance between the pro-Russian and pro-EU candidates.

 

6. The exact figures of forcibly displaced populations remain unclear. In many cases, people in need refuse to register with state bodies due to fears of violence and deportation, and they find the means of support from other civil society sources. Contradictory figures are provided by a wide range of national and international organisations, for example, in Greece, Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine.

 

7. Religious diversity remains one of the most challenging issues in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states. It is without doubt that many religious communities have provided support to populations in need, particularly at local level. However, fear of the ‘other’ and proselytism remain dominant and characterise the ways in which religious communities have responded to humanitarian crises. Religion-state relations are different for each country in the region going back to the role of religious communities in the establishment of modern nation states. Understanding the intricacies of religion-state relations is fundamental to the ways in which religious communities and state authorities support each other in times of both ‘peace’ and ‘crisis’.

 

8. As a general rule, Eastern Christian churches do not publicise their social activities, putting forward theological arguments that humanitarian activities should not be made public. The transparency of funds used in social programmes has been linked to the social and political legitimacy of each religious confession. This has been particularly poignant in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, with the lack of large-scale humanitarian programmes linked to the ways in which religion-state relations have evolved after the fall of communism.[3]

 Based on these findings the publication makes a number of policy recommendations:  

1. Religious literacy among political elites in Europe would help counter the politicisation of religion. There should be wider public and policy awareness of the ways in which political messages are delivered by religious channels of communication. The politicisation of religion in the Eastern Orthodox world will continue to shape relations between Russia and the EU. The ongoing conflict in Donbass and increasing regional instability will lead to further employment of religious symbols.

 

2. There is no (or in a number of cases, very limited) dialogue between Orthodox churches and their social departments working on humanitarian issues. A refugee entering a country on the Balkan route or one of the former Soviet states experiences varied levels of religious and state solidarity and humanitarian support. Cooperation between religious communities (as for example, the support of people in need by religious practitioners from the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church) has produced a tangible result for the migrants in state-run camps. Inter-religious cooperation on humanitarian issues should be encouraged and followed up not only internationally, but also at the national level. External funding to humanitarian programmes should include a wide range of religious actors, not only favouring the predominant religious confession in the country.

 

3. Religious education in this region should include more references to and examples of both violence and reconciliation. Many clergy depict the EU as an ideological bloc opposing Orthodox values. Opportunities should be funded encouraging religious practitioners and students of theology/religion to travel and study in the EU, which would lead to greater openness and understanding among not only religious leaders but also, and more importantly, within local communities affected by conflict.

 

4. Religious communities remain key to both violence and reconciliation. Policy makers should be aware of the potential of religious communities to aggravate violence. They should work with both local and top-level religious leaders to generate greater cooperation between state and religious structures benefiting populations in need. For example, the high degree of support since 2014 among the Ukrainian population for the former Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate, now mostly incorporated into the new Orthodox Church of Ukraine, was not only due to the church leadership’s welcoming of European values but also due to its support for Ukraine’s military forces in Donbass.[4] The numbers of military chaplains accompanying the troops has been reflected by the population’s trust in the Kyiv Patriarchate at the expense of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).

 Lucian N. Leustean is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Aston University where he has been teaching since 2007. He studied international relations, law and theology in Bucharest, Romania, and completed his PhD in Political Science at LSE. His research has been supported by fellowships from the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Amsterdam (Fellow in residence, 2018-19), the Westminster Abbey Institute (Fellow, 2015-16), and the Transatlantic Academy of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Senior Fellow, 2014-15), and grants from the British Academy, the European Commission and the Economic and Social Research Council. In 2018-21, he is Principal Investigator of a British Academy grant on 'When States Fail. Forced Displacement, Religious Diplomacy and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World'. The project draws on the findings of the 2018 British Academy Grant on 'Forced Migration'. Cover photo: ‘Cathedral of Talin, Armenia, May 2019’. Copyright: Lucian N. Leustean [1]The two projects are 2018-2020: ‘Forced Migration, Religious Diplomacy and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World’ (IC2\100047), awarded under the Tackling the UK's International Challenges 2017 Programme; and ‘When States Fail: Forced Displacement, Religious Diplomacy and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World’ (SDP2\100014), the Sustainable Development Programme, as part of the UK Government’s Global Challenges Research Fund. The projects have organised workshops which brought together academics and policy practitioners in Belgrade, Serbia (June 2018), Kyiv, Ukraine (September 2018) and Yerevan, Armenia (November 2019).[2] Findings 1-4 stem from the first British Academy project (2018) which focused on Serbia and Ukraine.[3] Findings 5-8 are based the second British Academy project (2018-2020) which focused on Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia and Moldova.[4] Most of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate has merged with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, to create the Orthodox Church of Ukraine following the Tomos (decree) of autocephaly (decree of ecclesial independence) by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in Istanbul on January 5^th 2019. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate was subsequently revived in 2019 by former UOC (KP) Patriarch Filaret (following the election of Epiphanius I as Metropolitan of the new church). [post_title] => Religion and Forced Displacement in the Eastern Orthodox World: Executive Summary [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => religion-and-forced-displacement-in-the-eastern-orthodox-world-executive-summary [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:35:25 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:35:25 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4842 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[38] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4840 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-07-23 00:07:14 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-07-22 23:07:14 [post_content] => IntroductionAfter the collapse of the Soviet Union and its newly gained independence in 1991, the Republic of Armenia (RA) underwent profound demographic changes. Since the late 1980s, the country has experienced waves of migration caused by the devastating earthquake of 1988 and the armed conflict with neighbouring Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) region, which resulted in border blockades and harsh economic conditions. Since then, Armenia has been characterised by one of the highest migration rates worldwide, as more than one third of the population lives permanently outside the country. From 2008 to 2012, Armenia was one of the main countries of origin of asylum seekers and economic refugees entering the European Union (EU).[1] The emigration of an estimated one million Armenians since 1988 has been offset by the influx of ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and NK, and, in the last five to six years, from Iraq, Iran and Syria. In addition, repatriated diaspora Armenians have started to return home. In addition, a relatively small proportion of incomers is formed by non-ethnic Armenians, such as refugees from Ukraine, the Far East and a number of African states. Religion, ethnicity and populationAs part of the Soviet Union, Armenia was the smallest (29,800 km²) but ethnically most homogenous republic. In the last Soviet census in 1989, Armenia, having already been affected by the 1988 earthquake, had a de jure population of 3,304,776 million, of whom two thirds were urban and one third rural. Ethnic Armenians represented the majority of the population (93.5 per cent), followed by Azerbaijanis, Kurds and Yezidis. After independence, the first Armenian census in 2001 already reflected drastic demographic changes with a population of 3,213,011, composed of 97.9 per cent Armenians with Yezidis as the largest ethnic minority (1.2 per cent). The Azerbaijanis had left or been expelled from the country.[2] After 2001, even greater demographic homogenisation was caused by the emigration of Russian-speaking Armenians and ethnic minorities as a consequence of strict language policies, and a wave of repatriation on the part of incoming diaspora Armenians. The census of 2011 counted 3,018,854 inhabitants, of whom 98.1 per cent were ethnic Armenians, followed by 1.1 per cent Yezidis and 0.3 per cent Russians.[3] In both censuses, the answer to the optional question of ethnic affiliation was recorded according to the respondent’s self-identification. Table 1: Population decrease in the Republic of Armenia, total numbers[4] Armenia is also labelled the last Christian bulwark in this region. The oldest Christian state in the world looks, at least in terms of official figures and statistics, to have a predominantly Christian population, with more than 90 per cent belonging to the Armenian Apostolic Church. In the census of 2011, the population was asked about its faith and religious affiliation for the first time after 70 years of Soviet atheist indoctrination. 95.97 per cent of the population described themselves as believers, with 96.55 per cent of these belonging to the Armenian Apostolic Church, the national church of Armenia. The next largest religious groups with 1.01 per cent were the Evangelicals and with 0.87 per cent the followers of Shar-fadin (Yezidism). [5] The question of religious affiliation was again based on self-identification with a religion or religious denomination, and cannot not be equated with official membership in the respective religious or denominational community or with active practicing of the given faith. Table 2: Religious affiliation in the Republic of Armenia, Census 2011[6] However, there is some doubt about the official population figures of Armenia. Due to population movements, mainly from Armenia (caused by both significant labour migration to Russia and Turkey and ongoing emigration), and to a much lesser extent also to Armenia (repatriation or naturalisation of diaspora Armenians), the number of people residing permanently in Armenia appears to be much smaller than the stated figures. The declining birth rate also contributes to the ongoing population decline.[7] The figures reflecting population distribution in terms of ethnicity, mother tongue and religious affiliation should also be critically examined. Information provided by representatives and associations of the respective ethnic and religious groups differ significantly from the census data. Religion-state relationsAt various times in the history of Armenia, the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) clearly held the position of national leader, and was strongly committed to preserving national culture and values. In the 1980s, the AAC was also involved in the movement towards regaining independence for Armenia and for the liberation of NK. With the country having achieved independence, the leadership of the republic had to redefine the balance of power in the state, and to formulate internationally recognised legislation concerning religion and religious groups. The 1988 earthquake provided fertile grounds for various ‘foreign’ religious organisations, with some arriving bearing humanitarian aid, and some regarding post-Soviet Armenia as a suitable market place for Evangelisation. Thus, even before the adoption of the first post-Soviet constitution in 1995, the law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations (FCRO) was passed on June 17^th 1991 and amended in 1997, 2001 and 2011.[8] This law, the RA Constitution of July 5^th 1995, amended in 2005 and 2015, and the Law regarding the relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church (RAHAAC) of February 2^nd 2007, form the most relevant legal documents regulating the religious affairs of the republic.[9] They also address the distribution of power between state and church, while also emphasising the role of AAC for the Armenian people: 

• The FCRO begins declaring the AAC as the "national Church of the Armenian people" and "an important bulwark for the edification of its spiritual life and national preservation", but establishes in Article 6.17 the separation of church and state.[10]
• Article 18 of the Armenian Constitution provides for the separation of church and state, but also defines the "exclusive historical mission" of the AAC.[11]
• The RAHAAC 2007 recognises in Article 2 the special relationship between the AAC and the state and the AAC as national church, as "an important and indivisible part of the foundation of the national identity".[12]

 The new government following the ‘velvet revolution’ of 2018 declared on various occasions the strict separation between state and government and its will not to interfere in church matters regarding religions minorities. It suspended, however the process of adopting a new draft of the law on religious freedom.[13] Religion and forced displacementThe Republic of Armenia is generally regarded as a traditional emigration country. The figures for the last 30 years indicate a continuing trend. This high level of emigration was initially a consequence of the 1988 earthquake, the armed conflict over NK in the 1990s, and economic factors ongoing since independence, and only to a limited extent due to discrimination or persecution based on political, religious or sexual orientation. The displaced population in RA consists largely of ethnic Armenians, and is composed only of a relatively small proportion of non-Armenian refugees and asylum seekers. In the early 1990s, the young republic was already overwhelmed by the mass influx of 360,000 ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan as a consequence of the NK conflict between 1988 and 1992. Since 2004, Armenia has welcomed hundreds of ethnic Armenian refugees from Iraq, as well as small numbers of ‘alien’ asylum seekers and refugees from the Middle East and Asia. The conflict in the Ukraine has led to a noticeable wave of arrivals since 2014. Since 2012, however, the most significant influx has come from Syria. Some 20,000 people sought shelter in Armenia, mainly ethnic Armenians, and by 2018 about 15,000 of them remained in the country. Following a short escalation of the conflict in NK in April 2016, about 2000 people were displaced from the NK villages of Talish and Mataghis. Table 3: Total number of asylum applications in the Republic of Armenia, 1999-2018[14] The Armenian authorities have reacted to the growing issue of displaced persons (DPs) and refugees by implementing corresponding laws and international agreements. In addition, Armenia quickly adopted various regulations to facilitate the status of ethnic Armenian DPs. Nevertheless, the majority of displaced ethnic Armenians, who came mainly from NK, Iraq and Syria, chose the administratively simpler and socially more prestigious residence permit or citizenship. Thus, while more than 15,000 displaced Armenians from Syria had received Armenian citizenship by 2015, just a few of them actually registered officially as asylum seekers or have the status of refugee.[15] Nevertheless, the majority of ethnic Armenians with residence or citizenship status live in refugee-like conditions. Officially, there are 18,085 refugees and asylum seekers registered in Armenia, among them 14,718 from Syria, 1,354 from Azerbaijan, 1092 from Iraq and 573 from NK.[16] Table 4: Citizenships of asylum seekers arriving in the Republic of Armenia, 2014-18[17] The relevant legal framework is mainly provided in the Armenian Law on Refugees and Asylum and in the law ‘On the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia’ of 1995 and amended in 2011, laws providing legislation for refugees from Azerbaijan and for ‘foreigners’ in general.[18] The State Migration Service, the National Security Service, Border Guards Troops, the Passport and Visa Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the office of the president of the RA and others are the primary responsible governmental entities. It is challenging to briefly summarise the role and position of the AAC on the DP issue. The AAC, which for centuries was the most important supporter of displaced Armenians in the diaspora, has significant difficulties in maintaining this function in the RA. Whereas until the early 2000s the precarious economic situation and the deficit of priests were cited as the main causes of inadequate humanitarian aid to DPs, in recent decades serious efforts by individual church NGOs and organisations have been repeatedly hampered due to ‘hunting for souls’ – proselytism – on the part of other churches. The AAC feels threatened in its role as national church by many religious groups, but above all by those who could win numerous ethnic Armenians for their religious communities, according to the AAC, mainly thanks to humanitarian aid campaigns and the active support of both internally displaced persons (IDPs) and DPs who crossed national borders. The mass influx of Syrian Armenians demonstrated that the AAC in Armenia is not prepared for far-reaching humanitarian programs, but still has to rely on both the financial help and the organisational experience of the AAC in the diaspora. Due to the dearth of coverage of AAC-initiated efforts for DPs in the media and on social media, many of the AAC's successful refugee projects were and are simply not perceived - either by governmental organisations or by the average Armenian citizen. For example, the efforts of the Armenia Inter-Church Charitable Round Table Foundation (ART), an ecumenical organisation collaborating closely with churches and NGOs with the aim of actively involving the church in social work, are almost unknown.[19] Furthermore, there are many other, smaller NGOs and private initiatives of AAC priests and members that are engaged in supporting displaced Armenians from Syria, but likewise suffer from a lack of public awareness. Thus, in public opinion, the AAC is involved neither in supporting DPs, IDPs and returnees, nor does it maintain any cooperation with governmental institutions on refugee issues. Allegedly there is also a lack of clear statements by the AAC regarding DPs. The AAC also seems to barely cooperate with foreign, religious NGOs or organisations (e.g. CARITAS), but rather tries to compete with them. This may be due to the fact that in recent years the AAC has claimed to be the sole church of every ethnic Armenian, and that ‘apostates’ are often perceived as less truly Armenian. Thus, while the Armenian state, being bound by international treaties and laws, seeks to treat all DPs equally regardless of ethnic origin or religion, the behavior of the AAC tends to share widespread xenophobia with the population of the RA paired with nationalistic narrowmindedness. Policy perspectivesDespite the variety of activities directed at migration and DPs in Armenia, migration policy and above all humanitarian aid are characterised by a lack of coherence, a dearth of accessible information and limited cooperation, particularly regarding interaction between the state and church, or church organisations. The strict separation between church and state, strongly propagated by the post-revolutionary government of Nikol Pashinyan, should better be limited to political issues in foreign and domestic policy, national security and decisions in education and science, but should not refer to issues of universal human rights, tolerance and humanitarian support for ALL persons living in Armenia.[20]  Better information exchange as well as targeted, joint programmes for refugee and DP aid must be ensured. In addition to fighting poverty and preventing further large-scale emigration, the support of DPs in Armenia should also be an important issue and priority for the AAC. This help must also reach all DPs, regardless of their origin, religion, language or cultural values. The Church should not fight a battle against proselytism at the expense of the needy; rather clerics must make every effort to support those in need of help and offer them an open ear. This would without doubt also strengthen the position of the AAC in Armenian society, showing that Christian humanitarian action is not limited to one's own people, but also to strangers and followers of other religions. Thus, the demand for better coherence, information flow and joint programmes also applies to the AAC and other religious organisations. The AAC should reconsider its opinion about relations with those ‘other’ churches and religious communities in the country, particularly with regard to those which have also committed themselves to helping refugees and DPs in Armenia. The AAC, which has not established comparable humanitarian programmes in its history and pastoral activities, can only profit and learn from the long humanitarian experience of these ‘others’. Though the Armenian saying "Armenians rescue Armenians first and foremost" was very true of Armenian history in the 20^th century, it should not prove so not in the history of 21^st century Armenia, which is an increasingly multicultural, multi-religious and highly diverse society, in which mutual respect and tolerance are the most important attributes. Jasmine Dum-Tragut, Armenologist, is head of the Center for the Study of the Christian East and the Department for Armenian Studies, senior scientist at the Department of Biblical Study and Ecclesiastical History, and docent at the Department of Linguistics at the University of Salzburg, Austria. Her latest publications include Far from the Fatherland, in the Fatherland. Fates of Armenian Soldiers in WWI. Exhibition Catalog, AGMI, Tigran Mets, Yerevan 2019; (with D. Winkler) Monastic Life in the Armenian Church, Peter Lang, 2018; and (with U. Bläsing, T.M. van Lint) (eds). A Commemoration Volume for Jos J.S. Weitenberg, Hebrew University Armenian Studies, 15, Peeters Publishers 2019.  Cover photo: ‘Syrian Armenian refugee child praying in Etchmiadzin Cathedral, April 2015’. Copyright: Asadour Guzelian. Printed with author’s permission. [1] Regional Migration Report: South Caucasus 2013, 121pp. ‘European Asylum: 90% of Armenia's Citizens Filing Requests Have Been Rejected’ published in the Armenian online newspaper HETQ, February 2017, https://hetq.am/en/article/75451. ‘The number of asylum applicants from Armenia to the EU is declining”, published in Newsworthy, July 2018, https://www.newsworthy.se/en/dashboard/newslead/13072/?token=31b93580-eab2-4924-91ed-55066b5049c0[2] ‘Results of Armenian Census 2001’ available at https://armstat.am/census2001/pdfs/12.pdf  (population in general) and https://armstat.am/census2001/pdfs/52.pdf  (Ethnic composition of population).[3] ‘Results of the Armenian Census 2011’ available at https://armstat.am/file/doc/99486108.pdf and https://armstat.am/file/doc/99486108.pdf (population in general), https://armstat.am/file/doc/99486253.pdf (Ethnic composition of population).[4] For figures of 2001 Census and 2011 Census see footnotes 2) and 3). For figures of all-Soviet census see http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php?reg=13. For 2019 estimate, with live numbers, see https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/armenia-population/[5] ‘Results of the census of 2011. Religious belief and affiliation’ https://armstat.am/file/doc/99486288.pdf[6] Ibid.[7] After a short-term increase in 2013-2014, the crude birth rate has been dropping annually over the last five years, down to 12.3 births per 1,000 capita of population in 2018. For more information see https://www.ceicdata.com/en/armenia/vital-statistics/vital-statistics-crude-birth-rate-per-1000-population. The de jure population in 2018 was estimated at 2,927,700 inhabitants according to the demographic yearbook of the Armenian Statistical Bureau, The Demographic Yearbook of Armenia, 2018, https://www.populationof.net/armenia/[8] Law for Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations, full text available at https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5744/file/Armenia_law_freedom_conscience_religious_orgs_1991_am2011_en.pdf[9] Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, adopted on December 6^th 2015, full text available at https://www.president.am/en/constitution-2015; Law regarding the relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church, 2007, full text available at: https://www.armenianchurch.org/index.jsp?sid=3&nid=724&y=2007&m=4&d=5&lng=en[10] ‘Being cognizant of the Armenian Apostolic Church as the national Church of the Armenian people and as an important bulwark for the edification of its spiritual life and national preservation’, available at https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5744/file/Armenia_law_freedom_conscience_religious_orgs_1991_am2011_en.pdf[11] Article 18 of the Armenian Constitution states that ‘The Armenian Apostolic Holy Church. 1. The Republic of Armenia shall recognise the exclusive mission of the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church, as a national church, in the spiritual life of the Armenian people, in the development of their national culture and preservation of their national identity. 2. The relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Apostolic Holy Church may be regulated by law’. https://www.president.am/en/constitution-2015/. The wording of the first version of 1991 ‘unique mission’ was changed in the amendment as response to the criticism of the Council of Europe.[12] ‘Article 2 – Holy Armenian Apostolic Church, 1. The Republic of Armenia recognizes the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church as the national church, with the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin as its headquarters and its hierarchal sees of the Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia and the Armenian Patriarchates of Holy Jerusalem and Constantinople; and the exceptional mission of the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church in the spiritual life of the Armenian people, their national cultural development and preservation of their national identity. […]  Article IV – Legislation Regulating the Relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church. The regulating principles of the relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church are delineated by the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia; its general relationship as delineated by the RA law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" and other laws and international agreements; and its special relationship – as a relationship between the state and national church recognized by the state – as delineated by this law’. https://www.armenianchurch.org/index.jsp?sid=3&nid=724&y=2007&m=4&d=5&lng=en[13] This process was also stimulated by a joint paper by the Venice Commission and the OSCE. See: ‘Venice Commission Opinion No. 909/2017, OSCE/ODIHR Opinion No. FORB ARM/319/2018: Joint Opinion on the Draft Law Amending the Law on Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Organizations. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 114th Plenary Session (Venice, March 16^th-17^th 2018)’ available at https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2018)002-e[14] Official figures published by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Development of the Republic of Armenia, Migration Service. http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=146 (figures 1999-2009); http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=145 (figures 2010-2013); and http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=144 (figures 2013-2019).[15] ‘15,465 displaced Armenians from Syria were granted Armenian citizenship between 2012 and June 2015’, in Economic integration of Syrian Armenians in Armenia, 2017, 17.[16] ‘UNHCR Fact Sheet Armenia’, September 2019, available at https://www.un.am/up/file/UNHCR_Armenia_FactSheet-September2019_ENG.pdf[17] Official figures published by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Development of the Republic of Armenia, Migration Service. http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=146 (figures 1999-2009); http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=145 (figures 2010-2013); and http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=144 (figures 2013-2019).[18] See ‘Law on refugees and asylum’ available at https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/7181/file/Armenia_law_on_refugees_asylum_am2011_en.pdf; See ‘Law on citizenship in Republic of Armenia’ available at http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=1731&lang=eng; ‘On legal and socio-economic guarantees of the refugees from the Republic of Azerbaijan from 1988-1992 who acquired the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia’, adopted on December 6^th 2000. ‘On allocating the apartments built for the refugees displaced from the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1988-1992 to the refugees with ownership right’, adopted November 20^th 2002. For a more detailed and complete overview of all Armenian regulations and legislation regarding refugees and asylum please see the website of the Armenian State Migration Service at http://www.smsmta.am/?menu_id=2; Armenian law ‘On Foreigners’, December 15^th 2006, mainly for residence permits for foreigners working and studying in Armenia.[19] The website of the Armenia Inter-Church Charitable Round Table Foundation is available at http://www.roundtable-act.am/en/[20] Nikol Pashinyan assumed the office as the 16^th Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia on May 8^th 2018. [post_title] => Religion and Forced Displacement in the Republic of Armenia [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => religion-and-forced-displacement-in-the-republic-of-armenia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:35:11 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:35:11 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4840 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw )[39] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 4838 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2020-07-23 00:06:54 [post_date_gmt] => 2020-07-22 23:06:54 [post_content] => IntroductionThe modern Bulgarian state emerged on the map of Europe in 1878. Since then, it has experienced a series of forced displacement acts, either as the receiving state or as the country of origin. Yet whereas the political and economic aspects of these displacements have attracted serious scholarly attention, the religious ones remain unexplored. This knowledge gap is largely the result of the militant atheism that until recently dominated in Bulgarian social sciences. Although the collapse of communism triggered a growing interest in religion, researchers continued to neglect its role in cases of forced migration. The situation changed in 2015 when the influx of thousands of migrants to Bulgaria provoked intense public debates centred on the religious identity of newcomers. Careful reading reveals that the host society is inclined to approach this identity through the prism of historical memories about the experience of its traditional religious communities rather than through the lens of abstract theology. Furthermore, Bulgarian citizens, living in a globalised world, have also been influenced by images and notions stirred by the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the more recent Islamist terrorist acts in Europe. Religion, ethnicity and population The modern Bulgarian state was created as a tributary principality of the Ottoman Empire, with the population of two million inhabiting a territory of 64,000 square kilometres situated between the Danube River and the Balkan mountain range. In 1885, the Principality of Bulgaria united with Eastern Rumelia – an Ottoman autonomous province where the majority of the population was also Bulgarian. This act augmented the territory of Bulgaria to 95,704.5 square kilometres and its population to 3,154,375.[1] Later, the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the First World War (1914-1918), the Treaty of Craiova (1940), and the Paris Peace Treaty (1947) caused further modifications to the state borders. Today, Bulgaria has a territory of 110,371.8 square kilometres and is inhabited by a population of 7,000,000.[2] The territorial changes were not the only factor determining the dynamics of Bulgaria’s religious and ethnic demography. No less important were the minority policies of the national governments as well as those of neighbouring states towards the Bulgarian minorities there. All these factors have left their imprint on the development of the ethnic and religious composition of modern Bulgaria (Tables 1 and 2). Interpretation of the numbers presented, however, needs to take into account the specific methodologies used in the date gathering. Until 1905, the censuses did not register the ethnic profile of citizens, but only their religious affiliation and mother tongue, e.g., as it used to be under the censuses conducted by the Ottoman authorities. In its turn, the communist regime excluded information about religion from the census. Finally, the 1992 Census introduced the collection of such data but approached religion as ‘a historically determined belonging of a citizen or that of his/her parents and ancestors to a given group with a specific religious worldview’. Therefore, it is unclear whether the figures registered reflect the family background or the personal religious identity of citizens. In 2001, the census methodology was harmonised with European Union (EU) legislation, and Bulgarians were no longer obliged to register their ethnicity, mother tongue, or religion. Due to the insufficient publicity given to this new situation, however, they took advantage of this right only in 2011, when 21.8 per cent of them declined to answer the questions concerning religion in the census questionnaire. At the same time, Bulgarian citizens were much more open to declaring their ethnicity and mother tongue; less than ten per cent of them omitted the corresponding sections in the questionnaire.[3]  Table 1. Ethnic Demography[4] Table 2. Religious Demography[5] Church-state relationsThe role of religion in acts of forced displacement has varied throughout the history of modern Bulgaria, just as the status of local religious traditions and their institutions altered under the successive political regimes. An essential factor in social life after the Liberation of 1878 but suppressed under communism (1944-1989), religion has been gradually regaining its position in society after the fall of the atheist regime. If pre-communist legislation distinguished explicitly between the majority and minority faiths by granting the status of ‘dominant religion’ to Eastern Orthodoxy (1879 Constitution, Article 37), post-communist law-making has adopted a different approach. It expresses a respect for religious freedoms (1991 Constitution, Articles 13.1 & 37), while considering Eastern Orthodoxy as the ‘traditional religion’ of Bulgaria (Article 13.3).[6]  In this regard, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) deserves special attention as the local institutional representative of this religious tradition. Before the communist takeover, its holy synod had exceptional authority in not only within its community of believers, but also generally in the religious affairs of the Bulgarian Kingdom (1879 Constitution, Article 39). Although the communist regime introduced the constitutional separation of the church and state (1947 Constitution, Article 78.2; 1971 Constitution, Article 53.2), it defined the local Orthodox church as a body linked with the history and traditional faith of the Bulgarian people (1949 Law on Religions, Article 3). This vision underwent a further development in 2002 when the newly adopted Religious Denominations Act emphasised ‘the special and traditional role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in the history of Bulgaria to establish and develop its spirituality and culture’ in its preamble. Moreover, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was granted ex lege the status of judicial entity (2002 Religious Denominations Act, Article 10.1), while other religious minorities can obtain this status only via court registration (Articles 14-20). The new legal status allows the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to act as a partner of the state in the sphere of social policies. The position of this religious institution in society is additionally enhanced by its image as the saviour of the Bulgarian people throughout history, especially during the five-century Ottoman rule. This new capacity became evident during the recent refugee crisis when the call of the BOC’s holy synod to stop incoming migrants, who were framed as a threat to Bulgarian national identity and state sovereignty, found broad support in society. The BOC has also emerged as an essential player when it comes to shaping the attitudes of people on issues linked with legislation on family affairs, and played a substantial role in blocking the ratification of the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence by the National Assembly of Bulgaria. Religion and forced displacement An analysis of the role of religion in forced displacement would be incomplete without taking into consideration the previous experience of Bulgarian society. Between 1878 and 1945, 806,000 people found asylum in Bulgaria; 698,000 of them were ethnic Bulgarians who had remained outside the borders of their kin state upon the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.[7] Initially, they continued living in their settlements in the hope that these territories would be unified with Bulgaria in the future. Later on, however, they abandoned their homes due to persecution or military conflicts. As national refugees, all of them were granted Bulgarian citizenship and received significant material support from the Bulgarian state. In its turn, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church took care of their spiritual needs. If they belonged to a different faith, however, they often became subjects of attempts at forceful conversion to Orthodoxy. This division of labour between church and state was also used in the case of foreign refugees. They consisted mostly of Armenians and Russians. The former sought asylum in Bulgaria after the massacres initiated by the Ottoman authorities in the mid-1890s and the early 1920s, while the latter fled the Bolshevik regime established in Russia. Both were met with empathy by Bulgarian society: the former shared a similar destiny with Bulgarians as victims of Ottoman rule, while the latter were exiles from Orthodox Russia that had liberated Bulgaria from that rule and was now suffering under the godless Bolsheviks. The Bulgarian state also reached out to help these incomers. It assisted them in receiving Nansen passports (internationally recognised travel documents issued to stateless refugees by the League of Nations from 1922 to 1938). It also offered them the opportunity to obtain Bulgarian citizenship. At the same time, the diverse profile of these refugees resulted in different policies targeting the various groups. The Armenians had generally emigrated with their families and often with their neighbours and priests, and were thus able to establish self-reliant parish-based communities. Their members additionally benefited from the financial support of Armenian diaspora organisations and the Armenian Apostolic Church. They were also skilful craftsmen, who easily found a place in the domestic economy. The Russians presented a different case: two-thirds of them were former military personnel who lacked the skills necessary for integration in a predominantly agrarian society. Their survival became possible thanks to annual subsidies secured by the Bulgarian state. The money was transferred to such organisations as the Russian Red Cross and the Union of Russian Military Veterans, which in turn distributed this aid among their members in the form of free soup kitchens, medical and educational services, housing and accommodation, etc. After having been defeated in World War I, however, Bulgaria was no longer able to provide the necessary financial support to the hundreds of thousands of refugees who were arriving. Thus, many Russians and Armenians continued to the west to settle in the wealthier victorious states. In its turn, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church provided moral and material support to both groups of foreign refugees, even though the Armenians belonged to a different branch of Christianity. At the same time, due to its schismatic status, the BOC was not able to offer pastoral care to Orthodox Russians. Therefore, it allowed them to establish a parallel network of parishes under the jurisdiction of the Russian Synod Abroad, which had been set up in interwar Yugoslavia. Additionally, the Bulgarian Church provided them with the churches and monasteries necessary for their religious life. Table 3. Major Immigration Waves (1878-1945)[8] Another type of forced migration appeared as a result of the bilateral population exchange agreements which Bulgaria had concluded with Turkey (1913), Greece (1919, 1927) and Romania (1940). They were facilitated by the reciprocal presence of Turkish, Greek, and Romanian minorities in Bulgaria, and of minorities of the corresponding countries in Bulgaria. As a result, the ethnic and religious profile of the displaced persons had a twofold effect: it facilitated their integration in the host state and increased the ethnoreligious homogeneity of its population. In the case of the Orthodox displaced persons (DPs), this exchange also allowed them to leave the jurisdiction of an ‘alien’ Orthodox Church and to join the national one, where they were able to attend liturgy in a familiar language. A no less noteworthy feature of this type of displacement is the settlement of the DPs alongside the state border that was closest to their previous homes. Table 4. Population Exchange and Forced Resettlement[9] The next form of forced displacement was influenced by the anti-Semitic policy of the Nazi regime. As an ally of Hitlerite Germany, Bulgaria was involved in the deportation of Jews to extermination camps. During World War II, Bulgarian citizens of Jewish origin were taken from their homes, although their deportation was blocked by the active opposition of the Orthodox Church and many Bulgarians. Unfortunately, this resistance did not prevent the deportation of 11,343 Jews from the areas under Bulgarian occupation (Aegean Thrace, Vardar Macedonia, and Eastern Serbia). Finally, religion also played a role in cases of forced emigration. According to Bulgarian scholars, about 954,000 people left Bulgaria from 1878 to 1945; about 574,000 of them were Muslims who sought a better standard of living, first in the Ottoman Empire and later in the Turkish republic.[10] Initially motivated by the disadvantageous change in their social status, their exodus continued over the next years for various reasons (discrimination, war, and population exchange), causing constant annual flows amounting to several to tens of thousands of DPs. Most of these émigrés were Turks, but there were also many Tatars, Circassians, Pomaks and Roma. After the Treaty of Neuilly (1919), however, the Bulgarian state started limiting the emigration of Pomaks (Bulgarian speaking Muslims), and took measures to integrate them by means of education. In parallel, the Orthodox Church abandoned its previous policy of forceful conversion of Pomaks to Orthodoxy and focused its efforts on diminishing the influence of Islam on them. Despite subscribing to a different ideology, the communist regime continued the policies of previous Bulgarian governments towards the Turkish minority, which it regarded as threatening state sovereignty. The Cold War closure of the Bulgarian-Turkish border did not stop Turkish emigration but replaced the annual flows with several big refugee waves. The last of them occurred in the mid-1980s when Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin were forced to adopt Bulgarian names. Officially justified as a means to recover of some alleged Bulgarian roots of this minority, the so-called ‘revival process’ aimed at the assimilation of this group. As a result, in the summer of 1989, 320,000 Turks left Bulgaria; half of them returned after the fall of communism.  Table 5. Major Waves of Turkish Minority Emigration and Forceful Displacement[11] The fall of communism stimulated a new type of emigration from Bulgaria. In the last 30 years, about 1,300,000 citizens of working age (20-59 years) have left Bulgaria, mostly for economic reasons.[12] This high level of net emigration has caused a serious demographic imbalance, which has affected the age profile of the population and its labour force potential. Thus, the quality of immigrants to Bulgaria has become a burning issue. In this regard, special attention is paid to such potential resources for solving the demographic crisis as the post-1989 Bulgarian emigrants, the historical Bulgarian diaspora (especially from Ukraine, Moldova, and North Macedonia), and highly skilled third-country nationals.[13] From this perspective, the educational level of refugees is far from optimal. According to the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees, in 2016 only 23 per cent of migrants over the age of 14 had secondary or higher education.[14] Also, they regard Bulgaria as a transit country. Until 2012, there was a low influx of migrants, and the annual number of asylum applications was below 1,000. In 2013, however, the refugee crisis caused a rapid growth in the number of asylum seekers, which reached 20,391 applications in 2015. Under these circumstances, Bulgaria’s responsibility as a country that has an external EU border grew as well. The change had a significant impact on the local political elite, shifting its attention to the security aspects of the migration pressure rather than the humanitarian ones. It also stimulated the spread of anti-immigrant rhetoric: initially used by the populists to expand their influence on society, it was soon adopted by mainstream parties as well. Meanwhile, the drop in the migration levels to the pre-crisis ones in the last three years has not stopped the misuse of the refugee issue for political ends.[15] Table 6. Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees: Data on Asylum Seekers (01.01.1993 – 31.12.2019)[16] The recent refugee crisis also pointed to a return of religion as a factor in forced displacement. On the one hand, the statements issued by the BOC’s holy synod and individual bishops between 2015 and 2017, played a substantial role in shaping a reserved, and even hostile, attitude towards refugees in Bulgarian society.[17] In particular, the church’s call to close the state borders to migrants from the Middle East and North Africa as religiously alien people who could present a threat to the national identity and state sovereignty of Bulgarians found significant support in society.[18] The impact of this vision was increased by the intertwining of the historical memory of Bulgarians about the five-century subjection of their forefathers to the Ottoman Empire with more recent impressions of the acts of Islamic terrorism in Europe and other parts of the world. At the same time, the Bulgarian case reveals an alternative involvement of religion in the recent refugee crisis, which was motivated by the ethos of Christian hospitality. It was associated mostly with minority religious communities. Especially active was the Catholic community, where the priests, believers, and religion-based structures such as Caritas played an active part in alleviating the suffering of refugees by providing humanitarian aid. Furthermore, the migrants received moral and material support from non-religious civil society structures such as the Council of Refugee Women in Bulgaria or local branches of international organisations such as the UN Refugee Agency.[19] Policy perspectivesThe analysis of the role played by religion in forced displacement acts throughout the history of modern Bulgaria outlines three major patterns: pre-communist, communist, and post-communist. The first of them took shape between 1878 and 1945 when the incoming and outgoing flows of refugees in the Balkans emerged as after-effects of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of young independent states whose governments pursued the creation of ethnically and religiously homogenous nations. As a rule, these processes of migration affected neighbouring states and concerned communities whose centuries-old coexistence had brought about specific modes of collaboration as well as of religious tensions. Besides, the discussed displacements often embraced entire parish/mosque-based neighbourhoods. As a result, their members were able to reproduce their religious and social infrastructure in their new settlements. The fact that most refugees were agrarians who moved together with their families from one rural society to another allowed them to establish self-reliant communities which thus needed less support from the host state and/or international organisations. The refugees from Bolshevik Russia presented the main deviance from this pattern. From a comparative perspective, the experience described might offer new insights into the understanding of post-Cold War migration as an outcome of the decolonisation process and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Tito’s Yugoslavia. In this regard, the Bulgarian experience points to new directions of research linked with: a) the potential of refugee religious structures to assist or impede the sustainable socialisation of asylum seekers in the host society; b) the role of the institution(s) of the majority faith in the host country as a factor shaping public attitudes towards the newcomers; and c) the division of labour between the state and the religious authorities in dealing with refugees. Furthermore, while the previous cohorts of refugees contributed towards greater ethno-religious homogeneity of Bulgarian society, the new ones would increase its diversity. This new phenomenon presents a serious challenge to many Eastern European societies, whose pluralist traditions were uprooted under communism. At the same time, the post-1989 democratisation and EU membership of Bulgaria have established a new balance between the local majority and minority religions, thus allowing the development of alternative responses to the refugee challenge. Daniela Kalkandjieva is a Bulgarian scholar affiliated with Sofia University St Kliment Ohridski. She is the author of The Russian Orthodox Church, 1917-1948: From Decline to Resurrection (Routledge 2015); ‘Russian Ecclesiastical Geopolitics between the Two World Wars’, CAS Sofia Working Papers Series, No. 10 (2018); ‘Eastern Orthodoxy and its Churches in Central and Eastern Europe’ in András Máté-Tóth and Gergely Rosta (eds.), Focus on Religion in Central and Eastern Europe: A Regional View (De Gruyter, 2016), ‘The Bulgarian Orthodox Church at the Crossroads: Between Nationalism and Pluralism’ in Andrii Krawchuk and Thomas Bremer (eds.), Orthodox Christian Encounters of Identity and Otherness: Values, Self-Reflection, Dialogue (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); and ‘А Comparative Analysis on Church-State Relations in Eastern Orthodoxy: Concepts, Models and Principles’, Journal of Church and State, 2011, 53 (4), pp. 587-614.  Cover photo: ‘'Clergy and faithful pleading for mandatory religious education in Bulgarian public schools, St Nevski Cathedral, Sofia, September 2010'. Copyright: Daniela Kalkandjieva. [1] Annuaire statistique du Royaume de Bulgarie, 1909 (I'année), Sofia: Imprimerie d’état, 1910, pp. 4 & 38.[2] Statistical Reference Book 2019, Sofia: National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2019, pp. 14 & 21, available at https://www.nsi.bg/sites/default/files/files/publications/StatBook2019_en.pdf. All websites accessed on 12 December 2019.[3] Dimitar Arkadiev, ‘Nyakoi problemi okolo dannite za etnicheskiya sastav na naselenieto v Balgariya ot preboryavaneto 2011 godina’ [The 2011 Census: Some problems related to the ethnic composition of Bulgaria’s population], Paper presented at the National Statistical Institute Conference on the 2011 Census (Sofia, June 17^th 2014), available at http://da.uni-vt.bg/pubinfo.aspx?p=6047[4] The 1887 Census did not collect data related to ethnicity but only about the mother tongue; Table 1 includes information about the major ethnic groups in Bulgaria which have been affected by acts of forced displacement. Sources: Annuaire statistique du Royaume de Bulgarie, 1909 (I anneé), Sofia: Imprimerie d’état, 1910; Ibid., 1923-1924 (XV-XVI années), Sofia: Imprimerie d’état, 1925; Ibid., 1929-1930 (XXI-XXII années), Sofia: Imprimerie d’état, 1930; Rezultati ot prebroyavane na naselenieto na 31.XII.1946 godina [1946 Census results], Sofia: Darzhavno upravlenie za informatsiya, 1970; Struktura na naselenieto po veroizpovednie [An overview of Bulgaria’s religious demography (1887-2001)], Sofia: National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria, available at https://www.nsi.bg/Census/StrReligion.htm; 2011 Population Census: Main Results, Sofia: National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria, [2012], available at https://www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf[5] Table 2 uses the same sources as Table 1.[6] Daniela Kalkandjieva, ‘The Bulgarian Orthodox Church: Authoring New Visions About the Orthodox Church’s Role in Contemporary Bulgarian Society’ in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), Orthodox Churches and Politics in Southeastern Europe: Nationalism, Conservativism, and Intolerance, London: Palgrave, 2019, pp. 53-83.[7] Vesselin Mintchev, ‘External Migration and External Migration Policies in Bulgaria’, South East Europe Review for Labor and Social Affairs, 1999, 2 (3), p. 125.[8] Data collected from the following sources: Mintchev; Detelina Dineva, ‘Bulgarian migration in a historical perspective’ in Anna Mazurkiwicz (ed.), East Central European Migrations During the Cold War: A Handbook, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019, p. 74; Tsvetana Kyoseva, ‘Ruskata emigratsiya i balgarskata darzhava (20-te – 50-te godini na XX v.)’ [Russian Emigration in Bulgaria in the 1920s --1950s], in Georgi Markov, Tatyana Shamray, Luiza Revyakina, Lizbet Lyubenova, Ganka Rupcheva, Ani Zlateva (eds.), Byalata emigratsia v Balgariya [The White Emigration in Bulgaria], Sofia: IK ‘Gutenberg’, 2001, p. 52.[9] Data collected from the following sources: Nikola Stanev, Nay-nova istoriya na Balgariya, 1912-1920 [The newest history of Bulgaria, 1912-1920], vol. 2 ‘Voyni za obedinenie’ [Unification wars], Sofia: Pechatnitsa S.M. Staykov, 1925, p.140; Dineva, pp. 70-71.[10] Mintchev, p. 125.[11] Data collected from Valeri Stoyanov, Turskoto naselenie v Balgariya mezhdu polyusite na etnicheskata politika [Turkish population in Bulgaria between the poles of ethnic policy], Sofia: Lik, 1998.[12] Anna Krasteva, The Bulgarian Migration Paradox: Migration and Development in Bulgaria, [issued within the MIND Project and with the support of Caritas Bulgaria, Caritas Europe, and Global Migration Policy Associates (GMPA)], Sofia: Caritas Bulgaria, May 2019, p. 9, available at https://www.caritas.eu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/CommonHomeBulgariaEN.pdf[13] National Strategy for Migration, Asylum and Integration (2011-2020) of the Republic of Bulgaria, p.12, available at https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/7202/file/Bulgaria_National_Strategy_Migration_Asylum_Integration_2011_2020_en.pdf[14] Albena Nikolova and Nina Chernicheska, Refugees in Bulgaria: Labour Market and Budgetary Costs, Sofia: Ministry of Finances of the Republic of Bulgaria, August 2016, pp. 9-11.[15]A.  Krasteva, pp. 16, 34-35; Daniela Kalkandjieva, ‘The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Refugee Crisis’ in Lucian N. Leustean (ed.), Forced Migration and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World, London: Routledge 2019, p. 243.[16] The presented data is announced by the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria on its official website at http://www.aref.government.bg/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/2020-01/Charts-website-bg_12.pdf[17] D. Kalkandjieva, ‘The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Refugee Crisis’, p. 243.[18] Special Address of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox with Reference to the Migration Crisis, September 25^th 2015, available at https://bg-patriarshia.bg/index.php?file=appeal_20.xml[19] https://caritas.bg/; crw-bg.org; https://www.unhcr.org/bg/ [post_title] => Religion and Forced Displacement in Bulgaria [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => religion-and-forced-displacement-in-bulgaria [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2021-01-04 18:34:47 [post_modified_gmt] => 2021-01-04 17:34:47 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=4838 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ))