Long Read | The State of the UN

Article by Fred Carver

September 7, 2026

As the international order becomes increasingly fragmented, the United Nations appears weaker than it has for decades. But what has actually been lost, and what does the UN still provide that states cannot easily replace? Ahead of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly, Fred Carver examines what a weakened UN means for the UK and where the new Government should invest its political capital.

The United Nations (UN) is not in good shape, but it is worth considering a little more carefully what precisely it is that is not working, and what actually still is.

The UN delivers an extraordinary amount of development and humanitarian work. For a long time the organisation leaned into this aspect of its work because it showed tangible results.Yet commendable as much of this work is, it was not an irreplaceable function, and perhaps others are far better placed to deliver it. Donors, Trump foremost among them, are now demanding a drastic and rapid downgrading of this capability, resulting in much short-term pain and waste.

When people think about the UN, they mostly think about its role in setting standards and expectations for behaviour. Human rights is often called the “forgotten pillar” of the UN’s work, and receives less than 1% of the organisation’s funding, but it is perhaps its most irreplaceable function, and certainly the most visible.^[1] The UN’s standard setting role also extends well beyond the narrow field of human rights, providing a common language of diplomatic expectation across global cooperation and bringing predictability and process, particularly when it comes to conflict.

A lot has been written about how and when the UN can act in “binding” and “non-binding” ways. This is an important technical and legal distinction, but its political effect is exaggerated. As the UN’s work on apartheid in South Africa and decolonisation has shown, if enough states are willing to put enough political capital into implementing non-binding resolutions they can still have dramatic impacts, whereas when binding resolutions have no enforcement mechanisms, or when states have no interest in applying them, then the binding nature of those resolutions becomes moot – Israel colonisation of the West Bank, for instance, has taken place in the face of multiple “binding” Security Council resolutions over the decades.^[2]

The UN can therefore be thought of as the velvet rope of diplomacy. It cannot really stop anyone who wants to cross it from doing so, but nevertheless has an extraordinary ability to shape behaviour. However, as soon as some people start crossing it, everyone else does, and the rope ceases to serve any purpose beyond signalling that something is amiss.

Many would say that that is what has happened recently. Others would counter that the UN has never meaningfully constrained the behaviour of the world’s major powers – whether that be French or American actions in Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or the British and French invasion of Suez. A more nuanced view is that, while major powers have certainly ensured the uneven application of international law, they have at least played lip service to the concept, and tried to avoid too publicly and egregiously violating it for the most part (at least without some semblance of an excuse – however flimsy). They do so because they recognise how much they benefit from such a system, and it is this restraint that may now be lost. Others would place the departure from this approach earlier, with the US-UK invasion of Iraq rather than Trump’s exceptionalism or Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. There’s probably some truth to all of the above.

A System Designed for Another World

The UN was not necessarily intended to be a mere velvet rope. As the International Crisis Group expert Richard Gowan likes to point out, the UN Charter even allows for the creation of a UN air-force, and discusses at some length provisions to cut off rail, telephone, and postal connections to states that do not play ball.^[3] The UN was born out of the alliance that won World War II, and some participants saw it as a means to continue that alliance – or, as Frantz Fanon famously described it, the “card used by the imperialist interests when the card of brute force has failed.”^[4]

However, the organisation quickly became, and has continued to be, one that does not provide more than the softest of challenges to national sovereignty. This is largely because baked into the design of the organisation was a desire to avoid the fate of the League of Nations – which fell apart when powerful states walked away from it. By establishing itself as an organisation whose power to limit state behaviour is highly limited, the UN ensured that states remained bought into it. Such success as the UN has had, notably in preventing conflict between major powers, probably owes much to that.

The UN is, however, an organisation designed for a world we no longer live in. It is not just that the major powers of 1945 – whose privileges when it comes to preventing collective action are enshrined in the UN Charter – are no longer the major powers of 2026, it is that today’s distribution of global power is itself less clear. The US has recently very publicly demonstrated the limits of its ability to shape global politics, while China’s interest and ability to do so are still largely untested. The UN Security Council is therefore increasingly anachronistic. Africa remains underrepresented, as do major population centres such as India and Brazil, while former imperial powers such as Russia, the UK, and France retain permanent seats.

But it is an anachronism we are stuck with. The Security Council can veto its own reform, and none of the five permanent members – the US, the UK, Russia, China, or France – will willingly give up their privileges. And any that suggest otherwise do so knowing the others will ensure their bluff is never called.

The Security Council is increasingly ignored, but there is more to the UN. However, the other parts of the organisation, notably the General Assembly, have not really stepped up to fill the leadership gap. Meanwhile the Secretariat, who once upon a time showed incredible creativity and willingness to ask forgiveness rather than permission in pushing the limits of what the UN can do, has been ground down by resource constraints and fearful leadership into a culture of meek compliance. Perhaps this will change if and when a new Secretary-General is selected this autumn, but given it is the Security Council who largely decide upon the choice of Secretary-General we should not assume that the next Secretary-General will be a transformational figure.^[5]

All these things limit the UN’s ability to set standards, but do not abolish it entirely, and taking the UN down risks further constraining the good it can do. Even Vladimir Putin is not quite as unconstrained as he would be if the UN truly did not matter, in part because the UN still matters to him as one of the last remaining global institutions that still treats Russia like a global power.

The UN as a Venue, Not an Actor

The UN is perhaps best understood not as a political actor but as a venue in which political actors, primarily states, operate. Former US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke famously described blaming the UN for the Rwandan genocide as the equivalent of blaming Madison Square Gardens when the New York Knicks lose (neglecting to mention that in that analogy he would be a Knick who had missed a number of shots).^[6] The UN undoubtedly receives blame that should more rightly be directed at the states who behave so appallingly within it.

Nevertheless, forums do have a powerful ability to shape the conversations that take place within them, and it is here that the UN really has worth. It gives states somewhere to theatrically let off steam, forums in which states can meet and discuss on terms closer to equality, access to expertise and mediation, and processes through which negotiated outcomes can be validated in treaties or resolutions.

If the UN’s enduring value lies in providing a venue for diplomacy, the question is what kind of diplomacy remains possible in the current political climate. In January, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, during the World Economic Forum in Davos made a speech suggesting that the decline in our international system’s ability to set and impose standards probably did spell the death of a universalist rules-based global order in favour of more ad-hoc and transactional diplomacy.^[7] But transactionalism need not be value free or amount to might-makes-right. He emphasised the long-term value of consistency, reliability, predictability, cooperation in mutual self-interest, and the potential for collective action by the many to rein in the excesses of the mighty.

The problem is that, while there is undoubtedly a long-term net benefit to building a reputation as a reliable partner, few of our political economies currently reward taking the long-term beneficial option over the immediate return. There is a clear logic to such an approach, but little political reward. So far, we have seen little sign of this form of leadership.

The UN is undoubtedly in poor shape, but it is far from useless. It continues to provide the tools and location to allow states to conduct diplomacy in a more sustainable and reliable way, alongside mechanisms to uphold international standards that benefit us all. But it cannot compel states to make use of the international machinery it provides. You can lead a government to the negotiating room, but you cannot make them talk.

What Does this Mean for the UK?

The UK’s ability to affect change at or through the UN is hamstrung by the loss of one of the main sources of added value: its status as a development superpower.^[8] This also limits the resource base the UK can mobilise in order to help the UN pivot to its core areas of standard-setting and mediation. Nevertheless, in the context of global peace and security budgets, or even development budgets, these are relatively cheap functions. Often a major part of the difference between successful and failed peace processes has been external human rights monitoring with a cost in the low millions. Likewise effective mediation and peacebuilding work is similarly cheap but not free, and has been neglected in recent years.^[9] Relatively small, strategic, investments in resources to strengthen the UN’s monitoring and mediating functions could have a significant multiplier effect on the organisation’s effectiveness.

Meanwhile the UK’s political engagement needs to be sophisticated and context specific: it is neither the strongest nor the weakest state at the UN, and has neither the best nor the worst reputation. It can and should be confident and firm, as long as it does not sound arrogant or hypocritical. The UK can look to states that punch above their weight at the UN (among them Ireland, Spain, above all tiny Liechtenstein) who combine being useful, being principled (and thus predictable), and articulating a clear vision for the kind of global institution they want to see. Generally speaking British diplomats have done a reasonable job of displaying such sophistication in recent years, but it has not always been reflected by the political leadership in either their decisionmaking or their presentation on the global stage. Having senior political leaders genuinely invest time and interest in building a safer and more prosperous world for its own sake, and not merely to perform statesmanship for a domestic audience, is vitally necessary, if insufficient, first step.

Fred Carver is a Managing Director at Strategy for Humanity, which works with mission-driven organizations and those who fund them on a range of policy and strategy issues. He has written a number of articles on international relations, with specific expertise on the United Nations, Peacekeeping, Atrocity Prevention, civil wars and political violence. From 2011-2016 he ran the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice, a human rights NGO, and from 2016-2020 he was head of policy at UNA-UK, a UK campaigning organisation for multilateralism. Prior to that he worked as a researcher specialising in South Asia (primarily Pakistan) and in UK politics. He lives in Norway.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] United Nations Association – UK, Strengthening the UN’s Human Rights Pillar, May 2025, https://una.org.uk/publication/think-piece-strengthening-the-uns-human-rights-pillar; Hilary Power, UN Financial Crisis Threatens to Halt Human Rights Work, Human Rights Watch, February 2026, https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/13/un-financial-crisis-threatens-to-halt-human-rights-work

^[2] UN Security Council, Resolution 446 (1979) (S/RES/446), United Nations, March 1979, https://docs.un.org/S/RES/446(1979)

^[3] Richard Gowan, Once Again, the U.N. Will Have to Adapt to Survive, World Politics Review, October 2025, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/un-day-guterres-trump/

^[4] Frantz Fanon, Toward the African Revolution, trans. Haakon Chevalier, Grove Press, 1967, https://files.libcom.org/files/%5BFrantz_Fanon%5D_Toward_the_African_Revolution(BookZZ.org).pdf

^[5] Ben Donaldson and Fred Carver, Compromised Candidates: How backroom deals shape the race for secretary-general and prevent U.N. reform, Foreign Policy, July 2026, https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/07/28/united-nations-security-council-secretary-general-corruption-reform/

^[6] Samuel Moyn, Imperial Graveyard, London Review of Books, February 2020, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v42/n03/samuel-moyn/imperial-graveyard

^[7] World Economic Forum, Davos 2026: Special Address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, January 2026, https://www.weforum.org/stories/forum-institutional/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/

^[8] United Nations Association – UK, Global Britain in the United Nations, February 2019, https://una.org.uk/publication/global-britain-in-the-united-nations/

^[9] United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, Evaluation of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (IED-23-005), June 2023, https://oios.un.org/system/files/confidential-files/Reports/2023_ied_23_005.pdf; Ian Martin and Tamrat Samuel, Being Serious About Peace, PassBlue, August 2026, https://passblue.com/2026/08/30/being-serious-about-peace/

Topics

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

UN Reform

Op-ed | International Aid as a Line of Defence: What Happens to Human Security Without Soft Power?

Article by Anna Chernova

April 24, 2026

Op-ed | International Aid as a Line of Defence: What Happens to Human Security Without Soft Power?

Securitisation of foreign (and domestic) policy is leading to a prioritisation of hard power approaches over civilian-led, soft power approaches, leaving many wondering about the future. As Europe rearms in response to the Russian threat to its collective security, and as the US proves itself an unreliable security partner, the UK finds itself repositioning within a fractured Euro-Atlantic alliance. This raises a broader question: how to de-securitise and return to “normal” politics?^[1]

If militarism shapes the next generation’s approach to public policy, what are the prospects for addressing the root causes of violence that are driving the skyrocketing humanitarian needs and record levels of forced displacement? The impact of armed conflict is increasingly more severe and violence is becoming the new normal, while political solutions are de-funded and militarised approaches take precedence.^[2]

As the UK and many other democratic states reduce investment into peacebuilding and other soft power efforts, resource constraints are affecting the very institutions that help prevent and mitigate conflict, support collective security, and promote diplomatic solutions.

Today, the international community marks the importance of multilateralism and diplomacy for peace.

This takes place in a context of increasing global arms transfers, the proliferation of non-state armed groups, a resurgence of international armed conflicts, and systematic violations of the UN Charter across continents.^[3] The low cost of entry into conflict for both state and non-state actors (in part enabled by globalisation, including access to technology, finance, and information), combined with social, economic and environmental factors, is undermining peace and other development goals. In a globalised order, military escalations in one region risk pushing millions into poverty, including in already conflict-affected contexts.^[4]

This dynamic is also unfolding alongside increasing inequalities and restrictions on civic space. Democratic backsliding has reduced agency for civil society, including humanitarian actors, women’s rights groups, LGBTQI+ movements and many others relying on a rights-based, rules-based international world order – particularly in contexts where the states are unwilling or unable to adhere to a viable social contract. Without multilateral spaces, civil society voices risk further marginalisation and isolation in the face of expanding authoritarianism.^[5] Without civic space, the positive peace agenda is undermined.

At the same time, significant reductions in aid are reshaping the UN and the multilateral architecture underpinning diplomacy for peace. Regional and global multilateral institutions and their civil society partners are grappling with a steadily increasing wave of violence and militarism with dwindling resources. The private sector, philanthropy, and new donors (e.g. in the Gulf) seem willing to meaningfully engage in ways that come close to replacing USAID’s contribution to pathways for peace, and the wider Nexus approach that brings together Humanitarian Development and Peace.^[6]

Human Development progress, particularly around Women, Peace and Security and gender justice, are stalling and regressing. These trends point to the continued importance of investment in soft power, including support for democracy, human rights, gender equality, the rule of law, and security sector reform. While the UK has historically positioned itself as a leader in this area and continues to recognise its importance, current policy choices suggest a growing gap between this recognition and the protection of funding for peacebuilding, development and humanitarian relief.^[7]

Where does this leave the UK role in the wider European neighbourhood and globally?

A renewed focus on human security is needed. A purely state-centric approach, driven by self-interest among a growing number of undemocratic and unequal states is likely to lead to a more violent world order that will not yield the desired collective human development dividends. The UK’s historic role in championing human security approaches in institutions like NATO, and reflected in its approaches at the UN Security Council is more needed than ever. In a shifting global order, where collaboration among middle powers around shared geographic or sectoral interests and values is becoming critical, the UK’s track record on human security lends value regionally and globally.

The UK’s Ministry of Defence review of strategic trends flagged important human security dimensions, outlining risks around inequalities and other socio-economic factors that are likely to drive instability and diminish UK’s global role and its national security.^[8] Yet despite the availability of such detailed and well-considered analysis, foreign policy and national security decision-makers continue to defund the human security agenda, and inadvertently make the world (and the country) less safe.

With civic space narrowing, citizens and states must be represented in regional and global dialogues, as well as in the institutions that underpin them. While the UK prides itself on a long historic track record of soft power, particularly through its academic institutions, think tanks, vibrant media, and civil society – these all require public investment. Without a well-resourced and stable civil service to help deliver on these objectives, this historic soft power asset risks weakening, with implications for peacebuilding outcomes.

Holding the pen, and running out of paper: what happens to penholding at the UN Security Council?

A major factor in the UK’s global security positioning is in the power of its permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The UK holds the pen on some key thematic and geographic files, convening peace and security conversations across a wide range of diverse states.

For a post-Brexit middle-power, the UK retains an impressive amount of influence in these soft power spaces. However, much of the political credit goes to historic investments by DFID and the Foreign Office in regional institutions such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the UN aid systems, and the Human Security agenda within NATO. Without sustained investment in these spaces, including in the civil service staff and structures, the UK’s soft power positioning will not be sustainable and it will not be able to build on its impressive historic track record of conflict resolution and peacebuilding through collective security and human security approaches.

Without diplomacy and resources to civilian-led processes, military solutions will be increasingly seen as “normal” and viable. A growing share of the population, particularly younger generations coming of age in a renewed period of geopolitical competition, may come to view conflict as an inevitable feature of international relations. Without diplomacy, there will be more bullets.^[9]

Anna Chernova has a background in foreign policy and international development, with a focus on human rights, conflict resolution and humanitarian action. She has worked in diplomatic and non-governmental sectors in Eurasia and West Asia. At the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, she led work on human rights and democracy, including parliamentary diplomacy efforts in conflict resolution, election observation and inquiries. Prior to joining the OSCE, Anna managed large-scale humanitarian operations in Russia’s North Caucasus at the close of the second Chechen war, and had worked on refugee issues with the UN in Bulgaria. Since 2014, she has been advising humanitarian organisations on foreign policy analysis, political risk and transnational threats. Her research and policy work focuses on gender and conflict, human security, counter-terrorism and human rights. She is particularly interested in conflict prevention and addressing root causes of violence driving humanitarian crises, such as extreme inequalities and authoritarianism. Anna’s academic background is in International Studies, Russia/Eastern Europe and Global Security. She is a US Fulbright Research and IREX Public Service Fellow, and is based in the UK.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Jonathan Luke Austin, Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard, “(De)securitisation dilemmas: Theorising the simultaneous enaction of securitisation and descuritisation,” Review of International Studies (2017) https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/desecuritisation-dilemmas-theorising-the-simultaneous-enaction-of-securitisation-and-desecuritisation/FE45D2C1D20870EC0E74DF54FA487C06

^[2] ACLED Conflict Watchlist 2026, “What is driving conflict today? A review of global trends,” (2025) https://acleddata.com/report/whats-driving-conflict-today-review-global-trends

^[3] ICRC https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/challenges-report_ihl-and-non-state-armed-groups.pdf; SIPRI, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025 https://www.sipri.org/publications/2026/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2025

^[4] UNDP, “Military escalation in the Middle East could push more than 30 million people into poverty worldwide,” (2026) https://www.undp.org/press-releases/military-escalation-middle-east-could-push-more-30-million-people-poverty-worldwide-un-development-programme-warns

^[5] Freedom House – Freedom in the World 2026, “The Growing Shadow of Autocracy,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2026/growing-shadow-autocracy

^[6] World Bank Group, “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” (2018) https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/publication/pathways-for-peace-inclusive-approaches-to-preventing-violent-conflict

^[7] International Development Committee, “Future of UK aid and development assistance: interim report, Government Response,” https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/52758/documents/293937/default/

^[8] Ministry of Defence, “Global Strategic Trends out to 2055,” 7^th edition (2024) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68dba439dadf7616351e4bf8/GST_7_Final_post_pic_change_WEB.pdf

^[9] Forbes, “Heed General Mattis’ Warning, D.C.: Less Diplomacy Means ‘More Ammunition’”, June 2025https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewtisch/2025/06/18/heed-general-mattis-warning-dc-less-diplomacy-means-more-ammunition/

Topics

International Relations and Geopolitics

Soft Power

Regions

United Kingdom

Op-ed | The Future of the OSCE and the UK’s Role

Article by Prof Stefan Wolff

February 20, 2026

Op-ed | The Future of the OSCE and the UK’s Role

The 25th Winter Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly should be a moment of celebration and reflection on past successes in advancing the organisation’s broader goals of comprehensive and collective security. Yet, much like the 50th anniversary of the organisation in 2025, it will be anything but. The OSCE continues to be in a deep crisis.

Triggered by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, this is first and foremost a crisis of paralysis, with meaningful dialogue and decision-making among participating States in Vienna largely stalled. The OSCE continues to function operationally, with at least some meaningful and substantive business being conducted in the organisation’s specialised institutions – the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), and the Representative on Freedom of the Media – as well as in its eleven field operations in eastern and southeastern Europe and Central Asia.

The existing crisis of paralysis is further compounded by the wider crisis of multilateralism and the deliberate dismantling of the rules-based international order, which did not begin with, but has significantly accelerated since the return of Donald Trump to the White House 13 months ago. The implications for the OSCE became particularly evident at the Ministerial Council in Vienna on 4 December 2025, when a representative of the US State Department called for “a reduction of at least €15 million in the annual budget by December 2026”, a shift in priorities away from politically contentious issues, and renewed engagement with Russia. Implied, if not explicitly stated, was the threat of US withdrawal from the OSCE: “If the OSCE continues on its current path, the United States will continue to assess our participation and support.”^[1]

As with previous periods of institutional strain, the key question that arises from it is not new: can participating States reform the organisation and help it find a way back to being an effective contributor to security across its vast geographic area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok? And perhaps more importantly, should they?

The priorities of this year’s Swiss Chairpersonship under the theme “Dialogue – Trust – Security” certainly suggest that a serious attempt will be made. Key objectives include safeguarding the OSCE’s operational capacity (“preserve the basic instruments … and to ensure their financing”) and revitalising multilateral diplomacy (“foster an open dialogue on security”, “maintain channels of communication on security, including between States in conflict”).^[2]

Another priority – to work for lasting peace on the basis of the Helsinki principles (enshrined in the organisation’s 1975 founding act) – envisages that “the OSCE is mobilising its instruments across all three dimensions to support a just and lasting peace in Ukraine”. Not only does this naturally align with the very purpose of the organisation but it also could give the OSCE a new lease of life in light of recent developments in the war against Ukraine.

The prospect of elections, a referendum, and a possible peace deal could give the OSCE and its participating States an opportunity to bring to bear its experience and expertise in election observation, ceasefire monitoring, demining, on-the-ground mediation, and post-conflict institution building.

However, not all of the OSCE’s past experiences in these areas were stellar successes. Getting the organisation into a position where it could meaningfully contribute to a lasting peace in Ukraine will require pain-staking, detail-oriented work in the corridors of the OSCE secretariat and the Hofburg in Vienna, not the megaphone diplomacy that tends to take place in the meetings of the Permanent Council or the Forum for Security Cooperation.

For the UK, the OSCE – notwithstanding the organisation’s ongoing crisis – still represents an important forum to articulate and pursue its national interests. While just one among several minilateralisms that have recently emerged – including the ‘coalition of the willing’, the European Political Community, the Ukraine Defence Contact (or Ramstein) Group – it is unique in the sense that it is one of the few remaining fora where direct dialogue with Russia is not just possible but embedded in the organisation’s founding purpose.

Such dialogue must, however, serve a concrete purpose and it needs to be based on clear principles. As Chair of the Forum for Security Co-operation in the last trimester of 2026, and as a member of the Forum’s Troika in the preceding and subsequent trimesters, the UK is well positioned to support the Swiss Chairpersonship’s reform agenda and to contribute to restoring the OSCE’s operational effectiveness. This is further enhanced by the fact that the Head of the UK Delegation to the OSCE, Ambassador Neil Holland, will also continue in his role as Chair of the Security Committee, one of the informal subsidiary bodies of the Permanent Council, specifically charged with discussing politico-military issues and supporting the preparation of the Annual Security Review Conference, which provides participating States with an opportunity to discuss regional security issues in plenary form.

The UK’s long-standing experience in multilateral diplomacy, its role as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and its still pivotal role at the nexus of Euro-Atlantic security create a unique opportunity for making a lasting contribution to making the OSCE relevant again as a forum for dialogue among all its participating States. This will not be easy and success will not be guaranteed, but it will be a worthwhile investment of UK

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Birmingham. A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts, in post-conflict state-building in deeply divided and war-torn societies, and in contemporary geopolitics and great-power rivalry. Wolff has extensive expertise in the post-Soviet space and has also worked on a wide range of other conflicts elsewhere, including in the Middle East and North Africa, in Central Asia, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Wolff holds degrees from the University of Leipzig (Erstes Staatsexamen), the University of Cambridge (M.Phil.), and the LSE (Ph.D.).

[1] United States Mission to the OSCE, “Plenary Statement 32nd OSCE Ministerial Council Vienna, Austria, December 4, 2025”, December 2025, https://www.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/official_documents/2025/12/mcdel0056%20usa.pdf

[2] OSCE, Programme and priorities of Switzerland’s OSCE Chairpersonship 2026, https://www.osce.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/2026/01/OSCE2026_Broschuere_Faltkarte_EN_Web%20%282%29.pdf.

Topics

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Europe

Long Read | The State of the UN

A System Designed for Another World

The UN as a Venue, Not an Actor

What Does this Mean for the UK?

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Op-ed | International Aid as a Line of Defence: What Happens to Human Security Without Soft Power?

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Op-ed | The Future of the OSCE and the UK’s Role

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