Op-ed | Armenia’s 2026 Parliamentary Election and the Future of the South Caucasus

Article by James Stanley and Stefan Wolff

June 4, 2026

Op-ed | Armenia’s 2026 Parliamentary Election and the Future of the South Caucasus

The upcoming Armenian elections are often framed as a choice between Russia and the West. In reality, the outcome will shape the country’s evolving relationship with Russia, the West, and its neighbours in the strategically important South Caucasus. This article forms part of the Foreign Policy Centre’s work on democracy and elections.

In the shadow of war in the Middle East and Russia’s ongoing war waged against Ukraine, Armenia is heading into parliamentary elections on 7 June that will not only be critical for the country’s own direction but are also likely to have an impact for the wider South Caucasus region; itself of broader geopolitical significance at a crucial north-south and east-west crossroads.

At stake is first of all the future of incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party government, which came to power in 2018 after the Velvet Revolution. The movement ousted the government of long-term leader Serzh Sarkisian, who had tried to prolong his stay in power “by moving from the office of president to that of prime minister”.^[1] This triggered nation-wide protests propelling Pashinyan to the premiership that May and to electoral victory in December.

Under Pashinyan, who was re-elected in 2021, Armenia has generally gravitated towards the European Union and away from Russia.^[2] The latter is mostly a result of Russia’s failure to support Armenia during the Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. The offensive resulted in Azerbaijan retaking control over the territory, which Armenia had illegally occupied since the first Karabakh war in the early 1990s – causing the displacement of around 100,000 Armenians from the region. These events unfolded in the presence of Russian ‘peacekeepers’ deployed under the terms of a cease fire agreement that ended the second Karabakh war in 2020.^[3]

Armenia’s election on 7 June therefore marks an important milestone not only domestically, but also for the wider region. Pashinyan campaigns on a platform “to reopen the country’s borders, lower dependence on Russia, and diversify its foreign and economic profile by normalising relations with traditional adversaries Azerbaijan and Turkey”.^[4] If Pashinyan secures another term, this would give him the mandate to carry out a major shift in Armenia’s foreign policy orientation, and in this sense, the elections are also a “strategic referendum on Armenia’s geopolitical orientation.”^[5]

A popular endorsement of Pashinyan’s agenda would enable the continuation of three important trends in the region: first, the gradual emergence of regional ties between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan; second, further declining Russian influence in a region where Moscow once was the undisputed hegemonic power; and third, a strengthening foothold for the EU and the US in a region that is a strategic land bridge towards Central Asia and China.

The relationship between Moscow and Yerevan has steadily deteriorated over the past decade.^[6] Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the weight and significance of Russia in the region has clearly diminished, but this has been a gradual process, rather than an abrupt rupture.^[7]

While Russia retains significant influence in Georgia, and the Georgian Dream government in Tbilisi is, for now, seemingly more closely aligned with Moscow than with either Brussels or Washington, it is also trying to balance its relationship more carefully between Russia and the West. This includes forging closer ties with Azerbaijan and Türkiye.^[8] A victory for Pashinyan and his pro-Western agenda is likely to reinforce the trend towards the geopolitical re-orientation of the region, but this will remain a more careful multi-vector balancing act – with a mixture of political, economic, and cultural relationships to different actors outside the region – rather than a more one-directional pivot towards the West.^[9]

Although Russian influence may be declining, Moscow’s strategic interests in the South Caucasus, including in Armenia, remain strong. Russia is poised to use whatever tools and leverage it still has to prevent a further decline of its role as erstwhile regional hegemon, including by using cultural and religious channels of influence.^[10] Economically, Russia remains Armenia’s most important trade partner and energy supplier.^[11] Many opposition forces also remain closely aligned with Russia, including the Strong Armenia bloc led by billionaire Samvel Karapetyan.^[12] Most Armenians favour diversification of relations rather than an outright rejection of Russia. According to recent polling, 43% see Moscow as the country’s most important partner, compared to 42% who think of Washington in that way, and 29% who think of Brussels.^[13]

The geopolitical dynamics in and around Armenia are therefore more complex and nuanced than the political rhetoric accompanying them. Yet, Russia’s capacity to exercise real influence effectively – and comparably to its previous dominance – is more constrained than ever. For example, Armenia has completely shifted away from Moscow as a security provider not only rhetorically but also in terms of who now supplies most of its arms: where Russia once accounted for over 90% of Armenia’s weapons purchases, its share has now dropped to somewhere between 5% and 10%, while France and India have become Armenia’s primary defence partners.^[14]

Armenia, thus, has not, and most likely will not, replace its close alignment with Russia with one that solely relies on the West. However, the change in foreign policy direction under Pashinyan has clearly shifted away from Russia and towards Brussels and Washington. On the European side, this has been reciprocated with the back-to-back European Political Community summit and first bilateral Armenia-EU summit held in Yerevan in May 2026.^[15]

The United States under President Donald Trump has also demonstrated a continuing interest in the region, which is most evident in Trump’s engagement in trying to broker a permanent peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While this has yet to be achieved, several pieces of this puzzle have been put in place, including, most recently, a bilateral framework agreement on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).^[16] Given the transactional and erratic nature of much of Trump’s foreign policy, this is unlikely to be a pivotal game changer either for peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan or for long-term US commitment to the country or the region, but it is part of the broader picture of the geopolitical importance of Armenia and the South Caucasus – and the opportunities that this may create for Pashinyan’s agenda.

A careful balance therefore needs to be struck between dismissing Armenia’s parliamentary elections as the continuation of Armenia’s historic dependence on Russia, and exclusively reorienting strategic alignment in the much bigger geopolitical game surrounding the South Caucasus. The outcome of the elections will be important for the country’s direction, and speed of travel: whoever forms the next government in Yerevan will still have a range of pre-existing problems to resolve in an environment where external support is neither certain nor dependably benign.

James Stanley is an M.A. International Relations student at the University of Birmingham. He has experience in policy research and public engagement, including contributing to the Helios exhibition at The Exchange. His research interests include Russia, European security, and the wider Eurasian region.

Stefan Wolff is Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre and Professor of International Security in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Birmingham. A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts, in post-conflict state-building in deeply divided and war-torn societies, and in contemporary geopolitics and great-power rivalry. Wolff has extensive expertise in the post-Soviet space and has also worked on a wide range of other conflicts elsewhere, including in the Middle East and North Africa, in Central Asia, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Wolff holds degrees from the University of Leipzig (Erstes Staatsexamen), the University of Cambridge (M.Phil.), and the LSE (Ph.D.).

Image: © European Union 2026 – Source : EP

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Miriam Lanskoy and Elspeth Suthers, Armenia’s Velvet Revolution. Journal of Democracy, April 2019, https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0027

^[2] Council of the European Union, EU Relations with Armenia, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/armenia/

^[3] Michael Ertl, Nagorno-Karabakh: Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenians explained, BBC News,September 2023, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66852070

^[4] Thomas de Waal, Armenia’s Election Is a Foreign Affair, Strategic Europe, November 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2025/11/armenias-election-is-a-foreign-affair

^[5] Robert Lansing Institute, Armenia’s Parliamentary Elections 2026: A Battle for the State’s Geopolitical Future,May 2026, https://lansinginstitute.org/2026/05/18/armenias-parliamentary-elections-2026-a-battle-for-the-states-geopolitical-future/

^[6] Ulviyya Asadzade, Russia’s Grip Weakens In The South Caucasus, Opening Doors To New Players, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 2025, https://www.rferl.org/a/south-caucasus-russia-losing-influence-armenia-azerbaijan/33475018.html

^[7] Emil Avdaliani, “Russian Influence Drains Away in the South Caucasus”, Center for European Policy Analysis, 22 May 2026, https://cepa.org/article/russian-influence-drains-away-in-the-south-caucasus/

^[8] Mark Temnycky, Caught Between NATO And Russia, Georgia Turns To The South Caucasus, Forbes, December 2025, https://www.forbes.com/sites/marktemnycky/2025/12/13/caught-between-nato-and-russia-georgia-turns-to-the-south-caucasus/

^[9] Laurence Broers, Armenia’s election: Voters to decide on Pashinyan’s peace agenda”, Chatham House, May 2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/05/armenias-election-voters-decide-pashinyans-peace-agenda

^[10] Mikayel Zolyan, “Russia Won’t Give Up Its Influence in Armenia Without a Fight”, Carnegie Politika, 3 February 2026, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/01/armenia-russia-drifting-apart; Davit Gasparyan, Russian Religious Networks and Armenia’s Church-State Confrontation, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, March 2026, https://substack.com/home/post/p-188618614

^[11] SpecialEurasia, Trade as Leverage: Russia’s Enduring Economic Role in Armenia, March 2026, https://www.specialeurasia.com/2026/03/11/trade-russia-armenia-leverage/

^[12] Sergey Kanev, Grabbing him by the ‘Beard’: The Insider identifies the FSB, GRU, and SVR agents Russia sent to Armenia to take on PM Nikol Pashinyan, The Insider, May 2026, https://theins.press/en/inv/292740

^[13] International Republican Institute, Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Armenia, February 2026, March 2026, https://www.iri.org/resources/public-opinion-survey-residents-of-armenia-february-2026/

^[14] Leonid Nersisyan and Sergei Melkonian, Escaping Russia’s Backyard: Armenia’s Strategic Defense Shift, War on the Rocks, November 2024, https://warontherocks.com/escaping-russias-backyard-armenias-strategic-defense-shift/

^[15] Rayhan Demytrie, European leaders converge on Armenia as Russia looks on, BBC News, May 2026, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cgkp1124y3yo

^[16] Office of the Spokesperson, The United States and Armenia Announce the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) Framework Agreement and Sign the Strategic Partnership Charter and Critical Minerals Memorandum of Understanding, US Department of State, May 2026, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/05/the-united-states-and-armenia-announce-tripp-framwork-agreement-and-sign-the-strategic-partnership-charter-and-critical-minerals-mou/

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Regions

Armenia

South Caucasus

Long Read | The German Far-Right’s Subversive Foreign Policy

Article by Rachel Herring

February 5, 2026

Long Read | The German Far-Right’s Subversive Foreign Policy

The German right-wing populist party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) has been at the centre of countless controversies since its formation in 2013, not least regarding its foreign policy. From AfD politicians’ downplaying of Nazi crimes to suspected links to the Russian and Chinese governments, the party is a source of disruption and debate in the media and in the German parliament itself.^[1] This article analyses the AfD’s foreign policy outlook and considers its implications in the context of emerging foreign policy challenges.

Why the AfD’s foreign policy matters

Having entered parliament in 2017 and secured the second-highest share of votes in the 2025 federal election, the AfD has rapidly established itself in the German political landscape, and indeed the foreign policy landscape. Regardless of whether the party gains power or remains in opposition in the coming years, it will undoubtedly remain part of the foreign policy conversation in Germany and beyond.

Identifying the party’s core positions and vision of Germany’s role in the world is therefore important, not only to understand the possible foreign policy implications of the AfD being in government, but also to understand how it is already shaping Germany’s relations with partner countries and institutions.

Historical (re)interpretation

Foreign policy is inseparable from national history, and there is no better example of this than Germany. For decades, the dominant interpretations shaping German foreign policy have been rooted in guilt, responsibility, and reconciliation in the aftermath of the Nazi regime. The AfD, however, both downplays such narratives and selectively invokes history to offer competing interpretations. For example, AfD parliamentary speeches on Israel and the conflict in Gaza appropriate narratives of historical responsibility to legitimise the party’s anti-Islam agenda. This kind of rhetoric fundamentally disrupts the relative consensus on key foreign policy pillars, challenging other parliamentarians to defend their positions and creating a divide between political elites who uphold existing pillars and those (primarily the AfD) who openly question them.

At the international level, the AfD’s controversial historical interpretations have not gone unnoticed. In Germany’s bilateral relationship with Poland, a central partner and neighbour where historical debates are ongoing, the AfD has the potential to be a highly problematic force. In late 2025, Polish historian and adviser to President Nawrocki, Andrzej Nowak, accepted an invitation from the AfD to speak in the German Bundestag, stating that his aim was to warn AfD politicians against naive positions towards Russia.^[2] Just a few months later, AfD politician Kay Gottschalk stated on X that his first act as Minister for Finance would be to demand 1.3 billion euros in reparations from Poland in response to the attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022.^[3] Uncoincidentally, this is the same sum President Nawrocki has demanded from Germany in war reparations.^[4] Such interactions have the potential to significantly sour relations, particularly given the AfD’s ongoing popularity.

Questioning established cooperation

The subversion of historical narratives is part of a wider challenge posed by the AfD to long-standing German partnerships and alliances. This is perhaps most evident – and most subversive – when it comes to the AfD’s stance towards the EU. Membership of the EU and European integration are fundamental pillars of German foreign policy, deeply intertwined with bilateral relations with other member states. While the other German political parties naturally differ regarding specific policy preferences, they are united in the position that EU membership is not only beneficial to Germany, but central to its identity and role in the world.

In contrast, and in line with the populist radical right tendency towards anti-globalisation and anti-establishment views, the AfD accuses the EU of being technocratic, elitist, and threatening to German interests and sovereignty. Following the 2024 European elections, which showed a clear shift to the right, the 14 AfD Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) formed a new far-right parliamentary group named Europe of Sovereign Nations, together with 11 representatives from seven different countries.^[5] The result indicated that the AfD’s scepticism towards the EU and championing of sovereignty over liberal institutionalism resonates beyond the national level.

These positions reflect a wider worldview held by many AfD politicians, in which the international system is understood primarily in terms of power politics and pragmatism. The AfD frequently attacks arguments in favour of interdependence and common values in the German parliament, dismissing these as ideologically driven or detached from political reality. Instead, AfD politicians favour a non-aligned position which resists external influence, even from traditional allies such as the US. A particular source of controversy in this regard is the AfD’s position on Putin’s war against Ukraine, which emphasises the negative impact of sanctions on the German economy, and calls for negotiations with Putin. Such positions are met with widespread rejection in the German parliament and again have the effect of uniting the other parties in their rhetorical commitment to defending international law and the European peace order.

Same positions, new context

The AfD’s status as a disruptive force within the German foreign policy discourse is unlikely to diminish as long as it remains in opposition. Whether it would significantly adapt its foreign policy positions if it were to enter government remains uncertain. At the same time, Russia’s war against Ukraine and President Trump’s aggressive and unpredictable foreign policy pose ongoing dilemmas for ruling and opposition parties alike.

In recent years, right-wing populists across Europe and the US have tended to uphold similar foreign policy positions and attitudes towards global security, including the pragmatic prioritisation of national interest, a non-aligned approach towards Russia and China, and a scepticism towards liberal institutions like the EU.^[6] It has also been characteristic of these political actors to cultivate transnational networks of political support. President Trump has frequently served as a point of reference in this regard, from the friendly relationship between Trump and Polish President Karol Nawrocki to Elon Musk’s public backing of the AfD.^[7]

However, Trump’s recent aggressive foreign policy moves towards Venezuela and Greenland may signal the beginning of the decline of this era. Along with other European right-wing parties, AfD leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla condemned Trump’s foreign policy in January 2026.^[8] These developments pose important questions regarding the direction of the AfD’s foreign policy. Will the German right increasingly distance itself from its previously friendly stance towards the Trump administration? And how will AfD advocates of a non-aligned, pragmatic approach respond to attempts to uphold liberal institutions and diversify global cooperation, such as the recent EU trade deals with Mercosur and India?^[9]

The AfD’s stance towards the international system not only has implications for German and European foreign policy. It also resonates within broader debates about the future of the so-called liberal international order. At the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addressed this discourse, arguing that the so-called rules-based order, and in particular American hegemony, had constructed a myth which has now been ‘ruptured.’^[10] He went on to argue that the solution is not a ‘world of fortresses’ but ‘collective investments in resilience.’ While many parties and governments are rallying around liberal institutions and alliances, the AfD’s foreign policy discourse to date clearly indicates a preference for a ‘world of fortresses.’

This article is based on a recently published original paper by Maximilian Tkocz and Rachel Herring, which can be found here.

Rachel Herring is a PhD researcher at Aston University and the University of Birmingham. Her research focuses on German foreign policy, Germany’s relations with Central Europe, and the role of civil society actors in foreign relations. She was the Think Visegrad Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Prague in 2024 and is currently a visiting researcher at the Jacques Delors Centre, Berlin.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Deutsche Welle, AfD chief downplays Nazi era as ‘bird shit’, Deutsche Welle, February 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/afds-gauland-plays-down-nazi-era-as-a-bird-shit-in-german-history/a-44055213; Der Spiegel, Maik Baumgärtner et al, How the AfD Became the Long Arm of Russia and China, May 2024, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/afd-spionageaffaere-russland-und-china-im-fokus-neue-enthuellungen-belasten-die-partei-1714480876-a-a1c05e64-b6bc-4c6b-844e-a78a32ec4f91

^[2] Jan Sternberg, Neue Annäherung zwischen der AfD und der polnischen Rechten, October 2025, https://www.rnd.de/politik/neue-annaeherung-zwischen-afd-und-der-polnischen-rechten-JRUDLEPR45FAZFVVCIEXQWCSKU.html

^[3] Welt, „Wer zuletzt lacht, lacht am besten“ – AfD-Politiker fordert 1,3 Billionen Euro von Polen, January 2026, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article6974fbce707d4aa2075800bf/reparationszahlung-wer-zuletzt-lacht-lacht-am-besten-afd-politiker-fordert-1-3-billionen-euro-von-polen.html

^[4] Tagesschau, Deutschland lehnt Reparationsforderungen erneut ab, September 2025, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/merz-steinmeier-polen-reparationen-100.html

^[5] Francois Hublet, 10 Key Lessons of the 2024 European Parliament Election, 2024, https://geopolitique.eu/en/articles/10-key-lessons-of-the-2024-european-parliament-election/

^[6] Jeremy Cliffe et al, Rise to the challengers: Europe’s populist parties and its foreign policy future, June 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/rise-to-the-challengers-europes-populist-parties-and-its-foreign-policy-future/

^[7] Jacek Lepiarz, What does Poland’s president hope to achieve in Washington?, February 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/poland-karol-nawrocki-washington-visit-donald-trump-nato-v2/a-73851111; Jessica Parker, Musk interviews German far-right frontwoman, January 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr7errxp5jmo

^[8] Sarah Marsh and Elizabeth Pineau, Europe’s far right and populists distance themselves from Trump over Greenland, January 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/europes-far-right-populists-distance-themselves-trump-over-greenland-2026-01-21/; Die Zeit, AfD-Spitze geht auf Distanz zu Trumps Außenpolitik, January 2026, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2026-01/afd-weidel-chrupalla-aussenpolitik-usa

^[9] European Commission, The EU-Mercosur trade agreement, 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/; Roshni Majumdar and Shakeel Sobhan, EU, India clinch historic free trade deal, January 2026, https://www.dw.com/en/india-eu-trade-deal-reached-modi-says/live-75669574

^[10] World Economic Forum, Davos 2026: Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, January 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/

Topics

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Europe

Germany

Op-ed | Armenia’s 2026 Parliamentary Election and the Future of the South Caucasus

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