On October 5^th 2020, several thousand Kyrgyz citizens poured in the main square of the capital Bishkek to denounce fraudulent elections. By the late evening of that day, this unexpected mobilisation led to the storming of the White House and to the beginning of a cloudy process that resulted in the removal of the incumbent president from office.[1]

With this recent round of events, this post-socialist state has witnessed the third violent change of government since its independence in 1991. There are many structural conditions that led the country to a permanent state of instability, not the least of which is the breakdown of the economy since the collapse of the USSR, which were never given priority by elites amidst incessant struggles for power.

Focusing on the political, this essay looks at the conditions that have enabled such frequent uprisings. In particular, it is argued that the constitutional design of 2010 did not only temper temptations to abuse office by the president but also led to the increasing oligarchisation of politics and a still divided opposition. These factors contributed to public frustrations about corruption and distrust towards the political establishment amidst devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.[2] On the other hand, the emergent party system had further implications for the balance within the state-oligarchy relationship, which still stands to shape politics in Kyrgyzstan for the foreseeable future.

October 2020: Murky change of government against the background of a genuine citizen mobilisation

With the October events of 2020, Kyrgyzstan experienced the third violent change of government via a popular uprising. Although every uprising of 2005, 2010, and 2020 is unique, one element is central to all of them: citizens and political opposition challenged the usurpation of power by presidents, which they deemed illegitimate. This time around, the regime of Sooronbay Jeenbekov grew unpopular because of the combined factors of mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic, corruption, the usurpation of power over the legislature, and the President’s perceived weak charisma. In August 2020, prior to the parliamentary elections, 53 per cent of the Kyrgyz population thought that the country was heading in the wrong direction, whereas only 41 per cent saw it going in the right direction.[3]

These perceptions and negative sentiments did not grow out of nowhere. In 2019, a consortium of independent mass media published a series of investigations unravelling massive corruption schemes that involved the then former deputy head of the State Customs Service, Raiymbek Matraimov, whose illegal business helped him to allegedly take $700 million out of the country.[4] These investigations did not only expose the involvement of state bodies in transnational corruption but also stressed the connection between Matraimov and the highest echelons of power, including President Jeenbekov himself. These publications spurred a series of citizen protests called ‘Reaksia!’ (from Russian – ‘Reaction!’) calling on authorities to launch an official investigation into these corruption schemes.[5] Despite the multiple pressures coming from liberal civil society, the President kept denying Matraimov’s involvement in corruption and even went as far as supporting Matraimov’s political party ‘Mekenim Kırgızstan’ to run in the parliamentary election. Following the election outcomes, three ‘parties of power’, including ‘Mekenim Kırgızstan’, won 107 out of the 120 seats thanks to massive electoral manipulations involving the use of ‘administrative resource’, vote buying, and others means.[6] The orchestrated victory of the three parties of power left opposition forces such as ‘Bütün Kyrgyzstan’, ‘Mekenchil’, ‘Reforma’, and ‘Ata-Meken’ outside of the system. Within the context of the devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on citizens’ livelihoods, such usurpation of power by the ruling regime-oligarchic tandem led to powerful anti-elite sentiments. While struggling with economic hardships and COVID-19-related issues on their own, people observed flagrant corruption among the elites and highest echelons of power. Ordinary citizens traced these inequalities back to the excesses of the post-revolutionary party system.[7]

However, the peaceful protesters who gathered on the next day of the parliamentary election, October 5^th, did not demand the President’s immediate resignation. In addition, most ‘system’ elites were not in the position to contest Jeenbekov’s grip on power as many of them were co-opted into the ‘parties of power’ on the eve of the parliamentary election. Moreover, the regime’s opponents who rallied next to the protesters to contest the election outcome, and who were competing with Sadyr Japarov for public support, did not seek the President’s removal as it was feared such a move could lead to a major destabilisation along the North/South cleavage and ethnic clashes like in the aftermath of the ‘April Revolution’ of 2010.[8] Finally, the international community recognised President Jeenbekov as the only legitimate authority to remain in power and prevent the country from falling into abyss.[9] Having the majority elite loyalty, President Jeenbekov could have, perhaps, avoided his deposing by swiftly conceding to protesters’ demands and cancelling the election outcomes, for example. Without the manpower, the street opposition would not be able to contest the regime. But while he lost the momentum, the citizen mobilisation around two opposition camps has acquired its own dynamics in parallel to the dynamics of regime contestation.

The competition emerged between political forces that were illegally released from prison on the night of October 5^th and who sought to capitalise on popular mobilisation. Two opposing groups were formed in the days after the start of the peaceful demonstration: a nationalist group under Japarov’s leadership and an amalgam of ‘liberal’ forces including the former president Almazbek Atambayev.[10] While the Japarov’s group has quickly and skilfully moved to consolidate protesters around their claims for power by framing the uprising as anti-regime and anti-elite, the liberals were slow and hesitant to adopt similar muscular strategies. The struggle for power between the two groups grew out of control when representatives of the liberal camp were ousted from the main public square, some of them were attacked and people allegedly close to Japarov shot at Atambayev’s departing car.[11] Facing the risk of destabilisation, President Jeenbekov sought to negotiate his own remaining in power by granting legitimacy to one of these camps. The choice was not complicated: his lasting rivalry with Atambayev, whom he sacked and imprisoned after being brought to power by him, determined his option for Sadyr Japarov. On the other hand, leaving the liberal camp to win over Japarov would entail the President’s certain demise. The deal between the President and the ‘newcomer’ Japarov was even sealed by Putin’s deputy head of administration, Dmitry Kozak, who flew to Bishkek in order to facilitate the peaceful maintenance of the regime.[12] However, neither the President nor the Russians expected that the group he had helped to legitimise would breach the agreement and force him to resign soon after. Several members of parliament and public figures hinted to the pressures exerted by organised crime, whose alleged collusion with Japarov was decisive in the president’s removal and takeover of power.[13] Further research is required in order to shed light on these obscure dynamics and the regime fragility.

‘Post-revolutionary’ constitutional reform 2010: Parliamentarism by discourse, money, and further oligarchisation of politics

Authors of the post-revolutionary constitutional reform of 2010 claimed the new design would put an end to strong presidentialism by giving more powers to political parties and the parliament. However, the supposed increase in political pluralism increased the fragmentation of power hence propelling the role of a central mediator in return. Despite constitutionally diminished powers, President Atambayev managed to control the defence and special security forces, the general prosecutor and the courts. In the past, access to these institutions had allowed the authoritarian regimes to suppress the opposition and civil society.[14] President Atambayev gradually fell in line when he successfully attempted to first craft a loyal parliament via national elections of 2015 and then, second, to appoint a political heir via the presidential elections in 2017.[15] By mobilising the state apparatus, he succeeded to bring to power a formerly unknown politician, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, who only three per cent of a spring 2017 poll respondents said they trusted most against the well-established businessman-cum-politician Omurbek Babanov, who had 35 per cent of the popularity in the same survey.[16] Jeenbekov continued this tradition by seeking to fill the parliament with three pro-presidential parties, excluding the opposition, weakening the party system, and further eroding the relationship between the electorate and elites.

The creeping usurpation of power by the presidency is one reason for increased popular frustration, but it is not the only one. The new constitutional design did not foresee that the emerging party system would further strengthen the oligarchisation of politics, bearing real implications for the regime stability.[17] The new constitutional design suddenly bestowed political parties with the power to control the government and make important appointments. However, to participate in highly competitive parliamentary elections, parties faced an acute problem of funding. Sponsorship by businessmen and oligarchs quickly became sine qua non for managing electoral campaigns. In practice it is believed that this was often done by selling seats in electoral party lists, with the first top ten to 20 seats believed to be worth between $500,000 thousand and $1 million in a country with only a GDP of $8.5 billion in 2019.[18] The newly elected parliamentary groups viewed the system as a way to access the state and use it for rent-seeking.[19] Employing their new constitutional powers, the parliamentary groups appointed their ministers and this way ‘divided’ the state among themselves. Oligarchs who had entered this system began employing their access to the state to return their prior investments in the election.[20]

Although the oligarchisation of Kyrgyz politics began in the 90s and was part of the state building, Jeenbekov’s recent regime had allowed for a certain degree of incorporation of oligarchs into the state system, which became a risk for regime stability. By summer 2020, according to elite claims oligarchic power had succeeded in infiltrating major state institutions including the special security forces, prosecution, and the courts. By placing loyal people inside the state bodies and relying on the power of money, the Matraimov family allegedly used the state to advance their own and their clients’ interests. By getting things done for a growing number of elite members, they earned the reputation of effective doers in contrast to the ‘indecisive’ and ‘slow’ President Jeenbekov.[21] As the electoral outcome of October elections shows, their party ‘Mekenim Kırgızstan’ was just 0.71 per cent behind the presidential party ‘Birimdik’ contesting the president’s monopoly to form the majority and control the future legislature.[22]

Violent change of government 2020: An intra-elite contestation? No, populism!

Given the above account of state-oligarchy competition, it could be implied that Jeenbekov’s removal from office was a result of the changing state-oligarchy relationship. We do not know what would have become of this relationship if the parliamentary elections were not annulled and if Jeenbekov were to face an increased competition within the newly elected oligarchic parliament. However, such a changing of balance cannot explain the unexpected emergence of populist leader Sadyr Japarov.[23] Two and half months later, Sadyr Japarov not only has won the presidential election, but has succeeded in carrying out a referendum with the goal of returning to a system of strong presidentialism. At the time of writing this essay, another referendum was scheduled to take place on April 11^th to vote for a new constitution in which the president becomes the head of the executive, the electoral system goes back to a mixed one and the number of deputies is reduced from 120 to 90.[24] The rise of a populist leader, even if it conceals an important informal process of oligarchisation that would have erupted into a major elite contestation, testifies to fundamental crises. One is the crisis of representative government, in which the emergent party system detached the elites even further from the people. By supporting Japarov’s idea of strong presidentialism people seek, paradoxically, a better accountability of the political system because it is easier to hold one person accountable rather than shallow political parties, frequently changing government ministers and the oligarchy-serving parliament. The following saying “We have brought Japarov to power and we will depose him if necessary” is currently a favourite tale one can hear in public places, bazaars and transportation. A tale that hints to the desires of the ordinary people, of the poor, who helped the populist leader to seize power, to see their own importance, to have their voices finally heard. Capitalising on people’s deep-seated frustrations and anger about elite corruption, the ineffective party system and the oligarchisation of politics, Japarov has surprisingly easily effected a constitutional coup.

Recommendations

As the October violent change of government has shown, there are multiple crises at work in Kyrgyzstan. The first is the crisis of representative government and the party system which led to deepening of popular distrust towards the elites. Early popular support for nationalist Sadyr Japarov in detriment to a coalition of well-established politicians such as Babanov, Atambayev and Madumarov (despite their representation of diverse social strata and geographic constituencies) also demonstrates low trust in the establishment. Yet within the corrupt system, new leaders with real programmatic visions have no chance to emerge. The party system failed to become a source of new leadership paving the way to populism to take over. In such conditions, the donor community should reconsider its past support to political parties and parliamentarism. The current crisis of the party system shows that the past programmes aimed at enhancing exchanges between MPs and their constituencies, exchanges between Kyrgyz PMs and other world parties have severe limits. Support to political parties should acquire a new dimension in the light of the new constitution which, if adopted on April 11^th, will shift to a mixed system and less power to parties.

Programmes aimed at developing and supporting liberal civil society which produce similar artificial results should be also reconsidered towards a better analysis where the real sources of authority and change are located. As the COVID-19 pandemic has shown, citizens of all avenues were quickly mobilising to step in where the state was missing or failing. From youth engagement in voluntary movements, to religious charity activities, to female solidarity groups, to business structures, to migrant safety nets, these mobilisations demonstrated existence of other sources of change and resilience. The donor aid should better understand these dynamics and work towards helping to sustain these safety nets and resilience.

It is important to understand that under the present conditions liberal NGOs and independent mass media are discredited in public eyes and enjoy a construed reputation of Western agents. Promoting these actors further will not help neither the liberal society nor the image of the international community. The focus on human rights, including the LGBT rights, has worsened considerably the Western image and consequently diminished the degree of influence of Western ideals and projects on local politics. To redress these negative images against the background of anti-Westernism prevalent in Kyrgyzstan, Western partners should work to promote other human rights images than of themselves.

As international practice shows, one of the dangers of nationalist populism in times of unaddressed economic hardships is a possible mobilisation of nationalism against vulnerable groups. In the Kyrgyz context, these traditionally include ethnic minorities, women, and LGBT people. Attacks on these groups have been frequently accompanying political changes in the country’s short history of independence. Therefore, one of the donor’s priorities should be focused on monitoring and preventing possible violence against these groups.

Most importantly, since current populism has economic roots, it is absolutely vital to pay more attention to people’s economic security and in particular to education. Half of the country’s population is less than 25 years old and their education and prospects of employment will determine the future political system of the country. There are multiple and diverse possibilities of improving the primary education which suffers from decades of underinvestment and neglect, which yet could become the motor of economic development and democratisation. One possibility is to support the teachers’ education and curriculum development in rural areas. Another possibility is to promote the idea that migrant remittances should be invested in children’s education and not in consumption culture. Children who suffer from the absence of migrant parents should receive extra psychological and educational council.

Finally, the donor community could help by investing in more research and public opinion polls as the primary and fundamental way of understanding societal processes that lead to populism, nationalism and right wing politics. The political system cannot know which policies to adopt if it lacks key knowledge about which policies which social groups would benefit from.

Dr. Asel Doolotkeldieva is a Senior Lecturer at the OSCE Academy (Bishkek). She holds her PhD from the University of Exeter and she previously was a Visiting Fellow at College Mondial, FMSH. Her academic interests include social mobilisations, regime transition and democratisation, post-socialism, political economy of resource extraction in Central Asia.

Image by Matthias Buehler under (CC).

[1] The White House is a seat of the President and Parliament of Kyrgyzstan.

[2] IRI, Public Opinion Poll Residents of Kyrgyzstan, December 2020, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/iri_kyrgyzstan_poll_dec_2020_eng.pdf: Unemployment, corruption and high costs of living remain at the top three concerns the Kyrgyz population have had in the past decade.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Radio Azattyk, How hundreds of millions of dollars were exited from Kyrgyzstan, November 2019, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30285881.html; Radio Azattyk, Kloop, and OCCRP, The story of Ayerken Saimati, who laundered 700 millions of dollars via Kyrgyzstan, Radio Azattyk, November 2019, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/kyrgyzstan-azattyk-occrp-kloop-joint-investigation/30286844.html; Bakyt Toregeldi, Traces of millions of dollars: facts and reaction, Radio Azattyk, July 2020, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30702217.html

[5] Evgeniya Mikhaylidi, In Bishkek, but not only: “Re:Action” of Kyrgyz citizens in other cities of the world, Kloop, November 2019, https://kloop.kg/blog/2019/11/25/v-bishkeke-i-ne-tolko-re-aktsiya-kyrgyzstantsev-v-drugih-gorodah-mira/; Zhamilya Zhakypbekova, Protest #ReAction 2:0 in Bishkek. How it was, 24.kg, December 2019, https://24.kg/obschestvo/138362_miting_REaktsiya_20v_bishkeke_kak_eto_byilo/; Aibek Biybosunov, ReAction 3:0: The public awaits the authorities’ reaction, Radio Azattyk, July 2020, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30699889.html

[6] Kaktus Media, Preliminary list of deputies of the VII convocation of the Jogorku Kenesh, October 2020, https://kaktus.media/doc/422474_predvaritelnyy_spisok_depytatov_vii_sozyva_jogorky_kenesha.html. The post-revolutionary constitution imposes a limit on the parliamentary majority capped at 65 seats. This measure was designed to prevent any political party – in Kyrgyzstan’s context of authoritarian past; it concerns primarily the ‘party of power’ – from usurping power (Interview with MP Omurbek Tekebaev, one of the main authors of the constitution 2010). However, as other countries and Kyrgyzstan demonstrate, the regimes succeed to bypass this constitutional constraint by propelling loyal political parties that allow forming an overwhelming majority and keeping the parliament at bay.

[7] Ordinary citizens who took part in peaceful protests in the aftermath of the parliamentary election, told to the author that their mobilisation was motivated by their indignation with irresponsible elite behaviour during the COVID-19 pandemic, corruption, and regime’s usurpation of power. See: Asel Doolotkeldieva, Power and space in social mobilisations: preliminary thoughts about protests that led to a change of government in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020, CAP papers (in Russian), forthcoming.

[8] Interviews with representatives of ‘Reforma’ and ‘Ata-Meken’ political parties, and civic activists.

[9] Fergana News,  European Union calls President Jeenbekov “the only legitimate institution in Kyrgyzstan”, October 2020, https://fergana.site/news/121128/

[10] The term ‘liberal’ is used here as a relative denomination of a rather heterogenous group of opposition leaders and parties who were compelled to cooperate in the face of their main competitor, populist leader Sadyr Japarov. This group has gathered liberal right-wing parties ‘Bir-Bol’, ‘Reforma’, and Respublica’ on the one hand, oldest political parties claiming socialist leaning ‘Ata-Meken’ and ‘SDPK’, and pro-nationalist parties ‘Bütün Kyrgyzstan’ and ‘Zamandash’ on the other hand. In public discourses, the generic term ‘liberal’ was applied to this group, in contrast to populist Sadyr Japarov because of the main distinction between them on the question of the country’s future political development along the strong presidentialism or party system. The temporary and unnatural consolidation of liberals was slow and ineffective. While these leaders lost the moment due to an internal competition for power and legitimisation along identity politics, they ended up mobilising around the former Prime Minister and oligarch Omurbek Babanov and the former president Almazbek Atambayev as the only politicians capable to withstand Japarov. The week after the parliamentary election in which the liberals and Japarov fought for power was decisive and as a public opinion poll shows Omurbek Babanov had a real chance to take over as he was as twice popular (16 per cent) than Sadyr Japarov (eight per cent) in August 2020. His popularity fell to three per cent in contrast to Japarov’s 51 per cent in December 2020. See IRI, Public Opinion Poll Residents of Kyrgyzstan, December 2020, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/iri_kyrgyzstan_poll_dec_2020_eng.pdf

[11] Kommersant, Ex-President Atambayev’s car was shot in Bishkek, October 20, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4528272

[12] Kommersant, Kozak met with President of Kyrgyzstan in Bishkek, October 2020, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4530007

[13] Kaktus media, Aida Kasymalieva about what happened in the state residence and who gave commands to the deputies, October 2020, https://kaktus.media/doc/423280_aida_kasymalieva_o_tom_chto_proishodilo_v_gosrezidencii_i_kto_daval_komandy_depytatam.html

[14] On Kyrgyzstan’s semi-presidentialism see: Eugene Huskey, “Eurasian Semi-Presidentialism: The Development of Kyrgyzstan’s Model of Government” in Robert Elgie & S. Moestrup, Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe A Comparative Study, 2011, Routledge; Matteo Fumagalli, Semi-presidentialism in Kyrgyzstan, in Robert Elgie & S. Moestrup, Semi-Presidentialism in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 2016, Palgrave Macmillan.

[15] Asel Doolotkeldieva & Alexander Wolters, Uncertainty Perpetuated? The Pitfalls of a Weakly Institutionalised Party System in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Affairs, 4 (2017) 26-50.

[16] IRI, Public Opinion Survey Residents of Kyrgyzstan, February-March 2017, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/kyrgyzstan_february-march_2017_-_public.pdf

[17] Oligarchic power is a global historical norm (J. Winters, Oligarchy, Cambridge University Press, 2012) and post-soviet states were particularly exposed to this type of politics with the emergence of a new capitalist class on the ruins of the Soviet economy (see Scott Radnitz’s Weapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite-Led Protests in Central Asia, Cornell University Press, 2012 on the role of oligarchic opposition in ousting Kyrgyzstan’s first president. See also Balihar Sanghera & E. Satybaldieva’s recent investigation of the rentier class in Central Asia, “The other road to serfdom: The rise of the rentier class in post-Soviet economies”, Social Science Information 2020, vol. 59 (3), 505-536). Incorporation of these important actors was necessary for the state-building processes in the 90s, and subsequent regimes have defined differently the state-oligarchy relationships.

[18] Zhibek Begalieva and Azat Yntymakov, These ‘tariffs’ were publicly exposed and widely discussed by public: 500 thousand dollars to become an MP. Who buys parliamentary seats in Kyrgyzstan?, Current Time, October 2019, https://www.currenttime.tv/a/parliament-seats-on-sale/30219729.html

[19] See also Johan Engvall, The State as Investment Market. Kyrgyzstan in Comparative Perspective, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016.

[20] According to informants inside the Government and political parties, Matraimov’s family has allegedly financed electoral campaigns of several political parties in 2015 and the presidential campaign of Jeenbekov in 2017.

[21] Informal interviews with members of parliament.

[22] Official website of the State Commission for Elections, https://newess.shailoo.gov.kg/ru/election/11098/ballot-count?type=NW_ROOT

[23] The space does not allow to develop on Japarov’s skillful strategies to grab power, offset other street opposition leaders, to pressure on the court justice to write off his criminal records that would prohibit him from running as a presidential candidate.

[24] To date, the draft project of the constitution remains secretive and several deputies are proposing to skip the public hearings over the project.

As I queue to cast my vote at a local polling station in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, I am all eyes and ears. I hope to catch anything irregular on the presidential election and national referendum day, January 10^th. Nothing unusual happens in this residential district of Bishkek though: there are no celebrity voters, no (explicit) electoral fraud, and nobody is willing to try and buy my vote. Tired voters quietly trickle to the polling station, queue to have their fingerprints checked and vote for the political future of Kyrgyzstan.

Revolution 3.0 and the future of Kyrgyz democracy

“Absolute power corrupts absolutely” – John Dalberg-Acton, 1857

The future of Kyrgyz democracy might be bleak as populist strongman Sadyr Japarov wins a landslide victory at the presidential election and secures himself unrestrained presidential powers through the referendum. The Central Electoral Committee (CEC) sealed his victory on January 20^th, having declared the election and the referendum results final and legitimate. Two CEC members refused to support this statement citing considerable irregularities during the entire electoral cycle in favour of Japarov.[1]

Their concerns are not unfounded. The legality and legitimacy of the election and the referendum are highly questionable as the process of launching both has been rushed.[2] The return to a strong presidential rule might be detrimental for the new Kyrgyz leadership. Three out of five Kyrgyz presidents to date have lost their seats in the course of public protests. More often than not, the protests would be sparked by the presidents’ attempt to increase their powers. Both the first Kyrgyz revolution of 2005 and the second Kyrgyz revolution of 2010 were largely caused by the ruling elites’ oppressive tactics and attempts to grab more power.[3] The third Kyrgyz revolution of 2020 was sparked by blatantly fraudulent parliamentary election that would have resulted in a very compliant parliament with only two factions: the pro-presidential political party Birimdik (‘Unity’) and the pro-presidential Mekenim Kırgızstan (‘Kyrgyzstan my homeland’).[4]

The third Kyrgyz revolution has been stolen from those who walked out at the Ala-Too Square to protest the unfair and unfree elections. The protesters on October 5^th represented a very broad political spectrum, from the liberal progressive party Reforma to the conservative nationalist party Chon Kazat. 16 political parties ran for parliament, and 14 of them were not happy with the outcomes.[5] While leaders of numerous political groups negotiated fickle alliances and plans in the chaos of revolution, Sadyr Japarov’s supporters took over the protests and snatched the power from the hands of hesitant political groups. President Sooronbay Jeenbekov resigned on October 15^th, under pressure mounted by Japarov’s foot soldiers, who quite literally besieged the Presidential Residence and the locations used by the Parliament for their extraordinary sessions.[6]

The Parliament, which by the October events had completed its term, had been forced out from its hiding and ‘encouraged’ to vote a new speaker, a Japarov ally, and to appoint an acting prime minister and acting president. Both positions were offered to Japarov. Some members of the Parliament reported threats and peer pressure.[7] In a similar manner, the Parliament voted to run a presidential election and a referendum on the political system.

The post-revolution events unfolded with a mind-boggling speed and, before the country knew it, Kyrgyz citizens were at the polling stations choosing the sixth president and returning to the presidential system. The CEC registered some irregularities, including 60 complaints about the use of administrative resources and vote buying.[8] Compared to the widespread use of administrative resources and blatant vote buying at the parliamentary election in October 2020 (to the extent that the CEC had to cancel the election outcome altogether), this election seems to reflect the voters’ preferences in a reasonably fair way.[9] As to why Japarov has not used his resources as extensively as his predecessor, it is difficult to judge, but a combination of factors might be involved. First, Japarov might have felt no need to engage in mass scale vote buying as his work and his appointee’s work between the October revolution and the election day in January 2021 has already mobilised enough administrative resources to ensure his victory. Second, all available resources for vote buying have been spent back in October, and there was simply nothing left to invest in this election. Third, Japarov might be adding to his public image as a tireless anti-corruption advocate.

As flawed as these election and referendum were, the outcomes are here to stay as Japarov won almost 80 per cent of the votes and gathered 81 per cent in the presidential system.[10] Given the return of a strong presidential rule, it is now important to understand the new president and what his rule might mean for Kyrgyzstan and its international partners.

From prison to presidency: The curious case of Sadyr Japarov

“Why repeat those mistakes? I’m going to rule fairly” – Sadyr Japarov, January 2021[11]

Amidst the chaos of the October 5-6^th protests, several people were freed from prisons and temporary detention centres by their supporters. The majority were ultimately brought back by the police. Two returned voluntarily, one managed to leave the country and request political asylum, and one became the sixth president of Kyrgyzstan.

While Western observers and local liberals are terrified of the advent of a populist leader fresh out of prison, Sadyr Japarov is a highly revered figure around Kyrgyzstan. Enthused with his populist nationalist rhetoric, Japarov’s supporters see him as a ‘fresh promise’ and last hope.[12] However, his political past is highly controversial.

Japarov first appeared on the Kyrgyz political scene in 2005 as a member of parliament from the pro-presidential Ak-Jol (‘Light path’) party. As President Bakiyev’s ally Sadyr Japarov led the notoriously useless National Corruption Prevention Agency.[13] After Bakiyev’s departure from the country, Japarov joined the nationalist Ata-Jurt (‘Homeland’) party. He got his first prison sentence when he attempted to climb over the White House fence with his supporters Kamchybek Tashiev (now the head of the National Security Committee) and Talant Mamytov (acting President during the last presidential campaign) at a protest action.[14] His second sentence was issued in 2013, when Japarov led a protest against Kumtor gold-mining company, and the Governor of Issyk-Kul region was taken hostage by protestors. Japarov fled Kyrgyzstan but was caught at the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border in 2017 and imprisoned.[15] He was one third of the way through serving his term, when a group of supporters freed him from the prison in October 2020 and launched his ascent to power.

While it is early to judge what Japarov’s rule would bring to Kyrgyzstan, his stunning victory might tell us about the state of affairs in Kyrgyzstan. First, the phenomenon of Japarov is not unique. His political persona seems to fit into the profile of populist nationalist strongmen around the globe, like Hungarian Victor Orbán or the US’s Donald Trump.[16] In this sense, Kyrgyzstan could be analysed within the context of this global trend.

Second, the cult of Japarov stems from the frustrations of disenfranchised groups of people. His current political party Mekenchil (‘Compatriot’) targets the rural population and labour migrants in Russia, i.e. large groups of population, who have been marginalised and abandoned by the state. Sadyr Japarov’s anti-elitist rhetoric, his life full of personal tragedies and a prison sentence for defending the interests of the common folk appeal to Kyrgyz everyman.[17] There is an increasing polarisation between the capital and the regions, between the urban, globalised middle class in Bishkek and the Kyrgyz-speaking rural population in the provinces. Unequal access to healthcare, education, information, job opportunities, as well as general disregard of regional development in the last 30 years have resulted in the emergence of two parallel worlds. This poses certain difficulties for international observers, who tend to approach the urban liberal world of local experts rather than the population in regions.

Third, there are legitimate concerns about Japarov’s ties to organised crime and exiled corrupt officials that should be taken into account by international partners.[18] Japarov is still seen as an ally of the ousted and exiled President Bakiyev. Japarov’s sister is accused of helping President Bakiyev’s younger son, Maxim Bakiyev, launder money in Europe. Maxim Bakiyev currently lives quite comfortably in Kent, UK.[19] These connections are difficult to trace, but, if true, they might potentially facilitate further expansion of corruption and organised crime in Kyrgyzstan.

Japarov is currently the choice of the Kyrgyz people. However, he has a lot to prove to his supporters. Japarov steps into this position at the hardest of times, when the country is severely cash-strapped, exhausted by the pandemic, and lacking basic services to the public. Kyrgyzstan’s international position is far from ideal too, after three revolutions, continuous instability and incompetent use of public resources.

Implications for international partners

It is possible to group the nations that are engaged in Kyrgyzstan into two camps: pro-democracy camp (such as the US and the EU) and regional authoritarian powers (China and Russia). The pro-democracy camp has been engaged in the promotion of democracy, rule of law and other similar values in Kyrgyzstan for decades. The election of a populist nationalist leader and the return to a strong presidential rule could potentially affect how they shape their future policies in the country.

The EU has been cautious in its reaction to the election. Dr. Chiara Pierobon, a European researcher, noted that the EU respects Kyrgyz sovereignty and the voters’ decision.[20] The EU would be more concerned with electoral processes and procedures that allows elections to be free and fair. For Dr. Pierobon, the reasons for the low voter turnout should be investigated in more detail and these findings should be taken into account in future EU democracy assistance initiatives addressed to civil society.

The EU Spokesperson’s statement indeed highlights the importance of adhering to free and fair electoral standard and calls the new leadership to fully respect democratic principles.[21] Professor Fabienne Bossuyt of Ghent University noted that the EU understands its limitations to promote democracy and its approach to democracy promotion is up for review. Democracy needs to come from within, and the EU will need to accommodate local forms and understandings of democracy.

The US Embassy in Bishkek issued a cautious statement congratulating the people and acknowledging Japarov as the newly elected president. However, the statement went in length to highlight the widely reported procedural irregularities, disproportionate financial means, misuse of administrative resources, and allegations of voter intimidation.[22] Nevertheless, the US would have to wait and see how the new President and his administration would treat the fragile Kyrgyz democracy. Dr. Shairbek Juraev, President of Crossroads Central Asia, a Bishkek-based think tank, does not think the political system generally would change Western donors’ attitude to Kyrgyzstan.[23] They would be more concerned about the new leadership’s adherence to freedom of speech, human rights, rule of law and political pluralism, as well as their policies on the matters that concern Western partners the most.

As to the regional authoritarian powers, their views and policies towards Kyrgyzstan are even more difficult to evaluate. There are reports that President Jeenbekov’s resignation was a strong disappointment for the Kremlin.[24] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak travelled to Kyrgyzstan a few days before Jeenbekov’s resignation and attempted to facilitate negotiations between key Kyrgyz political forces. Another sign of Russia’s disappointment was its suspension of its financial assistance to Kyrgyzstan until the political situation stabilises. However, this could be a simple pragmatic measure to ensure Russia’s assistance goes to a legitimate government.

China’s approach to Kyrgyzstan is a very pragmatic one. As Bishkek-based researcher Niva Yau noted China’s top two interests in Kyrgyzstan are its stability given the proximity to Xinjiang province and its potential role as a pivot for China’s land-based trade routes.[25] However, China might have certain concerns about Japarov’s nationalist rhetoric, which has been directed against foreign investors and border delimitation deals with neighbouring countries.

Overall, all international actors might have their concerns about Japarov’s presidency, but their actions will depend on his policies in the areas of their concern. Japarov inherits a country in dire straits with plenty of international commitments. If he is able to address the most urgent needs of people and demonstrate adherence to Kyrgyzstan’s international commitments, his presidency would last and leave a decent legacy. However, if he is unable to deliver to both domestic and international partners, he might follow the fate of his predecessors.

Recommendations

Based on the research in this publication there are several suggestions for possible action.

For the Governments of Kyrgyzstan’s international partners:

• Instigate an independent investigation into the corruption schemes, where Kyrgyz corrupt officials freely launder the money stolen from Kyrgyzstan in third countries, including Western nations that are engaged in democracy promotion in Kyrgyzstan. This information is vital for the Kyrgyz public to understand domestic processes and make decisions.
• Ensure that organised crime and corrupt officials do not seek money-laundering services in your countries. Western laundromats undermine any efforts to promote democracy and rule of law and devalue the achievements of your own political systems. This could be done through introducing and expanding such programmes as the UK National Crime Agency’s unexplained wealth order.
• If you are involved in promotion of democracy and rule of law, revise your engagement strategies on the ground. There is a clear gap between Western educated urban expert communities and the large mass of rural populations. Widen your pool of experts and include the non-liberal, non-democratic, non-Western-minded ones too as this might help you build your engagement strategies on a more accurate foundation. Principles of democracy and liberalism are sometimes perceived as largely Western alien concept. It is important to challenge this narrative, which often portrays civil society, liberals, human rights defenders and many other proactive members of society as ‘foreign agents’ and ‘grant-eaters’. In order to challenge this narrative, it is required to relate the principles of democracy and liberalism to local values.

For the new Kyrgyz leadership:

• Ensure that the Constitution drafting process strictly follows all legal procedures and is fair and transparent. Any more legal and political irregularities associated with the Constitution drafting and adoption process will undermine the public trust in the main legal document of the country.
• Revise the current mode of operation of the Constitutional Council to increase the transparency of the process. The Council does not share the crucial details of what has been changed so far. In addition, there seems to be no information on next steps, i.e. whether the draft will be given a round of evaluation by independent experts, and if it would be submitted to the Venice Commission for their professional feedback. The lack of transparency and clarity about the process will undermine the public trust to the new Constitution and leave many legal loopholes to challenge its legitimacy, which might cause further instability.
• Ensure a system of checks and balances within the governance structure. A strong presidential rule has never worked for Kyrgyzstan.

Dr. Aijan Sharshenova is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. Dr. Sharshenova holds a PhD in Politics awarded by the University of Leeds. Prior to joining the OSCE Academy, Dr. Sharshenova has worked at the UN and UNDP country offices in the Middle East and in international development projects in Kyrgyzstan. Her research interests include democratisation and democracy promotion, post-Soviet authoritarianism, and international development. Currently, Dr. Sharshenova works on a research project on Russia’s influence on the Kyrgyz Republic. Dr. Sharshenova has recently published her book ‘The European Union’s Democracy Promotion in Central Asia’.

Image by Official website of the Presidency of Kyrgyzstan.

[1] Munduzbek Kalykov, Japarov had no right to run for presidency: Two CEC members refuse to acknowledge the election results, Kloop, January 2021, https://kloop.kg/blog/2021/01/21/zhaparov-ne-imel-prava-ballotirovatsya-v-prezidenty-dva-chlena-tsik-ne-priznali-itogi-vyborov/

[2]These legal and political irregularities are well covered by Bruce Pannier, Questions arise with ex-fugitive Japarov, the favourite in Kyrgyz presidential race, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-presidential-election-japarov-questions-constitution-controversy-qishloq-ovoz/31038709.html

[3] Temirkulov, Azamat. 2010. Kyrgyz “revolutions” in 2005 and 2010: comparative analysis of mass mobilization. The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol.38 (5): 589-600

[4] Isabelle Khurshudyan, After Kyrgyzstan’s third uprising in 15 years, a nationalist who was sprung from prison is elected president, Washington Post, January 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/after-kyrgyzstans-third-uprising-in-15-years-a-nationalist-who-was-sprung-from-prison-is-elected-president/2021/01/11/1ed36db8-503c-11eb-a1f5-fdaf28cfca90_story.html

[5] Election 2020: The list of parties, Azattyk, October 2020, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30828971.html

[6] Kyrgyzstan election: President Jeenbekov resigns after protests, BBC News, October 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54553173

[7] Vyacheslav Polovinko, Freedom, equality, bros: Kyrgyz President resigned and opened path to power to the local underworld, Novaya Gazeta, October 2020, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/10/15/87529-svoboda-ravenstvo-bratva

[8] Nationalist politician wins Kyrgyz presidential election, set to get sweeping powers, Azattyk, January 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/japarov-kyrgyzstan-presidential-election-referendum-/31040110.html

[9] Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, Permanent Mission of the Kyrgyz Republic to the United Nations, October 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/japarov-kyrgyzstan-presidential-election-referendum-/31040110.html

[10] The CEC approved the outcomes of the early presidential election of the Kyrgyz Republic, Central Electoral Commission’s website, January 2021, https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/news/4383/; The CEC declared the referendum on the political system of the Kyrgyz Republic completed, Central Electoral Commission’s website, January 2021, https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/news/4384/

[11] As cited in Joanna Lillis, Sadyr Japarov is elected president of Kyrgyzstan in a landslide, The Economist, January 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/01/11/sadyr-japarov-is-elected-president-of-kyrgyzstan-in-a-landslide

[12] Aizirek Imanalieva, Kyrgyzstan: Japarov, last hope or populist menace?, Eurasianet, January 2021, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-japarov-last-hope-or-populist-menace

[13] The last two years of President Bakiyev’s rule were riddled with increased corruption cases, political assassinations, and all-pervasive nepotism.

[14] Aizirek Imanalieva, Kyrgyzstan: Japarov, last hope or populist menace?, Eurasianet, January 2021, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-japarov-last-hope-or-populist-menace

[15] Anna Kapushenko, Ex convict, a banker, several MPs and a national security officer: Who is running for presidency?, Kloop, January 2021,

[16] Georgy Mamedov, Japarov is our Trump, Open Democracy, January 2021, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/japarov-is-our-trump-kyrgyzstan-is-the-future-of-global-politics/

[17] While serving his prison sentence Japarov has lost his both parents and his oldest son to diseases and a car accident, source: Aruuke Uran kyzy, From prison to presidency: Sadyr Japarov’s victory, The Diplomat, January 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/from-prison-to-presidency-sadyr-japarovs-victory/; See more about his life in Aruuke Uran kyzy, From prison to presidency: Sadyr Japarov’s victory, The Diplomat, January 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/from-prison-to-presidency-sadyr-japarovs-victory/

[18] Ivan Nechepurenko, Populist, prisoner, president: A convicted kidnapper wins Kyrgyzstan election, New York Times, January 2021, https://nyti.ms/2LBCM4W

[19] Chris Rickleton, Kyrgyzstan’s former first son living the high life in UK, Eurasianet, 2015, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstans-former-first-son-living-the-high-life-in-uk-report; See also Global Witness, Surrey Mansion Used To Hide Suspect Funds, March 2015, https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/surrey-mansion-used-hide-suspect-funds/

[20] Interview with Dr. Chiara Pierobon, January 2021.

[21] Paul Stano, Kyrgyz Republic: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Presidential Elections and on the referendum on the future political system, European External Action Service, January 2021,

[22] U.S. Embassy Statement on 2021 Kyrgyz Presidential Elections, January 2021, https://kg.usembassy.gov/u-s-embassy-statement-on-2021-kyrgyz-presidential-elections/

[23] Interview with Dr. Shairbek Juraev, January 2021.

[24] Vyacheslav Polovinko, Freedom, equality, bros: Kyrgyz President resigned and opened path to power to the local underworld, Novaya Gazeta, October 2020, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/10/15/87529-svoboda-ravenstvo-bratva

[25] Interview with Niva Tsz Yau, January 2021.

Nationalist populism and online political mobilisation

The rising illiberal populism that imperils even established democracies including the US, Brazil, the UK, Turkey, and many European countries, has become a favourite political tool for many autocratically inclined politicians. Until recently, countries of the post-soviet region, where local authoritarian leaders prefer to rule with the help of traditional administrative methods of suppression, had been mostly spared from this phenomenon. But the recent political dynamics in Kyrgyzstan shows that leading political actors increasingly adopt populist language, nationalist discourses and polarising strategies to gain political power.

Looking at the recent Kyrgyz political realm, this essay discusses how nationalist populism has become a dominant political force in Kyrgyzstan. As we see today’s global populism is also associated with the power of social media platforms.^[1] Skilfully promoted through the Kyrgyz-speaking social media platforms by the newly elected president Sadyr Japarov, a pro-Japarov populist movement has gained political momentum in the aftermath of popular uprising against the then president Sooronbay Jeenbekov. On January 10^th, Sadyr Japarov won the presidential elections. This happened only three months after he had been released from the prison by street protestors following rigged parliamentary elections on October 4^th 2020 and popular uprising that deposed the regime of President Jeenbekov.

A campaign banner of Sadyr Japarov (January 2021): ‘Sadyr Japarov. Serving the Future!’

Sadyr Japarov, a new president and currently the most powerful political figure who was just recently in prison, successfully employs populist behaviour by producing divisive and hostile language. Japarov represents the image of a new type of populist politician who knows how to use social media in his favour to influence people. His power derives from, and popularity is based on, an unusually high number of followers on social media. Very much like Trump, who used Twitter to have direct appeal to his supporters, Japarov personally administers several large social media groups. He admitted in his interview that he used all kinds of social media networks, created 50 groups and managed them even while in prison: “In prison you are a free person for 24 hours, you have free time.”[2]

A screenshot from Sadyr Japarov’s biggest Facebook group (177K) which shows a list of the admins and moderators.[3] The one written in Latin Alphabet as Sadyr Japarov is his personal account which was created in 2012.[4]

Online mobilisation impacts real-world mobilisation, turning it into a crucial element of Japarov’s strategy that has de facto secured him a strategic advantage (winning the street during the initial protests and subsequently) and then the presidency. Our interviews with people in various localities indicate that Japarov’s followers often mobilised by creating local WhatsApp groups, which were then used to coordinate their actions, including travel to Bishkek to join forces with other supporters in the city’s Old Square.

The online mobilisation in the wake of the October post-electoral crisis that turned into actual street mobilisation and the physical presence of pro-Japarov groups in the Old Square in the post-election crisis period, was crucial to the successful rise of Japarov.^[5] Hundreds of his supporters gathered to support and protect the populist politician following his nomination to the post of interim Prime Minister on October 6^th. At the same time, supporters of a broad coalition of opposition politicians including former president Atambayev along with liberal youths gathered on the central Ala-Too square just a mile away. On October 9^th, Japarov’s supporters attacked and chased their opponents on the Ala-Too square.^[6] That clash became a critical juncture that determined the fate of political power struggle. From that moment, Japarov emerged as the most powerful actor in a political scene.

Background to social media populism

With the growing access to the internet and the availability of smartphones in recent years, the Kyrgyz speaking population has been increasingly exposed to online news content. Kyrgyz online nationalist groups are a relatively new phenomenon in Kyrgyzstan’s social domain. According to the data report for 2020 the number of internet users in Kyrgyzstan increased by 55 thousand (+1.8 per cent) between 2019 and 2020.[7]There were 3.06 million internet users in Kyrgyzstan in January 2020 and 2.5 million use social networks. In Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz-speaking social media users usually come from traditional rural backgrounds as opposed to urban dwellers, consumers of social media content in Russian language, including the content that comes from the Russian Federation’s media space.

Why now and why social media? Mobile internet provides rural people with great opportunities in expanding social communication networks through social media platforms. For many of them, news circulated in and through social media has replaced traditional newspapers and TV programmes as a primary source of getting information and entertainment. People in rural areas tended to trust the content in newspapers, so, not surprisingly, when the news circulated in social media came to replace traditional newspapers, people readily took for granted the reliability of the online content, especially if it is spread through trusted networks.

Emergence of nationalist groups and social media manipulation

However, despite this, in the pre-October period, the influence of Japarov’s social groups on public opinion was rather limited. Before 2020, nationalist groups were not highly visible on online platforms, mostly appearing to the public during controversial events such as anti-corruption demonstrations, the ReAction 1.0 and 2.0, the March 8^th feminist march, and the Femminale art exhibition. Those events were used as focal points and windows of opportunity for nationalist groups to showcase their strength and public presence. The strong connection between these high-publicity events and the emergence of nationalist groups signaled the first signs of social media manipulation of the nationalist mobilisation.

In particular, the organisation of the ReAction 2.0 on December 18^th was countered by an unprecedented level of sophisticated informational attacks against anti-corruption activists organised by pro-regime trolls supposedly financed by a controversial figure, Raiymbek Matraimov, popularly known as ‘Raiym Million’ for his alleged wealth.^[8] Several edited videos and images emerged in social media several days before the ReAction 2.0 demonstration targeting anti-corruption activists. These mounted videos and edited images stated that the forthcoming demonstration was organised by LGBT groups and western agents. The pictures of some anti-corruption activists were placed next to images and video-footage of sexually explicit gay scenes and images of LGBT activists. In other images, taken from the demonstration, some participants were randomly outlined as ‘western agents’. The supposed aim of those falsified information attacks was to activate yet another societal cleavage – between conservative-nationalist and liberal groups – to shift away from the anti-corruption discourse to cause societal outrage against ReAction 2.0 exploiting homophobic and anti-western sentiments that are dominant in Kyrgyzstan’s largely conservative society. The troll attacks skillfully build on recent controversies around feminist events such as the Femminale art exhibition and the March 8^th feminist march in Bishkek that was joined by some LGBT activists. These events caused huge outrage among conservative groups. Several female activists were attacked by aggressive men from nationalist groups, some of them allegedly linked to Kyrk Choro (Forty Knights) – one of the first conservative-nationalist groups, also infamous for their vigilante raids against prostitutes and brothels, that later was co-opted by Japarov’s populist movement. Their appearance at the controversial events was an indicator of growing polarisation between liberal and conservative groups.^[9]

Populist manipulation

Currently, pro-Japarov online groups are the most numerous and influential in the Kyrgyz-speaking social media domain. The membership significantly multiplied and the number of groups supporting Japarov mushroomed since he claimed political power last October. In the pre-October 2020 period, being probably the only politician who realised a high potential of social networks for political mobilisation, Japarov actively worked from the prison to create his support base on social media platforms. As Japarov himself claims: “More than a hundred people whom I worked with were released while I was still in prison. They started working for me, spreading the word that I was a good man. When I got out, they were all at rallies, supporting me. That is the whole secret of the third revolution.”^[10] He continues in his interview after the election: “In jail, I wasn’t just wasting time, I was working with the people through social media.^[11] For three and a half years, I communicated directly with ordinary people. I created groups on Odnoklassniki, on Facebook, on Instagram. I collected people’s contacts on WhatsApp and created more than 50 groups there: one group holds 256 contacts. Through these groups I spread information about Kumtor, about my work. That’s how I reached all the people in three and a half years.”

Japarov’s popularity and influence sky-rocketed after he was released from the prison and nominated for the position of interim prime minister by a group of MPs with close ties to the then president Sooronbay Jeenbekov and a powerful Matraimov’s clan. His overwhelming dominance in Kyrgyz social media became obvious thanks to the work of hundreds of aggressive trolls who attacked not only Japarov’s political opponents, but also ordinary people with dissident and opposition views.^[12] Their favourite target was liberal or opposition female activists whom trolls and then-ordinary users threatened with sexual violence.^[13] The hate speech incited by online trolls, and even Japarov himself, created an atmosphere of impunity exacerbated by the inaction of state authorities, Facebook administration, and moderators of social media groups run by or affiliated with Japarov and his close associates. Such impunity further emboldened or incited ordinary users to make attacks and open death threats against the opponents of their icon. Japarov’s divisive language sent clear signals to his supporters designating ‘enemies of the people’. Our monitoring of social media content and interviews with prominent opponents and civic activists reveal that the intensity of online threats and hate attacks would often increase after Japarov’s divisive speeches. Typically, trolls would label prominent human rights activists and opposition leaders, as ‘western agents, gays, and spies’. Another critical factor is new exposure to online manipulation. The absolute absence of experience among people to deal with fake news played a crucial role in the rapid spread of populist messages and manipulation of public opinion through fake news. Massive exposure to fake news and hate speech made inexperienced ordinary social media users sincerely believe the fake content of troll factories.^[14]

On December 12 2020, a protest by young males was held in Bishkek.^[15] The organisers explained that they are against any protests in Bishkek. The banners read: “Ï am a patriot of my country. I want peace in my city”, “By organising a protest of 10 people, don’t claim your rights!”, and “I am against the destabilisation in my country”. Some internet users compared them to a new version of a conservative ‘Kyrk Choro’ group of men. The head of this movement against protests, as they call themselves druzhinniki (vigilantes), is Marat Mamraliev. He is a young politician and entrepreneur who is developing a security agency, the rapid response group ‘Division’.

Virtually all nationalist groups and social media trolls rely on anti-western and anti-liberal discourse propagandised by the Kremlin as ready-to-use templates for nationalist actors to manipulate public opinion. High legitimacy of the Kremlin’s anti-liberal discourse among Kyrgyzstan’s general population provided political actors with a valuable tool to manipulate public opinion. Presidents, especially Atambayev, have willingly exploited this high legitimacy discourse in their political interests. Japarov fully employed this strategy against his political opponents. What Japarov added to the existing discourse frames is an anti-establishment discourse that he has splendidly promoted through numerous social media groups that he personally controls. For example, he personally administers his biggest Facebook group, which has 180,000 members.^[16] In general, there are more than ten big pro-Japarov groups on Facebook and Instagram. During the pre-election period, between November 19^th 2020 – January 1^st 2021, his Facebook groups created 49,500 posts. Japarov related groups produced more than a half of all posts generated by the biggest political Facebook groups taken together. This is much more than even groups with news information content, as the figure shows.

The army of trolls has been a crucial factor to bringing Japarov success. The hate-filled comments defending Japarov and attacking his opponents have been traced not only on Facebook and Instagram but also on YouTube. One of the authors of this paper, Gulzat Baialieva, together with Janeta Jakypova, conducted a textual data-analysis of two mostly watched videos where Japarov and his opponent Tekebaev talk about constitutional reforms.^[17] They have scraped all 6,799 commentaries to examine how the referendum and changes to the Constitution were discussed on YouTube. Among 100 of the most frequently used words (excluding pronouns) there is no mention of ‘law’, ‘referendum’ or ‘constitution’. As the cloud of words shows, the comments refer to these two politicians, Japarov and Tekebaev (used shortly by the users as a derogatory name ‘Teke’ meaning goat).  After these two names, the other most frequently used words are ‘people’ and ‘God’.

Cloud of words used under YouTube videos related to referendum and Constitution.

Sadyr Japarov’s groups made 49,500 posts in the pre-election period. Source: Center for Media Development.

Japarov’s populist message fell on favourable ground. It came when the fatigue for the corrupted system and politicians among ordinary people reached a high point, after years of rampant corruption among politicians and officials in practically all levels of state institutions. Japarov efficiently used the people’s fatigue and their distrust towards politicians. Many of his political decisions contain populist references to the ‘people’s will’. What we observe now is the overwhelming popularity of Japarov in mostly rural regions of Kyrgyzstan.

Performance during the pre-electoral campaign in Karakol on December 29 2020. The scene from the local genealogy of the seven saints ‘Jeti Ake’. The saints are blessing and initiating the presidential candidate Japarov blessed into the eighth saint warrior!

Liberal groups did not manage to effectively neutralise the populist message promoted by Japarov. Nor had they an effective plan to counteract his aggressive strategy. The main weakness is the lack of grassroot connections amongst the predominantly Russophone liberal groups with Kyrgyz-speaking social segments. They tend to adapt liberal ideas from western liberal discourse with little or no attempt to convert it into plain language that could be acceptable and comprehensible to the most traditional and rural segments of society. Abstract ideas that have little to do with the prosaic reality of everyday life of ordinary rural dwellers strongly contradict their traditional views and values. Attempts by Russophone liberals to ‘educate’ or ‘civilise’ fail to take into account the context and cultural values of rural people. Therefore, when liberal groups tried to resist Japarov’s illiberal constitutional reforms only appealing to the breach of constitutional procedures, his rural supporters simply did not buy those arguments. For Japarov’s supporters, the breach, even if they recognised it, did not make any sense because the constitution was violated so many times by Japarov’s predecessors for the personal benefit, so then why their political favourite could not do the same especially because he wanted it to work ‘in the interests of the people’?

Similarly, Kyrgyz and Russophone segments independently exist in parallel lives in social media networks rarely intersect in everyday life. But when they intersect to reflect high-publicity and controversial political and social events, the debates produce ideological cleavages and acute conflict. On the contrary, Japarov often personally engages in discussions with social media users in a simple popular language clearly understandable to many ordinary people. This informal direct contact that strikingly contrasts with the behaviour of traditional politicians appeals to many people who consider Japarov ‘our guy’.

Photo from Sadyr Japarov’s Facebook group. Pre-election campaign in Karakol, December 29 2020.

The following examples demonstrate his direct involvement in online discussions. Sadyr Japarov wrote a post on his personal Facebook account to respond to a critical publication about his endless promises: “Were you born as a nine-months-old? Or were you born premature? Please be patient, my brother. All in good time. There is so much you don’t know…”^[18] Japarov’s public posts against his opponents contain a patronising, accusing and discriminative language. Japarov does not hesitate to blame his critics for fake news and uses religious articulation: “How do you tell such lies? Have you no faith and morals?”, called the opposing groups “bastards” and wrote hate-filled posts “Go to hell those who cry out for their own interests!”.

Some populist measures have even seemingly caught sympathies of liberal middle-class urbanites. Anti-corruption discourse ‘kusturabyz’ (we make corrupt officials throw up what they stole) or the so-called economic amnesty is another effective populist move.

Conclusion

Japarov’s anti-establishment and anti-liberal rhetoric is framed as ‘the people’s voice’ and is characteristic to many populist leaders across the world. He skillfully manipulates rising inequality in Kyrgyz society to shift blame on old elites, liberal activists, and independent media – whom he calls as ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘traitors’. His blaming strategy and a reputation of a national hero and a victim of the corrupt and unjust system that he carefully constructed over years, allowed him to get a tight grip on ordinary people making him the most popular and powerful actor in Kyrgyzstan’s political scene. Sensing his power and popularity, Japarov has taken a successful gamble on changing the constitution that would dismantle democratic institutions and grant a new president with an unprecedented level of power. A huge popularity for Japarov among ordinary people provided him with high potential to push through anti-democratic constitutional reforms that threaten to transform the country into deep authoritarianism.

We suggest that key elements of Japarov’s populism, such as ‘eldin talaby’ (popular will) and ‘eski sayasatchylar’ (the corrupt elite), the direct appeal via social media and his political imprisonment with tragic personal consequences have been activated by context. The factors that led people to vote for President Japarov, including concerns about the country’s growing economic inequality, corrupt judicial system and foreign influence, were not new in 2021. The difference was the ways in which Japarov communicated about these issues. His provocative statements, rhetoric and social media trolling increased the intensity and polarised the society. Japarov and his political team attacked opponents and the independent media, presenting them as the “enemy”, “western influence” and “threat” to Kyrgyz unity and identity. Japarov was refashioned into a ‘uluttuk lider’ (national hero). We do not suggest one silver bullet to mitigate the negative effects of populism, especially when the societies are dismantled from within. Yet, we highlight several important considerations to respond to the effects of populism:

• Avoid efforts to ‘enlighten’ and ‘educate’ the ‘other side’ which aggravates polarisation: Simply exposing people to ‘the real facts’, ‘true story’ or to break down pre-existing beliefs are ineffective and can accentuate polarisation. They are especially ineffective when they are communicated by untrusted actors or messengers, which leads people to stay even more closely to their own group-congruent beliefs.
• Focus on shaping people’s perceptions of norms: As research on combating populism suggests people’s behaviour is shaped by individual attitudes and normative context. So rather than seeking to ‘educate’ and to change attitudes, which more likely have developed over a long period of time, liberal actors should focus on shaping norms.
• Create unifying beliefs, values and narratives: Japarov focused greatly on the ‘us versus them’ narrative, a typical tactic used by populists and authoritarian leaders. The liberal forces should avoid using their divisive language. They should create their brand of inclusive narratives and highlight unifying beliefs and values.

Gulzat Baialieva is a PhD candidate at the Social Anthropology Department, University of Tübingen. She holds a Master’s degree in Political Science (Comparative Politics) from Central European University and a graduate diploma in European Civilisations from Bishkek Humanities University. She has been teaching at the Social Anthropology Department, University of Tübingen and previously at Bishkek Humanities University. Her research interests include populism, environmental anthropology, post-socialist transformations, water use in Central Asia and digital ethnography.

Joldon Kutmanaliev is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Tübingen. He received his doctoral degree in political science from the European University Institute in Florence and MA in political science from the Central European University. Previously, he taught at the University of Tübingen and the Bishkek Humanities University for many years. He is an author of a forthcoming book ‘Intercommunal Warfare and Ethnic Peacemaking: The Dynamics of Urban Violence in Central Asia’, to be published with the McGill-Queens University Press.

Image by Etienne Combier under (CC).

[1] Flew T, Iosifidis P. 2020. Populism, globalisation and social media. International Communication Gazette, 82(1):7-25. doi:10.1177/1748048519880721

[2] Kommersant, “In prison you are a free man 24 hours a day”, January 2021, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4639707

[3] Sadyr Japarov, Facebook Public Group, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/groups/1412264215689407

[4] Sadyr Japarov, Facebook Personal Account, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/japarov.sadyr

[5] Gulzat Baialieva and Joldon Kutmanaliev, How Kyrgyz social media backed an imprisoned politician’s meteoric rise to power, openDemocracy, October 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/how-kyrgyz-social-media-backed-an-imprisoned-politicians-meteoric-rise-to-power/

[6] Kyrgyzstan election: Fresh clashes as state of emergency comes into force, BBC News, October 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-54481063

[7] Simon Kemp Digital 2020: Kyrgyzstan, DataRePortal, February 2020, https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-kyrgyzstan

[8] Raiym Matraimov, a former head deputy of the Customs, was a main target of the ReAction anti-corruption campaign for his involvement in high-level corruption schemes in transborder trade with China and his involvement in the assassination of Aierken Saimaiti, a whistleblower murdered by hired killers in Istanbul. Matraimov’s clan founded a Mekenim Kyrgyzstan (‘Homeland Kyrgyzstan’) party that ran in the parliamentary elections on October 4^th 2020. His party gained a majority of seats along with a pro-presidential Birimdik (‘Unity’) party in what independent observers called highly fraud and rigged elections that caused outraged and popular protests.

[9] Joldon Kutmanaliev and Gulzat Baialieva, Polarisation grows as Kyrgyzstan tackles controversial corruption issues, openDemocracy, December 2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/polarisation-grows-kyrgyzstan-tackles-controversial-corruption-issues/

[10] Kommersant, “In prison you are a free man 24 hours a day”, January 2021, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4639707

[11] Ibid.

[12] Gulzat Baialieva and Joldon Kutmanaliev, In Kyrgyzstan, social media hate goes unchecked, openDemocracy, December 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/kyrgyzstan-social-media-hate-goes-unchecked/

[13] Ibid.

[14] Kamila Eshaliyeva, Real fakes: how Kyrgyzstan’s troll factories work, openDemocracy, November 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/troll-factories-kyrgyzstan/?source=in-article-related-story

[15] Barakelde, Anti-protest rally took place on Ala-Too Square, December 2020, https://barakelde.org/news:419961

[16] Sadyr Japarov, Facebook Public Group, Facebook https://www.facebook.com/groups/1412264215689407/members/admins

[17] Gulzat Bayalieva and Janetta Zhakypova, Social Networks: Discussion or Disruption, RFE/RL, December 2020, https://www.azattyk.org/a/31013907.html?fbclid=IwAR2ZjGvoKqTpWB_Eh6bny0LCnBGc6LNTsmNTRCJXEcZAgyYb6-IqQs-jINI

[18] Sadyr Japarov, Facebook Post, Facebook, December 2020, https://www.facebook.com/japarov.sadyr/posts/1754338344741087

On the morning of October 6^th 2020, Sadyr Japarov was in jail, serving an 11-year sentence for kidnapping the Governor of Kyrgyzstan’s Issyk Kul region. Ten days later Japarov was anointed President, capping an extraordinary ten days of street protests and dubious legal procedures that saw one of Kyrgyzstan’s most prominent convicts catapulted to Kyrgyzstan’s most prominent political office. Rule of law in Kyrgyzstan is weak. It is the passions of the street – sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse – that shape both political fortunes and human rights in Kyrgyzstan.

Three decades after the Soviet collapse, Kyrgyzstan finds itself in a catch-22. Kyrgyz state capacity is weak and, as a result, political chaos is frequent. There is an upside, however, to chaos. Whereas other Central Asian governments, most notably Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have proven able to systematically target the political opposition, religious groups, and ethnic minorities, Kyrgyz state repression of human rights has been piecemeal and fleeting. The downside of Kyrgyz chaos, particularly from the perspective of vulnerable populations, is that guarantees of basic human rights are non-existent. Rather than rule-of-law ensured protections, it is society’s preferences, the state executive’s perception of threat, and the political elites’ on-again, off-again desire to maintain Kyrgyzstan’s international reputation as Central Asia’s only post-Soviet democracy that provide some modicum of human rights protection.

Society preferences

Most striking about Kyrgyz politics is that, despite the persistent chaos of national politics, everyday local life is, with a few important exceptions, peaceful. Unlike Uzbekistan, where the past three decades have seen sustained persecution of devout Muslims, and unlike Turkmenistan where the political opposition is routinely silenced and jailed, Kyrgyz citizens are comparatively free to worship as they wish and to criticise local, regional, and state elites. Kyrgyz citizens and Kyrgyzstan observers offer multiple wellsprings for these comparative freedoms: the enduring celebration of country’s nomadic history, western donors’ enthusiastic support of Kyrgyz NGOs in the decade following the Soviet collapse, and the can-do/must-do mentality that developed among local communities as the Kyrgyz welfare state steadily eroded in the years of post-Soviet independence.[1]

Regardless the origins of local communities’ power, what is clear is how local communities have harnessed this power to effect public goods, including the public good of human rights. Tablighi travelers, Muslim revivalists who seek to spread Islamic knowledge, are welcomed in local communities throughout Kyrgyzstan whereas similar revivalist movements are violently repressed in neighbouring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.[2] Opposition to the central government similarly thrives at the local level. Kyrgyz communities challenge central government contracts with international mining companies, neighbourhood organisations join together to block the destruction of parks and building of roads, and citizens across the country bind to gather to protest state attempts to raise the price of everyday necessities like natural gas. Local social networks are often the foundations upon which Kyrgyz political opposition is built and secured.

Societal preferences, critically however, do not invariably favour human rights for all. Just as we can identify systemic bias, for example, white privilege in the US or Han Chinese privilege in Xinjiang, so too does Kyrgyz society elevate the rights of some while concomitantly undermining the rights of others.[3] Vulnerable classes in Kyrgyzstan include ethnic minorities, particularly the Uzbek minority, members of the LGBTQ+ community, and women. Animus toward ethnic Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan has deep, Soviet-era roots. Bias against sexual minorities and women also has deep roots yet has grown in recent years as more and more political elites champion a return to ‘traditional society’.

Throughout the Soviet period, ethnic Uzbeks figured prominently in the economies of southern Kyrgyz cities. Soviet leaders, most notably Brezhnev, sought to minimise ethnic Kyrgyz economic grievances by increasing titular control over local political and administrative offices. This ‘nativisation’ of power, a process which has only accelerated since Kyrgyz independence, has produced a combustible situation in which political control rests squarely with ethnic Kyrgyz while ethnic Uzbeks have remained central to Kyrgyzstan’s southern urban economies. During periods of political instability, most notably in June 1990 and in June 2010, economic grievance has boiled over into deadly ethnic conflict. Uzbeks were disproportionately the victims of these ethnic conflicts. Thus, of the 470 who died in the 2010 conflict, nearly three-fourths were ethnic Uzbeks.[4] Ethnic Uzbeks, moreover, were disproportionately faulted for instigating the 2010 violence, this despite independent documentation that Kyrgyz police and the military did little to prevent and, at times, were complicit in violent attacks on Uzbek communities.[5]

Emblematic of the injustices ethnic Uzbeks have endured is the case of Azimjan Askarov, an ethnic Uzbek human rights defender, whom Kyrgyz courts found guilty of fomenting the 2010 violence. The United Nations Human Rights Committee concluded in May 2016 that Askarov’s ‘detention was not in accordance with domestic law, had no legitimate purpose, and was motivated by his role as a human rights defender and by his ethnicity.’[6] The Kyrgyz Government rejected the UN committee’s conclusion and Askarov, lamentably, died in prison in July 2020.

Whereas economic grievances have fomented anti-Uzbek sentiment in southern Kyrgyzstan, a revival of supposedly ‘traditional’ Kyrgyz values has led to increased gender discrimination and imperiled Kyrgyzstan’s LGBTQ+ community. On March 8^th 2020—International Women’s Day—a group of masked men wearing Ak-kalpaks, traditional Kyrgyz hats, attacked a group of activists who had gathered on Victory Square to highlight the persistence and acceptance of widespread domestic violence, bride kidnapping, and rape.[7] Revealingly, while the violent attackers were not detained, 50 women’s rights activists were arrested.[8]

Self-appointed defenders of Kyrgyz traditional society similarly, albeit less violently, opposed the Women’s Day march the previous year. Members of the nationalist group, Kyrk Choro, demanded Bishkek city authorities be dismissed for allowing the 2019 Women’s Day march to turn into a “gay parade.” Kyrk Choro also demanded legal action be taken against the march organisers “who have trampled on (Kyrgyz) national values ​​and pride.”[9] Kyrk Choro nationalists has woven a narrative that feminists and homosexuals are in league with ‘foreign specialists’ and are actively seeking to undermine traditional Kyrgyz culture.[10] This narrative presents challenges for those in the international community who do seek to support LGBTQ+ rights. International support for Kyrgyzstan’s LGBTQ+ community feeds into Kyrk Choro’s nationalist message that western governments are in league against Central Asian traditional values. At the same time, were donors to abandon the LGBTQ+ community, LGBTQ+ rights in Kyrgyzstan would become even more imperiled.

Kyrk Choro, it should be stressed, should not be dismissed as merely a fringe element of Kyrgyz society. Kyrgyz parliamentarians voice similar homophobic beliefs. MP Jyldyz Musabekova said of the March 2019 marchers, “the men who do not want to have children and the girls who do not want to pour tea…must not only be cursed, they must be beaten.”[11] While Kyrgyzstan has yet to pass an anti-LGBTQ+ law like the one adopted in Russia in 2013, draft laws strikingly similar to the Russian legislation and that focus on punishing those who spread ‘propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations’ have consistently received overwhelming support in the Kyrgyz parliament.[12] International donors would do well to recognise the sensitivity surrounding LGBTQ+ rights in Kyrgyzstan. Donors must not ignore this critically vulnerable population. At the same time, donors must acknowledge that bias against the LGBTQ+ community is, lamentably, widespread the world over. Just as politicians in Europe and the US have been slow to ensure LGBTQ+ protections, so too do Kyrgyz political elites hesitate to press LGBTQ+ rights out of a fear of alienating key constituencies.

Executive perceptions of threat

It is striking that, despite Kyrgyz MPs enthusiasm for anti-LGBTQ+ legislation, this legislation has yet to be formally adopted and passed into law. This is not to say that LGBTQ+ rights are robust in Kyrgyzstan; they are not. Members of the LGBTQ+ community are regularly the targets of violence and perpetrators of this violence rarely are brought to justice.[13] To date, though, presidents along with members of parliament have been content to propound homophobic rhetoric rather than legislate against and thereby criminalise Kyrgyzstan’s embattled LGBTQ+ community. The same cannot be said for members of the Uzbek minority or the political opposition. These groups, in that they either directly or indirectly pose what ruling elites perceive to be real threats, have suffered and will continue to suffer human rights violations at the hands of the Kyrgyz state.

There is no evidence, it must be emphasised, that Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic Uzbek minority has ever sought to undermine state power either at the national or local level. This reality, though, has not stopped Kyrgyz nationalists from advancing narratives suggesting minority Uzbeks are a fifth column. The former mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakhmetov, used anti-Uzbek xenophobia to build a devoted political following. Although the central Kyrgyz government eventually dethroned Myrzakhmetov from his mayoral seat in 2013, no Kyrgyz leader has sought to challenge Myrzakhmetov’s—or any other Kyrgyz nationalist’s—one-sided narrative of the 2010 ethnic violence. To challenge this narrative would be political suicide. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that, to this day, no Kyrgyz executive has sought to reverse the Kyrgyz judiciary’s gross miscarriage of justice conducted against ethnic Uzbeks in the aftermath of the 2010 riots. Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic Uzbeks, though the threat they pose to the state is imagined rather than real, will continue to be deprived full restitution of rights as long as Kyrgyz elites perceive weak nationalist bona fides will make them vulnerable to political attacks.

Political attacks, be they based on nationalist credentials, real or alleged corruption, or charges of incompetence, are frequent in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz presidents are always on guard to defend against these attacks and, despite Kyrgyzstan’s outward trappings of democracy, Kyrgyz executives have proven more than willing to use the judiciary as well as other ‘administrative’ means to minimise real and perceived threats from opponents. The current Kyrgyz President, Sadyr Japarov, was jailed in 2017 during the leadership of President Atambayev. Atambayev himself was placed under house arrest by his successor, President Jeenbekov. Jeenbekov, ousted by Japarov in October 2020, has thus far avoided arrest, assiduously avoiding confrontation knowing well how a sitting president can use the courts to silence political threats. This march of executives between prison and the presidency and the presidency to prison is clear illustration of how Kyrgyzstan’s political opposition can be silenced. Election monitoring reports from the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights are replete with examples of how the Kyrgyz executive systematically uses administrative resources, most notably the judiciary, to eliminate political threats. Indeed, it is precisely because political rights are so insecure that we see Kyrgyz politics so frequently devolve into street protests and putsches.

International reputation

Western governments, particularly the US Government, have viewed these protests and putsches more through the lens of democratic transition rather than unrestrained populism. US State Department Spokesman Adam Ereli was repeatedly pushed in March 2005, just days after a street protests led to the overthrow of Kyrgyzstan’s first president, Askar Akayev, if the US Government considered what happened in Kyrgyzstan to be a coup. Ereli responded, “we will continue to work to support the efforts of the Kyrgyz people as they endeavor to build a stable democracy.”[14] Following the putsch that led to Akayev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, fleeing to Kazakhstan, US Assistant Secretary of State Philip Crowley assured that the US Government would be “working with Kyrgyzstan to try to move it along on a path to democracy and economic prosperity.”[15] And in November 2020, just weeks after street protesters secured Sadyr Japarov’s release from jail and installation as acting president, the US Embassy in Bishkek announced it was renewing its ‘commitment to assist the Kyrgyz Government, its people, and civil society groups composed of ordinary citizens, to protect democratic institutions, support human rights, and conduct free and fair elections.’[16]

Although leaders like Japarov no doubt see through the sanguine outward facing pronouncements of the US Government, international exhortations of support for Kyrgyz democracy likely do have a net positive effect on human rights in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan depends heavily on foreign aid and receives more aid per capita from the two largest international donors—the European Union and the US Government—than any other Central Asian country.[17] To engage in widespread and systematic human rights repression—repression the likes of which we see in Turkmenistan today or we saw in Uzbekistan during President Karimov’s nearly three decades of terror—would jeopardise this much needed aid.

Kyrgyz presidents, including the recently-elected Japarov, consistently articulate support for human rights. Thus, Japarov pledged that “freedom of speech and the media will continue to be an inviolable value,” and that his administration would build “a model judicial system.”[18] It is also notable, however, that Japarov, in his January 10^th 2021 victory speech, issued a warning to the press: “While I will defend the media, I ask you not to distort my words or the words of politicians and officials, not to take our statements out of context. Do this and there won’t be any prosecutions.”[19] These are the worlds of a leader who perceives an overwhelmingly populist—though not necessarily democratically-won—mandate. This distinction is important and one that has not always informed how international partners engage Kyrgyz governments. Eliding populism and democracy, as international observers of Kyrgyz politics frequently do, is to celebrate political contestation but often at the expense of rule of law.

Japarov’s mixed messaging is an apt metaphor for the state of human rights in Kyrgyzstan. While rights violations are not systematic, neither are human rights guaranteed. Kyrgyz have long practiced robust local rule and this deep institutionalisation of local self-governance acts as a break to what might otherwise be the central government’s trampling of fundamental rights. Kyrgyz leaders’ desire to maintain an outward image as the one democracy in post-Soviet Central Asia, moreover, also acts as a check on human rights violations. At the same time, though, neither Kyrgyz leaders nor Kyrgyz society are invariably pro-human rights in orientation. Kyrgyzstan is not exceptional in this regard. The violent mob attack on the US capitol in January 2021 illustrates that western governments—the same states that are pushing countries like Kyrgyzstan to guarantee human rights—are themselves vulnerable to the autocratic leanings of their leaders and to the illiberal sentiments within their societies.

Kyrgyzstan’s great fortune, and its curse, is that no single party, no one force, has an uncontested upper hand in Kyrgyz politics. While it may seem that Japarov today is ascendent, past Kyrgyz presidents similarly received overwhelming waves of popular support only to be chased out of the country by angry protesters several years later. The political scientist Dankwart Rustow argued that what was necessary for democracy was not consensus, but rather, a “hot family feud.”[20] This Kyrgyzstan has in abundance. Rustow also cautioned, however, “many things can go wrong” during family feuds. Neither democracy nor human rights are the assured outcome of Kyrgyzstan’s protracted political contestation. Absent the institutionalisation of rule of law and democracy—and here national consensus is necessary—pressure on human rights will continue in Kyrgyzstan.

This essay partly draws on research undertaken as part of the project Russian, Chinese, Militant, and Ideologically Extremist Messaging Effects on United States Favorability Perceptions in Central Asia, funded by the US Department of Defense and the US Army Research Office/Army Research Laboratory under the Minerva Research Initiative, award W911-NF-17-1-0028. The views expressed here are those of the author and should not be attributed to the US Department of Defense or the US Army Research Office/Army Research Laboratory.

Eric McGlinchey is Associate Professor of Politics and Government in George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government. McGlinchey received his PhD from Princeton University and is the author of Chaos, Violence, Dynasty: Politics and Islam in Central Asia (2011). Grants from the Minerva Research Initiative, the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, the International Research & Exchanges Board, the Social Science Research Council, and the US Department of State have funded his research. McGlinchey writes for academic journals, the popular press, and think tanks. You can find Professor McGlinchey’s most recent publications through his university website: http://mcglinchey.gmu.edu/.

Image by Paul Schumacher under (CC).

[1] On the enduring influence of Kyrgyz nomadic identity, see: Judith Beyer, Revitalisation, Invention and Continued Existence of the Kyrgyz Aksakal Courts: Listening to Pluralistic Accounts of History, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 38, no. 53–54: 141–76, 2006, https://doi.org/10.1080/07329113.2006.10756601; and Ali Igmen. 2012. Speaking Soviet with an Accent: Culture and Power in Kyrgyzstan. University of Pittsburgh Pre. On the influence of western foreign aid, see: Erica Marat. 2005. Civil Society in Kyrgyzstan before, During and after the March 24 Revolution. Helsinki Monitor 16, no. 4: 267–77. On the role of local organisation to provide public goods, see: Eric McGlinchey. 2011. Chaos, Violence, Dynasty: Politics and Islam in Central Asia. University of Pittsburgh Pre.

[2] Emil Nasritdinov, Spiritual Nomadism and Central Asian Tablighi Travelers, Ab Imperio, no. 2: 145–67, 2012, https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2012.0062

[3] Ta-Nehisi Coates. 2015. Between the World and Me. 1st edition. New York: One World; Joanne N. Smith, Making Culture Matter: Symbolic, Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese, Asian Ethnicity 3, no. 2: 153–74, September 2002, https://doi.org/10.1080/14631360220132718

[4] RFE/RL, Understanding The Truth: Chief Investigator Of Deadly Kyrgyz-Uzbek Clashes Reflects 10 Years Later, June 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/chief-investigator-of-deadly-kyrgyz-uzbek-clashes-reflects-10-years-later-osh/30662610.html

[5] ReliefWeb, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 – Kyrgyzstan, May 2011, https://reliefweb.int/report/kyrgyzstan/report-independent-international-commission-inquiry-events-southern-kyrgyzstan

[6] International Covenant on and Civil and Political Rights, “Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 2231/2012” (United Nations Human Rights Committee, May 11, 2016).

[7] For more on the symbolism of the Ak-kalpak, see: Ak-Kalpak Craftsmanship, Traditional Knowledge and Skills in Making and Wearing Kyrgyz Men’s Headwear, Intangible Cultural heritage, UNESCO, https://ich.unesco.org/en/lists

[8] Women’s Rights Rally Held in Kyrgyz Capital, BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 2020, https://advance-lexis-com.mutex.gmu.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5YD2-42T1-DYRV-33TC-00000-00&context=1516831

[9] Bermet Ulanova, Miting ‘Kyrk Choro’ i tri ikh glavnikh trebovaniya vlastyam, Kaktus Media, March 2019, https://kaktus.media/doc/388158_miting_kyrk_choro_i_tri_ih_glavnyh_trebovaniia_vlastiam._videotransliaciia.html

[10] Ulanova.

[11] Pete Baumgartner, Rainbow Rage: Kyrgyz Rail Against LGBT Community After Central Asia’s ‘First’ Gay-Pride March, RFE/RL, March 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/rainbow-rage-kyrgyz-rail-against-lgbt-after-central-asia-s-first-gay-pride-march/29825158.html

[12] Anna Lelik, Kyrgyzstan: Anti-LGBT Bill Hits the Buffers, Eurasianet, May 2016, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-anti-lgbt-bill-hits-buffers

[13] Katie Arnold, All of Us Will Be Victims at Some Point: Why Bishkek’s Only Gay Club Closed, The Guardian, October 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/oct/19/victims-closure-bishkek-only-lgbt-club-kyrgyzstan

[14] State Department Briefing, States News Service, March 2005, https://advance-lexis-com.mutex.gmu.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4G2X-RRT0-00RY-942K-00000-00&context=1516831

[15] State Department Press Briefing April 15; Assistant Secretary Philip Crowley Briefs the Press on a Range of Topics, State Department Documents and Publications, April 2010, https://advance-lexis-com.mutex.gmu.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:7Y81-18R0-Y9R0-J29T-00000-00&context=1516831

[16] United States Announces Funding to Support Upcoming Elections in the Kyrgyz Republic, US Embassy in The Kyrgyz Republic, November 2020, http://kg.usembassy.gov/united-states-announces-funding-to-support-upcoming-elections-in-the-kyrgyz-republic/

[17] EU Aid Explorer – European Commission, https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/; US Foreign Aid by Country, https://explorer.usaid.gov/

[18] Highlights from Central Asian Press, Websites 12 Jan 21, BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, January 2021, https://advance-lexis-com.mutex.gmu.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:61RP-B2W1-JC8S-C51G-00000-00&context=1516831

[19] Aidai Tokoyeva, Ya prizyvayu opponentov obedinit’sya, menshestvo dolzhno podchinit’sya bolshinstvu–Zhaparov, KLOOP.KG – Новости Кыргызстана, January 2021, https://kloop.kg/blog/2021/01/10/ya-prizyvayu-opponentov-obedinitsya-menshinstvo-dolzhno-podchinitsya-bolshinstvu-zhaparov/

[20] D. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, Comparative Politics 2 (1970): 355.

Kyrgyzstan has been nation-building for the last 30 years and it is seen as one of the most politically dynamic post-soviet countries. Kyrgyzstan has an ethnically diverse population, with minorities constituting about 26.3 per cent of the total population.[1] Meanwhile, the country’s recent history shows that political destabilisation effects minorities, who are among the most vulnerable in relation to accessing political power and exercising full citizenship. The current political leadership stands for equality and interethnic harmony. The political platform of the newly elected President Sadyr Japarov, ‘Serving the Future’ (‘Kelechekke Kyzmat’), provides that the citizens of Kyrgyzstan may be of different ethnic roots, but they all share love for Kyrgyzstan and responsibility for its ancient history and faith in its future.[2] The post conflict situation after the tragic June 2010 ethnic conflict in the Southern Kyrgyzstan distanced minorities from political activism. Today, Kyrgyzstan needs to take significant steps on peacebuilding interventions and comprehensive political reform in interethnic relations. The argument goes that it would be inevitable to increase level of minority participation and representation in public life, including in elected positions if Kyrgyzstan endorses 21^st century nation-building.

On the eve of October 5^th 2020, the world witnessed how allegations of widespread irregularities, during parliamentary elections triggered street protests in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, which eventually ended up storming the main government building, the Parliament, the Jogorku Kenesh, and the President’s administration.[3] The building briefly caught fire before emergency services put out the blaze and debris from inside, including government papers, and office furniture was strewn outside. In addition, on the same day, groups of protesters were able to unlawfully release high-profile political figures from prison. The political crisis created the power vacuum and paralysed the functioning of state institutions, which were not able to observe the constitutional order. Kyrgyzstan’s Central Election Commission (CEC) later annulled the results of the elections amid political unrest. On October 9^th 2020, the President declared a state of emergency in Bishkek to stabilise the situation. However, the taken measure did not stop protestors pressuring the President to resign. The situation became hot and the political leadership, including President Sooronbay Jeenbekov, the Prime Minister and other top officials, stepped down in order to provide a ‘peaceful transit of the power’ to Sadyr Japarov. Sadyr Japarov, a former parliamentarian who was imprisoned for 11 and a half years and whom was freed on October 6^th 2020, assumed power and became the de facto country’s first person. Soon afterwards, the Supreme Court acquitted Japarov in a hasty trial and opened the way for him to become the interim Prime Minister and the country’s acting President.

The events of October 5^th were not only about controversial elections results, but were triggered by the incompetent response of the Government to the COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19-related lockdown weakened the county’s social-economic situation and dramatically increased the level of unemployment. As the UN CERD pointed out, the COVID-19 pandemic has been having significant adverse impacts on the enjoyment of human rights, in particular on the right to non-discrimination and to equality.[4] In this regard, COVID-19 remains a potential source of further social tensions, which would also affect interethnic relations in post political crisis Kyrgyzstan.

For Kyrgyzstan this is the third uprising that overthrew ruling presidents in the last 15 years. Both the 2005 and 2010 uprisings also featured political and economic crises, and caused property and power redistributions throughout the country. However, this time the Kyrgyz society managed to build up a tolerance against division. Yet, the sensitive question on ‘who is the true owner of the country?’ has the potential to escalate and endanger public safety and security. For example, Kyrgyzstan’s recent history has been marred by interethnic conflict, predominantly between ethnic Kyrgyz (71.7 per cent of the population) and ethnic Uzbeks (14.3 per cent of the population), with large-scale clashes taking place in June 2010. The causes of these conflicts are complex with their roots in the historical and cultural differences between the two groups, state policies, and actual and perceived socio-economic and political inequality between the two groups.[5] The official State narrative of so-called ‘separatism’ supported by nationalistic political rhetoric has made it easier to paint the ethnic minorities as solely responsible for the June violence, and has given license to law enforcement and security bodies to target them for arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment. As a result, the selective investigations and prosecutions, which have since been conducted, have disproportionately targeted Uzbeks and resulted in few prosecutions of anyone else.[6]

The UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Fernand de Varennes, during his visit to Kyrgyzstan in December 2019 described the interethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan as fragile, in particular the relations between the majority ethnic Kyrgyz and the Uzbek minority following the 2010 events in Osh. The Special Rapporteur identified several factors that could bring the level of interethnic tension to a breaking point, such as the underrepresentation of minorities; the issue of minority languages in education and public service provision; cases of claimed unfair treatment by law enforcement and in the provision of public services; and issues relating to resource management, including water and land.[7]

The legal framework of Kyrgyzstan states that everyone is equal before the law and recognises the need for the adoption of special measures promoting the rights of minority communities to ensure that everyone participates in society on an equal basis with others. However, in reality, national minorities, who make up 26.3 per cent of the population, remain underrepresented in both elected and appointed government positions, particularly Russians and Uzbeks the two largest ethnic minority groups. The participation of minorities in public life in Kyrgyzstan is extremely limited compared to the proportion of these minorities to the total population of the country. Even though the Government of Kyrgyzstan has acknowledged that the legal framework provides electoral quotas for political representation of the different ethnic groups, the objectives of the law are not achieved and all quota requirements not fully enforced.[8] In fact, out of the 120 members of parliament, only ten belonged to a national minority.[9] In addition, national minorities are generally underrepresented in government positions or local administrations. A particularly acute problem is the low rate of representation of ethnic minorities in law enforcement bodies in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan. Representation of ethnic minorities in public life has deteriorated dramatically since June 2010. The lack of programmes to promote the recruitment of national minorities affects their representation in different public bodies, including law enforcement. According to the de Varennes, the “disproportionate presence of minorities, or more accurately the near exclusion of minorities, has been linked in part to a language barrier as one of the main reasons explaining the low representation of minorities in public life.”[10]

Following the events of 2010, the Government adopted the Concept on Strengthening National Unity and Interethnic Relations in 2013, which underlines the commitment of all relevant stakeholders in the country to ensuring everyone’s equal rights and opportunities regardless of ethnicity. The body responsible to implement this Concept and to develop strategies for conflict prevention is the State Agency for Local Self-Government and Interethnic Relations (GAMSUMO), which was created also in 2013. However, there has been some criticism about the efficiency of GAMSUMO and the state concepts on interethnic relations. For example, a number of concerns were expressed in relation to a new concept of citizenship put forward by the Government which may be perceived as being centred around Kyrgyz ethnicity rather than a national citizenship of all members of the country’s population.

In other words, the policy framework focused on creating a national identity that did not explicitly include all ethnicities and may tend to reignite past tensions by symbolically and concretely ‘leaving out’ minorities from that view of the nation, despite their demographic weight.[11] As it was indicated by the UN Special Rapporteur, the state initiatives deals more with awareness-raising activities such as on combating racial discrimination and intolerance, and does not directly address issues such as education in minority languages or the under-representation of minorities in most areas of public life.

The October 4^th 2020 parliamentary elections have opened a new page in the sensitive interethnic relations. According to the ODIHR Election Observation ethnic minority candidates actively campaigned in areas where they comprise a substantial part of the population. Fierce competition within the Uzbek minority has caused a lot of anxiety among members of the community and contributed to their sense of insecurity. There were a mass brawl between supporters of leading political parties in the Aravan district of Osh, resulting in the deregistration of two ethnic Uzbek candidates.[12] In a separate development, a criminal investigation has been launched over the alleged vote-buying by two ethnic Uzbek candidates representing a leading party in Jalalabad. Reportedly, their supporters and relatives were subject to pressure by the local authorities and law enforcement bodies to testify against them. Following these incidents, there were cases of hateful rhetoric targeting the Uzbek community on social media.[13]

After October 5^th 2020, minorities were frustrated when they were able to secure relatively recognisable seats in Parliament, but the events of October 5^th nullified all their efforts, including financial resources. At the same time, the political crisis provided opportunities for some politicians who support nationalistic rhetoric to get access to political power. For example, Kamchybek Tashiev, leader of the nationalistic Mekenchil party, who formerly said: “I should say openly, and let people not be offended, that the head of government should be a pure-blooded Kyrgyz, who will actually be rooting for the interests of the country”, has been appointed as the Head of the State Committee for National Security.[14] In addition, Melis Myrzakhmetov, the former mayor of Osh, returned to Kyrgyzstan after seven years in ‘exile’ and has started actively participating in the country’s political life again.[15]

One of the notable events after October 5^th that directly related to interethnic relations was the returning of the column on ‘ethnicity’ in the passports of Kyrgyz citizens. The changes were introduced on October 16^th 2020 after the decisions of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court that recognised the absence of the ‘ethnicity’ column in the ID-passport of a citizen as contrary to Article 38 of the Constitution. In 2017, the controversial column on ‘ethnicity’ was removed from the new passports and installed into a special chip of the ID-card. From now, citizens, if they wish, can indicate their nationality in the ID-card. However, it may be argued that accentuating ethnic origin may also serve to undermine people’s sense of belonging to a cohesive and unified nation.

Japarov alongside his presidential campaign made a demonstrative move to initiate new constitutional order and organised the Constitutional Conference, which worked on the draft of the new Constitution even before the referendum on the form of government in the country took place.[16] On January 10^th 2021, early presidential elections and a referendum on the form of government were held in Kyrgyzstan. According to the Central Election Commission Japarov received more than 79 per cent of the vote and more than 80 per cent of voters supported a presidential rule. Right after the presidential inauguration, the Constitutional Conference provided its ‘product’ which has drawn criticism from the legal society. For example, compared to the existing Constitution the draft does not state that every person has the right to freely determine his/her ethnicity nor establish a direct prohibition on coercion to determine and indicate his/her ethnicity. The exclusion of these guarantees from the draft Constitution makes it possible to establish at the legislative level the obligation of citizens to indicate their ethnicity, of which certain sanctions may be imposed for non-observance.[17] For example, according to the current legislation, citizens who refuse to provide their biometric data are deprived of the right to vote in elections and referendums. In the long term, such provisions can lay the foundation for increased manifestations of discrimination against ethnic minorities, as well as other violations of human rights and freedoms, which are prohibited by international law Currently, the draft of the Constitution is under scrutiny of deputies who are still holding their mandate. However, it is expected that the final draft, which solidifies presidential power, will pass with only slight changes.

Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan has for three decades tried to establish nation-building through cultural and historical propaganda on praising national heroes through reincarnating from mythic to real, and ancient to contemporary. The current state-building processes and developing national consciousness include the legends of a nation’s ‘great history’ and grand national ideological projects.[18]

For example, the Manas epic, the world’s longest oral narration, is seen as the main for a national ideological framework. However, without development of a common civic identity, multilingual education and respect for diversity and minority rights it will not achieve consolidated and united statehood. In this regards, the calls of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues upon the Government of Kyrgyzstan to adopt a comprehensive anti-discrimination framework that would address all grounds of discrimination, as well as more comprehensive legislation to protect the human rights of minorities become urgent. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur suggested that the existing efforts of the Government of Kyrgyzstan to ensure the effective participation and representation of minorities in public life must be strengthened, including in relation to the operation of quotas in the country’s Parliament. To address the apparently increasingly low levels of employment of minorities in the civil service of the country, including in the police and the judiciary, affirmative action programmes should be in place to increase the hiring of minorities to more closely reflect their proportion in the population. If these measures would take place, there is a high chance that the Kyrgyzstani people will build a strong national identity.

Sardorbek Abdukhalilov is an attorney at-law at Spavediivost Human Rights Organization in Jalal-Abad, Kyrgyzstan. Spravedlivost for its outstanding work in improving the position of national minorities was awarded the OSCE Max van der Stoel Award 2014. Sardorbek has more than 15 years of experience in law with specialisation on Human Rights. Sardorbek is 2018 Fellow of the United Nations OHCHR’s Minorities Fellowship.

Image by Ben Paarmann under (CC).

[1] National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Kyrgyzstan” brief statistical handbook, April 2020, http://stat.kg/en/publications/kratkij-statisticheskij-spravochnik-kyrgyzstan/

[2] The political platform “Serving the Future” (“Kelechekke Kyzmat”), https://zhaparov.kg/platforma/

[3] The Associated Press, Violent Protests in Kyrgyzstan Over Results of Election Marred by Vote Buying, The New York Times, October 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/05/world/asia/kyrgyzstan-election-protests.html

[4] Statement on the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and its implications under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

[5] Reliefweb, According to the findings of the Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, June 2010 (see para. 228-230), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_490.pdf

[6] Ibid.

[7] Fernand de Varennes, United Nations Special Rapporteur on minority rights, Visit to Kyrgyzstan, 6-17 December 2019, End of mission statement, OHCHR, December 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25422&LangID=E

[8] According to Article 60 of the Constitutional Law “on elections of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic and the deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic ” in making the nomination list of candidates, a political party should take into account the representation of at least 15 per cent of candidates of different ethnic affiliation, with at least five of them to be included in the list of the first 65 candidates: https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/vybory-oktyabr-2020_/constitutional-law-kyrgyz-republic-elections-president-kyrgyz-republic-and-deputies-jogorku-kenesh-kyrgyz-republic/

[9]In the Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh), 91 per cent of members are ethnic Kyrgyz. Russians have three members, Dungans have two members of parliament, whereas Kazakhs, Tatars and Uighur have one member each. While Uzbeks represent more than 14 per cent of the population, only three members of parliament are members of the Uzbek minority: http://kenesh.kg/ru/deputy/list/35

[10]  Fernand de Varennes, End of mission statement  of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Visit to Kyrgyzstan, OHCHR, 6-17 December 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25422&LangID=E

[11] Ibid.

[12] Bruce Pannier, Brawls And All, Kyrgyz Parliamentary Campaigning Enters The Home Stretch, RFE/RL, September 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-parliament-election-campaigning-analysis/30858185.html

[13] ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report, Kyrgyz Republic: Parliamentary Elections 4 October 2020, OSCE, December 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/a/472461.pdf

[14] Minority Rights Group International, State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2013 – Kyrgyzstan, refworld, September 2013, https://www.refworld.org/docid/526fb7415.html

[15] Melis Myrzakhmetov was mayor of Osh city from 2009 to 2013. He was mayor during the violent 2010 ethnic conflict and he has a genuine following, especially among ethnic Kyrgyz drawn to his nationalistic views. A criminal case was opened against him under the Article «Abuse of official position» of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic. After the start of the criminal prosecution, he fled the republic. In 2015, the Osh City Court, chaired by Sheraly Kamchybekov, found the former head of the southern capital guilty and sentenced him to seven years in prison in absentia. The ex-mayor was put on the wanted list. RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, Former Mayor Of Osh Returns To Kyrgyzstan, Says Country Is In ‘Dangerous Situation’, RFE/RL, October 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/former-mayor-of-osh-returns-to-kyrgyzstan-says-country-is-in-dangerous-situation-/30879647.html

[16] Radio Azattyk, Kubanychbek Zholdoshev, Constitutional Conference: Doesn’t Wait Until Referendum?, December 2020, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/30991457.html

[17] Adilet, Analysis of the draft Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, February 2021, https://adilet.kg/tpost/2i09a01nu1-analiz-proekta-konstitutsii-kirgizskoi-r

[18] Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, National Ideology and State-building in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 2008 https://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2008_01_SRP_Marat_National-Ideology.pdf

Following the parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan on October 4^th 2020, a coup d’état took place on October 5^th as a result of popular discontent with the results of parliamentary elections. There were young political groups and several established politicians from different opposition parties who played an important role in the protests.[1] However, this change of power in Kyrgyzstan has ‘deeper and more structural causes than a mere power struggle’.[2]

Along with many other groups and individuals, supporters of Sadyr Japarov came out in force – the new rulers (Sadyr Japarov, Kamchy Tashiev, Talant Mamytov) being seen as ‘patriots’ by their supporters, and as ‘nationalists’ by many of the ethnic minorities, as well as by smaller more liberal or cosmopolitan elements in the Kyrgyz population. During the course of October 6^th when Japarov was released from prison, he managed to be acquitted by the Supreme Court and become Prime Minister, before subsequently becoming acting President. During his 40 days in government, he managed to put his supporters in key positions (The State Committee for National Security, Speaker of Parliament, Prosecutor General and later acting President, after Japarov resigned in order to be a president, etc.).

However, instead of holding new parliamentary elections, Japarov pushed for parliament to decide on presidential elections and a referendum on the form of government.[3] He also initiated the drafting of a new constitution of the republic and established a council to draft the constitution. These actions divided society into two camps.[4] Throughout these political dramas and subsequent discussions about the political situation in Kyrgyzstan, the situation of ethnic minorities was largely ignored.

There is a paradox in current Kyrgyz politics: Why is Japarov popular despite his complete disregard for the rule of law and the constitution? As I mentioned in previous research, the popularity of Japarov among the Kyrgyz citizens is that of a ‘native son’ (өz bala).[5] He is seen as a ‘simple man’ with several hats, who seeks authoritarian power, but promotes his legitimacy as national leader through his perceived personal suffering (his imprisonment) and his successful use of kinship, familiarity with Kyrgyzstan’s criminal elements, apparent commitment to ending corruption, ‘native son’ status, ritual symbols and genealogy – values that many ordinary people identify with.[6] This essay puts forward an analysis of the situation of ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan and provides their views based on my previous research as well as recent follow-up interviews via telephone. The essay discusses the interethnic patronage networks of Kyrgyz state authorities and Uzbek businessmen and seeks to understand their vision of the future.

Ethnic minorities and business

Ethnic Kyrgyz comprise 72 per cent of the population in Kyrgyzstan. The largest minority are the Uzbeks, comprising 14.6 per cent of the population, concentrated mainly in southern Kyrgyzstan near the border with Uzbekistan. More specifically, they are located mainly in the city of Osh and around Osh and Zhalal-Abad provinces in the Fergana Valley. Kyrgyz and Uzbeks reside in roughly equal proportions in southern Kyrgyzstan. For example, in 2009 the population of Osh city (total 258,000) was almost equally divided between Uzbeks (48 per cent) and Kyrgyz (43 per cent), while other ethnic groups made up the remaining nine per cent.[7]

Historically, the two ethnic groups have lived side by side, in constant contact with each other through a state-business ‘symbiosis’.[8] More specifically, Uzbeks have dominated business activities – trading in the bazaar, working as shopkeepers, café owners and drivers – while Kyrgyz have tended to occupy local government structures.[9] However, the conflict of 2010 drastically changed and destroyed this symbiosis, and with it threatened the Uzbek business sector.

The conflict between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz that erupted in the city of Osh in the summer of 2010 was the worst the region had seen in years. On June 10^th 2010 intercommunal clashes erupted as a result of political crisis in the country. Nationalism intensified in the country after the summer’s deadly clashes, and a decade later a common discourse promotes Kyrgyzstan as ‘the land of Kyrgyz and the rest, i.e. the ethnic minorities, are guests’. This remains a strongly held view not only among the youth, but also among the older generation in the South.[10] There is greater poverty in the south. Aspects of nationalisation, ethnic strife, and migration contributed to or created a sense of the Uzbeks being an ethnic minority, and have clearly sharpened the divisions between communities.

Many Uzbeks face a number of challenges on a daily basis. The main difficulties affect the economically active, who suffer constant pressure and intimidation from the state authorities and criminals alike. As a result, businesspeople have resorted to finding different kinds of creative strategies to keep their businesses secure. Measures include moving trading from the bazaar to the mahallas (neighbourhoods), using mobile phones for taking passenger bookings from the bus station and the airport, and avoiding selling to, or serving, potentially ‘suspicious’ clients. Uzbeks do not openly avoid developing businesses within their economic niches; rather they have tried to turn their existing niches into safer places by using practices that are not visible to the Kyrgyz community, and in this manner, safeguarding their businesses. Some businesses have been turned into ‘safe’ social projects, such as a school, hospital and madrasa. They have created ethnically exclusive zones as well as developed public services that are less likely to be targeted out of distrust.

Respondents to my research also try to use avoidance and concealment of businesses and identities, as well as using video cameras and social networks to evade contact with criminal networks. These securityscapes have developed as a reaction to different ‘anticipations’: the realities are experienced as physical violence, harassment and the seizure of Uzbek businesses.[11] According to von Boemcken et al. “securityscapes can be understood as ‘imagined worlds’ of security and insecurity that goad and structure the lives of people as they go about their daily business.”[12] Thus, securityscapes are based on inter-subjectively enacted social practices and emphasise the individual agency of actors in seeking security – which is especially evident if these actors do not and cannot rely on state authorities. Below I would like to discuss three cases to show how people experience and create securityscapes: 1) Against Suyun Omurzakov’s network; 2) against corruption and the system of ‘dolya’ (share, cut); and 3) balance between ‘low’ nationalism and ‘high’ nationalism.

Searching for security I: Against Suyun Omurzakov’s network

Police Major General Suyun Omurzakov, First Deputy Minister of Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic is the owner of several sport clubs in Osh, where local sportsmen train. He has a low respect and prestige among local businessmen in Osh even though he enjoys higher authority in the law enforcement agencies.

On September 12^th 2018, Radio Azattyk’s journalists conducted an investigation into crimes in which sportsmen from Suyun Omurzakov’s club were implicated. They also investigated the Omurzakov family. They reported that Ulukbek Omurzakov, an employee of the Osh regional prosecutor’s office, and brother of Suyun Omurzakov, was involved.[13]

This was supported by the findings of another investigative report entitled ‘Are Omurzakov’s sportsmen enjoying immunity in Osh?’ that confirmed that local businessmen complained about the Omurzakovs’ extortion rackets in Osh.[14] It was reported that after the events were publicised, Ulukbek Omurzakov threatened the businessmen and tried to force them to withdraw their statements. When this failed a criminal case was opened against the businessmen to silence them.[15]

In November 2020, officers of the State Committee for National Security detained Ulukbek Omurzakov in Osh. He was suspected of organising a raid on the coal mining company Zhol-Chirak. Together with the prosecutor, the law enforcers also detained four people from the Mukhammed-Umar sports club who it is reported were found to have ‘seized special equipment, illegally mined and sold more than 82 million soms worth of coal without making the appropriate tax and social payments.’[16] During a meeting with Japarov, local residents revealed that the Omurzakov family had ‘taken over’ the entire southern capital.[17]

In a zoom interview, Aftandil, a local resident, claimed that Omurzakov was linked to President Jeenbekov: “Jeenbekov and Omurzakov belong to the same ‘mafia’, because both come from the Kara-Kulja district. Omurzakov is a millionaire, so he used to share his ‘dolya’ (profit) with Jeenbekov’s Kara-Kulja fund. They are related and Jeenbekov has protected Omurzakov all these years.”

One of the owners of an Uzbek restaurant, Muhammed, told me on the phone that Suyun Omurzakov has been extorting money from the businessmen. “I was threatened by sportsmen and militia because they asked me to sell my restaurant in the city center [to them].” In his view, “Sadyr has ‘courage’ and is not afraid of Omurzakov (i.e. as proof, Uluk Omurzakov was imprisoned).” He comments, “it is acceptable if Sadyr is illiterate, even if he does not know Russian, even if he is a bandit, because he displayed strong courage (‘dukh’). Entrepreneurs just need stability in the government. The criminals are being arrested. Order seems to be coming here. But we have to see how things will go further.”

The arrest of Suyun Omurzakov’s younger brother was seen as a sign of strength and stimulated early confidence in Japarov for many Uzbeks. Locals say that for the safety of the restaurant owners, the arrest was a sign that he could take on Omurzakov’s network. However, things got more complicated later on because Suyun Omurzakov worked hard during the presidential elections to get more votes from the south by mobilising his people in an attempt to save his younger brother from prison.

On January 30^th 2021, right after Japarov’s inauguration, Ulukbek Omurzakov was released. A decision was made to release him under house arrest by the Bishkek Pervomaiskiy District Court and it was agreed that Omurzakov should pay 20 million som to the state budget according to his lawyer, Ikramidin Aitkulov.[18]

Another Uzbek respondent confirmed this saying, “See! Jeenbekov was neither meat nor fish; he did not have ‘dukh’ (courage). He did not even say anything to Matraimov [the notorious corrupt customs official]. Instead, Japarov said ‘kusturam’ [‘vomit’, i.e., cough up the extorted money], and he forced Matraimov to bring two billion som. Now Uluk has paid 20 million som to the government.” Whether there has been some negotiation here between Suyun Omurzakov and Japarov’s team is still uncertain; it may be that his younger brother was released because Omurzakov proved that he could be loyal to Japarov.

Searching for security II: Against corruption, ‘dolya’ (share)

The owner of several cafés, Akbar, supported and voted for Japarov because Japarov said that he would fight corruption, in particular he said that he would eliminate the system of ‘dolya’ (the practice by which shares of business profits are given to corrupt state authorities as well as to criminal groups). Akbar also said that Japarov had been in prison and had experienced injustice through his skin (jon terisi menen otkorgon) and (understood) the difficulties of life. Considering the situation of the Uzbek businessmen, Akbar further commented, “we have to follow what the Government says to protect our business. We would not go against the Government.”

When I asked the question as to whether there had been any changes since Japarov’s presidency, Akbar responded positively. According to him, “The younger brother of Kadyr Aliev [pseudonym], one of the important state authorities in Osh, used to be the head of police of Oron [pseudonym]district. He used to collect ‘dolya’ even from sunflower seed (semechki) sellers. [i.e. from small traders such as car washing services, small garages, food services, catering, shops, etc]. When Aliev’s younger brother first came to power, he would invite each businessman into his office (at the request of the precinct officer) and openly tell them that they should share their profits (dolya suragan) as a way to ‘congratulate him on his new position’ (kuttuktap).”

Akbar gave him 2,000 som, saying that he only had that amount of money to give. The businessmen were also required to provide their telephone numbers. Depending on Aliev’s brother’s needs, they would then be called. For example, Albek Ormonov would demand two kilos of meat regularly, and once a month he would order ash (pilaf) for six to seven friends from the restaurateur gratis. Other precinct officers would also come and order the café owners to provide them with catering services. This official would threaten not only local businessmen, but even state officials, saying “I heard you won the tender, where is my share (dolya)? Fortunately, this person has now been fired, and the current new appointee seems to be a trustworthy state official (taza bala eken).”

Another businessman, Alisher, talked about the complexities of the electricity grid: “I have electric service limited to 20 kilowatts for my restaurant, for which I paid 120,000 som, but in winter usage goes beyond 20 kilowatts because I need to heat the premises and have other additional needs. In summer, I have to cool ice cream and other products. So in winter or summer we exceed usage of 20 kilowatts and an electricity inspector immediately comes to me and asks for additional money (dolya). The electricity inspector gives me the option of either paying the full fine to the government or half the fine to him. Of course, I choose to pay half the fine to the inspector.”

Apparently, it is not possible to obtain a 30 or 40 kilowatts supply; if it were available the state authorities would lose the chance to extract their dolya. Instead, they allow only 20 kilowatts and the inspectors ‘deal’ with the violations in their own ways. For a supply of over 30 kilowatts, the state requires the restaurant owner to get a transformer, which would cost 500,000 som. In addition, one also needs to get permissions from an architect, a technical inspector, the village head and finally the public’s consent. It is not easy to get a transformer, so the businessmen have to stay within the 20 kilowatts permitted usage and pay for additional supplies used with dolya.

Another Uzbek respondent told me that the police are considered locally to be even more arrogant (nahalnyi) than criminals, and do not understand the situation of businesspeople. Criminals impose stricter controls than the official laws. According to the respondent you can ‘buy off’ the police, but it is very difficult to ‘buy off’ criminals. Uzbek businessmen have to give ‘dolya’ for the street boys/criminal networks (köchö baldar) and collect ‘grev’ (a remittance or a package sent to a prisoner) for convicts, especially for the ‘bratva’ (criminal leaders). Businessmen donate a small amount of money (for food, cigarettes, soap) to the prisoners. The state budget has very limited funds for prisoners. Apparently, the names of all cafés and restaurants are acknowledged by prisoners, in a practice known as otmetka. Business people describe criminals as less shameless (oni ne naglye) and say they understand that if their business is not doing well that they might have to wait a while for payment.

Three of my respondents told me that the ‘nahalyni’ police had not come to them recently, which is already good news. Nevertheless, we will have to wait and see how things develop – at the moment there is a change of power. This period is called a ‘waiting state’ (sostojina ojidanija) by many businesspeople.

Searching for security III: Balance between ‘low’ nationalism and ‘high’ nationalism

Japarov’s main opponent was a southerner, Madumarov, who is known as a ‘ethnic’ nationalist because of his advocacy against the Uzbek mass media when he was the first Secretary of State.[19] Madumarov got ten per cent of the vote in Osh oblast, whereas Japarov got 82 per cent, so Madumarov was a distant second.[20] However, he is also considered a nationalist by more than just ethnic minority groups. He is still remembered by many representatives of ethnic minorities for his divisive statement of 2007 (made when he was the State Secretary of Kyrgyzstan) when he opined that “Kyrgyzstan is indeed our common home, but other nations here are tenants”.[21]

Most ethnic minorities habitually vote for a northern presidential candidate or party whose leader is a northerner. As such, every Kyrgyz politician tries to win votes from ethnic minorities, particularly Uzbeks. During the elections, Kyrgyz politicians used to win the support of ethnic minorities by recruiting influential people of non-titular ethnicity to their electoral teams. According to Ilias, another Uzbek businessman, Japarov has ‘dukh’ (courage, in Kyrgyz as “erki bar eken”) and is from the north of Kyrgyzstan. “Since Soviet times, we have supported someone from the north”, says one of my respondents. Furthermore, Ilias says “It is easy to deal with state authorities from the north. Northerners, unlike southerners, have very little nationalist thinking. They can also openly protest against criminals. Because of this trust and sympathy, the Southern Uzbeks prefer the Northern Kyrgyz authorities because they have not forgotten the conflicts in Osh of 2010 when the Uzbek community was targeted.”[22] It is important to see distinction between Japarov’s economic populism and cultural conservativism/nationalism, which differs from a more ethnic nationalist like Madumarov.

A strategy was officially adopted to form a civil identity of ‘Kyrgyzstani’ in 2013, not based on ethnicity. Later, on the basis of this decision, the column indicating a citizen’s ethnicity in the national passport was abolished. However, after Japarov came to power, he re-introduced this field by decree in response to a Supreme Court decision based on the current constitution. The ‘ethnicity’ column will again appear in the passports of Kyrgyz citizens. This began to worry ethnic minorities, particularly the Uzbeks who were particularly affected by the June 2010 events. Yet, the indication of ethnicity is voluntary, so they should not have to declare it if they do not want to.[23]

Concluding remarks

To understand why people support Japarov despite his violations of the rule of law, it is important to look at the security strategies of Uzbek businessmen. They have put their trust in someone who is a ‘controversial’ figure, but who also is perceived as having personally experienced the injustice of the law, and is able to show his strength against other strong ‘mafia’ networks. The boundaries of state, business, and criminal have been blurred in the context of Kyrgyzstan.[24] Despite this, we see how many ordinary people want an end to the absurd levels of corruption. Sadly, however, it is quite difficult to avoid having police and others with power trying to extract bribes and dolya in the current environment. [25] As the above examples show, the police, judges and prosecutors are highly corrupt, as the process of reforming law enforcement agencies has consistently failed to meet the expectations of donor organisations and members of civil society due to existing authoritarian political regimes and weak local governance.[26]

People’s personalities and difficulties tend to coincide with the head of the potential state power they want. People are attracted to politicians who reflect their values. In the case of Japarov, people began to identify with him due to shared experiences, ‘dukh’ (courage), and his identity as a ‘northerner with ‘low’ nationalist ideals’. All these aspects contributed to people’s mobilisation.

In times when the rule of law does not work and people are tired of judiciary injustice and do not trust the state anymore, they start supporting ‘controversial’ figures, such as Japarov, despite his violations of the rule of law, as the ways to search for justice and hope for change. At the same time, businessmen describe their situation as the ‘waiting state’, by claiming that we will see how things will develop.

Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova is a research fellow at the Leibniz-Zentrum-Moderner Orient (ZMO). Her research work focuses on kinship, ethnicity, patronage, conflict and gender in Kyrgyzstan. Her monograph Blood Ties and the Native Son: Poetics of Patronage in Kyrgyzstan was published by Indiana University Press in 2017.

Image by Andrea Kirkby under (CC).

[1] Aksana Ismailbekova, Intergenerational Conflict at the Core of Kyrgyzstan’s Turmoil, The Diplomat, October 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/intergenerational-conflict-at-the-core-of-kyrgyzstans-turmoil/

[2] Azamat Temirkulov, Kyrgyzskaya mechta i chudo Sadyra Zhaparova, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Central Asia, Medium, January 2021, https://rosaluxca.medium.com/

[3] Mahabat Sadyrbek, Präsidentschaftswahl und Referendum in Kirgistan. Zwei Schritte zurück im kirgisischen »Demokratie-Experiment«?, Zentralasien-Analysen, 145, January 2021, https://laender-analysen.de/zentralasien-analysen/145/praesidentschaftswahl-und-referendum-in-kirgistan-zwei-schritte-zurueck-im-kirgisischen-demokratie-experiment/

[4] Gulzat Baialieva and Joldon Kutmanaliev, How Kyrgyz social media backed an imprisoned politician’s meteoric rise to power, openDemocracy, October 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/how-kyrgyz-social-media-backed-animprisoned-politicians-meteoric-rise-to-power/

[5] Ismailbekova, Aksana. 2017. Blood Ties and the Native Son: Poetics of Patronage in Kyrgyzstan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

[6] Aksana Ismailbekova, Native son: the rise of Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov, openDemocracy, January 2021, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/native-son-the-rise-of-sadyr-japarov-kyrgyzstan/

[7] NSC, 2009. Population and Housing Census of the Kyrgyz Republic of 2009. Book 1. National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek.

[8] Liu, Morgan. 2012. Under Solomon’s Throne. Uzbek Visions of Renewal in Osh. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; Megoran, Nick. 2013. Shared Space, Divided Space: Narrating Ethnic Histories of Osh. Environment and Planning A 45(4), pp. 892–907.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Sergei Abashin, Natsionalnoe stroitelstvo v Kyrgzystane i problema uzbekskogo menshin-stva, Fergana News, March 2012, http://www.fergananews.com/article.php?id=7126

[11] Ismailbekova, Aksana. 2018. Secure and Insecure Spaces for Uzbek Businesspeople in Southern Kyrgyzstan. IQAS Vol. 49 / 2018 1–2, pp. 41–60.

[12] Marc Von Boemcken, Conrad Schetter, Hafiz Boboyorov, Nina Bagdasarova, and Joomart Sulaimanov, Local Security-Making in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Production of Securityscapes by Everyday Practices, BICC Working Paper 5/2016, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), May 2016, https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/working_paper5-1_01.pdf

[13] Ydyrs Isakov, Bandytskyi Osh, Radio Azattyk, September 2018, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/29491208.html#player-set-time=4.259495

[14] Ernist Nurmatov, Sportsmeny Omurzakova pol’zuyutsya neprikosnovennost’yu v Oshe?, Radio Azattyk, July 2016, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/27881112.html

[15] Ibid.

[16] Elgezit, Zaderjan prokuror Uluk Omurzakov — brat zamglavı MVD Suyunbeka Omurzakova, November 2020, https://elgezit.kg/2020/11/12/zaderzhan-prokuror-ulukbek-omurzakov/

[17] Today.kg, Advokat schitayet bezosnovatel’nym soderzhaniye v SIZO Ulukbeka Omurzakova, January 2021, https://today.kg/news/411336/

[18] Radio Azattyk, Zaderzhannyy po podozreniyu v reyderstve prokuror Omurzakov vyshel na svobodu, RFE/RL, January 2021,

https://rus.azattyk.org/a/zaderzhannyy-po-podozreniyu-v-reyderstve-prokuror-omurzakov-vyshel-na-svobodu/31078504.html; Sputnik.kg Vyplatil 20 mln — brata zamglavy MVD KR otpustili pod domashniy arrest, February 2021 https://m.ru.sputnik.kg/society/20210201/1051299107/ulukbek-omurzakov-domashnij-arest.html?mobile_return=no

[19] Interview with my informant in Osh, Zoom, 07.02.2021

[20] President, Referendum 2021, Itogovye dannye ZIK posle ruchnogo podscheta, AKI Press, https://akipress.org/elections/president2021/?hl=ru#region-2

[21] Erica Marat, Kyrgyzstan: perspektivy pluralizma, Global Centre for Pluralism, November 2017, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ericamarat_prospectsforpluralism_RU.pdf

[22] Aksana Ismailbekova and Philipp Lottholz, The Conflict in South Kyrgyzstan Ten Years on: Perspectives, Consequences, Actions, Central Asia Program, July 2020, https://centralasiaprogram.org/archives/16380?fbclid=IwAR2UZqrzfKRXotQtGjgpKWxbQHnhdkoy79xxd7vg-4l2RxWVg6t3di3J774

[23] 24.kg, V pasportakh kyrgyzstantsev vnov’ poyavitsya grafa «natsional’nost’», October 2020, https://24.kg/vlast/169312_vpasportah_kyirgyizstantsev_vnov_poyavitsya_grafa_natsionalnost/

[24] Erica Marat, The State-Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organized Crime, and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, October 2006, https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2006_marat_the-state-crime-nexus-in-central-asia.pdf

[25] I would like to thank Nathan Light for this comment during the Roundtable “Society and Politics in the 2019-2020 Elections and Constitutional Revisions in Kyrgyzstan” Organised by Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies (IRES),  February 2021.

[26] Erica Marat, OSCE Police Reform Programmes in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: Past Constraints and Future Opportunities, EUCAM, October 2012, https://eucentralasia.eu/2012/10/osce-police-reform-programmes-in-kyrgyzstan-and-tajikistan-past-constraints-and-future-opportunities/; more about The Politics of Police Reform of Erica Marat, can be found here: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/book-talk-the-politics-police-reform

COVID-19’s impact on the global community revealed many inefficiencies in how the countries responded to the spread of the pandemic across borders. While some states have achieved promising results, others have struggled with response measures due to healthcare capacity limitations. In certain cases, capacity is not the only concern which contributed to the public health crisis. Kyrgyzstan is one of the examples where the country’s corruption record has exacerbated the Kyrgyz Government’s response measures to contain COVID-19. The Central Asian nation’s corruption perception index in 2019 was scored 30 out 100 by global watchdog Transparency International, finding itself next to the countries, such as Djibouti, Ukraine and Azerbaijan, that have similar records.[1]

Widespread corruption in the state institutions, including healthcare, is one of the primary triggers of political instability in Kyrgyzstan, where governments have been overthrown on three occasions since 2005.[2] Conceivably, the Kyrgyz Government has come under criticism during the COVID-19 crisis for a lack of transparency and oversight of the donations, ‘grants and loans’ from its own citizens and international organisations, including IMF, ADB, KfW, AIIB, IDB, WB and the EU.[3] Meanwhile, Amnesty International lambasted the country’s authorities for forcing medics to work long hours during the pandemic without extra pay for service in “prison-like” conditions.[4]

However, a dysfunctional healthcare is only one of the primary worries in the country, which was outlined by the USAID funded International Republican Institute’s nationwide poll in Kyrgyzstan’s seven regions and two largest cities ahead of the controversial parliamentary election on October 4^th 2020.[5] The Kyrgyz Government’s response to COVID-19, corruption and healthcare were named as the most important problems in the nation, according to a survey.[6] Endemic corruption was also addressed by the World Health Organization’s (WHO) report on Kyrgyzstan’s two decades-long health financing reform, pointing out as recently as 2019 the “conflict of interest” tendencies among state officials including the country’s presidential administration.[7] WHO’s recommendations to the Kyrgyz authorities stated:

“Where it is not possible to avoid having some members with a conflict of interest, clear policies on declaration and recording of conflicts at council/committee meetings, and procedural rules for handling situations of conflict of interest (e.g. recusal rules from some discussions and decisions), should be developed and adopted by the appropriate ministries.”[8]

Despite consistent guidance from international organisations, the Kyrgyz Government failed to sustain transparency policy when spending $645 million on COVID-19 emergency response during the pandemic in 2020. The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) platform scrutinised the country’s accountability mechanism which has “offering no detailed information on where the funds” were going.[9] The OCCRP report indicated that the Kyrgyz authorities “did not have the resources to track down the spending”. Similarly, cases of corruption in rural medical clinics and hospitals highlight a deeply entrenched culture of bribery and impunity. In one such case, medics and personnel of the southern Leilek district hospital in Batken region were appealing to the country’s former president and chief prosecutor in the middle of the COVID-19 public health emergency for assistance with addressing burgeoning corruption at the hospital.[10] Protesting medics complained that the hospital director “turned work in the hospital into a business. He opens extra vacancies and hires freelancers. Everyone who gets a job gives from 10,000 to 20,000 soms ($120-$230) to the head nurse of the hospital… Some people say that they gave the money personally to the director”.

Likewise, the country’s former Minister of Health, Kosmosbek Cholponabyev, was arrested and taken into custody in September 2020 for abuse of power while in office and organising a corruption scheme, which inflicted financial “damage to the state budget in the amount of nearly nine million soms” ($106,000).[11] Previously, the Security Council of Kyrgyzstan stated that there are eight corruption risks in the national Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF) relating to the transfer, redistribution of compulsory health insurance funds and collusion with pharmaceutical companies.[12]

The World Bank’s assessment of the Kyrgyz primary healthcare improvement programme indicated that MHIF is a “single purchaser of health services” in the country “managing 80% of the domestic public financing for health, contracting with 261 health institutions and providing health care services at all levels.”[13]

Source: Primary Health Care Quality Improvement Programme, World Bank, 2017

Kyrgyz media repeatedly raised the subject of corruption incidences in the MHIF, which is ultimately a result of its twisted legislative foundation.[14] MHIF is the single payer institution in the country’s health sector with “responsibility for pooling health funds and purchasing health services” under the law “On health insurance of citizens in the Kyrgyz Republic” and regulation on the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic.[15] In addition to having a defective legal base, MHIF conducts its own internal audit of expenditure and it is in charge of “supplying, distributing, storing, purchasing goods and services, and financing healthcare organisations”. Essentially, corruption risks in MHIF are consorted with a lack of clear regulations and weak oversight. WHO’s Regional Office for Europe working report in 2018 stated that “external assessment and inspection by the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund and by the Medical Accreditation Commission exercise central control but provide little support for organisational development, benchmarking, improving performance or public accountability”.[16] WHO’s regional office also shared similar concerns regarding the country’s “governance, monitoring and inspection of public-sector healthcare organisations” that are “fragmented, weak and ineffective”.[17]

However, a bribery case involving MHIF officials in January 2020 reignited public debate when one of its top department employees was arrested for extorting a 143,000-som ($1,686) bribe in the nation’s capital Bishkek.[18]

Source: Public Opinion Poll Residents of Kyrgyzstan, IRI, 6-15 August 2020

Subsequently, Kyrgyz journalists from the investigative group ‘PolitKlinika’ online publication released in early July 2020 their investigation into public procurement involving the country’s health authorities in February 2020 prior to the COVID-19 crisis. The report revealed that the prices for personal protective equipment (PPE) and medical masks were over inflated and excessive for certain items.[19] For example, protective suits with a market price tag of 2,000 soms ($23) per unit in Bishkek city were purchased for 6,000 soms ($70) per suit. The same for respiratory masks that were purchased for 300-400 soms ($3.5-$4.7) per item when the local market prices for the very same masks ranged from 30 to 150 soms ($0.3-$1.7). Public outrage resulted in a criminal investigation launched on July 10^th by the country’s Financial Police on former Kyrgyz president’s directive to probe health officials responsible for a corrupt procurement scheme.[20]

Whether PPE and medical masks were properly distributed during the initial COVID-19 crisis in the country’s poorly funded hospitals and clinics remains debatable after a public scandal in the Bishkek city hospital following personnel complaints regarding PPE shortage.[21] Similarly, ADB and UNDP assessments on the impacts of COVID-19 stated that by “29 June 2020, 783 Kyrgyz Republic health workers had been diagnosed with COVID-19 (15% of all confirmed cases in the country to this date). This very high proportion raises questions about the supply of personal protective equipment (PPE) for health professionals and highlights the need for additional training of health workers on infection prevention and control. Part of the aid received by the government might need to be channelled towards establishing sufficient domestic stores and/or production of affordable yet high-quality PPE.”[22]

Concurrently, the Ministry of Health and the local authorities were scrutinised by the country’s Interim officials after a change of government following the political crisis in October 2020.[23] Deputy Prime Minister Elvira Surabaldieva criticised the lack of transparency for medical and humanitarian aid that was donated to the country during the initial COVID-19 emergency. Simultaneously, a lack of adequate supply of PPE and medical masks steered complaints from the outspoken Kyrgyz health workers who took their criticism of authorities online, sharing their struggle experiences and frustrations on social media.[24] In one instance, a young medic wrote on his Twitter account: “The media write that doctors are provided with personal protective equipment. In fact, I was given a mask with holes on my duty today that is unlikely to protect me from being infected with coronavirus. And then they wonder why doctors are infected with COVID-19.”[25] 

However, the outspoken medic later complained he was reprimanded for posting a message online and deleted his Twitter account. His next public appearance was shown on the country’s TV network when he apologised for spreading false information earlier. The International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) regional watchdog later concluded that the Kyrgyz State Committee on National Security was detaining whistle blowers to “hold ‘preventive’ discussions with them, threatened them with criminal prosecution and released them after they publicly ‘apologised’ and ‘repented’. Many of those targeted were accused of disseminating incorrect information about the spread of COVID-19 in different parts of Kyrgyzstan, while some were medical professionals who had highlighted problems relating to the pandemic (such as the lack of means of protection) at hospitals or other health care facilities.“[26]

Source: Public Opinion Poll Residents of Kyrgyzstan, IRI, 6-15 August 2020

The Kyrgyz Government’s response to COVID-19 pandemic left the majority of the country’s poverty-stricken nation dissatisfied with nearly 70 per cent of the population expressing disapproval of how the Kyrgyz authorities handled the public health crisis, according to an IRI poll. It appears that public tension in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis was not in favour of the now overthrown government of former President Sooronbay Jeenbekov who was also ultimately toppled following a controversial parliamentary election on October 4^th. The latest political disturbances in Kyrgyzstan are increasingly indicative of the urgent need for healthcare reform based on realistic goals rather than status quo. Kyrgyz public health professionals believe that endemic corruption in the country’s ailing healthcare is not the only issue. Dr. Rakhman Toichuev of the National Academy of Science told the author that a lack of competent officials in the Ministry of Health and the imperfect legislative basis for the health system are perhaps the most significant concerns.

However, the healthcare crisis amid the first and second waves of COVID-19 sparked a fresh round of public debates in the country regarding reform of the health services. There are various views as to how to move forward from corruption-prone and stagnant healthcare to transparent and efficient service provider. Kyrgyz health officials and lawmakers seem to favour integration of MHIF and Ministry of Health after the Interim government announced a sweeping reform of the state bodies.[27] Contrarily, experts disagree that such intermediary steps will bring results thus leading to negative outcomes since the country scores poorly on reforms overall. Bermet Baryktabasova, an expert on evidence-based medicine, argues that “everyone works as much as the level of development of the country as a whole allows. One cannot expect ideal work from the Ministry of Health, the MHIF, when the work of all other state bodies, the government, and so on is imperfect.” [28]

The latest ADB and UNDP policy study paper in response to the COVID-19 crisis recommended the Kyrgyz authorities “reduce or abolish financial contribution (e.g., co-payments) and administrative barriers (e.g., requirements concerning proof of residence, legal identification, etc.) to quality health services; and invest in mobile solutions and digitalisation” which would contribute to more transparency in healthcare.[29] Global development groups also advised the country’s Government to “strengthen health information systems with emphasis on mapping essential service lists against resource requirements and available budgets; mapping public and private pharmacies and suppliers, identifying regional and spatial disparities (including informal peri-urban settlements); and strengthening inventory and procurement management.”[30]

Certainly, it is true that Kyrgyzstan has not done more to improve standards of living for the country’s poverty-stricken population since gaining independence in 1991, let alone eradicating deeply entrenched bribery and corruption in the Government including healthcare. It has been widely known among domestic healthcare experts that corruption risks occur in the system of procurement, namely in the procurement of PCR tests, in laboratories and the procurement of PPE and other medical drugs.[31] Critics argue that a lack of control over purchases paves way for corruption. Therefore, addressing these concerns must be on the Kyrgyz Government’s priority list for improvement-oriented goals in healthcare. However, it is unlikely that the country’s healthcare will have drastic changes in the nearest terms due to unresolved structured issues within the Kyrgyz state.

Ryskeldi Satke is a regional editor for Central Asia at the Third Pole multilingual web platform. Follow him on Twitter @RyskeldiSatke.

Image by Official website of Bishkek City Hall.

[1] Anti-Corruption Research Center Transparency International Kyrgyzstan, Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kyrgyzstan

[2] Another revolution in Kyrgyzstan?, European Parliament, October 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2020/659300/EPRS_ATA(2020)659300_EN.pdf

[3] Alexandra Li, No Transparency in Kyrgyzstan’s Coronavirus Spending, OCCRP, June 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/coronavirus/no-transparency-in-kyrgyzstans-coronavirus-spending; Olga Ruslanova, How Much Will COVID-19 Cost for Kyrgyzstan?, CABAR, June 2020, https://cabar.asia/en/how-much-will-covid-19-cost-for-kyrgyzstan

[4] Kyrgyzstan: Medics suffer rights violations, pay high personal price during COVID-19 pandemic, Amnesty International, September 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/kyrgyzstan-medics-suffer-rights-violations-pay-high-personal-price-during-covid19-pandemic/

[5] Kyrgyzstan Poll Suggests High Voter Intent Ahead of Parliamentary Elections, IRI, September 2020, https://www.iri.org/resource/kyrgyzstan-poll-suggests-high-voter-intent-ahead-parliamentary-elections

[6] Ibid.

[7] WHO – Regional Office for Europe, Governance of health financing and strategic purchasing of services in Kyrgyzstan, 2019, https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/412654/GHF_SPS_KGZ_-11-09-2019_WEB.pdf

[8] Ibid.

[9] Alexandra Li, No Transparency in Kyrgyzstan’s Coronavirus Spending, OCCRP, June 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/coronavirus/no-transparency-in-kyrgyzstans-coronavirus-spending

[10] Jazgul Masalieva, Medical workers of Leilek complain to President of corruption, 24kg, May 2020, https://24.kg/english/152640_Medical_workers_of_Leilek_complain_to_President_of_corruption/

[11] Aida Dzhumashova, Kosmosbek Cholponbaev placed in pretrial detention center 1 in Bishkek, 24kg, September 2020, https://24.kg/english/165584_Kosmosbek_Cholponbaev_placed_in_pretrial_detention_center_1_in_Bishkek/

[12] President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Security Council Information, http://www.president.kg/ru/apparat_prezidenta/sovety_pri_prezidente/informaciya_soveta_bezopasnosti

[13] The World Bank, Technical Assessment: Kyrgyz Republic – Primary Health Care Quality Improvement Program (P167598), http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/278311557237004060/pdf/Final-Technical-Assessment-Primary-Health-Care-Quality-Improvement-Program-P167598.pdf

[14] Kaktus Media, 8 corruption risks in the MHIF. Will eradicate, December 2016, https://kaktus.media/doc/348575_8_korrypcionnyh_riskov_v_foms._bydyt_iskoreniat.html

[15] Ainura Ibraimova, Baktygul Akkazieva, Aibek Ibraimov, Elina Manzhieva and Bernd Rechel, Kyrgyzstan: Health system review, Health Systems in Transition, Vol. 13 No. 3 2011, European Observatory, https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/142613/e95045.pdf; Law of the Kyrgyz Republic: About health insurance of citizens in the Kyrgyz Republic, Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic, October 1999 No. 112, http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/275?cl=ru-ru; Regulations on the Mandatory Health Insurance Fund under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic, September 2018 No. 420, http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/93506

[16] Quality of care review in Kyrgyzstan, Working document, WHO – Regional Office for Europe, September 2018, https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/383890/kgz-qoc-eng.pdf?ua=1

[17] Kyrgyzstan – Governance of health financing and strategic purchasing of services in Kyrgyzstan (2019), WHO – Regional Office for Europe, https://www.euro.who.int/en/countries/kyrgyzstan/publications/governance-of-health-financing-and-strategic-purchasing-of-services-in-kyrgyzstan-2019

[18] Tatyana Kudreyavtseva, Director of Bishkek branch of CMIF arrested for bribe extortion, 24.kg, January 2020, https://24.kg/english/142116_Director_of_Bishkek_branch_of_CMIF_arrested_for_bribe_extortion/

[19] Making money from coronavirus: A simple mask costs 25 soms, protective clothing costs 6000 soms (Longrid), pk.kg, July 2020, https://pk.kg/news/19017

[20] Kyrgyzstan: fight against COVID-19 could denigrate into a corruption scandal, Acca, July 2020, https://acca.media/en/kyrgyzstan-fight-against-covid-19-could-degenerate-into-a-corruption-scandal/

[21] Guliza Avazova, The head doctor of the hospital No. 1 in Bishkek was fired after the scandal with PPE, Kaktus Media, August 2020, https://kaktus.media/doc/418313_glavvracha_bolnicy_1_v_bishkeke_yvolili_posle_skandala_s_sizami.html

[22] COVID-19 in the Kyrgyz Republic: Socioeconomic and Vulnerability Impact Assessment and Policy Response, Institutional Document, ADB, August 2020, https://www.adb.org/documents/covid-19-kyrgyz-republic-socioeconomic-vulnerability-impact

[23] Dina Maslova, Elvira Surabaldieva criticised the Ministry of Health and local authorities for reports on humanitarian aid, Kaktus Media, December 2020, https://kaktus.media/doc/427174_elvira_syrabaldieva_raskritikovala_minzdrav_i_mestnye_organy_za_otchety_po_gympomoshi.html

[24] Robin Forestier-Walker, Kyrgyzstan gov’t faces backlash over doctor’s ‘forced confession’, Al Jazeera, April 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/videos/2020/4/20/kyrgyzstan-govt-faces-backlash-over-doctors-forced-confession

[25] In Kyrgyzstan, medical staff is afraid to complain about poor working conditions, Acca, April 2020, https://acca.media/en/in-kyrgyzstan-medical-staff-is-afraid-to-complain-about-poor-working-conditions/

[26] Human rights impact assessment of the COVID-19 response in Kyrgyzstan, IPHR, July 2020, https://www.iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Covid-19-KYZ-final.pdf

[27] Kyrgyzstan plans to cut number of civil servants by 10%, Kabar, November 2020, http://en.kabar.kg/news/kyrgyzstan-plans-to-cut-number-of-civil-servants-by-10/

[28] Maria Orlova, Itching to reform. When you need to measure seven times, 24.kg, November 2020, https://24.kg/obschestvo/173665_zud_reformirovaniya_kogda_nado_sem_raz_otmerit_/

[29] COVID-19 in the Kyrgyz Republic: Socioeconomic and Vulnerability Impact Assessment and Policy Response, ADB, Institutional Document, August 2020, https://www.adb.org/documents/covid-19-kyrgyz-republic-socioeconomic-vulnerability-impact

[30] Asian Development Bank, COVID-19 in the Kyrgyz Republic: Socioeconomic and Vulnerability Impact Assessment and Policy Response, August 2020, https://www.adb.org/documents/covid-19-kyrgyz-republic-socioeconomic-vulnerability-impact

[31] Marat Uraliev, Bermet Baryktabasova demanded to quickly develop a unified register of distribution of humanitarian aid, Kaktus Media, December 2020, https://kaktus.media/doc/427677_bermet_baryktabasova_potrebovala_bystree_razrabotat_edinyy_reestr_raspredeleniia_gympomoshi.html

Fighting corruption ad nauseam

For more than a quarter of a century, a number of Kyrgyz politicians have been using democracy as an ideological play to bamboozle and win the support of the West. At the same time, corruption and kleptocracy grew as fast as the promises of democracy by the ruling elite. Despite the fact that accusations of corruption have implicated most of the presidents that have lead the country since its independence, decades of constant fight against corruption have brought no results.

This is despite the fact, that Kyrgyzstan joined a number of international organisations and ratified number of treaties (the UNCAC in 2005, OECD’s Istanbul Anti- Corruption Action Plan, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2007 and joined the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2017), Kyrgyzstan still ranks among the most corrupt states in the world (The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Kyrgyzstan 124 out of the 180 countries as per 2020. Its score is 31 out of 100).[1] The international community has been continuously reassured with promises of democratic change by the Kyrgyz authorities and it has provided and continues to provide loans to fight corruption and provide institutional recommendations, but corruption is still the only constant in Kyrgyzstan.

UMUT 2020, a people’s movement against the corrupt political elite, kleptocracy and nepotism, demanded transparency and further evolution of applied democracy in Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 2019. The people’s movement stormed the political discourse with a series of investigative videos that launched a powerful, viral effect, succeeding in ‘waking’ the people, despite political repressions that culminated in GKNB surveillance of activists and the unlawful detention of my husband undertaken by the secret police of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. He was consequently held in prison for close to a year in retaliation against the movement’s activism. Based on the case of UMUT 2020’s Matraimov campaign, an analysis of the political processes has localised certain hotspots that have been often overlooked and need to be reckoned with if Kyrgyzstan is to have success at restoration and sustainability of justice.

RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz service (Azattyk), Kloop and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) in May 2019 released an investigative piece divulging a large-scale corruption scheme in Kyrgyzstan that facilitated money-laundering, providing access to a legitimate financial system for dirty money coming out of Kyrgyzstan (Annex 1: ‘The 700-Million Dollar Man’) in May, 2019. UMUT 2020 demanded that the authorities give a legal assessment of the information aired in this joint investigation that exposed allegations of a smuggling ring headed by Matraimov who had covertly overtaken the customs system. Despite the demands for clarification, or for any kind of reaction from our government, the authorities of Kyrgyzstan chose to ignore the demands of the public concerning the Matraimov investigations. Having exhausted all possible and legal ways to appeal to the Government with no results, UMUT 2020 decided to further the campaign by taking part in peaceful protest rallies, which took place in Bishkek in November and December 2019.

Kyrgyz authorities did finally detain Matraimov, an ally of former President Sooronbay Jeenbekov, earlier in October 2020 as part of a corruption investigation, but only after the dramatic events and the fall of President Jeenbekov. He was however released the same day based due to his promises to compensate the state for his crimes. A second attempt to detain Matraimov has recently been ordered by the court of law for a period of two months after public discontent.

Matraimov’s case epitomises the failure of the anti-corruption struggle in Kyrgyzstan that has plagued the country for decades. As is reflected in the volume of the shadow economy in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, according to various estimates, is estimated from 23.6 per cent to 53.5 per cent.^[2] According to the latest study of the SHADOW project, the level of the shadow economy in Kyrgyzstan is 42 per cent of GDP as per 2018.^[3]

Smuggling is believed to be the largest part of the shadow economy. In recent years, according to Chinese data, Kyrgyzstan receives $5.5 billion USD a year from China’s exports. However, Kyrgyzstan’s statistics show the official volume of imports from China to be $1.9 billion. A difference of $3.6 billion is not a small discrepancy.^[4] Neighbouring Kazakhstan has also announced the unreliability of customs statistics of Kyrgyzstan as well.^[5] This says a lot about the shrinking possibility for building a fair society in Kyrgyzstan, as is the case in practically all developing countries.

Real democracy or ‘façade’ democracy?

Billions of US dollars of foreign aid and investments enriched the Kyrgyz ruling class that pillaged state funds and created nepotistic opportunities for illegal enrichment of their extended families, while the majority of the people were reduced to having to having someone leave behind their families in order to find employment in Russia.

Not only was democracy taken hostage and cheaply exploited by Kyrgyz government officials but they soon figured out that while half the population is employed overseas as migrant laborers and sends money for subsistence from abroad to their families, it’s very convenient to keep pillaging and letting the state run on financial aid from our democratic allies. No need to improve the economy, no need to create jobs, no need to create tolerable living conditions for Kyrgyz citizens when all you need to do is present yourself correctly before the West and call yourself a ‘democrat’.

A surprisingly overlooked political analyst by the international academia is Alymbek Biialinov, who had warned of the superficiality of the Kyrgyz variant of democratisation, describing the process as the “coloring in” of the existing Soviet system of management and governance with insignificant additions of hollow democratic institutions such as the free market institutions.^[6] All too often Kyrgyz democratisation was limited to renaming or changing signs on existing ministries and government departments which at closer look had very little to do with switching to a true market economy.

Under the veneer of a façade democracy, Kyrgyzstan was left with ghost institutions of a bygone Soviet system with the same centralised management in which the state strictly controls the economy and the life of citizens and where the courts and law enforcement agencies are punitive bodies in the hands of the state that gladly wreck lives instead of defending the rights and freedoms of our citizens. The state administration apparatus interferes in the activities of private businesses in order to extort money and seize property. And to this day, our government agencies refuse to recognise the inviolability of private property rights.

The recent events of October 2020, when political upheaval in Kyrgyzstan resulted in the collapse of the Government of now-former President Sooronbay Jeenbekov and the rise of Sadyr Japarov, a “former convict” as the New York Times has so condescendingly labeled him, to the position of president-elect.^[7]  Knowing the Kyrgyz judicial system first hand after the arrest of my husband, any one of us is literally a step away from becoming a convict in a country with no human rights and no justice. But what gave rise to these changes? And who brought the leader whom many are quick to label a populist out of a prison cell and walked him to the throne? Could it be that Kyrgyz fake democrats have unwittingly aided in their own exposure and subsequent loss of political influence?

Democracy has lost its luster in Kyrgyzstan, having become a word that resonates with irony, a word that has lost most of its meaning for our impoverished nation. Like children raised in institutions, the Kyrgyz Government has learnt no skills to succeed in this world – it simply grew used to relying on others. If before we asked Moscow for handouts, nowadays we ask all countries. Not much has changed in terms of taking on responsibility by our political leaders.

Why did façade democracy turn out to be more dangerous even than authoritarianism? Façade democracy in Kyrgyzstan did not pave the road to more democracy or better democracy – it only paved the road to authoritarianism. After all, a veneer of democracy can be easily and swiftly removed and painted over if need be. Contrary to the hopes of international allies, façade democracy did not gradually turn into true democracy if one is to analyse the failure to thrive of the seeds of democracy on Kyrgyz soil as demonstrated in the backsliding that the nation gladly chose during the recent elections.

Well, of course, those nice pseudo democratic leaders are more pleasant to deal with than complete tyrants, moreover some of them speak English and have learnt to say the right things to get more treats. And do not forget that, it’s mostly children of former government officials (like myself) who have benefitted first, studying abroad after the collapse of the Soviet Union, creating a whole ‘mafia’ of local staff within international organisations, hiring their friends and relatives, deciding which local organisations are to receive financing and which do not. These international organisation royalty, for reasons unbeknownst, are never frowned upon by the Western headquarter administrations that claim to carry the bright torch of democracy into the dark of the developing world.

Speaking English sadly does not make one a better person, a better professional, nor a democrat. Façade democracy erodes the importance of the rights guaranteed in the Constitution, which through inconsistent application of democratic values by fake democratic leaders, snowballed towards an ultimate crisis of complete discrediting of democracy as is demonstrative in the events that have unfolded in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020.

Since the only democracy that the people of Kyrgyzstan had experienced personally was fake, inconsistent, and useful only for the elite and their families, the majority of the people would rather accept reality as is, a familiar construct will do and the majority have chosen to embrace a less democratic and a more centralised system of governance.

Façade democracy, incites a reaction similar to the reaction of the human body to substandard antibiotics when may cause antibiotic resistance and even failure of treatment. This is especially risky in critical situations when antibiotic resistance can often be the cause of preventable mortality – façade democracy or substandard democracy has masked the infection of corruption and nepotism until this faux bubble burst. It has now been laid bare that a fairy sprinkle of democracy that landed on the surface of the existing political construct failed to transform it into a magic carriage.

What is the use of these anti-corruption, anti-kleptocratic detailed plans, programs and strategies, if their implementation is entrusted to the same ‘façade’ leaders under whom corruption flourishes in the hollow and impotent institutions entrusted to them?

Transnational criminal organisations, supported by ‘façade’ democratic leaders continue to prosper, trafficking drugs and other types of contraband across the country’s borders which goes to show that official anti-corruption efforts are often for show and are often politically motivated.

Before the eyes of the whole world, impoverished and tiny Kyrgyzstan has defied injustice once again. But, with what outcome and what cost? Developments in Kyrgyzstan in the next few years will determine whether democracy regains its footing, or whether the shift towards authoritarianism and/or Islamisation accelerates. It remains to be seen whether the new Government’s apparent political resolve to fight corruption will translate into real changes in the country.

Shirin Aitmatova is a former MP from Kyrgyzstan who lead UMUT 2020 – a people’s movement against corruption. Aitmatova is a polemicist, an investigator who has collaborated with RFE/RL, Kloop.kg, Bellingcat and The Guardian. As a legislator and an activist her iconoclastic political work has shaken up Kyrgyzstan more than once. Aitmatova studied at Downe House School, Bryn Mawr College, The New School and Sarah Lawrence College. Currently she is working on a tell-all book about growing up as the daughter of the most famous Central Asian author, her decisive role in contemporary Kyrgyz politics and the page-turner story of leading UMUT 2020.

Image by Matthias Buehler under (CC).

[1] United Nations: Office on Drugs and Crime, Signature and Ratification Status, February 2020, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/ratification-status.html; OECD, CAN – Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Istanbul anti-corruption action plan: Third round of monitoring – Kyrgyzstan – Progress update, September 2017, https://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/OECD-ACN-Kyrgyzstan-Progress-Update-September-2017-ENG.pdf; EITI, Kyrgyz Republic, https://eiti.org/kyrgyz-republic; Open Government Partnership, Kyrgyz Republic – Member Since 2017 – Action Plan 1, https://www.opengovpartnership.org/members/kyrgyz-republic/; Transparency International, Anti-Corruption Research Center Transparency International Kyrgyzstan, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kyrgyzstan

^[2] National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Dynamics and parameters of the non-observed economy in the Kyrgyz Republic, April 2019, http://www.stat.kg/ru/news/dinamika-i-parametry-nenablyudaemoj-ekonomiki-v-kyrgyzskoj-respublike/; Ivallo Izvorski, et al. Kyrgyz Republic: Country Economic Memorandum, World Bank Group, 2020, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/679681585289928309/pdf/Main-Report.pdf

^[3] IBC Members’ News, Results of a research of the international SHADOW project presented in Bishkek, December 2020, http://ibc.kg/en/news/members/4807_results_of_a_research_of_the_international_shadow_project_presented_in_bishkek

^[4] Greater Europe Archives, http://greater-europe.org/archives/7725

^[5] Ivan Zuenko, The Eurasian Gap: Winners and Losers of the Economic Union, Carnegie Moscow Center, November 2016, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=65114

^[6] Alymbek Biyalinov o Mnenie Akipress, http://mnenie.akipress.org/find/?query=Алымбек%20биялинов&place=crosstop

^[7] Andrew Higgins, A Convicted Kidnapper Is Chosen to Lead Government of Kyrgyzstan, The New York Times, October 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/10/world/asia/kidnapper-kyrgyzstan-prime-minister.html

You may struggle to find a country that praises civil society sector and persecutes it simultaneously as much as Kyrgyzstan; where non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are needed most to cover up the dilettante state’s lack of coherence and responsiveness.

The human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan has been deteriorating for years and the foreign support of the civil society sector has been gradually fading away due to financial crises, rising nationalism in the donor countries, eroding democratic principles, deadly conflicts emerging worldwide, and the current pandemic.

Kyrgyz civil society, especially human rights defenders, feel betrayed by its state. There might be many indicators of this, such as anti-NGO law initiatives or persecution of particular leaders, but one is the heaviest – the Osh violence in 2010. It is the most enduring pain for many who tried to do their best to overcome the artificially promoted post-colonial differences the state persistently focuses on, atrocities of the law enforcement authorities, and the excessively triumphal behaviour of the Government in the aftermath of the conflict.

The Government and its proxies long-pursued NGOs and civil leaders to release themselves from ‘a burden’ of control. By sentencing Azimjan Askarov, the state reached several targets – ‘winning’ the war against the ‘enemy of the state’; the civil society ‘exposed’ as a ‘fifth column’; and ethnic Uzbeks considered as ‘diaspora’, not ‘a rooted’ community in Kyrgyzstan despite historical evidence. It was a victory over the non-governmental sector, which fiercely pushed for peacebuilding and rule of law. The government’s contempt for NGO’s relative independence amid the outcry over the imprisonment of ethnic Uzbek human rights defender extended to the denial of the privileged status of USAID aid programme.[1] And, it can be considered as a point defining further policies.

Some Kyrgyz scholars when abroad abstain from criticising the Government about its ethnic policy in the presence of public officials. They do not insist on the widely publicised findings even in a secure environment with Chatham House rules. The tragedy of the ethnic violence in 2010 and the consequent harassment, abuse, and asset stripping of ethnic Uzbeks might no longer cause discomfort to those who had not sustained any losses in the conflict, but survivors still live in continuous fear.

However, the Kyrgyz Government’s revised policy towards the development aid organisations and its own civil society seems not to be reactive, emotional or independent – it too served the interests of the expanding Eurasian Economic Union led by Russia. In 2014, Kyrgyzstan adopted more harsh policies towards its human rights defenders following the condemnation of the civil sector by Russian media and diplomacy. Kyrgyzstan backed the annexation of Crimea, ousted the US military base, and received significant financial support from Russia.[2] The state-funded media of Kyrgyzstan continued condemning the civil leaders over their critics of the Russian activity in Ukraine throughout the year.

It seems that the Kyrgyz government found 2014 perfect timing for a crackdown of the active critics among the NGO leaders. Many factors were leading to this moment, one of which was related to the influence of the US support of the civil sector in Kyrgyzstan, the US military base stationing near Bishkek in response to the global terroristic threat, and the international condemnation of the state’s response on the ethnic violence in 2010. President Atambayev proposed Russia to establish another military base later.[3]

When the UN describes human rights defenders, they emphasise that everyone promoting or protecting human rights can call themselves human rights defenders.[4] Amnesty names human rights defenders as ‘some of the bravest people in the world’.[5] In Kyrgyzstan, defending human rights has become a profession like any job in the civil society sector supported by the international community. The financial independence of civil society increased tensions with civil servants and the state media pushed myths about high salaries of the former increasing the cleavage further. Indeed, individuals involved in the activism and capable of promoting the values essential for every citizen can apply for financial support from abroad and rely on it. This has been the case for years.

Cases 

There were plenty of facts speaking about the increasingly hostile environment for human rights activists and the most publicised case of late Azimjan Askarov is eloquent enough. As one famous civil society leader commented, “I have no hope [left] after the death of Azimjan Askarov and therefore I left the human rights activity”.[6] The penitentiary agency known as ‘GSIN’ that represents the Kyrgyz state and is responsible for the care of its inmates did not prevent the death of a prominent and awarded human rights defender Azimjan Askarov in July 2020.

While the judges did everything possible to keep Askarov imprisoned, GSIN continued to withhold medical assistance despite pleadings from all over the world to release the venerable man until he fell completely ill. GSIN then hospitalised him in its penitentiary premises only when his health deteriorated irreversibly.[7] Askarov died the same night after being admitted to hospital. The official cause of his death was given as ‘pneumonia’.[8] It is no doubt that the Kyrgyz state is responsible for this crime against humanity leaving the late Askarov with no professional medical help in the turmoil of the COVID pandemic. Other crimes included blatant violations of human rights during the investigation, judicial hearings and re-trials of his case after the UN Human Rights Committee decision that called for his release.[9]

The sudden and untimely departure of the most persecuted, and well-known abroad, human rights defender and the final post-mortem result worsens the state’s position that they were ‘impartial’ towards Azimjan Askarov. To conclude, the Kyrgyz authorities saw no purpose of keeping Askarov healthy and alive, while applying the norms of early or temporary release selectively to other prisoners.

The penitentiary authority issued unescorted ‘furlough’ orders during the unrest in October 2020 to release prisoners including the former president and prime minister, who had been sentenced for grave crimes. The fairness of their trials is also questionable. However, such speedy decisions benefiting individuals backed by political groups mar the claims of the Government about their impartiality.

For ten years since 2010, human rights defenders have remained as outcasts for the authorities and political groups. There are few doubts left about the whole state system, even the President’s office under every President tried to undermine the independent role of the civil sector, and persecution of individual leaders has often been politically ‘expedient’. While the international media summarises harassment and persecution of civil activists well enough the details of many cases appear to be largely opaque for many and local news outlets barely cover them.

Local police in Issyk-Kul province irritated by anti-torture activist Kamil Ruziev threatened him in 2015 and consequentially he diminished his public activity.[10] The GKNB (the special service overlooking national security) then started criminal proceedings against Ruziev, detaining him in 2020.[11] He was released following the public outcry but not all the charges were dropped.

The nationalists and law enforcers threatened and tried to assault human rights lawyer Nurbek Toktakunov when he represented Azimjan Askarov in 2010 and 2011. He continued to litigate in high-profile cases but fell victim to smear campaigns involving intrusive surveillance and fake exposures by media sympathetic to the Government.[12]

President Atambayev sued prominent human rights lawyer Cholpon Djakupova for her criticism of his incumbency in 2017.[13] The lawyer reported on continuous surveillance in the aftermath of the October 2020 change of power.[14]

Another prominent human rights journalist, Ulugbek Babakulov, after the vilification by the then president Atambayev and threats by nationalists fled Kyrgyzstan days before GKNB charged him with a crime.[15] Later, France granted him asylum.

Membership of Aziza Abdirasulova and Tolekan Ismailova in the council on interethnic policies under President Atambayev ended prematurely because of vilification by the then incumbent president.[16] Abdirasulova also found out she was under close surveillance by the GKNB.[17] Both civil leaders unsuccessfully attempted to sue President Atambayev for moral damage.

Dinara Oshurahunova, Burul Makenbayeva, former NGO leader Gulnara Djurabayeva, and former Supreme Court Judge Klara Sooronkulova found that unknown individuals were following, photographing, and recording their conversations.[18] The law enforcement authorities formally investigated the case with no suspects or feasible explanation to why.

The GKNB targeted whole human rights organisations during the period when Kyrgyzstan started the integration process into the Eurasian Economic Union – called Customs’ Union at the time – and led by Russia. In 2015, they raided the offices of the Human Rights Advocacy Centre and Bir Duino in Osh, while searching the houses of the lawyers of the organisation.[19]

Leading human rights advocates, including the author, founded a Council of Human Rights Defenders, initially under the Ombudsman of Kyrgyzstan in 2008, to serve as an informal platform to raise awareness about human rights and the rule of law, and warn the state and the public about systemic issues when the formal institutions failed to do so. The platform also used its resources and outreach to public figures as a conflict resolution mechanism.

One of the most significant achievements of the Council was an amnesty for the Nookat 2008 disturbance participants, although the human rights defenders demanded a full acquittal.[20] Almost all the defendants were ethnic Uzbeks who had been sentenced for extremism in a process full of procedural violations and torture. Another instrument of conflict resolution became possible at that time. This is how the foundation was laid for councils under future presidents.

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 highlighted the specifics of the relationship between Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The Council of human rights defenders fiercely criticised the Russian hostility towards Ukraine and denounced the Kyrgyz Government siding with the Kremlin. It was no surprise that the media backing the Russian and Kyrgyz government reviled this group of independent individuals.[21] The Council of Human Rights Defenders ceased to exist that same year.

The downfall of the Council as a conflict resolution mechanism became a signal that the pressure is increasing and that it would jeopardise such a resource, leaving a vacuum for radical and latent activity.

The Collective Security Treaty Organisation, also led by Russia and including some former Soviet republics, criticised the Government of Kyrgyzstan hinting that numerous NGOs in the country cause a threat to its sovereignty.[22] An initiative to impose more intrusive controls over the activity of NGOs via a draft law on foreign agents or additional reporting almost reached its goal in 2016 before being dropped under pressure from civil society and Western donors, but the toxic environment created by the debate became another contributing factor to the hostile environment for human rights activists.[23]

Many of those mentioned or not mentioned civil leaders or human rights lawyers and activists would not share widely their stories about more dangerous harassment by law enforcement or proxies. These abuses would include numerous attempts to cause accidental injury or even death, arrest for deeds not associated with their activity – such as alleged drink driving or consumption of controlled drugs – that would not be publicly approved.

It is quite understandable that some civil leaders accept national awards to keep their activity public and exercise some sort of protection from abuse.[24] When the national authorities refrain from honoring human rights activists the foreign democracies and international organisations step up to raise awareness about how dangerous human rights profession is.[25]

Activism as a response to COVID-19

Kyrgyzstan experienced a reaction to the COVID-19 related situation also witnessed in other developing countries with persistent corruption too. Mass activism of volunteers, including from the civil sector, supported by individuals and entrepreneurs, helped the country to alleviate a weak and unprofessional response by the Government to the coronavirus outbreak. Even political activists, with their party finances associated with corrupt officials, were not so efficient.

Activism itself is filling the gaps but it should also be able to form a civil society not merely civil sector delivering services sometimes substituting the state. In Kyrgyzstan, it would possess expertise the state agencies lack. It is not a coincidence that one of the leading universities in Central Asia is in Bishkek – the American University of Central Asia – with its numerous alumni having international exposure it comes as a benefit for the society.

The GKNB under President Atambayev tracked down his critics on Facebook and it expanded their work under his successor.[26] Along with the Ministry of Interior, they were revealing dissent on social media regarding the poor performance of the Government on the COVID-19 pandemic, visiting the homes of critics and demanding to deny their words publicly, sometimes leading to arrests and convictions.[27] Suspicions of the public about the misuse of the huge amount of international aid directed to the fight against the pandemic have consequentially only further contributed to unresolved grievances about the political changes that almost never worked.[28]

This might have become one of the triggers that created the mass online activism and gave birth to the first crowdfunded political party consisted of activists, volunteers, and young politicians called ‘Reforma’.[29] Some of the volunteers have since joined the mainstream political parties.

Revolutions have never been complete in Kyrgyzstan and they have remained a tool of violent power change, benefiting only the rise of one political group over others, the sponsors of the presidency, and have been the reason for the deaths of many innocent civilians.

Politicians, unlike civil activists, are backed by their constituency, political groups and financial supporters. Partially, therefore, when in demise, politicians prefer to risk being unlawfully tried and imprisoned, thus accumulating political gains accounting for early release, after power change.

It was the activists, mainly from Bishkek, who first protested against the mass violations in the parliamentary elections and consequently led to a standoff with law enforcement authorities. However, experienced politicians with support from the provinces seized the momentum – released the political prisoners, started forming an interim government and drafting a new constitution. Later, after winning the January 2021 presidential election, Sadyr Japarov ‘revealed’ that he planned the October 2020 revolution while in prison.[30]

There are many ‘ifs’ for the future of human rights activities in Kyrgyzstan – if there would be continuous financial and moral support of it by the international institutions and foreign donors; if there would be enough legal space for human rights activism; if the state would refrain from imposing pressure on human rights defenders; and if there would be no persistently growing impunity against those who seek to restrict basic human rights and freedoms.

The old diplomatic approach by leading democracies of imposing sanctions (such as against former Sudanese President Al-Bashir over Darfur) against human rights abusers would barely affect them in Kyrgyzstan, now morally standing by Russia. Or, probably, it would have the same inconsistent or unsustainable effect as with the case of Azimjan Askarov, where the names of perpetrators were well-known starting from the local police officer torturing the human rights defender up to Prosecutor General that oversaw his case.[31]

Stable financial support is essential for any activity seeking sustainable goals. Who knows, maybe the private sector would start sponsoring local or national human rights activism to promote human rights and freedoms like it did when the pandemic hit Kyrgyzstan? In the meantime, some lawyers are already catching up on the defence of human rights, whether by representing individual cases or litigating on a strategic level.

Although foreign or international missions stationed in Bishkek represent donors, their influence on the Kyrgyz authorities is weak and bound by much anticipated and largely technical outcomes of their joint projects. Decision-makers in the governments or headquarters sponsoring reforms in Kyrgyzstan should demand bigger results from its government. The aid directed on democratic development should be conditional on the results and satisfaction of the Kyrgyz civil sector.

The established democracies should not limit themselves with merely raising their concern over rule of law issues but make sure their voices over the respect of human rights and freedoms heard. This is how the value of the taxpayers’ money brought to the Kyrgyz people would start to improve, and, Kyrgyzstan may stop persecuting own human rights activists.

Ernest Zhanaev, a human rights writer and consultant based in the UK since 2014. He was instrumental in making the Kyrgyzstan parliament adopt the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and latterly to pass legislation for greater financial transparency in electoral law. Also, he edited English news for the independent Fergana News covering developments in Central Asia. Now consultant for international organisations and think tanks Ernest researches human rights issues in post-Soviet countries specialising on freedom of speech, social and political development. He is currently also a postgraduate student at University of St Andrews.

Image by UN Women in Europe and Central Asia under (CC).

[1] Olga Dzyubenko, Defiant Kyrgyzstan says canceled treaty will hit U.S. aid agency, Reuters, July 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-kyrgyzstan-idUSKCN0PW0QA20150722

[2] RFE/RL, Kyrgyzstan Says Crimea Referendum ‘Legitimate’, March 2014, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-recognition-crimea-referendum-ukraine-russia/25304439.html; Stephanie Ott, Russia tightens control over Kyrgyzstan, The Guardian, September 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/18/russia-tightens-control-over-kyrgyzstan

[3] Bruce Pannier, Kyrgyzstan’s President Wants Another Russian Military Base, RFE/RL, June 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-new-russian-base-atambaev-putin-afghanistan/28583538.html

[4] OHCHR, Who is a defender, https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/srhrdefenders/pages/defender.aspx

[5] Amnesty International UK, Human rights defenders – some of the bravest people in the world, January 2018, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/human-rights-defenders-what-are-hrds

[6] Abdumomun Mamaraimov, Facebook, December 2020, https://www.facebook.com/abdumomun.mamaraimov/posts/10208073977203607

[7] OHCHR, Kyrgyzstan must uphold its human rights obligations and release human rights defender Azimjan Askarov, says UN expert, May 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25872&LangID=E

[8] OHCHR, Kyrgyzstan: Death of human rights defender Azimjan Askarov a stain on country’s reputation, says UN expert, July 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26138

[9] CCPR/C/116/D/2231/2012, The United Nations Human Rights Committee, May 2016, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/116/D/2231/2012&Lang=en

[10] Aleksandra Li, Активист заявляет о преследовании и угрозах за правозащитную деятельность [‘Activist states about persecution and threats for human rights activity’], Voice of Freedom of Central Asia, February 2015, http://vof.kg/?p=18578

[11] Ayzirek Imanaliyeva, Kyrgyzstan: Fresh arrest shows how screws are tightening on civil society, Eurasianet, June 2020, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-fresh-arrest-shows-how-screws-are-tightening-on-civil-society?fbclid=IwAR1wQg92Ojqch4pDSqWguQv_LKlJ9SkqdNfdYQv-66O0gZzlU8O3U5KAerY

[12] RFE/RL, Former Kyrgyz PM’s Defense Lawyer Says Targeted By Smear Campaign, February 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/former-kyrgyz-pm-s-defense-lawyer-says-targeted-by-smear-campaign/29785685.html

[13] Edliyar Arykbayev, Эмоции, оскорбления, ирония и сарказм: За что судят правозащитницу Чолпон

Джакупову? [‘Emotions, insults, irony and sarcasm: Why the human rights defender is being tried’], Kloop, May 2017, https://kloop.kg/blog/2017/05/02/oskorbleniyaemotsiiironiyaisarkazmzachtosudyatpravozashhitnitsucholpondzhakupovu/

[14] Cholpon Djakupova, Facebook Post, Facebook, October 2020, https://www.facebook.com/cholpon.djakupova/posts/3370862356329938

[15] RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, Kyrgyz Journalist ‘Given Political Asylum’ In France, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-journalist-who-denies-hate-incitement-charge-says-given-political-asylum-in-france/29791479.html

[16] Abdumomun Mamaraimov, Азиза Абдирасулова: “Парламент Кыргызстана совершил преступление против государства” [‘Aziza Abdirasulova: Kyrgyzstan parliament committed crime against state’], Fergana Agency, February 2019, https://fergana.news/articles/105294/

[17] Alina Pak, Правозащитница Азиза Абдирасулова заявила, что за ней следят [‘Human rights defender Aziza Abdirasulova says she is followed’], Kloop, December 2016, http://kloop.kg/blog/2016/12/08/pravozashhitnitsaazizaabdirasulovazayavilachtozanejsledyat/

[18] Fergana Agency, Киргизские правозащитницы пожаловались на прослушку [‘Kyrgyz human rights defenders complained about wiretapping’], September 2018, http://www.fergananews.com/news/32607

[19] Justin Burke, Kyrgyzstan: Criminal Probe Has Rights Activists on Alert, Eurasianet, November 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70846; Chris Rickleton, Kyrgyzstan’s Security Agents Intimidating Uzbek Minority, Activists Say, Eurasianet, April 2015, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstans-security-agents-intimidating-uzbek-minority-activists-say

[20] David Trilling, Evaluating Kyrgyzstan’s Impact on the Islamic Militant Threat in Central Asia, Eurasianet, June 2010, https://eurasianet.org/evaluating-kyrgyzstans-impact-on-the-islamic-militant-threat-in-central-asia

[21] StanRadar.com, “Совет правозащитников Кыргызстана” ангажированность или беспристрастность? (анализ обращений за 6 лет) [‘Council of human rights defenders’ bias or impartiality? (analysis of statements for 6 years], July 2014, http://www.stanradar.com/news/full/10870sovetpravozaschitnikovkyrgyzstanaangazhirovannostilibespristrastnostanalizobraschenijza6let.html

[22] Eleonora Beyshenbek kyzy, НПО Кыргызстана в поле зрения ОДКБ [‘Kyrgyzstan NGOs in sight of CSTO’], RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, March 2015, http://rus.azattyk.org/a/26890889.html

[23] Anna Lelik, Kyrgyzstan: Foreign Agent Bill Nixed, NGOs Rejoice, Eurasianet, May 2016, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-foreign-agent-bill-nixed-ngos-rejoice; Ayzirek Imanaliyeva, Kyrgyzstan: Draft bill threatens to drive NGOs against the wall, Eurasianet, May 2020, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-draft-bill-threatens-to-drive-ngos-against-the-wall

[24] President of the Kyrgyz Republic website, ‘О награждении государственными наградами Кыргызской Республики’ [‘On State Awards of the Kyrgyz Republic’], November 2017, http://www.president.kg/files/docs/award/ukaz_noyabr_russ.pdf

[25] US Department of State, 2014 Human Rights Defender Award Ceremony for Azimjan Askarov and Foro Penal, July 2015, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244903.htm

[26] Nurjamal Djanibekova, ‘Спецслужбы проверяют критиков Атамбаева в “Фэйсбуке”‘ [‘Special services scrutinise critics of Atambayev on Facebook’], Kloop, January 2017, http://kloop.kg/blog/2017/01/10/spetssluzhbyproveryayutkritikovatambaevavfejsbuke/

[27] Kloop, ‘Тот, кого нельзя называть. Как кыргызстанцев преследуют за критику президента’ [‘He Who Must Not Be Named. How Kyrgyzstani Persecuted for Criticising President’], July 2020, https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/07/31/tot-kogo-nelzya-nazyvat-kak-kyrgyzstantsev-presleduyut-za-kritiku-prezidenta/

[28] Aleksandra Li, Кыргызстан тратит миллионы долларов на борьбу с коронавирусом, но власти скрывают как расходуются деньги’, [‘Kyrgyzstan spends millions of dollars to fight coronavirus but authorities conceals how money is spent’], Kloop, June 2020, https://kloop.kg/blog/2020/06/24/milliony-na-covid/

[29] Bruce Pannier, Who’s Who In Kyrgyzstan After The Latest Tumultuous Uprising?, RFE/RL, October 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/who-is-who-in-kyrgyzstan-after-the-latest-tumultuous-uprising/30882154.html

[30] Vladimir Soloviev, В тюрьме ты 24 часа в сутки свободный человек [‘You are a free man in prison 24 hours a day ‘], Kommersant, January 2021, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4639707?from=main_1#id1957426

[31] Front Line Defenders, Case of Azimjan Askarov, July 2020, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/azimjan-askarov-sentenced-life-imprisonment