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A New Moment for Defamation Law Reform in Northern Ireland?

Article by Dr Mark Hanna

June 2, 2021

A New Moment for Defamation Law Reform in Northern Ireland?

Two weeks ago, on 14 May 2021, the UK Government gave its consent to a Private Member’s Bill introducing defamation law reform in Northern Ireland, welcoming it as a step “to put Northern Ireland in line with the rest of the United Kingdom”.[1] It is an important development, not least because it clears the procedural obstacles that had been used to block previous attempts to introduce reform in the province. The stage is now set for Northern Ireland’s elected representatives to finally debate the question in the open and considered manner it deserves.

 

Of course, it would be a mistake to simply adopt a carbon copy of the Defamation Act 2013, which applies in England and Wales, without first having consideration of some of the unique characteristics of Northern Ireland. This includes the history of conflict and the particular nature of the media sector here. Pandering to sectarian division, for example, has led to some conservatism in reporting here. Moreover, much of the broadcast and print media in the province are owned by parent companies located in Dublin, London, or other parts of the UK. Somewhat remote from the Northern Irish public, they have not been encouraged to take their chances with a complex and ambiguous body of common law in the Northern Irish courts. Such conditions even make it difficult to measure with any certainty the extent to which lack of reform in Northern Ireland has so far caused a chilling effect on free speech—although, it can be safely assumed that it has had some such effect.[2]

 

This is not to say that Northern Ireland should not legislate to reform defamation law. Not at all. The unique characteristics of Northern Ireland make the need for reform here all the more pressing. In particular, the Assembly must take action to ensure better protection of ‘public interest’ speech in Northern Ireland.

 

In recent years, Sam McBride, Political Editor of the Belfast News Letter, and Ed Moloney, a journalist and author who has written extensively about the IRA and the Troubles, have both spoken out about the legal threats they have received, which ultimately were withdrawn. The cost of defending such threats can be high. Just last month, the media outlet openDemocracy published an article about how they spent two years fighting off legal threats from the Democratic Unionist Party politician Jeffery Donaldson “burning through thousands of pounds and precious time that would otherwise have been spent on our journalism.”[3] The case never reached the court, and was only dropped when the legal time limit for Donaldson to proceed the case ran out. Certainly, the court records show that defendants in Northern Ireland have little confidence in the so called ‘Reynolds defence’ that aimed to protect such speech at common law.[4] Since the appeal courts in England and Wales now have little use for it, after the 2013 reform, the common law defence will be starved of any further development in a less active Northern Irish court system.

 

Yet, public interest speech is as vital to Northern Ireland as it is to any other part of the world. The political structures that were established as part of the peace process in Northern Ireland mean that its citizens rely heavily on the conduct of government and public administration. At the same time, peace was only secured by power-sharing between two extremes of sectarian division, and the political system is still prone to the factious, guarded and hidden arrangements that sectarianism begets. On top of this, Brexit also revealed in stark terms Northern Ireland’s central location in a complex web of international governance. Decisions taken in the Northern Irish political system can and do have important consequence not just for the public here, but for a public beyond its borders.

 

Admittedly defamation law reform now presents some challenges that were not as prevalent when England and Wales adopted the Defamation Act in 2013. The growth of social media has provided greater opportunity for publication injurious to reputation, without necessarily pertaining to public interest, or meeting standards of responsible journalism. Any legislature considering reform today will find the margin of error has increased, and that it has become more challenging to strike the proper target of protecting free speech in the public interest, without promoting low-value speech that unjustly interferes with reputation. However, Scotland wrestled with these complexities in its own reform, the Defamation and Malicious Publication Bill, and after considered debate managed to pass a Bill in 2021, which strikes a fine balance between freedom of expression and right to reputation.

 

The responsibility now falls on Northern Ireland’s elected representatives. Whether they will answer it remains to be seen. The Member of the Legislative Assembly who developed the Bill, Mike Nesbitt, has informed the Speaker of the Secretary of State’s consent, and now waits for formal approval to introduce the Bill to the Assembly. Time is of the essence, however. The Assembly’s legislative mandate expires April 2022, and the schedule for the remaining year is already quite busy. There is, however, some basis for cautious optimism. The DUP—the party who historically were most opposed to defamation law reform—have recently undergone a restructuring and change in leadership, and perhaps the new leadership may be less opposed to reform. Moreover, Brexit, and the resulting severance of Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK, has left Unionism in crisis. Perhaps Unionists will recognise that bringing defamation law in line with the rest of the UK will achieve at least some regulatory alignment. Sinn Féin on the other hand, if the party is committed to democracy, justice and equal rights for all, should also support reform of defamation law in Northern Ireland.

 

The next year will tell the story. Ultimately, regardless of party or sectarian allegiance, if Northern Ireland’s elected representatives deny again the opportunity to reform defamation law and better promote free speech, that in itself will raise a question of significant public interest.

 

Dr Mark Hanna is a Lecturer at the School of Law at Queen’s University Belfast. His research focuses on defamation and privacy law. He has produced two podcasts on the subject of libel law reform in Northern Ireland, one with journalists, lawyers and civil society representatives (http://lawpod.org/?name=2020-11-30_defamation-ni.mp3 ), the other with leading academics (http://lawpod.org/?name=2021-03-30_defamation-law-reform-ni.mp3).

 

[1] Sam McBride, Nine years after DUP secretly blocked libel reform, NIO clears way for bill to protect free speech, News Letter, May 2021, https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/politics/nine-years-after-dup-secretly-blocked-libel-reform-nio-clears-way-for-bill-to-protect-free-speech-3243327

[2] Gillian Halliday, RHI: DUP threatened me with legal action, says author McBride of book about boiler scandal, Belfast Telegraph, October 2019, https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/rhi-scandal/rhi-dup-threatened-me-with-legal-action-says-author-mcbride-of-book-about-boiler-scandal-38599506.html; Jessica Ní Mhainín, The UK and media freedom: An urgent need to lead by example, FPC, December 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/the-uk-and-media-freedom-an-urgent-need-to-lead-by-example/

[3] Peter Geoghegan and Mary Fitzgerald, Jeffrey Donaldson sued us. Here’s why we’re going public, openDemocracy, May 2021, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/jeffrey-donaldson-sued-us-heres-why-were-going-public/

[4] Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127. There the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords held that publications on matters relating to the public life of the community and/or the conduct of government (i.e., ‘public interest’) were privileged and that the requisite standard was ‘responsible journalism’. This was codified by section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013, which jettisoned the ‘baggage’ of the qualified privilege and simplified the defence to avoid some of the ambiguity of the judicial pronouncement in Reynolds.

 

This piece was produced as part of the Unsafe for Scrutiny project, which is kindly funded by the Justice for Journalists Foundation.

Topics
Civil Society
Freedom of Expression
Investigative journalism
Media and Online Freedom
SLAPPs
Regions
Europe
United Kingdom
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    British media speak out about legal threats from the super-rich, while UK commitments to tackle financial crime and corruption appear to disappear

    Article by Susan Coughtrie

    May 20, 2021

    British media speak out about legal threats from the super-rich, while UK commitments to tackle financial crime and corruption appear to disappear

    Last week, three British media outlets – the Financial Times, openDemocracy and The Observer – published articles regarding the impact of legal threats against journalists. The importance of media speaking out on this topic cannot be underestimated. As identified by the Foreign Policy Centre’s global survey last year, legal threats are being widely experienced by investigative journalists, they pose the greatest challenge in their ability to continue working and the UK is the leading international source of these threats.[1] Such findings remain shocking, particularly considering that public discourse on this issue in the UK has been relatively limited.

     

    This is in part due to the fact that it can be challenging for media to highlight legal threats against themselves or others without potentially opening themselves up to further legal risk. In his opinion piece for The Observer, ‘Are our courts a playground for bullies? Just ask Catherine Belton’, published on 8 May, Nick Cohen illustrated this point, writing “here at the Observer we have been wondering what we can safely say about the cases of assorted Russian billionaires v Catherine Belton. Something? Anything? Nothing at all?”[2]

     

    The legal cases against Belton, brought by four Russian oligarchs as well as the Russian state owned oil company Rosneft, relate to her critically acclaimed book ‘Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West’, published by HarperCollins last year. The Financial Times, Belton’s former employer, took the notable step of releasing a statement on 10 May, entitled ‘London, libel and reputation management: The English courts attract those with deep pockets and much to lose.’ Written by the FT’s Editorial Board it references the case against Belton but focuses its attention on broader concerns about how the UK legal system, as well as British law firms and PR companies, help the rich and powerful manage their reputations and fight their critics. Ironically, a topic also described by Belton in Putin’s People.

     

    While the FT and Cohen are clear, rightly, not to take a position on merits of the various cases against Belton, both speak to the inequality of arms that the UK legal system provides when the claimant is super wealthy and how this undermines both the justice system and chills media freedom. The FT piece also raises concerns about the extent to which reputation management services are also coming hand in hand with other ‘increasingly sinister’ tactics, something their own reporters are only too acutely aware. In September 2020, FT journalist Dan McCrum described how he was subject to “furious online abuse, hacking, electronic eavesdropping, physical surveillance and some of London’s most expensive lawyers,” while investigating the Wirecard fraud.[3] The independent journalist Clare Rewcastle Brown has also gone on the record regarding similar tactics being used against her while she investigated the Malaysian 1MBD scandal.[4]

     

    These stories are in the public domain now, but such cases rarely get heard until after the legal threat has dissipated. They are effectively the tip of the iceberg, and every time a journalist speaks out it is possible to get a glimpse at the extent of what remains hidden beneath the surface. openDemocracy’s Editor Mary Fitzgerald and Investigations Editor Peter Geoghegan provide such an opportunity in their article, “Jeffrey Donaldson sued us. Here’s why we’re going public,” also published on 10 May.[5] At the time of the article’s release, Donaldson was a potential frontrunner in the race to be the new leader Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (he eventually came second to Edwin Poots). In 2018, after openDemocracy had published several articles on his political and business affairs, Donaldson began sending legal letters and ultimately filed proceedings against the media outlet in Belfast. Fitzgerald and Geoghegan powerfully describe the impact this legal challenge had – “Those two years cost us a lot. We spent months dealing with legal letters, burning through thousands of pounds and precious time that would otherwise have been spent on our journalism. The psychological toll was even higher.”[6] They point to the fact they never ended up in court – instead the ‘ordeal’ was dragged out until the legal timeframe for the case to proceed eventually ran out in May 2020.

     

    The impact of legal threats, and other associated forms of harassment, have on individual journalists is, of course, of primary concern. If we as a society believe in protecting journalists – as the UK Government has stated it does both at an international level, through its leadership of the Global Media Freedom Coalition since 2019, and domestically having established in 2020 a National Committee on the Safety of Journalists – then addressing this type of threat must be a priority. However, there is a secondary impact for wider society that must also be recognised. openDemocracy’s reporting in 2017 on a ‘record breaking, controversial’ donation to DUP’s Brexit campaign, a campaign managed by Donaldson, resulted in a change to the law on anonymous political donations.[7] McCrum’s persistent reporting on Wirecard over four years brought to light what has since been described as the ‘biggest accounting fraud case since the Enron scandal in 2011’ and the company’s ultimate demise.[8] Rewcastle Brown’s reporting led to the collapse of the former Malaysian government, the imprisonment of the former Prime Minister and the businessman thought to behind the scandal on the run.[9]

     

    These scandals all have a real cost to societies and the people living in them. If journalists are hampered by legal threats and other forms of harassment that drain their financial, human and psychological resources, what will be the ultimate impact on our right to know about the nefarious influences affecting our society? And who will stop them?

     

    This latter question appears more crucial than ever. Writing in The Guardian, the investigative journalist and author of the book Moneyland, Oliver Bullough critically assessed the policies put forward by the UK Government in last week’s Queens Speech.[10] Despite previous anti-corruption commitments, including off-shore beneficial ownership registry and reform of Companies House, UK Government appears to now reneging on these, while other concerns, such as underfunding of key agencies such as the National Crime Agency, remain unaddressed. Instead, there has been a focus on issues that appear peripheral at best, such as ID cards to prevent voter fraud (the levels of which have been highly questioned) and protecting free speech in universities. Bullough argues that the UK Government has missed the mark – “In my opinion, freedom of speech is under threat, but not from right-on students excluding rightwing speakers. Instead it is from wealthy people using British courts to shut down investigations into their wealth.”

     

    In December 2020, FPC’s Unsafe for Scrutiny report highlight two interlinked concerns.[11] Firstly, the impact the UK’s facilitation of international financial crime and corruption has on media freedom, particularly when connected to political elites in countries with poor democratic records. Secondly, the enduring role London continues to hold as an international libel capital, despite reforms to English and Welsh law in 2013 intended to crack down on libel tourism, and the impact such legal action, or even the threat of it, in the UK can have on journalists here and abroad.

     

    Leadership is needed in the UK to tackle both of these issues, but a first step would be to recognise the symbiotic nature between the two. It is not possible to effectively protect and promote media freedom without first addressing the financial and legal systems that support the violations against it.

     

     

    For more on this topic, watch or listen to FPC’s event Suppressing Stories: How legal threats and challenges impact investigative journalism, held on 4th May 2021 together with Index on Censorship and the Justice for Journalism Foundation to mark World Press Freedom Day. Speakers included Gill Phillips, Director of Editorial Legal Services, Guardian News & Media, Franz Wild, Editor and Reporter at the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Jessica Ní Mhainín, Policy & Campaigns Manager, Index on Censorship and Susan Coughtrie, Project Director, Foreign Policy Centre. The event was chaired by Chris Matheson MP, Shadow Minister for Media.

     

     

    [1] Susan Coughtrie, Unsafe for Scrutiny: Examining the pressure faced by journalists uncovering financial crime and corruption around the world, FPC, November 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Unsafe-for-Scrutiny-November-2020.pdf

    [2] Nick Cohen, ‘Are our courts a playground for bullies? Just ask Catherine Belton’, The Observer, May 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/may/08/are-our-courts-a-playground-for-bullies-just-ask-catherine-belton

    [3] Dan McCrum, Wirecard and me: Dan McCrum on exposing a criminal enterprise, Financial Times, September 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/745e34a1-0ca7-432c-b062-950c20e41f03

    [4] Clare Rewcastle Brown, A scandal of corruption and censorship: Uncovering the 1MDB case in Malaysia, FPC, December 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/a-scandal-of-corruption-and-censorship-uncovering-the-1mdb-case-in-malaysia/

    [5] Peter Geoghegan and Mary Fitzgerald, Jeffrey Donaldson sued us. Here’s why we’re going public, openDemocracy, May 2021, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/jeffrey-donaldson-sued-us-heres-why-were-going-public/

    [6] Ibid

    [7] Mary Fitzgerald, We’ve forced a change in the law on ‘dark money’. But we still need to do more, openDemocracy, July 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/dark-money-investigations/opendemocracy-has-forced-change-in-law-on-dark-money-but-we-still-need-to-do-more/

    [8] Janet W. Lee, WME Signs Wirecard Scandal Journalists Dan McCrum, Paul Murphy, Variety, August 2020, https://variety.com/2020/biz/news/wirecard-scandal-journalists-dan-mccrum-paul-murphy-wme-1234726877/

    [9] Clare Rewcastle Brown, A scandal of corruption and censorship: Uncovering the 1MDB case in Malaysia, FPC, December 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/a-scandal-of-corruption-and-censorship-uncovering-the-1mdb-case-in-malaysia/

    [10] Oliver Bullough, What links cybercrime, terrorism and illegal trade? Dark money, The Guardian, May 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/may/18/cyber-crime-terrorism-illegal-trade-dark-money-uk-fraud-queens-speech

    [11] Susan Coughtrie, Unsafe for Scrutiny: Examining the pressure faced by journalists uncovering financial crime and corruption around the world, FPC, November 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/unsafe-for-scrutiny-12-2020-publication/

     

    This piece was produced as part of the Unsafe for Scrutiny project, which is kindly funded by the Justice for Journalists Foundation.

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    Investigative journalism
    SLAPPs
    Regions
    Europe
    United Kingdom
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      Stuck between underinvestment, government authoritarianism and corruption: The healthcare system in Tajikistan and the risks for the population

      Article by Dr Sebastien Peyrouse

      May 17, 2021

      Stuck between underinvestment, government authoritarianism and corruption: The healthcare system in Tajikistan and the risks for the population

      As the COVID-19 virus spread in Eurasia in early 2020, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon and his government chose to deny the crisis for more than four months, then acknowledged on April 30th only a very limited presence of the virus, according to the official data, of 15 cases. This low figure was at odds with the numerous local testimonies about people with symptoms of COVID-19 and the difficulties they were having in accessing medical care due to the lack of infrastructure and equipment. In addition, there were reports of hospitals refusing to admit patients with symptoms of COVID-19 due to unofficial instructions from some government officials to lower the number of reported cases.

       

      Tajikistan’s controversial management of the COVID-19 crisis goes well beyond the undeniable difficulty for any government to react to the unforeseen consequences of a pandemic. Rather, it is part of a deep and long-lasting crisis in the Tajikistani medical sector which has a variety of causes. First, the Tajikistani medical system has been weakened by the poor economic situation of the country, which undermined investment in the social welfare sector. Second, the lack of investment has also resulted from the kleptocratic and neo-patrimonial practices of the regime, where funding for the health sector has collided with protection of the economic and financial interests of the political elites and with securing the survival of the authoritarian political regime.

       

      Government denial and censorship

      Until April 30th 2020, the eve of the visit of the World Health Organization (WHO) to Tajikistan, the Government had systematically denied registering any coronavirus infections, and instead criticised journalists who were trying to disseminate information on this topic, accusing them of provoking panic among the population. After they recognised the presence of COVID-19, the political authorities, however, have continued to downplay the impact of the pandemic, registering only 52 deaths by the end of June 2020.[1] Finally, at the end of January 2021, the Government declared that the country was virus free. Since early January, the country’s coronavirus count has not changed, with, according to official statistics, 13,308 infections and 90 fatalities.[2]

       

      The official statements and figures go against even official state data. According to an annual digest produced by the State Statistics Agency, more than 41,700 people died in Tajikistan in 2020, about 8,650 more than in 2019, amounting to a 26 per cent increase over the average number of deaths recorded annually between 2015 and 2019; at the same time, Dushanbe recorded a 38 per cent surge in deaths.[3]

       

      This contrast has been further questioned by local testimonies, including from medical staff. Local doctors have reported about the difficulties of getting a reliable coronavirus diagnosis. Tajikistani medical services have not received the necessary equipment for widespread testing of the population, and hospitals have not received test kits to verify the diagnosis, making a reliable assessment of COVID-19 infections highly unlikely, as well as of COVID-19 deaths.[4]

       

      Second, the Government has kept tight control over the circulation of information about the spread of the disease, including by censoring the media, by exerting pressure on the population through fines on people deemed guilty of spreading ‘fake news’ on the pandemic for things like questioning the official statistics, and by pressuring medical staff to discharge patients with COVID-19 symptoms, such as high fever, in order to reduce the statistics, especially prior to the visit of the WHO delegation.[5] These measures have sparked controversy among medical staff and resulted in resignations, for example of a hospital manager in the Sughd Regional Hospital in Khujand.[6] Some doctors, with condition of anonymity, have reported that patients who died from symptoms of COVID-19 were instead recorded as having died of pneumonia, tuberculosis or Swine flu, and hospitals refused to return the bodies of people who supposedly died of pneumonia to their families and they were instead buried by medical workers dressed in hazmat suits.[7]

       

      The impact of a weakened healthcare system

      The Government’s difficulty in managing the COVID-19 crisis resulted primarily from a long-standing crisis. Since independence, the Government claimed to have committed to rebuild and modernise the health system by means of several reforms and programmes and the construction of hospital infrastructure. The most recent ‘Programme of State Guarantees to Provide the Population With Medical and Sanitary Assistance for 2017-2019’ envisaged the construction of hospitals and health centers throughout the country.[8] The announced improvements contained in multiple programmes discussed in government-controlled state media, however, have contrasted considerably with the experience of patients with the healthcare system of the country, which has been weakened by the accumulation of infrastructural and political factors.

       

      After independence, the Tajikistani regime had to respond to the economic and social crisis caused by the sudden loss of Soviet Union subsidies which had been an essential support to the local social welfare system, and by the civil war which significantly damaged the country’s economy. Despite some economic progress, in particular a notable increase in GDP and a decrease in poverty since the 2000s, some organisations have pointed out some root causes of the slow and limited improvement of the healthcare system, in particular low spending by the state on health at only $17 per capita.[9]

       

      Due to the lack of investment, an overwhelming majority of medical facilities, which were built between the 1930s and late 1970s, have deteriorated significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite government declarations to the contrary, many medical facilities still have outdated or dysfunctional equipment, lack medicines and a reliable supply of electricity, water, and heating, or a proper sewage system. The dilapidation of medical facilities and the disengagement of political authorities has led residents of some smaller cities and villagers to take repair or reconstruction into their own hands.[10]

       

      Medical facilities in rural areas are in worse shape than those in more urban areas. Most rural hospitals are staffed with only one doctor, and other medical facilities are generally staffed with young, inexperienced nurses and lack basic medicine. Hence, many patients prefer to avoid the physicians and local health centers which are supposed to provide primary care and go instead to the larger city hospitals that are more specialised for secondary and tertiary care. This, however, leads to an overcrowding of these facilities, which themselves are insufficiently staffed and equipped, and negatively impacts the quality of their services.

       

      In a mountainous and poor country, access to medical facilities can be difficult. Many Tajikistanis live tens of kilometers away from medical centers. This isolation, although not specific to Tajikistan, is made significantly worse by a faulty road system impacted by harsh winter climatic conditions, as well as by the deterioration of the public transport system since the fall of the USSR, resulting in few connections to cities.[11]

       

      Access to hospitals in emergency situations is particularly critical. The ambulance fleet is old and insufficient, including in large cities. Private transport by unofficial taxis is therefore the essential means to reach medical centers, including in case of severe symptoms such as heart failure or stroke. Worryingly, a significant part of the population, 30 per cent of which live under the national poverty line, cannot afford a private taxi service.[12] This leads residents of regions such as the GBAO to rely on understaffed and underequipped local health centers even in serious health situations.[13]

       

      Lack of preparedness and corruption in the Tajikistani administration

      Difficulties in addressing issues related to the national healthcare system is certainly not specific to Tajikistan. Many countries around the world, including in Eurasia, have struggled to reform and improve their healthcare systems. However, Tajikistan’s difficulties have been exacerbated by the neo-patrimonial nature of its political regime, in which the political and economic elites are closely interconnected, and sometimes are even the same, and where part of the way the medical system is managed has been based less on prioritised health needs and more on corruption and enrichment schemes for the elites.

       

      The well-documented misappropriation of the profits of the country’s scarce resources, especially those of the state aluminum company and biggest national export-earner Talco, by the President’s family and closest circles have gutted investment in social welfare, including in the health sector. As reported more than ten years ago by a former US ambassador, the “people of Tajikistan effectively subsidise Talco, by living without adequate health services, education or electricity”.[14] Since then, the President has strengthened his grip on the country’s resources and made Tajikistan essentially a family run state, resulting in further deterioration of the social welfare system.[15]

       

      Second, the medical sector itself has been a source of income for the presidential family, which has also had an impact on its management and development. For example, the construction of some medical or hospital centers have resulted more from corruption than from a strategic healthcare objective. According to local doctors and several other testimonies, businessmen without experience in medical management have been authorised to open medical structures by paying bribes to the presidential family.[16] Moreover, the pharmaceutical sector is largely under the control of presidential family members. Two of the companies which dominate Tajikistan’s pharmaceutical market, Sifat Pharm and Orion-Pharm, are owned respectively by the President’s daughter, Parvina, and his son, Rustam Emomali.[17] This has enabled Rahmon’s family and close allies to limit competition in the pharmaceutical sector and sell drugs at inflated prices, including during the COVID-19 crisis when the price of medications for mild forms of the disease increased seven fold, making it a source of income for the Rahmon family while also increasing the difficulty for poor families to access medical treatment.[18]

       

      Third, management of the medical sector has been heavily impacted by President Rahmon’s efforts to secure his political regime and a potential dynastic transition to his son Rustam Emomali. To this end, Rahmon has combined authoritarianism and repression against opposition together with conveying an image of himself as the guardian of citizens’ welfare; he has also striven to counter portrayals of degradation in the social welfare system in local testimonies or in the limited opposition media. In this context, the rationale behind investing in medical facilities has been less a matter of improvement and balanced development than of political authorities laundering their reputations. This has been reflected in the repeated announcements of improvements in medical infrastructure which have not been implemented.  For example, notwithstanding some achievements of the ‘Programme of State Guarantees to Provide the Population With Medical and Sanitary Assistance for 2017-2019’, information is vague concerning the location and opening dates for the planned 560 medical facilities.[19] Surprisingly, those facilities that were built have received very little press coverage in a country where achievements in the social welfare sector are usually widely celebrated by the state-controlled media. Actually, most new medical facilities reported on in the press in the last three years were not part of this programme, but instead the result of foreign aid coming inter alia from the Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, the Russian Federation, Japan, or the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA).

       

      This is also demonstrated by the geographic concentration of new medical constructions, which are mainly in the capital, where they are more visible than in remote regions, and in Khatlon, Rahmon’s birthplace, where seven out of eight medical centers under the 2017-2019 programme were built. This focus on Khatlon is also part of the President’s strategy to secure the loyalism of the elites of this region, on whom he had heavily relied since the end of the civil war, but whose political unity has been undermined by dwindling money and resources.[20] Despite the legitimate importance of developing infrastructure in the capital or in Khatlon, the geographical concentration of limited funds has undermined the development of infrastructure in the provinces and even led residents of some towns or villages to build or repair medical centers with their own money, including on the basis of Hashar-collective labour as noted in Lolazor-2, a village in Vakhsh district in the region of Khatlon.[21]

       

      COVID-19 versus regime security

      Rahmon’s prioritisation of the security of his political regime at the expense of the health of the population has been clearly illustrated by the Government’s management of the COVID-19 crisis. Recognising a large scale spread of the virus on the Tajik territory, and consequently imposing a lockdown like most countries in the world, posed a significant economic and social risk likely to further threaten the legitimacy and security of the regime. It therefore happened only belatedly and in a limited way.

       

      Tajikistan has been going through a social and financial crisis for several years. The extent of economic progress, growth of GDP and decrease in poverty that has been proclaimed by the Government has been widely disputed by independent observers.[22] Moreover, as described by the World Bank, Tajikistan’s economy remains vulnerable to external shocks.[23] While the remittances sent back by up to one million Tajikistani migrant workers in Russia had been an essential contribution to economy of the country and hence to the survival of the regime for at least the last 15 years, restricting the circulation and hence the migrations of Tajikistanis would have increased unemployment.

       

      The weakening and even unavoidable bankruptcy of many of the small and medium-sized businesses with a lockdown of the country would have further impacted the local labour market, and hence increased the risk of social unrest. Moreover, this was likely to impact the rentier system of Rahmon and the elites. Small and medium-sized enterprises bear a large share of the tax burden in Tajikistan, and significantly reducing their activities would have cut down income for the state budget and might have made it more difficult for the Government to reduce the tax allowances granted to big companies controlled by Rahmon and regional political elites, and which constitute an essential rentier source.[24]

       

      Finally, the intersection of the country’s health policy with the neo-patrimonial and authoritarian policies has been intensified by the timing of events. The COVID-19 crisis intersected with the 2020 presidential election, which was held in November and which OSCE observers found “took place within an environment tightly controlled by state authorities and characterized by long-standing restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms… no genuine political alternative … (and) lacked credibility and transparency.” Even if President Rahmon has kept tight authoritarian control over the administrative machine and the electoral process to prevent the emergence of any opposition, the crisis resulting from the COVID-19 could have undermined his official narrative portraying himself as the guarantor of economic progress in the country and of the supposed well-being of the population.

       

      Impact on the population

      The logic of prioritising policy at the expense of health, combined with authoritarianism, impacts the health of the Tajikistani population. By first refusing to recognise and then minimising the COVID-19 crisis, as well as preventing a lockdown, the Tajik Government has bet on the development of herd immunity, as have bet some other countries, such as Sweden, thereby hoping to reduce the economic and political risks brought by the health crisis. The Swedish strategy, however, has been criticised.[25] Moreover, unlike the well-developed Swedish healthcare system, the Tajikistani health system is weak and has been unable to address the epidemic; the Government’s assertion disseminated in the state media that the country had the necessary capacity to respond to the crisis has been contradicted by the testimonies of hospital workers from several different regions who have spoken out about the severe shortage of personal-protection equipment (PPE) for medics as well as other supplies, including those for treating patients.

       

      In addition, the lack of acknowledgement of the crisis slowed down dissemination of guidelines, instructions and treatment related to COVID-19. Temporary guidelines for the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of the infection were approved by Minister of Health Olimzod only on April 13th. Hence, doctors did not receive protocols for the diagnosis and treatment of the disease until at least four months after the outbreak of the virus. Although international aid has since contributed to improving the situation, the initial denial of the crisis led to a significant and risky lack of equipment, as reported in the southern district of Muminobod, where only one ventilator was been made available, at the main hospital, for a region of more than 72,000 inhabitants.[26]

       

      Moreover, the Government’s denial of the continued spread of the virus in the country led part of the population to not take seriously the risks of the disease or the necessary precautions to prevent its spread. This is likely to have been worsened by the WHO’s endorsement on April 20th 2020 of Rahmon’s narrative that no case of COVID-19 had been identified in the country, despite local testimonies, which was subsequently widely circulated in the controlled state media.[27]

       

      Finally, the COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated the difficulties the population already had in accessing medicine due to the underdeveloped and overly expensive pharmaceutical sector, as well as the control of the pharmaceutical market by the elites and the presidential family. Despite repeated official statements that there would be free medical services, including by Minister of Health Jamoliddin Abdullozoda in February 2021, patients have been charged around $200 USD for treatment of mild illnesses, and $400-700 for treatment of severe illnesses, including COVID-19. In 2020, nearly two-thirds of health expenditures came from out-of-pocket spending.[28] The high cost of drugs and medical treatment has made it inaccessible for a part of the population whose average salary is $150 USD.[29] Larger and poorer families were particularly affected, resulting in increased debt to finance treatment. Overall, the crisis has further highlighted a significant disparity between wealthy elites who have access to the few well-equipped hospitals and the majority of the population.

       

      Conclusion 

      While lack of proper healthcare has become one of the main grievances of the population towards the regime, the policy conducted by the Government has raised many questions and has been further illustrated by the management of the COVID-19 crisis. President Rahmon’s initial denial and then underestimation of coronavirus infections despite a growing number of suspicious deaths is likely to have further eroded people’s trust in the regime.[30] While most of the rest of the world faced the crisis and sounded warnings about the spread of the disease, and despite the WHO’s March 16th recommendations about the need to avoid mass gatherings, President Rahmon continued large celebrations and events during the electoral campaign to promote his regime and his son Emomali, such as the pompous Navruz celebrations, the Tulip Festival, and others.

       

      Despite the Government’s propaganda efforts and suppression of information, much of the population nevertheless is aware of the problems and contrasts the current failing health system with the free and relatively effective system it had been accustomed to under the Soviet regime. This has left many Tajikistani citizens dissatisfied with their current situation. While healthcare experts and economists have demonstrated an inextricable link between poor health, poverty, and under-development, Tajikistan’s emphasis on regime security and kleptocratic interests over healthcare is likely to have long-term negative impacts on this sector and on the country’s development.[31]

       

      Despite the complexity of providing assistance to authoritarian and corrupt regimes, international donors could make a real difference, even taking into account that many today have only modest investment capacities, including through targeted, smaller assistance programmes that contribute to the development of local medical structures, especially outside the capital; by improving access to health facilities, including by helping to develop emergency transport services such as ambulances; by supporting the development of civil society organisations which contribute to accountability in the medical sector but whose activities are currently restricted; and by raising visibility about the state of the medical sector in Tajikistan internationally.

       

      Sebastien Peyrouse, PhD, is a research professor at the Central Asia Program in the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (George Washington University). His main areas of expertise are political systems in Central Asia, economic and social issues, Islam and religious minorities, and Central Asia’s geopolitical positioning toward China, Russia, India and South Asia. He has authored or co-authored several books on Central Asia such as Turkmenistan. Strategies of Power, Dilemmas of Development (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe) and published many articles, including in Europe Asia Studies, Nationalities Papers, China Perspectives, Religion, State & Society, Journal of Church and State.

       

      Image by Ninara under (CC).

       

      [1] RFE/RL Investigation Finds, Tajikistan’s Official Coronavirus Stats Don’t Reflect Reality, RFE/RL, June 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-official-coronavirus-stats-don-t-reflect-reality-rfe-rl-investigation-finds/30692651.html

      [2] RFE/RL, Tajik Mosques Reopen as Government Claims No New Coronavirus Cases, February 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-mosques-reopen-as-government-claims-no-new-coronavirus-cases/31080795.html

      [3] Eurasianet, Tajikistan’s excess mortality data belie COVID-19 denialism, February 2021, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistans-excess-mortality-data-belie-covid-19-denialism

      [4] RFE/RL Investigation Finds, Tajikistan’s Official Coronavirus Stats Don’t Reflect Reality, RFE/RL, June 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-official-coronavirus-stats-don-t-reflect-reality-rfe-rl-investigation-finds/30692651.html

      [5] Tajikistan’s excess mortality data belie COVID-19 denialism.

      [6] Farangis Najibullah, As Coronavirus Infections Go From Zero To Hundreds In Days, Tajikistan’s Hospitals Can’t Keep Up, RFE/RL, May 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/overcrowded-hospitals-in-tajikistan-as-coronavirus-infections-go-from-zero-to-hundreds-in-days/30597899.html

      [7] Radio Ozodi, Zhertvy COVID -19 v Tadzhikistane. Rassledovanie June 2020, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30690777.html; RFE/RL Investigation Finds, Tajikistan’s Official Coronavirus Stats Don’t Reflect Reality, RFE/RL, June 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-official-coronavirus-stats-don-t-reflect-reality-rfe-rl-investigation-finds/30692651.html

      [8] Sebastien Peyrouse, The Alarming State of the Healthcare System in Tajikistan, IPHR, July 2020, https://www.iphronline.org/new-report-the-alarming-state-of-the-healthcare-system-in-tajikistan.html

      [9] See the World Bank website: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/overview

      [10] Eelco Jacobs and Claudia Baez Camargo, Local health governance in Tajikistan: accountability and power relations at the district level, International Journal for Equity in Health, 19, 30 (2020).

      [11] Hursand Hurramov, “V bol’nicu za 40 km”. Zhiteli tadzhikskih glubinok ne imejut dostupa k medicine, Radio Ozodi, June 2019, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/29976795.html

      [12] Sam Bhutia, How economic growth in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan masks the plight of their poorest, Eurasianet, December 2019, https://eurasianet.org/how-economic-growth-in-tajikistan-and-kyrgyzstan-masks-the-plight-of-their-poorest

      [13] Eelco Jacobs and Claudia Baez Camargo, Local health governance in Tajikistan: accountability and power relations at the district level, International Journal for Equity in Health, 19, 30 (2020).

      [14]  Alexander A. Cooley and John Heathershaw. 2017. Dictators Without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia. New Heaven and London: Yale University Press.

      [15] John Heathershaw and Parviz Mullojonov, Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Tajikistan Case Study, Stabilization Unit, February 2018.

      [16] Ariana, M. Dzhonmahmadov: Tadzhikskaia еkonomika – jeto semeinoe predpriiatie docherei Е.Rahmona, July 2012, https://ariana.su/?S=0.1207241307

      [17] Elena Korotkova, Emomali Rahmona obvinjajut v nazhive na epidemii koronavirusa v Tadzhikistane, News Asia, June 2020, http://www.news-asia.ru/view/13889; Eurasianet, Tajikistan: Coronavirus panic puts sufferers of other illnesses in grave danger, May 2020, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-coronavirus-panic-puts-sufferers-of-other-illnesses-in-grave-danger

      [18] RFE/RL, In Tajikistan, COVID-19 Patients, Families Scoff at Pledge Of ‘Free Treatment’, February 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-covid-19-coronavirus-free-treatment-scam-big-bills/31112946.html

      [19] TAJ News, S nachala goda v Tadzhikistane postroili 7 medpunktov, December 2018, http://news.taj.su/?p=24897

      [20] Lawrence Markowitz, Tajikistan: authoritarian reaction in a postwar state, Democratization, vol. 19, no. 1, 2012, pp. 98-119.

      [21] Cabar Asia, Tajikistan: Rural Residents Complain About Poor Conditions of the Healthcare Centers, October 8, 2020, https://cabar.asia/en/tajikistan-rural-residents-complain-about-poor-conditions-of-the-healthcare-centers-photoreport

      [22] Cabar Asia, The great discrepancy of Tajikistan: the rhetoric of poverty and the practice of state festivities, January 2021, https://cabar.asia/en/the-great-discrepancy-of-tajikistan-the-rhetoric-of-poverty-and-the-practice-of-state-festivities

      [23] See the World Bank website: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/overview

      [24] Azia Plus, Koronavirus v Tadzhikistane est’. Tak schitaet tadzhikskij politolog i ob’’jasnjaet, pochemu molchat vlasti, April 2020,  https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/opinion/20200416/koronavirus-v-tadzhikistane-est-tak-schitaet-tadzhikskii-politolog-i-obyasnyaet-pochemu-molchat-vlasti

      [25]  Kelly Bjorklund, Andrew Ewing The Swedish COVID-19 Response Is a Disaster. It Shouldn’t Be a Model for the Rest of the World, Time, October 2020, https://time.com/5899432/sweden-coronovirus-disaster/

      [26] Farangis Najibullah As Coronavirus Infections Go From Zero To Hundreds In Days, Tajikistan’s Hospitals Can’t Keep Up.

      [27] Koronavirus v Tadzhikistane est’. Tak schitaet tadzhikskij politolog i ob’’jasnjaet, pochemu molchat vlasti.

      [28] See the World Bank, Project Information Document, March 2020, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/274761585067722387/pdf/Project-Information-Document-Tajikistan-Emergency-COVID-19-Project-P173765.pdf

      [29] Elena Korotkova, Еmomali Rahmona obvinjajut v nazhive na jepidemii koronavirusa v Tadzhikistane, Asia News, June 2020, http://www.news-asia.ru/view/13889;  In Tajikistan, COVID-19 Patients, Families Scoff At Pledge Of ‘Free Treatment’

      [30] Tajikistan’s excess mortality data belie COVID-19 denialism.

      [31] J W Lynch, G D Smith, G A Kaplan and J S House, Income inequality and mortality: importance to health of individual income, psychosocial environment, or material conditions, BMJ, vol. 320, April 2000.

      Topics
      Civil Society
      Covid-19
      Good Governance and Institutional Reform
      Human Rights
      International Relations and Geopolitics
      Regions
      Former Soviet Union
      Central Asia
      Tajikistan
      Footnotes
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        Tajik civil society during and after the pandemic: Main challenges and development prospects

        Article by Dr Parviz Mullojonov

        Tajik civil society during and after the pandemic: Main challenges and development prospects

        In 2020 and 2021, COVID-19 and the economic crisis have brought a whole range of new phenomena and events into society, the significance and consequences of which we have yet to understand. The revitalisation of civil society and volunteer movement observed in many countries during the pandemic is also a manifestation of this new social phenomenon. This phenomenon is not something new and unusual for Western democratic countries, but the sudden increase in activities of the non-governmental sector looks quite unusual for developing countries with economies in transition. A similar phenomenon was observed also other post-Soviet countries with authoritarian or  hybrid regimes, such as Belarus where the Government’s denial policy and revitalisation of civil society eventually led the country to a large-scale ant-government uprising. Moreover, the scale of this civic revival looks especially considerable in authoritarian states, where civic activity seemed to be long gone or did not exist at all. Accordingly, a completely natural question arises – to what extent will the current revival of civil institutions be lasting, and how serious can be its impact on modern society – both globally and in certain regions and states.

         

        This question could be also fully attributed to the Tajik society, where during the pandemic the same level of the revival of civic activism is observed. Until very recently the Tajik non-governmental sector seemed to be gone into a deep crisis, completely unable to regain its former influence – as it was during its rise in the mid-2000s. The question is, will the current upsurge be a temporary phenomenon, after which everything will return to the pre-pandemic situation, or will it lead to a range of considerable and systemic changes in the structure and nature of Tajik civil society? Moreover, again, in this case, we are talking not only about Tajikistan but also about changes of a more global order that have been brewing for a long time, while the pandemic has only spurred their development.

         

        Tajik civil society during the pandemic – Key trends and tendencies

        There are many definitions of civil society – but it is most commonly understood as the entire space beyond the Government and official institutions – that is, de facto the whole area between an individual and the Government. Accordingly, civil society includes NGOs, community and political organisations, independent media, informal associations of citizens, and so on. Some researchers also include in civil society the private enterprises, primarily the small business sector.[1] Thus, civic institutions play the role of a mediator between citizens and political power, protecting their rights and representing their interests on the decision-making level.

         

        In times of crisis and social upheaval, when the authorities and official bodies are often not able to cover the whole spectrum of problems and challenges, civil society, as a rule, becomes active, filling the vacuum. Thus, civic institutions not only help the authorities but even take on some of their functions to satisfy the needs and requirements of the population affected by the crisis.

         

        This is precisely what is happening during the pandemic around the world, starting from the Western democracies and to the developing world and CIS countries. Today even the most developed economies proved to be less prepared for the pandemic, and even the most effective governments are struggling to cope with its consequences. Under these conditions, the growth of civic activity is expressed in the rapid growth of the volunteer movement, which is engaged in the collection and distribution of humanitarian aid, funds for the purchase of food and medicine, assistance to doctors and hospitals, and so on. Almost everywhere, civil society intensifies and strengthens public control over the activities of both local governments and international organisations involved in the fight against the pandemic.

         

        Today we can talk about a fundamental difference between the current crisis and all previous ones (for example, the last global crisis of 2008) – namely, a completely new level of information technology, online and Internet space, and social networks. It also implies a completely different level of self-organisation of civil society that was clearly demonstrated during the pandemic.

         

        Moreover, it seems that COVID-19 will give a new impetus to the development of online technologies, significantly accelerating the tendencies and trends that have been developing secretly in this area over the past decades. We are talking about speeding up the process of digitalisation of most areas of public life – economy, education, culture, medicine, and the transition of a significant part of information and business services to the online space, etc. Accordingly, in many countries – especially in authoritarian states – one can expect a new round of confrontation between political authority and civil society. On one hand, the reviving civic institutions will try to improve their positions in society and to increase their influence on the decision-making process. On the other hand, the authorities will always try to bring back the civil society under its strict control and reduce the space for social mobilisation and discourse.

         

        This trend towards a new round of confrontation and competition between the political power and civil society is observed today by both individual experts and leading international organisations. As one of the UN experts stated in this regard: “No country or government can overcome this health crisis alone, and I am worried about the alarming trends and limitations reported by civil society representatives around the world, including associated with their ability to support the effective fight against COVID-19.”[2]

         

        New realities – Revitalisation of civil society in Tajikistan

        Tajikistan is one of the most striking examples of the new phenomenon – today we are witnessing a revival of Tajik civil society that until recently seemed to be almost impossible. First of all, due to the very nature of the development of the pandemic situation in the country – the Government has denied for far too long the presence of coronavirus in the country, which exacerbated the growth of the pandemic and increased the number of infected people in the country. Besides, as it turned out, the Tajik economy, healthcare, and social welfare systems were completely unprepared for the crisis.

         

        As a result, in the conditions of the apparent failure of the official anti-crisis programme, the Tajik civil society has considerably intensified its activities, assuming some the state functions and services. This process of revitalisation of civic institutions could be relatively divided into three main stages:

         

        The first stage mainly affected the information space – where a sharp and first increase in civic activities was observed already by March – April 2020, when the Government was still vehemently denying the presence of the coronavirus in the country. Against the background of slurred and unconvincing official statistics, the Tajik segment of the Internet, independent media, and online social networks have launched a broad discussion of the state strategy and approaches to combating the pandemic. Special groups appeared in social networks (both closed and open) initiating heated discussions, doubting the official statistics, and offering a range of alternative facts and data.

         

        Thus, it was the policy of the authorities on hiding reliable information that has caused the first wave of the revitalisation of the Tajik non-governmental sector. At this stage, it was mainly about initiating a public discourse in the Internet sector, which remains beyond government control. And the more it became clear that the Government is suppressing the truth, the higher was the level of criticism both in public discourse and in the society as a whole.

         

        The second stage, namely, the intensification of volunteer activities, begins already after the first outbreak of the disease both in Tajikistan itself and in Russia, where the majority of Tajik migrants reside. During this period various groups of citizens started to engage in more practical and public actions – against the backdrop of a deepening collapse and the apparent perplexity of the Tajik official agencies, primarily the Ministry of Health. The process of self-organisation of civil society began in the form of the formation of a volunteer movement – a new phenomenon for the country that was not observed even during the civil war. Moreover, today we are talking about the self-organisation of citizens, most of whom have never been affiliated with political parties either, but in general, have not taken part in public activities.

         

        The process of society’s self-organisation from the very beginning went beyond the circle of professional NGOs that have played mainly a catalyst role for many civic initiatives. In Tajikistan the most civic initiatives were organised via Facebook and YouTube, which are traditionally the most popular platforms among Tajik intelligentsia and civic activists. Later on, various groups of volunteers began to gather and set up around these initiatives, and they began to collect products and personal protective equipment for doctors and ordinary citizens. The rapidly growing groups and associations of volunteers were engaged in cooking and purchasing food for doctors, raising funds to pay for medical services for the poorest and most vulnerable families, providing home care, etc. Some volunteers’ groups have already attempted to register as new NGOs – for example, in Khujand, the ‘Okean Iz Kapel’ (Ocean of Drops) charity foundation created based on such a group has managed eventually to consolidate a part of this movement in the city.

         

        In Dushanbe, a number of NGOs and new civic associations stood at the head of the volunteer movement, among them are the Civil Liberties Office, ‘Mozhesh – Pomogi’ (If You Can, Help), ‘SIZ Dushanbe’ (PPE Dushanbe) and ‘Peshraft’. Thus, the Civil Liberties Office has launched a special QR code to raise funds for those in need during the coronavirus pandemic. They raised $2,000 in a month and helped 300 people with food and medicine – an initiative copied by tens and hundreds of volunteer groups.[3] In Dushanbe, groups of volunteers and ordinary citizens launched a fundraising campaign for the outlined regions of the country. They rented vehicles and cars to send medicines and products to physicians and those in need in the regions. The civil associations of Dushanbe and volunteer groups in the regions have developed a set of joint initiatives. Thus, central NGOs gathered food and medicines based on the lists prepared by volunteers in the regions; when transported to the regions that required the items they were distributed by local activists among the most needed groups of the population. Moreover, volunteer groups have created their system of transparency and accountability, which looks especially attractive against the backdrop of the practice and working style of the relevant official agencies. In most cases, the civic groups carry out the fundraising and distribution activities as open as possible; thus, they have introduced a practice of disseminating special online reports and photos on the spent funds and distributed products.

         

        The volunteer movement has proved to be especially successful and widespread among the Tajik labour migrants, who have found themselves in a very difficult situation due to the onset of quarantine and the economic crisis in Russia. Several local migrant organisations – such as the Center for Tajiks in Moscow led by Izzat Amon, a Tajik lawyer –  have launched a set of large-scale fundraising and humanitarian campaigns to assist labour migrants and their families throughout Russia. Also, for the first time, volunteers who have never been engaged in social activities before, are taking part in this movement – among them are students and ordinary migrants, many of whom already have Russian citizenship. As in Tajikistan, the intensification of civic activities of the Tajik diaspora in Russia takes place against the backdrop of the passivity of the Tajik Government and diplomats that causes sharp criticism from society.

         

        The system of online appeals of volunteer organisations to the Government has also come into practice – for example, with a demand to assist migrant workers who remained outside the country during the COVID-19 pandemic, physicians and small businesses, and vulnerable groups of the population.

         

        Government response

        Therefore, since 2020, Tajikistan and the Tajik diasporas abroad have faced a largely unprecedented phenomenon of the rapid revitalisation of civil society and the formation of the volunteer movement. The Tajik Government proved to be completely unprepared for this new social movement, especially in the context of a deepening economic crisis. Initially, the Government did not know how to respond to such a ‘purely humanitarian’ and non-political nature of civic activism. This ‘confusion’ was because a significant part of the social and civic activism is manifested in the sectors beyond the Government’s control – namely, in the Internet and online space, as well as among migrant workers and foreign diasporas.

         

        Later, the Government developed a set of response measures aimed at reducing the level and influence of the volunteer movement. The new strategy includes the following set of measures:

         

        First, the Government has launched a counter-narrative information campaign. On one hand, the authorities tried to hush up the achievements of the volunteer groups. On the other hand, as a counterbalance, the official media launched an information campaign to popularise the Government humanitarian aid provided by large companies, officials, and state agencies.

         

        On the other hand, the Tajik authorities have strengthened their efforts to limit civic activism by putting pressure on the most critically-minded commentators, blocking websites, introducing provisions on “punishment for false information”, “escalating panic” and so on. The most striking and typical example of such pressure is a campaign directed against legally registered media – primarily ‘Radio Ozodi’ (Liberty), which disseminated information about the first cases of COVID-19 in Tajikistan, publicly casting doubt on official statistics. The confrontation with ‘Radio Ozodi’ in April 2020 reached an international level, causing serious criticism of the Government from the international community, including several statements made by a group of leading US senators and public figures.[4]

         

        Second, the Tajik law enforcement and security bodies have enhanced their activities abroad to neutralise the political opposition that took refuge in several EU countries. Besides this, they targeted several major NGOs and civic organisations specialised in defending migrants’ rights in Russia. Special attention is given to the critically-minded bloggers and owners of private YouTube channels, who criticised the official counter-pandemic strategy. In the last several years a wide network of independent online TV channels and video blogs appeared in the Tajik segment of the Internet. The majority of these private media are owned by migrants and non-professional journalists specialised mostly in the issues of the Tajik diasporas abroad. According to independent media sources, Tajik law enforcement tries to limit the criticism of the critically-minded video-bloggers by exerting pressure on their relatives residing in Tajikistan. The Government also undertakes a set of measures to control access to independent online media within the country. Since 2018, Tajik authorities carried out a consistent policy of making Internet access and mobile communication services more expensive and strengthening government control over the country’s telecommunications sector. In particular, the Government introduced a strict limitation on the number of SIM cards a user could have. As a result, by October 2019 the number of Internet users in the country declined to 2.9 million, while the number of mobile phone users went down to 6.2 million, of that number, only 4.5 million users were considered active subscribers.[5]

         

        Third, since 2017, the Tajik Government has been waging a campaign of arrests and detentions of the most critically minded online bloggers, civic activists, and opposition members – apparently to neutralise perceived dissident voices ahead of the 2020 presidential elections and during the pandemic. Some of the civic activists were arrested in Russia by local police to be later deported to Tajikistan. Thus, according to media, in the last several years, Russian authorities have cooperated with Dushanbe on the return of several prominent civic activists and opposition figures, including: Shobuddin Badalov (2020, detained in Nizhny Novgorod); Sharofiddin Gadoev (2019, kidnapped from Moscow); Naimjon Samiev (2018, detained in Grozny); and Karomatullo Sharipov (migrants’ rights defender, 2017). The most recent and notorious case is the detention and deportation of Izzat Amon, Head of the Center for Tajiks of Moscow — an organisation that has helped Tajik citizens properly register with Russian authorities, as well as to find places to live and work. Izzat Amon has doubled his popularity among the Tajik diaspora during the pandemic when he organised a wide and effective network of providing food and medicines for unemployed migrants in Moscow. As in other similar cases, in a hastily convened hearing before his deportation, a Russian court deprived him of his Russian citizenship.

         

        Besides, intending to limit the potential rise of dissident movement inside the country, the Government proceeded with police investigations and arrests of locally-based critically-minded civic and religious figures. Thus, during 2020 around 70 to 100 people have been charged with membership of the Muslim Brotherhood – a banned organisation, whose presence was never reported before in the country.[6] Most recently, in April 2021, several well-known religious figures were detained and questions after giving a speech on the funeral ceremony of one of the most prominent Sufi leaders in the country.

         

        This suppressive policy negatively affected the international rating of the country. In 2019, Reporters Without Borders, a non-governmental human rights organisation, ranked Tajikistan as 161st in its annual 2019 World Press Freedom Index. Therefore, Tajikistan went 12 spots down compared to 2018, when the country was ranked 149th among 180 countries.[7]

         

        Civil society after the pandemic: its politicisation and future prospects

        One of the most puzzling questions today is how the relationship between the revitalised civil society and the Government will develop after the pandemic – a question that is relevant not only for Tajikistan. Thus, today many authoritarian governments already exert significant efforts to bring civil society back under control. However, along this path, the Tajik Government will certainly face a range of serious obstacles and new challenges, such as:

         

        Firstly, the pandemic and related socio-economic consequences is a long-term phenomenon – in other words, the effect of the pandemic will last quite a long time. Accordingly, the more difficult the socio-economic situation in the country will be, the more active civil society will be and the more difficult it will be for the Government to drive it into the old framework.

         

        Secondly, the level of public criticism of the Government is also unprecedented and it rapidly assumes a political character. The first manifestations of politicisation of civic protest could be observed already several years ago – during the first phase of the economic crisis (2014-2017) caused by the shrinking of the Russian labour market and the corresponding drop in migrants’ remittances. The public discontent gradually accumulated to be unleashed recently after the above-mentioned arrest and deportation of Izzat Amon, Head of the Center for Tajiks in Moscow. The arrest caused a series of protests, including several attempts to organise demonstrations and pickets in front of the Tajik embassy in Moscow.[8] The opposition online media (Isloh.tj, Group-24, Minbari Muhojir/Tribune of Migrant) suddenly received tens of thousands of new followers and subscribers. Today, each online streaming devoted to Izzat Amon and other related issues attracts at least six to ten thousand viewers plus around 40-50 thousand people view each programme later.

         

        The future scale and degree of politicisation of public protest depends on the Government itself, or rather, on what tactics and strategy the authorities will choose to resolve the social and economic crisis. Most likely, a certain part of civil society, which mostly has a critical attitude towards the authorities, will be anyway politicised to one degree or another. The question is whether the growing politicisation trend would involve a considerable part of the population that for many years stayed out of politics.

         

        However, there is another serious challenge for the Tajik authorities here – even if they manage to hamper the ongoing process of politicisation of civil society, it will be much more difficult to reduce the activity of civic groups and institutions. Of course, in the near future, the authorities would be able to limit civic activity offline within Tajikistan; however, this will not be enough to prevent a possible politicisation of social and public protest in the Tajik society as a whole.

         

        The fact is that, as mentioned above, the mobilisation of civil society today takes place mainly in the online space, uniting various social groups and diasporas among themselves both in Tajikistan and beyond. All this space is beyond the control of the Government, which is unable to influence the processes taking place in it. Moreover, the growing process of transition of public discourse, media, and business structures to the online space and the Tajik segment of Internet began long before the pandemic.

         

        Thus, the pandemic only spurred and accelerated these processes. Today, it is hard to say how serious the changes will be in the structure and nature of Tajik civil society, the level of its activity, and the politicisation of social protest after the pandemic. However, in any case, it is quite possible that in a fairly short time the political elite of the country, as well as the Tajik society as a whole may deal with a new political and social reality.

         

        Recommendations to the Government:

        • To conduct close monitoring, research and analysis of the pandemic situation in the country and to ensure the dissemination of reliable information on its further development;
        • To ensure transparency and monitoring on the distribution of humanitarian aid, medical equipment among the healthcare employees and ordinary citizens;
        • To develop a set of advantages and additional incentives for the healthcare workers engaged in the COVID prevention activities and programmes. This set of incentives must include corresponding supplements to the employees’ salaries, providing them with additional paid vacations, awards, job promotions, etc.; and
        • To involve the newly appeared volunteer and civic groups in the Government anti-pandemic projects and initiatives, such as monitoring of the situation, distribution of humanitarian aid, rendering support to socially vulnerable groups of the population.

         

        Parviz Mullojonov, (Mullojanov) Ph.D., a political scientist, and historian, senior adviser to the International Alert office in Tajikistan and visiting researcher at the EHESS, Paris and former visiting researcher at the University of Uppsala, Sweden. He is former Chairman of the Board of the Tajik branch of the Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation); and former member of the EUCAM (EU and Central Asia Monitoring) research group. He is a former visiting professor at Whitman College (USA) and research fellow and at the Kettering Foundation (USA) and visiting scholar at the University of Exeter (UK), University of Heidelberg (Germany), and School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences – EHESS (Paris). Parviz Mullojonov worked for various international agencies and organisations such as Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, UNCHR, UNDP, ADB, Soros Foundation, and International Alert. Parviz Mullojanov received his Ph.D. in Islamic studies at the University of Basel (Switzerland).

         

        [1] See: David Mathews “Politics for People: Finding a Responsible Public Voice”, University of Illinois Press, 1999

        [2] Bez uchastia grazhdanskogo obshestva pravitelstva e spravyatsya s pandemieqi (Without participation of civic society the government would fail to deal with pandemic), UN News, April 2020, https://news.un.org/ru/story/2020/04/1376052

        [3] Muslimbek Buriev, Silver Lining of Pandemic: Redefining Civil Society in Tajikistan, CABAR Asia, August 2020, https://cabar.asia/en/silver-lining-of-pandemic-redefining-civil-society-in-tajikistan

        [4] Marco Rubio, Rubio, Risch, Menendez, Casey Send Letter to Tajikistan President Regarding Harassment of Tajik Journalists, October 2019, https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/10/rubio-risch-menendez-casey-send-letter-to-tajikistan-president-regarding-harassment-of-tajik-journalists

        [5] Regnum, Tajikistan reveals the number of Internet and mobile telephony users, Regnum, November 2019, https://regnum.ru/news/economy/2784254.html

        [6] Eurasianet, Tajikistan sees mass arrests ahead of elections, January 2020, https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-sees-mass-arrests-ahead-of-elections

        [7] Mumin Ahmadi, Reporters Without Borders: In Tajikistan, the situation with the freedom of speech is worse than in Uzbekistan, Radio Ozodi, April 2019, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/29889466.html

        [8] Reuters, Dozens Detained in Moscow in Rare Migrant Rights Protest – Human Rights Group, April 2021, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-04-02/dozens-detained-in-moscow-in-rare-migrant-rights-protest-human-rights-group

        Topics
        Civil Society
        Covid-19
        Good Governance and Institutional Reform
        International Relations and Geopolitics
        Regions
        Former Soviet Union
        Central Asia
        Tajikistan
        Footnotes
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          Loss of harmony: The rise of a new Tajikistan and the fall of old aspirations for the better

          Article by Xeniya Mironova

          Loss of harmony: The rise of a new Tajikistan and the fall of old aspirations for the better

          In the past ten years, almost every Central Asian republic has been demonstrating its sovereignty and independence through redevelopment of the architectural image of its capital city and the creation of the new architectural symbols of freedom. Such a tendency of complete destruction of the old is neither unusual, nor unexpected to say goodbye to the Soviet past and many tangible objects associated with it. Indeed, Nursultan Nazarbayev redeveloped Nur-Sultan (previously Astana) as a presidential city with plenty of monuments which are the landmarks of the contemporary Kazakh futuristic architecture. The old city of Bishkek contains plenty of buildings built during the Soviet-era, however, most of them have been left dilapidated, and by now, no revival is expected for them. Ashgabat, ‘the City of White Marble’, is widely known as an embodiment of the broad ambitions of its presidents, where out of the post-Soviet Ashgabat Saparmurat Niyazov and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov created the monumental city which suppresses the consciousness’s of its citizens. Under the rule of Islam Karimov, Tashkent faced great demolitions and dramatic reconstructions of the Soviet-era buildings, and the current president is also committed to further transformation of Tashkent into a modern business mecca. As for Dushanbe, a great number of Soviet-era buildings were already demolished, as they are the exact Soviet tangible objects which were ‘easy to reach’ to erase the legacy of the former generations, and to be replaced by other monuments which would belong to the generations living under the rule of Emomali Rahmon. While appealing again and again to the Tajik Government about the preservation of Soviet-era buildings it is like ‘trying to pour water into a sieve’. However, it is useful to consider and analyse the current situation, as well as to make further suggestions to the Government and other stakeholders for their further consideration and to put it into practice.

           

          Construction sector and COVID-19

          Currently in the time of COVID-19, it might be interesting to consider how the Government of Tajikistan copes with the new reality and how it lets the construction sector function in it. In Tajikistan, the official acknowledgement of the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic took place on April 30th 2020, i.e. just ahead of an official visit of a World Health Organization (WHO) team to the country to investigate whether the previous official denial of the absence of the virus was based on evidence. By the end of January 2021, Rahmon announced that there was no coronavirus in the country any more.

           

          Considering the rapid flattening of the curve of cases and deaths, one could think about the earliness of this announcement.[1] It seems that the Government would like to lift most of the restrictions connected to the battle with COVID-19. However, this should not influence the sector of construction in Dushanbe greatly, as during the pandemic forced evictions continued, and there was only a partial stop of some construction activities.[2] For instance, in the beginning of the pandemic in Tajikistan, the reconstruction of Korvon Bazaar (a market in Dushanbe) was closed only for three months. Later, all construction activities were resumed.

           

          The image of the Tajik capital is still being transformed, and there are many more destructions and redevelopments to come. Most of them include further demolitions of the Soviet buildings, and construction of new governmental buildings, new residencies for the heads of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s member states along with several new posh hotels, ordinary residential buildings, outdoor water parks, bazaars, monuments, etc.

           

          Residency registration system

          Most of the changes in the image of the Tajik capital are connected not only with the demolitions of substantial historical and unhistorical buildings, but also with the issue of forced evictions which becomes more intense because of the holdover of the Soviet system called propiska. This residency registration system is common for all post-Soviet Central Asia, but in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan its name varies.

           

          In Tajikistan, propiska is used to control internal and external migration and the way Tajik citizens fulfil their duties to the state.[3] It is inscribed in the passports of the Tajik citizens. However, even in present days there is a large number of those living without any identification documents and, as a result, without any propiska. This is a repercussion of the civil war (1992-1997), and in many cases it happens because of the legal illiteracy of a large part of the population, economic difficulties, and/or the absence of an official permission to live in the country which is mostly actual for ethnic Uzbeks and Afghans, who have been living in the border areas between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for many years.[4] The exact number of those living without passports is not defined, and Kevin Allen, UNHCR Representative in Tajikistan remarks that “[…] many people avoid appealing to the Government entities, as they are afraid of deportation and administrative punishment.”[5]

           

          Having no propiska means violation of people’s rights in terms of access to such basic rights as: the right to housing, the right to health protection, the right to education, the right to appeal and information, the right to participate in public life, the right to vote, the right to labour, the right of ownership, etc. Moreover, the absence of propiska leads to unemployment, poverty, fraud, and other consequences (including getting any kind of social support from the state). Having no propiska makes people vulnerable against the state and those who use the illegal status of this part of the population for their own benefit. According to the Article 469 of the Code of Administrative Violations of the Republic of Tajikistan, there is an administrative punishment for living without propiska.[6] Moreover, there is a designated period of 15 days set for getting propiska.

           

          In general, Tajik officials do not restrict the number of people who can get propiska to live in Dushanbe or other Tajik towns. This system is mostly used as a generic form of state control over the population. Thus, not registered people of Tajikistan either live without propiska, or in order to benefit from getting social support from the state and/or enjoy all basic rights mentioned above, they try to find alternative ways to make it. For instance, if a person does not have his or her own housing, he or she tries to find an alternative housing where it will be possible to get propiska. In many cases, people pay to the owners of the housing where propiska is made. In such situations, it is impossible to get birth certificates and passports, and claim pensions, etc.

           

          However, there are cases when the state realises the impossibility of getting any propiska, but nothing is made to improve the situation. This is happening with orphans when they are 16 years old or older, and are of the legal age of majority to leave children’s homes. Such children are not provided with any kind of housing, and as a result, these children are not able to register anywhere and get any propiska at all. According to Navruz Odinaev, the Lawyer and Head of the Himoya legal company, “the owners of the temporary housing where orphans live refuse to register their guests very often.”[7]

           

          The disadvantaged and underprivileged people are another segment of population that suffers from the imperfection of the state system. These people do not have any possibility to purchase housing and as a result, to make propiska legally. For instance, a case of Elvira Tumarova, a Tajik citizen who as a migrant worker went to Russia with her mother, but because of the expired documents was deported back to Tajikistan.[8] Elvira does not have a place to live, and she suffers from epilepsy. Because of her disease and the absence of propiska she is not able to work legally, to survive she gathers pinecones in one of the city’s parks and sells them as kindling. Once because of the absence of the passport and propiska, Elvira spent 48 hours in a temporary detention facility – this is the exact reason why this woman does not search for any kind of support from the Government any more. Now, the only thing she has to rely on is herself.

           

          Those people, who like Elvira’s mother sold their housing and after facing troubles were left without any money, and/or purchased new apartments in new constructions which did not pass the state commissioning even after the completion of constructions, are also not able to get propiska.

           

          Moreover, the absence of registration can lead to the fact that if any woman without propiska is pregnant, she will not be able to give birth in a maternity clinic, but in a department of infectious disease. Additionally, people with the absence of propiska are not able to get a driving license and/or will not be able to purchase a sim card, and by the Government’s request to register with the IMEIs (International Mobile Equipment Identifier) in the future.[9]

           

          After getting an official request from the Himoya legal company, Tajik Ministry of Internal Affairs recognised that they “allow the issue of passports with the possibility of registration in the reception centers”.[10] However, it is unclear whether people are informed about this opportunity and whether it is used in practice.

           

          Additionally, it is worth noting that the issue of propiska brings difficulties even to those who have it. This is the case of those who have double citizenship with the Russian Federation. There are more than 250,000 people in Tajikistan who have such a double citizenship, and these people have to choose in which country to register.[11] According to the Russian and Tajik legislations, one should be permanently registered only in one place; and it might be troublesome to get a temporary propiska in Tajikistan in case one owns an apartment in Russia and an apartment in Tajikistan.

           

          Demolitions and forced evictions     

          Current house demolitions in Dushanbe are undertaken by the state against the old solid two-, three-, and four-deckers built in the Soviet period and mainly located in the downtown of the city. In 2020 alone, a general number of demolished residential buildings totaled 422.[12] Among them, there are the first three-decker with three big and beautiful amphoras which dress the front façade of the Stalin-era house ever built in Dushanbe, two- and three-deckers with oriental stucco moldings, and a two-decker where Nikolay Voinovich, a famous Soviet journalist, Vladimir Voinovich, a famous Russian novelist, poet and playwright, Nikolay Akimov, an artistic director of the Leningrad Theatre of Comedy, George Millyar, a People’s Artist of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), and Evgeniy Shvarc, a famous Soviet story-teller, all lived. All these and many other Soviet-era buildings are being replaced with the new multistoried residential buildings predominantly of poor quality.

           

          The authorities justify the construction of residential houses between nine- and 18-storeys and the construction of administration buildings between 25- and 30-storeys by cost-effectiveness and space-saving.[13] However, many areas in the suburbs remain built-up by the slum dwellings, and no information about demolition of such dwellings and/or their replacement by the new constructions is available. For instance, this is a case in the Yuzhnyi neighbourhood, the Pervyi Sovetskyi district, the Chehovskaya mahallya [neighbourhood], the Borbad neighbourhood, the Avtovokzal neighbourhood, etc. However, nowadays, despite developing the suburbs with slum dwellings, the authorities continue ‘improving’ the downtown and are also considering building new constructions in the eastern part of Dushanbe.[14] At the same time, they ‘forgot’ that this part of Dushanbe is not suitable for constructions because of the loose soil. Due to this, it is in the list of ten areas which are dangerous for any kind of construction – especially the construction of multistory buildings.[15]

           

          Tajikistan is a mountainous country experiencing earthquakes on an ongoing basis, and all constructions made in the Soviet period were designed according to the seismic categories existing in the country. During the Soviet period, not every part of Dushanbe was built-up. According to Gafur Shermatov, a famous Tajik historian, and many former tenants of demolished Soviet-era buildings, the usefulness of almost all Soviet-era buildings demolished in the downtown and those under demolition could be prolonged; and due to the high quality of their constructions, they could accommodate many other future generations of Tajik citizens.[16] However, no chance was left for these buildings, and the state did not consider any possibility of renovation of Soviet-era buildings (including historical) or their restoration. The authorities deny any value and solidness of old buildings, they mostly do not go into any kind of dialogue with the general population and insist stubbornly that Dushanbe is a young city without any particular influence of the Soviets on the history of the capital, which should be built-up all over again.[17]

           

          Additionally, they report that the construction activities of 46 new residential buildings will be finalised by the 30th anniversary of the independence of Tajikistan, which will be celebrated on September 9th 2021.[18] However, this rush, the embezzlement of funds, and the use of construction materials of low-quality lead to the cases where the constructions did not go through the official state commissioning process.[19] That is why at the end of 2020, Rustam Emomali, a Mayor of Dushanbe, claimed that he would seek the improvement of these “disadvantages and defects in constructions” by the provision of the most experienced construction companies, personnel and construction materials.[20] However, back in 2017, the Mayor had already started to control the construction activities in Dushanbe and he already raised the issue of faulty construction at one of the cabinet councils.[21] Thus, as the situation has remained unchanged, and as only few months have passed since the Mayor’s most recent declaration, the same questions about the quality of works, the possibility of fire evacuations, and about whether the authorities pay any attention to the geographical peculiarities of the area being developed remain.

           

          All these changes in the construction sector of Dushanbe indicated in the final version of the not publicly known and not publicly discussed municipal redevelopment plans of Dushanbe (General plans) caused the emergence of the issue of forced evictions.[22] Those who had been forcibly evicted already faced and continue facing many challenges connected to the unwillingness of real estate developers to pay lucrative compensations for the housing, withholding of rent, and different kinds of fraud from the side of the real estate developers.

           

          According to the 2020 Valuation Act of the Republic of Tajikistan, the real estate developers are responsible for making notarial deed contracts on compensations with forcibly evicted.[23] The same law states that the property under demolition should be appraised by a real estate appraiser. And if a property owner does not agree with the conducted real estate appraisal, he or she might hire another independent real estate appraiser who is able to provide his or her expertise on the property under question. Simultaneously, the owner of the property can go to the court and demand a recall of the real estate appraisal made by the real estate developer. However, not every forcibly evicted in Tajikistan is aware about his or her legal rights, and this leads to the fact that the right for housing is greatly violated in Tajikistan.

           

          Because of the inaction of authorities and their unwillingness to consider people’s opinion, the forcibly evicted have to seek justice through insubordination to authorities’ decisions, media coverage, appeals to court and the Prosecutor-General’s Office, and appeals to the public organisation – Independent Center for Human Rights’ Protection. In some cases, persistence by the forcibly evicted have already paid off, in other cases further action is required.

           

          For instance, the case of the tenement #74 on Tursunzade Street gained the attention of mass media because of the unwillingness of its tenants to accept low levels of reimbursement for the evicted housing set by the real estate developer.[24] Several families of the tenants of this tenement refused to move out, and the authorities had to start demolition of the roof with these families living in the building. This demolition led to the tenants’ property damage caused by the rainy weather. To seek justice, the tenants had to unsuccessfully appeal to the court and the Prosecutor-General’s Office. The real help was received from the Independent Center for Human Rights’ Protection which provided the tenants with an experienced lawyer. And after more than 23 months, the issue, with lucrative compensation for the housing, was solved; and currently, the last tenants are in the process of signing a new contract with the real estate developer.

           

          A similar case is happening with the tenants of the tenement located on 49 Bukhoro Street, who faced the illegal demolition of half of their tenement by the real estate developer Pulodi Plaza. Without having a building demolition permit, the real estate developer demolished the roof and windows of part of the building which had been left by the tenants. Another part of the building was still inhabited by those tenants who decided not to move out. Later, the real estate developer invited the representatives of the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense to recognise the tenement as unsafe. The tenants of the building appealed to the Mayor, court and the President of the Republic of Tajikistan. However, the situation with the demolition of the tenement remain unchanged, and the real estate developer still does not guarantee sufficient compensation for the rehousing of the tenants of 49 Bukhoro Street. The chronicle of events is registered by the tenants in the Facebook group ‘Dom Buhoro 49’.[25]

           

          Dushanbe is full of similar cases of real estate developers trying not to fulfil their duties to the forcibly evicted.[26] Moreover, there are other cases of different examples of fraud made by real estate developers in the construction sector, such as: (i) Dushanbe real estate developers issued contracts which did not contain real dates for the end of construction;[27] (ii) they issued contracts which did not contain any dates for provision of documents of entitlement for new housing;[28] (iii) they issued contracts which contained false information, as they intentionally decreased the overall area of the demolished housing;[29] and (iv) they issued contracts which contained false information on the overall area of the new housing, as they intentionally decreased it, and included no information on the terms for providing additional accommodation in case if the overall area of the new housing was smaller.[30] Additionally, many real estate developers do not pay the rent of the forcibly evicted.[31]

           

          Currently, the real estate developers continue making money out of thin air by suppressing the tenants of the Soviet-era buildings, forcibly evicting them from their houses and issuing illegal contracts. In return, the forcibly evicted continue their fight with the real estate developers and insist on the real estate developers to statutorily pay for their leases, as well as suing real estate developers and possibly getting appropriate compensation for their loss.

           

          Money in the construction sector and ties to the family

          Historically, the construction sector is one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption. The constant presence of the same people in power can weaken this sector’s functionality and lead to imperfections in its structure. The closure of the political system allows those in the system to overstep and make good use of the office and power for their own ends. Additionally, the situation with the money in the construction sector of Tajikistan worsens because of the shortage of public information as the state authorities provide only general information about money spent in the sector, but almost no details. In most of the cases, it is extremely difficult to trace money spent in one of the chosen industries.

           

          If we consider the state budget of Tajikistan, we will see that most of the parts of its budget data are unofficially hidden from the population. In many cases, only summary data on defined sectors of the state budget is publicly available. The published law ‘On State Budget – 2020’ and the ‘Citizens’ Budget of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2020’ provide only limited information.[32] Thus currently, without having all the numbers and data from the state budget, one can only try to analyse and understand how the money of taxpayers is spent in the construction sector of Tajikistan.

           

          There, one can find that in 2020, the state budget revenues made more than TJS 3,170,000,000 (approx. $278.34 million).[33] These revenues were composed of the tax and non-tax revenues, grants (budget support), loans (public investment), grants (public investment), and revenues of budget organisations. According to the information in mass media about the report ‘Economic and Social Status of the Republic of Tajikistan’ prepared by the Statistical Agency, the investments in the construction sector between January and September 2020 comprised TJS 7,616,200,000 ($740 million).[34] However, currently the text of this report and other similar reports which should contain data on the rest of the months of the year are not publicly available.

           

          Additionally, according to mass media more than TJS 2,000,000,000 ($194 million) was allocated to the construction sector of Dushanbe out of different sources in 2020.[35] Again, due to the unavailability of the report ‘Economic and Social Status of the Republic of Tajikistan’ it was not possible to check the data on what exact sources had been considered by the Statistical Agency. Additionally, the Government preliminary planned that the expenditures of the state budget of the Republic of Tajikistan in 2020 in ‘the Industry and Construction’ sector would comprise TJS 232,400,000 ($22,542,800).[36] However in the beginning of 2021, the Government informed that all construction activities used more than TJS 11,600,000,000 ($1.1252bn) of all kind of investments in 2020.[37]

           

          Tajikistan depends on foreign credit a lot, and the following countries are among the main external creditors of the state: China, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, France, and Germany.[38] International organisations providing their credit to the state are: the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, the Eurasian Economic Union Anti-Crisis Fund, and the International Monetary Fund. The state provides no information on how exactly this money is spent in the housing sector.[39] And according to the investors’ reports, the biggest part of the foreign money is spent on the construction of power facilities, roads, the Rogun hydropower plant and in the sectors of education, agriculture, health, water supply, etc.[40]

           

          As for the local people and companies involved in the construction sector of Dushanbe, one should note that it is the real estate developers close to the policy elite of the state and/or associated with the family of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan who are undertaking the largest projects. In most of the cases this information is also hidden by the state, but behind-the-scenes almost every citizen of Tajikistan is aware that it is almost impossible ‘to survive’ in the sector of construction without any support from or connection to the state authorities.

           

          For instance, one of the biggest real estate developers greatly redeveloping Dushanbe is a limited liability company (LLC) Elit-Stroy-Servis (Elite Build Service).[41] This company was established in 2007, and since that time, it has built one 13-storey residential building in Khujand, four 12-storey residential buildings in Dushanbe, two nine-storey residential properties in Dushanbe, and one five-storey residential building in Dushanbe.[42] This company belongs to Izzat Davlatov, a son of Nusratullo Davlatzoda, the head of the Tax Committee of the Republic of Tajikistan.[43]

           

          An example of how an affinity with the President’s family could be more profitable is the case of Beg Sabur, the head of the Communication Service of Tajikistan and relative by marriage of Emomali Rahmon.[44] He was selling apartments in Dushanbe which had been constructed by the LLC Komil 2010, owned by Siyovush Zuhurov, his son. After the high-profile journalist investigation about such a profitable business of Beg Sabur, the head of the Communication Service became unavailable for the journalists and common population, though after every journalist’s request to provide information about Beg Sabur’s presence at work the state authorities continued insisting that Sabur is on a field trip.[45]

           

          In February 2021, the authorities reported that the license of Komil 2010 (its office is located in the building of the Communication Service; and according to the experts, the owner of Komil 2010 is Beg Sabur as such) and Niagara, another real estate development company owned by Beg Sabur, would be revoked after delivering the rest of construction projects he was involved in.[46] Additionally, because of the poor quality of the constructions built by both companies, it is planned that the rest of residential buildings built by Komil 2010 would be checked by the state quality control. Moreover, apart from the numerous violations in the quality of all constructions, for the last eight years the owners of the apartments located in Zarafshon district of Dushanbe did not have any documents for their property. The authorities are aware of this situation, but seek for public understanding and ask to stop criticising Sabur, as “he was very active in this case”.[47] Currently, because of the poor quality of its constructions, Niagara and Komil 2010 are on the black list of real estate development companies.[48]

           

          Apart from the involvement of the family members of government officials in the sector of construction of residential buildings, other private persons also largely built in Tajikistan. It was in June 2020 that the Government reported about 16 private persons building in the sector of construction.[49] Previously, this number reached 20. However, earlier in February 2020, the authorities stated that since 2018 building permission had not been provided to private persons. Previously, private persons could construct tenements even without having a construction license. For instance, a case of construction of a five-storey tenement located on N. Karabaeva St. resulted in people who had purchased apartments in that tenement not being able to get their documents proving entitlement of ownership from the real estate developer.[50] Currently, the general number of construction companies working in Tajikistan reach 2,113, out of which 80 companies are foreign.

           

          The above described involvement of private persons and politicians’ family members in different money earning schemes indicate the lack of transparency and the conflict of interests which currently exist in the construction sector of Tajikistan. The closeness of political system to people coming from ‘another world’ and the indulgence to violations made by the officials are likely to encourage numerous violations in the sector and corruption-related crime. In 2020, the Agency for State Financial Control and Combating Corruption of the Republic of Tajikistan informed journalists about only three crimes in the sector of architecture and construction, despite the great number of violations in the construction sector recorded by mass media and other different sources, such low figure raises a lot of questions.[51] Thus, it is high time to start working towards transparency and the lack of conflict of interests in the sector of construction of Tajikistan. However, currently one can only suggest that as the state continues to pursue the quasi-legal schemes of money-making and the non-criticism policy similar to the one used in the case of Beg Sabur.

           

          Conclusion and recommendations to the Tajik authorities

          Though the state already decided on the future of Tajikistan and its capital respectively, it is never too late to think better of it, consider the public opinion and improve the existing situation. The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan should remember that the most advanced economies honour their histories and tend to preserve the harmony in the appearance of their states which they received from their ancestors. Therefore, to keep the soul of Tajikistan alive and ensure the wellbeing of its society, Tajik authorities should organise public hearings on the reconstruction and redevelopment of the Tajik capital and other towns and ensure that civil society has access to the General Plans of Dushanbe and other towns respectively. Additionally, the state should stop all demolitions and forced evictions in Dushanbe, perform additional expert analysis of old buildings, consider the opinion of the majority of civil society, and learn the history of Tajikistan and its capital to preserve the rest of the Soviet-era historical buildings for future generations. Moreover, the state should consider abolishing the system of propiska, to minimise its consequences which make the life of Tajik citizens more complicated, and bring transparency and accountability to the sector of construction in Tajikistan.

           

          More precise recommendations to the Tajik Government are below:

          • Involve civil society in discussion of General Plans of Dushanbe and other Tajik towns;
          • Preserve the soul of Dushanbe and make renovations and restorations to what’s left of the Soviet-era historical buildings of architectural merit;
          • Arrange the registration of people and issuing of passports in reception centers;
          • Provide social housing to the orphan and homeless;
          • Ensure the provision of adequate housing and/or payment to the forcibly evicted;
          • Secure fraud protection by using the existing regulatory framework and ensuring compliance with the contracts’ terms and conditions;
          • Gain transparency and make information on the money available and spent in the construction sector publically available; and
          • Provide effective control of all construction works and stop excusing all violations in this sector.

           

          Xeniya Mironova is an independent scholar, translator and writer with research interest in Central Asia. She has been researching the Soviet-era architecture of Central Asian countries for the past six years. 

           

          Image by Ninara under (CC).

           

          [1] National Coronavirus Portal (COVID-19) – see website: https://covid.tj/

          [2] ICHRP, CA countries: How is the right to housing respected during a pandemic?, August 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/strany-ca-kak-soblyudaetsya-pravo-na-zhilishche-v-period-pandemii

          [3] Valentina Kasymbekova, How does a residence permit violate the rights of citizens, and why is it still not removed?, ASIA-Plus, November 2019, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20191109/kak-propiska-narushaet-prava-grazhdan-i-pochemu-eyo-do-sih-por-ne-uberut

          [4] Anora Sarkorova, Tajikistan: the invisible fates of invisible people, BBC Russian Service, May 2015, https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2015/05/150430_tajikistan_no_citizenship

          [5] Ibid.

          [6] Kodeks Respubliki Tadzhikistan Ob Administrativnyh Pravonarusheniyah, https://eurasiangroup.org/files/Legislation_RUS/Tadjikiston/supervision/4/KODEKS_RESPUBLIKI_TADZHIKISTAN_OB_ADMINISTRATIVNYH_PRAVONARUSHENIYAH.pdf

          [7] Valentina Kasymbekova, How does a residence permit violate the rights of citizens, and why is it still not removed?, ASIA-Plus, November 2019, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20191109/kak-propiska-narushaet-prava-grazhdan-i-pochemu-eyo-do-sih-por-ne-uberut

          [8] Anna Miftakhova, Elvira, 28, from Proletarsk, lives in the park. To feed, she has to collect cones, ASIA-Plus, February 2021, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20210202/28-letnyaya-elvira-iz-proletarska-zhivet-v-parke-chtobi-prokormitsya-ei-prihoditsya-sobirat-shishki

          [9] Bakhmaner Nadirov, “Where is Beg Sabur?” What questions did the journalists ask the Communication Service of Tajikistan?, ASIA-Plus, February 2021, https://www.asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/20210201/gde-beg-sabur-kakie-voprosi-sluzhbe-svyazi-tadzhikistana-zadali-zhurnalisti

          [10] Valentina Kasymbekova, How does a residence permit violate the rights of citizens, and why is it still not removed?, ASIA-Plus, November 2019, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20191109/kak-propiska-narushaet-prava-grazhdan-i-pochemu-eyo-do-sih-por-ne-uberut

          [11] Chiromon Bacosoda, Russia simplifies the procedure for obtaining citizenship for highly qualified specialists, Radio Ozodi, October 2019, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30207086.html

          [12] Sharif Sami, In the metropolitan area of I. Somoni, 422 residential buildings were demolished in 2020, ICHRP, February 2021, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/sharif-sami-v-stolichnom-rayone-i-somoni-v-2020-godu-sneseno-422-zhilyh-doma

          [13] IA Krasnaya Vesna, Social War: Infrastructure of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Rossa Primavera, November 2020, https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/faf2d448?fbclid=IwAR35z2w4Ykq2vfa7slYW7agtUJ5mu8jXIv-VR0tFb3WtfUX-Ff9lqMIPPxo; ICHRP, Main architecture of Tajikistan: High-rise buildings in the country are being built in order to save land, November 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/glavarhitektura-tadzhikistana-vysotki-v-strane-stroyatsya-v-celyah-ekonomii-zemel; Glavgosexpertiza of Russia, General plans for reconstruction of 90% of cities and regional centers approved in Tajikistan, November 2020, https://gge.ru/press-center/news/v-tadzhikistane-utverzhdeny-generalnye-plany-rekonstruktsii-90-gorodov-i-rayonnykh-tsentrov/

          [14] Fergana News, The score rules there: Will new buildings in Dushanbe survive a strong earthquake?, August 2019, https://fergana.agency/articles/109703/

          [15] Rustam Nazarzoda, In 2020, 141 residential buildings were damaged by natural disasters in Tajikistan, ICHRP, February 2021, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/rustam-nazarzoda-v-tadzhikistane-v-2020-godu-ot-stihiynyh-bedstviy-postradalo-141-zhiloe

          [16] Gafur Shermatov, Facebook Post, Facebook, February 2021, https://www.facebook.com/100005181610729/videos/1673723899476981/

          [17] Ibid.

          [18] Sharif Sami, In the metropolitan area of I. Somoni, 422 residential buildings were demolished in 2020, ICHRP, February 2021, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/sharif-sami-v-stolichnom-rayone-i-somoni-v-2020-godu-sneseno-422-zhilyh-doma

          [19] Fergana News, The score rules here: Will new buildings in Dushanbe survive a strong earthquake?, August 2019, https://fergana.agency/articles/109703/

          [20] ICHRP, The chairman of the city of Dushanbe expressed concern about the presence of shortcomings and shortcomings in the construction sector of the capital, December 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/predsedatel-goroda-dushanbe-vyrazil-obespokoennost-nalichiem-nedostatkov-i-nedochyotov-v

          [21] Cabar Asia, Dushanbe: new buildings for the elite, April 2018, https://cabar.asia/ru/dushanbe-novostrojki-dlya-izbrannyh

          [22] VoicesOnCentralAsia.org, Destructing Soviet Architecture in Central Asia, December 2019, https://voicesoncentralasia.org/destructing-soviet-architecture-in-central-asia/

          [23] ЗАКОН РЕСПУБЛИКИ ТАДЖИКИСТАН ОБ ОЦЕНОЧНОЙ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ, http://ncz.tj/system/files/Legislation/1720_ru.pdf

          [24] ICHRP, Tursunzade-74: All the dots above the ‘I’ are p[laced, the house is ready for demolition, February 2021, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/tursunzade-74-vse-tochki-nad-i-rasstavleny-dom-gotov-k-snosu

          [25] Buhoro 49, Facebook Community, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/buhoro49

          [26] ICHRP, Not everything is gold that is built, June 2019, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/ne-vsyo-zoloto-chto-stroitsya

          [27] ICHRP, The developer listened to the hopes of the residents of the demolished two-story building, November 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/zastroyshchik-prislushalsya-k-upovaniyam-zhiteley-snosimoy-dvuhetazhki

          [28] Ibid.

          [29] ICHRP, Alternative solution to a disputable situation: Conclusion of a new agreements, November 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/alternativnoe-reshenie-spornoy-situacii-zaklyuchenie-novogo-dogovora

          [30] ICHRP, The developer listened to the hopes of the residents of the demolished two-story building, November 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/zastroyshchik-prislushalsya-k-upovaniyam-zhiteley-snosimoy-dvuhetazhki

          [31] ICHRP, The developer has not paid rent for the fourth year…, January 2021, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/zastroyshchik-chetvertyy-god-ne-platit-arendnuyu-platu

          [32] Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan and Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On the State Budget for 2020”, Citizen’s Budget 2020, http://minfin.tj/downloads/citizens’%20budget-en.pdf; Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan and Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On the State Budget for 2020”, Citizen’s Budget 2020, http://minfin.tj/downloads/citizens’%20budget-en.pdf

          [33] Avaz Yuldashev, Dushanbe’s budget to be over 3 billion somoni, ASIA-Plus, December 2019, https://www.asiaplustj.info/news/tajikistan/society/20191224/byudzhet-dushanbe-sostavit-bolee-3-milliardov-somoni

          [34] Ibid; Statistics Agency under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, The report “Socio-economic situation of the Republic of Tajikistan” for January-September 2020 was released, https://www.stat.tj/ru/news/publications/the-publication-social-economic-situation-in-tajikistan-for-january-september-2020-was-released

          [35] Sputnik News, It became known how much money was spent in 2020 on the construction sector, October 2020, https://tj.sputniknews.ru/country/20201020/1032120338/stroitelstvo-statistika-tajikistan.html

          [36] Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan and Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On the State Budget for 2020”, Citizen’s Budget 2020, http://minfin.tj/downloads/citizens’%20budget-en.pdf

          [37] Payrav Chorshanbiev, More than $1.1 billion of investments allocated for construction in Tajikistan in 2020, ASIA-Plus, February 2021, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20210205/v-tadzhikistane-na-stroitelstvo-v-2020-godu-napravleno-investitsii-na-bolee-11-mlrd

          [38] Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Tajikistan and Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On the State Budget for 2020”, Citizen’s Budget 2020, http://minfin.tj/downloads/citizens’%20budget-en.pdf

          [39] Map Invest Com, see website: https://map.investcom.tj/

          [40] Invest Com, Information about current state investment projects, September 2019, https://investcom.tj/ru/invest/vneshnjaja-pomosch/102-investicionnye-proekty.html

          [41] Elite Story Service, see website: https://ess.tj/company/index.php

          [42] ASIA-Plus, Top 5 construction companies in Dushanbe that are rebuilding the city, August 2019, https://www.asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20190816/top-5-stroitelnih-kompanii-dushanbe-kotorie-perestraivayut-gorod

          [43] Safar Jamoliddini, Tajik businessmen flee corruption abroad, Komsomolskaya Pravda, December 2016, https://www.msk.kp.ru/daily/26619/3637026/; Tax Committee under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, Manual, https://andoz.tj/Kumita/rohbariyat?culture=ru-RU

          [44] Y. Halimov, The Houses That Beg Built, Cabar Asia, March 2019, https://cabar.asia/en/the-houses-that-beg-built

          [45] Ibid; Alisher Zarifi and Amriddin Olim, Beg’s son Sabur’s company may lose its license to build high-rise buildings?, Radio Ozodi, January 2020, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30410198.html; Bakhmaner Nadirov, “Where is Beg Sabur?” What questions did the journalists ask the Communication Service of Tajikistan?, ASIA-Plus, February 2021, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20210201/gde-beg-sabur-kakie-voprosi-sluzhbe-svyazi-tadzhikistana-zadali-zhurnalisti

          [46] Sputnik News, Two construction companies, owned by the head of the Communications Service, Beg Sabur, will have their licenses for the construction of buildings revoked after they hand over the old objects, February 2021, https://tj.sputniknews.ru/country/20210205/1032764027/kompanii-beg-sabura-zanesli-chernyy-spisok-dushanbe.html

          [47] Ibid.

          [48] The Asia Times, Construction companies of Bega Sabur hit black list in Tajikistan, February 2021, https://asia-times.org/glavnaya/10687-v-tadzhikistane-stroitelnye-kompanii-bega-sabura-popali-v-chernyy-spisok.html

          [49] ICHRP, 2113 construction companies work in Tajikistan, July 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/v-tadzhikistane-rabotayut-2113-stroitelnyh-kompaniy

          [50] Mahmadsaid Zuvaydzoda, Building permits are not issued to individuals, ICHRP, December 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/mahmadsaid-zuvaydzoda-chastnym-licam-razreshenie-na-stroitelstvo-ne-vydaetsya

          [51] ICHRP, More than 1.2 thousand corruption crimes detected in Tajikistan in six months, July 2020, http://ichrptj.org/ru/blog/v-tadzhikistane-za-polgoda-vyyavleno-bolee-12-tys-korrupcionnyh-prestupleniy

          Topics
          Civil Society
          Energy, Environment and Resources
          Good Governance and Institutional Reform
          Human Rights
          Regions
          Former Soviet Union
          Central Asia
          Tajikistan
          Footnotes
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            “In a time of universal deceit telling the truth is a revolutionary act” – The challenges facing free media in Tajikistan

            Article by Anne Sunder-Plassmann and Rachel Gasowski

            “In a time of universal deceit telling the truth is a revolutionary act” – The challenges facing free media in Tajikistan

            The authorities in Tajikistan have taken George Orwell’s words to the letter, as they have increasingly come to regard media outlets and independent journalists who ask probing questions, attempt to promote transparency and create space for public debate as a threat to their hold on power.[1] Government officials frequently invoke painful memories of violence and turmoil during the 1992-1997 civil war in Tajikistan to justify restrictions on media and other fundamental freedoms and to emphasise the image of the current regime as a guarantor of stability and national security. The colour revolutions in the former Soviet space and the Arab spring further exacerbated the authorities’ fears of the public exposure of government wrongdoings, corruption or human rights violations, all of which, they are afraid could push societal grievances to a tipping point beyond their control.

             

            During a research mission on media freedom in Tajikistan in November 2019, a human rights activist told us: “When a journalist writes something critical about a government policy the authorities think he is being critical of the entire government. They see him as a traitor even if he is a journalist who goes about his work as a professional and has no ideological agenda at all!”

             

            In today’s Tajikistan journalists have limited possibilities to provide information to the public on issues deemed ‘sensitive’ by the authorities without endangering their own safety or that of family members; to contribute to an informed public debate through news reporting and analysis; and to influence political decision-making. When asked about ‘sensitive’ issues many journalists we spoke to agreed that these included criticising President Emomali Rahmon, his family and their business affairs; the cult of personality; nepotism, corruption and privileges those in power enjoy; and reports about the fate of imprisoned members of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), their relatives and IRPT activities abroad.

             

            The muzzling of independent media outlets and journalists that do not toe the Government line forms part of a broader trend of increased authoritarianism in Tajikistan, which followed the banning of the opposition IRPT in 2015 and that has been reflected in increasing pressure on civil society groups and freedom of expression more generally.

             

            Many independent newspapers, electronic media outlets and news agencies such as Khafta, Nigoh, Nuri zindagi, Ozodagon, Paykon and TojNews have had to close down over the past decade for reasons including government interference with editorial policy, excessive tax inspections, and economic challenges. In 2020, the Prague-based news site akhbor.com, that had provided independent media content for four years, discontinued its work after the Supreme Court had added it to the list of prohibited sites in February last year. According to the Court, the news outlet, which had routinely quoted emigrants representing opposition groups such as the banned IRPT and Group-24 (among many other activists, analysts and experts), had offered a platform to “terrorists and extremists”. Those remaining privately-owned Tajikistani media outlets that aim to maintain an independent editorial policy (such as ASIA-Plus and Avesta) and journalists working for international media outlets with offices in Tajikistan such as Radio Ozodi, are forced to negotiate a path between restrictive legislation, pressure from the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) and other government agencies, and the desire to adhere to professional ethics. Most other media outlets are state-controlled and follow the Government line.

             

            Providing information: a risky mission

            Many independent journalists we spoke to in Tajikistan told us about their commitment to provide balanced information to the public in order to facilitate an informed public debate on various issues including politics and human rights. Some wished the authorities would see their work as of service to the country, as a way to identify and address societal problems and grievances. “Instead of promoting transparent reporting, the authorities increase the capacity of the State Committee for National Security to spy on citizens in order to understand what’s going on in society”, one interlocutor told us.

             

            The last few years have seen a quickening exodus from Tajikistan of dozens of journalists and editors following the 2015 banning of the IRPT. While some were supportive of the IRPT movement, others were forced into exile as a punishment for their independent reporting. Others face the choice of remaining in the country but giving up their profession or ceding to the demands of the SCNS. Many now make ends meet by doing odd jobs. In this way, Tajikistan lost many of its experienced journalists.

             

            The few independent-minded journalists who continue to work in Tajikistan told us that the atmosphere has changed. Government agencies routinely put pressure on the remaining independent journalists and media representatives and have succeeded in sowing mistrust and dividing the journalistic community. “We used to discuss things in the kitchen in the past, but we don’t trust anyone anymore. If something happens to a journalist the others won’t show solidarity, he can only count on his closest friends”, a journalist told us on condition of anonymity. Most of the independent journalists who talked about the limitations of media freedom in Tajikistan asked us not to publish their names and several journalists and members of their families chose not to meet with us for fear of reprisals.

             

            Local human rights and media groups have repeatedly drawn attention to the plight of independent journalists in Tajikistan and have called on the authorities to bring their practices in line with their international human rights obligations.

             

            Surviving 2020 and new challenges ahead

            When we visited Tajikistan in November 2019, there was a sense among independent journalists and media outlets of needing “to survive the next year”, as both Parliamentary and Presidential elections took place in 2020. “We understand that the authorities have all the necessary measures at their disposal to silence us. Many readers are unhappy about self-censorship, but we have to make sure we can survive the period of the elections in 2020”, one journalist said on condition of anonymity.

             

            Then the COVID-19 pandemic hit, bringing additional challenges for independent journalists in Tajikistan. Throughout March and April 2020 the Tajikistani authorities denied that the virus had spread to Tajikistan despite media reports and social media accounts indicating that the pandemic was already progressing rapidly across the country. The authorities refuted a transparent approach and rebutted journalists’ questions. On April 18th 2020, Jamshed Shohidon, the Deputy Health Minister, blamed the spike in ‘pneumonia’ cases on exceptionally rainy weather conditions.

             

            Instead of welcoming media reports about the first suspected cases of COVID-19 and using the media as a tool to raise awareness and slow the spread of the virus, the authorities warned the bearers of bad news that they would be “held to account”. On April 24th 2020, a little less than a week before the authorities admitted there were cases of coronavirus in Tajikistan, the Ministry of Health criticised journalists for reporting cases of death with COVID-19 like symptoms. It blamed them for “escalating the situation, leading to conflict and distrust in the Government and the Ministry”, according to a statement posted on the Ministry’s website. The statement concluded with the threat that “any media outlet, private individual or reporter who publishes incorrect and false information about the coronavirus will be brought to account.”

             

            Even after the authorities announced the first officially confirmed infections of coronavirus on April 30th, they continued to blame the media for its coverage of the pandemic. According to the Government news agency Khovar.tj, on May 7th 2020, the Prosecutor General’s Office press department warned that “legal measures will be taken against anybody who sows panic in the country”.[2]

             

            Since then, the authorities have continued to play down the scale of the pandemic and the number of officially confirmed deaths has been consistently lower than civil society estimates. During a press conference in January 2021, Justice Minister Muzaffar Ashuriyon stated “that there were no deaths in Tajik prisons as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic”.[3]

             

            After the Presidential elections on October 11th 2020, Emomali Rahmon was re-elected for a fifth term, receiving over 90 per cent of the vote with a turnout of some 85 per cent. According to the Election Assessment Mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the elections “took place within an environment tightly controlled by state authorities and characterised by long-standing restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms, including of association, assembly, expression, media, and harassment and intimidation of dissenting voices”.[4] Election observers added that there “was no genuine political alternative offered to voters, with only contrived debate between formal candidates and lack of independent media covering the campaign.”

             

            Unfortunately, the New Year did not bring calm after the storm. In early 2021, pressure has intensified on independent journalists and those defending media freedom.

             

            Methods to silence independent journalism

            Although the Constitution of Tajikistan safeguards media freedom, national laws fail to provide sufficient protection to journalists and media outlets and the authorities use an array of methods to keep media outlets on their toes, discourage critical reporting and force journalists into silence or cooperation. These repressive measures have led to a high degree of self-censorship among journalists, deeply regretted by many as diametrically opposed to their core convictions about the role of a journalist.

             

            For example, in order to discourage critical reporting authorities typically refrain from providing journalists with information on issues of public interest that they regard as ‘sensitive’ claiming that the information is ‘secret’, respond with such a delay that the issue is no longer topical, or exclude independent journalists from official press briefings. When journalists tried to obtain official information and clarification in connection with allegations of coronavirus infections last spring, they quickly hit a wall. In a letter to Sirojiddin Muhriddin, the Foreign Minister of Tajikistan, dated March 30th 2020, Jamie Fly, President of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), deplored attempts by the Tajikistani authorities to interfere with Radio Ozodi, RFE/RL’s Tajik Service’s coverage of the pandemic, stating that “Officials with the Health Ministry, the Anti-Epidemic Commission, and your own ministry have refused to speak with Ozodi correspondents […] and have excluded them from press briefings.”[5] In another example, ASIA-Plus sent 15 questions about the COVID-19 pandemic to the Ministry of Health on August 7th 2020. Three weeks later, on August 28th, ASIA-Plus received replies to only four of the questions. Among others, the Ministry did not respond to questions of how many patients were hospitalised with coronavirus at the time, how many medical professionals had been infected with coronavirus and how many had died since the beginning of the pandemic.[6]

             

            Licensing requirements for Tajikistani radio and TV broadcasters and accreditation of journalists working for foreign media outlets are frequently used as a tool to put pressure on journalists and media outlets. Local human rights groups and media watchdogs have called on the authorities to abolish the accreditation requirement, which is so often misused to influence media content.  A 2018 law provides that local journalists wanting to cover elections have to obtain an additional permit from the Central Election Committee. In 2020, six Radio Ozodi journalists and several ASIA-Plus journalists were denied the permit on technicalities.

             

            Officials with the SCNS frequently initiate so-called ‘prophylactic conversations’; they invite journalists or representatives of media outlets for a ‘conversation’ without an official summons, urge them to follow a pro-government editorial policy, to refrain from covering certain issues, or to publish materials drafted by the authorities. Warnings to media outlets typically include that failure to comply will lead to a revocation of their media licence and extraordinary tax checks. Threats to fabricate criminal charges or harm family members are also common. Journalists told us that officials were often surprisingly well-informed about their private lives, their families and loved ones and appeared to have meticulously gathered information in order to find effective ways to threaten and scare them into compliance.

             

            Targeting family members is a strategy not only used to put pressure on journalists inside Tajikistan but also to silence those exiled Tajikistani journalists who continue to write about ‘sensitive’ topics from abroad.

             

            Charges contained in the Administrative and Criminal Codes that can be used to punish the legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression hang over journalists’ heads like Damocles’ sword. Although in 2012 defamation was partially decriminalised with the repeal of Criminal Code Articles 135 (“defamation”) and 136 (“insult”), Articles 137 and 330 were retained, punishing “public insult or defamation of the President of Tajikistan” and “insult of a public official” by fines or imprisonment of up to five or two years, respectively. In October 2016, amendments to the Criminal Code created a new offence seeking to shield the President from criticism – Article 137, part 1 criminalises “insulting the Leader of the Nation through the media through print, online or other media”, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment.[7] These amendments run contrary to international human rights standards, which are clear that public officials should be prepared to tolerate more, rather than less, criticism, given the importance of allowing effective public scrutiny of government actions.

             

            Journalists and bloggers who speak out critically about state policies or practices are also at risk of being charged with articles that are worded so broadly and imprecisely that they grant overly wide discretion to authorities in their interpretation and application, leading to arbitrariness. Examples include provisions relating to restrictions on terrorism and extremism as well as Article 189 which punishes “inciting national, racial, local or religious discord”.

             

            In addition to discouraging the production and publication of critical media reports, authorities also limit their distribution. In recent years several local and foreign media websites have been blocked or completely disabled.[8] Prosecutions and sentences of prison terms for ‘liking’ and ‘sharing’ posts that the authorities deemed to be of ‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’ content have scared internet users and many are believed to have since refrained from accessing, reading and sharing media material for fear of reprisals.

             

            Conclusion

            As long as the Tajikistani authorities continue to pursue an authoritarian agenda, fundamental policy change toward strengthened civil and political freedoms including freedoms of expression and media freedom is unlikely. Therefore, it is all the more important that the international community fully uses its leverage through bi-lateral and multilateral channels, e.g. in the framework of any GSP+ negotiations, in order to protect individuals at risk and support Tajikistani human rights and media freedom organisations. International stakeholders should also persistently call on Tajikistan to comply with its international human rights obligations, particularly as a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and implement the important recommendations on media freedom that the UN Human Rights Committee issued to Tajikistan in 2019.[9]

             

            For further information, refer to the report ‘The price of silence vs. the cost of speaking out. Media freedom in Tajikistan’, which was published jointly by International Partnership for Human Rights and Article 19 in July 2020.[10]

             

            Anne Sunder-Plassmann and Rachel Gasowski work as human rights researchers and editors at International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR). From 1999 to 2014, prior to joining IPHR, Anne worked for Amnesty International as campaigner, then researcher on several countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. She holds a master’s degree in Eastern European History and Slavonic Studies from Hamburg University. Anne carried out field research on topics including torture, persecution of dissidents, human rights violations affecting LGBT people, domestic violence and the death penalty. Rachel joined IPHR in 2015. Before that she worked as Researcher for Amnesty International, and also for the European Council for Refugees and Exiles. She has experience of researching and writing publications on topics including torture and ill-treatment, prison conditions and juvenile justice, fundamental rights, domestic violence, persecution of human rights defenders and the death penalty.She holds a Russian degree from Bristol University.

             

            [1] As set out in the title of this essay “In a time of universal deceit telling the truth is a revolutionary act.”

            [2] Khovar, Are you not provided with the necessary medical care? Are prices for medicines increased in pharmacies? Call the General Prosecutor’s Office of Tajikistan, May 2020, https://khovar.tj/rus/2020/05/vam-ne-okazyvayut-neobhodimuyu-meditsinskuyu-pomoshh-v-aptekah-zavysheny-tseny-na-lekarstva-pozvonite-v-generalnuyu-prokuraturu-tadzhikistana/

            [3] Sarvinoz Ruhullo and Amriddin Olim, Head of the Ministry of Justice: not a single case of death from COVID-19 in the prisons of Tajikistan was recorded, Radio Ozodi, February 2021, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31080502.html

            [4] OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan – Presidential Election 11 October 2020, ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/6/477019.pdf

            [5] RFE/RL, RFE/RL President Jamie Fly’s Letter to Tajik Minister of Foreign Affairs Sirojiddin Muhriddin, March 2020, https://pressroom.rferl.org/a/rferl-president-jamie-fly-letter-to-tajik-minister-of-foreign-affairs-sirojiddin-muhriddin/30520646.html

            [6] ASIA-Plus, How much did Tajikistan spend on the fight against COVID-19, September 2020, https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20200908/kto-poluchil-koronavirusnie-nadbavki

            [7] The title of ‘Leader of the Nation’ was conferred on President Rahmon in December 2015 and is a life-long title.

            [8] For example, in recent years the websites of news outlets ASIA-Plus and Radio Ozodi, of social media and online platforms such as Facebook, Viber, Instagram and Youtube have been arbitrarily blocked on several occasions. At the time of writing the sites of ASIA-Plus, Avesto and Radio Ozodi were fully or partially blocked in Tajikistan.

            [9] UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Tajikistan, 22 August 2019, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fTJK%2fCO%2f3&Lang=en

            [10] IPHR, The price of silence vs. the cost of speaking out, Media freedom in Tajikistan, July 2020, https://www.iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ENG-Media-Report-TJ.pdf

            Topics
            Civil Society
            Democracy and Elections
            Freedom of Expression
            Good Governance and Institutional Reform
            Human Rights
            International Relations and Geopolitics
            Media and Online Freedom
            Regions
            Former Soviet Union
            Central Asia
            Tajikistan
            Footnotes
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              Academic freedom in Tajikistan: From suppression of scholars to incorporation into Rahmon’s regime

              Article by Dr Oleg Antonov, Dr Edward Lemon and Dr Parviz Mullojonov

              Academic freedom in Tajikistan: From suppression of scholars to incorporation into Rahmon’s regime

              On March 3rd 2021, presidential aide, Abdujabbor Rahmonzoda, called on intellectuals to wage an ‘information war’ on the opposition.[1] A month earlier, the Government of Tajikistan had issued a directive stating that government employees could only write PhD dissertations on topics pre-approved by the country’s president Emomali Rahmon.[2] The first of these signs of the Government’s tightening grip on academic freedom in the country came two months after Tajikistan celebrated President’s Day on November 16th. On that day in 1992, at the height of the country’s civil war, Rahmon was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet and therefore head of state. State-controlled media was abuzz with articles and interviews, with officials praising the ‘Leader of the Nation’, a title Rahmon has held since 2015. Among those paying homage to the President were a number of professors and researchers. Saltanat Salmonova from the Avicenna Tajik State Medical University, in an article entitled, ‘Our Leader, Our Pride’, stated that “today all the achievements and progress we see are due to the merits of this selfless person.”[3] Another article by an academic claimed the President “saved Tajikistan from disintegration.”[4] These two examples point to the ways in which academics have come under the control of the Government, incorporated into the state narrative legitimising the country’s authoritarian regime, and repressed should they be too critical.

               

              Universities should be spaces where academics and students can debate and discuss contentious issues without fear of reprisal. UNESCO established a number of tenets of academic freedom in its ‘Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel’, published in 1997.[5] These include freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof; freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work; freedom from institutional censorship; freedom of teaching and discussion; and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies. Universities develop critical thinking and independent thought. This creates a cadre of skilled technocrats and experts who can serve the regime. But it also facilitates the creation of a pool of potential opposition members.[6] Authoritarian governments around the world take considerable lengths to restrict academic freedom. This essay develops a typology of measures to restrict academic freedom in Tajikistan. We examine the ways in which the Government has suppressed academics by punishing those that dissent, forced others to acquiesce through self-censorship and incorporated academics into the narrative supporting the regime.

               

              Soviet legacies

              The Soviet period continues to cast its long shadow over higher education in the country. It was during the Soviet period that the first universities in the country were opened. At the time of Tajikistan’s independence, there were ten institutions with 65,586 students.[7] Academics in the Soviet Union occupied a position of relative prestige, with access to significant salaries, resources and networks. But at the same time, academics were supposed to serve the interests of the state with 70 per cent of research directed toward defense, economic, or ideological ‘production’.[8] Rather than being independent, universities and research institutions were subordinated to the Party Politburo. The Academy of Science, which coordinated most research, worked closely with the KGB to restrict research activities and international travel for academics.

               

              Not only did the Soviet Government utilise the technical expertise of academics but it also viewed academics as a potential threat. Academics were the basis of the samizdat movement and played crucial roles in the eventual collapse of communism. In Tajikistan, the openings of glasnost gave academics an opportunity to form new social movements calling for reform. For example, Rastokhez, formed in 1989 by a group of academics, called for a revival of the Tajik language. Its leader, Tohir Abdujabbor, was a Candidate of Science in Economics who worked with the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences.[9] Rastokhez would organise one of the first protests in the country and later join the opposition forces during the country’s civil war.

               

              Academic freedom in independent Tajikistan

              While the Marxist-Leninist baggage of Soviet academia has been removed and replaced with a new national ideology centred on the importance of stability and peace guaranteed by President Rahmon, many of the strategies of cooptation and control have been resurrected or have continued since independence. Sources of funding for higher education rapidly declined following independence, with the total budget for all forms of education declining from 11.6 per cent of GDP in 1989 to just 2.3 per cent in 2000.[10] Despite these budget cuts, the higher education sector has developed since independence, at least quantitatively, and there are currently 40 institutions of higher education in Tajikistan, employing 12,484 individuals in teaching and research capacities in Tajikistan, 4,359 of whom are women. Currently, there are 227,026 students in the country, 83,557 of whom are women.[11]

               

              Suppressing independent voices

              Suppression involves practices to repress academic freedom, through intimidation, physical attacks, arrests, removal of academics from their positions, and closure of dissenting institutions.

               

              Arrests

              A number of academics have been arrested in the country. The most well-known case is of Alexander Sodiqov, a PhD student at the University of Toronto, who was detained by the security services in Khorog in 2014 and accused of espionage and treason.[12] Following an international advocacy campaign, Sodiqov was released on July 22nd 2014, but the case against him was not dropped. His case is not an isolated incident.

               

              In January 2020, 113 individuals were detained on charges of being members of the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned organisation in the country. Among them were 20 professors, including Ikromshokh Sattorov, a senior lecturer at the Institute of Languages, Tojiddin Yakubov, head of the department of philology the Tajik National University, and poet Ismoil Kakhkhorov. A number of those arrested had links to the opposition, including the nephew of the former leader of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party, Said Abdullah Nuri, and Ismoil Qahhorov, the husband of cleric Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda’s sister.[13] More recently, the Government has detained at least 50 students who studied in Iran, accusing them of extremism, terrorism and espionage for Tehran.[14]

               

              At the same time as the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, journalist and academic Daler Sharipov was arrested on charges of “inciting religious accord” and “extremism.” Following his arrest, the General Prosecutor’s Office released a statement about Sharipov, saying that “in the period 2013-2019 he published more than 200 articles and notes of extremist content aimed at inciting religious hatred” and in June 2019, he illegally produced 100 copies of a dissertation entitled ‘The Prophet Muhammad and Terrorism’. The Prosecutor General claimed that a religious expert found that the dissertation “was developed in the context of the Muslim Brotherhood movement.”[15] In April 2020, Sharipov was sentenced to one year in prison and later released on January 29, 2021.

               

              Travel restrictions

              The Government of Tajikistan has adopted various measures to restrict access to foreign education and to stop academics from travelling to attend conferences and collaborating with foreign scholars. Up until 2010, approximately 2,500 Tajik citizens were studying Islam abroad mostly in Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Pakistan.[16] But in August 2010, President Rahmon made a speech accusing foreign madrassas of training “terrorists” and calling on them to return.[17] A year later, the Committee on Religious Affairs claimed that 1,950 of these students had returned home, with just 129 of them continuing their religious education.[18]

               

              In May 2018, the Ministry of Education published a regulation requiring academics to seek permission from the Ministry before leaving the country to attend conferences, providing details about the event and an outline of their presentation.[19] An additional directive published in August 2018 requires students planning to study abroad or participate in internships overseas to seek permission from the Ministry of Education. In justifying the move, the Government claimed it was “to protect young people from the influence of terrorism propaganda.”[20]

               

              Closure

              With the exception of the Aga Khan Foundation-funded University of Central Asia in Khorog, no independent universities exist within the country. Efforts to establish independent, private universities have been prevented by the Government. One such effort was the Institute of Technical Innovations and Communications, founded in 2003, and known by various names, including the University of International Relations. Established by Tajik-American citizen Sadriddin Akramov, the institute employed a number of opposition figures, including Social Democrat Party leaders Rahmatillo Zoirov and Shokirdjon Hakimov and the leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party, Muhiddin Kabiri. After years of pressure, in September 2009, the Ministry of Education demanded its closure for three months for ‘technical reasons’ to check its documents and activities. The Minister of Education described the university as “a hotbed of anti-government propaganda and political opposition” in a letter to President Rahmon.[21] The university was closed in 2010.

               

              Exile

              Some researchers have been forced to leave the country. At least eight academics have left the country in recent years according to our figures. Hafiz Boboyorov left the country in 2015. An employee of the Academy of Sciences since 1998, in 2014, he founded the Center for the Study of Contemporary Processes and Future Planning at the Academy of Sciences. But he lost this position in 2015 after he criticised the move by Parliament to make Rahmon ‘Leader of the Nation’, and thus able to rule the country indefinitely.[22] He left the country shortly afterwards. These estimates are likely an underestimate as academics do not usually announce their departure abroad and use pen names even after departing.

               

              Surveillance and intimidation

              Academics in the country are subject to surveillance and threatened not to voice independent opinions. A Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for National Security overseas academic publications by both local and foreign researchers, monitoring them for criticism of the Government. Employees of the security services are embedded in each of the 40 higher education institutions to report on the activities of employees and students there.

               

              Acquiescence to Regime

              In Tajikistan, there is a pattern of ‘educated acquiescence’, with academics complying with the Government in exchange for the benefits conferred upon them by the state.[23]

               

              Institutional autonomy

              The legal environment related to academic freedom in Tajikistan includes articles of the Constitution of Tajikistan, laws ‘On Education’ (2004) and ‘On Higher and Postgraduate Vocational Education’ (2009).   In accordance with Article 40 of the Constitution of Tajikistan “everyone has the right to free participation in the cultural life of society, artistic, scientific and technical creativity and to use their achievements. Cultural and spiritual values ​​are protected by the state. Intellectual property is protected by law.” Students and instructors are given ‘academic freedoms’ defined in Tajikistan as “freedom of delivering the content of learning in one’s own way – within the learning programmes” and “a freedom of those who study [students] to acquire knowledge in accordance with their own inclinations – within the learning programmes.”

               

              Yet in reality, legislators have guaranteed that the state controls universities and they have no autonomy. This is evidenced by paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the law ‘On Higher and Postgraduate Vocational Education’ which gives a special right to “the President and the Government, without competition, to appoint a rector in state universities.” This effectively places the state above universities. Rectors retain a great deal of power within the university system, managing budgets, the hiring of staff and controls what research can be conducted. All rectors in the country are members of the ruling People’s Democratic Party. 15 of the 40 are from Khatlon region, with four coming from Danghara district, where the President was born. The Soviet-era Accreditation Commission and its Councils of Scientists control the accreditation academics, preventing critical engagement by Tajik scholars. The Academy of Sciences is organisationally considered a government department. Rectors are appointed and dismissed from their positions by the Government.

               

              Self-censorship

              Many academics engage in self-censorship as a means to preserve their positions. Critical engagement with politically and socially sensitive subjects, such as politics, corruption and extremism, remains risky and most chose to avoid these subjects. Another serious problem is access to data and statistics. Critical and independent scholars face additional challenges in gaining government permission to conduct fieldwork and research projects. It forces local scholars to limit their criticism and to conform to official narratives in their studies. In many cases, local respondents refuse to participate in the studies conducted by independent scholars fearing for their safety and security.

               

              Incorporation into the Government discourse

              Intellectuals are crucial to the formation of policies, even in authoritarian contexts. They also form a crucial source of ruling class hegemony.

               

              Factory of answers

              As well as controlling the state media and disseminating its narrative, the Government has also taken steps to distort the opposition’s discourse, a process known as the fabrikai javob (‘the factory of answers’).[24] This refers to efforts by the security services to re­spond to criticism on social media and deploys the ‘truth’ via various individuals, including teachers, professors and government employees. The Government has enlisted the support of ‘volunteers’ in its mission to police the web.[25]

               

              Given their authority, academics are integral to the fabrikai javob. A Radio Ozodi investigation identified at least five people working in the structures of the Ministry of Education and Science of Tajikistan who also worked at a government ‘troll factory’, creating fake accounts on social networks, praising the Government and criticising the opposition.[26] The investigation estimated that at least 400 members are involved in the troll factory, or ‘Analytical Information Group’ within the Ministry of Education.

               

              Academics are called on to praise the President and assert that he is responsible for all the supposed progress in the country. Kholmakhmad Samiev, Dean of the Faculty of International Relations at the Tajik National University, penned a piece in April 2015 proposing that Rahmon be made ‘Leader of the Nation’, a title he gained later that year.[27] They are also pressured into criticising the opposition, calling them “extremists,” “traitors” whose actions threaten unity and stability. Each week, the security services circulate lists of topics they would like to see academics write about. In many cases, the security services write the pieces and then force academics to add their name to them. Combined, these strategies incorporate scholars into narratives legitimising the Government.

               

              Conclusion

              From suppressing independent academics to coopting scholars to re-enforce the state narrative that legitimates Tajikistan’s authoritarian regime, academic freedom is under attack in Tajikistan. Reports by Human Rights Watch, Freedom House and the State Department documenting a litany of abuses in other spheres but have largely neglected issues of academic freedom. When John Heathershaw and Edward Schatz penned an essay in openDemocracy exploring different options for external partners, ranging from boycotts to blacklists, they sparked a debate about the harm that could come from further isolating Tajik academics and the role that Western researchers have played in endangering Tajik colleagues.[28] These debates are important and should continue.

               

              We believe that academic freedom in Tajikistan is imperiled and this should not be ignored. The reasons for this are driven by the behaviour of international partners, but more importantly the Government of Tajikistan itself. We concur with Hafiz Boboyorov, Schatz and Heathershaw that “critical engagement” is the best strategy for international partners.[29] Rather than boycotting Tajik academia wholesale, this would involve making financial and other forms of cooperation between foreign bodies and academic institutions in the country, such as the Erasmus+ and World Bank’s Tajikistan Higher Education Project, conditional upon the involvement of independent scholars, think tanks and NGOs. Partners should raise concerns about academic freedom and the abuses of human rights during research collaborations. Through these measures, we could start to open the space for greater academic freedom in Tajikistan.

               

              Oleg Antonov is a guest researcher at the Department of Global Political Studies and Russia and the Caucasus Regional Research at Malmö University. He was previously a visiting scholar at the Södertörn University. His research focuses on education in Tajikistan and authoritarianism in Eurasia.

               

              Edward Lemon is Research Assistant Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, Washington DC Teaching Site. He was previously at the Wilson Center and Columbia University. His research examines issues of authoritarianism, international relations and security in Central Asia.

               

              Parviz Mullojonov, (Mullojanov) Ph.D., a political scientist, and historian, senior adviser to the International Alert office in Tajikistan and visiting researcher at the EHESS, Paris and former visiting researcher at the University of Uppsala, Sweden. He is former Chairman of the Board of the Tajik branch of the Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation); and former member of the EUCAM (EU and Central Asia Monitoring) research group. He is a former visiting professor at Whitman College (USA) and research fellow and at the Kettering Foundation (USA) and visiting scholar at the University of Exeter (UK), University of Heidelberg (Germany), and School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences – EHESS (Paris). Parviz Mullojonov worked for various international agencies and organisations such as Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, UNCHR, UNDP, ADB, Soros Foundation, and International Alert. Parviz Mullojanov received his Ph.D. in Islamic studies at the University of Basel (Switzerland).

               

              Image by Алишер Курбоналиев under (CC).

               

              [1] Rahmonzoda Ziyoiyoni Tojikro ba ”Jangi Ittilooti”- i ziddi Muholifon Da’vat Kard [Rahmonzoda called on Tajik intellectuals to wage an “information war” against the opposition], Radio Ozodi, March 2021, https://www.ozodi.org/a/31143080.html

              [2] V Tadzhikistane goschinovniki smogut zashchitit’ dissertatsii tol’ko s razresheniya prezidenta [In Tajikistan, government officials will be able to defend dissertations only with the permission of the president], Radio Ozodi, February 2021, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31082130.html

              [3] Jumhuriyat, Saltanat Salmonova, Peshvoi Mo – Iftihori Mo [Our Leader, Our Pride], November 2020, http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=42496

              [4] Jumhuriyat, Havasmoh Sohibnazarova, Marifat. Vaqte Rohbar Khiradi Azali Dorad… [Enlightenment. When a Leader has Eternal Wisdom], November 2020, http://jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=42497

              [5] UNESCO, Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel (Recommendation), 1997, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13144&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

              [6] Bueno de Mesquita, Bruno. and Downs, George. 2005. “Democracy and Development,” Foreign Affairs, September/October.

              [7] Kataeva, Zukhra. and DeYoung, Alan. 2018. Faculty Challenges and Barriers for Research and Publication in Tajik Higher Education. European Education: 252.

              [8] Ibid.

              [9] See: Scarborough, Isaac. 2018. The Extremes it Takes to Survive: Tajikistan and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985-1992, PhD Diss: LSE, London.

              [10] Kataeva, Zukhra. and DeYoung, Alan. 2018. Faculty Challenges and Barriers for Research and Publication in Tajik Higher Education. European Education 50: 250.

              [11] Ministry of Education. 2020. Ministerstvo obrazovaniya i nauki Respubliki Tadzhikistan. Statisticheskiy sbornik sfery obrazovaniya Respubliki Tadzhikistan na 2019-2020 gg [Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Tajikistan. Statistics of the education sector of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2019-2020] Dushanbe.

              [12] Katya Kumkova, Canadian Researcher Released after Five Weeks in Tajikistan Jail. The Guardian, July 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/24/canada-alexander-sodiqov-released-tajikistan

              [13] Akhbor, Ismi 18 Bozdoshtshuda dar Parvandai Ikhvon ul Muslimin Ma’lum Shud (Video) [Name of 18 Detained People Revealed (Video)], January 2020, http://akhbor.com/-p10989-120.htm

              [14] Radio Ozodi, Tadzhikskiye studenty zayavili o zaderzhaniyakh i doprosakh posle obucheniya v Irane [Tajik students report detentions and interrogations after studying in Iran], February 2021, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/31120888.html

              [15] Khovar, Zayavleniye press-tsentra General’noy prokuratury Respubliki Tadzhikistan [Statement by the press center of the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Tajikistan], February 2020, https://khovar.tj/rus/2020/02/zayavlenie-press-tsentra-generalnoj-prokuratury-respubliki-tadzhikistan/

              [16] Abramson, David. 2010. Foreign Religious Education and the Central Asian Islamic Revival: Impact and Prospects for Stability. Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.

              [17] See: Lemon, Edward. 2014. Mediating the Conflict in the Rasht Valley, Tajikistan: The Hegemonic Narrative and Anti-Hegemonic Challenges, Central Asian Affairs 1 (2): 247-272.

              [18] ASIA-Plus, 1,950 Tajik Students Have Returned Home from Islamic Schools Abroad, September 2011, http://www.news.tj/en/news/1950-tajik-students-have-returned-home-islamic-schools-abroad

              [19] Grazhdanskoye obshchestvo Genprokurature RT: Minobrnauki popirayet Konstitutsiyu strany. VIDEO [Civil society to the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Tajikistan: The Ministry of Education and Science violates the Constitution of the country. VIDEO], Radio Ozodi, June 2018, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/29320645.html

              [20] Dar boroi tasdiki tartibi firostodani ta’limgirandagon boroi tahsil ba khoriji kishvar [On approval of the order of sending trainees for study abroad], Ministry of Education, September 2018, https://maorif.tj/storage/Dokument’s/Baynalmilali/ef57cbe070df4e832f80d6b92bedd790.pdf

              [21] RFE/RL, Tajikistan’s Sole Private University Files Lawsuit Against Education Minister, August 2010, https://www.rferl.org/a/Tajikistans_Sole_Private_University_Files_Lawsuit_Against_Education_Minister/2119875.html

              [22] RFE/RL, Tajik Scholar, Government Critic Leaves Country, October 2016, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-scholar/28770973.html

              [23] Perry, Elizabeth. 2020. Educated Acquiescence: How Academia Sustains Authoritarianism in China. Theory and Society 49: 1-22.

              [24] See: Roche, Sophie. 2018. The Fabric of Answer: Constructing a National Facade. Central Asian Affairs 5 (2): 93–110.

              [25] Shafiev, Abdufattoh. and Miles, Marintha. 2015. Friends, Foes, and Facebook: Blocking the Internet in Tajikistan, Demokratizatsiya 23 (3): 297-319.

              [26] «Fabrika trolley» Tadzhikistana: glavnyye litsa i ispolniteli. Rassledovaniye Radio Ozodi popirayet Konstitutsiyu strany. VIDEO [“Troll Factory” of Tajikistan: key figures and performers. Investigation by Radio Ozodi shows this violates the country’s constitution. VIDEO], Radio Ozodi, May 2019, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/29926413.html

              [27] Hamovozi va maqolai «Peshvoi millat» [Echoes of the article “Leader of the Nation”], Sughd, May 2014,  www.hakikati-sugd.tj/index.php/politics/2678-amovoz-ba-ma-olai-peshvoi-millat-to-ikiston-13-az-2-04-2015-s-nosir-on-salim-va-khola-mad-same

              [28] John Heathershaw and Edward Schatz, Academic freedom in Tajikistan endangered: what is to be done? openDemocracy, February 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/academic-freedom-in-tajikistan-endangered/; Karolina Kluczewska, Academic freedom in Tajikistan: western researchers need to look at themselves, too, openDemocracy, February 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/academic-freedom-in-tajikistan/ ; Malika Bahovadinova, Academic freedom in Tajikistan: why boycotts and blacklists are the wrong response. openDemocracy, February 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/academic-freedom-in-tajikistan-boycotts/

              [29] Hafiz Boboyorov, Critical engagement and endangered academic freedom in Tajikistan, openDemocracy, March 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/critical-engagement-and-endangered-academic-freedom-in-tajikistan/

              Topics
              Freedom of Expression
              Good Governance and Institutional Reform
              Human Rights
              International Relations and Geopolitics
              Regions
              Former Soviet Union
              Central Asia
              Tajikistan
              Footnotes
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                Ill-treatment and torture: Something about which women choose to remain silent

                Article by Favziya Nazarova and Nigina Bakhrieva

                Ill-treatment and torture: Something about which women choose to remain silent

                Over the past decade, the Coalition of Civil Society against Torture and Impunity in Tajikistan has documented numerous cases indicating that women and girls in Tajikistan are regularly victims of torture, sexual coercion, insults, humiliation, beatings, and other inhumane treatment by police and law enforcement officials.[1] Between January 1st and December 31st 2020, the Coalition documented 37 cases of torture and ill-treatment, nine of which involved women and two minors.[2]

                 

                Nevertheless, in the Tajik context, where patriarchal culture prevails, women and girls who are victims of torture and ill-treatment face particular discrimination when applying to the competent authorities. Often such complaints are either not registered or women have to go through exhausting and often costly procedures to verify the occurrence of violence. As a result, criminals enjoyed almost absolute impunity, while the State preferred to hide the problem. Furthermore, there is almost no research conducted in this sphere and there is no comprehensive official statistics about the scope of this problem in the country.

                 

                Tajikistan is a state party to CEDAW since 1993 and on July 22nd 2014 the country also acceded to Optional Protocol to the CEDAW. In its concluding observations, the CEDAW Committee repeatedly recommended Tajikistan to prioritise its measures for eliminating violence against women and ensure that women and girls who are victims of violence have access to immediate means of redress and protection, and perpetrators are prosecuted and adequately punished.”[3] However, despite the high level of violence against women, both domestic and custodial, to date no complaints have been submitted to the Committee.

                 

                Police abuse

                Violence against women in detention very often includes rape and other forms of sexual violence, such as threats of rape, touching, being stripped naked, insults, and humiliation of a sexual nature. Victims of police abuse and brutality usually include young, poorly educated and underprivileged women, which leads to their further marginalisation. As it was stated by the UN Special Rapporteur on torture “in addition to the physical trauma, the mental pain and suffering inflicted on victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence are often long-lasting, in particular as a result of subsequent stigmatisation and isolation.”[4] Therefore, in most of the reported cases, women, especially in rural areas did not report such violence for fear of social stigmatisation or because the police had failed to take appropriate action in previous cases, and because of possible reprisals by abusers.

                 

                The few victims who were brave enough to report the violence to the Coalition Legal Aid Unit constitute a small percentage, while in most cases women prefer not to speak openly about the humiliation they have suffered.

                 

                In summer 2019, the Coalition Legal Aid Group registered the case of a 24-year-old resident of Vakhsh district, N.B., who had been subjected to ill-treatment and violence by the district internal affairs officers. A young woman was brought in on suspicion of theft and detained for almost two days, during which police officers used various forms of humiliation to force her to confess to a crime, including insults, threats and torture. According to the victim, she was blindfolded and forced to flee quickly along a narrow corridor of the office, causing her to run into the wall several times and fall. She was also beaten repeatedly, which caused her severe pain. She was later given an injection, which partially paralysed her as she could not feel her arms and legs. Taking advantage of her condition and helplessness, she was raped by a police officer.

                 

                Despite the best efforts of the lawyers, to date no police officers responsible have been brought to justice. In the presence of the lawyer, the victim indicted at one of the duty officers of the Vakhsh District Department of Internal Affairs, however, the management refused to inform the lawyer of his name.

                 

                For about a year now, a complaint of torture against the victim has been examined by the competent authorities at various levels, from the Office of the Procurator-General, the Office of the Procurator-General of Vakhsh district, the District Court of Vakhsh and the District Procurator’s Office of Khatlon, but N.B. has been awaiting a response to her complaints to date.

                 

                Rape and sexual harassment by the hands of law enforcement officers 

                It’s widely recognised that rape “carried out by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of public officials” constitutes torture and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.[5] However, there are cases when women and young girls become victims of sexual violence while addressing the law enforcement agencies with complaints.

                 

                In October 2018, a resident of the village of Pakhtakor, Pyanj district, S.H. turned to a local police officer, with a complaint against the unlawful actions of her neighbour. In spite of registering the complaint and taking appropriate measures, the officer locked the door of his office and raped the woman. According to the victim, the police officer threatened that if the incident became known, he would cripple her and make her as disabled as her mother, who has been paralysed and bedridden for years. However, according to the victim, she would not have been able to tell anyone without these threats, as it would have been a disgrace to her and her family.

                 

                Taking advantage of her weakness and his own impunity, the police officer continued to harass the young woman for more than eight months, raping and beating her until she had the courage to call a medical expert to record the beatings. The medical examination documented the victim’s beatings, including a broken arm, nose, as well as injuries to his ribs and chest. The victim filed complaints against the police officer to the Department of Internal Affairs of Khatlon province. However, the beatings and threats did not stop there, to the extent that the police officer attacked her with a knife, injuring her seven-year-old son who stood up to defend his mother.

                 

                As a result, the police officer was fired from the internal affairs agencies, but was not prosecuted. To the date his victim does not give up hope for justice. In January 2020, when she repeatedly addressed the General Prosecutor’s Office with her complaint, she was told that an investigation was being conducted, however, no additional information was provided.

                 

                Torture and ill-treatment against female relatives of the suspect and detained persons

                In addition, female relatives of suspects and detainees are also among the victims of violence in places of detention. There are cases where suspects confess to a crime under duress, including threats of rape against their mother, wife or daughter.

                 

                Case of Hasan Yodgorov

                In the autumn of 2017, internal affairs officers in Tursunzade arrested Hasan Yodgorov on suspicion of murder. Immediately after his arrest, a video was shown on central television in which Yodgorov confessed to the murder. However, nine months later, Yodgorov was released after the real killer was apprehended. After his release, Yodgorov told that the confession was made under torture and ill-treatment, to which his mother, his wife and even his eight-year-old daughter were also subjected.

                 

                Sharofat Narzykulova, Yodgorov’s mother, was subjected to ill-treatment from the first days of her son’s detention. When attempting to enter the police station, the person on duty abruptly closed the door and slammed her hand, so she stood for 20 minutes, after which random passers-by helped push the door and free the woman’s hand. When her son was charged with murder, Narzykulova herself was tried as an accomplice, allegedly hiding a stolen bracelet and the deceased’s phone. For two weeks, she was summoned daily for extended questioning. During the interrogation, the woman was insulted, called a “thief” and “mother of the murderer” in front of her son, who could not even say a word in defence of his mother and only cried in silence. During one of the interrogations, his son was forced to kneel and ask his mother for money. According to S.Narzykulova, she was asked for $6,000. The son, on his knees, begged the mother to find the money to stop the abuse they were both experiencing.

                 

                Tojinissiso Izatullo, Yodgorov’s wife and his eight-year-old daughter were also subjected to the brutality of law enforcement: the woman was constantly harassed, insulted and humiliated, and threatened that if her husband did not confess the crime the child would be sent to an orphanage. As a result of constant interrogations, the child suffered a great deal of psychological trauma and developed nervous enuresis (urinary incontinence).

                 

                Based on the received information, a criminal case was initiated against officers of the Tursunzade Internal Affairs Department Sherali Azizov, Saadi Davlatmurodzoda, Eradj Naimov, for using torture and ill-treatment against Yedgorov and his family members. The first trial was held in July 2019 in the Supreme Court of Tajikistan. Nevertheless, on January 16th 2020, the judge decided to return the case for additional investigation due to the fact that “… there were a number of flaws and violations of procedural norms…” In particular, the judge stated that the criminal investigation should be initiated not only against the police officers who had committed the torture, but also against the judge in Tursunzade city court, who had tried the case of administrative detention, the leadership of the Internal Affairs Department and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who have failed to exercise proper control over the actions of their officers.[6]

                 

                To the date there is no information about the course of the investigation.

                 

                Case of Mastona Zainiddionva and Mariam Sodikova

                On December 16th 2017, officers of the Internal Affairs Department of the Shohmansoor district of Dushanbe detained Mariam Sodikova and two of her minor children, in connection with the search for Sodikova’s husband, accused of stealing a large sum of money. According to the woman, she was subjected to electric shocks in an attempt to obtain information about her husband’s whereabouts. The torture continued for three days, during which the children were held at the police station and allowed to sleep on chairs. In addition, the police also detained Mastonа Zainiddinova, wife of the suspect’s brother, with her and she was also subjected to beatings and humiliation.

                 

                One year later, the General Procurator’s Office initiated criminal proceedings against Shohmansur district police officer Nurhonov F. and other persons under six articles of the Criminal Code, including the use of torture.

                 

                On December 16th 2019, the Dushanbe court handed down a verdict in which the defendants were found guilty on all charges and received the following punishment: Nurhonov F. – 17 years’ imprisonment, Sabzaev A.- 9 years’ imprisonment, Wakhobov U. – 7.5 years of imprisonment, and Ikroriddin Akhliddin – 9 years of imprisonment.[7]

                 

                Violence against female sex-workers

                In addition, female sex workers are often victims of abuse by law enforcement agencies. Under article 130 of the Code of Administrative Offences, prostitution was only an administrative offence and was punishable by a fine or administrative detention for ten to 15 days. However, the police have used various methods of pressure against sex workers, including verbal abuse, inhuman and degrading treatment and arbitrary detention. At the same time, police officers visit sex workers and demand free sexual services, using their position, violence and blackmail.[8]

                 

                Social and family stigmatisation

                Often, the suffering caused by sexual violence by public officials goes ‘beyond the suffering caused by classical torture’, as victims usually find no support from either society or family members, which often leads to her isolation.[9] In the context of Tajik society, very often families, including parents and husbands, abandon victims of sexual violence, condemning them to destitution and poverty.

                 

                Victims of sexual violence face a high level of stigma. It can take place at the individual level as well as within the family or community and at the institutional level, including the judiciary. Guilt and shame, fueled by traditional prejudices, often discourage victims from talking about their experiences.

                 

                The cases, mentioned above clearly demonstrate lack of support from the state and judicial bodies. Women who are victims of torture face a number of difficulties. According to the national legislation, they must independently prove that they are victims of torture, which includes various expert examinations, the gathering of evidence, the filing of complaints and many others, which is almost impossible without the qualified assistance of a lawyer, which is not always available, especially in rural areas. Moreover, female detainees who are victims of rape face major obstacles when seeking justice. The procedures required to pursue a complaint can often lead to the re-traumatisation of the victim.

                 

                In addition, complaints about torture and ill-treatment are often not investigated effectively because the investigating institutions are not sufficiently independent. No separate and independent mechanisms capable of carrying out effective criminal investigations and prosecutions have been set up in Tajikistan despite recommendations by the CAT, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the Special Rapporteur on torture.

                 

                In Tajik society, there is special discrimination against women who are single parents or divorced women. Often victims of violence complain of rough treatment, even in the prosecution system, where she is branded ‘beva’ (divorced or widowed), which gives an excuse to treat her roughly and/or impolitely. In colloquial speech, the word is used for the purpose of humiliation.

                 

                In addition, victims of torture are usually criminal suspects, which creates negative social attitudes towards them. Unfortunately, the presumption of innocence is often forgotten, and a detained or suspected citizen is already subjected to negative treatment and may be subjected to cruel treatment for the purpose of punishment.

                 

                Coalition’s efforts to fight against torture and impunity

                Since 2011, the Coalition has documented over 1,000 cases of torture. While most victims of torture are still waiting for justice and perpetrators enjoy impunity, the Coalition and its lawyers sometimes are the only hope for the victims of torture and their family members. Apart from the legal consultations, the Coalition also represents the victims and their relatives in the courts for claiming compensation for the physical and moral harm and as a result of Coalition’s litigation in court, financial compensation was provided to nine of victims. The Coalition helped change laws and increase levels of public awareness about the responsibilities of the state and the rights of victims. The Coalition also engaged in dialogue with authorities on improving conditions in closed institutions, including prisons, psychiatric institutions and military units. Members of the Coalition, together with the Ombudsman carry out human rights monitoring in the penitentiary facilities – in light of there being no independent access for the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Coalition also engaged in meaningful process with the state on improving the quality of forensic examination of allegations of torture. Furthermore, the Coalition is promoting rehabilitation services for victims, including psychological assistance. While these are all positive trends towards breaking the cycle of silence by victims, non-action by state actors and impunity for the perpetrators, a lot remains to be done to remove some of the most persistent obstacles to end torture in Tajikistan.

                 

                Conclusion

                According to Oynihol Bobonazarova, one of the prominent human rights activist in Tajikistan and a member of the Coalition of Civil Society against Torture and Impunity in Tajikistan, the widespread use of torture is “a consequence of the failure to combat torture in a country where, in most cases, perpetrators of torture enjoy impunity. This gives investigators a sense of untouchability and permissiveness.”[10] It was therefore necessary to constantly promote a policy of zero tolerance for torture in the country and to ensure that all perpetrators were brought to justice.

                 

                The Coalition welcomes recent positive developments in which Tajikistan’s courts have begun to draw attention to investigative shortcomings as well as broadening the circle of those responsible for torture and ill-treatment (Yodogorov case). However, there is also a need to ensure that criminal investigations and trials address all forms of violence and ill-treatment against women and girls, including through the lens of gender discrimination.

                 

                Recommendations for the Government of Tajikistan:

                1. Various strategic documents in the area of human rights and freedom from torture, including the National Human Rights Strategy until 2030 and its Action Plan for 2021-2023, and the Draft Law on Non-Discrimination, are currently being developed. It is very important to take a gender perspective in the development of any strategies.
                2. There is also a need to conduct educational activities for investigative bodies on the specifics of conducting criminal cases against women victims of torture and ill-treatment.
                3. A State programme for the rehabilitation of torture victims, with a special focus on women, should be developed, as well as rehabilitation centres where women victims of torture could receive psychological assistance and rehabilitation.

                 

                Favziya Nazarova is Director of Public Foundation Notabene (http://www.notabene.tj/). She has over 15 years of experience in protection and human rights advocacy in Tajikistan, with a focus on civil society development, torture and ill-treatment and non-discrimination issues.

                 

                Nigina Bakhrieva is the Founder of Notabene with human rights experience over 20 years. She is a regional Expert on the issues of freedom from torture and other fundamental human rights and the protection of human rights in the United Nations system.

                 

                The information is based on the cases, documented by the Coalition from 2017 to 2020.

                 

                Image by Ninara under (CC).

                 

                [1] Freedom From Torture: the Coalition of Civil Society against Torture and Impunity in Tajikistan, https://notorturetj.org/en

                [2] Civil Society Coalition against tortur’s Annual report 2020, https://notorturetj.org/sites/default/files/articles/2021/files/rezultaty_deyatelnosti_za_2020_g._koaliciya_protiv_pytok_i_beznakazannosti_v_tadzhikistane_1.pdf

                [3] CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/3, 2007, para 22.

                [4] UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Gender perspectives on torture (A/HRC/31/57), para. 51.

                [5] Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, A/HRC/7/3, para 34.

                [6] Freedom from Torture, Press Release, August 2019, https://notorturetj.org/news/press-reliz-0

                [7] Radio Ozodi, Policemen accused of torture received from 7 to 17 years in prison, December 2019, https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30328153.html

                [8] Shah-Aiym Network NGO and Apeyron NGO, Joint submission for the Pre-sessional Working Group for the 71st session of the CEDAW Committee to generate list of issues to the Sixth Periodic Report of the Republic of Tajikistan, Condition of sex workers in Tajikistan, CEDAW, January 2018, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/TJK/INT_CEDAW_NGO_TJK_30029_E.pdf

                [9] Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, A/HRC/7/3, para 36.

                [10] Evening, Abuse and Torture Against Women: What Women Choose to Stay silent about, Vecherka, April 2020, https://vecherka.tj/archives/42131

                Topics
                Civil Society
                Good Governance and Institutional Reform
                Human Rights
                Women's Rights
                Regions
                Former Soviet Union
                Central Asia
                Tajikistan
                Footnotes
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                  Low women’s political participation in Tajikistan: Will the anti-discrimination law be a solution?

                  Article by Dilbar Turakhanova

                  Low women’s political participation in Tajikistan: Will the anti-discrimination law be a solution?

                  Setting the scene: gender (in)equality in Tajikistan

                  Among Central Asian countries, Tajikistan rates lowest in internationally comparable indices of gender equality. With the score of 0.626 in the Global Gender Gap ranking of the World Economic Forum (WEF) Tajikistan ranked 137 of 153 countries in 2020.[1] This index is a composite measure of four dimensions: economic participation and opportunity; educational attainment; health and survival; and political empowerment. Tajikistan ranks highest in health and survival (72 of 153 countries) followed by educational attainment (123 of 153 countries). In political empowerment, Tajikistan ranks 128.[2] The lowest of the four sub-indices is the dimension of economic participation and opportunity, where Tajikistan ranks 134 of 153 countries.[3] In socio-economic development indicators, which make up the Gender Development Index (GDI), the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) ranking of human development, values for the Human Development Index (HDI) of women and men differ substantially. In 2019, the HDI value for men was 0.712 and 0.586 for women showing particular gaps in expected years of schooling (12.6 years for men and 10.7 years for women); mean years of schooling (11.3 years for men and 10.2 years for women) and Gross National Income (GNI). Women’s GNI of $1,440 USD is four and half times lower than for men whose GNI in 2019 was $6,427.[4]

                   

                  These rankings, while not exhaustive, demonstrate that in Tajikistan women lag behind men in all spheres, including education, economic participation, health and political participation. Women in Tajikistan experience various forms of discrimination in merely all spheres, including Violence Against Women (VAW) as one of the extreme examples and many others. The legislation of Tajikistan does not yet address comprehensively discrimination in all forms and does not prohibit discrimination on all possible grounds in line with the international human rights obligations that Tajikistan voluntarily acceded to, especially the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

                   

                  Legal gaps in protection from discrimination in all forms and on all grounds in Tajikistan resulting in gender neutral legislation on women’s political participation[5]

                  Tajikistan as a signatory to a number of international human rights treaties, including CEDAW established in its Constitution in Article 17 guarantees equality of all before the law and the courts. Human rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed by the State for all without distinction based on nationality, race, sex, language, religion, political convictions, and education, social or material status. It also stipulates that men and women have equal rights. Such provisions are replicated in the numerous codes and laws of Tajikistan.

                   

                  In terms of discrimination based on sex, Tajikistan has adopted the special Law on the State Guarantees of Equal Rights of Men and Women and Equal Opportunities of their Enjoyment (hereinafter, referred to as Gender Equality Law) in 2005. This is the only Law that defines the notion of discrimination. It is defined as any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition of equal rights of men and women in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. The notion is not inclusive of direct and indirect discrimination and the Law does not protect from intersectional discrimination.[6] Besides, the Law has several critical gaps: it fails to prohibit workplace discrimination; introduce temporary special measures and prohibit violence against women as a form of gender-based discrimination.[7] It has no measures on elimination of existing social and cultural patterns on role of women that perpetuate discrimination against women.

                   

                  The Article 17 of the Constitution as well as definition of discrimination established by Gender Equality Law are not compliant with the CEDAW intersectionality concept that links discrimination based on sex and gender with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste and sexual orientation and gender identity.[8] While the text of CEDAW adopted in 1979 referred to sex-based discrimination, in 2010 the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women explained that Article 1 of the CEDAW (on discrimination) when read together with Articles 2 (f) and 5 (a) covers gender-based discrimination, thus, calling state parties for explicit legal recognition of intersecting forms of discrimination and their prohibition.[9] In Tajikistan, Lesbian, Gay, By-sexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex (LGBTQI) rights are not recognised.[10] So as the rights of disadvantaged groups of women and girls such as refugee women, migrant women, women left behind by male migrants, widows of male migrants, stateless women, women and girls with disabilities, women living with HIV/AIDS, women in prison and former women inmates, and rural women are not fully considered in legislation.[11]

                   

                  The Constitution stipulates that any citizen who reached the age of 18 has a right to participate in the political life and administration of the state directly or through representatives, they have a right to vote and be elected upon reaching eligible age (Article 27). Similar equality guarantees are provided in the constitutional laws and laws establishing a right to participate in elections to parliament and local municipalities, civil service and judiciary.

                   

                  Tajikistan has a bi-cameral Parliament, Majlisi Oli. The Lower Chamber (Majlisi namoyandagon) is directly elected for a five-year term. Nationals of Tajikistan who reached 30 years and have a higher education have a right to run for the post of the member of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament (Article 49). The elections are administered by the Central Commission on Election and Referenda which supervises district election commissions and precinct election commissions. Elections are conducted in accordance with the Constitutional Law on Elections to Majlisi Oli (High Assembly) that in line with Article 17 of the Constitution ensures the right to vote regardless of ethnicity, race, sex, language, beliefs, political convictions, social status, education and property (Article 4). There are two requirements for running for elections: 1) an election deposit that has to be paid by candidates during registration process, and 2) higher education. Both are gender neutral requirements, but in fact they place women into disadvantaged position compared to men.[12] The deposit shall be paid from the personal means of the candidates and it equals to ten units used for calculation (in 2020, the deposit amount was 5,800 Tajik Somoni or USD $600). The deposit is returned if candidate obtains at least ten per cent of votes. The Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women recommended to withdraw a deposit fee for women to increase their political participation.[13] In general, the deposit fee is too high given Tajikistan economic situation and poverty levels, especially for women, whose economic activity is much lower compared to men and the gender wage gap in Tajikistan.[14] OSCE regards that a requirement of a higher education is overly restrictive and recommends to fully remove it for both male and female candidates. So as the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women considers that such a requirement contravenes the CEDAW even if applied to both women and men, because it may have a disproportionate impact on women.[15] In Tajikistan, where women have a restricted access to higher education such a requirement places women in more disadvantaged position compared to men.

                   

                  Do women equally enjoy rights to political participation in Tajikistan?

                  Back in 1995, the Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA) noted that despite a call of UN Economic and Social Council to reach 30 per cent target of women’s political participation by 1995 that is also termed as “critical mass”, the progress to achieve it was modest.[16] The BPfA called for a balanced political participation and power-sharing between women and men in decision-making as internationally agreed target.[17] Statistical data on women’s participation in politics and decision-making demonstrates that 1995 target of 30 per cent is out of reach in 2021 in Tajikistan.

                   

                  In the Parliament, despite progress compared to 2015 elections (when women made up 14.5 per cent of all members of the Upper Chamber and 19 per cent of all members in the Lower Chamber), in the 2020 elections, in the Upper Chamber (where members are appointed) women made up 25.8 per cent and in the Lower Chamber women made up 23.8 per cent of all members.[18] Currently, two of the nine committees of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament are chaired by women.[19] One of the three deputy chairmen of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament is a woman. There are no special measures to promote women candidates in political parties.[20] In Tajikistan, there is no any women’s fraction or coalition of women members of Parliament.[21]

                   

                  At the decision-making level, 30 per cent representation is out of reach. As to high level positions, women are usually appointed to posts of ministers responsible for social issues. Recent appointments in the Government resulted in appointment of a woman on a post of the Deputy Prime Minister on social affairs. Among 18 Ministers, women hold two posts: the Minister of Labour, Employment and Migration, and the Minister of Culture.

                   

                  In the civil service, the share of women among civil servants decreased from 35.2 per cent in 2013 to 23.8 per cent in 2019. As to senior level in the civil service, women made up 19.1 per cent of all managers in 2020. At the local level, women made up 26.7 per cent of all civil servants and 21.5 per cent of all managers. Three women were chairing districts (equivalent to head of local government at the district level).[22] In 2017 the amendment was introduced to Decree of the President on Procedure of Competitive Recruitment for the Positions of Civil Service that provided women participating in the competitive recruitment for positions of civil service for the first time with additional three scores during exams.[23] This measure is aimed at encouraging young women to enter the civil service. However, the analysis of impact of this measure has not been conducted as yet.

                   

                  Since its independence, Tajikistan did not have any female President, Prime Minister, governors of provinces, ambassadors or representatives of Tajikistan to international bodies. As to the defence and security sector, share of women working in law enforcement bodies: office of the Prosecutor General, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Agency on Anti-Corruption and Financial Control, Drug Control Agency, State Committee on National Security, and Customs Service, is not disclosed. Women have not been appointed to the positions of Ministers or Chairpersons of these bodies in Tajikistan.

                   

                  While one woman was appointed to the position of the Chairperson of the Supreme Economic Court, share of women among judges is far below 30 per cent target. In the Constitutional Court, only one position of the seven posts of judges is occupied by a woman. In the economic courts, women make up 15.8 per cent of all judges. In the courts of general jurisdiction, women hold 19 per cent of all posts of judge.

                   

                  Another (good) law: will the political participation of women improve?

                  Tajikistan did not establish an environment conducive for improvement of participation of women in political life and decision-making and it does not establish neither in law nor in practice temporary special measures to remedy the situation. In 2018, Government established a working group to draft a comprehensive anti-discrimination law in line with the recommendations it received during two cycles of the Universal Periodic Review on Human Rights (UPR) and respective National Action Plans (NAPs) adopted to implement these recommendations. The draft law was prepared in 2020 and was submitted to the Government for the review. The draft law establishes a comprehensive definition of discrimination and includes list of grounds upon which discrimination may take place, including sex, sexual orientation and gender identity and covers all spheres where discrimination may occur. It further defines direct and indirect discrimination and calls for adoption of positive measures, including temporary special measures. Would this law if adopted be a solution to currently low political participation of women? Most probably not, because exclusion of women from political participation is a result of combination of factors, including social and political discourses; political structures and institutions; and socio-cultural and functional constraints that limit women’s individual and collective agency.[24]

                   

                  Since 1999 Tajikistan has taken a strong strand in ensuring gender equality when the President adopted a Decree on advancement of the role of women in Tajikistan that was followed by the adoption of the State Programme ‘On Main Directions of National Policy on Provision of Equal Rights and Opportunities of Men and Women in the Republic of Tajikistan for 2001-2009’ (hereinafter, the State Programme) in 2001 and the Gender Equality Law in 2005. However, the rhetoric on gender equality, especially, on political participation of women was declarative, because some of the measures institutionalised a ‘glass ceiling’. The 1999 Decree while focused on the promotion of women to senior management positions in government at the national and local levels, judiciary, prosecutor’s bodies, and educational institutions, it explicitly restricted such appointment to the positions of only Deputy Minister and excluded their appointment to the positions of Deputy Ministers of Defense and Internal Affairs.[25] Since 2000, the Government adopted a targeted state programme to promote women in leadership. It is called a State Programmes on Education, Selection and Appointment of Talented Women and Girls to Management Positions that initially covered the period of 2007-2016 and, then, 2017-2022. The programme has an ambition of 30 per cent representation of women in public bodies. However, the fulfilment of such an ambition remains out of reach.

                   

                  Since 2009, Tajikistan further rolled back in conceptualising gender equality when the International Women’s Day celebrated on March 8th was renamed to the Mother’s Day using explicitly nationalist and anti-feminist explanations. The Mother’s Day was proclaimed to praise a woman mother, creator of life, educator of generations, mentor of young boys and youth on kind path, and sustainable founder of the family.[26] It was further linked to the three thousand-old tradition of Aryan men to honour mothers and wives during spring season. In majority of his annual addresses to the Parliament, the President underlines the role of women in implementation of social policy, their role as mothers and educators of daughters as main guardians of families and traditions.[27] These narratives are particularly disempowering for women and girls given the already prevalent perception in the Tajikistan’s society about the role of woman as a wife and a mother and, respective, high burden of unpaid care work.[28] The nationwide time use survey was not conducted in Tajikistan to assess engagement of women in unpaid care work. However, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) conducted in 2016 clearly demonstrated that women regardless of their economic activity and employment status are extensively engaged in unpaid work related to household duties; care after sick and disabled members of the family.[29] Besides, families in Tajikistan are still an extended family with several generations sharing one household and young women – daughters, including daughters-in-law – holding the lowest position in family hierarchy with restricted agency to making decisions over their access to education; health, including reproductive health and rights; marriage and their engagement to public domains.[30]

                   

                  Thus, ideologically, Tajikistan’s political landscape is not supportive of the meaningful political participation of women and approaches towards gender equality are contradictory. The legislation on elections while gender neutral, in reality, imposes excessive requirements for women preventing them from political participation and does not take into account their low economic and educational status compared to men. Strong gender stereotypes that put women in subordinate position compared to men prevent women from playing more active roles in public domains and gaining necessary networking and social capital required for running for elections and promotion of their careers.

                   

                  While adoption of anti-discrimination law will be an important step in recognising intersectional discrimination in all forms and in all spheres of life, it is unlikely that law alone will remedy current low participation of women in political life in Tajikistan. To amplify the impact of the adoption of anti-discrimination law the following considerations should be taken into account to boost the political participation of women:

                  • Introduce quotas for political participation of women as a fast-track strategy to improve political participation of women in all branches of state power;
                  • Narrow gaps in economic participation and opportunities of women and educational attainment, especially at the level of higher education;
                  • Implement large scale communication, information and education campaigns to change gender stereotypes and promote women’s participation in public domains; and

                   

                  Establish a caucus of current and former women in power (covering all branches of state power) for the purpose of networking and building collective power and agency of women, and link them with younger generations of women, promote leadership and role models among young women.

                   

                  Dilbar Turakhanova is an independent consultant with over 15 years of extensive experience in researching gender equality issues in Tajikistan (native country), Central Asia, South Caucasus and others. Dilbar has several academic and non-academic publications in the areas of gender, migration, gender-based violence. Her research interests include gender, migration, Central Asia.

                   

                  Image UNDP in Europe and CIS by under (CC).

                   

                  [1] World Economic Forum. 2020. Global Gender Gap Report. P.329

                  [2] World Economic Forum. 2020. Global Gender Gap Report. P.329

                  [3] World Economic Forum. 2020. Global Gender Gap Report. P.329

                  [4] UNDP.2020. Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century Briefing note for countries on the 2019 Human Development Report Tajikistan, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TJK

                  [5] While Article 7 of CEDAW regards political participation of women as a right: (a) to vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies; (b) to participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government; (c) to participate in non-governmental organisations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country, in this article only the following rights are assessed: (a) right to be elected and (b) right to participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government.

                  [6] CEDAW. Concluding observations on Tajikistan 2018. CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/6, paragraph 11 (a).

                  [7] CEDAW in its General Recommendation No.25 noted that such measures are a wide variety of legislative, executive, administrative and other regulatory instruments, policies and practices, such as outreach or support programmes; allocation and/or reallocation of resources; preferential treatment; targeted recruitment, hiring and promotion; numerical goals connected with time frames; and quota systems. (paragraph 22)

                  [8] CEDAW, General Recommendation No.28 on the core obligations of States parties under Article 2 of the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW/C/GC/28, paragraph 18, 2010,  https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/711350?ln=en

                  [9] Ibid.

                  [10] CEDAW. Concluding observations on Tajikistan 2018, CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/6, paragraphs 11 (b), 39 (c), (e).

                  [11] CEDAW. Concluding observations on Tajikistan 2018, CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/6, paragraph 12 (c).

                  [12] OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan Parliamentary Elections 1 March 2015 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report p.11, 2015, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/6/158081.pdf

                  [13] CEDAW, Concluding observations on Tajikistan 2007, CEDAW/C/TJK/CO/3, paragraph 26.

                  [14] OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan Parliamentary Elections 1 March 2020 ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report, p.7, 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/9/443983.pdf

                  [15] CEDAW, General Recommendation No.23: Political and Public Life, paragraph 23, 1997, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/INT_CEDAW_GEC_4736_E.pdf

                  [16] Ibid, paragraph 16.

                  [17] United Nations. 1995. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Critical Area G, “Women, Power and Decision-Making”.

                  [18] According to data of the Committee on Women’s and Family Affairs under the Government of Tajikistan published in 2021.

                  [19] Both women MPs head the  traditional for women areas: one of the two committees deals with education, health, culture and youth policy and another one focuses on social issues, family and protection of health; available at: https://parlament.tj/ru/kumitaho

                  [20] IPU Parline, Tajikistan, House of Representatives, https://data.ipu.org/node/169/data-on-women?chamber_id=13538

                  [21] Mamadazimov, A and Kuvatova, A. 2011. Political Party Regulations and Women’s Participation in Political Life of Tajikistan, National Association of Political Scientists of Tajikistan, p. 46.

                  [22] Committee on Women’s and Family Affairs under the Government of Tajikistan. 2021. Analysis of Implementation of the National Strategy on Advancement of Role of Women for 2011-2020.

                  [23] European Union. 2018. European Union – Tajikistan Civil Society Seminar on Practical Implementation of the Gender Equality Principles in Tajikistan, Seminar Report, p.17

                  [24] Bari, Farzana. 2005. Women’s Political Participation: Issues and Challenges. p.3.

                  [25] Kasymova, S. 2007. Transformation of Gender Order in Tajik Society, p.51.

                  [26] Decree of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan “On Mother’s Day” adopted on 6 March 2009, No.632, http://www.adlia.tj/show_doc.fwx?Rgn=14361

                  [27] President of the Republic of Tajikistan, see website: http://president.tj/ru/taxonomy/term/5/69

                  [28] Kasymova, S. 2007. Transformation of Gender Order in Tajik Society, p.52.

                  [29] Agency of Statistics under the President of Tajikistan. 2017. Situation in the Labour Market in the Republic of Tajikistan (Report on findings of the labour force survey conducted from 20 July to 20 August, 2016), p.94; 96.

                  [30] Temkina,  A.2006. Subordination to Older vs. Deconstruction of Patriarchy: Women’s Sexuality in Marriage (North of Tajikistan), Journal of Social Policy Studies, 4 (4), p.446.

                  Topics
                  Civil Society
                  Democracy and Elections
                  Good Governance and Institutional Reform
                  Human Rights
                  Women's Rights
                  Regions
                  Former Soviet Union
                  Central Asia
                  Tajikistan
                  Footnotes
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                    Human rights of people living with HIV in Tajikistan

                    Article by Larisa Alexandrova

                    Human rights of people living with HIV in Tajikistan

                    HIV is a disease that affects various spheres of people’s life, including healthcare, legal, labour and other aspects. Tajikistan, being a rule of law based secular and social state, adopted development programmes to address priority problems in the legal and social sphere. To address HIV-related issues, the Government of Tajikistan periodically adopts relevant National Programs every three years.

                     

                    In 2020, the Government of Tajikistan approved the National Programme to Combat the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (hereinafter HIV) and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (hereinafter AIDS) Epidemic in the Republic of Tajikistan 2021 – 2025, along with the overall budget and Action Plan which includes the SDGs and other international human rights and HIV instruments.[1]

                     

                    According to the data presented in the National Program, the total number of officially registered HIV cases in the country is 11,986, of which 7,698 people (64.1 per cent) are men and 4,288 people (35.8 per cent) are women. However, it is estimated that the number of people living with HIV could be 13,000.

                     

                    In 2019, 1,320 new cases of HIV infection (adults and children) were registered in Tajikistan, which roughly corresponds to the number of cases in 2018 and 2017 (101 cases less than in 2018 and 115 cases more than in 2017). Of these new HIV cases registered in 2019, 772 were men (58.5 per cent) and 548 women (41.5 per cent). In recent years, there has been a general trend towards an increase in the proportion of women among all new HIV infections, from 30.9 per cent in 2011 to 41.5 per cent in 2019. Overall, the cases in the country amount to 14.5 per 100,000 population.

                     

                    The Constitution of Tajikistan enshrines the fundamental human and civil rights and freedoms that are equally binding for all persons living in Tajikistan, with some exceptions for foreign citizens and stateless persons.[2] Persons living with HIV, based on the principle of non-discrimination, have all the rights and freedoms provided for all in Chapter Two of the Constitution – the right to life, judicial protection, education, physical and mental health and social protection, information, privacy and others.

                     

                    In 2016, Tajikistan ratified the ‘Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS: speeding up the fight against HIV and ending the AIDS epidemic by 2030’. In 2017, the Health Code was adopted, which in Chapter 24 pays attention to the issues of HIV treatment and prevention, and prohibits discrimination against people living with HIV (PLHIV) in all fields of life. It defines the rights of PLHIV in receiving free qualified and specialised medical care, including medication, in public healthcare institutions, and recognises the principle of voluntary HIV treatment, as well as confidential and voluntary medical examinations for HIV. PLHIV, upon disclosing their medical diagnosis of HIV, have the right to compensation for moral and material damage. Children with HIV under the age of 16 receive a food allowance, and parents or legal representatives of children born to mothers infected with HIV have the right to receive breast milk substitutes from the moment they are born until the time they are finally diagnosed with HIV, with the aim of further reducing risk of HIV infection.

                     

                    Despite these progressive provisions in Tajik legislation, practice has shown that PLHIV unfortunately continue to be discriminated against in all spheres of life. The reasons for such discrimination are different, ranging from: false ideas/knowledge of the disease; low qualifications of doctors, judges, and law enforcement officers; low legal awareness in the general population including PLHIV themselves; gender stereotypes; contradictions between healthcare laws and criminal and administrative legislation; discriminatory provisions of the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences; new discriminatory by-laws adopted, which are better implemented in practice than laws; and generally weak law enforcement.[3]

                     

                    The new National Programme also underlines the existence of barriers for creating an enabling environment to support the development of programmes for counteracting the epidemic, including the need for legislation to mitigate the high level of stigma and discrimination against people living with HIV and other key populations. Unfortunately, there is currently no single and comprehensive anti-discrimination law in Tajikistan.

                     

                    The Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan has a separate corpus delicti for HIV infections. In accordance with Article 125 of the Criminal Code, criminal liability is provided for the infecting of someone with HIV/AIDS, as well as for knowingly leaving someone at risk of being infected with HIV. At the same time, the legislation does not take into account exceptions in the form of informed consent of the other sexual partner (regardless of whether there was the risk of HIV infection), or whether the virus carrier is taking precautions.[4] In addition, the legislation does not define the form of warning a partner should take about their status. Thus, all persons living with HIV who have sexual intercourse can be prosecuted, thereby violating their right to sexual health. When a criminal case is initiated under this Article, the status of both the suspect and the victim is simultaneously opened.

                     

                    Thus, the wording of 125 of the Criminal Code leads to the situation whereby law enforcement agencies initiate criminal cases only on the basis of endangering HIV infection and HIV infection. Article 125 has already become a ‘routine Article’ for law enforcement agencies. In 2018, and for four months of 2019, law enforcement agencies identified 138 cases of deliberate infection of people by HIV-infected persons. 33 criminal cases were initiated against 26 HIV-infected persons therein in 2018, and 39 criminal cases were initiated against 32 HIV-infected persons in 2019.

                     

                    In addition, Article 162 of the Health Code gives doctors the right to disclose the status of HIV patients at a simple request from the investigating authorities without providing a justification for it. Some criminal cases under Part 1 of Article 125 were initiated after the AIDS Center disclosed information on HIV to law enforcement agencies. During the investigation and trial, the accused’s right to confidentiality over their HIV status is not ensured because the investigators, officers, court clerks and judges are able to request medical information under provisions of the health code without conditions.

                     

                    At a roundtable organised by the Public Organisation Human Rights Center (PO HRC) on December 1st 2020, dedicated to the problem of HIV criminalisation, one of the representatives of the PLHIV community in Tajikistan stated: “One gets the impression that law enforcement agencies are fighting not the infection, but rather the PLHIV.”

                     

                    Amendments to the Family Code, adopted as a Government Decree on August 23rd 2016 (No.374), violate the right of PLHIV to voluntariness and confidentiality of HIV testing. In particular, the amended Article 14 now requires every future spouse to submit to a compulsory medical examination as a mandatory condition for marriage, and this was. The rules indicate that the examination includes, among other things, an enzyme-linked immunosorbent test (HIV/AIDS) and the couples must be familiarised with the results of each other’s examination. Without a medical document proving such examinations, the registry office does not have the right to register a marriage.[5] This requirement violates the right to privacy of everyone who wishes to marry. For PLHIV and other persons who have the disease Hepatitis B, C, drug addiction, in case of refusal to voluntarily disclose information about their disease to a partner, a medical certificate is not issued, so the marriage shall not be registered. A medical certificate is also not issued to persons who have drug addiction, Hepatitis B and C, mental illness, until they are cured and pose a threat to the life and health of another person who is getting married. Treatment is carried out at the expense of patients and after treatment they must undergo a repeated examination.

                     

                    In turn, Articles 119 and 120 of the Code of Administrative Responsibility of the Republic of Tajikistan provide for an administrative penalty in the form of a fine for refusing to have mandatory medical examinations and HIV treatment, as well as for concealing the source of HIV infection, which is a significant barrier for PLHIV to receive ARV therapy.

                     

                    There is a free legal hotline for these groups at the PO HRC. Over the period from November 2018 to December 2019, 167 calls were received by the hotline, of which 67 were from men and 100 from women. From January to December 2020, 415 calls were received, 163 from men, 214 from women, and 38 from government agencies. The calls were associated with various violations of rights against PLHIV.

                     

                    In 2019 to 2020, legal assistance was provided for cases such as:

                    • 11 initiated criminal cases under Part One of Article 125 (deliberate exposure to the risk of HIV infection);
                    • Two criminal cases under Part Two of Article 125; and
                    • Three criminal cases under Part Three of Article 125.

                     

                    Most of the criminal cases were brought against women. Many of the calls to the hotline are by the employees of public organisations who work directly with communities. They complain that police officers detain them, demanding them to disclose the status of all their beneficiaries with whom they work on adherence to HIV treatment, and threaten to initiate a criminal case against them under Part One of Article 125 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan. They also demand to write receipts stating that they undertake not to infect HIV, which means for them not to have an intimate relationship.

                     

                    In 2019, the PO HRC conducted an analysis of the criminal procedure legislation of Tajikistan. Within the framework of this analysis, law enforcement practice was also taken into account in connection with which 13 criminal cases under Article 125 were covered. The analysis revealed the following problems:

                     

                    • When considering cases under Part One of Article 125, there is a lack of direct evidence. The accusation is based not on facts, but on the words of a person, which are often impossible to verify. As a rule, the court takes the side of the one who was put at risk.
                    • Another difficulty comes from prejudice and poor awareness. For example, in Tajikistan, representatives of the local judicial system do not yet have a complete understanding of the characteristics of the disease, and regularly do not distinguish HIV from AIDS. There is no Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court on such categories of cases that would explain to the courts what is meant by putting under the risk of HIV. Guidelines for these categories of cases to prosecutors have not been adopted.
                    • At the first medical examination for HIV after determining a positive diagnosis in accordance with the guidelines for diagnosis, treatment and dispensary observation for HIV infection (for adults and adolescents) requires infected persons to sign a paper stating that they have been warned of criminal liability for infecting another person with HIV. The fact that a person is aware of their HIV infection does not necessarily imply that they are also aware of the ways of passing of the virus. As PLHIV themselves note, in practice they are faced with low quality of information before and after the test consultation, or lack of it. As a rule, the signing of documents often occurs after people learn about their incurable disease for the first time when they are in state of confusion or shock. The issue of adapting a HIV-positive person to their own diagnosis is very acute. In other countries, there is practice on how to show the partner their HIV-positive status. Among the proposed forms are a statement, a verbal announcement in the presence of witnesses or a doctor, in a self-help group. At the same time, these recommendations are not stipulated anywhere in the legislation of Tajikistan, and their implementation is difficult due to psychological barriers. Psychological services are not provided free of charge at HIV/AIDS centers.
                    • The right to receive documents (resolution on the initiation of a criminal case, indictment, sentence and others) of criminal proceedings in a language accessible to the accused and convicted, in particular in Russian and Uzbek, is violated. The right to testify in an accessible language for Russian-speaking and Uzbek-speaking suspects and detainees is also being violated. Translators are not present during the inquiry, and the suspects are forced to sign explanations recorded from their words in Tajik on their behalf. The indictment is not served in a language accessible to the accused in accordance with Part One of Article 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Tajikistan.
                    • State lawyers who are involved by investigators in fulfilling their duties to protect PLHIV are reluctant, or because of ignorance of HIV, and they overlook many important points.
                    • Most cases under Part One of Article 125 are initiated according to the data of the HIV/AIDS centers without signs of a crime, but only on the basis of information about the HIV disease. Patients with HIV are called to the interrogator, and they are openly asked: “Who are you sleeping with?” This is also facilitated by Article 162 of the Health Code, which allows doctors to disclose a patient’s HIV diagnosis at the request of the investigating authorities without any conditions.
                    • Attention is drawn to the fact that only two criminal cases out of 13 were initiated on the basis of the victims’ statements. Eight out of 13 criminal cases are private prosecution cases under Part One of Article 125, which are initiated in the presence of claims from victims. The study of all 13 sentences showed that under Part One of Article 125, nine victims and under Part Two of of Article 3 of the victims had no claims against the convicted. In 2018, there were no criminal cases terminated by the courts on the basis of Articles 72-75 of the Criminal Code (exemption from criminal liability in connection with reconciliation with the victim, sincere repentance, etc.), which is provided by the Criminal Procedure Code for Part One of Article 125. Despite the fact that in one of the cases the so-called victim in court declared: “I have no complaints against the defendant, I love her, please set her free.” As a result, the court pronounces a sentence of one year and two months in prison. The cassation and supervisory instance courts did not find any irregularities or omissions in the trial.
                    • According to Part Three of Article 24 of the Criminal Procedure Code, cases under Part One of Article 125 are initiated upon the claim of a person who has suffered from a crime. In the event of reconciliation of the person who suffered from the crime with the accused, and compensation for the harm caused to the victim, the proceedings are terminated. According to Article 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code if the case is of particular public importance or if the victim is in a helpless state, dependent on the accused or for other reasons is unable to defend their rights and legitimate interests, the prosecutor has the right to initiate a criminal case even in the absence of a victim’s statement. But unfortunately, the legislation does not provide an explanation of the wording ‘special public importance’ and the prosecutors interpret it based on their personal understanding. There were cases when criminal cases were initiated under Part One of Article 125 by the police without a victim’s statement, and the courts did not pay attention to this.
                    • Complaints against the verdict of the first instance in accordance with the norms of the Criminal Procedure Code are submitted through the court of first instance, and the judge who passed the verdict, who is appealed, prepares the case and the complaint and sends it to the higher cassation court. The supervisory appeal is considered by the same court as the cassation appeal, only in a different composition of judges, but in essence it is the same court. Accordingly, there is a risk that the court will not be objective in this matter and will not take a positive decision on the complaint against itself. In this connection, lawyers repeatedly apply in a supervisory manner to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tajikistan, which delays the consideration of complaints.
                    • There is a lack of coordination between the doctors of HIV/AIDS centers and temporary detention centers, which leads to the fact that PLHIV do not have access to Antiretroviral Therapy (ARVT) drugs, which entails a violation of their right to health.
                    • In cases involving people who inject drugs, and at the same time have been participants in the opioid substitution therapy programme for many years, the courts additionally prescribe compulsory drug addiction treatment under Article 101 of the Criminal Procedure Code, without clarifying how it can harm the convict and what is opioid substitution therapy. According to Article 194 of the Health Code, substitution therapy is considered to be one of the types of assistance, and Article 101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also contradicts the Article 203 Health Code. It states that compulsory treatment is applied by a court verdict to persons who have committed a crime, including persons who have committed administrative offenses and who at the same time need treatment for a confirmed neurological illness, when they refuse voluntary treatment. But in our case, our beneficiaries do not refuse substitution therapy, which is an alternative treatment, as it is stated in Articles 194 and 197 of the Health Code.
                    • Attention is drawn to the fact that in Tajikistan there are more children infected with HIV via an unknown route than children infected with HIV via the vertical route. Moreover, the Ministry of Health is not taking the necessary measures to find out how children are infected. When a child is diagnosed, when both parents are healthy, doctors at HIV/AIDS centers do not send information to prosecutors for proper investigation. Moreover, in the proceedings of the PO HRC there is a case where a lawyer defends the interests of a girl, currently ten years old, who was infected when she was 20 months old. The case has already been initiated for several times and terminated due to lack of evidence. The lawyer petitioned for a re-examination, request for information about the donor, the plasma that was transfused to the girl, and other investigative actions that enable a high-quality investigation. But this petition was never approved, and the case was again terminated. Unfortunately, the judicial practice does not have any positive precedents yet. But if the fact of HIV infection in state medical institutions is proven, the state will be obliged to pay benefits to PLHIV for a lifetime, as well as compensate for material and moral damage, and provide them with housing.

                     

                    In addition to problems with access to justice in the criminalisation of HIV, PLHIV also face social problems, which can be expressed in the absence of implementation of the principle of rule of law.

                     

                    Thus, the Health Code provides for the right for parents of children born to mothers with HIV to receive breast milk substitutes from the moment of their birth until the time they are finally diagnosed with HIV. Statistics show that cases of HIV detection among children born to HIV-infected mothers in 2017 were 60 children, 53 children in 2018, and 45 children in 2019.[6] There is also a problem with the realisation of this right, when not all parents of children born to mothers with HIV have access to breast milk substitutes. This is due to the fact that the mechanism for implementing this norm has not yet been developed, funding is not provided in the state budget, and funds for these needs are not always allocated from the local budget.

                     

                    Government Resolution No. 232 dated May 10th 2010 provides for the issuance of benefits for children with HIV up to 16 years of age. There are bureaucratic mechanisms for granting benefits, from the moment of filing an application until its permission, which can take more than a year, the parents of children are forced to provide information to local authorities that the children are alive and while the information is being checked the issuance of benefits is suspended.

                     

                    Resolution No. 475, dated September 25th 2018, defines the List of Diseases, which subsequently does not give people living with HIV the right to study in educational medical institutions, nor the right to adopt a child, be their guardian or custodian.

                     

                    The Health Code provides for free treatment and examination of all types of medical and drug assistance in public health institutions. However, in practice, except for ARV therapy, all other services are paid for by patients, and in practice this norm practically does not work.

                     

                    A HIV test is also required for employment, even when opening a retail outlet for small entrepreneurs, and there is a practice of refusing to hire a HIV-positive person. PLHIV do not appeal against this illegal practice for fear of disclosing their status, since PLHIV mostly live in small areas, villages where everyone knows each other and it is impossible to keep information about the disease a secret.

                     

                    In labour relations, when hiring and subsequently when working, according to the Labour Code and other by-laws of the Republic of Tajikistan, an HIV test is required only for medical workers in the surgical field (including surgeons, dentists, obstetrician-gynecologists, etc.); those working in blood transfusion services; specialists in infectious diseases; and departments in which there is an increased risk of infections.

                     

                    In practice, this requirement is not observed and the HIV test in particular, and the results of medical examinations in general, is demanded in the hiring process for any type of work and position, even when opening a retail outlet for small entrepreneurs. There are cases of refusal to hire a HIV-positive person. PLHIV do no appeal against this illegal practice for fear of disclosing their status, since they mainly live in small settlements, where everyone knows each other and it is difficult to keep information about the disease a secret.

                     

                    In 2019, the Government tested children for HIV in schools in pilot districts. The testing took place while parents were not present, mandatory consulting was not provided before and after the test, and the result was disclosed to the school administration. There were even statements regarding the exclusion of a child from school due to their positive HIV status.

                     

                    Representatives of civil society regularly communicate with various state bodies to improve the situation with the rights of PLHIV in Tajikistan. Civil society has proposed amendments to the new Criminal Code, which is currently being developed by a working group approved by the decree of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan. The proposals are aimed at decriminalising the first part of Article 125 of the Criminal Code. The good news is that the working group on the development of the new Criminal Code has included a footnote to Article 125, which provides for the exemption from criminal liability of HIV-positive people in the case of the informed consent of the sexual partner.

                     

                    In addition, within the framework of advocacy activities, work is underway to develop a draft Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tajikistan on the consideration of cases related to the criminal prosecution of PLHIV, including an explanation of Article 125. The Supreme Court has already analysed about 100 court cases, which were considered over the period 2018-2020.

                     

                    Also, as it was noted above, the National Programme was adopted and it has already been approved by the Resolution of the Government No. 50 (dated November 27th 2020). According to the recommendations of the civil society, all the problems mentioned above were also included in this programme. We hope that all the initiatives undertaken by the civil society will result to an improvement in the situation with the observance of the rights of PLHIV in Tajikistan.

                     

                    In this connection, the following recommendations for solving problems are offered:

                     

                    On the criminalisation of HIV:

                    • To decriminalise Article 125, and to criminalise and prosecute only for intentional HIV infection within the framework of the general article causing harm to health of moderate severity;
                    • To people living with HIV in cases related to HIV infection, to provide obligatory participation of a lawyer in criminal cases at the expense of the state;
                    • It is advisable to clarify the issue of protecting the confidentiality of the diagnosis and provide that in order to obtain data on the state of health and HIV status, a petition from the prosecutor and a court order is required. For this, appropriate amendments should be made to the Law on Operational-Investigative Activities and Articles 49 and 162 of the Health Code, expressly indicating that data constituting a medical secret can be disclosed to the bodies of inquiry or investigation only with the approval of the court;
                    • Exclude compulsory treatment for PWID as an additional measure of punishment, amend the Criminal Code with the possibility of prescribing alternative treatment for PWID, instead of compulsory treatment. Include in the Criminal Code or Criminal Procedure Code the concept of alternative treatment and the procedure for its appointment;
                    • Given that there are many myths and stigmatising attitudes regarding HIV, people living with HIV and those affected by the epidemic, it is imperative to ensure regular training of police officers, prosecutors and judges on HIV, including the latest scientific and medical data on HIV infection as a chronic disease, risk of transmission, effects of antiretroviral therapy and precautions, etc., and the importance of maintaining confidentiality of diagnosis and privacy;
                    • To develop and adopt the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court on cases related to Article 125, taking into account modern scientific advances in HIV treatment before the abolition of this article; and
                    • For investigative bodies and prosecutors to develop instructions for conducting criminal cases under Article 125, as well as oversight in HIV prevention.

                     

                    For voluntary HIV testing:

                    • Given the concentrated nature of the HIV epidemic in Tajikistan, replace the mandatory medical examination for HIV of persons entering into marriage with voluntary and confidential HIV testing, and with the provision of pre- and post-test consulting;
                    • To reform all legislation, taking into account the observance and non-discrimination of the rights of PLHIV; and
                    • To strengthen the responsibility of doctors, medical personnel, and government officials, who have access to information on the presence of HIV, regarding the disclosing of confidential information without any connection with aggravating consequences and for refusing medical care and services.

                     

                    On issues of violation of other rights of PLHIV:

                    • Adopt the Government Resolution on the issue of infant formula for children born to HIV-infected mothers, and provide funding for these purposes, both in the local budgets of Tajikistan and at the state level in the case of subsidised financing of subsidised districts;
                    • Simplify the procedure for granting benefits to children with HIV and amend the Health Code, increasing the age of children eligible for benefits to 18 years old;
                    • To terminate the widespread practice of HIV testing upon admission to school, vocational educational institutions and upon employment in all types of work; and
                    • The Ministry of Labour will strengthen its work with employers on the observance of safety measures at the workplace, including clarifications on HIV prevention and prohibition of discrimination against PLHIV.

                     

                    Larisa Alexandrova is an expert on gender, human rights and HIV. Since 2011, it has been advocating for women’s rights in access to justice for victims of domestic violence and other women’s rights. Author of guidelines for conducting a gender analysis of legislative acts for State bodies, as well as an assessment of the legal and regulatory environment in the area of HIV/AIDS in the Republic of Tajikistan, and a gender and anti-discrimination analysis of the draft law “Protection against Discrimination” and other laws concerning the rights of women living with HIV.

                     

                    Image by USAID in Central Asia under (CC).

                     

                    [1] The National Program to Combat the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Epidemic in the Republic of Tajikistan 2021 – 2025. This programme was approved by the decree of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan No. 50 dated November 27, 2020.

                    [2] Article 16 of the Constitution

                    [3] HRC, Assessment of the legal and regulatory environment in the field of HIV/AIDS in the Republic of Tajikistan, February 2020, https://hrc.tj/archives/325; Е. Maron, L. Aleksandrova. “Assessment of the Legal and Regulatory Environment in the Field of HIV/AIDS in the Republic of Tajikistan. Dushanbe. 2019г.

                    [4] Such as wearing a condom.

                    [5] REPORT FOR THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW FROM THE NGO RULE OF LAW AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE NETWORK. 39th session of the UPR Working Group, October-November 2021

                    [6] The national programme to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic for the period 2021-2025 was approved by Government Decision 50 of 27 November 2020.

                    Topics
                    Civil Society
                    Good Governance and Institutional Reform
                    Human Rights
                    Regions
                    Former Soviet Union
                    Central Asia
                    Tajikistan
                    Footnotes
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