Moldova entered its September 2025 parliamentary elections at a moment of rare consequence, with rising geopolitical pressures magnifying what was already perceived as a pivotal vote. In a parliamentary republic, where control of the legislature determines both government formation and strategic direction, this vote assumed historic weight, a critical juncture over whether Moldova would consolidate its European path or succumb to Russian influence.
The patterns of interference preceding and accompanying Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary election cannot be understood solely through the lens of online manipulation and propaganda. Digital operations do not occur in a vacuum – they thrive in conditions already embedded in political arenas, domestic as well as regional. From the geopolitics of neutrality (long instrumentalised by Russia) to proxy candidates, (covert) financial streams, and the managed ambiguity of ideological positioning, these dynamics do not simply co-exist with disinformation; they enable and magnify it, conferring influence operations both entry points and receptive audiences.
To situate the 2025 vote within the broader genealogy of subversion is to understand Moldova’s political contestation as more than a domestic struggle over governance. Positioned at Europe’s eastern edge, this small, landlocked post-Soviet state functions simultaneously as a nodal point in Europe’s security architecture and as a (historical) laboratory for hybrid destabilisation.
“In essence, the attacker need only sow doubt, while the defender must rebuild the public trust that makes democratic choice meaningful — a task far more fragile, and consequential than any specific electoral outcome.”
Andra-Lucia Martinescu, Senior Research Fellow, FPC
Synopsis of project and outputs:
This analysis covers context to mechanism: the long read article (see Vote at the Fault Line of Europe: Learnings from Moldova’s 2025 Parliamentary Elections) opens by placing Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary contest within a wider geopolitical and socio-economic landscape, emphasising how hybrid interference exploits existing domestic vulnerabilities, historical rifts and/or regional alliances. The data driven analysis provides a cross-platform (see A Data Driven Analysis: The Online Ecosystem ahead of the 2025 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections) examination of the online environment, using targeted data collection to chart the scale and transnational reach of manipulative interventions across social media and the web via networked geographies.
The analyses draw on research produced through a European consortium collaboration, including the authors’ work within the PROMPT EU project. The material presented here expands this research into a policy-facing format, enriched with newly analysed data and adapted to draw out broader implications for democratic resilience and European security, including lessons relevant to the United Kingdom (see Policy & Key Takeaways: Lessons for the UK from a Transnational Influence Battlefield).
Download copies of the briefing papers below:
1. Vote at the Fault Line of Europe: Learnings from Moldova’s 2025 Parliamentary Elections
2. A Data Driven Analysis: The Online Ecosystem ahead of the 2025 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections
3. Policy & Key Takeaways: Lessons for the UK from a Transnational Influence Battlefield
Acknowledgments and Contributions:
This work also draws on substantive and timely collaboration with the Romanian-based investigative outlet Context.ro, the FACT EU Hub, and the tireless investigative journalists, fact-checkers, civic groups and watchdog organisations working on the digital frontlines of European democratic resilience. Their efforts to monitor, verify and connect fast-moving signals across borders were essential to exposing patterns of manipulation, and illicit financing designed to remain fragmented and deniable. Without this collective infrastructure of scrutiny, many of the online-offline networks documented here would have remained harder to trace, harder to challenge and easier to reproduce.
Principal investigator: Andra-Lucia Martinescu
Andra-Lucia is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre, specialising in threat intelligence, hybrid operations, conflict analysis and democratic resilience. Her recent work also focuses on how hostile influence, political violence, information manipulation and proxy networks affect vulnerable democracies, particularly across Eastern Europe and the wider European neighbourhood. She has previously held research roles with the British Army’s Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, RUSI, RAND Europe and other institutions, and has provided evidence to the UK Parliament on a number of issues. She is also actively involved in civic-tech, independent electoral monitoring and grassroots democratic initiatives. Andra-Lucia is co-founder of Qriton and The Diaspora Initiative, the latter, an independent Luxembourg-based project working at the intersection of diaspora studies, migration, good governance and democratic participation.
Data Architecture: Marius Dima
Marius Dima is co-founder of Qriton Technologies, where he develops neural-symbolic AI systems for high-reliability analysis in critical environments. His work bridges advanced AI, open data governance and civic technology, with a focus on systems that are both powerful and accountable. He also leads civic-tech initiatives such as igov.ro, supporting open data, public-sector transparency and citizen participation. Before moving into AI, he spent two decades in industrial automation, including work on offshore platforms and manufacturing systems. Based in Germany, he brings practical experience in emerging AI governance, regulatory compliance and the design of trustworthy analytical infrastructure for public-interest applications.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this publication are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.