Array ( [0] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8449 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-10-22 05:00:04 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-10-22 04:00:04 [post_content] => Alongside issues such as housing and health care, the key far-right theme of immigration continues to feature high on the political agenda ahead of the Dutch national election on 29^th October. In a fragmented political landscape marked by intense competition on the socio-cultural right, mainstream parties are also deliberately choosing to make this issue important in their campaigns.   Just under two years ago, the Netherlands experienced a shock national election result, with Geert Wilders’ far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) becoming the largest party in parliament by a considerable margin (winning almost a quarter of the vote and 37 of the 150 seats).^[1]   As is typical for these parties in Europe and beyond, the PVV is known for its vehement opposition to immigration and multiculturalism. There are cultural components to this discourse (focusing on the supposed threat of Islam to Western norms and values, in particular), as well as economic ones (arguing that welfare entitlements should be reserved for the ‘native’ population).   The PVV eventually entered government, despite reservations of its more centrist coalition partners, New Social Contract (NSC) and the Liberals (VVD), concerning the parts of the PVV programme that are at odds with liberal democratic principles such as freedom of religion. The third coalition partner, the agrarian and culturally conservative Farmer Citizen Movement (BBB) expressed fewer concerns.   Government formation took over half a year. The cabinet was led by the non-partisan and previously unknown Prime Minister Dick Schoof. It was marked by poor relationships between the coalition partners and ineffectiveness in terms of policy outcomes. The pugnacious PVV immigration minister Marjolein Faber became known for headline-grabbing policies and controversial statements, but failed to deliver on her promise of the ‘strictest asylum policy ever’ and did nothing to alleviate the clogged-up asylum system.   On June 3^rd 2025, less than a year after the installation of the Schoof government, Wilders instigated a cabinet crisis centred on his core issue of migration.^[2] He presented his coalition partners with new far-reaching demands they could not agree to. As a result, the PVV left the coalition and the government assumed caretaker (‘demissionary’) status, and new elections were scheduled for 29^th October. Notably, the NSC later withdrew from the demissionary cabinet due to disagreements over the government's position towards Israel (NSC favouring further-reaching sanctions than the VVD and BBB).^[3]   For understandable reasons, the political chaos and ineffectiveness dented public trust in politics.^[4] Remarkably, however, after the cabinet breakdown, Wilders’ PVV has remained the leading party in opinion polls.^[5] This indicates that – at least for his supporters – Wilders successfully deflected the blame to his erstwhile coalition partners, claiming these blocked the implementation of the PVV’s desired immigration policies.   Indeed, immigration has remained a key issue in the run-up to the election. In September, violent riots erupted on the back of an anti-immigration protest in The Hague (the ‘political capital’ of the Netherlands).^[6] Across the country, further unruly and intimidating protests took place at the sites of asylum centres. What was unprecedented at these events was the unveiled flaunting of extreme-right symbols and chants.   Even though its violence was widely condemned, the rise of the extreme-right at the grassroots level has done little to stop traditional mainstream parties, particularly on the centre-right, from politicising immigration. The debate has focused predominantly on asylum, which is by default framed as a ‘problem’ that needs a solution. Many politicians have furthermore been careful to show sympathy for citizens concerned about the supposed erosion of Dutch cultural identity, and few have challenged the widespread perception that the housing shortage – another salient issue – is connected in large part to asylum seekers receiving priority over native citizens.   Specific party stances differ, of course. While shunning the more apocalyptic rhetoric of the PVV, the centre-right VVD, in particular, but also the Christian Democrats (CDA) have made reducing immigration an important theme in their campaigns. The Liberal Democrats (D66) have also ‘moved to the right’ on socio-cultural issues, including asylum, but have been keener to welcome ‘talented’ migrants that serve the Dutch economy. On the centre-left, the Green-Labour Party coalition (Groenlinks-PvdA) expressed the need to limit labour migration in the name of halting exploitation and social injustice, while taking a more welcoming stance towards refugees.   Yet, overall, arguments in favour of immigration – such as its role in addressing labour market shortages and mitigating the effects of an ageing population – have been largely absent from the campaign. Similarly, any virtues of multiculturalism have been left unmentioned.   As is the case in so many other European countries, the rise of far-right parties in the Netherlands has significantly impacted the political debate. Across the continent, mainstream parties have adopted stricter positions on immigration, as they fear the far right's electoral competition. There is evidence that such a strategy is risky at best: it is, on balance, the far right that tends to benefit from an increased focus on its key themes.^[7] The more general effect is the normalisation and legitimisation of the far right's agenda and discourse.   In the Dutch context, it is particularly remarkable how both mainstream parties and many media outlets have facilitated far-right agenda-setting. Far-right actors and sympathisers have been given considerable airtime at televised talk show tables. Geert Wilders himself has been quiet during the early stages of the campaign, citing security threats as reasons for his absence in several radio and televised debates. However, his absence cast a clear shadow over these events where the theme of immigration and asylum took centre stage, irrespectively.   There is also no shortage of other far-right political parties besides the PVV. The BBB has now entered far-right territory with its anti-immigration positions and concerns about radical Islam. The more extreme-right Forum for Democracy (FvD) is likely to win a few seats as well. The more ‘moderate’ JA21 may benefit in particular from the fact that the PVV is not a likely coalition option anymore for most other parties.   Given the highly fragmented nature of Dutch politics, a new government may consist of a broad coalition of parties, thus lacking a clear ideological direction. This may in turn fuel disappointment (and continued support for the radical right) in the longer term. A key lesson for mainstream parties and media elsewhere – and this certainly includes the UK – is not to let the far right set the terms of the debate to the extent it has in the Netherlands.     Stijn van Kessel is Professor of Comparative Politics at Queen Mary University of London. His main research interests are populism and the politics of European integration, with a particular emphasis on radical right parties and Euroscepticism. His latest co-authored book is Populist Radical Right Parties in Action: The Survival of the Mass Party (Oxford University Press, 2025).     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   [1] Stijn van Kessel, The Guardian, 'Geert Wilders’ win shows the far right is being normalised. Mainstream parties must act´, November 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/26/far-right-normalised-mainstream-parties-geert-wilders-dutch [2] Laura Gozzi and Anna Holligan, BBC News, 'Dutch government collapses after far-right leader quits coalition', June 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0r1x5yyd5wo [3] Clea Skopeliti, The Guardian, 'Dutch foreign minister quits over failure to secure sanctions against Israel', August 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/23/netherlands-foreign-minister-sanctions-israel-gaza [4] Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 'Nederlanders machteloos en gefrustreerd over het land en de politiek in aanloop naar de verkiezingen', October 2025, https://www.scp.nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/10/20/nederlanders-machteloos-en-gefrustreerd-over-het-land-en-de-politiek-in-aanloop-naar-de-verkiezingen [5] See the Dutch ‘poll of polls’: https://peilingwijzer.tomlouwerse.nl/ [6] Stijn van Kessel and Andrej Zaslove, Illiberalism Studies Program, 'What mainstream parties and media should learn from the Dutch extreme‑right riots', September 2025, https://www.illiberalism.org/what-mainstream-parties-and-media-should-learn-from-the-dutch-extreme-right-riots/ [7] Werner Krause, Denis Cohen and Tarik Abou‑Chadi, The Guradian, 'Copying the far right doesn’t help mainstream parties',  April 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2022/apr/13/copying-far-right-doesnt-help-mainstream-parties [post_title] => Op-ed: The enduring relevance of the Far Right ahead of the Dutch National Election on 29th October [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-the-enduring-relevance-of-the-far-right-ahead-of-the-dutch-national-election-on-29th-october [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-10-22 08:26:02 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-10-22 07:26:02 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8449 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [1] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8410 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-10-06 15:42:27 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-10-06 14:42:27 [post_content] => On 9th September 2025, the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC), the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) and the University of Lancaster’s Sectarianism, Proxies and Desectarianisation project (SEPAD) co-hosted a high-level expert roundtable exploring Syria’s transition following the fall of the Assad regime, and the future of justice and accountability in the country.    The event was chaired by Mark Stephens CBE, IBAHRI Co-Chair, and brought together an expert panel  including legal and policy experts, academics and civil society leaders: Yumen Hallaq, Senior Researcher at the Syrian Network for Human Rights; Sana Kikhia, Executive Director of the Syrian Legal Development Programme (SLDP); Dr Maria Kastrinou, Senior Lecturer in Anthropology at Brunel, University of London; Alan Haji, Lead for Case Building at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC); Mariana Karkoutly, Co-Founder and Board Member of Huquqyat; and Professor Simon Mabon, Chair in International Politics at Lancaster University and Director of the SEPAD project.   The roundtable provided an opportunity to assess the state of Syria’s political and legal transition nine months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Since the takeover by opposition forces in December 2024, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Syria has been governed by a transitional government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa, operating under a five-year constitutional declaration framework. While the international community has cautiously welcomed these changes and initial commitments to reform, major questions remain about the durability of the transition, the prospects for justice and reconciliation, and the appropriate role for international actors in supporting this process.   In charting a way forward for Syria, justice and accountability must be pursued through mechanisms that foster equal citizenship, political rights and freedoms, and collective trust, rather than reproduce the political processes of division that have fuelled sectarian and gendered violence. Domestic actors, civil society organisations, survivors, and victim’s families should be at the forefront of any accountability, legal or institutional reform. The international community can repeat calls and support processes that recognise the suffering of all victims, ensure accountability for the gravest of crimes, and foster genuine reconciliation and respect for the rule of law. Transitional justice processes must be coupled with long-term initiatives and dialogue to ensure that accountability and guarantees of non-reoccurrence of crimes become a foundation for sustainable truth, justice, and reconciliation. By embedding justice within a broader framework of social healing and inclusive governance, Syria can lay the groundwork for lasting peace in which accountability strengthens unity and helps prevent future cycles of violence.   To explore key themes and insights from the parliamentary roundtable discussion — including legal reform, institutional fragility, humanitarian conditions, and international engagement — you can download the full briefing here.   [post_title] => Expert Briefing: ‘Syria’s transition nine months on: Examining frameworks for international justice and accountability’ [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => expert-briefing-syrias-transition-nine-months-on-examining-frameworks-for-international-justice-and-accountability [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-10-06 15:42:35 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-10-06 14:42:35 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8410 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [2] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8341 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-08-08 05:00:39 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-08-08 04:00:39 [post_content] => A recently published volume, The Policies and Power of Public Diplomacy – Wilton Park’s Road, based on reports of Wilton Park’s higher level international policy discussions since 1946, provides a concise background to key challenges facing the world today.^[1]  Wilton Park is an executive agency of the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) focused on facilitating international policy dialogue, convening around 80 strategic discussions a year. Nick Hopkinson, the volume’s Editor, and a former director of Wilton Park (1987-2010), provides his insight into how the power of diplomacy can be used to revive democracy.   Few challenges are as pressing as the need to stop the democratic backsliding seen in many leading nations today, as evidenced by, for example, the increased undermining of independent media and the judiciary, and growing infringements of human rights. Weaknesses in, or the absence of, democracy are often at the root of conflict, whether internal or international. Discussing challenges and ultimately co-operating are cheaper than the heavy cost, both human and financial, of crises and war. Both can be mitigated, perhaps on occasion avoided, through greater international understanding and co-operation nurtured in what are called ‘Track 2 spaces’ for dialogue, such as Wilton Park.^[2]   Post-WWII Origins   Initially a ‘re-education camp’ for German officers after World War Two (WW2), Wilton Park was a key part of Sir Winston Churchill’s vision to build a democratic post-war Germany. Since then it has evolved into a first-class international policy forum which has expanded beyond its 16th century country home in West Sussex to work in more than 50 countries.  Founded by Sir Heinz Koeppler, Wilton Park established an independent approach to democracy building and international policy dialogue. Koeppler believed strengthening democracy and international understanding could be progressed through talking, debating, eating and living together. The original ‘courses’ evolved into interactive roundtables for ministers, diplomats, officials, academics, businesspeople, journalists and non-governmental opinion formers from countries around the world.   The UK’s model of parliamentary democracy has been discussed regularly at Wilton Park, especially in its early years. Sir Heinz was sensitive to possible accusations that the institution might be regarded as an instrument of government propaganda. To avoid this he crafted an independent, inter-disciplinary, international and interactive method which became widely recognised as a skilful exercise in education, engagement and influencing.   After its original mission was successfully achieved, Wilton Park focused on other topics, sometimes to survive as an institution. It has addressed topical international policy issues and challenges since 1946 including: forging consensus in the transatlantic alliance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; the Cold War; developments in the Former Soviet Union, in particular the Russian Federation; arms control; UK relations with the European Community and the Commonwealth; integration in and enlargement of the European Union; Africa (including ending apartheid); China, and the Middle East.   Post-Cold War Shift   The end of the Cold War resulted in Wilton Park’s greatest expansion of subject coverage, notably transnational challenges such as migration, crime and terrorism, curbing climate change and disease, as well as humanitarian intervention. There was also a renewed emphasis on democracy promotion, this time focused on the developing world.   As transnational challenges grew in salience in the post-war era, tackling them has exposed the limits of the nation state. As former Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of State, Sir Kenneth Younger, argued at Wilton Park in 1973 “none of these modern problems can be solved within the framework of the traditional nation state”^[3].In the past dozen years, coverage of developing world issues has come to dwarf European coverage, in part reflecting changing UK government priorities, notably the UK’s — possibly short-lived — pivot away from Europe after Brexit. Most recently, the multi-national response to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates the need for, and benefits of, international co-operation.   The Current Age of Democratic Erosion   A triumph of the liberal order was the spread of prosperity to developing nations, notably China. It was hoped economic liberalisation would lead to the strengthening of democratic practice, but in spite of positive signs in the 1990s, progress in the new millennium has proven limited, and in some cases democratic reforms have been reversed.   The ongoing rise of populism suggests strengthening democracy is needed more than ever, even in the mature democracies which championed it during and after WW2. The recent democratic backsliding can be attributed, inter alia, to low growth after the 2007/8 global financial crisis, the failure of governments to spread the benefits of globalisation fairly, and the inability of nation states to resolve the new transnational challenges to which Sir Kenneth alluded. Furthermore, the revolution in digital technology has resulted in an explosion of media sources and increasing misinformation, leading to a decline in a shared understanding about domestic and global developments. This makes it much more difficult for governments to address problems and to co-operate internationally.   Populism in the digital age appeals to nationalist, isolationist and protectionist sentiment which provide particularly ill-suited solutions to today’s challenges. Today’s performative populist politics is less directed against other states, and rails against an amorphous globalisation and other social groups. The growth of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism and the scapegoating of refugees deflect attention from the real need to tackle growing domestic inequality and under-investment in health, education and infrastructure. If politicians fail to deliver solutions based on evidence and need, the integrity of democratic institutions themselves is further threatened, and authoritarian tendencies are strengthened. To restore faith in the functioning of democracy, citizens, particularly the young, need to be empowered through greater education and digital literacy, especially critical thinking and the ability to assess the veracity of media content.   The growing erosion of democracy has international ramifications. Wilton Park’s discussions since 1946 reflect the rise, consolidation and more recently decline of the post-war liberal ‘Western’ international order. That order can only be effective if democracy continues to function effectively in the countries which have underpinned it. Furthermore, if the US in particular is no longer able to and/or willing to champion the international post-war liberal order it shaped, the perception grows that the order is less relevant.   What Next?   Indeed, today the liberal international order looks less liberal, less international and less ordered. Stasis in the World Trade Organisation and failure to reform the United Nations system are symptomatic of declining international cohesion. Most worryingly, as foreseen in a 2017 Wilton Park conference, the increasing ineffectiveness of global powers and diplomacy means interstate conflict becomes a greater threat. Five years later, Russia invaded Ukraine and conflict rages again in Israel-Palestine. Might has prevailed over right.   As the international order fragments, what can be done? One senior Pakistani diplomat, Malik Azhar Ellahi, noted Track 2 exchanges such as those at Wilton Park can play an important role.  

“When existing treaties (are) being junked and ongoing initiatives trashed… the one tempting conclusion is that it makes no difference what goes on in Track 2 exchanges. This in my view will not only be unfair but also unfortunate. I would think that there is a greater need at this time for policy to take into account views and concerns expressed in informal settings so that the divide which has emerged in official fora is not made permanent”. ^[4]

  If democratic governments, opposition parties, non-governmental organisations and citizens do not redouble efforts wherever we can to counter the growing threat of populism, the continuing weakening of democratic checks and balances, and the undermining of international law and institutions, we risk ending up where Wilton Park started after WW2. After another horrific global conflict, ways and structures will again have to be created for nations to co-operate and live together in peace.   In the context of the fragmenting post-war global order, democratic backsliding and the growth of misinformation, spaces such as Wilton Park are needed more than ever as forums to exchange and influence policy and opinion through constructive informed dialogue. Sir Heinz’ logo for Wilton Park of a bridge of international understanding remains as apt as ever.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   Nick Hopkinson is a writer on EU and international affairs and is former director of Wilton Park where he served from 1987 to 2010. He posts @nickhopkinson.bsky.social   Image: Wiston House. © Wilton Park. Used with permission.   ^[1] Hopkinson, Nick (ed.), The Policies and Power of Public Diplomacy – Wilton Park’s Road. Routledge, London and New York, 2025. A free copy of the volume is available by clicking on the open access button within the following link: https://www.routledge.com/The-Policies-and-Power-of-Public-Diplomacy-Wilton-Parks-Road/Hopkinson/p/book/9781032831251 ^[2] “Track Two diplomacy consists of informal dialogues among actors such as academics, religious leaders, retired senior officials, and NGO officials that can bring new ideas and new relationships to the official process of diplomacy.” - Peter Jones, Stanford University Press, Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice, September 2015, https://www.sup.org/books/politics/track-two-diplomacy-theory-and-practice ^[3] Hopkinson, Nick (ed.), The Policies and Power of Public Diplomacy – Wilton Park’s Road. Routledge, London and New York, 2025. A free copy of the volume is available by clicking on the open access button within the following link: https://www.routledge.com/The-Policies-and-Power-of-Public-Diplomacy-Wilton-Parks-Road/Hopkinson/p/book/9781032831251 ^[4] Ibid. [post_title] => Op ed: The urgent need to revive democracy and the power of diplomacy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-the-urgent-need-to-revive-democracy-and-the-power-of-diplomacy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-09-01 09:48:16 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-09-01 08:48:16 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8341 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [3] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8301 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-08-04 08:09:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-08-04 07:09:00 [post_content] => Transnational repression (TNR) is on the rise globally, fuelled by rapidly evolving technology, global democratic- backsliding and the rise of authoritarianism and years of neglect by previous governments. It is a major policy blind spot, resulting in significant constraints on the exercise of fundamental rights in the UK.    Repressive actors, including powerful and hostile states, have a growing set of tools to surveil, threaten, harass and attack individuals in the UK, violating their fundamental rights guaranteed under international and domestic laws such as the Human Rights Act 1998. Political dissidents, exiled journalists and human rights defenders have traditionally been the main targets of TNR, but today a broader array of groups and individuals also find themselves subject to transnational human rights violations here in the UK.   The UK’s responses to TNR to date have been sparse, incoherent and largely inaccessible to targeted communities and individuals. Law enforcement is an important part of the solution, but the cross-border nature of TNR demands a broader approach to protect the rights of those targeted.   The Foreign Policy Centre is a founding member of the Tackling Transnational Repression (TNR) in the UK Working Group. Formed in September 2024, the Tackling TNR Working Group is an informal coalition of individuals and organisations working to address TNR in the UK context.    The working group’s steering committee includes: The Foreign Policy Centre, Richardson Institute at Lancaster University, Index on Censorship, Reporters Without Borders, Azadi Network and The Rights Practice. The wider membership also comprises organisations such as Amnesty International UK,  ARTICLE 19, the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), China Dissent Network, Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, FairSquare, Hong Kong Democracy Council, Hong Kong Watch, and Iran International, as well as other individual experts and researchers.   The aims of the group are to: 

• To advance research and monitor incidents and effects of TNR in the UK;

• Support individuals and groups affected by TNR; and

• Identify and shape the development of a comprehensive policy response to TNR in the UK.

  Together, the Tackling TNR WG  has developed a ‘Four Part Approach’ for addressing TNR in the UK, which is outlined in detail below. This approach was included in the Tackling TNR in the UK Working Group’s submission to the Human Rights (Joint Committee) inquiry into ‘Transnational repression in the UK,’ in February 2025. Our evidence was published by the Committee in June 2025, and is available here. FPC’s Director, Susan Coughtrie, also gave oral evidence to the Committee in March 2025, the transcript of which can be found here.   Following the publication of the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report on transnational repression in the UK on 30th July 2025, the Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group prepared a statement in response. To read the statement, click here.  

The Tackling TNR Working Group’s ‘Four Part Approach’ for addressing TNR in the UK

  If you are interested to find out more about the working group and/or to enquire about joining, please email: info@fpc.org.uk  [post_title] => Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => tackling-transnational-repression-in-the-uk-working-group [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-09-04 14:15:35 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-09-04 13:15:35 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8301 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [4] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8192 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-25 01:00:51 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-25 00:00:51 [post_content] => Bureaucracy still moves at the speed of fax, but exile communities are prototyping governance technologies at the speed of necessity. This opens new possibilities for host countries of those in exile to learn from their innovations, while building democratic values and resilience.   As someone exiled twice – first from Belarus due to political persecution, then from Ukraine due to war – I have come to see home not as a place, but as a protocol, where new digital governance tools enable active citizenship.  Diasporas are building these protocols under fire. Displacement breeds innovation: those in exile are not merely adapting to digital governance; they are pioneering it because their old institutions have collapsed.   Diaspora communities should be taken seriously because they have the power to influence change at home. We saw this in action when voters from abroad tipped the scales in Moldova's October 2024 EU accession referendum. The decisive votes were not cast in Chișinău – they came from WhatsApp groups in Italy, community centres in Germany and kitchen tables in Dublin^[1]. One in four Moldovans now lives abroad^[2]; their ballots turned a domestic stalemate into constitutional change.   The Belarusian diaspora pushed even further, electing a parliament in exile. Despite cyber harassment and threats to relatives, we held block chain audited elections for a Coordination Council in May 2024^[3]. Six thousand verified votes out of a million strong diaspora is not regime toppling, but it is a proof of concept that democratic processes can outlive failed states^[4].   In the shadow of authoritarianism, new technologies are making democratic engagement possible.  Zero knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are one promising approach. Projects like Freedom Tool let citizens prove passport validity without revealing personal data^[5].   Zero knowledge voting sounds dystopian until your polling station becomes a prison cell. Then it becomes a tool for building democratic resilience. Early pilots in Russian, Iranian and Georgian contexts suggest the method can scale, even under authoritarian pressure^[6]. It deserves rigorous security audits and a clear path to legal recognition.   Policymakers in Western democracies must understand that digital innovations by exile communities are more than fringe experiments – they are stress testing governance under extreme conditions. The UK should observe carefully, not as saviour but as strategic learner.   One quick win is improved administrative efficiency. For example, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office takes weeks to certify official documents, but secure digital credentials could streamline verification. Pilot schemes would surface real world obstacles early.   As authoritarian states weaponise diasporas, the UK could partner with democratic exile networks on standards and sandbox trials, that test new technologies in safe environments^[7].   Low-risk pilots could include a sandbox test for diaspora credentials as supplementary evidence for specific visa categories^[8].  Think tanks could convene Belarusian, Moldovan, Ukrainian, Hong Kong and Taiwan tech teams with MPs, regulators and the FCA sandbox to swap playbooks.   The government could also fund independent open-source audits of diaspora governance tools to understand security threats and vulnerabilities before deeper institutional engagement.   These technologies might eventually reshape citizenship and belonging. However, the transition from paperwork to digital protocols demands careful navigation. The question is not whether exile communities will innovate, but whether established democracies can learn from their experiments without repeating their mistakes.   Ray Svitla is a Belarus-born entrepreneur, fractional CMO and governance strategist working at the nexus of Web3, civil-society tech and frontier finance. He has mobilised $25 M+ in capital and unlocked $200 K in equity-free grants from USAID, the NEAR Foundation and others. As co-founder of WAKA he scaled the matchmaking platform to 100 000 users at one-tenth typical CAC. He also led a research department producing more than 80 publications that drew tier-1 clients including Blockchain.com. Today he stewards the 404embassy.com network, hosting salons with visionaries such as Vitalik Buterin. A John Smith Trust Fellow, Ray applies value-driven governance insights to build more resilient, inclusive futures.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] Wikipedia, ‘2024 Moldovan European Union membership constitutional referendum’, October 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Moldovan_European_Union_membership_constitutional_referendum ^[2] Tiina Kaukvere, Emerging Europe, ‘Is Moldova’s diaspora ready to return home?’, May 2025, https://emerging-europe.com/analysis/is-moldovas-diaspora-ready-to-return-home/ ^[3] Kamil Kłysiński, OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, ‘Belarus: elections to the opposition parliament’, May 2024, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-05-29/belarus-elections-to-opposition-parliament ^[4] Ray Svitla, Embassy.Svit.la, ‘Pavel Liber: Building a New Belarus in Exile (An Interview)’, June 2025, https://embassy.svit.la/p/pavel-liber-building-a-new-belarus ^[5] Rarimo, Medium, ‘Introducing Freedom Tool’, February 2024, https://rarimo.medium.com/introducing-freedom-tool-15709e9eaa73; Ray Svitla, Embassy Svit.la, ‘Kitty Horlick (Rarimo): ZKDemocracy & Privacy’s Future’, July 2025, https://embassy.svit.la/p/kitty-horlick-rarimo-zk-democracy ^[6] Oleksandr Kurbatov and Lasha Antadze, Medium, ‘Building ZK passport-based voting’, September 2024, https://rarimo.medium.com/building-zk-passport-based-voting-3f6f97ebb445 ^[7] Citizen Lab, UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Written evidence to UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee – Transnational Repression (TRUK0112)’, 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/138042/html/ ^[8] Office for Digital Identities and Attributes, GOV.UK, ‘About us’, November 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-for-digital-identities-and-attributes [post_title] => From paperwork to digital protocols: how exile rewrites citizenship [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => belarus-from-paperwork-to-digital-protocols-how-exile-rewrites-citizenship [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:23:52 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:23:52 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8192 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [5] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8187 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-23 01:00:24 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-23 00:00:24 [post_content] =>  Displaced Ukrainians in the UK are highly educated, with strong professional backgrounds and well placed to contribute economically and socially. However, to do this, they need greater certainty about their future in the country.   More than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the UK has provided refuge to over 218,600 displaced Ukrainians under humanitarian visa schemes.   Government data shows 68% of Ukrainian adults are employed or self-employed^[1]. Yet only about one-third are working in their original professions, with 20% employed in the hospitality sector, indicating that there are opportunities to make much better use of their skills^[2].   Many Ukrainians are also proactively contributing to community life, establishing cultural associations, grassroots organisations, and volunteer initiatives that provide language classes, cultural events, and mental health support.   Last year, I joined the John Smith Trust’s Ukrainian Women’s Leadership programme in Scotland and I met many women who are contributing to the UK economy and whose efforts have strengthened both Ukrainian and local communities.   One Fellow, Hanna Tekliuk, is an active member of the Education Working Group of the CPG on Ukraine. She has also established the Ukrainian St Margaret’s Saturday School for relocated Ukrainian children. These schools are vital for maintaining a deep connection to their heritage.   Anna Kulish is another of the many women and John Smith Fellows making a vital contribution. She is the Secretary of the Scottish Parliament Cross-Party Group on Ukraine and chairs its business and economy working group, which promotes economic ties between Scotland and Ukraine.   With the CPG, she led the first trade visit from Ukraine to Scotland in over a decade, with 60 delegates including community leaders and mayors of Ukrainian cities. They came to Scotland not to ask for aid, but to present investment projects.   However without a clear pathway to permanence in the UK, many displaced Ukrainians face limited opportunities. The three-year visas under the Ukraine schemes are now approaching expiry. The Ukraine permission extension grants an additional 18 months’ stay, offering temporary reassurance. However, this extension does not guarantee indefinite leave to remain, leaving long-term status unresolved.   Career advancement, housing stability, and family planning are all shaped by legal uncertainty. Policy choices now will influence whether integration efforts continue to yield social and economic dividends—or risk stagnation under prolonged precarity.   While some Ukrainians intend to return when conditions allow, most are laying down roots and wish to remain long term^[3]. However, a sense of belonging remains constrained.   As one displaced Ukrainian reflected: “We came here to survive, but we’ve built lives. Now we need to know whether we’re staying as guests—or neighbours.”   As the UK navigates this next phase, there is an urgent need for clarity. Policymakers may consider how temporary protection could transition into more secure residency for those who would like to remain, aligning with broader migration and integration objectives.   Ukrainians in the UK have a great deal of untapped potential, with the skills and motivation to contribute more to the economy.  Targeted investment in credential recognition, bridging programmes, and language support could address underemployment and better align Ukrainian skills with labour market needs. This is a clear win for both Ukrainians and the UK communities that have welcomed them. Meanwhile, strengthening partnerships with Ukrainian-led organisations could enhance community integration and complement formal support services.   Integration is shaped by opportunity and agency. Policy decisions taken now will influence whether displaced Ukrainians can contribute through work, taxes, and civic engagement or remain constrained by temporary status.   Three years on, the UK faces a pivotal policy moment: whether the welcome extended in 2022 becomes a pathway to belonging or remains a temporary refuge.     Nataliia Danova is a John Smith Trust alumna, currently working for Edinburgh City Council. She is the co-founder of Help Ukraine Scotland, an organisation providing informational support and resources to displaced Ukrainians across Scotland. Nataliia is a creative practitioner, cultural mediator, and advocate for refugee and migrant rights, committed to building pathways for integration and community support through grassroots initiatives.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, ‘Ukrainian migration to the UK’, December 2024, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/ukrainian-migration-to-the-uk/ ^[2] Chatham House, ‘Ukrainian refugees and their shifting situation’, part of Ukraine’s fight for its people, February 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/02/ukraines-fight-its-people/ukrainian-refugees-and-their-shifting-situation ^[3] Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, ‘Ukrainian migration to the UK’, December 2024, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/ukrainian-migration-to-the-uk/   [post_title] => Legal certainty could boost Ukrainians’ economic contribution in the UK [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => ukraine-legal-certainty-could-boost-ukrainians-economic-contribution-in-the-uk [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:28:57 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:28:57 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8187 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [6] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8249 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-21 01:00:44 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-21 00:00:44 [post_content] => As global power dynamics shift, Central Asia’s strategic relevance is rising, – but so too is the need for a reset in engagement by international partners. Could a more principled, values-driven approach unlock lasting stability and democratic resilience in the region?    Central Asia stands at a peculiar crossroads. Decades after gaining independence, a common refrain echoes: "Everything has changed, but nothing has changed."    On the surface, new infrastructure rises, economies evolve, and geopolitical alignments shift. Yet, beneath this veneer, the fundamental nature of international engagement often remains stubbornly familiar, characterised by a transactional approach that prioritises short-term gains over long-term partnership. What was once subtly implied is now glaringly apparent: a pervasive lack of genuine interest in the region's holistic development, with compromises frequently driven by the pursuit of trade and resources.     Deepening regional integration is paramount. Initiatives like the Central Asian Summit are fostering greater cooperation among the republics themselves, building a collective identity and reducing reliance on external powers for regional stability. This internal cohesion makes the region a more attractive and reliable partner for others.    To truly move forward, a fundamental shift is required: a transition towards a more principled and value-driven approach to diplomacy. This means moving beyond the immediate gratification of trade deals or security pacts and embracing a long-term vision rooted in genuine partnership.    A key opportunity lies in enhancing regional connectivity and integration. As global supply chains are re-evaluated and diversified, Central Asia's geographic position as a land bridge between East and West becomes even more critical. Investing in modern transport corridors, logistics hubs, and digital infrastructure can transform the region into a vital transit artery, generating substantial transit revenues and stimulating local economies.     Firstly, a principled approach entails consistent investment in human capital and civil society. This includes supporting independent media, educational exchanges, and grassroots initiatives that empower citizens and foster critical thinking. Such investments, though not immediately yielding economic returns, are foundational for resilient societies and accountable governance.    Secondly, diplomacy must be predicated on shared values like the rule of law, transparency, and sustainable development. Instead of overlooking governance issues for the sake of a trade agreement, international partners should consistently advocate for reforms that strengthen institutions and combat corruption. This does not mean imposing Western models, but rather supporting Central Asian efforts to build systems that serve their own people effectively and justly.    Thirdly, fostering regional integration that benefits all citizens, not just elites, should be a priority. Supporting cross-border initiatives in areas like water management, energy, and transport can build trust and interdependence, creating a more stable and prosperous region.    A principled approach is not merely altruistic - it is strategically sound. By investing in the long-term stability and genuine development of Central Asian nations, international partners build more reliable and resilient allies. It counters malign influences by offering a compelling alternative rooted in mutual respect and shared prosperity. It acknowledges that true security and economic growth stem from strong institutions, empowered citizens, and a commitment to universal values.    The time has come to shed the transactional shadows and embrace a brighter, more principled path for diplomacy in Central Asia. Only then can "everything truly change" for the better, fostering a future of genuine partnership and lasting progress.      Ainur Kanafina is a Programme Specialist in Population and Development at United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Regional Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia in Istanbul, Türkiye. Previously, Ainur served at the World Health Organization (WHO) in Amman, Jordan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Kazakhstan. She has also worked at the British Embassy in Astana KAZGUU Higher School of Economics, Global Center for Cooperative Security and the Institute for Strategic Development. Ainur holds a MSc in public policy from University College London and a BSc in information technology and business from Indiana University. She is an alumna of various programmes organised by Council of Europe, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Riga Graduate School of Law and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Academy. Ainur is also a Bolashak scholar and a PMP certified project manager.    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Beyond transactions to rebuilding trust with Central Asia [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => beyond-transactions-to-rebuilding-trust-with-central-asia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:29:13 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:29:13 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8249 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [7] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8189 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-21 01:00:15 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-21 00:00:15 [post_content] => High unemployment and limited economic opportunities in Central Asian countries have traditionally driven millions of people to migrate to Russia in search of work^[1]. Where the region’s historical, cultural and linguistic links with Russia have been a major factor in migrants’ choice of destination,  new migration patterns are however emerging, influenced by geopolitical shifts in the region. These present opportunities for Central Asian governments, the receiving countries, and the migrants themselves^[2].   Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, life has become more difficult for Central Asian migrants who live and work in Russia. Those who hold Russian passports are compelled to join the armed forces, and tens of thousands have been sent to the war zone^[3]. Some returned to their home countries to avoid the draft.   Then there are undocumented migrants. Since the terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall by Tajik nationals, Russia’s attitude towards Central Asian migrants has become more hostile^[4]. Combined with military mobilisation, this has led to new regulatory frameworks and tools for registering undocumented migrants.   From the perspective of Central Asian countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, whose economies rely heavily on remittances, dependence on a single country as a migration destination is a high-risk strategy^[5]. It gives the destination country a disproportionate influence over policies and leaves you vulnerable to changes in theirs.   That is why governments in Central Asia need to pursue a strategy to diversify the migration destinations of their citizens. We are seeing opportunities to expand mutually beneficial agreements on labour migration with countries such as the UK, Germany, Japan and South Korea ^[6]. These countries offer workers better conditions than Russia, with proper contracts that reduce the risk of exploitation and better legal protections.   The UK’s Seasonal Workers Scheme is a good example^[7]. The UK has a quota system, which allocates a specific number of places for each country. In 2024, Great Britain allocated 45,000 seasonal work visas for Central Asia, with approximately 30% going to citizens of Kyrgyzstan^[8]. Central Asian migrants view the scheme as a valuable opportunity for legitimate, well-paid and well-regulated work. The scheme benefits the UK by filling a seasonal labour shortage in the agricultural and poultry sectors. The same is true in Japan and South Korea.   For the governments of receiving countries such as the UK, labour migration schemes offer opportunities for cultural exchange and stronger relations in the region^[9]. Central Asian governments appreciate the UK’s scheme because it helps them to resolve their unemployment issues. So, if UK policy is to increase its influence in Central Asia, this is received more positively.   The temporary and seasonal nature of these schemes suits Central Asian citizens themselves, as they are not looking to emigrate but to resolve an economic need.  For host societies, Central Asian seasonal workers present minimal integration challenges, as their temporary stay avoids long-term social or economic strain. As long as the scheme is well-regulated, everybody wins.     Meder Dastanbekov is the former country director for Winrock International in the Kyrgyz Republic, where he led initiatives to promote safe migration and combat human trafficking in the Kyrgyz Republic and wider Central Asia region. His work addresses the critical challenges faced by migrants, particularly in light of evolving geopolitical dynamics, such as the war in Ukraine and its impact on migration patterns. With extensive experience fostering collaboration between governments, international organisations, and civil society, Meder helps in developing inclusive policies and practices that prioritise human rights and empower vulnerable populations.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] Kommersant, ‘Мы реально не знаем, кто к нам едет’, September 2024, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7166241 ^[2] University of Central Asia Institute of Public Policy and Administration, How War in Ukraine Has Shaped Migration Flows in Central Asia, policy brief, c. 2023, https://ucentralasia.org/media/psdnh1p1/pbmigration-flow-change-in-central-asia-en.pdf ^[3] Kaktus.media, ‘Бастрыкин заявил, что десятки тысяч мигрантов с гражданством РФ находятся на передовой’, May 2025, https://kaktus.media/doc/524105_bastrykin_zaiavil_chto_desiatki_tysiach_migrantov_s_grajdanstvom_rf_nahodiatsia_na_peredovoy.html ^[4] BBC News, ‘Ukraine war: US and UK to supply longer‑range missiles to Kyiv’, June 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68665896 ^[5] Азаттык Радиосу (RFE/RL), ‘Рублдин курсу борбор азиялык мигранттарга кандай таасир этти?’ (How the ruble exchange rate affects Central Asian migrants), April 2025, https://www.azattyk.org/a/33394657.html ^[6] Farangis Najibullah, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘Happy To Be In Britain, Central Asian Migrants Want More Work To Cover Expenses’, August 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/britain-central-asia-migrants-more-work-expenses/31997221.html; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘“This Is Not My World”: Central Asian Migrants in Russia Say They Could Never Return Home’, April 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-migrants-centralasia-uzbekistan/33261194.html; and, Akchabar.kg, ‘Kyrgyzstan and Japan deepen cooperation in employment and social projects’, n.d., https://www.akchabar.kg/en/news/kirgizstan-i-yaponiya-uglublyayut-sotrudnichestvo-v-sfere-trudoustrojstva-i-sotsialnikh-proektov-pdhtnmeblegahkmk ^[7] Association of Labour Providers, ‘Seasonal Worker Scheme’, n.d., https://www.labourproviders.org.uk/seasonal-worker-scheme/ ^[8] Akchabar.kg, ‘Великобритания выделяет 45 тысяч квот для сезонных работников из ЦА — 30 получат граждане Киргизстана’ (Britain allocates 45,000 quotas for seasonal workers from Central Asia — 30 will go to Kyrgyzstan citizens), n.d., https://www.akchabar.kg/en/news/velikobritaniya-videlyaet-45-tisyach-kvot-dlya-sezonnikh-rabotnikov-iz-tsa-30-poluchat-grazhdane-kirgizstana-mdphrmumvuomxzgj ^[9] The Economist, ‘Why Central Asians are flocking to Britain’, July 2023, https://www.economist.com/britain/2023/07/24/why-central-asians-are-flocking-to-britain [post_title] => Europe and Central Asia can benefit from changing migration patterns [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => kyrgyzstan-europe-and-central-asia-can-benefit-from-changing-migration-patterns [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:29:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:29:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8189 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [8] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8185 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-18 01:00:30 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-18 00:00:30 [post_content] =>  When speaking about Russian and Soviet colonialism, the first step is to agree on the terminology. Why do we continue to define the region by referencing that it ‘formerly’ belonged to the Soviet Union more than 30 years ago? To move on from the Soviet identity, we should refer  instead to Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the South Caucasus.   Yet this solution does not reflect the commonality of problems countries in this region face, exactly because of their tumultuous history and present circumstances. Given ‘post-socialist’, ‘post-communist’ or ‘post-anything’, present the same definitional problem as the ‘former soviet union’. One suggestion is to call the region the “Global East”^[1]. The second step is to realise that not all countries that were the republics of the Soviet Union and before that parts of the Russian Empire, necessarily agree that they were “colonised”. Some reject the term as degrading and not reflecting the economic and cultural reality they lived in. Some Georgians, for example, prefer to talk about it in terms of an occupation.   We also need to recognise that experiences vary hugely by country. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia kept their cultural identities and language. However, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, due to the influx of Slavic and other non-Asian populations, Russian remains the lingua franca and an official language until this day. In Estonia and Latvia, the large Russian-speaking populations form parallel social structures. In Belarus, Lukashenko’s regime actively promotes russification, and speaking Belarusian is perceived as a sign of being in the opposition.   Ukraine and Kazakhstan suffered starvation under Stalin in the 1930s. In Ukraine, memorialising the Holodomor is one of the foundations of modern Ukrainian identity^[2]. Meanwhile, the Kazakh famine (Asharshylyk), which was equally devastating, is less well-remembered and less researched^[3].   So, how can we start to shift colonial mindsets? We need to have conversations between different nations and ethnic groups about their experiences, including national minorities from Russia and ethnic Russians. Failing to do so allows propaganda to build. The consequences of failing to challenge false narratives can clearly be seen in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.   A good place to start is for decolonial activists from across the region to find spaces where we can share our experiences and build a common understanding. Independent media are ideally placed to support this process. For example, the Kyrgyz podcast O’decolon (English version Yurt Jurt) brings people together from almost all the countries in the region to discuss their experiences^[4].   When we are ready to reach a bigger audience, a series in the mainstream media exploring these issues in a more engaging way could be a good way to breakthrough. Just as Adolescence sparked conversations about teenagers, social media and misogyny, a series tackling colonial issues could help shift mindsets on a large scale.   Shifting mindsets within Russian society is an important component too, and not only with the involvement of civil society and independent media in exile. Hundreds of thousands of people fled Russia to avoid being mobilised^[5], with many ending up in Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan and other countries of the region.   For those who have left Russia at least, there is an opportunity to see their country from another perspective. It could be the beginning of some overdue reflection on the Soviet legacy and Russian colonialism.     Aigulle Sembaeva is an experienced civil society professional, Aigulle’s area of expertise is in leading and designing education, capacity building and youth participation programmes. Throughout her career she has brought together students, activists, journalists, reformers, and researchers from Central Asia and Eastern Europe to share their experiences and innovative ideas. She is a strong believer in the power of people’s networks to effect change.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] G. John Ikenberry, International Affairs, ‘Three Worlds: the West, East and South and the competition to shape global order’, vol. 100, no. 1, January 2024, pp. 121–138, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad284 ^[2] National Museum of the Holodomor‑Genocide, ‘The History of the Holodomor’, n.d. https://holodomormuseum.org.ua/en/the-history-of-the-holodomor/ ^[3] Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, 'Remembering Kazakhstan’s Great Famine of the 1930s', https://ieres.elliott.gwu.edu/project/remembering-kazakhstans-great-famine-of-the-1930s/ ^[4] Bashтан, Подкаст О’Деколон, YouTube playlist, 43 episodes, last updated 19 December 2024, https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLjI-VRWtNFhNoA45bMJhPzqY82-smpeZF;  and, Bashтан, Yurt Jurt, Spotify podcast, hosted by Dr. Diana Kudaibergen, https://open.spotify.com/show/51uxvx3yDWujSSBPykPZYR ^[5] The Bell, ‘Russia’s 650,000 wartime emigres’, July 2024, https://en.thebell.io/russias-650-000-wartime-emigres/   [post_title] => How can we start conversations to shift colonial mindsets? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => russia-how-can-we-start-conversations-to-shift-colonial-mindsets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:30:02 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:30:02 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8185 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [9] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8176 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-16 01:00:44 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-16 00:00:44 [post_content] => All societies are diverse, even if some people have got used to thinking that their country should be homogeneous, where everyone looks the same, speaks the same language, and follows the same religion.It is this mindset that enables authoritarian and populist leaders to divide their societies into “us and them”.   Globally we are seeing a pushback against the diversity, equality and inclusion (DEI) agenda, not least of all in the United States under the second Trump administration. Yet DEI is crucial to maintaining a peaceful society.My work, as the national coordinator in Georgia for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe High Commissioner on National Minorities,is mostly about preventing ethnic conflict and promoting a diverse society. Inclusive decision-making is one of the ways to make this happen.   When minorities take part in the decision-making process, they take ownership of those decisions^[1]. It gives the process more legitimacy because it represents the interests and needs of the whole society. This is relevant for all groups, whether ethnic, religious minorities or the LGBTQI community.   This is extremely important for democracy, especially today, as politicians all over the world revert to divisive rhetoric , fostering distrust among communities and attempting to manipulate  and try to manipulate us.   It’s never easy. You make certain steps forward, but then you must go back and start over again. In Georgia right now, where civil society is under unprecedented pressure from the government, there are fewer opportunities to implement a diversity agenda^[2]. When there is a rise in authoritarianism, minorities try to stay silent to weather the storm and survive this pressure. This further alienates them.   Despite this,  there is still an opportunity to show people why diversity is important. We can do this by making the connection between diversity and peace. When there is too much pressure on minority communities, people start resisting, and that could lead to tensions and then even conflict. But when you foster diversity, there is less friction and a greater chance of different communities living together peacefully. Thus, exclusion is not an answer; societies need to find their own way to embrace diversity so that it reflects the needs and aspirations of their members.   Diversity matters more than ever because it’s about individual dignity and security for everyone. It’s about creating avenues which enable people to become part of society so that they do not have to fight every single day to get a job, an education, medical help. National governments need to design inclusive policies to address these issues.   In Georgia, I would like us to reach a point where ethnic minorities feel confident and welcome to speak up, not only about their own issues, but also about issues that affect the whole country.   For this to happen, we need inclusive leadership and role models in high-level positions. And we need to see this from our partners in Western democracies. The UK could lead by example, including diversity not only in policies but also in their actions when interacting with Georgian politicians. It sends an important message.   I want society and politicians to understand that diversity is not a danger to our identities. You do not have to build barriers between different groups to keep people safe. Instead, you celebrate diversity and benefit from it. It creates opportunities for us all.   Nino Gogoladze is a national programme coordinator for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE HCNM) in Tbilisi, Georgia. She manages the work of the HCNM in Georgia seeking to prevent ethnic conflict in the country and promote integration of diverse society. Nino previously worked as a project coordinator at the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), a programme coordinator at the Heinrich Boell Foundation, and national anti-trafficking officer for the OSCE Mission to Georgia. She holds an LLM degree from London School of Economics and Political Science; and an MA in international relations and European studies from the Central European University, Budapest.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre nor those of the OSCE HCNM.   ^[1] OSCE, ‘The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’, September 1999, https://www.osce.org/hcnm/lund-recommendations ^[2] Nini Gabritchidze, ‘Georgian Dream’s FARA Takes Effect’, Civil.ge, May 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/684669   [post_title] => We must make the connection between diversity and peace [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => georgia-we-must-make-the-connection-between-diversity-and-peace [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:30:14 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:30:14 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8176 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [10] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8173 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-14 01:00:54 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-14 00:00:54 [post_content] => Ukraine is not just a battlefield – it is democracy’s most critical frontline. It is misleading to treat war as a regional conflict – the spillover of Russian aggression beyond Ukraine’s borders is not just possible, but likely.   What we are witnessing now is the global shift from a rules-based to a power-based order. The outcome of this confrontation will decide the politics of the future. We have a window of opportunity to create a global alliance based on democratic values and we must not miss it.   The cooperation between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea becomes more strategic than ever, as they prepare to undermine the Western-led, rule-based order. For Europe and the democratic world, it is crucial to break the endless cycle of appeasing the aggressor and to adopt a firm, practical policy of isolating Russia.   While some think about possible concessions to the aggressor, it is important  to understand that what is being sacrificed is not only territory but also our values and freedom. Appeasement encourages further aggression. In this context, democracies must show they have the strength and tools to counter authoritarian power. And while we cannot change our existing institutions – such as NATO and the European Union (EU) – overnight, we can adapt.   There are still instruments that have not been fully utilised. Despite Russia’s hybrid aggression and energy blackmail costing hundreds of billions, Europe has hesitated to confiscate Russian assets for Ukraine’s benefit. Seizing the Russian Central Bank’s assets to create a European defence fund would provide crucial resources and demonstrate Europe’s commitment to countering ongoing threats^[1]. Building on this, there must be a policy shift towards total economic isolation of Russia by ending all trade with it.   The ‘Coalition of the Willing,’ led by the UK and France, provides the decisive leadership Europe needs^[2]. This coalition has the potential to evolve into a broader security mechanism, with existing institutions like the EU taking on a greater role. In this context, the UK can further support a humanitarian operation to protect Ukraine’s airspace over the north-western sector of the Black Sea and western Ukraine.   Building on Ukrainian practical experience of modern warfare with new technologies, the UK could also develop initiatives like Sky Shield^[3]. This could protect the sky in Europe and the UK using the Ukrainian example to build air superiority.   Ukrainian military experience is highly beneficial for Europe and NATO because they can better understand what they’re dealing with. Looking beyond our traditional allies, we must make space for new partners and security alliances, such as Japan and South Korea.  A values-based alliance is our real strategic advantage.   The partnerships between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are based on mutual benefits and goals but there is no trust.  On the contrary, Ukraine is paying with its blood for choosing Europe. That is why our accession to the EU remains a top priority. With Russia watching, it sends a powerful message that Europe supports our aspirations. It’s more than integration. It's about the strategic perspective and common security.   If we stay firm on our common values, we can build greater trust and unity based on a shared vision. A consensus-based approach takes time, and there is a need to move quickly in this fast-changing environment. However, in the long term,  it will be more reliable than the transactional-based approach of the autocracies.     Kateryna Musiienko is a Kremenchuk City Council member and deputy head of the Committee for Foreign Relations, Education and Youth. She is a Head of the Foreign Affairs, Strategic Partnerships and Innovations at ANTS NGO. Kateryna was an advisor to a member of the European Parliament and former advisor to the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Ukrainian Parliament. Her educational background is in political science (Passau University) and diplomacy (University of Oxford).    Fellow Photo (c) Sarah Oughton, The John Smith Trust   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1]  Ukrainian Victory, Confiscation of Russian State-Owned and Affiliated Property in Ukraine: Path to Justice and Recovery, n.d., https://ukrainianvictory.org/wp-content/uploads/Confiscation.pdf ^[2] UK Government, ‘Coalition of the Willing: Joint UK–France statement following 10 April meeting’, April 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/coalition-of-the-willing-joint-uk-france-statement-following-10-april-meeting ^[3]Dan Sabbagh, The Guardian, ‘European‑led Ukraine air protection plan could halt Russian missile attacks’, March 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/06/european-led-ukraine-air-protection-plan-could-halt-russian-missile-attacks     [post_title] => How democracies can leverage Ukraine’s resistance for a global reset [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => ukraine-how-democracies-can-leverage-ukraines-resistance-for-a-global-reset [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:30:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:30:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8173 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [11] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8194 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-14 01:00:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-14 00:00:48 [post_content] =>   We are living through the biggest shift in geopolitical power since the Second World War, accelerated by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, China’s economic ascendency, and the US retreat from guaranteeing Europe’s security.     A new multipolar power-based order is emerging. And in many countries, democracy is under threat as populist leaders exploit false and divisive narratives to gain and maintain power. In these turbulent times, we can see all too clearly that democracy is fragile and precious, and not to be taken for granted. We must have the courage to defend it in the face of growing authoritarianism.    Amid these shifts and crises, it has never been more important for UK policymakers to listen to a wide range of voices and perspectives, especially those we often don’t hear from. And where there are crises, there are also sometimes opportunities if you are willing to look for them and keep an open mind.    In this mini-series, John Smith Fellows from Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia discuss opportunities for transformation and development in their societies. We hear from Fellows in Ukraine, Georgia and  Kyrgyzstan, as well as Fellows exiled from Belarus and Russia, on topics including changing colonial mindsets, looking beyond traditional alliances, keeping the diversity agenda alive and opportunities for displaced people and local communities to thrive together.    Our Fellows are leaders and changemakers in their fields, who are committed to tolerance, openness and rules-based, people-focused governance. Together, they bring diverse perspectives and embody the value of connection and shared ‘sense-making’ in moments of crisis.    During our 30-year history, the John Smith Trust has built a network of more than 500 Fellows from across the region. This means that together we are well-placed to develop cross-regional and cross-sectoral connections, create space for new ideas and share expertise at a time of increasing polarisation.     The UK still excels at open discussion and respectful disagreement, which our Fellows value highly and take back to their societies. And while hard security cooperation – such as that proposed by the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ – is becoming increasingly important, the UK’s soft power diplomacy approaches are also crucial in the defence of democratic values in Europe and beyond.    For UK policymakers and advisors, it’s well worth spending time exploring emerging opportunities for local action and identifying where there’s potential for new alliances and collaborative relationships.     We can find strength in our shared values and focus on what unites us, not what divides us.    Baroness Suttie is a Member of the House of Lords since October 2013, Alison is currently the Liberal Democrat Northern Ireland Spokesperson in the House of Lords and is also a Party Whip. She served on the EU Select Committee in the House of Lords from 2015-19. She currently is a member of the Constitution Committee.  Alison was Head of the Liberal Democrat Leader’s office from 2006 to 2010 and was Deputy Chief of Staff to the Deputy Prime Minster for the first 18 months of the Coalition Government from 2010 to 2011.  In addition to being a working peer, Alison also works as an independent consultant in developing parliaments around the world. She has worked in Jordan, Iraq, Sudan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tunisia.  Having studied Russian and French at Heriot-Watt university in Edinburgh as well in Voronezh State University in Russia in 1988, she continues to enjoy speaking both languages.      Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.    [post_title] => Geopolitical shifts: crisis or opportunity for democracy? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => geopolitical-shifts-crisis-or-opportunity-for-democracy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:22:58 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:22:58 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8194 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [12] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8199 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-11 07:00:58 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-11 06:00:58 [post_content] =>   As war, political instability, and democratic erosion continue to reshape Europe’s trajectory, experts recently gathered in Westminster to examine where Central Europe stands and where it may be heading.   On 24th June 2025, the Aston Centre for Europe, the Foreign Policy Centre and UK in a Changing Europe co-hosted a high-level expert roundtable exploring the current political and geopolitical landscape of Central Europe. The event was chaired by the Rt Hon Anneliese Dodds MP and featured speakers from academia, policy, and journalism: Dr. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, Masaryk University (Czechia); Prof. Aleks Szczerbiak, University of Sussex (Poland); Vladimir Bilčík, Senior Fellow, GLOBSEC (Slovakia); and Alexander Faludy, Journalist (Hungary).  

"The geopolitical roles of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have always been important but are even more crucial given the war against Ukraine. It is essential that we develop strong people-to-people bilateral relationships, especially to support and promote democracy and security in the face of threats from illiberal actors."

Rt Hon Anneliese Dodds MP

  The panel focused on developments in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia. As war continues in Ukraine and global power dynamics shift, Central Europe has become a frontline for democratic resilience and foreign policy fragmentation. While united in their proximity to the war, the four countries diverge significantly in their internal politics, stance towards Russia, relations with the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), and their approaches to regional cooperation and defence. Included below is a snapshot of the panel’s discussion by country:  

• Poland faces institutional deadlock following the election of Karol Nawrocki as president. Nawrocki’s predecessor from the Law and Justice party blocked legislative progress by the government under Prime Minister Donald Tusk and more of the same can be expected. However, while judicial reform and domestic governance are stalled, foreign and defense policy remain largely stable. A broad public consensus supports military aid to Ukraine, but Nawrocki has expressed scepticism about its NATO and EU membership ambitions and foresees a more instrumental relationship. UK-Poland defence ties, especially in arms procurement and shared threat assessment, are expected to continue regardless of internal political friction or transatlantic uncertainty.

 

“Poles have mixed views about Donald Trump, and many are concerned about the possible weakening of the trans-Atlantic alliance, but whatever their views most of them see the US as Poland's only military security guarantor and are wary of any EU defence identity that is separate from NATO.”

Aleks Szczerbiak, Professor of Politics, University of Sussex

 

• Hungary is entering a politically volatile phase. The ruling Fidesz party is under pressure from the emerging TISZA party. This has prompted Fidesz, variously, to propose and enact a wave of restrictive legislation aimed at entrenching its power ahead of the 2026 elections. These include constitutional changes, media crackdowns and foreign interference laws. Hungary maintains close ties with China, Iran, and Belarus. Orbán‘s government continues to obstruct EU consensus on critical issues such as sanctions on Russia and resists rule of law standards.^[1] The political climate in Hungary is increasingly shaped by shifts in Washington. With President Trump’s administration in the United States taking a more transactional and ambiguous stance toward Europe, Hungary enjoys greater political cover to resist EU pressure.

 

“Hungary under Orbán is a headache for EU and NATO partners: a country from which Russian intelligence operates with impunity inside Schengen and which issues residents permits and passports to persons associated with those same intelligence services. The concern is multi-dimensional, given security and nuclear energy agreements with China and Iran.”

Alexander Faludy, Journalist

 

• Slovakia has seen moves to roll back democratic norms by the current government, though so far without the same degree of traction as in Hungary. Despite attempts by the government to control criminal investigations and to sideline independent media, public opinion remains broadly pro-EU and pro-NATO, and opposition forces are polling strongly ahead of the next election. Official rhetoric has increasingly challenged Slovakia’s commitments to NATO and EU norms, with Prime Minister Robert Fico raising the prospect of neutrality and distancing the country from Western consensus on Ukraine and Russia.^[2] The country’s trajectory remains uncertain, compounded by the government’s inability to address structural, economic, and social weaknesses. While civic resistance and electoral competition offer space for political change in Slovakia, continued UK and European engagement will be important to support conditions for democratic politics and economic modernisation.

 

“The current government in Slovakia is Prime Minister Fico’s weakest and most rudderless government so far. While conditions for democratic political change are still prevailing, a future Slovak government will have to address the most daunting social and economic tasks since EU and NATO accessions in 2004.”

Vladimir Bilčík, Senior Fellow, GLOBSEC

 

• Czechia presents a paradox. The country has a firmly pro-Western government, competitive elections, independent judiciary, and a pro-democracy president, yet there is growing electoral volatility ahead of the 2025 parliamentary elections. The ruling coalition is polling poorly amid public frustration over economic hardship, soaring living costs, and housing crisis. In this context, former populist Prime Minister Andrej Babiš is resurging, offering a technocratic, business-first message that sidelines foreign policy and questions Czechia’s continued support for Ukraine^[3]. His return could shift the country toward transactional neutrality, weakening its strong alignment with EU and NATO partners.

 

               “Czechia might look like the diligent pupil on democracy indices, but beneath the surface, there is growing political volatility and disillusionment. A return of Andrej Babiš would not just reshape domestic politics — it could steer Czechia towards a more transactional, inward-looking foreign policy, marked by greater readiness to play both sides.”

Dr. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, Associate Professor , Masaryk University, Brno

    To read the full country analyses and explore key thematic takeaways from this expert discussion, you can download the full briefing here.     ^[1] Gabriel Gavin, Politico, ‘Hungary, Slovakia stall new Russia energy sanctions over gas ban proposal’,   June 2025,https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-slovakia-block-new-russia-energy-sanctions-ukraine-war-invasion-eu-viktor-orban/; International Bar Association, ‘Rule of law: EU blocking €18bn funding to Hungary over legislation concerns’, June 2025, https://www.ibanet.org/Rule-of-law-EU-blocking-18bn-funding-to-Hungary-over-legislation-concerns?utm_source=chatgpt.com ^[2] Jan Lopatka, Reuters, ‘PM Fico says neutrality would benefit NATO member Slovakia’, June 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/pm-fico-says-neutrality-would-benefit-nato-member-slovakia-2025-06-17/ ^[3] Jan Lopatka, Reuters, ‘Czech populist opposition leads as election set for October’,  May 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/czech-populist-opposition-leads-election-set-october-2025-05-13/   [post_title] => Expert Briefing: ‘Central Europe at a time of European and transatlantic challenges’ [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => expert-briefing-central-europe-at-a-time-of-european-and-transatlantic-challenges [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:31:01 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:31:01 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8199 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [13] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8063 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-04-03 13:30:31 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-04-03 12:30:31 [post_content] => Yesterday, Donald Trump announced a shift towards protectionism, the likes of which the world has not seen since the Great Depression.   For decades, global prosperity has been underpinned by a system of open trade without parallel in history. That system has enabled the creation of vast wealth in the Western world and lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in the Global South. It has also arguably contributed to global peace, as countries have more to gain by trading than warring with one another.   At a stroke, Trump brought that system to an end. By signing an executive order last night, he imposed a base tariff of 10% on imports from nearly all nations and additional steep levies on many.[1]  The United Kingdom faces only the base rate, but many other countries were not so fortunate. For American allies Taiwan and Israel, the rates are 32% and 17% respectively. For the European Union, the rate is 20%.and for China, 54%. For Vietnam and Cambodia – where many international companies moved production in order to avoid becoming victims of a US-China trade war – the rates are 46% and 49% respectively.[2]   Trump’s moves are just the beginning of what will now become a global trade war. Although the Trump administration has suggested that other countries not retaliate, they surely will – leading to an increase in trade barriers which is likely to be catastrophic for the global economy.[3]  In the West, consumer goods will become more expensive, interest rates will rise, and jobs will be lost. Elsewhere in the world, economic models which poorer nations were using to lift themselves up will cease to function. Geopolitical instability is likely to follow in the wake of economic instability, as it so often does.   Why is Trump doing it? There are at least three theories, some more persuasive than others. The first holds that this is simply the opening gambit in an epic negotiation, one that will end with most of these tariffs being swept away. The affected countries will come to the table and offer to reshape their trading relationship in a way that is more favourable to the United States, and the world will go back to (more or less) normal.   There are a few problems with this theory. Firstly, what exactly the administration even wants from other countries is not clear. It claims to have based its tariff rate for each country on the mixture of tariff and non-tariff barriers (for instance, subsidies and taxes) that the country in question imposes on the U.S. This is why Trump calls the tariffs “reciprocal”. But if that is the case, then something as simple as VAT would count towards the administration’s calculation. Unless the European Union and other economies are going to abolish VAT, there’s not much they can do to address the administration’s grievance.   The plot thickens when we examine the numbers more closely.[4]  The tariff rate the US has imposed on other countries appears not to be based on any plausible mixture of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers. Instead, the calculation seems to be based on that country’s trade deficit with the United States, meaning that only a complete collapse in its exports to the US could satisfy Trump. Only the complete unstitching of the modern global economy could achieve that. Even if it were possible, it implies a world radically different – and poorer – than the one we now inhabit.   Another problem is that the US government lacks the administrative capacity to engage in this many trade negotiations at once. Even the crude back-of-the-envelope way in which its tariff rates have been calculated betray that. Trump’s rambling, incoherent delivery of his speech at the White House yesterday – which badly misstated numerous facts about the economy and economic history – will also do little to inspire confidence amongst either the markets or US trading partners.[5]   A second theory for why Trump is doing this is that he genuinely is seeking a major rebalance of the world economy. He has stated repeatedly that he wants to see a renaissance of manufacturing in the United States, that he believes trade amounts to other countries ripping America off, and that US consumers should be willing to bear some pain in pursuit of economic rebalancing.[6]  During his speech yesterday, he once again raised the idea of tariffs becoming a major source of revenue for the US government, implying that they are here to stay.   This theory has plenty of problems too. The economic pain which would be involved in such an adjustment would be catastrophic for the US and global economies, not just a transient period of a little pain. The resultant trade wars could easily get out of control, depressing global economic activity and destroying trust between the United States and its economic partners. There would also be numerous unintended consequences, the type which have bedevilled state economic planners throughout history.   Trump’s idea to fund the US government through tariffs also makes little sense.[7]  In his speech yesterday, Trump decried the government’s shift from funding itself through tariffs to doing so through income taxes, a move which occurred in the early twentieth century. But this move was made for a simple reason: tariffs simply cannot generate enough revenue to fund a modern state. Trump’s vision implies a dramatically smaller US state, one that would not be up to the job of containing the geopolitical instability which results from its trade war.   A third theory of Trump’s motives views this whole affair as a power play. By holding a gun to the head of both the American and global economies, he forces everyone to come to him with their cap in their hands. Both foreign countries and domestic industries will have to grovel for relief, and to receive it they will be forced to pledge their allegiance to him. In this view, tariffs aren’t really about economics. They’re about building the structures of a more autocratic state, one based on blackmail and coercion rather than consent and trust.   Already, many countries around the world are debating whether to band together to resist Trump or try to cut their own separate deals. The United Kingdom received a lower tariff rate than the EU, which UK ministers are touting as a success.[8]  But trying to negotiate with Trump separately plays into his hands because each country is weaker individually than they would be if they banded together. Such moves are also corrosive of trust between allies and threaten to plunge the world even further into zero-sum thinking.   Which of these three theories best suits events? Given the chaotic nature of policymaking in the Trump administration, there’s likely some truth in all of them. What the administration does next will depend on the reaction of other countries, and of financial markets. By adopting such a maximalist course, Trump has made it more likely that the blowback will be so intense that he will be forced to adjust. But he has also dramatically raised the potential of a global economic catastrophe if he does not.     Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and author of the newsletter America Explained. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   Photograph courtesy of The White House from Washington, DC, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.   [1] The White House, ‘Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits’, April 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and-persistent-annual-united-states-goods-trade-deficits/ [2] Kayla Epstein, ‘Trump's Tariffs on China, EU and more, at a Glance’, BBC News, April 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1jxrnl9xe2o [3] Daniel Flatley and Annmarie Hordern, ‘Bussent Urges Against Reliation, says ‘Wait and See’ on Talks’, Bloomberg, April 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-02/bessent-urges-against-retaliation-says-wait-and-see-on-talks [4] Tony Romm, Ana Swanson and Lazaro Gamio, ‘How Are Trump’s Tariff Rates Calculated?’, The New York Times, April 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/02/business/economy/trump-tariff-rates-calculation.html [5] Daniel Dale, ‘Fact Check: Trump’s False Claims About Tariffs and Trade’, CNN, April 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/02/politics/fact-check-trump-tariffs-trade/index.html [6] Jeff Stein and David J. Lynch, ‘Trump Aides Draft Tariff Plans as some Experts Warn of Economic Damage’, The Washington Post, April 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/04/01/trump-tariffs-draft-recession-projection/ [7] Andrew Gawthorpe, ‘On Tariffs, Trump Resurrects 18th Century Economics’, America Explained, November 2024, https://amerex.substack.com/p/on-tariffs-trump-resurrects-18th [8] Eleni Courea, ‘Why Starmer’s Trade Diplomacy May Still Bear Fruit Despite 10% Tariffs on UK’, BBC News, April 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/apr/02/why-starmers-trade-diplomacy-may-still-bear-fruit-despite-10-tariffs-on-uk [post_title] => What’s Behind Trump’s Upending of the Global Economy? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => whats-behind-trumps-upending-of-the-global-economy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-04-03 13:44:36 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-04-03 12:44:36 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8063 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [14] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8044 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-28 09:46:34 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-28 08:46:34 [post_content] => Three years on from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, John Smith Fellows are focusing on systemic change and are at the forefront of Ukraine’s democratic transformation and recovery.   In 2022, John Smith Fellows were deeply engaged in humanitarian relief – delivering aid to displaced families and coordinating international donations. Today, they are focused on the critical need for long-term solutions.   Fellows now work on legal reform, cultural preservation, emergency response, and community innovation.   Transforming Ukraine through leadership These efforts are vital for Ukraine’s transformation into a resilient and prosperous democracy, guided by the shared principles of justice, human rights, and equality that underpin democratic world.   Their work not only reflects Ukraine’s commitment to aligning with Western institutions but also highlights the critical role of international collaboration in driving sustainable progress.   Their achievements and projects highlighted in the Fellows profiles below, show how international partnerships can play a vital role in Ukraine’s path towards a better future in NATO and the EU.  

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  Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Response Oksana Romanukha: Empowering Ukraine’s first responders As the Ukraine project manager at FIRE AID, Oksana coordinates the delivery of lifesaving firefighting and rescue equipment to the active hostilities zones. Her work directly supports first responders who face immense challenges amid missile strikes, fires, and collapsing buildings.   Why it matters: Emergency services in Ukraine are under overwhelming pressure, with outdated equipment and growing demands due to war-related destruction. Oksana’s efforts are saving lives and maintaining critical infrastructure.   What’s next: Oksana seeks additional international donors and partners to secure more equipment and build the capacity of first responders in the whole war-torn country.   Oksana says: “While Ukraine has surpassed all expectations, we have little to celebrate as the war passes the three years mark. Nobody wants to end this war more than Ukrainians, but we remain determined to end the war on terms that will allow the next generation to live in peace. This will not be possible without continued international support.”  

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  Education and Legal Reform Artem Shaipov: Shaping the future of Ukraine’s legal system Artem is at the forefront of Ukraine’s push for European integration in the field of rule of law. As an international development professional, he supports strengthening the rule of law and transforming Ukraine's legal education system. By aligning it with international and European standards and good practices, Artem aims to empower new generations of legal professionals to uphold democracy and the rule of law.   Artem also works on educating current and future policy professionals so that Ukraine has more people with improved policy implementation skills to address complex development challenges. In collaboration with the Kyiv School of Public Administration, he launched a podcast series, where he and his guests reflect on policy implementation issues in the context of various reforms.   Why it matters: Ukraine’s European integration requires a robust legal framework and legal professionals capable of upholding democracy and ensuring the rule of law. A lack of institutional capacity hampers progress.   Ukraine needs many people capable of implementing system-level changes necessary for Ukraine to withstand Russia’s full-scale war of aggression, recover, and prosper in the future.   What’s next: Artem seeks partnerships with international institutions to enable capacity-building programmes and facilitate experience exchanges. This includes opportunities for learning, and development for policy professionals eager to strengthen their policy implementation skills.   Artem says: “I come from Bakhmut, a once-thriving Ukrainian city that Russia has reduced to ruins and now occupies. I long for the day when my home, along with every other occupied town and village, is freed and rebuilt - a testament to Ukraine’s resilience.”  

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  Human rights and social justice Nataliia Bolshova: Advocating for the rights of alienated children and parents in Ukraine Nataliia is a civil rights advocate and a committed member of The Child Has a Right, a national initiative dedicated to addressing the escalating crisis of parental alienation and child abduction in Ukraine. Her advocacy is both professional and deeply personal – despite multiple court rulings in her favor, Nataliia has been unable to see her daughter for over 4.5 years. This is due to systemic inefficiencies, an outdated family law framework, and limited enforcement of court decisions.   Ukraine’s challenges in protecting the rights of children and parents have been further exacerbated by Russia’s full-scale war of aggression, which has created a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented scale. Millions of children have been displaced, and thousands have been illegally deported to Russia. Within Ukraine, the war has disrupted countless families, with 30% of children who fled Ukraine with one parent losing all contact with the other parent, and 80% of children whose parents serve in the Armed Forces experiencing minimal or no communication with them.   Why this matters: While Russia’s war crimes against Ukrainian children are the root cause of many recent cases of family separation, Ukraine’s family law system is ill-equipped to address the increasing complexities of parental alienation and child abduction. Social services, enforcement agencies, and courts handling family law cases often lack the necessary resources, expertise, and accountability to resolve these issues. This creates a cycle where systemic failures place the burden on alienated children, leading to significant psychological distress. Cases of depression and even suicides among affected children have been documented, underscoring the urgent need for action.   What’s next: Nataliia is seeking international partnerships and resources to address these critical issues. Her vision includes:

1. Advocacy for legislative reform: Collaboration with governments and international organisations to support the drafting and enforcement of family law reforms, ensuring that court decisions are not only issued but also effectively implemented.
2. Training and expertise: Assistance from experts and institutions to design specialised training programmes for Ukrainian social workers, judges, and law enforcement officials, equipping them with the tools to handle cases of parental alienation empathetically and effectively.
3. Support programmes for families: Collaboration with donors and organisations like UNICEF, Eurochild, and the Family Rights Group (UK) to establish comprehensive support systems. These initiatives would include psychological rehabilitation centers for affected children and parents, public awareness campaigns, and legal advocacy programmes.

  Nataliia says: “Three years into Russia’s full-scale war, millions of Ukrainian children have been displaced, thousands abducted, and countless more lost in a broken system. While international attention has rightly focused on Russia’s war crimes against children, another crisis is unfolding: the systemic failures that separate Ukrainian children from their parents, leaving them vulnerable to long-term psychological and social consequences. Protecting children’s rights must be central to Ukraine’s recovery, not an afterthought. The war will end, but without urgent reform, its consequences will last for generations. My mission is clear: to ensure that children’s rights are protected, families are reunited, and systemic reforms create a lasting impact for future generations.”  

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  Community development and innovation Vadim Georgienko: Empowering communities through citizen-led solutions Vadim, co-founder of the Smart Interactions initiative, is revolutionising local governance and community development with the innovative Citizen Token System (CTS). This groundbreaking mechanism empowers citizens to actively participate in decision-making and resource allocation by introducing governance tokens as a tool for transparency and engagement.   CTS has already been successfully piloted in four Ukrainian regions, demonstrating its ability to deliver measurable benefits. By rewarding citizen involvement, the system ensures up to 17.5 times greater social impact compared to traditional methods of humanitarian assistance and economic development. This approach bridges gaps in financial inclusion, strengthens local governance, and fosters trust within communities.   Why it matters: CTS offers a scalable, effective solution for empowering communities, addressing poverty, and improving governance, especially in challenging and rapidly changing environments. By putting citizens at the center, it creates a new standard for participatory governance.   What’s next: Vadim and his team are seeking partners to develop advanced digital tools for CTS and expand its reach across Ukraine and beyond. With your support, CTS can transform how communities in Ukraine and worldwide approach resilience, development, and inclusion.   Vadim says: “The future of Ukraine is interconnected with the future of the democratic world. Now, democracy faces a big problem globally. Why did "traditional" programs to support democracy fail? Without a good analysis of the reasons, I'm not sure that using "traditional" approaches will be successful anymore. On the other hand, I have doubts that respected designers of traditional programmes are able to get out of their habitual bubbles. The world changes rapidly, and rethinking the democratic strategy became a global challenge just yesterday.”    

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  Diplomacy and advocacy Serhii Orlov: Countering disinformation and strengthening Ukraine’s voice in Central Asia As a diplomat based in Tajikistan, Serhii is at the forefront of combating Russian propaganda in Central Asia, a region deeply influenced by Kremlin narratives. In his role as counsellor at the Embassy of Ukraine, Serhii leads efforts to counter disinformation, foster bilateral relations between Ukraine and Tajikistan, and amplify Ukraine’s voice in a region often seen as neutral in Russia’s ongoing full-scale war of aggression in Ukraine.   Serhii’s work goes beyond traditional diplomacy. He collaborates with local media and international partners to deliver truthful narratives and expose the manipulation of information that undermines democratic values. By supporting independent journalism and leveraging innovative media strategies, such as Telegram groups and widely consumed social media platforms, he ensures Ukraine’s perspective reaches broader audiences, particularly in regions vulnerable to disinformation.   Why it matters: Disinformation is one of the most insidious weapons in Russia’s arsenal, destabilising democracies and manipulating public opinion. Central Asia, with its strategic importance and proximity to Russia, is a critical battleground in the fight for truthful narratives. Serhii’s initiatives address this challenge by empowering local media and creating sustainable platforms for unbiased information, ensuring Ukraine’s story is told authentically.   What’s next: Serhii emphasizes the urgent need for more targeted and proactive strategies in collaboration with Ukraine’s Western and Eastern partners. Current approaches, while well-intentioned, often fail to account for the complexities of local dynamics, leading to resources unintentionally benefiting pro-Russian entities. To counter this, Serhii advocates for direct support of objective media projects, innovative outreach strategies, and enhanced funding for platforms that combat disinformation effectively.   By strengthening alliances and fostering local resilience, Serhii’s vision extends beyond Ukraine’s immediate needs – he sees this as part of a global effort to defend democracy, reduce corruption, and promote transparency.   Serhii says: “Impunity always evokes even greater evil. The civilized world must realize that neither a divided Ukraine nor its full conquest will satisfy the aggressor’s appetite. All the states that confront dictatorships now, as well as 'neutral' countries will become targets of hybrid warfare: election interference, support for radical political movements, energy disruptions, stolen databases, assassinations, and sabotage. That’s why we must act together to stop Russia, ensuring its demilitarization and preventing it from threatening global security again.”  

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  Andriy Shevchenko: Uniting the global Ukrainian diaspora against Russian aggression As head of mission in Ukraine for the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC), Andriy is mobilising the 25-million-strong global Ukrainian diaspora to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s full-scale war. Through international advocacy, humanitarian initiatives, and cultural diplomacy, Andriy works to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience and amplify its voice on the world stage.   The UWC, recognized by the UN Economic and Social Council, unites over 100 organisations in nearly 50 countries to support Ukraine’s defenders, advance its Euro-integration, rebuild communities, and promote democratic transformation. Under Andriy’s leadership, the UWC is driving efforts to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty and support its recovery.   Why it matters: The war has demonstrated the critical importance of global solidarity in defending freedom and democratic values.   What’s next: To learn more about UWC’s initiatives, explore ongoing projects, or discover ways to contribute, visit Ukrainian World Congress.  

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  Education and integration for displaced communities Elena Frantskevych: Transforming lives through education and integration Elena is a co-founder of Perlyna, a non-profit center in Riga, Latvia, dedicated to supporting over 100 Ukrainian refugee children daily. The center plays a vital role in ensuring the well-being, education, and integration of children who have faced displacement due to the war in Ukraine.   Why it matters: Elena and Perlyna co-founder Anna address critical challenges for displaced children and their families, including the following:

• Education: Assisting children in continuing their studies in both Ukrainian and Latvian curricula, preserving their academic progress and connection to Ukraine.
• Mental health: Providing psychological support to help children and their parents overcome trauma and stress caused by war.
• Cultural integration: Organising art, music, and sports events to help children integrate into their new communities while maintaining their Ukrainian identity.

  The challenge: The center faces significant obstacles, including inconsistent funding and bureaucratic hurdles in securing grants. These issues limit its ability to sustain and expand its essential programs.   What’s next: Elena is seeking partnerships with international organisations, including UNICEF and the European Union Children's Participation Platform, to secure consistent funding and expand the center’s reach. Additional support from corporate sponsors and charitable foundations can help provide meals, educational resources, and recreational opportunities for children.   Elena says: “Children in war-torn Ukraine face unimaginable vulnerability, with their safety, education, and well-being at constant risk. As the future of the nation, they must be cherished and loved to ensure a better tomorrow. It's our moral duty to support refugee children, providing the care, protection, and opportunities they desperately need to rebuild their lives and secure a brighter future.”  

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  Arts, culture and storytelling Olga Reka: Preserving Ukraine’s cultural identity Through her creative projects, Olga ensures that Ukraine’s cultural narrative is both preserved and reimagined for a global audience. Her recent project, Ukraine and Ukrainians, is a contemporary reissue of Ivan Honchar’s legendary historical-ethnographic art album, brought to life through a collaboration between the Ivan Honchar Museum and Gunia Project, with support from USAID. This edition revisits and expands upon the original work by spotlighting the regions and communities of Ukraine deeply affected by the World Wars, 20th-century technological disasters, and Russia’s ongoing full-scale war of aggression.   Olga’s projects not only document Ukraine’s rich cultural history but also offer a powerful testament to resilience, creativity, and hope in the face of adversity, inspiring global audiences to stand with Ukraine.   Why it matters: Cultural preservation is a cornerstone of Ukraine’s identity and resistance. Olga’s work bridges past and present, offering stories that underscore the strength of the Ukrainian people amidst unimaginable challenges.   What’s next: Olga is seeking funding to further expand her cultural initiatives and to collaborate with international publishers and co-producers, amplifying Ukraine’s voice and cultural heritage on the global stage.   Olga says: “The current war has many dimensions; in addition to the events on the battlefield, it has brought about constant terror from the skies, an information war, and a dramatic reduction in opportunities for entrepreneurship and creativity. However, living through this catastrophe has taught us to adapt and refocus in our search for ideas and models of working.”      

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  Varvara Mishyna: Building bridges through theatre Varvara Mishyna, the CEO of a cross-cultural theatre initiative, uses storytelling as a tool to connect Ukrainian and international audiences. Her performances in Scotland not only bring Ukrainian culture to new communities but also foster understanding and solidarity during one of Ukraine’s darkest times.   Why it matters: Art and culture play a pivotal role in uniting communities and sharing Ukraine’s message with the world. Varvara’s theatre provides a platform for dialogue and empathy.   What’s next: Varvara seeks collaborations with cultural organisations, venues, and donors to expand her initiative’s reach and impact.   Vavara says: “Theatre has become a bridge between cultures, preserving Ukrainian identity and resilience in times of war. Art cannot stop a war, but it ensures that Ukraine’s voice is heard, its culture remains vibrant, and its stories of strength and survival reach the world.”    

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  Transforming Ukraine together These are just some of the stories of Ukrainian John Smith Fellows which showcase their remarkable resilience, talent, and dedication. Their efforts are essential to Ukraine’s survival, recovery, and transformation, as well as to strengthening the global democratic community. These Fellows represent a new generation of leaders ready to collaborate with international partners and drive meaningful change.   How you can help:

• Collaborate: Offer expertise or create joint initiatives to scale their impact.
• Advocate: Share their stories with your networks to amplify their voices.
• Donate: Support specific projects through direct funding or by partnering with the John Smith Trust.

  For further details or to connect with any John Smith Fellows, please contact admin@johnsmithtrust.org.   Together, we can support Ukraine in its journey towards recovery and democracy, reinforcing our shared values and strengthening the global democratic community as we work for fairer, more sustainable and inclusive societies.       Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Three years on: Resilience and leadership - John Smith Fellows shaping Ukraine’s future [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-resilience-and-leadership-john-smith-fellows-shaping-ukraines-future [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-28 09:46:34 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-28 08:46:34 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8044 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8040 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-28 09:33:55 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-28 08:33:55 [post_content] => When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine our immediate priority was to support Ukrainian John Smith Fellows in our network. This included amplifying their humanitarian work, showing solidarity and sharing reliable information from the ground.^[1] Our current and former staff and trustees also leveraged their UK networks to mobilise aid, in-kind donations and helped Fellows and their families to find refuge in the UK.   In the longer term, we have had to rethink how we work. The Trust was established in the 1990s to help emerging leaders in the former Soviet Union navigate an anticipated democratic transition. Thirty years on, the context is very different. Democracy is facing a crisis of trust. Authoritarianism and populism are on the rise. Our world is increasingly fragmented and polarised. We are all facing similar challenges and will be better equipped to tackle them if we work together, listening and learning from each other.   Being a small, independent organisation has allowed us to be agile and responsive. Our strength lies in our networks, built through 30 years of running fellowship programmes for exceptional young leaders from Eastern Europe, Russia, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Staying connected with them gives us the insights we need to develop responsive programmes.   As our Ukrainian Fellows’ focus has evolved over the last three years from immediate humanitarian response to long-term transformation, institutional reforms and sustainable development, so too has our programming as we now focus on supporting the capable leaders within Ukraine who are looking for international partners to help drive change. At the same time, we recognise that Ukrainians have a wealth of expertise – from cyber threats to digital transformation and crisis management to civic activism – that can offer valuable learning for counterparts in the UK and elsewhere.   Through our Ukrainian Women’s Leadership Programme, in partnership with the University of Edinburgh Business School, and through our current Scotland-Ukraine Reconstruction and Recovery Leadership Programme, our focus is on fostering collaborative connections between counterparts in both countries.^[2] By developing and sharing expertise together, we can help ensure Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery is sustainable, fair and inclusive.   As we’ve heard time and time again from our network, “Ukraine’s fight has become everyone’s fight” – and that includes the Russian and Belarusian professionals who have been part of our recent leaders in exile programmes.^[3] Unlike other organisations who have opted to exclude all Russians and Belarusians, as aggressor-state passport holders, from their programmes, we have taken a more nuanced approach: we have developed a separate strand of programming for those exiled leaders who are actively working towards an alternative, peaceful and free future for their countries. We think it is more important than ever to engage with Russians and Belarusians who oppose the war and are committed to a peaceful and democratic future for their countries. Not doing so increases Putin and Lukashenka’s power to silence people opposed to their regimes. These programmes support Fellows to develop the insights and skills needed to build the kinds of societies they want to live in in the future. This includes working on shifts needed to break away from authoritarian, imperialistic and patriarchal mindsets.   After everything that Ukrainians have gone through these last three years, they deserve nothing less than a just peace. In the long term, such a peace will only be sustainable if there are leaders on all sides who are willing to listen and learn from each other, who have the skills to debate and disagree with each other respectfully, who can hold difficult conversations about the past and who are motivated and inspired to imagine alternative ways of doing things. The Trust has a history of facilitating discussions and fostering collaborations with people who sometimes have very different backgrounds and points of view. Through our programmes we are creating connections and hope for a brighter future.     Maija has been the Executive Director of the John Smith Trust since 2020. As Executive Director, Maija is responsible for the overall strategic direction of the John Smith Trust. Maija has been with the John Smith Trust since 2017, first as Director of the Central Asia Fellowship Programme and then as Director of Programmes with added responsibility for the Wider Europe Fellowship Programme. Prior to this, she worked for the UK’s leading international conflict prevention and peacebuilding organisation, focusing on governance, peacebuilding processes, security and civil society sector development. Maija has over 20 years of experience in research, analysis and programme development in complex environments, including working in Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia in education, media and organisational development. She speaks multiple languages and has an MA in Modern History and Russian from the University of St Andrews and an MSc in Development Studies with special reference to Central Asia from the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] John Smith Trust, ‘Ukraine: what our Fellows are doing and how you can help’, 24 May 2022, https://johnsmithtrust.org/ukraine-what-our-fellows-are-doing-and-how-you-can-help/; John Smith Trust, ‘Fellows in Ukraine fight hard for freedom and democracy’, 18 March 2022, https://johnsmithtrust.org/fellows-in-ukraine-fight-hard-for-freedom-and-democracy/; and, John Smith Trust, ‘Ukraine: efforts to tackle the war’s devastating environmental impact’, 17 June 2022, https://johnsmithtrust.org/ukraine-efforts-to-tackle-the-wars-devastating-environmental-impact/ ^[2] John Smith Trust, ‘Launch of new leadership programme for Ukrainian women in UK’, 08 March 2024, https://johnsmithtrust.org/launch-of-new-leadership-programme-for-ukrainian-women-in-uk/; and, John Smith Trust, ‘Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Leadership Programme’, 2025, https://johnsmithtrust.org/applications/fellowships-2024-5/ukraine-recovery-and-reconstrustion-leadership-programme/ ^[3] John Smith Trust, ‘Leaders in Exile: ‘Future of Belarus’ Fellowship’, 2024, https://johnsmithtrust.org/applications/belarus/. [post_title] => Three years on: How the power of networking can contribute to a peaceful and democratic future [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-how-the-power-of-networking-can-contribute-to-a-peaceful-and-democratic-future [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-28 09:33:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-28 08:33:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8040 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [16] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8034 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-27 08:49:18 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-27 07:49:18 [post_content] => The call between President Trump and President Putin on 12 February 2025, left millions of Ukrainians in a state of silent disbelief, shock, and even grief. Along with the comments of US Secretary of Defense Hegseth at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group the same day, it gives us a rather clear frame for the future negotiations, which will define the destiny of Ukraine, Europe – and the whole world.^[1]   Let me stress the conceptual faults of the intended outcome called ‘peace’. So what does peace really mean and what is missing in a contemporary high level discussion about it?   Peace is when war does not happen again. But the reasons for the Russian-Ukrainian war have not been resolved. Putin did not reverse his vision of the Russian world. Russia did not recognise Ukraine’s right to exist and to join NATO. Crimea and part of Donbas are not given back, and the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions are not excluded from the Russian constitution.   Europe cannot deter Russia alone There is no power balance. The USA is openly declaring that it is leaving European security to the Europeans, denying help to Ukraine to secure its future. NATO membership for Ukraine or any NATO commitment is not happening: no one is risking war to defend Ukraine. Conversely, getting a ‘neutral’ Ukraine fully ready – with massive anti-ballistic missile defense, long-range strike capability, matching air force and fleet, and artillery power – is not on the table either.   Europe cannot deter Russia alone, neither by nuclear, conventional, or hybrid means. Regional powers like the UK or France will not tackle emboldened Russia strengthened by the global network of allies. And prosperity without security – Ukraine’s potential EU membership in the coming decade – is not going to bring investment, development, and reconstruction, because war will come again.   Putin gets ‘neutral’ Ukraine with no security guarantees and shuts us out of NATO. He achieved all his war aims but the change of regime in Kyiv and full control over the rest of the Ukrainian territory (this can wait a bit, and be delivered either through political warfare or during his next stage of aggression).   Democracy and human rights are becoming irrelevant Peace is when there is justice and dignity. But instead of this the perpetrator is being equalised with the victim in intent, actions, consequences – and moral posture. The aggressor is to be rewarded. International law, along with the values of sovereignty, democracy and human rights are being made irrelevant.   Evidence of genocidal intent is ongoing – Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian identity is being erased in the occupied territories. Rape and mass murders stay unpunished, and arrests and tortures continue as we read this text. Mass mobilisation in the occupied territories is ongoing, and these Ukrainians will be killed in battles against their own.   Irresponsibility for war crimes – be it mass murders, replacement of population, deeming civilians as ‘cannon fodder’, use of chemical weapons, weaponization of frost and hunger – will solidify them as legitimate and efficient means of war.   Denying Ukraine EU membership will be next Peace is when there is freedom. Ukraine’s war for independence is being devalued into ‘something that should never have happened’. Its heroes will become victims. Those remembering our victories might be labelled radicals, nationalists and war-mongers.   Future elections in Ukraine may become an opposite of itself: an orgy of psychological warfare, toxic social networks and political AI manipulations, massive Russian interference, including terror unconstrained by any moral or legal rules. Much cheaper, much more deniable, and extremely efficient.   Putin continues to deny Ukraine’s access to NATO. The predator will not release its prey.   Is the USA really backing Russia? Peace should be sustainable. This current framing of peace is not. Setting the precedent of the legalised partitioning of Ukraine will next invite the redrawing of borders in Africa, Latin America, Asia – and in Europe. The example of nuclear disarmament of Ukraine will set the precedent for generations; anything short of nuclear weapons in stock will invite aggression.   Sacrificing Ukraine for avoiding nuclear conflict and for stopping active combat will simply delay the next act. All of this is prolonging Russia’s agony for the next wars to come, instead of finishing the collapse of the USSR and Russian empire. Is the West, and specifically the USA, backing Russia again?   President Trump potentially standing in Moscow next to Putin for his own “victory-against-Ukraine” parade on 9 May is not peace. It looks like the new ‘Yalta accords’, discussing Ukraine’s forced submission and disengagement rules in a Russia-created reality – and the next war coming very soon.^[2]     Ostap Kryvdyk is the Chair of the Ukrainian Strategic Initiative for the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Ukraine and is also a Fellow for the John Smith Trust.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] Pete Hegseth, ‘’Opening Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defense Contact Group (As Delivered)’, US Department of Defense, 12 February 2025, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4064113/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-at-ukraine-defense-contact/ ^[2] Department of State, United States of America, ‘The Yalta Conference, 1945’, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/yalta-conf [post_title] => Three years on: What peace should be [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-what-peace-should-be [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-27 13:29:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-27 12:29:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8034 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8012 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-26 09:00:29 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-26 08:00:29 [post_content] => Every war is a war against children. However, in its war in Ukraine, the Russian Government has specifically targeted children as a tool to disrupt Ukrainian communities, and secure long-term dominance in the region – pursuing a cruel and systematic policy of forcibly separating tens of thousands of Ukrainian children from their families and deporting them to Russia or Belarus.^[1]   As of 19 February 2025, Children of War reports that 19,546 children have been forcibly deported in this manner, and only 388 returned to Ukraine, while 596 are known to have died. According to the National Police of Ukraine, 2057 are still missing.^[2]   Some children have been placed in Russian foster and adoptive families and given Russian nationality.  More than 6,000 have been transferred to “filtration” and “re-education camps” where they are interrogated, and later, “integrated” and receive a “patriotic education.”^[3]   International human rights law (IHRL) does protect children in conflict. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, which both Russia (1990) and Ukraine (1991) have ratified, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR), for example, prohibit the forcible separation and displacement of children.^[4] The fact that Russia ceased to be party to the ECHR in September 2022, six months after its exclusion from the Council of Europe, is perhaps a reminder, however, of the limited reach of IHRL in conflict situations.^[5]   International humanitarian law (IHL) also recognises children as particularly vulnerable during conflict. Under Geneva Convention IV, and Additional Protocol 1, they are recognised as “protected persons” who should be respected, protected and cared for.^[6] The Geneva Conventions prohibit forcible deportation of civilians, including children; and where evacuation is necessary, protect family unity, require state parties to identify and register separated children, and closely regulate the evacuation of children to other states.^[7] Crucially, changing the personal or family status, including nationality or civil status, of children of war is prohibited.^[8]   Finally, Russia’s program of child deportation may also constitute a war crime. On 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights, who it holds to be allegedly responsible for the “war crimes of unlawful deportation and transfer of [children] from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.”^[9]   So, what does this mean for the future, and specifically, for the protection, return, and reintegration of the tens of thousands of Ukrainian children who have been victims of Russia’s cynical program of “renationalisation”?   It is clear that progress in rectifying these violations has been painfully slow and despite the strong prohibitions in IHRL and IHL, as well as in the intervention of the ICC, there is at present, no real prospect of change on the horizon for Ukrainian children who have been systematically abducted by the Russian state – at least not until peace is negotiated in the region.   On that day, let us hope that the fate of Ukraine’s missing children is brought to the fore of the negotiations between the state parties, and their return, reunification with their families and reintegration into Ukrainian society is prioritised. They are, after all, an important part of Ukraine’s history of this conflict and to its future.     Jen Ang is Founding Director of Lawmanity, a project that aims to tackle inequalities in the law by working with people-led movements to secure positive change. She is an experienced human rights lawyer and activist, qualified to practice in Scotland, England and Wales, and New York State. She is a legal expert on immigration and asylum, violence against women and girls, children’s rights, and on the rights of survivors of torture and trafficking. She is also a Professor in Practice at the University of Glasgow, and believes in making legal education open and accessible to all.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou, ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Forcibly displaced Ukrainian children’, European Parliamentary Research Service: Brussels, February 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/747093/EPRS_BRI(2023)747093_EN.pdf ^[2] National Information Bureau of Ukraine Children of War, 2025,  https://childrenofwar.gov.ua/en,  Accessed on 19 February 2025. ^[3] Yale School of Public Health researchers identified 43 facilities in Russia responsible for systematically re-educating at least 6,000 children, but this is considered to be a conservative estimate.  See further, Khoshnood, Kaveh, Nathaniel A. Raymond and Caitlin N. Howarth et al., ‘Russia’s Systematic Program for the Re-education and Adoption of Ukraine’s Children’, Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health: New Haven, 14 February 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/humanitarian-research-lab-yale-school-public-health-russias-systematic-program-re-education-adoption-ukraines-children-enruuk ^[4] OHCHR, UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies database, Accessed on 19 February 2025, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?Treaty=CRC&Lang=en ^[5] Council of Europe, ‘Russia ceases to be a party to the European Convention on Human Rights on 16 September 2022’, 23 March 2022, https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/russia-ceases-to-be-a-party-to-the-european-convention-of-human-rights-on-16-september-2022 ^[6] Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol 1, Article 77, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-77 ^[7] Geneva Convention IV, Article 49, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-49 ^[8] Geneva Convention IV, Article 50, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-50 ^[9] International Criminal Court, ‘Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova’, 17 March 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and [post_title] => Three years on: Russia’s War on Ukraine’s Forcibly Displaced Children [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-russias-war-on-ukraines-forcibly-displaced-children [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-26 09:36:01 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-26 08:36:01 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8012 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8016 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-26 09:00:18 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-26 08:00:18 [post_content] => Right now, thousands of Ukrainian children do not know if their parents are alive. Tens of thousands have been taken to Russia, while hundreds of thousands have been lost in a broken system.   Three years into Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the world has witnessed the forced displacement of millions of Ukrainians, the abduction of thousands of children, and the fragmentation of families on a devastating scale. While international attention has rightly focused on Russia’s war crimes and mass deportations, a parallel crisis is unfolding – one that is less visible but just as devastating: the growing number of Ukrainian children permanently separated from their parents not by missiles, but by a fractured legal system, wartime displacement, and institutional inaction.   The scale of the crisis The numbers tell a tragic story. More than 2.5 million Ukrainian children have been displaced – many evacuated abroad for safety, others left behind while their parents serve in the Armed Forces.[1]   We know that 30% of children who fled Ukraine with one parent have lost all contact with the other parent who remains in Ukraine.[2]   Meanwhile, 80% of children whose parents serve in the Armed Forces have little or no communication with them.[3]   For more than 20,000 Ukrainian orphans and children who lost their parents in the war the heartbreak did not end there. They have been illegally deported to Russia, where efforts to repatriate them have stalled for three years. Many of those abducted before 2014 have already turned 18 and have been forcibly conscripted into the Russian army to fight against Ukraine.   These are not just numbers – these are children whose futures are being erased.   This problem extends beyond Ukraine’s borders. The breakdown of family ties slows the return of refugees, erodes trust in legal institutions, and weakens post-war recovery.   A system unprepared to reunite families Ukraine’s legal and social systems were never designed to handle the scale of parental separation caused by war. Cases of parental abduction and alienation existed before the invasion, but the war has multiplied their complexity.   Ukraine’s civil courts, law enforcement agencies, and social services do process these cases, but:

• There is no unified system ensuring the protection of children’s rights and the enforcement of court rulings.
• Corruption and bureaucratic inertia often render court decisions unenforceable.
• Family court proceedings can take 2-4 years, by which time a child’s relationship with the alienated parent may already be irreparably damaged.

  The burden of these systemic failures falls entirely on the children. Many suffer profound psychological distress, including anxiety, depression, and, tragically, even suicide.   While these are humanitarian tragedies today, they also pose a long-term challenge for Ukraine’s recovery, demographic stability, and national security.   Without urgent reform, Ukraine risks losing an entire generation.   What needs to happen next Protecting children’s rights must be a core pillar of Ukraine’s recovery and European integration process. This is not just a moral obligation – it is essential for social stability, national resilience, and Ukraine’s credibility as a democratic state.   Legislative reform and diplomatic engagement The UK and European partners can play a key role in advocating for urgent reforms in Ukraine’s family law system, ensuring alignment with European human rights standards. International legal expertise and diplomatic support can help ensure that these reforms lead to enforceable protections, not just symbolic commitments.   At the same time, strengthening Ukraine’s legal and social institutions and expanding support programmes for affected children and families is critical to delivering real change.   A generation at risk Ukraine is fighting for its land, but it must also fight for the generation that will rebuild it.   If we do not act today, Ukraine risks losing not just territory, but its future.   The international community has provided weapons, economic aid, and humanitarian assistance. Now, it must help protect Ukraine’s most vulnerable citizens: its children.     Nataliia is a John Smith Trust Fellow civil rights advocate as well as a committed member of The Child Has a Right, a national initiative dedicated to addressing the escalating crisis of parental alienation and child abduction in Ukraine. Her advocacy is both professional and deeply personal – despite multiple court rulings in her favor, Nataliia has been unable to see her daughter for over 4.5 years. This is due to systemic inefficiencies, an outdated family law framework, and limited enforcement of court decisions.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     [1] United Nations, ‘Two million refugee children flee war in Ukraine in search of safety across borders’, Press Release, UNICEF, 30 March 2022, https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/two-million-refugee-children-flee-war-ukraine-search-safety-across-borders [2] Obudsman, ‘deportation of ukrainian children is genocide!’, Ukraine Government, 13 September 2024, https://ombudsman.gov.ua/storage/app/media/uploaded-files/UPF%204.pdf [3] Maksym Savchuk, ‘From the "Youth Army" to the front: how Russia prepares Ukrainian children under occupation for war against their own country’, Radio Svoboda, 16 November 2024, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/skhemy-ukrayinski-dity-yunarmiya-viyna/33203644.html [post_title] => Three years on: Ukraine’s stolen children – the silent crisis that threatens the future [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-ukraines-stolen-children-the-silent-crisis-that-threatens-the-future [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-26 09:26:07 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-26 08:26:07 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8016 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7999 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-25 09:14:32 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-25 08:14:32 [post_content] => In the past few weeks, Europe has been hit with a series of shocks. Firstly, the Trump administration has threatened military force to take control of Greenland, the territory of NATO ally Denmark. Secondly, it began direct talks with Russia over the future of the European security order. Thirdly, the administration escalated its aggressive rhetoric against the European political establishment, with Vice President J.D. Vance suggesting that the Trump administration would rather deal with parties of the far right.^[1]   These three issues cannot be separated from one another. Trump views the war in Ukraine as just one part of a bigger picture. He wants to drastically improve US relations with Russia while forcing Europe into a subordinate position. His goal is to make European countries directly serve the interests of the United States, be it by spending more on their own defence, buying more US goods and services, and even proffering up territory which Washington regards as strategically important.   Viewed from this standpoint, the war in Ukraine looks to Trump like an unnecessary irritant. Its continuation harms US relations with Russia while also compelling the United States to dedicate large amounts of resources to European defence. Caring little for Ukraine itself, Trump would rather end the war speedily by making concessions to Russia – and then move onto bigger issues.   Chief among those issues is the long-term future of the European security order. Russia is making demands similar to those that it made at the outset of the war in 2022, including the withdrawal of US troops from NATO’s eastern border and the recognition of a Russian sphere of influence in its near abroad.^[2] For European officials, this idea is terrifyingly compatible with Trump’s own desire to spend fewer American resources ensuring the security of Europe. They fear concessions to Russia on this issue even more than concessions regarding Ukraine itself.^[3]   What happens next for Ukraine is  vitally important, not only first of all for the Ukrainian people, but also because it will create the framework in which Europe and Russia must coexist in the years ahead. It seems likely that Ukraine will be forced to give up much of the territory captured by Russia and to forswear any short-term ambitions to join NATO – points that even the Biden administration were willing to concede.^[4] What is still open to question is whether and to what extent the country will receive credible security guarantees against renewed Russian aggression. Yet given that the US has said it will not give any such guarantee, and that European countries lack the means to enforce one, the future looks bleak for Kyiv.   Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s broader attack on the European political establishment looks set to continue. Trump sees the world as split into spheres of influence in which great powers have the right to coerce and even conquer weaker countries. A Trump administration which is threatening military force to seize Greenland is one which sees Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine as something to emulate, not something to be stopped.   Confronting hostile superpowers to both their east and west, European leaders are faced with their greatest crisis since World War II. This crisis is not just about Ukraine, but the apparent end of the conditions that have made Europe peaceful and prosperous for many decades. It will take a great leap of imagination and concerted political will to find a way out.     Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] J.D. Vance, ‘JD Vance’s Full Speech on the Fall of Europe’, The Spectator, February 2025, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/jd-vance-what-i-worry-about-is-the-threat-from-within/. ^[2] ‘Kremlin says Ukraine Settlement ‘Impossible’ without Addressing Wider Security Issues’, The Kyiv Post, , February 2025, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/47337. ^[3] ‘Donald Trump Opens the Door to Vladimir Putin’s Grandest Ambitions’, The Financial Times, February 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/2bf263a0-9768-4049-8f7d-239940a49efb. ^[4] Andrew Gawthorpe, ‘The Black Hole at the Heart of America’s Ukraine Strategy’, Atlantische Perspectief, November 2024, https://www.atlcom.nl/artikel-atlantisch-perspectief/the-black-hole-at-the-center-of-americas-ukraine-strategy/. [post_title] => Three years on: The impact of Trump 2.0 on the war in Ukraine [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-the-impact-of-trump-2-0-on-the-war-in-ukraine [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-26 09:30:39 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-26 08:30:39 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7999 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [20] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7982 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-24 09:04:25 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-24 08:04:25 [post_content] => On the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the world continues to witness the resilience of the Ukrainian people. Among them, journalists stand on the frontlines of an information war, risking their lives to ensure the truth is heard. Today, I want to highlight the extraordinary courage of Ukrainian journalists, particularly those working in the most dangerous areas—our local newspapers in the frontline and de-occupied territories.   The war has not only destroyed cities and taken lives but has also created an information vacuum in many regions. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians living near the frontlines or in recently liberated areas are cut off from reliable news sources. Electricity and communication networks are often destroyed, leaving people isolated and vulnerable to Russian propaganda. In these areas, local newspapers have become a lifeline, providing not only news but also a sense of connection and hope.   The National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU), together with international partners, has worked tirelessly to support these vital publications. Over the past two years, we have helped revive 32 local newspapers in regions like Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Sumy and Kharkiv. These newspapers are often the only source of verified information for communities under constant threat.   One such example is the story of Vasyl Myroshnyk, the editor of a newspaper in Zolochiv, Kharkiv region. His weekly journey to deliver newspapers has been called “the most dangerous newspaper route in the world” by British journalists. Despite constant shelling and the threat of drone attacks, Vasyl drives hundreds of kilometers to ensure his readers receive their papers. “In wartime, people need news more than ever,” he says. His dedication is a testament to the unbreakable spirit of Ukrainian journalists.   Similarly, Oleksiy Pasyuha, editor of the Vorskla newspaper in Sumy region, continues to deliver newspapers to the few remaining residents of a border village near Russia. His weekly route is fraught with danger, but he persists, knowing that for many, his newspaper is the only connection to the outside world. “Even if only five people remain here, I will stay,” says a local shopkeeper in one of the villages he serves.   These stories are not just about delivering news; they are about preserving humanity in the face of unimaginable hardship. Local newspapers provide a sense of normalcy and continuity, reminding people that they are not forgotten. They are a symbol of resistance against the Russian aggression that seeks to erase Ukrainian identity and culture. However, the challenges are immense. Many local newspapers struggle to survive due to a lack of funding and resources. International support, which has been crucial in keeping these publications alive, is now dwindling as the war drags on. The economic devastation caused by the conflict makes it nearly impossible for these newspapers to sustain themselves without external help.   The NUJU has also established six Journalists’ Solidarity Centers across Ukraine, providing journalists with protective equipment, workspace, and psychological support. These centers have become a refuge for hundreds of journalists, both Ukrainian and international, who risk their lives to document the truth.   As the war enters its fourth year, the world must not forget the importance of supporting Ukrainian journalism. The work of our journalists is not just about reporting the news; it is about defending democracy and truth in the face of tyranny. Every newspaper delivered, every story published, is a small victory in the information war.   To our international partners and colleagues, we extend our deepest gratitude. Your solidarity has been a source of strength for us. But the fight is far from over. We urge the global community to continue supporting Ukrainian media, especially local newspapers in frontline areas. They are not just newspapers; they are beacons of hope and resilience.   In the words of Richard Pendlebury, a British journalist who documented Vasyl Myroshnyk’s journey, “The bravery and resilience of Ukrainian journalists should be an inspiration to everyone in our profession.” Indeed, their courage reminds us why journalism matters, especially in times of war.   As we mark this somber anniversary, let us remember that the fight for truth is as important as the fight on the battlefield. Support Ukraine. Support Ukrainian journalists. Because journalists are important.   Postscript: Recently, NUJU convened an international conference that brought together over 130 participants, including leading global press freedom organizations like the Committee to Protect Journalists, European Federation of Journalists, International Press Institute, and Global Forum for Media Development. The resulting Resolution outlines urgent measures needed to support journalists in frontline regions, where they face not only physical threats but also a severe financial crisis due to the war's economic impact. The document particularly emphasizes the need for emergency funding for local newspapers that maintain crucial information links with their communities, often being the only source of reliable information in areas with limited internet access and electricity. The Resolution also highlights the pressing issue of Ukrainian journalists held captive by Russia, calling for increased international pressure for their release and investigation of crimes against media workers. You can read the full Resolution here: https://nuju.org.ua/standing-with-ukraine-s-media-and-journalists-a-resolution-for-safety-support-and-solidarity/     Sergiy Tomilenko is the President of the National Union of journalists of Ukraine.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   [post_title] => Three years on: The Unyielding Spirit of Ukrainian Journalism [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-the-unyielding-spirit-of-ukrainian-journalism [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-24 09:04:25 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-24 08:04:25 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7982 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7976 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-24 09:04:18 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-24 08:04:18 [post_content] => There was a famous saying that all roads lead to Rome. Now they are leading to Kyiv, in all senses: geopolitical, geo-economic, value-based and rule-based order or at least in the attempt to preserve the rules-based global order.   Despite all the challenges, Ukraine proves to continue functioning, fighting on the ground, having offensive operations and reforming itself. It seems surreal but very much true despite the evidence that in the last two weeks the world order as we knew it has come to an end. The system once based on rules, agreements, and shared values has been under a tsunami of geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges. It was never perfect, but it functioned. Now, its whole existence is under question.   All signs suggest that the United States is disengaging geopolitically from Europe. This growing transatlantic divide was particularly evident at the Munich Security Conference, where the rift proved not only deep but also fundamentally rooted in diverging values.   Moreover, European leaders found themselves directly challenged by US Vice President J.D. Vance, further amplifying the sense of uncertainty. This moment of shock should serve as a wake-up call for Europe, prompting a reassessment of its strategic autonomy and global role.   So, why do all eyes still need to be on Ukraine? Ukraine continues to prove that it can resist multiple challenges as well as reinvent itself in terms of innovations. Whether it is about the successful usage of naval drones, joint production lines in Ukraine under the “Danish model” or some other efforts to produce various unmanned aerial systems, it proves that it is more efficient to use advanced military technologies and localise production. [1]   Ukraine is nearing completion of the roadmaps required to open the first negotiation cluster in its EU accession process. The European Commission’s screening report is almost finalised; however, Hungary is delaying its approval.   A negotiation framework is already in place, containing multiple safeguards that allow for the suspension of the negotiation process if necessary. Ukraine anticipates the official launch of the first negotiation cluster in April or May. Moreover, the government has stated its ambition to open all negotiation clusters by the end of this year. It is important to emphasise that the negotiation process is not merely a technocratic or bureaucratic exercise. While technical compliance plays a significant role, the process is highly influenced by the political situation within the candidate country.   However, the beginning of the 2025 shapes new waves of Russia’s aggression that has hastened the emergence of a multipolar world, undermined global security, and exposed critical vulnerabilities in the West’s strategic posture. The trajectory is clear: if left unchecked, the war risks escalating into a broader European conflict by 2030, with the prospect of a global confrontation no longer beyond consideration.   Ukraine knows with its history and present resilience that Putin’s demands—whether concerning territory, neutrality, elections, or other conditions—are ultimately irrelevant. These demands merely reflect Russia’s true objectives: to assert control over Ukraine and compel the US and NATO to compromise their principles and interests in favor of a global order that serves Russia’s strategic ambitions.   The US must eliminate any hope Putin may have of achieving these goals—whether through military means or a so-called "peaceful" agreement. This war can only end when Russia understands it cannot secure victory either on the battlefield or through diplomatic manipulation.   The Alliance must seriously reassess its strategic options, including the deployment of ground forces, if Russia’s continued unwillingness to compromise—coupled with Ukraine’s increasing manpower shortages due to the "too little, too late" policy—brings Moscow closer to restoring its former sphere of influence.   Drawing on extensive fieldwork conducted across the Black Sea region, the US in 2025 has multiple avenues to bolster its strategic presence and regional stability. Key initiatives might include strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank through targeted force deployments, expanded arms sales, and increased defense investments to reinforce deterrence against Russian aggression, fostering “minilateral” cooperation—flexible, issue-driven alliances—among regional partners, particularly with Ukraine, to enhance interoperability and security coordination; securing and supporting regional connectivity initiatives that bypass Russian influence, reinforcing economic resilience and strategic independence for Black Sea nations.   This shift in US priorities underscores the urgent need for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own defense—not as a matter of political convenience, but as an imperative for long-term security and stability.   Given the shifting security landscape, investments in Ukraine’s defense industry, joint production ventures, and military innovation are essential. After nearly three years of war, Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable resilience, now producing over a third of its battlefield weaponry through domestic innovation.   Strengthening Ukraine’s defense industrial base not only enhances its self-sufficiency in warfare but also fosters long-term partnerships with Western defense sectors. By expanding joint production efforts, allied nations can bolster Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities while also reinforcing Europe’s broader security framework.   Russia, along with its allies, must not be underestimated as a destabilizing force in European security for at least the next decade. Its offensive strategies—combining hard and soft power with hybrid tactics—pose a persistent challenge that demands serious, sustained, and adaptive containment efforts.   As Winston Churchill once warned, “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile—hoping it will eat him last.” Failing to confront Russian aggression today will only embolden further destabilization tomorrow.   In this defining moment, Ukraine’s fight is Europe’s fight—and Europe’s security is the world’s security.         Dr. Victoria Vdovychenko is a widely recognized and published expert on the issues of hybrid warfare, strategic communication, with particular emphasis on relations between Ukraine and the European Union as well as NATO. She is working on the challenges of the European Union, Euro-Atlantic integration, hybrid warfare, strategic communication collaborating with such educational institutions as University of Bologna, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, KU Leuven, University Catholic Louvain, Cambridge University. Victoria is currently a Visiting Fellow within the British Academy and a co-lead of the Future of Ukraine Program at the Centre for Geopolitics, University of Cambridge.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre       [1] Ukraine and Denmark summarised the results of cooperation under the ‘Danish Model’ of support for the Ukrainian defense industry in 2024. Through this initiative, the Armed Forces of Ukraine received weapons valued at nearly EUR 538 million. https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/results-of-the-danish-model-of-support-for-ukraine-s-defense-industry-in-2024-the-armed-forces-of-ukraine-received-weapons-valued-at-nearly-538-million [post_title] => Three Years On: Why all eyes still need to be on Ukraine [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-why-all-eyes-still-need-to-be-on-ukraine [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-24 10:53:15 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-24 09:53:15 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7976 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [22] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7970 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-24 09:04:02 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-24 08:04:02 [post_content] => 85 years ago, in December 1940, Franklin Roosevelt described the US as the ‘great arsenal of democracy’ in a broadcast made less than a year before the country decisively entered the war against fascism in Europe. That ushered in almost a century where the US could be relied on by European allies.   That security blanket led to complacency and an over reliance on the US by European leaders. The first Trump Presidency and shift in public attitudes towards European security in the US was seen as a blip, but few can have that excuse anymore.   The dangers of these attitudes have been most apparent when it comes to dealing with the threat from the Kremlin. More than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 11 years after the war started and a quarter century after Putin came to power, we Europeans are still not taking our collective security seriously enough.   For too many democracies in Western Europe, there has not been the same urgency in dealing with our security as you will find among those bordering Russia. Leadership has shifted away from the old axis of Paris, Berlin and London and has instead come from Warsaw, Tallinn and Helsinki. Although Europe’s democracies have responded with support to Ukraine it has been nowhere near the scale that was needed. It should be a source of shame that North Korea has been able to provide more support to Russia than many European countries have to Ukraine.   That needs to change. Europe needs to step up and take responsibility for its own security. For three long years, and the eight years before then, Ukrainians have defended their fellow Europeans, far too often underequipped and under-resourced as we bicker at home.   This has shown up the weaknesses of the traditional European powers with the rise of the right in France, Germany’s failure to take its security responsibilities seriously and the UK’s indulgent act of self-harm with Brexit holding the rest of Europe back.   The time for complacency was over three years ago and the need for greater European self-reliance on security is now urgent. In supporting Ukraine we support ourselves. It’s time to invest in the defence of European democracy again and a more integrated approach to European defence and security.     Stephen Gethins MP is a member of the Foreign Policy Centre's Political Council   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   [post_title] => Three years on: An end to Europe’s Complacency is Urgent [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-an-end-to-europes-complacency-is-urgent [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-24 09:50:07 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-24 08:50:07 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7970 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [23] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7906 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-04 10:18:21 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-04 09:18:21 [post_content] => The rapid disintegration of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad stunned observers. Forces from Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army and Syrian Free Army converged on Damascus on 8 December 2024, sealing the fall of Ba’athist forces which had ruled Syria since 1971. Eleanor Nott, founder of a development NGO and PhD candidate at King’s College London, travelled to Syria to visit civil society leaders and assess the state of the health system.     Syria, January 2025 We landed early in Beirut and the rising sun illuminated our drive through the mountains to the Jdedeh border crossing into Syria.   The Lebanese border was the familiar experience of uniformed staff checking papers in buildings adorned with the flags of their nation. What I encountered on the other side was different and the first sight of a nation in a state of rebirth. On the first stretch of the road to Damascus, we saw an abandoned checkpoint painted in the faded livery of the fallen regime. Shreds hung where a portrait of former President Bashar al-Assad, the first of many, once looked down. The sheer number of images of Assad and his father, Hafez, was remarkable. On buildings, Bashar’s cold-eyed stare gazed down from posters and in paint, at the entrance to towns, along highways, made of tiles or carved into stone, Assad – both senior and junior – have had their images smashed, torn or scratched out. Bashar in military fatigues; perhaps the final sight of the outside world seen by those entering one of the many notorious mukharbarat sites in Damascus. The footage of liberated Sednaya prison has revealed to the world the torture and degradation meted out by the regime in its cells.   At the Jdedeh crossing there were no uniforms, just a quiet industriousness which set the tone for my forthcoming encounters. A man walked in and proclaimed ‘good morning, welcome to free Syria.’ The men behind the desks asked questions about who I was here to see, wrote things on a piece of paper with biro, conversed among themselves and eventually handed me a form to complete.   In Damascus’ Umayyad Square, the setting for scenes of jubilation in early December as the regime melted away, the tri-star free Syrian flag was draped from buildings and flashed in the windows of passing cars. A group of people were digging up the grass on the roundabout and planting shrubs and flowers. The lobby of the Sheraton hotel was full of activity, the obligatory NGO and UN white Land Cruisers crouched in the car park.   Crossing a bridge to eastern Ghouta, a short drive from the Assads’ palace on the hill and smart international hotels, ranges of shattered apartment blocks loomed in the near distance. This was the scene of the first chemical attack launched by the regime in 2013, when it was on the edge of defeat. American and British red lines evaporated and with a Russian diplomatic sleight of hand, the regime agreed to surrender its chemical weapons - only for them to be used on dozens of further occasions.[1]   The new head of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), Dr Hazem Bakleh, served the organisation for decades before resigning in disgust at the corruption he witnessed, an act which marked him out as a transgressor in the cult of Assad. His predecessor had a security buzzer fitted to control entry to his office but Bakleh operates an open door policy with his team, something he considers vital and in the spirit of the new Syria. Since 2016 the President of the SARC had been Khaled Hboubati - an Assad associate . As Hboubati’s business interests in dried apricots suffered due to the conflict, he was rewarded with a government contract to formalise the Khirbet Ghazaleh crossing in Deraa.   The scale of corruption in Syria has been breathtaking and the aid sector was not exempt from the efforts of the regime to co-opt all resources entering the state. Once the conflict started, a key mechanism for monitoring and controlling the activities of humanitarian agencies within the country was the insistence that aid organisations partner with the SARC. SARC’s role was as a gatekeeper and coordinator of all humanitarian actors in Syria, domestic and international. It was the lead implementing partner of the UN. The inadequacy of the SARC-administered cross-line operations from Damascus into opposition-controlled areas was a spur for UN Security Council Resolution 2165 which authorised cross-border operations in 2014; allowing aid to enter opposition enclaves from Jordan, Iraq and Turkey.   The SARC’s brand is a tarnished one and its new chief is keen to restore trust among both the Syrian people and international donors. Dr Bakleh describes how he instructed the contents of a recent planeload of food aid from the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center, the humanitarian arm of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to be delivered directly to local distribution points, bypassing SARC’s warehouses, to demonstrate the new era of transparency. This was a response to past SARC activity when some staff used to divide the packages in the quiet of the warehouse and sell the high value items on the black market for profit.   In Homs, the consequences of corruption for the health system are apparent. I am told how the cost of a CT scanner would double, from delivery at the airport to arrival at the hospital, as bribes inflated the price in transit, from the government department through the local intelligence branch to a hospital. Hospital authorities are struggling to settle an unpaid bill left over from old times, some $16,000 and counting. The medical electronics company gave up waiting for payment and no longer maintains the scanner, which sits idle.   I have lunch with a group of doctors who tell me about the patient who was hauled off the operating table by the mukhabarat, the surgeon begging to be able to at least stitch closed the open abdomen.[2] One of them says that when the regime was in power, permission would need to be sought for such a gathering as ours - of ten or more people - from the local police. My host has returned to a family home he left fourteen years ago, happy to find it still standing. Many are not, some 60% of Homs’ residential areas bombed by barrels from helicopters or missile payloads courtesy of the Russian air force.[3] Among the casualties was also the Amal hospital, bombed in 2012 and its flattened buildings still standing in ruins today.[4] The ruins of smashed neighbourhoods were left as a reminder of the fate of those who challenged the regime.   Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) estimate more than 949 healthcare workers have been killed directly during the conflict, with more than 92 percent killed by the Syrian government and its allies.[5] The assault on health is one of the most striking features of the Syrian conflict. One of the most authoritative investigations was the Lancet-American University of Beirut Commission on Syria which used the term ‘weaponisation’ to describe the strategy of violently depriving people of healthcare they need at the cost of hundreds of healthcare workers killed, incarcerated or tortured and scores of healthcare facilities attacked.[6] In addition to denying wounded civilians’ impartial medical treatment, PHR reported about the invasion, attack and misuse of hospitals, impediment and attack of medical transport and detention and torture of doctors.   The new head of the Homs Health Directorate is from Idlib, the quasi-state from which Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched its lightning offensive in November. The doctor did not know what to expect when he returned home to Homs. To his surprise the standard of healthcare provision he found in government areas was inferior to that in the northwest.   The health system, among other services, in the northwest has been sustained by a range of Syrian charitable and governance organisations. Many were established in the wake of the revolution with strong support from the Syrian diaspora in the Gulf, North America, Europe and the UK. These organisations were able to sustain the functions of the state in the absence of the Damascus government. Financial resources were often modest but well-managed and high standards of probity applied to governance.   The new government faces huge economic, political, and security challenges. HTS has demonstrated itself to be a disciplined force, stopping looting and thus far maintaining its commitment to protecting rights of minorities. In Homs and Damascus, I visited churches where worshippers were attending Mass and the Divine Liturgy as usual. In Homs, a queue snaked around the block of former security personnel handing in their weapons and military identity cards, an early Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) move. There will be a temptation to centralise management and coordination of services. In many of my conversations there was a sense that the civil society activity that sustained the northwest was only for the emergency period and that the right leadership body is central and local government. This would represent a blow to those who strove tirelessly to maintain vital services and whose talents Syria will need to restore the national fabric. Civil society is also a route to political participation and engagement, the call of the revolution, and essential for building peace and stability.     Calls for restoration and resilience over retribution and revenge The Assad regime sought to project an image of stability which many people were convinced by. Assad had been readmitted to the Arab League, the EU was calibrating an early recovery approach that would fall short of reconstruction, and Italy had re-opened its embassy in Damascus.   It was an illusion. The state was a facade constructed to serve one small section of the population. All economic and political mechanisms were geared toward capturing resources that would sustain the regime and its allies, including international aid.   Civil society organisations sustained the northwest, kept services running and provided a space for the development of associations and grassroots institutions. The new government will need the resources - intellectual, financial and social – of all those who continued to serve their country and nurture the wellspring of institutional life.   Witnessing the condition of Syria, destroyed cityscapes and a state hollowed out by corruption and cynicism; the resilience of the Syrian people is all the more remarkable. I heard calls for justice, not revenge. For restoration, not retribution. This is a resourceful and proud nation. It deserves the best chance of success.   Most of all, there is relief that the regime’s arbitrary and sadistic rule is over. Describing the evaporation of the secret police, my friend said: ‘the shadows that followed us have gone now.’ As have a million Assad portraits, rendered in stone, tile, fabric and paint.     Eleanor Nott is a Senior Adviser and Co-Founder of the David Nott Foundation. Since 2015 the DNF has trained over 2,000 doctors in life and limb-saving surgical skills. Eleanor oversaw the development of the Hostile Environment Surgical Training (HEST) course, a trademarked programme accredited by the Royal College of Surgeons of England and supported by bespoke simulation equipment. Eleanor was recognised with her husband and Co-Founder, Professor David Nott, on Foreign Policy’s Global Thinkers list of 2016 for their work training doctors in conflict areas. She has contributed to The Telegraph, British Medical Journal, IISS Voices, CNN and has appeared on Sky News. Eleanor is also a PhD student in the department of War Studies at King’s College London.     Photographs courtesy of author.     Disclaimer: Eleanor is writing in a personal capacity. The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre nor the David Nott Foundation.     [1] Tobias Schneider and Theresa Lütkefend, ‘Introduction: The Syrian Regime’s Approach to Chemical Warfare’, GPPi, April 2020, https://chemicalweapons.gppi.net/analysis/introduction/ [2]  Mukhabarat is an arabic phrase used to describe intelligence agencies and secret police used to spy on civilians [3] Marwa al-Sabouni, ‘The Lost Heritage of Homs: From the Destruction of Monuments to the Destruction of Meaning’, Cultural Heritage and Mass Atrocities, https://www.getty.edu/publications/cultural-heritage-mass-atrocities/part-2/11-al-sabouni/ [4] American Association for the Advancement of Science, ‘Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights Project: Assessing the status of medical facilities in Syria’, AAAS Centre for Scientific Responsibility and Justice, 14 May 2014, https://www.aaas.org/resources/assessing-status-medical-facilities-syria [5] Physicians for Human Rights, ‘Medical Personnel Are Targeted in Syria’, March 2024,  https://phr.org/our-work/resources/medical-personnel-are-targeted-in-syria/ [6] Fouad M Fouad et al., ‘Health workers and the weaponisation of health care in Syria: a preliminary inquiry for The Lancet-American University of Beirut Commission on Syria’, The Lancet, Volum 390, Issue 10111, 02 December 2017, https://www.thelancet.com/article/S0140-6736(17)30741-9/fulltext [post_title] => Op-Ed: Hope amidst the rubble - Syria’s rebirth after Assad [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-hope-amidst-the-rubble-syrias-rebirth-after-assad [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-04 11:40:58 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-04 10:40:58 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7906 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [24] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7897 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-01-29 10:14:57 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-29 09:14:57 [post_content] => Media freedom, and access to information, are fundamental rights at the heart of open societies. In 2025, these rights are facing significant and sustained assaults. Governments and political leaders around the world are harassing and attacking journalists, viral disinformation and conspiracy campaigns are polluting information eco-systems, and the journalism business model is failing.   Last year, more than 120 journalists were killed and 500 imprisoned.^[1] Countless more were arbitrarily detained, censored, and targeted with lawsuits and online harassment campaigns, designed to intimidate and silence. Meanwhile, public media organisations have been politicised and influenced by political elites, and had their funding threatened.^[2]   A shocking 80% of the world’s population has less freedom of expression today than they did in 2000.^[3]   As the dust settles on 2024, the bumper ‘year of elections’, we are also seeing a rise in the number of leaders who verbally attack and criticise the media - including in the United States and Europe – historic champions of free speech.^[4]   Famously, during his 2024 Presidential election campaign, Donald Trump said he wanted to jail journalists and close down major news networks. At one rally, he even joked that he “wouldn’t mind” if an assassin shot the journalists standing in front of him.^[5]   These attacks are amplified by new alliances between political elites and technology platforms that increasingly set the rules of engagement for the global public sphere.^[6] Elon Musk, in particular, is using X to criticise the ‘mainstream media’. Meanwhile, Meta has announced that it will cease fact checking on its platforms in the United States, and relax its community regulations.   Declining media freedom is also compounded by the extreme economic pressure facing the news industry. Over the past two decades, the advertising revenue that once supported independent journalism has moved to social media and online platforms, resulting in staggering job cuts and newsroom closures.   In the UK, the revenue for traditional local journalism is today roughly only a quarter what it was in 2007.^[7] While in the United States, there have been so many newsroom closures that an estimated 55 million Americans now live in ‘news deserts’: areas where there is limited or no access to local news at all.^[8]   Why does this matter? Journalists are the traditional ‘fourth estate’ that hold elites to account. They help to expose corruption and abuses of power, and ensure that civil rights and freedoms are protected.   Research shows that, in ‘news desserts’ without local media, voter turn-out goes down,  political partisanship goes up, and local politicians, courts and business are not scrutinised. One study has even shown that, as local newspapers close down, oil and gas plants pollute more.^[9]   Most significantly, declining media freedom goes hand in hand with democratic backsliding. Governments that seize and silence the media face less scrutiny; and it becomes easier to disregard the rights and freedoms of citizens and manipulate election outcomes.   More generally, when elites relentlessly attack and criticise the ‘fake news’ media, they create confusion about what sources of information can be trusted, and this makes populations more vulnerable to propaganda, mis- and disinformation.   This misinformation causes real harm – as seen during the Covid-19 pandemic.^[10] It can also exacerbate crises and conflict, as it has in Ukraine and Syria.^[11] Finally, misinformation can create social division and undermine democratic institutions, including through election interference by foreign actors. A free and critical news media – that is trusted by audiences - helps to insulate society against these harms.   For all these reasons, as the OSCE argues, “There is no security without media freedom”.^[12]   What next? States have made numerous pledges to protect and promote media freedom – through fora including the United Nations and UNESCO, the OECD, The International Partnership for Information and Democracy, and the US-led Summit for Democracy, to name a few.   Notably, in 2019, then Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt made media freedom the UK’s number one foreign policy priority. He appointed Amal Clooney as the UK’s Special Envoy for Media Freedom, and he launched the Media Freedom Coalition (MFC) with Canada as the co-chair.   As media freedom continues to decline, it is crucial that the UK and its allies follow through on these pledges. There have been endless summits, days, and reports documenting the decline of media freedom. What we need now is action.   This means unequivocally condemning those who attack journalism – be those attacks physical, legal, verbal, or through online harassment. It means going beyond questions of journalism safety to focus on media funding, the regulation of online platforms, media literacy, and methods for countering more subtle forms of influence and control.   The fight for media freedom will require significant political and financial capital.^[13] Yet it could not be more important for democratic survival.     Mel Bunce is Professor of International Journalism and Politics at City St George's, University of London. Her research examines international news, media freedom, and the relationship between journalism and democracy. She is currently the Deputy Dean of the School of Communication & Creativity at City St George’s, University of London, and she was previously the Head of City's renowned Department of Journalism. Mel holds a Doctorate in Politics from the University of Oxford, and is a Senior Fellow of the UK’s Higher Education Association.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre     ^[1] International Federation of Journalists, Press Release: 122 journalists and media workers killed in 2024, says the IFJ, 31 December 2024, https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/122-journalists-and-media-workers-killed-in-2024-says-the-ifj. ^[2] Kate Wright, Martin Scott, and Mel Bunce, Capturing News, Capturing Democracy: Trump and the Voice of America, Oxford University Press, 26 September 2024, https://global.oup.com/academic/product/capturing-news-capturing-democracy-9780197768495?lang=en&cc=au. ^[3] Article 19, ‘Explore the state of freedom of expression around the world’, Global Expression Report 2024, 2025, https://www.globalexpressionreport.org/. ^[4] Reporters Without Borders (RSF), 2024 World Press Freedom Index – journalism under political pressure, 2024, https://rsf.org/en/2024-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-under-political-pressure. ^[5] Steve Holland, ‘Trump says he wouldn't mind if someone shot through 'the fake news' to get him’, Reuters, 03 November 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-says-he-wouldnt-mind-if-someone-shot-through-the-fake-news-get-him-2024-11-03/ ^[6] Julie Posetti, Kaylee Williams and Mel Bunce, Donald Trump, Elon Musk and the threat to press freedom, The Guardian, 04 December 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/dec/04/donald-trump-elon-musk-and-the-threat-to-press-freedom. ^[7] Dominic Ponsford, Colossal decline of UK regional media since 2007 revealed, Press Gazette, https://pressgazette.co.uk/publishers/regional-newspapers/colossal-decline-of-uk-regional-media-since-2007-revealed/. ^[8] Ill Evanston, ‘Medill report shows local news deserts expanding’, Northwestern Medill, 23 October 2024, https://www.medill.northwestern.edu/news/2024/medill-report-shows-local-news-deserts-expanding.html ^[9] Pamela Campa, Press and leaks: Do newspapers reduce toxic emissions?, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 91, September 2018, Pages 184-202, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069616301371. ^[10] Maria Mercedes Ferreira Caceres et al., The impact of misinformation on the COVID-19 pandemic, AIMS Public Health. January 2022,  Pages 262–277, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9114791/. ^[11] Mel Bunce, Humanitarian Communication in a Post-Truth World, Journal of Humanitarian Affairs, Volume 1, Issue 1, 01 January 2019, https://www.manchesterhive.com/view/journals/jha/1/1/article-p49.xml. Cathrin Schaer, ‘How fake news campaigns could push Syria back to civil war’, DW, 03 January 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/syria-civil-war-hts-bashar-assad-regime-fake-news-disinformation-v2/a-71210900 Max Hunter, ‘Russia vs Ukraine: the biggest war of the fake news era’, Reuters, 01 August 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-vs-ukraine-biggest-war-fake-news-era-2024-07-31/. ^[12]  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ‘can there be security without media freedom?’, 25th Anniversary of the Mandate of the OSCE Representative on Freedom on the Media, 2022, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/d/530239.pdf ^[13] William Horsley, Dear foreign secretary, here’s how to protect journalists and press freedom, The Conversation, 5 February 2019, https://theconversation.com/dear-foreign-secretary-heres-how-to-protect-journalists-and-press-freedom-111128. [post_title] => Decline in media freedom ‘hand-in-hand’ with democratic backsliding [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => decline-in-media-freedom-hand-in-hand-with-democratic-backsliding [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-01-29 10:14:57 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-01-29 09:14:57 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7897 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [25] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7885 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-01-27 10:12:08 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-27 09:12:08 [post_content] => In recent years, claims about advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have also promised to revolutionise our worlds.^[1][2] Business, finance, healthcare, transportation, education, communication and translation, and customer service among others are under the magic spell of AI.^[3] It should come as no surprise, then, that the AI revolution has generated international competition among states to lead and benefit from the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution.^{[4] [5]} The struggle for capitalising on the AI revolution among states, without a doubt, will change local and international politics.   The West led by the United States, United Kingdom and Europe intends to focus on liberal principles to set the AI standards for innovation and mitigate risks.^[6] The rest, mostly the Global South, is expected to see the benefits of these prudent norms, rules, and principles, if not acquiesce, to make the world a better place.^[7] After all, previous instances of disruptive technologies such as the invention of the telegraph and the telephone or nuclear weapons were managed through multilateral norms and institutions. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) shaped the norms for reliable and equitable use of communication systems globally and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) aimed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promising disarmament whilst promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But the struggle to capitalise on AI or tame it through globally acceptable norms and institutions will not follow past precedents, for the simple reason that the AI revolution is not only a driver of global disorder, but thrives on it.   Global disorder is a way to understand the complex and interlinked chaos and crisis unfolding in our world – everything everywhere all at once. There are endless wars across regions, rising economic inequalities, continuous racial and gendered injustices, predatory capitalism and its impact on the environment, resource wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, callous disregard of international rule of law and multilateral institutions across the political spectrum, societal discontents that feed into radical right-wing ideologies of violence and left-wing visions of revolution. Global disorder has also led to increasing interference of global elites and tech-billionaires in the everyday conduct, not just the broad contours, of politics. These episodes of crisis as individual instances are certainly not new. However, today we live in a world of polycrises.^[8] Our world is interconnected than any time in the past spinning the crises faster.^[9] Policymakers cannot put a band aid on one crisis to resolve another as global disorder forms an intricate web of crises – each influencing and amplifying the other.     AI and Multilateralism AI is a driver of global disorder in this interconnected world of crises. This is in part due to three reasons. Firstly, multilateral norms and institutions as a solution to stabilise the world from the problems of disruptive technologies are in a deep crisis.^[10] Many stakeholders in AI are led by players in the private sector. A group of influential members in this sector distrust multilateral global institutions and inveigh against attempts to manage AI as regulatory overreach that stifles innovation.^[11] They call for self-regulation instead.^[12] This convergence of distrust of multilateralism is deeply troubling.   For example, in handling the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s invasion of Gaza, both the Western and the Global South policy makers have challenged the liberal international order for addressing the scourge of war.^[13] Many policymakers turned to selfies, smart phones, and propaganda to feed the hungry social media machine with rhetoric about both these wars. More than anything, policymakers discarded an important “qualitative” element of multilateralism: non-discrimination.^[14] The AI world on social media thrived on this rejection of the non-discrimination principle. We find multiple AI curated videos and memes in YouTube, Tiktok, Facebook, and in other social media platforms where actors justify one war whilst rejecting or ignoring many others. Policymakers and the general public found ways to disparage the UN, avoided dialogue with their “enemies,” and lived in media driven realities of these wars. AI has changed the world from modus-vivendi to the world of irreconcilable differences.   In the past, multilateral institutions were avenues to articulate differences through dialogue. For example, US policymakers were wary of state-centric norms of ITU. They pursued power in diplomacy to regulate the internet through the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). They ensured governments took private sector interests seriously.^[15] Similarly, on the NPT, Indian policymakers disagreed on the norms of nuclear haves and have-nots, asserted sovereign equality among states, and developed an independent nuclear programme. India maintained its international non-proliferation credentials and in 2005 Indian policymakers cashed this cheque as a responsible nuclear weapons state against the geopolitical competition between the US and China.^[16] The influence of short-curated videos, pictures, and memes powered by AI and machine learning algorithms have changed such slow pursuit of interest within multilateral norms towards the desires for speedy solutions outside of it.   AI and Global Digital Divide Secondly, the AI revolution rests on a larger digital divide between the West and the Global South states, and a sharper divide between and within Global South states.^[17] Claims about the promises of AI wrongly predict a fair distribution of its benefits to the world, when in fact advancements in AI perpetuate sharp divisions, hierarchy, and inequalities globally. Digital hierarchy takes many forms. For example, in the West there is thicket of data protection and planned regulation of risks to privacy.^[18] Nevertheless, machine learning algorithms require supply of data. Many tech-companies work closely with governments and non-governmental organisations and focus on democracy to use data from the Global South. For example, “Microsoft partnered with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in 2022 to expand a training curriculum for investigative journalists on the abuse of state resources in elections.” [19] Piloted in 2022 in Tunisia and Serbia, the training is in high demand, “for safely investigating state abuse of public resources.”[20]   This is not altruism, however. Even relatively strong states from the Global South, who are very much part of the liberal order such as India, Brazil, or South Africa, frequently face the dictates of tech-giants, which many see as digital colonialism.^[21] Similarly, the expertise and the capacity to manufacture advanced semiconductors are concentrated in the West, leading to race for semiconductor supremacy.^[22] Specifically, investing in equal access to advanced semiconductors or universal data protection is antithetical to the AI revolution. China has already sensed a geopolitical struggle in this arena and has its own AI plans that are distinct from the West.^[23] Furthermore, critical minerals and rare earth in Africa and Latin America power AI machines.^[24] Increasingly assertive or even democratic political actors in this part of the world saddles easy access to these resources. Possibly worst of all, many AI stakeholders find struggles in “free market” is better than a regulated supply of these resources. Like a wolf watching over a henhouse, many companies have made promises about voluntary commitments such as safety tests, information sharing, or robust reporting mechanisms to manage risks posed by AI.^[25] The future of global disorder lies in how these promises and commitments unfold in world politics.   AI and Power Politics Finally, exalted claims of the AI revolution hide the novel power politics that is part of any technological advancements in the world.^[26] With the relative decline of the West, albeit with a militarily powerful United States, and the shift in the bargaining leverage of many other states in the lower rungs of international hierarchy, we are moving from the age of great power geopolitics to widespread power politics of all actors. Increasingly power politics on technology resort to technology for influence. Ambitious policymakers will aim to use AI technology global influence detached from the realities of inequalities in an unequal world. Hyper surveillance, return to techno-nationalism, silencing dissent, relying on technocratic solutions, and a lofty imagination of AI driven warfare will augment global disorder.       Sasikumar Sundaram is a Senior Lecturer in Foreign Policy and Security at the Department of International Politics, City St George’s, University of London. He is currently Vice Chair of the Global South Caucus of the International Studies Association. He completed a PhD in International Relations at Central European University (Budapest / Vienna) and Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil and American University, Washington DC. He is author of forthcoming book Rhetorical Powers: How Rising States Assert Competence in International Politics (New York: Columbia University Press). His work has been published in several leading journals, including International Theory, International Studies Quarterly, and Journal of Global Security Studies.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre     ^[1] Mustafa Suleyman, Michael Bhaskar, ‘The Coming Wave: AI, Power, and Our Future’, Penguin, 03 October 2024, https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/454199/the-coming-wave-by-bhaskar-mustafa-suleyman-and-michael/9781529923834 ^[2] Mustafa Suleyman, ‘How the AI Revolution Will Reshape the World’, Time, 01 September 2023,  https://time.com/6310115/ai-revolution-reshape-the-world/ ^[3] Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor, ‘AI Snake Oil: What Artificial Intelligence Can Do, What It Can’t, and How to Tell the Difference’, Princeton University Press, 24 September 2024, https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691249131/ai-snake-oil?srsltid=AfmBOor515mF4ERoCFTYk0P5B_ePkAuyJzpbo-eT0UYBWN0LadHgrINS ^[4] Sam Winter-Levy, The Emerging Age of AI Diplomacy, Foreign Affairs, 28 October 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/emerging-age-ai-diplomacy ^[5] UK Government, ‘Regulation for the Fourth Industrial Revolution’, Policy Paper, 11 June 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/regulation-for-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/regulation-for-the-fourth-industrial-revolution ^[6] Anu Bradford, ‘The Race to Regulate Artificial Intelligence’, Foreign Affairs, 27 June 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/race-regulate-artificial-intelligence-sam-altman-anu-bradford ^[7] Rachel Adams, ‘AI Is Bad News for the Global South’, Foreign Policy, 17 December 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/17/ai-global-south-inequality/ ^[8] Adam Tooze, ‘Welcome to the World of the Polycrisis’, Financial Times, October 28, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/498398e7-11b1-494b-9cd3-6d669dc3de33 ^[9] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, ‘Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion’, International Security, Volume 44, Issue 1, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351 ^[10] United Nations, ‘Amid Rise in Conflict, Distrust among Nations, Stronger Multilateral System Led by United Nations Needed More than Ever, World Leaders Tell General Assembly’, Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, Seventy-eighth Session, 80th & 81st Meetings, 07 May 2024, https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12598.doc.htm ^[11] Financial Times, ‘OpenAI warns over split with Europe as regulation advances’, 25 May 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/5814b408-8111-49a9-8885-8a8434022352 ^[12] Taken from a video tweeted by Meet the Press (MTP) whilst interviewing CEO of Google, Eric Schmidt, on 13 May 2023, https://x.com/MeetThePress/status/1657778656867909633?mx=2. ^[13] Patrick Wintour, ‘Why US double standards on Israel and Russia play into a dangerous game’, The Guardian, 26 December 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/dec/26/why-us-double-standards-on-israel-and-russia-play-into-a-dangerous-game ^[14] John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution, Cambridge University Press,  Volume 46, Issue 3 , pp. 561 - 598, 1992, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/multilateralism-the-anatomy-of-an-institution/AB34548F299B16FDF0263E621905E3B5 ^[15] See Duncan Hollis and Kal Rustiala, “The Global Governace of the Internet” in Duncan Snidal & Michael N. Barnnett (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023) ^[16] US Department of State (Archive), U.S. - India: Civil Nuclear Cooperation, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/c17361.html ^[17] United Nations, ‘Widening Digital Gap between Developed, Developing States Threatening to Exclude World’s Poorest from Next Industrial Revolution, Speakers Tell Second Committee’, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, Seventy-eighth Session, 10th & 11th Meetings, 06 October 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/gaef3587.doc.htm ^[18] Daniel Spichtinger, ‘New data protection and privacy laws have changed the regulatory landscape for researchers in the Global North’, LSE, 15 April 2024, shttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2024/04/15/new-data-protection-and-privacy-laws-have-changed-the-regulatory-landscape-for-researchers-in-the-global-north/ [19] International Foundation for Electoral Systems, https://www.ifes.org [20] The original report in the US State Department is US Department of State, ‘Private Sector Commitments to Advance Democracy’, 29 March 2023, https://www.state.gov/private-sector-commitments-to-advance-democracy/ . This report is now removed. See archives: http://web.archive.org/web/20230329182252/https://www.state.gov/private-sector-commitments-to-advance-democracy/ ^[21] Toussaint Nothias, ‘How to Fight Digital Colonialism’, Boston Review, 14 November 2022, https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/how-to-fight-digital-colonialism/ ^[22] Financial Times, ‘The race for semiconductor supremacy’, 03 October 2023, https://channels.ft.com/en/tech/the-race-for-semiconductor-supremacy/ ^[23] Ludovica Meacci and Dr Pia Hüsch, ‘How China and the UK are Seeking to Shape the Global AI Discourse’, RUSI, 25 September 2022, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/how-china-and-uk-are-seeking-shape-global-ai-discourse ^[24] Kate Crawford, ‘Atlas of AI’, Yale University Press, London, 11 October 2022, https://yalebooks.co.uk/book/9780300264630/atlas-of-ai/ ^[25] Kevin Roose, ‘How Do the White House’s A.I. Commitments Stack Up?’, The New York Times, 22 July 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/22/technology/ai-regulation-white-house.html?mc_cid=615f6f367d&mc_eid=808c31b9bc ^[26] Jeffrey Ding, ‘Technology and the Rise of Great Powers: How Diffusion Shapes Economic Competition’, Princeton University Press, 20 August 2024, https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691260341/technology-and-the-rise-of-great-powers [post_title] => Artificial Intelligence: Driving and Thriving on Global Disorder? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => artificial-intelligence-driving-and-thriving-on-global-disorder [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-01-27 18:06:43 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-01-27 17:06:43 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7885 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [26] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7845 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-01-23 11:03:20 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-23 10:03:20 [post_content] => The recent expansion of the BRICS, an intergovernmental organisation setup in 2009 spearheaded by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, can be seen as a key driver, as well as perhaps a symptom, of the global disorder seen today.[1] Emerging middle powers, including the new BRICS members - Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates -  are playing an increasingly important role in the decision-making processes of global economic governance. However, when these powers turn into ‘politically aligned’ blocs, they can also be seen to create more problems than solutions to Liberal International Order (LIO).[2]   The so-called BRICS emerged in the context of the crisis of the legitimacy of the capitalist system and the LIO. The formation of the BRICS gradually created cooperation mechanisms to give a more assertive expression and a joint demand for greater participation of emerging powers in international economic governance. This demand was further expanded to include interests from other countries in the Global South. As such, the BRICS evolved into a political movement that morphed overtime to challenge the status quo of the LIO.   It is in this political context that new horizons of “promotion by invitation” are opening up within the BRICS organisation. Over the course of 2024-5, the BRICS old guards - Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa - were joined by new members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Indonesia to become BRICS+.   In recent years, under China’s leadership, a call for a multipolar world - a world where there is a great distribution of power held between more than two states - has emerged as a political movement where BRICS+ members invite other countries to participate in an initiative that can benefit development goals. See, for example, Chinese investments in infrastructure all over the Global South and their impact on the development of such countries. This expansionist effort to widen collaboration between states was made explicit through China’s BRICS plus initiative when they hosted the 2017 summit. Notably, at the 2023 summit, held in South Africa, and the 2024 summit, held in Russia, invitations to join the BRICS organisation were collectively offered to 19 countries, with the aforementioned six states so far taking up membership.^[3]   Many middle powers see the “open doors” policy of BRICS as a great opportunity. The collective group has also portrayed the US as the declining hegemon, giving further credence to the problems of the LIO and the ability to engage in new economic governance beyond the hegemony of the US.[4]   However, the BRICS+ process also triggers an “expansion dilemma,” meaning that there are unresolved questions on the nature of the BRICS as an institutional format, the identity of BRICS, and its role as the “nucleus of the Global South.”[5] In this sense, such an initiative has the potential to establish distinct regional platforms in the areas of trade and investment cooperation, particularly on cooperation in technology and innovation, bringing more significant challenges for established powers such as the US and the UK for a global solution for global problems.   Furthermore, the BRICS+ approach has generated potential problems for the strategic interests of some of its own BRICS members – particularly Brazil, India and South Africa – since it may be in the Chinese interest to incorporate actors that threaten or weaken the leadership and regional interests of these countries.[6] In this case, India’s concern with Pakistan is an important point of attention, for example.   The process of BRICS expansion thus accelerates the multicentric and local characteristics of the international system and the return of bloc politics in the face of a changing geopolitical context. Such movement in this direction occurs under the leadership of China with the relative consensus of the other four members and can be problematic to the LIO and the norms related to it, once such group are not fully supporters of the LIO.   The BRICS+ can be seen to be moving from a condition of minilateral political formation to complex multilateralisation, interconnected both with other initiatives of the multicentric international system such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the China Forums Policy, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as well as with institutions and processes of regional cooperation around which BRICS member countries orbit. This presents a complex overlap between bilateralism, minilateralism and multilateralism in a current multicentric system, which could result in a profound transformation of the international order and/or in the coexistence of several international orders simultaneously. Hence, BRICS+ can be seen as a crucial aspect and symptom of global disorder current developments: if we want to understand global disorder paths, we must understand BRICS+ developments.       Leonardo Ramos (Brazilian) is currently an Associate Professor of International Relations at Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas), Brazil, and has been a visiting scholar at the Universidad Nacional de Rosario (UNR). His current research topics include BRICS, emerging countries, and the crisis of the international liberal order. His publications include: Caesarism, populism, and the 2018 election in Brazil (2019, Capital & Class); The BRICS International Security Agenda (2009–2019) (2021, Dados—with Pedro Rocha and Danny Zahreddine); The role of declining Brazil and ascending China in the BRICS initiative (2019, In: Li Xing. (Org.). The international political economy of the BRICS. Routledge—with Javier Vadell).   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre   [1] BRICS is an intergovernmental organisation consisting of - Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The acronym is derived from the founding members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). [2]  The ‘Liberal International Order’ is a term used to describe a set of governing ideals, rooted in WWII, in which nations adhere to multilaterialism (through institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc), and subscribe to cooperation on and the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, monetary and trade policies, security, and open markets; for a through analysis and key debates on the nature of this order, see G John Ikenberry, Inderjeet Parmar, and Doug Stokes, eds., Ordering the World? Liberal internationalism in theory and practice, International Affairs special issue 94, 1 (2018). ^[3] At the 2023 summit: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; At the 2024 summit: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. [4] Javier Vadell & Leonardo Ramos, ‘The role of declining Brazil and ascending China in the BRICS initiative’, The International Political Economy of BRICS, Routledge, 2019, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429507946-5/role-declining-brazil-ascending-china-brics-initiative-javier-vadell-leonardo-ramos. Yichao Li, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Jorge Tavares da Silva, and Carlos Rodrigues, The Palgrave Handbook on China-Europe-Africa Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. Javier Vadell & Leonardo Ramos, ‘World Reordering and the Emergence of BRICS Plus in a Multicentric System’, The Palgrave Handbook on China-Europe-Africa Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 1133-1147, 10 January 2025 (online), https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-97-5640-7_56 [5] ibid [6] ibid   [post_title] => A new world (re)order: Expansion of the BRICS and rise of alternative multilateralism? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => a-new-world-reorder-expansion-of-the-brics-and-rise-of-a-new-multilateralism [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-01-24 11:47:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-01-24 10:47:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7845 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [27] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7858 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-01-22 10:22:47 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-22 09:22:47 [post_content] => The rule of law is vital for creating and maintaining democracy; providing security; protecting human rights; and promoting economic development.[1] Definitions vary, but fundamentally it demands that all are bound by the same law and that the law protects and holds accountable both the governed and governing.^[2] Promoting the rule of law has been a core policy priority for Western states and international institutions since the 1990s.   A Deepening Challenge Globally, the rule of law is in crisis today. Many prominent advocates, including the United Kingdom and the United States, have seen the rise of political movements openly antagonistic to its ideals. While President Donald Trump’s first administration did not formally abandon the longstanding official US policy of backing the rule of law abroad, it was not a priority. How the second Trump administration will behave in office remains to be seen. That said, if his rhetoric to date is any indication, at best, a Trump-led United States shows little appetite to be a leading global proponent for the rule of law in the coming years.  Within the European Union, longstanding organisational consensus about the rule of law has been shattered with the mainstreaming of far-right politics. In Hungary, for instance, Viktor Orban has entrenched a government that the European Parliament calls a "hybrid regime of electoral autocracy."^[3] Powerful revisionist states, such as China and Russia, have tried to recast the rule of law as a means to exercise, but not restrain, authority.   This crisis is further compounded by the chronic failure of costly international efforts to advance the rule of law through the use of force in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Likewise, over forty years of technocratic internationally funded foreign aid that equates rule of law promotion with capacity building and material assistance have consistently disappointed.[4]  Technocratic rule of law work focuses on building skills and improving legal processes, but largely avoids bigger questions of what makes for a more just society or how to get the government itself to be committed to rule of law ideals. This approach has a certain appeal because judicial training and case management systems, for instance, are easy to monitor and can be pursued regardless of the overarching political order because it does not threaten that order.   It is clear, however, that establishing and sustaining the rule of law is a political process. The rule of law requires a commitment to its ideals by, as noted above, both the governing and the governed. Powerful people, including high-level state officials, who violate its precepts must face at least some prospect of accountability. While not all democratic regimes have the rule of law, research has shown that democratic accountability is essential for both creating and sustaining the rule of law.^[5]   A New Approach Ultimately, a more promising approach demands both continuity and change. It needs to recognise the rule of law matters as a real foreign policy goal though it is not the only one. Effective foreign policy sometimes requires dealing with unsavoury regimes and tough compromises. Rule of law ideals must sometimes give way to pragmatism. Few people would sensibly argue that Western states should have no dealings with China, a leading economic and global power. Rule of law concerns must be balanced with other vital issues like addressing global challenges like climate change and seeking to maintain key security goals in places like Taiwan while avoiding potentially catastrophic military conflicts.   At the same time, this does not require abandoning the rule of law as an ideal or as a policy priority. Rather, the key is strategically and systematically making incremental improvements when possible and avoiding own goals like unnecessarily strengthening authoritarian rulers or undercutting the rule of law internationally.   While aid still has a role to play, thinking critically about the structure of the aid industry and the organization of government agencies that provide assistance to ensure that building long term, sustainable success lies at the core of their mission.  Furthermore, promoting the rule of law comprehensively, as is generally done for transnational security or economic statecraft, can also make a difference.   Justice should also be engaged beyond the state. In countries receiving foreign aid, non-state justice systems rooted in custom or religion generally handle most legal disputes.^[6] This dramatically influences both domestic and international security as it undercuts the state’s claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its territory. In other words, the state is not always in control even in its own territory. State claims to authority can be highly contentious. It also dramatically impacts the prospects of international rule of law endeavours.^[7] Yet, current efforts overwhelmingly focus on state institutions. More serious and more constructive engagement with non-state justice is essential.^[8]   Even more fundamentally, it is vital to make it clear what the rule of law requires and what it is not. This means pushing back against claims that equate the rule of law with rule by law which renders the law a mere tool of state authority absent any restraint or accountability.   Last but not least, there is a need for states that back the rule of law abroad to try to better uphold those ideas within their own societies. This means following the law both domestically and internationally. Fighting corruption and impunity in society and within the state is vital as is respect for democratic norms and processes. This demonstration is absolutely critical as a seeming lack of commitment to rule of law ideals by its proponents within the international systems has undermined those efforts and provided an opening for authoritarian regimes seeking to undermine the existing global order and legitimize oppression domestically.   In short, strengthening the rule of law, and through it a more rules-based international order, remains not only possible, but essential. Nevertheless, there is no ground for complacency. Real changes and real commitments are vital.    

Geoffrey Swenson is a Reader in International Politics at City, University of London, a Trustee of the British International Studies Association, and was previously a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He completed a PhD in International Relations at Oxford as a Clarendon Scholar, an MA from Queen's University Belfast as a Mitchell Scholar, and a JD from Stanford Law School. He is the author of Contending Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2022), and his work has been published in several leading journals, including International Security, International Studies Quarterly, and World Development.

  Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre   [1] Francis Fukuyama, ‘Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy’, London: Profile, 2014. ^[2] Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law’, St John’s Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-0082, 13 September 2007, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1012051 ^[3] Paul Kirby and Nick Thorpe, ‘Who is Viktor Orban, Hungarian PM with 14-year grip on power?’, BBC News, 12 February 2024. [4] Roland Janse, ‘A Turn to Legal Pluralism in Rule of Law Promotion?’, Erasmus Law Review 6 (3–4): 181–90, 2013. ^[5] Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘The Quality of Democracy: Why the Rule of Law Matters’, Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 32-46, October 2004, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-quality-of-democracy-why-the-rule-of-law-matters/ ^[6] Geoffrey Swenson, ‘Legal Pluralism in Theory and Practice’, International Studies Review, Volume 20, Issue 3, Pages 438–462, September 2018, https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/20/3/438/4817016 ^[7] Geoffrey Swenson, ‘Contending Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law’, Oxford University Press, 20 October 2022, https://academic.oup.com/book/44455?login=false ^[8] Geoffrey Swenson, ‘Promoting Law Beyond the State’, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 68, Issue 3, September 2024, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/68/3/sqae102/7708174?login=false [post_title] => Rule of law in crisis: The need for a new approach [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => rule-of-law-in-crisis-the-need-for-a-new-approach [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-01-22 10:27:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-01-22 09:27:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7858 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [28] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7822 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-01-20 11:31:11 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-20 10:31:11 [post_content] => Donald Trump’s re-election to the American presidency has sparked serious debates over both the United States’ role in world politics and as the leader of the Liberal International Order.^[1] Despite warranted claims about Trump’s unpredictability, volatility and unreliability, he is no “isolationist”. Trump, along with the various forces behind him – corporate, intellectual, and political - remain wedded to US global power but in more unilateralist, nationalist, realist, ways, and are therefore committed to even more aggressive pursuit of US ‘vital interests’.   This means the incoming administration  broadly rejects liberals’ methodology of regime change, ‘democracy’ promotion, and a liberal international order. However, even post—Cold War liberals, such as those part of the Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations, have been pragmatic, and highly selective, about their commitment to multilateralism and international law. Notably, US military budgets have continued to burgeon throughout the period since 1991.   Trump has therefore intensified, broadened and mainstreamed a tendency that has been long in the making. As a ‘blunt instrument’, whose self-concept and vision has clearly sharpened since 2020, Trump falsely projects himself as the anti-war candidate while simultaneously aiming to further strengthen the US military machine under the banner of “peace through strength”. Hence, the challenges Trump offers to traditional US foreign policy will rattle allies and stir up ‘beltway’ national security elites. His Nixonian era ‘mad man’ approach to global messaging is meant to be unsettling but, ultimately, Trump remains rooted in and loyal to the goal of US global predominance – that of an American empire.   The US foreign policy establishment in crisis – of destruction and reconstruction With the return of Trump to the White House, the ‘traditional’ US foreign policy establishment is in another one of its periodic crises. However, as Italian revolutionary Antonio Gramsci noted, crises are moments of destruction and reconstruction.^[2] Hence, anxious establishmentarians’ debates abound in the hallowed halls of the exclusive think tank, Ivy League university, blue-chip Wall Street corporation, bank and law firm, in the mainstream media ecosystem, and in the American state. The US establishment is seemingly besieged by enemies and critics from within and without.   America’s allies worry about what a second Trump administration might do to the G7, NATO, UN, or World Health Organisation. Global South states, particularly China, demand status and recognition, decrying “centuries of [colonial] humiliation”.^[3] At home, that establishment is held responsible for ‘endless’ wars, especially since the 1990s, including seemingly intractable conflicts such as Ukraine’s war with Russia.^[4]   The ‘traditional’ liberal internationalist foreign policy establishment under ‘threat’ The US foreign policy establishment, largely dominant since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, has had 3 major methodological-ideological characteristics that are now in crisis and flux:  

1. Constantly expanding and open markets, broad commitment to freer trade;
2. Global economic expansionism organised under the umbrella of US-led liberal international order;
3. Above underpinned by that dominant elite’s ideology – American exceptionalism, historic mission of a chosen people to improve the world.

  Those three principal characteristics are now seen as less relevant or even obsolete. They are secondary to the more naked pursuit of unilateral power. The traditional principles and methods of US power in a world system dominated by the US, and its allies, are no longer sufficient to achieve or maintain America’s global primacy, and are being marginalised or thrust aside by Trumpism’s increasing insistence that the United States is not exceptional but in effect another ordinary state, albeit with extraordinary power.^[5]   Trump’s blunt challenge and Republican foreign policy tribes Appointments in the first Trump administration to high level defence, security, and foreign policy positions, in comparison to those now being appointed and nominated in the immediate aftermath of Trump’s 2024 victory, signal a significant change in the offing. Appointees under the first Trump administration were comparable to those in previous administrations, continuing the Washington, DC, establishment trend, but by 2019 appointees were more consistent with MAGA and America First loyalists.^[6]   By 2024, nominees and appointees appear based on the ‘Fuhrer’ principle: loyal to the leader and saturated in MAGA (‘Make America Great Again’) principles and beliefs: anti-immigration, rejection of globalisation/free trade, denial of the climate crisis and question reckless military interventionism (though support greater military spending to maintain global armed superiority). A large part of this agenda also aligns with the more traditional mainstream support of the Trump-era Republican party as a whole.  Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz (Secretary of State and National Security Adviser picks) resemble ‘primacists’ – believers in US global hegemony in which Washington must maintain its global leadership and military dominance, including in terms of NATO, and Ukraine, whilst allies must also provide more for global security. Other pro-Trump loyalists ‘prioritise’ one region over another – such as the Indo-Pacific over Europe, and more specifically Ukraine, while a third group constitute ‘restrainers’ who are more domestically-focused, arguing for military restraint, and have an emphatic focus on China rather than Russia. All three ‘tribes’, however, are pro-Israel, and MAGA-loyalists.^[7]   In conclusion, the second Trump administration will continue to play an aggressive role in world affairs in practically all respects. In part, a more ‘realist’ global strategy is required by the increasingly failing US social fabric – based on the effects of decades of neoliberal globalisation, which fuelled both ‘America First’ and ‘Bidenomics’.^[8] Both main parties have embraced ‘industrial policy’ to strengthen the US economy for intensified geoeconomic and geopolitical competition, mainly with China, but with other emerging states as well as the European Union and Japan.   The US is now more flexible than ever before in how it maintains its global imperium, principally through weaponizing every aspect of its powers. Trump 2.0 presents as ‘disorderly’. It is a blunt force shift in methods and flexibility in observance of the rule of law, at home and abroad. The slow evolution in these directions since the end of the Cold War, presided over by successive Democratic and Republican administrations, was accelerated by Trump’s first term, and appears to be hyper-intensifying under Trump II. Trump is actively and simultaneously disordering and reordering America at home, and the world system, based on overwhelming full spectrum dominance.   We are living in an era of organic crisis and flux - of morbid symptoms, violent solutions, charismatic leaders claiming to restore lost glories - an age of danger.     Inderjeet Parmar is Professor of International Politics at City St George’s, University of London, since 2012, having previously taught at the University of Manchester from 1991-2012. He is Associate Dean (Research) in the School of Policy and Global Affairs, and a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences (FAcSS), and Past president of the British International Studies Association. He is co-editor of a book series, Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy.   Parmar has published 3 research monographs and dozens of articles in academic journals on US elite power politics; his most recent book, Foundations of the American Century: Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power was published in 2012 by Columbia University Press, and translated into Chinese (2018) and Farsi (2021). He is also a columnist at The Wire (http://thewire.in/author/iparmar/), and has published articles on US elections and politics in Newsweek, Fortune, The Hindu, The Conversation.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre   [1] The ‘Liberal International Order’ is a term used to describe a set of governing ideals, rooted in WWII, in which nations adhere to multilaterialism (through institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc), and subscribe to cooperation on and the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, monetary and trade policies, security, and open markets; for a through analysis and key debates on the nature of this order, see G John Ikenberry, Inderjeet Parmar, and Doug Stokes, eds., Ordering the World? Liberal internationalism in theory and practice, International Affairs special issue 94, 1 (2018). [2] Stuart Hall: “Gramsci and Us,” Blogpost; 10 February 2017; https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/blogs/news/2448-stuart-hall-gramsci-and-us?srsltid=AfmBOopFSpblrSQS0wA0Q5v5oXosMS93Rw-o7Oe61HAAzgH-ECUIbhI-. [3] Alison A. Kaufman, “The ‘century of humiliation’ and China’s national narratives,” https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf. [4] Stephen Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of US Primacy, Macmillan, 2019. [5] Giovanni Grevi, “Trump’s America: the ordinary superpower,” European Policy Centre, 13 June 2017, https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Trumps-America-the-ordinary-superpower~20ff44. [6] Make America Great Again of ‘MAGA’ is the acronym for the political movement synonymous with Donal Trump’s presidential campaign. [7] Majda Ruge and Jeremy Shapiro, European CFR, 17 November 2022, https://ecfr.eu/article/polarised-power-the-three-republican-tribes-that-could-define-americas-relationship-with-the-world/. [8] America First focused on domestic economy, including trade protectionism and plans for infrastructure programmes, which were implemented and extended by policies followed by the Biden administration, such as the Inflation Reduction Act, CHIPS Act, among other legislation; Edward Walden, “Bidenomics is ‘America First’ With a Brain,” Foreign Policy, 18 June 2021,  https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/18/biden-bidenomics-economy-america-first-trump-trade-supply-chains-industrial-policy-china-reshoring-protectionism/. [post_title] => Trump’s ‘America First’: US predominance as a threat to the liberal international order [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => trumps-america-first-us-predominance-as-a-threat-to-the-liberal-international-order [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-04 15:07:13 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-04 14:07:13 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7822 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [29] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7789 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-01-16 11:59:08 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-16 10:59:08 [post_content] => On Monday, 20th January, Donald Trump will be inaugurated into his second Presidency. With America, and the world, preparing for the next Trump administration, we turned to US experts, and friends of the FPC, Anthony Silberfeld (Bertelsmann Foundation) and Andrew Gawthorpe (Leiden University) to provide us with insights into what this will mean for foreign policy and global relations.   In this interview, Anthony and Andrew discuss what President Trump’s return to the White House means for the US’s role as the ‘global watchdog’, the impact and importance of this administration's obsession with both social media and its owners, as well as what the future holds for the ‘special relationship’ between the US and the UK.     Where will foreign affairs sit on the list of policy priorities for President Trump, and what does this mean for the US’s traditional role as a ‘global watchdog’?   Anthony Silberfeld: The concept of “policy priorities” in a conventional sense did not exist in Donald Trump’s chaotic first term, and should not be expected in his second.  Instead, one should view what’s ahead in two tiers of retribution. The first tier will be action taken against domestic threats, focusing specifically on undocumented immigrants and political enemies. Trump’s incoming border czar, Tom Homan, has committed to rounding up and deporting millions of migrants currently residing in the US. Whether this ends up being more theoretical than practical remains to be seen, but the result will have widespread economic and reputational repercussions for the US, not to mention the human toll it will take on these individuals and their families.   The second tier will take aim at foreign actors who, in Trump’s view, “have treated us unfairly.” This would include any country with which the US has a trade deficit, particular venom is reserved for Germany and China, but the punitive response will be widespread. During the 2024 presidential campaign, Trump threatened a range of tariffs against allies and adversaries alike. Rhetoric is one thing, but higher prices from food, electronics and cars for all Americans is something else. There will surely be announcements of tariffs in the early days of the new administration, but the economic impact of this action may temper much of this initial bluster. Nevertheless, the idea of America continuing its role as a global watchdog is unlikely.  This new administration has no appetite for it, and will quickly forfeit any remaining credibility the US has as a force for stability in an increasingly volatile environment.

"[The] idea of America continuing its role as a global watchdog is unlikely.  This new administration has no appetite for it, and will quickly forfeit any remaining credibility the US has as a force for stability in an increasingly volatile environment."

  Andrew Gawthorpe: Foreign policy is high on Trump’s list of policy priorities, but he has a narrower understanding of American goals than many previous presidents and is particularly focused on economic aspects of foreign policy. His planned trade tariffs, even if they are not implemented on as broad of a scale as he has suggested, will quickly become the top bilateral issue between the US and affected countries.   Trump’s presidency is not likely to be one in which the US is active in multilateral fora or seeking new cooperative agreements. He is sceptical of many of the things that previous American presidents have viewed as obligations deriving from international treaties or organisations. Instead, Trump likes to deal with countries bilaterally, a situation in which he feels he can better use American power as leverage against weaker nations.   Looking more closely at the potential foreign policy approaches of the US under a Trump Presidency, how could his policies affect the UK and Europe, particularly with relation to NATO and defence?   Anthony Silberfeld: Let’s start with the good news. I do not see a scenario in which the US withdraws from NATO, or reduces its own defence spending, which currently amounts to approximately two-thirds of the NATO total. Now for the bad news. The Trump administration has already signalled its intent to ask NATO members to increase their defence spending (as a percentage of GDP) beyond their current two percent commitment to as much as five percent. At present, only Poland, Greece and the three Baltic countries are meeting their two percent commitments, so the prospect of all NATO members meeting Trump’s new terms is somewhere between slim and none.   How the president-elect will treat those countries that fall below the spending threshold is the key question, notwithstanding America’s obligations under NATO’s Article 5. It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their defence spending obligations, while those that do not are left to fend for themselves. The UK’s current status as a laggard in its NATO spending will draw the unwanted attention of the new regime in Washington, and will surely be an additional point of friction that will test the durability of the special relationship.

"...It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their [NATO] defence spending obligations, while those that do not are left to fend for themselves."

  Andrew Gawthorpe: While an American withdrawal from NATO remains unlikely, Trump could undercut the credibility of the alliance by refusing to endorse the organization’s mutual defence clause, Article V. However, Trump is likely to push European countries for much higher levels of defence spending and to wind down American support for Ukraine. He is likely to be willing to attempt to impose ceasefire terms that many European governments regard as too generous towards Russia. There is also a chance that his chaotic style of policymaking causes negotiations to collapse, potentially leading to further escalation in the conflict.   Anthony Silberfeld:  Despite assurances from Donald Trump during the campaign that he would end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours upon taking office if not sooner, his envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently recalibrated expectations. The new outlook from Washington remains fluid, but aims for a ceasefire of some kind within 100 days of Trump taking office. How much consultation is done with the UK and European allies (let alone Ukraine itself) will not just determine whether an end to the war is viable, but will also provide an early signal for how this administration will work with its allies going forward.   Andrew Gawthorpe: For the UK specifically, Trump’s presidency raises the difficult question of London’s relationship with the European Union. The UK will be much better able to weather both Trump’s trade policy and his impact on the overall strategic situation in Europe through cooperation with the EU. Whereas UK policymakers have tended to assume that the US shares their fundamental commitment to European security and the transatlantic bond, the incoming administration does not. That requires recalibration and looking to like-minded countries on the continent who share the UK’s goals and values.

 "...UK policymakers have tended to assume that the US shares their fundamental commitment to European security and the transatlantic bond, [but] the incoming administration does not."

  Elon Musk took an active role in the Trump-Vance campaign, utilising his platform on X in particular, and has been rewarded with a role in the Trump Administration. With Musk repeatedly criticised for his comments on UK developments, how large an impact do you anticipate Musk having on foreign policy?   Anthony Silberfeld: Musk’s support for Trump and Republican candidates during the election  bought him a seat (and apparently a guest bedroom) at Mar-a-Lago, which he has already used to influence policy and there is no question that Musk will continue to use the influence he purchased to further his own business interests.

"...there is no question that [Elon] Musk will continue to use the influence he purchased to further his own business interests." 

  Andrew Gawthorpe: Musk’s position inside the Trump administration is hard to determine. His position is unofficial and advisory, and he has many political disagreements with key segments of Trump’s political coalition. For instance, he favours certain forms of immigration, and is relatively close with the Chinese government. His longevity in Trump’s inner circle is hence not assured, particularly given that Trump has been known to turn on people who he perceives as taking the limelight away from him.   However, Musk should be taken seriously. Trump’s “MAGA movement” has often talked about internationalizing its project and trying to support right-wing parties in Europe, but Musk is doing it on a scale unseen in the past. Europe’s mainstream parties could face a pincer movement – Trump hammering them with tariffs and defence spending demands from abroad, and Musk supporting their extremist rivals at home. At its worst, it could appear as de facto foreign intervention in European elections. And Musk can continue to do this, using X and his global bullhorn, even if he parts ways with Trump at some point.

"Europe’s mainstream parties could face a pincer movement – Trump hammering them with tariffs and defence spending demands from abroad, and [Elon] Musk supporting their extremist rivals at home."

  Anthony Silberfeld: The role of corporate influence in the new administration is not limited to Elon Musk. During the transition period there has been a steady parade of corporate CEOs who have made rhetorical, policy and financial contributions to curry favour with the incoming president. Some of the most egregious examples start with Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg scrapping fact-checking on his platforms and contributing one million dollars to Trump’s inaugural fund.   Not to be outdone, Amazon’s executive chairman Jeff Bezos donated one million dollars to the same inaugural fund, and ponied up an additional $40 million to produce a Melania Trump biographical documentary. They are not alone, and in each instance, there is a calculation being made about offensive and defensive engagement with this new administration. In other words, how much does a company have to give to get what it wants, or conversely, how much will it cost to avoid being targeted if it runs afoul of the White House. These are real considerations for business leaders as they consider strategy and tactics in the period ahead.

"The role of corporate influence in the new administration is not limited to Elon Musk."

  Given President Trump’s previous actions, can we expect US foreign policy discourse and decisions to be played out through comments made personally by Trump through non-traditional channels, and how can global leaders respond?   Anthony Silberfeld: I would make a distinction here between discourse and decisions when it comes to Trump’s foreign policy. As he did in the first term, Trump’s reflexive comments made via social media platforms or at impromptu new conferences will shape the policy discourse, and will force everyone else to react. American policymakers will scramble to determine whether Trump’s latest utterance should be taken figuratively, literally, or in jest. The press will (depending on their political orientation) either amplify Trump’s pronouncement or turn the half-baked screed into a policy analysis that is worthy of debate. But there is often a significant gap between Trump’s rhetoric and reality.   Many of the most controversial foreign policy statements made by Trump thus far, such as acquiring the Panama Canal, Greenland and Canada, or the imposition of tariffs, will encounter legal, legislative, and public opinion barriers that may prove to be insurmountable. What we found in the first Trump administration is that his interests in policy initiatives were often transient. In those days, the administration was staffed in part with institutional professionals who still ran into roadblocks that curtailed the president’s worst instincts. This time around, the quality of staff in this administration, combined with the desire to gut the federal workforce through layoffs and loyalty tests is unlikely to result in the efficient implementation of the MAGA agenda. It’s going to be a wild ride for all involved. World leaders would benefit from taking the right lessons from the first iteration of Trump, take a deep breath, and only respond when it becomes clear there is no other alternative.  

"World leaders would benefit from taking the right lessons from the first iteration of Trump, take a deep breath, and only respond when it becomes clear there is no other alternative."

  Andrew Gawthorpe: Trump’s incoming chief of staff, Susie Wiles, is supposedly going to ensure that the new administration is more focused and less prone to chaotic policymaking than Trump’s first term. However, it’s unlikely she can persuade Trump to give up his social media habit, and that means he will continue to drive the global agenda in part through this type of personal comment. This creates a tricky situation for world leaders. On the one hand, they feel domestic political pressure to stick up for their country. On the other hand, it’s important to not get too bogged down in the weeds. Trump threatens to do things all the time which he has no intention of doing. And he makes policy through personal relationships, meaning that it’s important for leaders to cultivate good relations with him and stay on his good side, so as better to promote their country’s interests. They cannot let those interests get drowned in a tide of tweets, and so it’s often better to not engage.   What does all of this mean for the ‘Special Relationship’ between the US and the UK going forward?   Anthony Silberfeld: The latest version of the special relationship will almost certainly get off to a rocky start since Donald Trump is never one to forget a real or perceived slight. Past comments by Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Foreign Secretary David Lammy are going to be difficult for the White House to forgive, in spite of both men’s efforts to walk back those statements.[1] The US is also doing its part to poison the relationship before it begins as Elon Musk, one of President Trump’s closest advisers, is meddling in British domestic politics to undermine the Labour government. Not exactly a recipe for a harmonious marriage, but not all is lost.   Trump is, at the end of the day, transactional, so if the United Kingdom can demonstrate the value it can add to the special relationship, it has the potential of living up to that lofty moniker. Meeting the elevated NATO defence spending obligations, and highlighting the importance of UK investment in the US will be a good starting point. Unfortunately, it’s hard to imagine a Thatcher-Reagan or even a Blair-Bush relationship to flourish between Starmer and Trump, so London might be best served by spending its energy on cultivating relationships with members of Congress, state governors and mayors.

"Trump is, at the end of the day, transactional, so if the United Kingdom can demonstrate the value it can add to the special relationship, it has the potential of living up to that lofty moniker."

  Andrew Gawthorpe:  The UK government should recognize the importance of personal relationships to Trump and attempt to cultivate ties with people in his inner circle. Then the government needs to use these relationships to put forward the UK’s case for why it is a constructive economic and security actor and not a net drain on American resources. Secondly, the UK also needs to look beyond the “special relationship” and instead think in broader US-European terms. The UK government has to realize that this second election of Trump means that the world is changing. American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore. Europe needs to be prepared to develop its capabilities as a geopolitical actor, and the correct role for the UK is to work alongside Europe in doing that.

"The UK government has to realize that this second election of Trump means that the world is changing. American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore."

  Living our values of democracy and the rule of law means having the capabilities to advance and defend them – something which is particularly important when the US is increasingly deviating from those very values.     Dr Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   Anthony Silberfeld joined the Bertelsmann Foundation as the Director of Transatlantic Relations in April 2014. His research focuses on democratic innovations in cities, and geopolitical competition in space. Anthony arrived at the Foundation after seven years with the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, where he was head of political and public affairs at the British Embassy’s Northern Ireland Bureau in Washington, DC. Prior to his tenure with the British government, Anthony held posts as a foreign policy advisor in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre   [1] Albert Toth, From ‘repugnant’ to ‘the closest of allies’: Everything Keir Starmer has said about Donald Trump, The Independent, 06 November 2024, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/us-election-trump-starmer-labour-republican-2024-b2642284.html; Chris Mason and Becky Morton, Lammy dismisses past criticism of Trump as 'old news', BBC, 07 November 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cm2z1zm1pk3o. [post_title] => Trump 2.0: What does the future hold for US foreign policy? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => trump-2-0-what-does-the-future-hold-for-us-foreign-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-01-20 12:49:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-01-20 11:49:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7789 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [30] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7644 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-11-08 13:23:12 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-11-08 12:23:12 [post_content] => The votes are still being counted, but it is already clear who is the winner of the US election – Donald Trump. He not only sailed to victory in the Electoral College, but also is likely to end up with more total votes than his opponent, Kamala Harris. Unlike in 2016, Trump is the clear choice of the majority of Americans – or at least of those who voted.   How did he do it? Although it takes time for the data to trickle in, we are starting to have a sense of the geography and demographics which drove Trump to victory. The former president won by improving his performance in every single type of locality – urban, suburban, and rural. The biggest swings towards him were in urban areas, a reflection of slightly better performance with non-white voters than he achieved in 2016 or 2020. Harris’ hope of improving her standing in the suburbs, and particularly among women, did not transpire. She actually performed slightly worse with female voters overall than Biden did in 2020. The only demographic group she did better with was highly educated women, but they only make up a small part of the electorate.[1]   Postmortems of the Harris campaign have already begun, and the debate over what it could have done differently is likely to continue for years. Her defeat seems to have been mainly due to general malaise in America caused by a period of high inflation and an unpopular incumbent president. There was a fairly uniform swing against the Democrats across all areas of the country and demographic groups, suggesting that it was not some mistake by Harris which turned off a key slice of voters. It was just that the country was ready for a change.   There is also no indication that America is headed for an extended period of dominance by Trump or the Republican Party. His ultimate margin in the popular vote, if he wins one at all, will be small. Moreover, in the swing states in which the two candidates actively campaigned, Harris did between 3 and 5% better than in states in which she did not campaign. This suggests that many people were convinced by her message – just not quite enough to overcome the national backlash against her party.   In Trump’s first term, his chaotic and offensive behaviour quickly produced a backlash of its own which drove down his popularity and led to subsequent electoral defeat. The same thing is likely to happen again this time, provided he does not do too much damage to American democracy in the meantime.   What does it mean? Nevertheless, the implications of the election for the country  and the world will be profound. Firstly, this election surely marks the acceptance of Trumpism as a normal, legitimate part of the American political spectrum. It is by no means politically dominant, but nor is it a temporary aberration. Trump won despite making no effort to moderate his racism, misogyny or authoritarian tendencies. Whether voters were really enthusiastically embracing these things is unclear, but a majority of them did not regard them as disqualifying.   The exact impact that Trump will have on the stability of democratic institutions and values in the US is hard to predict. He has talked about carrying out a mass deportation of immigrants and weaponising the criminal justice system against his political opponents and the media. The very fact that he will now avoid facing trial for his role in the January 6^th insurrection and his broader attempt to overturn the 2020 election also undermines democratic norms.   In a worst-case scenario, Trump and his allies might attempt to make more structural changes to the nature of American democracy, for instance through changing the way elections are administered or the way that the media is regulated. Such changes would likely kick off a furious backlash from civil society and be contested in the courts, but this does not mean they will necessarily fail. The hope of everyone must be that the country can make it through to November 2028 with its democracy more or less intact and that another free and fair election can be held.   The election also carries consequences for the world at large. The fact that Trumpism still remains a viable electoral force even after his disastrous first term means that it poses a more long-term challenge to Europe and the rest of the world. While America’s traditional internationalism and transatlanticism are by no means dead – they still have the support of the Democratic Party and some Republicans – they now co-exist with a more unilateral, even isolationist view. It is this view that will be ascendant over the next four years.   Therefore Britain and Europe can expect less attention from the United States as a result – and the attention that they do get will be of a less benign kind. Trump’s opposition to providing continued support to Ukraine is well known, and he appears to have kept up his friendly relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin while out of office.[2] Trump has also proposed placing 10% tariffs on all imports into the US, a move that economists have warned could plunge the Eurozone into recession and halve economic growth in Britain.[3]   The focus of European policymakers in the short term will be on trying to divine whether Trump plans to follow through with these security and economic policies, and how he might be persuaded not to. Trump’s very personalised approach to diplomacy means that foreign leaders will need to attempt to build a friendly rapport with him. This could prove divisive, with leaders vying for his favour and hoping that he directs his tariffs against their neighbours instead.   Foreign capitals also need to pay close attention to who Trump takes into the White House with him. In his first term, he often – although not always – placed experienced administrators and experts in charge of key agencies and in White House positions. However, the expectation is that in a second term Trump will be more dependent on figures who are closely associated with his Make America Great Again movement and the right-wing fringes of American politics. It is vital now for European governments to learn who these people are, what drives them, and how to establish a relationship with them.   The city on the hill no longer After Trump takes office, Europe will exist in a world in which none of the major global powers – Russia, the United States, or China – has a leadership which is committed to liberal democracy, the rule of law, or the multilateral institutions which make up the international order. Navigating this world while maintaining support for these values at home will require cooperation within Europe, including Great Britain. This requires European countries to develop not only the tools of power and influence, but also new mechanisms for pooling their strength and acting together.   The immediate challenge will be in finding ways to aid the defence of Ukraine and fend off the economic harm of Trump’s tariffs. Beyond that, Europe will need to become more serious about charting its own destiny. The continent’s prosperity and security cannot be left to the whim of voters in Michigan any longer. Nor can Europe continue to rely on always having an American leader who more or less shares the continent’s values. It must develop the capacity to champion and defend those values itself.   In practical terms, this means a few things. Firstly, it means boosting European defence industries so that the continent has the defence industrial base that it needs to look after itself. This will come too late to enable Ukraine to fight on if Trump pulls the plug on American support, but it would help with the defence of the continent in the future. Secondly, European governments – including the UK – need to do more to stimulate economic growth in order to generate the resources that the continent needs to stand on its own two feet. Finally, there is an urgent need for increased solidarity and coordination between Britain and the European Union, who must pool their resources to meet this moment.   Trump’s first term produced four years of talk about “strategic autonomy” in Europe, but far too few concrete steps to realise it. These steps proved to be difficult in part because the first time around, few European leaders wanted to accept that Trump and the movement he represented would be around for long. It was easier to still live in a mental universe in which the US still had a dominant seat at the table, even if that seat was temporarily unoccupied. This time around, Trump seems to want to turn over the table altogether. Europe needs to be prepared to build a new one in its place.   Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre   Photograph courtesy of Oleg Yunakov via WikiCommons.    [1] Kevin Schaul and Kati Perry, How Counties Are Shifting In The 2024 Presidential Election, The Washington Post, November 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/interactive/2024/11/05/compare-2020-2024-presidential-results/; Kaitlin Lewis, CNN Exit Poll Shows Kamala Harris’ One Area Of Growth In Election, Newsweek, October 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/kamala-harris-democrats-election-white-college-voters-1981832. [2] Michael Hirsh, The Enduring Mystery Of Trump’s Relationship With Russia, Foreign Policy, October 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/30/enduring-mystery-trump-relationship-russia/. [3] Larry Elliott, Trump Tariffs Would Halve UK Growth And Push Up Prices, Says Thinktank, The Guardian, November 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/06/donald-trump-tariffs-would-cut-uk-growth-by-half-and-push-up-inflation-thinktank-warns; Piero Cingari, Why Trump’s Plans For Tariffs Could Be Bad For Europe’s Economy, Euronews.com, November 2024, https://www.euronews.com/business/2024/11/04/how-much-could-trumps-tariffs-damage-europes-economy.   [post_title] => US Election Aftermath: How Trump won and what it means for the US and the world [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => us-election-aftermath-how-trump-won-and-what-it-means-for-the-us-and-the-world [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-11-08 14:38:54 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-11-08 13:38:54 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7644 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [31] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7638 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-11-05 09:00:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-11-05 08:00:00 [post_content] => After what has felt like an endless campaign, today is Election Day in the United States (US). Presuming that counting proceeds smoothly, there’s a good chance that by tomorrow we will know the winner of one of the most consequential elections in modern history. That makes it a good moment to look back on what has happened during the campaign and consider the stakes for the future.   The state of the race Let’s start with the current state of the race. As always, the outcome of the election depends on the swing states. Most US states reliably vote the same way every election. By contrast, the swing states are those in which a victory for either candidate is possible and so which will ultimately decide the overall winner. These seven states – Georgia, North Carolina, Nevada, Arizona, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania – have been polled more than ever before, and we also now have early voting data available from all of them.   So far, all of this information is inconclusive. The race appears to be a dead heat, with neither candidate enjoying a significant advantage. However, this appearance is based largely on the polls, which have been giving strange and contradictory results. The 2024 election comes at a make-or-break moment for the American polling industry, which badly misread both the 2016 and 2020 elections by underestimating support for Donald Trump.   Determined not to make the same mistake again, pollsters have radically changed their methods, and the exact changes have varied from pollster to pollster. Many seem to be suppressing results which suggest a clear victory for either candidate because they fear reputational damage from another drastically wrong call. This could be one reason why the polls appear so abnormally stable and tied.[1]   Early voting data is also a poor guide to the outcome of the election. Widespread early voting is a relatively recent phenomenon in U.S. elections, and this year it has been embraced by the Republican Party on a scale unseen in the past. This means that we lack a basis for comparison to previous elections.[2]   Not that this has stopped anxious (and sometimes jubilant) members of each party poring over the data looking for signs of an advantage. For instance, Republicans have been buoyed by turnout among seniors, and Democrats have been pleased to see women disproportionately represented among those who have voted early.[3] Yet there is no evidence that this means that younger people or men are less likely to vote on Election Day itself, when their votes will count just as much as those who turned out early.   The campaigns Everything, then, hinges on what happens today – who turns out to vote, and who they actually vote for. Here is what the two campaigns will be hoping is going to happen.   Kamala Harris has run her campaign with one overriding goal: to appeal to moderate, white swing voters in general and women in particular. She had three reasons for doing this. Firstly, as a woman of colour – not to mention a former senator from California – she realized that her biggest potential liability was being seen by the electorate as too liberal. Secondly, ever since 2016 Democrats have been able to make enormous inroads into America’s formerly Republican-leaning suburban communities as their residents have been repelled by Trump. Harris’ focus on the idea of Trump as a threat to democracy in the final weeks of her campaign is designed to win over more of this group. Thirdly, the overturning of Roe v. Wade – which guaranteed the right to abortion – has galvanized American women against the Republican Party, and Harris has made abortion rights a central part of her message.[4]   Victory for Harris hence looks something like this. Firstly, she needs to make sure that her party’s most reliable supporters turn out to vote in significant numbers in large cities like Philadelphia, Milwaukee and Atlanta. Secondly, she needs to peel as many suburban moderates and women away from Trump as possible.   Right now, defeat looks most likely to come from a failure of the party’s base to be enthused by her candidacy. If Harris loses, she’ll be criticized for not paying enough attention to voters of colour and working-class whites. Campaigning with former Republicans like Liz Cheney might have appeal in the suburbs, but there’s a chance it turns people off downtown.[5]   The Trump campaign is trying to pull off a similar balancing act. In previous elections, Trump has managed to mobilize white rural and working-class voters in large numbers while also maintaining some support in the suburbs. This time around, Trump himself has focused on using divisive and incendiary rhetoric to mobilize his base. While his campaign advertising has focused much more often on messages about inflation and immigration which are designed to appeal more to suburban moderates, it has also featured a heavy attack on transgender rights.[6]   Trump has also made an explicit appeal to men a central part of his campaign and has made some moves towards trying to broaden the Republican Party’s appeal with men of colour. The impact of the latter, however, has been blunted by the open racism of his campaign in its final weeks.[7]   If they were fielding any other candidate, then this would be the Republican Party’s election to lose. The US has just seen sky-high inflation, a crisis at its southern border, and an unpopular incumbent president having to step down halfway through his own re-election campaign. Virtually every other post-pandemic leader or government which oversaw similar levels of inflation has been ejected from office. The Republicans ought to be leading comfortably in the polls, not locked in an apparent tie. Instead, the party is paying a “Trump Tax” for their candidate’s divisiveness and extremism.[8] If victory comes, it will be because their discontent with the state of the country in the last four years persuaded just enough voters to give the former president another chance anyway.   The stakes In a sense, what is on the ballot today is not just who will be president for the next four years – it is whether the country will finally reject Trumpism or accept it as a normal feature of the country’s political landscape. If Trump loses, his political record will be a grim one for Republicans. The former president faced an unpopular opponent in 2016 and won by a tiny margin, and then went on to lead his party to dramatically underperform in the 2020 presidential election and the 2018 and 2022 midterms. Another loss now would present an opportunity for moderate Republicans with respect for the constitution to reclaim their party, and for the US to draw a line under the Trump era.   Victory, by contrast, would unleash Trump like never before. Indeed, Trump and his campaign seem to be relishing in divisiveness more openly than ever, meaning that it will be hard to claim that Americans did not know what they were getting themselves in for if they elect him. Trump’s campaign this year has been more overtly racist. He has complained that immigrants have bad “genes” and that they “poison the blood” of the American people.[9] At an event billed as his campaign’s “closing argument”, Trump hosted a comedian well known for making racist remarks – who then proceeded to do just that, sparking a furious backlash from some of the voters of colour who Trump had previously claimed to be trying to win over.[10]   Trump has also continued his violent rhetoric and attacks on the democratic process. These have included welcoming violence against journalists, speculating about his political opponents being jailed and shot, and making baseless accusations of election fraud. And that is just in the past week.[11]   Something else has hung over the closing days of the campaign – the possibility of violence or divisive legal contests, particularly if Trump loses. The Trump campaign has been ratcheting up its criticism of the electoral process in recent days, and it will almost certainly attempt to use lawsuits and pressure on local election officials to influence the counting process. The result could be chaos – or outbreaks of violence against election officials and offices, such as that which Trump has been criminally charged with orchestrating on January 6^th, 2021.   All of this means that the stakes are high. It matters a great deal to the rest of the world whether the United States is a country in which this style of politics is accepted by voters and practiced by the nation’s president. What happens today will determine the course of the next four years, and far beyond.   Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre   Photograph courtesy of Phil Roeder via Wikicommons.   [1] Robert Tait, Dead-Heat Poll Results Are Astonishing – And Improbable, These Experts Say, The Guardian, November 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/02/what-polls-mean-so-far-trump-harris-election-voters. [2] Ivan Pereira, Tens Of Millions Of Early Votes Have Been Cast. What Could It Mean For Election Day?, ABC News, November 2024, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/tens-millions-early-votes-cast-election-day/story?id=115272249. [3] Joey Garrison, Women Outpacing Men In Early Voting, Boosting Harris Campaign’s Optimism, USA Today, November 2024, https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/11/01/women-outpacing-men-early-voting-optimism-harris/75990004007/; Ryan King, Trump Camp Touts GOP Early-Voting Gains Over 2020 As Election Comes Down To Wire, The New York Post, November 2024, https://nypost.com/2024/11/03/us-news/trump-camp-touts-gop-early-voting-gains-over-2020-as-election-comes-down-to-wire/. [4] Megan Messerly and Meridith McGraw, Harris Is Courting Moderate Republicans. Liz Cheney Is Helping, Politico, November 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/10/21/harris-liz-cheney-moderate-republicans-00184765; Justine McDaniel, Abortion Rights Gave Democrats Big Wins Post-Roe. Harris Wants A Repeat, The Washington Post, November 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/11/03/kamala-harris-abortion-campaign-voters/. [5] Nicholas Nehamas and Erica L. Green, As Harris Courts Republicans, The Left Grows Wary And Alienated, The New York Times, November 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/24/us/politics/kamala-harris-progressives-democrats.html. [6] Susan Davis, GOP Ads On Transgender Rights Are Dominating Airwaves In The Election’s Closing Days, NPR, November 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/10/19/g-s1-28932/donald-trump-transgender-ads-kamala-harris. [7] Zac Anderson, Crude Talk And The NFL: Trump Doubles Down On His Lead With Male Voters, USA Today, October 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/10/19/g-s1-28932/donald-trump-transgender-ads-kamala-harris; Harry Enten, Trump Was Doing Historically Well With Hispanic Voters Before Madison Square Garden Backlash, CNN, October 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/28/politics/hispanic-voters-trump-election-rally/index.html. [8] Andrew Gawthorpe, Republicans Pay A Trump Taks – Again, America Explained, October 2024, https://amerex.substack.com/p/republicans-pay-a-trump-tax-again. [9] Kate Sullivan, Trump Suggests Undocumented Immigrants Who Commit Murder Have ‘Bad Genes’, CNN, October 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/07/politics/trump-undocumented-immigrants-bad-genes/index.html; Maggie Astor, Trump Doubles Down On Migrants ‘Poisoning’ The Country, The New York Times, March 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/17/us/politics/trump-fox-interview-migrants.html. [10] Jill Colvin and Michelle L. Price, Trump’s Madison Square Garden Event Features Crude And Racist Remarks, The Associated Press, October 2024, https://apnews.com/article/trump-madison-square-garden-new-york-election-fcfe75be7f8281fde7bffa3adb3bba5d. [11] Hannah Knowles and Meryl Kornfield, Trump Says He Doesn’t Mind Someone Shooting At Journalists At Rally, The Washington Post, November 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/2024/11/03/trump-rally-media-shooting/; Michael Gold and Adam Nagourney, Trump Assails Liz Cheney And Imagines Guns ‘Shooting At Her’, The New York Times, November 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/01/us/politics/trump-liz-cheney-tucker-carlson.html; Alexandra Marquez, Jake Traylor and Jillian Frankel, Trump Talks About Shooting At Press, Ramps Up Election Fraud Claims At Pa. Rally, NBC News, November 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-wouldnt-mind-if-someone-shot-media-pa-rally-rcna178573. [post_title] => Today is Election Day in America. Who will win – and what is at stake? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => today-is-election-day-in-america-who-will-win-and-what-is-at-stake [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-11-05 09:57:15 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-11-05 08:57:15 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7638 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [32] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7625 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-11-01 18:22:54 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-11-01 17:22:54 [post_content] => Donald Trump regularly claims that his strong leadership prevented the outbreak of war during his presidency. However, it's an argument that doesn't stand up to much scrutiny.   Some of the conflicts that have dogged his successor Joe Biden's presidential administration are the direct result of policies put in place during Trump's time in the White House. Not to mention the time Trump's grandstanding almost embroiled the United States (US) in a conflict with North Korea in 2017.[1]   The first foreign policy act for which Trump criticised the Biden administration was the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. The fact is that Biden was following the previous administrations’ plan, having been left with little choice but to implement Trump's deal with the Taliban in February 2020.[2]   This agreement, done without the involvement of the Afghan government, involved the US committing to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan in return for the Taliban pledging not to attack American forces. There was no corresponding requirement to prevent the Taliban attacking Afghan government forces, no mechanism to enforce this agreement, and the deal sanctioned the release of 5,000 Taliban fighters who soon found themselves back on the front line.   The US withdrawal also involved the removal of military protection of US contractors who serviced and maintained Afghan army helicopters and other equipment. Their withdrawal contributed heavily to the rapid defeat of these forces.[3] Mark Esper, Trump’s then defence secretary, criticised the deal for pulling out too many troops, too quickly for nothing in return.[4] H.R. McMaster, Trump’s second national security adviser, went further in calling the deal “a surrender agreement with the Taliban”.[5] So, although Afghanistan was a defeat on Biden’s watch, it was a failure of the Trump administration’s making.   Similarly, it can be argued that a contributing factor behind the decision by Hamas to launch its murderous attack on Israel in October 2023 was to derail the normalisation of relations between the Arab world and Israel that the Trump administration initiated through the Abraham Accords.[6] The bilateral agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco is seen as one of, if not the, signature foreign policy achievements of the Trump administration. [7]   However, the Accords failed to address the Palestinian question meaning efforts to extend normalisation to Saudi Arabia were perceived by Hamas as the abandonment of their plight. While talks of normalisation paid lip service to the need to address the Palestinian question, Hamas, amongst others, were clearly of the opinion that that framing of the Abraham Accords that Trump set in motion was decidedly and deliberately exclusionary of their interests.   That Hamas's plan was a success in this regard was borne out by the subsequent statement in 2024 by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that: "No relations with Israel will be established before progress is made toward establishing a Palestinian state".[8]   While Biden could have deviated from Trump’s policies in both Afghanistan and the Middle East there would have been costs associated with doing so. In Afghanistan, it would have required sending huge numbers of American military forces back to the region. In the Middle East, it would have meant unpicking a diplomatic initiative that has already granted Israel diplomatic progress without the requirement to make concessions.   That he did not do so does not mean that responsibilities for these debacles lays solely with Biden. These were all policy decisions of which Trump would have reaped the consequences had he won a second term in November 2020.   What is most often forgotten about Trump’s years in the White House is how close America came to war with North Korea. In July 2017, Pyongyang developed an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with the capability to reach the continental US, something that candidate Trump vowed would never happen. While the military advised quiet defensive measures and military signalling, Tump took to twitter, calling Kim Young Un “Little rocket man” and promising: “Fire and fury like the world has never seen.”[9]   His threats towards North Korea, however, were not confined to escalatory rhetoric. Instead, Trump ordered three carrier battle groups to the region and flew numerous simulated air attacks against the country.[10]   Discussion within the White House over a US nuclear attack against Pyongyang’s rocket forces were so advanced that Defence Secretary Jim Mattis was being dropped off at Washington’s National Cathedral on his way home from the Pentagon, in order to pray for guidance as he prepared plans to “incinerate a couple million people.”[11]   It was a crisis that could have so easily have escalated had Trump not been seduced by a series of vague promises and the opportunity to meet the North Korean leader in three media-drenched summit meetings. On this occasion Trump’s love of the cameras, the sense of anticipation and the belief that the summits were in themselves substantive, persuaded him to drop the pressure on North Korea and effectively accept the nuclear threat that Kim now presents to America.   At the time Trump declared “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea”, with US Senator Chuck Schumer responding: “Saying it doesn’t make it so.” [12] Since this episode US relations with North Korea have only worsened.   Trump’s handling of the threat of Iranian nuclear proliferation also brings into question the idea that his return to the White House would be conflict free. In May 2018 Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for Iran – the “Iran Nuclear deal”, without having any alternative plan beyond sanctions of limiting the development of Tehran’s latent nuclear weapons programme.[13] As a result, Iran is much closer to a nuclear weapons capability than ever before.  Trump’s response to this is to publicly support the notion that Israel should pre-emptively destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities before they can develop the capacity to reach the United States. [14] In order to be successful such an action would likely require a joint US Israeli attack of considerable scale.[15]Hardly the impression that Trump likes to give of what his second term would be like.   How a second Trump administration would deal with threats over Iran, North Korea, the Chinese threat to Taiwan, the war in Ukraine will play out are unknowable. Yet what is certain is that the track record of his first term in office is no guarantee of peace and security for the next four years.   David Hastings Dunn is Professor of International Politics at the University of Birmingham, he writes on US and international security issues.   Photograph courtesy of The White House from Washington, DC, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   [1] James Hohmann, The Washington Post, 16 September 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/16/daily-202-us-came-much-closer-war-with-north-korea-2017-than-public-knew-trump-told-woodward/ [2] David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, Conflict - The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Gaza, 15 October 2024 https://www.harpercollins.com/products/conflict-david-petraeusandrew-roberts?variant=41467744092194 [3] ibid. [4] Amber Philips, The Washington Post, 26 August 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/08/20/trump-peace-deal-taliban  [5] Bari Weiss, X, 19 August 2021, https://x.com/bariweiss/status/1428191060791005186 [6] Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Steven Tian and Dan Raviv, Time, 'Why Hamas Tried to Sabotage Arab-Israeli Peace Prospects With a Massive Unprovoked Attack', 08 October 2023, https://time.com/6321671/why-hamas-sabotaged-peace-prospects-israel-attack/ [7] Quint Forgey, Politico, '‘The dawn of a new Middle East’: Trump celebrates Abraham Accords with White House signing ceremony' , 15 September 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/15/trump-abraham-accords-palestinians-peace-deal-415083 [8] Tamir Pardo and Nimrod Novik, The Jerusalem Post, 'Former Mossad chief warns Netanyahu’s ‘curse plan’ endangers Israel’s regional future - opinion', 30 September 2024  https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-822472 [9] Bob Woodward, Rage, Simon & Schuster, 31 May 2021, https://www.simonandschuster.co.uk/books/Rage/Bob-Woodward/9781471197741 [10] ibid. [11] James Hohmann, The Washington Post, 16 September 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/16/daily-202-us-came-much-closer-war-with-north-korea-2017-than-public-knew-trump-told-woodward/ [12] Donald Trump, X, 13 June 2018 https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1006837823469735936 Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, The New York Times, 'Trump Sees End to North Korea Nuclear Threat Despite Unclear Path', 13 June 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/us/politics/trump-north-korea-denuclearization.html [13] Mark Lander, The New York Times, 'Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned' 8 May 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html [14] AFP, The Times of Israel, 'Trump says he thinks Israel should ‘hit’ Iran nuclear facilities', 05 October 2024 https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/trump-says-he-thinks-israel-should-hit-iran-nuclear-facilities/ [15] Doreen Horschig, CSIS, 'Why Striking Iranian Nuclear Facilities Is a Bad Idea', 25 October 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-striking-iranian-nuclear-facilities-bad-idea [post_title] => Op-ed: Would Trump 2.0 mean “No War”? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-would-trump-2-0-mean-no-war [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-11-01 19:55:16 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-11-01 18:55:16 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7625 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [33] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7575 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-10-07 11:00:03 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-10-07 10:00:03 [post_content] => With the US presidential election fast approaching, Ukraine’s allies in the West have been trying to find ways to shore up Kyiv. Further support for Ukraine seems much more uncertain if Donald Trump wins the American presidency, and so the window for the West to act in a more or less unified fashion may be closing. This is the context in which a number of Western countries, led by the UK, recently argued for Ukraine to be given permission to fire long-range missiles provided by the West deeper into Russia.^[1]   For some time, Western countries – namely the UK, France, and the US – have been providing Ukraine with long-range missiles which are technically capable of striking targets deep inside Russia.  At the same time, however, these countries have only given Kyiv permission to use the missiles on Ukrainian territory, fearing that their use in Russia itself might lead to a dramatic escalation of the conflict. Conversely, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has downplayed the risk of escalation this may cause, and instead argued that this restriction is preventing Ukraine from defending itself as effectively as possible.^[2]   At the time of writing, it appears that the Biden administration is unlikely to approve Ukraine’s request. US intelligence agencies assess that the strategic value of allowing the use of the missiles in this manner is outweighed by the risks of escalation. While they acknowledge that the Ukrainian military would be able to do some damage to Russian supply lines and strike capabilities, they argue that the missiles would not be available to the Ukrainians in sufficient quantity to fundamentally change the course of the conflict.^[3] Russia is widely reported to have already prepared for the decision by moving many of its military assets outside of the range of the missiles.^[4]   It is possible, of course, that the Biden administration will change its mind. Given British Prime Minister Keir Starmer still strongly endorses allowing Ukraine to use long-range missiles within Russia, it is fathomable that the deteriorating position on Ukraine’s eastern front may eventually convince Washington that granting permission has value, even merely as a gesture of diplomatic support. However, the debate over the missiles has also highlighted four issues which will continue to plague the Western alliance, even if Ukraine eventually gets to use the missiles as it wishes.   The first is the cumbersome and public process of decision-making. As democracies, the UK and the US – along with other members of NATO – make decisions through building domestic and international consent. This involves allowing wide discussion of a decision before it is taken, which sacrifices surprise and secrecy. The extent to which Russia has adapted its supply lines and the disposition of its forces in anticipation of any missile decision is a testament to how difficult it is for the Western allies to achieve a measure of surprise.   The second problem regards escalation of risk. US officials are said to be concerned both about the possibility of sabotage or lethal attacks on military bases in Europe, and that Russia might strike back somewhere else in the world, for instance by providing Yemen’s Houthis with missile technology to strike at American military bases or shipping in the Middle East.^[5] The Biden administration desperately wants to avoid entering a cycle of increasing tit-for-tat action with the Kremlin, and for now it seems that Russia has succeeded in deterring it from doing so.   Even if permission to use the missiles for deep strikes into Russia is eventually granted, it seems that we are at or very near the limits of Washington’s appetite for taking further risks in order to help Ukraine defend itself. Further steps would raise the likelihood of Russian retaliation. Given that the usage of these missiles to strike deeper into Russia is unlikely to strategically change the course of the conflict, Washington is right to suspect that if it grants permission, the conversation will quickly shift to even riskier proposals – ones which American officials do not want to consider, much less accept.   This fact is reinforced by the third point, which is that Ukraine and its allies are beginning to disagree more than ever about what “victory” looks like and how to achieve it. As part of his push for loosening the missile restrictions, Zelensky presented a “victory plan” to US and European officials; however, the plan reportedly left the officials unimpressed. Behind closed doors, fewer and fewer officials outside of Ukraine believe that the country’s goal of regaining all of its lost territory is realistic.^[6]   With even those supportive of the missile decision conceding that it would not turn the conflict around, there also appears to be no other conceivable decision that Ukraine’s allies could take that would have a large impact on the course of the war at what Washington considers an acceptable level of risk. The disconnect between Ukraine’s goals and what its international supporters are able and willing to do will become a key problem if diplomatic efforts to pause the conflict ramp up after the US presidential election.   The fourth problem is just how tenuous Kyiv’s Western lifeline may be. Although the UK and France supported loosening restrictions on the usage of these long-range missiles, the key strategic decisions regarding Western support are ultimately made in one place – the White House. That means that Ukraine is particularly vulnerable to abrupt changes in American policy.   Even under the strongly internationalist Biden administration, US support for Ukraine has been deliberative and cautious. With the United States more concerned about the rising threat of China than it is about Russia – and ultimately unwilling to risk war with Russia to defend Ukraine – Kyiv will eventually face pressure to settle the conflict. If Trump wins the presidential election, Ukraine’s support from the US may evaporate entirely. Long-range missiles or not, both Ukraine and its allies will eventually be faced with some agonising choices regarding the kind of end to the conflict that they are willing to accept.   Andrew Gawthorpe is a historian of the United States at Leiden University. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office. He writes a newsletter called America Explained.   Photograph courtesy of The White House, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] Michael D. Shear and David E. Sanger, Meeting With Biden, British Leader Hints at Ukraine Weapon Decision Soon, The New York Times, September 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/13/us/politics/biden-starmer-ukraine-russia-missiles.html. ^[2] James Marson, Alexander Ward, and Lara Seligman, Zelensky Visited U.S. to Seek War Boost. His Most-Important Ally Shrugged, The Wall Street Journal, September 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/zelensky-visited-u-s-to-seek-war-boost-his-most-important-ally-shrugged-d7ba76e7. ^[3] Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Intelligence Stresses Risks in Allowing Long-Range Strikes by Ukraine, The New York Times, September 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/26/us/politics/us-ukraine-strikes.html. ^[4] Clare Sebastian, Ukraine Wants To Fire Western Long-Range Weapons Into Russia. But The Battlefield Gain Is Not Clear-Cut, CNN, September 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/22/europe/ukraine-western-long-range-weapons-russia-intl/index.html. ^[5] Julian E. Barnes and John Ismay, Alert Level Raised at U.S. Bases in Europe Over Russian Threats, The New York Times, September 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/01/us/politics/us-bases-alert-level-russia.html; Josh Irish, Parisa Hafezi and Jonathan Landay, Exclusive: Iran Brokering Talks To Send Advanced Russian Missiles To Yemen's Houthis, Sources Say, Reuters, September 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-brokering-talks-send-advanced-russian-missiles-yemens-houthis-sources-say-2024-09-24/. ^[6] Alexander Ward and Lara Seligman, U.S. ‘Unimpressed’ With Ukraine’s Victory Plan Ahead of Biden-Zelensky Meeting, The Wall Street Journal, September 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/u-s-unimpressed-with-ukraines-victory-plan-ahead-of-biden-zelensky-meeting-23e87bff. [post_title] => Op-Ed: Long-range missile debate reveals key problems for Ukraine and its supporters [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-long-range-missile-debate-reveals-key-problems-for-ukraine-and-its-supporters [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-10-07 12:48:59 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-10-07 11:48:59 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7575 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [34] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7562 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-09-20 16:12:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-09-20 15:12:48 [post_content] => In Western media, Serbia is often presented as a pawn in Vladimir Putin’s confrontation with his US counterparts. However, the real situation is far more complex. While the Russian state does maintain a significant presence in this Balkan state, its influence has been relatively limited. Furthermore, Putin’s reckless gamble in Ukraine has resulted in a greater decline of Moscow’s ties to Belgrade. In the same vein, while Serbian society has a long history of pro-Russian orientation, a closer look suggests a more nuanced picture that extends beyond simplistic explanations circling around ‘Russophilia’ and ‘Putinomania’. This article analyses the development of Russia’s influence in Serbia under the Progressive Party (SNS), which has been in power since 2012, and outlines the current state of affairs.   Power and Russia’s desired outcomes in Serbia In international relations, influence is often conceptualised as power - “the ability to affect the behaviour of others to get what one wants”.^[1] It can be exercised through mechanisms that are either hard (coercion and payment) or soft (attraction and persuasion), and the extent of their impact can be judged by the outcomes.[2] A state’s desired outcomes in respect of other states can be determined from the general aims and specific goals codified in its official documents. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, Military Doctrine and National Security Strategy allow insight into the state’s desired outcomes regarding international relations. To date, Serbia has not been mentioned in any past or current versions of this strategy, which suggests its low-priority status for Russia's power elite. Nevertheless, based on the general aims and more region-specific goals articulated by the Russian leadership, their desired outcomes in Serbia have been to: maximise Russia’s security by pushing back against North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), their “main external military danger”; to amass economic and cultural influence by securing the Serbian segment of Russia’s gas and oil supply network and other trade activities; as well as  generating pro-Russian attitudes among Serbia’s power elite and public.^[3]   Security Security cooperation between Russia and Serbia began to advance in 2012, when the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) took over from their more openly Western-oriented predecessors, the Democratic Party. This manifested in the signing of the bilateral Military Cooperation Agreement (MCA) in 2013, providing for information and experience exchange, cooperation in military education, cartography, topography, and peacekeeping.[4] MCA was followed in 2014 by the Military Technical Cooperation Agreement (MTCA), securing Serbia as a client of Russia’s military industry, as well as other agreements on cooperation to combat organised crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.^[5] Since 2013, Serbia has also been an observer in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and took part in joint Russian-led military exercises (“Slavic Brotherhood” & “BARS”) between 2014 and 2021.[6]   Looking at the bigger picture, however, Russia’s military influence in Serbia peaked in June 1999, when a relatively small Russian military contingent took over the Slatina Airport near Priština in an attempt to prevent NATO’s control over Yugoslavia’s Kosovo & Metohija region. They managed to temporarily block the US-led “Allied Force”. However, due to Russia’s weak position in the global political landscape at that time, the country’s leadership could not secure a supply route for their military contingent. Their risky gambit was over within a few days.   Since 1999, NATO, led by the US, has secured its military supremacy in Serbia, which resulted in the construction of the second largest US military base in Europe (Camp Bondsteel, in the southern part of Kosovo) in 1999; the departure of the Russian peacekeepers from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission in 2003; and several agreements signed between NATO and Belgrade. This includes the NATO Transit Agreement, which allowed NATO troops to travel freely through Serbian territory, as well as the establishment of the Serbia-NATO Defence Reform Group and the Partnership for Peace, bringing Serbia even closer to the North Atlantic alliance. This partnership has continued under the SNS, with the previous Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić signing the Individual Partnership Action Plan and an agreement on support and procurement (NSPO), and the current Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić pursuing further cooperation. Serbia has also regularly participated in NATO’s military exercises, which outnumbered their joint manoeuvres with Russia five-to-one.   In 2022, in the context of intensifying confrontation between Moscow and Washington over Ukraine, the Serbian government suspended their engagement in military exercises with both sides. However, they have since resumed their participation in US-led military training activities while Russia’s recent military exercises, including “Union Shield 2023”, were marked by the absence of Serbia’s military contingent.[7]   Economy Russia’s most significant economic progress in Serbia has been related to energy supply. Following the signing of the Energy Cooperation Framework Agreement between Belgrade and Moscow in 2008, Gazprom Neft acquired the controlling stake of 51% in Serbia’s faltering energy giant Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS). This share was increased to 56.15% in 2011.[8] With oil products and gas accounting for almost half of Serbia’s total energy consumption, and with a quarter of its oil and almost all of its gas coming from Russia, Belgrade has become highly energy-reliant on Moscow.[9]   Over the years, Serbia proved to be a reliable partner, accommodating one of Russia’s key pipelines supplying gas to Europe (TurkStream), while buying Russian oil and gas at relatively advantageous rates. In addition to this, the Strategic Partnership Declaration (SPD) signed by the then Serbian President Nikolić in 2013 provided for greater cooperation in business, investment and trade, as well as transport, tourism, and agriculture.[10] Economic ties were further bolstered by a series of bilateral agreements signed by President Vučić in 2019.[11] However, the bigger picture reveals a situation that is not as favourable to the Kremlin.   Despite the aforementioned developments, Russia is not the prime mover in Serbia’s economy, trailing behind Germany, other European countries and increasingly China. Furthermore, Serbia’s trade with Russia has fallen significantly over the past two years due to new rounds of US-led sanctions, after Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in 2022.[12] In addition to this, with Serbia’s recent strides towards energy diversification manifested in its recent agreements on natural gas with Azerbaijan and on nuclear energy with France, as well as potential liquified natural gas (LNG) perspectives via Greece and Montenegro, Russia’s influence in the only sector of Serbia’s economy where it had been able to achieve significant success is likely to decrease in the near future.   While Gazprom Neft and other companies affiliated with the Kremlin (e.g. Russian Railways) continue to operate in Serbia, albeit under increasing pressure, others (e.g. Sberbank) have left. One may note the recent expansion of Russian IT companies (Yandex in particular) and mushrooming of small Russian enterprises around Belgrade and Novi Sad. However, most of these new arrivals, relokanty (“individuals who have relocated for an indefinite period“), tend to be opponents rather than supporters of Putin and are highly unlikely to facilitate the Russian state’s influence in their newly-found Balkan refuge.   At the same time, while Serbia voted for the United Nations’ motion condemning Putin’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, it did not join economic sanctions against Russia despite the pressure from the US. One reason for this is the aforementioned dependence on affordable Russian gas. However, there is more to it.   US, Russia and Serbian society In 2008, Priština-based challengers of the central government in Belgrade proclaimed Kosovo’s independence, which was swiftly recognised by Washington. The expectation that a state leader must preserve their country’s territorial integrity and the extant cultural importance of Kosovo to many Serbs meant that accepting its secession would have cost then-president Boris Tadić his political career. Therefore, despite the ruling Democratic Party’s pro-Western stance, Tadić decided to pivot towards Russia while maintaining ties to the US, adopting a neo-Titoist approach of balancing between the West and the East. Hence, in this context, Russia emerged as Serbia’s indispensable ally, using its permanent seat at the UN Security Council to block the full legitimisation of Kosovo’s statehood.   Another potential factor underpinning President Vučić’s decision not to join the US-led sanctions against Russia, is the pro-Russian sentiments common in Serbian society. In this respect, any policies perceived as anti-Russian are prone to invoking strong negative reactions from the staunchly pro-Kremlin, Putinist segment of the public and silent disapproval from the moderately Russia-friendly majority. These dynamics can be explained by several cultural and material factors.   The majority of Serbs and Russians identify with Orthodox Christianity, which enables a perception of mutual societal similarities, in particular among the practising Orthodox Christians. Furthermore, the closeness between Russian and Serbian clergy and their vocal support for both governments make them efficient public diplomacy agents for the Russian state. Another cultural factor is a shared history, from an earlier, spiritual connection between the two Slavic nations through to Russia emerging as zaštitnica (defender) of Serbs. The latter theme has crystallised as a result of Russia’s role in facilitating Serbia’s independence from the Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia’s survival in the First and Second World Wars and in its conflict with NATO in the late 1990’s. Considering the popularity of national history and reading in Serbian society and the consonance between Russian and Serbian narratives in the aforementioned themes, they have come together as a solid cultural foundation for the Kremlin’s soft power in Serbia.   The cultural aspect of Russia’s soft power in Serbia also has a solid material base. For instance, Russia showed high scores and gradual growth (up to 72%) in a series of polls on the general impression of foreign countries among the young adults in Serbia, conducted between 2008 and 2016. This contrasted with the lower perceptions of the US, which did not rise above the 20% mark.[13] Looking more closely, the increases in pro-Russian attitudes demonstrated in this poll appear to have coincided with particular events, such as: the announcement of Russia’s energy projects in Serbia; Putin’s takeover of Crimea; Moscow’s veto of the genocide resolution on Srebrenica at the UN; and Russian Foreign Minister’s visit to Belgrade for an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conference, at which he mentioned the “NATO aggression against Yugoslavia” and the “Kosovo tragedy” themes.[14] Therefore, while pro-Russian attitudes are common in Serbia, they also appear to be influenced by the Kremlin’s diplomatic support for Serbia’s territorial integrity and international reputation. This hypothesis is reinforced by recent polls that feature Russia as the top choice for the country that should be more involved in the talks on Kosovo (29%), a country that Serbia should rely on in international relations (42.1%) and align its foreign policy with (61%).^[15]   Furthermore, with the perception of the US as the enemy (due to the NATO’s previous military and ongoing political alignment with Bosniaks and Kosovan Albanians against Serbs), any of Russia’s actions against the interests of the US are likely to generate a positive response. This is reinforced by recent research that points to the perception of similarity between Serbia’s and Russia’s negative experiences with the West (economic sanctions and military confrontation) as the reason for the high opposition to sanctions against Russia (74.3%) in Serbian society.[16] Hence, the basis of Russia-friendly attitudes among the majority of Serbian citizens is not only cultural, but also material.   Russia’s public diplomacy in Serbia Unsurprisingly, all of the above themes have been systematically promoted by Russia’s Serbian-language online media (e.g. Sputnik Srbija), the Russian House (Kremlin’s cultural diplomacy centre in Belgrade) and other, smaller organisations, through exhibitions, film screenings, concerts and religious events (e.g. Holy Fire). These have often been endorsed by various Serbian political officials looking to reaffirm their respect for their Russian partners and to capitalise on pro-Russian sentiments among the public. It must be noted that Russia’s public diplomacy actors have seldom been able to reach beyond the minority groups of Russophile intellectuals and ultra-conservatives. Nevertheless, certain cultural constructs such as Putin’s strongman persona have travelled through society organically, manifested in various ways, from local bars bearing his name or displaying his portraits to mugs, T-shirts and other Putin paraphernalia. As famously explained by Dragan Vučićević, the owner of the country’s leading tabloid, Informer: “Our usual daily circulation is 120,000… When I have Putin calendars, we sell 250,000… If I had put Catherine Ashton or Juncker on calendar, I don’t think I would sell even 12 copies”.[17] Moreover, Serbia’s own news media, cinemas and other platforms have been fairly accommodating to Russia’s political perspectives and cultural products.   At the same time, Serbian media have also platformed pro-Western voices, and the CNN-affiliated channel N1 has taken a prominent spot on Serbia’s television grid. Furthermore, Western films, TV series and music remain far more plentiful and popular in Serbia than the Russian products, especially among young adults. Similarly, English and other West European languages continue to be more popular than Russian.[18] Moreover, despite the extant belief in potential aid from Russia, the perception of Russia as Serbia’s main donor continues to fall behind the European Union (EU) and now also China. The same can be said about the appeal of the Kremlin's state model, overshadowed by Switzerland, Norway and Germany.^[19] The latter may have been partially influenced by some of the 370,000 relokanty, recent Russian émigrés many of whom have been vocal about the rise of repression and corruption in their home country.[20] Meanwhile, the EU continues to represent genuine economic opportunities, with a far greater number of Serbian citizens living, working and studying in the EU states than in Russia.^[21]   There have been recent attempts to revamp Russia’s cultural strategy with the arrival of new, pro-active public diplomacy chiefs on the scene – in particular the new head of Rossotrudnichestvo (Russia’s cultural diplomacy agency) Yevgeniy Primakov Jr and new Russian House director Yevgeniy Baranov. Over the past three years, they have doubled down on youth exchange programmes and social media activities in Serbia. However, whether these efforts will bring any significant results remains to be seen. In the same vein, in 2022, following their banishment from the West, RT finally launched a Serbian-language online portal, but their reach and public engagement remain modest. Russia’s only potential game-changer in this respect would be expanding to television, which remains the dominant news platform in Serbia. If some segments of the Serbian public switch from national channels to one completely dominated by carefully crafted pro-Kremlin frames, Russia’s soft power potential may increase.  However, with the launch previously announced for 2024, RT has yet to materialise on Serbian TV screens.[22] Considering the Serbian government’s already precarious situation in the context of the war in Ukraine and the questionable appeal of having another TV channel beyond their control, the prospects for RT appearing on Serbia’s television grid remain uncertain, albeit not unlikely.   Conclusion The results of the Russian government’s efforts in Serbia have been relatively modest despite the enabling environment offered by their counterparts in Belgrade. Russia has been long overtaken by the US-led NATO in the military domain, and trails behind European states and China economically, with the exception of the energy sector. Furthermore, Putin’s reckless actions in Ukraine not only jeopardised Moscow’s chances of any further advancement, but they also compromised what the Kremlin had managed to achieve in the previous ten years. Its military cooperation with Belgrade has been reduced and its, once solid, position in the energy sector is now at risk of decline.   At the same time, Moscow’s extant power can be evidenced by Belgrade’s refusal to join the US-led sanctions against Russia. Clearly, the Kremlin has been successful in generating some pro-Russian policies from Serbia’s leadership and cultivating pro-Russian attitudes among the Serbian public. This has been enabled by Moscow’s consistent political support for Serbia’s territorial integrity and international reputation, which sits in contrast to Washington’s current policies and previous military actions against Belgrade. Meanwhile, shared religion, history and other cultural aspects continue to provide an organic foundation for Russia’s soft power in Serbia.   While a significant percentage of Serbian citizens may collectively look up to Russia as the defender of their state on the global arena, nevertheless, as individuals, many opt for the EU due to the greater economic opportunities it offers and prefer the political models of West European states such as Switzerland, Norway and Germany. Meanwhile, some of the recent 370,000 relokanty from Russia are likely to reinforce and amplify these attitudes by sharing their experiences of growing authoritarianism and corruption in their home country. At the same time, because of the low-cost strategy pursued by Moscow vis-à-vis Serbia in previous years, its public diplomacy capabilities remain limited.   Recent signs of reactivation of Kremlin’s cultural actors in Serbia may mean some increase in pro-Russian attitudes in the near future, certainly if they manage to secure their spot on the TV grid. However, if these efforts do not bear any fruit, Moscow’s influence will continue to diminish, overshadowed by Washington, Brussels and Beijing. ​​ Dr Ernest A Reid is a Teaching & Development Assistant at Aston University and an Associate Fellow at Advance HE (AFHEA). He was formerly a PhD Scholar at Aston School of Social Sciences and an IMESS Scholar at UCL School of Slavonic & Eastern European Studies (UCL SSEES). His expertise on Russia’s influence in Serbia comes from a research project he had developed and carried out for UCL SSEES, spending nine months in Belgrade and travelling to Moscow to observe and interact with Russian public diplomacy actors. Fluent in Russian, he has also worked as a translator, with former clients including the UK government and law enforcement agencies, as well as IGOs, NGOs and media companies.   Photograph courtesy of author.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] Joseph Nye, Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power, Foreign Affairs, July 2009, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20699631 [2] Joseph Nye, Hard, soft and smart power, The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, March 2013, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199588862.013.0031 ^[3] President of Russia, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2008, Kremlin, January 2008, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116; President of Russia, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2013, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Kingdom of Thailand, February 2013, https://thailand.mid.ru/en/o_rossii/vneshnyaya_politika/kontseptsiya_vneshney_politiki_rf/; President of Russia, The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/; President of Russia, Strategiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda, Kremlin, May 2009, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/424 ; President of Russia, Ukaz ‘O strategii Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, December 2015, https://rg.ru/documents/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html;  President of Russia, Strategiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, National Security Council of the Russian Federation, July 2021, http://scrf.gov.ru/media/files/file/l4wGRPqJvETSkUTYmhepzRochb1j1jqh.pdf;  President of Russia, Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii, National Security Council of the Russian Federation, December 2014, http://scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document129/ [4] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Soglasheniye o voyennom sotrudnichestve, Russian Embassy in Serbia, November 2013, https://serbia.mid.ru/ru/countries/legal_base/mezhpravitelstvennye_dogovory/ ^[5] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Soglasheniye o voyenno-tehnicheskom sotrudnichestve, Russian Embassy in Serbia, October 2014, https://serbia.mid.ru/ru/countries/legal_base/mezhpravitelstvennye_dogovory/ [6] Rossiya perebrosila na ucheniya v Serbiyu batareyu “Pantsirey”, Interfaks – Agentstvo Voyennyh Novostey, October 2021, https://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=0&nid=558708&lang=RU [7] V Rossii nachalis’ sovmestnye s Belorussiyey ucheniya, Yevraziya, September 2023, https://eurasia.expert/v-rossii-nachalis-sovmestnye-s-belarusyu-ucheniya-shchit-soyuza-2023/ [8] Gazprom Neft buys 5.15 pct of Serbia's NIS, Reuters, March 2011, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/stocks/gazprom-neft-buys-515-pct-of-serbias-nis-idUSLDE72H0UB/ [9] Serbia, International Energy Agency, January 2021, https://www.iea.org/countries/serbia/energy-mix;  Michał Paszkowski, Serbia activates natural gas supply efforts, Instytut Europy Środkowej, July 2023, https://ies.lublin.pl/en/comments/serbia-activates-natural-gas-supply-efforts/ [10] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Deklaratsiya o strategicheskom partnyorstve, Kremlin, May 2013, http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/1461 [11] Governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia, Dokumenty, podpisannye oficial’nogo visita Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federacii V. Putina v Respubliku Serbiyu, Kremlin, January 2019, http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5386 [12] Statistics of external trade 23, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, December 2022, https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2024/PdfE/G20241207.pdf; Statistics of external trade 207, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, June 2024, https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2023/PdfE/G20231023.pdf [13] Ernest Reid, "Moscow’s public diplomacy and Russophilia in Serbia, 2012–2019", FPN Godišnjak, June 2020, https://www.fpn.bg.ac.rs/wp-content/uploads/FPN-Godisnjak-23-2020.pdf [14] Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s Remarks at the 22nd OSCE Ministerial Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2015, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1519569/ ^[15] Opinion poll report: socio-political views of Serbian citizens in 2023, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, April 2023, https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/wfd_nws_2023_eng_final.pdf ; Political attitudes of citizens of Serbia – Fall 2022, CRTA Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability 2022, December 2022, https://crta.rs/en/opininon-poll-political-attitudes-of-citizens-of-serbia-fall-2022/ [16] Vuk Vuksanovic, Srdjan Cvijic, Maksim Samorukov, Beyond Sputnik & RT: How does Russian soft power in Serbia really work, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, December 2022, https://bezbednost.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/How-does-Russian-soft-power-in-Serbia-really-work.pdf [17] Valerie Hopkins, In Balkans, Britain rejoins battle for influence, Politico, March 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/balkans-bbc-britain-rejoins-battle-for-influence-russia-soft-power/ [18] Ernest Reid, Third Rome or Potemkin village: Analyzing the Extent of Russia’s Power in Serbia, 2012–2019, Nationalities Papers, October 2020, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/abs/third-rome-or-potemkin-village-analyzing-the-extent-of-russias-power-in-serbia-20122019/E8E755F37EB6AA8AB477EAB3FBB3474E ^[19] Public Opinion Polls, Ministry of European Integration, December 2022, https://www.mei.gov.rs/eng/documents/national-documents/public-opinion-poll/ [20] Broj ruskih firmi u Srbiji od početka rata skočio za 1.000 odsto, Nova Ekonomija, June 2024, https://novaekonomija.rs/vesti-iz-zemlje/broj-ruskih-firmi-u-srbiji-od-pocetka-rata-skocio-za-1-000-odsto ^[21] Political attitudes of citizens of Serbia – Fall 2022, CRTA Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability 2022, December 2022, https://crta.rs/en/opininon-poll-political-attitudes-of-citizens-of-serbia-fall-2022/ [22] Počeo sa radom portal ruske RT na srpskom jeziku, RTS, November 2022, https://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/drustvo/poceo-sa-radom-portal-ruske-rt-na-srpskom-jeziku_1391190.html   [post_title] => An ambiguous future? Russia’s declining material presence and remaining soft power in Serbia [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => an-ambiguous-future-russias-declining-material-presence-and-remaining-soft-power-in-serbia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-09-23 09:41:35 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-09-23 08:41:35 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7562 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [35] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7547 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-08-21 08:36:17 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-08-21 07:36:17 [post_content] => This week at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Kamala Harris and Tim Walz will formally accept their party’s nomination for president and vice-president. Given the speed and unusual circumstances in which Harris and Walz have emerged as their party’s standard-bearers, observers around the world will be closely watching the convention – as well as the planned protests against United States’ policy towards Gaza taking place on the sidelines – for clues as to the likely foreign policy approach of any future Harris administration.   The Harris-Walz campaign has come together quickly, and so far, it has not focused strongly on world affairs. Harris has given no major speech on this topic, and none are currently planned. However, this should not be mistaken for disinterest, or inexperience – in fact, Harris would come to the Oval Office with more executive branch foreign policy experience than any president in decades.[1] By looking at her record both in the Biden administration and as a senator, it’s possible to piece together her worldview and reach cautious conclusions about the direction she might take US foreign policy in an administration of her own.   For his part, Walz has less direct experience of foreign affairs – he has never served in the executive branch, and the only federal office he has held is as a member of the House of Representatives. That does not mean he’s a blank slate though. Walz served 24 years in the National Guard, including deployments overseas, and also has a surprising, and long-running, interest in China. If he became vice president, he would bring a distinct populist worldview to the role.   Here's a quick guide to what a Harris-Walz foreign policy might look like.   General principles and personnel Perhaps the biggest question about a Harris foreign policy is whether it would be mostly a continuation of the approach seen under current President Joe Biden or if it would chart some new course. The answer is probably the former. As vice president, it has been Harris’ job to defend the policies of the administration she was a part of, meaning that any private doubts or disagreements she may have had were buried. Yet little about her record before becoming vice president suggests that Harris would make a fundamental break with this policy either.   Like Biden, Harris has always been a committed internationalist who believes that the US should play an active role in world affairs. As vice president, she has chosen mainstream, career diplomats as her key foreign policy aides – first Nancy McEldowney, and then Philip Gordon. She has also enthusiastically embraced multilateral agreements such as the Paris Climate Accords and the Iran nuclear deal and made clear that she values and supports America’s allies. All of this would suggest that, in contrast to Donald Trump, she believes in the need for America to lead groups of like-minded countries in tackling global problems.   If she has a major difference of principle with Biden, it’s that she apparently views his tendency to frame global affairs as an ongoing battle between “democracy” and “autocracy” as a misleading over-simplification.[2] This echoes a criticism that has long been made by outside analysts who have pointed out that this narrative makes little sense in a world in which autocratic states like Saudi Arabia and Vietnam are close US partners.[3]   Although Harris’ criticism on this point seems to be mostly rhetorical, some foreign policy thinkers in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party are hoping it might be an opportunity for greater influence. Foreign policy progressives – who tend to believe in the need to reduce the U.S. military footprint around the world, dial back conflict with China, and be more consistent on democracy and human rights – would like to see some of their own kind placed in key positions in a future Harris administration.[4]   Given that she hails from a younger generation and has risen through the party at a time of greater progressive influence, Harris is likely more sympathetic to these voices than Biden has been. Yet there’s little sign she has fully bought into their worldview, and the youthful, progressive wing lacks leaders with the experience and stature that Harris seems to value. In the end, she’s likely to give second- and third-tier jobs to some while placing career technocrats in more important positions.   Perhaps the greatest hope that progressives have for redirecting Harris’ foreign policy comes from Walz, who over time has been more sceptical of military intervention than the average Democrat. He opposed the Iraq troop surge of 2006, Barack Obama’s desire to strike Syria after the country used chemical weapons against civilians in 2013, and US support for Saudi Arabia’s recent war in Yemen. Yet Walz’s distaste for the horrors of war is more that of the soldier than the pacifist. In 2016, he joined Republicans in opposing cuts to the Army, arguing that it needed to be well-funded to face challenges around the world. As a Midwestern populist who served for 24 years in uniform, Walz has a deep appreciation of the costs of war for ordinary Americans – but he’s no dove, either.[5]   Europe and NATO In the Biden administration, Harris has been a key spokesperson for the government’s attempt to convene a coalition of countries to oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. She has led the US delegation to the Munich Security Conference three times, met Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky six times, and called the US commitment to NATO “unwavering” and “sacrosanct”.[6] On the other hand, however, she had little prior exposure to the continent before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has been criticized by some European officials for a lack of engagement on other issues.[7]   All of this suggests continuity. Harris is firmly committed to the defence of Ukraine, but otherwise seems to agree with the consensus position in US foreign policy circles that Europe is of declining importance in a world in which the locus of global power is moving towards Asia. At the same time, Gordon – Harris’ key national security aide – is a dedicated Europhile who speaks four European languages and is well-known on the continent. If he takes a position in her administration, that ought to calm European leaders who are worried that Harris might leave them behind.[8]   The Middle East Few aspects of Harris’ foreign policy views have generated as much comment as those on the Middle East. Whatever its merits, Biden’s unequivocal support of Israel is out of step with his own party – and as a representative of a younger generation, Harris has been widely assumed to have more nuanced views.   The actual evidence for this is somewhat thin. Harris has publicly voiced more empathy for Palestinian suffering than Biden, and she is said to have privately advocated that the administration push Israel more forcefully towards either changing the way it conducts the war or ending it.[9] Since becoming the presumptive nominee however, she has neither announced any major policy departure nor wholeheartedly embraced left-wing protesters who oppose the administration’s approach to the region. This has been noted, and protesters are planning to try to disrupt the DNC this week in an attempt to force policy changes.[10] They’ll find little comfort from Harris’ running mate, who has also hewed closely to the Biden administration’s line throughout the conflict.[11]   For now, Harris seems to view the Middle East primarily through the lens of politics. She wants to win back left-wing voters critical of the administration without scaring away pro-Israel independent voters. In office, this splitting of the difference would be likely to continue – a consequence both of political necessity and Harris’ pragmatic, non-ideological worldview.   Trade and climate Like many Democrats, Harris has been on an interesting journey with regards to trade. She has described herself as “not a protectionist”, but also said she would have voted against both the 1994 North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiated by Obama. This suggests that she does not buy into the old neoliberal consensus around free trade either. In fact, Harris in recent years has sounded more and more sceptical of free trade, and her running mate has always sounded that way.  Walz opposed both NAFTA and the TPP as well as a host of smaller bilateral trade agreements during his time in Congress, some on the grounds that they would help to bolster governments with poor human rights records.[12]   Most notably, both Harris and Walz opposed the Trump-negotiated United States, Mexico, and Canada Agreement – a replacement for NAFTA – because they said it did not do enough to protect the environment or workers’ rights. This  indicates that their administration would double down on the Biden administration’s attempts to use trade as a tool of climate policy, and probably also to promote human rights. It also means that London’s desire for a US trade deal will continue to be frustrated.[13]   China and the Indo-Pacific China policy is another area in which Harris seems closely wedded to the Biden administration’s position, which is that the US should attempt to pursue economic and military competition with Beijing while at the same time cooperating on shared challenges such as climate change. Harris has had relatively little exposure to China, having met its President Xi Jinping only once and never having travelled to the country.[14] Hence, there is little indication of how, if at all, she differs from the administration in which she has served. Especially given the strong hawkish consensus towards China which exists in US politics, she is unlikely to bring about any major change of policy.   Walz, by contrast, has a long-standing interest in the country which has been reflected in both his private and public life. He first visited the country just after the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 and has gone back over 30 times since, primarily to facilitate trips by American students. He has spoken admiringly of Chinese people but been sharply critical of their government’s human rights abuses, including by meeting with the Dalai Lama. His nuanced view suggests that he understands the importance of dialogue between America and China, but is likely to push for strong criticism of its human rights record.[15]   Conclusion A Harris-Walz foreign policy is one which is not likely to see any major departure from Biden’s approach. It will be strongly internationalist, remaining committed to the defence of Ukraine and organizing a coalition of countries to oppose the rise of China. It will likely be more engaged – and honest – about human rights and the environment, but still pragmatic and dominated by technocrats rather than progressive reformers. It will also, of course, be shaped by events which we cannot yet predict – much less understand the implications of – possibly even before US citizens go to the polls on 5^th November.   Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   [1] Fred Kaplan, Kamala Harris Has Been Much More Involved In Foreign Policy Than We Realize, Slate, August 2024, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2024/08/kamala-harris-foreign-policy-2024-presidential-election.html. [2] Ibid. [3] Joshua Keating, Biden Promised to Defeat Authoritarianism. Reality Got In The Way, Vox, May 2024, https://www.vox.com/2024/5/20/24159229/biden-democracy-authoritarianism-india-saudi-arabia. [4] Nahal Toosi, Phelim Kine and Joseph Gedeon, Progressives Jostle For Nat Sec Jobs Under Harris, Politico, August 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/13/progressives-harris-foreign-policy-jobs-00173697. [5] Connor O’Brien and Eric Bazail-Eimil, How Tim Walz Could Help Harris Connect With Veterans, Politico, August 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/06/tim-walz-vp-harris-veterans-00172782; Noah Berman and Diana Roy, Issue Guide: Tim Walz On Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, August 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/issue-guide-tim-walz-foreign-policy. [6] The Kamala Harris Doctrine, Foreign Policy, July 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/26/kamala-harris-policy-china-russia-trade-immigration-israel-gaza-india/. [7] Suzanne Lynch and Ben Munster, ‘Invisible’ Kamala Harris Struggles To Win Over Europe, Politico, July 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/kamala-harris-europe-us-election-joe-biden-democratic-party/. [8] Laura Kayali and Clea Caulcutt, Phil Gordon: Europe’s ‘Ally’ on Kamala Harris’ Team, Politico, August 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/philip-gordon-us-politics-kamala-harris-us-elections-europe-joe-biden-emmanuel-macron/. [9] Eugene Daniels and Holly Otterbein, Kamala Harris Pushes White House To Be More Sympathetic Toward Palestinians, Politico, December 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/14/kamala-harris-gaza-palestinians-00131633; Yasmeen Abutaleb and Shane Harris, Harris Created Distance From Biden On Gaza By Emphasizing Palestinian Suffering, The Washington Post, July 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/07/24/harris-gaza-israel/. [10] Tens Of Thousands Of Activists Prepare Protests Over Gaza war At Democratic National Convention, The Guardian, August 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/aug/19/democratic-national-convention-gaza-protests-pro-palestine. [11] Andrew Prokop, Is Tim Walz A Progressive Or A Centrist – Or Both?, Vox, August 2024, https://www.vox.com/2024-elections/366201/tim-walz-record-governor-progressive-agenda. [12] Greg Rosalsky, The Economic Mind of Tim Walz, NPR, August 2024, https://www.npr.org/sections/planet-money/2024/08/13/g-s1-16662/the-economic-mind-of-tim-walz. [13] Ana Swanson, With Kamala Harris, U.S. Free Trade Skepticism May Continue, The New York Times, July 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/26/us/politics/kamala-harris-trade-trump.html. [14] China’s Rulers Are Surprised By Kamala Harris and Tim Walz, The Economist, August 2024, https://www.economist.com/china/2024/08/18/chinas-rulers-are-surprised-by-kamala-harris-and-tim-walz. [15] Paul Musgrave, Tim Walz Has Always Been Consistent On China, Foreign Policy, August 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/12/tim-walz-china-record-us-election-harris-trump/; John Sudworth, Walz Has History With China – It’s More Hawkish Than Critics Claim, BBC, August 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgewpzyd91o. [post_title] => US Presidential Election: What would a Harris-Walz foreign policy look like? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => us-presidential-election-what-would-a-harris-walz-foreign-policy-look-like [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-08-21 08:57:44 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-08-21 07:57:44 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7547 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [36] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7506 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-07-08 11:37:51 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-07-08 10:37:51 [post_content] => Over the past few weeks, two events have dramatically changed the nature of the US presidential race. Joe Biden’s debacle in his debate against Donald Trump threw the Democratic Party into chaos, making it increasingly unclear whether Biden can continue as the party’s nominee. Perhaps even more importantly, a recent decision by the US Supreme Court has granted presidents immunity from prosecution for a wide range of criminal behavior, dramatically raising the stakes of November’s election.   The Assassin-in-Chief? The Supreme Court ruling came in response to an attempt by Trump to have the charges against him in the federal January 6^th probe thrown out. However, the justices ruled in a way that goes far beyond that narrow case, and in doing so they fundamentally revised the American constitutional order. From now on, presidents have absolute immunity from prosecution for any acts which relate to their “core constitutional responsibilities” and what the court called “presumptive immunity” for any acts related to their “official duties”.[1]   Cutting through this legalese is hard, in part because the court has entirely invented much of it. There is no precise definition of “official duties”, “core constitutional responsibilities”, or even “presumptive immunity”. Presumably, these will be defined by future case law.   Let’s take a look at one much-discussed example: could the president order the military to assassinate a political rival? The answer seems to be quite clearly that yes, he could. Control of the military is clearly within the president’s core constitutional responsibilities, as set out in Article II of the constitution.[2] Even conservative commentators who have been dismissive of this scenario only do so based on the claim that the president would not be able to find any military personnel willing to carry out the order, and that he would be impeached if he did.[3] Given previous examples of presidential abuse of power involving the military as well as the intense partisanship of current US politics, both of these assumptions are highly questionable.   To take another example: the president’s ability to influence the legal process. Both the pardon power and the power to direct the Department of Justice are clearly within the president’s “core constitutional responsibilities”. Henceforth the president can order his political opponents to be prosecuted on false pretenses, and pardon any of his own supporters who commit federal crimes. In the assassination scenario, whoever pulled the trigger would still ordinarily be liable to prosecution – but a rogue president could now simply pardon them without any fear of legal ramifications.   Raising the stakes Long-term, the myriad ways in which future presidents might abuse this ruling are hard to predict. In the short-term, however, it is clear that whoever wins in November, they will be handed an office with vastly increased powers. And if the victor in that election is Donald Trump, we already have some idea of how he might use them.   Trump has been quite open about his plans for a second term, and even before the immunity decision he did not shy away from spelling out how he would abuse the powers of his office. Among other things, Trump has threatened to have his political opponents prosecuted or subject to military tribunals, laid out plans to deport millions of people in mass immigration sweeps involving the military, and said he will pardon the perpetrators of the January 6^th insurrection.[4] The immunity ruling provides him with a menu of other options for using presidential power to advance his personal and political interests, from enriching his family through corruption to suppressing political opposition.   In such a scenario, the only potential checks on Trump would be Congress, the federal bureaucracy, and mass protests. However, in today’s hyper-polarized age, impeachment is almost impossible. Members of Congress are not willing to risk the wrath of members of their own party by voting to convict, and the Congressional Republican Party is today more pro-Trump than it has ever been.[5] The federal bureaucracy might provide a check, but Trump’s allies have already formulated plans to reduce the power of civil servants and subject the bureaucracy to much greater political control.[6] Trump has also openly speculated about using the military to suppress protests in a second term.[7]  Moreover, while presidents would in theory still face regular elections, they could also use their new powers to subvert them, much as Trump attempted to in 2020.   Democratic woes These developments have coincided with the outbreak of complete chaos in the Democratic Party. Biden’s disastrous performance at the presidential debate in Atlanta has brought out into the open long-standing concerns about the president’s age and cognitive abilities.   Perhaps even more damaging than the debate itself has been what has happened since. As Biden’s standing in the polls has plummeted, he has appeared to falter in subsequent appearances in which he has been unable to rely on a teleprompter. This has fueled the belief that the president is unable to campaign and sparked rage among other Democratic politicians that the deterioration of his condition has been hidden up to this point. It has not helped that the White House has attacked critics from within the party as “bedwetters” and “hysterical” while also repeatedly changing its story about why Biden appeared so unwell during the debate.[8]   With the Supreme Court’s immunity decision focusing the party’s minds on the stakes in November, Vice President Kamala Harris has seen her stock within the party rise dramatically. Attitudes towards her taking the nomination range from resignation to enthusiasm. Even her critics concede that passing her over might alienate sections of the Democratic Party, and they also realize that campaign finance law makes her the only plausible candidate who can maintain access to the Biden campaign’s substantial financial resources.[9] More enthusiastic supporters point out that she is young, energetic, and can be an articulate spokesperson for the party’s case.   Over the past year, the Democratic Party has arguably become used to setting its expectations low. Even before the debate, the Biden campaign had decided on a light schedule for its candidate in deference to his age and low energy levels. The theory was that it would not matter if Biden was not particularly visible, because Trump would implode in a cloud of his own legal woes and controversial statements.[10] If that strategy was ever tenable, it is not anymore after the debate, when Biden himself has become the focus of media attention. Democrats desperately need to get the focus back on Trump. Having a much younger and energetic candidate barnstorming the swing states, while highlighting the stakes of a new Trump presidency, might be just the way to do it.   If Biden does step down from the campaign, focus is likely to shift to the question of whether it is even tenable for him to remain president for the next seven months in the run up to the election. If his mental condition really has deteriorated as dramatically as it seems, it will be difficult – not to mention distracting – for Harris to continue to justify him remaining in office on the campaign trail. Letting President Harris run, with all of the powers of incumbency, might be the best way forward.[11]   These are not easy matters to navigate. American democracy is currently in grave peril, and almost any decision that Biden and others in the party take carries great risks. Yet one thing is clear: absolute focus must be maintained on keeping Trump and the authoritarian forces that he represents out of the White House.   There is no time, now, to allow personal egos or long-running intra-party feuds get in the way of what needs to be done. A Democratic presidential candidate needs not only to be able to win the election, but also to engage in the long struggle ahead to put American democracy back on a sustainable footing. When the dangers are this great, anyone who aspires to carry the torch of freedom has to prove that they can bear it – or hand it over to someone else who can.   Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office. [1] Supreme Court of the United States, Trump v. United States, July 2024, https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf [2] Quinta Jurecic and Benjamin Wittes, A Decision of Surpassing Recklessness In Dangerous Times, Lawfare, July 2024, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/a-decision-of-surpassing-recklessness-in-dangerous-times [3] The Supreme Court Protects the Presidency In Trump v. US, Wall Street Journal, July 2024, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-v-u-s-supreme-court-presidential-immunity-official-acts-john-roberts-january-6-c4d5eddc; Dan McLaughlin, Actually, Presidents Still Can’t Murder People With Impunity, National Review, July 2024, https://fpc.org.uk/the-transatlantic-partnership-looking-ahead-on-the-impacts-of-trade/ [4] Chris Cameron, Trump Amplifies Calls to Jail Top Elected Officials, Invokes Military Tribunals, The New York Times, July 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/01/us/politics/trump-liz-cheney-treason-jail.html; Zachary B. Wolf, Trump Explains His Militaristic Plan To Deport 15-20 Million People, CNN, May 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/01/politics/trump-immigration-what-matters/index.html; Lauren Aratani, Trump Says Pardoning Capitol Attackers Will Be One Of First Acts If Elected Again, Guardian, March 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/12/trump-january-6-pardons [5] Patrick Svitek and Mariana Alfaro, Trump’s Influence Looms Large Over Congressional Republicans, The Washington Post, April 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/04/12/donald-trump-congress-republicans-mike-johnson-fisa-ukraine-abortion/ [6] Trump’s Schedule F Plan, Explained, Protect Democracy, June 2024, https://protectdemocracy.org/work/trumps-schedule-f-plan-explained [7] Michael Waldman, Trump’s Insurrection Act Threat, Brennan Center for Justice, November 2023, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/trumps-insurrection-act-threat [8] Toluse Olorunnipa, Tyler Page and Michael Scherer, Biden Team Works Furiously To Quell Any Democratic Revolt After Debate, The Washington Post, June 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/06/30/biden-democrats-election/; Alex Thompson, “Freaking The F*** Out”: Turmoil In The White House Over Biden, Axios, July 2024, https://www.axios.com/2024/07/02/biden-white-house-campaign-staff-freaking-out-debate [9] David Dayen, Campaign Finance Laws Give Harris Big Boost in Biden Dropout Scenario, The American Prospect, July 2024, https://prospect.org/power/2024-07-02-campaign-finance-laws-harris-big-boost-biden-dropout-scenario/ [10] Edward-Isaac Dovere, How The Biden Campaign Hopes To Make 2024 Less About Biden And More About A Contrast With Trump, CNN, January 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/02/politics/biden-campaign-strategy-trump-2024/index.html [11] Andrew Gawthorpe, The Case for Biden Resigning Right Now, America Explained, June 2024, https://amerex.substack.com/p/the-case-for-biden-resigning-right [post_title] => Op-Ed: What recent events could mean for the US Presidential race and America’s future [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-what-recent-events-could-mean-for-the-us-presidential-race-and-americas-future [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-07-12 15:00:31 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-07-12 14:00:31 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7506 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [37] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7442 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-05-16 14:54:19 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-05-16 13:54:19 [post_content] => Summary: The lessons which the international community have drawn thus far from Russia's aggression against Ukraine have been dominated by the necessity of measures in the military sphere. However, the war has also exposed weaknesses in the soft power field - such as polarisation along political and geographic boundaries - as well as illuminated the role of exclusion, the underestimation of societies' potential reform, and the domination of neopatriarchy in contemporary politics and international relations.   Dr Leila Alieva, an Affiliate of REES, Oxford School for Global and Area Studies (OSGA), shares her analysis of these themes, based on her research and lived experience.   Read the author's in depth article here.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Soft power lessons from Russia’s war: How to overcome polarisation and strengthen liberal democracy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => soft-power-lessons-from-russias-war-how-to-overcome-polarisation-and-strengthen-liberal-democracy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-05-17 13:02:32 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-05-17 12:02:32 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7442 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [38] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7420 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-05-07 10:17:38 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-05-07 09:17:38 [post_content] => Over the past decade, international trade has become an increasingly contentious political issue in both the United Kingdom and the United States. Departing from a postwar consensus in favour of liberalising trade, both countries have embraced a more ambiguous and complex attitude towards the issue. Neither country has embraced outright protectionism, but both have sought to manage and redirect trade and investment flows. By doing so, they have moved away from an approach to trade which focuses on maximising economic growth and towards one which involves a blend of political and national security considerations.   As both countries approach their next national elections, it is time to take stock of these trends and to consider how they might develop further in the coming years. As a struggle is underway to rewrite the rules of the international economy in regions like the Indo-Pacific, choices taken in Washington and London will have far-reaching impact. At stake are the standards of living, environmental protections, and labour rules affecting billions of people around the world.   The new trade policy For different reasons, both the UK and the US have moved away from a pure emphasis on economic efficiency in their recent trade policy.   Although supporters often claimed that Brexit was a free trade measure designed to increase the UK’s economic opportunities abroad, its main practical effect has been to make trade between the UK and its largest export market more difficult. This negative effect on trade with the European Union was supposed to be offset by the UK’s ability to negotiate its own free trade agreements with third countries. The results of this were uncertain at the time of Brexit and have mostly proved to be disappointing since. This has particularly been so in the case of a US-UK trade agreement, which many supporters of Brexit touted as a major goal. In effect, Brexit has meant sacrificing a measure of future economic growth in order to “take back control” of other policy areas from Brussels.^[1]   Over roughly the same period, the US has also backed away from its past support for a liberalising trade agenda. President Trump famously started a trade war with China and pulled out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a sweeping free trade agreement covering much of the Pacific rim. But his successor President Biden has proven to be sceptical of trade as well, imposing new economic sanctions on China, declining to rejoin the TPP, and announcing that expanding market access is no longer a priority of US trade policy.   The result has been the emergence of a new and powerful protectionist coalition in American politics. On one side, it comprises economic nationalists, China hawks, and members of Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement, who see trade as weakening the American economy and destroying its manufacturing base. The other side consists firstly of economic progressives who see free trade deals as enriching corporations at the expense of American workers, and secondly of Democrats concerned about winning votes in key industrial Midwestern swing states.   This protectionist coalition reached its ascendancy at precisely the wrong moment for the UK, which since 2016 has been seeking a US-UK trade deal. There has been little to no appetite in Washington for expanding the access that the two countries have to the other’s market, which is the key goal of British policymakers. Limited talks over harmonising regulations and addressing other barriers to trade fizzled out late last year amid concerns among Democrats that even appearing to consider a substantive new trade agreement would harm them in November’s election.^[2] Even if there were a political appetite for a deal, long-running disagreements over agricultural standards would make one hard to achieve.   These political dynamics – both the ascendancy of a protectionist coalition in the United States and the specific barriers to a US-UK agreement – are not likely to improve even after this year’s elections. It is possible that, with the election behind it, a second Biden administration might return to talks on a limited agreement dealing mostly with regulation, but talks on expanding market access are unlikely. Trump, meanwhile, is campaigning on increasingly draconian trade policies, including a flat 10% tariff on all imports.^[3] His advisors are also reportedly debating whether to purposefully devalue the dollar, which would make British exports to the United States less competitive.^[4] These policies could significantly harm US-UK trade and foreclose the possibility of any constructive new agreement.   A whole world of trade Even with US-UK trade arrangements appearing uncertain, both the UK and the United States are involved in setting and influencing the rules of the international economy further afield.   As it has moved away from traditional free trade agreements, the Biden administration has not completely lacked a trade policy. It has focused instead on more narrow negotiations which have sought to address non-tariff barriers, but also to persuade partners to raise their environmental and labour standards. Its most notable attempt came in the form of the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), an agreement covering 12 nations containing 2.6 billion people and over a third of the global economy.^[5]   Although these headline figures sound impressive, the results of IPEF have been limited. Last year, the cooperating nations reached minor agreements on coordinating supply chains and sharing knowledge related to the green energy transition. But the Biden administration walked away from the portion of the agreement related to environmental and labour standards, believing that the other IPEF states – which include India, Japan, and Vietnam – were not willing to do enough to satisfy American opinion.^[6]   The travails of IPEF revealed the limits of the Biden administration’s approach. Without offering its partners increased access to the US market, the administration gave them little incentive to raise their environmental and labour standards, which would in turn make their products less competitive internationally. But this means that the United States has lost the opportunity to have a strong voice in determining the economic future of the region. This points to there being a strong chance that the initiative will pass to China, which sits at the centre of a growing economic bloc called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – and which does little to raise environmental protections or standards for workers.^[7]   The UK has taken a different approach. In recent years, it has signed several new bilateral free trade agreements in the region – with New Zealand and Australia – and joined the successor to the TPP, known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The UK Government has not taken a formal position on IPEF, but the UK may try to join it in the future.^[8] Although the benefits to the British economy are small, these moves have signalled that the UK remains interested in new trade agreements and wants to play an increased geopolitical role in the region. This looks likely to remain the case regardless of the outcome of the next UK general election.   The most contentious international economic issue faced by the two countries in the coming years is likely to be relations with China. Trump has signalled that he is looking to engage in extremely harsh economic policies against China if elected. In this case, the UK will likely find itself caught uncomfortably between Washington and more dovish European countries who want to maintain economic ties with Beijing. Particularly if Trump also engages in new trade measures against European countries – as he did in his first term – it will be extremely difficult for the UK to pursue a liberalising agenda. Instead, the world is likely to be consumed by a new round of trade wars.   More harmonious relations can be expected between a second Biden administration and a government led by the Labour Party, which has voiced support for the “new overseas investment and regulatory partnerships” which are at the centre of the Biden administration’s approach.^[9] Ultimately, however, UK policymakers who want to pursue an agenda of liberalisation and integration will be at the mercy of sentiment in Washington. The UK economy is simply not big enough for London to drive the process itself.   A difficult future Both the UK and the US have identified the Indo-Pacific as a region which is key to the future of global politics and economics. But political reservations in Washington are currently holding both countries back from playing a decisive role in setting the economic rules of the region. The UK’s enthusiasm is not matched by its heft, whereas America’s heft goes to waste without enthusiasm to match.   By working together, the two countries could offer a positive, optimistic vision of the international economy – one which prioritises raising environmental and labour standards as well as boosting economic growth. The aftermath of this year’s elections in both countries will be a critical test of whether this is possible, or whether familiar barriers and animosities will lead to another wave of protectionism.   Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   [1] Jonathan Portes, The Impact Of Brexit On The UK Economy: Reviewing The Evidence, VOX EU, July 2023, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/impact-brexit-uk-economy-reviewing-evidence/ [2] Politico, Biden Quietly Shelves Trade Pact With UK Before 2024 Elections, December 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/us-president-joe-biden-shelves-trade-pact-with-uk-2024-election/ [3] Katie Lobosco, Trump Wants More Tariffs. His Earlier Trade Wars Cost Americans $230 Billion To Date, CNN, March 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/18/politics/donald-trump-tariffs-trade-war/index.html [4] Gavin Bade, Trump Trade Advisors Plot Dollar Devaluation, Politico, April 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/15/devaluing-dollar-trump-trade-war-00152009/ [5] World Economics, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), May 2024, https://www.worldeconomics.com/Regions/IPEF/ [6] Gavin Bade, RIP ‘Worker-Centered Trade’: Biden’s Global Economic Agenda Stalls, Politico, January 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/02/bidens-economic-agenda-stalls-00133138 [7] Andrew Gawthorpe, Biden’s Trade Policy Is Missing One Thing: Partners, World Politics Review, March 2024, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/us-free-trade-policy-biden/ [8] Foreign Affairs Committee, Tilting Horizons: The Integrated Review And The Indo-Pacific – Government Response To The Committee’s Eighth Report of Session 2022–23, UK Parliament, March 2024, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5804/cmselect/cmfaff/630/report.html [9] David Lammy, The Case for Progressive Realism: Why Britain Must Chart A New Global Course, Foreign Affairs, April 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-kingdom/case-progressive-realism-david-lammy. See also David Lammy, Britain Reconnected: A Foreign Policy For Security And Prosperity At Home (London, 2023), p. 24. [post_title] => The Transatlantic Partnership: Looking ahead on the impacts of trade [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => the-transatlantic-partnership-looking-ahead-on-the-impacts-of-trade [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-05-07 10:17:38 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-05-07 09:17:38 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7420 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [39] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7391 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-03-19 00:01:08 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-03-18 23:01:08 [post_content] => The global struggle to protect free speech has reached a new fever pitch. The power of news media to act as a safeguard against tyranny has been critically undermined as the world’s autocracies have grown to outnumber the democracies. The Economist says a global gag on free speech has tightened thanks to “the new censors”.[1] Technology has brought new opportunities to suppress truthful communications, and the coarsening of language has poisoned the well of public debate, affecting us all.   Recognising those dangers, 200 leading international lawyers and civil society figures gathered in London in January at the launch of a remarkable initiative aimed to turn back the tide by harnessing the law in the service of free speech. Renowned human rights lawyer Amal Clooney and Lord Neuberger, former President of the UK Supreme Court, have marshalled some of the world’s most authoritative jurists. Their joint publication Freedom of Speech in International Law (OUP) seeks to codify the universal rights to freedom of expression in a single substantial volume for the first time.[2]   The book charts the chilling decline in protections for speech in multiple jurisdictions. It also it aims to provide a useable roadmap for governments to comply with the minimum standards in law that they have signed up to. The endeavour is inspired by the belief that the impressive body of international human rights laws that has been developed since 1945 – although much scorned and often flouted – can yet be used by “courts and newsrooms” around the world to win this Manichean contest.   Lord Neuberger sounded a personal alarm, telling the meeting he had never before been so keenly aware of the importance and the fragility of international law. When Slobodan Milošević was found guilty of war crimes at the tribunal in The Hague in 1999, he had thought that victory for justice would usher in a new “era of accountability”. Now instead he saw signs of an “age of impunity and apathy”, and declared it to be imperative to halt the slide towards “unreason” or even fascism.   Amal Clooney is the project’s moving spirit. In Gaza, journalists are “our eyes and ears”, Clooney said, but more than 70 had been killed in “the deadliest month ever recorded” for journalists in any conflict. In India the authorities’ widespread use of sedition and terrorism laws sends journalists and human rights defenders to jail for years even before a conviction. In the Philippines the Nobel prize-winning journalist Maria Ressa still faces a possible six years in jail after a “false” libel conviction in a corruption case.[3] And in Thailand thousands of citizens have been prosecuted for criticising the King, an offence which carries a penalty of up to 15 years in jail.   Western states’ legal provisions that criminalise speech attract equally blunt criticism. Amal Clooney singled out the failure of the USA and the UK to recognise public interest as a defence against harsh anti-terrorism laws, meaning that prosecutions in both jurisdictions can lead to long jail sentences and those laws have a wider “chilling effect” on free speech. Lord Neuberger acknowledged his own embarrassment that not so long ago British judges had backed the use of secret super-injunctions to curtail free speech on important public issues.   The authors – seven in all – focus on four categories of laws which they say are being weaponised to silence the press and independent voices: laws regulating political speech, false speech, hate speech, and speech related to official secrets and national security. They recount how new legislative tools are being used by states to quash dissent – not only familiar ones like sedition, treason and criminal defamation laws but increasingly terrorism, ‘false news’ and other vague laws that autocrats use to protect themselves against unflattering press. Hong Kong, for example, has revived sedition laws which have lain dormant for decades with devastating consequences for publisher Jimmy Lai and a host of other critical voices.   The building blocks of free speech protection The postwar framework of international human rights, explicitly aimed at preventing a repeat of the Holocaust and carnage of World War Two war, accorded seminal importance to the rights of freedom of expression and opinion from the start. In 1948 the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 19 of the UDHR proclaimed that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes “the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”.   A slate of legitimate restrictions on freedom of expression were also identified, in particular with regard to the rights of others, national security, public order, and public health; but enforcement of those restrictions is permissible only if provided for by law, necessary in democratic society, and proportionate. In 1976 the right to free speech was first made legally binding through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which has been ratified by 173 states.   Clooney, Neuberger and the other co-authors set out with meticulous clarity and in granular detail how, despite setbacks, the jurisprudence arising from the various international and regional treaties shows broad convergence on key issues. Among them are the principles that restrictions on free speech must be tightly drawn and not vague or overbroad; that freedom of opinion may never be curtailed; and that imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty for speech unless it also involves more serious harms such as incitement to violence.   International bodies also broadly agree on the importance of protecting the press. The UN Human Rights Committee, interpreting the ICCPR’s provisions on freedoms of opinion and expression in its 2011 guidance to state authorities, says that “a free, uncensored and unhindered press is essential in any society”;[4] and that the press merits certain particular protections because of its role in enabling and promoting open public debate, without which an informed and engaged citizenry cannot exist. The European Court of Human Rights has strongly endorsed the vital “public watchdog role” of the press, which is accorded the broadest scope of protection in its case law, including with respect to the protection of journalists’ confidential sources.   Yet in reality, Amal Clooney says, states have often imposed the harshest possible penalties on journalists to block or curtail their work to keep the public informed. In particular, states weaponise their legal systems by allowing “baseless lawsuits against journalists” that are often prohibitively expensive to defend against. In 2023, the UK Government faced a blizzard of criticism when it was revealed that the government gave permission for sanctioned Russian warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin to sue the founder of Bellingcat, Eliot Higgins, the man who had exposed Prigozhin’s crimes as head of the Wagner group.   South African lawyer and academic Dr Dario Milo co-authored the book’s chapter on insulting speech. He called for states to act decisively to end “lawfare”, the widespread and cynical use of vexatious or abusive lawsuits or legal threats by the rich and powerful to harass and silence journalists and activists who report on matters of public interest. The numbers involved are extraordinary. In a 2023 survey of around 500 media workers in over 100 countries, half of the respondents reported that they or their media were facing legal threats.[5] The authors call for legal protections against abuse, including provisions for the early dismissal of frivolous cases, placing the burden proof on the plaintiff, and awarding full legal costs to defendants who are cleared.   Misuses and law and the “undoing” of vital protections The book draws on exhaustive research data to show how devastating the real-world consequences of misuses of the law can be. Between 2014 and 2020 over 9000 people were imprisoned in Turkey for insulting President Erdogan. Before she was murdered, Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia faced more than 40 libel claims, many of them from politicians or public officials. As many as 160 states still have criminal defamation laws on their books; and the global census of jailed journalist by the Committee to Protect Journalists found that 320 journalists – close to an all-time record number – were imprisoned as of December 2023.   Spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic, governments have enacted a raft of new misinformation laws in the past decade, especially related to speech on the internet. At least 18 states passed legislation against ‘fake information’ or ‘online misinformation’. Many of them apply criminal penalties and have extraterritorial reach. In Hungary, for example, a conviction can lead to a five year prison term. In many cases the institutions of the state – the judiciary, military or the government – have applied those laws to protect their own reputations in ways which, the authors insist, violates international legal standards. Among the book’s standout recommendations is that “false” speech should not be liable to penalties unless real-world harms result from it.   The ubiquity of the Internet in people’s lives has landed private companies with a hornet’s nest of responsibilities to take quasi-judicial decisions by the minute about words and images are allowed on their Platforms. The authors propose as a general rule that those companies should recognise international human rights standards as “a floor, not a ceiling, of speech protection”. The scale of the task is extraordinary: Facebook/Meta’s removal of hateful material rose tenfold in two years up to 2020, while TikTok alone removed more than 100 million videos in the first half of that year   Big technology and social media companies face fierce criticism from all sides, but this examination of their record shows that leading players have committed to ensuring that their policies are consistent with human rights standards. Meta’s Oversight Board of independent experts is tasked with determining “what to take down, what to leave up and why’. Its task includes holding the company to account to live up to its pledge to comply with international human rights standards.   A systemic obstacle to a uniform global code of practice lies in the uneven or contradictory principles enshrined in the major sources of standards on free speech and human rights. Twitter (now known as ‘X’) claims to ground its values in both the First Amendment of the US Constitution and the European Convention, which are “two very different bodies of law”. Meta’s Oversight Board, however, has said it would not apply the First Amendment as it does not govern the conduct of private companies.   The field of allowable speech online is fiercely contested. The less than satisfactory conclusion reached here is that there is as yet “no single principle for resolving conflicts of interpretation, nor a hierarchy or avenue of appeal”. A future Research report focusing on Internet shutdowns is promised by members of the same team of legal experts.[6]   International law: a launchpad for recovering the lost ground of free speech? The authors also point to important legal and institutional reforms that have recently been launched but which must gather wider political traction and public support if they are to have a decisive impact. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, for example, has issued a strong Recommendation to its 46 member states on countering SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation). Regional human rights courts in Africa and the Americas have delivered landmark judgements – for example, directing state authorities to decriminalise defamation and to honour their obligations to give emergency protection to journalists who face imminent threats of violence. The past decade has seen the birth of some major initiatives in which governments are working in tandem with dynamic civil society and stakeholder organisations as never before.   Amal Clooney, David Neuberger and Darius Milo are members of the High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom.[7] The panel is an independent advisory body of the Media Freedom Coalition established by the UK and Canada in 2019.[8] The Coalition now comprises 50 countries, which have made a public commitment to promote and protect a vibrant, free, and independent media. Such innovations reflect the encouraging fact that the stifling of free speech and independent media and its pernicious impact on standards of democratic behaviour have risen sharply up the international policy agenda, often driven by dynamic civil society organisations. The 46 member states of the Council of Europe recently began an unprecedented Europe-wide Journalists matter campaign which will go on until 2027, aimed at improving the safety of journalists, protecting media freedom, and raising wider public awareness of the necessary part journalists play in safeguarding democratic and pluralistic societies.[9]   There is also a message for academics here. Engaged academics are committed to advancing the implementation of the UN Action Plan on the Safety of journalists and the Issue of Impunity through collaborative research with local actors in order to develop policies which can strengthen protections and safeguard journalists’ rights.[10] Yet the authors observe that many scholars focus somewhat narrowly on one jurisdiction or type of speech, such as defamation, without demonstrating connections between those findings and the wider picture. The explicit aim of the new publication is to effect change by spurring governments, big tech companies and other duty-bearers to enforce the international standards that exist to protect free speech.   Strikingly, the international law experts assert that Article 19 of the ICCPR has achieved the status of “customary international law”, after decades in which the legal standards for protecting freedom of expression have been fought over and refined through a host of decisions in international and domestic courts, The International Court of Justice has already accepted that it has done so. If that were to be generally accepted, then states like China, Myanmar and Saudi Arabia, which have not ratified any of the relevant treaties, can be bound by same rules as the countries that have ratified them.   Clooney, Neuberger and their colleagues recognise that it will be a hard slog to embed meaningful reforms and truly hold states accountable. Many are convinced the death in February of Alexei Navalny, like those of Anna Politkovskaya, Jamal Khashoggi, Daphne Caruana Galizia and other charismatic critics of authoritarian rulers, amounts to state-sanctioned murder. Each one of those iconic cases also speaks to the close connection between the fight for free speech and the demand for political freedoms.   The authors of this book have lucidly articulated the goal of preventing autocratic regimes and overzealous prosecutors from manipulating the law to silence journalists and protect themselves. As they show only too well, some habitual state practices are “wildly at odds” with what is written in international treaties. But they make a powerful case that international law is not just the best instrument we have to undo the stifling of free speech. It is the only one.     William Horsley is co-founder and international director of the Centre for Freedom of the Media (CFOM) at the University of Sheffield and a former BBC foreign correspondent in Europe and Asia. He is the author of the Safety of Journalists Guidebooks published by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and his work for the Association of European Journalists was instrumental in the establishment in 2015 of the Council of Europe’s digital Platform for the Safety of Journalists, a Europe-wide monitoring and response system to counter threats to media freedom and the safety of journalists. He is a member of the UK Advisory Board of RSF (Reporters Without Borders).   Photo supplied by: IBA Human Rights Institute.   [1] The Economist, The global gag on free speech is tightening, August 2019, https://www.economist.com/international/2019/08/17/the-global-gag-on-free-speech-is-tightening [2] Ms Amal Clooney and Lord David Neuberger, Freedom of Speech in International Law, Oxford University Press, January 2024, https://global.oup.com/academic/product/freedom-of-speech-in-international-law-9780198899372?cc=gb&lang=en& [3] Committee to Protect Journalists, Hold The Line Coalition welcomes acquittal of Maria Ressa and Rappler, calls for dropping of remaining cases, September 2023, https://cpj.org/2023/09/hold-the-line-coalition-welcomes-acquittal-of-maria-ressa-and-rappler-calls-for-all-remaining-cases-to-be-dropped/ [4] United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR/C/GC/34, September 2011, https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf [5] The Foundation, New research exposes global trends in legal attacks facing journalists, Thomas Reuters Foundation, April 2023, https://www.trust.org/i/?id=b68bd251-a405-4dbe-890b-0ed50bc33f8f [6] High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom – Our Reports, Research Reports on International Standards, International Bar Association, https://www.ibanet.org/HRI-Secretariat/Reports#IntStandards [7] International Bar Association, High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom, see: https://www.ibanet.org/IBAHRIsecretariat [8] Media Freedom Coalition, see: https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/ [9] Council of Europe, Journalists Matter: Council of Europe Campaign for the Safety of Journalists, see: https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/safety-of-journalists-campaign [10] UNESCO, UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, https://www.unesco.org/en/safety-journalists/un-plan-action [post_title] => How international law can reverse the global assault on free speech: A review of a new expert guide [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => open [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => how-international-law-can-reverse-the-global-assault-on-free-speech-a-review-of-a-new-expert-guide [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-03-18 15:28:04 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-03-18 14:28:04 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7391 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) )