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Op-ed | A Camel Called the Investor Visa

Article by Matthew McGlynn

July 29, 2026

Op-ed | A Camel Called the Investor Visa

The UK Government is reportedly considering the reintroduction of an investor visa for high-net-worth individuals. In this op-ed, Matthew McGlynn examines the economic, security and anti-corruption implications of reviving a scheme that was closed in 2022.

 

There is an old line that a camel is a horse designed by committee. The Starmer Government reported plans to revive an investor visa – invite-only, £5 million minimum, enhanced vetting, a three-year path to settlement – are the embodied camel.[1] The scheme is too narrow and too expensive to compete with its international counterparts, but also too toxic for a country still trying to shake off its ‘Londongrad’moniker. The Burnham Government would do well to simply scrap this idea.

 

At £5 million, the entry price is roughly ten times the United Arab Emirates’ ten-year golden visa, 20 times Portugal’s €250,000 residency route, and five times President Trump’s transactional “gold card”. Yet however high the bar, the headline writes itself: Britain is back in the business of selling residency. This is not a policy, it is a compromise between Whitehall’s perennial clash between the security and prosperity departments which will satisfy neither.

 

The politics are stranger still. In opposition, Labour were among the loudest critics of the Tier 1 (Investor) route accusing the Conservative Government of a “totally inadequate response” to the “very serious corruption and criminality concerns” the scheme raised.[2] They demanded answers on how many golden visas had been revoked and how many holders had been waved through to citizenship. In government, Labour’s own Anti-Corruption Strategy commits the UK to “continue to tackle abuse of residency or citizenship by investment schemes” in other countries.[3] One cannot credibly tackle abroad what one is reintroducing at home.

 

So why the U-turn? The answer may be about worries over the UK’s weak growth and concerns about a receding tax base among high-net worth individuals although some of the evidence for this has been challenged in certain quarters.[4] Whatever is driving wealth from Britain, it is not the absence of a visa for sale.

 

I write with some scar tissue here. As a Home Office official, I was part of the long, torturous process of shutting the Tier 1 route in 2022, a closure that took the Salisbury poisonings, an aborted 2018 suspension, an internal review that sat unpublished for years, and ultimately a looming Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine to force over the line.[5] Schemes like this are easy to open and agonising to close.

 

The underlying economic case has never survived contact with evidence so it is for good reason that the Treasury are said to be sceptical about its potential for economic growth.[6] Our international partners like Australia, Ireland and Spain have all shut down their investor visa regimes in recent years.[7] The IMF is blunter still, calling the abuses of such schemes – through corruption, money laundering, tax evasion – “widely documented”.[8] The mooted proposal tries to engineer around this by directing capital into priority sectors and pre-screening applicants through an invite-only gate. To follow the scheme’s logic, if the regime is genuinely confined to a vetted handful of ultra-wealthy individuals investing in growth sectors, the aggregate sums will be a rounding error against the UK’s investment needs, and the individuals in question would already have ample visa routes available. A scheme too small to move the economic dial but large enough to revive the brand of Britain-for-sale begs the question: what is the point beyond a “pro-growth” press release? Trump’s gold card is the cautionary tale: launched to predictions of hundreds of billions in revenue, it had attracted 338 applications and a single lucky winner by this spring.[9] If the world’s wealthy will not pay $1 million for America, the queue for Britain at £5 million will be short indeed.

 

While the upsides are unclear, the risks are not. The UK has spent considerable resources trying to shed its reputation as a host to the world’s dirty money and become a standard-setter on illicit finance through sanctions innovation, beneficial ownership transparency or the economic crime acts. The upcoming Illicit Finance Summit is the latest example of the UK seeking a leading role. It now risks falling a step behind the European Commission, which fought and won a landmark case against Malta’s golden passport scheme in April 2025, with the Court of Justice ruling that citizenship “cannot result from a commercial transaction”.[10] The Commission’s opposition is one of principle, and it is well founded: this is a cowboy-ridden industry. Cyprus scrapped its programme after undercover footage showed officials offering to launder a fictitious convicted criminal into EU citizenship. Vanuatu lost its EU visa-free access over discount passports sold with negligible checks. Malta naturalised “residents” who spent barely weeks on the island. Britain re-entering this market hands a talking point to every jurisdiction that the UK lectures on dirty money. The timing makes it worse: the Financial Action Task Force, the global anti-money laundering standard setter, which has warned against the risks of investment-residency schemes, will shortly begin its review of the UK.[11] Reopening a route closed on security grounds, on the eve of inspection, invites a finding no government wants to read.

 

The conclusion that new ministers should reach is the simplest one: don’t. If the goal is investment, the levers are unglamorous but proven: planning reform, competitive treatment of genuinely active entrepreneurs, and visa routes that prize talent rather than wealth. The UK’s actual investment proposition is the rule of law, liquid markets, and institutions that cannot be bought. A visa that puts a price on residency corrodes precisely the asset it is trying to sell.

 

All told, you might say it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than it is for a golden visa regime to pass the “Makerfield Test” the new Prime Minister has set. The natural conclusion is to send this camel back to the committee.

 

 

Matthew McGlynn is a consultant specialising in Russia and illicit finance, following close to a decade of operational and policy experience in the UK Government. Matthew led the Home Office’s work on international illicit finance for over five years including its work to tackle Russian illicit finance in the UK.

 

 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

 

[1] Benjamin Stupples, UK Explores ‘Invite-Only’ Investor Visa With £5 Million Cost, Bloomberg, May 2026, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-19/uk-weighs-invite-only-investor-visa-with-5-million-price-tag

[2] BBC News, ‘Golden visas’ for wealthy investors linked to corruption review finds, January 2023, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-64250182

[3] HM Governmnet, UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2025, December 2025, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6932caa7375aee4a15ee8c8c/36.37_HO_JACU-Strategy_v12b_FINAL_WEB.pdf

[4] Peter Munro, Our letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer: Investor visas risk rolling out the red carpet to kleptocrats, criminals, and spies, UK Anti-Corruption Coalition, July 2025, https://www.ukanticorruptioncoalition.org/work/kwr577ner07dvlc0qobg2184it1tmh

[5] Home Office and The Rt Hon Priti Patel MP, Tier 1 Investor Visa route closes over security concerns, Gov.uk, February 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/tier-1-investor-visa-route-closes-over-security-concerns

[6] Financial Times, UK government split over new ‘golden visa’ scheme to woo super-rich, June 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/7ec350b9-ba64-4dc5-bc0c-7719cae58dcd?syn-25a6b1a6=1

[7] Brendan Coates, Trent Wiltshire, Tyler Reysenbach, Australia’s migration opportunity: how rethinking skilled migration can solve some of our biggest problems, Grattan Institute, December 2022, https://grattan.edu.au/report/australias-migration-opportunity-how-rethinking-skilled-migration-can-solve-some-of-our-biggest-problems/; Hugh O’Connell and Sarah Collins, Ireland shutting down ‘golden visa’ investment-for-residence scheme amid concerns about unvetted applicants, Irish Independent, February 2023, https://www.independent.ie/business/irish-business/ireland-shutting-down-golden-visa-investment-for-residence-scheme-amid-concerns-about-unvetted-applicants/a/134321593.html; Elena Giordano, Spain to scrap cash-for-visas scheme, Politico, April 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-golden-visa-scrapped-pedro-sanchez/

[8] Francisca Fernando, Jonathan Pampolina, and Robin Sykes, Citizen for Sale, International Monetary Fund, Summer 2021, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2021/06/citizenship-for-sale-fernando-pampolina-sykes.htm

[9] Robert Frank, Trump’s $1 million ‘Gold Card’ fails to catch on among the world’s wealthy, CNBC, May 2026, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/08/trump-gold-card-wealth.html

[10] Pia Engelbrecht-Bogadanov, EU Court of Justice puts an end to harmful citizenship-by-investment schemes, Transparency International EU, April 2025, https://transparency.eu/eu-court-of-justice-puts-an-end-to-harmful-citizenship-by-investment-schemes/

[11] FATF and OECD, Misuse of Citizenship and Residency by Investment Programmes, November 2023, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Misuse-CBI-RBI-Programmes.pdf.coredownload.pdf

Topics
Regions
United Kingdom
Footnotes
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    Op-ed | Iran Attack Shows Limits of Starmer’s ‘Trump-Whispering’

    Article by Dr Andrew Gawthorpe

    March 4, 2026

    Op-ed | Iran Attack Shows Limits of Starmer’s ‘Trump-Whispering’

    Ever since Donald Trump returned to office in 2025, Keir Starmer has had to perform a difficult balancing act.

     

    On the one hand, he has sought to avoid open confrontation with Trump despite policies that have directly affected British interests, including imposing trade tariffs on the UK and threatening to annex Greenland, the territory of a NATO ally. On the other hand, the British Prime Minister has tried to carve out a space in which to pursue what he perceives as Britain’s national interests. One of the main bases of this strategy was the idea that appeasing Trump would allow Starmer to become “the Trump whisperer”, nudging the US President towards more amenable policies.[1]

     

    With the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran, this effort has reached an ignominious end. Like many UK prime ministers before him, Starmer appears to have discovered that a policy predicated on accommodating 90% of an American president’s agenda in the hope of influencing the remaining 10% is doomed to failure. When Washington decides to act, it will do so anyway – and London will often be left picking up the pieces.

     

    Starmer is not wrong that US foreign policy is very important for the United Kingdom, and that influencing it is desirable. In particular, the US commitment to NATO and the defence of Europe more broadly is vital to British security. Faced with trade-offs in other less vital areas – for instance the exact level of tariffs affecting US-UK trade – pragmatic concessions might be necessary to maintain it. Keeping channels of communication open and friendly is certainly wiser than engaging in unnecessary diplomatic spats.

     

    Ultimately, the administration of President Trump is not one that can be constrained through careful diplomatic management alone. Trump has an expansive view of his right to use military force across the world, scant respect for alliances or international law, and a chaotic decision-making process. It is not so easy to ‘nudge’ him in constructive directions.

     

    Starmer recognised the dangers inherent in the US military build-up in the Middle East at an early stage. He decided to deny the use of Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford as launching points for strikes on Iran and kept quiet about his views on the coming war. At the same time, Starmer – ever the balancer – did not directly state his opposition to it, either.

     

    Had he done so, he would have been on extremely firm ground for two reasons. The first is international law. The US and Israel’s attack on Iran was patently illegal. The UK government recognised this and it was apparently one reason why the use of UK territory for striking Iran was denied.[2] Whatever the horrendous crimes committed by the Iranian government against its own people, further weakening of the norm of non-aggression is clearly not in the UK’s interest.

     

    The second reason is geopolitical. At a time when the UK desperately needs the US to recommit to European security, Trump is once again leading his country down the path of launching a costly war of choice in the Middle East. Rather than preserving their military assets and diplomatic goodwill to deter Russia, both the United States and Europe are now expending them to justify and deal with the consequences of a war of aggression of their own. The economic consequences and strain on military readiness could significantly damage European and British security.

     

    Yet now that the war has begun, despite what appeared to be Starmer’s obvious private opposition, the UK once again finds itself being swept up in America’s wake. After Iran’s predictable retaliation against both Israel and Arab nations, the Prime Minister has authorised the use of Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford for what he terms “defensive” strikes on Iranian missile launchers.[3] Legal gymnastics aside, these “defensive” strikes are indistinguishable from the “offensive” operations that Starmer only a few days ago refused to allow Trump to launch from British bases.

     

    Nor can we be certain that this will end up being the full extent of British involvement. Already, an explosive drone has struck RAF Akrotiri, a British base in Cyprus, and others have been intercepted en route.[4] There are hundreds of thousands of British citizens in Israel and in the Arab nations that are now under Iranian bombardment. The possibility of UK involvement in opening shipping lanes threatened by Iran and its regional allies cannot be ruled out.

     

    In other words, the UK now shares much of the risk that the United States has taken on with this reckless war of choice. Starmer’s policy of balance could not prevent it, and nor can it protect Britain from its consequences.

     

     

    Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

     

    Andrew Gawthorpe is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre. He isa specialist in US politics and foreign policy at Leiden University. He also writes a newsletter called America Explained. He was previously a teaching fellow at the UK Defence Academy, a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and a civil servant in the Cabinet Office.

     

     

    [1] Rowena Mason, Starmer Faces Great Quandary Over ‘Special Relationship’ After Iran Attack, The Guardian, March 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/mar/01/keir-starmer-donald-trump-uk-us-special-relationship-iran.

    [2] Brad Lendon, Britain Blocking Use of Air Bases Trump Says Would Be Needed for Strikes on Iran, UK Media Reports, CNN, February 2026, https://edition.cnn.com/2026/02/20/europe/britain-air-base-access-us-iran-intl-hnk-ml.

    [3] Lucy Fisher and George Parker, Keir Starmer Will Let US use UK Bases for Attacks on Iranian Missile Sites, Financial Times, March 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/b988499b-1a89-4e56-b0cf-19d5a8ac7111.

    [4] Cachella Smith and Nikos Papanikolaou, Two Drones Intercepted Heading for RAF Base, Cyprus Says, BBC, March 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cm2r0q310e3o.

    Topics
    International Relations and Geopolitics
    Regions
    Europe
    United Kingdom
    Middle East and North Africa
    United States and Canada
    Footnotes
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