Summary

It has been more than two decades since the Kyrgyz Republic became independent.  At that time, Kyrgyzstan had an ambitious agenda to become a ‘Switzerland’ of Central Asia and open up the country to new opportunities, embrace the market economy and become a true democracy where human rights are respected and protected. However, despite these initial goals, true and meaningful reforms never took place because of the three main factors that have driven these trends and directly impacting the protection and implementation of human rights. The factors are: the endemic corruption, the lack of political will and the culture of impunity, or ‘legal mentality’, a mindset where people believe that there will be no consequences for ignoring or subverting the legal process, and lack of respect for the rule of law. In order to overcome these obstacles, the Government of Kyrgyzstan as well as the international community must agree on a road map on how to better protect the rights of the people of Kyrgyzstan and especially the vulnerable and marginalised. The road map should include a conditionality rule that requires the Government to protect human rights in order to receive large aid packages or financial loans or technical assistance. In other words, the human rights agenda should always be front and center of the internal policies, and be a main objective during the external negotiations or evaluations of progress.

Background

Kyrgyzstan is a small landlocked country in Central Asia, located south of Kazakhstan and west of China, which gained its independence in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[1] The population of the country is slightly over six million people, with the majority of people living in rural areas and 32 per cent of the population living under the poverty line.[2]

In the earlier stages of independence, Kyrgyzstan was consistently called the ‘Switzerland’ of Central Asia, illustrating the international community’s hopes for the country and its potential to become an ‘island of democracy’ in the region.[3] Kyrgyzstan joined many international organisations and ratified the main human rights conventions.[4] For example, in 1992, Kyrgyzstan became the member of the World Bank, in 1994, Kyrgyzstan was the first among Central Asian republics to accede to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in 1998 was the first country of the former Soviet republics to join the World Trade Organization.[5]

Although the country took these important steps to become a democracy, through the years the Government of Kyrgyzstan has not respected, promoted, protected, and fulfilled its human rights obligations or its democratic promise. The country is considered to be only partially free by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report, with a score of 38/100.[6] It is battling endemic corruption and was placed at 126^th out of 180 on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI).[7] The rule of law reforms have stalled and the 2020 WJP rule of law index was at 0.48 or 87^th place out of 128 countries; judicial independence remains elusive with the score of three out of seven, placing it at 106^th out of 141 in the 2019 Global Competitiveness Index; and the country’s overall human rights record is worsening.[8]

The leaders of Kyrgyzstan fell into a disappointingly familiar cycle of retrenchment and backsliding on human rights and reforms. The first President, Askar Akayev, was elected in October 1991. Initially he positioned himself as a reformer and a moderate leader.[9] However, in his later years in office, he became more authoritarian by suppressing opposition members, more corrupt by allowing his family and others become enriched on local resources, and more willing to let lapse those international and local rules that might have reigned in his corruption.[10] This behaviour led to the ‘Tulip’ revolution in March 2005, and Akayev resigned a month later.[11] The second President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected in July 2005. Despite initial optimism, his presidency was marred by many problems including a failing economy, ties to criminals and the killings of several Members of Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh), corruption and his family’s battles over lucrative businesses.[12] In 2010, another revolution forced Bakiyev to flee and President Atambayev eventually took power in December 2011, following a short stint by Rosa Otunbayeva as interim President. Atambaev’s presidency was also troubled and problematic. While some reforms took place and new amendments to the constitution were adopted during his one six-year term in office, he was connected with many corruption cases ‘ranging from the illegal privatisation of municipal property to the embezzlement of funds from infrastructure projects.’[13] In November 2017, new President Sooronbay Jeenbekov became President, in the so-called first democratic transfer of power in the country. Jeenbekov was not president for long, however, and in 2020, after contested Parliamentary elections he was forced out in another revolution, that many observers called a coup d’état.[14] While it is too early to rule on how sincerely the most recent president Sadyr Japarov’s administration will support a human rights agenda, the methods used by him and his supporters to achieve power are concerning.

During this period, the overall human rights record deteriorated – the rights of the vulnerable, minority, women and marginalised groups remain unprotected; torture practices are common; human rights defenders, journalists and lawyers are harassed, and the environment for the civil society to operate is becoming more difficult.[15] The gender inequality in society and violations against the rights of women and girls have been getting worse in spite of recent legislative amendments aimed at improving the situation.[16] Violence against women is “wide-spread” and women are subject to “domestic violence, bride kidnapping, trafficking, early marriages and physical abuse” with limited access to justice to remedy such violations.[17] The situation with the rights of people with disabilities remains to be “unsatisfactory”.[18] People with disabilities continue to be discriminated against and isolated from the community especially when it comes to the access to medical care, political participation in decision-making on disability issues and the policy-making processes, though hopes are high for improvements after the 2019 CRPD ratification.[19] The rights of minorities continue to remain a sensitive topic for the Government and society especially in the aftermath of the 2010 inter-ethnic conflict in the south of Kyrgyzstan.[20] An Uzbek minority human rights defender and journalist Azimjan Askarov was detained, tortured and prosecuted after these events.[21] Askarov passed away in prison on July 25^th 2020, in spite of the 2016 UN Human Rights Committee’s decision demanding his immediate release and many other interventions and advocacy efforts by the international community.[22] The torture practices by the law enforcement bodies have been an on-going reality for the past decades and appear to be “systematic”.[23] For example, in the first half of 2019, there were 171 allegations of torture registered in Kyrgyzstan and only in 11 cases prosecutors opened and investigated the cases.[24] The situation of human rights of the LGBTQ people remains challenging when violations, hate crimes and discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation are “menacingly systematic” and continuing.[25]

While many factors could account for these failures, the three most relevant reasons hindering the protection and enforcement of human rights are corruption, the lack of political will to protect human rights and the culture of impunity, i.e. legal mentality that allows a continuing culture of disrespect for the rule of law and human rights. These reasons affect human rights directly because the core of these human rights lie in protection of the most vulnerable and marginalised people, thus the existence of corruption and its repugnant effects harm the vulnerable people by denying them essential government services such as social support, health services, education, as well as legal services such as access to lawyers, courts and law enforcement.[26]

Corruption

In the last two decades, Kyrgyzstan, just like many other countries of the former Soviet Union, was one of the most corrupt countries in the world.[27] Though many anti-corruption laws and initiatives were enacted, this negative trend endures.[28] Kyrgyzstan’s corruption continues to be one of the most challenging obstacles in its overall development with a score of 29/100 in the Global Competitiveness Index and remains to be a barrier for rule of law implementation as indicated above.[29]

The Kyrgyz people themselves recognise and react to the detrimental effects of corruption. When asked about government performance, they indicated corruption as the third most important concern (47 per cent) after health (67 per cent) and the economy (52 per cent).[30] After the June 2019 Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s (OCCRP) reporting, ‘Plunder and Patronage in the Heart of Central Asia’, on Kyrgyzstan’s customs officials’ funneling $700 million out of the country, people took to the streets and demanded accountability and investigation into these allegations.[31] In October 2020, another series of reporting on corruption by the OCCPR called ‘The Matraimov Kingdom’ was published and caused a strong public reaction right before the October parliamentary elections, which themselves were characterised as having serious allegations of vote buying.[32] The protests against corruption and other political events in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, have been on-going since.[33]

While corruption exists in many areas of society including education, health care, city utilities, the corruption in the justice system has the most detrimental effect on the implementation and enforcement of human rights. The Government should be able to protect and fulfil its international human rights obligations and rely on the legal system in place to hold perpetrators accountable whether they are state or non-state actors. A legal system should allow for the Government to, first, conduct effective investigations at the initial stages of the legal process. Second, prosecutors should establish cases with sufficient and sound evidentiary basis to send to court. Third, the courts must comply with the fair trial standards to ensure impartial, competent and fair hearings to deliver just and legally sound decisions.

In practice, the insidious effects of corruption make reaching accountability during these legal steps a very bumpy and problematic process. Due to corruption, the law enforcement bodies are known for being ineffective, unprofessional, abusive and weak. The local culture of tribalism — where people support their relatives affiliated with the same local tribes – leads to “nepotism and unprofessional conduct, which in turns leads to operational inefficiencies.”[34] Some local police districts are influenced by local government officials making them vulnerable to partiality when investigating cases.[35] Victims often have a difficult time convincing police officers to even register complaints in part because of the pervasive corruption and, in part, because of the legal culture discussed below. For example, in 2019, there were 9,000 cases of domestic violence. Of those, approximately 5,456 cases were registered with the authorities as administrative cases, and only around 784 were registered as criminal.[36] Bribery, as a form of corruption, of law enforcement bodies remains common among citizens in order to avoid investigation or prosecution.[37] When asked if respondents or members of their families paid a bribe to police in the previous year when they came into contact with the service, 61 per cent replied positively which indicates that bribing police officials is a common practice.[38] While legislation exists to prohibit corruption including bribery, the laws overall have mostly declarative nature and do not envision detailed mechanisms of implementation.[39]

Extortion by law enforcement officers of those accused in the form of threatened arbitrary arrests, torture and the potential criminal prosecution is also quite common.[40] For example, police targets the members of the marginalised community and LGBT people to extort money from them. The Human Rights Watch reported that police tortured and extorted money from gay men and threaten them not to seek accountability.[41] When one of such victims, Mikhail Kudryashov, tried to demand remedies, the court did not adjudicate his case, thus, contributing to the culture of impunity and lack of accountability.[42]

Further, there is no relief from corruption when a case gets to the courts – the bribes and cash payments in relation to judicial decisions are among the highest in the world.[43] The judges and judiciary in general are vulnerable to corruption in part because of the politicised system of judicial appointments and low salaries for judicial personnel.[44] In 2010, a new Council for the Selection of judges was introduced and was tasked with the selection of candidates for the judges to the Constitutional, Supreme and local courts to be appointed by the President and the Parliament. Although the council did not include any representatives from the executive brunch, the two-third of the council consisted of the members of the political parties in parliament making the appointment process vulnerable to political influence.[45] The judicial branch is also dependent on the executive branch because the executive is responsible for the budget allocation.[46]

Many attempts have been made to reform and eradicate corruption in the justice system, but with limited success. In 2019, the Kyrgyz Government, with the support of donors, adopted a number of changes to the local laws attempting to eliminate “repressive measures” and develop “new methods” to better protection of human rights.[47] The reforms aimed to, among other things, shift the authority in investigative actions from prosecutors to courts, create an office of investigative judge, introduce a new system of probation, digitise courtrooms and investigative offices, and create a unified register.[48] It is still too early to see any marked improvements.

Other initiatives also supported by foreign donors include the EU’s 12.2 million euro rule of law programmes that have been running since 2014 and are focusing to increase the “effectiveness of judicial administration by creating transparency and credibility within judicial and court structures and fighting corruption.”[49] The United States Agency for International Development (USIAD) funded and implemented numerous programmes over the past years to support the Kyrgyz judiciary.[50] For example, in 2008-2010, USAID administered the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) Threshold programme of $16 million, which supported reforms in the judiciary, as well as in prosecutorial services, to fight corruption.[51] The e-justice programme implemented through the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) was another USAID-funded initiative which assisted with the creation of a country-wide portal www.sot.kg that aims to make all court decisions available to the public by digitising them.[52] The most recent project funded by the USAID is a $3.2 million programme to “increase public trust in the Judiciary as an independent branch of power”.[53] While all these initiatives are very much needed, they are not always sustainable nor fully implemented once the grants money runs out, meaning that ultimately the local government is not held accountable for delivering long-term change.

Lack of political will power

The second factor that contributes to poor human rights protection is the lack of political will when the key decision makers fail to understand, implement and ensure that the policy solutions for human rights protections are carried out.[54] Former Presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Akayev, Bakiyev, Atambaev, Jeenbekov, and their administrations all lacked the necessary political will and failed to deliver and implement needed reforms to ensure sufficient protection of human rights. The reasons for this lack of political will are multifaced and complex, but corruption, abuse of office for personal gain, ties to the criminal world, and corrupt personal agenda seem to top the list.

While the first President Akayev was publicly outlining ambitious plans to build a new democratic and independent country where the rule of law prevailed, his era was characterised by limited support, funding and follow-through of human rights policies, plans and programmes. Akayev’s personnel policy of keeping the ‘old guard’ at the important regional governor positions as well as to staff other top seats of power with a close tribal network did not promote reform, as those leaders did not understand, implement and enforce the new policies in the regions, ensuring that his administration’s commitment to reform would fail.[55]

With President Bakiyev, the human rights agenda took a back seat when his close circle engaged in power grabs, dealing with criminal elements, and dividing lucrative contracts and businesses. The next two presidents, Atambaev and Jeenbekov, had followed similar patterns where their administrations did not have either true commitment to reform, nor had clear ideas or understanding of the policy solutions require to implement and deliver solutions to specific problems.[56] Such approaches certainly undermined the reform process and demonstrated the lack of political will to deliver basic rule of law to the public.

People’s ‘legal mentality’ – the culture of impunity and disrespect for the rule of law

The third issue responsible for the poor record of human rights is people’s ‘legal mentality’, i.e. the culture of impunity and the low level of respect and understanding of the concepts of the rule of law.[57] The laws protecting human rights are not implemented and do not work in practice if people do not believe in those laws, do not trust them and do not think there is accountability for violating them. As a result, such beliefs ultimately shape the attitudes and lead to behaviours where violating the law becomes a norm for both state-actors and citizens.

The culture of the rule of law is a complex and multifaceted concept in practice and there are vast resources, literature and manuals exist on the topic.[58] In Kyrgyzstan, the low culture of respect for the rule of law has its origins from the Soviet culture, where transparency, equality and accountability were an uncommon practice and ‘telephone justice’ was a norm.[59] In the current conditions of Kyrgyzstan, for example, lawyers (less so judges and prosecutors) are assaulted in or outside the courtroom by the members of the community because of the lack of understanding of the role of the legal profession as the lawyers are often identified with their clients and because of the lack of the accountability and consequences for such behaviour.[60] Similarly, the victims of gender violence would often be harassed not only by the perpetrator’s family, but also by the members of the larger community, as well as law enforcement and prosecutors because of their ignorance of the laws and wide-spread misogyny and sexism.[61]

To change this legal mentality towards the rule of law, there should be a desire from the community to make appropriate changes – both the Government and civil society.[62] In 2016, the Kyrgyz Government seemingly understood the problem and adopted a resolution on the Concept of Increasing of Legal Culture of the Population of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2016-2020 (Concept).[63] The concept aimed to “introduce a systematic approach to improve the legal culture, including legal training and education of the population, formation of modern legal culture and behaviour.”[64] The concept outlined a set of objectives and an action plan to reach those goals by raising awareness among the public and setting up educational initiatives to inform young generation about the importance of following the laws, by working with the local media to create relevant public campaigns, and by coordinating with the government agencies to ensure the implementation of these objectives. For example, one of such activity under this Concept was the ‘bus of solidarity’ initiative where a group of local lawyers traveled to remote areas of Chui and Osh regions to provide free legal advice, servicing 4,145 people in 2016-2017 and approximately 4,000 people in 2020.[65]

Other advocacy campaigns took place to achieve these goals. In 2008, the above mentioned MCC Threshold anti-corruption programme created cartoons for children highlighting human values that stealing, lying and cheating are not good behaviours and are not acceptable by their families, their community and the country.[66] In 2014, similar public awareness campaigns, competitions, art exhibits, and programmes also took place to improve the legal culture and to fight the culture of impunity.[67] While such individual programmes and actions may have been a success at that time, the consistency of the message and sustainability of such efforts is lacking. Without appropriate support from all stakeholders, it will likely take years to make a measurable difference in local legal culture. It remains an open question if the new administration will see this as a problem worth addressing.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The path forward for Kyrgyzstan is a challenging one and difficult choices and coordinated action must be made if there will be a serious attempt to bring real reform and respect for rule of law, and thus providing for better protection for human rights. That said, Kyrgyzstan faces an important decision point – rule of law leads to greater prosperity and integration with the international community. Continued endemic corruption leads to stagnation and instability. It is not too late for Kyrgyzstan to pursue tangible reforms even in times of political instability. That said, the longer these reforms are delayed, the more difficult they will be to bring to conclusion. Given Kyrgyzstan’s low culture of rule of law, at a certain point, existing systems will not be able to bear the pain and uncertainty that long-term reforms necessitate. In order to improve the situation for the protection of human rights in Kyrgyzstan, all stakeholders have a role to play:

• The Kyrgyz Government have to demonstrate commitment and put the human rights agenda front and center into their internal policies using a human rights-based approach;
• The Kyrgyz Government has to respect, promote, protect and fulfil its international human rights obligations, failure to do so may trigger conditions of the financial and technical assistance;
• The Kyrgyz Government have to show political will and true commitment to combat corruption and improve the rule of law;
• The Kyrgyz Government should continue its work on improving the legal mentality and educating the population on the importance of the rule of law and respect for the legal norms;
• Local civil society should continue to monitor the human rights situation, report on any violations and raise awareness both locally and with the international community;
• Local civil society should also be more unified and show more solidarity when it comes to the protecting their professional rights and their interests, for example, for the lawyers, journalists, minorities, and marginalised groups;
• The international community should use their leverage and put conditions that the human rights agenda and rule of law are included and are addressed by the local government when negotiating for potential loans or financial assistance programs; and
• The international community and donors should continue to provide assistance in a demand driven way supporting the human rights defenders, civils society organisations and empowering local communities to continue the reforms and make changes for the better.

Jasmine Cameron, Esq., is a US-trained human rights lawyer, originally from Kyrgyzstan. Jasmine has been working for the US Government and non-profit organizations and living overseas for many years. She was implementing the rule of law and human rights programs in the regions of Europe and Eurasia.

Image by Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic to Switzerland.

[1] CIA: The World Fact Book, Kyrgyzstan, The World Factbook, CIA.gov, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/kyrgyzstan/

[2] Ibid.

[3] The Frontline World, Kyrgyzstan, The Kidnapped Bride, PBS, March 2004, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/kyrgyzstan/facts.html

[4] OHCHR, View the ratification status by country or by treaty, Ratification Status for Kyrgyzstan, United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=93&Lang=EN. In 1994, Kyrgyzstan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (CESSR), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). In 1997, it joined the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), as well as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). In 2003, Kyrgyzstan joined the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW). Most recently, in 2019, Kyrgyzstan joined the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

[5] Ibid. See also World Trade Organization, Kyrgyz Republic to become WTO member, October 1998, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres98_e/pr114_e.htm; see also United Nations, Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26459VNR_2020_Kyrgyzstan_Report_English.pdf

[6] Freedom House, 2020 Freedom in the World Report, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/kyrgyzstan/facts.html

[7] Transparency International, Annual Report, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kyrgyzstan. It also gives the score of 31 out of 100 (0 – highly corrupt and 100 – very clean), though this score is an improvement from the years before, for example, in 2012 Kyrgyzstan had the score of 154.

[8] World Justice Project, WJP 2020 Rule of Law Index, https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2020; World Economic Forum’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Index, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/kyrgyzstan/facts.html; Human Rights Watch, 2021 World Report Kyrgyzstan, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan;  Amnesty International, Kyrgyzstan, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/kyrgyzstan/report-kyrgyzstan/

[9] Regine A. Spector, The Transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan, University of California, Berkeley, Spring 2004, https://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/2004_02-spec.pdf

[10] RFE/RL, Central Asia Report: August 22, 2002, RFE/RL, August 2002, https://www.rferl.org/a/1342268.html

[11] International Crisis Group, Kyrgyzstan After the Revolution, May 2005, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/09/29/icg_05042005.pdf

[12] BBC NEWS, Kyrgyz MP shot dead in Bishkek, May 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4759301.stm; BBC NEWS, Kyrgyz rally against corruption, April 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4958146.stm

[13] Satina Aidar, What we know about alleged elite corruption under former Kyrgyz president Almazbek Atambayev, openDemocracy, October 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/what-we-know-about-alleged-elite-corruption-under-former-kyrgyz-president-almazbek-atambayev/

[14] Vladimir Pirogov, Coup d’etat ‘under way’ as Kyrgyzstan opposition claims power, The Sydney Morning Herald, October 2020, https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/coup-d-etat-under-way-as-kyrgyzstan-opposition-claims-power-20201006-p562lo.html

[15] Human Rights Watch, Kyrgyzstan: Events of 2019, (HRW 2019 Report), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan; see also Amnesty International, Kyrgyzstan, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/kyrgyzstan/report-kyrgyzstan/; see also Committee to Protect Journalist (CPJ): Kyrgyzstan, 2020, https://cpj.org/europe/kyrgyzstan/2020/; see situation with human rights defenders at Frontline Defenders, Kyrgyzstan, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/kyrgyzstan; see also the situation with lawyers Legal Clinic Adilet’s Report on Lawyers, http://www.adilet.kg/en/news/full/415; see also Kyrgyzstan’s Bar Association’s Public Letter to the Kyrgyz President on concerning trends of attacks on lawyers, www.advokatura.kg/foto/obrashchenie-k-prezidentu-kyrgyzskoy-respubliki; Radio Azattyk, Osh: The lawyer says that he was under surveillance and eavesdropping, November 2020, https://www.azattyk.org/a/30966296.html

[16] Human Rights Watch, Kyrgyzstan: Events of 2019, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan

[17] UN Women, Kyrgyzstan, https://eca.unwomen.org/en/where-we-are/kyrgyzstan; see also American Bar Association, Center for Human Rights: Violence against Women in Kyrgyzstan: Barriers to Accessing Justice, Fair Trial Rights, and the Right of Peaceful Assembly, December 2020, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/reports/violence-against-women-in-kyrgyzstan–barriers-to-accessing-just/; see also American Bar Association, Center for Human Rights, Trial Observation Report: Kyrgyzstan vs. Gulzhan Pasanova, May 2020, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/reports/kyrgyzstan_vs_Gulzhan_Pasanova1/

[18] Gulmira Kazakunova, Kyrgyzstan’s Social Protection Measures and Programmes, United Nations, June 2018, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/06/3-1.pdf

[19] Amnesty International, One year after CRPD ratification in Kyrgyzstan, March 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2020/03/one-year-after-crpd-ratification-in-kyrgyzstan/

[20] Minority Rights Group International, Kyrgyzstan, https://minorityrights.org/country/kyrgyzstan/. Kyrgyzstan also got a 55 place in 2020 on the people under threat index that identifies communities facing potential threats of genocide, mass killing, or systematic repressions.

[21] Human rights Watch, Kyrgyzstan: Travesty of Justice for Rights Defender, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/24/kyrgyzstan-travesty-justice-rights-defender

[22] Committee to Protect Journalists,  Azimjan Askarov, https://cpj.org/campaigns/azimjon-askarov/; also see,  OHCHR | Release Azimjan Askarov and quash his conviction, UN human rights experts urge Kyrgyzstan, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19853&LangID=E; see the UN Human Rights Committee’s decision at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/116/D/2231/2012&Lang=en ; US State Department, 2014 Human Rights Defender Award Ceremony for Azimjan Askarov and Foro Penal, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244903.htm; Human Rights Watch, Joint Letter to the EU on Detention of Azimjan Askarov in Kyrgyzstan, November 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/06/joint-letter-eu-detention-azimjon-askarov-kyrgyzstan

[23] Olga Dolzhenkova and Alexandra Vasilkova, The History Of Torture In Kyrgyzstan: “Used Combat Sambo Techniques To Protect Oneself”, CABAR, July 2020, https://longreads.cabar.asia/the-history-of-torture-in-kyrgyzstan

[24] US Department of State, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kyrgyz Republic (DOS 2019 HRPR), https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/kyrgyzstan/

[25] Joint submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review, Kyrgyzstan: Human Rights Violations Of

LGBT, https://ilga.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Shadow-report-15.pdf; Human rights Watch, 2019 World Report, Kyrgyzstan, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan

[26] Lucy Koechlin and Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmon, Corruption and human rights: exploring the connection.

[27] Robert Legvold, Corruption, Global Security, and World Order, Corruption, the Criminalized State and Post-Soviet Transition.

[28] OECD, Kyrgyzstan, Anti-Corruption Reforms in Kyrgyzstan, March 2015, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Kyrgyzstan-Round-3-Monitoring-Report-ENG.pdf

[29] OECD, Kyrgyzstan anti-corruption project, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/kyrgyzstananti-corruptionproject.htm

[30]  Transparency International, Corruption Barometer, Annual Report Kyrgyzstan, 2016 https://www.transparency.kg/files/AnnualReport2016.pdf

[31] OCCRP, Plunder and Patronage in the Heart of Central Asia, November 2019, https://www.occrp.org/en/plunder-and-patronage/; US News, World News, Hundreds Protest Over Kyrgyz Corruption Report, November 2019, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2019-11-25/hundreds-protest-over-kyrgyz-corruption-report

[32] OCCPR, The Matraimov Kingdom, October 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/the-matraimov-kingdom/; see also, OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Kyrgyzstan, ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission, October 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/a/472461_0.pdf

[33] RFE/RL, Kyrgyz Activists Rally Against Corruption, February 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-activists-rally-against-corruption/31102170.html

[34] Risk and Compliance Portal, Kyrgyzstan Country Report, July 2020, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/kyrgyzstan/

[35] Ibid.

[36] Human Rights Watch, Kyrgyzstan – Events of 2018, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/kyrgyzstan#e81181

[37] Risk and Compliance Portal, Kyrgyzstan Country Report, July 2020, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/kyrgyzstan/

[38] OECD, Kyrgyzstan, Anti-Corruption Reforms in Kyrgyzstan, March 2015, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Kyrgyzstan-Round-3-Monitoring-Report-ENG.pdf

[39] Ibid

[40] U.S. Department of State, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kyrgyz Republic, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/kyrgyzstan/

[41]Human rights Watch, Kyrgyzstan: Police torture gay men, https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/kyrgyzstan

[42] Ibid.

[43] Risk and Compliance Portal, Kyrgyzstan Country Report, July 2020, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/kyrgyzstan/

[44] Transparency International, Kyrgyzstan: Overview of Corruption and anti-corruption, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kyrgyzstan;  see also Sustainable Development Goals, Voluntary Review of the Kyrgyz Republic, p. 121, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26459VNR_2020_Kyrgyzstan_Report_English.pdf

[45] Transparency International, Kyrgyzstan: Overview of Corruption and anti-corruption, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kyrgyzstan

[46] Ibid.

[47] Sustainable Development Goals, Voluntary Review of the Kyrgyz Republic, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26459VNR_2020_Kyrgyzstan_Report_English.pdf

[48] TI Report, at p. 8 and Voluntary Review, at p. 122.

[49] IRZ, Kyrgyzstan: The Rule of Law Programme in the Kyrgyz Republic – 2^nd phase (ROLPRO2), April 2020, https://www.irz.de/index.php/en/projects/74-kirgisistan-eu-projekte/1771-kyrgyzstan-the-rule-of-law-programme-in-the-kyrgyz-republic

[50] USAID, U.S. Foreign Aid by Country, https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/KGZ?fiscal_year=2021&measure=Obligations

[51] Millennium Challenge Corporation, Kyrgyz Republic Threshold Program, https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/kyrgyz-republic-threshold-program

[52] International Development Legal Organization, E-Nabling Sustainable Development: Lessons From E-Justice Programming In Kyrgyzstan, December 2018, https://www.idlo.int/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/IDLO%20-%20LLB%20-%20E-Justice%20-%20December2018.pdf

[53] USAID, Trusted Judiciary, Fact Sheet, Kyrgyz Republic, https://www.usaid.gov/kyrgyz-republic/fact-sheets/trusted-judiciary

[54] Since the 2000s, a term of political will has been defined, measured and mapped, and applied to many scenarios in the newly created states of the former Soviet states. The scholars define the political will as the extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem. In other words, a set of decision-makers with a common understanding of a particular problem on the formal agenda is committed to supporting – a commonly perceived, potentially effective policy solution. See: Lori A. Post, Amber N. W. Raile, and Eric D. Raile, Defining Political Will, Montana State University, August 2010, https://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1/14420/Raile_PoliticsPolicy2010_A1b.pdf;jsessionid=56375A117171857854D2CF29975F8C84?sequence=1

[55] Regine A. Spector, “The Transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan, University of California, Berkeley, 2004, https://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/2004_02-spec.pdf

[56] Satina Aidar, What we know about alleged elite corruption under former Kyrgyz president Almazbek Atambayev, openDemocracy, October 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/what-we-know-about-alleged-elite-corruption-under-former-kyrgyz-president-almazbek-atambayev/; see also Bertelsmann Stiftung, Transformation Index, Country Report 2020 Kyrgyzstan, https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report-KGZ.html#pos15

[57] This is a self-made term and is not commonly used, in the relevant literature it’s more likely referred to as the culture of impunity or legal culture. However, I prefer to use the term of ‘legal mentality’, as the term incorporates the idea of people’s mindset towards the rule of law culture.

[58] United Nations and the Rule of Law, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/; see also Leanne McKay, Toward-a-Rule-of-Law-Culture, United States Institute of Peace, 2015, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Toward-a-Rule-of-Law-Culture_Practical-Guide_0.pdf; see also Center for Teaching the Rule of Law, Educational Resources, https://www.thecenterforruleoflaw.org/educational-resources.html

[59] UNDP in Kyrgyz Republic, The legal culture starts from me, from you, from us, from each member of the society, September 2020, https://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/presscenter/articles/2020/08/legal-culture-starts-with-every-member-of-society.html; see also Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic, On approval of the Concept of increasing the legal culture of the population of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2016–2020, http://minjust.gov.kg/en/content/755; See also International Crises Group, Kyrgyzstan: The Challenge of Judicial Reform, April 2008, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan-challenge-judicial-reform

[60] Lawyers for Lawyers, Surveys of Working Conditions Lawyers, https://lawyersforlawyers.org/en/survey-of-working-conditions-lawyers/

[61] American Bar Association, Center for Human Rights, Trial Observation Report: Kyrgyzstan vs. Gulzhan Pasanova, May 2020, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/reports/kyrgyzstan_vs_Gulzhan_Pasanova1/

[62] Leanne McKay, Toward-a-Rule-of-Law-Culture,  United States Institute of Peace, 2015, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Toward-a-Rule-of-Law-Culture_Practical-Guide_0.pdf

[63] Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic, On approval of the Concept of increasing the legal culture of the population of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2016–2020, http://minjust.gov.kg/en/content/755

[64] UNDP in Kyrgyz Republic, Towards a sustainable access to justice for legal empowerment in the Kyrgyz Republic, https://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/projects/towards-a-sustainable-access-to-justice-for-legal-empowerment-in0.html

[65] UNDP in Kyrgyz Republic, 4,000 People Received Legal Aid Within Six Days, December 2020, https://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2020/12/fla-decade.html

[66] Aljazeera, Kyrgyzstan cartoon takes aims at corruption, YouTube, December 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y6-2o4P4TSY. I was honored to be part of this initiative by helping to create and manage this project.

[67] OECD Report, p. 28.

Resolving the situation

This Retreating Rights publication has tried to set out the scale of the challenges facing Kyrgyzstan today. The people of Kyrgyzstan have seen the same movie several times now: rapid, chaotic political change leading to new leaders with big promises but who fall prey to the same vices as those they replaced, leading in turn to further dramatic change. The central question now remains whether President Japarov will follow the same script as his predecessors. However while certain issues have been amplified since the October 2020 upheaval, most of Kyrgyzstan’s challenges have been years in the making and at their heart lie three mutually reinforcing problems: corruption, hatred and impunity.

There are a lot of questions then for those who want to help Kyrgyzstan tackle these ‘three evils’.[1] Western Governments working with Kyrgyzstan have not ignored the country’s structural problems but they have perhaps been guilty of sometimes downplaying them. There has been a tendency to compare the country with the shocking human rights performance of its Central Asian neighbours rather than addressing Kyrgyzstan purely on its own merits, something that may have dulled some of the urgency of the response. Rather than panic though, it is time for a clear eyed assessment of the present situation, including examining the progress (or lack thereof) of previous approaches, in order to turn ‘deep concern’ into action.

As ever it is easier to diagnose a problem than to suggest a suitable remedy. However many of the authors in this contribution have tried to chart a possible way forward for international engagement in Kyrgyzstan. This conclusion seeks to marshal some of those ideas and add some additional ones. The challenges are both conceptual and practical, around what goals Western donors are seeking to achieve and what mechanisms they are trying to use to attain them.

Given the failings of the Kyrgyz state during the pandemic and the endemic levels of corruption that riddle the delivery of public services and all parts of public life that helped lead to the subsequent collapse and reformation of state authority in October, there is an urgent need to review projects that have been focused on capacity building in government ministries, state agencies and with the Supreme Council (Parliament). A significant proportion of international donor support, notably from the EU, has been channeled directly to the Government in the form of budget support.^[2] There are important capacity building and local ownership arguments in favour of budget support in the context of a relationship of trust between donors and government. However there are reasons to reconsider existing approaches given the enduring levels of graft within these institutions (even if donor funded work is subject to heavy scrutiny such projects can displace other funding that can be used for less helpful purposes), their lack of accountability to citizens of Kyrgyzstan and the variable outcomes of different schemes.[3] As Ernest Zhanaev notes there is a tendency for an overly technocratic approach to assessing the outcomes of joint projects, an expert involved in some of these processes described it as ‘box ticking’.[4] An open and frank review would have been welcome even if the October 2020 events had not taken place. As President Japarov is looking at ways to consolidate the power of the central state and the international community should only find new ways to do this in return for real change in how things work.

Beyond working directly with the Government of Kyrgyzstan there is a tendency for governmental and institutional donors to package up their support into large funding bids, with bureaucratic reporting mechanisms in English. This approach is not always as conducive as it could be for the capacity building of local civil society (both activists and organisations) or the ability to move swiftly and creatively to address emerging issues.^[5] This leads to many contracts being won by big international players, both consultancies and NGOs, with local organisations sometimes only able to benefit as junior partners.

When it comes to Kyrgyzstan’s civil society, as discussed in the introduction and many of the essays, it is increasingly clear that local NGOs are not only under legislative and political pressure but that the campaign of delimitation has sadly been successful in the eyes of a significant proportion of the public. Asel Doolotkeldieva concludes her essay by arguing that ‘it is important to understand that under the present conditions liberal NGOs and independent mass media are discredited in public eyes and enjoy a construed reputation of Western agents. Promoting these actors further will not help neither the liberal society nor the image of the international community. The focus on human rights, including the LGBT rights, has worsened considerably the Western image and consequently diminished the degree of influence of Western ideals and projects on local politics’.

So given that are legitimate concerns about the operation and outcomes of activities conducted at all levels there is a compelling case for an open, holistic and independent review of all donor spending by governments, multilateral institutions (including the development banks) and international foundations in Kyrgyzstan. This should be informed by a wide-ranging evidence gathering process involving a mix of independently run focus groups and public opinion polls to gauge broader public opinion (to help understand both what the public would like to see prioritised and what they understand about the current situation, including past donor efforts).[6] Not only should such a process ensure that it reaches beyond those who would normally engage in donor initiatives, but there is, as Sharshenova notes, a need to engage with those with different viewpoints (including institutional stakeholders and experts, those whose values may be different to existing liberal interlocutors, including moderate or constructive critics of donor actions).[7]

While any review process must be led by evidence on the ground the experts who have contributed to this collection have some important ideas to suggest. Both Sharshenova and Doolotkeldieva argue, in line with development best practice, strongly in favour of finding new ways to root democratic and governance practice in the local rather than international. Sharshenova argues that ‘democracy needs to come from within, and the EU will need to accommodate local forms and understandings of democracy’, while Doolotkeldieva writes that in order ‘to redress these negative images (of NGOs and liberal values) against the background of anti-Westernism prevalent in Kyrgyzstan, Western partners should work to promote other human rights images than of themselves’. The focus needs to be on shared principles rather than specific structures, so while using examples of Western institutions and practices can sometimes help illustrate ideas and inform operational understanding, the systems that evolve in Kyrgyzstan would benefit from being able to draw legitimacy from local values and history, as well as examples of good practice from other developing country contexts.

One of the major conceptual challenges is around what the international community should be prioritising. Given the level of cynicism amongst many in Kyrgyzstan towards liberally minded initiatives, some of the contributors here have argued in favour of a switch in priority towards projects focused on economic security and education rather than rights. There are a couple of dimensions to assess here. Firstly, many of the existing major donor projects in Kyrgyzstan have focused on building the economy and improving access to education, with limited to mixed results. However in this author’s opinion there could well be scope for a switch in focus to more directly tackling issues of economic inequality and providing grassroots support to family incomes of those most in need rather than an emphasis on entrepreneurship and business development at a higher level, if both poverty reduction and the need to tackle populist discontent are seen as a strategic priority for donors.

Secondly, it is worth noting the global context of development aid budgets dropping around the world, with major global cuts to the UK’s Foreign Aid budget and the withdrawal of Germany as a bilateral donor from Kyrgyzstan, on the grounds of reprioritisation and claims that poverty reduction efforts had already been a success.[8] So funding for a major new drive on more inclusive economic development may face significant resource hurdles, particularly once emergency COVID support schemes have been wound down.

Thirdly, it is important to examine a narrative that donors or ‘the West’ should have focused on economic development before civic freedoms and democracy (with a view that the latter would follow the former) in a global context. For example, since the 1990s enormous amounts of Western development aid has been spent in countries like Uganda and Rwanda with a successful focus on delivering local education initiatives, improving primary health care, access to water and micro-level economic development, yet both (and many others recipients) are still authoritarian regimes, with Uganda experiencing recent electoral repression as well as having a worse Transparency International Ranking for Corruption than Kyrgyzstan.[9] This is not to argue against the enormous value such development initiatives have in terms of improving people’s life chances but the evidence is certainly limited that this automatically provides a future spring board for political development and reform. So while in Kyrgyzstan the lack of progress on economic development, poverty reduction and equality have helped nationalist and reactionary groups cynically to compare and contrast funding for NGOs, that poverty is used as a distraction from the corruption and mismanagement that really lies behind that failure. This author would caution against taking an ‘either/or’ approach to ‘development’ or civil and political rights. This is not least because the two agendas can join effectively together to try to address issues of governance, transparency and accountability which lie at the heart of Kyrgyzstan’s problems.

This is not intended to be a counsel of despair, to throw away everything people have worked hard for and to give up. There are many past programmes that have made a positive difference to people’s lives and any new strategy from donors will need to find ways to engage with the state to help tackle certain development challenges; there will continue to be a role for international expertise and the ability to work at scale; and working with existing and emerging civil society groups will be a crucial part of the picture going forwards. In particular those civil society activists and human rights defenders who have weathered enormous pressures, made huge personal sacrifices to prevent abuse or to painstakingly achieve incremental change should not simply be cut loose to fend for themselves against the powerful forces they have angered over the years. But it is nevertheless time for reflection and while this collection does not pretend to have all the answers, it does attempt to suggest some of them.

So any major shifts in funding priorities should be informed by the findings of the type of review suggested above and be driven by local demand in order to build public credibility. Nevertheless, there are a number of important themes to be considered that flow from the analysis in this publication. Firstly, a rigorous focus on governance, transparency and accountability will be important to tackle the systemic problems of corruption, hate (often linked to nationalism, misogyny and homophobia) and impunity that this publication concentrated on. Secondly, a number of essay contributors here, and other experts interviewed as part of the research, strongly argue for a rethink of previous international engagement work with political parties and Parliament, given how recent events have further exposed the hollowness of such political vehicles. This is not to suggest a bar on engagement with the development of political ideas with civil society or to end inter-Parliamentary engagement as a form of diplomacy, but at least in the short-term capacity building efforts need to be rethought in recognition of the ephemeral nature of party allegiances and where the true sources of power lie in the current political system.

Work on domestic violence, women’s rights and LGBTQ rights remain hugely important areas for donors, not least given that there are few options for domestic funding for protecting these communities and the growing risks they face provide a clear need for efforts to monitoring threats and preventing possible violence. However it is abundantly clear that such work has been weaponised and deployed against the wider range of liberal minded initiatives and ‘the West’ in general. There are no easy answers about what might shift the tide of public opinion on these issues but donors can perhaps think more about how they can develop and promote narratives around their wider interventions that emphasise areas of shared interest with the wider Kyrgyz population. Building positive, unifying and engaging public narratives, rooted in local preferences, about the work that liberal civil society (including journalists, human rights defenders, NGO workers and lawyers) are doing are likely to be the most effective ways of gradually shifting public opinion. Fact-checking and myth-busting can be helpful to inform elite policy actors in their work but the wider research on their use shows that this approach can be of limited use in reaching out to many sceptics, particularly where the message carrier is not trusted and the sources of disinformation (often people they know) are more trusted. So a combative approach to challenging falsehood can often harden rather than soften resistance, accentuating polarisation and often act to amplifying negative messages to a wider audience as Gulzat Baialieva and Joldon Kutmanaliev note. There may however be less confrontational approaches that can find some areas of commonality, while respecting difference, that open up new conversations. There is scope to learn from the burgeoning global literature on psychology and messaging and then look to implement best practice in Kyrgyzstan.

Donors will be considering what role that could and should play in supporting new volunteer and social movements.[10] As Doolotkeldieva notes there is more that can be done to understand and map the dynamics and dimensions of these more fluid forms of civic mobilisation to identify where the real sources of authority and change are located. It will be important that conversations between these movements and the international community are shaped by the wishes of the activists, who may well have understandable wariness about engaging with the international donors (even when their assistance could be helpful) given the ways in which more traditional civil society has been demonised for its links to the ‘West’.

When looking at traditional donor support to civil society, as set out above there needs to be a process of reflection, recalibration and reform but there would seem to be two recommendations that might help move things forward, though they are somewhat in contradiction with each other. Local civil society groups would benefit from greater flexibility and speed of response from donors to help them adapt to the fast changing local environment and to enable them to be more closely driven by priorities arising from local need, rather than plugging in to strategies devised in donor home capitals. Such a flexible approach (including core funding) would likely rely, in this time of ever greater desire for scrutiny and accountability to donor taxpayers, on working with trusted partners with whom donors have an established working relationship and a confidence in their operational capacity. However this does not necessarily fit very well with the second clear recommendation which is to find ways to support fresh voices and new thinking, given the critique posed by Shirin Aitmatova and others that certain donor approaches and partnerships have gone stale over several decades. There would seem to be a misalignment between the local Kyrgyz demand for creativity, innovation and risk-taking and the Western donor taxpayer demand for accountability. There is a need to make the case that innovation and outcomes can be more important in showing value for money than what can be caricatured as box ticking exercises. Some Western aid sceptics may be willing to consider more creative approaches if packaged in the right way, particularly given that some of their often misplaced concerns can echo local complaints about ‘the usual suspects’ and ‘grant eating’. Decisions on any strategic changes should be based on evidence and the eventual approach would be likely to comprise a mix of greater flexibility for some trusted partners and involving a new generation of organisations, but it is important that this not be business as usual masquerading as something new if the credibility gap of donor aid is to be addressed.

As discussed above, any strategic rethink is coming at a hugely challenging time for the international donors, as demands rise in the wake of COVID and as budgets are often being cut. This context gives less room for maneuver than would be ideal and makes it more difficult to provide the stability and predictability of funding that can be so important. However, it is important that the international community takes a holistic view about the range of tools available to it.

Given that the EU has negotiated but not yet ratified its 2019 Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Kyrgyzstan and the UK is currently negotiating its new partnership arrangements there is surely scope to link progress on completing these deals (and in the case of the UK-Kyrgyzstan deal uprating it to match the EU’s current plans) in return for some concrete and measurable actions to reassure partners that there will be no further backsliding on human rights. Partners could continue to explore new ways to use trade and investment incentives, with human rights conditionality and anti-corruption safeguards that can be leveraged and tailored to incentivise reform and improved development outcomes. Conditionality against clear benchmarks will be important but needs to be coupled with increased incentives to have resonance in an environment where the ‘West’ is clearly behind Russia and China in terms of Kyrgyzstan’s strategic priorities. This could potentially include ways to examine debt forbearance (such as interest relief) and debt reductions and relief on the portion of Kyrgyzstan’s debt held by multilateral banks (around 44 per cent of total external debt, which at $1.7bn is a relatively small figure by global standards) and other Western partners.^[11] Such efforts could help to free up funding for services in the governance revenue budget and give the country the policy space to consider new capital investment projects (a comprehensive approach to existing debt relief could also be linked to find ways to improve transparency and accountability over new lending by China and other partners).

There is also a clear role the international community can play outside of Kyrgyzstan to address some of the systemic failings within it. This means being willing to use the personal sanctions (including asset freezes, banking system and visa bans) provided by the US, UK and EU Magnitsky powers, and anti-corruption mechanisms such as the UK’s Unexplained Wealth Orders.[12] The US have already deployed their Magnitsky sanctions in relation to Raimbek Matraimov on grounds of corruption.[13] Although the UK and EU schemes currently do not include corruption as a reason for applying such sanctions but other anti-corruption tools perhaps may be more appropriate in jurisdictions where assets identified in Kyrgyzstan’s corruption scandals are to be found.[14] Officials involved in the torture and imprisonment of Azimjan Askarov, should however be eligible for all three mechanisms, sending a strong signal against impunity, though potentially with a less direct impact on the lives of the alleged perpetrators. It should go without saying that the ways in which the Kyrgyz elites have used international real estate markets, company formation and other tools, provide more evidence of the need for wider anti-corruption reforms across the West, as addressed in other FPC publications and the wider literature.[15]

International social media companies can certainly play their part to help address the situation on the ground. They can look at ways to expand access to Kyrgyz language moderation and support to tackle online hate speech, particularly at times of political tension such as elections or constitutional referendums or around known flashpoints such as International Women’s Day. As Begaim Usenova and ARTICLE 19 argue the internal redress mechanisms of social media platforms still need further improvement and better sign posting, with a particular focus on tackling gender-based abuse. Further steps should be taken to expedite review mechanisms for those who are repeat victims, building on progress so far. Social media companies and donors can find ways to collaborate to help journalists and activists in Kyrgyzstan develop new methods of generating advertising revenue, crowdfunding and other monetisation techniques. Traditional donor funding can and should still assist with training on investigative reporting and on support for Kyrgyz language and local journalists, including how best to use social media and online dissemination channels. Given the rise in online abuse (to complement and amplify in-person threats) social media companies and donors (including donors linked to social media companies) need to do more to provide psychosocial support for victims of abuse and to facilitate the holistic documentation of such targeted abuse campaigns against journalists, human rights defenders, NGO workers and lawyers, with a particular focus on those in rural areas without established support networks.

There is much to say about what Western partners can do in relation to the situation, more than can be contained above or in this publication. However it is important not to ignore the political agency of the new Government of Kyrgyzstan. President Japarov’s background and his rise to power have raised a number of legitimate concerns about what may come next and so there is perfectly understandable scepticism about future prospects, not least given the trajectory of his many predecessors upon taking office. However, it is important to find appropriate ways to constructively engage with Japarov’s stated objectives and find the right mix of incentives and pressure to try and hold him to his pledges. International partners will need to make clear that further attempts to shrink the already reduced civic space or to target vulnerable groups and journalists who annoy him will lead to concerted and wide-ranging push back. Despite the many reservations noted in this publication about the approach being taken by Japarov to tackling corruption, his desire to be seen to be doing something by his supporters is clear. This could provide new opportunities to mutually identify illegitimately acquired assets stashed around the world, provided that such efforts are not solely targeted at his political opponents.

President Japarov has a long held beliefs about the importance of state consolidation and the centralisation of power in response to the chaos of previous years. It is clear that this political prospectus has some public appeal but it is at odds with a previous desire by donors and local civil society to see the distribution of power away from the ‘strong man as President’ (a key factor in the 2005 and 2010 revolutions) and towards to Supreme Council and local communities, with the intention of creating greater pluralism. In following these perfectly laudable objectives, the approach of the last ten years may have to some extent redistributed power, but it often did so in opaque and unaccountable ways, with a corrupted Parliament and players behind the scenes shaping decision-making (a key factor in the events of October 2020).

This author would argue that there is no single correct international model to follow and that there is not always a clear link between the form and function of government, between structures and accountability. This can perhaps be illustrated by two well-known, but far from perfect, democratic models. Though the US President is often still described as the most powerful person in the world, the country’s Presidential System is designed with such substantial congressional and judicial ‘checks and balances’ that the President often has a real challenge in passing much of his agenda. Furthermore, given the substantial power held at state level there are large areas of policy and practice where the federal government is only tangentially involved. Whereas the UK’s Westminster Parliament, claimed to be ‘the mother of Parliaments’, in fact consolidates more power in the hands of the executive and central government than almost any other in the democratic world.[16]

Despite the very low turnout, President Japarov’s victory and the approval of the change to a Presidential system by a wide margin will see him push ahead with his project of state consolidation and power centralisation, which he argues will enable Kyrgyzstan to deliver a more competent government and better outcomes for its public. This consolidation process clearly carries significant risks that it could quickly lead the country further down the road to full authoritarianism. However, given where things stand following the approval by referendum of the move to transfer powers from the Parliament to the President, there is a need to try and find new ways to help provide genuine transparency and accountability. Considering the referendum result and Japarov’s clearly stated objectives, it may be that arguments around retaining some ‘checks’, in the form of requirements to sometimes pause the breakneck speed with which he is making change and consult with the public (giving the opportunity for a populist like Japarov to learn what citizens think in real time and therefore potentially head off issues that may cause him problems) may have a greater chance of gaining some (if probably limited) traction than demands to retain ‘balances’ that give power (and opportunities for horse trading and corruption) to other political players that are or can be captured by powerful interests.[17]

One of the emerging issues will be what to do about the Kurultai. Given the history of the proposal and its backers and the abuse of similar schemes in Central Asia as a tool for presidential power to undermine or bypass parliamentary scrutiny it is absolutely clear why many activists have focused on trying to stop its inclusion in the new constitution. However the proposal, albeit in a watered down version, has made it into the revised February 2021 draft and, given the importance of some its backers to President Japarov’s electoral coalition, it seems likely that something called a Kurultai will be created whenever the constitution is finally voted on and, in all likelihood, adopted. So while efforts to remove this provision may well continue, it is important for civil society and the international community to consider what lessons they would like to seek to be applied from local community practices in Kyrgyzstan and from models of consultative bodies in developing countries around the world that could be more helpful than the current ideas being floated. If Western models can be of assistance to the discussion, then examples might include the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the mostly slow paced and bureaucratic EU consultative body of ‘social partners’ that acts as a generally harmless and sometimes helpful adjunct to the Union’s democratic structures, through to the ‘Citizens Assembly’ models used particularly effectively in Ireland but also in places like Canada and Demark.[18] There are certainly a wide range of different ideas out there for inclusive collective discussion and decision-making rather than leaving the body to be a self-appointed talking shop for older men or a rubber stamp for the whims of those in power, which it risks becoming without proactive engagement by those with better ideas.

Beyond the debate around the Kurultai, there will be a need to focus efforts on the other contentious issues that remain in the February draft constitution. Four particular areas stand out to this author. In the current draft, Article 8.4 would create a requirement that ‘political parties, trade unions and other public associations ensure the transparency of their financial and economic activities’ that may give constitutional weight to efforts to increase NGO regulation and bureaucratic pressure. The continued, though watered down, presence of a ‘moral and ethical’ values test in Article 10 4, which states that ‘in order to protect the younger generation, events that contradict moral and ethical values, the public consciousness of the people of the Kyrgyz Republic may be limited by law’ is a continuing concern. Efforts must be made to ensure that this is only applied to issues such as protecting young people from age inappropriate content, such as pornography, rather than providing a backdoor mechanism to supress discussion about women’s or LGBTQ rights issues that offend ‘traditional’ sensibilities. The experience of how the Russian Federal Law ‘for the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values’, has been used to repress their LTBTQ community is certainly a worrying precedent in that regard.[19]

As Sardorbek Abdukhalilov notes the proposed new constitution no longer has the requirement, set out in Article 38 of the existing constitution, that ‘everyone shall have the right to freely determine and state his/her ethnicity. No one may be forced to determine and state his/her ethnicity’.[20] While recently this requirement has been watered down to allow for the state to place an optional ethnicity section on passports and other forms of ID, there are fears that without such constitutional protection it may become mandatory to state their ethnicity on their ID, despite the provision of the newly proposed Article 1.5 that ‘The people of Kyrgyzstan are citizens of all ethnic groups of the Kyrgyz Republic’.[21] Abdukhalilov separately notes the importance of enforcing existing quotas for minority groups on electoral lists and recommends that similar measures should be brought in to improve diversity in government service and public bodies.

The draft Constitution, in Article 105, would also seem to further consolidate the power of the Prosecutor General’s office. It states that ‘supervision over the accurate and uniform execution of laws and other regulatory legal acts is carried out by the prosecutor’s office of the Kyrgyz Republic’.[22] Adilet have argued that this wording will ‘provide the prosecutors with the right to conduct inspections of citizens, commercial organisations, other economic entities, non-governmental, non-commercial organisations, institutions, enterprises, etc.’ and the power to control or replace other supervisory mechanisms.[23] This consolidation risks creating a tool that could be used even more efficiently to pressurise critics of the Government if effective safeguards are not put in place.

Jasmine Cameron suggests that the new Government of Kyrgyzstan should set out a fresh ‘road map on how to better protect the rights of the vulnerable and marginalised’. Such a plan could include the ‘National Action Plan for the safety of journalists’ with clear procedures and enforcement capacity that Begaim Usenova and ARTICLE 19 recommend. Such a new plan, replacing the Jeenbekov-era 2019-21 National Human Rights Action plan, could enable President Japarov to take personal ownership of such an agenda, and use it as a basis for efforts to reassure his sceptics and critics that he will not abuse the Presidential ‘bully pulpit’ to target them or encourage his supporters to do so. For any human rights road map or action plan to be more than another meaningless piece of paper to distract the international community, it should be authored and owned by the new Government but clearly linked to rights based conditionality around the signing of new partnership agreements, debt relief, new aid to the Government and further investment in infrastructure or economic development.

A number of authors in this collection try to help illuminate who President Japarov is and how he came to power. He has, or at least has been able to craft, a powerful personal story that resonates with a significant section of the public. As Aksana Ismailbekova puts it ‘to understand why people support Japarov, despite his violations of the rule of law, it is important to look at the security strategies of Uzbek businessmen. They have put their trust in someone who is a ‘controversial’ figure, but who also is perceived as having personally experienced the injustice of the law, and is able to show his strength against other strong ‘mafia’ networks. The boundaries of state, business, and criminal have been blurred in the context of Kyrgyzstan.’ So if the popular contention that most politicians in Kyrgyzstan are thieves is true (or at least partially true), it is understandably tempting for people to support the one who portrays himself as Robin Hood rather than someone who insists they are beyond reproach, despite evidence to the contrary.

President Japarov has also tapped into the same well of public concern about instability and a desire for strength or political courage (dukh) that so many populist figures use around the world. This dynamic is particularly relevant in the context of the recent chaos, corruption and lack of capacity in the Kyrgyz state. So it is absolutely understandable for observers, both inside and outside Kyrgyzstan to be concerned but in the absence of a significant deterioration in freedoms (or for those inside the country until new alternatives begin to emerge), there needs to be an attempt to find areas of Japarov’s agenda where common ground can be found, such as holding him to his rhetoric on tackling corruption, while organising and mobilising against emerging issues of concern.[24]

This publication shows that while on the surface the political landscape has changed dramatically since October 2020, in other important respects much has not changed and many of the same trends and forces are at work shaping the situation as they ever have been. The outlook may seem bleak but many of the dark clouds over Kyrgyzstan’s political system have been there for a long time. Kyrgyzstan’s people are resilient but its freedoms are fragile and action must be taken to prevent further backsliding. The Japarov Presidency should be a spur to review, revise and reinvigorate the international community’s engagement with Kyrgyzstan, focused on efforts to tackle corruption, hatred and impunity.

So this publication makes a number of potential recommendations for the international community and the Government of Kyrgyzstan.

Recommendations for the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, international institutions, Western partners and donors:

• Ensure a rigorous focus on issues of corruption, hatred and impunity;
• Undertake a systemic review of international donor funded projects in Kyrgyzstan including budget support, the use of consultancies and working with NGOs. It should look at both objectives and implementation, based on evidence and widespread engagement;
• Find ways to empower fresh thinking and new voices, while giving partners the space and resources to adapt to local priorities;
• Encourage the Japarov Government to develop a new and comprehensive National Human Rights Action Plan;
• Increase human rights and governance conditionality in order to unlock stalled EU and UK partnership agreements, debt relief, further government related aid and new investment;
• Deploy Magnitsky Sanctions and anti-corruption mechanisms more widely;
• Expand Kyrgyz language moderation by social media companies and strengthen reporting and redress mechanisms;
• Push for further amendments to the draft constitution to protect NGOs, trade unions, free speech and minority rights, and avoid increasing the Prosecutor General’s office’s power; and
• Explore new mechanisms for civic consultation learning from local practices in Kyrgyzstan, consultative bodies in other developing countries and the use of Citizens Assemblies.

Image by Dan Lundberg under (CC).

[1] Channelling the spirit of Dr Martin Luther King Jr. rather than Communist Party of China.

[2] Ana-Maria Anghelescu, Should Europe Worry About Kyrgyzstan?, The Diplomat, January 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/should-europe-worry-about-kyrgyzstan/; EEAS, Kyrgyz Republic and the EU, October 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kyrgyz-republic/1397/kyrgyz-republic-and-eu_en; European Commission, Kyrgyzstan, https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/where-we-work/kyrgyzstan_en#:~:text=EU%20bilateral%20development%20cooperation%20with,education%2C%20rural%20development%20and%20investments

[3] Eurasianet use the Askarov case to highlight the lack of progress made by donor backed rule of law programmes: Eurasianet, Kyrgyzstan: Will fury around Askarov death end up signifying nothing?, July 2020, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-will-fury-around-askarov-death-end-up-signifying-nothing

[4] In conversation with the author.

[5] This essay notes the English language reporting requirements: Ana-Maria Anghelescu, Should Europe Worry About Kyrgyzstan?, The Diplomat, January 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/should-europe-worry-about-kyrgyzstan/; As noted in the introduction the top partners for USAID funding are all either US development consultancies, large NGOs or other US agencies: USAID, U.S. Foreign Aid by Country: Kyrgyzstan, 2018, https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/KGZ?fiscal_year=2018&measure=Obligations

[6] Factoring in such exercises across the world, much of what can be gleaned will likely show how loosely rooted some (even strongly held) perceptions are in the details of current or past donor activity.

[7] As well as engaging with past and present users of donor funded services, there should be outreach to the wider public particularly in rural areas.

[8] Tatyana Kudryavtseva, Germany announces reduction in cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, 24.kg, May 2020, https://24.kg/english/152054_Germany_announces_reduction_in_cooperation_with_Kyrgyzstan/

[9] Transparency International, Transparency International Uganda, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/uganda

[10] COVID response to the druzhinniki who protected businesses from potential rioting to the Bashtan Bashta (start with your head) protest movement, which in recent months has organised creative campaigns against elements of the proposed constitution, to youth engagement in voluntary movements, to religious charity activities, to female solidarity groups, to business structures, and to migrant safety nets

[11] Dirk van der Kley, COVID and the new debt dynamics of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Eurasianet, October 2020, https://eurasianet.org/covid-and-the-new-debt-dynamics-of-kyrgyzstan-and-tajikistan

[12] Though Kyrgyzstan may not have the level of wealth that fuels large scale oligarchic expansion overseas seen in the cases of Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan but it does have some and particularly given the potential links to organised crime these potential pressure points should be on the radar of the international community.

[13] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Global Magnitsky Designations, September 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20201209

[14] Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Guidance: Global Human Rights Sanctions: Information Note for NGOs and Civil Society, Government.uk, July 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-human-rights-sanctions-information-note-for-non-government-organisations-and-others-interested-in-human-rights/global-human-rights-sanctions-information-note-for-ngos-and-civil-society; Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Policy Paper: Global Human Rights Sanctions: consideration of designations, Government.uk, July 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-human-rights-sanctions-factors-in-designating-people-involved-in-human-rights-violations/global-human-rights-sanctions-consideration-of-targets; Council of the EU, EU adopts a global human rights sanctions regime, December 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/07/eu-adopts-a-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime/

[15] For example: FPC, Finding Britain’s role in a changing world: Project the UK’s values abroad, December 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/projecting-the-uks-values-abroad/; Susan Coughtrie, Unsafe for Scrutiny: Examining the pressures faced by journalists uncovering financial crime and corruption around the world, FPC, November 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/unsafe-for-scrutiny/; FPC, Unsafe for Scrutiny: How the misuse of the UK’s financial and legal systems to facilitate corruption undermines the freedom and safety of investigative journalists around the world, December 2020, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/unsafe-for-scrutiny-12-2020-publication/

[16] Provided they are able to command a Parliamentary majority and the UK’s first-past-the-post electoral system has led to majority governments for almost all of the democratic era. Even in recent times where that has not been the case, such as the 2010-15 Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition and the 2017-19 Parliament, the Prime Minister and Cabinet still have enormous power and latitude to run the Government as they see fit on an operational basis without reference to Parliament.

[17] In the US system, where the term originates, the checks are provided by the balancing institutions.

[18] The Citizen’s Assembly, https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/

[19] Human Rights Watch, No Support: Russia’s “Gay Propaganda” Law Imperils LGBT Youth, December 2018, https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/12/11/no-support/russias-gay-propaganda-law-imperils-lgbt-youth

[20] Constitute, Kyrgyzstan’s Constitution of 2010, constituteproject.org, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Kyrgyz_Republic_2010.pdf

[21] Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic, From November 17, 2020, the draft Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On the appointment of a referendum (nationwide vote) on the draft Law of the Kyrgyz Republic” On the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic”, November 2020, http://www.kenesh.kg/ru/article/show/7324/na-obshtestvennoe-obsuzhdenie-s-17-noyabrya-2020-goda-vinositsya-proekt-zakona-kirgizskoy-respubliki-o-naznachenii-referenduma-vsenarodnogo-golosovaniya-po-proektu-zakona-kirgizskoy-respubliki-o-konstitutsii-kirgizskoy-respubliki (As revised in February 2021)

[22] Ibid.

[23] Adilet, Analysis of the draft Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, February 2021, https://adilet.kg/tpost/2i09a01nu1-analiz-proekta-konstitutsii-kirgizskoi-r

[24] Rather than it being used for selective prosecutions and backroom deals as it has in the past