Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) has been high on the agenda of liberal democracies for years.^[1] The European External Action Service has just published its fourth annual report on the subject, and the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee is due to release the result of its inquiry into disinformation on 27 March.^[2] The threat to liberal democracies from hostile autocrats is real and growing, but democratic states and societies are far from defenceless, as the case of one Europe’s smallest and poorest countries vividly illustrates.

On 28 September 2025, Moldova held its parliamentary elections in the shadow of the Russian war against Ukraine while itself being under relentless attack from the Kremlin – not by enemy soldiers, missiles, and drones, but by an army of chatbots, covert operators, and willing proxies.^[3] The choice before the Moldovan people was simple: to cast their vote in support of EU integration or to back parties prioritising an amicable relationship with Russia.

In many ways it was a litmus test: could a small nation of 2.5 million people preserve the integrity of its electoral process in the face of Russia’s hybrid war? With President Maia Sandu’s pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) winning more than 50% of the votes, Moldova has become a success story for how a democracy under attack by a revanchist Russia can protect its sovereignty.^[4]  This offers vital lessons for the broader efforts to make liberal democracies more resilient and future-proof them against autocratic subversion.

It is estimated that the Russian regime spent between €100m and €200m in its effort to undermine Moldova’s parliamentary elections.^[5] These resources were partly poured into a multi-layered interference architecture that applied behavioural insights, cross-platform access, and AI-generated content to coordinate its reach. Pro-Russian narratives were pushed on a myriad of fabricated websites employing deepfakes designed to mimic legitimate news media from across the world to create the illusion of an international consensus aligned to the Kremlin’s interests.

In one instance, hackers impersonated the Council of Europe and “fabricated a story portraying Moldova as condemned by European institutions”. Moldova’s government institutions were also targeted by hackers “to gain access to sensitive information”.^[6] Evidence has shown that “on TikTok alone, 1,347 fake accounts generated 42 million interactions”, demonstrating Russia’s capability to bypass traditional media to push pro-Kremlin content directly to its targets.^[7]

Importantly, Russia’s manipulation campaign was not just limited to the digital realm. Another significant part of the resources that Moscow mobilised was used to transfer money to around 130,000 Moldovan citizens in an attempt to buy their votes. Cash from Russia was also used to bribe groups and individuals to provoke disorder and spread fear, including through bomb threats against polling stations for expatriates living in Italy, Romania, Spain and America.^[8] The Kremlin even went as far as enlisting Moldovan Orthodox priests to post pro-Russian and anti-European messages on dedicated Telegram channels.^[9]

Russia’s attempts to manipulate the outcome of the elections clearly presented a grave threat to Moldova’s future. Yet despite the vast resources the Kremlin mobilised and the sophistication of its tools, Moldova’s democracy proved remarkably resilient, offering important insights for strategies to counter election interference.

Moldova’s political leaders, civil society, and European partners pushed back against Russia’s unprecedented influence operation on multiple fronts. To pre-empt election fraud, strategic communication was harnessed.^[10] Russian lies were proactively exposed in government communications. Senior EU officials and leaders from key member states visited the country in the run-up to the elections to show their support against Russian manipulation efforts.^[11]

Moldova’s government not only worked to denounce Russian interference, but the country’s law enforcement agencies also made sustained and successful efforts to dismantle Russia’s vote-buying network. This included banning two political parties from participating in the elections, issuing 25,000 fines to individuals who sold their votes and a large-scale public awareness campaign that exposed this fraud through billboards, traditional media and social media.^[12]

Moldovan authorities also coordinated closely with EU neighbours to defend itself against Russian cyberattacks by sharing intelligence and collaborating on investigations. This cross-border cooperation successfully thwarted major disruptions in the days leading up to the vote and thus protected the integrity of Moldova’s electoral process.^[13]

EU institutions and Moldovan NGOs also worked together to highlight the benefits of integration into the EU in a campaign that engaged with celebrities, popular magazines, artists and religious leaders to promote EU values and partnership. By focusing on the concrete results of the EU-funded and Moldovan government-led “European Village” programme, that supports local community projects from building playgrounds to repairing roads, the message to voters was very clear: Moldovans will benefit much more from a future inside the EU rather than outside of it.^[14] Ultimately, this too, was a message that cut through the fog of Russian disinformation.

Moldova’s experience highlights both the vulnerability of countries in the crosshairs of Russian interference campaigns and the limits that these campaigns have in the face of well-conceived and coordinated resistance. Russia’s well-funded and highly sophisticated ‘hybrid war’ poses a real threat. However, European democracies are not defenceless. As the Moldovan experience demonstrates, they can emerge more resilient from the fight back against foreign information manipulation and election interference.

Philip J. Javens is a Writer/Producer currently studying an MA in International Relations at the University of Birmingham. His professional credits include working on documentaries for Amazon Prime, Netflix, Apple TV+ and more.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Birmingham. A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts, in post-conflict state-building in deeply divided and war-torn societies, and in contemporary geopolitics and great-power rivalry. Wolff has extensive expertise in the post-Soviet space and has also worked on a wide range of other conflicts elsewhere, including in the Middle East and North Africa, in Central Asia, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Wolff holds degrees from the University of Leipzig (Erstes Staatsexamen), the University of Cambridge (M.Phil.), and the LSE (Ph.D.).

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] Camilla Cavendish, Britain must be more vigilant to the risk of sabotage by hostile states, Financial Times, March 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/720543d3-bdfc-4008-b64d-5a8abbdb0d61

[2] European External Action Service, 4th EEAS Annual Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats, March 2026, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/4th-eeas-annual-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en; UK Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy, https://committees.parliament.uk/work/8818/disinformation-diplomacy-how-malign-actors-are-seeking-to-undermine-democracy/

[3] David Smith, Engineering Doubt: Cyber Operations and Hybrid Election Interference in Moldova’s 2025 Elections, Watchdog.md, 2026, https://watchdog.md/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Cyberwarfare-Moldovas-Elections.pdf

[4] Stefan Wolff, Moldova: pro‑EU party wins majority in election dominated by Russian interference, The Conversation, September 2025, https://theconversation.com/moldova-pro-eu-party-wins-majority-in-election-dominated-by-russian-interference-266179

[5] The Stimson Center relies on an interview with a senior Moldovan police officer by the Moldovan state information agency for the lower figure, while the Economist cites the Moldovan government as a source of the higher figure. See Sanda Sandu, Moldova’s 2025 Elections: A Test Case for Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, September 2025, https://www.stimson.org/2025/moldovas-2025-elections-a-test-case-for-russias-hybrid-warfare/; Moldpres, Interview with the Head of the General Inspectorate of Police, March 2026, https://www.moldpres.md/rom/interviuri/interviu-moldpres-seful-igp-viorel-cernauteanu-federatia-rusa-fie-prin-interpusul-ilan-sor-fie-prin-alte-elemente-va-incerca-continuu-sa-gaseasca-anumiti-algoritmi-prin-care-sa-ajunga-la-dezordini-si-destabilizari; The Economist, Moldova defies Russia by re-electing its pro-European government, September 2025, https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/09/29/moldova-defies-russia-by-re-electing-its-pro-european-government

[6] Ancuța (Anna) Hansen, How Russia tried to manipulate Moldova’s election – and what it reveals, The Interpreter, November 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-russia-tried-manipulate-moldova-s-election-what-it-reveals

[7] Ibid.

[8] Leo Litra and Gabrielė Valodskaitė, From success to strategy: Three lessons from Moldova’s election, https://ecfr.eu/article/from-success-to-strategy-three-lessons-from-moldovas-election; RFE/RL’s Moldovan Service, EU Monitoring Threats To Moldova’s Elections Amid Alleged Russian Plot To Train Provocateurs In Serbia, September 2025, https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-russia-parliamentary-election-arrests-provocation-marta-kos-european-commission-maia-sandu/33539603.html; Anna Hansen, How Russia tried to manipulate Moldova’s election, November 2025. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-russia-tried-manipulate-moldova-s-election-what-it-reveals

[9]  Christian Lowe, Polina Nikolskaya and Anton Zverev, Holy war: How Russia recruited Orthodox priests to sway Moldova’s voters, Reuters, September 2025, https://www.reuters.com/investigations/holy-war-how-russia-recruited-orthodox-priests-sway-moldovas-voters-2025-09-26/

[10] The Moldovan parliament established a Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation in 2023. See Parliament of Moldova, ‘Law No. 242 of 31 July 2023’, https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=138661&lang=ro. The website of the Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation can be accessed here: https://stratcom.md/en/

[11] EU Neighbours East, European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos visits Moldova, September 2025, https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/european-commissioner-for-enlargement-marta-kos-visits-moldova/; Alexander Tanas and Andreas Rinke, German, Polish, French leaders visit Moldova in pre-election show of support for pro-EU president, Reuters, August 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/german-polish-french-leaders-visit-moldova-pre-election-show-support-pro-eu-2025-08-27/

[12] Abbey Fenbert, Moldova bans 2 pro-Russian parties on eve of key election, The Kyiv Independent, September 2025, https://kyivindependent.com/moldova-bans-2-pro-russian-parties-on-eve-of-key-election/; Reuters, Moldova bans another pro-Russian party from Sunday’s vote, September 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/moldova-bans-another-pro-russian-party-sundays-vote-2025-09-27/; ECFR, Leo Litra and Gabriele Valodskaitė, From success to strategy, October 2025, https://ecfr.eu/article/from-success-to-strategy-three-lessons-from-moldovas-election

[13] Ibid.

[14] The European Village programme (https://www.euvillages.eu/) is a long-standing Europe-wide EU initiative to invest in local rural infrastructure. Its most recent renewal in Moldova was announced in April 2025. See Moldpres, Two new EU-funded government programs launched in Moldova, April 2025, https://www.moldpres.md/eng/economy/two-new-government-programs-launched-in-moldova-funded-by-european-sources; Leo Litra and Gabrielė Valodskaitė, From success to strategy: Three lessons from Moldova’s election, October 2025, https://ecfr.eu/article/from-success-to-strategy-three-lessons-from-moldovas-election