Long Read | The State of the UN

Article by Fred Carver

September 7, 2026

As the international order becomes increasingly fragmented, the United Nations appears weaker than it has for decades. But what has actually been lost, and what does the UN still provide that states cannot easily replace? Ahead of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly, Fred Carver examines what a weakened UN means for the UK and where the new Government should invest its political capital.

The United Nations (UN) is not in good shape, but it is worth considering a little more carefully what precisely it is that is not working, and what actually still is.

The UN delivers an extraordinary amount of development and humanitarian work. For a long time the organisation leaned into this aspect of its work because it showed tangible results.Yet commendable as much of this work is, it was not an irreplaceable function, and perhaps others are far better placed to deliver it. Donors, Trump foremost among them, are now demanding a drastic and rapid downgrading of this capability, resulting in much short-term pain and waste.

When people think about the UN, they mostly think about its role in setting standards and expectations for behaviour. Human rights is often called the “forgotten pillar” of the UN’s work, and receives less than 1% of the organisation’s funding, but it is perhaps its most irreplaceable function, and certainly the most visible.^[1] The UN’s standard setting role also extends well beyond the narrow field of human rights, providing a common language of diplomatic expectation across global cooperation and bringing predictability and process, particularly when it comes to conflict.

A lot has been written about how and when the UN can act in “binding” and “non-binding” ways. This is an important technical and legal distinction, but its political effect is exaggerated. As the UN’s work on apartheid in South Africa and decolonisation has shown, if enough states are willing to put enough political capital into implementing non-binding resolutions they can still have dramatic impacts, whereas when binding resolutions have no enforcement mechanisms, or when states have no interest in applying them, then the binding nature of those resolutions becomes moot – Israel colonisation of the West Bank, for instance, has taken place in the face of multiple “binding” Security Council resolutions over the decades.^[2]

The UN can therefore be thought of as the velvet rope of diplomacy. It cannot really stop anyone who wants to cross it from doing so, but nevertheless has an extraordinary ability to shape behaviour. However, as soon as some people start crossing it, everyone else does, and the rope ceases to serve any purpose beyond signalling that something is amiss.

Many would say that that is what has happened recently. Others would counter that the UN has never meaningfully constrained the behaviour of the world’s major powers – whether that be French or American actions in Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or the British and French invasion of Suez. A more nuanced view is that, while major powers have certainly ensured the uneven application of international law, they have at least played lip service to the concept, and tried to avoid too publicly and egregiously violating it for the most part (at least without some semblance of an excuse – however flimsy). They do so because they recognise how much they benefit from such a system, and it is this restraint that may now be lost. Others would place the departure from this approach earlier, with the US-UK invasion of Iraq rather than Trump’s exceptionalism or Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. There’s probably some truth to all of the above.

A System Designed for Another World

The UN was not necessarily intended to be a mere velvet rope. As the International Crisis Group expert Richard Gowan likes to point out, the UN Charter even allows for the creation of a UN air-force, and discusses at some length provisions to cut off rail, telephone, and postal connections to states that do not play ball.^[3] The UN was born out of the alliance that won World War II, and some participants saw it as a means to continue that alliance – or, as Frantz Fanon famously described it, the “card used by the imperialist interests when the card of brute force has failed.”^[4]

However, the organisation quickly became, and has continued to be, one that does not provide more than the softest of challenges to national sovereignty. This is largely because baked into the design of the organisation was a desire to avoid the fate of the League of Nations – which fell apart when powerful states walked away from it. By establishing itself as an organisation whose power to limit state behaviour is highly limited, the UN ensured that states remained bought into it. Such success as the UN has had, notably in preventing conflict between major powers, probably owes much to that.

The UN is, however, an organisation designed for a world we no longer live in. It is not just that the major powers of 1945 – whose privileges when it comes to preventing collective action are enshrined in the UN Charter – are no longer the major powers of 2026, it is that today’s distribution of global power is itself less clear. The US has recently very publicly demonstrated the limits of its ability to shape global politics, while China’s interest and ability to do so are still largely untested. The UN Security Council is therefore increasingly anachronistic. Africa remains underrepresented, as do major population centres such as India and Brazil, while former imperial powers such as Russia, the UK, and France retain permanent seats.

But it is an anachronism we are stuck with. The Security Council can veto its own reform, and none of the five permanent members – the US, the UK, Russia, China, or France – will willingly give up their privileges. And any that suggest otherwise do so knowing the others will ensure their bluff is never called.

The Security Council is increasingly ignored, but there is more to the UN. However, the other parts of the organisation, notably the General Assembly, have not really stepped up to fill the leadership gap. Meanwhile the Secretariat, who once upon a time showed incredible creativity and willingness to ask forgiveness rather than permission in pushing the limits of what the UN can do, has been ground down by resource constraints and fearful leadership into a culture of meek compliance. Perhaps this will change if and when a new Secretary-General is selected this autumn, but given it is the Security Council who largely decide upon the choice of Secretary-General we should not assume that the next Secretary-General will be a transformational figure.^[5]

All these things limit the UN’s ability to set standards, but do not abolish it entirely, and taking the UN down risks further constraining the good it can do. Even Vladimir Putin is not quite as unconstrained as he would be if the UN truly did not matter, in part because the UN still matters to him as one of the last remaining global institutions that still treats Russia like a global power.

The UN as a Venue, Not an Actor

The UN is perhaps best understood not as a political actor but as a venue in which political actors, primarily states, operate. Former US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke famously described blaming the UN for the Rwandan genocide as the equivalent of blaming Madison Square Gardens when the New York Knicks lose (neglecting to mention that in that analogy he would be a Knick who had missed a number of shots).^[6] The UN undoubtedly receives blame that should more rightly be directed at the states who behave so appallingly within it.

Nevertheless, forums do have a powerful ability to shape the conversations that take place within them, and it is here that the UN really has worth. It gives states somewhere to theatrically let off steam, forums in which states can meet and discuss on terms closer to equality, access to expertise and mediation, and processes through which negotiated outcomes can be validated in treaties or resolutions.

If the UN’s enduring value lies in providing a venue for diplomacy, the question is what kind of diplomacy remains possible in the current political climate. In January, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, during the World Economic Forum in Davos made a speech suggesting that the decline in our international system’s ability to set and impose standards probably did spell the death of a universalist rules-based global order in favour of more ad-hoc and transactional diplomacy.^[7] But transactionalism need not be value free or amount to might-makes-right. He emphasised the long-term value of consistency, reliability, predictability, cooperation in mutual self-interest, and the potential for collective action by the many to rein in the excesses of the mighty.

The problem is that, while there is undoubtedly a long-term net benefit to building a reputation as a reliable partner, few of our political economies currently reward taking the long-term beneficial option over the immediate return. There is a clear logic to such an approach, but little political reward. So far, we have seen little sign of this form of leadership.

The UN is undoubtedly in poor shape, but it is far from useless. It continues to provide the tools and location to allow states to conduct diplomacy in a more sustainable and reliable way, alongside mechanisms to uphold international standards that benefit us all. But it cannot compel states to make use of the international machinery it provides. You can lead a government to the negotiating room, but you cannot make them talk.

What Does this Mean for the UK?

The UK’s ability to affect change at or through the UN is hamstrung by the loss of one of the main sources of added value: its status as a development superpower.^[8] This also limits the resource base the UK can mobilise in order to help the UN pivot to its core areas of standard-setting and mediation. Nevertheless, in the context of global peace and security budgets, or even development budgets, these are relatively cheap functions. Often a major part of the difference between successful and failed peace processes has been external human rights monitoring with a cost in the low millions. Likewise effective mediation and peacebuilding work is similarly cheap but not free, and has been neglected in recent years.^[9] Relatively small, strategic, investments in resources to strengthen the UN’s monitoring and mediating functions could have a significant multiplier effect on the organisation’s effectiveness.

Meanwhile the UK’s political engagement needs to be sophisticated and context specific: it is neither the strongest nor the weakest state at the UN, and has neither the best nor the worst reputation. It can and should be confident and firm, as long as it does not sound arrogant or hypocritical. The UK can look to states that punch above their weight at the UN (among them Ireland, Spain, above all tiny Liechtenstein) who combine being useful, being principled (and thus predictable), and articulating a clear vision for the kind of global institution they want to see. Generally speaking British diplomats have done a reasonable job of displaying such sophistication in recent years, but it has not always been reflected by the political leadership in either their decisionmaking or their presentation on the global stage. Having senior political leaders genuinely invest time and interest in building a safer and more prosperous world for its own sake, and not merely to perform statesmanship for a domestic audience, is vitally necessary, if insufficient, first step.

Fred Carver is a Managing Director at Strategy for Humanity, which works with mission-driven organizations and those who fund them on a range of policy and strategy issues. He has written a number of articles on international relations, with specific expertise on the United Nations, Peacekeeping, Atrocity Prevention, civil wars and political violence. From 2011-2016 he ran the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice, a human rights NGO, and from 2016-2020 he was head of policy at UNA-UK, a UK campaigning organisation for multilateralism. Prior to that he worked as a researcher specialising in South Asia (primarily Pakistan) and in UK politics. He lives in Norway.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] United Nations Association – UK, Strengthening the UN’s Human Rights Pillar, May 2025, https://una.org.uk/publication/think-piece-strengthening-the-uns-human-rights-pillar; Hilary Power, UN Financial Crisis Threatens to Halt Human Rights Work, Human Rights Watch, February 2026, https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/13/un-financial-crisis-threatens-to-halt-human-rights-work

^[2] UN Security Council, Resolution 446 (1979) (S/RES/446), United Nations, March 1979, https://docs.un.org/S/RES/446(1979)

^[3] Richard Gowan, Once Again, the U.N. Will Have to Adapt to Survive, World Politics Review, October 2025, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/un-day-guterres-trump/

^[4] Frantz Fanon, Toward the African Revolution, trans. Haakon Chevalier, Grove Press, 1967, https://files.libcom.org/files/%5BFrantz_Fanon%5D_Toward_the_African_Revolution(BookZZ.org).pdf

^[5] Ben Donaldson and Fred Carver, Compromised Candidates: How backroom deals shape the race for secretary-general and prevent U.N. reform, Foreign Policy, July 2026, https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/07/28/united-nations-security-council-secretary-general-corruption-reform/

^[6] Samuel Moyn, Imperial Graveyard, London Review of Books, February 2020, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v42/n03/samuel-moyn/imperial-graveyard

^[7] World Economic Forum, Davos 2026: Special Address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, January 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/forum-institutional/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/

^[8] United Nations Association – UK, Global Britain in the United Nations, February 2019, https://una.org.uk/publication/global-britain-in-the-united-nations/

^[9] United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, Evaluation of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (IED-23-005), June 2023, https://oios.un.org/system/files/confidential-files/Reports/2023_ied_23_005.pdf; Ian Martin and Tamrat Samuel, Being Serious About Peace, PassBlue, August 2026, https://passblue.com/2026/08/30/being-serious-about-peace/

Topics

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

UN Reform

Four Years On: Europe’s Strategic Test in Ukraine

Article by Prof Stefan Wolff

February 24, 2026

Four Years On: Europe’s Strategic Test in Ukraine

Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conflict remains unresolved and the strategic landscape increasingly complex. In this analysis, Stefan Wolff, FPC’s Senior Research Fellow, examines the evolving diplomatic scenarios, the limits of US-led negotiations, and the choices confronting the UK and its European partners as the war enters a fifth year.

As Ukraine heads into a fifth year of defending itself against the unprovoked Russian full-scale invasion, the prospects of a just and sustainable peace agreement remain distant. On the ground, the land war continues to be in a stalemate, with the pace of Russian territorial gains now slower than some of the most protracted battles of trench warfare during the First World War.

In the air war, Moscow has demonstrated a ruthless and brutal efficiency in destroying much of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The repeated destruction of power generation and distribution facilities has taken a serious toll on the Ukrainian population and economy. Yet beyond inflicting hardship, these strikes have not had the kind of strategic effect Russia needs to achieve in order to turn the military tables decisively on Ukraine.

All in all, the Kremlin narrative of inevitable victory looks more like Soviet-style propaganda than a reflection of battlefield reality. President Vladimir Putin, however, is not the only world leader guilty of wishful thinking. His American counterpart, President Donald Trump, at times, also appears to make policy untethered from the real world. First, there was his claim on the campaign trail that he could end the fighting in Ukraine within 24 hours. Upon returning to the White House, Trump issued multiple ceasefire demands and associated deadlines that Putin simply ignored without incurring any cost. The latest plan from Washington is for a peace deal to be concluded between Moscow and Kyiv, approved by a Ukrainian referendum, and followed by national elections — all before June.

Scenarios for a US-Mediated Settlement

The timeline for the American plan aside, a US-mediated deal between Russia and Ukraine remains possible. However, It is unlikely that it will take the form of the just and sustainable settlement that Kyiv and its European allies demand. If it comes to pass as a result of the ongoing trilateral negotiations currently underway, it is highly probable that Ukraine will have to make significant concessions on territory in exchange for US-backed security guarantees and a mostly European-financed package of post-war reconstruction measures.

An additional bitter pill to swallow for Ukraine and Europe would be an unashamed US-Russia rapprochement with a simultaneous end to American sanctions on Russia, a flurry of economic deals between the two countries, and pressure on Ukraine’s other allies to follow suit, at least on sanctions relief and possibly on the release and return of Russian frozen assets.

The other — and more likely — possibility is that not even a bad deal will be forthcoming. The Russian side has given no indication that it is willing to make any significant concessions. Moscow’s position is that Kyiv should relinquish control over the entirety of the Donbas, including territory in Ukraine’s fortress belt that Moscow has so far been unable to take by military force. In return, or under the terms of what Russia refers to as the ‘Anchorage formula’ allegedly agreed between Putin and Trump at their Alaska summit in August 2025, the Kremlin is apparently willing to freeze the current frontlines elsewhere along the more than 1,000 km long line of contact.

Even at the very remote possibility that this was acceptable, or that Ukraine would be pressured into agreeing to such a deal, this would hardly seal a settlement, given that Russia continues to oppose the security guarantees currently on the table between Kyiv and its Western partners. Without them, territorial concessions make no sense for Ukraine, especially as there is no imminent danger of a collapse of Ukrainian defences.

The Hungarian blockage of the EU’s €90 billion loan to Ukraine — likely instigated by the country’s Prime Minister, Victor Orbán, at the behest of both Trump, whose Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, had visited the country just before the announcement, and Putin, with whom Orban has had close ties for a long time — is not going to change Kyiv’s calculations significantly. Not only is the EU surely going to find a work-around to deal with this blockage but Orban’s days as Ukraine’s principal foe inside the EU might be numbered given that he is trailing in opinion polls ahead of April’s parliamentary elections. As any embrace of and by Trump and Putin is unlikely to improve Orban’s prospects for another term, the Hungarian blockage might ultimately prove temporary regardless of the outcome of April’s elections.

If, as is therefore likely, Trump’s latest deadline passes without a deal being reached, the question arises what next? Trump could simply walk away from the war. He threatened to do so in the past but a likely mix of ego and the prospect of economic deals in the event of peace prevented him from doing so. Nothing suggests at the moment that this time will be different. There might be some angry exchanges and finger pointing, but after that, the current, deeply flawed negotiation process is likely to resume in some form because the alternatives are worse for all sides, Trump included.

The US President could walk away and finally realise that Putin is simply not interested in peace, no matter what is on offer. But this will not lead Trump to ramp up pressure on Russia in a significant way. He has had reason and opportunity to do so on multiple occasions since returning to the White House in January 2025. He has not done so then, and there is no reason to believe that he would do so now.

Trump could then instead pursue a bilateral deal with Russia. But without European participation, such a deal will be of limited benefit to both sides. The bulk of Russian foreign assets remain frozen in Europe, and would very likely stay so in the absence of coordinated transatlantic action. Russia has little of value to export to the US and lacks the market conditions to make it an attractive destination for US foreign direct investment. Some US companies might return or expand their still existing operations in the country, but these will hardly be the trillion-dollar deals that Trump, and possibly Putin, envisage.

Even if any such separate US-Russia deal would be of limited economic value, it would still be politically damaging, especially to transatlantic relations. That, however, also makes it less likely to happen. By June, primaries in the United States ahead of the November midterm elections will largely have concluded and Republican candidates will be less susceptible to pressure from the White House. As was already obvious in the context of Trump’s threats to take over Greenland, if necessary by force, there remains a segment of foreign policy realists among congressional Republicans who, unshackled from the leverage Trump may have held over them in the primaries, are likely to push back more against his most disruptive foreign policy stances, including when it comes to any dealing with Russia reached at the expense of the transatlantic alliance.

What Europe Must Do Now

All of these scenarios, and a likely myriad of more or less minor variations of them, contain the ingredients of a British and European strategy for what is probably another year of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The first is the utmost importance of unity behind Ukraine’s defence efforts. Across the multiple overlapping multi- and mini-lateral formats of EU, NATO, coalition of the willing, etc., there needs to be a clear message to Russia, the US, and Ukraine alike: Russia’s aggression is also Europe’s problem and will be treated as such for as long as the threat from Moscow — not just against Ukraine but against the fundamental tenets of the European security order as such — remains credible.

This means, second, that Ukraine needs to be supported materially with military economic aid and politically when it comes to pushing back against both American and Russian designs for a deal to serve the interests of the current incumbents of the White House and the Kremlin first. For a more effective political pushback, Europe needs to cultivate relations with those in the US foreign policy establishment who continue to see value in established alliance structures, especially if they reflect more balanced burden-sharing.

Third, the UK and its European allies also need to think beyond Ukraine — because this is what Russia is doing as well, despite the demands of its war of aggression. Though it need not be limited to the EU-Russia borderlands, this is where the focus needs to remain for the foreseeable future.

Moldova, for example, remains particularly vulnerable to Russian interference, notwithstanding the success of pro-European forces in the country in presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024 and 2025. Moscow still retains multiple channels of influence, including through the unresolved conflict in the Transnistrian region, which, if left to fester, could significantly impede Moldova’s EU accession process and provide opportunities for renewed destabilisation.

Similarly, parliamentary elections in Armenia in June will create an opportunity for the Kremlin to destabilise another of its neighbours that has increasingly turned away from Moscow and towards Brussels. Given the role of the US, and of Trump personally, in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this also offers an opportunity to cooperate with Washington in working towards constraining Russian influence in the South Caucasus region as a whole.

A fourth and final ingredient in an evolving British and European strategy is a focus on becoming a credible player in the emerging new international order. This requires a certain amount of realism and modesty in aspirations and messaging. The UK is not pursuing a fast track to rejoining the EU, but closer alignment and cooperation across the English Channel is essential.

Equally important is that declarations of intent, be they about a UK-EU reset or an expanding coalition of the willing, are followed with concrete action — especially on investment in defence and a more credible European deterrence posture. This means both a more capable defence industrial base and doctrine for the kind of war being fought in Ukraine and improved defence readiness and resilience at the level of society.

A reconstituted European alliance, with a coalition at its heart that is not just willing but also capable of deterring Russia, is not beyond the reach of the UK and Europe. It may not be, nor ever become, a traditional great power, but by continuing to back Ukraine today and integrating it tomorrow, it will feel, and be, less vulnerable to the whims of the current or any future mercurial leader in the White House or the Kremlin. Crucially, it preserves the opportunity to rebuild the transatlantic alliance in the future, and to do so on stronger European foundations.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Birmingham. A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts, in post-conflict state-building in deeply divided and war-torn societies, and in contemporary geopolitics and great-power rivalry. Wolff has extensive expertise in the post-Soviet space and has also worked on a wide range of other conflicts elsewhere, including in the Middle East and North Africa, in Central Asia, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Wolff holds degrees from the University of Leipzig (Erstes Staatsexamen), the University of Cambridge (M.Phil.), and the LSE (Ph.D.).

Topics

Ukraine Conflict

Regions

Europe

Ukraine

Long Read | The German Far-Right’s Subversive Foreign Policy

Article by Rachel Herring

February 5, 2026

Long Read | The German Far-Right’s Subversive Foreign Policy

The German right-wing populist party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) has been at the centre of countless controversies since its formation in 2013, not least regarding its foreign policy. From AfD politicians’ downplaying of Nazi crimes to suspected links to the Russian and Chinese governments, the party is a source of disruption and debate in the media and in the German parliament itself.^[1] This article analyses the AfD’s foreign policy outlook and considers its implications in the context of emerging foreign policy challenges.

Why the AfD’s foreign policy matters

Having entered parliament in 2017 and secured the second-highest share of votes in the 2025 federal election, the AfD has rapidly established itself in the German political landscape, and indeed the foreign policy landscape. Regardless of whether the party gains power or remains in opposition in the coming years, it will undoubtedly remain part of the foreign policy conversation in Germany and beyond.

Identifying the party’s core positions and vision of Germany’s role in the world is therefore important, not only to understand the possible foreign policy implications of the AfD being in government, but also to understand how it is already shaping Germany’s relations with partner countries and institutions.

Historical (re)interpretation

Foreign policy is inseparable from national history, and there is no better example of this than Germany. For decades, the dominant interpretations shaping German foreign policy have been rooted in guilt, responsibility, and reconciliation in the aftermath of the Nazi regime. The AfD, however, both downplays such narratives and selectively invokes history to offer competing interpretations. For example, AfD parliamentary speeches on Israel and the conflict in Gaza appropriate narratives of historical responsibility to legitimise the party’s anti-Islam agenda. This kind of rhetoric fundamentally disrupts the relative consensus on key foreign policy pillars, challenging other parliamentarians to defend their positions and creating a divide between political elites who uphold existing pillars and those (primarily the AfD) who openly question them.

At the international level, the AfD’s controversial historical interpretations have not gone unnoticed. In Germany’s bilateral relationship with Poland, a central partner and neighbour where historical debates are ongoing, the AfD has the potential to be a highly problematic force. In late 2025, Polish historian and adviser to President Nawrocki, Andrzej Nowak, accepted an invitation from the AfD to speak in the German Bundestag, stating that his aim was to warn AfD politicians against naive positions towards Russia.^[2] Just a few months later, AfD politician Kay Gottschalk stated on X that his first act as Minister for Finance would be to demand 1.3 billion euros in reparations from Poland in response to the attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022.^[3] Uncoincidentally, this is the same sum President Nawrocki has demanded from Germany in war reparations.^[4] Such interactions have the potential to significantly sour relations, particularly given the AfD’s ongoing popularity.

Questioning established cooperation

The subversion of historical narratives is part of a wider challenge posed by the AfD to long-standing German partnerships and alliances. This is perhaps most evident – and most subversive – when it comes to the AfD’s stance towards the EU. Membership of the EU and European integration are fundamental pillars of German foreign policy, deeply intertwined with bilateral relations with other member states. While the other German political parties naturally differ regarding specific policy preferences, they are united in the position that EU membership is not only beneficial to Germany, but central to its identity and role in the world.

In contrast, and in line with the populist radical right tendency towards anti-globalisation and anti-establishment views, the AfD accuses the EU of being technocratic, elitist, and threatening to German interests and sovereignty. Following the 2024 European elections, which showed a clear shift to the right, the 14 AfD Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) formed a new far-right parliamentary group named Europe of Sovereign Nations, together with 11 representatives from seven different countries.^[5] The result indicated that the AfD’s scepticism towards the EU and championing of sovereignty over liberal institutionalism resonates beyond the national level.

These positions reflect a wider worldview held by many AfD politicians, in which the international system is understood primarily in terms of power politics and pragmatism. The AfD frequently attacks arguments in favour of interdependence and common values in the German parliament, dismissing these as ideologically driven or detached from political reality. Instead, AfD politicians favour a non-aligned position which resists external influence, even from traditional allies such as the US. A particular source of controversy in this regard is the AfD’s position on Putin’s war against Ukraine, which emphasises the negative impact of sanctions on the German economy, and calls for negotiations with Putin. Such positions are met with widespread rejection in the German parliament and again have the effect of uniting the other parties in their rhetorical commitment to defending international law and the European peace order.

Same positions, new context

The AfD’s status as a disruptive force within the German foreign policy discourse is unlikely to diminish as long as it remains in opposition. Whether it would significantly adapt its foreign policy positions if it were to enter government remains uncertain. At the same time, Russia’s war against Ukraine and President Trump’s aggressive and unpredictable foreign policy pose ongoing dilemmas for ruling and opposition parties alike.

In recent years, right-wing populists across Europe and the US have tended to uphold similar foreign policy positions and attitudes towards global security, including the pragmatic prioritisation of national interest, a non-aligned approach towards Russia and China, and a scepticism towards liberal institutions like the EU.^[6] It has also been characteristic of these political actors to cultivate transnational networks of political support. President Trump has frequently served as a point of reference in this regard, from the friendly relationship between Trump and Polish President Karol Nawrocki to Elon Musk’s public backing of the AfD.^[7]

However, Trump’s recent aggressive foreign policy moves towards Venezuela and Greenland may signal the beginning of the decline of this era. Along with other European right-wing parties, AfD leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla condemned Trump’s foreign policy in January 2026.^[8] These developments pose important questions regarding the direction of the AfD’s foreign policy. Will the German right increasingly distance itself from its previously friendly stance towards the Trump administration? And how will AfD advocates of a non-aligned, pragmatic approach respond to attempts to uphold liberal institutions and diversify global cooperation, such as the recent EU trade deals with Mercosur and India?^[9]

The AfD’s stance towards the international system not only has implications for German and European foreign policy. It also resonates within broader debates about the future of the so-called liberal international order. At the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addressed this discourse, arguing that the so-called rules-based order, and in particular American hegemony, had constructed a myth which has now been ‘ruptured.’^[10] He went on to argue that the solution is not a ‘world of fortresses’ but ‘collective investments in resilience.’ While many parties and governments are rallying around liberal institutions and alliances, the AfD’s foreign policy discourse to date clearly indicates a preference for a ‘world of fortresses.’

This article is based on a recently published original paper by Maximilian Tkocz and Rachel Herring, which can be found here.

Rachel Herring is a PhD researcher at Aston University and the University of Birmingham. Her research focuses on German foreign policy, Germany’s relations with Central Europe, and the role of civil society actors in foreign relations. She was the Think Visegrad Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Prague in 2024 and is currently a visiting researcher at the Jacques Delors Centre, Berlin.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Deutsche Welle, AfD chief downplays Nazi era as ‘bird shit’, Deutsche Welle, February 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/afds-gauland-plays-down-nazi-era-as-a-bird-shit-in-german-history/a-44055213; Der Spiegel, Maik Baumgärtner et al, How the AfD Became the Long Arm of Russia and China, May 2024, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/afd-spionageaffaere-russland-und-china-im-fokus-neue-enthuellungen-belasten-die-partei-1714480876-a-a1c05e64-b6bc-4c6b-844e-a78a32ec4f91

^[2] Jan Sternberg, Neue Annäherung zwischen der AfD und der polnischen Rechten, October 2025, https://www.rnd.de/politik/neue-annaeherung-zwischen-afd-und-der-polnischen-rechten-JRUDLEPR45FAZFVVCIEXQWCSKU.html

^[3] Welt, „Wer zuletzt lacht, lacht am besten“ – AfD-Politiker fordert 1,3 Billionen Euro von Polen, January 2026, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article6974fbce707d4aa2075800bf/reparationszahlung-wer-zuletzt-lacht-lacht-am-besten-afd-politiker-fordert-1-3-billionen-euro-von-polen.html

^[4] Tagesschau, Deutschland lehnt Reparationsforderungen erneut ab, September 2025, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/merz-steinmeier-polen-reparationen-100.html

^[5] Francois Hublet, 10 Key Lessons of the 2024 European Parliament Election, 2024, https://geopolitique.eu/en/articles/10-key-lessons-of-the-2024-european-parliament-election/

^[6] Jeremy Cliffe et al, Rise to the challengers: Europe’s populist parties and its foreign policy future, June 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/rise-to-the-challengers-europes-populist-parties-and-its-foreign-policy-future/

^[7] Jacek Lepiarz, What does Poland’s president hope to achieve in Washington?, February 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/poland-karol-nawrocki-washington-visit-donald-trump-nato-v2/a-73851111; Jessica Parker, Musk interviews German far-right frontwoman, January 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr7errxp5jmo

^[8] Sarah Marsh and Elizabeth Pineau, Europe’s far right and populists distance themselves from Trump over Greenland, January 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/europes-far-right-populists-distance-themselves-trump-over-greenland-2026-01-21/; Die Zeit, AfD-Spitze geht auf Distanz zu Trumps Außenpolitik, January 2026, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2026-01/afd-weidel-chrupalla-aussenpolitik-usa

^[9] European Commission, The EU-Mercosur trade agreement, 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/; Roshni Majumdar and Shakeel Sobhan, EU, India clinch historic free trade deal, January 2026, https://www.dw.com/en/india-eu-trade-deal-reached-modi-says/live-75669574

^[10] World Economic Forum, Davos 2026: Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, January 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/

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