The state is back. Public spending and regulation are the new black. The public sector is seen as honest, well intentioned, and desirable. Gordon Brown is the most popular chancellor in recent memory – and for putting taxes up, not trimming them down. Across the Atlantic, despite George Bush’s pro-corporate instincts, The President has been forced to talk about curbing the excesses of the American boardroom. And, in fact, Bush has alread been one of most economically interventionist of American Presidents – handing money out to farmers and ailing companies.
Meanwhile polls show a public which believes that business is dishonest, inefficient, callous and greedy. Seven out of ten Americans think that companies routinely lie to mislead investors, and six out of ten think that they have too much control over politics. As if to prove the contrast, the stock market plummetted on the very day that Gordon Brown announced the biggest rise in public spending this century.

The cartoonish avarice that now defines Corporate America has caused no little schadenfreude amongst the Left. Just as memories are short during boom years, as eager pundits predict that the economy will defy well-worn economic laws, so a collective amnesia overcomes left-wing commentators when the world economy enters a downturn. Every economic trough – from the exit from the ERM in 1992 to the Asian flu five years later – there were predictions that the era of untrammelled capitalism was coming to an end. The stock market always ended up higher than before within acouple of years – and regulation to curb the excesses of capital never materialised.

The danger is that this inane crowing will destroy the best chance yet to address one of the biggest questions: what are the responsibilities of business towards society? This is a much broader question than the much-needed but relatively straightforward reforms which would bring more transparency and honesty into corporate accounting practices.

To address the issue depends on rejecting the the unholy alliance of right-wing commentators like Milton Friedman who see the business of business as business and nothing else – the mantra that “the social responsibility of business is to make a profit” – and those on the left, like Naomi Klein who want “the contaminating influence of business” removed from the public sphere because it has no place in education, health-care or criminal justice. Many people will instinctively think Klein is right. Surely the public sphere is the business of government itself? Indeed, when anyone thinks of companies providing public goods they imagine Virgin delaying trains, Group Four losing prisoners or McDonalds taking over the school canteen.

But despite current events, many governments want private involvement and know they need it if they are to deliver the public goods their electorate’s expect. What is more they are right to do so, despite the endless caricatures of governments being helplessly “in thrall to business”. There are many examples of companies delivering public goods. Of course, companies create jobs and pay taxes for a start but business entrepreneurs can also create the technology for renewable energy, affordable housing, or life-saving drugs. When they do this companies do not replace or hollow out the role of governments – but they can help to make it possible for political leaders to meet policy objectives. Forging an effective partnership with business can be the key to tackling climate change by using the market to spread clean fuels; tackling war in Africa by certifying resources like diamonds that have fuelled conflicts; renewing neighbourhoods by rebuilding public spaces and creating a better-work life balance for employees. Many of the thorniest public policy issues will continue to defy governments acting on their own.

Recent heated debates about pharmaceuticals show how public debate rarely recognises this reality. Fourteen million people die every year of preventable or curable diseases. The products of pharmaceutical companies can play a vital role in tackling them. But public debate focuses on vilifying corporations rather than exploring how their resources can be harnessed to research new drugs, supply them at affordable prices, and integrate them into national health systems.

However an understandable cynicism remains. Why would companies do anything other than make their shareholders richer – particularly if we enter an economic downturn?

Where corporate behaviour has changed in the last decade, the driving force has been public opinion. Even corporate titans like Shell and GAP have been dented by customer boycotts when they appeared to be misbehaving. In both of these cases, consumer pressure brought about immediate changes in corporate behaviour.

Claims that GAP used Cambodian child labour in the manufacture of clothes resulted in changes in the supply chain; protests at Shell’s proposed dumping of the Brent Spa oil platform led to a swift volte-face, against the advice of the company’s own scientists. But the ability of pressure politics to change the world in this way is limited. These effect of public exposure on the corporate bottom-line arguments will only ever make a difference to the most high profile companies at the top end of branded products.

If GAP were to implement a tougher labour code of conduct through its supply chains, this might directly benefit 5 million workers. That seems limited when 1.5 billion people live on less than a dollar a day. And consumers are entirely capable of holding contradictory views – polls show that most people care about the environment but there are no unfilled job vacancies at Exxon Mobil because of their virulent opposition to the Kyoto Protocol. Relying purely on public and media pressure turns accountability into a lottery – the worst offenders can escape media scrutiny because they are less famous. And a narrow focus on naming and shaming bad practice may stop some bad practices, but it will not unleash the powers of companies to do good.

This is where intelligent government action can make a real difference. Companies are acutely aware of the way in which NGO campaigns can knock billions off their share price. Yet they can’t be sure that if they change their policies in response to one NGO campaign, they won’t be criticized by another one for the opposite reasons. This leaves many business leaders jittery about their position. BP Executive Nick Butler says “we don’t feel we have very much power at all”. Attempts to regain control drive DIY attempts at accountability. BP recently hired Senator George Mitchell to chair an independent commission on the impact of their Indonesian drilling operations on the local community. But not every company can hire a Nobel Prize nominee. And that doesn’t solve the problem of judging the veracity of claims made against companies. NGOs are not vetted according to the evidence behind their allegations and companies almost invariably deny wrongdoing. How will consumers be able to navigate this world of claim and counter-claim?

The pharmaceutical industry experience shows that progress will be patchy unless governments set out clearer frameworks for understanding corporate responsibility. At the moment companies that are trying to reform like Glaxo SmithKline – which has been praised by Oxfam for beginning to address the issue of access to medicines more transparently – are tarred with the same brush as those like Hoffmann-La Roche that still refuse to discuss the substantive issues on the grounds of “confidentiality”.

The solution is for governments to bring companies, NGOs and international organisations together to thrash out new standards which can then be vouched for by governments. These would need to be underpinned by carrots and sticks – kitemarks or tax-breaks for companies that are responsible with censures and fines for those that aren’t – so that recalcitrant companies feel the pressure for change. This is starting to happen in the clunkily named “joint public private initiatives” which are being formed to tackle health problems in developing countries.

These new partnerships begin to align the activities of companies to real public policy problems rather than the perspective of the corporate PR department. The presence of governments and international bodies like the World Health Organisation mean that corporate initiatives are slotted into broader development projects. They allow ethical companies to stave off unfair attacks. Governments need to set out transparent frameworks for public-private partnerships at home and abroad and be prepared to praise good “corporate citizens” while mercilessly naming and shaming poor performers.

Public cynicism about companies has created both the thirst and the opportunity for government action. What is more, many companies realise they need governments too: not just for their “licence to operate” but to enjoy stability and to know what rules they will be expected to follow. But will governments realise that being “business-friendly” can mean delivering uncomfortable truths as well as light regulation? That would be mark the real return of the state.

Globalisation has increased the extent and complexity of migration throughout the world. In the year 2000, there were some 168 million people living outside their country of origin – 21 million of whom were refugees or displaced persons.
Migration is now of crucial importance to developing countries, for whom remittances from migrant workers can outstrip overseas aid in economic significance. So, for example, “Migradollars” earned in the USA are now the most significant source of foreign exchange for many Central American countries. And managed migration also benefits advanced economies, supplying the workers they need at different skills levels, and cementing trade links.
But migration also brings significant cultural, as well as economic, benefits. It increases the diversity of our societies, and builds up our cultural capital. In the UK, we have always been an open, trading nation, enriched by our global links. Contemporary patterns of migration extend this tradition.
Unless properly managed, however, migration can be perceived as a threat to community stability and good race relations. Where asylum is used as a route to economic migration, it can cause deep resentment in the host community. Democratic governments need to ensure that their electorates have confidence and trust in the nationality, immigration and asylum systems they are operating, or people will turn to extremists for answers.
This is a key issue that I want to address in this article. But I want to start by looking at how the events of 11 September have shaped contemporary political debates. In particular, I will examine how they have acted as a prism through which many issues of social order, community cohesion and cultural diversity have been viewed in recent months.
11 September
People from all over the world were killed in the attacks on the World Trade Centre. They came from many different cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds. Christian, Jewish, Muslim and Hindu believers were killed together as they worked in the towers. It is a bitter irony of the terrorist atrocity that the centre was targeted as a symbol of US capitalism, yet as a hub of global finance, its workers came from across the world, including Islamic countries. Wall Street’s bankers and stockbrokers are multinational, reflecting the integration of finance capital in the global economy. And its waiters, cleaners and chefs are equally cosmopolitan, reflecting the reality of mass migration in the modern world.
The 11 September atrocity has come to crystallise the fear and insecurity many people feel in this new globalised age. It was such an appalling, inexplicable and morally unimaginable act of terror that it appeared almost to symbolise our vulnerability itself.
But it is not simply fears that were evoked on September 11 and during its immediate aftermath. Rather, an extraordinary mutuality emerged in New York itself and across the United States of America, building on a national identity and commitment which embraces those from different cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds. It was a mutuality which spread outwards to embrace the kind of internationalism which is always talked about on the Left of politics, but which in this case, interestingly, did not appear wholly to engage some of those who would count themselves as internationalists. How many of those who normally preach solidarity and interdependence were opposed to the action against the Taliban and their protection of bin Laden and the al Qaida terrorists?
It’s a strange paradox, but one that is mirrored too often in the contradictions that exist in domestic as well as international affairs, when values and principles on the one hand get muddled with immediate reaction and long held antagonisms on the other!
Defending democracy
The attack was, of course, a threat to economic stability, to commerce and social intercourse, but primarily it was a threat to democracy. It was not simply a terrorist action, but a fundamental rejection of the values of democracy. The al-Qaida and their Taliban sponsors were motivated by doctrines that reject democratic norms, human rights, and the whole moral basis upon which our society has evolved in recent centuries. In that sense, it was an attack on modernity itself, reflected in the medieval repression to which Afghanistan was subjected under Taliban rule.
The military intervention in Afghanistan was therefore substantially also a defense of democracy, and fundamental norms of human rights. It was not, however, a defense of Western civilization against Islam. To portray it as such is politically misguided and historically wrong. It reduces the diversity of the states of the entire Islamic world – their structures of governance, civil societies, and religious and secular practices – to an extreme and crude parody of the faith to which the majority of their populations give adherence. It is akin to reducing the whole of the world in which the Christian faith is practiced to the actions of a cult. Moreover it ignores the fact that a substantial proportion of the citizens of the West are themselves Muslims – something which is very important to social cohesion in countries such as the UK.
People who talk about a clash of civilizations also imply the West has a moral superiority over Islamic culture. This is scarcely credible, not least because the most appalling genocide the world has ever seen took place in the 20th century in the heart of Europe. And historically, it is basically wrong. It obscures the depth of shared history that has formed our societies in both East and West. Trade and commerce, intellectual engagement, and cultural exchange have taken place throughout the centuries. So to suppose that there are two civilisations that have no shared roots or mutual ties flies in the face of history.
This is not to say, of course, that there isn’t a continuing tension between modernity and the cultural practices of some of those entering highly advanced countries. This is not true, of course, for the majority of those entering the more developed world, but it is for those who, because of education or geography, find themselves catapulted into effectively different centuries. They are making a journey in the space of a few weeks or months, which it has taken us hundreds of years to make.
Recognising and helping people with this change is as much part of the job of the settled community of similar religion and culture as it is of the host nation, and this is one of the challenges that we need to face. Accepted norms hundreds of years ago in this country, but now rejected, remain acceptable from particular cultures of varying religions. This is why Pim Fortuyn, the leader of the Libertarian Right movement in the Netherlands before his assassination in the Spring of 2002 had a point to make about the clash of modernity with long held cultural traditions – but not of course the solution he offered. Those who struggle intellectually and morally between their dislike of the Taliban with their instinctive opposition to the United States, found themselves equally at odds with modernity and cultural correctness when it came to Afghanistan.
The military engagement in Afghanistan illustrates not a war of competing civilisations, but a defence of democratic states from terrorist attacks sponsored by deep oppression and brutalisation. But democracy is not only defended in military terms – it is defended in depth through the commitment of its citizens to its basic values. When the people of New York pulled together after 11 September, they were displaying not just mutual sympathy, support and solidarity, but a patriotic commitment to their democracy. By that I mean patriotism in its most decent, and deeply expressed sense, of civil virtue – a commitment to one’s community, its values and institutions.
It follows that the strongest defence of democracy resides in the engagement of every citizen with the community, from activity in the neighbourhood, through to participation in formal politics. Interestingly, Robert Putnam, the American theorist, has conducted a survey of social capital in the USA since 11 September. He found that people have become more concerned about community and politics, and more engaged as citizens, as a result of the atrocity. Rather than terrorizing people, the attack appears to have stimulated greater social cohesion and civic awareness.
Security and social order
But the defence of our democratic way of life also requires that the threat to security at home is met.Securing basic social order, and protecting people against attack, is a basic function of government – a fact that has been recognised at least since Thomas Hobbes penned his famous description of life in the ungoverned state of nature as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”
That is why, in the aftermath of 11 September, I took the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act through Parliament. I had to ensure that basic civil liberties and human rights were protected, at the same time as ensuring the protection of the public from terrorist attack in conditions of heightened threat.
There were, of course, real arguments about the balance between the immediate reaction to the threat and the long-term imperative to protect fundamental democratic norms. Constructive tensions exist in any democratic society between the freedom of the individual, the liberty of the population as a whole to move safely and freely, and the overriding well being of the nation state. These tensions are most acute at times of war or crisis. And as I illustrated in my book Politics and Progress, there has been a misunderstanding on the liberal Left in particular of the need to maintain stability and security in order to protect basic individual freedoms and liberty, rather than allow them to be eroded.
Of course, the democratic state can sometimes abuse its power as much as those who seek to destroy it abuse fundamental rights and democratic practices. In simple terms, there is an obligation on those who have some influence over the levers of state power to be more careful to maintain democratic freedoms, than there is on those who oppose these values. In spelling out to the House of Commons what I believed to be the balance between meeting the terrorist threat and the danger of over-reaction, I genuinely believed that the failure to take action would be an act of weakness.
As I had already reflected prior to 11 September, this was surely the lesson of the failure to understand the Nazi threat in Weimar Germany, or the social disintegration which led to the military coup against the elected government of the Spanish Second Republic.
Most of the criticism of the Act focused on the provisions for detention of foreign nationals in the UK who are suspected of terrorist activity or represent a threat to national security, in circumstances where a prosecution cannot be brought in this country, for either juridical or evidential reasons. My opponents on the Right argued that I should simply deport these people, whatever the consequences. On the opposite wing of the argument, civil libertarians accused me of breaching the fundamental principle of detention without trial.
I was not prepared to abrogate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and deport people to countries where they could face death and torture. But neither was I prepared simply to let people stay in the country freely if they represented a threat to national security. My solution was to permit detention of these foreign nationals, building on existing immigration powers, but give them a right of appeal to senior judges on the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, who could overturn my ruling with access to the available intelligence evidence. In addition, those detained could leave the country at any point if they could find a safe third country to take them.
I believe this to be a correct and morally defensible means of protecting the basic right to security, as well as the liberties and freedoms, of the people I am elected to represent. The provisions of the Act are subject to statutory review, and many of the major clauses must be renewed by primary legislation after a set duration. I believe the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act will stand as a good example of the balances that must be struck by those who seek to defend the basic principles of democracy in conditions of uncertainty and threat.
However, we also need to face the fact that to protect democracy, we must strengthen it. This is not about returning to a 19th century form of Parliamentary representation, and therefore relying solely on accountability through the ballot box. It is more fundamental than that. We need to engage people with participative democracy, so that they are part of the process. At present, they simply do not feel that government is “on their side”. We need a new relationship between governed and governing, which reflects the profound changes that have taken place in our society. Globalisation has changed the nature of the power held by nation states, and the balance of forces in society. Aspirations are now much greater for control over the consumption of both public and personal goods and services. And people want to be active in civil society, sharing in the governance of their own communities of geography or interest.
But to protect the framework within which democracy can flourish, change and grow, it is necessary to understand the pysche and contempt for democracy displayed by those who would use suicide bombing and terror to get their way. This is true whether initiated by those funded and organised by Osama bin Laden, or by those who choose to send teenagers to their death as suicide bombers in the (legitimate) cause of establishing a viable Palestinian state.
By the same token, of course, democratic states like Israel who act to defend their citizens must abide by international law and conventions, and uphold moral standards. As we know from painful experience in Northern Ireland, conflicts between communities that have legitimate aspirations and rights cannot be resolved by brute force. A lasting peace depends on dialogue and justice.
Tackling crime together
At a very different level, we see in the elections across Europe in late 2001 and through 2002 a rejection of ruling establishments, bordering on contempt for corporatism. Whilst there is no doubt that perception can be substantially fostered or altered by campaigns through the print and broadcast media, politicians that do not hear and respond to the genuine feelings and concerns of those they serve, will in the 21st century receive short shrift. This, therefore, raises profound issues about the relationship between governed and governing, between civil society and formal political democracy, and of course the role of Government in a global, economic, and social firmament, where issues of rapid change and fears of social dislocation remain critical to a feeling of general wellbeing and stability. Dismissing this as either a right wing agenda or of marginal relevance can only lead to the demise of progressive politics.
There are wider implications here for the political thinking of the centre-Left. In my recent book Politics and Progress I examine the importance of social order and security to a healthy democracy and strong civil society. My argument is that the centre-Left has never adequately theorized social order – its importance, and the conditions in which it is sustained. In addition to a tendency to be suspicious of any external military action, we have in the past assumed too readily that a fair society of free and equal citizens would naturally be a harmonious one, and that the role of the state in protecting social order would become less important as social justice was achieved.
At its crudest, this was expressed as a simple economic reductionism: that crime and disorder were simply the result of unemployment and economic crisis. Whilst it is certainly true that the highest rates of crime are found in the most disadvantaged areas, this kind of simplistic cause and effect analysis – with the ethical laxity towards criminal acts that usually comes with it – is not tenable in contemporary societies. The causes of crime, as well as the solutions for tackling it, are far more complex and multifaceted than simple material poverty can explain.
Tony Blair’s famous soundbite, “tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime” demonstrated for the first time that the Labour Party cared about dealing with criminals, and knew how to tackle crime. It repositioned the centre-Left on crime, in a politically crucial fashion. But we have yet to fully develop that lead through into our political theory. Too often the debate is polarized between liberals and authoritarians. There is a tendency for those who justifiably want to protect human rights to fall into the trap of placing themselves on the side of the criminal, rather than the victim. In fact, whose side you are on is not only an important signal to the public, but a recognition of representative democracy itself. We need to be clearly placed on the side of the victim, but also on the protection and integrity of society. Individual rights, not subsumed but set within the context of broader freedoms, place those who believe in interdependence and mutuality firmly on the side of securing justice, and not simply “due process”.
What I have tried to offer is new thinking on tackling social disorder and crime, based on a civil politics for the centre-Left; a politics of mutualism and civil renewal that places a premium on active self-government within communities. My core belief is that the good society is one in which people are active as citizens in shaping what happens in their communities. People are only genuinely free and fulfilled when they themselves determine what happens in their community, not when someone else does it for them, or when they simply abdicate responsibility and retreat into the private realm.
What this means is that we have to nurture trust, confidence and the capacity to get things done in communities. None of that is possible if an area is plagued by crime, disorder and social disintegration, any more than maintaining liberty and making progressive change is possible if the state is threatened. Establishing basic order and security is a prerequisite of building social capital.
But beyond that, it means building community solutions to social problems. In terms of crime reduction, it means drawing on the moral resources of the community to tackle offending behavior – helping parents deal with difficult children; ensuring that antisocial behavior is not condoned or tolerated; and enabling people actively to shape policing strategies and assist the law enforcement agencies.
A civil politics also places the community at the heart of the process of justice. It sets out to make criminal justice comprehensible to the community, so that the processes of law are demystified, and the sentences imposed on criminals bear some tangible relation to the reality of everyday life. That doesn’t mean pandering to the lowest common denominator; in fact, quite the reverse. Brutal, simplistic solutions like capital punishment tend to gain support when the criminal justice system is completely opaque to people, and they play no part in it.
Similarly, community engagement in crime reduction attempts to “re-socialise” the processes of justice back into the local community. This can be achieved through a variety of mechanisms, such as: lay involvement in offender panels; restorative justice forums in which offenders have to confront the consequences of their behaviour; and rehabilitation and reparation policies which involve the community, as well as perpetrators of crime, in taking responsibility for stopping offending. It sees effective, tough community sentences as a strong alternative to prison for those who are not a violent danger to the public, because these are about confronting somebody’s lack of social morality, and ensuring that the community is given reparation for the crime.
Social order and the response to the far Right
Promoting social order and community renewal is also a political, as well as social, imperative. History shows us that anti-democratic forces, particularly from the far Right, gain support in conditions of fear and insecurity, mutual distrust and ignorance. When crime and insecurity rises, people look for authoritarian solutions, unless there is a credible alternative. This is what has happened in Europe in recent months. The substantial vote for Le Pen, and other anti-immigration or overtly fascist parties, has come about because millions of ordinary voters have felt alienated from the mainstream political process, and have looked for solutions from extreme parties.
Of course, there are tactical lessons for the Left as well. Le Pen’s breakthrough came about because the Left vote in France was fundamentally split. Large numbers of French voters abandoned the French socialists in favour of Trotskyist candidates, only to find themselves having to vote for Jacques Chirac in the second round to keep Le Pen out. Such sectarianism mirrors the disastrous policy of dividing the Left opposition to fascism that Stalin imposed on Western Communists in the early 1930s. Describing Parliamentary socialists as “social fascists”, the communists effectively prevented the formation of a united anti-fascist bloc, fatally weakening the opposition to the rise of the Nazi Right until it was too late. Those who write off any engagement with mainstream politics, and denigrate the motives and morals of democratic politicians, make the same mistake today.
Giving meaning to citizenship
A major part of the progressive response to this challenge must be found in giving content and meaning to citizenship and nationality. Too often, we have let citizenship go by default. Until 2002, we had not taught citizenship in our schools. Nor have we sought to induct new members of the community into what it means to be a British citizen. Nor have we actively promoted community cohesion and a shared sense of civic belonging.
An active concept of citizenship can articulate shared ground between diverse communities. It offers a shared identity based on membership of a political community, rather than forced assimilation into a monoculture, or an unbridled multiculturalism which privileges difference over community cohesion. It is what the White Paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven, called “integration with diversity”.
The starting point for an active concept of citizenship must be a set of basic rights and duties. Respect for cultural difference has limits, marked out by fundamental human rights and duties. Some of these boundaries are very clear, such as in the examples of forced marriage or female circumcision (more accurately described as female genital mutilation, for that is what it is). These practices are clearly incompatible with our basic values – an observation which went unremarked in the first edition of my book, but one for which I was later vilified! However, other issues are less clear, and it is for democratic politics to resolve disagreement and find solutions.
Respect and support for diversity within the boundaries established by basic rights and duties is equally crucial. People must be free to choose how to lead their lives, what religion to follow, and so on. Such diversity is not only right; it is desirable. It brings immense social, economic and cultural benefits to our society.
But there must also be greater content to citizenship beyond these foundations: it must be an active, real expression of the life of the community. Citizenship should be about shared participation, from the neighbourhood to national elections. That is why we must strive to connect people from different backgrounds, tackle segregration, and overcome mutual hostility and ignorance. Of course, one factor in this is the ability of new migrants to speak English – otherwise they cannot get good jobs, or share in wider social debate. But for those long settled in the UK, it is about social class issues of education, housing, jobs and regeneration, and tackling racism.
I have never said, or implied, that lack of fluency in English was in any way directly responsible for the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in the summer of 2001. However, speaking English enables parents to converse with their children in English, as well as in their historic mother tongue, at home and to participate in wider modern culture. It helps overcome the schizophrenia which bedevils generational relationships. In as many as 30% of Asian British households, according to the recent citizenship survey, English is not spoken at home. But let us be clear that lack of English fluency did not cause the riots.
It is vital that the Left doesn’t inhibit debate on these issues. Where people feel silenced, they turn to the politics of despair. We should embrace debate on citizenship, and make change happen in our communities, rather than just the statute book. If the Left fails to offer real solutions to these issues, the Right will step into the gap.
From politics to progress
Since I became Home Secretary, I have sought to put the political beliefs and policies I have outlined in this article and others published since the General Election into practice. Home Secretaries are notoriously vulnerable to “events”, and I am no exception. That’s one reason why it is important to have a set of guiding values which underpin a framework of policy. Without this foundation, the events that emerge from nowhere can blow you off course and obscure the work you are already doing. Given the tendency to collective amnesia in the Britain of the 21st century, where published policy or even immediate action is forgotten within weeks, I certainly don’t hold my breath as to whether I should find myself equally subject to the winds of misfortune.

Britishness rarely occupies the centre ground of political debate. But it often lurks behind and shapes some of the most controversial political choices: Should we join the euro? What should our immigration and asylum policies be? Should we intervene in Iraq? Should there be state funding for religious schools?

The thread that links these difficult and different dilemmas is the question of living together at home as the population becomes ever more diverse and globally as we come to terms with greater interdependence and need to devise new forms of governance to solve our common problems. Identity has always been a site of conflict involving choices and decisions about who to include and who to exclude. It is made up of a potent mix of symbols, myths, historic events, institutions, values and traditions. But the choice of our reference points (whether Margaret Thatchers celebration of Victorian entrepreneurs, John Majors nostalgia for the close-knit communities of the 1950s, or Tony Benns evocation of the chartists) is always heavily political.

In this collection of essays, we explore how a modern, inclusive, outward-looking notion of Britishness can be used as a guide through difficult issues and how it can become a reality. This collection aims to take stock of where the political project of forging a modern and inclusive patriotism has got to in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, the riots of summer 2001 and the elections in France and Holland. Together these pieces, which were written at various points following the attacks of 11 September, deal with four areas. Firstly, they explore the elements of what could be called a clear political project which will help us respond coherently to events which challenge. Secondly, they ask us to identify shared British values. Thirdly, they look at the elements in our community which have found it hard to integrate. Finally, they explore the idea of integration – how Britishness plays out in practice in local communities and labour markets.

Britishness as a political project

If British identity is defined primarily through a desire to preserve our political and cultural institutions in their current form, a pride in our heavy industrial heritage, and an adherence to Protestantism as the established religion, the policy implications will be clear: domestic policy will be driven by a fear of immigration on cultural grounds, and foreign policy by a defence of national sovereignty, and a mistrust of multilateral institutions.

If, on the other hand, we define Britishness according to values rather than unchanging institutions or a single religion, and celebrate Britains global links, its openness to other cultures, its democracy and its creativity, then we will have a foreign policy based on pooling sovereignty with others to solve shared problems, building effective forms of international engagement and immigration policies suited to our economic needs and global responsibilities.

This was the battle for Britishness which Tony Blair pledged to join in one of his first speeches as Labour Party leader when he promised to turn Britain into a young country. His determination to seize the flag from the Conservative Party was part of a political strategy that also led him to develop progressive narratives around the touchstone issues of crime, defence and the family. The importance of this strategy is underlined by the Conservative politician David Willets: What our opponents once most feared about us, and perhaps still do to this day, is that somehow Conservatives understood the drumbeat of national identity. We had an ability to reach the hearts of the electors and evoke instincts and emotions which were a closed book to the rationalist progressives.

On the surface the battle for the soul of the country has already been won. The multi-ethnic nature of the Jubilee celebrations showed how the Monarchy is joining a growing range of institutions from the BBC and the Foreign Office to the Metropolitan Police and the Army that are seeking to become more representative of the make-up of contemporary Britain. Perhaps the most visible sign is the change in tone from the Conservative Party. When the comedian Jim Davidson arrived up at Tory Central Office on election night in 2001 he said, “I’m just scratching my head thinking, am I part of this country now? William Hague had claimed that asylum seekers and the European Union would turn Britain into a foreign country and British voters had comprehensively rejected him. Today, the Conservative Party beams with pride over the appointment of a Hindu as vice-chair, a new unit in Conservative Central Office is scouring the country for candidates from ethnic minorities, and their home affairs spokesperson, Oliver Letwin, poses as the voice of reason, patiently lecturing David Blunkett over his choice of language. As Matthew DAncona states in his piece, these moves are in part a return to the traditions of the Conservative Party which do not tell law-abiding people how to live their lives, raise their families, or practice religion.

The embrace by the British people of a modern and inclusive identity is possibly one of the most significant (and under-acknowledged) achievements of the Blair Government in the first term. In spite of the medias mockery of Cool Britannia and the Millennium Dome, and the negative reactions to political speeches that saw Chicken Tikka Massala as a unifying symbol of modern Britain there had been a palpable shift in the way that Britishness has been defined and celebrated by people across the country. But, as Philip Dodd points out in his essay, the limits of this metropolitan celebration of diversity are being tested. And even more importantly, the concern with identity has been more about electoral politics than a way of anchoring a progressive political agenda in the national story. For this to happen the political account of Britishness must be more than celebratory: as well as setting out the values that must be celebrated (diversity, fairness, creativity, internationalism), we must also have a consensus on the British demons that must be exorcised (muddling through, racism, euroscepticism).

Though the contours of a modern and inclusive British identity are already supported across the political spectrum, our discourse on national identity has continued to lurch from crisis to crisis. The riots of 2001 created a heated debate about English language lessons which polarised people between demands for cultural assimilation and accusations of linguistic imperialism. And the rise of the far Right in Europe both played to British smugness (this couldnt happen here!) and led worried politicians to adopt the language of the Right and talk of swamping. The attacks of 11 September in many ways crystallised these paradoxes by forcing Muslims to choose their allegiance and fuelled prejudices against refugees and migrants.

What became clear is how easily events can throw the whole debate about Britishness into confusion. Take for example the recent dispute over faith schools. While the parameters of the debate would have been straightforward in a country such as France where secular education is enshrined in the Constitution, in Britain we found ourselves torn between the fear of further isolation among different groups and the belief in community rights which argue in favour of letting each group chose. Ultimately, the issue got brushed under the carpet and remains unresolved. British policymakers had no compass to navigate them through a complex debate which had huge implications for key areas education and community cohesion, among others.

What are British Values and will they help us make these decisions?

When conflicts arise, the political class searches for ties that bind. Both David Blunkett and Peter Hain recently declared that immigrants need to be more British but their invocation of British values merely highlighted the extent to which there is confusion about the content of British identity.

Fifty years ago when Herbert Morrison launched the Festival of Britain, he spoke of a new Britain springing form the battered fabric of the old. But the country he was celebrating was very different from the one which his grandson, Peter Mandelson, referred to when he reclaimed the slogan of New Britain for Tony Blairs new Labour Party. This shows how our definition of identity needs to reflect the nature of our times the interdependence of countries and growing migration, and the independence of citizens who no longer fit easily into the traditional categories of nationality, class, gender or race. In a time of peace and prosperity we must also accept that national identity will be worn more lightly it is unlikely to be something for which we will have to die, and our attachment to it will be contingent (my country right or wrong is not a sentiment felt by my generation).

But the fact that national identity must be lighter and more inclusive does not mean that it should be vague. Whatever the hopes of the liberal elite we cant just be global citizens. The failure of progressives to engage in the conflict about national identity simply leaves the field open for those with a more regressive agenda to set the terms of the debate. In the second section of this collection Michael Wills, David Lammy and Francesca Klug therefore try to provide a more precise definition of some of our national values.

Of course the quest to define British values must be related to a broader idea of citizenship and embodied in national and local institutions. As Michael Wills points out in his chapter, it is difficult to create a sense of belonging to a nation if people do not feel that being part of this imagined community brings them any benefits. One of the clearest signs that Britain was going through an identity crisis in the last decade was the collapse in support for most of the national institutions: the House of Commons, the Monarchy, the judiciary, and the civil service. It is interesting to note that a few institutions have managed to maintain strong popular support in the polls: the NHS, the Army, and the BBC.

These institutions are popular because they are becoming emblematic of the greater diversity of Britain, as we move from having an identity based on the idea of a majority host community with ethnic minorities living in its midst (or a community of communities, as Bkikhu Parekh calls it) into a mongrel nation with diversity at the heart of the identity of the majority. One could even argue that the reason these institutions stand out is because they remain the living embodiment of transcendental values which are at the heart of British identity: the NHS stands for fairness and solidarity, the armed forces for Britains internationalism, and the BBC for our creativity. Each of these values has a long history, but each is being lived out in new ways today, as David Lammys piece on internationalism shows. The biggest challenge is dealing with clashes of values in a diverse society, and Francesca Klugs piece shows that human rights and the Human Rights Act, can help to create a framework for defining and dealing with conflicts.

Who is excluded?

The riots in the Northern towns did not just show the gulf between theories of a diverse identity and the reality of segregation on the ground. They also showed that problems of integration at the margins can create a major crisis for the core of our identity. The third section of this book looks at three instances of exclusion.

Ziauddin Sardar examines the difficulties of being a Muslim in Britain after 11 September, and explains how the traditional ways that we have thought of identity (related to geography, race or class) and the intrinsic secularism of Britishness make it difficult for Muslims to feel part of Britain.

Adrienne Katz looks at the pressures on young people in the inner cities. Many are victims of bullying and racism. As a result of being picked on they cannot feel part of the majority society, or their own communities. She describes the peculiar dilemma of fitting in or fighting back, and describes how a group of retaliators is resorting to gangs, weapons and violence to create an identity and sense of self-worth. Citizenship lessons and model youth parliaments will not reach this group in society, but responsive strategies which are in touch with the micro realities of young peoples lives (what happens during the walk to school or on the playground) can.

Yasmin Alibhai-Brown writes about the biggest blind spot of the Left on identity. While Ministers will line up to talk about Scottishness, Welshnes and the value of diversity, Englishness is the final taboo. Englishness is usually dismissed as a meaningless level of identity (a pastiche identity of maypole dancing and nuns cycling in the mist) which must be broken down into its meaningful components of Cornish, Geordies, Socusers, etc. Part of the problem is the legitimate fear that tolerating English patriotism might lead to the lunacy of an English Parliament. But it is perfectly possible to give space to a debate about Englishness without thinking that an English Parliament would bring decisions any closer to the people than Westminster. The challenge, as Yasmin Alibhai-Brown points out, is surely to get involved in defining an inclusive, progressive English identity rather than retreating from the debate altogether and leaving the ground clear for the peddlers of anachronistic nationalism.

These three instances of exclusion came together spectacularly in the Northern towns last summer: white English exclusion mixed with the anxiety of Muslims, and the alienation of the young retaliators from both of these groups.

Community and integration

Ultimately the success of the quest for a modern British identity will depend on the Governments ability to give British Citizenship meaning for everyone who lives in the country. David Blunkett shows that in an age of migration, it is essential for a society to debate and define its foundation values and to inculcate them in its own citizens and its newcomers. A clear pathway towards promoting citizenship for newcomers is an essential and progressive step towards creating a framework for migration policies which are dictated by economic and social needs rather than racial or cultural prejudices. Establishing that all people who live or are born in Britain are accepted as long as they accept the responsibilities of citizenship, is an essential part of creating a progressive account of citizenship, but it must not be used to marginalize migrants who wish to retain their original nationality.

Moreover, the trappings of citizenship will be meaningless unless we actually give people a stake in our local communities. In After Multiculturalism Yasmin Alibhai-Brown wrote about how multicultural policies which defend group rights and link the allocation of resources to ethnicity can lead to segregation and a perpetual sense of minority status amongst second or third generation children (including those of mixed races). Furthermore, as described in Shamit Saggars essay, these attempts to define citizenship in a way that celebrates diversity must go hand-in hand with policies to tackle the stark, racially defined differences that still plague the labour market. By using both gross measurements (which quantify basic statistics such as earning and unemployment levels) and net measurements (which relate these differences to other factors such as gender and education) of ethnic penalties the chapter reveals that minority groups score worse in both the net and the gross stakes. The chapter describes how, for example, how Pakistani and Bangladeshi men still earn on average 163 per week less than their white counterpart with similar educational levels. More worryingly, it shows how stories about the minorities who have made it, such as Chinese and Indian-Britons, may not be as representative in reality, with these groups achievements not being commensurate with their levels of education. As long as ethnic penalties affect certain groups more than others it will be impossible to talk of a nation at ease with itself.

It will be very difficult to create the well-managed system of migration that David Blunkett advocates, unless we make the integration of newcomers work in real communities. Phoebe Griffith and Sacha Chan-Kam uncover how Britains self-image as a tolerant country belies great ignorance and deep hostility to refugees. They argue that the key to turning this around is to reshape the debate so that it no longer focuses exclusively on who should be allowed in or out, but rather on how the 50% of asylum seekers who are awarded the right to remain can be given the opportunity to make a full contribution to the British economy and society. They show that integration has to be a two-way process with newcomers having obligations such as learning English and looking for work but in return the Government must supply English lessons, sensible labour market policies, and conduct public education campaigns to try to reduce ignorance. This is essential as our policies fore dealing with refugees today could avoid the segregation which could lead to social unrest tomorrow.

Conclusion: a symbolic policy

In her Millennium Lecture, the historian Linda Colley said that politicians should spend less time asking agonised questions about the viability of Britishness. What would make people relate to Britishness, she argued, would be the success of policies which both made a difference to peoples lives and helped them connect tangibly with the debate.

The government needs to start thinking in terms of small, symbolic innovations which can send positive shock waves across the board and address peoples fears and concerns. In this context, the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers will be key because it speaks volumes about the way in which we relate to both the rest of the world and with each other as a nation.

If the Government is going to bring its domestic policies into line with its rhetoric about global communities, it needs to devote some real attention to developing innovative policies in this area. One way would be to learn from some of the most positive policies around the world. For example, one policy that could seriously reshape our debate would be to adopt a UK Refugee Sponsorship Scheme based on the Canadian sponsorship project described in Chapter 11. This could do for the current programme of rejuvenating Britishness what Thatchers council house policies did for her economic reforms. Like Thatchers policy which has had a lasting impact precisely because it encapsulated the ethos of the Thatcher government spreading the message of property-owning capitalism to those considered working class a sponsorship scheme could help displace some of the demons that plague the debate about British identity.

While there is concrete evidence about the ways in which refugees in Canada benefit directly from this scheme, the dynamic of having a community sponsoring a refugee could yield both practical and symbolic rewards when it comes to promoting outward-looking and inclusive notions of Britishness.

Community involvement of this kind is an ideal way of turning around myths of scrounging and of promoting a debate about common needs. It would encapsulate what David Blunkett refers to as building community solutions to social problems in his chapter, by making British sponsors get to know refugees and giving them a stake in their future. The move would also be a straightforward means of injecting extra cash into the elements of the system which remain under-funded. Though the state will need to provide safeguards to ensure that the system is not open to abuse – checking whether sponsors are suitable, guaranteeing living standards, ensuring that the system does not descend into cherry-picking the funds for this scheme would be raised locally through voluntary initiatives. Arguments about special and preferential treatment will therefore not hold because sponsors will be acting voluntarily.

The potential symbolic impact of this scheme could be even greater. Firstly, the scheme could be held up as an instantly recognisable reflection of British tolerance and fair play. Secondly, it would stand as a reflection of our intrinsic internationalism. It will help address the clash which exists between the motives which drive our interventions in conflicts abroad, as in the case of Kosovo, and the fact that we somehow find it much harder to extend a helping hand when people fleeing those very same conflicts arrive on our shores. Finally, it would reflect British talent for creativity and openness to new ideas, opening people up to the fact that all newcomers are a source of creativity for societies which are ready to accept them openly. In short, a policy such as the UK Refugee Sponsorship Scheme could be held up as a useful living example of the best features of Britishness and could address some of the challenges brought out throughout this collection.

The frameworks which we adopt for making sense of a diverse British identity and the policies that they inform in local communities will be the key to deciding whether Britishness can become anchored as an inclusive identity. It is the labour market and social policies we adopt for managing integration of a few thousand, that will determine the lived reality for millions in the future.

The nearest most people get to Foreign Office travel advice is hearing about it on the news. When Pakistan and India threaten nuclear holocaust, when Central Europe floods, or when a new wave of suicide bombings erupts in the Middle East, changes to travel advice becomes a news story. It is always linked in the public mind to hurried evacuations and imminent threats to life and limb. Of course, the news stories are always lopsided – we hear about advice when it becomes more stringent but never when it is relaxed. And this is part of the problem – the ordinary, prosaic incidents that cause the most headaches happen on the Ibiza package tour and Silver anniversary cruise, not just on the Peruvian Inca trail.
More and more Britons are falling into all kinds of trouble overseas each year. Statistics from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office show that the number of Britons detained or imprisoned overseas rose by nearly a half between 1995/6 and 2000/1, and the number of emergency passports issued rose by a quarter. The types of problems they face range from the irritating stomach upset brought on by ignoring warnings not to drink the tap water to ending up in a Foreign jail after ignoring local customs.

Unsurprisingly, Britons are more likely to fall into trouble outside Europe and North America, areas that, with the growth of adventure tourism, are experiencing some of the highest growth rates for British visitors. In 2001, while around three-quarters of all trips in 2001 were to just ten countries – France, Spain, USA, Republic of Ireland, Greece, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal – two-thirds of robberies, half of all rapes, and all abductions and kidnaps happened outside these countries.

Of course, these problems only affect a small minority. But if the number needing consular help continues to spiral, the Foreign Office may not be able to keep pace with demand. It predicts that overseas travel will grow by ten per cent in the next two years, but cannot guarantee that its funding for travel advice and services to Britons who fall into trouble will rise at the same speed. And with one-fifth of travellers still not taking out travel insurance to cover them if something does go wrong, overstretch is a real danger.

The Foreign Office’s travel information has been called “world class” by some. But it is failing to get to the people who need it. In a recent poll, fewer than one in ten respondents were able to name a risk they may have faced on their last trip overseas, and it is estimated that less than 10 per cent of travellers consult the Foreign Office website. As Alan Flook of the Federation of Tour Operators says “there is still an amazing amount of ignorance among the travelling public, even about the most popular destinations and the most common problems.”

There is also evidence to suggest that travellers do not seek out advice because they assume that they are in the protective arms of others. This attitude is summed up by Bob Boyce of Thomas Cook: “Customers [feel that they] don’t need to consider the difficulties of travelling to a country on their own. The majority buy packages, are met by reps and hand-delivered to the hotel. The reps are there for any problems they might have during their holiday.”

Complacency does not stop at the poolside. Many business travellers assume either that their company would not send them to work in a high-risk environment, or that they would be able to initiate security to eradicate the risks. As a former kidnap hostage in Colombia said, “I didn’t know how big the risk of kidnapping was there. Of course, I knew Colombia wasn’t the safest country in the world, but I assumed that my company would be able to keep me away from harm.”

One of the reasons that advice is not getting through is that the Foreign Office have to produce general advice on a particular destination or country that cannot hope to suit those on business trips and 18-30 holidays. While tour operators complain that the advice is becoming too long, many companies want more detailed information. And while the Government might warn against all but essential travel to a particular country, risk consultancies may be advising their Business clients on how they can operate there.

With the constraints on the FCO’s consular funding, it is unrealistic to expect it to foot the bill for targeted advice. Instead, it should team up with travel companies, aid agencies and Business to distribute effective advice – from how to keep lap-tops safe to how aid workers should behave in a conflict zone. The most effective time to communicate travel advice is immediately prior to, or during, the trip. This could mean including travel advice in the envelope with air-tickets, or paying those who hand out club flyers in Ibiza to distribute information on the dangers of drugs.

Since thousands of hours of consular time are already spent picking up the pieces after easily avoidable accidents, getting travel advice to those who need it would prove cheaper for the taxpayer – and cut down on those holiday-dampening trips to the Casualty Department.

But this is not to spill sand in the Ambre Solaire. The rise in overseas travel has been an overwhelmingly healthy phenomenon – a sign that we’ve sloughed off layers of British insularity and superstition about the rest of the world. The Foreign Office must give appropriate advice, but its also up to us to read and act on the information provided. The Man from the Ministry can’t be expected to take sole responsibility for making sure that we don’t go swimming in the dark.

In speeches about the EU, at seminars and conferences, in discussions about the European Parliament and even in publications put out by the Foreign Policy Centre
much is said about a “democratic deficit” in the EU. We are told that this must be corrected by recommendations from the Convention on the Future of Europe now going on and decisions taken at the 2004 IGC. The analysis is suspect.

Anti-Europeans wish people to believe that the EU is undemocratic. If it were, the idea of leaving it or at the least of “renegotiating” its Treaties (codeword for destroying it or leaving it) might gain ground. At the other end of the spectrum, the supporters of the concept of a centralised Europe, a United States of Europe, want more “democracy”, for example electing the President of the Commission, as a step down the road towards their aim. This is an unholy alliance, but too many pro-European pragmatists have become its fellow travellers. To deny that there is a democratic deficit is no longer politically correct.

There is a deficit, but it is a deficit of consent not of democracy. Too many people are moving into support for the Le Pens of this world. Huge numbers of people say they do not understand what the EU is or what it is for. There is a rising tide of nationalism.

The EU is not like a country with a democratically elected government. If it were, democratic theory and practice would demand that the people be able to change their government by voting it out at periodic elections. The fact that the European Parliament (EP) is called a Parliament has compounded the confusion because it is normal to feel that a Parliament ought to be able to change the government. But the EP can sack the European Commission, but it cannot sack the government of the EU because it is the Council (the member states) and not the Commission which takes the decisions. The EU is a unique international organisation with some pronounced supranational features. The right question to ask is “Is existing democratic accountability sufficient and appropriate to its intermediate constitutional position?”

The European Commission is an independent organisation, not just a civil service. It has important independent powers in the field of competition and regulating state aids. The Commissioners are usually politicians, often distinguished politicians, by origin who have sworn not to take instructions from ‘their’ national government. It has the role of making sure that the member states carry out their Treaty obligations and can take them to the European Court if they do not. It has, by the letter of the law, the exclusive right to propose draft legislation, though in practise it works with governments who wish to see specific legislation proposed. It has a crucial role in implementing the decisions of the Council and in representing the EU internationally. But it is the Council which is the decision-making body.

Representatives of the fifteen member states form the Council. Different Ministers attend, depending on the subject to be dealt with. But, increasingly in recent years, it is the European Council composed of the Heads of Government which has played the leading role. All the member states are required by treaty to be democracies and so the representatives of their countries in the Council are subject to the democratic control exercised by their national Parliaments. Some national Parliaments do the job more thoroughly than others, but all the Ministers who speak in the Council pay great attention to their political constituencies at home. If the EU is not to become a superstate, which none of the Ministers want, national Parliaments must perforce be the main element of democratic control over decisions taken by Ministers in the Council. The commitment by Prime Ministers to directing the EU ensures that national Parliaments hear about the main things which are going on.

The Eurosceptics, like Margaret Thatcher, argue that majority voting in the Council destroys accountability to their Parliaments of those Ministers who are outvoted. Yet in 1985 she agreed that, in order to remove national barriers to free trade, majority voting was essential if the Single Market was to be created. My own experience in the Council was that Ministers much preferred not to outvote each other. Decisions were normally taken by consensus, except that votes were sometimes taken at the request of an isolated Minister – so that he could tell his own Parliament he had had no choice. In practice, however, the usual consequence of the existence of a provision for majority voting was to stimulate the civil servants and Ministers in any minority country to think up ways in which a compromise could be devised that served the interests of all the members. Because of this Britain has been voted down a negligible number of times. A theoretical diminution of accountability is the price paid for getting things done.

But Ministerial accountability to Parliament is not the only element of democratic control in the EU. The directly elected EP contributes another important element. It was responsible for the removal of the Santer Commission. Still more important in practice, but little known, is the contribution it makes to improving draft legislation by means of its power of co-decision with the Council on subjects which are dealt with by majority voting. If the representatives of the Council and the Parliament cannot reach agreement in the co-decision procedure, draft legislation cannot be adopted. To this should be added all the many ways in which the Commission, and increasingly Ministers also, seek to consult with members of the EP. If the EU was moving in the direction of a superstate, the EP’s degree of control might seem inadequate. But since it is not, the EP’s role seems appropriate and is much greater than is generally recognised.

There is on the other hand a deficit of consent. Politicians in many countries find that it is good politics to attack the EU in general and the Commission in particular. There is a low turn-out in European elections and pervasive ignorance about what the EU does. (It is not only in European elections that there is a low turn-out. The same is true of many national elections. Wherever the electorate cannot see that their vote will change things of direct interest to them, they are reluctant to make the effort to go to the polls.) But what is the remedy? Surely not more constitutional tinkering! Can anyone seriously maintain that indirect, or even direct, election of the President of the Commission would change the voter’s behaviour? It would create a constitutional muddle while provoking nothing more than a public yawn. While the Convention debates such abstruse constitutional questions, nothing will be done about the deficit of consent – which is even more serious in the case of the EU than nationally because the growth of anti-EU parties might in the end undo the progress since 1945 and lead to the triumph of nationalism in Europe. We don’t need to emulate the first half of the 20th century in the first half of the 21st.

People, even well educated readers of the serious newspapers, are constantly asking what the EU is for. They genuinely feel they don’t know. There are many answers which they can be given. Here are some of them. It is for ensuring that the zone of peace created by its foundation is enlarged to cover the whole of the European continent. It is for continuing actively to build prosperity by completing and maintaining the Single Market and by action by member governments to match each other’s best practise in economic management; it is for contributing to economic prosperity and stability through the Single Currency; for dealing with all those problems of the environment that cannot be tackled on a purely national basis; for helping to deal with crime, drugs, illegal immigration and other cross-border evils through police and judicial co-operation and the proposed common arrest warrant; and for innumerable small acts of co-operation, too many to list. It is also for common policies on agriculture and fisheries, policies which still need much reform.

In the world outside the EU, its purposes are to ensure that European economic interests are protected, especially in the World Trade Organisation, and in bilateral dealings with other countries, including the United States; to serve the long-term interests of its members by common action to keep the peace in places like the Balkans; to create a small rapid reaction force which could undertake peacekeeping or humanitarian interventions when NATO cannot because the Americans are unwilling; and to take common positions on foreign policy issues where the EU collectively can exert influence for good which its individual members cannot.

Tackling the massive consent deficit is never going to be easy and will take time as well as concerted effort. To consent you need to understand why the EU is important to all of us. It is not elitist to suggest that the citizen who only reads the Sun or the Daily Mirror may not understand the Commission’s competition policy. I tried out a draft of this paper on a reader of the Times who abandoned it after suggesting a few changes to make the second paragraph easier to understand. But ordinary citizens are no longer prepared automatically to trust their government to get things right. The subjects dealt with by the EU are complicated and hard to explain. Who but an expert can follow the disputes with the USA about trade policy? Who can explain with clarity that free trade is good and that all the regulations in the nearly 300 single market directives are needed in order to have genuine free trade. The British, who suffer from the excess zeal of British bureaucrats when they turn EU directives into UK law, are rightly suspicious. Even among those who would like objectively to enlighten the people there are bound to be differences of opinion which is confusing for those who would like to learn. But the effort must be made to persuade the vast majority of citizens that the EU is a force for good.

In addition to the problems we have now, there are going to be real difficulties about how to make the EU institutions work with ten or more new members from Eastern and Southern Europe. But we do not yet know what the reality of a Union of 27 will be like and what needs to be changed to make it work. One thing is certain, however, that the right way is not for the heads of our governments to sit together quarrelling for several days in order to produce a voting system that only a powerful computer will be able to understand, as they did at Nice.

Here are five suggestions for our leaders.
1. They should agree that they need urgently to address the deficit of consent if nationalism is not to continue to gain ground. The first thing to do might be to put the best brains available to them to work to draft an agreed text of 1000 simple words saying what the EU is and does and why it is a “good thing”.
2. They should send a message to the Convention on the Future of Europe to the effect that the argument about where the EU is going in the long run must be suspended for the time being, while the urgent problems of substance are settled, not least the remaining chapters in the accession negotiations.
3. They should agree that it will be premature to make any important constitutional changes at an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 2004. There should be a five year period of living with the new members before an IGC in 2009.
4. Meanwhile a one-day 2004 IGC will agree one short clause permitting the European Council to make any constitutional changes that experience with enlargement suggests are necessary, by unanimous agreement and without ratification by member states, but on a provisional basis and subject to confirmation in 2009.
5. Finally, a small group should be created in the Secretariat of the Council to explain in simple language to all those prepared to listen or write about it the decisions the Council takes each week.

This would allow the endless constitutional wrangling to be put on ice for five years while the new members settle in. It would frustrate the evil designs of the unholy alliance of Eurosceptics and Federalists by allowing for time to analyse whether there is really a democratic deficit and time for a new-found unity of European Ministers to work together to make the EU comprehensible to the citizens.

The governments aim to promote social inclusion and community cohesion through initiatives such as youth parliaments and citizenship classes may be undermined because they do not address the fundamental role which street life plays in young peoples lives. The day-to-day micro reality what happens to teenagers on the way to school or in the neighbourhood will have the greatest impact on their sense of belonging. Policies will need to respond to the fact that fear, the lack of personal safety and the subsequent loss of faith in authority are driving a minority of young people to take their own steps to stay safe. Although small in number, these young people are destabilising society in some dangerous ways with some groups suffering disproportionately. These groups belong namely, but not solely, to ethnic minorities. For young people, the scales are weighted on either side by two opposites: victimhood and a sense of dignity and worth. Anything that can tilt the direction towards dignity will help avoid the dangers inherent in feeding victimhood; for the latter can help shore up a sense of moral right and indignation. At Bradford University, Ian Vine has described the psychological pathways to civic alienation and shown how this sense of moral indignation can lead young people to justify actions they take in self defence

This chapter is based on two research projects carried out by Young Voice during momentous events. The first, in Bradford, took place just before the riots of 2001 (86% of the sample reflect ethnic minority communities). It explored the career aspirations and future dreams of young people and included experience of bullying and racism. The second, in an inner London borough, took place after 11 September. This study explored issues of personal safety, bullying, gangs, attitudes to weapons, drug misuse and emotional well-being among 2062 young people from one borough. By monitoring how safe young people feel in their neighbourhood and on the journey to school, and whether or not they were bullied, the projects revealed:
#a how the lived experience of certain young people differed between groups which were more vulnerable to racism and bullying
#a how this in turn affected their overall attitudes and behaviour whether they were more likely to fight back in some way or lose hope altogether.

Young Voice had already found that despite schools being obliged to have anti-bullying policies in place, almost half the pupils dont believe their school has one and half of those who say their school does so, consider it ineffective. The more detailed local studies confirmed this pattern but also made it clear that school policies cannot succeed without support from the wider community and other agencies because bullying gets displaced outside school even when schools are effective at reducing it. From these results we developed a Coherent Community Approach which aims to respond to young peoples multiple needs and use the wider community to support schools in their anti-bullying efforts.

Who is more vulnerable?

It is a truism to say that young people can teach adults a lot about how to get along. And the evidence compiled by Young Voice does show that for the most part young people have a remarkable capacity to relate to each other in ways that bridge cultural and ethnic divides. The main problem is that those who arent able to relate, although small in number, are destabilising communities in dangerous ways.

The studies by Young Voice show that a minority of young people have poor coping strategies in response to threats and fears. We have labelled this group at risk. There are two main coping strategies displayed by this group. The submitters, on the one hand, who become timid or withdrawn, do not fulfil their potential or become depressed. If they use drugs it is to relieve tension. These young people become increasingly disaffected from school or unsure about their potential, a trend which affects their life chances in the long-term. The effects on aspiration and attainment in this group are clear. In Bradford, this showed itself in the fact that young people had a more resigned attitude, with 20% saying that bullying has made me feel I cant do things in contrast to only 14% of people saying this in the national sample. Fewer than half these young people believe they will achieve their goal for the future in contrast to almost two-thirds of other students. The second group could be referred to as the retaliators. These are the young people who fight back and fall into risky patterns of behaviour, particularly joining gangs or carrying weapons. They pick fights, feel depressed, and bully other people. Some smash things up or join gangs and carry weapons. They also use more drugs and alcohol. The inappropriate actions they take put not only themselves at risk, but act to destabilise their neighbourhood as a whole and they too become less likely to fulfil their potential.

In both cases, bullying plays a key role in this process of destabilisation. More worryingly, our studies found that often bullying comes in the form of covert racism because young people from ethnic minorities reported higher indices of bullying overall. In ‘Bullying in Britain’ in 2000, Young Voice found that while approximately one in ten of all young people in Bradford reported suffering from bullying, one in three Muslim children had experienced violence from bullies. Consequently, one finds that young people from ethnic minorities are often more likely to be ‘at risk’. In a survey of 2,062 inner London teenagers post-11 September, for example, one in six young people had a chance of being ‘at risk’. Within this troubling group of 315 young people, Asians were the most likely to join a gang and carry a weapon. Nearly all of these ‘at risk’ young Asians described being attacked, bullied and insulted and the feeling prevailed among them nine in ten of them that ‘it is acceptable to carry a weapon for self defence’.

Nonetheless, fixed prescriptions which focus on black or Asian populations miss the point for two reasons. One reason is because minority population patterns vary from one neighbourhood to another, with different groups becoming targeted by bullies because they belong to the smallest minority. Another reason is that the experiences of young people from the same ethnic group living in the same neighbourhood deviated sharply: Those at risk and those not at risk led entirely different lives: Asians who were not defined as at risk, for example, were also the least likely of young people to either join a gang or carry a weapon. Similar bipolar patterns could be identified among black pupils and their attitudes to school. When pupils were asked if they enjoyed school for example, black pupils not in the at risk category responded more positively than the average of all pupils. This was startling since black pupils are widely known to be the most likely to be excluded from school. On closer examination, black pupils also topped the groups who said they disliked school. The question is which black pupils are unhappy and why?

A more subtle way of analysing the responses of young people is to explore whether the young person sees his or her neighbourhood as a good place in which to grow up; how valued, safe and respected they feel within school and outside it. The surveys in London showed that young people, including white young people, who said ethnic groups dont get on at all in my neighbourhood, were the most likely to be at risk. Of all those interviewed, 50% thought that the different ethnic groups in their neighbourhood get on either OK, Well, or Very Well. But the 8% who said they believed that ethnic groups do not get on at all in their neighbourhood were the most troubling. Although small in number they were disproportionately disturbing to the majority and to themselves. Almost a third of them reported having been bullied within the last two weeks and more than one in four were likely to fall into the at risk category already described above. Forty-three per cent said they were likely to join a gang and 61% believe it is acceptable to carry a weapon for safety (one in five already do). They were also more likely to use hard drugs, make abusive comments to teachers and almost half of them admit to bullying other people. This small minority might grow alarmingly if the further 11% of young people who replied the different ethnic groups only just get on come to agree with them that we do not get on at all.

Moving forward: a Coherent Community Approach

The results of these surveys are the basis of Young Voices Coherent Community Approach. The aim is to provide local services with evidence of young peoples needs, looking both at how we can better understand the lived experience of young people who are potentially at risk, pre-empt the development of risky patterns of behaviour and help them fulfil their potential. At the heart of this is young peoples voice and involvement. Unless we hear from them about what is working or not working to reduce bullying and racism, imposed solutions will be likely to fail. Unless they wholeheartedly support reduction strategies and believe they work, cynicism will grow. This is why ongoing research with participation is vital. Drawing from what young people have told us in our projects and some innovative projects currently being run at local level, the Coherent Community Approach is divided into five key steps:

Tipping the balance towards dignity: Children need tools to be able to rise above the threats and taunting or intimidation. The best way of supplying these is by giving them something concrete to help build up confidence and counter low self-esteem. In Bradford, for example, a small, low-key youth programme run by a countryside officer helps young Muslim women become involved in the management of countryside projects and outings. The activities are specifically designed to build confidence by giving these young women skills, self-efficacy and determination. By designing a service which is responsive to the cultural sensitivities of their background (for example, ensuring that the girls were chaperoned at all times so that their parents would not be opposed to them attending the sessions), the programme enables them to become part of the mainstream and thrive in the education system. The results speak for themselves: in an area of deprivation in which their mothers barely had education and where their school got 23% through GCSE at A-C grade, eleven out of fourteen of these potentially at risk girls have gone on to higher education.

Understanding groups better: Efforts to promote integration or reduce bullying/racism cannot fall into simple broad-brush categories, i.e. designing services only for black and Asian teenagers. Services need to factor in the discrepancies between different groups and be able to identify those people who are in the minority in any given area. Clearly this will differ from one location to another. The minority may be white, or it may be defined as an even smaller category Catholic, Greek Cypriot or Somali. Monitoring changing patterns in bullying and racism requires constant vigilance and tracking the mutations of the types of bullying and racism practised. Young Voice is setting up a Bully Data Bank to do this .This data bank will centrally hold all the information gathered by Young Voice in partnership with young people. It will be able to provide monitoring and comparisons. To know whether or not an anti-bullying policy works, we need to follow trends, see what works and what needs tweaking. Local authorities will be able to have a survey undertaken, followed by a service keeping them informed.

Putting the street at the centre of our policies: in order to work, policies need to involve not only teachers and school staff, but bus drivers, the police, and other members of the wider community. Durham County Council has been responsive to this need and put in place training schemes to help their employees develop the skills necessary to identify and deal with bullying. They have instigated a county-wide programme offering training packages to teachers, pupil peer support teams, and council staff such as librarians and park keepers. The aim is to help all these stakeholders develop greater awareness about the complexities which lie behind at risk behaviour

Getting all agencies to work together
The borough of Islington has carried out a multi-agency investigation into the day-to-day experienced of its young people. This stakeholder approach makes each agency aware of the way in which their little bit of the teenagers life is linked with other factors. Schools, as well as the drug and alcohol team, the youth offending team, play and leisure departments and the co-ordinator of the Personal Social and Health Education curriculum, all worked collaboratively with Young Voice. The results of the study provided evidence of the complex interaction of factors at work and clear evidence of how necessary a joined-up approach actually is. The motivation of drug users and the links with bullying, or the reasons why people might carry a weapon, are vital information for services tackling these problems.

Involving the community
A Coherent Community Approach does not expect schools to tackle bullying and harassment alone. It involves the local community, the very adults who live on the estates where the tensions may brew up, and the community leaders. Parents too must be asked to sign up to the whole school anti-bullying strategy when their child starts school at secondary level because parents often give advice to their child which is directly counter to the schools policy of non-violence. Violence at home was found to be a driver behind violence on the street so to work with parents and teaching Positive Parenting may be needed in some cases. Above all, it calls for collective responsibility for the safety and dignity of all young citizens. For without an improvement in their personal experience of safety, these young people will perceive all our calls for inclusion and integration as just window dressing.

President Chirac, at the recent Brussels summit, has delayed the reform of Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy, but he has not, and cannot rule it out indefinitely. He, with the other members of the European Union, as well as the United States and Canada, have agreed to submit proposals to the World Trade Organisation next spring, which would significantly liberalise global trade in agricultural products by giving developing countries better access to the markets of the rich. If this is to be achieved, radical reform of the CAP, especially with regard to the reduction of market subsidies, protectionist tariff barriers and the dumping of surpluses on world markets, will be essential.
The main reason behind the reluctance of Presidents Chirac and Bush to accept reform is that their powerful farm lobbies fear that they would not be able to survive in an unprotected global market. But these fears are largely unfounded.
The population of the world is expected to rise by 50% over the next thirty years, and this will require a comparable increase in food production. The concern should not be about the future of farming, but rather that Dr Malthus’ gloomy, and so far unfulfilled prediction, that population growth could lead to widespread starvation will at last come true. For example, environmental concerns about the conversion of rain forest to arable farming could severely restrict the growth of cultivatable land in the future. This would however suggest an encouraging prospect for the world’s farmers.
European farmers have the advantage of being close to 400 million affluent consumers who increasingly want to buy fresh food which is safe. It is much easier and reassuring to source perishable food from ‘local’ sources. Whilst New Zealand farmers can supply long-life butter, they cannot ship fresh milk to Europe to satisfy the needs of the yoghurt and soft cheese markets.
Because of a favourable climate, good soil and competitive farm structures, large numbers of European farms will prosper in an open world market. The dairy cows of Normandy and Cork can compete with anyone, as can the grain producers of Schleswig-Holstein, the Paris basin and Eastern England. Nobody can produce pigs like the Danes, or potatoes like the Poles.
But whilst Cornwall produces excellent daffodils, Lincolnshire grows high quality vegetables, and Kent superb fruit, they frequently cannot harvest them because of labour shortages. Ironically, if we restrict migration from Eastern Europe and elsewhere, we will put these farmers out of business. British workers are no longer prepared to do these arduous, physically-demanding, jobs.

High quality regional foods will maintain and increase their share in affluent markets, as discriminating shoppers choose to buy expensive ham from Parma, Stilton cheese from Leicestershire, French soft cheese, Welsh lamb, Scottish beef (despite BSE), and Italian olive oil. There is a growing market for authentic, locally produced, organic food, though farmers need to be careful that supply does not exceed demand in a small, niche market, as is happening with devastating consequences with organic milk.
At one time farmers in Europe struggled to collect their harvest because of adverse weather conditions, but modern plant breeding makes crops more resilient to weather extremes and engineering technology has made harvesting a speedier and more efficient process.
British farms remain uncompetitive compared with their European and North American counterparts because of their reluctance to co-operate with each other. By working together, they can buy their fertiliser and seed much more cheaply, they can reduce their capital by sharing working assets, and increase their prices by investing in primary processing and co-operative marketing.
Already over half of British and EU farmers supplement their income through non-agricultural activities, typified by part-time farmers in Bavaria working on the BMW assembly line. This trend will accelerate as IT connects remote farms to the world of commerce and if planners become more flexible in allowing redundant farm buildings to be converted for other uses, consistent with a sustainable environment. Rural tourism is booming, linked with the growing trend towards several short-break holidays a year. From Cornwall to Silesia, from Bavaria to Brittany, from the Lake District to Tuscany, farmers are diversifying into the holiday trade.
The value of farm land, especially in the more densely populated parts of Europe remains high despite the difficult trading conditions. Farmers who own their land are, therefore, asset rich if income poor. They have the option of selling-up and relying on the proceeds – their average age is 58 – or alternatively disposing of especially valuable plots, to raise capital for expansion, which many younger, progressive farmers are doing in Britain today. However, this option is not available to tenant farmers, and there is a case for a review of their rights vis-à-vis their landlords.
There are large numbers of European farmers, who for reasons of location (e.g. remote Welsh farmers), soil, climate and size (e.g. Southern Italy), are not economically viable today and will be less so in future. If existing subsidies are withdrawn, taxpayers will have to decide whether they are prepared to make direct payments, to promote a sustainable environment, to encourage such farmers to remain in business. Under the reform proposals of the Commissioner for Agriculture, Franz Fischler, all farmers would be entitled to such payments, which would also be compatible with a WTO settlement.
But this hopeful prospect would only be achieved if farmers abandon their dependence on state hand-outs. Inefficient farmers have as little reason to expect to be protected by government as any other inefficient businesspeople. The present system seeks to do just that.
CAP reform must concentrate on incentivising responsible, enterprising farmers, unencumbered by bureaucracy and market restraints. Seeking to maintain the status quo is both wrong and unachievable.

It is difficult to overstate the change to the international security environment that we face at the beginning of the 21st century. For almost half a century, the UK and allies were locked in cold war confrontation. Politicians and policy makers for defence and foreign policy habitually thought of the world in two geographical compartments:

· First, the NATO area, from which we faced the Soviet Union. This was ultimately the most important theatre, but the aim essentially was to ensure that nothing much changed or happened.

· Second, there was “The rest of the world”. This was of altogether lesser significance. Things certainly happened there, not least as super power rivalry was covertly pursued. But everything was seen through the prism of the cold war confrontation and conflicts were dampened or controlled out of deference to the great global stand-off.

This division began to break down with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. This Labour Government formally cast aside much of the old defence thinking in the Strategic Defence Review in 1998, with our new emphasis on expeditionary warfare. But it took the appalling events of 11 September 2001 to bring home to us the artificiality of the old geographical distinction and its irrelevance to the security problems we face now.

Prior to those events, perhaps too many in the West also paid too much attention to the classical constraint on Intervention – possibly best expressed in the field of medicine – first do no harm. We now know that we have no choice but to be prepared to intervene and actively manage the international security environment or, to continue the metaphor, the patient may well get worse before he gets better. But intervention is not all or even preferably about the use of force. What it is about is positive action driven by a thorough analysis of the security challenges we face.
New Chapter

The appalling attacks in the United States on 11 September dominated the year which followed. Not only did those attacks lead us to commit military forces to operations against Al Qaida in Afghanistan but they also caused us to look very closely at the strategic environment in which our Armed Forces operate.

The most important element of that policy analysis shows that there is a new category of player in the strategic security arena. Not new in the sense that we had never heard of Al Qaida or Usama Bin Laden before, but qualitatively different.

It would be wrong to suggest that Al Qaida somehow emerged from nowhere as a strategic threat on 11 September. Rather those attacks demonstrated to us that a hostile force had developed the will and the capability to be actively hostile on a scale we had not previously anticipated.

It remains to be seen whether or not Al Qaida is a unique phenomenon, given an opportunity to flourish only by a particular combination of leadership, financial resource and a relationship with a regime, the Taliban, that gave it a haven in which to grow.

We would be unwise to assume so. Or to assume that other terrorist networks might not develop the same will and strategic capability by different means.

We must learn the lesson that, just as viruses evolve new strains which constantly challenge medical science, and successive generations of bacteria grow resistant to antibiotics, so can the nature and means of hostility change in the wider world.

The terrorist network is an enemy whose strategic interests, infrastructure and will to fight are very different to those of a conventional nation-state. It has no territory to control, no economy to protect or nurture, no citizens to whom it has obligations. Nor does it have an existence within the society of states: it has no institutional relationships with states or supra-national organisations. Its hostility might be self-inspired by some ideological fervour, or externally generated, a response to some action of ours or condition of its constituency. In a sense, it seems to have nothing to lose.

Therefore many of the normal vehicles of analysis, power and influence within the society of states do not apply to it. Nor do the military relationships with which we are familiar.

The policy analysis which supported the New Chapter of the Strategic Defence Review reflected on these differences.

It highlighted the fundamental importance of knowing the enemy, of being one step ahead of it so that we could assess, decide and act faster than it could. We gave this a label. It is ‘knowledge superiority’.

The New Chapter went on to demonstrate that the Armed Forces still had a significant role in a wider counter-terrorist strategy.

First, Defence Diplomacy, the provision of military training to less capable states and deployments on stabilisation operations can help prevent the development of conditions which give rise to terrorism.

Second, by demonstrating that we have a genuine capability to respond to attacks and by making known that we will do so, the Armed Forces offer deterrence.

Third, the threat of military action, or its actual use can back up coercive demands that states or organisations do not engage in terrorism.

Fourth, military operations can disrupt the capability of terrorist networks to act by denying them money, equipment or freedom of movement, or by dislocating whatever physical infrastructure they create.

Finally, we can destroy terrorist cells or networks directly.

These military means were all firmly within the scope of the original Strategic Defence Review. The New Chapter showed that its emphasis on expeditionary operations with allies was correct. But the New Chapter also identified what we needed to do to make these military means operate more effectively against a different sort of enemy.

We were already building capabilities around the networking of equipment which collects data about the enemy, to the commanders who make decisions based on that information, to the weapons platforms – whatever they might be – which hit the target. The pace of change in this ‘network-centric capability’ has accelerated rapidly since we first saw it in the Gulf War and it continues to do so. We concluded that we need to exploit this approach better and more comprehensively.

The essence of this concept of operations is precision in the application of military power – hitting the right target hard and hitting it fast.

There is a range of such scenarios. We have to plan for more than just terrorism. Terrorism is not the only threat to peace and stability around the world.

9/11 did not remove existing issues, or diminish their importance over time. We still face the challenge of Weapons of Mass Destruction. We still face the challenges of drugs and crime organised on a global scale. We still face the challenges of geo-political tensions in many parts of the world.

And terrorism does not exist in isolation from these challenges. In some cases they themselves give rise to the conditions which breed terrorism.

At one end of the scale, in consequence management, it does not much matter if the damage was caused by a terrorist attack, by a state actor, by an aircraft crash, or indeed by an earthquake or a flood.

At the other end as well, the circumstances which give rise to terrorism also bear on state actors and their strategic aims and actions. In some cases they are inseparable. The Middle East peace process is perhaps the prime example.

The levers I described, levers which we can apply to terrorism, apply elsewhere as well. But we do need to recognise differences: some concepts work differently when applied to states as opposed to terrorist networks. This is especially true of coercion and deterrence where the nature of a state’s interests and obligations, and its inability to hide, make it more amenable to pressure than a terrorist network.

We can immodestly claim to have been in the forefront of European and Alliance thinking on this – including through the SDR, and this year’s New Chapter – but our European allies are arriving at the same conclusions. The forthcoming NATO Summit in Prague holds out the prospect of a significant expansion of Euro/Atlantic security, with new members being drawn into the Alliance and new partnerships forged with an expanding periphery including of course, most notably, Russia.

NATO

NATO is arguably the most successful Alliance in history, a fundamental reason why the Cold War had the right outcome, and still the single most effective international security organisation in existence. And yet there are still those who question the purpose and relevance of the Alliance.

Let us think back for a moment as to why the Alliance came into existence in the first place. I won’t dwell on the constant shifting of the balance of power, and the multiple conflicts which accompanied it, over the centuries in which Europe as we recognise it today came into being. Hegel referred to the “slaughterbench of history” looking back from the early Nineteenth Century. How much stronger would he have put it if he could have anticipated the events of the Twentieth?

And it was the first half of that Century that was the period of maximum European instability. Two world wars, destruction and loss of life on a scale unimaginable before the industrial age, and resolution coming about in both cases following US intervention. And that was where real vision was implemented. Our forebears realised that, if the Europeans could not sort out their own security and stability, then we needed to institutionalise United States involvement in European security affairs.

Of course, the urgency of this project was underlined by the ugly post-War division of Europe, and by the emerging threat from the Soviet bloc. The foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1949 was absolutely timely under the circumstances, and brought about this visionary institutionalisation of the United States in European security.

That stood us in excellent stead throughout the Cold War, and while there was the occasional transatlantic tension over issues like, for example, burdensharing, the Alliance stood rock solid in the face of many a provocation. And it was not just the extraordinary political solidarity that so marked out NATO: it was the forming of a common enterprise between nations which, so often throughout history, had been adversaries rather than partners. It still impresses me today when I attend NATO meetings to look round the table and see the countries represented, and the immense camaraderie and sense of common purpose that binds us together.

And looking round the table today, of course, tells us something about what has happened to the Alliance since the Cold War. Three new members joined in 1999 – three former members of the Warsaw Pact. Ten more former Eastern bloc countries want to be invited at this month’s Prague Summit. That is not bad for an organisation which some said had overstayed its welcome when the Berlin Wall came down.

So why is NATO still attractive to these countries? Why is it still the defence and security foundation stone for existing members?

There is one simple reason. It is because NATO’s fundamental benefit has not changed. That benefit is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members and to provide peace and security in the European and the North Atlantic area. The commitment of the North American Allies to come to Europe’s defence – the Article 5 obligation of the North Atlantic Treaty – is the glue that held the Alliance together during the Cold War. It remains the key factor in preserving European stability today. Now more than ever, in a world at risk from Weapons of Mass Destruction and international terrorism, collective defence is, and must remain, the foundation of our security.

Collective defence might be the headline – and it certainly sits at the heart of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept agreed at the Washington Summit in 1999 – but NATO does much more than that. As the Strategic Concept makes clear, NATO provides security; it is a forum for consultation; it promotes partnership; and it undertakes crisis management. I will say a few words on each of these.

Security is something we too often take for granted in the prosperous West. We cannot claim perfection, but at least people are educated, go to work and raise families free from war or conflict. A standard of living which many people in other parts of the world can only envy. NATO states something fundamental about the political maturity of the Euro-Atlantic region: we resolve our disputes peacefully; we do not intimidate or coerce each other; we have democratic institutions which serve the will of the people.

I have already talked about consultation, about the enormous benefits of bringing together nations with shared values to discuss and decide on the key issues of the day. I will not pretend that this is not sometimes a tough business: seeking consensus among 19 nations is never going to be plain-sailing, even among friends. But time and time again we achieve this. Time and time again, particularly in crisis situations, we prove that shared values are a solid foundation on which to take collective action.

Partnership was the great departure for NATO at the end of the Cold War. It was about nurturing the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, about showing them that there was a better way, about spreading the democratic ideal. And in all these senses, it has been an enormous success. Enlargement at Prague will be the principal result of this. Add to that the improved military interoperability we now have with partner states, and their contribution to various crisis management operations, and we have a considerable achievement. And partnership is catching: those states which NATO has worked hardest to engage – the aspirants – are now passing on the lessons they have learned to other partner states.

Crisis management was another departure for NATO. Why is it that critics of the Alliance so routinely forget the enormous achievement of NATO operations in the Balkans? What other organisation could have engaged in the way NATO has? What other organisation could have brought the Balkans back from the brink – and in many cases on the path to stability and full democratisation – in the way NATO has? The problem is that NATO’s critics don’t see the quiet, patient, unsung work that NATO personnel continue to put in on the ground in the Balkans. Critics do our armed forces an injustice when they neglect the crisis management dimension of NATO’s work.

But why use NATO for crisis management? Because countries like the United Kingdom, even the United States, lack the resources to carry out these missions alone. They can only be done collectively – and you need organisation and co-ordination to do it successfully. In other words, if NATO had not been created for its original 1949 purpose, we would have had to create something very much like it long before now.

So let us stop talking about whether NATO has a role. Let us talk instead about how we continue to make NATO relevant to a fast-moving strategic setting: a NATO that is structured and equipped, and flexible and responsive enough, to take on tomorrow’s challenges.

One of the basic founding reasons for creating NATO has not gone away. The need to maintain the engagement of the United States in European security is as vital as ever. The years since the end of the Cold War clearly demonstrated this to be true. But Americans are concerned that NATO needs to change, that Europeans lack the right capabilities, that current NATO structures may lack the required flexibility and deployability to lead and conduct operations in the new security environment. And they are right – NATO has not been ideally configured and equipped to tackle challenges like international terrorism.

The Prague Summit presents a unique opportunity to transform NATO to meet the challenges presented by new threats and the need to perform new missions. The UK wants to see a revitalised Alliance after Prague, ready for new roles and strengthened by new members, new and better partnerships, and new capabilities.

First and foremost, the Alliance needs to strengthen its capacity for action. This will include the establishment of a new Command Structure able efficiently to project power wherever it is needed, to provide command and control for effective and decisive action, and to sustain operations for as long as required. It will include building on the excellent work already undertaken in establishing a new Force Structure, based on High Readiness Forces HQs, by establishing a new NATO Response Force – the NRF. And it will include building on the achievements of the Defence Capabilities Initiative, or DCI, through the launch of a new programme, the Prague Capabilities Commitment. DCI hasn’t delivered all that we needed; we have good reason to believe that its successor will do better. Heads of State and Government are likely to make a number of important commitments to capability improvement at Prague, focused in particular on the specific requirements of the high readiness end of the NATO force structure, including the NRF.

But putting in place the right structures and capabilities is only part of the story. NATO is also all about teamwork. NATO has provided the interoperability – in language, doctrine, concepts, equipment, capabilities and training – to allow a large number of countries to work successfully together. That experience has value outside the Alliance too. Operations in Afghanistan are testimony to this, with NATO Allies forming the majority of the nations who deployed troops. They were entirely at home in working with one another because they knew each other from working within NATO. This is a key NATO role that is often overlooked.

Threats such as terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction can only be tackled with the international community working together. Enlarging NATO and enhancing its existing partnerships are therefore key steps in meeting current and future security challenges.

That is why I welcome the prospect of enlargement at Prague – a crucial part of the revitalisation of NATO and a clear sign that the relevance of NATO is increasing . All NATO members agree that enlargement will be good for the Alliance and good for the security and stability of Europe. I expect to see invitations to all those aspirants ready and willing to meet the responsibilities and obligations of membership. In their responses since September 11, all of the NATO aspirant states have demonstrated that they are willing to stand shoulder to shoulder with NATO Allies and offer practical assistance wherever they can. There are signs of a consensus emerging in the Alliance that 7 will be invited. Let us see what Heads of State and Government say next week.

This will not be the last round of enlargement. NATO’s door will remain open. We will continue to provide incentives for reform, and the prospect of eventual membership, for new and continuing aspirants. The right place for them is within the Alliance – together we will continue to work towards that goal.

However, facing new security challenges is not only a matter for member nations. We need also to secure new partnerships and to consolidate existing ones. We have already taken a significant first step in this respect by seeking to build a new partnership with Russia. Those efforts have now proved successful and NATO and Russia have begun a new era of co-operation. This is an immensely important step forward for Euro-Atlantic security, and one that is already providing considerable benefits.

The United Kingdom is committed to developing the NATO-Russia Council. The level of trust and co-operation will continue to grow as Allies and Russia work together. Progress so far has been excellent. An active spirit of NATO-Russia co-operation is developing. Prague will provide an ideal opportunity to consolidate our new relationship.

In this unpredictable world therefore, we need NATO more than ever. And more than ever we need a NATO that has the flexibility, the structure, the forces and the strong partnerships that can face down the threats and challenges that are going to come our way. The Prague Summit presents a unique opportunity to get the NATO we need. We are determined to grasp that opportunity and, with equal commitment from Allies, we will ensure that the Alliance continues to play a key role in our future security.

The European Union

The growing need for a more effective European military contribution has been recognised in the European Union. Eleven EU nations are also NATO members, a number that is likely to rise following respective enlargement rounds. It follows that Europe has a hugely significant role to play in NATO. At the same time, the EU itself is emerging as a major actor on the world security stage.

The EU is evolving as a foreign policy entity through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, or CFSP, where 15 nations can speak as one on key issues. But this is not enough: experience in Kosovo, and elsewhere, showed us that there are times when words must be backed by military action. The European Security and Defence Policy, or ESDP, will give us the ability to do this, in two ways. First, by improving Europe’s military capabilities so that EU nations can make a better, and more coherent, contribution to NATO operations. Second, in co﷓operation with NATO, by giving the EU the ability to take military decisions and to undertake operations to meet the Petersberg tasks which range from humanitarian relief up to peace-making.

It is a common myth, put about by ESDP’s detractors, that allowing the EU to gain these abilities will somehow weaken NATO. I reject this totally. NATO is and will be the only organisation for collective defence in Europe. The EU initiative complements NATO. Modernisation of European capabilities will allow us to operate alongside all of our Allies more effectively, and, since many of the capability shortfalls in the EU mirror those in NATO, military improvements will benefit both. Arrangements for links between ESDP and NATO – the so-called Berlin Plus scheme – have taken longer to gel than we would have wished, but a little goodwill should get them in place soon.

Alongside our improved contribution to NATO, the EU will undertake crisis management operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged. Its capability is also intended to include rapid reaction elements able to respond quickly to crises. We are not creating a new military alliance to duplicate or rival NATO: we are giving ourselves the ability to play a more committed and responsible international role. The United Kingdom remains wholly committed to ESDP.

BMD

I referred a few moments ago to the need for a flexible and responsive NATO. If it is to remain relevant it must address not only today’s needs but also the new challenges emerging. NATO is already examining the threat to deployed forces from ballistic missiles. It also needs to look carefully at the emerging threat from ballistic missiles to the territory and population centres of NATO nations.

I raised this issue in the House of Commons on 17 October, because we need to think more about the dangers from the growing proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction and about how we should respond.

As I told the House, with the end of the ABM Treaty, the US programme on missile defence is gathering momentum. That is not to say that there is a quick and easy solution to be found within the next few years. Hitting a bullet with a bullet, which is often how the Americans describe their efforts, is no mean feat. But there are signs of progress:

· A testing programme demonstrating the increasing success of their interceptor missiles,

· Advances in radar technology creating the ability to detect ever more sophisticated threats.

There are many challenges still to be met. Assembling an elaborate warning system using a wide range of passive sensors deployed on land, at sea, in the air and in space and command and control – to direct fast-moving interceptors to targets moving at thousands of kilometres per hour. This may sound like the stuff of science-fiction but advances in technology are bringing closer the possibility of a credible and useful defence against limited numbers of missiles. What is achievable by when still remains uncertain. But we can expect the US to deploy ever more sophisticated solutions over decades, as the system evolves and improves.

This is a vast enterprise, involving cutting edge technologies. It will require a massive effort over the coming years. The US Administration is committed to that effort. But there are as yet no US decisions about the overall shape of the system they may deploy. They have plans for an extensive testbed or prototype system, which could if absolutely necessary double as an emergency operational capability. But the best architecture for defending the United States or its allies in Europe and beyond has yet to be determined, and will not be decided for some time yet. It follows that the Americans have not yet decided whether they need to use bases in the United Kingdom for this architecture. They have not asked us for such use, but clearly they may do so. We need therefore to consider the security issues that would arise. Not least amongst these is whether, and how, any UK involvement and participation in their developing systems will affect the security of the UK and of Europe.

Let me say straight away that I do not see a divergence between the basis of UK and US security interests. Our security interests coincide or are very similar, whether as part of our close bilateral relationship or within wider defence alliances such as NATO. Let me also make it clear that developing the capacity to defend against the threat of ballistic missile attack is in the interest of the UK and its people, just as much as it is in the interest of the United States. September 11 did not make the US a different target from the rest of the world; it made us all realise the nature of the threats that now confront us. And it reinforced the message that some groups and even states care nothing about – indeed actively welcome – large numbers of civilian casualties. And past conflicts have already demonstrated the potential of ballistic missiles to threaten, indeed strike, large population centres.

In posing the question in the House of Commons as to how the United Kingdom should respond to the threat of ballistic missiles, the underlying principle and aim of our policy must be to defend the UK and its people from attack. This is a fundamental responsibility for the Government. As we debate these issues in the coming months I urge all participants to remember this prime responsibility.

This Government agrees therefore with the United States that ballistic missiles are a threat to take seriously. We are equally concerned about the rate of proliferation. And as the threat grows, and technologies develop, there may come a day when we need to decide to add a further capability to our current range of responses by acquiring missile defences for the UK and for Europe as a whole – in the way the US has already decided.

We know that a number of states have acquired both weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and some are seeking to extend their missile capability. There is the widely publicised example of Iraq, where Saddam Hussein has not only used weapons of mass destruction against his enemies, both internal and external, but also during the Gulf War used his ballistic missiles to attack coalition forces as well as civilian targets in Israel.

Despite his refusal to comply with his UN obligations and allow International Inspection of his weapons of mass destruction, we have clear evidence that Saddam is reconstituting his ballistic missile capabilities.

Ballistic missile proliferation is a fact we have to deal with, and a very real threat. When viewed in combination with programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction, the international community has a right to ask why missiles of this range are wanted, what warheads they might carry to threaten population centres, and to consider how it should best respond. As increasing numbers of states acquire increasingly sophisticated technology. The reality is that once a ballistic missile has been launched against us, deterrence has failed and the only recourse left to us is to try to shoot it down.

Some argue that missile defence will somehow spark a new arms race, There is no evidence that this has happened or is happening. Indeed, the US withdrawal from the ABMT coincided with the negotiation and conclusion of the Moscow treaty, under which the US and Russia agreed to make steep reductions in the number of their deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

We are already pursuing many diplomatic means to address the drivers of missile proliferation, including by addressing regional insecurities and tensions. We are also strongly committed to multilateral arms control agreements, such at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. This helps to create an international consensus against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which in turn makes it easier to bear down on proliferators. Together with the US, we are also committed to preventing the spread of missile technology, through the Missile Technology Control Regime. There is no doubt that such measures have slowed the spread of proliferation. Their impact will grow as an international consensus is built around the need for tight controls to prevent the further spread of dangerous technologies.

There is an obvious gap in the network of international treaties where missiles are concerned. That is why we and our EU partners have taken a lead in promoting the establishment of a politically-binding International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which will be launched at a meeting in the Hague later this month. The Code will not be a panacea that solves the missile problem: other measures will be needed. But it will be a visible expression of the international community’s determination to address the unrestrained spread of these destabilising weapons. And, by promoting a number of confidence building measures, it can help to limit the damage to stability in regions where such proliferation has already happened.

Let me finally set out some questions for debate on one further aspect, that of deterrence. I raise these questions against the background that the old certainties of deterrence during the Cold War have changed. Mutually Assured Destruction is no longer central to our thinking. We have to think through how to deter – and I am not talking here solely, or even mainly, of nuclear deterrence – in a new and infinitely more complex international environment. Across nearly half a century of Cold War, a huge intellectual effort was dedicated to elaborating and broadcasting the doctrines of deterrence. They entered deep into the subconscious of political and strategic leaders on both sides of the old Cold War confrontation. Like chess games subjected to infinite analysis, the risk/reward calculus that one party to that confrontation might make in contemplating a move to secure advantage were known to the other party almost as well as to the potential aggressor himself. In the end, the state of being deterred became a habit of mind. We still need to be able to deter states with large nuclear capabilities; despite many financial pressures, Russia continues to keep up-to-date and effective nuclear systems; and more countries are acquiring nuclear weapons all the time.

Now we also have additional actors to consider, people who may be far removed in attitudes, values and preconceptions from the cautious and conservative members of the old Soviet Politburo. We can no longer be so confident what will, and what will not, influence their calculations and behaviour. In particular, where an individual or tiny clique has seized power, and acquired a WMD capability, how might they react in the final throes of facing loss of power personally? In this more uncertain international strategic context it worth thinking hard about whether a defensive system against a limited ballistic missile attack might serve to reinforce and complement in some special cases the general deterrence provided by our conventional and nuclear weapons. The impact could be salutary, not only on the calculations of a proliferator perhaps contemplating the use of a few ballistic missiles as a desperate last throw, but also upon those weighing the pros and cons of embarking on the costly and difficult path of developing or procuring them in the first place. We have to that extent a new problem – of the rogue state with a limited but dangerous capacity. It is in the interests of all responsible states to confront this. Missile defence has the potential to enhance strategic stability for everyone.

The leader of a rogue state contemplating a ballistic missile attack on the UK or an ally would need to reckon not only with the near certainty of a powerful retaliatory response, but also with the possibility that active defences would prevent his attack from succeeding at all. Ballistic missile attack on the United Kingdom or our interests involving weapons of mass destruction would be an overt and undeniable form of assault. Would he be prepared to take the risk in these circumstances? Of course, proliferators will be thinking about deterrence too. We have to reckon with the possibility that one attraction in the pursuit of Ballistic Missile and Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes is the thought that the capability to hold at risk the homelands of Western nations might make the proliferator miscalculate that he has some immunity.

These are reasons for thinking hard about missile defence. The debate is hugely challenging, and still in its early days. We neither can nor should leap to conclusions that ignore that reality. But it is time to debate the issues.

Conclusion

I have deliberately taken a broad interpretation of the title of this lecture. The realisation that we needed the ability to ‘intervene’ describes very well the principal conclusions of the Strategic Defence Review, including the creation of Defence Diplomacy and the Joint Rapid Reaction Force. This thinking has reshaped the whole of our defence effort since the SDR concluded in 1998, and continues to do so.

We had already, in 1998, faced up to the fact that post-Cold War British security interests demanded the ability to intervene beyond the old ‘NATO area’. Perhaps some thought we were wrong, that we were clinging to an international role and armed forces of a size that were not necessary in the absence of a major external threat. But September 11th underlined the fact that homeland security – the fundamental responsibility of any government – cannot begin and end at our own borders, or even those of NATO. Those who thought that Britain could have chosen a more limited role for itself in the modern security environment have been proven wrong. Those who think that NATO is irrelevant are similarly misguided.

Finally, just as we have little choice but to engage in a more complex international arena, so we also have to face up to a more diverse and uncertain range of potential threats, and assess the demands they may place upon our future capabilities. Network Centric technology is a critical element of the response to terrorism. We also have to look again at new elements of the potential threat posed by Ballistic Missiles; Ballistic Missile Defence may be one element of the response. We will address the issue with the same thorough approach that characterised the development of the SDR and the New Chapter.

We now know the real price that we will pay for not being in the euro: the 49 billion euros a year that the European Union will continue to pour into a failed Common Agricultural Policy until 2006.
Tony Blair may be angry with Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder for their short-sighted attempt to pre-empt the Brussels summit but the Prime Minister’s real problem is that time is running out for his project of putting Britain at the heart of Europe. Last week’s final moves in the Prime Minister’s reshuffle – with the promotion of the ardently pro-euro Denis MacShane as Europe Minister – were intended as a soothing signal to pro-europeans. But the window in which Blair can make holding moves and keep all sides happy is almost over. If euro membership is not to fall victim to an Iraq conflict and the vagaries of the political and economic cycles, decision day is upon the Prime Minister. If he cannot make space for a euro referendum by the early summer, the defining political issue of the Blair era is likely to be lost by default.

The euro debate is usually about economics. The government has largely wanted it that way. And the campaigners from Britain In Europe have done a good job at putting across the economic arguments: 3 million jobs depend on the single market, the fact that the French do not come over in their millions on booze cruises to Dover, the millions of pounds that British Home-owners squander on higher mortgages.

But there are also vital political reasons why Blair would like to join the euro. That is why his government is committed in principle to membership if those famous five tests are met. The problem is that the political arguments for joining the Euro have seemed abstract and difficult to grasp – and they have been largely obscured by ministers keen to say that they are making a hard-headed economic assessment. We need some hard-headed political analysis too. The truth is that Blair could have stopped dead the tawdry Franco-German deal if Britain had been in the Euro.

Advisers in Downing Street glow with pride as they tell you that Blair has a closer relationship with all the key players in Europe than any other leader: who else can claim to be best friends with Aznar, Ahern, Schroeder, and even the Poles. Moreover Blair’s towering stature amongst the ranks of political time-servers from Jacques Chirac to Bertie Ahern should give him influence unknown since the days when Kohl and Mitterand plotted over beer and sausages.

But the fact that Britain is not in the euro means that Prime Minister cannot cash in his chips for leadership. This has been apparent in the proceedings of the Convention on the future of Europe. Peter Hain has played a constructive role and won many of the arguments on the detail – but the mood music coming out of Brussels still sounds like the old elitist tunes. As European foreign ministers scrabble over Iraq, Giscard decided to launch an argument over whether to call the EU a United States of Europe or United Europe. This is in danger of being seen as the old Europe from above – paying lip-service to democracy and legitimacy but focusing more on bureaucratic games and paper solutions while fudging the real challenges of reforming the common agricultural policy or making the institutions serve people more effectively.

All this could be reversed if Blair lives up to what he has often called his “historic mission” of ending British ambivalence to Europe. Time on this is running out. The list of hurdles is well known and long. The official barriers include the Maastricht criteria – which we meet apart from membership of the ERM. There is the question of the stability pact that will have to be renegotiated to accommodate Gordon Brown’s schools and hospitals bonanza. The exchange rate has to fall to avoid crippling British exports, and the Government’s five economic tests have to be credibly met. The sixth unmentionable test – public opinion – will mean a sharp intake of breath for a leader temperamentally averse to taking risks with the electorate. And the conditions aren’t likely to get better for pro-Europeans. They have to take advantage of Iain Duncan Smith’s weakness and settle the issue in a short, sharp, focused campaign.

But this means that they need to move fast. The Government have pledged to make an assessment of the tests by June next year, which has led most pundits to predict an autumn referendum, when the public return bronzed from their holidays in euro land. But they cannot afford to wait that long. Having finally gathered political momentum and nailed their colours to the mast, the last thing they need is a lengthy summer break where the campaign loses steam and people lose interest.

This means that the announcement will need to be made in the spring with a referendum in early summer before people go away. There will also be the difficulty of passing paving legislation. In 1975 this was announced on 1 January and it took a mere five weeks. Getting it through the commons this time will be a breeze – but the assembled ranks of hard-core sceptics in the House of Lords will be sure to give it a bumpy ride.

There are many imponderables. I have written before in this slot about the impact a campaign in Iraq could have for the the prospects for a referendum. This still could make a referendum impossible – particularly if the Government ends up intervening unilaterally with the Americans. Nobody knows whether a war will happen or not. But it is probably more likely that any conflict would have UN backing and, of course, Blair himself would argue that decisive action in the Gulf would show that there is no contradiction between being pro-European and pro-American. Certainly his role since 9/11 has made it difficult for opponents on the right to claim that he is either weak or unpatriotic.

The problem for pro-Europeans is that the calculus of political risk looks skewed against joining. That may be one of reasons why Blair’s party conference speech laid down a gauntlet to himself and his party to be bold.

And the challenge for those of us who want Britain to join must now be to show convincingly how staying out of the euro is not cost-free. Not just in Brussels where the chance of leading Europe in more than rhetorical terms is now real. There is a political price at home as well. For Blair, the sense of betrayal by the liberal elite who write the history books will be palpable and difficult to dispel. A fudge on this most neuralgic issue will tarnish his reputation and make him look too weak to take on his chancellor. But there are also political risks for Gordon Brown in being the spoiler. Older pro-European such Giles Radice will be able to warn him of the consequences of euro-ambivalence for able politicians such as Crosland and Healey. Radice’s recent book, Friends and Rivals, shows how Denis Healey never became leader because he wasn’t seen as pro-European enough by Jenkinsites who should have been his natural allies on the right. In a close contest for the succession, there might be a few new-Labour Pro-Europeans who are equally unforgiving.

Just as war is too important an issue to be left to the generals, so UK entry to the euro is too big a national question to be confined to the Treasury. I am a great admirer of Gordon Brown, who has steered the economy with such success. But it is high time that both the national debate and the government’s strategy for joining the euro went beyond the five tests.

When in October 1997 I supported the chancellor’s statement in the Commons setting out the five tests, I did so on the basis that the government was genuinely committed in principle to joining, that the assessment would be open and fair and that the decision would be taken without excessive and damaging delay and in the long-term interests of the country. I could never have imagined that, 5 1/2 years later, we would still be waiting for the assessment of the five tests and that speculation about these tests and Mr Brown’s attitude to them would still be dominating the news.

In a recent speech, Ed Balls, the chancellor’s chief economic adviser, tried to put the five tests into historical perspective by analysing four occasions – the 1925 return to the gold standard, the postwar re-entry to a fixed exchange rate system with the dollar in 1946, the failure to devalue in 1964 and the European exchange rate mechanism debacle of the early 1990s – when policymakers failed to pay sufficient attention to economics in making crucial decisions.

But there is another lesson that could be drawn from the Treasury’s past: that of excessive delay. In 1950, the Treasury was strongly against UK participation in the Schuman plan. In the mid-1950s, it was at best ambivalent about British entry into the Common Market. Even in the early 1970s, when the UK decided to join the European Community, the Treasury dissented. Characteristically, it advised against the UK’s joining the ERM when it was first set up and when we could have benefited most from entry.

Mr Brown is right to stress the need to get the economics of joining right. On his crucial test of convergence there can be little doubt that, compared with 1997, in terms of inflation, output gaps, interest rates and trade orientation the UK economy has come much closer to that of the eurozone. Indeed, a number of countries already in the eurozone diverge more from the euro area average than the UK.

However, in deciding whether now is the time to join, it is essential to distinguish the wood from the trees. We must not ignore broader economic questions such as the benefits that entry would bring and the costs of exclusion. In a world of currency areas, medium-sized currencies such as sterling are likely to experience volatility that will adversely affect their trade and investment. Furthermore, while we remain out of the euro, powerful new commercial groups and new trade partners are emerging on the continent from which we may be excluded. Staying out is not a cost-free option.

So we cannot hide behind the five tests for ever. If the government is genuinely committed in principle to joining, it is high time that it had a comprehensive strategy for entry. Quite apart from the five tests, there are other vital issues that the government now needs to tackle. These include satisfying the criteria set out in the Maastricht treaty governing entry to European monetary union; ensuring the stability pact is suitably reformed to be more flexible; dealing with the tricky question of the UK exchange rate; deciding what is involved in the UK joining the European Central Bank and the increasingly influential euro group of finance ministers; setting out the timetable and costs of entry, including the adoption of notes and coins; preparing the legislation that is required for membership; and assessing the long-term economic and political cost of staying out.

In his new year’s message, Tony Blair said this year we faced “what may be the single most important decision that faces this political generation – the question of whether to join the euro”. If the government is serious about joining, it should set up a euro strategy group. This should include the chancellor, the deputy prime minister, the foreign and trade and industry secretaries, the leader of the House and the Lord Chancellor. It should be chaired by the prime minister himself, who is, after all, First Lord of the Treasury and main arbiter of the national interest.

Lord Radice is chairman of the House of Lords European sub-committee on economic and financial affairs and author of How to join the Euro www.fpc.org.uk