Apologies for John Battle’s absence, due to pressing parliamentary commitments. He asked me to make his speech in his absence and to thank The Foreign Policy Centre for the invitation. And of course thanks to Rachel Briggs for her interesting and thought-provoking work. This paper is very timely. Three weeks ago, Tim Selby and his Danish colleagues were released unharmed after a month in captivity in Bangladesh, and only last week two British nationals were released after eight days in detention in Somalia. One of the top films of the moment, “Proof of Life” is about kidnapping and its hero, Russell Crowe, has apparently been the subject of a kidnap plot himself. But there are many more kidnaps, both political and criminal, reported and unreported, involving nationals of many countries all over the world. Some of us find ourselves very much in the “kidnapping business”.

Let us make no mistake – kidnapping is a business, and in Latin America in particular it is big business. Some of the groups we are up against even organise themselves in the same way as legitimate businesses and make much bigger profits. Like drug trafficking – nad I should say in passing that kidnapping groups often have drug links – we are in certain parts of the world facing a powerful and well organised enemy. We thus have no illusions about the complexity of the problems we are likely to face when dealing with a kidnap. Nor about the fact that kidnapping is a rapidly growing and world-wide problem. The Foreign Office’s “hot-spots” – that is, areas where UK citizens are involved – are not quite the same as those global hot-spots quoted in the report. Since the beginning of 1997 we have dealt with 54 kidnap incidents involving over 100 British nationals. Our top kidnap countries are Nigeria, Yemen, Sierra Leone, Chechnya, Georgia, Colombia and Somalia – but there are many other countries which are not far behind in our league table and new ones, such as Bangladesh, are being added.

I would like to take this opportunity to explain to a knowledgeable audience the framework within which the FCO operates when a British national is kidnapped overseas. This is perhaps not as well publicised as it should be – not because it is secret information but because we believe in getting on with our job rather than spending time explaining what we are doing. I should start by saying that our objective is always the same, whether the motive is political, “economic” or criminal. If British citizens are kidnapped our first priority is to get them home safely. Of course we are interested in the kidnappers’ motives and demands – they are the keys to resolving the situation – but we never forget that we are dealing with human beings, and extremely anxious human beings at that. We are thus in constant contact with the hostages’ families and with the media. We recognise that if things go wrong we will be held responsible for the outcome, even if our involvement in the case is minimal. Our aim is to carry the families with us and ensure that they understand that each move we make is for the best. Let me assure you that no-one is more delighted than we are when we hear of a hostage’s safe return home.

The key to handling kidnaps is, of course, “joined-up” thinking. I head the FCO’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Department which handles all kidnaps involving British nationals. Most Foreign Ministries do not have the luxury of a whole department devoted to counter-terrorism, with the experience, contacts and expertise which we are fortunate enough to be able to build up. CTPD is the hub of all government activity when a British national is kidnapped overseas, but it could not operate without the support of many other departments within the FCO and elsewhere in Whitehall.

Every kidnap is different, but the mechanism for dealing with them is sadly, well-tested. It relies on the closest possible co-ordination between the different Whitehall departments and agencies, and effective liaison with the other governments, NGOs and international organisations involved. When the team is not dealing with real kidnaps it practices regularly. I have taken part both in real live incidents and exercises and I can confirm that they show joined-up government in action. The operation moves smoothly and at speed and, as in real life, everyone simply gets on with the job in hand, away from the media and the cameras.

The FCO also employs a hostage consultant, a former Metropolitan Police negotiator, who visits vulnerable countries which have expressed an interest in improving their response to kidnaps and spreads best practice. And we do work with organisations such as Control Risks where our interests overlap. I hope Sir James would agree that we have great respect for one another’s work.

I think it is worth repeating that the safety of the hostages is always paramount in a kidnap situation. This is the first message which we ask our Ambassador or High Commissioner on the spot to pass immediately to the government of any country in which a British national is kidnapped. We also ask him or her to make clear our policies of not making substantive concessions to hostage-takers and not paying ransoms. These are non-negotiable as far as the British government is concerned. Giving in once would reward a serious crime, make it much harder to resist a second time, and would turn many parts of the world into “no-go” areas for British nationals.

The last part of the message which we pass to host governments in hostage situations is that we look to them to bring the kidnap to a peaceful conclusion and bring the perpetrators to justice. We will offer as much support and assistance as is required, but it is always up to the authorities in the country concerned to resolve the situation. The multiplication of possible actors where there is a ransom demand should not detract from this basic principle, though we recognise that in practice the government concerned may not control the area where the hostages are being held or may not subscribe to our preferred strategy. Some of the methods employed by other governments to bring hostage situations to an end send shivers down our spines. We find ourselves constantly reminding others of our preference for a negotiated solution and our opposition to military action except as a last resort. Of course, different countries invariably have different ways of looking at things. Nothing however prepared us for a recent case where Ministers went on foot, deep into a notoriously dangerous area to negotiate personally for the hostages’ freedom. A am not, John Battle has specifically asked me to clarify, advocating a move to that sort of policy for the UK!

A kidnap is always a crisis. It is a crisis for the hostages, a crisis for their families and friends, often a crisis for the country where it happens – and it is a crisis for us. We try to manage it as we would any other crisis – by identifying the main players and keeping in constant touch with them; by developing a strategy and sticking to it; and by pursuing every avenue we can think of to bring the crisis to a controlled end. But we are only human and experience has taught us that the main rule in hostage cases is that there are very few rules. Often we do not have all the information; sometimes information is deliberately withheld from us; situations change fast and in remote places with poor communications and a huge time difference; the media produce stories which we can’t substantiate; and we are not always given the facts – people often tell us what they think we want to hear; or they don’t tell us the truth because they have an eye on the politics of the situation or, worse, their own personal or financial gain. I am quite sure that others here today in the same business have similar stories to tell. Resolving a kidnap, by whichever means you choose, is rarely simple. And, as we all know, kidnaps do not always end with a peaceful release of the hostages. Most of the kidnaps the FCO is working on are not current. Some of them happened many years ago. But we never give up. We will pursue the kidnappers until they are brought to justice and we will never stop following leads which might lead us to British nationals who have disappeared and whose fate is not known.

I want to stress though that the FCO is not only concerned with resolving kidnaps. We would much prefer to avoid them in the first place. FCO travel advice is freely available. It covers the whole world and it is deliberately kept as concise as possible. I cannot approve of the method of measuring quality by quantity, or numbers of words in this case. I am sure we all agree that brevity can be a virtue. Of course our travel advice doesn’t go into the detail which Control Risks is able to provide – at a price. It is intended to be freely available, generally applicable and easily digestible. Experience tells us that most people don’t want to read more than one or two paragraphs. And we also know that the vast majority of our customers, including major corporate customers, are very satisfied with the service we provide. Our travel advice is up-dated regularly and in the event of a kidnap or other crisis it can change constantly. The whole travel advice system was reviewed in 1999 and the travel area of the FCO’s website has just been improved. We hope that this will make it even more accessible and customer-friendly. But we must remember that it is only advice and it is worthless if no-one reads it. And, as we and others know to our cost, it is equally worthless if it is read and then ignored. We welcome constructive criticism, but I would like to underline the point that we are not in competition with Control Risks or any of the other companies providing a similar service. Unfortunately there is more than enough work to go around. Specialist companies cater for specialist markets. We can’t compete – and nor would we wish to.

Having said this, we accept without question the need to provide information to the public, including on where responsibilities for protecting individuals against kidnapping risk lie. In an effort to improve our service we will be adding a page on kidnapping to the FCO web site. This is intended to be read in conjunction with the travel advice for specific countries. It will set out some basic advice on personal safety, and the responsibilities of the different actors, outline the government’s policy on the handling of kidnaps which I have just explained to you, and point people in the direction of Embassies, High Commissions and Consulates overseas for more detailed information. We do not want to alarm people – kidnaps are, after all, rare in most parts of the world – but we accept the need for more information on the subject.

We are less convinced of the need for further regulation in this area. In our experience, employers are well aware of their responsibilities and of the risks in the areas where they operate. Our embassies already play a key role in many of the world’s security “hot spots” in raising the level of security consciousness among the local British community, often by convening regular meetings of their representatives or providing specific security advice. Similarly, FCO departments such as the Consular Division, the geographical desks, and CTPD can and do liaise with companies and NGOs in the UK on security issues in different countries and regions. When they can, they also try to get over the same messages to a wider audience by participating in conferences and seminars and contributing to specialist publications. More specifically, the UK hosted G8 conferences in London in 1998 and 2000 to establish Best Practice guidelines on hostage-taking and hijacking. These guidelines have been widely disseminated in international organisations such as the G8, EU, Commonwealth and ICAO and are readily available to others who might have to deal with such situations. I have copies available here if any of you would like them. Nonetheless, I would be interested to hear from others here if they think there is interest in a more formal coordination mechanism between government, industry and NGOs.

I look forward to an interesting discussion. Thank you again.

The boot is on the other foot. Pro-Europeans sense an opportunity in the panicked excuses and ashen faces of the sceptics. Ever since the bloody battles over Maastricht in the early 1990s, this Right-wing cabal has tormented every pro-European from Ken Clarke to Peter Mandelson with impunity. Now, suddenly, they seem deflated.

William Hague’s failed attempt to turn the election into a referendum on the euro proved, as the pollsters have known for years, that saving the pound is only a dominant issue for a tiny minority of voters. More importantly, Europhiles have been buoyed by recent evidence showing the public mood moving in their direction. For a long time, people have thought British membership of the euro inevitable; new evidence shows a clear majority thinks it desirable at some point in the future.

But this sanguine mood will fade unless the Government speaks with a clearer voice on Europe. If it really is going to pull off the biggest turnaround in public opinion since the war, it must sell a popular vision of the EU before anyone will listen to its arguments about the euro. Tony Blair realised long ago that the referendum won’t be won on economics alone. Even if the electorate accepts that the euro will mean more jobs, lower mortgages and an end to trips to the bureau de change, they will never sign up if they think they will lose their independence.

He is right to believe that the only chance of turning public opinion around is to equate Europe with patriotism and the national interest: a referendum will be won only by changing the perception that the EU has an insatiable appetite for stripping powers from nation states. With his strong credentials as a scourge of Hampstead liberals, the new Foreign Secretary Jack Straw is well placed to argue the practical, patriotic case.

But too often the Government has given mixed messages. Its choice tactic to allay concerns has been to portray Europe as a vast stomping ground waiting to be reformed by British values and leadership. Ministers have often slipped into the trap of trumpeting a proud tally of crazy EU directives they have thwarted and boasting of British-inspired initiatives to inject Europe with transatlantic dynamism. In a recent speech, Mr Blair claimed to be leading the process of reform in Europe, moving it away from concentration on regulation, winning arguments against harmonising taxes.

This bellicose rhetoric might persuade people that Labour is defending our interests, but it also promotes the notion that, given free rein, the EU would turn Britain into a basket case. If British ministers never mention the EU without exhorting it to change, or use it as a convenient foil to highlight US economic success, then voters are entitled to ask why they should grant it sweeping economic powers. Of course, such grandstanding is understandable with a hostile press desperate to portray the Government as weak. But pro-Europeans should not allow their natural caution to blind them to the fact that a real opportunity now exists for positive vision.

The lazy caricature of a continent wedded to trade unionism, bloated state provision and sclerotic working practices exists only in the minds of Right-wing leader writers. Britain might have a record on job creation and inward investment that rivals the best in Europe, but comparative figures show that we lose five times as many days from strikes as France and twice as many as Germany; our spending on primary and secondary education languishes near the bottom of the EU league; our infant mortality rates are worse than the EU average; and the proportion of British 18-year-olds entering further and higher education is not just lower than most of the EU, but less than Croatia and Slovenia. Not all of the figures are this bad, but they underline the fact that instead of imploring the rest of Europe to be more like us, we should set out the success stories worth repeating.

The electorate is already a step ahead. Mori polling found that more Britons wanted to emulate the German than the US economy, even at the height of the Wall Street boom. This election showed the breadth of the coalition demanding the kind of social democracy that pervades Europe. Thatcherite neglect of our public infrastructure has come to haunt the Daily Telegraph-reading commuter classes as much as anyone else: when Blair pressed the flesh during the election campaign, it was bad public services rather than tax increases that caused memorable stand-offs. And although employment is at record levels, discontent with long hours in the office and a work/life balance that is out of kilter mean that there is a new hunger for government to offer something more than low mortgage rates.

A political programme that aims to have trains as reliable as France’s, schools as effective as Germany’s and industries as innovative as Finland’s won’t just capture the public imagination, it will also turn round the debate on the euro. Incorporating a vision of the European good life into domestic politics must be more effective than remaining stuck in the tramlines of the conventional Europe debate. Mr Blair has already set the precedent with his commitment to raising health spending to the EU average. Paradoxically, this might have done more to engage Britain with the EU than all his keynote speeches on European reform combined. The Government could extend this process to other areas of policy by encouraging the EU to publish league tables detailing our performance compared with that of other European countries on the economy and public services.

Mr Blair is the first prime minister to be comfortable describing Britain as a European power within a definitively European cultural heritage. Where Margaret Thatcher proselytises about a union of the English speaking world, Mr Blair talks of Edinburgh as a jewel of European civilisation and London as a great European city. But this Europhilia is safely contained in the past. It does not extend to arguing that other European countries have lessons for the UK here and now. None of this should replace the strong economic arguments for joining the euro, but the polls won’t shift until the Government finally destroys the argument that all our problems come from Europe and all the solutions come from the Anglo-Saxons.

Mark Leonard is director of the Foreign Policy Centre, an independent think-tank launched by the Prime Minister and Robin Cook in 1998

Luddites, extremists and the ‘leftover left’; unaccountable interest groups that undermine the authority of elected officials; armchair radicals from the rich world who have no right to speak for the Third-World poor. Reactions to the recent Prague street protests confirmed that NGO bashing has become a favourite sport for government officials, business and the Press.

It is tempting for NGOs to dismiss these claims as ill-informed and self-serving, but this would be a serious mistake. NGOs must build their legitimacy in the global arena by pushing through much-needed reforms in their own community. As I argue in a new pamphlet for the Foreign Policy Centre, it is time for a “new deal” in global governance that gives citizens groups the right to a voice in global debates in return for a stronger commitment to their responsibilities. That means concerted action in three areas:

First, transparency and accountability. Unlike governments (which must face elections) and businesses (which must face their shareholders), NGOs report to boards of trustees that exercise only a light form of oversight. This makes it difficult to publicly test the accuracy and validity of their claims. NGOs don’t insist on a vote in global governance, just more of a voice, but they should still be held accountable for what they do and say – whose ‘voice’ is heard in NGO campaigns? If the NGOs who protested so loudly at Prague turn out to be wrong in their assumptions about global trading strategies, it is farmers in the Third World who have never heard of Christian Aid that will suffer the consequences for generations. The same strictures apply to pro free traders too, of course, but NGOs cannot use this as a defence. They need to ensure that their message is grounded in grassroots experience and accurate research.

Second, global NGO networks are dominated by voices from the rich world, a weakness that makes them easy targets for attack. Powerful NGOs like Oxfam and Greenpeace must make some sacrifices to ensure that Southern NGOs are not excluded from debates by their wealthier counterparts from Europe and North America. This will involve some short-term pain for long term gain, since governments, business and the general public will respect those NGOs that are seen to practice what they preach by empowering poor people to speak and act for themselves.

Third, NGO campaigns are sometimes driven by fashion and sensation rather than loyalty to the facts. The absence of more thoughtful critiques can give unwitting support to reactionary forces that care little about the welfare of the poor: it is no coincidence that protectionism is on the rise in the USA at a time when attacks against the World Bank and the IMF are in full swing. NGOs don’t need to be think tanks or universities, but they do need to put more resources into rigorous research and the building of credible policy alternatives.

These weaknesses cannot be corrected through the heavy hand of bureaucratic regulation. The challenge is to find a light set of structures and incentives that guard against malpractice, while protecting the variety and independence that are the hallmarks of a healthy civil society. Here are some suggestions:

First, codes of conduct for global networks that lay out minimum standards for NGO integrity and performance, monitored through self regulation but with a ‘quality assurance board’ in the United Nations to provide some independent oversight.

Second, a level playing field for NGOs and other civil society groups from the South and the North, with special help to those currently left out of global debates. A ‘WTO Participation Fund’ could channel resources to capacity building among NGOs and governments in the South. This should be used to ensure that all developing country members can be represented at future summit meetings, and it should pay for meaningful NGO participation through workshops, mentoring and other training schemes. Meanwhile donors should place a 25 per cent cap on the amount of foreign aid that can be channelled through NGOs in the North.

Third, we need structures that give NGOs a meaningful role without pretending that they can substitute for governments in formal decision-making. For example, a ‘World Financial Forum’ every five years could enable stakeholders to debate the role and performance of the International Financial Institutions once the dust has settled on particular crises and interventions. Relevant NGOs and civil society groups could be given the right to monitor the World Bank’s new Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, country by country, to ensure that both the negotiation and implementation of these strategies draws as much as possible on local knowledge.

These measures will not solve all the problems of NGO participation, but they should help to assuage the criticisms that threaten to turn back the tide of global citizen action. This is an important point because – despite the inadequacies of current practice – the increasing involvement of NGOs had been a significant force for the common good. Deeper debt relief, the Ottawa Treaty on land mines, the global movement for womens’ rights and protection of the environment – none of these advances would have happened without NGO ideas and pressure.

Though stereotyped as “Luddites”, most NGOs are not against globalisation as such, merely advocates for global democracy and human rights as well as market integration. Whether they are more or less ‘representative’, or right or wrong on the fine print of their critiques, are not the most important questions, since NGOs differ so much even among themselves. But principles of equal voice, accountability and a level playing field are things that NGOs already support, even though they struggle to put them into practice. Certainly, NGOs must work harder to put their house in order, but the message to government and business is also clear: instead of opposing the rise of NGOs with tear gas, pepper spray and batons, put in the place some rules of the game to ensure that their energies are channeled democratically, and to the genuine benefit of those excluded from the fruits of global progress.

Michael Edwards is a director of the Ford Foundation and the author of “Future Positive” (Earthscan), but writes here in a personal capacity. “NGO Rights and responsibilities: a New Deal for Global Governance” is published by the Foreign Policy Centre (£9.95) and is available from Central Books: 020 8986 5488

On Thursday October 19th The Foreign Policy Centre convened and hosted a fascinating off-record discussion seminar on ways in which the West in general, and Britain in particular, could assist the recently emerged Serbian democracy, build up its institutions and preserve its new and hard-won freedoms. Professor Mary Kaldor of the LSE and Charles Crawford of the FCO chaired a panel of academic, civil society and diplomatic experts on Balkan Affairs.

The background

The speakers unanimously hailed what had been an inspiring and legitimate “people’s revolution” but were quick to warn that the hard work in Yugoslavia was only just beginning. In a sense, relief overpowered happiness as the dominant emotion. An end had come at last to ten years of debilitating and belligerent dictatorship, a decade that had left Yugoslavia isolated, brutalised and impoverished. Serbia had stood on the brink of civil war; only the ultimate reluctance of the security forces to open fire on Serb civilians had prevented bloodshed.

Speakers agreed that the current situation was far from straightforward. Slobodan Milosevic and his power apparatus remains a malevolent presence in the background while Kostunica finds himself President of a Yugoslavia which will only continue to exist as long as Montenegro and Kosovo are included in the country. It is striking that there was little evidence of euphoria at Milosevic’s downfall in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia or elsewhere. Clearly much will depend on the Serbian elections in December, and on how the new president handles the nationalist dialectic in which he may find himself entangled: pulled by those impatient for revolutionary change on the one hand and those who quickly hark bark to former days when things go wrong on the other, all under the shadow of Chetnik symbolism.

Principles for progress

The panel agreed that four broad principles should inform short and medium term strategies. The first was an integrated regional approach to the Balkans: it would be wrong to be seen to be rewarding Serbia for Milosevic’s misdemeanours. Meanwhile, other Balkan nations who had used the Serbian menace to obfuscate on internal progress now had no excuse but to press on with reform. There exist large opportunities for Serbia and for the whole region, notably in the form of a post-Kosovo regional stability pact, which had been previously blocked by Milosevic’s regime. Serbia has to be integrated into the mechanisms of regional co-operation. Its relations with the United Nations, Western Europe and its Balkan neighbours must be rapidly normalised.

The second revolves around slowly changing and improving the internal set-up in Yugoslavia. The current narrow mindsets need to be broken, thinking needs to be opened up and a healing process started. Milosevic may be gone, but the oversized and dangerous ranks of army, secret service, police force and diplomatic service in Serbia remain replete with scores of his placemen. Over a million Serbs still voted for their former dictator. Such elements of continuity will need careful and subtle treatment. Downsizing, the gradual weeding-out of Milosevic’s supporters, and a change of emphasis, for example from repressive to community policing, will all be necessary.

Thirdly, an end is needed to imperialist and didactic attitudes from the West. The post-Milosevic era needs to be approached with humility and sensitivity, not triumphalism. The insensitive arrogance displayed towards Eastern Europe after 1989 must not be repeated: we should listen to Serbs’ worries and demands, not preach at them. It is important to remember that the Serbs overthrew Milosevic themselves; it was not Allied bombs which finally forced him out. There remains a strong anti-Western suspicion in Yugoslavia and many Serbs feel their revolution was in spite of the West, its bombs and sanctions, not because of it.

Fourthly, accountability and transparency in aid provision is crucial. Services on a local and municipal level have also to be a major priority. The sort of changes on that level are the ones that people really see, and the creation of trust in functioning accountable participatory local government is vital. The indictment of Milosevic on war crimes charges also assisted the process of change in Yugoslavia, but now help is needed to enable the Serbs to try and convict the malefactors of recent years in their own courts of justice. At present, legal frameworks in Yugoslavia are almost non-existent. In addition, oil prices are now higher than ever, sugar and heating for homes are still in scarce supply, and the list of hardships goes on. People can get very cynical about change very quickly, and this can push them into more extreme positions on either side of Kostunica. Some material assistance is therefore clearly necessary, although the way it is apportioned must be carefully monitored to guard against making already endemic corruption any worse.

Concrete assistance

Several elements at work in precipitating and assisting the recent changes were singled out, and Britain can feel particularly proud of its role. The Local Radio Network was very helpful and the support given to the Youth Networks was also extremely important. Civil society groundwork and awareness raising, much of it online, also played a role. The breadth and scope of such work needs to be amplified and entrenched in order to build up the institutions and mindsets that will preserve the nascent Serb democracy and enable it to flourish. The BBC World Service is now increasing FM broadcasts in Serbia, and opening a Media training centre like that already operational in Bosnia. Serbia needs a free Media, and to develop the norm that debate and criticism are forces that strengthen democracy, not which threaten a ruling elite. The Norwegian scheme of awarding stipends to promising Yugoslav students is another useful assistance scheme.

Lessons from Bosnia-Herzegovina

Lessons to be learned from the Bosnian reconstruction experience were also frequently drawn, although the situation on the ground is different. It is clear that job creation has to be an absolute priority in the new Yugoslavia if a return to the sort of conditions that precipitate violence is to be avoided.

The International Community has economic means at its disposal, but wishes to achieve political ends. In Bosnia it is now becoming clear that the achievements of post-conflict reconstruction are still vague. The West wants change quickly, but real progress may well come extremely slowly. Successful economic reforms will always be sui generis: different actors’ needs and demands can be and often are contradictory. At the moment, the potential of human capital in Serbia exceeds its production capacity. Serbia’s skilled/educated people must be used carefully. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, society and economy are still sluggish even after five years. Bosnia also indicates the vital lesson that aid to Yugoslavia must be apportioned with the utmost care in order to avoid entrenched and expanding networks of organised crime and corruption.

Another crucial question emerging from Bosnia, and arguably the biggest failure there, was on the question of identity. States simply are not capable of democracy and stability without some form of identity, and no tangible progress is possible without it. Having effectively imposed borders on the region, extreme tolerance of the Greater Serbia question, and of how the Serbs handle the issue of their identity, was recommended: for example over the display of Chetnik symbols. Coherent political communities have to be invented and made viable across the region, including in Kosovo. Only then can really workable settlements on how to run things emerge, otherwise one can fall prey to zealots and tyrants: the local people have to be worked with first.

Looking forwards

The recent changes also effectively mean that Britain, and the West, no longer has a real plan for Kosovo, or really for Bosnia-Herzegovina either. Current tactics of working through sovereign actors has increased corruption and dependency, and led to increasingly bitter rivalries. A stance of ‘constructive ambiguity’ over borders, and Kosovo in particular, has much to recommend it, but solutions cannot be delayed indefinitely, and the recent Kosovo Commission Report recommending conditional independence clearly changes the parameters of the debate.

The lack of trust and respect in Serbia at the moment, as well as the danger of being too patronising, are real problems. People there have many very good ideas and must be listened to, but there are also far too many people there who have no role at all in moving things forward. The need for a new attitude of humility and inclusiveness from the West is therefore imperative. Work must happen within and involving all elements of Serb society, not just be imposed on top of it. The Foreign Policy Centre will seek to continue to convene such events with the ongoing aim of discussing and assisting the development of democracy and legitimacy in the new Yugoslavia, and across the battle-weary and scarred Balkan region.

Imagine a world where strikes are popular. Not just tolerated, but actually popular. Imagine a situation where the end of a Tube or bus strike is lamented on the streets. Belgian transport workers achieved this unlikely feat last year, when members of the Centrale Generale des Services Publics went on a spree of industrial action. Instead of ruining the lives of commuters through a general shutdown, striking workers in Brussels closed the ticket offices and allowed a grateful public on to trains and buses for free.

Maybe, as they prepare to extend Britain’s summer of discontent on the railways, RMT bosses should hop on the Eurostar and take a few lessons from their Belgian counterparts. For that matter, they could even learn a few lessons closer to home.

There has been a revolution in attitudes towards strikes among British unions. Not only are strikes now hedged around with all sorts of legal restrictions, but also unions find it increasingly difficult to persuade their members to take action. Nigel Stanley, the head of campaigns and communications at the TUC, says: “Union members do not want to lose the income. They have mortgages and foreign holidays to pay for.”

Above all, there has been an ideological shift from “social conflict” to “social partnership”. Under John Monks’s leadership, the TUC has moved from collective bargaining for union members’ rights to campaigning for statutory rights. And the number of stoppages fell in 1998 to just 166, the lowest figure since records began in 1891. Phone a union press office nowadays and they’ll expertly fend off questions about strikes and instead talk about how unions are changing. Log on to the TUC website and you are more likely to find proud boasts about a sterling performance in this year’s PR Week awards than tales of success on the picket lines.

The unions have realised that the all-out strikes of the 1970s and 1980s caused immeasurable damage, still feeding tabloid depictions of the trade union movement. The winter of discontent and the miners’ strike pitted the interests of the public against those of the strikers – and forced us to choose between our identity as consumers and our identity as class warriors. Unsurprisingly, they found we were consumers first, second and third. As the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm has argued: “Militant trade unionism antagonised the people not involved in it to such an extent that it gave Thatcherite Toryism its most convincing argument – and the justification for turning the traditional ‘one-nation’ Tory party into a force for waging militant ‘class war’.” It took 20 years for unions to recover their position in the public eye, according to John Knell of the Industrial Society: “There is an almost direct correlation between the unpopularity of trade unions and the number of days lost in strikes.”

There are parallels between the debate about strikes and that other 1970s weapon of the progressive left – sanctions. Sanctions were enthusiastically embraced as a pain-free way of answering the cry that “something must be done”, but they are now seriously discredited. Though they had a dramatic effect on South Africa, they often harm the people they are trying to help. In response to the growing unease over the human toll of all-out sanctions, policy-makers are investigating “smart sanctions” that can target members of the ruling elite while sparing the population. Pioneered by Nato during the Kosovo campaign, such sanctions froze the bank accounts of the Milosevic clan and prevented its members from leaving the country. Could Belgian transport workers be pointing to the birth of the “smart strike”?

British public sector unions are getting the idea, walking the fine line between expressing protest and keeping the public on board. During the 1980s, a year of industrial action by the National Union of Teachers resulted in terrible headlines as children were sent home and after-school activities were cancelled. The chastened unions adopted new tactics to fight the imposition of over-bureaucratic and excessive tests. Exam scripts were marked and returned to pupils – so parents were kept happy – but the government’s plans for feeding the data into national league tables were boycotted. The action succeeded: the government was forced to hire external markers the following year. This ingenuity echoes past innovations such as “open-air classes”, which mark protest without harming children. More recently, Unison campaigns for a “living wage” have abandoned the angry demo in favour of the carnival, with a pantheon of pop stars to take the message to the people.

Smart strikes in the private sector are about targeting companies’ reputations, calculating the damage they can inflict on brand value rather than on production targets. “Hitting a company’s reputation and share price may well be much more damaging than hitting a day’s activities in some part of the organisation,” says Nigel Stanley. “There is more suspicion about big corporations than in the past as the fuss about GM food demonstrated.”

Unions now understand that, if they do mount strikes, the action must move seamlessly from the picket line to the photo opportunity. The British Airways cabin crew strike – which began the sharp decline in the company’s share price – is cited with awe by many union apparatchiks. The Transport and General Workers’ Union promoted air stewardesses, photographed in their uniforms, as the least likely militants in industrial iconography. “People naturally thought that these friendly, charming people must have a real grievance,” says Stanley. Not to be outdone, Rolls-Royce workers in Coventry, represented by the MSF, thumbed their noses at management by turning up to work in their gardening clothes, and saw their cause splashed across the tabloids.

Andrew Pakes, the director of communications at the Association of University Teachers, predicts that the fragility of public support means we are unlikely to see the drawn-out disputes of the past again. “Demonstrative action has replaced all-out strikes. With a one-day strike, it is easy to demonstrate to the public that you have a cause rather than are trying to cause misery. And it is also easier to win a ballot of members.”

Robert Taylor, the labour editor of the Financial Times, argues that the old techniques can still be the most effective. He points out that, on the London Tube, the RMT has just managed to get an old-style deal with jobs for life. Yet even this unreconstructed remnant from the 1970s ran its campaign with one eye on public opinion. Precious little was heard about overtime and job security. Instead, with high-minded talk of “public safety”, the union tried to align its members’ interests with the interests of the public.

In any case, the rail unions know that this is the moment to act, because anything they do pales into insignificance against the management-induced chaos on the railways. When Railtrack and the operating companies are so inept at showing that they care about the public, the unions can do their worst. Perhaps Railtrack needs a Belgian trade unionist to run its PR department.

Mark Leonard is director of the Foreign Policy Centre

The panel consisted of:

Judith Mayhew, Chairman, Policy and Resources, Corporation of London
W Guy Walker CBE
Tomas Rosander, Embassy of Sweden
Mark Leonard, Director, The Foreign Policy Centre.

——–
The speeches:

MISS JUDITH MAYHEW LL.M.
CHAIRMAN OF POLICY AND RESOURCES, THE CORPORATION OF LONDON
‘THE NEW EUROPEAN ECONOMY: ENTERPRISE, INNOVATION AND THE STOCKHOLM EUROPEAN SUMMIT’

Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen.
Thank you Chairman. I am delighted to be able to join you today for this most important discussion on the way ahead for the new European economy, and particularly the Stockholm European summit.
In financial services there are a lot of areas to cover. In the short time that I have this morning I will therefore confine myself to highlighting the areas of greatest importance to financial services in the European Union.
Across the EU we all take pride in the success of the single market. But this success has not been repeated in the area of financial services.
There are still far too many barriers in the trading of financial products across borders.
The single market has in fact allowed the creation of the very barriers that it was intended to remove. These barriers have been put up in the name of consumer protection. But they have clearly become a device for protecting national self-interest. And by restricting choice within the single market it is the consumer who is being short – changed.
The European Union’s aim in financial services must be to promote the most efficient, effective and dynamic single market in the world.
As by far the largest financial centre in Europe, the City of London will of course be a great beneficiary of this: but so will all the other financial centres in Europe, and through them the population of Europe.
 We need broader and deeper capital markets that will reduce the cost of capital for our firms, including the very important start-up companies and SMEs.
 We need to promote the efficient allocation of capital across the EU, thereby promoting growth and employment.
 And we need a greater choice of more competitive and innovative financial services for consumers and investors.
So how do we do this? What are firms in the City of London pressing for?
At the EU level the development of the regulatory framework is being taken forward by the Financial Services Action Plan. This initiative was started under the UK presidency in order to drive forward progress on achieving the single market in financial services.
The FSAP identifies key measures, which are aimed at removing the range of barriers to the single market, and sets a timetable for adoption.
At the Lisbon European Council a deadline of the year 2005 was set for the implementation of this plan.
Internal Market Commissioner Bolkestein said at the time “a single financial market is an essential compliment to the single currency. Without a single financial market, consumers and businesses will continue to pay over the odds and Europe’s financial services cannot realise their full potential.”
“Implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan is crucial to this goal. We must act faster if we are serious about helping the European economy grow faster, perform better and create more jobs.”
The Commission in Brussels has therefore set ten priorities for the next six months:
For the single EU wholesale market these include proposals to upgrade the two directives on Prospectuses; a proposal for a directive on cross-border use of collateral; a Commission communication on the upgrading of the investment services directive; and a proposal for a directive on market manipulation.
In the area of open, secure retail markets there is a communication on E–commerce policy for financial services.
And in the area of sound prudential rules there are proposals for the creation of a Securities Committee; a proposal for a directive on prudential rules for financial conglomerates: and a proposal for a directive governing the capital framework for banks and investment firms.
In the same time frame the UK has declared its three main priorities for financial services for the Stockholm European summit.
Priority one is to demonstrate clearer progress on the priority measures for completion of the single market. These priorities include a single prospectus for issuers; the adoption of Common, international accounting standards; the liberalisation of cross-border pension funds; and greater clarity in the regulatory treatment of professional investors.
The UK also wishes to force the pace on the 2005 goal for completion of the Financial Services Action Plan by declaring a new deadline for completion of the capital markets by 2003, and the overall 2005 deadline brought forward to 2004.
In the City of London we are very concerned at the speed at which markets are changing and we are impatient for change and progress. By 2004, who knows how markets will look?
The only certainty, I think, is that they will look different from now, and we will still be trying to sort out common standards for the market as they were in the year 2000.
And finally the UK would like to see a priority put on handling the conclusions of the Report of the Wise Men, which has now been completed.
Certainly in the City of London we regard this report as a particularly well-balanced package. We believe that it is now essential that the Commission, the council, the Parliament, the regulators, and the market users work together to promote its proposals as a whole – as soon as possible.
This will allow the report to become an effective, open and adaptable mechanism which can enhance economic growth and international competition in Europe. There are real economic games to be won by all member states.
The City believes that the next steps, which should be taken, should include:
 Rapid completion of the priority measures.
 Implementation of the level 2 Committee structures by the end of 2001.
 Implementation of structures to ensure transparent involvement of market practitioners and users.
 And the adoption of a resolution based on the Wise Men’s recommendations at the Stockholm Council.
I have covered a lot of ground in the last ten minutes in a very complex area. But it is one that is very important to the future of Europe, and it is one that deserves careful attention and much priority.
Thank you.

The New European Economy – Enterprise, Innovation, and the Stockholm Summit
remarks by W Guy Walker CBE

Anti-European caricature
Readers of euro-sceptic newspapers may be tempted to believe that the European economy is failing, that Britain is far ahead of our European partners, who are still living in the economic dark ages. This caricature is far from the truth.

New economic reform agenda, driven by the single currency
In fact, the whole focus of economic policy making in the European Union has changed, and done so in a way that will create greater prosperity and give greater opportunities for UK companies to acquire market share in continental Europe.

The creation of the single currency is one of the key forces driving the process of economic reform in Europe. It has unleashed new competitive pressures, leaving inefficient businesses – and countries with inefficient economic practices – nowhere to hide. The single market is forcing tax competition and helping business as a result.

What EU governments are doing
All over Europe, governments are grasping the nettle of reform

In the words of the Italian government itself, at the front of its latest Cardiff report:

“Over the past few years, Italy has experienced the first attempts to reform the burdensome bureaucracy that has inhibited economic activity in the country for several years, by progressively eliminating anti-competitive and inefficient laws and regulations”

And it has published a list of all the anti-bureaucracy reforms it has undertaken up on its website.

In Germany, corporation tax will fall from 52 per cent on aggregate to 39 per cent in 2001, and the basic rate of income tax will fall from 22.9 per cent to a staggering 15 per cent by 2005.

In France, a ten percent surcharge on corporation tax will be eliminated by 2003. Small and medium sized enterprises will benefit from a reduced rate of corporation tax of 25 per cent in 2001 and a new starting rate of 15 per cent in 2002.

Privatisation is at an advanced stage across the continent. The Italians have disbanded their privatisation agency, declaring their programme more or less complete. The French have sold their last state-owned bank. State aids are coming down: germany is reducing subsidies by 35 per cent between 2000 and 2004.

In telecoms, there is a ferocious price race, spurred by liberalization and competition. The cost of mobile phone calls in Germany fell by 60 per cent in the five years to September 2000. Indeed the EU leads the US in mobile telephony precisely because the ground rules for the industry were set by the European Commission early on.

Where a common European approach is required, governments have agreed to EU directives. For example:
o An e-commerce directive was agreed in 2000 to set equal ground rules for European dot.coms to compete.
o Directives that open up the gas and electricity markets to competition, along the lines of UK legislation, are now in operation.
o In late 2000 European governments agreed legislation to complete telecoms liberalisation by ‘unbundling’ local monopoly access to telephone networks, to bring prices down and increase internet access.

So there is already substantial progress in improving the business climate.

The Stockholm agenda
The Swedish government has set out three priorities for its Presidency – enlargement, the environment, and employment.

Enlargement
British business is very much in favour of enlargement of the EU to the east, carried out on the right terms. The former Communist countries of central and eastern Europe will offer enormous opportunities for British firms. After enlargement, Britain’s home market will rise from 370 million people to 470 million. We should get on with it.

Environment
Much environmental legislation impinges on British business. We must ensure that any action that is taken by the EU does not leave European firms at a competitive disadvantage. Efforts to improve environmental regulation must not rush ahead of the United States, in particular. The same is true of environmental taxation.

On the positive side, the liberalisation of energy markets offers significant opportunities to British firms. The British government took the lead on this, and now others are following. Our message to Stockholm is: get on with it.

Employment
Under the banner of employment, British business is particularly concerned about the new information and consultation directive.

The British business agenda
Beyond the Swedish presidency’s agenda, there are a number of areas in which British business would like to see progress.

Research
The first is that Stockholm must signal a real commitment to stimulating innovation and supporting research. This means rapid progress on

Protection of intellection property
Rapid introduction of the community patent

Biotechnology
The UK has invested heavily in Biotech research, both through the Government and private sector. Britain is a European, and indeed global, leader in the biotechnology industry. (I speak as a recent member of the Biotech Research Council).

It is a tragedy that EU governments have not so far grasped the implications for innovation and research of simplistic constraints on biotech research. Unless British biotechnology firms are given the regulatory framework to test and bring to market new products, then we will rapidly cease to be a leader in this sector.

So there is still much to be done to make the EU a truly dynamic, competitive single market, but from a UK perspective the prospects are much improved compared with 4 or 5 years ago.

Chapter One: Introduction

Kidnapping is not as visible as it used to be. Only fifteen years ago, British hostages in the Middle East regularly led the evening TV bulletins and provided a staple diet for mid-market tabloid features. Jill Morrell’s brilliant campaign to keep John McCarthy’s detention alive in the public mind captured the hearts and minds of the nation and catapulted her into the realms of celebrity. Even now, the tales of cruel punishment, personal trial and unlikely camaraderie are as unforgettable as the vivid personalities involved: warm, irreverent Brian Keenan; spitfire ace Jackie Mann, charming John McCarthy and the ascetic Terry Waite.

The huge public interest in their stories – together with the capture of a spate of American and European hostages – raised political kidnapping to the top of government in-trays world-wide: from Downing Street to the White House, the Bundestag to L’Assemblée Nationale. Kidnapping became the stuff of high diplomacy, and there was little doubt about the kidnappers’ motives. They were political organisations motivated by political goals and their demands varied in scope, from the release of a few prisoners to the dissolution of the state of Israel.

Kidnapping now rarely makes the headlines: the media arc lamp has dimmed. But when cases do generate column inches, the public’s understanding is still filtered through the news footage of the late eighties; seen as a political crime carried out by fanatics.

However, in many areas of the world, kidnapping is now big business and kidnappers are motivated by profit rather than principle. Economic kidnapping is one of the fastest growing criminal industries; it is estimated that kidnappers globally take home well over $500 million each year – and rising. The business is centred largely around Latin America – most notably Colombia, Mexico and Brazil – but there are also pockets of activity in the Philippines, parts of the Former Soviet Union and Africa.
With entrepreneurial flair, kidnappers are adapting their business models in response to prevailing market conditions and the relative risks they face of detection, prosecution and incarceration. In urban Mexico, where the likelihood of detection is high, kidnappers use more violence to frighten those negotiating to pay up quickly than in rural Colombia. There, kidnappers are beyond the writ of law enforcement agencies and can afford to extract concessions over a longer period of time. In fact, Colombia is the birthplace of ‘the double’, where kidnappers request a second payment after the first has been received, underlining their confidence and swagger in drawing out negotiations.

Responsibility for these changes largely lies with the end of the Cold War:

 Firstly, the funding of political revolutionaries world-wide fell with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the declining interest of sympathetic countries such as China. These groups have been forced to find new ways of financing their cause and for many economic kidnapping has provided an answer. Groups such as the Marxist-Leninist guerrilla FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia now use kidnapping as a key source of income. This, of course, means that there are grey areas between political and economic kidnapping. But individual cases motivated primarily by financial gain will clearly have a different dynamic from those motivated by political goals.

 The rise of political instability has also contributed to the growth of the kidnapping business. When, post-1989, the nationalist genies escaped and fragile economies collapsed, the lawless conditions that were created in some countries allowed kidnapping to thrive. Kidnapping groups have been able to capitalise upon the instability of the systems in which they operate and use their weaknesses to grow. Under such conditions, the state’s ability to put forward risks to deter kidnappers is severely hampered.

 The opening up of new economic territories that has taken place over the past two decades has also created new opportunities for kidnappers by bringing new potential victims. The entry of firstly Western multinationals – and now much smaller companies – into new markets introduces high-value individuals into these areas with the backing of their companies. Aid and humanitarian agencies have gone into these areas to offer support against the consequences of instability. More recently, the appetite for “adventure tourism” has grown and created more opportunities for the crime. More people are travelling to more dangerous places than ever before.

Though there is overlap between the groups that carry out economic and political kidnapping, the two crimes have different motivations and the dynamics that govern them are distinct. It is important that there is a full understanding of the differences between them in order to be able to deal with the new challenges posed by economic kidnapping.

Where demands are political there is a framework to deal with individual cases, and this is understood by all concerned. The UK government has developed a simple approach: no substantive concessions. This stance underlines the government’s commitment not to be held to ransom by terrorists – because hostages are often treated as representatives of a country or ideological system. But it is also based on the premise that concessions encourage future crimes. Because the demands in political cases are for changes in legislation or prisoner releases, they tend to be resolved within the diplomatic arena, and although partnerships with other groups can be helpful, the UK government generally has the authority to take the lead on how an individual case is handled. This allows it to ensure that a relatively consistent line is taken.

Because demands by economic kidnappers are financial,the negotiating table is opened up to anyone with the money to pay. This means that companies, charities and even individuals are all able to respond independently of the government. Most groups have formulated their policies according to their own interests and the specific risks they face and have developed tools that allow them to deliver on their priorities. Companies do not have the same concerns about sovereignty as government, and many have developed services such as specialist insurance cover and corporate security that allow them to manage their risks like they would any other locational risk. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have tended to see themselves as being immune from the risks of kidnapping because of their work supporting local communities. They have also sought to maintain their independence from government and business so as not to jeopardise their position within local communities. The families of independent travellers have even fewer constraints on their behaviour as they do not have long-term interests in the areas in question.

Kidnapping has changed, but despite the differences between economic and political kidnapping – and the fact that the current policy framework is best suited to responding to the latter – there has not yet been a full discussion about what the policy objectives should be for economic kidnapping. It is no longer clear where boundaries of responsibility for safety lie, or what the role of each group – the government, business and NGOs – should be in the policy process.

This report is not an exhaustive attempt to explain the phenomena of economic kidnapping, nor a country-by-country analysis of the kidnapping industry. Rather, it attempts to set out a narrative that, though widely understood by policy-makers, has not filtered through to public consciousness. It seeks to outline the dynamics and trends of economic kidnapping – where it happens, who is responsible, who is targeted and how it is resolved. The report will also examine the implications of economic kidnapping for the main UK policy groups: the UK government, UK companies and UK NGOs as well as UK tourists. It shows that there is great potential for policies that try to prevent kidnapping by decreasing the opportunities for kidnappers. It argues that an effective approach should place more emphasis on partnerships. The UK government should seek to forge new relationships with the different policy groups and play a central role in developing a new collaborative policy framework rather than always being the lead player itself.

The Kidnapping Business argues that effective solutions to tackle the problem of economic kidnapping must be developed for the long-term, and that progress will have to take place in several phases. It seeks to overhaul the way that policy in this area is thought about and co-ordinated between the different policy groups, and set out a vision for the way policy groups within the UK can work together. The suggestions put forward in this report will form a basis from which bi-lateral and then multi-lateral partnerships and coalitions can be forged.

These policies will have a much wider impact than on simply kidnapping. While kidnapping is not the most pressing issue for most individuals and organisations, it does affect over 10,000 people a year, and it can impact on access to key natural resources such as oil. Its presence can deter investment in high-risk countries, and it must therefore be a factor in any analysis of the risks of operating in unstable environments. Economic kidnapping is also linked to so many other problems, such as the international drugs industry and other criminal activities, and so often the causes and perpetrators are the same. Solutions in this area must therefore consider the cross-impact on other problems faced by these regions. While economic kidnapping is not in itself the biggest problem facing UK policy groups, finding policies that can impact on the crime or reduce its opportunities are helpful in tackling other problems.

The Second Lecture of the 2000-2001 Global Health Lectures came as a powerful reminder of the implications of exponential population growth on the environment, development and the future of the human race on an overcrowded planet. John Gillebaud, Professor of Family Planning and Reproductive Health at the UCL Medical School and a leading mind in the field, recalled his personal awakening in 1959 when, while still a medical student, he confronted the daunting prediction that the world’s population would double by 2000, from 3000 to 6000 million inhabitants. A year and a half after this prediction became a reality on October 10th 1999, Prof. Gillebaud gave a compelling and authoritative talk on both his personal and professional thoughts on the subject, urging the audience to recognise that “population is the most important issue of our time”.

This was essentially a visual presentation, brought to life by a rich selection of slides of tables, cartoons, photographs and charts, and a variety of daunting facts and figures driving his arguments forward, culminating in a 4 minute film. Journalist / broadcaster and expert on women’s issues, childcare and the NHS, Claire Rayner, kindly chaired the event.

Impact (I) = Population (P) x Affluence (A) x Technology (T)
The increasingly widespread tendency to rely on technological advance as the key to confronting the impacts of population explosion is dangerous in the long-term. Science can and will deliver reductions in the impacts of population growth. However, its power should not be overestimated. Firstly, greener, more efficient technologies are expensive, often beyond the means of developing countries. Secondly, while technology can help ease the strain on both the resources available and the environment, it has also tended to work as a scapegoat for the issue that lies at the core of the impact which we are having on the planet, and that is population growth itself. In his words, the question should not be how to “make the bucket bigger” but how to “stop the flow” which is threatening to overflow that bucket. Public policy must thus shift away from its efforts to cater more, and start emphasising the need to curtail population growth, particularly in the countries where it is hardest to cater for fast growing numbers.

The destruction of the Natural World – “love thy neighbour”
In addition to the depletion of resources which we live off, population growth is affecting what Prof. Guillebaud called the right of every living creature to live. Our current destruction rates amount to the disappearance of 10 species a day, a figure that will probably rise to 100 species by the end of this decade. Human thoughtlessness lies at the heart of this destruction. The each-man-for-himself mentality dominating people’s lives today (“I’m doing nothing wrong, just doing my job” frame of mind), stymies our ability to see beyond the everyday and to formulate a long-term game-plan to stop the destruction of the natural world, asking ourselves what kind of world we will be leaving behind for our grandchildren. Further, the tragedy is intensified by the fact that the very rarity of species makes them more coveted by human beings thus furthering their fate at man’s hands.

Footprints
The footprint concept in environmental terms measures the legacy that each human being and each nation leaves on the planet. Unsurprisingly it is the rich developed nations that are leaving greater footprints in their wake. Holland, for example, a country generally admired for its equality, prosperity, environmental record and democracy, is not a paragon of perfection when put into the context of the long-term effect which its population is having on the planet’s environment. As a country, it lives off 14 times its so-called allocated means, in terms of the rates of the pollution it produces and resources it consumes. The UK does not fair much better with a footprint of 11-12 times. Such figures are by no means sustainable in the long term and are exacerbated by our own inability to see the extent of the impact that our attitudes as consumers will have on our ever-growing footprints.

The affluence question
Every five days one million extra humans all wanting and deserving to consume and pollute like we do are born. Most of these people are being born in the developing world. However, what they are faced with are the other, more deadly and less obvious effects of exponential population growth. Among these are: violence and genocide, disease, maternal mortality, infant mortality, starvation, shortage of water and other resources such as energy. People in the developed world must not forget that, with this mass migration and global instability will follow. Africa is undoubtedly the continent which is suffering from these issues all most intensely, issues directly linked to the dramatic increases in population undergone in the continent. Much of their suffering could have been curtailed had those countries faced up to the problems of over-population in hostile lands sooner.

The tyranny of unwanted fertility
The suffering impinged on those women who are put at risk by unwanted pregnancies is a serious matter yet has been routinely ignored. Two of the capital risks facing women in poor countries are those of unsafe abortion and death at childbirth, both of which are directly linked to unwanted fertility. Contrary to what is claimed in institutions such as the Catholic Church, family planning should thus be perceived as a pro-life mechanism which allows women in poor countries to avoid these forms of suffering. Family planning is also pro-life in terms of the effect it has on infant mortality rates for there is a proven link between unwanted births and the deaths of young children. One revealing fact is that, contrary to what is often believed, in the UK fertility rates declined before infant mortality rate.

Poverty and Population
Poverty has many dimensions but population growth is the multiplier of all the world’s major problems. The crisis in poor countries is exacerbated by the well-known vicious cycle which dominates rural poverty. In poor rural communities it appears more advantageous to have more not less children given high infant mortality and the “social security” aspect aptly summarised as “every mouth has 2 hands”. Were we to view this problem with a greater degree of vision it would become clear that the promotion of later marriages, education, literacy in these communities are all important factors in the shift of mentality necessary to reverse this trend.

Prof. Gillebaud however stressed the fact that the provision of these factors alone would not have a significant effect on population growth. Policies designed to address these issues will not work without giving poor people (and women in particular) access to contraceptive methods. Provision of contraception for all who want it would cost as little as 17 million pounds a year. It is thus important to strike a constructive balance between development and contraception, giving the developing world access to the plethora of contraceptive methods available in the UK today.

Glimmers of Hope
Successful population control methods must invariably hold the fact that ‘people count’ at their heart. Top-down policies such as sterilisation programmes are not only inhumane but past experiences have proved that these will eventually backlash and become unsustainable. Prof. Gillebaud ended his lecture by highlighting the positive efforts being made in some parts of the world, countries such as Colombia and Thailand which have succeeded in controlling population growth without turning to the coercive techniques used by China and India in the past. He also referred to the so-called ‘love jelly’ – a treatment that women can use internally to stop the HIV virus, and the wider availability of the morning after pill. He also highlighted the success of the entrepreneurial methods such as those being used by the Mary Stoppes clinics.

This was the second in a series of 5 Global Health Lectures currently being organised by the Foreign Policy Centre in association with MEDSIN and the Wellcome Trust.

If you would like to receive further information about the next 3 lectures please contact miren@fpc.org.uk or telephone 020 74015352.

The Foreign Policy Centre would like to thank the Wellcome Trust for their generous support.

The Euro non-revolution
By Tom Arbuthnott of The Foreign Policy Centre
In eight months’ time, the European economy will totally self-destruct, the stock market will crash and the cumulative savings of generations dwindle to nothing in the chaos of e-day.

Either that or Europeans will be looking forward to a bright new dawn of political stability as a Grand Historical Project moves on to its next inexorable step.

The political class is polarised by the prospect. But the public?

A recent survey on the impact of the euro showed that, by February 2000, 97% of people in the eurozone had not yet made any payments in euros.

Just a currency

When asked why this was, over 77% of these responded simply that they hadn’t needed to yet: why bother, when perfectly serviceable Deutschmarks were still available from the local cash machine?

Come January next year, the euro is no grand political project. It’s just a currency.

In 12 European states, it will be no more and no less than the way you buy your newspaper in the morning, your sandwich at lunch, your glass of Leffe in the evening.

After an initial flurry of unpopularity, as people get used to it, it will be depoliticised, merely functional to most people.

It will have an important psychological effect for certain people, especially for those who live near borders or who are used to internet and mail-order shopping.

Harmonisation pressure

People will find it much easier to buy goods from abroad, and to isolate the cheapest deals – the virtual monopoly that domestic tax regimes and shops wield over citizens’ habits will disappear.

This will initially be a small effect, but will grow, and exert a strong domestic pressure towards harmonisation on governments.

If one government (say, Luxembourg) offers preferential tax rates on a certain good (say, kumquats), there will be no reason for a company not to set up there and sell its kumquats online using direct price comparisons with the domestic price to ram the message home.

Governments, in setting policies, will have to compete for consumers just as much as companies already do.

Certainly, this will give definition to the European Union as a single political space.

Convenience

The ability to compare domestic consumer prices with those in other countries will increase the perception of living in a single space.

Just look at the effect that comparisons of the price of fuel in France, Germany and Britain had in the UK in September 2000.

But the political pressure that results is exerted domestically, and does not lead to a desire for a whole new system of European government.

Despite the hopes of the European federalists, notes and coins are not that important. Currencies do not confer legitimacy on political institutions, even if they do create political spaces.

No-one will really care where the euro came from once it exists.

The same effect applied to the removal of passport controls at EU internal borders under the Schengen Convention, the last step-change in people’s lives engineered by the EU.

While undeniably helpful, especially for those crossing borders regularly, this added convenience has not manifested itself in a surge of support for the instruments of European integration.

Non-ideological notes and coins

When you’ve had to show a passport all your life, it becomes routine: when you stop, that becomes routine.

The only problem comes when you’ve got used to the convenience and then have the threat of having it reversed, as the Norwegians have recently been complaining.

Jurgen Stark, deputy governor of Germany’s Bundesbank, said last year: “The euro is an expression of the willingness and determination to achieve further integration.”

He was right, but only in a limited way, because this “willingness and determination” was expressed only by a tiny proportion of the population – the political elite in national governments and within the European institutions.

For most people the ideology of integrating Europe and the change in currency are separate issues – or will be once the crinkle of euronotes and the jangle of eurocoins becomes a reality.

An amalgamation of recent statistics suggests that the type of Briton most likely to be strongly opposed to the EU is a woman in her later fifties or early sixties. She is lower-middle class, and lives in the Midlands. The nemesis of Brussels does not look like a hooligan, but a grandmother.

Profiles built on statistics can be as misleading as any other stereotype. But Tony Blair’s decision to hold a referendum on the Constitution, combined with the success of anti-EU candidates in June’s European elections, has meant that British attitudes to Europe must now go under the microscope.

In the run-up to the constitutional referendum, pollsters and analysts will make good money interpreting the nation’s moods. Yet sufficient data already exists to draw broad conclusions about how the campaign may develop – and they make mildly cheerful reading for pro-Europeans.

Crucially, polling does not support the tabloids’ claim that Britain is a fundamentally anti-European country. Research conducted by the ICM agency in March 2004 analysed attitudes to Europe in terms of age, gender, region and class. It found that all groups were strongly suspicious of the (then unfinalised) Constitution. Two-thirds of respondents were opposed to it.

But when asked whether they would like Britain to leave the EU completely, only a third agreed. Just over half were actively in favour of continued membership.

Distinct differences emerged between types of voter on this issue. Some were predictable. The young display a higher degree of support for membership than their elders. Women, traditionally more conservative than men, are less pro-European too. But more intriguing divisions emerge when responses are broken down by class and region.

Residual Marxists will not be surprised to learn that the EU is a class issue. Whereas nearly two-thirds of those in the upper and upper-middle classes are in favour of continued British membership of the Union, only 42% of what are technically known as “C2s” (the skilled working class) share this commitment.

This Euroscepticism cannot be reduced to simple isolationism. The majority of C2s have holidayed abroad in recent years, and have regular access to the internet. It is unlikely that they are unaware that the EU has an important role to play in defending their social rights. Separate polling by MORI has demonstrated that a majority of the British public is conscious of Brussels’ significance to their working hours and conditions.

However, it is probable that they doubt that the EU has a positive role to play in making them better off. Mistrust of Europe’s economic influence is high in all classes, in spite of the efforts of both the government and independent organisations such as Britain in Europe to underline its advantages. This mistrust is at its highest among C2s.

If pro-Europeans are to make their case successfully, they must find new ways of presenting its economic benefits to ordinary voters. A comparison of various regions’ views of the EU underlines the importance of this message: it is particularly popular in Wales and the South-West, which have benefited markedly from European funds. However, those who believe that the EU is a natural ally of Britain’s Celtic periphery will be disappointed: Euroscepticism remains strong in Scotland.

In spite of these variations, the British average of 51%:36% support for EU membership marks the nation out as moderately pro-European rather than fiercely Eurosceptic. Public suspicion of the Constitution is rooted more in doubts over its contents than the idea of Europe per se. Nor are they easily swayed by the rabid anti-European voices of the United Kingdom Independence Party.

While the UKIP scored nearly three million votes in this year’s European Parliament elections, it had very little impact on the views of the public as a whole. An ICM poll on attitudes conducted when the party was at its height showed no swing against the Constitution – if anything, it suggested a tiny (1%) shift in favour of the document.

This suggests that the British electorate are willing to be reasonable on Europe. But it does not mean that they are interested by it. While the political classes were getting excited over Blair’s spring referendum U-turn, polls found that only 9% of voters thought Europe to be the most important issue facing the UK. This group is thought to consist largely of worried pro-Europeans rather than diehard Europhobes.

If, as is now threatened, the constitutional referendum is two years off, it is unlikely that the public will follow it closely. The gaggle of UKIP-supporting minor celebrities that dominated the run-up to the European elections in June had become almost invisible in the media by the end of the month. Joan Collins’ career is back on hold.

Such apathy allows pro-Europeans a quiet life. But it is problematic in that, to win on the Constitution, they must make the public understand why the treaty is essential to the good functioning of the sort of moderate EU most Britons want to live in. The gap must be closed between those that back the Constitution and those who want to stay in the EU.

Achieving this must involve work at the grass-roots level in response to the differences between voters noted above. In recent years, pro-Europeans have lost a series of referendums around the continent because they did not engage in such work. Norway’s 1994 effort to enter the EU was blocked because Eurosceptics made good use of local and regional differences to outmanoeuvre pro-European politicians in Oslo. A similar grass-roots effort kept Denmark out of the Eurozone.

However, it is equally crucial that pro-Europeans should not only address such differences but aim to overcome them. Regional differences played little part in the final result of the 1975 referendum on British membership of the Common Market, resoundingly won by pro-Europeans after a 22% swing away from their opponents in the six months before polling day. Only the Highlands and Islands of Scotland voted on a clearly parochial basis, with Orkney and the Shetlands delivering anti-Market majorities contrary to the national trend.

The decisive factor in 1975 was, in fact, none of the social divisions mentioned so far. They were all overwhelmed by party loyalty, even though the contest was supposedly a non-party affair. With the Tories and Liberal leaderships solidly in favour of Europe, the referendum “campaign” was reduced to in-fighting within Labour. With the pro-market Roy Jenkins and Denis Healey winning that struggle, the national result was assured.

Moreover, the campaign demonstrated that public apathy toward Europe could be overcome. Less than six months before the referendum, a Gallup poll found that 1% of Britons rated Europe as the most important issue facing the UK. By the month of the poll, public interest in the result was high, and the eventual turnout was 65%.

The key question for the next referendum may thus not be about divisions between classes and areas, but about how far the opposed camps can each cohere. Two scenarios are imaginable, both related to the outcome of the expected May 2005 general election.

In the best-case scenario for pro-Europeans, Tony Blair would win that election by a clear majority (perhaps one hundred Commons seats) allowing him or his anointed successor to take on a newly-fractured Tory party. While pro-European Conservatives such as Kenneth Clarke would feel little need to toe their party line, the Tories’ weakness would open up more political space for the UKIP. Differences between the two parties would hamper the anti-European message from the Right. The Constitution would be won.

In the worst-case scenario (barring the still unlikely eventuality of a Conservative victory), Blair might win by a narrow margin, giving the Tories an incentive to hang together in hope of a victory at the next election. With Labour entering a period similar to the last years of John Major, it would be the pro-European camp that fractured. Anti-European figures in labour such as Tony Benn (a key opponent of the Common Market in 1975) would come to the fore. With the UKIP redundant, the more mainstream opponents of the Constitution would have the upper hand.

Even in the best case, the campaign would not be as simple as that of 1975. Then, the entire press bar the Communist Morning Star was in favour of staying in the Common Market. Nor did there seem to be a serious alternative to membership: Commonwealth premiers and US president Gerald Ford all advocated a “yes” vote to Europe.

This time round, the press will not be so favourable to pro-Europeans, and the Tories may be able to say that there remains a transatlantic alternative to European solidarity. Nonetheless, if Labour maintains coherence, it clearly has a well of pro-European public opinion to tap. To date, the party’s leaders have been somewhat coy in their efforts to do so. Having announced the referendum so as to pre-empt argument prior to European elections, the prime minister and his supporters have not been consistent in selling the Constitution.

How long they can continue to prevaricate is unclear. They may be inclined to do so in the belief that Europe remains unsellable. But if the polls are correct, an act of concentrated political will should mean that a few sixty-year olds in the Midlands will be unhappy the morning after the referendum.