Development and diplomacy are key to Global Britain’s success

Article by Theo Clarke MP

March 3, 2020

Development and diplomacy are key to Global Britain’s success

Britain has long played a vital role in supporting international peace, security and prosperity. This has been a conscious choice on the part of our country – a recognition of both the socio-economic and moral sense that underpins a global, outward-looking approach to engaging with our neighbours. At the beginning of a new decade, we face a foundational shift in our world order. Britain’s departure from the EU has necessitated a fundamental reappraisal of our international role, as understood through the prism of prosperity, security and diplomacy. As we stand at the cusp of this defining time in our history, we face a formidable challenge: to design a new foreign policy which reflects the rapidly changing demands of our era. I believe that the best way to address this challenge is to turn it into an opportunity for ourselves and our global partners. With a renewed mandate to define and deploy a forward-thinking foreign policy, we must recognise the central role that British aid should play as an engine for global development and prosperity.

UK aid helps the poorest and neediest in the world – those who often have nowhere else to turn. Over the years, British aid has helped make Mozambique landmine-free following decades of deadly war, saved 6.2 million people from dying of malaria globally and immunised 6.7 million children across the world against preventable diseases.[1] As these interventions demonstrate, when deployed effectively, British aid can help shape a better world, save lives and improve the lives of and expectations for millions across the globe. In doing so, Britain sends out a clear message about the values we hold dear, whilst fulfilling our moral duty as a nation to support our neighbours far and wide. For these reasons, aid must play a key role in developing our future foreign policy.

The UK’s aid budget helps to create a safer, healthier, more prosperous world, which directly benefits Britain. It is our international development efforts which enable British businesses to build new trading relations, create safety for British citizens at home and abroad, and empower our leaders and diplomats to collaborate on tackling global issues. With Africa’s GDP set to hit $3.2 trillion in the next five years, initiatives such as Africado are key to cultivating the wealth needed to build possible future trading markets for UK business.[2] Developed with the support of UK foreign aid, Africado is now Tanzania’s largest cultivator and exporter of avocados; Britain alone spends an average of $144 million on avocados every year. Sustaining over 2,000 jobs for farmers in the East African country, Africado is a perfect demonstration of how UK aid is lifting living standards and creating opportunities to meaningfully tackle poverty. As a trading nation, Britain benefits when we stimulate global prosperity and growth. This is not an untested hypothesis. Whilst South Korea is a high-income country today, providing foreign direct investment, jobs and trade for the UK, it was once a recipient of aid too. In 2018 alone, trade between the UK and South Korea totalled £14.6 billion, making it one of the UK’s most valuable partners in East Asia.[3]

Beyond trade, the UK’s work in promoting global health is also protecting citizens at home as well as abroad. When Ebola broke out in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and previously in Sierra Leone, the UK was one of the first responders. I have seen first-hand in West Africa how UK aid played a leading role in mitigating one of the largest and most devastating outbreaks the modern world has seen. By dedicating resources to tackle the disease and halt its transmission, the UK has not only saved lives in the DRC, but also prevented possible deaths across the rest of the world, safeguarding British citizens worldwide.

Notably, UK aid is also protecting citizens of the UK and the world from the harms of social and political instability. UK aid in Somalia is a pertinent example of this in action. Following a spate of terrorism and coastal piracy in the country, in 2012 the UK started contributing to state-building, policing and local peace arrangements in areas newly liberated from Al-Shabaab.[4] The UK approach was widely credited by experts, including the United Nations, and is now being followed by other international actors.[5] This shows the power of UK leadership in stabilising a part of the world long plagued by insecurity and long known to promote instability abroad.

Lastly, development aid is crucial to building and sustaining the UK as a ‘soft superpower’ – a quality which British diplomats across the world value highly and utilise to great effect. UK aid flies the flag for Britain around the world and sends a clear message about Britain’s values and role at the supranational level. This standing helps to cement the UK as a key figure on the global stage, sending a message of international solidarity, and building prestige and influence. It also helps build goodwill for the UK in communities around the world, who see the food, tents and other supplies that we distribute proudly marked with the Union Jack.

More directly, the UK’s success in delivering aid has also made Britain a global leader and authority on development. The Department for International Development (DFID) is widely regarded to be one of the most effective distributors of international aid in the world. In 2018, the Aid Transparency Index, produced by Publish What You Fund, rated the department as the world’s third-most effective aid agency, out of 45 agencies analysed, categorising it ‘very good’ for its transparency and effectiveness.[6] This expertise does not go unnoticed and helps maintain the UK’s standing as a key international player, helping Britain to leverage international debates, exert influence on international action and create relationships with growing powers.

So, as we begin to shape our new foreign policy, we must choose to be an open and cooperative partner. A new approach to foreign policy will ensure we can prosper, but it can only do so sustainably if we recognise Britain’s moral responsibility to lift standards of living and security in the process. Post-Brexit, as we chart a new course for our nation, it is through the significant contribution of UK aid – functioning alongside diplomacy, defence and trade – that we can preserve our reputation as a force for good. That is why, at this pivotal moment in our history, it is vital our leadership sets out a positive vision for UK aid as part of any comprehensive future foreign policy.

Theo Clarke was elected MP for Stafford in 2019 and currently sits on the International Development Select Committee in the UK Parliament. She is the founder of The Coalition for Global Prosperity and former Director of the Conservative Friends of International Development. She has led the Conservative Party’s social action project in Sierra Leone and has delivered education, enterprise and employability training in several African countries. She previously sat on the Board of Africa House London which promotes trade between the UK and emerging markets.

[1] Theo Clarke, Read Our Essay in Bright Blue’s Magazine on Britain as a force for good, Coalition for Global Prosperity, 2018, https://www.coalitionforglobalprosperity.com/blog/emergency-first-responder

[2] AgDevCo, Africado, Investment Information. https://www.agdevco.com/our-investments/by-investment/Africado; Theo Clarke, Theresa May is right to focus on post-Brexit trading opportunities in Africa, Coalition for Global Prosperity, 2018, https://www.coalitionforglobalprosperity.com/blog/theresa-may-post-brexit-trading-africa

[3] BBC News, UK and South Korea sign ‘continuity’ trade agreement, August 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-49430207

[4] ICAI, UK aid in a conflict-affected country: Reducing conflict and fragility in Somalia, June 2017, https://icai.independent.gov.uk/html-report/uk-aid-conflict-affected-country-reducing-conflict-fragility-somalia/

[5] Ibid.

[6] Publish What You Fund is an international campaign to build transparency in the aid sector. Publish What You Fund, The 2018 Aid Transparency Index, 2018, https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/the-index/2018/; Bond, DFID rated “very good”, FCO “poor”, in aid transparency index, June 2018, https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2018/06/dfid-rated-very-good-fco-poor-in-aid-transparency-index

Photo: Workers at Oxfam’s beehive production workshop in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia. Oxfam is helping to assist and train the local community in honey production, distribution and selling. Photo credit: Kieran Doherty/Oxfam.

Topics

Human Rights

International Development

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Europe

United Kingdom

Narrowing the gap – The case for DFID to focus more on tackling inequality

Article by Stephen Twigg

In January of this year, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kristalina Georgieva, issued a powerful message about the impact of inequality on development. She described it as ‘one of the most complex and vexing challenges in the global economy’ over the past decade and emphasised the policies needed to address inequality, including progressive taxation, gender budgeting and social spending in key areas including education and health.

We have now entered the Decade of Delivery for Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[1] Goal Ten (SDG10) seeks to ‘reduce inequality within and among countries’. The United Kingdom has been an important voice for international development, especially since the creation of the Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997. This heralded a period of growth in UK aid expenditure, culminating in legislation adopted in 2015 that legally commits the UK to spending 0.7 per cent of our national income on Official Development Assistance (ODA).

DFID has played a crucial role in tackling extreme poverty and hunger around the world. SDG1 aims to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030, building upon the progress made during the period of the Millennium Development Goals. The challenge now for governments and campaigners alike is to focus both on extreme poverty and on inequality. How might DFID go about doing this?

There is a strong argument that without tackling inequality, we will struggle to overcome poverty by 2030. The World Inequality Report 2018 showed that, between 1980 and 2016, the poorest 50 per cent of people only received 12 cents in every dollar of global income growth. By contrast, the richest one per cent received 27 cents of every dollar.[2]

The first target in SDG10 (Reduced Inequalities) is to ‘by 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average’. There is a longstanding debate about how to measure inequality most effectively in light of the evidence about patterns of income distribution in different societies.

Chilean economist José Gabriel Palma found that the ‘middle 50 per cent’ (those with a household income between the fifth and ninth deciles) have a proportion of national income that is relatively stable and close to 50 per cent, whereas the division between the top ten per cent and the bottom 40 per cent varies considerably.[3] Therefore, to put it simply, Palma’s argument is that the level of inequality is determined by the distribution of what we might call the ‘other 50 per cent’ of income – how much goes to the top ten per cent and how much goes to the bottom 40 per cent?

In 2013, the Centre for Global Development (CGD) outlined a possible new measure of inequality: the Palma ratio between the top ten per cent and the bottom 40 per cent. Oxfam has proposed that the UK and other nations should set clear, targeted plans to reduce the gap between the rich and poor as expressed in the Palma ratio using what they term the ‘Palma Premium’ – the extent to which the incomes of the poorest 40 per cent are growing faster than the richest ten per cent.[4]

I recommend that DFID does some further work on how the Palma Premium concept could assist the UK’s efforts to promote the SDGs and how best to combine it with the important continued focus on eliminating extreme poverty. I recognise that there are serious challenges here, including the availability of reliable data, but the potential prize is a big one if we are going to make a reality of the slogan ‘Leave No One Behind’ that is attached to the SDGs.

There is a compelling argument to enshrine this in UK law, which would strengthen our existing legislation on international development. Under the 2002 International Development Act, DFID spending must be ‘likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty’. It would be a straightforward change to add ‘and inequality’ to the legislation and to be explicit that this would apply to all Official Development Assistance by the UK – whether delivered by DFID or other government departments.

Legislation alone, however, is not sufficient. There is a strong case for a focus by DFID on SDG10 in the forthcoming Comprehensive Spending Review and for it to feature prominently in the UK’s next Voluntary National Review to the United Nations. I hope my successor as Chair of the International Development Committee might pursue this.

The focus of this chapter is what DFID can do to address inequality. It is worth making the point, however, that the UK has its own domestic challenges on inequality and we can learn some lessons from other European countries with lower Palma ratios, including Sweden and the Netherlands. As the UK Government’s own Voluntary National Review said in 2019, ‘The Palma ratio has … fallen slightly over this period. Despite this, the UK has the sixth highest level of income inequality in the OECD’.

Of course, agreeing a DFID inequality indicator is just one step forward – albeit an important one. Alongside such an indicator it is crucial that we take an evidence-based approach to the policies that could contribute to a more equal distribution of income. Investment in health, education and social security systems is a critical element here. Properly resourced public services are essential to the achievement of SDG10, and I urge DFID and other donors to continue to give high priority to working with the least developed countries towards universal health coverage, high quality education and social protection systems.

However, money alone will not be enough. Take education. There is a big set of issues around the quality of education and the importance of having reliable data on which to assess progress. I know from my previous experience as Minister for Schools that inequality is a major challenge with significant differences both between schools and within schools. This affects many sections of society but can be especially significant for disabled children and children with Special Education Needs.

SDG10’s second target is to ‘by 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status’. Disability-inclusive development is vitally important if we are to address exclusion and tackle inequality.

DFID has done some excellent work on the education of women and girls, which reminds us that we will not seriously overcome inequality until we empower women and girls. So far, I have focused on Global Goals 1 and 10 – tackling extreme poverty and inequality. Let me turn now to SDG5: to ‘achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls’. This goal is both of paramount intrinsic importance and is vital to the other goals. We cannot achieve sustainable development without a fundamental change in the lives of women and girls.

Earlier I referred to the recent remarks of the IMF’s Kristalina Georgieva and her emphasis on gender budgeting. Women’s economic empowerment is essential to lasting development and greater social and economic equality. Gender budgeting is where fiscal policy is used proactively in support of gender equality. DFID has funded the IMF’s review of tax and public expenditure policies against how they promote gender equality. There is considerable scope to learn from and build upon this work.

Legislation in this area was strengthened by Conservative MP Bill Cash in his excellent 2014 International Development (Gender Equality) Act, which was passed with strong cross-party support.[5] Six years on from this, I urge DFID to review the impact of the Act on DFID’s work, on ODA-eligible programmes run by other government departments and in multilaterals. The UK has shown real leadership in this area but as the recent Independent Commission for Aid Impact review into the UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative shows, it is critical that leadership is sustained if lasting change is to be achieved.[6] The Prime Minister’s strong personal commitment to girls’ education is an encouraging example of such leadership.

I have sought to emphasise two priorities for DFID: the importance of a clear indicator on economic inequality and the centrality of gender to development. Important policy considerations follow from these two priorities including:

the importance of policies being shaped by communities at the sharp end of inequality. This means strengthening the voices of the Global South in international institutions and ensuring that the most marginalised are heard, including refugees and the internally displaced;
the availability of good, secure jobs and workplace rights. Trades unions and businesses are essential partners in achieving sustainable development;
economic development strategies that explore alternative business models, including a greater role for co-operatives and other forms of social enterprise;
progressive taxation, which requires countries to be able to mobilise domestic resources and for wealthy individuals and profitable companies to pay their fair share; and
remittances, which play a vital role in development, together with a much greater focus on reducing associated transaction costs.

The challenge now is to build a strong alliance of commitment to tackling the scourge of inequality. DFID is crucial here, but the challenge is for the Government as a whole. If the Prime Minister takes the lead on a sustained effort by the UK to deliver on SDG10, he would attract cross-party support and mobilise civil society here and internationally. It would, surely, be a powerful signal of the UK taking seriously our role in a changing world.

Stephen Twigg served as the Labour and Co-operative Member of Parliament for Liverpool, West Derby from 2010 until 2019. He was the Chair of the UK House of Commons International Development Select Committee from June 2015 until standing down from Parliament in 2019. Between 2005 and 2010 he served as Director of the Foreign Policy Centre. He also worked for the Holocaust Centre and the Aegis Trust. He previously served as Member of Parliament for Enfield Southgate from 1997–2005. His ministerial and shadow ministerial roles have included Deputy Leader of the House of Commons, Education Minister, Shadow Education Secretary, Shadow Foreign Minister and Shadow Justice Minister.

[1] UN Sustainable Development Goals, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs

[2] Facundo Alvaredo, et al, The World Inequality Report 2018, World Inequality Lab, December 2017, https://wir2018.wid.world/

[3] The idea was first raised in the journal Development and Change: José Gabriel Palma, Homogeneous Middles vs. Heterogeneous Tails, and the End of the ‘Inverted‐U’: It’s All About the Share of the Rich, Development and Change, 87–153, April 2011, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2011.01694.x. For more recent analysis of the ratio see: IBEI, José Gabriel Palma re-examines the ‘Palma Ratio’ at the IBEI, October 2016, https://www.ibei.org/en/jose-gabriel-palma-re-examines-the-palma-ratio-at-the-ibei_46738

[4] See for example: Chiara Mariotti and Claire Spoors, Fighting Inequality to Beat Poverty: The role of UK international development, Oxfam GB, June 2019, https://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/fighting-inequality-to-beat-poverty-the-role-of-uk-international-development-620763

[5] UK Government, International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/9/contents/enacted

[6] Independent Commission for Aid Impact, The UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative, January 2020, https://icai.independent.gov.uk/report/psvi/

Photo: A woman tea plantation worker shows the breakdown of wages on her pay slip. The slip is impossible to understand for a majority of the workers; they do not know what comprises their salary or what is it that they actually get. Photo credit: Roanna Rahman/Oxfam.

Topics

Human Rights

International Development

Regions

Europe

United Kingdom

A feminist foreign policy: What would it mean for the UK?

Article by Marissa Conway

Fresh on the heels of Brexit, the landscape of British foreign policy is infused with uncertainty. We are entering a new chapter of British politics and culture, and in the face of overwhelming change and unfamiliarity, the pull to revert to the known is strong. Unfortunately for the United Kingdom, our ‘known’ includes a violent history of colonisation and domination through foreign policy. Politicians like Prime Minister Boris Johnson have cited the opportunity for a ‘Global Britain’ now that we are outside of the European Union.[1] This ‘Global Britain’, so it goes, gives the UK the chance to restore ourselves to our historical place at the top of the global hierarchy. But what goes unsaid in these sound bites is that this position of power came and continues to come at the expense of the quality of life and the actual lives of those both at home and abroad who do not fit a patriarchal mould of the status quo; in other words, for those who were not English-born white men. For example, the Windrush scandal cast a harsh spotlight on the way in which formerly colonised people of colour who are legally entitled to reside in the UK were forced to leave or were detained. Many also lost their jobs and homes or were refused healthcare and social assistance they legally should have been able to access.[2]

Brexit, with all its upheavals, does present a chance to hit reset and break such a historical pattern of trauma and violence both abroad and at home. We now have an opportunity to re-envision foreign policy in a way we have never conceived of it before, and it is going to take more than reappointing positions when politicians fall short. Now that we are outside of the political structures of the EU, how will we craft our legacy? I believe the UK can be a leader in building peace through its foreign policy not by means of claiming power over others, but by adopting a strong ethical framework to guide its decision-making in order to set a new international standard for placing human rights at the centre of policy. And there is no better way to do so than by adopting a feminist foreign policy.

What is a feminist foreign policy?

A feminist foreign policy (FFP) is a relatively new political framework, first introduced and adopted by Sweden in 2014.[3] Theirs focuses on three Rs: Rights, Representation, and Resources for women and girls. Though initially a state-generated approach to foreign policy, civil society has since taken the idea and run with it, working to fill out its theoretical foundation and offering a more radical interpretation of what FFP can mean for any given country.[4] The general consensus is that FFP is most concerned with the human impact of foreign policy and actively works to create policies that are helpful and not hurtful. It does this by building out political systems which are oriented towards achieving equality, justice and solidarity and rejects patriarchal values like racism, capitalism and imperialism. The ‘feminist’ part of FFP calls in intersectional, decolonial and anti-racist principles to this work, which are built on an extensive history of activism and campaigning for women’s rights. Setting feminist values as the filter through which decisions are made means that FFP centres the needs of vulnerable people (who are often the most impacted by foreign policy) as the most important aspect of all policymaking processes. For example, under an FFP framework, immigration policymakers would work directly with asylum seekers to create the most supportive systems for those in need of a new home.

It is important to note that though FFP originated in Sweden as a means to fortify women’s rights, it has already evolved to be understood as a framework that works for everyone. It is primarily concerned with the rights and needs of people who are marginalised for a wide variety of reasons beyond their gender identity. This includes race, class and ability, to name a few. In order to do this, FFP investigates power dynamics and seeks to address how foreign policy fashions power as hierarchical between both people and states. This hierarchy is sustained by patriarchal values and functions best when an elite few sit alone at the top. Between people, this commonly looks like Eton- and Oxbridge-educated white men making decisions that impact the rest of the population, even though these men are unlikely to ever experience the impacts of their decisions themselves. Between states, it looks like Permanent Members (P5) of the Security Council, who are also nuclear weapon-possessing nations, holding the ultimate veto power over anything they might not like.

This is not to say that it is written in the stars that all P5 states are doomed to cause violence to others, or that all Oxbridge-educated white men can only ever be bad policymakers. Rather, it means recognising we all participate in a system in which power is skewed dramatically in a specific direction and taking the responsibility to address this in a meaningful way. All of us most likely occupy some position of power, and so have a duty to constantly reflect on how we can better wield it to help, not harm, our world. Through an FFP framework, the questioning of these power imbalances becomes institutionalised in policy practices, and by focusing on fulfilling the needs of the most vulnerable first we begin to flip this hierarchy on its head and make equality a reality.

A UK feminist foreign policy

Foreign policy has the potential to be a mechanism by which we create a world free from violence. Britain sits as a Permanent Member on the Security Council and is a nuclear weapon-possessing nation, and so operates its foreign policy from a place of considerable influence.[5] Wielding this power wisely means ensuring that those who historically have been othered, ignored or exploited are meaningfully included in policymaking. We are seeing interest and steps in the right direction by the UK Government through its National Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security, and its Preventing Sexualised Violence Initiative, for example. Though it is arguable that both of these are struggling to be meaningful and sustainable as political attention frequently wanders, it is clear that there is already momentum within the Government to make the principles behind FFP more prominent in policy work. In fact, the Labour Party and Women’s Equality Party have also both expressed interest in FFP.[6] While promising, it is important that any work in this field seeks systemic change, rather than just addressing the symptoms of inequality. Ultimately, FFP means that the thoughts and opinions of an elite few who will not experience the consequences of their own decisions should never be the driver behind decisions around issues like economic sanctions, arms sales or immigrant detention time.

FFP is more than throwing a few women or people of colour into political leadership and calling it a day. It is oriented towards a complete systemic overhaul of politics as we know it. It is not necessarily easy work and requires introspection and self-reflection about the way in which UK foreign policy is paradoxical as, for example, it funds peacekeeping initiatives to resolve conflict while selling arms which fuel that very conflict in the first place. Colonial legacies in particular are held front and centre under the microscope of FFP as something that has been deeply harmful on a large scale and is in need of reparations.

So what can we do today to set the UK on a path towards a more sustainably peaceful world? The first step to thinking about UK policy under an FFP framework involves a feminist analysis of power and asking for any given issue area, ‘Who has power?’ ‘Who does not?’ ‘Why do these dynamics exist?’ This analytical exercise begins to peel back the surface layers of political agendas and exposes vulnerability, sites of exploitation and patriarchal patterns. Once this information is gathered, the second step involves reimagining the goal of all current policy as achieving solidarity, justice and equality. How would trade policy change if it was less concerned with capital and more concerned with protecting exploited workers’ rights? How do ideas about security and the arms trade change if we seek to stand in true solidarity with victims of conflict?

Though originating from decades of feminist activism and academia, FFP as a state-implemented political framework is still remarkably new and many of the questions framed in this article have yet to be addressed. However, today’s feminists are continuing to push the envelope. Both globally and in the UK, we are on the cusp of a new wave of foreign policy thinking and action, and what this means for any given context requires a great deal more research and discussion. What is clear is that an FFP framework would dramatically change the landscape of UK politics for the better and make sustainable peace a real possibility.

Marissa Conway is the Co-Founder of the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy and a current doctoral candidate earning her PhD in Politics at the University of Bristol. She is on the Forbes 30 Under 30 list. Follow her on Twitter: @marissakconway

[1] BBC News, Boris Johnson: First speech as PM in full, July 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-49102495

[2] Steve Valdez-Symonds, Seventy Years After Windrush, Amnesty International UK, April 2018, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/blogs/yes-minister-it-human-rights-issue/seventy-years-after-windrush?gclid=Cj0KCQiAs67yBRC7ARIsAF49CdUMs1ralFtMQkPJ7WWFFQvXVI-udPY0ZDqJxwDQ39ntpKvCy_M9cgkaAtz3EALw_wcB

[3] Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Feminist Foreign Policy, Government Offices of Sweden, https://www.government.se/government-policy/feminist-foreign-policy/

[4] For a complete list of current writing and research on feminist foreign policy, see the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy’s Feminist Foreign Policy Reading List: https://centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/feminist-foreign-policy

[5] United Nations Security Council Members, United Nations, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/security-council-members; Nuclear Threat Initiative: United Kingdom, (updated October 2016), https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/united-kingdom/

[6] Preet Gill MP, Preet Gill: Labour’s feminist foreign policy would take on gender-based violence in all its forms, The House, Politics Home, January 2019, https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/foreign-affairs/house/house-magazine/101069/preet-gill-labours-feminist-foreign-policy-would; Women’s Equality Party UK, Twitter post, September 2018, https://twitter.com/WEP_UK/status/1038727838415953920

Photo: Women’s March participants in Liverpool in January 2017. Photo credit: Samwalton9.

Topics

Brexit

Civil Society

Conflict Resolution and Security

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Human Rights

Regions

Europe

United Kingdom

Putting well-being and the interests of future generations at the heart of foreign policy

Article by Sophie Howe

Our world is uncertain. Our political system is uncertain. Our people are uncertain. Whether we look at Brexit, tensions between the Middle East and the United States, technological advancements, climate change or any other potentially detrimental international area of concern, we see an unpredictable future. Our current system is failing us and we need change.

The answer lies in values. A values-based foreign policy would allow for an international landscape of cooperation and action rather than countries constantly grappling for pole position in global markets and arguing over natural resources. If every individual nation was globally responsible, the world would look after itself. If each country took responsibility for its consumption and emissions, for its greed and exploitative international trade relationships, for the narrow-mindedness of politicians and governments so intent on being popular they lose sight of their own ideals, goals and capabilities for real progressive change, we could create a future of certainty and hope. As leaders in today’s world, we need to understand how placing well-being and protecting the interests of future generations at the heart of foreign policy can provide a platform for progressive change and allow us to create a future we look forward to being a part of – a future we are proud to say we helped to shape.

People’s attitudes are changing. Whilst in some areas the changes could be seen as regressive, in many others we are seeing more progressive ideologies and expectations, often driven by younger generations who are less prejudiced, more concerned about the planet and more focused on having a life well-lived than a bank account well-fed.^[1] This push for change in the UK creates a platform for the younger generation to be heard. Wales itself has created a youth parliament and recently passed a Senedd Elections Bill reducing the voting age in these elections to include 16- and 17-year-olds.^[2] We are seeing a suite of these new laws accommodating the voices and views of the next generation and it is vital that we listen to these voices if we are to safeguard their futures against our past mistakes.

As future generations begin to be included in the process of shaping their own societies, the people with the power must show that their inclusion is not a token gesture but a genuine step towards protecting them from the damage that is being done. We as leaders cannot fall victim to what Matthew Syed terms ‘cognitive dissonance’: ‘when mistakes are too threatening to admit to, so they are reframed or ignored…the internal fear of failure: how we struggle to admit mistakes to ourselves’.^[3] Future generations have a right to meet their needs and we must overcome our fear of failure to allow their success. Whether we look at obesity, climate change, poverty or any other major threat the human race faces, we need political infrastructure that is conducive to action. As leaders, we cannot afford not to try.

It would be unfair, both to our peers and to our descendants, to give in to ignorance and scorn the clear demand from the new generation of British people for more action on many globally consequential problems. Extinction Rebellion membership hit 100,000 in 2019 and the UK Government declared a climate emergency after huge public pressure to officially recognise the issue.^[4] There has been increasing public outcry at the marginalisation of certain groups in society, with one in 50 UK households being forced to resort to food banks in 2018–19 as over three million food parcels were given out.^[5] We have also seen a rise in the number of social businesses as the economy slowly starts to merge with notions of social value. Consumers are becoming increasingly morally conscientious and are channelling their money into worthwhile causes and businesses that take into account the consequences of their actions, with social enterprises contributing £60bn to the UK economy and employing two million people.^[6]

This push towards more sustainable action in all walks of public life means that policymakers and governments are being pressured to push these issues to the top of their agenda.

Wales is a leader in this area. To tackle the age-old problem of short-term decision-making, the National Assembly for Wales drafted a groundbreaking piece of legislation centring well-being and future generations in the minds of every sector in Wales: The Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 (WFGA).^[7] This act requires each of the 44 main public bodies in Wales (health boards, local authorities, fire and rescue services, national bodies like Sport Wales and Natural Resources Wales and, significantly, the Welsh Government itself) to take decisions ‘in a way which meets today’s needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. It sets out seven national well-being goals that as a nation we are aspiring to, and five ways of working that public bodies must demonstrate in how they operate: longer-term, prevention, collaboration, integration and involvement.

As the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, I monitor and advise public bodies on their compliance with the Act and strive to push everyone in Wales to live and act more sustainably. Although I describe this work as an expedition rather than a journey, the Act is beginning to drive change. Just recently, Transport for Wales released a Sustainable Development Plan ‘closely aligned with the Well-Being of Future Generations (Wales) 2015 Act’, and their recent procurement of a £5 billion rail franchise for Wales, supported by my Office, required companies bidding for the franchise to demonstrate how they would not just deliver a faster, cleaner, greener rail service in Wales, but how they would contribute to each one of our well-being goals.^[8] Many initiatives have been undertaken as a result these actions: for example, employing Customer and Community Ambassadors to encourage a greater sense of community; addressing socio-economic disadvantage with cheaper fares for more deprived areas; supporting social enterprises in running their operations on a local level; or providing bicycle storage and well-lit walking routes to stations to encourage physically active travel.

Following in Wales’ footsteps is crucial if Britain is to deviate from its prevailing and potentially catastrophic course. Do we really want to be responsible for a future of economic decline, irreversible environmental damage and nation-wide societal divisions? We cannot go down in history as the generation who stood by and let the world spiral. We must be remembered as dutiful ancestors who stood up and changed the course of history for the better.

The most important way of achieving this is changing mindsets and creating a paradigm shift. The outdated economic model of exponential growth and trading one form of capital for another, certainly at the cost of the planet and often at the cost of its people, must be challenged – something which is recognised in the Welsh legislation and other leading countries such as New Zealand and Finland in making their shift to well-being economics. As Chair of the Network of Institutions for Future Generations, I work with several international organisations in calling for countries to legislate on behalf of future generations. An example of this work can be seen in the United Arab Emirates’ Well-being Strategy 2030, a product of several meetings between myself and the UAE administration, which reflects the principles of our WFGA. I have also worked closely with colleagues in other countries, such as Norway, New Zealand, South Korea, Australia and Canada, along with much high-level institutional collaboration with the United Nations and the OECD to promote sustainable development and well-being.

Despite this promising international cooperation and discussion, there is still a huge tanker full of vested interests to turn if this approach is to become mainstream. The public will have to up the ante and move beyond Veganuary or donating to food banks and really start to demand a fundamental change to the economic status quo if politicians are to change the policymaking habits of a lifetime.

In Wales, our legally binding duties represent both a response to public demand and a bravery of political leadership, which I think shows more than just green shoots of optimism. This approach represents the beginnings of a potentially revolutionary political shift and should also apply to Britain more generally. This may actually be the one thing British party leaders can agree on, given that in the build-up to the December 2019 election each of the major party leaders signed the Future Generations Pledge in support of Lord Bird’s Future Generations Bill.^[9] Looking to emulate Wales’s example, should the Bill be passed, there would be a Future Generations Commissioner for the UK working to bring about progressive and sustainable change in Westminster and British politics.

This Future Generations Pledge is a positive first step; however, more needs to be done. We are not expecting immediate overnight results, but we need to continue in the right direction and establish the infrastructure necessary to create the real change we are championing here. This is the point of a values-based approach. We want to induce action and long-term planning that can give future leaders and their societies the capabilities to deal with their problems and their past, which is our present.

Wales provides a shining example of a country attempting to change the attitude of its policymakers through its WFGA. As Britain attempts to find its role in an ever-changing and uncertain world, it must look at this example and follow in Wales’ footsteps by placing values and the needs of future generations at the top of its agenda.

Sophie Howe is the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales. The world’s only Future Generations Commissioner, her role is to provide advice to the Government and other public bodies in Wales on delivering social, economic, environmental and cultural well-being for current and future generations and assessing and reporting on how they are delivering. Since taking up the role in 2016, she has represented Wales at the UN, the OECD and on a number of international forums, including chairing the Network of Institutions for Future Generations. Prior to this role Sophie was the first Deputy Police and Crime Commissioner for South Wales. She has also served as an Adviser to two Welsh First Ministers providing policy and political advice on communities, local government, equality and community safety, where she led the development of Wales’ first legislation to tackle violence against women and girls. Sophie was an elected Councillor for nine years and she wrote the 2009 report of the Councillors Commission, which led to legislative reforms on increasing diversity amongst elected members. She has a background in equality and diversity, having managed the legal department of the Equal Opportunities Commission. Sophie is named in the top 100 Business Women in Wales. She is a fellow at Cardiff University Business School and Swansea University, holds an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Wales Trinity Saint David, and has a degree in law and politics.

^[1] Eating Better, Climate change top concern for British teenagers, November 2019, https://www.eating-better.org/blog/climate-change-top-concern-for-british-teenagers; Matthew Jenkin, Millennials want to work for employers committed to values and ethics, The Guardian, November 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/may/05/millennials-employment-employers-values-ethics-jobs

^[2] Welsh Youth Parliament, https://www.youthparliament.wales; National Assembly for Wales, Senedd and Elections (Wales) Act 2020, http://www.senedd.assembly.wales/mgIssueHistoryHome.aspx?IId=23754

^[3] Syed, M., Black box thinking: The surprising truth about success, London: Hachette UK, September 2015, https://www.hachette.com.au/matthew-syed/black-box-thinking-the-surprising-truth-about-success

^[4] BBC News, Extinction Rebellion ‘stemmed from failed bus lane protest’, September 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-49513802; BBC News, UK Parliament declares climate change emergency, May 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48126677

^[5] Patrick Butler, Welfare changes drive rising poverty and food bank use, study finds, The Guardian, November 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/nov/05/welfare-changes-key-factor-rising-poverty-food-bank-use-study-finds

^[6] Barclays Business Banking, Start with purpose: Putting social purpose at the heart of your new venture, https://www.barclays.co.uk/business-banking/business-insight/start-up-with-purpose/

^[7] Future Generations: Commissioner for Wales, Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, https://futuregenerations.wales/about-us/future-generations-act/

^[8] Transport for Wales, Sustainable Development Plan, https://tfwrail.wales/sustainable-development-plan

^[9] John Bird, John Bird: Let’s rewrite the future with a Future Generations Bill, The Big Issue, October 2019, https://www.bigissue.com/latest/john-bird-lets-rewrite-the-future-with-a-future-generations-bill/

Photo: A participant at the UK Youth Parliament in November 2015. Photo credit: Roger Harris.

Topics

Energy, Environment and Resources

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Human Rights

Regions

Europe

United Kingdom

Finding Britain’s role in a changing world: Conclusions and Recommendations

Article by Adam Hug, Dr Abigael Baldoumas, Katy Chakrabortty and Dr Danny Sriskandarajah

The extent to which the United Kingdom is to be taken seriously on the world stage post-Brexit will depend significantly on whether it has the confidence to stand up for what it says it believes in, or risk its focus on trade being seen as a sign of weakness and inexorable decline. There is a widely shared fear, particularly in the short to medium term as the UK completes its conscious uncoupling from the European Union, that commercial considerations will overwhelm other priorities. If the UK is seen to ignore its stated values and wider strategic interests in pursuit of new trade deals, the Brexit process will have diminished the UK’s standing in the world rather than marking the start of a new and more vibrant chapter. The UK must aspire to be more than simply a cold, wet Dubai.

A whole-government approach to the UK’s foreign policy is to be welcomed. However, it is important to ensure that the UK’s values do not get lost amid inter-departmental wrangling; they must instead be mainstreamed to all those involved in policy-making and delivery. A joined-up government should not come at the expense of the world’s poorest people or those facing human rights abuses and conflict.

The UK has an opportunity to articulate a powerful vision for ‘Global Britain’ that is defined by commitments to human rights, inclusive representation at home and abroad, and by the ways it uses resources to have the greatest impact on poverty and inequality. The current Foreign Secretary has said that the ‘guiding lights’ for the current integrated policy review ‘will be free trade, democracy, human rights and the international rule of law’.[1] Different stakeholders and political actors will have different views about what should be contained in such a statement of values, but whatever the government decides, a clear, concise declaration that enumerates the key principles would be very helpful. Authors in this collection have set out potential principles for such a declaration including ensuring policy alignment with the Sustainable Developments Goals (SDGs); ensuring wider representation of women, young people and marginalised communities (both from the UK and our partners in the Global South) in the policy development process; and ensuring that policies uphold longstanding goals around support for democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Baroness Anelay has written about the need to incorporate the ‘Ruggie Principles’ on business and human rights into the UK trade agenda.[2] Stephen Twigg has spoken in detail about the need for a clear set of indicators on economic inequality and the centrality of gender to development to assess policy impact. Marissa Conway makes the case that a feminist foreign policy would provide a strong ethical framework to guide decisions and set a new international standard. The Government’s Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review should help define and refine these principles into a clear and codified statement of the values of ‘Global Britain’ that would give an unambiguous signal to the international community and to stakeholders across the Government.

Building on such a statement of values, the Government should consider enhancing existing consultation practices by setting a ‘Global Britain’ values test for all major policy and spending decisions with an international dimension, including trade deals. This would set out the Government’s impact assessment of how each decision will affect the goals enumerated in the ‘Global Britain’ values statement and examine its implications for the needs of future generations and the most vulnerable people in the world. The results of this assessment should then be published ahead of decisions being taken to encourage feedback, input and scrutiny from Parliament, key stakeholders and the wider public.

Keeping in mind the ideals of good governance, transparency and accountability that the UK looks to promote abroad, the Government should think carefully about how it develops new decision-making processes. It should rethink its current approach that limits parliamentary accountability and public scrutiny over trade deals. Given past critiques of decision-making in the EU when the UK was a member, new processes in Westminster should not be less publicly accountable than the processes for scrutiny by the European Parliament, Member States and public that it has just left. As proposed by Ruth Bergan and Dr Emily Jones, the government should publish its draft negotiating mandates (with headline information about priorities); the International Trade Select Committee or a new Trade Scrutiny Committee needs to be involved in regular dialogue with ministers and officials with scope for proper scrutiny on the progress of ongoing negotiations; and the agreed trade deals should be subject to a proper debate and approval vote in Parliament.[3] Similarly, new UK trade deals should have at least as strong human rights clauses as the deals being done by the EU and where possible it should seek to strengthen them.

While developing its own foreign policy independent of the EU, the UK still needs to show it is willing to work with like-minded partners. This will not only involve seeking to build a strong foreign policy and security partnership with the EU as part of the post-Brexit process, but it should also seek to enhance or create a range of bilateral mechanisms with Member States that augment, but do not seek to replace, relationships with the EU, such as UK-France defence cooperation under the Lancaster House Treaties and continued involvement in the E3 group on Iran.[4] As Lord McConnell argues, the UK must also seek to deepen relations with countries who share similar values and not-dissimilar strategic positions, such as Canada, Japan and New Zealand, with the UK-Canadian joint Campaign on Media Freedom being an important example of the potential for joint working.[5] The UK will also need to retain an active presence at international forums to project its continuing global role – as Rt Hon Tobias Ellwood points out, the absence of senior ministers from the February 2020 Munich Security Conference was not seen as a good sign by Britain’s international partners.

Alongside new state-level alliances, the government should reaffirm its commitment to working in partnership with civil society. Civil society networks reinforce and deepen state-level cooperation. Many of the authors in this collection highlight the role of civil society in tackling so many of the challenges facing the world today: Baroness Anelay on delivering international development goals; Jonathan Cohen, Dr Theresa Dumasy and Richard Reeve on peacebuilding and security; Marissa Conway on shaping values-based foreign policy; Ruth Bergen and Dr Emily Jones on trade; and Sophie Howe on sustainable societies. Globally, restrictions on civil society space are increasing,[6] but the government should ensure that its own actions, including counter-terrorism agendas, do not inadvertently restrict civil society space further.

A clear focus on continued engagement in the UK’s neighbourhood aligns with its capabilities, the threats it faces and its opportunities. Given the pressure on Europe’s eastern flank from Russia, the UK should continue to show its support for the Baltic States and other NATO Member States, as well as with Ukraine. There will also be scope to show renewed and enhanced engagement with NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE), working within them to reform their processes and ensure that they meet both their founding objectives and the values and priorities which the UK is seeking to promote.[7] It will be important to ensure that the contentious domestic debate about the way in which the European Convention on Human Rights is incorporated into British law through the Human Rights Act takes place in a way that does not undermine the UK’s commitment to the Convention itself nor the UK’s membership of the CoE, or further encourage other CoE members to ignore their responsibilities under the Convention.[8]

One way to show that the UK is not being overly cowed by commercial constraints will be ensuring that UK ambassadors feel supported and encouraged to speak out on human rights and other abuses taking place in the countries where they are posted. Such actions should often be coordinated with other like-minded partners to benefit from strength in numbers, whilst not being afraid to show leadership where necessary. Ministerial statements should follow a similar approach. While the UK is not in a position to dictate terms to countries abusing human rights and other international values, such statements are often of significant value to local activists working to defend their rights.

With the spectre of a no-deal Brexit removed, immediate concerns about existing EU funding for UK non-governmental organisations (NGOs) through 2020 have been alleviated.[9] However, it remains unclear how and in what form the £1.5 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) that is currently dispensed through EU mechanisms will be repatriated. As has been argued by a number of authors, not least Baroness Anelay and Theo Clarke MP, our development expertise and aid budget remain major global assets in building a values-based foreign policy. The government’s integrated review should be an opportunity for development expertise to have influence across our foreign policy, creating policy coherence for development, and therefore maintain a values-based and long-term strategic vision for our foreign policy that helps create a more peaceful, prosperous, and equitable world for all. Proposals to subsume the Department for International Development (DFID) under the auspices of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) should be shelved, and the government should ensure that aid spending across all departments retains a strong poverty focus – in line with the International Development Act. At an operational level, DFID could explicitly consider the impact of development programming on economic inequality. This could, for instance, result in greater focus on supporting the public provision of health, high quality education and social protection.

The UK is an international centre of excellence for peacebuilding, with experienced NGOs and academic experts who have until recently received a significant proportion of their project funding through pooled EU grants. It will be important to ensure that as funding streams are repatriated to direct UK control this expertise is maintained and developed. This may mean reviewing and revising existing UK mechanisms for funding peacebuilding to ensure that they are agile and appropriate for civil society peacebuilding work. Similarly, existing support for the FCO’s human rights and governance initiatives, both through embassies and through centrally coordinated schemes should be built upon and enhanced, rather than risk marginalisation behind economic and trade priorities. Wherever possible such mechanisms should be flexible enough to support smaller and specialist NGOs and experts, rather than being more accessible to large consultancies as can be the case.

As the Foreign Secretary has already announced, one way to show leadership on human rights issues would be to increase the use of ‘Magnitsky’ sanctions against human rights abusers who have some financial connections to the UK. The use of these and other financial instruments, such as Unexplained Wealth Orders, are to be warmly welcomed but it is important to ensure they are being used consistently based on the level of wrongdoing rather than the strategic alignment of their country of origin.[10] To assist with this process, it will be vital to ensure the full implementation of the Registration of Overseas Entities Bill, as set out in the Queen’s Speech, which will finally create the long-awaited beneficial ownership register for UK properties owned by offshore-entities, as well as the wider 2019–2022 Economic Crime Plan.[11]

As is made clear by the essays on trade from Ruth Bergen and Dr Emily Jones, as well as by Baroness Anelay, it is impossible to separate global political foreign policy from international economic issues. The promotion of an international rules-based order also requires the UK to lead in setting and enforcing fair global economic rules that work for everyone and that deliver positive outcomes in line with the SDGs as well as international commitments on climate change and human rights. Baroness Anelay’s suggestion to include economic issues in the remit of the National Security Council is one part of a solution, but it also requires articulating solutions to global economic challenges that put the rights and needs of people at the centre. It will mean putting our own house in order as well as working to make the global economic rules as fair as possible. The ongoing OECD-BEPS discussions, including a minimum effective corporate tax rate, are one opportunity for the UK to engage positively to strengthen international governance. Meanwhile, the UK should ensure its own Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies continue to reform to achieve higher standards of tax transparency.[12]

The United Nations Climate Summit in Glasgow (COP26) represents a chance for real climate leadership from the UK Government and is the first big test of a values-based vision for ‘Global Britain’. As Caroline Lucas MP argues, this will be dependent on investment in the hard work of diplomacy to raise the ambition of other nations’ plans to reduce emissions, getting our own house in order at home, and a relentless focus on a just way forward for the countries and communities worst affected. Beyond the COP, policy coherence is key. As Caroline Lucas sets out clearly, the government cannot continue to finance fossil fuel projects overseas while claiming climate leadership. The UK’s trade regime could be a powerful expression of its commitment to environmental and sustainability policy, as Ruth Bergen and Dr Emily Jones make clear. The government should review all trade provisions in its trade agreements to ‘stress test’ them against climate goals as well as human rights commitments, potentially using the suggested ‘Global Britain’ values process outlined above.

In a fast-changing world with new powers rising, old institutions struggling and future challenges emerging, having a clear approach to values in British foreign policy is not just about doing what we think is right but about ensuring we are actively helping to shape the international systems, norms and rules that the UK will have to work within for decades to come. The threats to the idea of liberal democracy from increasingly confident authoritarian states and internal strains and inequalities in established democracies are real, and need to be addressed to halt and reverse its decline. As a medium-sized power, albeit one with considerable assets, the UK will need to show it is still willing to work collaboratively with partners, and to use the tools of influence available to it to creatively and meaningfully shape the future direction of the international system and to respond effectively to specific crises and abuses of its values.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this publication that values should be an important part of the foundations of future UK foreign policy, we would like to make a number of recommendations.

The UK Government should:

Agree a clear ‘Global Britain’ values statement of the principles underpinning the UK’s role in the world.
Use the values statement to develop a ‘Global Britain Benchmark’ that assesses the impact of new policies against these principles.
Demonstrate a renewed commitment to engage with and reform the regional and multilateral institutions the UK remains a part of, while building new partnerships for the future.
Defend and maintain the spirit as well as the fact of its commitment to allocate 0.7 per cent Gross National Income (GNI) to international development assistance by:
Keeping a separate Department for International Development with a Secretary of State for International Development;
Ensuring aid spending across all departments retains a strong poverty focus – in line with the International Development Act; and by the
Coordination and sharing of best practice on aid spending, which would see other government departments meeting higher standards on aid transparency.
Show that the UK still has the confidence and stature to stand up for its values by supporting those who defend them, and speaking out and taking action when they are abused, by:
Encouraging ambassadors and ministers to condemn human rights abuses wherever they occur;
Actively using and equitably applying new ‘Magnitsky’-style personal sanctions;
Fully implementing new measures to improve financial transparency, and take further action on tax havens; and
Increasing and improving UK funding for peacebuilding and human rights.
Remain actively committed to the promotion of human rights, defence and security in the European neighbourhood, of which the UK is still a part.
Take decisive and immediate action to demonstrate climate leadership, including:
- Announcing a high-ambition Nationally Defined Contribution (NDC) for COP26 and working with countries around the world to aim for increased ambition in their NDCs, in time to know how much is left to do to close the gap between current plans and the aim of limiting warming to 1.5°C;
- Scaling up resources to impacted communities, including a new goal for climate finance for adaptation, and leading efforts to find new and additional sources of finance for loss and damage;
- Immediately stopping all new support for fossil fuels (oil, coal and gas) and phasing out existing investments;
- Implementing policies at home that demonstrably put us on track for net zero as soon as possible, without using international offsets, and recognising that – without the inclusion of consumption emissions – this is only part of the job.
Ensure efforts to address international economic issues are joined up with global political foreign policy by:
- Including economic issues within the remit of the National Security Council; and
- Partaking fully in the OECD-BEPS discussions, including on a minimum effective corporate tax rate, as well as ensuring that the UK’s own Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies continue to reform to meet higher standards of tax transparency.

Adam Hug became Director of the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) in November 2017. He had previously been the Policy Director at the FPC from 2008–2017. His research focuses on human rights and governance issues, particularly in the former Soviet Union. He also writes on UK and EU foreign policy.

Dr Abigael Baldoumas is a humanitarian policy advisor for Oxfam GB. She holds a DPhil in Political Science from Oxford University on the role of social movements in shaping public policy in the UK. She has worked in international development since 2012. Her work focuses on forced displacement, gender justice and rights-based humanitarian response.

Katy Chakrabortty is the head of advocacy at Oxfam GB. She has been at Oxfam since 2009, and as well as political relations work she has played a major role in Oxfam’s Even it Up campaign against extreme economic inequality. Her background is in political campaigning and parliamentary advocacy, having previously worked for the Electoral Reform Society, Amnesty International and DeHavilland.

Dr Danny Sriskandarajah joined Oxfam GB as chief executive in January 2019 from CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance of which he was Secretary General for six years. Prior to that he was Director General of the Royal Commonwealth Society, Interim Director of the Commonwealth Foundation and held various posts at the Institute for Public Policy Research.

[1] FCO and The Rt Hon Dominic Rabb MP, Foreign Secretary’s introduction to the Queen’s Speech debate, January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-introduction-to-queens-speech-debate

[2]Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework and Guiding Principles, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/un-secretary-generals-special-representative-on-business-human-rights/un-protect-respect-and-remedy-framework-and-guiding-principles

[3] For more background see: Trade Justice Movement, Securing democracy in UK Trade policy, November 2017, https://www.tjm.org.uk/documents/briefings/0870_TJM_SECURING_DEMOCRACY_2019_PRF1.pdf

[4] Ministry of Defence, UK and France defence cooperation, September 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-and-france-defence-cooperation; Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street and The Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP, E3 statement on the JCPoA: 12 January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/e3-statement-on-the-jcpoa-12-january-2020

[5] There are of course a number of caveats raised about the lack of clear actions being taken from the work so far as highlighted by campaign groups such as: Article 19, UK: Government must take more action on media freedom, September 2019, https://www.article19.org/resources/uk-government-must-take-more-action-on-media-freedom/; Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Liberty is under attack as journalists are silenced, say MPs, UK Parliament, September 2019, https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/news-parliament-2017/global-media-freedom-report-published-17-19/

[6] Danny Sriskandarajah, Under threat: five countries in which civic space is rapidly closing, Open Democracy, January 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/openglobalrights-openpage/under-threat-five-countries-in-which-civic-space-is-rapi/

[7] See for example the ideas set out in: Adam Hug, Institutionally blind? International organisations and human rights abuses in the former Soviet Union, The Foreign Policy Centre, February 2016, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/institutionallyblind/; and Adam Hug, Institutionally Blind: The next steps in reforming the Council of Europe and the OSCE, The Foreign Policy Centre, November 2017, https://fpc.org.uk/institutionally-blind-next-steps-reforming-council-europe-osce/

[8] David Maddox, Attorney General vows to change Human Rights Act and limit power of Supreme Court judges, Daily Express, February 2020, https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1242879/attorney-general-suella-braverman-human-rights-act-supreme-court-judges-cabinet-reshuffle

[9] DFID, EU-funded programmes under the withdrawal agreement, January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/eu-funded-programmes-under-the-withdrawal-agreement

[10] Home Office, Circular 003/2018: unexplained wealth orders, February 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/circular-0032018-criminal-finances-act-unexplained-wealth-orders/circular-0032018-unexplained-wealth-orders

[11] Transparency International UK, Measures to tackle dirty money in UK property market a major step in fight against corruption, December 2019, https://www.transparency.org.uk/press-releases/registration-of-overseas-entities-bill-queens-speech-2019/; HM Treasury and Home Office, Economic crime plan 2019 to 2022, July 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/economic-crime-plan-2019-to-2022

[12] The OECD and G20 are working on a new Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) framework to address corporate tax avoidance. See https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/

Photo credit: Lighthouse and sunset, Isle of Skye. Image by Frank Winkler from Pixabay.

Topics

Brexit

Civil Society

Conflict Resolution and Security

Energy, Environment and Resources

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Human Rights

International Development

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Europe

United Kingdom

De-radicalisation tactics in the North Caucasus can serve as a lesson and a warning

Article by Lana Estemirova

February 12, 2020

De-radicalisation tactics in the North Caucasus can serve as a lesson and a warning

As Britain was shaken by its third terrorist attack in as many months, the Conservative government was quick to respond by calling for tougher sentencing for all those convicted of terror offences.[1] Michael Gove suggested that terrorist should be ‘jailed indefinitely’[2]– while opposition politicians and academics have emphasised the total inadequacy of rehabilitation programmes running in prisons[3]. Waiting lists are long, even when offenders ask for help, with programmes woefully underfunded and unable to meet demand.

This is not a problem isolated to just the United Kingdom (UK). Unexpected terrorist attacks carried out using primitive weapons, single-handedly or in small groups have become a part of reality across the world. As the UK contemplates these moves, it is worth looking at the example of Russia’s North Caucasus region where we can see the results of both punitive and preventative approaches to dealing with the issue of domestic Islamist terrorism.

Roughly 3400 people, mostly from Russia’s Muslim Northern Caucasus republics, have left Russia to join ISIS since the start of the conflict.[4] In response, local governments alongside the Federal Security Service (FSB) have designed a series of soft and punitive measures to tackle extremism. While many tactics (especially Chechen) involve violent threats, illegal imprisonment, torture and intimidation[5], there is also a less-known pool of constructive approaches with a focus on preventing radicalisation.

While some methods to counter-violent extremism are similar across republics, they vary depending on regional context. Chechnya’s complicated political landscape, shaped by two wars with Russia and pro-Kremlin Ramzan Kadyrov’s iron fisted rule, requires a separate look. The underlying causes of radicalisation are similar across the regions – ethnic conflicts, police brutality, corruption, unemployment and a general lack of prospects are among the external factors. Internal factors often include a personality crisis, low self-esteem, an inability to fit in and a desire for adventure.[6] Compassion for the victims of Assad’s regime was also an important motivator for people to go to Syria. According to Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, director at Conflict analysis and prevention centre, a single ‘terrorist’ type doesn’t exist, radicalisation depends on a range of individual factors that can equally affect people from London to Grozny.

A big focus across the predominantly Muslim republics, is an emphasis on prevention, with a lot of recourses poured into programmes that are aimed at averting the radicalisation of the youth before it occurs. There are ‘heavy weapons’ such as mandatory seminars and presentations for students carried out by government officials, accompanied by slideshows and reports. This counter-radicalisation state propaganda is largely ineffectual, often deemed dull and boring; there is a general sense of fatigue amongst young people when it comes to the topic. Other state-sponsored religious programmes, whereby state-affiliated imams attempt to use theological arguments to dissuade against extremism also fail to resonate due to their close association with the authorities. Many officials handling counter-extremism programmes in the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic are beginning to accept that repetitively hammering in a blunt anti-radicalism message is not the most effective method at prevention – and at times can even spark interest in the forbidden fruit.[7]

Other more successful state-funded programmes aim to channel young minds towards other pursuits. The range is quite diverse; it involves volunteering, summer camps, sports, military training for teenagers and even expeditions to recover relics from the Second World War. The overall aim is to divert young people in a more patriotic direction.[8]

An abundance of government grants for counter-extremist initiatives encourages competition between NGOs, who have produced a range of nuanced and creative approaches to capturing the minds of young people. The high levels of unemployment and corruption in the North Caucasian republics provide gloomy prospects for young people, leaving some of them more prone to radicalisation. One approach is the ‘Own business’ [9] programme, which helps people get their small enterprises off the ground, whether that’s developing a business plan or providing them with a microcredit. It also offers a range of courses and seminars that attract entrepreneurs from different regions, giving them an opportunity to collaborate and learn from each other. This is an example of a positive initiative that focuses on developing skills and bringing like-minded people together.

Ingushetia seems to have one of the most thought-out series of programmes targeting extremist ideology – one of them is ‘DISlike extremism’ that targets high school and university students. Unlike other programmes, ‘DISlike…’ has a Q&A session in the end that gives young people an opportunity to express themselves, explore topics that are relevant to them and tell the organisers how it could be improved.

The obvious pattern here is that creatively engaging young people in activities where they can prove themselves and be treated with dignity is a more successful strategy than simply patronising and lecturing them. Multi-targeted approaches that encourage cooperation and cross-cultural dialogue are crucial in a highly volatile region with raging inequality. It’s also vital to have an open, democratic discussion that is open to the public’s suggestions and constructive criticism.

This appears to have worked for a time with those groups deemed most at risk. ‘At risk’ groups, which can be defined as those who have showed an active interest in radical ideas and non-traditional strands of Islam such as Salafism, receive a very different treatment from local government and security officials. Salafism is an ultraconservative branch of Sunni Islam that preaches the return to a purer form of Islam as shown by the first three generations of Prophet Muhammad. The followers of Salafism are treated with suspicion by the security officials but in Ingushetia and Dagestan (up until 2012 Sochi Olympics) Salafi mosques were allowed to function alongside others. The overwhelming majority of Salafis do not show interest in joining ISIS or carrying out jihad at home. Khamzat Chumakov, a popular Salafi preacher from Ingushetia used religious arguments to dissuade his followers from even considering going to Syria. He claimed that a true believer should not put himself in the place where there is fitna (disagreement) between Muslims, providing examples from religious texts to prove his point. That appeared to be very effective in deterring people from going to Syria.[10]

Unfortunately, Russian security services have greater faith in more repressive methods for tackling radicalisation. In an attempt to wipe out any sign of insurgency before the Sochi Olympics in 2012, massive ‘cleansing’ operations were carried out throughout the North Caucasus, especially in Chechnya and Dagestan. Hundreds of people suspected of holding radical views were illegally detained, beaten, tortured and even murdered. In Dagestan, the authorities had introduced ‘profuchet’ (a preventative register) for Salafis, with regular police check ups and interrogations, merely because of their religious beliefs. Those who ended up on the list struggle to find a job and often find themselves in social isolation. The ‘profuchet’ had become a tool of repression, often used unjustifiably to make innocent people’s lives difficult. Despite significant pressure, the ex-president of Inguhsetia, Yunus-Bek Evkourov refused to shut down the re-integration programmes for ex-militants and did not support the crackdown on Salafis prior to the 2012 Olympic Games. That possibly explains why Ingushetia has one of the lowest radicalisation rates in the Northern Caucasus.

Unlike most of the European states, Russia has been surprisingly willing to allow the wives and children of ISIS fighters[11] to return from Syria. The calculation behind this move is that leaving those children to grow up in conflict zone will make them more prone to future radicalisation. However, no easy life awaits them back home: many women are arrested and interrogated by the police. Families receive barely any psychological support and rehabilitation upon their return. The treatment of ISIS women and their children varies depending on the republic, for instance in Chechnya and Ingushetia their re-integration in society is allowed and welcomed, whereas in Dagestan they often end up on the notorious ‘preventative registry’ list.

Driving Salafis underground does not stop their beliefs but rather strengthens it. Religious crackdowns, arrests and persecution is a quick-fix that doesn’t tackle the root problems causing radicalisation. In Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkarya, where officials act within the law and don’t use heavy-handed repression, the numbers of radicalised individuals is much lower, as measured by the low numbers of attacks on policemen and government officials.[12] There has been a steady decrease in radicalisation over the past several years, as demonstrated by decreased terror attacks across the republics. However, as ISIS is largely defeated on the ground in Syria and Iraq, it is difficult to predict how exactly this will affect domestic radicalisation levels across the country.

Tackling any anti-social and criminal behaviour, ranging from religious radicalisation of youth, to knife crime and the drug trade requires a complex approach that should focus on prevention, not only punishment. Radicalisation is often a symptom of a deeper societal malaise, often perpetuated by inadequate, corrupt local government and law-ignoring security officials. A ‘lock them up and throw away the key’ approach to terrorism ignores the multi-faceted influences that lead to radicalisation. Leaving offenders to languish in prison, without targeted and well-funded interventions leaves them prone to even deeper radicalisation and commitment to act upon their beliefs – a point poignantly underscored in the UK by the recent terror attack within the walls of a prison itself. A patient, nuanced approach focused on prevention that seeks to learn from effective de-radicalisation programmes across the world will produce more effective outcomes – closing the gaps through which fundamentalist ideas often seep with devastating consequences for the population as a whole.

Lana Estemirova is a graduate in International Relations from London School of Economics. She writes on Chechnya and human rights issues in Russia and is working on her first book.

[1] Peter Walker, London attack: PM says terrorism sentence changes may be applied retrospectively, The Guardian, February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/feb/03/prison-cuts-rishi-sunak-terrorism-suspects-streatham-attacker

[2] Simon Murphy and Rowena Mason, Terror offenders should be jailed indefinitely if necessary, says Gove, The Guardian, February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/feb/04/terror-offenders-should-be-jailed-indefinitely-if-necessary-says-gove

[3] Pen Mendonca, The London Bridge attack must not stop our vital work to tackle terrorism, The Guardian, December 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/dec/03/london-bridge-attack-2019-not-stop-work-prisoners-tackle-terrrorism

[4] Program: Hotspots, Experts discussed the prospects for radicalisation in the North Caucasus and measures to prevent it, ‘Memorial’ Human Rights Center, January 2019, https://memohrc.org/ru/news_old/eksperty-obsudili-perspektivy-radikalizacii-na-severnom-kavkaze-i-mery-po-ee

[5] Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, Will new waves of radicalisation in the North Caucasus be prevented?, Conflict Analysis and Prevention Center, January 2019, http://cap-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CVE_En.pdf

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid

[8] Ibid

[9] Caucasian Knot, Own Business and reality shows as methods of preventing extremism, Conflict Analysis and Prevention Center, December 2018, http://cap-center.org/виктория-гуревич-свой-бизнес-и-реалит/

[10] Ibid

[11] Andrew E. Kramer, Raised by ISIS, Returned to Chechnya: ‘These Children Saw Terrible Things’, The New York Times, February 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/24/world/europe/chechnya-russia-isis-children-return.html

[12] Ibid

Photo by President of Russia. No modifications to photo and under creative commons licence.

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Russia

Central Europe, a brief analysis of the Visegrad Group’s function within the EU political framework

Article by Paolo Zucconi

February 11, 2020

Central Europe, a brief analysis of the Visegrad Group’s function within the EU political framework

Since the 1989 revolutions, the strategic priority of Central Europe was integration into the European Community (EC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Central European states returned to democratic Europe after 40 years of Soviet domination. In this strategic framework of integration with the West, Central Europe was involved in establishing a sub-regional partnership to facilitate the process and also to say goodbye to their Cold War past. The Visegrad Group is an example of a (non) institutional organisation that has helped such a process.

Although sub-regional cooperation in Europe was already established prior to the fall of communism (i.e. the Benelux Group and Nordic Cooperation), the proliferation of groupings after 1989 developed the need to understand the purpose, potential and limitations of the ‘children of the post–Cold war era’.[1] When the Visegrad Group was formed in 1991, its function was to integrate in the EC and improve mutual cooperation, democracy, and free-market capitalism in post-Soviet Central Europe. The group became an exclusive framework for both internally and externally-oriented sub-regional cooperation between its four Central European member states (V4 – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia).

The 2004 EU enlargement and the V4 function

The 2004 EU enlargement then introduced the V4 as a new sub-regional partnership in the European Union (EU) framework. Since then, all V4 states are full EU members and have the right to participate in shaping the EU’s future.[2] Over time, similarities among the V4 countries in terms of economic profile, geography and history have led to a greater awareness of how their intra-EU interests tend to overlap.

During the Czech V4 Presidency in 2003-2004 cooperation revitalised, embodied in a declaration adopted in Kroměříž in 2004.[3] It reflected the EU membership, the belief in common European heritage and the development of European architecture within existing Euro-Atlantic institutions. This group was considered an important actor by the EU institutions in the EU enlargement policy, keeping an open channel eastward.

Though European integration was the ultimate proof of the legitimacy of the V4 objective and challenge, three significant historical events occurred and fostered intra-V4 cooperation:

Firstly, the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004, as Moscow began to reassert itself in its sphere of influence and push back against the West’s attempts to expand NATO into its former territory.[4]
Then, the 2008 economic crisis and the 2011 Euro debt crisis, which proved to the V4 countries that the EU heavyweights were not necessarily reliable partners. The consequent adoption of austerity policies in the EU and collective efforts (EU, EBRD, IMF, ECB) to bail out the then-troubled Central European economies, strengthened this assumption. The V4 perceived the EU not as guarantor of economic prosperity as expected.[5]
Finally, the 2015 refugee and migration crisis and the outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum have provided a more favourable context for the V4 to reinforce cooperation, but with different goals from the 2004 Declaration. No more in the context of European integration but in the context of sovereignty and nationalism, which has considerably influenced and continues to influence the acceptance of the EU’s operating institutional framework.[6]

The Visegrad Group today

Today, the Visegrad Group’s function has changed. It is now characterised by extraordinary government prerogatives including limitations to constitutional provisions and rule of law, to the development of a free and open society.[7] It has become a pressure group of hybrid regimes contributing to base the EU on sovereignty and intergovernmental decision-making processes. The function has gone from pro-European cooperation to differentiation of interests of individual countries in specific strategic issues.

The Visegrad Group offers its members a useful model to discuss, represent and safeguard common interests in a collective manner within the regional and broader international political landscape.[8] The success of the Group can be measured by analysing the V4’s approach to key issues (i.e. migration and refugee crisis) of EU policy-making process.[9] The Visegrad Group is able to act as a ‘bloc’, exploiting the current vacuum of EU governance and maintaining its one-cause mobilisation capabilities against refugee and migrant redistribution across the EU, while enjoying billions of EU funds for economic development. For example, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, to safeguard Hungary from immigration, has erected a separation fence on the border with Serbia and Croatia. According to Deutsche Welle, in 2015, more than 170,000 people applied for asylum in Hungary while, in 2017, it was about 3,400.[10] The V4 approach to the refugee and migration crisis diverges significantly from Brussels. The V4 member states mostly disagree with quota principle of distribution of refugees and migrants and oppose the financial aid given to Turkey to stop refugees and migrants from entering in the EU.

The V4 states have been successful in promoting their strategic interests within the EU framework over the years. This success is based on flexibility and ‘transformational capacity’.[11] The Group is able to disagree on key strategic issues (i.e. relations with Russia)[12] while be strongly cohesive on pursuing its interests on other issues (i.e. the refugee and migration crisis)[13] without compromising the strength of the group.

When it comes to Russia, unlike the rest of the Visegrad Group, Hungary has good relations with the Russian Federation. In the last meeting in Budapest, Orbán and Putin discussed business and energy deals, making Hungary a close Russia’s ally in the EU.[14] According to Prime Minister Orbán, good relations with Russia are a necessity because of country’s geographical location.[15]

Poland instead is unlikely to re-approach to Russia and refuses any interference in its home affairs. There are both historical and strategic reasons for this. Poland suffered significant changes in its political structure and territories over the years, especially during the 18^th century and due to the fight against Soviet Russia in the 1920s. Important changes occurred just before and after World War II (WWII) as well. The Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (mostly known as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact) was used by Moscow to unilaterally occupy part of the country. At the end of WWII, the new frontiers of Central and East Europe were defined by leaders of the winning parties in the conferences in Tehran (1943), Yalta and Potsdam (1945). Poland formally belonged to the winners of the WWII, its eastern borders were also changed in accordance with the so-called Curzon line.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation emerged and the Polish-Russian relations entered a new phase. The turbulent history of conflicts and tensions with the Soviet Union and the subsequent mutual accusations of historical revisionism affects today relations. Russia’s current foreign policy agenda aimed at destabilising Eastern Europe (i.e. hostile influence operations and media campaigns) represent another significant challenge for Poland, the entire region and even the EU efforts for integration.

The energy policy is another crucial issue, especially the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project as bypasses East Europe, bringing natural gas from Russia to Germany.[16] Although the pipeline is expected to be operational in early 2021, it is likely to cause geopolitical tensions between Russia and East European countries, including Poland.[17] Also, Ukraine remains a strategic priority for Poland because a strong pro-European Ukraine would be an important ally in an anti-Russian perspective. The deep differences in security policy and a long-term mistrust do not make rapprochement very likely.

When it comes to European integration, the V4 countries partially disagree. Slovakia and the Czech Republic are more Europe-friendly than Hungary and Poland[18]. However, the Eurosceptic approach has overall increased in the region, affecting the chances for better European integration eastwards. The V4 seems to be more interested in strengthening a sub-regional partnership – promoting Western Balkans’ integration as well – rather than a stronger EU. The Czech, Hungarian and Polish EU Council presidencies made Western Balkan integration a priority on the agenda to finalise integration talks with Croatia and beginning preliminary accession negotiations with Serbia.[19]

Conclusion

Central Europe has recently gained importance due to the divisions of the political course of various states forming the V4, the different strategic orientation of the member states in the region, the strengthening of the asymmetric inter-governmentalism (favouring EU big member states over smaller countries).

The EU macro-political environment changed dramatically since 2004, whereas the complex set of emerged political and economic issues turned to multi-speed integration affecting initial Euro-enthusiasm.

The importance of the group is increasing due to internal challenge to EU cohesion and the variety of strategic preferences.

All of these elements intersect in an interesting matrix as the role of the Visegrad Group is evolving within the process of European integration. In the near future, it can work as amplifier, reinforcing or affecting the relationship between regional and sub-regional partnership in the EU. The Visegrad Group has the potential to become a more relevant actor in the EU political framework and pursue its strategic goals. However, the changes in the institutional structure of some member states, the emerged illiberal democracy and reduced rule of law in Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland has a negative impact over the V4’s influence in the EU.

[1] Bjurner, Anders. 1999. European Security at the End of the Twentieth Century: The Subregional Contribution. In Andrew Cottey, ed., Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe. UK: Macmillan.

[2] Pelkmans, Jacques. 2006. European Integration, Methods and Economic Analysis. 3rd edition. UK: Pearson Education.

[3] Declaration of Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on cooperation of the Visegrad Group countries after their accession to the European Union, 12 May 2004.

[4] Fraser, Derek. 2008. Taking Ukraine Seriously: Western and Russian Responses to the Orange Revolution.

[5] Stratfor Assessment. 2011. The Visegrad Group: Central Europe’s Bloc.

[6] Schmidt, Andrea. 2016. Friends forever? The Role of the Visegrad Group and European Integration in Politics in Central Europe. The Journal of the Central European Political Science Association.

[7] Morillas, Pol. 2016. Illiberal Democracies in the EU: the Visegrad Group and the Risk of Disintegration. Barcelona Centre for International Affairs.

[8] Törő, Csaba, Butler, Eamonn & Grúber, Károly. 2013. Visegrád: The Evolving Pattern of Coordination and Partnership After EU Enlargement. Europe – Asia Studies.

[9] Ivanova, Diana. 2016. Migrant Crisis and the Visegrad Group Policy. De Gruyter Open. Vol. XXII. No 1.

[10] Klein, Rahel. 2019. This is How the Visegrad Group Works. Deutsche Welle.

[11] Fawn, Frederick Julian. 2013. External Diplomatic Perceptions of Visegrad Cooperation. EUROPEUM; Fawn, Rick. 2013. Visegrad: Fit for Purpose?. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 46, 3, pp. 339-349.

[12] Dangerfield, Martin. 2011. Visegrad Group Cooperation and Russia. Conference paper. Journal of Common Market Studies.

[13] Ivanova, Diana. 2016. Migrant Crisis and the Visegrad Group Policy. De Gruyter Open. Vol. XXII. No 1.

[14] Financial Times. 2019. Orban-Putin talks compound disquiet over Hungary’s Russia ties.

[15] Gorondi, Pablo. 2019. Hungary’s Orban: Good relations with Russia are a necessity. Associate Press.

[16] Balcer, Adam & Buras, Piotr. 2016. An unpredictable Russia: the impact on Poland. European Council of Foreign Relations.

[17] Elliott, Stuart & Griffin Rosemary. 2020. Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline could be delayed to Q1 2021: Putin. S&P Global Markey Insights.

[18] Végh, Zsuzsanna. 2018. From Pro-European Alliance to Eurosceptic Protest Group? The case of the Visegrad Group. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies.

[19] Zgut, Edit & Zbytniewska, Karolina & Yar, Lucia & Plevák, Ondřej. 2019. Transforming words into deeds – the Visegrad Group and Western Balkans’ EU integration. Euractiv.

Topics

EU Reform

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Europe

EU Institutions

Passing on the authoritarian torch: power transition in Central Asia

Article by Francisco Olmos

February 7, 2020

Passing on the authoritarian torch: power transition in Central Asia

Three decades after gaining independence, the Central Asian republics have recently experienced changes in their leadership. The rulers that were in charge before the collapse of the Soviet Union are, in most cases, no longer present and the countries are now led by their successors. The authoritarian nature of the regimes has resulted in a lack of transparency in the power transitions, but trends have already emerged in the ways these have occurred and may continue to take place in the near future.

The authoritarian Central Asian states, with the exception of Tajikistan, where Rahmon has been in power since 1992, have only of late started being ruled by a second generation of presidents. The Soviet-era rulers of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan that steered their countries through independence and in the establishment of the states are no longer President. The Turkmen and Uzbek cases present similarities while the Kazakh scenario is different. Even though Emomali Rahmon did not rule the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and participated in the transition to independence, like Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev, Turkmenistan’s Saparmurat Niyazov and Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov who did rule their SSRs he can be considered to be the last ‘first generation leader’ still in power.[1]

The changes in leadership that have taken place in the region’s authoritarian regimes thus far provide two separate approaches to the transition of power. On the one hand, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have witnessed the sudden death of their first presidents and their substitution by regime insiders in a short and opaque process that took place within their respective elites. On the other hand, Kazakhstan has experienced a gradual handover that is still taking place where the former president has officially resigned but still exerts most of the authority in the country. These different methods are a result of the countries’ characteristics as well as the strategic vision of their leaders.

Self-management within the regime

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have experienced opaque power transitions following the deaths of Niyazov and Karimov. Both regimes perpetuated themselves through insiders that had been part of their predecessor’s government and that reached power without much disruption, gradually establishing their own rule by purging potentially rival elements. Even though Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan went through a similar process, they had differences due to the nature of their regimes and leadership.

The lack of transparency that has shrouded the Turkmen regime since its inception makes it difficult to analyse in detail the events that led to Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s rise to power. The death of Niyazov in 2006 was all but clear and, as a result of the lack of verifiable information, a number of rumours arose about his demise. Regardless of the way this happened, within hours of its official announcement, Turkmenistan’s then vice president and health minister was appointed head of state by the State Security Council and the Council of Ministers. This bypassed the constitutional order that stated that it was the chairman of the parliament, Ovezgeldy Atayev, who should have succeeded the president.[2] A show, in the form of elections a few months later, confirmed Berdimuhamedov as Turkmenistan’s second president.

What is noteworthy in the Turkmen case is the prompt and efficient way in which the elite, reduced after years of a personalistic regime, united and elevated an unexpected candidate who was not Niyazov’s explicit choice nor part of his family. There was no significant opposition, as far as we know, to Berdimuhamedov’s rise to power, with the legitimate successor, Atayev, being detained and imprisoned shortly after Niyazov’s death. The lack of information makes it impossible to know what happened behind the scenes in late 2006, but what is clear is that a regime insider reached power in collusion with and supported by the country’s elites.

In Uzbekistan the result was similar although the process varied due to a wider range of candidates and power centres. Shortly after the sudden death of Islam Karimov in August 2016, his Prime Minister for 13 years, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, was named interim president. In a case that has some similarities with Turkmenistan’s, this role was meant for the chairman of the Senate, who declined it in favour of Mirziyoyev, in a move of questionable constitutional validity. This was the first battle in a fight for power between Mirziyoyev, Finance Minister Rustam Azimov and, the considered kingmaker, head of the security services, Rustam Inoyatov. In a gradual process in which different actors and clan politics intervened, Mirziyoyev was able to be elected president and cement his power in detriment of his two other rivals.[3]

As in Turkmenistan, the deceased president was succeeded by someone from his inner-circle. However, in Uzbekistan, with different power centres, clan politics and a much larger and heterogeneous elite, the process was more uncertain and lengthy. It took Mirziyoyev months to be able to establish himself and even now there are elements within his regime that he has to balance out.

In both cases, neither Niyazov nor Karimov had defined plans for their succession which resulted in a period of uncertainty and a transition that was decided within the elites. In addition, their respective families did not take place in the process, either voluntarily or involuntarily, and in some instances, like Karimov’s estranged daughter Gulnara, their situation worsened as a result. This last point, among others, is what Nursultan Nazarbayev seems inclined to avoid.

Kazakhstan’s piloted transition

Nursultan Nazarbayev is the only leader of a former Central Asian Soviet Republic that remains in power, although not nominally. Nearing his 80^th birthday and having seen the situation that unfolded in neighbouring Uzbekistan after Karimov’s death and the lack of succession plans, Nazarbayev decided to act and ensure Kazakhstan would not experience the same after his demise. In order to achieve this, he decided for the power transition to take place during his lifetime and directed by himself; a first in Central Asian politics.

In March 2019, Nazarbayev surprisingly resigned and called for early presidential elections to choose his successor. He had already designated the former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to take over, which he officially did after winning an election in which there was not much competition. A technocrat, Tokayev is considered to be a transitory figure, a bridge between Elbasy, as Nazarbayev is also known, and a longer-term head of state.

While Tokayev is nominally the president, it is Nazarbayev who still holds the reins of power in the country. Through his tailor-made position of Chairman of the Security Council, Nazarbayev is still in charge of the country, even more so after a series of reforms in October 2019 that granted him powers over key government appointments to the detriment of Tokayev’s authority.[4] It is Nazarbayev who plays the role of head of state, attending different international summits in representation of Kazakhstan and meeting with his former counterparts, while Tokayev is relegated to the domestic sphere.[5]

The transition in Kazakhstan is still unfolding and therefore it is yet to be known if it will succeed. Nevertheless, such process is being moulded by Nazarbayev himself. As a result, Elbasy is ensuring the position and wealth of his family within the new regime that will emerge after his demise. This includes situating his daughter Dariga as the head of the Senate, which some observers interpret as a signal she might end up becoming the country’s first female president, although there is little evidence to support it.[6] However, by securing his family’s position and his legacy as the founder of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev has demonstrated to have a strategic vision that his Central Asian counterparts, so far, have lacked.

Hereditary succession, a real possibility?

Two models have emerged thus far in the transition of power in Central Asia’s authoritarian regimes: Turkmenistan’s and Uzbekistan’s change from within and Kazakhstan’s piloted handover. However, a new method may start to take shape: hereditary succession. This is a process that is unknown to the republics, and to see it occurring in the region we have to look back at the beginning of the 20^th century in the Emirate of Bukhara and Khanate of Khiva. Nevertheless, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan may be in the course of reviving this long-lost practice.

Among the Central Asian republics, Tajikistan is the only one who still is ruled by someone who got to power in the early 90s. Emomali Rahmon has been Tajikistan’s president since 1992, including the civil war, and it seems that he might be looking for his son Rustam to succeed him. To that effect, the 32 year old has already occupied a number of positions within the Tajik government, including heading the country’s main anti-corruption agency, being promoted to major general and, more importantly, being appointed mayor of the capital, Dushanbe, in 2017. At the same time, the parliament approved reducing the eligibility age from 35 to 30 for the presidency and the upper chamber.[7] The parliamentary and presidential elections that the country will undergo in 2020 could be a stepping stone in Rustam’s political future, including Rahmon taking a step back like Nazarbayev to make room for his son.

Turkmenistan seems to be going in a similar direction. Berdimuhamedov’s son Serdar has been designated to multiple government posts in the last years, including member of the Mejilis (Turkmenistan’s legislative chamber), Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and governor of the significant Ahal region.[8] His fast progression becomes more important when taking into account the questions surrounding his father’s health, including last summer’s rumours that he had died.

While the progression of both Rustam Emomali and Serdar Berdimuhamedov indicates that they are being groomed to succeed their fathers, this would be oversimplifying the situation. Firstly, it is unclear if the only objective behind Rahmon’s and Berdimuhamedov’s actions is to have their sons take over power. Positioning them well within the state, with enough power to be relevant in the case of regime change could be another aspiration. This would act as an insurance policy against other actors or political rivals who would want to undermine them and strip them of their wealth and influence. Secondly, even if the aim was for them to succeed their fathers, it is not clear that would be successful. Once the figures of Rahmon and Berdimuhamedov disappear, even if before they have ‘retired’ like Nazarbayev, there is no indication that the elites, even if diminished in Turkmenistan’s case in particular, would comply with their wishes and raise their children to power. Therefore, while hereditary succession remains a possibility in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, it is far from being a fact.

The transition of power in authoritarian states is always surrounded by uncertainty as the established procedures that dictate it are not respected due to the lack of democratic practises and institutions. So far Central Asia’s regimes have navigated this situation with swift, albeit opaque, transitions within the system, avoiding major disruptions for the state although not necessarily for the families and legacies of their former rulers. In this regard, Nazarbayev’s move last year opened a new possibility by pre-emptively controlling much of the transition before it actually happens, although it does not entirely guarantee its success. Lastly, a new trend seems to be emerging which is the prospect of hereditary succession. This last approach can be combined with the piloted transition but it is yet to be seen if it becomes a reality and, even if it does, if it will be ultimately successful.

Photo by President of Russia, Central Asian Cooperation Organisation Summit, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/trips/48832/photos/25413. No modifications to photo, Creative commons licence, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en

[1] Rahmon became Chairmen of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan in November 1992 during the early stages of the Tajik Civil War and was the acting head of Government until being elected to the re-established role of President in 1994.

[2] Annette Bohr, Turkmenistan: Power, Politics and Petro-Authoritarianism, Chatham House, March 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-03-08-turkmenistan-bohr.pdf

[3] Bruce Pannier, How Shavkat Mirziyoev Became Uzbekistan’s Supreme Leader, RFE/RL, February 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-mirziyoev-consolidation-of-power/29016113.html

[4] Joanna Lillis, Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev takes back control, Eurasianet, October 2019, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-nazarbayev-takes-back-control

[5] Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s face to the world, Blue Domes, January 2020, http://bluedomes.net/2020/01/06/nazarbayev-kazakhstans-face-to-the-world/

[6] Neil MacFarquhar, Daughter of Departing Kazakhstan President May Succeed Him, The New York Times, March 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/20/world/asia/rise-of-first-daughter-in-kazakhstan-fuels-talk-of-succession.html

[7] Will Rustam Emomali Become The Next President Of Tajikistan?, RFE/RL, March 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/will-rustam-emomali-become-the-next-president-of-tajikistan-/29810996.html

[8] Victoria Clement, Passing the baton in Turkmenistan, Atlantic Council, October 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/passing-the-baton-in-turkmenistan/

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Central Asia

The Death of a General: What’s next for Iran, Iraq and the wider Middle East?

Article by Dr Simon Mabon and SEPAD project colleagues

January 16, 2020

The Death of a General: What’s next for Iran, Iraq and the wider Middle East?

Following the United States (US) assassination of Qasim Soleimani – the erstwhile commander of the Quds Force, the elite wing of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, – close to Baghdad airport, Iraq’s parliament passed a non-binding bill calling for the US to leave the country. The strike against Soleimani has serious implications for a range of areas including: Iraqi politics; Iranian activity across the region; the fight against Da’ish (ISIS); and more. In this piece, scholars working with SEPAD (the Sectarianism, Proxies and De-sectarianisation project of the Richardson Institute for Peace) [1] share their thoughts on the decision and the impact for Iraq and the wider Middle East.

The Implications for Iraq

Fanar Haddad (Senior Research Fellow at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore) argues that ‘ultimately, Iran’s most potent response might be a political rather than a military one: consolidating its grip on Iraqi politics and forcing a US withdrawal. However, the matter is complicated by Iraqi dynamics. Recent events are proving increasingly polarising: Sunni and Kurdish political actors fear the rise of a majoritarian Iran-leaning Baghdad; the Iraqi protest movement is as adamant on the necessity of systemic change as ever before; and the tensions between Iran-aligned and non-Iran-aligned actors are likely to get worse. Even if a withdrawal is not achieved, the assassinations have succeeded in lending Iran-leaning actors what they have been searching for since the protests began: a counter-cause to enable counter-protests and counter-pressure. The US has a lot of coercive leverage over Iraq (economic, diplomatic and military) but lacks the political assets and soft power that will be needed for the contest that Iran is initiating.’

Regional Politics

Dr Lawrence Rubin (Associate Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology) believes that ‘concerning implications for the region, it’s too early to say given the uncertainty in Iraqi politics and the most recent gaffe from US regarding troop withdrawal. Naturally, the most important aspect will be how it plays out in Iraqi politics and second, how the US manages it. Sectarian politics have and will continue to play a role because of which Iraqi groups’ interests are more closely aligned with the US presence in the region.

Two facts also remain: the US is both a stabilising and destabilising force in Iraqi politics and this is a microcosm for the region. The US presence in Iraq would reassure the Saudis and Emiratis (and others) that the US hasn’t abandoned them. If the US withdraws from Iraq, Iran and Russia will have to fill the vacuum to fight a resurgent ISIS. If the US remains, the US presence will continue to be a counter-mobilising symbol for opposition and destabilising political influence in Iraq as well as a target of opportunity for Iran. Meanwhile, the uncertainty takes the attention off of the Syrian-Russian and Turkish campaign in Syria.’

Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and the Iranian Question

Dr Simon Mabon believes that ‘the US decision to strike against Soleimani has caused a great deal of concern amongst many of Washington’s key allies. In the immediate days after the strike a number of prominent Gulf diplomats spoke of the need for de-escalation including, perhaps most surprisingly, Adel Al Jubeir, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister. Under Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia has embarked on a vociferously anti-Iranian foreign policy, best seen in the military incursion in Yemen, yet after a strike on a Saudi ship in 2019, officials in Riyadh called for calm, much to the surprise of many. In these two instances, it appears that pragmatism has triumphed, although as the regional security environment continues to be precarious, it remains to be seen how long this pragmatic approach can last’.

Haian Dukhan (Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Syrian Studies at the University of St Andrews) thinks that ‘the non-binding resolution asking the US troops to leave Iraq will raise more questions about the legality and the legitimacy of the presence of the US troops in Syria. Strategically, if the withdrawal happens, it will also have a great impact on its newly built bases on Deir Ezzor, the eastern governorate of Syria, as these bases are mainly reliant on the logistic support from their counterparts in Iraq. The question will be then whether the Americans will be able to maintain their presence in eastern Syria if they withdraw from Iraq’.

Iranian Foreign Policy

SEPAD Fellow Banafsheh Keynoush thinks ‘Soleimani’s legacy to the region could be a lengthy war of attrition if the US and Iran do not agree on a framework that allows for limited US military presence and Iranian influence inside Iraq. Tehran will wield influence over multiple Iraqi actors who negotiate with the US to decide on this framework. The Shia cleric Muqtada Al Sadr, who visited Soleimani’s house after the killing, has called for an end to the US occupation of Iraq. Iraq’s sitting Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, who is a go between figure for Iran, could be reinstalled despite previous calls by Iraqis for his resignation.

Signs point to US and Iranian restraint in managing the future of their presence in Iraq. Iran could still insist on a hardline position, but it will engage in give and take when its interests demand. Iran’s missile attacks on the Iraqi bases did not lead to death tolls for the Americans. In exchange, the US ordered its diplomats to limit links with Iranian opposition groups. Still, Iran considers itself to be in a war. This means that it may still engage in conflicts that take on conventional, asymmetrical or even nonconventional forms if the Iran nuclear deal is not revived.’

Dr Edward Wastnidge (Deputy Director of SEPAD and Lecturer at the Open University) believes that ‘the assassination of Qasim Soleimani was a clear illustration of the Trump administration’s total lack of a coherent strategy on Iran and the wider region. It shows how petulant, misguided and incoherent his and his close aides’ ideas are when it comes to Iran. The fact that Trump has veterans from the US’ occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan directing US military adventurism helps drive this vindictive policy. They are so focused on seeing Iran as the enemy that they let this cloud every judgement that they make.

In many ways his is the hallmark of a hubristic imperial power that has miscalculated the level of opposition to its damaging policies in the region. It could be that Soleimani’s greatest achievement comes as a result of his murder – insofar as it could herald the start of a US withdrawal from Iraq, thus meeting one of the Islamic Republic’s key foreign policy aims. The need for an inclusive regional security architecture, free of external interference, is more pressing than ever. It is with the people of the region that the answers lie, not the think-tanks and vested interests of the commentariat in DC and elsewhere.’

Meysam Tayebipour (Research Fellow with the Richardson Institute) believes that ‘the death of Qasim Soleimani is a significant loss for the Iranian regime, as he was the most prominent Iranian figure in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. In other words, Soleimani and the Quds force boosted Iran’s geopolitical importance in the region. One would be surprised to see his successor (Esmail Ghaani) be as influential in the head of Quds force as he was. Soleimani also had an important role in Iran’s domestic politics. Thanks to his charismatic personality, he was portrayed by some Iranians as a righteous man. That was the reason that many people participated in his funeral. Not all those who took part in Soleimani’s funeral were supporters of the regime.

By killing him, Trump injected new blood into the broken body of the Islamic Republic. Before Soleimani’s death, people were on the streets protesting against the regime. But after Soleimani’s assassination, once again, people were on the streets, but this time for expressing their sadness for the loss of Iran second most powerful man. The Islamic Republic could not ask for a better enemy.’

Olivia Globitza (SEPAD PhD Fellow) thinks that ‘even though the US have for the moment rejected Iraq’s request to withdraw its troops, a potential withdrawal is by far not off the table. Yet, the repercussions of such a move are complex and unlikely to please everyone in the region. While certainly welcomed by many, particularly those opposed to US presence in Iraq and elsewhere in the region, including Iran, it will open new fissures and tap into the fears of those that believe Iran will seek to take advantage of the void the US will leave behind, and substantially increase its influence over Iraq.’

Eyad Al Refai (SEPAD PhD Fellow) believes ‘the discussion on the implications of the US withdrawal from the Middle East has a long legacy. Therefore, opinions on this case shift depending on the situation of regional and global orders. However, In the current political context in the Middle East, where the state is significantly threatened due to its weakness and broad regional conflicts, these implications are mostly detrimental to the regional and the international system. The current US presence in the region, after its departure from Iraq in 2011, is primarily due to the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings and the prevalence of terrorist sectarian militias that filled vacuums. The US withdrawal from the region cannot remedy domestic grievances and regional manipulation, which led the state system in the region to its current collapse. American troops stretch from Europe to Asia however it is only in the Middle East that such a presence is discussed heavily through a cynical lens, and such views are reasonable considering the American legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the answers to the region’s issues are regionally based, and in fact, the current presence of American troops is the result of invitations by states in the region.’

Photo by Ali Khamenei, under Creative Commons.

[1] Sectarianism, Proxies and De-sectarianisation (SEPAD) project is based at Lancaster University’s Richardson Institute, The Foreign Policy Centre is a project partner of SEPAD, https://www.sepad.org.uk/about

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Middle East and North Africa

Gulf States

Iran

Iraq

The last year in Azerbaijan: the highs and lows

Article by Arzu Geybulla

January 2, 2020

The last year in Azerbaijan: the highs and lows

2019 was a year not without its highs and lows in the land of fire – Azerbaijan. From a snap decision to dismiss the national parliament, to the release of prominent political prisoners, to the replacing of some high ranking government officials, as well as more arrests and detentions. This year, Azerbaijan made the news for its lack of capacity while hosting the Europa League final and the farce with the loose manhole cover that damaged George Russell’s Williams during the Grand Prix practice in Baku.[1] Not to mention the vehicle carrying the damaged Williams striking a bridge on the way to the pit making it all look even more comical. The corrupt nature of its ruling government and its affiliates haunted officials in Baku in 2019 as well. One key example of this is when the news of the country’s former international bank head Jahangir Hajiyev’s wife was spotted at London’s high end department store Harrods, having spent 16 million pounds.[2] Not all at once of course, but over the last ten years. Meanwhile, her husband, was sentenced to 15 years in jail in October on charges of fraud and money laundering to name a few.

To break it all down, here is a closer look at some of these and other developments that shook Azerbaijan’s civil society, government and the country’s image abroad.

#FreeMehman

2019 began with the #FreeMehman campaign that targeted authorities in Azerbaijan to immediately drop new charges that citizen journalist and activist Mehman Huseynov was facing, just when his previous two year prison term was going to finish. Despite the absence of evidence in court, and an international outcry on the illegality of the sentence, Huseynov was jailed in 2017 on charges of slander and sentenced to two years in prison.

In December 2018, new charges were brought against Huseynov accusing him of allegedly “resisting a representative of the authorities with the use of violence dangerous to his health and life”.[3] If found guilty, Huseynov was facing an additional seven year prison term. While Huseynov declared he was going on a hunger strike, many prominent civil society activists joined him in solidarity. An unsanctioned rally was organised in support of Huseynov on January 19^th, demanding his release. Several human rights watchdog groups, as well as the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, called on the authorities to drop the new charges while the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for Huseynov’s release. As a result of mounting pressure, the charges were dropped and Huseynov was released in March 2019 after having served his full two year sentence.

So much for emancipation

It was not the way Azerbaijani feminist activists would have wanted to celebrate the country’s first ever women’s march.[4] Instead of celebrating the achievements of Azerbaijani women, police chose to celebrate the day with slaps and kicks. But not from the police per se. A collection of older women, many who were later identified as fruit and flower sellers, charged into the crowd of protestors to shout at and harass them. There were slaps and shoves for both the marchers and the journalists covering the event. Police were there, to idly watch and observe.

Meanwhile on an international diplomacy stage, negotiations over disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh were back on the agenda. Except that President Ilham Aliyev refused to accept the proposal to include Nagorno-Karabakh officials at the negotiation table ahead of the summit in Vienna.[5][6]

He did, however, agree to release over 50 political prisoners during the annual presidential pardons over the Novruz celebrations in March. The good news was quickly followed with some bad news – the editor of the ‘criminal.az’ website, Anar Mammadov was handed a suspended sentence of five and half years with a two year probation period.[7] Mammadov was found guilty of making public calls against the state, abuse of professional duties and forgery, all of which Mammadov and his lawyer refuted in court to no avail.

Then a massive fire at one of the shopping malls in Baku burned the place to the ground. It was one of eight large fires in 2019 that damaged businesses in the capital.[8] These fires raised one of the most pressing issues in Azerbaijan – the presence of a shadow economy and its consequences, not only on economic transparency but the ability to engage in any kind of healthy business in the country. Many business owners who suffered great costs during the fires complained of the absence of property insurance. This, however, is directly linked to the commercial agreements made between the property owners and business owners. In Azerbaijan, often, these agreements are not made. Partly due to the fact that often shops or businesses are owned by government employees. There is also a 14 per cent tax imposed on business owners which according to independent economists is too high given economic conditions in Azerbaijan.[9]

In April, Bayram Mammadov, one of the graffiti prisoners released during the March pardons, was rearrested and sentenced to 30 days in administrative detention on charges of resisting the police.[10] During his hearing, Mammadov said the charges were baseless and that he was innocent and that he had been subject to police violence after his arrest with officers on duty severely beating him. Two of the men who beat Mammadov sat in the courtroom during the hearing and although Mammadov pointed them out, the two men were let go while the judge ruled to keep the decision of the administrative sentence.

Nothing surprising there – in a country that lacks independent judiciary, the chances of accessing a fair trial are virtually non-existent. But the chances of getting a fair trial if you are George Russell who was racing in Baku during the Grand Prix increase substantially. While Mammadov was beaten, rearrested on false charges and sent away to detention, Baku was getting ready to host yet another round of the Azerbaijan Grand Prix. But sloppy preparations led to a rather embarrassing accident for the organisers. As set out above, ahead of the weekend’s race George Russell’s Williams struck a manhole cover during the practice sessions. The incident made the news, and even briefly turned into a meme. Immediately after the accident, Arif Rahimov, the promoter of the Azerbaijan Grand Prix and the executive director of Baku City Circuit said the damage caused will be covered as per an insurance agreement.[11] While the costs were not mentioned, it is worth mentioning that Rahimov, who happens to be the son of Azerbaijani Youth and Sports Minister Azad Rahimov, was in charge of picking the suitable bidder in the tender to become the official organiser of the race.[12] But it just happened that Rahimov junior’s company received the right to host the competition without any tender which is a violation of Azerbaijani laws. For the likes of Mammadov, one lives below the law, but for the likes of Rahimov, one lives above the law and very little can get in their way, including an accident.

Another major sporting event hiccup took place just a month later when Baku opened its doors – for the first time in its history – to the Europa League final, hosting Arsenal and Chelsea football clubs. If only this one was as easy to pull off as the European Games, or the Islamic Solidarity Games or even the Grand Prix. There was much criticism of Baku as a host city, even before the game. From expensive airfares, to a lack of hospitality infrastructure, to the capacity issues with Baku’s International terminal and last but not least, the safety concerns for Arsenal player, Armenian national Henrikh Mkhitaryan.

At least these were the issues that made the international headlines. There was little mention of the issues Azerbaijani citizens had to face during the games. In addition to main road closures, transportation routes were amended to accommodate football fans traveling from Georgia to Baku.[13]

Perhaps Azerbaijan is just one of the many countries in the world, where celebrating one’s heritage and commemorating Independence Day are less important than a football match.

A wave of protests

In October, two important rallies put a spotlight on Azerbaijan.[14] On October 19^th, the National Council of Democratic Forces (NCDF), an umbrella group of Azerbaijani opposition groups, organised an unsanctioned rally that was violently dispersed by local police. Demonstrators called for the release of all remaining political prisoners, guarantees for free and fair elections, and an end to economic injustice.[15] Among the many who were rounded up and arrested was Ali Karimli, leader of an opposition party – Popular Front. Karimli was severely beaten and then let go. Police refuted claims Karimli was beaten during detention in a statement, concluding Karimli injured himself while taking a fall. A statement released by the prosecutor office claimed Karimli sustained the injuries during a scuffle with police officers as he resisted arrest and managed to beat two police officers in the meantime.

But arrests began already days ahead of the scheduled rally. Former political prisoner and journalist Seymur Hezi was one of many arrested ahead of the rally. In the run-up to the demonstration, Azerbaijani investigative reporter Khadija Ismayilova said police also blocked three subway stations in an apparent attempt to thwart protesters from reaching the main rally site.[16] Meanwhile, activists reported disruptions in internet access across central Baku.

The following day, a group of women activists took to the streets calling to end all forms of violence against women.[17] The march was sparked by yet another victim of domestic violence, Leyle Mammadova who was stabbed by her husband in public.

Phantom reforms

After 16 years in power, surrounded by more or less the same old guard as his father, President Ilham Aliyev decided to shuffle things around. Shuffle is the key word here, because all the changes that have taken place among government officials over the recent months indicate no real reform but rather an illusion of it.

In October, Aliyev replaced the second most powerful man in the country, the chief of staff Ramiz Mehdiyev. Then the Prime Minister Novruz Mammadov was replaced by a slightly younger technocrat Ali Asadov. Meanwhile, a man of all traits, Mikayil Jabbarov took on his third ministerial posting, this time as the Minister of Economy after having served as Minister of Education and later as Minister in charge of taxes. Jokes about Jabbarov collecting different ministerial titles were abundant among Azerbaijani activists. Aliyev also reshuffled his Cabinet of Ministers and the Presidential Apparatus.

In December, the Azerbaijani National Parliament was dissolved following the ruling party initiative and early elections are scheduled for February 9^th 2020.

Some have praised these changes, but in absence of real legal, judicial, and social reforms, none of these new appointments give hope.[18] Among them, is Rauf Mirkadirov, a veteran Azerbaijani journalist who said, “Reforms are a new ideology, a new management system, and not new people. With a good system, even a bad manager cannot ruin everything […]. Without fundamental reforms affecting all spheres, we cannot create a good system of government.”[19]

The recent municipal election held on December 23^rd, attest to just how far the ruling elite of Baku – even with newly appointed officials and the talk about reforms – are willing to go to protect their position. Reports of ballot stuffing, multiple voting by a single individual at different polling stations, and intimidation of journalists were abundant.[20] However the election of a few young faces, such as former journalist Vafa Nagi and civil society activist Rufat Aliyev gives some hope. Theirs was a real fight, something that the government in power has not done in decades and most likely forgotten what it means.

Photo by President.az, under Creative Commons.

[1] Paul Doyle, Why did Uefa hand Azerbaijan hosting rights for the Europa League final?, The Guardian, May 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2019/may/16/uefa-handed-azerbaijan-europa-league-final-baku-chelsea-arsenal

[2] Dominic Casciani, Zamira Hajiyeva: How the wife of a jailed banker spent £16m in Harrods, BBC, May 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48433012

[3] Arzu Geybullayeva, Azerbaijanis pressure government to #FreeMehman after blogger endures 12 days on hunger strike, Global Voices, January 2019, https://globalvoices.org/2019/01/08/azerbaijanis-pressure-government-to-freemehman-after-blogger-endures-12-days-on-hunger-strike/

[4] Arzu Geybulla, Azerbaijan: Celebrating Women with Slaps and Kicks, Global Voices, March 2019, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/azerbaijan-celebrating-women-slaps-and-kicks

[5] RFE/RL, Aliyev Rejects Armenian Proposal To Include Karabakh Officials in Peace Talks, March 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/aliyev-rejects-armenian-proposal-to-include-karabakh-officials-in-peace-talks/29821933.html

[6] RFE/RL, Armenia-Azerbaijan Summit Described As ‘Positive,’ ‘Constructive;, March 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-azerbaijan-summit-vienna-positive-nagorno-karabakh/29850997.html

[7] Council of Europe, Anar Mammadov Gets Suspended Prison Sentence, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists, April 2019, https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/detail-alert?p_p_id=sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_col_id=column-3&p_p_col_count=7&_sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet_alertPK=56733828

[8] Meydan Tv, Fire in the capital, December 2019, https://www.meydan.tv/az/article/paytaxtdaki-yanginlar/?ref=list-news

[9] Ibid 8.

[10] RFLE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service, Pro-Democracy Activist Rearrested In Azerbaijan After Amnesty Release, April 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/pro-democracy-activist-rearrested-in-azerbaijan-after-amnesty-release/29857422.html

[11] Pete Baumgartner and Hafiz Babali, Family Connections Fuel Controversy Over Azerbaijan Grand Prix, June 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/family-connections-fuel-controversy-over-azerbaijan-grand-prix/28575756.html

[12] Ibid 11.

[13] Rashim Shaliyev, Beyond the controversies, Baku’s Europa League final brought little for locals, OC Media, June 2019, https://oc-media.org/beyond-the-controversies-baku-s-europa-league-final-brought-little-for-locals/

[14] Nailia Bagirova, Polina Devitt, Margarita Antidze and Gareth Jones, Azeri police detain scores of protesters, including opposition party leader, Reuters, October 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-azerbaijan-opposition-protests/azeri-police-detain-scores-of-protesters-including-opposition-party-leader-idUSKBN1WY0DM

[15] Human Rights Watch, Azerbaijan: Peaceful Rallies Dispersed Violently, October 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/22/azerbaijan-peaceful-rallies-dispersed-violently

[16] RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service, Baku Police Detain Dozens As Opposition Rallies, October 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/police-arrest-opposition-activists-ahead-of-baku-rally/30225138.html

[17] RFE/RL, Photo Galleries: Azerbaijani Capital Rocked By Weekend of Protests, October 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/weekend-of-protests-shakes-azerbaijan/30227692.html

[18] Thomas De Waal, is Change Afoot in Azerbaijan?, Carnegie Europe: Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, November 2019, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80271

[19] Turan: Informasiya Agentliyi, Experts doubt the effectiveness of so-called “Azerbaijani reforms”, October 2019, http://www.turan.az/ext/news/2019/10/free/Want%20to%20Say/en/84843.htm

[20] RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service, Azerbaijanis Vote in Municipal Elections, December 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijanis-vote-in-municipal-elections/30340791.html

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Human Rights

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Azerbaijan

South Caucasus

Development and diplomacy are key to Global Britain’s success

Join our mailing list

Narrowing the gap – The case for DFID to focus more on tackling inequality

Join our mailing list

A feminist foreign policy: What would it mean for the UK?

Join our mailing list

Putting well-being and the interests of future generations at the heart of foreign policy

Join our mailing list

Finding Britain’s role in a changing world: Conclusions and Recommendations

Join our mailing list

De-radicalisation tactics in the North Caucasus can serve as a lesson and a warning

Join our mailing list

Central Europe, a brief analysis of the Visegrad Group’s function within the EU political framework

Join our mailing list

Passing on the authoritarian torch: power transition in Central Asia

Join our mailing list

The Death of a General: What’s next for Iran, Iraq and the wider Middle East?

Join our mailing list

The last year in Azerbaijan: the highs and lows

Join our mailing list

Join our mailing list