With the US presidential election fast approaching, Ukraine’s allies in the West have been trying to find ways to shore up Kyiv. Further support for Ukraine seems much more uncertain if Donald Trump wins the American presidency, and so the window for the West to act in a more or less unified fashion may be closing. This is the context in which a number of Western countries, led by the UK, recently argued for Ukraine to be given permission to fire long-range missiles provided by the West deeper into Russia.[1]
For some time, Western countries – namely the UK, France, and the US – have been providing Ukraine with long-range missiles which are technically capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. At the same time, however, these countries have only given Kyiv permission to use the missiles on Ukrainian territory, fearing that their use in Russia itself might lead to a dramatic escalation of the conflict. Conversely, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has downplayed the risk of escalation this may cause, and instead argued that this restriction is preventing Ukraine from defending itself as effectively as possible.[2]
At the time of writing, it appears that the Biden administration is unlikely to approve Ukraine’s request. US intelligence agencies assess that the strategic value of allowing the use of the missiles in this manner is outweighed by the risks of escalation. While they acknowledge that the Ukrainian military would be able to do some damage to Russian supply lines and strike capabilities, they argue that the missiles would not be available to the Ukrainians in sufficient quantity to fundamentally change the course of the conflict.[3] Russia is widely reported to have already prepared for the decision by moving many of its military assets outside of the range of the missiles.[4]
It is possible, of course, that the Biden administration will change its mind. Given British Prime Minister Keir Starmer still strongly endorses allowing Ukraine to use long-range missiles within Russia, it is fathomable that the deteriorating position on Ukraine’s eastern front may eventually convince Washington that granting permission has value, even merely as a gesture of diplomatic support. However, the debate over the missiles has also highlighted four issues which will continue to plague the Western alliance, even if Ukraine eventually gets to use the missiles as it wishes.
The first is the cumbersome and public process of decision-making. As democracies, the UK and the US – along with other members of NATO – make decisions through building domestic and international consent. This involves allowing wide discussion of a decision before it is taken, which sacrifices surprise and secrecy. The extent to which Russia has adapted its supply lines and the disposition of its forces in anticipation of any missile decision is a testament to how difficult it is for the Western allies to achieve a measure of surprise.
The second problem regards escalation of risk. US officials are said to be concerned both about the possibility of sabotage or lethal attacks on military bases in Europe, and that Russia might strike back somewhere else in the world, for instance by providing Yemen’s Houthis with missile technology to strike at American military bases or shipping in the Middle East.[5] The Biden administration desperately wants to avoid entering a cycle of increasing tit-for-tat action with the Kremlin, and for now it seems that Russia has succeeded in deterring it from doing so.
Even if permission to use the missiles for deep strikes into Russia is eventually granted, it seems that we are at or very near the limits of Washington’s appetite for taking further risks in order to help Ukraine defend itself. Further steps would raise the likelihood of Russian retaliation. Given that the usage of these missiles to strike deeper into Russia is unlikely to strategically change the course of the conflict, Washington is right to suspect that if it grants permission, the conversation will quickly shift to even riskier proposals – ones which American officials do not want to consider, much less accept.
This fact is reinforced by the third point, which is that Ukraine and its allies are beginning to disagree more than ever about what “victory” looks like and how to achieve it. As part of his push for loosening the missile restrictions, Zelensky presented a “victory plan” to US and European officials; however, the plan reportedly left the officials unimpressed. Behind closed doors, fewer and fewer officials outside of Ukraine believe that the country’s goal of regaining all of its lost territory is realistic.[6]
With even those supportive of the missile decision conceding that it would not turn the conflict around, there also appears to be no other conceivable decision that Ukraine’s allies could take that would have a large impact on the course of the war at what Washington considers an acceptable level of risk. The disconnect between Ukraine’s goals and what its international supporters are able and willing to do will become a key problem if diplomatic efforts to pause the conflict ramp up after the US presidential election.
The fourth problem is just how tenuous Kyiv’s Western lifeline may be. Although the UK and France supported loosening restrictions on the usage of these long-range missiles, the key strategic decisions regarding Western support are ultimately made in one place – the White House. That means that Ukraine is particularly vulnerable to abrupt changes in American policy.
Even under the strongly internationalist Biden administration, US support for Ukraine has been deliberative and cautious. With the United States more concerned about the rising threat of China than it is about Russia – and ultimately unwilling to risk war with Russia to defend Ukraine – Kyiv will eventually face pressure to settle the conflict. If Trump wins the presidential election, Ukraine’s support from the US may evaporate entirely. Long-range missiles or not, both Ukraine and its allies will eventually be faced with some agonising choices regarding the kind of end to the conflict that they are willing to accept.
Andrew Gawthorpe is a historian of the United States at Leiden University. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office. He writes a newsletter called America Explained.
Photograph courtesy of The White House, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.
[1] Michael D. Shear and David E. Sanger, Meeting With Biden, British Leader Hints at Ukraine Weapon Decision Soon, The New York Times, September 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/13/us/politics/biden-starmer-ukraine-russia-missiles.html.
[2] James Marson, Alexander Ward, and Lara Seligman, Zelensky Visited U.S. to Seek War Boost. His Most-Important Ally Shrugged, The Wall Street Journal, September 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/zelensky-visited-u-s-to-seek-war-boost-his-most-important-ally-shrugged-d7ba76e7.
[3] Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Intelligence Stresses Risks in Allowing Long-Range Strikes by Ukraine, The New York Times, September 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/26/us/politics/us-ukraine-strikes.html.
[4] Clare Sebastian, Ukraine Wants To Fire Western Long-Range Weapons Into Russia. But The Battlefield Gain Is Not Clear-Cut, CNN, September 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/22/europe/ukraine-western-long-range-weapons-russia-intl/index.html.
[5] Julian E. Barnes and John Ismay, Alert Level Raised at U.S. Bases in Europe Over Russian Threats, The New York Times, September 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/01/us/politics/us-bases-alert-level-russia.html; Josh Irish, Parisa Hafezi and Jonathan Landay, Exclusive: Iran Brokering Talks To Send Advanced Russian Missiles To Yemen’s Houthis, Sources Say, Reuters, September 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-brokering-talks-send-advanced-russian-missiles-yemens-houthis-sources-say-2024-09-24/.
[6] Alexander Ward and Lara Seligman, U.S. ‘Unimpressed’ With Ukraine’s Victory Plan Ahead of Biden-Zelensky Meeting, The Wall Street Journal, September 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/u-s-unimpressed-with-ukraines-victory-plan-ahead-of-biden-zelensky-meeting-23e87bff.