Array ( [0] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8589 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-11-12 01:00:07 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-11-12 00:00:07 [post_content] => In their first year in power, the Labour Government made several big policy announcements related to national security, defence, and their vision for Britain’s place in the world. As the UK and its allies continue to confront the most dangerous moment for European security since the Cold War, respond to the growing levels of human insecurity in many regions around the world and navigate global economic challenges, a considered strategic approach is clearly needed.   Yet, less than a month out from the next Budget, questions continue to mount about the financial feasibility, priorities, and long-term direction of the country’s approach towards ensuring our defence; as well as the relationship between the UK’s evolving soft and hard power strategies. How will the Government reconcile strengthening defence and security with growing pressures at home? What progress has been made on the Government’s stated ambitions?   Below is an overview of the recent developments, followed by views from FPC’s experts, including those who contributed to FPC’s 2024 submission to the SDR, and to our most recent report Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy, as to how the UK’s approach to defence and security is evolving in practice, and where gaps remain in implementation, public communication, and whole-of-society readiness.   Strategic Defence Review, Soft Power and Aid Cuts In June 2025, the UK Government outlined a new approach to defence and security, publishing the ‘Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2025’, which contained 62 recommendations.^[1] The SDR outlined a range of strategic goals, including renewed focus on NATO, investment in AI and drone technologies, and discussion of potential UK participation in NATO’s nuclear mission. The Government also committed to an increase in defence spending to “2.5% of GDP by 2027 and 3% in the next Parliament when fiscal and economic conditions allow,” with a view to “help make defence an engine for growth—boosting prosperity, jobs and security for working people across the UK.”   The Review was highly anticipated given the context of heightened uncertainty for the Euro-Atlantic alliance, the ongoing war in Ukraine, an unpredictable US administration under President Donald Trump, and shifting security realities in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and beyond. While the SDR contained some significant shifts in posture, there remain considerable concerns about resourcing, prioritisation, and delivery.   In January 2025, the Government launched its Soft Power Council, an advisory body to support the development of a ‘soft power’ strategy, which is expected to be released spring of next year. What this will contain and similarly, how it will be implemented is yet to be seen. However, the significant aid cuts the Government announced in February and their impact on the UK’s soft power potential was a key discussion point at every major political party conference in September.   The decision by the UK Government to reduce aid from 2027 to 0.3% of gross national income (GNI), in favour of increasing the UK’s defence spending (as outlined above) drew sharp criticism at the time.^[2] Not least because Labour had previously indicated they aimed to restore aid spending to 0.7%, after it was cut to 0.5% of GNI in 2021.   While the need to strengthen UK defences is clear, there remains a question as to whether doing so at the expense of aid is the right answer. A recent Chatham House report noted that “the £6 billion saving from aid is unlikely to plug defence gaps,” while “the West’s retreat from aid will leave an obvious opening for revisionist powers to build further influence in developing countries.”^[3] The significant fallout from the closure of The US Agency for International Development (USAID) in July this year, has been notable, and likely destabilising for a number of countries that significantly relied on international support. Last month, the UK Parliament’s International Development Committee launched an inquiry to examine how the UK can continue to deliver high impact international aid and development assistance in the face of a 40% budget cut. Announcing the inquiry, Committee Chair Sarah Champion MP posed the question: “What should drive the Government’s vision for foreign aid; national security, moral duty, international obligations?”.   Meanwhile, earlier this year, in response to the funding cuts, former national security adviser, Lord Peter Ricketts, coordinated a letter to the Prime Minister urging him to sustain funding for the British Council.^[4] In comments to The Guardian, he noted: “A lot of defence people will tell you that a small investment in soft power such as the British Council is worth a lot of money on the military side.”^[5] However, neither international aid nor soft power are mentioned in the SDR, despite the clear linkages with national security and defence - a notable omission that reinforces concerns about cross-Whitehall coordination.   What do these combined developments mean for our national security? Views from our Experts   Dr Andrew Gawthorpe Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University   “The SDR sets out an ambitious agenda for UK defence policy going forward, but there are limits to how much planning is possible in the current international environment. The recent NATO summit in June calmed fears that Donald Trump might announce an immediate withdrawal from the alliance, but it also left all of the major questions dividing the U.S. from Europe, and European countries from each other, unresolved. Later this year the U.S. will likely announce the withdrawal of tens of thousands of soldiers from Eastern Europe, making the continent even harder to defend.”   Dr Andrew Gawthorpe also cautions that the UK’s ability to follow through on its defence spending promises and to coordinate effectively with European partners on rearmament, remains uncertain. “Whether the UK government can actually deliver on the necessary spending commitments and whether the UK and the rest of Europe can coordinate rearmament in a smart and effective way remain to be seen. In the meantime, the ultimate direction of U.S. policy remains unclear – and under Trump, basically unpredictable.”   Christopher Langton Head of Independent Conflict and Research Analysis (ICRA)   Langton acknowledges the SDR’s attention to innovation but raised two concerns: “The Review highlights the all-important use of AI in defence. However, I wonder if the environmental impact of AI—most notably its water usage—has been considered, particularly amid increasing climate pressures.” But commitments on welfare and personnel are welcome: “The focus on manpower and welfare is a very welcome part of the Review. However, our history on delivering in this area is not good. A firm ring-fenced commitment to fund increases in personnel and expenditure on the defence estate, including housing, would bring confidence to boost recruiting and retention.”   Nina Kuryata Ukraine and Defence Editor, The Observer   Regarding the Review’s emphasis on NATO as a strategic priority: “It says ‘NATO first’- but what does it actually mean in terms of measures to be taken? If the UK wants to lead in NATO, it must back that up with clear timelines and funding. At present, there’s a pledge to increase military spending to 2.5% by April 2027, with a "clear ambition" to reach 3% by 2034, would economic conditions allow. This is still far from the 5% that all NATO members committed to reach by 2035.”   She also questions some of the more rhetorical claims: “It says we will create a British army which is 10 times more lethal. That would need more development, I think, because it's not clear what it means – number of soldiers, more deadly weapons or something else.”   Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams Senior Fellows, European Leadership Network   “The recommendation  by the Review that the UK commence discussions on enhanced participation in NATO's nuclear mission constitutes, potentially, a substantial change in the UK nuclear posture. More generally, the SDR leaves many fundamental questions unanswered, relying on the assumption, or hope, that NATO will continue much as it did before Trump.  The military implications for force capabilities and structure of having to operate in a purely European framework or a US-lite NATO framework are not explored. There is, however, a surprising indication that while the UK has always declared the primacy of NATO in strategic and defence terms, in practice, it has not taken its contribution to NATO's military posture as seriously as it pretended. ”   You can read more of Simon and Nicholas’ analysis of enhanced UK participation in NATO's nuclear mission in their longer piece here.   Poppy Ogier Research and Communications Manager, and author of ‘Playing to our strengths: The future of the UK’s soft power in foreign policy’, Foreign Policy Centre   “A modern defence strategy must recognise the vitality of soft power. Take the BBC World Service, it is the world’s most trusted news provider, reaching over 450 million people each week - and only costs around 5% of what Russia and China are thought to be spending internationally in an age of information warfare. However, its sustained funding is in question - and neither it, nor soft power more broadly, is mentioned in the SDR. The ‘influence’ of others is discussed - Russia’s, China’s and the US’s - without addressing what tools to influence the UK has. Including soft power in a defence review is not an optional extra, it’s a force multiplier for everything else.”   Susan Coughtrie Executive Director, Foreign Policy Centre   “While there is a clear need for a shift in how the UK approaches the country’s defence in today’s climate, there are concerns with the current approach. For the implementation of the SDR and the future soft power strategy to be effective, they must recognise the dynamic between domestic and international developments.   Encouragingly, the SDR recognises the need for a ‘whole of society approach’ and argues to “Build national resilience to threats below and above the threshold of an armed attack through a concerted, collective effort involving—among others—industry, the finance sector, civil society, academia, education, and communities.” However, the Government should more closely examine the layered threats specifically directed at these groups, including through the use of transnational repression, foreign influence, disinformation and cyber attacks; which are only likely to further increase with more countries sliding towards authoritarianism. The impact of the aid cuts should be examined through this security lens too, to ensure that short-term ‘gains’ do not give way outcomes that will take years to rectify.”   Next steps While the Government’s commitment to increased defence spending is evident, significant tension remains around what this will look like in practice, particularly how it can be delivered without further damaging other critical areas of UK influence, such as soft power and development aid. Key questions persist around resourcing, prioritisation, and whether the Government can protect vital diplomatic, cultural, and development tools while pursuing an ambitious defence agenda.   In an era marked by geopolitical changes, strategic uncertainty, and shifting power dynamics, particularly with an unpredictable US administration and evolving threats in the Middle East, the success of the SDR will depend on more than political will and funding. It will require sustained strategic focus, effective implementation, a strong soft power strategy and international coordination. Most importantly, an effective defence strategy calls for an approach that upholds democratic principles, protects human rights, and preserves the UK’s institutional integrity at home and abroad.     ^[1] Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, June 2025 ,https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/683d89f181deb72cce2680a5/The_Strategic_Defence_Review_2025_-_Making_Britain_Safer_-_secure_at_home__strong_abroad.pdf ^[2] House of Commons Debates, Defence and Security vol. 762, February 2025, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-02-25/debates/8BF58F19-B32B-4716-A613-8D5738541A30/DefenceAndSecurity#contribution-DB32B970-42F2-4B1B-A92C-54CA0B28BA41 ^[3] Chatham House, First USAID closes, then UK cuts aid: what a Western retreat from foreign aid could mean, March 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/first-usaid-closes-then-uk-cuts-aid-what-western-retreat-foreign-aid-could-mean ^[4] Lord Ricketts, Tweet (@LordRickettsP), April 2025, https://x.com/LordRickettsP/status/1915396877018632373 ^[5] The Guardian, British Council ‘may have to close in 60 countries’ amid cuts to aid budget, June 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jun/08/british-council-spending-plans-may-close-in-60-countries [post_title] => Expert Look: Unanswered questions regarding UK Government’s approach to defence and security [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => expert-look-unanswered-questions-regarding-uk-governments-approach-to-defence-and-security [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-11 13:35:50 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-11 12:35:50 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8589 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [1] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8577 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-11-10 01:00:31 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-11-10 00:00:31 [post_content] => Every year, on 2^nd November, the United Nations and its member states condemn attacks on journalists. In 2025, this “International Day to End Impunity for Crimes Against Journalists” is a particularly sombre occasion – with threats to journalists at an all-time high.   More than 120 journalists were killed in 2024 while doing their work.^[1] Countless others were arbitrarily detained, abused, and threatened both physically and online. News outlets are struggling to develop sustainable business models, and media freedom is at its lowest level globally in at least two decades, according to Reporters Without Borders.^[2]   This matters because a decline in media freedom can contribute to a deeper collapse in the systems that support democracy. As Nobel Prize-winning journalist, Maria Ressa, recently warned: “if journalism dies, democracy dies”.^[3]   Unfortunately, supporting media freedom is not a foreign policy priority for most countries. Multilateral fora – like the Media Freedom Coalition – encourage their member states to take action. However, these fora lack enforcement or accountability mechanisms.   To help address this gap, the Centre for Journalism and Democracy has launched a new annual index to try to hold states to account and encourage them to take action to promote media freedom beyond their borders. The Index for International Media Freedom Support (IMFS) evaluates 30 countries across three key foreign policy areas: diplomacy, funding, and safety/protection.^[4] The results paint a concerning and inconsistent picture – with no state performing strongly across all three categories.     Financial support for media freedom According to the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media, “globally… the first problem to be fixed is the insufficient volume of Official Development Assistance (ODA) that goes to media support”.^[5] On average, the 30 countries assessed in the IMFS Index allocated just 0.16% of their foreign aid to supporting independent journalism in 2023. Thirteen countries awarded less than 0.1%, while three – Latvia, Greece, and Slovenia – reported allocating 0%.   The only country that came close to the benchmark set by the Forum on Information and Democracy of allocating 1.0% of ODA to media support was Sweden – who contributed 0.91%. In 2023, Sweden spent over $51 million supporting initiatives such as rural radio stations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and strengthening environmental reporting across the Asia-Pacific region.^[6] Largely for this reason, Sweden came 2^nd overall in the 2025 IMFS Index.   Support for journalism safety and protection Another group of leading experts – The High-Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom – has consistently advised governments that providing safe refuge to journalists at risk is one of the most effective measures to improve the climate for press freedom around the world.^[7]   The IMFS Index finds that only one country – Latvia (who came 9^th overall) – had both an active emergency visa scheme for at-risk journalists and supported a national scheme promoting the safety of exiled media workers. Twenty-one of the thirty countries in the Index had neither measure in place.   Diplomatic support for media freedom Lithuania was the highest ranked country in the 2025 IMFS Index, largely because of its diplomatic leadership roles in several UN initiatives relating to media freedom and journalist safety. Estonia (4^th overall) also performed well diplomatically, having served as co-chair of the Media Freedom Coalition in 2024, alongside Germany (equal 5^th).   The lowest scoring countries in the ‘diplomatic’ category of the IMFS Index were Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and Switzerland.   Making media freedom a foreign policy priority The results of the 2025 IMFS Index suggests that political will – rather than state capacity – is a country’s greatest barrier to supporting media freedom worldwide.   The Baltic states – Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia – were amongst the smallest – but also the strongest performing. By contrast, four members of the G7 – the United Kingdom (equal 12^th), the United States (equal 12^th), Italy (equal 24^th) and Japan (28^th) – all ranked in the Index’s lowest ‘bronze’ category.   Due to the time lag in data reporting, the Index does not capture recent cuts to foreign aid that occurred in 2025 in the United States, the UK, Germany, France, and elsewhere. Therefore, future versions of the IMFS Index are likely to show an even bigger gap between some countries' public commitments to media freedom and their actual support.   Given this, the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media is right to argue that “what is needed now is not [a] reinvention of the wheel, but a new level of political will and a concerted commitment by governments to invest in what we know works – nationally and internationally.”^[8]   Hopefully, by publicly tracking countries’ performances, this new Index will help to generate more political pressure for meaningful action.     Martin Scott is a Professor of Media and Global Development at the University of East Anglia. His publications include, ‘Capturing News, Capturing Democracy’ (2024), ‘Humanitarian Journalists’ (2022), ‘Media and Development’ (2014) and ‘From Entertainment to Citizenship’ (2014).   Mel Bunce is a Professor of International Journalism and Politics, and the Director of the Centre for Journalism and Democracy at City St George’s, University of London. She was previously the Head of City’s renowned Department of Journalism. Her research focuses on journalism and democracy, crisis reporting, media freedom and international journalism.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     [1] Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024 is deadliest year for journalists in CPJ history, February 2025 https://cpj.org/special-reports/2024-is-deadliest-year-for-journalists-in-cpj-history-almost-70-percent-killed-by-israel/ [2] RSF, World Press Freedom Index 2025: over half the world's population in red zones, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-2025-over-half-worlds-population-red-zones [3] Kathimerini, Maria Ressa warns social media is ‘demolishing democracy’ at Athens forum, October 2025, https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/society-in-depth/1282767/maria-ressa-warns-social-media-is-demolishing-democracy-at-athens-forum/ [4] Centre for Journalism and Democracy, The 2025 Index on International Media Freedom Support, n.d., IMFS Index is published by the Centre for Journalism and Democracy, and is available at https://jdem.org/the-imfs-index/; The 30 states included in the index are members of both the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, and the Media Freedom Coalition (OECD-DAC). [5] Forum on Information and Democracy, Statement of the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media: The Economic Imperative of Investing in Public Interest Media, September 2025, https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Economic-Imperative-of-Investing-in-Public-Interest-Media.pdf [6] Forum on Information and Democracy, “The Forum on Information and Democracy calls for a New Deal for Journalism, June 2021,  https://informationdemocracy.org/2021/06/16/the-forum-on-information-and-democracy-calls-for-a-new-deal-for-journalism/ [7] Media Freedom Coalition, High Level Panel of Legal Experts on Media Freedom, n.d., https://mediafreedomcoalition.org/who-is-involved/high-level-panel-of-legal-experts/ [8] Forum on Information and Democracy, Statement of the High-Level Panel on Public Interest Media: The Economic Imperative of Investing in Public Interest Media, September 2025, https://informationdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Economic-Imperative-of-Investing-in-Public-Interest-Media.pdf [post_title] => Who is standing up for media freedom – and who is not? A new Index has some answers [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => who-is-standing-up-for-media-freedom-and-who-is-not [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-07 11:39:25 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-07 10:39:25 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8577 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [2] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8558 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-11-07 01:00:07 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-11-07 00:00:07 [post_content] => COP30 - the 30th Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change - will take place in Belém, Brazil from 10th to 21st November 2025.   The last 10 years have been the hottest on record, and an estimated 3.3-3.6 billion people live in contexts highly vulnerable to climate change. This year, countries were due to publish their updated national climate plans outlining their contribution to cutting global emissions (‘national determined contributions’ or ‘NDCs’). However, plans so far fall well short of what is required to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C.^[1] Therefore, COP30 needs to focus on the further ambition required to close the gap. Yet achieving this greater ambition will not be possible without the large-scale delivery of grant-based climate finance, making finance an equally critical discussion in Belém.   COP30 must deal with climate finance Last year’s COP in Baku agreed to a new global climate finance goal (the so-called NCQG) to deliver at least $300 billion per year by 2035, led by developed countries and directed to developing country parties. However, the agreement lacked both a roadmap and the accountability mechanisms required to ensure that governments pay up. The NCQG also included an even vaguer aspiration to scale up finance to $1.3 trillion per year.   Implementation of the new finance goal is critical, as lower income countries require significant finance to develop their economies cleanly; to adapt to worsening climate impacts; and to pay for the escalating costs of the damage to homes, infrastructure and livelihoods (so-called ‘Loss and Damage’). The impacts of the climate crisis disproportionately affect the most vulnerable and least responsible the hardest, and could push up to 132 million more people into extreme poverty by 2030. African countries contribute just 4% of global carbon emissions but are among the hardest hit, and yet, along with other lower income countries, have thus far received only a small fraction of the finance they need – therefore having to take on most of the financial burden themselves. Indeed, the climate crisis is one of the key drivers of today’s debt crisis, as governments are forced to borrow more simply to recover and rebuild from climate disasters.   In this context, building trust among developing countries that the NCQG will be fulfilled is essential to maintaining a multilateral process capable of limiting temperature rises to safe levels. Delivery of climate finance at scale by developed countries, including the UK, is a well-established principle in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and is a legal obligation, as recently affirmed by the International Court of Justice. It is also a moral responsibility falling upon historically high emitters who bear the greatest responsibility for causing the climate crisis. Any wealthy government that considers itself a principled global actor must, at a very minimum, act in good faith to deliver their fair share of the $300 billion finance goal as a starting point.   Governments responsible for delivering this finance are increasingly putting their eggs in the private finance basket. Yet, while private finance has a key role to play, especially in delivering mitigation initiatives like large scale energy projects, it also has huge limitations. Very little private finance is flowing to the world’s most climate-vulnerable communities, especially for adaptation and ‘Loss and Damage’, and the evidence suggests it is not likely to do so at scale, particularly for the poorest countries. To date less than 50 cents in every $100 of all climate finance has been private finance for adaptation efforts, and only 3% of private climate finance goes to low-income countries.^[2] Moreover, the majority share of climate finance has thus far been provided as repayable loans with interest, which simply adds to the debt burden of those countries which are not responsible for the climate crisis – yet are, in this way, expected to doubly pay for its costs.   The reality is that to meet the needs of the world’s most climate vulnerable communities most of the NCQG finance must be public grant-based finance.   Will the UK Government show moral leadership? When entering power the Labour Government said it wanted to rebuild broken trust with the global South and reestablish the UK as a global climate leader.^[3] While certainly deserving of credit for being the first G7 economy to outline its new strengthened emissions reduction target (the UK launched its NDC at the beginning of the year^[4]), genuine climate leadership requires this government to set out a credible offer on international climate finance too. And it must look beyond aid and private finance to do so.   Despite the UNFCCC principle that climate finance should be “new and additional”, successive governments have so-far drawn the UK’s international climate finance contributions from the aid budget, as have other developed countries. It was one thing to do so while the aid budget was going up. And to its credit, the UK Government was bucking the trend by delivering most of its climate finance as grants not loans. But as the ODA budget began to shrink, taking climate finance from the same pot has become increasingly untenable, so the Government has resorted to creative accounting and a shift towards loans rather than grants.^[5] With the latest aid cuts imposed earlier this year, combined with the greater size of the new global climate finance goal, alternative sources of finance obviously need to be found.   Aware of this, the Government’s narrative is now primarily focused on the idea that private finance will come to the rescue. But, unfortunately too much of this appears based on wishful thinking rather than evidence about where private finance does and does not reach. If the Government truly wants to rebuild trust with Global South governments, honesty is the best policy. It can’t just wish away the evidence because it finds it politically inconvenient at home; it needs to deal in reality not fantasy.   Realistic solutions do exist and the Government should pursue them. The UK could employ new and progressive ways of raising public finances, including through fair ‘polluter pays’ measures, at no cost to the average taxpayer, and use a portion of the revenues raised to deliver on its climate finance responsibilities. Ending fossil fuel producer subsidies in the UK could save around £3.6 billion per year for climate finance. A permanent excess profits tax on fossil fuel producers and/or a Climate Damages Tax on the production of fossil fuels extracted could raise further billions. A reformed financial transaction tax could raise £6.5 billion annually. Meanwhile, a net wealth tax on those with assets over £10 million to the tune of 2% would raise £24 billion a year – part of which could go to climate finance. The UK could also join the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force which recently secured an agreement by eight countries, including France, Spain and Kenya to implement luxury air travel taxes and is building momentum for coordinated action on other revenue raising measures. Why is the UK not part of this?   Polling shows overwhelming public and cross-party support for the polluter pays principle. In a YouGov survey conducted in March 2025, 85% of respondents agreed that those most responsible for pollution should bear the cost of addressing the harm it causes. Another poll in May 2025 found 7 in 10 Reform-leaning voters support higher taxes on oil and gas companies and other high-emitting businesses to fund climate action.   The UK Government can and must turn up to COP30 with a proper plan on international climate finance that is capable of truly delivering for the world’s most marginalised people. That, combined with ambitious net zero plans at home, would give the UK genuine grounds to claim the badge of climate leadership.     Sophie Powell is the Chief of UK Advocacy and Policy at Christian Aid. She currently leads Christian Aid’s engagement with the UK Government on the charity’s advocacy priorities of debt and climate justice. Sophie has worked in the international development field for over 20 years in policy, advocacy and campaigning roles on a wide range of themes - from trade, agriculture, tax and debt, to refugee rights and climate. During her first decade in the sector she worked particularly closely with partners across several African countries, including while working for Oxfam in Kenya for several years, before moving into more UK-facing roles.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     [1] Fiona Harvey, World’s climate plans fall drastically short of action needed, analysis shows, The Guardian, October 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/oct/28/worlds-climate-plans-fall-drastically-short-of-action-needed-analysis-shows [2] Christian Aid, Putting our money where our mouth is, November 2024, https://www.christianaid.org.uk/resources/our-work/putting-our-money-where-our-mouth [3] Labour Party, Britain Reconnected, March 2025, https://labour.org.uk/change/britain-reconnected/ [4] UK Government, UK shows international leadership in tackling climate crisis, November 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-shows-international-leadership-in-tackling-climate-crisis/ [5] Independent Commission for Aid Impact, UK aid’s international climate finance commitments, February 2024, https://icai.independent.gov.uk/review/uk-aids-international-climate-finance-commitments/ [post_title] => At COP30, UK leadership requires paying up on climate finance [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => at-cop30-uk-leadership-requires-paying-up-on-climate-finance [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-05 17:03:51 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-05 16:03:51 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8558 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [3] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8554 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-11-05 12:23:28 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-11-05 11:23:28 [post_content] => Earlier this year the Soft Power Council (SPC) was formed to provide concrete and actionable advice and support in the development and delivery of a UK soft power strategy. Comprising of leading experts from outside of government, spanning the arts, culture, and education as well as foreign policy priorities, the SPC is co-chaired by the Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper, and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Lisa Nandy.   Soft power is described by some as the power of attraction; it is a reason why people and other states might be drawn to the UK. Happily, the UK is blessed with many such reasons. Our language alone is a huge advantage globally; UK arts, music, and sport are loved the world over; the BBC (and the BBC World Service) provides us with unique levels of access and influence; Shakespeare, the Beatles, Coldplay are loved by billions; the Premier League is one of the world’s greatest brands, as is our reputation for education, science and technology.   More recently, we have also recognised that the UK’s reputation, expertise and leadership in harder edged fields is not only welcomed by partners around the world but also provides significant additional advantages and opportunities (soft power). Despite what often seems like turbulent and discordant times at home, our reputation for the rule of law and justice, a stable democracy, and military leadership, allows the UK to lead on the international stage, be a partner of choice, and attract inward investment.   So, soft power is already recognised as vital to UK growth, prosperity, and national security – if we want other countries to work with us and support us, we need them to value us, and soft power plays a critical part in achieving that. For evidence of this, one only has to look at the UK’s international successes in the last 12 months – trade deals with the US, the EU, and India; securing a more unified approach to NATO and supporting Ukraine through a coalition of the willing; and forging agreements with France and Germany to work together more effectively on irregular migration.   Crucially, in each of these, the objectives were very clear, and the key decision makers and influencers could be identified. Deep and trusted relationships had to be built, and common ground found and agreed. Undoubtedly, all of this was achieved primarily as a result of intensive, sustained and skilled hard work, commitment, and diplomacy by a host of senior and working level ministers, officials and civil servants – both in London and around the globe. But soft power also played its own vital part. Recognising and understanding that contribution is essential if we are to seize the opportunity presented by the SPC and develop a more strategic and targeted approach to soft power.   Even the most basic understanding of international affairs makes it obvious that, in addition to the intense political and diplomatic work, soft power plays a crucial role in advancing the UK’s interests. For example, President Trump’s second state visit in September (and the PM’s visit to the White House and more) was crucial to securing the US trade deal, support for the West in the face of aggression from Russia, and UK input to discussions re the Gaza ceasefire. That’s classic soft power, delivered by some of our greatest soft power assets: the Royal Family and the office of Prime Minister (and their iconic homes).   Similarly, when President Zelensky was met and photographed on the steps of Downing Street - just 24 hours after his disastrous first visit to the White House, an event that is widely credited as a catalyst for getting US/Ukraine back on track - the event’s staging leveraged soft power. The symbolism of that greeting in Downing Street, is a classic use of that UK soft power asset, as is Sir Keir Starmer and President Macron together at the D-Day celebrations or travelling up the Champs Elysees in a tank. Every visit to Chequers by a European leader tells a similar story: this is who we are, and this is the welcome, the support, the history, and friendship the UK offers.   Of course, these are top-level examples, and given their vital importance to the UK, the attention to, and use of, soft power is carefully considered and planned. And this is how I believe the Soft Power Council can add real value to the next level of UK efforts to deliver growth, prosperity, and enhanced security.   The UK has consistently ranked very highly in global soft power. We have the fantastic GREAT campaign that strategically builds on and amplifies our many strengths. But there is undoubted room for improvement in a more tactical and transactional deployment of our many strengths, as too often, the coordinated use of soft power is a secondary or belated consideration. More generally, coordination across government departments in our engagement with soft power partners could be better joined up. This is precisely where the SPC can help: by ensuring UK efforts are more coherent and joined up, and by acting as a super connector between HMG and the UK’s soft power partners, the SPC can better harness and utilise these many assets. Moreover, the SPC can become a go to soft power hub for the whole of HMG when they are planning how best to deliver hard-edged, specific outcomes.   To do this, we need to work very closely with our government leaders and senior civil servants. Ultimately, the onus is on them to recognise this opportunity, identify their priority objectives, and demand our input. With clear objectives, and briefings, the SPC must then deliver bespoke and targeted soft power – just as effectively as HMG has done on the very highest international priorities. And the best thing about all of this is that it does not have to cost very much at all; it is much more about being better joined up, thinking differently, and acting as a team than about expensive new initiatives. It also allows for us to use what is already in existence rather than reinventing the wheel.   Of course, there is much talk about the reduction in our aid budget and its impact on UK soft power (and inevitably a reduction in spending can negatively impact levels of ambition). But the SPC exists to advise the Government on how best to harness and utilise what we do have, rather than to lament what we do not. So, taking the world as it is, the work of the SPC aligns clearly with the four stated shifts in UK aid support (as set out by Baroness Chapman in her recent essay for the Fabian Society).^[1] These include partnering closely with countries to unlock growth and drive innovative finance and private sector investment; focusing on system support, so that we work alongside countries and move from grants to providing expertise, as they build their own education, health, economic, and legal systems. The UK’s soft power strengths, our world-class universities, and expertise in finance, law, health, and technology, perfectly aligns with this approach, enabling us to support others through partnership and shared expertise.   Working together in this way and demonstrating the SPC’s added value to securing and deploying soft power in a manner that helps HMG deliver on its most important objectives over the next year or so, is the true marker of success. We all know that the UK is ‘Great’, but the challenge is to now use all those things that make us great in a strategic, impact-driven, and focused way.   When we reach the point where, whenever our government partners think about their priority objectives and how to achieve them, and one of their first thoughts is “We need the support of the Soft Power Council”, then we will be able to confidently say that we are delivering on our remit.     Patrick Stevens is Rule of Law Director at International Justice Development. He is an internationally renowned leader in justice development and delivery with two decades of unrivalled experience. After leading some of the UK’s most sensitive and serious terrorism cases in the unprecedented period immediately post 9/11, Patrick helped set up and lead the Crown Prosecution Service’s (CPS) International Division for over a decade. As the CPS’s first International Director, Patrick developed a global network of justice advisors and international engagement that delivered strategic and operational Rule of Law improvement at the heart of the UK’s national security effort worldwide. He now works as a justice development consultant for International Justice Development Ltd and is a member of the UK’s Soft Power Council.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] Fabian Society, Promising development: The future of aid in an uncertain world, September 2025, https://fabians.org.uk/publication/promising-development/ [post_title] => Op-ed | UK Soft Power and the Soft Power Council [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-uk-soft-power-and-the-soft-power-council [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-05 17:06:53 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-05 16:06:53 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8554 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [4] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8539 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-11-03 11:36:15 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-11-03 10:36:15 [post_content] => A dozen years ago, in 2013, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on the safety of journalists which proclaimed 2 November as the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists.^[1] Not the most catchy of names, admittedly, but intended as a line in the sand, and a formal recognition that attacks on journalists cannot go unpunished, because when they do, further violence becomes all the more likely.   The UN was correct in its evaluation: impunity is not just an injustice to the victims of crimes, it is a carte blanche for perpetrators. And when we are talking about crimes against journalists – given the vital role of the press in underpinning democracy – allowing impunity to flourish means accepting that human rights and democratic freedoms are undermined.   What a tragedy, then, that 12 years after that UN resolution, the world has made no progress at all towards ending impunity for crimes against journalists. The data is shocking: according to UNESCO, of the more than 1,700 cases of journalists killed around the world between 2006 and 2024, around 85 per cent never even made it to court. Some estimates are even higher.^[2]   Right now, in 2025, the world is more dangerous for journalists than ever. As Reporters Without Borders (RSF) marked 2 November once again, on our minds were the 546 journalists and media workers imprisoned worldwide, and the 56 who have been killed this year. And beyond physical threats, journalists face rampant harassment online, abusive lawsuits, the pursuit of their families, intrusive surveillance, and a raft of other online and offline tactics used to silence them.^[3] While conflict and authoritarian crackdowns are often the most proximate cause, it is entrenched impunity which emboldens those who attack the press.   There has been no more glaring example of this than Gaza, where, since October 2023, Israeli forces have killed more than 200 journalists, more than 50 of whom were either deliberately targeted or killed while working.^[4] Israel has also denied Gazan journalists vital medical evacuations, spread lies to discredit them, blocked international colleagues from reinforcing them, stopped organisations like RSF from sending protective equipment, and targeted the infrastructure they need to report. All with complete impunity.   Like everything about the war in Gaza, the scale of Israel’s attacks on journalists has defied comprehension – but they did not come out of nowhere. Long before the current war, RSF filed complaints to the International Criminal Court (ICC) about Israeli attacks on journalists: in 2018, after two journalists were killed and 18 wounded; in 2021, following Israeli air strikes on more than 20 media outlets in Gaza; and in 2022 when it supported an Al Jazeera complaint about the fatal shooting of journalist Shireen Abu Akleh.^[5] An investigation by the Committee to Protect Journalists meanwhile found that between 2001-2022, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed at least 20 journalists, 18 of whom were Palestinians.^[6]   The fact that no one was ever held accountable for any of these crimes not only shows how deeply embedded the culture of impunity is, it laid the ground for the subsequent horror unfolding in Gaza. The failure to hold Israel to account was effectively a silent invitation to Israel to do even more of the same. Impunity has far-reaching and devastating consequences.   Gaza may be the most stark example of how entrenched impunity plays out, but it is far from the only one. Across the world, journalists are being killed, detained, tortured, harassed or otherwise attacked, with few consequences for their oppressors. In Mexico, for example, one of the most dangerous countries in which to be a journalist, state failures to ensure the protection of at-risk journalists and the ineffectiveness of prosecutors means few have been brought to justice for the violence which has seen more than 150 journalists murdered since 2000.^[7] In Sudan, those who harass and attack journalists are often protected by the authorities and enjoy total impunity.^[8] Even right here in the UK, justice has yet to be served for the 2001 murder of Sunday World journalist Martin O’Hagan or the killing of investigative journalist Lyra McKee in 2019.^[9] Press freedom worldwide is declining, and impunity incubates that decline.   So what do we do? As UN Secretary-General António Guterres once again used 2 November to call for justice for journalists, international promises ring increasingly hollow. Low public trust in media, economic uncertainty, and turbulent and divided politics provide a depressing backdrop.^[10] But the bottom line is that we cannot afford to give up. Because ultimately, this is not a story about journalists at all: it is a story about our right, as citizens and human beings, to know more of the world around us.   We need to protect journalists, because it is journalists who hold the powerful to account on our behalf, who expose corruption and reveal what is done in all of our names. We need to protect journalists, because good journalism is the antidote to bad governance. Indeed there can be no stronger proof of journalism’s power than the targeting of journalists by those who do not want their wrongdoings exposed.   It is critical therefore that democracies come together to stop those who kill, torture, detain, harass, or otherwise silence journalists. It is not enough for states just to condemn these actions, restate a belief in press freedom, or hide their inertia in statements forgotten as soon as they are heard.   This year, world leaders need to stop talking and start doing: set up a standing International Investigative Task Force, as outlined by the Media Freedom Coalition’s High Level Panel of Legal Experts in 2020, use targeted sanctions, support the ICC, and work together proactively to bring an end to a culture which emboldens hostile actors and chills the press. Investigate, prosecute, and punish. It is time for action, not words. It is time for impunity for crimes against journalists to end.     Fiona O'Brien has been the UK Director of Reporters Without Borders (RSF) since 2023. She started her career as a journalist, working as a foreign correspondent in Africa and the Middle East. She has also worked for the UN as a consultant editor, and ran the MA in Journalism at Kingston University. She is a Fellow of the Higher Education Authority and a member of the Chartered Institute of Editing and Proofreading.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Resolution A/RES/68/163: The Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, December 2013, https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/68/163 ^[2] UN News, 85 per cent of journalist killings go unpunished, November 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1156426 ^[3] Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Press Freedom Barometer, n.d, https://rsf.org/en/barometer ^[4] RSF, RSF files fifth complaint with ICC about Israeli war crimes against journalists in Gaza, September 2025, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-files-fifth-complaint-icc-about-israeli-war-crimes-against-journalists-gaza ^[5] RSF, RSF asks ICC to investigate Israeli sniper fire on Palestinian journalists, May 2018, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-asks-icc-investigate-israeli-sniper-fire-palestinian-journalists; RSF, RSF asks ICC prosecutor to say whether Israeli airstrikes on media in Gaza constitute war crimes, May 2021, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-asks-icc-prosecutor-say-whether-israeli-airstrikes-media-gaza-constitute-war-crimes; RSF, Shireen Abu Akleh’s murder: RSF alongside Al Jazeera to support its complaint before the ICC, September 2022, https://rsf.org/en/shireen-abu-akleh-s-murder-rsf-alongside-al-jazeera-support-its-complaint-icc ^[6] Committee to Protect Journalists, Deadly Pattern: 20 journalists died by Israeli military fire in 22 years. No one has been held accountable, May 2023, https://cpj.org/reports/2023/05/deadly-pattern-20-journalists-died-by-israeli-military-fire-in-22-years-no-one-has-been-held-accountable/ ^[7] RSF, Mexico, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/country/mexico ^[8] RSF, Sudan, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/country/sudan ^[9] RSF, United Kingdom, n.d., https://rsf.org/en/country/united-kingdom ^[10] United Nations Information Service (UNIS), Message for the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists, October 2025, https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2025/unissgsm1542.html [post_title] => Op-ed | If we value Democracy, we have to end impunity for those who kill journalists [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-if-we-value-democracy-we-have-to-end-impunity-for-those-who-kill-journalists [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-03 11:36:15 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-03 10:36:15 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8539 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [5] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8484 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-10-30 01:00:36 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-10-30 00:00:36 [post_content] => On 4th October 2025, Georgia held local elections that will be remembered for many reasons, but not for the actual outcome. These elections broke new ground – only 41% of the population cast their votes, as the majority of the parties decided to boycott the process. Traditionally, local elections in Georgia were never too popular. As a highly centralised state, Georgia has seen repeated – but unsuccessful – attempts by some opposition parties to push for federalisation.   Still, the 4th October elections were different. They were taking place almost a year after Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, had manipulated the results in parliamentary elections that were widely seen as a choice between a pro-Russian and pro-European trajectory. Since then, the ruling party has suspended negotiations with the EU, violently cracked down on protests, and introduced several pieces of repressive legislation. At the time the electoral campaign was announced, Georgia had more than 60 prisoners of conscience in its jails — now it’s closer to 120.   According to the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), the legislative changes to these elections have made the conditions worse than for the previous elections, which were already considered neither free nor fair by the majority of the international observers, the opposition, and Georgia’s 5th President.^[1] Georgian Dream scrapped the 40% threshold required for the majoritarian seats, increased the number of majoritarian seats in each city council, and increased the threshold necessary for a party to make it to the local government. These changes meant that statistically, it would be almost impossible for smaller opposition parties to compete.   The recent introduction of the ‘foreign agents law’ and the law that requires all foreign funding to get the government’s approval before it is paid to the beneficiary nonprofits means that observing these elections has become extremely difficult. Further changes introduced have limited the rights of the election observers, effectively giving Georgian Dream an unfair advantage in these and any future elections. Combined with ongoing issues such as vote buying, multiple-voting, and carousels present in Georgia’s elections, the prospect for free or fair elections was diminished.   The opposition faced a choice — boycotting elections and empowering the protest, or participating under a unified candidate. In nonviolent resistance under authoritarian regimes, unity, discipline, and strategic planning are essential. A full boycott would have been a strategic decision — undermining the legitimacy of the process and reinforcing the idea that, after the fiasco of previous parliamentary elections, the electoral way of changing the regime is no longer an option.   However, a unified opposition response was not achieved — the growing authoritarianism, as well as more repressive laws that made it impossible for independent observers to monitor the elections, forced eight opposition parties to boycott the local elections. In contrast, two other parties – ‘Lelo - Strong Georgia’ and ‘Gakharia - For Georgia’ – chose to contest the elections in several municipalities.   The results were not surprising. Incumbent mayor, Kakha Kaladze, got more than 70% of the votes as the majority of the people followed the parties into a boycott. In actual terms, Kaladze got only 20% of the votes from the total population of Tbilisi.   Some groups affiliated with the United National Movement (UNM) scheduled a parallel event on 4th October, announcing a peaceful revolution on the day. The attempt largely failed, with a small group of people attempting to storm the presidential palace, but it was unclear who these people were, as the majority of the protesters had taken to the streets near the Georgian parliament and peacefully protested the elections that they saw as neither free nor fair. Some argue that this was a setup: the government deliberately left access points open, making it easier for a small group of people to enter the garden of the presidential palace, and then cracked down on them afterwards. In the aftermath of 4th October, more than 60 people were prosecuted under the charges of an attempted coup.   The ‘attempted revolution’, as well as the local elections, created a tense reality for both civil society and the opposition. As unity wasn’t achieved prior to the elections, the opposition is risking repeating the mistakes made by their colleagues in Belarus and fragmenting themselves even further. One bloc, the seven parties along with the former President, Salome Zourabichvili, have distanced themselves both from the 4th October attempted revolution and from the local elections. The UNM, meanwhile, is seen as a separate political center in its own right. The parties that decided to participate, on the other hand, have blamed the boycott supporters and proclaimed that they only believe in the change of power through elections. Understandably, mutual blame currently clouds the political landscape, and a challenge remains in moving the resistance movement forward strategically.   The boycott was arguably the right decision. As the Georgian Dream government delegitimised elections, clinging to them for the simulation of the democratic process just prolongs the crisis and wastes resources on battles that are predetermined. Empowering the protest and unifying different factions under the nonviolent resistance umbrella is the only viable solution. At the same time, the fragmented responses harm the common battle, and it is easy to overanalyse the events and find people to blame, with all three segments of the opposition blaming the other two. An important question to ask now is not who was right about 4th October, but what should be done next.   Specific activities are hard to plan, but the overall strategy is simple: unity, strategic planning, and discipline. These three core components can help civic groups and activists in Georgia avoid fragmentation. These same strategies proved effective in Serbia, Ukraine, and in Georgia itself back in 2003 – and are still effective today.^[2]   Unity does not mean that all political parties should agree on the same candidate or the same strategy; it means most parties, organisations, and activists agreeing on core principles and distancing themselves from those who undermine them. Strategic planning means focusing on the resources already available rather than on the ones it would like to have – as hard as this can sound. Finally, discipline means directing the limited resources toward the main challenges and identifying potential allies in the new post-4th October reality. Without these three components, any resistance movement is destined to fail.     Davit Jintcharadze is a fellow at Newspeak House and the founder of Freedom Fund, a crowdsourcing initiative to aid the protesters in Georgia. He holds a BA in psychology from New York University and a MA in psychotherapy from the University of Cambridge. Before becoming a member of Georgia's resistance movement, he was researching the psychological factors influencing people's voting behaviours.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] Civil Georgia, ISFED: Election Law changes tilt October 4 vote further toward Georgian Dream, August 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/697904 ^[2] Centre for Applied NonViolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), 50 Crucial Points: A Strategic Approach to Everyday Tactics, 2006, https://canvasopedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/50-Crucial-Points-web.pdf [post_title] => Op-ed |Georgian Elections: Unpacking the fallout of 4th October [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-georgian-elections-unpacking-the-fallout-of-4th-october [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-10-31 11:17:59 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-10-31 10:17:59 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8484 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [6] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8475 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-10-29 01:00:10 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-10-29 00:00:10 [post_content] => Summary Western sanctions against Russia, designed to isolate and weaken the Kremlin’s war economy, have instead generated a global “sanctions bubble”: an adaptive ecosystem of intermediaries, offshore jurisdictions, and political enablers that convert constraint into profit. At the center of this system stands Georgia, which has evolved from passive circumvention to strategic facilitation, leveraging its geography, financial infrastructure, and political flexibility to become a key node in Russia’s sanctions-evasion network.   Rather than crippling Russia’s capacity to sustain its war effort, successive sanction rounds have redirected trade and capital flows through the Caucasus, Central Asia, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates. These channels have allowed sanctioned goods, funds, and individuals to re-enter global markets through legal, semi-legal, and illicit means. Georgia’s economic and political elite have capitalised on these gaps, transforming re-exports, dual-use technology transfers, and permissive financial regulation into sources of revenue. As a result, the Georgian economy has become structurally dependent on Russian-linked capital inflows, turning sanctions into an instrument of enrichment rather than deterrence.   This dependency has reshaped Georgia’s political and institutional landscape. The influx of Russian money, businesses, and professionals has deepened the capture of state institutions by oligarchic interests aligned with Moscow’s economic sphere. At the same time, the Georgian government has sought to protect these interests through legislative measures that have shielded domestic actors from Western regulatory scrutiny. These developments have coincided with democratic backsliding, the erosion of Euro-Atlantic alignment, and ideological convergence with sovereigntist regimes that promote “peace through neutrality” while shielding their economies from sanction-related costs.   The weaknesses of the Western sanctions regime are both structural and conceptual. By targeting categories of individuals rather than specific financial and corporate networks, the system has blurred legal and moral distinctions, creating opportunities for evasion and undermining its own legitimacy. Fragmentation within the European Union and declining transatlantic coordination have further limited the coherence and effectiveness of enforcement. The result is a sanctions framework that produces symbolic political gains for Western states while enabling material enrichment for those it was intended to constrain.   To address these challenges, a strategic recalibration of the sanctions regime is needed. This includes shifting from broad-based designations toward targeted, precision instruments that isolate key enablers within the global evasion network; strengthening regulatory coordination among willing states; and creating structured pathways for economic and political defection from the Russian sphere of influence. The objective is not punitive isolation but strategic disruption: dismantling the protection economies that sustain kleptocratic governance in both Russia and its partner states.   The Georgian case demonstrates that sanctions, when poorly designed or inconsistently enforced, do not simply fail but transform. They create new centres of power, profit, and dependency. Reversing this dynamic is essential if sanctions are to remain a credible tool of international governance rather than an accelerant of global authoritarian capital.   Read the full piece here.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   Dr Ilya Roubanis (PhD, EUI Florence) is Senior Fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Athens (IDIS) and Research Fellow at the Aletheia Research Institution. His business intelligence work spans energy and security, driven by HUMINT and strategic analysis across Europe and the MENA regions. [post_title] => Long Read | Dealing with the Sanctions Bubble in Georgia [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => dealing-with-the-sanctions-bubble-in-georgia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-10-31 11:20:11 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-10-31 10:20:11 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8475 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [7] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8449 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-10-22 05:00:04 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-10-22 04:00:04 [post_content] => Alongside issues such as housing and health care, the key far-right theme of immigration continues to feature high on the political agenda ahead of the Dutch national election on 29^th October. In a fragmented political landscape marked by intense competition on the socio-cultural right, mainstream parties are also deliberately choosing to make this issue important in their campaigns.   Just under two years ago, the Netherlands experienced a shock national election result, with Geert Wilders’ far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) becoming the largest party in parliament by a considerable margin (winning almost a quarter of the vote and 37 of the 150 seats).^[1]   As is typical for these parties in Europe and beyond, the PVV is known for its vehement opposition to immigration and multiculturalism. There are cultural components to this discourse (focusing on the supposed threat of Islam to Western norms and values, in particular), as well as economic ones (arguing that welfare entitlements should be reserved for the ‘native’ population).   The PVV eventually entered government, despite reservations of its more centrist coalition partners, New Social Contract (NSC) and the Liberals (VVD), concerning the parts of the PVV programme that are at odds with liberal democratic principles such as freedom of religion. The third coalition partner, the agrarian and culturally conservative Farmer Citizen Movement (BBB) expressed fewer concerns.   Government formation took over half a year. The cabinet was led by the non-partisan and previously unknown Prime Minister Dick Schoof. It was marked by poor relationships between the coalition partners and ineffectiveness in terms of policy outcomes. The pugnacious PVV immigration minister Marjolein Faber became known for headline-grabbing policies and controversial statements, but failed to deliver on her promise of the ‘strictest asylum policy ever’ and did nothing to alleviate the clogged-up asylum system.   On June 3^rd 2025, less than a year after the installation of the Schoof government, Wilders instigated a cabinet crisis centred on his core issue of migration.^[2] He presented his coalition partners with new far-reaching demands they could not agree to. As a result, the PVV left the coalition and the government assumed caretaker (‘demissionary’) status, and new elections were scheduled for 29^th October. Notably, the NSC later withdrew from the demissionary cabinet due to disagreements over the government's position towards Israel (NSC favouring further-reaching sanctions than the VVD and BBB).^[3]   For understandable reasons, the political chaos and ineffectiveness dented public trust in politics.^[4] Remarkably, however, after the cabinet breakdown, Wilders’ PVV has remained the leading party in opinion polls.^[5] This indicates that – at least for his supporters – Wilders successfully deflected the blame to his erstwhile coalition partners, claiming these blocked the implementation of the PVV’s desired immigration policies.   Indeed, immigration has remained a key issue in the run-up to the election. In September, violent riots erupted on the back of an anti-immigration protest in The Hague (the ‘political capital’ of the Netherlands).^[6] Across the country, further unruly and intimidating protests took place at the sites of asylum centres. What was unprecedented at these events was the unveiled flaunting of extreme-right symbols and chants.   Even though its violence was widely condemned, the rise of the extreme-right at the grassroots level has done little to stop traditional mainstream parties, particularly on the centre-right, from politicising immigration. The debate has focused predominantly on asylum, which is by default framed as a ‘problem’ that needs a solution. Many politicians have furthermore been careful to show sympathy for citizens concerned about the supposed erosion of Dutch cultural identity, and few have challenged the widespread perception that the housing shortage – another salient issue – is connected in large part to asylum seekers receiving priority over native citizens.   Specific party stances differ, of course. While shunning the more apocalyptic rhetoric of the PVV, the centre-right VVD, in particular, but also the Christian Democrats (CDA) have made reducing immigration an important theme in their campaigns. The Liberal Democrats (D66) have also ‘moved to the right’ on socio-cultural issues, including asylum, but have been keener to welcome ‘talented’ migrants that serve the Dutch economy. On the centre-left, the Green-Labour Party coalition (Groenlinks-PvdA) expressed the need to limit labour migration in the name of halting exploitation and social injustice, while taking a more welcoming stance towards refugees.   Yet, overall, arguments in favour of immigration – such as its role in addressing labour market shortages and mitigating the effects of an ageing population – have been largely absent from the campaign. Similarly, any virtues of multiculturalism have been left unmentioned.   As is the case in so many other European countries, the rise of far-right parties in the Netherlands has significantly impacted the political debate. Across the continent, mainstream parties have adopted stricter positions on immigration, as they fear the far right's electoral competition. There is evidence that such a strategy is risky at best: it is, on balance, the far right that tends to benefit from an increased focus on its key themes.^[7] The more general effect is the normalisation and legitimisation of the far right's agenda and discourse.   In the Dutch context, it is particularly remarkable how both mainstream parties and many media outlets have facilitated far-right agenda-setting. Far-right actors and sympathisers have been given considerable airtime at televised talk show tables. Geert Wilders himself has been quiet during the early stages of the campaign, citing security threats as reasons for his absence in several radio and televised debates. However, his absence cast a clear shadow over these events where the theme of immigration and asylum took centre stage, irrespectively.   There is also no shortage of other far-right political parties besides the PVV. The BBB has now entered far-right territory with its anti-immigration positions and concerns about radical Islam. The more extreme-right Forum for Democracy (FvD) is likely to win a few seats as well. The more ‘moderate’ JA21 may benefit in particular from the fact that the PVV is not a likely coalition option anymore for most other parties.   Given the highly fragmented nature of Dutch politics, a new government may consist of a broad coalition of parties, thus lacking a clear ideological direction. This may in turn fuel disappointment (and continued support for the radical right) in the longer term. A key lesson for mainstream parties and media elsewhere – and this certainly includes the UK – is not to let the far right set the terms of the debate to the extent it has in the Netherlands.     Stijn van Kessel is Professor of Comparative Politics at Queen Mary University of London. His main research interests are populism and the politics of European integration, with a particular emphasis on radical right parties and Euroscepticism. His latest co-authored book is Populist Radical Right Parties in Action: The Survival of the Mass Party (Oxford University Press, 2025).     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   [1] Stijn van Kessel, The Guardian, 'Geert Wilders’ win shows the far right is being normalised. Mainstream parties must act´, November 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/26/far-right-normalised-mainstream-parties-geert-wilders-dutch [2] Laura Gozzi and Anna Holligan, BBC News, 'Dutch government collapses after far-right leader quits coalition', June 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0r1x5yyd5wo [3] Clea Skopeliti, The Guardian, 'Dutch foreign minister quits over failure to secure sanctions against Israel', August 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/23/netherlands-foreign-minister-sanctions-israel-gaza [4] Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 'Nederlanders machteloos en gefrustreerd over het land en de politiek in aanloop naar de verkiezingen', October 2025, https://www.scp.nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/10/20/nederlanders-machteloos-en-gefrustreerd-over-het-land-en-de-politiek-in-aanloop-naar-de-verkiezingen [5] See the Dutch ‘poll of polls’: https://peilingwijzer.tomlouwerse.nl/ [6] Stijn van Kessel and Andrej Zaslove, Illiberalism Studies Program, 'What mainstream parties and media should learn from the Dutch extreme‑right riots', September 2025, https://www.illiberalism.org/what-mainstream-parties-and-media-should-learn-from-the-dutch-extreme-right-riots/ [7] Werner Krause, Denis Cohen and Tarik Abou‑Chadi, The Guradian, 'Copying the far right doesn’t help mainstream parties',  April 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2022/apr/13/copying-far-right-doesnt-help-mainstream-parties [post_title] => Op-ed | The enduring relevance of the Far Right ahead of the Dutch National Election on 29th October [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-the-enduring-relevance-of-the-far-right-ahead-of-the-dutch-national-election-on-29th-october [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-10-31 11:18:35 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-10-31 10:18:35 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8449 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [8] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8410 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-10-06 15:42:27 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-10-06 14:42:27 [post_content] => On 9th September 2025, the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC), the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) and the University of Lancaster’s Sectarianism, Proxies and Desectarianisation project (SEPAD) co-hosted a high-level expert roundtable exploring Syria’s transition following the fall of the Assad regime, and the future of justice and accountability in the country.    The event was chaired by Mark Stephens CBE, IBAHRI Co-Chair, and brought together an expert panel  including legal and policy experts, academics and civil society leaders: Yumen Hallaq, Senior Researcher at the Syrian Network for Human Rights; Sana Kikhia, Executive Director of the Syrian Legal Development Programme (SLDP); Dr Maria Kastrinou, Senior Lecturer in Anthropology at Brunel, University of London; Alan Haji, Lead for Case Building at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC); Mariana Karkoutly, Co-Founder and Board Member of Huquqyat; and Professor Simon Mabon, Chair in International Politics at Lancaster University and Director of the SEPAD project.   The roundtable provided an opportunity to assess the state of Syria’s political and legal transition nine months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Since the takeover by opposition forces in December 2024, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Syria has been governed by a transitional government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa, operating under a five-year constitutional declaration framework. While the international community has cautiously welcomed these changes and initial commitments to reform, major questions remain about the durability of the transition, the prospects for justice and reconciliation, and the appropriate role for international actors in supporting this process.   In charting a way forward for Syria, justice and accountability must be pursued through mechanisms that foster equal citizenship, political rights and freedoms, and collective trust, rather than reproduce the political processes of division that have fuelled sectarian and gendered violence. Domestic actors, civil society organisations, survivors, and victim’s families should be at the forefront of any accountability, legal or institutional reform. The international community can repeat calls and support processes that recognise the suffering of all victims, ensure accountability for the gravest of crimes, and foster genuine reconciliation and respect for the rule of law. Transitional justice processes must be coupled with long-term initiatives and dialogue to ensure that accountability and guarantees of non-reoccurrence of crimes become a foundation for sustainable truth, justice, and reconciliation. By embedding justice within a broader framework of social healing and inclusive governance, Syria can lay the groundwork for lasting peace in which accountability strengthens unity and helps prevent future cycles of violence.   To explore key themes and insights from the parliamentary roundtable discussion — including legal reform, institutional fragility, humanitarian conditions, and international engagement — you can download the full briefing here.   [post_title] => Expert Briefing: ‘Syria’s transition nine months on: Examining frameworks for international justice and accountability’ [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => expert-briefing-syrias-transition-nine-months-on-examining-frameworks-for-international-justice-and-accountability [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-10-06 15:42:35 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-10-06 14:42:35 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8410 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [9] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8341 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-08-08 05:00:39 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-08-08 04:00:39 [post_content] => A recently published volume, The Policies and Power of Public Diplomacy – Wilton Park’s Road, based on reports of Wilton Park’s higher level international policy discussions since 1946, provides a concise background to key challenges facing the world today.^[1]  Wilton Park is an executive agency of the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) focused on facilitating international policy dialogue, convening around 80 strategic discussions a year. Nick Hopkinson, the volume’s Editor, and a former director of Wilton Park (1987-2010), provides his insight into how the power of diplomacy can be used to revive democracy.   Few challenges are as pressing as the need to stop the democratic backsliding seen in many leading nations today, as evidenced by, for example, the increased undermining of independent media and the judiciary, and growing infringements of human rights. Weaknesses in, or the absence of, democracy are often at the root of conflict, whether internal or international. Discussing challenges and ultimately co-operating are cheaper than the heavy cost, both human and financial, of crises and war. Both can be mitigated, perhaps on occasion avoided, through greater international understanding and co-operation nurtured in what are called ‘Track 2 spaces’ for dialogue, such as Wilton Park.^[2]   Post-WWII Origins   Initially a ‘re-education camp’ for German officers after World War Two (WW2), Wilton Park was a key part of Sir Winston Churchill’s vision to build a democratic post-war Germany. Since then it has evolved into a first-class international policy forum which has expanded beyond its 16th century country home in West Sussex to work in more than 50 countries.  Founded by Sir Heinz Koeppler, Wilton Park established an independent approach to democracy building and international policy dialogue. Koeppler believed strengthening democracy and international understanding could be progressed through talking, debating, eating and living together. The original ‘courses’ evolved into interactive roundtables for ministers, diplomats, officials, academics, businesspeople, journalists and non-governmental opinion formers from countries around the world.   The UK’s model of parliamentary democracy has been discussed regularly at Wilton Park, especially in its early years. Sir Heinz was sensitive to possible accusations that the institution might be regarded as an instrument of government propaganda. To avoid this he crafted an independent, inter-disciplinary, international and interactive method which became widely recognised as a skilful exercise in education, engagement and influencing.   After its original mission was successfully achieved, Wilton Park focused on other topics, sometimes to survive as an institution. It has addressed topical international policy issues and challenges since 1946 including: forging consensus in the transatlantic alliance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; the Cold War; developments in the Former Soviet Union, in particular the Russian Federation; arms control; UK relations with the European Community and the Commonwealth; integration in and enlargement of the European Union; Africa (including ending apartheid); China, and the Middle East.   Post-Cold War Shift   The end of the Cold War resulted in Wilton Park’s greatest expansion of subject coverage, notably transnational challenges such as migration, crime and terrorism, curbing climate change and disease, as well as humanitarian intervention. There was also a renewed emphasis on democracy promotion, this time focused on the developing world.   As transnational challenges grew in salience in the post-war era, tackling them has exposed the limits of the nation state. As former Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of State, Sir Kenneth Younger, argued at Wilton Park in 1973 “none of these modern problems can be solved within the framework of the traditional nation state”^[3].In the past dozen years, coverage of developing world issues has come to dwarf European coverage, in part reflecting changing UK government priorities, notably the UK’s — possibly short-lived — pivot away from Europe after Brexit. Most recently, the multi-national response to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates the need for, and benefits of, international co-operation.   The Current Age of Democratic Erosion   A triumph of the liberal order was the spread of prosperity to developing nations, notably China. It was hoped economic liberalisation would lead to the strengthening of democratic practice, but in spite of positive signs in the 1990s, progress in the new millennium has proven limited, and in some cases democratic reforms have been reversed.   The ongoing rise of populism suggests strengthening democracy is needed more than ever, even in the mature democracies which championed it during and after WW2. The recent democratic backsliding can be attributed, inter alia, to low growth after the 2007/8 global financial crisis, the failure of governments to spread the benefits of globalisation fairly, and the inability of nation states to resolve the new transnational challenges to which Sir Kenneth alluded. Furthermore, the revolution in digital technology has resulted in an explosion of media sources and increasing misinformation, leading to a decline in a shared understanding about domestic and global developments. This makes it much more difficult for governments to address problems and to co-operate internationally.   Populism in the digital age appeals to nationalist, isolationist and protectionist sentiment which provide particularly ill-suited solutions to today’s challenges. Today’s performative populist politics is less directed against other states, and rails against an amorphous globalisation and other social groups. The growth of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism and the scapegoating of refugees deflect attention from the real need to tackle growing domestic inequality and under-investment in health, education and infrastructure. If politicians fail to deliver solutions based on evidence and need, the integrity of democratic institutions themselves is further threatened, and authoritarian tendencies are strengthened. To restore faith in the functioning of democracy, citizens, particularly the young, need to be empowered through greater education and digital literacy, especially critical thinking and the ability to assess the veracity of media content.   The growing erosion of democracy has international ramifications. Wilton Park’s discussions since 1946 reflect the rise, consolidation and more recently decline of the post-war liberal ‘Western’ international order. That order can only be effective if democracy continues to function effectively in the countries which have underpinned it. Furthermore, if the US in particular is no longer able to and/or willing to champion the international post-war liberal order it shaped, the perception grows that the order is less relevant.   What Next?   Indeed, today the liberal international order looks less liberal, less international and less ordered. Stasis in the World Trade Organisation and failure to reform the United Nations system are symptomatic of declining international cohesion. Most worryingly, as foreseen in a 2017 Wilton Park conference, the increasing ineffectiveness of global powers and diplomacy means interstate conflict becomes a greater threat. Five years later, Russia invaded Ukraine and conflict rages again in Israel-Palestine. Might has prevailed over right.   As the international order fragments, what can be done? One senior Pakistani diplomat, Malik Azhar Ellahi, noted Track 2 exchanges such as those at Wilton Park can play an important role.  

“When existing treaties (are) being junked and ongoing initiatives trashed… the one tempting conclusion is that it makes no difference what goes on in Track 2 exchanges. This in my view will not only be unfair but also unfortunate. I would think that there is a greater need at this time for policy to take into account views and concerns expressed in informal settings so that the divide which has emerged in official fora is not made permanent”. ^[4]

  If democratic governments, opposition parties, non-governmental organisations and citizens do not redouble efforts wherever we can to counter the growing threat of populism, the continuing weakening of democratic checks and balances, and the undermining of international law and institutions, we risk ending up where Wilton Park started after WW2. After another horrific global conflict, ways and structures will again have to be created for nations to co-operate and live together in peace.   In the context of the fragmenting post-war global order, democratic backsliding and the growth of misinformation, spaces such as Wilton Park are needed more than ever as forums to exchange and influence policy and opinion through constructive informed dialogue. Sir Heinz’ logo for Wilton Park of a bridge of international understanding remains as apt as ever.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   Nick Hopkinson is a writer on EU and international affairs and is former director of Wilton Park where he served from 1987 to 2010. He posts @nickhopkinson.bsky.social   Image: Wiston House. © Wilton Park. Used with permission.   ^[1] Hopkinson, Nick (ed.), The Policies and Power of Public Diplomacy – Wilton Park’s Road. Routledge, London and New York, 2025. A free copy of the volume is available by clicking on the open access button within the following link: https://www.routledge.com/The-Policies-and-Power-of-Public-Diplomacy-Wilton-Parks-Road/Hopkinson/p/book/9781032831251 ^[2] “Track Two diplomacy consists of informal dialogues among actors such as academics, religious leaders, retired senior officials, and NGO officials that can bring new ideas and new relationships to the official process of diplomacy.” - Peter Jones, Stanford University Press, Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice, September 2015, https://www.sup.org/books/politics/track-two-diplomacy-theory-and-practice ^[3] Hopkinson, Nick (ed.), The Policies and Power of Public Diplomacy – Wilton Park’s Road. Routledge, London and New York, 2025. A free copy of the volume is available by clicking on the open access button within the following link: https://www.routledge.com/The-Policies-and-Power-of-Public-Diplomacy-Wilton-Parks-Road/Hopkinson/p/book/9781032831251 ^[4] Ibid. [post_title] => Op-ed | The urgent need to revive democracy and the power of diplomacy [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-the-urgent-need-to-revive-democracy-and-the-power-of-diplomacy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-05 11:16:50 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-05 10:16:50 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8341 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [10] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8301 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-08-04 08:09:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-08-04 07:09:00 [post_content] => Transnational repression (TNR) is on the rise globally, fuelled by rapidly evolving technology, global democratic- backsliding and the rise of authoritarianism and years of neglect by previous governments. It is a major policy blind spot, resulting in significant constraints on the exercise of fundamental rights in the UK.    Repressive actors, including powerful and hostile states, have a growing set of tools to surveil, threaten, harass and attack individuals in the UK, violating their fundamental rights guaranteed under international and domestic laws such as the Human Rights Act 1998. Political dissidents, exiled journalists and human rights defenders have traditionally been the main targets of TNR, but today a broader array of groups and individuals also find themselves subject to transnational human rights violations here in the UK.   The UK’s responses to TNR to date have been sparse, incoherent and largely inaccessible to targeted communities and individuals. Law enforcement is an important part of the solution, but the cross-border nature of TNR demands a broader approach to protect the rights of those targeted.   The Foreign Policy Centre is a founding member of the Tackling Transnational Repression (TNR) in the UK Working Group. Formed in September 2024, the Tackling TNR Working Group is an informal coalition of individuals and organisations working to address TNR in the UK context.    The working group’s steering committee includes: The Foreign Policy Centre, Richardson Institute at Lancaster University, Index on Censorship, Reporters Without Borders, Azadi Network and The Rights Practice. The wider membership also comprises organisations such as Amnesty International UK,  ARTICLE 19, the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), China Dissent Network, Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, FairSquare, Hong Kong Democracy Council, Hong Kong Watch, and Iran International, as well as other individual experts and researchers.   The aims of the group are to: 

• To advance research and monitor incidents and effects of TNR in the UK;

• Support individuals and groups affected by TNR; and

• Identify and shape the development of a comprehensive policy response to TNR in the UK.

  Together, the Tackling TNR WG  has developed a ‘Four Part Approach’ for addressing TNR in the UK, which is outlined in detail below. This approach was included in the Tackling TNR in the UK Working Group’s submission to the Human Rights (Joint Committee) inquiry into ‘Transnational repression in the UK,’ in February 2025. Our evidence was published by the Committee in June 2025, and is available here. FPC’s Director, Susan Coughtrie, also gave oral evidence to the Committee in March 2025, the transcript of which can be found here.   Following the publication of the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report on transnational repression in the UK on 30th July 2025, the Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group prepared a statement in response. To read the statement, click here.   On 30th October 2025, the UK Government published its response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report on TNR. While the Working Group welcomes the Government’s acknowledgement of TNR as a human rights issue and its intention to improve coordination, it maintains concerns about the lack of transparency, the absence of a clear definition of TNR, and limited plans to engage affected communities. In response, the Working Group has written to the Home Secretary to outline these concerns. You can read the full letter here.  

The Tackling TNR Working Group’s ‘Four Part Approach’ for addressing TNR in the UK

  If you are interested to find out more about the working group and/or to enquire about joining, please email: info@fpc.org.uk  [post_title] => Tackling Transnational Repression in the UK Working Group [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => tackling-transnational-repression-in-the-uk-working-group [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-11-07 15:57:58 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-11-07 14:57:58 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8301 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [11] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8192 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-25 01:00:51 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-25 00:00:51 [post_content] => Bureaucracy still moves at the speed of fax, but exile communities are prototyping governance technologies at the speed of necessity. This opens new possibilities for host countries of those in exile to learn from their innovations, while building democratic values and resilience.   As someone exiled twice – first from Belarus due to political persecution, then from Ukraine due to war – I have come to see home not as a place, but as a protocol, where new digital governance tools enable active citizenship.  Diasporas are building these protocols under fire. Displacement breeds innovation: those in exile are not merely adapting to digital governance; they are pioneering it because their old institutions have collapsed.   Diaspora communities should be taken seriously because they have the power to influence change at home. We saw this in action when voters from abroad tipped the scales in Moldova's October 2024 EU accession referendum. The decisive votes were not cast in Chișinău – they came from WhatsApp groups in Italy, community centres in Germany and kitchen tables in Dublin^[1]. One in four Moldovans now lives abroad^[2]; their ballots turned a domestic stalemate into constitutional change.   The Belarusian diaspora pushed even further, electing a parliament in exile. Despite cyber harassment and threats to relatives, we held block chain audited elections for a Coordination Council in May 2024^[3]. Six thousand verified votes out of a million strong diaspora is not regime toppling, but it is a proof of concept that democratic processes can outlive failed states^[4].   In the shadow of authoritarianism, new technologies are making democratic engagement possible.  Zero knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are one promising approach. Projects like Freedom Tool let citizens prove passport validity without revealing personal data^[5].   Zero knowledge voting sounds dystopian until your polling station becomes a prison cell. Then it becomes a tool for building democratic resilience. Early pilots in Russian, Iranian and Georgian contexts suggest the method can scale, even under authoritarian pressure^[6]. It deserves rigorous security audits and a clear path to legal recognition.   Policymakers in Western democracies must understand that digital innovations by exile communities are more than fringe experiments – they are stress testing governance under extreme conditions. The UK should observe carefully, not as saviour but as strategic learner.   One quick win is improved administrative efficiency. For example, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office takes weeks to certify official documents, but secure digital credentials could streamline verification. Pilot schemes would surface real world obstacles early.   As authoritarian states weaponise diasporas, the UK could partner with democratic exile networks on standards and sandbox trials, that test new technologies in safe environments^[7].   Low-risk pilots could include a sandbox test for diaspora credentials as supplementary evidence for specific visa categories^[8].  Think tanks could convene Belarusian, Moldovan, Ukrainian, Hong Kong and Taiwan tech teams with MPs, regulators and the FCA sandbox to swap playbooks.   The government could also fund independent open-source audits of diaspora governance tools to understand security threats and vulnerabilities before deeper institutional engagement.   These technologies might eventually reshape citizenship and belonging. However, the transition from paperwork to digital protocols demands careful navigation. The question is not whether exile communities will innovate, but whether established democracies can learn from their experiments without repeating their mistakes.   Ray Svitla is a Belarus-born entrepreneur, fractional CMO and governance strategist working at the nexus of Web3, civil-society tech and frontier finance. He has mobilised $25 M+ in capital and unlocked $200 K in equity-free grants from USAID, the NEAR Foundation and others. As co-founder of WAKA he scaled the matchmaking platform to 100 000 users at one-tenth typical CAC. He also led a research department producing more than 80 publications that drew tier-1 clients including Blockchain.com. Today he stewards the 404embassy.com network, hosting salons with visionaries such as Vitalik Buterin. A John Smith Trust Fellow, Ray applies value-driven governance insights to build more resilient, inclusive futures.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] Wikipedia, ‘2024 Moldovan European Union membership constitutional referendum’, October 2024, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Moldovan_European_Union_membership_constitutional_referendum ^[2] Tiina Kaukvere, Emerging Europe, ‘Is Moldova’s diaspora ready to return home?’, May 2025, https://emerging-europe.com/analysis/is-moldovas-diaspora-ready-to-return-home/ ^[3] Kamil Kłysiński, OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, ‘Belarus: elections to the opposition parliament’, May 2024, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-05-29/belarus-elections-to-opposition-parliament ^[4] Ray Svitla, Embassy.Svit.la, ‘Pavel Liber: Building a New Belarus in Exile (An Interview)’, June 2025, https://embassy.svit.la/p/pavel-liber-building-a-new-belarus ^[5] Rarimo, Medium, ‘Introducing Freedom Tool’, February 2024, https://rarimo.medium.com/introducing-freedom-tool-15709e9eaa73; Ray Svitla, Embassy Svit.la, ‘Kitty Horlick (Rarimo): ZKDemocracy & Privacy’s Future’, July 2025, https://embassy.svit.la/p/kitty-horlick-rarimo-zk-democracy ^[6] Oleksandr Kurbatov and Lasha Antadze, Medium, ‘Building ZK passport-based voting’, September 2024, https://rarimo.medium.com/building-zk-passport-based-voting-3f6f97ebb445 ^[7] Citizen Lab, UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Written evidence to UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee – Transnational Repression (TRUK0112)’, 2025, https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/138042/html/ ^[8] Office for Digital Identities and Attributes, GOV.UK, ‘About us’, November 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-for-digital-identities-and-attributes [post_title] => From paperwork to digital protocols: how exile rewrites citizenship [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => belarus-from-paperwork-to-digital-protocols-how-exile-rewrites-citizenship [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:23:52 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:23:52 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8192 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [12] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8187 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-23 01:00:24 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-23 00:00:24 [post_content] =>  Displaced Ukrainians in the UK are highly educated, with strong professional backgrounds and well placed to contribute economically and socially. However, to do this, they need greater certainty about their future in the country.   More than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the UK has provided refuge to over 218,600 displaced Ukrainians under humanitarian visa schemes.   Government data shows 68% of Ukrainian adults are employed or self-employed^[1]. Yet only about one-third are working in their original professions, with 20% employed in the hospitality sector, indicating that there are opportunities to make much better use of their skills^[2].   Many Ukrainians are also proactively contributing to community life, establishing cultural associations, grassroots organisations, and volunteer initiatives that provide language classes, cultural events, and mental health support.   Last year, I joined the John Smith Trust’s Ukrainian Women’s Leadership programme in Scotland and I met many women who are contributing to the UK economy and whose efforts have strengthened both Ukrainian and local communities.   One Fellow, Hanna Tekliuk, is an active member of the Education Working Group of the CPG on Ukraine. She has also established the Ukrainian St Margaret’s Saturday School for relocated Ukrainian children. These schools are vital for maintaining a deep connection to their heritage.   Anna Kulish is another of the many women and John Smith Fellows making a vital contribution. She is the Secretary of the Scottish Parliament Cross-Party Group on Ukraine and chairs its business and economy working group, which promotes economic ties between Scotland and Ukraine.   With the CPG, she led the first trade visit from Ukraine to Scotland in over a decade, with 60 delegates including community leaders and mayors of Ukrainian cities. They came to Scotland not to ask for aid, but to present investment projects.   However without a clear pathway to permanence in the UK, many displaced Ukrainians face limited opportunities. The three-year visas under the Ukraine schemes are now approaching expiry. The Ukraine permission extension grants an additional 18 months’ stay, offering temporary reassurance. However, this extension does not guarantee indefinite leave to remain, leaving long-term status unresolved.   Career advancement, housing stability, and family planning are all shaped by legal uncertainty. Policy choices now will influence whether integration efforts continue to yield social and economic dividends—or risk stagnation under prolonged precarity.   While some Ukrainians intend to return when conditions allow, most are laying down roots and wish to remain long term^[3]. However, a sense of belonging remains constrained.   As one displaced Ukrainian reflected: “We came here to survive, but we’ve built lives. Now we need to know whether we’re staying as guests—or neighbours.”   As the UK navigates this next phase, there is an urgent need for clarity. Policymakers may consider how temporary protection could transition into more secure residency for those who would like to remain, aligning with broader migration and integration objectives.   Ukrainians in the UK have a great deal of untapped potential, with the skills and motivation to contribute more to the economy.  Targeted investment in credential recognition, bridging programmes, and language support could address underemployment and better align Ukrainian skills with labour market needs. This is a clear win for both Ukrainians and the UK communities that have welcomed them. Meanwhile, strengthening partnerships with Ukrainian-led organisations could enhance community integration and complement formal support services.   Integration is shaped by opportunity and agency. Policy decisions taken now will influence whether displaced Ukrainians can contribute through work, taxes, and civic engagement or remain constrained by temporary status.   Three years on, the UK faces a pivotal policy moment: whether the welcome extended in 2022 becomes a pathway to belonging or remains a temporary refuge.     Nataliia Danova is a John Smith Trust alumna, currently working for Edinburgh City Council. She is the co-founder of Help Ukraine Scotland, an organisation providing informational support and resources to displaced Ukrainians across Scotland. Nataliia is a creative practitioner, cultural mediator, and advocate for refugee and migrant rights, committed to building pathways for integration and community support through grassroots initiatives.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, ‘Ukrainian migration to the UK’, December 2024, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/ukrainian-migration-to-the-uk/ ^[2] Chatham House, ‘Ukrainian refugees and their shifting situation’, part of Ukraine’s fight for its people, February 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/02/ukraines-fight-its-people/ukrainian-refugees-and-their-shifting-situation ^[3] Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, ‘Ukrainian migration to the UK’, December 2024, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/ukrainian-migration-to-the-uk/   [post_title] => Legal certainty could boost Ukrainians’ economic contribution in the UK [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => ukraine-legal-certainty-could-boost-ukrainians-economic-contribution-in-the-uk [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:28:57 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:28:57 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8187 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [13] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8249 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-21 01:00:44 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-21 00:00:44 [post_content] => As global power dynamics shift, Central Asia’s strategic relevance is rising, – but so too is the need for a reset in engagement by international partners. Could a more principled, values-driven approach unlock lasting stability and democratic resilience in the region?    Central Asia stands at a peculiar crossroads. Decades after gaining independence, a common refrain echoes: "Everything has changed, but nothing has changed."    On the surface, new infrastructure rises, economies evolve, and geopolitical alignments shift. Yet, beneath this veneer, the fundamental nature of international engagement often remains stubbornly familiar, characterised by a transactional approach that prioritises short-term gains over long-term partnership. What was once subtly implied is now glaringly apparent: a pervasive lack of genuine interest in the region's holistic development, with compromises frequently driven by the pursuit of trade and resources.     Deepening regional integration is paramount. Initiatives like the Central Asian Summit are fostering greater cooperation among the republics themselves, building a collective identity and reducing reliance on external powers for regional stability. This internal cohesion makes the region a more attractive and reliable partner for others.    To truly move forward, a fundamental shift is required: a transition towards a more principled and value-driven approach to diplomacy. This means moving beyond the immediate gratification of trade deals or security pacts and embracing a long-term vision rooted in genuine partnership.    A key opportunity lies in enhancing regional connectivity and integration. As global supply chains are re-evaluated and diversified, Central Asia's geographic position as a land bridge between East and West becomes even more critical. Investing in modern transport corridors, logistics hubs, and digital infrastructure can transform the region into a vital transit artery, generating substantial transit revenues and stimulating local economies.     Firstly, a principled approach entails consistent investment in human capital and civil society. This includes supporting independent media, educational exchanges, and grassroots initiatives that empower citizens and foster critical thinking. Such investments, though not immediately yielding economic returns, are foundational for resilient societies and accountable governance.    Secondly, diplomacy must be predicated on shared values like the rule of law, transparency, and sustainable development. Instead of overlooking governance issues for the sake of a trade agreement, international partners should consistently advocate for reforms that strengthen institutions and combat corruption. This does not mean imposing Western models, but rather supporting Central Asian efforts to build systems that serve their own people effectively and justly.    Thirdly, fostering regional integration that benefits all citizens, not just elites, should be a priority. Supporting cross-border initiatives in areas like water management, energy, and transport can build trust and interdependence, creating a more stable and prosperous region.    A principled approach is not merely altruistic - it is strategically sound. By investing in the long-term stability and genuine development of Central Asian nations, international partners build more reliable and resilient allies. It counters malign influences by offering a compelling alternative rooted in mutual respect and shared prosperity. It acknowledges that true security and economic growth stem from strong institutions, empowered citizens, and a commitment to universal values.    The time has come to shed the transactional shadows and embrace a brighter, more principled path for diplomacy in Central Asia. Only then can "everything truly change" for the better, fostering a future of genuine partnership and lasting progress.      Ainur Kanafina is a Programme Specialist in Population and Development at United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Regional Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia in Istanbul, Türkiye. Previously, Ainur served at the World Health Organization (WHO) in Amman, Jordan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Kazakhstan. She has also worked at the British Embassy in Astana KAZGUU Higher School of Economics, Global Center for Cooperative Security and the Institute for Strategic Development. Ainur holds a MSc in public policy from University College London and a BSc in information technology and business from Indiana University. She is an alumna of various programmes organised by Council of Europe, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Riga Graduate School of Law and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Academy. Ainur is also a Bolashak scholar and a PMP certified project manager.    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Beyond transactions to rebuilding trust with Central Asia [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => beyond-transactions-to-rebuilding-trust-with-central-asia [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:29:13 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:29:13 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8249 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [14] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8189 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-21 01:00:15 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-21 00:00:15 [post_content] => High unemployment and limited economic opportunities in Central Asian countries have traditionally driven millions of people to migrate to Russia in search of work^[1]. Where the region’s historical, cultural and linguistic links with Russia have been a major factor in migrants’ choice of destination,  new migration patterns are however emerging, influenced by geopolitical shifts in the region. These present opportunities for Central Asian governments, the receiving countries, and the migrants themselves^[2].   Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, life has become more difficult for Central Asian migrants who live and work in Russia. Those who hold Russian passports are compelled to join the armed forces, and tens of thousands have been sent to the war zone^[3]. Some returned to their home countries to avoid the draft.   Then there are undocumented migrants. Since the terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall by Tajik nationals, Russia’s attitude towards Central Asian migrants has become more hostile^[4]. Combined with military mobilisation, this has led to new regulatory frameworks and tools for registering undocumented migrants.   From the perspective of Central Asian countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, whose economies rely heavily on remittances, dependence on a single country as a migration destination is a high-risk strategy^[5]. It gives the destination country a disproportionate influence over policies and leaves you vulnerable to changes in theirs.   That is why governments in Central Asia need to pursue a strategy to diversify the migration destinations of their citizens. We are seeing opportunities to expand mutually beneficial agreements on labour migration with countries such as the UK, Germany, Japan and South Korea ^[6]. These countries offer workers better conditions than Russia, with proper contracts that reduce the risk of exploitation and better legal protections.   The UK’s Seasonal Workers Scheme is a good example^[7]. The UK has a quota system, which allocates a specific number of places for each country. In 2024, Great Britain allocated 45,000 seasonal work visas for Central Asia, with approximately 30% going to citizens of Kyrgyzstan^[8]. Central Asian migrants view the scheme as a valuable opportunity for legitimate, well-paid and well-regulated work. The scheme benefits the UK by filling a seasonal labour shortage in the agricultural and poultry sectors. The same is true in Japan and South Korea.   For the governments of receiving countries such as the UK, labour migration schemes offer opportunities for cultural exchange and stronger relations in the region^[9]. Central Asian governments appreciate the UK’s scheme because it helps them to resolve their unemployment issues. So, if UK policy is to increase its influence in Central Asia, this is received more positively.   The temporary and seasonal nature of these schemes suits Central Asian citizens themselves, as they are not looking to emigrate but to resolve an economic need.  For host societies, Central Asian seasonal workers present minimal integration challenges, as their temporary stay avoids long-term social or economic strain. As long as the scheme is well-regulated, everybody wins.     Meder Dastanbekov is the former country director for Winrock International in the Kyrgyz Republic, where he led initiatives to promote safe migration and combat human trafficking in the Kyrgyz Republic and wider Central Asia region. His work addresses the critical challenges faced by migrants, particularly in light of evolving geopolitical dynamics, such as the war in Ukraine and its impact on migration patterns. With extensive experience fostering collaboration between governments, international organisations, and civil society, Meder helps in developing inclusive policies and practices that prioritise human rights and empower vulnerable populations.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] Kommersant, ‘Мы реально не знаем, кто к нам едет’, September 2024, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7166241 ^[2] University of Central Asia Institute of Public Policy and Administration, How War in Ukraine Has Shaped Migration Flows in Central Asia, policy brief, c. 2023, https://ucentralasia.org/media/psdnh1p1/pbmigration-flow-change-in-central-asia-en.pdf ^[3] Kaktus.media, ‘Бастрыкин заявил, что десятки тысяч мигрантов с гражданством РФ находятся на передовой’, May 2025, https://kaktus.media/doc/524105_bastrykin_zaiavil_chto_desiatki_tysiach_migrantov_s_grajdanstvom_rf_nahodiatsia_na_peredovoy.html ^[4] BBC News, ‘Ukraine war: US and UK to supply longer‑range missiles to Kyiv’, June 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68665896 ^[5] Азаттык Радиосу (RFE/RL), ‘Рублдин курсу борбор азиялык мигранттарга кандай таасир этти?’ (How the ruble exchange rate affects Central Asian migrants), April 2025, https://www.azattyk.org/a/33394657.html ^[6] Farangis Najibullah, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘Happy To Be In Britain, Central Asian Migrants Want More Work To Cover Expenses’, August 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/britain-central-asia-migrants-more-work-expenses/31997221.html; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘“This Is Not My World”: Central Asian Migrants in Russia Say They Could Never Return Home’, April 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-migrants-centralasia-uzbekistan/33261194.html; and, Akchabar.kg, ‘Kyrgyzstan and Japan deepen cooperation in employment and social projects’, n.d., https://www.akchabar.kg/en/news/kirgizstan-i-yaponiya-uglublyayut-sotrudnichestvo-v-sfere-trudoustrojstva-i-sotsialnikh-proektov-pdhtnmeblegahkmk ^[7] Association of Labour Providers, ‘Seasonal Worker Scheme’, n.d., https://www.labourproviders.org.uk/seasonal-worker-scheme/ ^[8] Akchabar.kg, ‘Великобритания выделяет 45 тысяч квот для сезонных работников из ЦА — 30 получат граждане Киргизстана’ (Britain allocates 45,000 quotas for seasonal workers from Central Asia — 30 will go to Kyrgyzstan citizens), n.d., https://www.akchabar.kg/en/news/velikobritaniya-videlyaet-45-tisyach-kvot-dlya-sezonnikh-rabotnikov-iz-tsa-30-poluchat-grazhdane-kirgizstana-mdphrmumvuomxzgj ^[9] The Economist, ‘Why Central Asians are flocking to Britain’, July 2023, https://www.economist.com/britain/2023/07/24/why-central-asians-are-flocking-to-britain [post_title] => Europe and Central Asia can benefit from changing migration patterns [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => kyrgyzstan-europe-and-central-asia-can-benefit-from-changing-migration-patterns [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:29:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:29:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8189 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [15] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8185 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-18 01:00:30 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-18 00:00:30 [post_content] =>  When speaking about Russian and Soviet colonialism, the first step is to agree on the terminology. Why do we continue to define the region by referencing that it ‘formerly’ belonged to the Soviet Union more than 30 years ago? To move on from the Soviet identity, we should refer  instead to Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the South Caucasus.   Yet this solution does not reflect the commonality of problems countries in this region face, exactly because of their tumultuous history and present circumstances. Given ‘post-socialist’, ‘post-communist’ or ‘post-anything’, present the same definitional problem as the ‘former soviet union’. One suggestion is to call the region the “Global East”^[1]. The second step is to realise that not all countries that were the republics of the Soviet Union and before that parts of the Russian Empire, necessarily agree that they were “colonised”. Some reject the term as degrading and not reflecting the economic and cultural reality they lived in. Some Georgians, for example, prefer to talk about it in terms of an occupation.   We also need to recognise that experiences vary hugely by country. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia kept their cultural identities and language. However, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, due to the influx of Slavic and other non-Asian populations, Russian remains the lingua franca and an official language until this day. In Estonia and Latvia, the large Russian-speaking populations form parallel social structures. In Belarus, Lukashenko’s regime actively promotes russification, and speaking Belarusian is perceived as a sign of being in the opposition.   Ukraine and Kazakhstan suffered starvation under Stalin in the 1930s. In Ukraine, memorialising the Holodomor is one of the foundations of modern Ukrainian identity^[2]. Meanwhile, the Kazakh famine (Asharshylyk), which was equally devastating, is less well-remembered and less researched^[3].   So, how can we start to shift colonial mindsets? We need to have conversations between different nations and ethnic groups about their experiences, including national minorities from Russia and ethnic Russians. Failing to do so allows propaganda to build. The consequences of failing to challenge false narratives can clearly be seen in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.   A good place to start is for decolonial activists from across the region to find spaces where we can share our experiences and build a common understanding. Independent media are ideally placed to support this process. For example, the Kyrgyz podcast O’decolon (English version Yurt Jurt) brings people together from almost all the countries in the region to discuss their experiences^[4].   When we are ready to reach a bigger audience, a series in the mainstream media exploring these issues in a more engaging way could be a good way to breakthrough. Just as Adolescence sparked conversations about teenagers, social media and misogyny, a series tackling colonial issues could help shift mindsets on a large scale.   Shifting mindsets within Russian society is an important component too, and not only with the involvement of civil society and independent media in exile. Hundreds of thousands of people fled Russia to avoid being mobilised^[5], with many ending up in Georgia, Armenia and Kazakhstan and other countries of the region.   For those who have left Russia at least, there is an opportunity to see their country from another perspective. It could be the beginning of some overdue reflection on the Soviet legacy and Russian colonialism.     Aigulle Sembaeva is an experienced civil society professional, Aigulle’s area of expertise is in leading and designing education, capacity building and youth participation programmes. Throughout her career she has brought together students, activists, journalists, reformers, and researchers from Central Asia and Eastern Europe to share their experiences and innovative ideas. She is a strong believer in the power of people’s networks to effect change.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1] G. John Ikenberry, International Affairs, ‘Three Worlds: the West, East and South and the competition to shape global order’, vol. 100, no. 1, January 2024, pp. 121–138, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad284 ^[2] National Museum of the Holodomor‑Genocide, ‘The History of the Holodomor’, n.d. https://holodomormuseum.org.ua/en/the-history-of-the-holodomor/ ^[3] Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, 'Remembering Kazakhstan’s Great Famine of the 1930s', https://ieres.elliott.gwu.edu/project/remembering-kazakhstans-great-famine-of-the-1930s/ ^[4] Bashтан, Подкаст О’Деколон, YouTube playlist, 43 episodes, last updated 19 December 2024, https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLjI-VRWtNFhNoA45bMJhPzqY82-smpeZF;  and, Bashтан, Yurt Jurt, Spotify podcast, hosted by Dr. Diana Kudaibergen, https://open.spotify.com/show/51uxvx3yDWujSSBPykPZYR ^[5] The Bell, ‘Russia’s 650,000 wartime emigres’, July 2024, https://en.thebell.io/russias-650-000-wartime-emigres/   [post_title] => How can we start conversations to shift colonial mindsets? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => russia-how-can-we-start-conversations-to-shift-colonial-mindsets [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:30:02 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:30:02 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8185 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [16] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8176 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-16 01:00:44 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-16 00:00:44 [post_content] => All societies are diverse, even if some people have got used to thinking that their country should be homogeneous, where everyone looks the same, speaks the same language, and follows the same religion.It is this mindset that enables authoritarian and populist leaders to divide their societies into “us and them”.   Globally we are seeing a pushback against the diversity, equality and inclusion (DEI) agenda, not least of all in the United States under the second Trump administration. Yet DEI is crucial to maintaining a peaceful society.My work, as the national coordinator in Georgia for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe High Commissioner on National Minorities,is mostly about preventing ethnic conflict and promoting a diverse society. Inclusive decision-making is one of the ways to make this happen.   When minorities take part in the decision-making process, they take ownership of those decisions^[1]. It gives the process more legitimacy because it represents the interests and needs of the whole society. This is relevant for all groups, whether ethnic, religious minorities or the LGBTQI community.   This is extremely important for democracy, especially today, as politicians all over the world revert to divisive rhetoric , fostering distrust among communities and attempting to manipulate  and try to manipulate us.   It’s never easy. You make certain steps forward, but then you must go back and start over again. In Georgia right now, where civil society is under unprecedented pressure from the government, there are fewer opportunities to implement a diversity agenda^[2]. When there is a rise in authoritarianism, minorities try to stay silent to weather the storm and survive this pressure. This further alienates them.   Despite this,  there is still an opportunity to show people why diversity is important. We can do this by making the connection between diversity and peace. When there is too much pressure on minority communities, people start resisting, and that could lead to tensions and then even conflict. But when you foster diversity, there is less friction and a greater chance of different communities living together peacefully. Thus, exclusion is not an answer; societies need to find their own way to embrace diversity so that it reflects the needs and aspirations of their members.   Diversity matters more than ever because it’s about individual dignity and security for everyone. It’s about creating avenues which enable people to become part of society so that they do not have to fight every single day to get a job, an education, medical help. National governments need to design inclusive policies to address these issues.   In Georgia, I would like us to reach a point where ethnic minorities feel confident and welcome to speak up, not only about their own issues, but also about issues that affect the whole country.   For this to happen, we need inclusive leadership and role models in high-level positions. And we need to see this from our partners in Western democracies. The UK could lead by example, including diversity not only in policies but also in their actions when interacting with Georgian politicians. It sends an important message.   I want society and politicians to understand that diversity is not a danger to our identities. You do not have to build barriers between different groups to keep people safe. Instead, you celebrate diversity and benefit from it. It creates opportunities for us all.   Nino Gogoladze is a national programme coordinator for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE HCNM) in Tbilisi, Georgia. She manages the work of the HCNM in Georgia seeking to prevent ethnic conflict in the country and promote integration of diverse society. Nino previously worked as a project coordinator at the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), a programme coordinator at the Heinrich Boell Foundation, and national anti-trafficking officer for the OSCE Mission to Georgia. She holds an LLM degree from London School of Economics and Political Science; and an MA in international relations and European studies from the Central European University, Budapest.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre nor those of the OSCE HCNM.   ^[1] OSCE, ‘The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’, September 1999, https://www.osce.org/hcnm/lund-recommendations ^[2] Nini Gabritchidze, ‘Georgian Dream’s FARA Takes Effect’, Civil.ge, May 2025, https://civil.ge/archives/684669   [post_title] => We must make the connection between diversity and peace [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => georgia-we-must-make-the-connection-between-diversity-and-peace [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:30:14 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:30:14 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8176 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [17] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8173 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-14 01:00:54 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-14 00:00:54 [post_content] => Ukraine is not just a battlefield – it is democracy’s most critical frontline. It is misleading to treat war as a regional conflict – the spillover of Russian aggression beyond Ukraine’s borders is not just possible, but likely.   What we are witnessing now is the global shift from a rules-based to a power-based order. The outcome of this confrontation will decide the politics of the future. We have a window of opportunity to create a global alliance based on democratic values and we must not miss it.   The cooperation between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea becomes more strategic than ever, as they prepare to undermine the Western-led, rule-based order. For Europe and the democratic world, it is crucial to break the endless cycle of appeasing the aggressor and to adopt a firm, practical policy of isolating Russia.   While some think about possible concessions to the aggressor, it is important  to understand that what is being sacrificed is not only territory but also our values and freedom. Appeasement encourages further aggression. In this context, democracies must show they have the strength and tools to counter authoritarian power. And while we cannot change our existing institutions – such as NATO and the European Union (EU) – overnight, we can adapt.   There are still instruments that have not been fully utilised. Despite Russia’s hybrid aggression and energy blackmail costing hundreds of billions, Europe has hesitated to confiscate Russian assets for Ukraine’s benefit. Seizing the Russian Central Bank’s assets to create a European defence fund would provide crucial resources and demonstrate Europe’s commitment to countering ongoing threats^[1]. Building on this, there must be a policy shift towards total economic isolation of Russia by ending all trade with it.   The ‘Coalition of the Willing,’ led by the UK and France, provides the decisive leadership Europe needs^[2]. This coalition has the potential to evolve into a broader security mechanism, with existing institutions like the EU taking on a greater role. In this context, the UK can further support a humanitarian operation to protect Ukraine’s airspace over the north-western sector of the Black Sea and western Ukraine.   Building on Ukrainian practical experience of modern warfare with new technologies, the UK could also develop initiatives like Sky Shield^[3]. This could protect the sky in Europe and the UK using the Ukrainian example to build air superiority.   Ukrainian military experience is highly beneficial for Europe and NATO because they can better understand what they’re dealing with. Looking beyond our traditional allies, we must make space for new partners and security alliances, such as Japan and South Korea.  A values-based alliance is our real strategic advantage.   The partnerships between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are based on mutual benefits and goals but there is no trust.  On the contrary, Ukraine is paying with its blood for choosing Europe. That is why our accession to the EU remains a top priority. With Russia watching, it sends a powerful message that Europe supports our aspirations. It’s more than integration. It's about the strategic perspective and common security.   If we stay firm on our common values, we can build greater trust and unity based on a shared vision. A consensus-based approach takes time, and there is a need to move quickly in this fast-changing environment. However, in the long term,  it will be more reliable than the transactional-based approach of the autocracies.     Kateryna Musiienko is a Kremenchuk City Council member and deputy head of the Committee for Foreign Relations, Education and Youth. She is a Head of the Foreign Affairs, Strategic Partnerships and Innovations at ANTS NGO. Kateryna was an advisor to a member of the European Parliament and former advisor to the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Ukrainian Parliament. Her educational background is in political science (Passau University) and diplomacy (University of Oxford).    Fellow Photo (c) Sarah Oughton, The John Smith Trust   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   ^[1]  Ukrainian Victory, Confiscation of Russian State-Owned and Affiliated Property in Ukraine: Path to Justice and Recovery, n.d., https://ukrainianvictory.org/wp-content/uploads/Confiscation.pdf ^[2] UK Government, ‘Coalition of the Willing: Joint UK–France statement following 10 April meeting’, April 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/coalition-of-the-willing-joint-uk-france-statement-following-10-april-meeting ^[3]Dan Sabbagh, The Guardian, ‘European‑led Ukraine air protection plan could halt Russian missile attacks’, March 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/06/european-led-ukraine-air-protection-plan-could-halt-russian-missile-attacks     [post_title] => How democracies can leverage Ukraine’s resistance for a global reset [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => ukraine-how-democracies-can-leverage-ukraines-resistance-for-a-global-reset [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:30:26 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:30:26 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8173 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [18] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8194 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-14 01:00:48 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-14 00:00:48 [post_content] =>   We are living through the biggest shift in geopolitical power since the Second World War, accelerated by Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, China’s economic ascendency, and the US retreat from guaranteeing Europe’s security.     A new multipolar power-based order is emerging. And in many countries, democracy is under threat as populist leaders exploit false and divisive narratives to gain and maintain power. In these turbulent times, we can see all too clearly that democracy is fragile and precious, and not to be taken for granted. We must have the courage to defend it in the face of growing authoritarianism.    Amid these shifts and crises, it has never been more important for UK policymakers to listen to a wide range of voices and perspectives, especially those we often don’t hear from. And where there are crises, there are also sometimes opportunities if you are willing to look for them and keep an open mind.    In this mini-series, John Smith Fellows from Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia discuss opportunities for transformation and development in their societies. We hear from Fellows in Ukraine, Georgia and  Kyrgyzstan, as well as Fellows exiled from Belarus and Russia, on topics including changing colonial mindsets, looking beyond traditional alliances, keeping the diversity agenda alive and opportunities for displaced people and local communities to thrive together.    Our Fellows are leaders and changemakers in their fields, who are committed to tolerance, openness and rules-based, people-focused governance. Together, they bring diverse perspectives and embody the value of connection and shared ‘sense-making’ in moments of crisis.    During our 30-year history, the John Smith Trust has built a network of more than 500 Fellows from across the region. This means that together we are well-placed to develop cross-regional and cross-sectoral connections, create space for new ideas and share expertise at a time of increasing polarisation.     The UK still excels at open discussion and respectful disagreement, which our Fellows value highly and take back to their societies. And while hard security cooperation – such as that proposed by the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ – is becoming increasingly important, the UK’s soft power diplomacy approaches are also crucial in the defence of democratic values in Europe and beyond.    For UK policymakers and advisors, it’s well worth spending time exploring emerging opportunities for local action and identifying where there’s potential for new alliances and collaborative relationships.     We can find strength in our shared values and focus on what unites us, not what divides us.    Baroness Suttie is a Member of the House of Lords since October 2013, Alison is currently the Liberal Democrat Northern Ireland Spokesperson in the House of Lords and is also a Party Whip. She served on the EU Select Committee in the House of Lords from 2015-19. She currently is a member of the Constitution Committee.  Alison was Head of the Liberal Democrat Leader’s office from 2006 to 2010 and was Deputy Chief of Staff to the Deputy Prime Minster for the first 18 months of the Coalition Government from 2010 to 2011.  In addition to being a working peer, Alison also works as an independent consultant in developing parliaments around the world. She has worked in Jordan, Iraq, Sudan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tunisia.  Having studied Russian and French at Heriot-Watt university in Edinburgh as well in Voronezh State University in Russia in 1988, she continues to enjoy speaking both languages.      Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.    [post_title] => Geopolitical shifts: crisis or opportunity for democracy? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => geopolitical-shifts-crisis-or-opportunity-for-democracy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:22:58 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:22:58 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8194 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [19] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8199 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-07-11 07:00:58 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-07-11 06:00:58 [post_content] =>   As war, political instability, and democratic erosion continue to reshape Europe’s trajectory, experts recently gathered in Westminster to examine where Central Europe stands and where it may be heading.   On 24th June 2025, the Aston Centre for Europe, the Foreign Policy Centre and UK in a Changing Europe co-hosted a high-level expert roundtable exploring the current political and geopolitical landscape of Central Europe. The event was chaired by the Rt Hon Anneliese Dodds MP and featured speakers from academia, policy, and journalism: Dr. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, Masaryk University (Czechia); Prof. Aleks Szczerbiak, University of Sussex (Poland); Vladimir Bilčík, Senior Fellow, GLOBSEC (Slovakia); and Alexander Faludy, Journalist (Hungary).  

"The geopolitical roles of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have always been important but are even more crucial given the war against Ukraine. It is essential that we develop strong people-to-people bilateral relationships, especially to support and promote democracy and security in the face of threats from illiberal actors."

Rt Hon Anneliese Dodds MP

  The panel focused on developments in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia. As war continues in Ukraine and global power dynamics shift, Central Europe has become a frontline for democratic resilience and foreign policy fragmentation. While united in their proximity to the war, the four countries diverge significantly in their internal politics, stance towards Russia, relations with the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), and their approaches to regional cooperation and defence. Included below is a snapshot of the panel’s discussion by country:  

• Poland faces institutional deadlock following the election of Karol Nawrocki as president. Nawrocki’s predecessor from the Law and Justice party blocked legislative progress by the government under Prime Minister Donald Tusk and more of the same can be expected. However, while judicial reform and domestic governance are stalled, foreign and defense policy remain largely stable. A broad public consensus supports military aid to Ukraine, but Nawrocki has expressed scepticism about its NATO and EU membership ambitions and foresees a more instrumental relationship. UK-Poland defence ties, especially in arms procurement and shared threat assessment, are expected to continue regardless of internal political friction or transatlantic uncertainty.

 

“Poles have mixed views about Donald Trump, and many are concerned about the possible weakening of the trans-Atlantic alliance, but whatever their views most of them see the US as Poland's only military security guarantor and are wary of any EU defence identity that is separate from NATO.”

Aleks Szczerbiak, Professor of Politics, University of Sussex

 

• Hungary is entering a politically volatile phase. The ruling Fidesz party is under pressure from the emerging TISZA party. This has prompted Fidesz, variously, to propose and enact a wave of restrictive legislation aimed at entrenching its power ahead of the 2026 elections. These include constitutional changes, media crackdowns and foreign interference laws. Hungary maintains close ties with China, Iran, and Belarus. Orbán‘s government continues to obstruct EU consensus on critical issues such as sanctions on Russia and resists rule of law standards.^[1] The political climate in Hungary is increasingly shaped by shifts in Washington. With President Trump’s administration in the United States taking a more transactional and ambiguous stance toward Europe, Hungary enjoys greater political cover to resist EU pressure.

 

“Hungary under Orbán is a headache for EU and NATO partners: a country from which Russian intelligence operates with impunity inside Schengen and which issues residents permits and passports to persons associated with those same intelligence services. The concern is multi-dimensional, given security and nuclear energy agreements with China and Iran.”

Alexander Faludy, Journalist

 

• Slovakia has seen moves to roll back democratic norms by the current government, though so far without the same degree of traction as in Hungary. Despite attempts by the government to control criminal investigations and to sideline independent media, public opinion remains broadly pro-EU and pro-NATO, and opposition forces are polling strongly ahead of the next election. Official rhetoric has increasingly challenged Slovakia’s commitments to NATO and EU norms, with Prime Minister Robert Fico raising the prospect of neutrality and distancing the country from Western consensus on Ukraine and Russia.^[2] The country’s trajectory remains uncertain, compounded by the government’s inability to address structural, economic, and social weaknesses. While civic resistance and electoral competition offer space for political change in Slovakia, continued UK and European engagement will be important to support conditions for democratic politics and economic modernisation.

 

“The current government in Slovakia is Prime Minister Fico’s weakest and most rudderless government so far. While conditions for democratic political change are still prevailing, a future Slovak government will have to address the most daunting social and economic tasks since EU and NATO accessions in 2004.”

Vladimir Bilčík, Senior Fellow, GLOBSEC

 

• Czechia presents a paradox. The country has a firmly pro-Western government, competitive elections, independent judiciary, and a pro-democracy president, yet there is growing electoral volatility ahead of the 2025 parliamentary elections. The ruling coalition is polling poorly amid public frustration over economic hardship, soaring living costs, and housing crisis. In this context, former populist Prime Minister Andrej Babiš is resurging, offering a technocratic, business-first message that sidelines foreign policy and questions Czechia’s continued support for Ukraine^[3]. His return could shift the country toward transactional neutrality, weakening its strong alignment with EU and NATO partners.

 

               “Czechia might look like the diligent pupil on democracy indices, but beneath the surface, there is growing political volatility and disillusionment. A return of Andrej Babiš would not just reshape domestic politics — it could steer Czechia towards a more transactional, inward-looking foreign policy, marked by greater readiness to play both sides.”

Dr. Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, Associate Professor , Masaryk University, Brno

    To read the full country analyses and explore key thematic takeaways from this expert discussion, you can download the full briefing here.     ^[1] Gabriel Gavin, Politico, ‘Hungary, Slovakia stall new Russia energy sanctions over gas ban proposal’,   June 2025,https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-slovakia-block-new-russia-energy-sanctions-ukraine-war-invasion-eu-viktor-orban/; International Bar Association, ‘Rule of law: EU blocking €18bn funding to Hungary over legislation concerns’, June 2025, https://www.ibanet.org/Rule-of-law-EU-blocking-18bn-funding-to-Hungary-over-legislation-concerns?utm_source=chatgpt.com ^[2] Jan Lopatka, Reuters, ‘PM Fico says neutrality would benefit NATO member Slovakia’, June 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/pm-fico-says-neutrality-would-benefit-nato-member-slovakia-2025-06-17/ ^[3] Jan Lopatka, Reuters, ‘Czech populist opposition leads as election set for October’,  May 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/czech-populist-opposition-leads-election-set-october-2025-05-13/   [post_title] => Expert Briefing: ‘Central Europe at a time of European and transatlantic challenges’ [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => expert-briefing-central-europe-at-a-time-of-european-and-transatlantic-challenges [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-08-12 15:31:01 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-08-12 14:31:01 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8199 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [20] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8063 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-04-03 13:30:31 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-04-03 12:30:31 [post_content] => Yesterday, Donald Trump announced a shift towards protectionism, the likes of which the world has not seen since the Great Depression.   For decades, global prosperity has been underpinned by a system of open trade without parallel in history. That system has enabled the creation of vast wealth in the Western world and lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in the Global South. It has also arguably contributed to global peace, as countries have more to gain by trading than warring with one another.   At a stroke, Trump brought that system to an end. By signing an executive order last night, he imposed a base tariff of 10% on imports from nearly all nations and additional steep levies on many.[1]  The United Kingdom faces only the base rate, but many other countries were not so fortunate. For American allies Taiwan and Israel, the rates are 32% and 17% respectively. For the European Union, the rate is 20%.and for China, 54%. For Vietnam and Cambodia – where many international companies moved production in order to avoid becoming victims of a US-China trade war – the rates are 46% and 49% respectively.[2]   Trump’s moves are just the beginning of what will now become a global trade war. Although the Trump administration has suggested that other countries not retaliate, they surely will – leading to an increase in trade barriers which is likely to be catastrophic for the global economy.[3]  In the West, consumer goods will become more expensive, interest rates will rise, and jobs will be lost. Elsewhere in the world, economic models which poorer nations were using to lift themselves up will cease to function. Geopolitical instability is likely to follow in the wake of economic instability, as it so often does.   Why is Trump doing it? There are at least three theories, some more persuasive than others. The first holds that this is simply the opening gambit in an epic negotiation, one that will end with most of these tariffs being swept away. The affected countries will come to the table and offer to reshape their trading relationship in a way that is more favourable to the United States, and the world will go back to (more or less) normal.   There are a few problems with this theory. Firstly, what exactly the administration even wants from other countries is not clear. It claims to have based its tariff rate for each country on the mixture of tariff and non-tariff barriers (for instance, subsidies and taxes) that the country in question imposes on the U.S. This is why Trump calls the tariffs “reciprocal”. But if that is the case, then something as simple as VAT would count towards the administration’s calculation. Unless the European Union and other economies are going to abolish VAT, there’s not much they can do to address the administration’s grievance.   The plot thickens when we examine the numbers more closely.[4]  The tariff rate the US has imposed on other countries appears not to be based on any plausible mixture of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers. Instead, the calculation seems to be based on that country’s trade deficit with the United States, meaning that only a complete collapse in its exports to the US could satisfy Trump. Only the complete unstitching of the modern global economy could achieve that. Even if it were possible, it implies a world radically different – and poorer – than the one we now inhabit.   Another problem is that the US government lacks the administrative capacity to engage in this many trade negotiations at once. Even the crude back-of-the-envelope way in which its tariff rates have been calculated betray that. Trump’s rambling, incoherent delivery of his speech at the White House yesterday – which badly misstated numerous facts about the economy and economic history – will also do little to inspire confidence amongst either the markets or US trading partners.[5]   A second theory for why Trump is doing this is that he genuinely is seeking a major rebalance of the world economy. He has stated repeatedly that he wants to see a renaissance of manufacturing in the United States, that he believes trade amounts to other countries ripping America off, and that US consumers should be willing to bear some pain in pursuit of economic rebalancing.[6]  During his speech yesterday, he once again raised the idea of tariffs becoming a major source of revenue for the US government, implying that they are here to stay.   This theory has plenty of problems too. The economic pain which would be involved in such an adjustment would be catastrophic for the US and global economies, not just a transient period of a little pain. The resultant trade wars could easily get out of control, depressing global economic activity and destroying trust between the United States and its economic partners. There would also be numerous unintended consequences, the type which have bedevilled state economic planners throughout history.   Trump’s idea to fund the US government through tariffs also makes little sense.[7]  In his speech yesterday, Trump decried the government’s shift from funding itself through tariffs to doing so through income taxes, a move which occurred in the early twentieth century. But this move was made for a simple reason: tariffs simply cannot generate enough revenue to fund a modern state. Trump’s vision implies a dramatically smaller US state, one that would not be up to the job of containing the geopolitical instability which results from its trade war.   A third theory of Trump’s motives views this whole affair as a power play. By holding a gun to the head of both the American and global economies, he forces everyone to come to him with their cap in their hands. Both foreign countries and domestic industries will have to grovel for relief, and to receive it they will be forced to pledge their allegiance to him. In this view, tariffs aren’t really about economics. They’re about building the structures of a more autocratic state, one based on blackmail and coercion rather than consent and trust.   Already, many countries around the world are debating whether to band together to resist Trump or try to cut their own separate deals. The United Kingdom received a lower tariff rate than the EU, which UK ministers are touting as a success.[8]  But trying to negotiate with Trump separately plays into his hands because each country is weaker individually than they would be if they banded together. Such moves are also corrosive of trust between allies and threaten to plunge the world even further into zero-sum thinking.   Which of these three theories best suits events? Given the chaotic nature of policymaking in the Trump administration, there’s likely some truth in all of them. What the administration does next will depend on the reaction of other countries, and of financial markets. By adopting such a maximalist course, Trump has made it more likely that the blowback will be so intense that he will be forced to adjust. But he has also dramatically raised the potential of a global economic catastrophe if he does not.     Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and author of the newsletter America Explained. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   Photograph courtesy of The White House from Washington, DC, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.   [1] The White House, ‘Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits’, April 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/regulating-imports-with-a-reciprocal-tariff-to-rectify-trade-practices-that-contribute-to-large-and-persistent-annual-united-states-goods-trade-deficits/ [2] Kayla Epstein, ‘Trump's Tariffs on China, EU and more, at a Glance’, BBC News, April 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1jxrnl9xe2o [3] Daniel Flatley and Annmarie Hordern, ‘Bussent Urges Against Reliation, says ‘Wait and See’ on Talks’, Bloomberg, April 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-02/bessent-urges-against-retaliation-says-wait-and-see-on-talks [4] Tony Romm, Ana Swanson and Lazaro Gamio, ‘How Are Trump’s Tariff Rates Calculated?’, The New York Times, April 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/02/business/economy/trump-tariff-rates-calculation.html [5] Daniel Dale, ‘Fact Check: Trump’s False Claims About Tariffs and Trade’, CNN, April 2025, https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/02/politics/fact-check-trump-tariffs-trade/index.html [6] Jeff Stein and David J. Lynch, ‘Trump Aides Draft Tariff Plans as some Experts Warn of Economic Damage’, The Washington Post, April 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/04/01/trump-tariffs-draft-recession-projection/ [7] Andrew Gawthorpe, ‘On Tariffs, Trump Resurrects 18th Century Economics’, America Explained, November 2024, https://amerex.substack.com/p/on-tariffs-trump-resurrects-18th [8] Eleni Courea, ‘Why Starmer’s Trade Diplomacy May Still Bear Fruit Despite 10% Tariffs on UK’, BBC News, April 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/apr/02/why-starmers-trade-diplomacy-may-still-bear-fruit-despite-10-tariffs-on-uk [post_title] => What’s Behind Trump’s Upending of the Global Economy? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => whats-behind-trumps-upending-of-the-global-economy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-04-03 13:44:36 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-04-03 12:44:36 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8063 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [21] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8044 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-28 09:46:34 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-28 08:46:34 [post_content] => Three years on from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, John Smith Fellows are focusing on systemic change and are at the forefront of Ukraine’s democratic transformation and recovery.   In 2022, John Smith Fellows were deeply engaged in humanitarian relief – delivering aid to displaced families and coordinating international donations. Today, they are focused on the critical need for long-term solutions.   Fellows now work on legal reform, cultural preservation, emergency response, and community innovation.   Transforming Ukraine through leadership These efforts are vital for Ukraine’s transformation into a resilient and prosperous democracy, guided by the shared principles of justice, human rights, and equality that underpin democratic world.   Their work not only reflects Ukraine’s commitment to aligning with Western institutions but also highlights the critical role of international collaboration in driving sustainable progress.   Their achievements and projects highlighted in the Fellows profiles below, show how international partnerships can play a vital role in Ukraine’s path towards a better future in NATO and the EU.  

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  Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Response Oksana Romanukha: Empowering Ukraine’s first responders As the Ukraine project manager at FIRE AID, Oksana coordinates the delivery of lifesaving firefighting and rescue equipment to the active hostilities zones. Her work directly supports first responders who face immense challenges amid missile strikes, fires, and collapsing buildings.   Why it matters: Emergency services in Ukraine are under overwhelming pressure, with outdated equipment and growing demands due to war-related destruction. Oksana’s efforts are saving lives and maintaining critical infrastructure.   What’s next: Oksana seeks additional international donors and partners to secure more equipment and build the capacity of first responders in the whole war-torn country.   Oksana says: “While Ukraine has surpassed all expectations, we have little to celebrate as the war passes the three years mark. Nobody wants to end this war more than Ukrainians, but we remain determined to end the war on terms that will allow the next generation to live in peace. This will not be possible without continued international support.”  

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  Education and Legal Reform Artem Shaipov: Shaping the future of Ukraine’s legal system Artem is at the forefront of Ukraine’s push for European integration in the field of rule of law. As an international development professional, he supports strengthening the rule of law and transforming Ukraine's legal education system. By aligning it with international and European standards and good practices, Artem aims to empower new generations of legal professionals to uphold democracy and the rule of law.   Artem also works on educating current and future policy professionals so that Ukraine has more people with improved policy implementation skills to address complex development challenges. In collaboration with the Kyiv School of Public Administration, he launched a podcast series, where he and his guests reflect on policy implementation issues in the context of various reforms.   Why it matters: Ukraine’s European integration requires a robust legal framework and legal professionals capable of upholding democracy and ensuring the rule of law. A lack of institutional capacity hampers progress.   Ukraine needs many people capable of implementing system-level changes necessary for Ukraine to withstand Russia’s full-scale war of aggression, recover, and prosper in the future.   What’s next: Artem seeks partnerships with international institutions to enable capacity-building programmes and facilitate experience exchanges. This includes opportunities for learning, and development for policy professionals eager to strengthen their policy implementation skills.   Artem says: “I come from Bakhmut, a once-thriving Ukrainian city that Russia has reduced to ruins and now occupies. I long for the day when my home, along with every other occupied town and village, is freed and rebuilt - a testament to Ukraine’s resilience.”  

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  Human rights and social justice Nataliia Bolshova: Advocating for the rights of alienated children and parents in Ukraine Nataliia is a civil rights advocate and a committed member of The Child Has a Right, a national initiative dedicated to addressing the escalating crisis of parental alienation and child abduction in Ukraine. Her advocacy is both professional and deeply personal – despite multiple court rulings in her favor, Nataliia has been unable to see her daughter for over 4.5 years. This is due to systemic inefficiencies, an outdated family law framework, and limited enforcement of court decisions.   Ukraine’s challenges in protecting the rights of children and parents have been further exacerbated by Russia’s full-scale war of aggression, which has created a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented scale. Millions of children have been displaced, and thousands have been illegally deported to Russia. Within Ukraine, the war has disrupted countless families, with 30% of children who fled Ukraine with one parent losing all contact with the other parent, and 80% of children whose parents serve in the Armed Forces experiencing minimal or no communication with them.   Why this matters: While Russia’s war crimes against Ukrainian children are the root cause of many recent cases of family separation, Ukraine’s family law system is ill-equipped to address the increasing complexities of parental alienation and child abduction. Social services, enforcement agencies, and courts handling family law cases often lack the necessary resources, expertise, and accountability to resolve these issues. This creates a cycle where systemic failures place the burden on alienated children, leading to significant psychological distress. Cases of depression and even suicides among affected children have been documented, underscoring the urgent need for action.   What’s next: Nataliia is seeking international partnerships and resources to address these critical issues. Her vision includes:

1. Advocacy for legislative reform: Collaboration with governments and international organisations to support the drafting and enforcement of family law reforms, ensuring that court decisions are not only issued but also effectively implemented.
2. Training and expertise: Assistance from experts and institutions to design specialised training programmes for Ukrainian social workers, judges, and law enforcement officials, equipping them with the tools to handle cases of parental alienation empathetically and effectively.
3. Support programmes for families: Collaboration with donors and organisations like UNICEF, Eurochild, and the Family Rights Group (UK) to establish comprehensive support systems. These initiatives would include psychological rehabilitation centers for affected children and parents, public awareness campaigns, and legal advocacy programmes.

  Nataliia says: “Three years into Russia’s full-scale war, millions of Ukrainian children have been displaced, thousands abducted, and countless more lost in a broken system. While international attention has rightly focused on Russia’s war crimes against children, another crisis is unfolding: the systemic failures that separate Ukrainian children from their parents, leaving them vulnerable to long-term psychological and social consequences. Protecting children’s rights must be central to Ukraine’s recovery, not an afterthought. The war will end, but without urgent reform, its consequences will last for generations. My mission is clear: to ensure that children’s rights are protected, families are reunited, and systemic reforms create a lasting impact for future generations.”  

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  Community development and innovation Vadim Georgienko: Empowering communities through citizen-led solutions Vadim, co-founder of the Smart Interactions initiative, is revolutionising local governance and community development with the innovative Citizen Token System (CTS). This groundbreaking mechanism empowers citizens to actively participate in decision-making and resource allocation by introducing governance tokens as a tool for transparency and engagement.   CTS has already been successfully piloted in four Ukrainian regions, demonstrating its ability to deliver measurable benefits. By rewarding citizen involvement, the system ensures up to 17.5 times greater social impact compared to traditional methods of humanitarian assistance and economic development. This approach bridges gaps in financial inclusion, strengthens local governance, and fosters trust within communities.   Why it matters: CTS offers a scalable, effective solution for empowering communities, addressing poverty, and improving governance, especially in challenging and rapidly changing environments. By putting citizens at the center, it creates a new standard for participatory governance.   What’s next: Vadim and his team are seeking partners to develop advanced digital tools for CTS and expand its reach across Ukraine and beyond. With your support, CTS can transform how communities in Ukraine and worldwide approach resilience, development, and inclusion.   Vadim says: “The future of Ukraine is interconnected with the future of the democratic world. Now, democracy faces a big problem globally. Why did "traditional" programs to support democracy fail? Without a good analysis of the reasons, I'm not sure that using "traditional" approaches will be successful anymore. On the other hand, I have doubts that respected designers of traditional programmes are able to get out of their habitual bubbles. The world changes rapidly, and rethinking the democratic strategy became a global challenge just yesterday.”    

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  Diplomacy and advocacy Serhii Orlov: Countering disinformation and strengthening Ukraine’s voice in Central Asia As a diplomat based in Tajikistan, Serhii is at the forefront of combating Russian propaganda in Central Asia, a region deeply influenced by Kremlin narratives. In his role as counsellor at the Embassy of Ukraine, Serhii leads efforts to counter disinformation, foster bilateral relations between Ukraine and Tajikistan, and amplify Ukraine’s voice in a region often seen as neutral in Russia’s ongoing full-scale war of aggression in Ukraine.   Serhii’s work goes beyond traditional diplomacy. He collaborates with local media and international partners to deliver truthful narratives and expose the manipulation of information that undermines democratic values. By supporting independent journalism and leveraging innovative media strategies, such as Telegram groups and widely consumed social media platforms, he ensures Ukraine’s perspective reaches broader audiences, particularly in regions vulnerable to disinformation.   Why it matters: Disinformation is one of the most insidious weapons in Russia’s arsenal, destabilising democracies and manipulating public opinion. Central Asia, with its strategic importance and proximity to Russia, is a critical battleground in the fight for truthful narratives. Serhii’s initiatives address this challenge by empowering local media and creating sustainable platforms for unbiased information, ensuring Ukraine’s story is told authentically.   What’s next: Serhii emphasizes the urgent need for more targeted and proactive strategies in collaboration with Ukraine’s Western and Eastern partners. Current approaches, while well-intentioned, often fail to account for the complexities of local dynamics, leading to resources unintentionally benefiting pro-Russian entities. To counter this, Serhii advocates for direct support of objective media projects, innovative outreach strategies, and enhanced funding for platforms that combat disinformation effectively.   By strengthening alliances and fostering local resilience, Serhii’s vision extends beyond Ukraine’s immediate needs – he sees this as part of a global effort to defend democracy, reduce corruption, and promote transparency.   Serhii says: “Impunity always evokes even greater evil. The civilized world must realize that neither a divided Ukraine nor its full conquest will satisfy the aggressor’s appetite. All the states that confront dictatorships now, as well as 'neutral' countries will become targets of hybrid warfare: election interference, support for radical political movements, energy disruptions, stolen databases, assassinations, and sabotage. That’s why we must act together to stop Russia, ensuring its demilitarization and preventing it from threatening global security again.”  

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  Andriy Shevchenko: Uniting the global Ukrainian diaspora against Russian aggression As head of mission in Ukraine for the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC), Andriy is mobilising the 25-million-strong global Ukrainian diaspora to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s full-scale war. Through international advocacy, humanitarian initiatives, and cultural diplomacy, Andriy works to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience and amplify its voice on the world stage.   The UWC, recognized by the UN Economic and Social Council, unites over 100 organisations in nearly 50 countries to support Ukraine’s defenders, advance its Euro-integration, rebuild communities, and promote democratic transformation. Under Andriy’s leadership, the UWC is driving efforts to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty and support its recovery.   Why it matters: The war has demonstrated the critical importance of global solidarity in defending freedom and democratic values.   What’s next: To learn more about UWC’s initiatives, explore ongoing projects, or discover ways to contribute, visit Ukrainian World Congress.  

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  Education and integration for displaced communities Elena Frantskevych: Transforming lives through education and integration Elena is a co-founder of Perlyna, a non-profit center in Riga, Latvia, dedicated to supporting over 100 Ukrainian refugee children daily. The center plays a vital role in ensuring the well-being, education, and integration of children who have faced displacement due to the war in Ukraine.   Why it matters: Elena and Perlyna co-founder Anna address critical challenges for displaced children and their families, including the following:

• Education: Assisting children in continuing their studies in both Ukrainian and Latvian curricula, preserving their academic progress and connection to Ukraine.
• Mental health: Providing psychological support to help children and their parents overcome trauma and stress caused by war.
• Cultural integration: Organising art, music, and sports events to help children integrate into their new communities while maintaining their Ukrainian identity.

  The challenge: The center faces significant obstacles, including inconsistent funding and bureaucratic hurdles in securing grants. These issues limit its ability to sustain and expand its essential programs.   What’s next: Elena is seeking partnerships with international organisations, including UNICEF and the European Union Children's Participation Platform, to secure consistent funding and expand the center’s reach. Additional support from corporate sponsors and charitable foundations can help provide meals, educational resources, and recreational opportunities for children.   Elena says: “Children in war-torn Ukraine face unimaginable vulnerability, with their safety, education, and well-being at constant risk. As the future of the nation, they must be cherished and loved to ensure a better tomorrow. It's our moral duty to support refugee children, providing the care, protection, and opportunities they desperately need to rebuild their lives and secure a brighter future.”  

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  Arts, culture and storytelling Olga Reka: Preserving Ukraine’s cultural identity Through her creative projects, Olga ensures that Ukraine’s cultural narrative is both preserved and reimagined for a global audience. Her recent project, Ukraine and Ukrainians, is a contemporary reissue of Ivan Honchar’s legendary historical-ethnographic art album, brought to life through a collaboration between the Ivan Honchar Museum and Gunia Project, with support from USAID. This edition revisits and expands upon the original work by spotlighting the regions and communities of Ukraine deeply affected by the World Wars, 20th-century technological disasters, and Russia’s ongoing full-scale war of aggression.   Olga’s projects not only document Ukraine’s rich cultural history but also offer a powerful testament to resilience, creativity, and hope in the face of adversity, inspiring global audiences to stand with Ukraine.   Why it matters: Cultural preservation is a cornerstone of Ukraine’s identity and resistance. Olga’s work bridges past and present, offering stories that underscore the strength of the Ukrainian people amidst unimaginable challenges.   What’s next: Olga is seeking funding to further expand her cultural initiatives and to collaborate with international publishers and co-producers, amplifying Ukraine’s voice and cultural heritage on the global stage.   Olga says: “The current war has many dimensions; in addition to the events on the battlefield, it has brought about constant terror from the skies, an information war, and a dramatic reduction in opportunities for entrepreneurship and creativity. However, living through this catastrophe has taught us to adapt and refocus in our search for ideas and models of working.”      

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  Varvara Mishyna: Building bridges through theatre Varvara Mishyna, the CEO of a cross-cultural theatre initiative, uses storytelling as a tool to connect Ukrainian and international audiences. Her performances in Scotland not only bring Ukrainian culture to new communities but also foster understanding and solidarity during one of Ukraine’s darkest times.   Why it matters: Art and culture play a pivotal role in uniting communities and sharing Ukraine’s message with the world. Varvara’s theatre provides a platform for dialogue and empathy.   What’s next: Varvara seeks collaborations with cultural organisations, venues, and donors to expand her initiative’s reach and impact.   Vavara says: “Theatre has become a bridge between cultures, preserving Ukrainian identity and resilience in times of war. Art cannot stop a war, but it ensures that Ukraine’s voice is heard, its culture remains vibrant, and its stories of strength and survival reach the world.”    

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  Transforming Ukraine together These are just some of the stories of Ukrainian John Smith Fellows which showcase their remarkable resilience, talent, and dedication. Their efforts are essential to Ukraine’s survival, recovery, and transformation, as well as to strengthening the global democratic community. These Fellows represent a new generation of leaders ready to collaborate with international partners and drive meaningful change.   How you can help:

• Collaborate: Offer expertise or create joint initiatives to scale their impact.
• Advocate: Share their stories with your networks to amplify their voices.
• Donate: Support specific projects through direct funding or by partnering with the John Smith Trust.

  For further details or to connect with any John Smith Fellows, please contact admin@johnsmithtrust.org.   Together, we can support Ukraine in its journey towards recovery and democracy, reinforcing our shared values and strengthening the global democratic community as we work for fairer, more sustainable and inclusive societies.       Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre. [post_title] => Three years on: Resilience and leadership - John Smith Fellows shaping Ukraine’s future [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-resilience-and-leadership-john-smith-fellows-shaping-ukraines-future [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-28 09:46:34 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-28 08:46:34 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8044 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [22] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8040 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-28 09:33:55 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-28 08:33:55 [post_content] => When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine our immediate priority was to support Ukrainian John Smith Fellows in our network. This included amplifying their humanitarian work, showing solidarity and sharing reliable information from the ground.^[1] Our current and former staff and trustees also leveraged their UK networks to mobilise aid, in-kind donations and helped Fellows and their families to find refuge in the UK.   In the longer term, we have had to rethink how we work. The Trust was established in the 1990s to help emerging leaders in the former Soviet Union navigate an anticipated democratic transition. Thirty years on, the context is very different. Democracy is facing a crisis of trust. Authoritarianism and populism are on the rise. Our world is increasingly fragmented and polarised. We are all facing similar challenges and will be better equipped to tackle them if we work together, listening and learning from each other.   Being a small, independent organisation has allowed us to be agile and responsive. Our strength lies in our networks, built through 30 years of running fellowship programmes for exceptional young leaders from Eastern Europe, Russia, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Staying connected with them gives us the insights we need to develop responsive programmes.   As our Ukrainian Fellows’ focus has evolved over the last three years from immediate humanitarian response to long-term transformation, institutional reforms and sustainable development, so too has our programming as we now focus on supporting the capable leaders within Ukraine who are looking for international partners to help drive change. At the same time, we recognise that Ukrainians have a wealth of expertise – from cyber threats to digital transformation and crisis management to civic activism – that can offer valuable learning for counterparts in the UK and elsewhere.   Through our Ukrainian Women’s Leadership Programme, in partnership with the University of Edinburgh Business School, and through our current Scotland-Ukraine Reconstruction and Recovery Leadership Programme, our focus is on fostering collaborative connections between counterparts in both countries.^[2] By developing and sharing expertise together, we can help ensure Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery is sustainable, fair and inclusive.   As we’ve heard time and time again from our network, “Ukraine’s fight has become everyone’s fight” – and that includes the Russian and Belarusian professionals who have been part of our recent leaders in exile programmes.^[3] Unlike other organisations who have opted to exclude all Russians and Belarusians, as aggressor-state passport holders, from their programmes, we have taken a more nuanced approach: we have developed a separate strand of programming for those exiled leaders who are actively working towards an alternative, peaceful and free future for their countries. We think it is more important than ever to engage with Russians and Belarusians who oppose the war and are committed to a peaceful and democratic future for their countries. Not doing so increases Putin and Lukashenka’s power to silence people opposed to their regimes. These programmes support Fellows to develop the insights and skills needed to build the kinds of societies they want to live in in the future. This includes working on shifts needed to break away from authoritarian, imperialistic and patriarchal mindsets.   After everything that Ukrainians have gone through these last three years, they deserve nothing less than a just peace. In the long term, such a peace will only be sustainable if there are leaders on all sides who are willing to listen and learn from each other, who have the skills to debate and disagree with each other respectfully, who can hold difficult conversations about the past and who are motivated and inspired to imagine alternative ways of doing things. The Trust has a history of facilitating discussions and fostering collaborations with people who sometimes have very different backgrounds and points of view. Through our programmes we are creating connections and hope for a brighter future.     Maija has been the Executive Director of the John Smith Trust since 2020. As Executive Director, Maija is responsible for the overall strategic direction of the John Smith Trust. Maija has been with the John Smith Trust since 2017, first as Director of the Central Asia Fellowship Programme and then as Director of Programmes with added responsibility for the Wider Europe Fellowship Programme. Prior to this, she worked for the UK’s leading international conflict prevention and peacebuilding organisation, focusing on governance, peacebuilding processes, security and civil society sector development. Maija has over 20 years of experience in research, analysis and programme development in complex environments, including working in Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia in education, media and organisational development. She speaks multiple languages and has an MA in Modern History and Russian from the University of St Andrews and an MSc in Development Studies with special reference to Central Asia from the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] John Smith Trust, ‘Ukraine: what our Fellows are doing and how you can help’, 24 May 2022, https://johnsmithtrust.org/ukraine-what-our-fellows-are-doing-and-how-you-can-help/; John Smith Trust, ‘Fellows in Ukraine fight hard for freedom and democracy’, 18 March 2022, https://johnsmithtrust.org/fellows-in-ukraine-fight-hard-for-freedom-and-democracy/; and, John Smith Trust, ‘Ukraine: efforts to tackle the war’s devastating environmental impact’, 17 June 2022, https://johnsmithtrust.org/ukraine-efforts-to-tackle-the-wars-devastating-environmental-impact/ ^[2] John Smith Trust, ‘Launch of new leadership programme for Ukrainian women in UK’, 08 March 2024, https://johnsmithtrust.org/launch-of-new-leadership-programme-for-ukrainian-women-in-uk/; and, John Smith Trust, ‘Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Leadership Programme’, 2025, https://johnsmithtrust.org/applications/fellowships-2024-5/ukraine-recovery-and-reconstrustion-leadership-programme/ ^[3] John Smith Trust, ‘Leaders in Exile: ‘Future of Belarus’ Fellowship’, 2024, https://johnsmithtrust.org/applications/belarus/. [post_title] => Three years on: How the power of networking can contribute to a peaceful and democratic future [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-how-the-power-of-networking-can-contribute-to-a-peaceful-and-democratic-future [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-28 09:33:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-28 08:33:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8040 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [23] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8034 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-27 08:49:18 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-27 07:49:18 [post_content] => The call between President Trump and President Putin on 12 February 2025, left millions of Ukrainians in a state of silent disbelief, shock, and even grief. Along with the comments of US Secretary of Defense Hegseth at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group the same day, it gives us a rather clear frame for the future negotiations, which will define the destiny of Ukraine, Europe – and the whole world.^[1]   Let me stress the conceptual faults of the intended outcome called ‘peace’. So what does peace really mean and what is missing in a contemporary high level discussion about it?   Peace is when war does not happen again. But the reasons for the Russian-Ukrainian war have not been resolved. Putin did not reverse his vision of the Russian world. Russia did not recognise Ukraine’s right to exist and to join NATO. Crimea and part of Donbas are not given back, and the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions are not excluded from the Russian constitution.   Europe cannot deter Russia alone There is no power balance. The USA is openly declaring that it is leaving European security to the Europeans, denying help to Ukraine to secure its future. NATO membership for Ukraine or any NATO commitment is not happening: no one is risking war to defend Ukraine. Conversely, getting a ‘neutral’ Ukraine fully ready – with massive anti-ballistic missile defense, long-range strike capability, matching air force and fleet, and artillery power – is not on the table either.   Europe cannot deter Russia alone, neither by nuclear, conventional, or hybrid means. Regional powers like the UK or France will not tackle emboldened Russia strengthened by the global network of allies. And prosperity without security – Ukraine’s potential EU membership in the coming decade – is not going to bring investment, development, and reconstruction, because war will come again.   Putin gets ‘neutral’ Ukraine with no security guarantees and shuts us out of NATO. He achieved all his war aims but the change of regime in Kyiv and full control over the rest of the Ukrainian territory (this can wait a bit, and be delivered either through political warfare or during his next stage of aggression).   Democracy and human rights are becoming irrelevant Peace is when there is justice and dignity. But instead of this the perpetrator is being equalised with the victim in intent, actions, consequences – and moral posture. The aggressor is to be rewarded. International law, along with the values of sovereignty, democracy and human rights are being made irrelevant.   Evidence of genocidal intent is ongoing – Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian identity is being erased in the occupied territories. Rape and mass murders stay unpunished, and arrests and tortures continue as we read this text. Mass mobilisation in the occupied territories is ongoing, and these Ukrainians will be killed in battles against their own.   Irresponsibility for war crimes – be it mass murders, replacement of population, deeming civilians as ‘cannon fodder’, use of chemical weapons, weaponization of frost and hunger – will solidify them as legitimate and efficient means of war.   Denying Ukraine EU membership will be next Peace is when there is freedom. Ukraine’s war for independence is being devalued into ‘something that should never have happened’. Its heroes will become victims. Those remembering our victories might be labelled radicals, nationalists and war-mongers.   Future elections in Ukraine may become an opposite of itself: an orgy of psychological warfare, toxic social networks and political AI manipulations, massive Russian interference, including terror unconstrained by any moral or legal rules. Much cheaper, much more deniable, and extremely efficient.   Putin continues to deny Ukraine’s access to NATO. The predator will not release its prey.   Is the USA really backing Russia? Peace should be sustainable. This current framing of peace is not. Setting the precedent of the legalised partitioning of Ukraine will next invite the redrawing of borders in Africa, Latin America, Asia – and in Europe. The example of nuclear disarmament of Ukraine will set the precedent for generations; anything short of nuclear weapons in stock will invite aggression.   Sacrificing Ukraine for avoiding nuclear conflict and for stopping active combat will simply delay the next act. All of this is prolonging Russia’s agony for the next wars to come, instead of finishing the collapse of the USSR and Russian empire. Is the West, and specifically the USA, backing Russia again?   President Trump potentially standing in Moscow next to Putin for his own “victory-against-Ukraine” parade on 9 May is not peace. It looks like the new ‘Yalta accords’, discussing Ukraine’s forced submission and disengagement rules in a Russia-created reality – and the next war coming very soon.^[2]     Ostap Kryvdyk is the Chair of the Ukrainian Strategic Initiative for the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Ukraine and is also a Fellow for the John Smith Trust.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] Pete Hegseth, ‘’Opening Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defense Contact Group (As Delivered)’, US Department of Defense, 12 February 2025, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4064113/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-at-ukraine-defense-contact/ ^[2] Department of State, United States of America, ‘The Yalta Conference, 1945’, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/yalta-conf [post_title] => Three years on: What peace should be [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-what-peace-should-be [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-27 13:29:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-27 12:29:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8034 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [24] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8012 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-26 09:00:29 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-26 08:00:29 [post_content] => Every war is a war against children. However, in its war in Ukraine, the Russian Government has specifically targeted children as a tool to disrupt Ukrainian communities, and secure long-term dominance in the region – pursuing a cruel and systematic policy of forcibly separating tens of thousands of Ukrainian children from their families and deporting them to Russia or Belarus.^[1]   As of 19 February 2025, Children of War reports that 19,546 children have been forcibly deported in this manner, and only 388 returned to Ukraine, while 596 are known to have died. According to the National Police of Ukraine, 2057 are still missing.^[2]   Some children have been placed in Russian foster and adoptive families and given Russian nationality.  More than 6,000 have been transferred to “filtration” and “re-education camps” where they are interrogated, and later, “integrated” and receive a “patriotic education.”^[3]   International human rights law (IHRL) does protect children in conflict. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, which both Russia (1990) and Ukraine (1991) have ratified, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR), for example, prohibit the forcible separation and displacement of children.^[4] The fact that Russia ceased to be party to the ECHR in September 2022, six months after its exclusion from the Council of Europe, is perhaps a reminder, however, of the limited reach of IHRL in conflict situations.^[5]   International humanitarian law (IHL) also recognises children as particularly vulnerable during conflict. Under Geneva Convention IV, and Additional Protocol 1, they are recognised as “protected persons” who should be respected, protected and cared for.^[6] The Geneva Conventions prohibit forcible deportation of civilians, including children; and where evacuation is necessary, protect family unity, require state parties to identify and register separated children, and closely regulate the evacuation of children to other states.^[7] Crucially, changing the personal or family status, including nationality or civil status, of children of war is prohibited.^[8]   Finally, Russia’s program of child deportation may also constitute a war crime. On 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights, who it holds to be allegedly responsible for the “war crimes of unlawful deportation and transfer of [children] from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.”^[9]   So, what does this mean for the future, and specifically, for the protection, return, and reintegration of the tens of thousands of Ukrainian children who have been victims of Russia’s cynical program of “renationalisation”?   It is clear that progress in rectifying these violations has been painfully slow and despite the strong prohibitions in IHRL and IHL, as well as in the intervention of the ICC, there is at present, no real prospect of change on the horizon for Ukrainian children who have been systematically abducted by the Russian state – at least not until peace is negotiated in the region.   On that day, let us hope that the fate of Ukraine’s missing children is brought to the fore of the negotiations between the state parties, and their return, reunification with their families and reintegration into Ukrainian society is prioritised. They are, after all, an important part of Ukraine’s history of this conflict and to its future.     Jen Ang is Founding Director of Lawmanity, a project that aims to tackle inequalities in the law by working with people-led movements to secure positive change. She is an experienced human rights lawyer and activist, qualified to practice in Scotland, England and Wales, and New York State. She is a legal expert on immigration and asylum, violence against women and girls, children’s rights, and on the rights of survivors of torture and trafficking. She is also a Professor in Practice at the University of Glasgow, and believes in making legal education open and accessible to all.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] Maria Margarita Mentzelopoulou, ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Forcibly displaced Ukrainian children’, European Parliamentary Research Service: Brussels, February 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/747093/EPRS_BRI(2023)747093_EN.pdf ^[2] National Information Bureau of Ukraine Children of War, 2025,  https://childrenofwar.gov.ua/en,  Accessed on 19 February 2025. ^[3] Yale School of Public Health researchers identified 43 facilities in Russia responsible for systematically re-educating at least 6,000 children, but this is considered to be a conservative estimate.  See further, Khoshnood, Kaveh, Nathaniel A. Raymond and Caitlin N. Howarth et al., ‘Russia’s Systematic Program for the Re-education and Adoption of Ukraine’s Children’, Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health: New Haven, 14 February 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/humanitarian-research-lab-yale-school-public-health-russias-systematic-program-re-education-adoption-ukraines-children-enruuk ^[4] OHCHR, UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies database, Accessed on 19 February 2025, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?Treaty=CRC&Lang=en ^[5] Council of Europe, ‘Russia ceases to be a party to the European Convention on Human Rights on 16 September 2022’, 23 March 2022, https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/russia-ceases-to-be-a-party-to-the-european-convention-of-human-rights-on-16-september-2022 ^[6] Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol 1, Article 77, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-77 ^[7] Geneva Convention IV, Article 49, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-49 ^[8] Geneva Convention IV, Article 50, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-50 ^[9] International Criminal Court, ‘Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova’, 17 March 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and [post_title] => Three years on: Russia’s War on Ukraine’s Forcibly Displaced Children [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-russias-war-on-ukraines-forcibly-displaced-children [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-26 09:36:01 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-26 08:36:01 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8012 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [25] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 8016 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-26 09:00:18 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-26 08:00:18 [post_content] => Right now, thousands of Ukrainian children do not know if their parents are alive. Tens of thousands have been taken to Russia, while hundreds of thousands have been lost in a broken system.   Three years into Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the world has witnessed the forced displacement of millions of Ukrainians, the abduction of thousands of children, and the fragmentation of families on a devastating scale. While international attention has rightly focused on Russia’s war crimes and mass deportations, a parallel crisis is unfolding – one that is less visible but just as devastating: the growing number of Ukrainian children permanently separated from their parents not by missiles, but by a fractured legal system, wartime displacement, and institutional inaction.   The scale of the crisis The numbers tell a tragic story. More than 2.5 million Ukrainian children have been displaced – many evacuated abroad for safety, others left behind while their parents serve in the Armed Forces.[1]   We know that 30% of children who fled Ukraine with one parent have lost all contact with the other parent who remains in Ukraine.[2]   Meanwhile, 80% of children whose parents serve in the Armed Forces have little or no communication with them.[3]   For more than 20,000 Ukrainian orphans and children who lost their parents in the war the heartbreak did not end there. They have been illegally deported to Russia, where efforts to repatriate them have stalled for three years. Many of those abducted before 2014 have already turned 18 and have been forcibly conscripted into the Russian army to fight against Ukraine.   These are not just numbers – these are children whose futures are being erased.   This problem extends beyond Ukraine’s borders. The breakdown of family ties slows the return of refugees, erodes trust in legal institutions, and weakens post-war recovery.   A system unprepared to reunite families Ukraine’s legal and social systems were never designed to handle the scale of parental separation caused by war. Cases of parental abduction and alienation existed before the invasion, but the war has multiplied their complexity.   Ukraine’s civil courts, law enforcement agencies, and social services do process these cases, but:

• There is no unified system ensuring the protection of children’s rights and the enforcement of court rulings.
• Corruption and bureaucratic inertia often render court decisions unenforceable.
• Family court proceedings can take 2-4 years, by which time a child’s relationship with the alienated parent may already be irreparably damaged.

  The burden of these systemic failures falls entirely on the children. Many suffer profound psychological distress, including anxiety, depression, and, tragically, even suicide.   While these are humanitarian tragedies today, they also pose a long-term challenge for Ukraine’s recovery, demographic stability, and national security.   Without urgent reform, Ukraine risks losing an entire generation.   What needs to happen next Protecting children’s rights must be a core pillar of Ukraine’s recovery and European integration process. This is not just a moral obligation – it is essential for social stability, national resilience, and Ukraine’s credibility as a democratic state.   Legislative reform and diplomatic engagement The UK and European partners can play a key role in advocating for urgent reforms in Ukraine’s family law system, ensuring alignment with European human rights standards. International legal expertise and diplomatic support can help ensure that these reforms lead to enforceable protections, not just symbolic commitments.   At the same time, strengthening Ukraine’s legal and social institutions and expanding support programmes for affected children and families is critical to delivering real change.   A generation at risk Ukraine is fighting for its land, but it must also fight for the generation that will rebuild it.   If we do not act today, Ukraine risks losing not just territory, but its future.   The international community has provided weapons, economic aid, and humanitarian assistance. Now, it must help protect Ukraine’s most vulnerable citizens: its children.     Nataliia is a John Smith Trust Fellow civil rights advocate as well as a committed member of The Child Has a Right, a national initiative dedicated to addressing the escalating crisis of parental alienation and child abduction in Ukraine. Her advocacy is both professional and deeply personal – despite multiple court rulings in her favor, Nataliia has been unable to see her daughter for over 4.5 years. This is due to systemic inefficiencies, an outdated family law framework, and limited enforcement of court decisions.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     [1] United Nations, ‘Two million refugee children flee war in Ukraine in search of safety across borders’, Press Release, UNICEF, 30 March 2022, https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/two-million-refugee-children-flee-war-ukraine-search-safety-across-borders [2] Obudsman, ‘deportation of ukrainian children is genocide!’, Ukraine Government, 13 September 2024, https://ombudsman.gov.ua/storage/app/media/uploaded-files/UPF%204.pdf [3] Maksym Savchuk, ‘From the "Youth Army" to the front: how Russia prepares Ukrainian children under occupation for war against their own country’, Radio Svoboda, 16 November 2024, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/skhemy-ukrayinski-dity-yunarmiya-viyna/33203644.html [post_title] => Three years on: Ukraine’s stolen children – the silent crisis that threatens the future [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-ukraines-stolen-children-the-silent-crisis-that-threatens-the-future [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-26 09:26:07 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-26 08:26:07 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=8016 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [26] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7999 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-25 09:14:32 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-25 08:14:32 [post_content] => In the past few weeks, Europe has been hit with a series of shocks. Firstly, the Trump administration has threatened military force to take control of Greenland, the territory of NATO ally Denmark. Secondly, it began direct talks with Russia over the future of the European security order. Thirdly, the administration escalated its aggressive rhetoric against the European political establishment, with Vice President J.D. Vance suggesting that the Trump administration would rather deal with parties of the far right.^[1]   These three issues cannot be separated from one another. Trump views the war in Ukraine as just one part of a bigger picture. He wants to drastically improve US relations with Russia while forcing Europe into a subordinate position. His goal is to make European countries directly serve the interests of the United States, be it by spending more on their own defence, buying more US goods and services, and even proffering up territory which Washington regards as strategically important.   Viewed from this standpoint, the war in Ukraine looks to Trump like an unnecessary irritant. Its continuation harms US relations with Russia while also compelling the United States to dedicate large amounts of resources to European defence. Caring little for Ukraine itself, Trump would rather end the war speedily by making concessions to Russia – and then move onto bigger issues.   Chief among those issues is the long-term future of the European security order. Russia is making demands similar to those that it made at the outset of the war in 2022, including the withdrawal of US troops from NATO’s eastern border and the recognition of a Russian sphere of influence in its near abroad.^[2] For European officials, this idea is terrifyingly compatible with Trump’s own desire to spend fewer American resources ensuring the security of Europe. They fear concessions to Russia on this issue even more than concessions regarding Ukraine itself.^[3]   What happens next for Ukraine is  vitally important, not only first of all for the Ukrainian people, but also because it will create the framework in which Europe and Russia must coexist in the years ahead. It seems likely that Ukraine will be forced to give up much of the territory captured by Russia and to forswear any short-term ambitions to join NATO – points that even the Biden administration were willing to concede.^[4] What is still open to question is whether and to what extent the country will receive credible security guarantees against renewed Russian aggression. Yet given that the US has said it will not give any such guarantee, and that European countries lack the means to enforce one, the future looks bleak for Kyiv.   Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s broader attack on the European political establishment looks set to continue. Trump sees the world as split into spheres of influence in which great powers have the right to coerce and even conquer weaker countries. A Trump administration which is threatening military force to seize Greenland is one which sees Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine as something to emulate, not something to be stopped.   Confronting hostile superpowers to both their east and west, European leaders are faced with their greatest crisis since World War II. This crisis is not just about Ukraine, but the apparent end of the conditions that have made Europe peaceful and prosperous for many decades. It will take a great leap of imagination and concerted political will to find a way out.     Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.     ^[1] J.D. Vance, ‘JD Vance’s Full Speech on the Fall of Europe’, The Spectator, February 2025, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/jd-vance-what-i-worry-about-is-the-threat-from-within/. ^[2] ‘Kremlin says Ukraine Settlement ‘Impossible’ without Addressing Wider Security Issues’, The Kyiv Post, , February 2025, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/47337. ^[3] ‘Donald Trump Opens the Door to Vladimir Putin’s Grandest Ambitions’, The Financial Times, February 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/2bf263a0-9768-4049-8f7d-239940a49efb. ^[4] Andrew Gawthorpe, ‘The Black Hole at the Heart of America’s Ukraine Strategy’, Atlantische Perspectief, November 2024, https://www.atlcom.nl/artikel-atlantisch-perspectief/the-black-hole-at-the-center-of-americas-ukraine-strategy/. [post_title] => Three years on: The impact of Trump 2.0 on the war in Ukraine [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-the-impact-of-trump-2-0-on-the-war-in-ukraine [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-26 09:30:39 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-26 08:30:39 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7999 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [27] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7982 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-24 09:04:25 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-24 08:04:25 [post_content] => On the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the world continues to witness the resilience of the Ukrainian people. Among them, journalists stand on the frontlines of an information war, risking their lives to ensure the truth is heard. Today, I want to highlight the extraordinary courage of Ukrainian journalists, particularly those working in the most dangerous areas—our local newspapers in the frontline and de-occupied territories.   The war has not only destroyed cities and taken lives but has also created an information vacuum in many regions. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians living near the frontlines or in recently liberated areas are cut off from reliable news sources. Electricity and communication networks are often destroyed, leaving people isolated and vulnerable to Russian propaganda. In these areas, local newspapers have become a lifeline, providing not only news but also a sense of connection and hope.   The National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (NUJU), together with international partners, has worked tirelessly to support these vital publications. Over the past two years, we have helped revive 32 local newspapers in regions like Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Sumy and Kharkiv. These newspapers are often the only source of verified information for communities under constant threat.   One such example is the story of Vasyl Myroshnyk, the editor of a newspaper in Zolochiv, Kharkiv region. His weekly journey to deliver newspapers has been called “the most dangerous newspaper route in the world” by British journalists. Despite constant shelling and the threat of drone attacks, Vasyl drives hundreds of kilometers to ensure his readers receive their papers. “In wartime, people need news more than ever,” he says. His dedication is a testament to the unbreakable spirit of Ukrainian journalists.   Similarly, Oleksiy Pasyuha, editor of the Vorskla newspaper in Sumy region, continues to deliver newspapers to the few remaining residents of a border village near Russia. His weekly route is fraught with danger, but he persists, knowing that for many, his newspaper is the only connection to the outside world. “Even if only five people remain here, I will stay,” says a local shopkeeper in one of the villages he serves.   These stories are not just about delivering news; they are about preserving humanity in the face of unimaginable hardship. Local newspapers provide a sense of normalcy and continuity, reminding people that they are not forgotten. They are a symbol of resistance against the Russian aggression that seeks to erase Ukrainian identity and culture. However, the challenges are immense. Many local newspapers struggle to survive due to a lack of funding and resources. International support, which has been crucial in keeping these publications alive, is now dwindling as the war drags on. The economic devastation caused by the conflict makes it nearly impossible for these newspapers to sustain themselves without external help.   The NUJU has also established six Journalists’ Solidarity Centers across Ukraine, providing journalists with protective equipment, workspace, and psychological support. These centers have become a refuge for hundreds of journalists, both Ukrainian and international, who risk their lives to document the truth.   As the war enters its fourth year, the world must not forget the importance of supporting Ukrainian journalism. The work of our journalists is not just about reporting the news; it is about defending democracy and truth in the face of tyranny. Every newspaper delivered, every story published, is a small victory in the information war.   To our international partners and colleagues, we extend our deepest gratitude. Your solidarity has been a source of strength for us. But the fight is far from over. We urge the global community to continue supporting Ukrainian media, especially local newspapers in frontline areas. They are not just newspapers; they are beacons of hope and resilience.   In the words of Richard Pendlebury, a British journalist who documented Vasyl Myroshnyk’s journey, “The bravery and resilience of Ukrainian journalists should be an inspiration to everyone in our profession.” Indeed, their courage reminds us why journalism matters, especially in times of war.   As we mark this somber anniversary, let us remember that the fight for truth is as important as the fight on the battlefield. Support Ukraine. Support Ukrainian journalists. Because journalists are important.   Postscript: Recently, NUJU convened an international conference that brought together over 130 participants, including leading global press freedom organizations like the Committee to Protect Journalists, European Federation of Journalists, International Press Institute, and Global Forum for Media Development. The resulting Resolution outlines urgent measures needed to support journalists in frontline regions, where they face not only physical threats but also a severe financial crisis due to the war's economic impact. The document particularly emphasizes the need for emergency funding for local newspapers that maintain crucial information links with their communities, often being the only source of reliable information in areas with limited internet access and electricity. The Resolution also highlights the pressing issue of Ukrainian journalists held captive by Russia, calling for increased international pressure for their release and investigation of crimes against media workers. You can read the full Resolution here: https://nuju.org.ua/standing-with-ukraine-s-media-and-journalists-a-resolution-for-safety-support-and-solidarity/     Sergiy Tomilenko is the President of the National Union of journalists of Ukraine.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   [post_title] => Three years on: The Unyielding Spirit of Ukrainian Journalism [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-the-unyielding-spirit-of-ukrainian-journalism [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-24 09:04:25 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-24 08:04:25 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7982 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [28] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7976 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-24 09:04:18 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-24 08:04:18 [post_content] => There was a famous saying that all roads lead to Rome. Now they are leading to Kyiv, in all senses: geopolitical, geo-economic, value-based and rule-based order or at least in the attempt to preserve the rules-based global order.   Despite all the challenges, Ukraine proves to continue functioning, fighting on the ground, having offensive operations and reforming itself. It seems surreal but very much true despite the evidence that in the last two weeks the world order as we knew it has come to an end. The system once based on rules, agreements, and shared values has been under a tsunami of geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges. It was never perfect, but it functioned. Now, its whole existence is under question.   All signs suggest that the United States is disengaging geopolitically from Europe. This growing transatlantic divide was particularly evident at the Munich Security Conference, where the rift proved not only deep but also fundamentally rooted in diverging values.   Moreover, European leaders found themselves directly challenged by US Vice President J.D. Vance, further amplifying the sense of uncertainty. This moment of shock should serve as a wake-up call for Europe, prompting a reassessment of its strategic autonomy and global role.   So, why do all eyes still need to be on Ukraine? Ukraine continues to prove that it can resist multiple challenges as well as reinvent itself in terms of innovations. Whether it is about the successful usage of naval drones, joint production lines in Ukraine under the “Danish model” or some other efforts to produce various unmanned aerial systems, it proves that it is more efficient to use advanced military technologies and localise production. [1]   Ukraine is nearing completion of the roadmaps required to open the first negotiation cluster in its EU accession process. The European Commission’s screening report is almost finalised; however, Hungary is delaying its approval.   A negotiation framework is already in place, containing multiple safeguards that allow for the suspension of the negotiation process if necessary. Ukraine anticipates the official launch of the first negotiation cluster in April or May. Moreover, the government has stated its ambition to open all negotiation clusters by the end of this year. It is important to emphasise that the negotiation process is not merely a technocratic or bureaucratic exercise. While technical compliance plays a significant role, the process is highly influenced by the political situation within the candidate country.   However, the beginning of the 2025 shapes new waves of Russia’s aggression that has hastened the emergence of a multipolar world, undermined global security, and exposed critical vulnerabilities in the West’s strategic posture. The trajectory is clear: if left unchecked, the war risks escalating into a broader European conflict by 2030, with the prospect of a global confrontation no longer beyond consideration.   Ukraine knows with its history and present resilience that Putin’s demands—whether concerning territory, neutrality, elections, or other conditions—are ultimately irrelevant. These demands merely reflect Russia’s true objectives: to assert control over Ukraine and compel the US and NATO to compromise their principles and interests in favor of a global order that serves Russia’s strategic ambitions.   The US must eliminate any hope Putin may have of achieving these goals—whether through military means or a so-called "peaceful" agreement. This war can only end when Russia understands it cannot secure victory either on the battlefield or through diplomatic manipulation.   The Alliance must seriously reassess its strategic options, including the deployment of ground forces, if Russia’s continued unwillingness to compromise—coupled with Ukraine’s increasing manpower shortages due to the "too little, too late" policy—brings Moscow closer to restoring its former sphere of influence.   Drawing on extensive fieldwork conducted across the Black Sea region, the US in 2025 has multiple avenues to bolster its strategic presence and regional stability. Key initiatives might include strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank through targeted force deployments, expanded arms sales, and increased defense investments to reinforce deterrence against Russian aggression, fostering “minilateral” cooperation—flexible, issue-driven alliances—among regional partners, particularly with Ukraine, to enhance interoperability and security coordination; securing and supporting regional connectivity initiatives that bypass Russian influence, reinforcing economic resilience and strategic independence for Black Sea nations.   This shift in US priorities underscores the urgent need for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own defense—not as a matter of political convenience, but as an imperative for long-term security and stability.   Given the shifting security landscape, investments in Ukraine’s defense industry, joint production ventures, and military innovation are essential. After nearly three years of war, Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable resilience, now producing over a third of its battlefield weaponry through domestic innovation.   Strengthening Ukraine’s defense industrial base not only enhances its self-sufficiency in warfare but also fosters long-term partnerships with Western defense sectors. By expanding joint production efforts, allied nations can bolster Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities while also reinforcing Europe’s broader security framework.   Russia, along with its allies, must not be underestimated as a destabilizing force in European security for at least the next decade. Its offensive strategies—combining hard and soft power with hybrid tactics—pose a persistent challenge that demands serious, sustained, and adaptive containment efforts.   As Winston Churchill once warned, “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile—hoping it will eat him last.” Failing to confront Russian aggression today will only embolden further destabilization tomorrow.   In this defining moment, Ukraine’s fight is Europe’s fight—and Europe’s security is the world’s security.         Dr. Victoria Vdovychenko is a widely recognized and published expert on the issues of hybrid warfare, strategic communication, with particular emphasis on relations between Ukraine and the European Union as well as NATO. She is working on the challenges of the European Union, Euro-Atlantic integration, hybrid warfare, strategic communication collaborating with such educational institutions as University of Bologna, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, KU Leuven, University Catholic Louvain, Cambridge University. Victoria is currently a Visiting Fellow within the British Academy and a co-lead of the Future of Ukraine Program at the Centre for Geopolitics, University of Cambridge.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre       [1] Ukraine and Denmark summarised the results of cooperation under the ‘Danish Model’ of support for the Ukrainian defense industry in 2024. Through this initiative, the Armed Forces of Ukraine received weapons valued at nearly EUR 538 million. https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/results-of-the-danish-model-of-support-for-ukraine-s-defense-industry-in-2024-the-armed-forces-of-ukraine-received-weapons-valued-at-nearly-538-million [post_title] => Three Years On: Why all eyes still need to be on Ukraine [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-why-all-eyes-still-need-to-be-on-ukraine [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-24 10:53:15 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-24 09:53:15 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7976 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [29] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7970 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-24 09:04:02 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-24 08:04:02 [post_content] => 85 years ago, in December 1940, Franklin Roosevelt described the US as the ‘great arsenal of democracy’ in a broadcast made less than a year before the country decisively entered the war against fascism in Europe. That ushered in almost a century where the US could be relied on by European allies.   That security blanket led to complacency and an over reliance on the US by European leaders. The first Trump Presidency and shift in public attitudes towards European security in the US was seen as a blip, but few can have that excuse anymore.   The dangers of these attitudes have been most apparent when it comes to dealing with the threat from the Kremlin. More than three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 11 years after the war started and a quarter century after Putin came to power, we Europeans are still not taking our collective security seriously enough.   For too many democracies in Western Europe, there has not been the same urgency in dealing with our security as you will find among those bordering Russia. Leadership has shifted away from the old axis of Paris, Berlin and London and has instead come from Warsaw, Tallinn and Helsinki. Although Europe’s democracies have responded with support to Ukraine it has been nowhere near the scale that was needed. It should be a source of shame that North Korea has been able to provide more support to Russia than many European countries have to Ukraine.   That needs to change. Europe needs to step up and take responsibility for its own security. For three long years, and the eight years before then, Ukrainians have defended their fellow Europeans, far too often underequipped and under-resourced as we bicker at home.   This has shown up the weaknesses of the traditional European powers with the rise of the right in France, Germany’s failure to take its security responsibilities seriously and the UK’s indulgent act of self-harm with Brexit holding the rest of Europe back.   The time for complacency was over three years ago and the need for greater European self-reliance on security is now urgent. In supporting Ukraine we support ourselves. It’s time to invest in the defence of European democracy again and a more integrated approach to European defence and security.     Stephen Gethins MP is a member of the Foreign Policy Centre's Political Council   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   [post_title] => Three years on: An end to Europe’s Complacency is Urgent [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => three-years-on-an-end-to-europes-complacency-is-urgent [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-24 09:50:07 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-24 08:50:07 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7970 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [30] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7906 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-02-04 10:18:21 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-02-04 09:18:21 [post_content] => The rapid disintegration of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad stunned observers. Forces from Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army and Syrian Free Army converged on Damascus on 8 December 2024, sealing the fall of Ba’athist forces which had ruled Syria since 1971. Eleanor Nott, founder of a development NGO and PhD candidate at King’s College London, travelled to Syria to visit civil society leaders and assess the state of the health system.     Syria, January 2025 We landed early in Beirut and the rising sun illuminated our drive through the mountains to the Jdedeh border crossing into Syria.   The Lebanese border was the familiar experience of uniformed staff checking papers in buildings adorned with the flags of their nation. What I encountered on the other side was different and the first sight of a nation in a state of rebirth. On the first stretch of the road to Damascus, we saw an abandoned checkpoint painted in the faded livery of the fallen regime. Shreds hung where a portrait of former President Bashar al-Assad, the first of many, once looked down. The sheer number of images of Assad and his father, Hafez, was remarkable. On buildings, Bashar’s cold-eyed stare gazed down from posters and in paint, at the entrance to towns, along highways, made of tiles or carved into stone, Assad – both senior and junior – have had their images smashed, torn or scratched out. Bashar in military fatigues; perhaps the final sight of the outside world seen by those entering one of the many notorious mukharbarat sites in Damascus. The footage of liberated Sednaya prison has revealed to the world the torture and degradation meted out by the regime in its cells.   At the Jdedeh crossing there were no uniforms, just a quiet industriousness which set the tone for my forthcoming encounters. A man walked in and proclaimed ‘good morning, welcome to free Syria.’ The men behind the desks asked questions about who I was here to see, wrote things on a piece of paper with biro, conversed among themselves and eventually handed me a form to complete.   In Damascus’ Umayyad Square, the setting for scenes of jubilation in early December as the regime melted away, the tri-star free Syrian flag was draped from buildings and flashed in the windows of passing cars. A group of people were digging up the grass on the roundabout and planting shrubs and flowers. The lobby of the Sheraton hotel was full of activity, the obligatory NGO and UN white Land Cruisers crouched in the car park.   Crossing a bridge to eastern Ghouta, a short drive from the Assads’ palace on the hill and smart international hotels, ranges of shattered apartment blocks loomed in the near distance. This was the scene of the first chemical attack launched by the regime in 2013, when it was on the edge of defeat. American and British red lines evaporated and with a Russian diplomatic sleight of hand, the regime agreed to surrender its chemical weapons - only for them to be used on dozens of further occasions.[1]   The new head of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), Dr Hazem Bakleh, served the organisation for decades before resigning in disgust at the corruption he witnessed, an act which marked him out as a transgressor in the cult of Assad. His predecessor had a security buzzer fitted to control entry to his office but Bakleh operates an open door policy with his team, something he considers vital and in the spirit of the new Syria. Since 2016 the President of the SARC had been Khaled Hboubati - an Assad associate . As Hboubati’s business interests in dried apricots suffered due to the conflict, he was rewarded with a government contract to formalise the Khirbet Ghazaleh crossing in Deraa.   The scale of corruption in Syria has been breathtaking and the aid sector was not exempt from the efforts of the regime to co-opt all resources entering the state. Once the conflict started, a key mechanism for monitoring and controlling the activities of humanitarian agencies within the country was the insistence that aid organisations partner with the SARC. SARC’s role was as a gatekeeper and coordinator of all humanitarian actors in Syria, domestic and international. It was the lead implementing partner of the UN. The inadequacy of the SARC-administered cross-line operations from Damascus into opposition-controlled areas was a spur for UN Security Council Resolution 2165 which authorised cross-border operations in 2014; allowing aid to enter opposition enclaves from Jordan, Iraq and Turkey.   The SARC’s brand is a tarnished one and its new chief is keen to restore trust among both the Syrian people and international donors. Dr Bakleh describes how he instructed the contents of a recent planeload of food aid from the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center, the humanitarian arm of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to be delivered directly to local distribution points, bypassing SARC’s warehouses, to demonstrate the new era of transparency. This was a response to past SARC activity when some staff used to divide the packages in the quiet of the warehouse and sell the high value items on the black market for profit.   In Homs, the consequences of corruption for the health system are apparent. I am told how the cost of a CT scanner would double, from delivery at the airport to arrival at the hospital, as bribes inflated the price in transit, from the government department through the local intelligence branch to a hospital. Hospital authorities are struggling to settle an unpaid bill left over from old times, some $16,000 and counting. The medical electronics company gave up waiting for payment and no longer maintains the scanner, which sits idle.   I have lunch with a group of doctors who tell me about the patient who was hauled off the operating table by the mukhabarat, the surgeon begging to be able to at least stitch closed the open abdomen.[2] One of them says that when the regime was in power, permission would need to be sought for such a gathering as ours - of ten or more people - from the local police. My host has returned to a family home he left fourteen years ago, happy to find it still standing. Many are not, some 60% of Homs’ residential areas bombed by barrels from helicopters or missile payloads courtesy of the Russian air force.[3] Among the casualties was also the Amal hospital, bombed in 2012 and its flattened buildings still standing in ruins today.[4] The ruins of smashed neighbourhoods were left as a reminder of the fate of those who challenged the regime.   Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) estimate more than 949 healthcare workers have been killed directly during the conflict, with more than 92 percent killed by the Syrian government and its allies.[5] The assault on health is one of the most striking features of the Syrian conflict. One of the most authoritative investigations was the Lancet-American University of Beirut Commission on Syria which used the term ‘weaponisation’ to describe the strategy of violently depriving people of healthcare they need at the cost of hundreds of healthcare workers killed, incarcerated or tortured and scores of healthcare facilities attacked.[6] In addition to denying wounded civilians’ impartial medical treatment, PHR reported about the invasion, attack and misuse of hospitals, impediment and attack of medical transport and detention and torture of doctors.   The new head of the Homs Health Directorate is from Idlib, the quasi-state from which Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched its lightning offensive in November. The doctor did not know what to expect when he returned home to Homs. To his surprise the standard of healthcare provision he found in government areas was inferior to that in the northwest.   The health system, among other services, in the northwest has been sustained by a range of Syrian charitable and governance organisations. Many were established in the wake of the revolution with strong support from the Syrian diaspora in the Gulf, North America, Europe and the UK. These organisations were able to sustain the functions of the state in the absence of the Damascus government. Financial resources were often modest but well-managed and high standards of probity applied to governance.   The new government faces huge economic, political, and security challenges. HTS has demonstrated itself to be a disciplined force, stopping looting and thus far maintaining its commitment to protecting rights of minorities. In Homs and Damascus, I visited churches where worshippers were attending Mass and the Divine Liturgy as usual. In Homs, a queue snaked around the block of former security personnel handing in their weapons and military identity cards, an early Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) move. There will be a temptation to centralise management and coordination of services. In many of my conversations there was a sense that the civil society activity that sustained the northwest was only for the emergency period and that the right leadership body is central and local government. This would represent a blow to those who strove tirelessly to maintain vital services and whose talents Syria will need to restore the national fabric. Civil society is also a route to political participation and engagement, the call of the revolution, and essential for building peace and stability.     Calls for restoration and resilience over retribution and revenge The Assad regime sought to project an image of stability which many people were convinced by. Assad had been readmitted to the Arab League, the EU was calibrating an early recovery approach that would fall short of reconstruction, and Italy had re-opened its embassy in Damascus.   It was an illusion. The state was a facade constructed to serve one small section of the population. All economic and political mechanisms were geared toward capturing resources that would sustain the regime and its allies, including international aid.   Civil society organisations sustained the northwest, kept services running and provided a space for the development of associations and grassroots institutions. The new government will need the resources - intellectual, financial and social – of all those who continued to serve their country and nurture the wellspring of institutional life.   Witnessing the condition of Syria, destroyed cityscapes and a state hollowed out by corruption and cynicism; the resilience of the Syrian people is all the more remarkable. I heard calls for justice, not revenge. For restoration, not retribution. This is a resourceful and proud nation. It deserves the best chance of success.   Most of all, there is relief that the regime’s arbitrary and sadistic rule is over. Describing the evaporation of the secret police, my friend said: ‘the shadows that followed us have gone now.’ As have a million Assad portraits, rendered in stone, tile, fabric and paint.     Eleanor Nott is a Senior Adviser and Co-Founder of the David Nott Foundation. Since 2015 the DNF has trained over 2,000 doctors in life and limb-saving surgical skills. Eleanor oversaw the development of the Hostile Environment Surgical Training (HEST) course, a trademarked programme accredited by the Royal College of Surgeons of England and supported by bespoke simulation equipment. Eleanor was recognised with her husband and Co-Founder, Professor David Nott, on Foreign Policy’s Global Thinkers list of 2016 for their work training doctors in conflict areas. She has contributed to The Telegraph, British Medical Journal, IISS Voices, CNN and has appeared on Sky News. Eleanor is also a PhD student in the department of War Studies at King’s College London.     Photographs courtesy of author.     Disclaimer: Eleanor is writing in a personal capacity. The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre nor the David Nott Foundation.     [1] Tobias Schneider and Theresa Lütkefend, ‘Introduction: The Syrian Regime’s Approach to Chemical Warfare’, GPPi, April 2020, https://chemicalweapons.gppi.net/analysis/introduction/ [2]  Mukhabarat is an arabic phrase used to describe intelligence agencies and secret police used to spy on civilians [3] Marwa al-Sabouni, ‘The Lost Heritage of Homs: From the Destruction of Monuments to the Destruction of Meaning’, Cultural Heritage and Mass Atrocities, https://www.getty.edu/publications/cultural-heritage-mass-atrocities/part-2/11-al-sabouni/ [4] American Association for the Advancement of Science, ‘Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights Project: Assessing the status of medical facilities in Syria’, AAAS Centre for Scientific Responsibility and Justice, 14 May 2014, https://www.aaas.org/resources/assessing-status-medical-facilities-syria [5] Physicians for Human Rights, ‘Medical Personnel Are Targeted in Syria’, March 2024,  https://phr.org/our-work/resources/medical-personnel-are-targeted-in-syria/ [6] Fouad M Fouad et al., ‘Health workers and the weaponisation of health care in Syria: a preliminary inquiry for The Lancet-American University of Beirut Commission on Syria’, The Lancet, Volum 390, Issue 10111, 02 December 2017, https://www.thelancet.com/article/S0140-6736(17)30741-9/fulltext [post_title] => Op-Ed: Hope amidst the rubble - Syria’s rebirth after Assad [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-hope-amidst-the-rubble-syrias-rebirth-after-assad [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-04 11:40:58 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-04 10:40:58 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7906 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [31] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7897 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-01-29 10:14:57 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-29 09:14:57 [post_content] => Media freedom, and access to information, are fundamental rights at the heart of open societies. In 2025, these rights are facing significant and sustained assaults. Governments and political leaders around the world are harassing and attacking journalists, viral disinformation and conspiracy campaigns are polluting information eco-systems, and the journalism business model is failing.   Last year, more than 120 journalists were killed and 500 imprisoned.^[1] Countless more were arbitrarily detained, censored, and targeted with lawsuits and online harassment campaigns, designed to intimidate and silence. Meanwhile, public media organisations have been politicised and influenced by political elites, and had their funding threatened.^[2]   A shocking 80% of the world’s population has less freedom of expression today than they did in 2000.^[3]   As the dust settles on 2024, the bumper ‘year of elections’, we are also seeing a rise in the number of leaders who verbally attack and criticise the media - including in the United States and Europe – historic champions of free speech.^[4]   Famously, during his 2024 Presidential election campaign, Donald Trump said he wanted to jail journalists and close down major news networks. At one rally, he even joked that he “wouldn’t mind” if an assassin shot the journalists standing in front of him.^[5]   These attacks are amplified by new alliances between political elites and technology platforms that increasingly set the rules of engagement for the global public sphere.^[6] Elon Musk, in particular, is using X to criticise the ‘mainstream media’. Meanwhile, Meta has announced that it will cease fact checking on its platforms in the United States, and relax its community regulations.   Declining media freedom is also compounded by the extreme economic pressure facing the news industry. Over the past two decades, the advertising revenue that once supported independent journalism has moved to social media and online platforms, resulting in staggering job cuts and newsroom closures.   In the UK, the revenue for traditional local journalism is today roughly only a quarter what it was in 2007.^[7] While in the United States, there have been so many newsroom closures that an estimated 55 million Americans now live in ‘news deserts’: areas where there is limited or no access to local news at all.^[8]   Why does this matter? Journalists are the traditional ‘fourth estate’ that hold elites to account. They help to expose corruption and abuses of power, and ensure that civil rights and freedoms are protected.   Research shows that, in ‘news desserts’ without local media, voter turn-out goes down,  political partisanship goes up, and local politicians, courts and business are not scrutinised. One study has even shown that, as local newspapers close down, oil and gas plants pollute more.^[9]   Most significantly, declining media freedom goes hand in hand with democratic backsliding. Governments that seize and silence the media face less scrutiny; and it becomes easier to disregard the rights and freedoms of citizens and manipulate election outcomes.   More generally, when elites relentlessly attack and criticise the ‘fake news’ media, they create confusion about what sources of information can be trusted, and this makes populations more vulnerable to propaganda, mis- and disinformation.   This misinformation causes real harm – as seen during the Covid-19 pandemic.^[10] It can also exacerbate crises and conflict, as it has in Ukraine and Syria.^[11] Finally, misinformation can create social division and undermine democratic institutions, including through election interference by foreign actors. A free and critical news media – that is trusted by audiences - helps to insulate society against these harms.   For all these reasons, as the OSCE argues, “There is no security without media freedom”.^[12]   What next? States have made numerous pledges to protect and promote media freedom – through fora including the United Nations and UNESCO, the OECD, The International Partnership for Information and Democracy, and the US-led Summit for Democracy, to name a few.   Notably, in 2019, then Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt made media freedom the UK’s number one foreign policy priority. He appointed Amal Clooney as the UK’s Special Envoy for Media Freedom, and he launched the Media Freedom Coalition (MFC) with Canada as the co-chair.   As media freedom continues to decline, it is crucial that the UK and its allies follow through on these pledges. There have been endless summits, days, and reports documenting the decline of media freedom. What we need now is action.   This means unequivocally condemning those who attack journalism – be those attacks physical, legal, verbal, or through online harassment. It means going beyond questions of journalism safety to focus on media funding, the regulation of online platforms, media literacy, and methods for countering more subtle forms of influence and control.   The fight for media freedom will require significant political and financial capital.^[13] Yet it could not be more important for democratic survival.     Mel Bunce is Professor of International Journalism and Politics at City St George's, University of London. Her research examines international news, media freedom, and the relationship between journalism and democracy. She is currently the Deputy Dean of the School of Communication & Creativity at City St George’s, University of London, and she was previously the Head of City's renowned Department of Journalism. Mel holds a Doctorate in Politics from the University of Oxford, and is a Senior Fellow of the UK’s Higher Education Association.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre     ^[1] International Federation of Journalists, Press Release: 122 journalists and media workers killed in 2024, says the IFJ, 31 December 2024, https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/122-journalists-and-media-workers-killed-in-2024-says-the-ifj. ^[2] Kate Wright, Martin Scott, and Mel Bunce, Capturing News, Capturing Democracy: Trump and the Voice of America, Oxford University Press, 26 September 2024, https://global.oup.com/academic/product/capturing-news-capturing-democracy-9780197768495?lang=en&cc=au. ^[3] Article 19, ‘Explore the state of freedom of expression around the world’, Global Expression Report 2024, 2025, https://www.globalexpressionreport.org/. ^[4] Reporters Without Borders (RSF), 2024 World Press Freedom Index – journalism under political pressure, 2024, https://rsf.org/en/2024-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-under-political-pressure. ^[5] Steve Holland, ‘Trump says he wouldn't mind if someone shot through 'the fake news' to get him’, Reuters, 03 November 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-says-he-wouldnt-mind-if-someone-shot-through-the-fake-news-get-him-2024-11-03/ ^[6] Julie Posetti, Kaylee Williams and Mel Bunce, Donald Trump, Elon Musk and the threat to press freedom, The Guardian, 04 December 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/dec/04/donald-trump-elon-musk-and-the-threat-to-press-freedom. ^[7] Dominic Ponsford, Colossal decline of UK regional media since 2007 revealed, Press Gazette, https://pressgazette.co.uk/publishers/regional-newspapers/colossal-decline-of-uk-regional-media-since-2007-revealed/. ^[8] Ill Evanston, ‘Medill report shows local news deserts expanding’, Northwestern Medill, 23 October 2024, https://www.medill.northwestern.edu/news/2024/medill-report-shows-local-news-deserts-expanding.html ^[9] Pamela Campa, Press and leaks: Do newspapers reduce toxic emissions?, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Volume 91, September 2018, Pages 184-202, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069616301371. ^[10] Maria Mercedes Ferreira Caceres et al., The impact of misinformation on the COVID-19 pandemic, AIMS Public Health. January 2022,  Pages 262–277, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9114791/. ^[11] Mel Bunce, Humanitarian Communication in a Post-Truth World, Journal of Humanitarian Affairs, Volume 1, Issue 1, 01 January 2019, https://www.manchesterhive.com/view/journals/jha/1/1/article-p49.xml. Cathrin Schaer, ‘How fake news campaigns could push Syria back to civil war’, DW, 03 January 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/syria-civil-war-hts-bashar-assad-regime-fake-news-disinformation-v2/a-71210900 Max Hunter, ‘Russia vs Ukraine: the biggest war of the fake news era’, Reuters, 01 August 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-vs-ukraine-biggest-war-fake-news-era-2024-07-31/. ^[12]  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), ‘can there be security without media freedom?’, 25th Anniversary of the Mandate of the OSCE Representative on Freedom on the Media, 2022, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/d/530239.pdf ^[13] William Horsley, Dear foreign secretary, here’s how to protect journalists and press freedom, The Conversation, 5 February 2019, https://theconversation.com/dear-foreign-secretary-heres-how-to-protect-journalists-and-press-freedom-111128. [post_title] => Decline in media freedom ‘hand-in-hand’ with democratic backsliding [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => decline-in-media-freedom-hand-in-hand-with-democratic-backsliding [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-01-29 10:14:57 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-01-29 09:14:57 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7897 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [32] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7885 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-01-27 10:12:08 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-27 09:12:08 [post_content] => In recent years, claims about advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have also promised to revolutionise our worlds.^[1][2] Business, finance, healthcare, transportation, education, communication and translation, and customer service among others are under the magic spell of AI.^[3] It should come as no surprise, then, that the AI revolution has generated international competition among states to lead and benefit from the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution.^{[4] [5]} The struggle for capitalising on the AI revolution among states, without a doubt, will change local and international politics.   The West led by the United States, United Kingdom and Europe intends to focus on liberal principles to set the AI standards for innovation and mitigate risks.^[6] The rest, mostly the Global South, is expected to see the benefits of these prudent norms, rules, and principles, if not acquiesce, to make the world a better place.^[7] After all, previous instances of disruptive technologies such as the invention of the telegraph and the telephone or nuclear weapons were managed through multilateral norms and institutions. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) shaped the norms for reliable and equitable use of communication systems globally and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) aimed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promising disarmament whilst promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But the struggle to capitalise on AI or tame it through globally acceptable norms and institutions will not follow past precedents, for the simple reason that the AI revolution is not only a driver of global disorder, but thrives on it.   Global disorder is a way to understand the complex and interlinked chaos and crisis unfolding in our world – everything everywhere all at once. There are endless wars across regions, rising economic inequalities, continuous racial and gendered injustices, predatory capitalism and its impact on the environment, resource wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, callous disregard of international rule of law and multilateral institutions across the political spectrum, societal discontents that feed into radical right-wing ideologies of violence and left-wing visions of revolution. Global disorder has also led to increasing interference of global elites and tech-billionaires in the everyday conduct, not just the broad contours, of politics. These episodes of crisis as individual instances are certainly not new. However, today we live in a world of polycrises.^[8] Our world is interconnected than any time in the past spinning the crises faster.^[9] Policymakers cannot put a band aid on one crisis to resolve another as global disorder forms an intricate web of crises – each influencing and amplifying the other.     AI and Multilateralism AI is a driver of global disorder in this interconnected world of crises. This is in part due to three reasons. Firstly, multilateral norms and institutions as a solution to stabilise the world from the problems of disruptive technologies are in a deep crisis.^[10] Many stakeholders in AI are led by players in the private sector. A group of influential members in this sector distrust multilateral global institutions and inveigh against attempts to manage AI as regulatory overreach that stifles innovation.^[11] They call for self-regulation instead.^[12] This convergence of distrust of multilateralism is deeply troubling.   For example, in handling the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s invasion of Gaza, both the Western and the Global South policy makers have challenged the liberal international order for addressing the scourge of war.^[13] Many policymakers turned to selfies, smart phones, and propaganda to feed the hungry social media machine with rhetoric about both these wars. More than anything, policymakers discarded an important “qualitative” element of multilateralism: non-discrimination.^[14] The AI world on social media thrived on this rejection of the non-discrimination principle. We find multiple AI curated videos and memes in YouTube, Tiktok, Facebook, and in other social media platforms where actors justify one war whilst rejecting or ignoring many others. Policymakers and the general public found ways to disparage the UN, avoided dialogue with their “enemies,” and lived in media driven realities of these wars. AI has changed the world from modus-vivendi to the world of irreconcilable differences.   In the past, multilateral institutions were avenues to articulate differences through dialogue. For example, US policymakers were wary of state-centric norms of ITU. They pursued power in diplomacy to regulate the internet through the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). They ensured governments took private sector interests seriously.^[15] Similarly, on the NPT, Indian policymakers disagreed on the norms of nuclear haves and have-nots, asserted sovereign equality among states, and developed an independent nuclear programme. India maintained its international non-proliferation credentials and in 2005 Indian policymakers cashed this cheque as a responsible nuclear weapons state against the geopolitical competition between the US and China.^[16] The influence of short-curated videos, pictures, and memes powered by AI and machine learning algorithms have changed such slow pursuit of interest within multilateral norms towards the desires for speedy solutions outside of it.   AI and Global Digital Divide Secondly, the AI revolution rests on a larger digital divide between the West and the Global South states, and a sharper divide between and within Global South states.^[17] Claims about the promises of AI wrongly predict a fair distribution of its benefits to the world, when in fact advancements in AI perpetuate sharp divisions, hierarchy, and inequalities globally. Digital hierarchy takes many forms. For example, in the West there is thicket of data protection and planned regulation of risks to privacy.^[18] Nevertheless, machine learning algorithms require supply of data. Many tech-companies work closely with governments and non-governmental organisations and focus on democracy to use data from the Global South. For example, “Microsoft partnered with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in 2022 to expand a training curriculum for investigative journalists on the abuse of state resources in elections.” [19] Piloted in 2022 in Tunisia and Serbia, the training is in high demand, “for safely investigating state abuse of public resources.”[20]   This is not altruism, however. Even relatively strong states from the Global South, who are very much part of the liberal order such as India, Brazil, or South Africa, frequently face the dictates of tech-giants, which many see as digital colonialism.^[21] Similarly, the expertise and the capacity to manufacture advanced semiconductors are concentrated in the West, leading to race for semiconductor supremacy.^[22] Specifically, investing in equal access to advanced semiconductors or universal data protection is antithetical to the AI revolution. China has already sensed a geopolitical struggle in this arena and has its own AI plans that are distinct from the West.^[23] Furthermore, critical minerals and rare earth in Africa and Latin America power AI machines.^[24] Increasingly assertive or even democratic political actors in this part of the world saddles easy access to these resources. Possibly worst of all, many AI stakeholders find struggles in “free market” is better than a regulated supply of these resources. Like a wolf watching over a henhouse, many companies have made promises about voluntary commitments such as safety tests, information sharing, or robust reporting mechanisms to manage risks posed by AI.^[25] The future of global disorder lies in how these promises and commitments unfold in world politics.   AI and Power Politics Finally, exalted claims of the AI revolution hide the novel power politics that is part of any technological advancements in the world.^[26] With the relative decline of the West, albeit with a militarily powerful United States, and the shift in the bargaining leverage of many other states in the lower rungs of international hierarchy, we are moving from the age of great power geopolitics to widespread power politics of all actors. Increasingly power politics on technology resort to technology for influence. Ambitious policymakers will aim to use AI technology global influence detached from the realities of inequalities in an unequal world. Hyper surveillance, return to techno-nationalism, silencing dissent, relying on technocratic solutions, and a lofty imagination of AI driven warfare will augment global disorder.       Sasikumar Sundaram is a Senior Lecturer in Foreign Policy and Security at the Department of International Politics, City St George’s, University of London. He is currently Vice Chair of the Global South Caucus of the International Studies Association. He completed a PhD in International Relations at Central European University (Budapest / Vienna) and Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil and American University, Washington DC. He is author of forthcoming book Rhetorical Powers: How Rising States Assert Competence in International Politics (New York: Columbia University Press). His work has been published in several leading journals, including International Theory, International Studies Quarterly, and Journal of Global Security Studies.     Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre     ^[1] Mustafa Suleyman, Michael Bhaskar, ‘The Coming Wave: AI, Power, and Our Future’, Penguin, 03 October 2024, https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/454199/the-coming-wave-by-bhaskar-mustafa-suleyman-and-michael/9781529923834 ^[2] Mustafa Suleyman, ‘How the AI Revolution Will Reshape the World’, Time, 01 September 2023,  https://time.com/6310115/ai-revolution-reshape-the-world/ ^[3] Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor, ‘AI Snake Oil: What Artificial Intelligence Can Do, What It Can’t, and How to Tell the Difference’, Princeton University Press, 24 September 2024, https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691249131/ai-snake-oil?srsltid=AfmBOor515mF4ERoCFTYk0P5B_ePkAuyJzpbo-eT0UYBWN0LadHgrINS ^[4] Sam Winter-Levy, The Emerging Age of AI Diplomacy, Foreign Affairs, 28 October 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/emerging-age-ai-diplomacy ^[5] UK Government, ‘Regulation for the Fourth Industrial Revolution’, Policy Paper, 11 June 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/regulation-for-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/regulation-for-the-fourth-industrial-revolution ^[6] Anu Bradford, ‘The Race to Regulate Artificial Intelligence’, Foreign Affairs, 27 June 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/race-regulate-artificial-intelligence-sam-altman-anu-bradford ^[7] Rachel Adams, ‘AI Is Bad News for the Global South’, Foreign Policy, 17 December 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/17/ai-global-south-inequality/ ^[8] Adam Tooze, ‘Welcome to the World of the Polycrisis’, Financial Times, October 28, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/498398e7-11b1-494b-9cd3-6d669dc3de33 ^[9] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, ‘Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion’, International Security, Volume 44, Issue 1, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351 ^[10] United Nations, ‘Amid Rise in Conflict, Distrust among Nations, Stronger Multilateral System Led by United Nations Needed More than Ever, World Leaders Tell General Assembly’, Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, Seventy-eighth Session, 80th & 81st Meetings, 07 May 2024, https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12598.doc.htm ^[11] Financial Times, ‘OpenAI warns over split with Europe as regulation advances’, 25 May 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/5814b408-8111-49a9-8885-8a8434022352 ^[12] Taken from a video tweeted by Meet the Press (MTP) whilst interviewing CEO of Google, Eric Schmidt, on 13 May 2023, https://x.com/MeetThePress/status/1657778656867909633?mx=2. ^[13] Patrick Wintour, ‘Why US double standards on Israel and Russia play into a dangerous game’, The Guardian, 26 December 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/dec/26/why-us-double-standards-on-israel-and-russia-play-into-a-dangerous-game ^[14] John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution, Cambridge University Press,  Volume 46, Issue 3 , pp. 561 - 598, 1992, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/multilateralism-the-anatomy-of-an-institution/AB34548F299B16FDF0263E621905E3B5 ^[15] See Duncan Hollis and Kal Rustiala, “The Global Governace of the Internet” in Duncan Snidal & Michael N. Barnnett (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023) ^[16] US Department of State (Archive), U.S. - India: Civil Nuclear Cooperation, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/c17361.html ^[17] United Nations, ‘Widening Digital Gap between Developed, Developing States Threatening to Exclude World’s Poorest from Next Industrial Revolution, Speakers Tell Second Committee’, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, Seventy-eighth Session, 10th & 11th Meetings, 06 October 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/gaef3587.doc.htm ^[18] Daniel Spichtinger, ‘New data protection and privacy laws have changed the regulatory landscape for researchers in the Global North’, LSE, 15 April 2024, shttps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2024/04/15/new-data-protection-and-privacy-laws-have-changed-the-regulatory-landscape-for-researchers-in-the-global-north/ [19] International Foundation for Electoral Systems, https://www.ifes.org [20] The original report in the US State Department is US Department of State, ‘Private Sector Commitments to Advance Democracy’, 29 March 2023, https://www.state.gov/private-sector-commitments-to-advance-democracy/ . This report is now removed. See archives: http://web.archive.org/web/20230329182252/https://www.state.gov/private-sector-commitments-to-advance-democracy/ ^[21] Toussaint Nothias, ‘How to Fight Digital Colonialism’, Boston Review, 14 November 2022, https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/how-to-fight-digital-colonialism/ ^[22] Financial Times, ‘The race for semiconductor supremacy’, 03 October 2023, https://channels.ft.com/en/tech/the-race-for-semiconductor-supremacy/ ^[23] Ludovica Meacci and Dr Pia Hüsch, ‘How China and the UK are Seeking to Shape the Global AI Discourse’, RUSI, 25 September 2022, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/how-china-and-uk-are-seeking-shape-global-ai-discourse ^[24] Kate Crawford, ‘Atlas of AI’, Yale University Press, London, 11 October 2022, https://yalebooks.co.uk/book/9780300264630/atlas-of-ai/ ^[25] Kevin Roose, ‘How Do the White House’s A.I. Commitments Stack Up?’, The New York Times, 22 July 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/22/technology/ai-regulation-white-house.html?mc_cid=615f6f367d&mc_eid=808c31b9bc ^[26] Jeffrey Ding, ‘Technology and the Rise of Great Powers: How Diffusion Shapes Economic Competition’, Princeton University Press, 20 August 2024, https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691260341/technology-and-the-rise-of-great-powers [post_title] => Artificial Intelligence: Driving and Thriving on Global Disorder? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => artificial-intelligence-driving-and-thriving-on-global-disorder [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-01-27 18:06:43 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-01-27 17:06:43 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7885 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [33] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7845 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-01-23 11:03:20 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-23 10:03:20 [post_content] => The recent expansion of the BRICS, an intergovernmental organisation setup in 2009 spearheaded by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, can be seen as a key driver, as well as perhaps a symptom, of the global disorder seen today.[1] Emerging middle powers, including the new BRICS members - Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates -  are playing an increasingly important role in the decision-making processes of global economic governance. However, when these powers turn into ‘politically aligned’ blocs, they can also be seen to create more problems than solutions to Liberal International Order (LIO).[2]   The so-called BRICS emerged in the context of the crisis of the legitimacy of the capitalist system and the LIO. The formation of the BRICS gradually created cooperation mechanisms to give a more assertive expression and a joint demand for greater participation of emerging powers in international economic governance. This demand was further expanded to include interests from other countries in the Global South. As such, the BRICS evolved into a political movement that morphed overtime to challenge the status quo of the LIO.   It is in this political context that new horizons of “promotion by invitation” are opening up within the BRICS organisation. Over the course of 2024-5, the BRICS old guards - Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa - were joined by new members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Indonesia to become BRICS+.   In recent years, under China’s leadership, a call for a multipolar world - a world where there is a great distribution of power held between more than two states - has emerged as a political movement where BRICS+ members invite other countries to participate in an initiative that can benefit development goals. See, for example, Chinese investments in infrastructure all over the Global South and their impact on the development of such countries. This expansionist effort to widen collaboration between states was made explicit through China’s BRICS plus initiative when they hosted the 2017 summit. Notably, at the 2023 summit, held in South Africa, and the 2024 summit, held in Russia, invitations to join the BRICS organisation were collectively offered to 19 countries, with the aforementioned six states so far taking up membership.^[3]   Many middle powers see the “open doors” policy of BRICS as a great opportunity. The collective group has also portrayed the US as the declining hegemon, giving further credence to the problems of the LIO and the ability to engage in new economic governance beyond the hegemony of the US.[4]   However, the BRICS+ process also triggers an “expansion dilemma,” meaning that there are unresolved questions on the nature of the BRICS as an institutional format, the identity of BRICS, and its role as the “nucleus of the Global South.”[5] In this sense, such an initiative has the potential to establish distinct regional platforms in the areas of trade and investment cooperation, particularly on cooperation in technology and innovation, bringing more significant challenges for established powers such as the US and the UK for a global solution for global problems.   Furthermore, the BRICS+ approach has generated potential problems for the strategic interests of some of its own BRICS members – particularly Brazil, India and South Africa – since it may be in the Chinese interest to incorporate actors that threaten or weaken the leadership and regional interests of these countries.[6] In this case, India’s concern with Pakistan is an important point of attention, for example.   The process of BRICS expansion thus accelerates the multicentric and local characteristics of the international system and the return of bloc politics in the face of a changing geopolitical context. Such movement in this direction occurs under the leadership of China with the relative consensus of the other four members and can be problematic to the LIO and the norms related to it, once such group are not fully supporters of the LIO.   The BRICS+ can be seen to be moving from a condition of minilateral political formation to complex multilateralisation, interconnected both with other initiatives of the multicentric international system such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the China Forums Policy, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as well as with institutions and processes of regional cooperation around which BRICS member countries orbit. This presents a complex overlap between bilateralism, minilateralism and multilateralism in a current multicentric system, which could result in a profound transformation of the international order and/or in the coexistence of several international orders simultaneously. Hence, BRICS+ can be seen as a crucial aspect and symptom of global disorder current developments: if we want to understand global disorder paths, we must understand BRICS+ developments.       Leonardo Ramos (Brazilian) is currently an Associate Professor of International Relations at Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas), Brazil, and has been a visiting scholar at the Universidad Nacional de Rosario (UNR). His current research topics include BRICS, emerging countries, and the crisis of the international liberal order. His publications include: Caesarism, populism, and the 2018 election in Brazil (2019, Capital & Class); The BRICS International Security Agenda (2009–2019) (2021, Dados—with Pedro Rocha and Danny Zahreddine); The role of declining Brazil and ascending China in the BRICS initiative (2019, In: Li Xing. (Org.). The international political economy of the BRICS. Routledge—with Javier Vadell).   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre   [1] BRICS is an intergovernmental organisation consisting of - Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The acronym is derived from the founding members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). [2]  The ‘Liberal International Order’ is a term used to describe a set of governing ideals, rooted in WWII, in which nations adhere to multilaterialism (through institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc), and subscribe to cooperation on and the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, monetary and trade policies, security, and open markets; for a through analysis and key debates on the nature of this order, see G John Ikenberry, Inderjeet Parmar, and Doug Stokes, eds., Ordering the World? Liberal internationalism in theory and practice, International Affairs special issue 94, 1 (2018). ^[3] At the 2023 summit: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; At the 2024 summit: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. [4] Javier Vadell & Leonardo Ramos, ‘The role of declining Brazil and ascending China in the BRICS initiative’, The International Political Economy of BRICS, Routledge, 2019, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429507946-5/role-declining-brazil-ascending-china-brics-initiative-javier-vadell-leonardo-ramos. Yichao Li, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Jorge Tavares da Silva, and Carlos Rodrigues, The Palgrave Handbook on China-Europe-Africa Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. Javier Vadell & Leonardo Ramos, ‘World Reordering and the Emergence of BRICS Plus in a Multicentric System’, The Palgrave Handbook on China-Europe-Africa Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, pp 1133-1147, 10 January 2025 (online), https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-97-5640-7_56 [5] ibid [6] ibid   [post_title] => A new world (re)order: Expansion of the BRICS and rise of alternative multilateralism? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => a-new-world-reorder-expansion-of-the-brics-and-rise-of-a-new-multilateralism [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-01-24 11:47:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-01-24 10:47:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7845 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [34] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7858 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-01-22 10:22:47 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-22 09:22:47 [post_content] => The rule of law is vital for creating and maintaining democracy; providing security; protecting human rights; and promoting economic development.[1] Definitions vary, but fundamentally it demands that all are bound by the same law and that the law protects and holds accountable both the governed and governing.^[2] Promoting the rule of law has been a core policy priority for Western states and international institutions since the 1990s.   A Deepening Challenge Globally, the rule of law is in crisis today. Many prominent advocates, including the United Kingdom and the United States, have seen the rise of political movements openly antagonistic to its ideals. While President Donald Trump’s first administration did not formally abandon the longstanding official US policy of backing the rule of law abroad, it was not a priority. How the second Trump administration will behave in office remains to be seen. That said, if his rhetoric to date is any indication, at best, a Trump-led United States shows little appetite to be a leading global proponent for the rule of law in the coming years.  Within the European Union, longstanding organisational consensus about the rule of law has been shattered with the mainstreaming of far-right politics. In Hungary, for instance, Viktor Orban has entrenched a government that the European Parliament calls a "hybrid regime of electoral autocracy."^[3] Powerful revisionist states, such as China and Russia, have tried to recast the rule of law as a means to exercise, but not restrain, authority.   This crisis is further compounded by the chronic failure of costly international efforts to advance the rule of law through the use of force in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Likewise, over forty years of technocratic internationally funded foreign aid that equates rule of law promotion with capacity building and material assistance have consistently disappointed.[4]  Technocratic rule of law work focuses on building skills and improving legal processes, but largely avoids bigger questions of what makes for a more just society or how to get the government itself to be committed to rule of law ideals. This approach has a certain appeal because judicial training and case management systems, for instance, are easy to monitor and can be pursued regardless of the overarching political order because it does not threaten that order.   It is clear, however, that establishing and sustaining the rule of law is a political process. The rule of law requires a commitment to its ideals by, as noted above, both the governing and the governed. Powerful people, including high-level state officials, who violate its precepts must face at least some prospect of accountability. While not all democratic regimes have the rule of law, research has shown that democratic accountability is essential for both creating and sustaining the rule of law.^[5]   A New Approach Ultimately, a more promising approach demands both continuity and change. It needs to recognise the rule of law matters as a real foreign policy goal though it is not the only one. Effective foreign policy sometimes requires dealing with unsavoury regimes and tough compromises. Rule of law ideals must sometimes give way to pragmatism. Few people would sensibly argue that Western states should have no dealings with China, a leading economic and global power. Rule of law concerns must be balanced with other vital issues like addressing global challenges like climate change and seeking to maintain key security goals in places like Taiwan while avoiding potentially catastrophic military conflicts.   At the same time, this does not require abandoning the rule of law as an ideal or as a policy priority. Rather, the key is strategically and systematically making incremental improvements when possible and avoiding own goals like unnecessarily strengthening authoritarian rulers or undercutting the rule of law internationally.   While aid still has a role to play, thinking critically about the structure of the aid industry and the organization of government agencies that provide assistance to ensure that building long term, sustainable success lies at the core of their mission.  Furthermore, promoting the rule of law comprehensively, as is generally done for transnational security or economic statecraft, can also make a difference.   Justice should also be engaged beyond the state. In countries receiving foreign aid, non-state justice systems rooted in custom or religion generally handle most legal disputes.^[6] This dramatically influences both domestic and international security as it undercuts the state’s claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its territory. In other words, the state is not always in control even in its own territory. State claims to authority can be highly contentious. It also dramatically impacts the prospects of international rule of law endeavours.^[7] Yet, current efforts overwhelmingly focus on state institutions. More serious and more constructive engagement with non-state justice is essential.^[8]   Even more fundamentally, it is vital to make it clear what the rule of law requires and what it is not. This means pushing back against claims that equate the rule of law with rule by law which renders the law a mere tool of state authority absent any restraint or accountability.   Last but not least, there is a need for states that back the rule of law abroad to try to better uphold those ideas within their own societies. This means following the law both domestically and internationally. Fighting corruption and impunity in society and within the state is vital as is respect for democratic norms and processes. This demonstration is absolutely critical as a seeming lack of commitment to rule of law ideals by its proponents within the international systems has undermined those efforts and provided an opening for authoritarian regimes seeking to undermine the existing global order and legitimize oppression domestically.   In short, strengthening the rule of law, and through it a more rules-based international order, remains not only possible, but essential. Nevertheless, there is no ground for complacency. Real changes and real commitments are vital.    

Geoffrey Swenson is a Reader in International Politics at City, University of London, a Trustee of the British International Studies Association, and was previously a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He completed a PhD in International Relations at Oxford as a Clarendon Scholar, an MA from Queen's University Belfast as a Mitchell Scholar, and a JD from Stanford Law School. He is the author of Contending Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2022), and his work has been published in several leading journals, including International Security, International Studies Quarterly, and World Development.

  Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre   [1] Francis Fukuyama, ‘Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy’, London: Profile, 2014. ^[2] Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law’, St John’s Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-0082, 13 September 2007, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1012051 ^[3] Paul Kirby and Nick Thorpe, ‘Who is Viktor Orban, Hungarian PM with 14-year grip on power?’, BBC News, 12 February 2024. [4] Roland Janse, ‘A Turn to Legal Pluralism in Rule of Law Promotion?’, Erasmus Law Review 6 (3–4): 181–90, 2013. ^[5] Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘The Quality of Democracy: Why the Rule of Law Matters’, Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 32-46, October 2004, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-quality-of-democracy-why-the-rule-of-law-matters/ ^[6] Geoffrey Swenson, ‘Legal Pluralism in Theory and Practice’, International Studies Review, Volume 20, Issue 3, Pages 438–462, September 2018, https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/20/3/438/4817016 ^[7] Geoffrey Swenson, ‘Contending Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law’, Oxford University Press, 20 October 2022, https://academic.oup.com/book/44455?login=false ^[8] Geoffrey Swenson, ‘Promoting Law Beyond the State’, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 68, Issue 3, September 2024, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/68/3/sqae102/7708174?login=false [post_title] => Rule of law in crisis: The need for a new approach [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => rule-of-law-in-crisis-the-need-for-a-new-approach [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-01-22 10:27:55 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-01-22 09:27:55 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7858 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [35] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7822 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-01-20 11:31:11 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-20 10:31:11 [post_content] => Donald Trump’s re-election to the American presidency has sparked serious debates over both the United States’ role in world politics and as the leader of the Liberal International Order.^[1] Despite warranted claims about Trump’s unpredictability, volatility and unreliability, he is no “isolationist”. Trump, along with the various forces behind him – corporate, intellectual, and political - remain wedded to US global power but in more unilateralist, nationalist, realist, ways, and are therefore committed to even more aggressive pursuit of US ‘vital interests’.   This means the incoming administration  broadly rejects liberals’ methodology of regime change, ‘democracy’ promotion, and a liberal international order. However, even post—Cold War liberals, such as those part of the Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations, have been pragmatic, and highly selective, about their commitment to multilateralism and international law. Notably, US military budgets have continued to burgeon throughout the period since 1991.   Trump has therefore intensified, broadened and mainstreamed a tendency that has been long in the making. As a ‘blunt instrument’, whose self-concept and vision has clearly sharpened since 2020, Trump falsely projects himself as the anti-war candidate while simultaneously aiming to further strengthen the US military machine under the banner of “peace through strength”. Hence, the challenges Trump offers to traditional US foreign policy will rattle allies and stir up ‘beltway’ national security elites. His Nixonian era ‘mad man’ approach to global messaging is meant to be unsettling but, ultimately, Trump remains rooted in and loyal to the goal of US global predominance – that of an American empire.   The US foreign policy establishment in crisis – of destruction and reconstruction With the return of Trump to the White House, the ‘traditional’ US foreign policy establishment is in another one of its periodic crises. However, as Italian revolutionary Antonio Gramsci noted, crises are moments of destruction and reconstruction.^[2] Hence, anxious establishmentarians’ debates abound in the hallowed halls of the exclusive think tank, Ivy League university, blue-chip Wall Street corporation, bank and law firm, in the mainstream media ecosystem, and in the American state. The US establishment is seemingly besieged by enemies and critics from within and without.   America’s allies worry about what a second Trump administration might do to the G7, NATO, UN, or World Health Organisation. Global South states, particularly China, demand status and recognition, decrying “centuries of [colonial] humiliation”.^[3] At home, that establishment is held responsible for ‘endless’ wars, especially since the 1990s, including seemingly intractable conflicts such as Ukraine’s war with Russia.^[4]   The ‘traditional’ liberal internationalist foreign policy establishment under ‘threat’ The US foreign policy establishment, largely dominant since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, has had 3 major methodological-ideological characteristics that are now in crisis and flux:  

1. Constantly expanding and open markets, broad commitment to freer trade;
2. Global economic expansionism organised under the umbrella of US-led liberal international order;
3. Above underpinned by that dominant elite’s ideology – American exceptionalism, historic mission of a chosen people to improve the world.

  Those three principal characteristics are now seen as less relevant or even obsolete. They are secondary to the more naked pursuit of unilateral power. The traditional principles and methods of US power in a world system dominated by the US, and its allies, are no longer sufficient to achieve or maintain America’s global primacy, and are being marginalised or thrust aside by Trumpism’s increasing insistence that the United States is not exceptional but in effect another ordinary state, albeit with extraordinary power.^[5]   Trump’s blunt challenge and Republican foreign policy tribes Appointments in the first Trump administration to high level defence, security, and foreign policy positions, in comparison to those now being appointed and nominated in the immediate aftermath of Trump’s 2024 victory, signal a significant change in the offing. Appointees under the first Trump administration were comparable to those in previous administrations, continuing the Washington, DC, establishment trend, but by 2019 appointees were more consistent with MAGA and America First loyalists.^[6]   By 2024, nominees and appointees appear based on the ‘Fuhrer’ principle: loyal to the leader and saturated in MAGA (‘Make America Great Again’) principles and beliefs: anti-immigration, rejection of globalisation/free trade, denial of the climate crisis and question reckless military interventionism (though support greater military spending to maintain global armed superiority). A large part of this agenda also aligns with the more traditional mainstream support of the Trump-era Republican party as a whole.  Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz (Secretary of State and National Security Adviser picks) resemble ‘primacists’ – believers in US global hegemony in which Washington must maintain its global leadership and military dominance, including in terms of NATO, and Ukraine, whilst allies must also provide more for global security. Other pro-Trump loyalists ‘prioritise’ one region over another – such as the Indo-Pacific over Europe, and more specifically Ukraine, while a third group constitute ‘restrainers’ who are more domestically-focused, arguing for military restraint, and have an emphatic focus on China rather than Russia. All three ‘tribes’, however, are pro-Israel, and MAGA-loyalists.^[7]   In conclusion, the second Trump administration will continue to play an aggressive role in world affairs in practically all respects. In part, a more ‘realist’ global strategy is required by the increasingly failing US social fabric – based on the effects of decades of neoliberal globalisation, which fuelled both ‘America First’ and ‘Bidenomics’.^[8] Both main parties have embraced ‘industrial policy’ to strengthen the US economy for intensified geoeconomic and geopolitical competition, mainly with China, but with other emerging states as well as the European Union and Japan.   The US is now more flexible than ever before in how it maintains its global imperium, principally through weaponizing every aspect of its powers. Trump 2.0 presents as ‘disorderly’. It is a blunt force shift in methods and flexibility in observance of the rule of law, at home and abroad. The slow evolution in these directions since the end of the Cold War, presided over by successive Democratic and Republican administrations, was accelerated by Trump’s first term, and appears to be hyper-intensifying under Trump II. Trump is actively and simultaneously disordering and reordering America at home, and the world system, based on overwhelming full spectrum dominance.   We are living in an era of organic crisis and flux - of morbid symptoms, violent solutions, charismatic leaders claiming to restore lost glories - an age of danger.     Inderjeet Parmar is Professor of International Politics at City St George’s, University of London, since 2012, having previously taught at the University of Manchester from 1991-2012. He is Associate Dean (Research) in the School of Policy and Global Affairs, and a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences (FAcSS), and Past president of the British International Studies Association. He is co-editor of a book series, Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy.   Parmar has published 3 research monographs and dozens of articles in academic journals on US elite power politics; his most recent book, Foundations of the American Century: Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power was published in 2012 by Columbia University Press, and translated into Chinese (2018) and Farsi (2021). He is also a columnist at The Wire (http://thewire.in/author/iparmar/), and has published articles on US elections and politics in Newsweek, Fortune, The Hindu, The Conversation.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre   [1] The ‘Liberal International Order’ is a term used to describe a set of governing ideals, rooted in WWII, in which nations adhere to multilaterialism (through institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc), and subscribe to cooperation on and the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, monetary and trade policies, security, and open markets; for a through analysis and key debates on the nature of this order, see G John Ikenberry, Inderjeet Parmar, and Doug Stokes, eds., Ordering the World? Liberal internationalism in theory and practice, International Affairs special issue 94, 1 (2018). [2] Stuart Hall: “Gramsci and Us,” Blogpost; 10 February 2017; https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/blogs/news/2448-stuart-hall-gramsci-and-us?srsltid=AfmBOopFSpblrSQS0wA0Q5v5oXosMS93Rw-o7Oe61HAAzgH-ECUIbhI-. [3] Alison A. Kaufman, “The ‘century of humiliation’ and China’s national narratives,” https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf. [4] Stephen Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of US Primacy, Macmillan, 2019. [5] Giovanni Grevi, “Trump’s America: the ordinary superpower,” European Policy Centre, 13 June 2017, https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Trumps-America-the-ordinary-superpower~20ff44. [6] Make America Great Again of ‘MAGA’ is the acronym for the political movement synonymous with Donal Trump’s presidential campaign. [7] Majda Ruge and Jeremy Shapiro, European CFR, 17 November 2022, https://ecfr.eu/article/polarised-power-the-three-republican-tribes-that-could-define-americas-relationship-with-the-world/. [8] America First focused on domestic economy, including trade protectionism and plans for infrastructure programmes, which were implemented and extended by policies followed by the Biden administration, such as the Inflation Reduction Act, CHIPS Act, among other legislation; Edward Walden, “Bidenomics is ‘America First’ With a Brain,” Foreign Policy, 18 June 2021,  https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/18/biden-bidenomics-economy-america-first-trump-trade-supply-chains-industrial-policy-china-reshoring-protectionism/. [post_title] => Trump’s ‘America First’: US predominance as a threat to the liberal international order [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => trumps-america-first-us-predominance-as-a-threat-to-the-liberal-international-order [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-02-04 15:07:13 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-02-04 14:07:13 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7822 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [36] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7789 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2025-01-16 11:59:08 [post_date_gmt] => 2025-01-16 10:59:08 [post_content] => On Monday, 20th January, Donald Trump will be inaugurated into his second Presidency. With America, and the world, preparing for the next Trump administration, we turned to US experts, and friends of the FPC, Anthony Silberfeld (Bertelsmann Foundation) and Andrew Gawthorpe (Leiden University) to provide us with insights into what this will mean for foreign policy and global relations.   In this interview, Anthony and Andrew discuss what President Trump’s return to the White House means for the US’s role as the ‘global watchdog’, the impact and importance of this administration's obsession with both social media and its owners, as well as what the future holds for the ‘special relationship’ between the US and the UK.     Where will foreign affairs sit on the list of policy priorities for President Trump, and what does this mean for the US’s traditional role as a ‘global watchdog’?   Anthony Silberfeld: The concept of “policy priorities” in a conventional sense did not exist in Donald Trump’s chaotic first term, and should not be expected in his second.  Instead, one should view what’s ahead in two tiers of retribution. The first tier will be action taken against domestic threats, focusing specifically on undocumented immigrants and political enemies. Trump’s incoming border czar, Tom Homan, has committed to rounding up and deporting millions of migrants currently residing in the US. Whether this ends up being more theoretical than practical remains to be seen, but the result will have widespread economic and reputational repercussions for the US, not to mention the human toll it will take on these individuals and their families.   The second tier will take aim at foreign actors who, in Trump’s view, “have treated us unfairly.” This would include any country with which the US has a trade deficit, particular venom is reserved for Germany and China, but the punitive response will be widespread. During the 2024 presidential campaign, Trump threatened a range of tariffs against allies and adversaries alike. Rhetoric is one thing, but higher prices from food, electronics and cars for all Americans is something else. There will surely be announcements of tariffs in the early days of the new administration, but the economic impact of this action may temper much of this initial bluster. Nevertheless, the idea of America continuing its role as a global watchdog is unlikely.  This new administration has no appetite for it, and will quickly forfeit any remaining credibility the US has as a force for stability in an increasingly volatile environment.

"[The] idea of America continuing its role as a global watchdog is unlikely.  This new administration has no appetite for it, and will quickly forfeit any remaining credibility the US has as a force for stability in an increasingly volatile environment."

  Andrew Gawthorpe: Foreign policy is high on Trump’s list of policy priorities, but he has a narrower understanding of American goals than many previous presidents and is particularly focused on economic aspects of foreign policy. His planned trade tariffs, even if they are not implemented on as broad of a scale as he has suggested, will quickly become the top bilateral issue between the US and affected countries.   Trump’s presidency is not likely to be one in which the US is active in multilateral fora or seeking new cooperative agreements. He is sceptical of many of the things that previous American presidents have viewed as obligations deriving from international treaties or organisations. Instead, Trump likes to deal with countries bilaterally, a situation in which he feels he can better use American power as leverage against weaker nations.   Looking more closely at the potential foreign policy approaches of the US under a Trump Presidency, how could his policies affect the UK and Europe, particularly with relation to NATO and defence?   Anthony Silberfeld: Let’s start with the good news. I do not see a scenario in which the US withdraws from NATO, or reduces its own defence spending, which currently amounts to approximately two-thirds of the NATO total. Now for the bad news. The Trump administration has already signalled its intent to ask NATO members to increase their defence spending (as a percentage of GDP) beyond their current two percent commitment to as much as five percent. At present, only Poland, Greece and the three Baltic countries are meeting their two percent commitments, so the prospect of all NATO members meeting Trump’s new terms is somewhere between slim and none.   How the president-elect will treat those countries that fall below the spending threshold is the key question, notwithstanding America’s obligations under NATO’s Article 5. It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their defence spending obligations, while those that do not are left to fend for themselves. The UK’s current status as a laggard in its NATO spending will draw the unwanted attention of the new regime in Washington, and will surely be an additional point of friction that will test the durability of the special relationship.

"...It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which mutual defence commitments are only extended to those that meet their [NATO] defence spending obligations, while those that do not are left to fend for themselves."

  Andrew Gawthorpe: While an American withdrawal from NATO remains unlikely, Trump could undercut the credibility of the alliance by refusing to endorse the organization’s mutual defence clause, Article V. However, Trump is likely to push European countries for much higher levels of defence spending and to wind down American support for Ukraine. He is likely to be willing to attempt to impose ceasefire terms that many European governments regard as too generous towards Russia. There is also a chance that his chaotic style of policymaking causes negotiations to collapse, potentially leading to further escalation in the conflict.   Anthony Silberfeld:  Despite assurances from Donald Trump during the campaign that he would end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours upon taking office if not sooner, his envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently recalibrated expectations. The new outlook from Washington remains fluid, but aims for a ceasefire of some kind within 100 days of Trump taking office. How much consultation is done with the UK and European allies (let alone Ukraine itself) will not just determine whether an end to the war is viable, but will also provide an early signal for how this administration will work with its allies going forward.   Andrew Gawthorpe: For the UK specifically, Trump’s presidency raises the difficult question of London’s relationship with the European Union. The UK will be much better able to weather both Trump’s trade policy and his impact on the overall strategic situation in Europe through cooperation with the EU. Whereas UK policymakers have tended to assume that the US shares their fundamental commitment to European security and the transatlantic bond, the incoming administration does not. That requires recalibration and looking to like-minded countries on the continent who share the UK’s goals and values.

 "...UK policymakers have tended to assume that the US shares their fundamental commitment to European security and the transatlantic bond, [but] the incoming administration does not."

  Elon Musk took an active role in the Trump-Vance campaign, utilising his platform on X in particular, and has been rewarded with a role in the Trump Administration. With Musk repeatedly criticised for his comments on UK developments, how large an impact do you anticipate Musk having on foreign policy?   Anthony Silberfeld: Musk’s support for Trump and Republican candidates during the election  bought him a seat (and apparently a guest bedroom) at Mar-a-Lago, which he has already used to influence policy and there is no question that Musk will continue to use the influence he purchased to further his own business interests.

"...there is no question that [Elon] Musk will continue to use the influence he purchased to further his own business interests." 

  Andrew Gawthorpe: Musk’s position inside the Trump administration is hard to determine. His position is unofficial and advisory, and he has many political disagreements with key segments of Trump’s political coalition. For instance, he favours certain forms of immigration, and is relatively close with the Chinese government. His longevity in Trump’s inner circle is hence not assured, particularly given that Trump has been known to turn on people who he perceives as taking the limelight away from him.   However, Musk should be taken seriously. Trump’s “MAGA movement” has often talked about internationalizing its project and trying to support right-wing parties in Europe, but Musk is doing it on a scale unseen in the past. Europe’s mainstream parties could face a pincer movement – Trump hammering them with tariffs and defence spending demands from abroad, and Musk supporting their extremist rivals at home. At its worst, it could appear as de facto foreign intervention in European elections. And Musk can continue to do this, using X and his global bullhorn, even if he parts ways with Trump at some point.

"Europe’s mainstream parties could face a pincer movement – Trump hammering them with tariffs and defence spending demands from abroad, and [Elon] Musk supporting their extremist rivals at home."

  Anthony Silberfeld: The role of corporate influence in the new administration is not limited to Elon Musk. During the transition period there has been a steady parade of corporate CEOs who have made rhetorical, policy and financial contributions to curry favour with the incoming president. Some of the most egregious examples start with Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg scrapping fact-checking on his platforms and contributing one million dollars to Trump’s inaugural fund.   Not to be outdone, Amazon’s executive chairman Jeff Bezos donated one million dollars to the same inaugural fund, and ponied up an additional $40 million to produce a Melania Trump biographical documentary. They are not alone, and in each instance, there is a calculation being made about offensive and defensive engagement with this new administration. In other words, how much does a company have to give to get what it wants, or conversely, how much will it cost to avoid being targeted if it runs afoul of the White House. These are real considerations for business leaders as they consider strategy and tactics in the period ahead.

"The role of corporate influence in the new administration is not limited to Elon Musk."

  Given President Trump’s previous actions, can we expect US foreign policy discourse and decisions to be played out through comments made personally by Trump through non-traditional channels, and how can global leaders respond?   Anthony Silberfeld: I would make a distinction here between discourse and decisions when it comes to Trump’s foreign policy. As he did in the first term, Trump’s reflexive comments made via social media platforms or at impromptu new conferences will shape the policy discourse, and will force everyone else to react. American policymakers will scramble to determine whether Trump’s latest utterance should be taken figuratively, literally, or in jest. The press will (depending on their political orientation) either amplify Trump’s pronouncement or turn the half-baked screed into a policy analysis that is worthy of debate. But there is often a significant gap between Trump’s rhetoric and reality.   Many of the most controversial foreign policy statements made by Trump thus far, such as acquiring the Panama Canal, Greenland and Canada, or the imposition of tariffs, will encounter legal, legislative, and public opinion barriers that may prove to be insurmountable. What we found in the first Trump administration is that his interests in policy initiatives were often transient. In those days, the administration was staffed in part with institutional professionals who still ran into roadblocks that curtailed the president’s worst instincts. This time around, the quality of staff in this administration, combined with the desire to gut the federal workforce through layoffs and loyalty tests is unlikely to result in the efficient implementation of the MAGA agenda. It’s going to be a wild ride for all involved. World leaders would benefit from taking the right lessons from the first iteration of Trump, take a deep breath, and only respond when it becomes clear there is no other alternative.  

"World leaders would benefit from taking the right lessons from the first iteration of Trump, take a deep breath, and only respond when it becomes clear there is no other alternative."

  Andrew Gawthorpe: Trump’s incoming chief of staff, Susie Wiles, is supposedly going to ensure that the new administration is more focused and less prone to chaotic policymaking than Trump’s first term. However, it’s unlikely she can persuade Trump to give up his social media habit, and that means he will continue to drive the global agenda in part through this type of personal comment. This creates a tricky situation for world leaders. On the one hand, they feel domestic political pressure to stick up for their country. On the other hand, it’s important to not get too bogged down in the weeds. Trump threatens to do things all the time which he has no intention of doing. And he makes policy through personal relationships, meaning that it’s important for leaders to cultivate good relations with him and stay on his good side, so as better to promote their country’s interests. They cannot let those interests get drowned in a tide of tweets, and so it’s often better to not engage.   What does all of this mean for the ‘Special Relationship’ between the US and the UK going forward?   Anthony Silberfeld: The latest version of the special relationship will almost certainly get off to a rocky start since Donald Trump is never one to forget a real or perceived slight. Past comments by Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Foreign Secretary David Lammy are going to be difficult for the White House to forgive, in spite of both men’s efforts to walk back those statements.[1] The US is also doing its part to poison the relationship before it begins as Elon Musk, one of President Trump’s closest advisers, is meddling in British domestic politics to undermine the Labour government. Not exactly a recipe for a harmonious marriage, but not all is lost.   Trump is, at the end of the day, transactional, so if the United Kingdom can demonstrate the value it can add to the special relationship, it has the potential of living up to that lofty moniker. Meeting the elevated NATO defence spending obligations, and highlighting the importance of UK investment in the US will be a good starting point. Unfortunately, it’s hard to imagine a Thatcher-Reagan or even a Blair-Bush relationship to flourish between Starmer and Trump, so London might be best served by spending its energy on cultivating relationships with members of Congress, state governors and mayors.

"Trump is, at the end of the day, transactional, so if the United Kingdom can demonstrate the value it can add to the special relationship, it has the potential of living up to that lofty moniker."

  Andrew Gawthorpe:  The UK government should recognize the importance of personal relationships to Trump and attempt to cultivate ties with people in his inner circle. Then the government needs to use these relationships to put forward the UK’s case for why it is a constructive economic and security actor and not a net drain on American resources. Secondly, the UK also needs to look beyond the “special relationship” and instead think in broader US-European terms. The UK government has to realize that this second election of Trump means that the world is changing. American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore. Europe needs to be prepared to develop its capabilities as a geopolitical actor, and the correct role for the UK is to work alongside Europe in doing that.

"The UK government has to realize that this second election of Trump means that the world is changing. American goodwill cannot be relied on anymore."

  Living our values of democracy and the rule of law means having the capabilities to advance and defend them – something which is particularly important when the US is increasingly deviating from those very values.     Dr Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   Anthony Silberfeld joined the Bertelsmann Foundation as the Director of Transatlantic Relations in April 2014. His research focuses on democratic innovations in cities, and geopolitical competition in space. Anthony arrived at the Foundation after seven years with the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, where he was head of political and public affairs at the British Embassy’s Northern Ireland Bureau in Washington, DC. Prior to his tenure with the British government, Anthony held posts as a foreign policy advisor in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre   [1] Albert Toth, From ‘repugnant’ to ‘the closest of allies’: Everything Keir Starmer has said about Donald Trump, The Independent, 06 November 2024, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/us-election-trump-starmer-labour-republican-2024-b2642284.html; Chris Mason and Becky Morton, Lammy dismisses past criticism of Trump as 'old news', BBC, 07 November 2024, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cm2z1zm1pk3o. [post_title] => Trump 2.0: What does the future hold for US foreign policy? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => trump-2-0-what-does-the-future-hold-for-us-foreign-policy [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2025-01-20 12:49:42 [post_modified_gmt] => 2025-01-20 11:49:42 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7789 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [37] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7644 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-11-08 13:23:12 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-11-08 12:23:12 [post_content] => The votes are still being counted, but it is already clear who is the winner of the US election – Donald Trump. He not only sailed to victory in the Electoral College, but also is likely to end up with more total votes than his opponent, Kamala Harris. Unlike in 2016, Trump is the clear choice of the majority of Americans – or at least of those who voted.   How did he do it? Although it takes time for the data to trickle in, we are starting to have a sense of the geography and demographics which drove Trump to victory. The former president won by improving his performance in every single type of locality – urban, suburban, and rural. The biggest swings towards him were in urban areas, a reflection of slightly better performance with non-white voters than he achieved in 2016 or 2020. Harris’ hope of improving her standing in the suburbs, and particularly among women, did not transpire. She actually performed slightly worse with female voters overall than Biden did in 2020. The only demographic group she did better with was highly educated women, but they only make up a small part of the electorate.[1]   Postmortems of the Harris campaign have already begun, and the debate over what it could have done differently is likely to continue for years. Her defeat seems to have been mainly due to general malaise in America caused by a period of high inflation and an unpopular incumbent president. There was a fairly uniform swing against the Democrats across all areas of the country and demographic groups, suggesting that it was not some mistake by Harris which turned off a key slice of voters. It was just that the country was ready for a change.   There is also no indication that America is headed for an extended period of dominance by Trump or the Republican Party. His ultimate margin in the popular vote, if he wins one at all, will be small. Moreover, in the swing states in which the two candidates actively campaigned, Harris did between 3 and 5% better than in states in which she did not campaign. This suggests that many people were convinced by her message – just not quite enough to overcome the national backlash against her party.   In Trump’s first term, his chaotic and offensive behaviour quickly produced a backlash of its own which drove down his popularity and led to subsequent electoral defeat. The same thing is likely to happen again this time, provided he does not do too much damage to American democracy in the meantime.   What does it mean? Nevertheless, the implications of the election for the country  and the world will be profound. Firstly, this election surely marks the acceptance of Trumpism as a normal, legitimate part of the American political spectrum. It is by no means politically dominant, but nor is it a temporary aberration. Trump won despite making no effort to moderate his racism, misogyny or authoritarian tendencies. Whether voters were really enthusiastically embracing these things is unclear, but a majority of them did not regard them as disqualifying.   The exact impact that Trump will have on the stability of democratic institutions and values in the US is hard to predict. He has talked about carrying out a mass deportation of immigrants and weaponising the criminal justice system against his political opponents and the media. The very fact that he will now avoid facing trial for his role in the January 6^th insurrection and his broader attempt to overturn the 2020 election also undermines democratic norms.   In a worst-case scenario, Trump and his allies might attempt to make more structural changes to the nature of American democracy, for instance through changing the way elections are administered or the way that the media is regulated. Such changes would likely kick off a furious backlash from civil society and be contested in the courts, but this does not mean they will necessarily fail. The hope of everyone must be that the country can make it through to November 2028 with its democracy more or less intact and that another free and fair election can be held.   The election also carries consequences for the world at large. The fact that Trumpism still remains a viable electoral force even after his disastrous first term means that it poses a more long-term challenge to Europe and the rest of the world. While America’s traditional internationalism and transatlanticism are by no means dead – they still have the support of the Democratic Party and some Republicans – they now co-exist with a more unilateral, even isolationist view. It is this view that will be ascendant over the next four years.   Therefore Britain and Europe can expect less attention from the United States as a result – and the attention that they do get will be of a less benign kind. Trump’s opposition to providing continued support to Ukraine is well known, and he appears to have kept up his friendly relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin while out of office.[2] Trump has also proposed placing 10% tariffs on all imports into the US, a move that economists have warned could plunge the Eurozone into recession and halve economic growth in Britain.[3]   The focus of European policymakers in the short term will be on trying to divine whether Trump plans to follow through with these security and economic policies, and how he might be persuaded not to. Trump’s very personalised approach to diplomacy means that foreign leaders will need to attempt to build a friendly rapport with him. This could prove divisive, with leaders vying for his favour and hoping that he directs his tariffs against their neighbours instead.   Foreign capitals also need to pay close attention to who Trump takes into the White House with him. In his first term, he often – although not always – placed experienced administrators and experts in charge of key agencies and in White House positions. However, the expectation is that in a second term Trump will be more dependent on figures who are closely associated with his Make America Great Again movement and the right-wing fringes of American politics. It is vital now for European governments to learn who these people are, what drives them, and how to establish a relationship with them.   The city on the hill no longer After Trump takes office, Europe will exist in a world in which none of the major global powers – Russia, the United States, or China – has a leadership which is committed to liberal democracy, the rule of law, or the multilateral institutions which make up the international order. Navigating this world while maintaining support for these values at home will require cooperation within Europe, including Great Britain. This requires European countries to develop not only the tools of power and influence, but also new mechanisms for pooling their strength and acting together.   The immediate challenge will be in finding ways to aid the defence of Ukraine and fend off the economic harm of Trump’s tariffs. Beyond that, Europe will need to become more serious about charting its own destiny. The continent’s prosperity and security cannot be left to the whim of voters in Michigan any longer. Nor can Europe continue to rely on always having an American leader who more or less shares the continent’s values. It must develop the capacity to champion and defend those values itself.   In practical terms, this means a few things. Firstly, it means boosting European defence industries so that the continent has the defence industrial base that it needs to look after itself. This will come too late to enable Ukraine to fight on if Trump pulls the plug on American support, but it would help with the defence of the continent in the future. Secondly, European governments – including the UK – need to do more to stimulate economic growth in order to generate the resources that the continent needs to stand on its own two feet. Finally, there is an urgent need for increased solidarity and coordination between Britain and the European Union, who must pool their resources to meet this moment.   Trump’s first term produced four years of talk about “strategic autonomy” in Europe, but far too few concrete steps to realise it. These steps proved to be difficult in part because the first time around, few European leaders wanted to accept that Trump and the movement he represented would be around for long. It was easier to still live in a mental universe in which the US still had a dominant seat at the table, even if that seat was temporarily unoccupied. This time around, Trump seems to want to turn over the table altogether. Europe needs to be prepared to build a new one in its place.   Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre   Photograph courtesy of Oleg Yunakov via WikiCommons.    [1] Kevin Schaul and Kati Perry, How Counties Are Shifting In The 2024 Presidential Election, The Washington Post, November 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/interactive/2024/11/05/compare-2020-2024-presidential-results/; Kaitlin Lewis, CNN Exit Poll Shows Kamala Harris’ One Area Of Growth In Election, Newsweek, October 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/kamala-harris-democrats-election-white-college-voters-1981832. [2] Michael Hirsh, The Enduring Mystery Of Trump’s Relationship With Russia, Foreign Policy, October 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/30/enduring-mystery-trump-relationship-russia/. [3] Larry Elliott, Trump Tariffs Would Halve UK Growth And Push Up Prices, Says Thinktank, The Guardian, November 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/06/donald-trump-tariffs-would-cut-uk-growth-by-half-and-push-up-inflation-thinktank-warns; Piero Cingari, Why Trump’s Plans For Tariffs Could Be Bad For Europe’s Economy, Euronews.com, November 2024, https://www.euronews.com/business/2024/11/04/how-much-could-trumps-tariffs-damage-europes-economy.   [post_title] => US Election Aftermath: How Trump won and what it means for the US and the world [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => us-election-aftermath-how-trump-won-and-what-it-means-for-the-us-and-the-world [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-11-08 14:38:54 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-11-08 13:38:54 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7644 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [38] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7638 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-11-05 09:00:00 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-11-05 08:00:00 [post_content] => After what has felt like an endless campaign, today is Election Day in the United States (US). Presuming that counting proceeds smoothly, there’s a good chance that by tomorrow we will know the winner of one of the most consequential elections in modern history. That makes it a good moment to look back on what has happened during the campaign and consider the stakes for the future.   The state of the race Let’s start with the current state of the race. As always, the outcome of the election depends on the swing states. Most US states reliably vote the same way every election. By contrast, the swing states are those in which a victory for either candidate is possible and so which will ultimately decide the overall winner. These seven states – Georgia, North Carolina, Nevada, Arizona, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania – have been polled more than ever before, and we also now have early voting data available from all of them.   So far, all of this information is inconclusive. The race appears to be a dead heat, with neither candidate enjoying a significant advantage. However, this appearance is based largely on the polls, which have been giving strange and contradictory results. The 2024 election comes at a make-or-break moment for the American polling industry, which badly misread both the 2016 and 2020 elections by underestimating support for Donald Trump.   Determined not to make the same mistake again, pollsters have radically changed their methods, and the exact changes have varied from pollster to pollster. Many seem to be suppressing results which suggest a clear victory for either candidate because they fear reputational damage from another drastically wrong call. This could be one reason why the polls appear so abnormally stable and tied.[1]   Early voting data is also a poor guide to the outcome of the election. Widespread early voting is a relatively recent phenomenon in U.S. elections, and this year it has been embraced by the Republican Party on a scale unseen in the past. This means that we lack a basis for comparison to previous elections.[2]   Not that this has stopped anxious (and sometimes jubilant) members of each party poring over the data looking for signs of an advantage. For instance, Republicans have been buoyed by turnout among seniors, and Democrats have been pleased to see women disproportionately represented among those who have voted early.[3] Yet there is no evidence that this means that younger people or men are less likely to vote on Election Day itself, when their votes will count just as much as those who turned out early.   The campaigns Everything, then, hinges on what happens today – who turns out to vote, and who they actually vote for. Here is what the two campaigns will be hoping is going to happen.   Kamala Harris has run her campaign with one overriding goal: to appeal to moderate, white swing voters in general and women in particular. She had three reasons for doing this. Firstly, as a woman of colour – not to mention a former senator from California – she realized that her biggest potential liability was being seen by the electorate as too liberal. Secondly, ever since 2016 Democrats have been able to make enormous inroads into America’s formerly Republican-leaning suburban communities as their residents have been repelled by Trump. Harris’ focus on the idea of Trump as a threat to democracy in the final weeks of her campaign is designed to win over more of this group. Thirdly, the overturning of Roe v. Wade – which guaranteed the right to abortion – has galvanized American women against the Republican Party, and Harris has made abortion rights a central part of her message.[4]   Victory for Harris hence looks something like this. Firstly, she needs to make sure that her party’s most reliable supporters turn out to vote in significant numbers in large cities like Philadelphia, Milwaukee and Atlanta. Secondly, she needs to peel as many suburban moderates and women away from Trump as possible.   Right now, defeat looks most likely to come from a failure of the party’s base to be enthused by her candidacy. If Harris loses, she’ll be criticized for not paying enough attention to voters of colour and working-class whites. Campaigning with former Republicans like Liz Cheney might have appeal in the suburbs, but there’s a chance it turns people off downtown.[5]   The Trump campaign is trying to pull off a similar balancing act. In previous elections, Trump has managed to mobilize white rural and working-class voters in large numbers while also maintaining some support in the suburbs. This time around, Trump himself has focused on using divisive and incendiary rhetoric to mobilize his base. While his campaign advertising has focused much more often on messages about inflation and immigration which are designed to appeal more to suburban moderates, it has also featured a heavy attack on transgender rights.[6]   Trump has also made an explicit appeal to men a central part of his campaign and has made some moves towards trying to broaden the Republican Party’s appeal with men of colour. The impact of the latter, however, has been blunted by the open racism of his campaign in its final weeks.[7]   If they were fielding any other candidate, then this would be the Republican Party’s election to lose. The US has just seen sky-high inflation, a crisis at its southern border, and an unpopular incumbent president having to step down halfway through his own re-election campaign. Virtually every other post-pandemic leader or government which oversaw similar levels of inflation has been ejected from office. The Republicans ought to be leading comfortably in the polls, not locked in an apparent tie. Instead, the party is paying a “Trump Tax” for their candidate’s divisiveness and extremism.[8] If victory comes, it will be because their discontent with the state of the country in the last four years persuaded just enough voters to give the former president another chance anyway.   The stakes In a sense, what is on the ballot today is not just who will be president for the next four years – it is whether the country will finally reject Trumpism or accept it as a normal feature of the country’s political landscape. If Trump loses, his political record will be a grim one for Republicans. The former president faced an unpopular opponent in 2016 and won by a tiny margin, and then went on to lead his party to dramatically underperform in the 2020 presidential election and the 2018 and 2022 midterms. Another loss now would present an opportunity for moderate Republicans with respect for the constitution to reclaim their party, and for the US to draw a line under the Trump era.   Victory, by contrast, would unleash Trump like never before. Indeed, Trump and his campaign seem to be relishing in divisiveness more openly than ever, meaning that it will be hard to claim that Americans did not know what they were getting themselves in for if they elect him. Trump’s campaign this year has been more overtly racist. He has complained that immigrants have bad “genes” and that they “poison the blood” of the American people.[9] At an event billed as his campaign’s “closing argument”, Trump hosted a comedian well known for making racist remarks – who then proceeded to do just that, sparking a furious backlash from some of the voters of colour who Trump had previously claimed to be trying to win over.[10]   Trump has also continued his violent rhetoric and attacks on the democratic process. These have included welcoming violence against journalists, speculating about his political opponents being jailed and shot, and making baseless accusations of election fraud. And that is just in the past week.[11]   Something else has hung over the closing days of the campaign – the possibility of violence or divisive legal contests, particularly if Trump loses. The Trump campaign has been ratcheting up its criticism of the electoral process in recent days, and it will almost certainly attempt to use lawsuits and pressure on local election officials to influence the counting process. The result could be chaos – or outbreaks of violence against election officials and offices, such as that which Trump has been criminally charged with orchestrating on January 6^th, 2021.   All of this means that the stakes are high. It matters a great deal to the rest of the world whether the United States is a country in which this style of politics is accepted by voters and practiced by the nation’s president. What happens today will determine the course of the next four years, and far beyond.   Andrew Gawthorpe is an expert on US foreign policy and politics at Leiden University and the creator of America Explained, a podcast and newsletter. He was formerly a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre   Photograph courtesy of Phil Roeder via Wikicommons.   [1] Robert Tait, Dead-Heat Poll Results Are Astonishing – And Improbable, These Experts Say, The Guardian, November 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/02/what-polls-mean-so-far-trump-harris-election-voters. [2] Ivan Pereira, Tens Of Millions Of Early Votes Have Been Cast. What Could It Mean For Election Day?, ABC News, November 2024, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/tens-millions-early-votes-cast-election-day/story?id=115272249. [3] Joey Garrison, Women Outpacing Men In Early Voting, Boosting Harris Campaign’s Optimism, USA Today, November 2024, https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/11/01/women-outpacing-men-early-voting-optimism-harris/75990004007/; Ryan King, Trump Camp Touts GOP Early-Voting Gains Over 2020 As Election Comes Down To Wire, The New York Post, November 2024, https://nypost.com/2024/11/03/us-news/trump-camp-touts-gop-early-voting-gains-over-2020-as-election-comes-down-to-wire/. [4] Megan Messerly and Meridith McGraw, Harris Is Courting Moderate Republicans. Liz Cheney Is Helping, Politico, November 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/10/21/harris-liz-cheney-moderate-republicans-00184765; Justine McDaniel, Abortion Rights Gave Democrats Big Wins Post-Roe. Harris Wants A Repeat, The Washington Post, November 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/11/03/kamala-harris-abortion-campaign-voters/. [5] Nicholas Nehamas and Erica L. Green, As Harris Courts Republicans, The Left Grows Wary And Alienated, The New York Times, November 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/24/us/politics/kamala-harris-progressives-democrats.html. [6] Susan Davis, GOP Ads On Transgender Rights Are Dominating Airwaves In The Election’s Closing Days, NPR, November 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/10/19/g-s1-28932/donald-trump-transgender-ads-kamala-harris. [7] Zac Anderson, Crude Talk And The NFL: Trump Doubles Down On His Lead With Male Voters, USA Today, October 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/10/19/g-s1-28932/donald-trump-transgender-ads-kamala-harris; Harry Enten, Trump Was Doing Historically Well With Hispanic Voters Before Madison Square Garden Backlash, CNN, October 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/28/politics/hispanic-voters-trump-election-rally/index.html. [8] Andrew Gawthorpe, Republicans Pay A Trump Taks – Again, America Explained, October 2024, https://amerex.substack.com/p/republicans-pay-a-trump-tax-again. [9] Kate Sullivan, Trump Suggests Undocumented Immigrants Who Commit Murder Have ‘Bad Genes’, CNN, October 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/07/politics/trump-undocumented-immigrants-bad-genes/index.html; Maggie Astor, Trump Doubles Down On Migrants ‘Poisoning’ The Country, The New York Times, March 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/17/us/politics/trump-fox-interview-migrants.html. [10] Jill Colvin and Michelle L. Price, Trump’s Madison Square Garden Event Features Crude And Racist Remarks, The Associated Press, October 2024, https://apnews.com/article/trump-madison-square-garden-new-york-election-fcfe75be7f8281fde7bffa3adb3bba5d. [11] Hannah Knowles and Meryl Kornfield, Trump Says He Doesn’t Mind Someone Shooting At Journalists At Rally, The Washington Post, November 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/2024/11/03/trump-rally-media-shooting/; Michael Gold and Adam Nagourney, Trump Assails Liz Cheney And Imagines Guns ‘Shooting At Her’, The New York Times, November 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/01/us/politics/trump-liz-cheney-tucker-carlson.html; Alexandra Marquez, Jake Traylor and Jillian Frankel, Trump Talks About Shooting At Press, Ramps Up Election Fraud Claims At Pa. Rally, NBC News, November 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-wouldnt-mind-if-someone-shot-media-pa-rally-rcna178573. [post_title] => Today is Election Day in America. Who will win – and what is at stake? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => today-is-election-day-in-america-who-will-win-and-what-is-at-stake [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-11-05 09:57:15 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-11-05 08:57:15 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7638 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [39] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 7625 [post_author] => 38 [post_date] => 2024-11-01 18:22:54 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-11-01 17:22:54 [post_content] => Donald Trump regularly claims that his strong leadership prevented the outbreak of war during his presidency. However, it's an argument that doesn't stand up to much scrutiny.   Some of the conflicts that have dogged his successor Joe Biden's presidential administration are the direct result of policies put in place during Trump's time in the White House. Not to mention the time Trump's grandstanding almost embroiled the United States (US) in a conflict with North Korea in 2017.[1]   The first foreign policy act for which Trump criticised the Biden administration was the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. The fact is that Biden was following the previous administrations’ plan, having been left with little choice but to implement Trump's deal with the Taliban in February 2020.[2]   This agreement, done without the involvement of the Afghan government, involved the US committing to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan in return for the Taliban pledging not to attack American forces. There was no corresponding requirement to prevent the Taliban attacking Afghan government forces, no mechanism to enforce this agreement, and the deal sanctioned the release of 5,000 Taliban fighters who soon found themselves back on the front line.   The US withdrawal also involved the removal of military protection of US contractors who serviced and maintained Afghan army helicopters and other equipment. Their withdrawal contributed heavily to the rapid defeat of these forces.[3] Mark Esper, Trump’s then defence secretary, criticised the deal for pulling out too many troops, too quickly for nothing in return.[4] H.R. McMaster, Trump’s second national security adviser, went further in calling the deal “a surrender agreement with the Taliban”.[5] So, although Afghanistan was a defeat on Biden’s watch, it was a failure of the Trump administration’s making.   Similarly, it can be argued that a contributing factor behind the decision by Hamas to launch its murderous attack on Israel in October 2023 was to derail the normalisation of relations between the Arab world and Israel that the Trump administration initiated through the Abraham Accords.[6] The bilateral agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco is seen as one of, if not the, signature foreign policy achievements of the Trump administration. [7]   However, the Accords failed to address the Palestinian question meaning efforts to extend normalisation to Saudi Arabia were perceived by Hamas as the abandonment of their plight. While talks of normalisation paid lip service to the need to address the Palestinian question, Hamas, amongst others, were clearly of the opinion that that framing of the Abraham Accords that Trump set in motion was decidedly and deliberately exclusionary of their interests.   That Hamas's plan was a success in this regard was borne out by the subsequent statement in 2024 by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that: "No relations with Israel will be established before progress is made toward establishing a Palestinian state".[8]   While Biden could have deviated from Trump’s policies in both Afghanistan and the Middle East there would have been costs associated with doing so. In Afghanistan, it would have required sending huge numbers of American military forces back to the region. In the Middle East, it would have meant unpicking a diplomatic initiative that has already granted Israel diplomatic progress without the requirement to make concessions.   That he did not do so does not mean that responsibilities for these debacles lays solely with Biden. These were all policy decisions of which Trump would have reaped the consequences had he won a second term in November 2020.   What is most often forgotten about Trump’s years in the White House is how close America came to war with North Korea. In July 2017, Pyongyang developed an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with the capability to reach the continental US, something that candidate Trump vowed would never happen. While the military advised quiet defensive measures and military signalling, Tump took to twitter, calling Kim Young Un “Little rocket man” and promising: “Fire and fury like the world has never seen.”[9]   His threats towards North Korea, however, were not confined to escalatory rhetoric. Instead, Trump ordered three carrier battle groups to the region and flew numerous simulated air attacks against the country.[10]   Discussion within the White House over a US nuclear attack against Pyongyang’s rocket forces were so advanced that Defence Secretary Jim Mattis was being dropped off at Washington’s National Cathedral on his way home from the Pentagon, in order to pray for guidance as he prepared plans to “incinerate a couple million people.”[11]   It was a crisis that could have so easily have escalated had Trump not been seduced by a series of vague promises and the opportunity to meet the North Korean leader in three media-drenched summit meetings. On this occasion Trump’s love of the cameras, the sense of anticipation and the belief that the summits were in themselves substantive, persuaded him to drop the pressure on North Korea and effectively accept the nuclear threat that Kim now presents to America.   At the time Trump declared “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea”, with US Senator Chuck Schumer responding: “Saying it doesn’t make it so.” [12] Since this episode US relations with North Korea have only worsened.   Trump’s handling of the threat of Iranian nuclear proliferation also brings into question the idea that his return to the White House would be conflict free. In May 2018 Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for Iran – the “Iran Nuclear deal”, without having any alternative plan beyond sanctions of limiting the development of Tehran’s latent nuclear weapons programme.[13] As a result, Iran is much closer to a nuclear weapons capability than ever before.  Trump’s response to this is to publicly support the notion that Israel should pre-emptively destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities before they can develop the capacity to reach the United States. [14] In order to be successful such an action would likely require a joint US Israeli attack of considerable scale.[15]Hardly the impression that Trump likes to give of what his second term would be like.   How a second Trump administration would deal with threats over Iran, North Korea, the Chinese threat to Taiwan, the war in Ukraine will play out are unknowable. Yet what is certain is that the track record of his first term in office is no guarantee of peace and security for the next four years.   David Hastings Dunn is Professor of International Politics at the University of Birmingham, he writes on US and international security issues.   Photograph courtesy of The White House from Washington, DC, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons   Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.   [1] James Hohmann, The Washington Post, 16 September 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/16/daily-202-us-came-much-closer-war-with-north-korea-2017-than-public-knew-trump-told-woodward/ [2] David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, Conflict - The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Gaza, 15 October 2024 https://www.harpercollins.com/products/conflict-david-petraeusandrew-roberts?variant=41467744092194 [3] ibid. [4] Amber Philips, The Washington Post, 26 August 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/08/20/trump-peace-deal-taliban  [5] Bari Weiss, X, 19 August 2021, https://x.com/bariweiss/status/1428191060791005186 [6] Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Steven Tian and Dan Raviv, Time, 'Why Hamas Tried to Sabotage Arab-Israeli Peace Prospects With a Massive Unprovoked Attack', 08 October 2023, https://time.com/6321671/why-hamas-sabotaged-peace-prospects-israel-attack/ [7] Quint Forgey, Politico, '‘The dawn of a new Middle East’: Trump celebrates Abraham Accords with White House signing ceremony' , 15 September 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/15/trump-abraham-accords-palestinians-peace-deal-415083 [8] Tamir Pardo and Nimrod Novik, The Jerusalem Post, 'Former Mossad chief warns Netanyahu’s ‘curse plan’ endangers Israel’s regional future - opinion', 30 September 2024  https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-822472 [9] Bob Woodward, Rage, Simon & Schuster, 31 May 2021, https://www.simonandschuster.co.uk/books/Rage/Bob-Woodward/9781471197741 [10] ibid. [11] James Hohmann, The Washington Post, 16 September 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/16/daily-202-us-came-much-closer-war-with-north-korea-2017-than-public-knew-trump-told-woodward/ [12] Donald Trump, X, 13 June 2018 https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1006837823469735936 Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, The New York Times, 'Trump Sees End to North Korea Nuclear Threat Despite Unclear Path', 13 June 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/us/politics/trump-north-korea-denuclearization.html [13] Mark Lander, The New York Times, 'Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned' 8 May 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html [14] AFP, The Times of Israel, 'Trump says he thinks Israel should ‘hit’ Iran nuclear facilities', 05 October 2024 https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/trump-says-he-thinks-israel-should-hit-iran-nuclear-facilities/ [15] Doreen Horschig, CSIS, 'Why Striking Iranian Nuclear Facilities Is a Bad Idea', 25 October 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-striking-iranian-nuclear-facilities-bad-idea [post_title] => Op-ed: Would Trump 2.0 mean “No War”? [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => open [post_password] => [post_name] => op-ed-would-trump-2-0-mean-no-war [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-11-01 19:55:16 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-11-01 18:55:16 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => https://fpc.org.uk/?p=7625 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => post [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) )