Finding Britain’s role in a changing world: Conclusions and Recommendations

Article by Adam Hug, Dr Abigael Baldoumas, Katy Chakrabortty and Dr Danny Sriskandarajah

March 3, 2020

Finding Britain’s role in a changing world: Conclusions and Recommendations

The extent to which the United Kingdom is to be taken seriously on the world stage post-Brexit will depend significantly on whether it has the confidence to stand up for what it says it believes in, or risk its focus on trade being seen as a sign of weakness and inexorable decline. There is a widely shared fear, particularly in the short to medium term as the UK completes its conscious uncoupling from the European Union, that commercial considerations will overwhelm other priorities. If the UK is seen to ignore its stated values and wider strategic interests in pursuit of new trade deals, the Brexit process will have diminished the UK’s standing in the world rather than marking the start of a new and more vibrant chapter. The UK must aspire to be more than simply a cold, wet Dubai.

A whole-government approach to the UK’s foreign policy is to be welcomed. However, it is important to ensure that the UK’s values do not get lost amid inter-departmental wrangling; they must instead be mainstreamed to all those involved in policy-making and delivery. A joined-up government should not come at the expense of the world’s poorest people or those facing human rights abuses and conflict.

The UK has an opportunity to articulate a powerful vision for ‘Global Britain’ that is defined by commitments to human rights, inclusive representation at home and abroad, and by the ways it uses resources to have the greatest impact on poverty and inequality. The current Foreign Secretary has said that the ‘guiding lights’ for the current integrated policy review ‘will be free trade, democracy, human rights and the international rule of law’.[1] Different stakeholders and political actors will have different views about what should be contained in such a statement of values, but whatever the government decides, a clear, concise declaration that enumerates the key principles would be very helpful. Authors in this collection have set out potential principles for such a declaration including ensuring policy alignment with the Sustainable Developments Goals (SDGs); ensuring wider representation of women, young people and marginalised communities (both from the UK and our partners in the Global South) in the policy development process; and ensuring that policies uphold longstanding goals around support for democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Baroness Anelay has written about the need to incorporate the ‘Ruggie Principles’ on business and human rights into the UK trade agenda.[2] Stephen Twigg has spoken in detail about the need for a clear set of indicators on economic inequality and the centrality of gender to development to assess policy impact. Marissa Conway makes the case that a feminist foreign policy would provide a strong ethical framework to guide decisions and set a new international standard. The Government’s Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review should help define and refine these principles into a clear and codified statement of the values of ‘Global Britain’ that would give an unambiguous signal to the international community and to stakeholders across the Government.

Building on such a statement of values, the Government should consider enhancing existing consultation practices by setting a ‘Global Britain’ values test for all major policy and spending decisions with an international dimension, including trade deals. This would set out the Government’s impact assessment of how each decision will affect the goals enumerated in the ‘Global Britain’ values statement and examine its implications for the needs of future generations and the most vulnerable people in the world. The results of this assessment should then be published ahead of decisions being taken to encourage feedback, input and scrutiny from Parliament, key stakeholders and the wider public.

Keeping in mind the ideals of good governance, transparency and accountability that the UK looks to promote abroad, the Government should think carefully about how it develops new decision-making processes. It should rethink its current approach that limits parliamentary accountability and public scrutiny over trade deals. Given past critiques of decision-making in the EU when the UK was a member, new processes in Westminster should not be less publicly accountable than the processes for scrutiny by the European Parliament, Member States and public that it has just left. As proposed by Ruth Bergan and Dr Emily Jones, the government should publish its draft negotiating mandates (with headline information about priorities); the International Trade Select Committee or a new Trade Scrutiny Committee needs to be involved in regular dialogue with ministers and officials with scope for proper scrutiny on the progress of ongoing negotiations; and the agreed trade deals should be subject to a proper debate and approval vote in Parliament.[3] Similarly, new UK trade deals should have at least as strong human rights clauses as the deals being done by the EU and where possible it should seek to strengthen them.

While developing its own foreign policy independent of the EU, the UK still needs to show it is willing to work with like-minded partners. This will not only involve seeking to build a strong foreign policy and security partnership with the EU as part of the post-Brexit process, but it should also seek to enhance or create a range of bilateral mechanisms with Member States that augment, but do not seek to replace, relationships with the EU, such as UK-France defence cooperation under the Lancaster House Treaties and continued involvement in the E3 group on Iran.[4] As Lord McConnell argues, the UK must also seek to deepen relations with countries who share similar values and not-dissimilar strategic positions, such as Canada, Japan and New Zealand, with the UK-Canadian joint Campaign on Media Freedom being an important example of the potential for joint working.[5] The UK will also need to retain an active presence at international forums to project its continuing global role – as Rt Hon Tobias Ellwood points out, the absence of senior ministers from the February 2020 Munich Security Conference was not seen as a good sign by Britain’s international partners.

Alongside new state-level alliances, the government should reaffirm its commitment to working in partnership with civil society. Civil society networks reinforce and deepen state-level cooperation. Many of the authors in this collection highlight the role of civil society in tackling so many of the challenges facing the world today: Baroness Anelay on delivering international development goals; Jonathan Cohen, Dr Theresa Dumasy and Richard Reeve on peacebuilding and security; Marissa Conway on shaping values-based foreign policy; Ruth Bergen and Dr Emily Jones on trade; and Sophie Howe on sustainable societies. Globally, restrictions on civil society space are increasing,[6] but the government should ensure that its own actions, including counter-terrorism agendas, do not inadvertently restrict civil society space further.

A clear focus on continued engagement in the UK’s neighbourhood aligns with its capabilities, the threats it faces and its opportunities. Given the pressure on Europe’s eastern flank from Russia, the UK should continue to show its support for the Baltic States and other NATO Member States, as well as with Ukraine. There will also be scope to show renewed and enhanced engagement with NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE), working within them to reform their processes and ensure that they meet both their founding objectives and the values and priorities which the UK is seeking to promote.[7] It will be important to ensure that the contentious domestic debate about the way in which the European Convention on Human Rights is incorporated into British law through the Human Rights Act takes place in a way that does not undermine the UK’s commitment to the Convention itself nor the UK’s membership of the CoE, or further encourage other CoE members to ignore their responsibilities under the Convention.[8]

One way to show that the UK is not being overly cowed by commercial constraints will be ensuring that UK ambassadors feel supported and encouraged to speak out on human rights and other abuses taking place in the countries where they are posted. Such actions should often be coordinated with other like-minded partners to benefit from strength in numbers, whilst not being afraid to show leadership where necessary. Ministerial statements should follow a similar approach. While the UK is not in a position to dictate terms to countries abusing human rights and other international values, such statements are often of significant value to local activists working to defend their rights.

With the spectre of a no-deal Brexit removed, immediate concerns about existing EU funding for UK non-governmental organisations (NGOs) through 2020 have been alleviated.[9] However, it remains unclear how and in what form the £1.5 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) that is currently dispensed through EU mechanisms will be repatriated. As has been argued by a number of authors, not least Baroness Anelay and Theo Clarke MP, our development expertise and aid budget remain major global assets in building a values-based foreign policy. The government’s integrated review should be an opportunity for development expertise to have influence across our foreign policy, creating policy coherence for development, and therefore maintain a values-based and long-term strategic vision for our foreign policy that helps create a more peaceful, prosperous, and equitable world for all. Proposals to subsume the Department for International Development (DFID) under the auspices of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) should be shelved, and the government should ensure that aid spending across all departments retains a strong poverty focus – in line with the International Development Act. At an operational level, DFID could explicitly consider the impact of development programming on economic inequality. This could, for instance, result in greater focus on supporting the public provision of health, high quality education and social protection.

The UK is an international centre of excellence for peacebuilding, with experienced NGOs and academic experts who have until recently received a significant proportion of their project funding through pooled EU grants. It will be important to ensure that as funding streams are repatriated to direct UK control this expertise is maintained and developed. This may mean reviewing and revising existing UK mechanisms for funding peacebuilding to ensure that they are agile and appropriate for civil society peacebuilding work. Similarly, existing support for the FCO’s human rights and governance initiatives, both through embassies and through centrally coordinated schemes should be built upon and enhanced, rather than risk marginalisation behind economic and trade priorities. Wherever possible such mechanisms should be flexible enough to support smaller and specialist NGOs and experts, rather than being more accessible to large consultancies as can be the case.

As the Foreign Secretary has already announced, one way to show leadership on human rights issues would be to increase the use of ‘Magnitsky’ sanctions against human rights abusers who have some financial connections to the UK. The use of these and other financial instruments, such as Unexplained Wealth Orders, are to be warmly welcomed but it is important to ensure they are being used consistently based on the level of wrongdoing rather than the strategic alignment of their country of origin.[10] To assist with this process, it will be vital to ensure the full implementation of the Registration of Overseas Entities Bill, as set out in the Queen’s Speech, which will finally create the long-awaited beneficial ownership register for UK properties owned by offshore-entities, as well as the wider 2019–2022 Economic Crime Plan.[11]

As is made clear by the essays on trade from Ruth Bergen and Dr Emily Jones, as well as by Baroness Anelay, it is impossible to separate global political foreign policy from international economic issues. The promotion of an international rules-based order also requires the UK to lead in setting and enforcing fair global economic rules that work for everyone and that deliver positive outcomes in line with the SDGs as well as international commitments on climate change and human rights. Baroness Anelay’s suggestion to include economic issues in the remit of the National Security Council is one part of a solution, but it also requires articulating solutions to global economic challenges that put the rights and needs of people at the centre. It will mean putting our own house in order as well as working to make the global economic rules as fair as possible. The ongoing OECD-BEPS discussions, including a minimum effective corporate tax rate, are one opportunity for the UK to engage positively to strengthen international governance. Meanwhile, the UK should ensure its own Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies continue to reform to achieve higher standards of tax transparency.[12]

The United Nations Climate Summit in Glasgow (COP26) represents a chance for real climate leadership from the UK Government and is the first big test of a values-based vision for ‘Global Britain’. As Caroline Lucas MP argues, this will be dependent on investment in the hard work of diplomacy to raise the ambition of other nations’ plans to reduce emissions, getting our own house in order at home, and a relentless focus on a just way forward for the countries and communities worst affected. Beyond the COP, policy coherence is key. As Caroline Lucas sets out clearly, the government cannot continue to finance fossil fuel projects overseas while claiming climate leadership. The UK’s trade regime could be a powerful expression of its commitment to environmental and sustainability policy, as Ruth Bergen and Dr Emily Jones make clear. The government should review all trade provisions in its trade agreements to ‘stress test’ them against climate goals as well as human rights commitments, potentially using the suggested ‘Global Britain’ values process outlined above.

In a fast-changing world with new powers rising, old institutions struggling and future challenges emerging, having a clear approach to values in British foreign policy is not just about doing what we think is right but about ensuring we are actively helping to shape the international systems, norms and rules that the UK will have to work within for decades to come. The threats to the idea of liberal democracy from increasingly confident authoritarian states and internal strains and inequalities in established democracies are real, and need to be addressed to halt and reverse its decline. As a medium-sized power, albeit one with considerable assets, the UK will need to show it is still willing to work collaboratively with partners, and to use the tools of influence available to it to creatively and meaningfully shape the future direction of the international system and to respond effectively to specific crises and abuses of its values.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this publication that values should be an important part of the foundations of future UK foreign policy, we would like to make a number of recommendations.

The UK Government should:

Agree a clear ‘Global Britain’ values statement of the principles underpinning the UK’s role in the world.
Use the values statement to develop a ‘Global Britain Benchmark’ that assesses the impact of new policies against these principles.
Demonstrate a renewed commitment to engage with and reform the regional and multilateral institutions the UK remains a part of, while building new partnerships for the future.
Defend and maintain the spirit as well as the fact of its commitment to allocate 0.7 per cent Gross National Income (GNI) to international development assistance by:
Keeping a separate Department for International Development with a Secretary of State for International Development;
Ensuring aid spending across all departments retains a strong poverty focus – in line with the International Development Act; and by the
Coordination and sharing of best practice on aid spending, which would see other government departments meeting higher standards on aid transparency.
Show that the UK still has the confidence and stature to stand up for its values by supporting those who defend them, and speaking out and taking action when they are abused, by:
Encouraging ambassadors and ministers to condemn human rights abuses wherever they occur;
Actively using and equitably applying new ‘Magnitsky’-style personal sanctions;
Fully implementing new measures to improve financial transparency, and take further action on tax havens; and
Increasing and improving UK funding for peacebuilding and human rights.
Remain actively committed to the promotion of human rights, defence and security in the European neighbourhood, of which the UK is still a part.
Take decisive and immediate action to demonstrate climate leadership, including:
- Announcing a high-ambition Nationally Defined Contribution (NDC) for COP26 and working with countries around the world to aim for increased ambition in their NDCs, in time to know how much is left to do to close the gap between current plans and the aim of limiting warming to 1.5°C;
- Scaling up resources to impacted communities, including a new goal for climate finance for adaptation, and leading efforts to find new and additional sources of finance for loss and damage;
- Immediately stopping all new support for fossil fuels (oil, coal and gas) and phasing out existing investments;
- Implementing policies at home that demonstrably put us on track for net zero as soon as possible, without using international offsets, and recognising that – without the inclusion of consumption emissions – this is only part of the job.
Ensure efforts to address international economic issues are joined up with global political foreign policy by:
- Including economic issues within the remit of the National Security Council; and
- Partaking fully in the OECD-BEPS discussions, including on a minimum effective corporate tax rate, as well as ensuring that the UK’s own Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies continue to reform to meet higher standards of tax transparency.

Adam Hug became Director of the Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) in November 2017. He had previously been the Policy Director at the FPC from 2008–2017. His research focuses on human rights and governance issues, particularly in the former Soviet Union. He also writes on UK and EU foreign policy.

Dr Abigael Baldoumas is a humanitarian policy advisor for Oxfam GB. She holds a DPhil in Political Science from Oxford University on the role of social movements in shaping public policy in the UK. She has worked in international development since 2012. Her work focuses on forced displacement, gender justice and rights-based humanitarian response.

Katy Chakrabortty is the head of advocacy at Oxfam GB. She has been at Oxfam since 2009, and as well as political relations work she has played a major role in Oxfam’s Even it Up campaign against extreme economic inequality. Her background is in political campaigning and parliamentary advocacy, having previously worked for the Electoral Reform Society, Amnesty International and DeHavilland.

Dr Danny Sriskandarajah joined Oxfam GB as chief executive in January 2019 from CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance of which he was Secretary General for six years. Prior to that he was Director General of the Royal Commonwealth Society, Interim Director of the Commonwealth Foundation and held various posts at the Institute for Public Policy Research.

[1] FCO and The Rt Hon Dominic Rabb MP, Foreign Secretary’s introduction to the Queen’s Speech debate, January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-introduction-to-queens-speech-debate

[2]Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework and Guiding Principles, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/un-secretary-generals-special-representative-on-business-human-rights/un-protect-respect-and-remedy-framework-and-guiding-principles

[3] For more background see: Trade Justice Movement, Securing democracy in UK Trade policy, November 2017, https://www.tjm.org.uk/documents/briefings/0870_TJM_SECURING_DEMOCRACY_2019_PRF1.pdf

[4] Ministry of Defence, UK and France defence cooperation, September 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-and-france-defence-cooperation; Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street and The Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP, E3 statement on the JCPoA: 12 January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/e3-statement-on-the-jcpoa-12-january-2020

[5] There are of course a number of caveats raised about the lack of clear actions being taken from the work so far as highlighted by campaign groups such as: Article 19, UK: Government must take more action on media freedom, September 2019, https://www.article19.org/resources/uk-government-must-take-more-action-on-media-freedom/; Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Liberty is under attack as journalists are silenced, say MPs, UK Parliament, September 2019, https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/news-parliament-2017/global-media-freedom-report-published-17-19/

[6] Danny Sriskandarajah, Under threat: five countries in which civic space is rapidly closing, Open Democracy, January 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/openglobalrights-openpage/under-threat-five-countries-in-which-civic-space-is-rapi/

[7] See for example the ideas set out in: Adam Hug, Institutionally blind? International organisations and human rights abuses in the former Soviet Union, The Foreign Policy Centre, February 2016, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/institutionallyblind/; and Adam Hug, Institutionally Blind: The next steps in reforming the Council of Europe and the OSCE, The Foreign Policy Centre, November 2017, https://fpc.org.uk/institutionally-blind-next-steps-reforming-council-europe-osce/

[8] David Maddox, Attorney General vows to change Human Rights Act and limit power of Supreme Court judges, Daily Express, February 2020, https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1242879/attorney-general-suella-braverman-human-rights-act-supreme-court-judges-cabinet-reshuffle

[9] DFID, EU-funded programmes under the withdrawal agreement, January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/eu-funded-programmes-under-the-withdrawal-agreement

[10] Home Office, Circular 003/2018: unexplained wealth orders, February 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/circular-0032018-criminal-finances-act-unexplained-wealth-orders/circular-0032018-unexplained-wealth-orders

[11] Transparency International UK, Measures to tackle dirty money in UK property market a major step in fight against corruption, December 2019, https://www.transparency.org.uk/press-releases/registration-of-overseas-entities-bill-queens-speech-2019/; HM Treasury and Home Office, Economic crime plan 2019 to 2022, July 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/economic-crime-plan-2019-to-2022

[12] The OECD and G20 are working on a new Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) framework to address corporate tax avoidance. See https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/

Photo credit: Lighthouse and sunset, Isle of Skye. Image by Frank Winkler from Pixabay.

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De-radicalisation tactics in the North Caucasus can serve as a lesson and a warning

Article by Lana Estemirova

February 12, 2020

De-radicalisation tactics in the North Caucasus can serve as a lesson and a warning

As Britain was shaken by its third terrorist attack in as many months, the Conservative government was quick to respond by calling for tougher sentencing for all those convicted of terror offences.[1] Michael Gove suggested that terrorist should be ‘jailed indefinitely’[2]– while opposition politicians and academics have emphasised the total inadequacy of rehabilitation programmes running in prisons[3]. Waiting lists are long, even when offenders ask for help, with programmes woefully underfunded and unable to meet demand.

This is not a problem isolated to just the United Kingdom (UK). Unexpected terrorist attacks carried out using primitive weapons, single-handedly or in small groups have become a part of reality across the world. As the UK contemplates these moves, it is worth looking at the example of Russia’s North Caucasus region where we can see the results of both punitive and preventative approaches to dealing with the issue of domestic Islamist terrorism.

Roughly 3400 people, mostly from Russia’s Muslim Northern Caucasus republics, have left Russia to join ISIS since the start of the conflict.[4] In response, local governments alongside the Federal Security Service (FSB) have designed a series of soft and punitive measures to tackle extremism. While many tactics (especially Chechen) involve violent threats, illegal imprisonment, torture and intimidation[5], there is also a less-known pool of constructive approaches with a focus on preventing radicalisation.

While some methods to counter-violent extremism are similar across republics, they vary depending on regional context. Chechnya’s complicated political landscape, shaped by two wars with Russia and pro-Kremlin Ramzan Kadyrov’s iron fisted rule, requires a separate look. The underlying causes of radicalisation are similar across the regions – ethnic conflicts, police brutality, corruption, unemployment and a general lack of prospects are among the external factors. Internal factors often include a personality crisis, low self-esteem, an inability to fit in and a desire for adventure.[6] Compassion for the victims of Assad’s regime was also an important motivator for people to go to Syria. According to Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, director at Conflict analysis and prevention centre, a single ‘terrorist’ type doesn’t exist, radicalisation depends on a range of individual factors that can equally affect people from London to Grozny.

A big focus across the predominantly Muslim republics, is an emphasis on prevention, with a lot of recourses poured into programmes that are aimed at averting the radicalisation of the youth before it occurs. There are ‘heavy weapons’ such as mandatory seminars and presentations for students carried out by government officials, accompanied by slideshows and reports. This counter-radicalisation state propaganda is largely ineffectual, often deemed dull and boring; there is a general sense of fatigue amongst young people when it comes to the topic. Other state-sponsored religious programmes, whereby state-affiliated imams attempt to use theological arguments to dissuade against extremism also fail to resonate due to their close association with the authorities. Many officials handling counter-extremism programmes in the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic are beginning to accept that repetitively hammering in a blunt anti-radicalism message is not the most effective method at prevention – and at times can even spark interest in the forbidden fruit.[7]

Other more successful state-funded programmes aim to channel young minds towards other pursuits. The range is quite diverse; it involves volunteering, summer camps, sports, military training for teenagers and even expeditions to recover relics from the Second World War. The overall aim is to divert young people in a more patriotic direction.[8]

An abundance of government grants for counter-extremist initiatives encourages competition between NGOs, who have produced a range of nuanced and creative approaches to capturing the minds of young people. The high levels of unemployment and corruption in the North Caucasian republics provide gloomy prospects for young people, leaving some of them more prone to radicalisation. One approach is the ‘Own business’ [9] programme, which helps people get their small enterprises off the ground, whether that’s developing a business plan or providing them with a microcredit. It also offers a range of courses and seminars that attract entrepreneurs from different regions, giving them an opportunity to collaborate and learn from each other. This is an example of a positive initiative that focuses on developing skills and bringing like-minded people together.

Ingushetia seems to have one of the most thought-out series of programmes targeting extremist ideology – one of them is ‘DISlike extremism’ that targets high school and university students. Unlike other programmes, ‘DISlike…’ has a Q&A session in the end that gives young people an opportunity to express themselves, explore topics that are relevant to them and tell the organisers how it could be improved.

The obvious pattern here is that creatively engaging young people in activities where they can prove themselves and be treated with dignity is a more successful strategy than simply patronising and lecturing them. Multi-targeted approaches that encourage cooperation and cross-cultural dialogue are crucial in a highly volatile region with raging inequality. It’s also vital to have an open, democratic discussion that is open to the public’s suggestions and constructive criticism.

This appears to have worked for a time with those groups deemed most at risk. ‘At risk’ groups, which can be defined as those who have showed an active interest in radical ideas and non-traditional strands of Islam such as Salafism, receive a very different treatment from local government and security officials. Salafism is an ultraconservative branch of Sunni Islam that preaches the return to a purer form of Islam as shown by the first three generations of Prophet Muhammad. The followers of Salafism are treated with suspicion by the security officials but in Ingushetia and Dagestan (up until 2012 Sochi Olympics) Salafi mosques were allowed to function alongside others. The overwhelming majority of Salafis do not show interest in joining ISIS or carrying out jihad at home. Khamzat Chumakov, a popular Salafi preacher from Ingushetia used religious arguments to dissuade his followers from even considering going to Syria. He claimed that a true believer should not put himself in the place where there is fitna (disagreement) between Muslims, providing examples from religious texts to prove his point. That appeared to be very effective in deterring people from going to Syria.[10]

Unfortunately, Russian security services have greater faith in more repressive methods for tackling radicalisation. In an attempt to wipe out any sign of insurgency before the Sochi Olympics in 2012, massive ‘cleansing’ operations were carried out throughout the North Caucasus, especially in Chechnya and Dagestan. Hundreds of people suspected of holding radical views were illegally detained, beaten, tortured and even murdered. In Dagestan, the authorities had introduced ‘profuchet’ (a preventative register) for Salafis, with regular police check ups and interrogations, merely because of their religious beliefs. Those who ended up on the list struggle to find a job and often find themselves in social isolation. The ‘profuchet’ had become a tool of repression, often used unjustifiably to make innocent people’s lives difficult. Despite significant pressure, the ex-president of Inguhsetia, Yunus-Bek Evkourov refused to shut down the re-integration programmes for ex-militants and did not support the crackdown on Salafis prior to the 2012 Olympic Games. That possibly explains why Ingushetia has one of the lowest radicalisation rates in the Northern Caucasus.

Unlike most of the European states, Russia has been surprisingly willing to allow the wives and children of ISIS fighters[11] to return from Syria. The calculation behind this move is that leaving those children to grow up in conflict zone will make them more prone to future radicalisation. However, no easy life awaits them back home: many women are arrested and interrogated by the police. Families receive barely any psychological support and rehabilitation upon their return. The treatment of ISIS women and their children varies depending on the republic, for instance in Chechnya and Ingushetia their re-integration in society is allowed and welcomed, whereas in Dagestan they often end up on the notorious ‘preventative registry’ list.

Driving Salafis underground does not stop their beliefs but rather strengthens it. Religious crackdowns, arrests and persecution is a quick-fix that doesn’t tackle the root problems causing radicalisation. In Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkarya, where officials act within the law and don’t use heavy-handed repression, the numbers of radicalised individuals is much lower, as measured by the low numbers of attacks on policemen and government officials.[12] There has been a steady decrease in radicalisation over the past several years, as demonstrated by decreased terror attacks across the republics. However, as ISIS is largely defeated on the ground in Syria and Iraq, it is difficult to predict how exactly this will affect domestic radicalisation levels across the country.

Tackling any anti-social and criminal behaviour, ranging from religious radicalisation of youth, to knife crime and the drug trade requires a complex approach that should focus on prevention, not only punishment. Radicalisation is often a symptom of a deeper societal malaise, often perpetuated by inadequate, corrupt local government and law-ignoring security officials. A ‘lock them up and throw away the key’ approach to terrorism ignores the multi-faceted influences that lead to radicalisation. Leaving offenders to languish in prison, without targeted and well-funded interventions leaves them prone to even deeper radicalisation and commitment to act upon their beliefs – a point poignantly underscored in the UK by the recent terror attack within the walls of a prison itself. A patient, nuanced approach focused on prevention that seeks to learn from effective de-radicalisation programmes across the world will produce more effective outcomes – closing the gaps through which fundamentalist ideas often seep with devastating consequences for the population as a whole.

Lana Estemirova is a graduate in International Relations from London School of Economics. She writes on Chechnya and human rights issues in Russia and is working on her first book.

[1] Peter Walker, London attack: PM says terrorism sentence changes may be applied retrospectively, The Guardian, February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/feb/03/prison-cuts-rishi-sunak-terrorism-suspects-streatham-attacker

[2] Simon Murphy and Rowena Mason, Terror offenders should be jailed indefinitely if necessary, says Gove, The Guardian, February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/feb/04/terror-offenders-should-be-jailed-indefinitely-if-necessary-says-gove

[3] Pen Mendonca, The London Bridge attack must not stop our vital work to tackle terrorism, The Guardian, December 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/dec/03/london-bridge-attack-2019-not-stop-work-prisoners-tackle-terrrorism

[4] Program: Hotspots, Experts discussed the prospects for radicalisation in the North Caucasus and measures to prevent it, ‘Memorial’ Human Rights Center, January 2019, https://memohrc.org/ru/news_old/eksperty-obsudili-perspektivy-radikalizacii-na-severnom-kavkaze-i-mery-po-ee

[5] Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, Will new waves of radicalisation in the North Caucasus be prevented?, Conflict Analysis and Prevention Center, January 2019, http://cap-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CVE_En.pdf

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid

[8] Ibid

[9] Caucasian Knot, Own Business and reality shows as methods of preventing extremism, Conflict Analysis and Prevention Center, December 2018, http://cap-center.org/виктория-гуревич-свой-бизнес-и-реалит/

[10] Ibid

[11] Andrew E. Kramer, Raised by ISIS, Returned to Chechnya: ‘These Children Saw Terrible Things’, The New York Times, February 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/24/world/europe/chechnya-russia-isis-children-return.html

[12] Ibid

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Central Europe, a brief analysis of the Visegrad Group’s function within the EU political framework

Article by Paolo Zucconi

February 11, 2020

Central Europe, a brief analysis of the Visegrad Group’s function within the EU political framework

Since the 1989 revolutions, the strategic priority of Central Europe was integration into the European Community (EC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Central European states returned to democratic Europe after 40 years of Soviet domination. In this strategic framework of integration with the West, Central Europe was involved in establishing a sub-regional partnership to facilitate the process and also to say goodbye to their Cold War past. The Visegrad Group is an example of a (non) institutional organisation that has helped such a process.

Although sub-regional cooperation in Europe was already established prior to the fall of communism (i.e. the Benelux Group and Nordic Cooperation), the proliferation of groupings after 1989 developed the need to understand the purpose, potential and limitations of the ‘children of the post–Cold war era’.[1] When the Visegrad Group was formed in 1991, its function was to integrate in the EC and improve mutual cooperation, democracy, and free-market capitalism in post-Soviet Central Europe. The group became an exclusive framework for both internally and externally-oriented sub-regional cooperation between its four Central European member states (V4 – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia).

The 2004 EU enlargement and the V4 function

The 2004 EU enlargement then introduced the V4 as a new sub-regional partnership in the European Union (EU) framework. Since then, all V4 states are full EU members and have the right to participate in shaping the EU’s future.[2] Over time, similarities among the V4 countries in terms of economic profile, geography and history have led to a greater awareness of how their intra-EU interests tend to overlap.

During the Czech V4 Presidency in 2003-2004 cooperation revitalised, embodied in a declaration adopted in Kroměříž in 2004.[3] It reflected the EU membership, the belief in common European heritage and the development of European architecture within existing Euro-Atlantic institutions. This group was considered an important actor by the EU institutions in the EU enlargement policy, keeping an open channel eastward.

Though European integration was the ultimate proof of the legitimacy of the V4 objective and challenge, three significant historical events occurred and fostered intra-V4 cooperation:

Firstly, the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004, as Moscow began to reassert itself in its sphere of influence and push back against the West’s attempts to expand NATO into its former territory.[4]
Then, the 2008 economic crisis and the 2011 Euro debt crisis, which proved to the V4 countries that the EU heavyweights were not necessarily reliable partners. The consequent adoption of austerity policies in the EU and collective efforts (EU, EBRD, IMF, ECB) to bail out the then-troubled Central European economies, strengthened this assumption. The V4 perceived the EU not as guarantor of economic prosperity as expected.[5]
Finally, the 2015 refugee and migration crisis and the outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum have provided a more favourable context for the V4 to reinforce cooperation, but with different goals from the 2004 Declaration. No more in the context of European integration but in the context of sovereignty and nationalism, which has considerably influenced and continues to influence the acceptance of the EU’s operating institutional framework.[6]

The Visegrad Group today

Today, the Visegrad Group’s function has changed. It is now characterised by extraordinary government prerogatives including limitations to constitutional provisions and rule of law, to the development of a free and open society.[7] It has become a pressure group of hybrid regimes contributing to base the EU on sovereignty and intergovernmental decision-making processes. The function has gone from pro-European cooperation to differentiation of interests of individual countries in specific strategic issues.

The Visegrad Group offers its members a useful model to discuss, represent and safeguard common interests in a collective manner within the regional and broader international political landscape.[8] The success of the Group can be measured by analysing the V4’s approach to key issues (i.e. migration and refugee crisis) of EU policy-making process.[9] The Visegrad Group is able to act as a ‘bloc’, exploiting the current vacuum of EU governance and maintaining its one-cause mobilisation capabilities against refugee and migrant redistribution across the EU, while enjoying billions of EU funds for economic development. For example, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, to safeguard Hungary from immigration, has erected a separation fence on the border with Serbia and Croatia. According to Deutsche Welle, in 2015, more than 170,000 people applied for asylum in Hungary while, in 2017, it was about 3,400.[10] The V4 approach to the refugee and migration crisis diverges significantly from Brussels. The V4 member states mostly disagree with quota principle of distribution of refugees and migrants and oppose the financial aid given to Turkey to stop refugees and migrants from entering in the EU.

The V4 states have been successful in promoting their strategic interests within the EU framework over the years. This success is based on flexibility and ‘transformational capacity’.[11] The Group is able to disagree on key strategic issues (i.e. relations with Russia)[12] while be strongly cohesive on pursuing its interests on other issues (i.e. the refugee and migration crisis)[13] without compromising the strength of the group.

When it comes to Russia, unlike the rest of the Visegrad Group, Hungary has good relations with the Russian Federation. In the last meeting in Budapest, Orbán and Putin discussed business and energy deals, making Hungary a close Russia’s ally in the EU.[14] According to Prime Minister Orbán, good relations with Russia are a necessity because of country’s geographical location.[15]

Poland instead is unlikely to re-approach to Russia and refuses any interference in its home affairs. There are both historical and strategic reasons for this. Poland suffered significant changes in its political structure and territories over the years, especially during the 18^th century and due to the fight against Soviet Russia in the 1920s. Important changes occurred just before and after World War II (WWII) as well. The Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (mostly known as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact) was used by Moscow to unilaterally occupy part of the country. At the end of WWII, the new frontiers of Central and East Europe were defined by leaders of the winning parties in the conferences in Tehran (1943), Yalta and Potsdam (1945). Poland formally belonged to the winners of the WWII, its eastern borders were also changed in accordance with the so-called Curzon line.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation emerged and the Polish-Russian relations entered a new phase. The turbulent history of conflicts and tensions with the Soviet Union and the subsequent mutual accusations of historical revisionism affects today relations. Russia’s current foreign policy agenda aimed at destabilising Eastern Europe (i.e. hostile influence operations and media campaigns) represent another significant challenge for Poland, the entire region and even the EU efforts for integration.

The energy policy is another crucial issue, especially the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project as bypasses East Europe, bringing natural gas from Russia to Germany.[16] Although the pipeline is expected to be operational in early 2021, it is likely to cause geopolitical tensions between Russia and East European countries, including Poland.[17] Also, Ukraine remains a strategic priority for Poland because a strong pro-European Ukraine would be an important ally in an anti-Russian perspective. The deep differences in security policy and a long-term mistrust do not make rapprochement very likely.

When it comes to European integration, the V4 countries partially disagree. Slovakia and the Czech Republic are more Europe-friendly than Hungary and Poland[18]. However, the Eurosceptic approach has overall increased in the region, affecting the chances for better European integration eastwards. The V4 seems to be more interested in strengthening a sub-regional partnership – promoting Western Balkans’ integration as well – rather than a stronger EU. The Czech, Hungarian and Polish EU Council presidencies made Western Balkan integration a priority on the agenda to finalise integration talks with Croatia and beginning preliminary accession negotiations with Serbia.[19]

Conclusion

Central Europe has recently gained importance due to the divisions of the political course of various states forming the V4, the different strategic orientation of the member states in the region, the strengthening of the asymmetric inter-governmentalism (favouring EU big member states over smaller countries).

The EU macro-political environment changed dramatically since 2004, whereas the complex set of emerged political and economic issues turned to multi-speed integration affecting initial Euro-enthusiasm.

The importance of the group is increasing due to internal challenge to EU cohesion and the variety of strategic preferences.

All of these elements intersect in an interesting matrix as the role of the Visegrad Group is evolving within the process of European integration. In the near future, it can work as amplifier, reinforcing or affecting the relationship between regional and sub-regional partnership in the EU. The Visegrad Group has the potential to become a more relevant actor in the EU political framework and pursue its strategic goals. However, the changes in the institutional structure of some member states, the emerged illiberal democracy and reduced rule of law in Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland has a negative impact over the V4’s influence in the EU.

[1] Bjurner, Anders. 1999. European Security at the End of the Twentieth Century: The Subregional Contribution. In Andrew Cottey, ed., Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe. UK: Macmillan.

[2] Pelkmans, Jacques. 2006. European Integration, Methods and Economic Analysis. 3rd edition. UK: Pearson Education.

[3] Declaration of Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on cooperation of the Visegrad Group countries after their accession to the European Union, 12 May 2004.

[4] Fraser, Derek. 2008. Taking Ukraine Seriously: Western and Russian Responses to the Orange Revolution.

[5] Stratfor Assessment. 2011. The Visegrad Group: Central Europe’s Bloc.

[6] Schmidt, Andrea. 2016. Friends forever? The Role of the Visegrad Group and European Integration in Politics in Central Europe. The Journal of the Central European Political Science Association.

[7] Morillas, Pol. 2016. Illiberal Democracies in the EU: the Visegrad Group and the Risk of Disintegration. Barcelona Centre for International Affairs.

[8] Törő, Csaba, Butler, Eamonn & Grúber, Károly. 2013. Visegrád: The Evolving Pattern of Coordination and Partnership After EU Enlargement. Europe – Asia Studies.

[9] Ivanova, Diana. 2016. Migrant Crisis and the Visegrad Group Policy. De Gruyter Open. Vol. XXII. No 1.

[10] Klein, Rahel. 2019. This is How the Visegrad Group Works. Deutsche Welle.

[11] Fawn, Frederick Julian. 2013. External Diplomatic Perceptions of Visegrad Cooperation. EUROPEUM; Fawn, Rick. 2013. Visegrad: Fit for Purpose?. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 46, 3, pp. 339-349.

[12] Dangerfield, Martin. 2011. Visegrad Group Cooperation and Russia. Conference paper. Journal of Common Market Studies.

[13] Ivanova, Diana. 2016. Migrant Crisis and the Visegrad Group Policy. De Gruyter Open. Vol. XXII. No 1.

[14] Financial Times. 2019. Orban-Putin talks compound disquiet over Hungary’s Russia ties.

[15] Gorondi, Pablo. 2019. Hungary’s Orban: Good relations with Russia are a necessity. Associate Press.

[16] Balcer, Adam & Buras, Piotr. 2016. An unpredictable Russia: the impact on Poland. European Council of Foreign Relations.

[17] Elliott, Stuart & Griffin Rosemary. 2020. Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline could be delayed to Q1 2021: Putin. S&P Global Markey Insights.

[18] Végh, Zsuzsanna. 2018. From Pro-European Alliance to Eurosceptic Protest Group? The case of the Visegrad Group. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies.

[19] Zgut, Edit & Zbytniewska, Karolina & Yar, Lucia & Plevák, Ondřej. 2019. Transforming words into deeds – the Visegrad Group and Western Balkans’ EU integration. Euractiv.

Topics

EU Reform

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Europe

EU Institutions

Passing on the authoritarian torch: power transition in Central Asia

Article by Francisco Olmos

February 7, 2020

Passing on the authoritarian torch: power transition in Central Asia

Three decades after gaining independence, the Central Asian republics have recently experienced changes in their leadership. The rulers that were in charge before the collapse of the Soviet Union are, in most cases, no longer present and the countries are now led by their successors. The authoritarian nature of the regimes has resulted in a lack of transparency in the power transitions, but trends have already emerged in the ways these have occurred and may continue to take place in the near future.

The authoritarian Central Asian states, with the exception of Tajikistan, where Rahmon has been in power since 1992, have only of late started being ruled by a second generation of presidents. The Soviet-era rulers of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan that steered their countries through independence and in the establishment of the states are no longer President. The Turkmen and Uzbek cases present similarities while the Kazakh scenario is different. Even though Emomali Rahmon did not rule the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and participated in the transition to independence, like Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev, Turkmenistan’s Saparmurat Niyazov and Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov who did rule their SSRs he can be considered to be the last ‘first generation leader’ still in power.[1]

The changes in leadership that have taken place in the region’s authoritarian regimes thus far provide two separate approaches to the transition of power. On the one hand, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have witnessed the sudden death of their first presidents and their substitution by regime insiders in a short and opaque process that took place within their respective elites. On the other hand, Kazakhstan has experienced a gradual handover that is still taking place where the former president has officially resigned but still exerts most of the authority in the country. These different methods are a result of the countries’ characteristics as well as the strategic vision of their leaders.

Self-management within the regime

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have experienced opaque power transitions following the deaths of Niyazov and Karimov. Both regimes perpetuated themselves through insiders that had been part of their predecessor’s government and that reached power without much disruption, gradually establishing their own rule by purging potentially rival elements. Even though Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan went through a similar process, they had differences due to the nature of their regimes and leadership.

The lack of transparency that has shrouded the Turkmen regime since its inception makes it difficult to analyse in detail the events that led to Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s rise to power. The death of Niyazov in 2006 was all but clear and, as a result of the lack of verifiable information, a number of rumours arose about his demise. Regardless of the way this happened, within hours of its official announcement, Turkmenistan’s then vice president and health minister was appointed head of state by the State Security Council and the Council of Ministers. This bypassed the constitutional order that stated that it was the chairman of the parliament, Ovezgeldy Atayev, who should have succeeded the president.[2] A show, in the form of elections a few months later, confirmed Berdimuhamedov as Turkmenistan’s second president.

What is noteworthy in the Turkmen case is the prompt and efficient way in which the elite, reduced after years of a personalistic regime, united and elevated an unexpected candidate who was not Niyazov’s explicit choice nor part of his family. There was no significant opposition, as far as we know, to Berdimuhamedov’s rise to power, with the legitimate successor, Atayev, being detained and imprisoned shortly after Niyazov’s death. The lack of information makes it impossible to know what happened behind the scenes in late 2006, but what is clear is that a regime insider reached power in collusion with and supported by the country’s elites.

In Uzbekistan the result was similar although the process varied due to a wider range of candidates and power centres. Shortly after the sudden death of Islam Karimov in August 2016, his Prime Minister for 13 years, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, was named interim president. In a case that has some similarities with Turkmenistan’s, this role was meant for the chairman of the Senate, who declined it in favour of Mirziyoyev, in a move of questionable constitutional validity. This was the first battle in a fight for power between Mirziyoyev, Finance Minister Rustam Azimov and, the considered kingmaker, head of the security services, Rustam Inoyatov. In a gradual process in which different actors and clan politics intervened, Mirziyoyev was able to be elected president and cement his power in detriment of his two other rivals.[3]

As in Turkmenistan, the deceased president was succeeded by someone from his inner-circle. However, in Uzbekistan, with different power centres, clan politics and a much larger and heterogeneous elite, the process was more uncertain and lengthy. It took Mirziyoyev months to be able to establish himself and even now there are elements within his regime that he has to balance out.

In both cases, neither Niyazov nor Karimov had defined plans for their succession which resulted in a period of uncertainty and a transition that was decided within the elites. In addition, their respective families did not take place in the process, either voluntarily or involuntarily, and in some instances, like Karimov’s estranged daughter Gulnara, their situation worsened as a result. This last point, among others, is what Nursultan Nazarbayev seems inclined to avoid.

Kazakhstan’s piloted transition

Nursultan Nazarbayev is the only leader of a former Central Asian Soviet Republic that remains in power, although not nominally. Nearing his 80^th birthday and having seen the situation that unfolded in neighbouring Uzbekistan after Karimov’s death and the lack of succession plans, Nazarbayev decided to act and ensure Kazakhstan would not experience the same after his demise. In order to achieve this, he decided for the power transition to take place during his lifetime and directed by himself; a first in Central Asian politics.

In March 2019, Nazarbayev surprisingly resigned and called for early presidential elections to choose his successor. He had already designated the former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to take over, which he officially did after winning an election in which there was not much competition. A technocrat, Tokayev is considered to be a transitory figure, a bridge between Elbasy, as Nazarbayev is also known, and a longer-term head of state.

While Tokayev is nominally the president, it is Nazarbayev who still holds the reins of power in the country. Through his tailor-made position of Chairman of the Security Council, Nazarbayev is still in charge of the country, even more so after a series of reforms in October 2019 that granted him powers over key government appointments to the detriment of Tokayev’s authority.[4] It is Nazarbayev who plays the role of head of state, attending different international summits in representation of Kazakhstan and meeting with his former counterparts, while Tokayev is relegated to the domestic sphere.[5]

The transition in Kazakhstan is still unfolding and therefore it is yet to be known if it will succeed. Nevertheless, such process is being moulded by Nazarbayev himself. As a result, Elbasy is ensuring the position and wealth of his family within the new regime that will emerge after his demise. This includes situating his daughter Dariga as the head of the Senate, which some observers interpret as a signal she might end up becoming the country’s first female president, although there is little evidence to support it.[6] However, by securing his family’s position and his legacy as the founder of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev has demonstrated to have a strategic vision that his Central Asian counterparts, so far, have lacked.

Hereditary succession, a real possibility?

Two models have emerged thus far in the transition of power in Central Asia’s authoritarian regimes: Turkmenistan’s and Uzbekistan’s change from within and Kazakhstan’s piloted handover. However, a new method may start to take shape: hereditary succession. This is a process that is unknown to the republics, and to see it occurring in the region we have to look back at the beginning of the 20^th century in the Emirate of Bukhara and Khanate of Khiva. Nevertheless, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan may be in the course of reviving this long-lost practice.

Among the Central Asian republics, Tajikistan is the only one who still is ruled by someone who got to power in the early 90s. Emomali Rahmon has been Tajikistan’s president since 1992, including the civil war, and it seems that he might be looking for his son Rustam to succeed him. To that effect, the 32 year old has already occupied a number of positions within the Tajik government, including heading the country’s main anti-corruption agency, being promoted to major general and, more importantly, being appointed mayor of the capital, Dushanbe, in 2017. At the same time, the parliament approved reducing the eligibility age from 35 to 30 for the presidency and the upper chamber.[7] The parliamentary and presidential elections that the country will undergo in 2020 could be a stepping stone in Rustam’s political future, including Rahmon taking a step back like Nazarbayev to make room for his son.

Turkmenistan seems to be going in a similar direction. Berdimuhamedov’s son Serdar has been designated to multiple government posts in the last years, including member of the Mejilis (Turkmenistan’s legislative chamber), Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and governor of the significant Ahal region.[8] His fast progression becomes more important when taking into account the questions surrounding his father’s health, including last summer’s rumours that he had died.

While the progression of both Rustam Emomali and Serdar Berdimuhamedov indicates that they are being groomed to succeed their fathers, this would be oversimplifying the situation. Firstly, it is unclear if the only objective behind Rahmon’s and Berdimuhamedov’s actions is to have their sons take over power. Positioning them well within the state, with enough power to be relevant in the case of regime change could be another aspiration. This would act as an insurance policy against other actors or political rivals who would want to undermine them and strip them of their wealth and influence. Secondly, even if the aim was for them to succeed their fathers, it is not clear that would be successful. Once the figures of Rahmon and Berdimuhamedov disappear, even if before they have ‘retired’ like Nazarbayev, there is no indication that the elites, even if diminished in Turkmenistan’s case in particular, would comply with their wishes and raise their children to power. Therefore, while hereditary succession remains a possibility in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, it is far from being a fact.

The transition of power in authoritarian states is always surrounded by uncertainty as the established procedures that dictate it are not respected due to the lack of democratic practises and institutions. So far Central Asia’s regimes have navigated this situation with swift, albeit opaque, transitions within the system, avoiding major disruptions for the state although not necessarily for the families and legacies of their former rulers. In this regard, Nazarbayev’s move last year opened a new possibility by pre-emptively controlling much of the transition before it actually happens, although it does not entirely guarantee its success. Lastly, a new trend seems to be emerging which is the prospect of hereditary succession. This last approach can be combined with the piloted transition but it is yet to be seen if it becomes a reality and, even if it does, if it will be ultimately successful.

Photo by President of Russia, Central Asian Cooperation Organisation Summit, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/trips/48832/photos/25413. No modifications to photo, Creative commons licence, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en

[1] Rahmon became Chairmen of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan in November 1992 during the early stages of the Tajik Civil War and was the acting head of Government until being elected to the re-established role of President in 1994.

[2] Annette Bohr, Turkmenistan: Power, Politics and Petro-Authoritarianism, Chatham House, March 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-03-08-turkmenistan-bohr.pdf

[3] Bruce Pannier, How Shavkat Mirziyoev Became Uzbekistan’s Supreme Leader, RFE/RL, February 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-mirziyoev-consolidation-of-power/29016113.html

[4] Joanna Lillis, Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev takes back control, Eurasianet, October 2019, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-nazarbayev-takes-back-control

[5] Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s face to the world, Blue Domes, January 2020, http://bluedomes.net/2020/01/06/nazarbayev-kazakhstans-face-to-the-world/

[6] Neil MacFarquhar, Daughter of Departing Kazakhstan President May Succeed Him, The New York Times, March 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/20/world/asia/rise-of-first-daughter-in-kazakhstan-fuels-talk-of-succession.html

[7] Will Rustam Emomali Become The Next President Of Tajikistan?, RFE/RL, March 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/will-rustam-emomali-become-the-next-president-of-tajikistan-/29810996.html

[8] Victoria Clement, Passing the baton in Turkmenistan, Atlantic Council, October 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/passing-the-baton-in-turkmenistan/

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Central Asia

The Death of a General: What’s next for Iran, Iraq and the wider Middle East?

Article by Dr Simon Mabon and SEPAD project colleagues

January 16, 2020

The Death of a General: What’s next for Iran, Iraq and the wider Middle East?

Following the United States (US) assassination of Qasim Soleimani – the erstwhile commander of the Quds Force, the elite wing of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, – close to Baghdad airport, Iraq’s parliament passed a non-binding bill calling for the US to leave the country. The strike against Soleimani has serious implications for a range of areas including: Iraqi politics; Iranian activity across the region; the fight against Da’ish (ISIS); and more. In this piece, scholars working with SEPAD (the Sectarianism, Proxies and De-sectarianisation project of the Richardson Institute for Peace) [1] share their thoughts on the decision and the impact for Iraq and the wider Middle East.

The Implications for Iraq

Fanar Haddad (Senior Research Fellow at the Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore) argues that ‘ultimately, Iran’s most potent response might be a political rather than a military one: consolidating its grip on Iraqi politics and forcing a US withdrawal. However, the matter is complicated by Iraqi dynamics. Recent events are proving increasingly polarising: Sunni and Kurdish political actors fear the rise of a majoritarian Iran-leaning Baghdad; the Iraqi protest movement is as adamant on the necessity of systemic change as ever before; and the tensions between Iran-aligned and non-Iran-aligned actors are likely to get worse. Even if a withdrawal is not achieved, the assassinations have succeeded in lending Iran-leaning actors what they have been searching for since the protests began: a counter-cause to enable counter-protests and counter-pressure. The US has a lot of coercive leverage over Iraq (economic, diplomatic and military) but lacks the political assets and soft power that will be needed for the contest that Iran is initiating.’

Regional Politics

Dr Lawrence Rubin (Associate Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology) believes that ‘concerning implications for the region, it’s too early to say given the uncertainty in Iraqi politics and the most recent gaffe from US regarding troop withdrawal. Naturally, the most important aspect will be how it plays out in Iraqi politics and second, how the US manages it. Sectarian politics have and will continue to play a role because of which Iraqi groups’ interests are more closely aligned with the US presence in the region.

Two facts also remain: the US is both a stabilising and destabilising force in Iraqi politics and this is a microcosm for the region. The US presence in Iraq would reassure the Saudis and Emiratis (and others) that the US hasn’t abandoned them. If the US withdraws from Iraq, Iran and Russia will have to fill the vacuum to fight a resurgent ISIS. If the US remains, the US presence will continue to be a counter-mobilising symbol for opposition and destabilising political influence in Iraq as well as a target of opportunity for Iran. Meanwhile, the uncertainty takes the attention off of the Syrian-Russian and Turkish campaign in Syria.’

Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and the Iranian Question

Dr Simon Mabon believes that ‘the US decision to strike against Soleimani has caused a great deal of concern amongst many of Washington’s key allies. In the immediate days after the strike a number of prominent Gulf diplomats spoke of the need for de-escalation including, perhaps most surprisingly, Adel Al Jubeir, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister. Under Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia has embarked on a vociferously anti-Iranian foreign policy, best seen in the military incursion in Yemen, yet after a strike on a Saudi ship in 2019, officials in Riyadh called for calm, much to the surprise of many. In these two instances, it appears that pragmatism has triumphed, although as the regional security environment continues to be precarious, it remains to be seen how long this pragmatic approach can last’.

Haian Dukhan (Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Syrian Studies at the University of St Andrews) thinks that ‘the non-binding resolution asking the US troops to leave Iraq will raise more questions about the legality and the legitimacy of the presence of the US troops in Syria. Strategically, if the withdrawal happens, it will also have a great impact on its newly built bases on Deir Ezzor, the eastern governorate of Syria, as these bases are mainly reliant on the logistic support from their counterparts in Iraq. The question will be then whether the Americans will be able to maintain their presence in eastern Syria if they withdraw from Iraq’.

Iranian Foreign Policy

SEPAD Fellow Banafsheh Keynoush thinks ‘Soleimani’s legacy to the region could be a lengthy war of attrition if the US and Iran do not agree on a framework that allows for limited US military presence and Iranian influence inside Iraq. Tehran will wield influence over multiple Iraqi actors who negotiate with the US to decide on this framework. The Shia cleric Muqtada Al Sadr, who visited Soleimani’s house after the killing, has called for an end to the US occupation of Iraq. Iraq’s sitting Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, who is a go between figure for Iran, could be reinstalled despite previous calls by Iraqis for his resignation.

Signs point to US and Iranian restraint in managing the future of their presence in Iraq. Iran could still insist on a hardline position, but it will engage in give and take when its interests demand. Iran’s missile attacks on the Iraqi bases did not lead to death tolls for the Americans. In exchange, the US ordered its diplomats to limit links with Iranian opposition groups. Still, Iran considers itself to be in a war. This means that it may still engage in conflicts that take on conventional, asymmetrical or even nonconventional forms if the Iran nuclear deal is not revived.’

Dr Edward Wastnidge (Deputy Director of SEPAD and Lecturer at the Open University) believes that ‘the assassination of Qasim Soleimani was a clear illustration of the Trump administration’s total lack of a coherent strategy on Iran and the wider region. It shows how petulant, misguided and incoherent his and his close aides’ ideas are when it comes to Iran. The fact that Trump has veterans from the US’ occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan directing US military adventurism helps drive this vindictive policy. They are so focused on seeing Iran as the enemy that they let this cloud every judgement that they make.

In many ways his is the hallmark of a hubristic imperial power that has miscalculated the level of opposition to its damaging policies in the region. It could be that Soleimani’s greatest achievement comes as a result of his murder – insofar as it could herald the start of a US withdrawal from Iraq, thus meeting one of the Islamic Republic’s key foreign policy aims. The need for an inclusive regional security architecture, free of external interference, is more pressing than ever. It is with the people of the region that the answers lie, not the think-tanks and vested interests of the commentariat in DC and elsewhere.’

Meysam Tayebipour (Research Fellow with the Richardson Institute) believes that ‘the death of Qasim Soleimani is a significant loss for the Iranian regime, as he was the most prominent Iranian figure in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. In other words, Soleimani and the Quds force boosted Iran’s geopolitical importance in the region. One would be surprised to see his successor (Esmail Ghaani) be as influential in the head of Quds force as he was. Soleimani also had an important role in Iran’s domestic politics. Thanks to his charismatic personality, he was portrayed by some Iranians as a righteous man. That was the reason that many people participated in his funeral. Not all those who took part in Soleimani’s funeral were supporters of the regime.

By killing him, Trump injected new blood into the broken body of the Islamic Republic. Before Soleimani’s death, people were on the streets protesting against the regime. But after Soleimani’s assassination, once again, people were on the streets, but this time for expressing their sadness for the loss of Iran second most powerful man. The Islamic Republic could not ask for a better enemy.’

Olivia Globitza (SEPAD PhD Fellow) thinks that ‘even though the US have for the moment rejected Iraq’s request to withdraw its troops, a potential withdrawal is by far not off the table. Yet, the repercussions of such a move are complex and unlikely to please everyone in the region. While certainly welcomed by many, particularly those opposed to US presence in Iraq and elsewhere in the region, including Iran, it will open new fissures and tap into the fears of those that believe Iran will seek to take advantage of the void the US will leave behind, and substantially increase its influence over Iraq.’

Eyad Al Refai (SEPAD PhD Fellow) believes ‘the discussion on the implications of the US withdrawal from the Middle East has a long legacy. Therefore, opinions on this case shift depending on the situation of regional and global orders. However, In the current political context in the Middle East, where the state is significantly threatened due to its weakness and broad regional conflicts, these implications are mostly detrimental to the regional and the international system. The current US presence in the region, after its departure from Iraq in 2011, is primarily due to the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings and the prevalence of terrorist sectarian militias that filled vacuums. The US withdrawal from the region cannot remedy domestic grievances and regional manipulation, which led the state system in the region to its current collapse. American troops stretch from Europe to Asia however it is only in the Middle East that such a presence is discussed heavily through a cynical lens, and such views are reasonable considering the American legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the answers to the region’s issues are regionally based, and in fact, the current presence of American troops is the result of invitations by states in the region.’

Photo by Ali Khamenei, under Creative Commons.

[1] Sectarianism, Proxies and De-sectarianisation (SEPAD) project is based at Lancaster University’s Richardson Institute, The Foreign Policy Centre is a project partner of SEPAD, https://www.sepad.org.uk/about

Topics

Conflict Resolution and Security

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Middle East and North Africa

Gulf States

The last year in Azerbaijan: the highs and lows

Article by Arzu Geybulla

January 2, 2020

The last year in Azerbaijan: the highs and lows

2019 was a year not without its highs and lows in the land of fire – Azerbaijan. From a snap decision to dismiss the national parliament, to the release of prominent political prisoners, to the replacing of some high ranking government officials, as well as more arrests and detentions. This year, Azerbaijan made the news for its lack of capacity while hosting the Europa League final and the farce with the loose manhole cover that damaged George Russell’s Williams during the Grand Prix practice in Baku.[1] Not to mention the vehicle carrying the damaged Williams striking a bridge on the way to the pit making it all look even more comical. The corrupt nature of its ruling government and its affiliates haunted officials in Baku in 2019 as well. One key example of this is when the news of the country’s former international bank head Jahangir Hajiyev’s wife was spotted at London’s high end department store Harrods, having spent 16 million pounds.[2] Not all at once of course, but over the last ten years. Meanwhile, her husband, was sentenced to 15 years in jail in October on charges of fraud and money laundering to name a few.

To break it all down, here is a closer look at some of these and other developments that shook Azerbaijan’s civil society, government and the country’s image abroad.

#FreeMehman

2019 began with the #FreeMehman campaign that targeted authorities in Azerbaijan to immediately drop new charges that citizen journalist and activist Mehman Huseynov was facing, just when his previous two year prison term was going to finish. Despite the absence of evidence in court, and an international outcry on the illegality of the sentence, Huseynov was jailed in 2017 on charges of slander and sentenced to two years in prison.

In December 2018, new charges were brought against Huseynov accusing him of allegedly “resisting a representative of the authorities with the use of violence dangerous to his health and life”.[3] If found guilty, Huseynov was facing an additional seven year prison term. While Huseynov declared he was going on a hunger strike, many prominent civil society activists joined him in solidarity. An unsanctioned rally was organised in support of Huseynov on January 19^th, demanding his release. Several human rights watchdog groups, as well as the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, called on the authorities to drop the new charges while the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for Huseynov’s release. As a result of mounting pressure, the charges were dropped and Huseynov was released in March 2019 after having served his full two year sentence.

So much for emancipation

It was not the way Azerbaijani feminist activists would have wanted to celebrate the country’s first ever women’s march.[4] Instead of celebrating the achievements of Azerbaijani women, police chose to celebrate the day with slaps and kicks. But not from the police per se. A collection of older women, many who were later identified as fruit and flower sellers, charged into the crowd of protestors to shout at and harass them. There were slaps and shoves for both the marchers and the journalists covering the event. Police were there, to idly watch and observe.

Meanwhile on an international diplomacy stage, negotiations over disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh were back on the agenda. Except that President Ilham Aliyev refused to accept the proposal to include Nagorno-Karabakh officials at the negotiation table ahead of the summit in Vienna.[5][6]

He did, however, agree to release over 50 political prisoners during the annual presidential pardons over the Novruz celebrations in March. The good news was quickly followed with some bad news – the editor of the ‘criminal.az’ website, Anar Mammadov was handed a suspended sentence of five and half years with a two year probation period.[7] Mammadov was found guilty of making public calls against the state, abuse of professional duties and forgery, all of which Mammadov and his lawyer refuted in court to no avail.

Then a massive fire at one of the shopping malls in Baku burned the place to the ground. It was one of eight large fires in 2019 that damaged businesses in the capital.[8] These fires raised one of the most pressing issues in Azerbaijan – the presence of a shadow economy and its consequences, not only on economic transparency but the ability to engage in any kind of healthy business in the country. Many business owners who suffered great costs during the fires complained of the absence of property insurance. This, however, is directly linked to the commercial agreements made between the property owners and business owners. In Azerbaijan, often, these agreements are not made. Partly due to the fact that often shops or businesses are owned by government employees. There is also a 14 per cent tax imposed on business owners which according to independent economists is too high given economic conditions in Azerbaijan.[9]

In April, Bayram Mammadov, one of the graffiti prisoners released during the March pardons, was rearrested and sentenced to 30 days in administrative detention on charges of resisting the police.[10] During his hearing, Mammadov said the charges were baseless and that he was innocent and that he had been subject to police violence after his arrest with officers on duty severely beating him. Two of the men who beat Mammadov sat in the courtroom during the hearing and although Mammadov pointed them out, the two men were let go while the judge ruled to keep the decision of the administrative sentence.

Nothing surprising there – in a country that lacks independent judiciary, the chances of accessing a fair trial are virtually non-existent. But the chances of getting a fair trial if you are George Russell who was racing in Baku during the Grand Prix increase substantially. While Mammadov was beaten, rearrested on false charges and sent away to detention, Baku was getting ready to host yet another round of the Azerbaijan Grand Prix. But sloppy preparations led to a rather embarrassing accident for the organisers. As set out above, ahead of the weekend’s race George Russell’s Williams struck a manhole cover during the practice sessions. The incident made the news, and even briefly turned into a meme. Immediately after the accident, Arif Rahimov, the promoter of the Azerbaijan Grand Prix and the executive director of Baku City Circuit said the damage caused will be covered as per an insurance agreement.[11] While the costs were not mentioned, it is worth mentioning that Rahimov, who happens to be the son of Azerbaijani Youth and Sports Minister Azad Rahimov, was in charge of picking the suitable bidder in the tender to become the official organiser of the race.[12] But it just happened that Rahimov junior’s company received the right to host the competition without any tender which is a violation of Azerbaijani laws. For the likes of Mammadov, one lives below the law, but for the likes of Rahimov, one lives above the law and very little can get in their way, including an accident.

Another major sporting event hiccup took place just a month later when Baku opened its doors – for the first time in its history – to the Europa League final, hosting Arsenal and Chelsea football clubs. If only this one was as easy to pull off as the European Games, or the Islamic Solidarity Games or even the Grand Prix. There was much criticism of Baku as a host city, even before the game. From expensive airfares, to a lack of hospitality infrastructure, to the capacity issues with Baku’s International terminal and last but not least, the safety concerns for Arsenal player, Armenian national Henrikh Mkhitaryan.

At least these were the issues that made the international headlines. There was little mention of the issues Azerbaijani citizens had to face during the games. In addition to main road closures, transportation routes were amended to accommodate football fans traveling from Georgia to Baku.[13]

Perhaps Azerbaijan is just one of the many countries in the world, where celebrating one’s heritage and commemorating Independence Day are less important than a football match.

A wave of protests

In October, two important rallies put a spotlight on Azerbaijan.[14] On October 19^th, the National Council of Democratic Forces (NCDF), an umbrella group of Azerbaijani opposition groups, organised an unsanctioned rally that was violently dispersed by local police. Demonstrators called for the release of all remaining political prisoners, guarantees for free and fair elections, and an end to economic injustice.[15] Among the many who were rounded up and arrested was Ali Karimli, leader of an opposition party – Popular Front. Karimli was severely beaten and then let go. Police refuted claims Karimli was beaten during detention in a statement, concluding Karimli injured himself while taking a fall. A statement released by the prosecutor office claimed Karimli sustained the injuries during a scuffle with police officers as he resisted arrest and managed to beat two police officers in the meantime.

But arrests began already days ahead of the scheduled rally. Former political prisoner and journalist Seymur Hezi was one of many arrested ahead of the rally. In the run-up to the demonstration, Azerbaijani investigative reporter Khadija Ismayilova said police also blocked three subway stations in an apparent attempt to thwart protesters from reaching the main rally site.[16] Meanwhile, activists reported disruptions in internet access across central Baku.

The following day, a group of women activists took to the streets calling to end all forms of violence against women.[17] The march was sparked by yet another victim of domestic violence, Leyle Mammadova who was stabbed by her husband in public.

Phantom reforms

After 16 years in power, surrounded by more or less the same old guard as his father, President Ilham Aliyev decided to shuffle things around. Shuffle is the key word here, because all the changes that have taken place among government officials over the recent months indicate no real reform but rather an illusion of it.

In October, Aliyev replaced the second most powerful man in the country, the chief of staff Ramiz Mehdiyev. Then the Prime Minister Novruz Mammadov was replaced by a slightly younger technocrat Ali Asadov. Meanwhile, a man of all traits, Mikayil Jabbarov took on his third ministerial posting, this time as the Minister of Economy after having served as Minister of Education and later as Minister in charge of taxes. Jokes about Jabbarov collecting different ministerial titles were abundant among Azerbaijani activists. Aliyev also reshuffled his Cabinet of Ministers and the Presidential Apparatus.

In December, the Azerbaijani National Parliament was dissolved following the ruling party initiative and early elections are scheduled for February 9^th 2020.

Some have praised these changes, but in absence of real legal, judicial, and social reforms, none of these new appointments give hope.[18] Among them, is Rauf Mirkadirov, a veteran Azerbaijani journalist who said, “Reforms are a new ideology, a new management system, and not new people. With a good system, even a bad manager cannot ruin everything […]. Without fundamental reforms affecting all spheres, we cannot create a good system of government.”[19]

The recent municipal election held on December 23^rd, attest to just how far the ruling elite of Baku – even with newly appointed officials and the talk about reforms – are willing to go to protect their position. Reports of ballot stuffing, multiple voting by a single individual at different polling stations, and intimidation of journalists were abundant.[20] However the election of a few young faces, such as former journalist Vafa Nagi and civil society activist Rufat Aliyev gives some hope. Theirs was a real fight, something that the government in power has not done in decades and most likely forgotten what it means.

Photo by President.az, under Creative Commons.

[1] Paul Doyle, Why did Uefa hand Azerbaijan hosting rights for the Europa League final?, The Guardian, May 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/football/2019/may/16/uefa-handed-azerbaijan-europa-league-final-baku-chelsea-arsenal

[2] Dominic Casciani, Zamira Hajiyeva: How the wife of a jailed banker spent £16m in Harrods, BBC, May 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48433012

[3] Arzu Geybullayeva, Azerbaijanis pressure government to #FreeMehman after blogger endures 12 days on hunger strike, Global Voices, January 2019, https://globalvoices.org/2019/01/08/azerbaijanis-pressure-government-to-freemehman-after-blogger-endures-12-days-on-hunger-strike/

[4] Arzu Geybulla, Azerbaijan: Celebrating Women with Slaps and Kicks, Global Voices, March 2019, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/azerbaijan-celebrating-women-slaps-and-kicks

[5] RFE/RL, Aliyev Rejects Armenian Proposal To Include Karabakh Officials in Peace Talks, March 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/aliyev-rejects-armenian-proposal-to-include-karabakh-officials-in-peace-talks/29821933.html

[6] RFE/RL, Armenia-Azerbaijan Summit Described As ‘Positive,’ ‘Constructive;, March 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-azerbaijan-summit-vienna-positive-nagorno-karabakh/29850997.html

[7] Council of Europe, Anar Mammadov Gets Suspended Prison Sentence, Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists, April 2019, https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/detail-alert?p_p_id=sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_col_id=column-3&p_p_col_count=7&_sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet_alertPK=56733828

[8] Meydan Tv, Fire in the capital, December 2019, https://www.meydan.tv/az/article/paytaxtdaki-yanginlar/?ref=list-news

[9] Ibid 8.

[10] RFLE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service, Pro-Democracy Activist Rearrested In Azerbaijan After Amnesty Release, April 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/pro-democracy-activist-rearrested-in-azerbaijan-after-amnesty-release/29857422.html

[11] Pete Baumgartner and Hafiz Babali, Family Connections Fuel Controversy Over Azerbaijan Grand Prix, June 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/family-connections-fuel-controversy-over-azerbaijan-grand-prix/28575756.html

[12] Ibid 11.

[13] Rashim Shaliyev, Beyond the controversies, Baku’s Europa League final brought little for locals, OC Media, June 2019, https://oc-media.org/beyond-the-controversies-baku-s-europa-league-final-brought-little-for-locals/

[14] Nailia Bagirova, Polina Devitt, Margarita Antidze and Gareth Jones, Azeri police detain scores of protesters, including opposition party leader, Reuters, October 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-azerbaijan-opposition-protests/azeri-police-detain-scores-of-protesters-including-opposition-party-leader-idUSKBN1WY0DM

[15] Human Rights Watch, Azerbaijan: Peaceful Rallies Dispersed Violently, October 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/22/azerbaijan-peaceful-rallies-dispersed-violently

[16] RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service, Baku Police Detain Dozens As Opposition Rallies, October 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/police-arrest-opposition-activists-ahead-of-baku-rally/30225138.html

[17] RFE/RL, Photo Galleries: Azerbaijani Capital Rocked By Weekend of Protests, October 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/weekend-of-protests-shakes-azerbaijan/30227692.html

[18] Thomas De Waal, is Change Afoot in Azerbaijan?, Carnegie Europe: Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, November 2019, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80271

[19] Turan: Informasiya Agentliyi, Experts doubt the effectiveness of so-called “Azerbaijani reforms”, October 2019, http://www.turan.az/ext/news/2019/10/free/Want%20to%20Say/en/84843.htm

[20] RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service, Azerbaijanis Vote in Municipal Elections, December 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijanis-vote-in-municipal-elections/30340791.html

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Human Rights

Regions

Former Soviet Union

South Caucasus

Tracking drugs in the MENA: proposing a new analytical lens

Article by Dr Lucia Ardovini

December 20, 2019

Tracking drugs in the MENA: proposing a new analytical lens

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is at the centre of numerous investigations, which see international actors and policy makers tracking conflicts, resources and shifting alliances. Security and economic concerns generally identify territorial disputes, sectarian tensions, radicalisation and proxies as the key matters that explain general insecurity and authoritarianism in the region. However, there is a largely ignored matter that brings together all of these issues: drugs. Their production, usage, smuggling and criminalisation come with significant geopolitical concerns, and directly relates to state-society relations, porous borders, militias and dark economies. Yet, when it comes to the MENA region, this is still a remarkably unexplored topic. During the last decade, and especially following the worsening of the heroin epidemic in the United States (US), the Western-led ‘war on drugs’ has made a return to public and policy debates. There is a growing body of literature that focuses on a wide variety of drug-related challenges, ranging from their societal implications, the racial connotations of the war on drugs, Latin American cartels and smuggling channels. However, almost none of this research focuses on the MENA, or goes beyond identifying Afghanistan as a major opium producer and Turkey as a main harbour for transportation. This is surprising, especially given the growing European demands for cannabis and opiates. So far, the only region-wide study of drugs in the region is Philip Robins’ Middle East Drug Bazaar,[1] which lays the basis for a more complete geopolitical understanding of their consumption and trade.

Therefore, this brief aims at taking a step towards filling this gap, proposing that drugs – and the multifaceted dynamics surrounding them – can indeed be used as an analytical lens to gain original insights into state-society relations, militias, non-state actors, and transnational dynamics.

Setting the Context

Drug usage, production and transportation has significant geopolitical, societal, security and policy ramifications. While there is extensive scholarship on Latin America and on the effects that drugs have on European Union (EU) countries and Western societies, the issues and dynamics they cause in the MENA is still remarkably under-researched. Yet, it is no secret that the region is a major source, transit point and consumer of illicit substances, which both influences and is negatively affected by drug abuse and production.[2] This is somewhat ironic, as Arab states also flaunt some of the harshest penalties for drug-related crimes globally, and have often openly allied with the US-led ‘war on drugs’. To put things into perspective, Saudi Arabia and Iran alone executed 1,218 people for drug-related crimes between 2014 and 2016, while all of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have capital punishment for drug-related offences and Egypt has recently announced the introduction of the death penalty for drug dealers.[3]

Nevertheless, as a report by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) notes, these trends are unlikely to shift anytime soon, because of the absence of alternative livelihoods for producers and the continuously escalating demand for illegal substances. Therefore, the insecurity and societal implications linked to the drugs ‘complex’ offer an innovative lens to look at the state of intra-states and state-society relations in the region, as drug trafficking and consumption have a mutually defining relationship with fragile areas and non-state actors.

Yet, despite the absence of focused research on these matters, it would be unfair to say that the importance of drug related issues in the MENA region is totally absent from the international radar.

Heroin trade is indeed understood as one key reason behind the US and UK ‘failure’ in Afghanistan, where opium has been the leading response to the devastation left behind by two decades of destructive warfare.[4] The heritage of geopolitical instability left behind by foreign intervention in the country has in fact allowed militia and non-state groups to thrive, building a parallel dark economy and essentially taking over the role of state institutions. Lebanon, and particularly Hizballah, have long been suspected of trafficking billions worth of drugs from Iran into the region and Europe, as a recently leaked CIA report reveals.[5] Meanwhile, drugs implication in Iran go beyond production and trade and have long constituted a growing societal concern, which is exponentially growing into an HIV crisis.[6] In Egypt drug abuse is double the international standards, with some 10.4 per cent of Egyptians using illicit drugs, a phenomenon that has steadily escalated in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings and the growing authoritarianism it has left behind.[7]

Moreover, the recently released Arab Youth Survey 2019 devoted a whole section on drug use, for the first time, and found that the phenomenon is growing exponentially across the region. In particular, the survey reports that 76 per cent of youth in the Levant (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories) agree that drug use is on the rise, followed by the 59 per cent in North Africa and 36 per cent in the GCC states.[8]

There are several reasons for the recent rise in consumption, and the region’s protracted instability is arguably the leading one. The destabilisation of decades old regimes, coupled with state failure and the escalation of proxy conflicts across the MENA, makes it considerably harder for governmental and armed forces to police drug production and distribution. In the case of Lebanon, while the country has always been at the centre of smuggling routes from the Af-Pak region through to Europe and neighbouring countries, it has also become a major producer of cannabis and opium in the aftermath of the civil war, with militia groups taking advantage of the unpatrolled porous borders with Syria.[9]

Societal Implications

As pointed out above, there are obvious advantages in using drug-related activities as an analytical lens. Doing so would offer a fresh perspective on porous borders, corruption and on the ever-evolving role of militias and non-state actors across the region. However, even more importantly, there is a lot that such an approach can tell us about state-society relations in the region. This is the case as there are clear class and racial connotations inherently linked to drug production and usage, which certain communities and societal groups being more discriminated against than others. In a region plagued by the remnants of sectarianisms and struggling to cope with almost 11 million of internally displaced people,[10] these nuances become incredibly significant.

While the recreational use of hashish seems to cut pretty consistently across all societal groups, party-goers and middle class citizens are known to routinely enjoy coke and ecstasy. This is particularly evident in any of Beirut’s clubs, with the city living up to its reputation as the Middle East’s ‘party city’, but is a widespread phenomenon across the region. On the other side, cheap opioids and methamphetamines are becoming increasingly common within the lower and working classes, as well as in refugee camps. Captagon, a lower-grade methamphetamine, is reported to have been used by fighters in Syria to enhance alertness and is referred to as ‘chemical courage’.

In Iraq, a country not usually associated to drug-related issues, crystal meth has increasingly afflicted thousands of users in the aftermath of the 2003 American invasion. Such a sudden escalation is a clear manifestation of the fragmentation of the social order that has plagued Iraq over the past few decades. Basra and Baghdad are the two most affected cities, with a recent investigation by the New York Times reporting that only in 2019 approximately 1,400 people were convicted on drug-related offences in Basra alone.[11]

This phenomenon is exacerbated by state’s failure to care for their citizens, especially in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. Rising rates of unemployment, regional instability and the growth of authoritarian measures are all disintegrating the already fragile state-society relation at the core of many regimes. In such a context, alienation and the lack of opportunities are directly linked to escalating rates of drug abuse, which also assume a further sectarian connotation in refugee camps across the MENA. Even more importantly, the money flow generated by drug production and trafficking has grown into a parallel dark economy that is directly linked to corruption and ruling elites, which makes this phenomenon even harder to eradicate.

Conclusions

Therefore, it is evident that including drugs into the analysis of rising insecurities in the MENA region would offer a fresh analytical perspective into national as well as regional dynamics. This is not an easy task, as to do so would require a significant qualitative shift away from long established ‘lenses’ such as sectarianism, proxy conflicts and radicalisation. Nevertheless, drug-relates issues arguably cut intersectionally across societal, security and geopolitical matters, making their inclusion in the analytical framework incredibly valuable.

From the socio-political perspective, the recorded rates of growing drug consumption across the region during the past decade reveal that alienation, discontent and structural inequalities remain a feature of several Arab states. As corruption, authoritarianism and the gap between the general population and ruling elites continues to grow, several Arab states are being confronted with a drug-related societal crisis that they are unequipped to deal with. To put things into perspective, there are only 22 rehab facilities in Egypt, most of which are private and therefore inaccessible to those who need them the most.[12] Iraq, where the abuse of crystal meth is now a recognised as a crisis by international institutions such as the World Health Organisation, still lacks specialised rehabilitation centres and and suffers from a severe shortage of psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers.[13] This state of affairs is widespread across the region, with states relying on an unequipped criminal justice system to deal with this phenomenon, furthering social stratification and inequalities.

Economically, drug production and trafficking have come to constitute a parallel dark economy across the MENA, enriching both local and ruling elites, as well as constituting the only source of livelihood for a growing part of the population. As this phenomenon become more entrenched, its transformation into a structural issue will make it significantly harder to eradicate.

To conclude, carefully tracking drug production and smuggling would also offer new insights into the role of militias and non-state actors, enriching our understanding of the developing geopolitical dynamics across the region. Therefore, in the wake of renewed popular uprisings and instability in MENA, drugs and its related issues should be integrated into analytical and policy discussions.

[1] Robins, Philip. 2016. Middle East Drugs Bazaar: Production, Prevention and Consumption. London: Hurst Publishers.

[2] Georgios Barzoukas, Drug trafficking in the MENA: The economics and the politics, EUISS Brief Issue 29, 2017, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%2029%20MENA%20drugs.pdf

[3] Middle East Monitor, Substance abuse in Egypt double international levels, April 2019, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190409-substance-abuse-in-egypt-double-international-levels/

[4] Alfred W McCoy, How the heroin trade explains the US-UK failure in Afghanistan, The Guardian, January 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/09/how-the-heroin-trade-explains-the-us-uk-failure-in-afghanistan

[5] Josh Meyer, The secret backstory of how Obama let Hezbollah off the hook, Politico, 2017, https://www.politico.com/interactives/2017/obama-hezbollah-drug-trafficking-investigation/

[6] John Calabrese, Iran’s War on Drugs: Holding the Line?, MEI, December 2017, https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-war-drugs-holding-line

[7] Ibid. 3

[8] Sunniva Rose, Arab Youth Survey 2019: Drug use rising in Middle East party capital Lebanon, The National UAE, April 2019, https://www.thenational.ae/uae/arab-youth-survey-2019-drug-use-rising-in-middle-east-party-capital-lebanon-1.855195

[9] This happens especially in the Bekaa region, a fertile agricultural valley bordering Syria.

[10] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 11 million people displaced within their countries across Middle East and North Africa [EN/AR], Relief Web, May 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/11-million-people-displaced-within-their-countries-across-middle-east-and-north-africa

[11] Alissa J. Rubin, Iraq Faces a New Adversary: Crystal Meth, New York Times, September 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/iraq-drug-addiction-meth.html

[12] Ibid. 3

[13] The New Arab, Basra: The epicentre of Iraq’s drug problem, January 2018, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/society/2018/1/2/basra-the-epicentre-of-iraqs-drug-problem

Topics

Civil Society

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Human Rights

International Relations and Geopolitics

Regions

Middle East and North Africa

Protest as a Tool for Political and Social Change

Article by Mariam Uberi

December 9, 2019

Protest as a Tool for Political and Social Change

Protests play an important part in the civil and political life of democratic societies. Georgia’s civil society has long been a good example of an engaged and informed citizenry, with the protests in June 2019 having largely secured a promise from the government that it would seek a change in Georgia’s election system from a mixed system to a fully proportional one.^[1] The dropping of those proposed constitutional amendments in November 2019, however, triggered the biggest anti-government protest in years.^[2] As suggested by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), that Georgia has ratified, the right to peaceful assembly is a fundamental principle in a democratic society and, like the right to freedom of expression, is one of the foundations of such a society and cannot be interpreted restrictively.^[3] Authorities’ attempts to shut down dissenting voices appear to be in violation of these rights. Disappointment expressed by the European Union (EU) on the failed constitutional reforms also hints to Georgia backtracking on some important reforms in the rule of law area.^[4]

On November 17^th, all 44 members of the parliament’s opposition parties supported the constitutional changes on introducing a proportional system for 2020. The three lawmakers from Georgia’s Dream party however voted against the amendment while 37 abstained, making the constitutional amendment fall short of the 113 votes required, three quarters of the 150 sitting lawmakers.^[5]

This prompted waves of protests where in the events leading to the arrests of demonstrators, members of the opposition political parties vowed to block Parliament to ‘restore its legitimacy’ and use the lawful means available to them within Georgian legislation.^[6] The protesters brought in sand bags and barricades and attempted to stop Members of Parliament (MPs) from entering Parliament.^[7] In a bid to secure free passage to Parliament on November 18^th, after a half an hour warning, the Interior Ministry’s riot police dispersed the protest rally. Many tried to resist and sat down in the street to block their movement. Following a brief confrontation, police used water cannons to remove protesters from the street and arrested 37 civil activists, including a political leader, on charges of petty hooliganism and disobedience to the police. ^[8]

Some protesters, who had been ill treated by police during their arrests, required medical interventions after being badly hurt.^[9] The peaceful protesters gathered again on November 25^thwith an intent to stop the ruling MPs attending the Parliament session the next day. The riot police used water cannons again in the early hours of November 26^th, in sub-zero conditions to clear the entrance from behind the parliament building and arrested 28 individuals and injuring others.^[10] Before the dispersal protesters were stopped from bringing wood to use for heating and bags were searched profusely. On November 28^th, however, the protesters who wanted to gather around Parliament faced iron gates that blocked the streets leading to Parliament and were met with a police cordon across the barriers.

Events of November

Georgian law expressly prohibits blocking administrative buildings, however, in retrospect the excessive number of anti-riot police deployed and the use of water cannons against passively resisting protesters were disproportionate and deemed unlawful by civil society.^[11]The State under international law is responsible to protect peaceful protesters and ensure a safe and enabling environment for people to exercise their freedom of expression and right to peaceful assembly. The use of force must be minimum even when ‘roadblocks’ are used as a means of protest and which may warrant state intervention to disperse the protesters.^[12] It is also stated that the State must resort to only the minimum use of force and only after less intrusive and discriminatory means of managing the situation have failed.^[13] Generally, the States should be mindful that in some circumstances where a protest occurs in violation of applicable laws, use of force is not always justified and non-intervention might be the best approach.^[14]

On November 18^th, the riot police after little warning rolled in with water cannons amid the absence of any communication with the leaders of the protest, which is an essential part of the authorities’ positive obligations to ensure the peaceful conduct of an assembly, to prevent disorder and to secure the safety of all involved.^[15] The Venice Commission’s Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) refers to, recommends negotiation or mediated dialogue if a stand-off or other dispute arises during the course of an assembly as a way of avoiding the escalation of conflict.^[16]

The United Nations (UN) Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials calls on the authorities to ‘‘exercise restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved.’’^[17] These principles are echoed in the national legislation regulating assemblies and demonstrations where among other requirements, the benefit protected by the restriction should exceed the damage caused by the restriction and should be necessary in a democratic society.^[18] The notion of ‘necessary’ in a democratic society among others implies that the interference must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. On November 26^thauthorities maintained that after seeing the blocked passages to Parliament they had to use the means provided by the law.^[19] In reality the benefit does not seem to outweigh the measures or appear proportionate, whereas 28 people were arrested on administrative charges and four sustained injuries.^[20] Among those arrested was a member of a political party, who in the words of his defence lawyer, his only fault was that he had ‘‘thrown beans in the air’’ during the rally. He was sentenced to eight days of administrative detention.^[21]

On both occasions the authorities showed no attempt to use less intrusive ways to deescalate the tension and conduct a dialogue with the protesters. It is also followed that subjecting the demonstrators to high-pressure water cannons requires specific justification.^[22] The UN Principles further scrutinises the use of water cannons, not allowing the use of targeted jet water at an individual or group of individuals at short range with a view to avoid injury or blindness.^[23] The water cannon can only be used when there is a ‘serious significant likelihood of loss of life’ or when property is being destroyed.^[24] It should not be used in cold weather to avoid cold water shock.^[25] In the absence of these conditions the use of water cannons does not appear legitimate especially considering that more people got injured then it was officially declared.^[26] During these events, one protester suffered a broken hand after being forced down by a jet of water, another received an eye injury whilst a third got hypothermia. In response to the criticism that the cold water cannons should not be used in cold weather conditions, the Minister of Interior maintained that they will warm the water next time before using it against demonstrators.^[27]

The ECHR requires States to show a certain ‘degree of tolerance’ towards peaceful gatherings, even unlawful ones.^[28] The State is also called to use its powers to protect its institutions and citizens from associations that might jeopardise them rather sparingly.^[29] It is further claimed that the exceptions to the right of freedom of association has to be construed strictly and only convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on that freedom.^[30] Surprisingly, even the occupation of public buildings is generally regarded as peaceful conduct, despite its unlawfulness and the disruptions it may cause.^[31] The authorities should not have dispersed the rally unless law enforcement officials had taken all reasonable measures to facilitate and protect the assembly from harm^[32] and unless there was an imminent threat of violence.^[33] Amidst the absence of previous violent clashes and the lack of imminent threat as protesters had no special equipment, breaking up the protest in such a manner does not have a compelling reason.^[34]

Finally, erecting iron gates later on November 28^th to safeguard the normal functioning of the Parliament does not seem to be within the powers set-out in the Georgian law on policing.^[35] The blocking of the street with iron barricades is not ‘proportionate to the expected threat’ and cannot be used against peaceful demonstrators unless there is a particular risk of a crime or disorder.^[36] The Civil society further maintained that the general public were not duly informed on these restrictive measures either.^[37]

The trial of 37 people charged under administrative offences on November 18^th attempted to normalise the restriction on freedom of expression through its conflation with resisting the police and hooliganism under the punitive Code of Administrative Offences.^[38] The trial has been largely marred by procedural violations, at the time of writing this, 14 people have been tried and the cases of 23 are still under deliberation.

Selective and unlawful arrests

The Government should not have the power to ban a demonstration because of the ‘wrong message’ it sends against the government, especially when the main target of criticism is the very same authority which has the power to authorise or deny the public gathering.^[39] Defence lawyers suggest that police have selectively targeted activists whereas some in their interviews given to the media said that they have been ill-treated during the arrest.^[40] As suggested, police arbitrarily arrested those expressing criticism of the government and state officials, which does not make sufficient grounds to make an arrest. In light of many procedural violations, it was revealed that the police did not discharge their responsibilities duly. Arrest protocols were not drawn up on the spot as required. Police completed it with a significant delay and without interrogating the accused.^[41] Many have not seen their arrest protocols whilst those who did do not agree with what it said.^[42]

Marred due process and a Telephone Justice

The Code of Administrative Offences mandates a tight timeframe within which the case had to be deliberated. The distribution of the cases has somehow put one judge in charge of all 37 cases, which significantly curtails the procedural rights of the accused. A defence lawyer for the accused argues that the police had to set the activists free after filling out the detention protocols.^[43] Nevertheless, they were kept handcuffed well beyond the prescribed time limit. The judge went well over time too, keeping them in detention over the 12 hour time limit prescribed by law.^[44] To respond to the growing criticism on the flawed timeframes, Tbilisi City Court later made a formal announcement referring to the Constitutional guarantees on the inviolability of the judge and that the cases had been automatically distributed in line with the national law.^[45] The process also undermined the right of the defence lawyers left with inadequate time to prepare for the defence, some given only two minutes. As suggested by the statement issued by the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association present at the hearing, the judge often stepped out during to allegedly receive instructions.^[46]

Flawed Evidence and Lack of reasoning

The evidence submitted by the police include arrest protocols, offence protocols and in rare cases video footage. In the case of the video footage, however, almost all police officers had difficulties identifying the arrested and could not recall the details leading to the arrest. This further questioned the validity of the requests the police had in relation to the accused and with the grounds they had made arrests. Contrary to the law, none of the police body cameras were working, whilst on one occasion a police officer confessed that he did not have time to examine the evidence that he had submitted.^[47] Nonetheless, the judge gave weight to the evidence against the accused and did not require the police to justify interference with the accused right to freedom of assembly. Nor did he question the reliability and quality of the evidence.

The accused were cleared of hooliganism charges, but ten were charged with police disobedience and sentenced to between three and 13 days administrative detention, three received warnings and one was fined.^[48] There was no reasoning behind how the length of the sentence was calculated. It appears that the sentences were high for those who were especially active during the court proceedings and during the organisation of the protest rally in general.^[49] The absence or lack of reasoning on how sanctions were determined are largely incompatible with the principle of non-arbitrariness when it comes to human rights standards. The ECtHR emphasised the need for courts to take seriously suggestions that real evidence introduced by police may have been planted^[50] or fabricated^[51]. Moreover, in cases where the only witness is the police who had a major role in the contested events, it is indispensable for the court to check their incriminating statements.^[52] In the absence of these safeguards the hearings conducted appear to be in violation of the right to a fair trial.^[53]

The Repressive Law

The commentators agree that the present Code of Administrative Offences is often used as an instrument for repression, with every government in power using it to punish dissenting voices rather than scrap it. The Code lacks judicial safeguards otherwise guaranteed by the national laws, as well as constitutional and international standards. The Code, which was adopted by the Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR in 1984, has seen some changes since its adoption. It does not entail a criminal record but allows sentencing of an individual for a maximum of 15 days without offering robust guarantees for a fair trial, or a standard beyond that of reasonable doubt otherwise required in the Criminal justice. It circumvents guarantees such as access to legal representation, adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, the right to examine witnesses and introduce evidence. Eight provisions from the Code, including the provisions on hooliganism and police disobedience, were sent for appeal to the Constitutional Court of Georgia a year ago and have been pending before the court since.^[54] The cases on excessive use of force perpetrated by police on November 19^th have been picked up by the independent investigative mechanism that is tasked to take up cases of ill treatment and torture perpetrated by public agents. The mechanism that started functioning on November 1^st of this year does not have prosecutorial functions and can only investigate the cases. It has nevertheless been a welcome initiative and will serve as a litmus test for the authorities in investigating the offences without bias.

Conclusion

The ECHR, the Venice Commission and the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association have repeatedly stressed that there is a presumption in favour of holding peaceful assemblies; where an assembly should be presumed lawful and deemed as not constituting a threat to public order, until the Government put forward compelling evidence that rebuts that presumption. The authorities have not yet produced compelling evidence in this case. Moreover the use of repressive laws against activists and opposing political party leaders aimed to punish criticism against the Government, and to have a discouraging effect for others to participate in protest rallies and from engaging actively in opposition parties, has chilling effects. Furthermore, the effects of these sanctions are further amplified by inadequate administrative code procedures. On a political level, the backtracking on promised constitutional change is largely seen as fear by the ruling party of losing power. The authorities’ response to that fear seems to be the flagrant ignorance of the rule of law and the safeguards on freedom of expression and the right to peaceful assembly as they attempt to flatten the increased mistrust and heightened tensions between the ruling party, opposition and civil society.

Photo by George Melashvili. No modifications to photo. Creative commons licence, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en

^[1] BBC News, Georgiaprotests: Thousands storm parliament over Russian MP’s speech, June 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-48710042

^[2] Civil.ge, Two Rallies Demand Snap Elections in Tbilisi; Parliament Blocked by Protesters, November 2019, https://civil.ge/archives/327189

^[3] Djavit An v. Turkey, § 56; Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania § 91.

^[4] EU Neighbours, EU reacts to on-going events in Georgia, November 2019, https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/stay-informed/news/eu-reacts-going-events-georgia

^[5] Civil.ge, Ex-U.S. Amb: There’s Concern in U.S. about Georgian Democracy, November 2019, https://civil.ge/archives/328588

^[6] Ibid. 2

^[7] Civil.ge, Georgian Opposition, Activists Keep Blocking Parliament Entrances, November 2019, https://civil.ge/archives/327415

^[8] Civil.ge, Riot Police Remove Barricades from Parliament Area, November 2019, https://civil.ge/archives/327545

^[9] Radio Free Liberty, Activist detained near parliament found fractured bones, November 2019, https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/30288154.html

^[10] Ibid. 7

^[11] Amnesty International Public Statement, Georgia: Authorities Must Guarantee Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, Amnesty International, November 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR5614802019ENGLISH.pdf

^[12] OHCHR, Lebanon: UN Experts decry incidents of excessive force in Lebanon. November 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25354&LangID=E

^[13] Ibid.

^[14] Article 19, The Right to Protest: Principles on the protection of human rights in protests, 2016, https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38581/Right_to_protest_principles_final.pdf

^[15] Frumkin v. Russia, § 128-129.

^[16] Ibid. referring to guideline 5.4, cited in Frumkin v. Russia § 80. See also Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines, July 2019, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2019)017-e

^[17] Facing Finance, UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement officials, http://www.facing-finance.org/en/database/norms-and-standards/un-basic-principles-on-the-use-of-force-and-firearms-by-law-enforcement-officials/. Adopted by the eight UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of offenders. 27 August- 7 September 1990.

^[18] Article 2 (3). The Law of Georgia on Assemblies and Demonstrations. The restriction of the rights recognised and protected by this Law shall: a) be addressed to achieve the benefits protected by Article 24(4) of the Constitution of Georgia; b) be considered under the law; c) be necessary for a democratic society; d) be non-discriminatory; e) be proportionally restrictive; f) be such that the benefit protected by the restriction exceeds the damage caused by the restriction, https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/download/31678/10/en/pdf

^[19] The statement of the Ministry of Interior (MIA) of Georgia, November 2019, https://police.ge/ge/shinagan-saqmeta-saministros-gantskhadeba/13145

^[20] Democracy Research Institute (DRI), Authorities Again Use Disproportionate Force During Dispersal of Peaceful Rally., November 2019, http://www.democracyresearch.org/eng/109; See also an announcement by MIA on 26 November 2019.supra 20.

^[21] Formula News, Lasha Chkartishvili was sentenced to administrative detention, November 2019, https://formulanews.ge/new/index.php?m=41&news_id=16073&fbclid=IwAR1JD3Cm791cIqhcFZpJYatIdvwirw2RYll_uAtt4R19qgpOFpU_2pRfXCY#

^[22] Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası v. Turkey, § 108.

^[23] The United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/LLW_Guidance.pdf

^[24] Ibid.

^[25] Ibid.

^[26] Radio Free Liberty, Protester says that his hand was broken during a protest rally, November 2019,

^[27] 1TV.ge, Vakhtang Gomelauri – They criticise us for using cold water in cold weather, we will now try to warm the water before using it, December 2019, https://1tv.ge/news/vakhtang-gomelauri-gvlandzghaven-rogor-sheidzleba-siciveshi-wylis-gamoyenebao-akhla-vcdilobt-gavatbot-wyali-da-tbili-wyali-gamoviyenot/?fbclid=IwAR1PMVn34SRgdah5mQW-HsVAP3dyYmyzLVehgv7zbPnXgN4UTM1nMA1Dd9g

^[28] Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, § 63.

^[29] Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház v Hungary, § 79.

^[30] Ibid.

^[31] Cisse v. France, §§ 39-40.

^[32] Including, for example, quieting hostile onlookers who threaten violence.

^[33] The Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly adopted by the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR used in Furumkin v Russia §166.

^[34] Primov v Russia, § 144-148.

^[35] Democracy Research Institute, Democracy Research Institute Responds to the Blockage of Parliament Area by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, November 2019, http://www.democracyresearch.org/eng/115

^[36] Ibid.

^[37] Ibid.

^[38] Administrative Code of Offences in Georgia, http://www.parliament.am/library/varchakaniravaxaxtum19/vrastan.pdf

^[39] Navalnyy v. Russia, § 134.

^[40] Email correspondence with defence lawyer and the Deputy Director of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Nona kurdovanidze. See also Radio Free Liberty, Activists versus the Soviet Code, November 2019, https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/30285194.html?fbclid=IwAR0sKimGMfgqyDKgB5vzjZDDELdf6LXRQSpvk5RygLzd6NTW3XAzrrHxfiE

^[41] Ibid.

^[42] Ibid.

^[43] Ibid.

^[44] Ibid.

^[45] Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Trial conducted with serious violations, November 2019, https://gyla.ge/ge/post/dakavebuli-demonstrantebis-sasamartlo-procesebi-mdzime-darghvevebis-fonze-chatarda?fbclid=IwAR34pLLL_fKUKWLOZGMhOSPCCVnNIFUxFq7CQnH8dWtiPqLwo69dL4nOZ_g#sthash.q0AoSPak.4iTU4vnX.dpbs

^[46] Ibid.

^[47] Radio Free Liberty, Activists versus the Soviet Code, supra 38.

^[48] Correspondence with Nona Kurdovanidze, December 2019.

^[49] Defence Lawyer, Giorgi Mshvenieradze, at Radio Free Liberty, supra 38.

^[50] Sakit Zahidov v. Azerbaijan, §52.

^[51] Sand Gradinar v. Moldova, § 111.

^[52] Kasparov and Others, § 64.

^[53] Navalnyy v Russia § 74.

^[54] Interview with Nona Kurdovanidze. See also: The Public Defender even filed an amicus curiae brief with the Constitutional Court of Georgia in June 2019 regarding the constitutional lawsuit “Citizen of Georgia Zurab Japaridze v. Parliament of Georgia”. In the amicus curiae brief, the Public Defender referred to Articles 166 (petty hooliganism) and 173 (Disobedience to the Legal Orders or Instructions of Law Enforcement or Military Officers) of the Administrative Offences on Misdemeanour and indicated that the judicial practice in that direction could not meet the constitutional standards, Public Defenders’ Office Georgia, November 2019.

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Regions

Former Soviet Union

South Caucasus

A Tale of Two Recycling Initiatives: State, Society and Waste Management in St Petersburg and Shanghai

Article by Dr Catherine Owen

December 4, 2019

A Tale of Two Recycling Initiatives: State, Society and Waste Management in St Petersburg and Shanghai

Its 7pm on a summery evening in a typical Shanghai housing estate, and the public courtyards are bustling with people. Residents of all ages descend from their apartments carrying bags of rubbish, neatly sorted into different categories, in order to throw it into the brightly decorated public recycling bins. Since the new regulations came into force in July 2018, every evening at twilight the estate comes alive with the sounds of chatter as the recycling bins are unlocked and made available for people to use. Volunteers wearing green overalls guide their fellow residents to the correct bins, the local residents’ committee members who manage residential life mingle with citizens and oversee the volunteers, enthusiastic children explain the new waste categories to struggling family members, and at the back of the bins, recycling managers sort through residents’ incorrectly sorted waste. The whole community has been mobilised to carry out these new regulations.

Volunteers and residents gather to collect recyclable waste in St Petersburg

Seven thousand kilometres to the other side of the Eurasian continent, a very different approach to recycling is in operation. On the first Saturday of every month, environmental activists in the Russian city of St Petersburg organise recycling collections on a public driveway or street corner in each of the city’s 18 districts. Hardy volunteers hold large plastic bags where concerned citizens can bring the plastic bottles, polystyrene, Tetrapaks, and other recyclables they have been collecting over the previous four weeks. Boxes for old CDs, un-wanted medicines and plastic bottle tops are laid out on park benches. Some people set up tables nearby selling crafts made out of recycled materials. When the collection period has finished, the volunteers ensure that the recycling is collected by local companies for re-processing. These meet-ups, steadily increasing in popularity since their inception seven years ago, are co-ordinated by a local NGO, staffed entirely by volunteers, and take place every month throughout the year – even in the freezing, snowy months of January and February. The state is nowhere to be seen.

Shanghai and St Petersburg make an interesting choice of city for a comparative exploration of recycling initiatives and the practices of citizen participation they generate. Both are the ‘second cities’ of their respective countries, are relatively wealthy and internationalised, and belong to political systems broadly characterised as authoritarian. Both have a huge problem with waste. St Petersburg, with a population of nearly 5.5 million, produces approximately 1.8 million tonnes of household waste per year. Shanghai’s 24 million residents produce over 9 million tonnes per year. Thus, the average St Petersburger produces 0.32 tonnes of waste a year, while the average Shanghaiese produces 0.37. In St Petersburg, the vast majority of this is sent to landfill; until very recently this was also the case in Shanghai.[1]

Both Russian and Chinese governments recognise that waste management is a growing problem and, in the last year, have developed policy initiatives to deal with it. These initiatives, however, could not be more different. Following calls by Chinese President Xi Jinping for recycling to become part of a ‘fashionable new lifestyle’, recycling facilities are rapidly being rolled out across the country. 46 cities are expected to have established a comprehensive recycling system by 2020, with all cities expected to do so by 2025. Shanghai has trailblazed recycling, becoming the first to enforce city-wide regulations: recycling facilities exist in every estate, many of which are overseen by CCTV cameras and/or a team of volunteers, and bins for separated waste are dotted along the streets. Failure to recycle correctly in Shanghai is now punishable by a fine. Following initial confusion and scepticism regarding the new regulations – spawning viral memes in the Chinese internet asking ‘what type of rubbish are you?’ – public behaviour appears to be changing.[2] The amount of recyclable materials collected in the first three months following the introduction of the new regulations was five times the amount collected during the same period in the previous year. [3]

An oblique sign with the words ‘Don’t you care?’, possibly commissioned by the government, but no one could say for sure

In Russia, the national-level project ‘Ecology’ has promised to transform Russia’s waste management system by 2024, increasing recycling rates from their current 7 per cent to an ambitious 60 per cent.[4] These new regulations have been rolled out across the regions since 1 January 2019 and have required a single ‘regional operator’, selected by the regional governor following a competitive tender, to assume responsibility for the entire waste management process in each region – from collection to sorting and landfill – at a cost of 120 roubles per month to residents.[5] However, St Petersburg constitutes one of three cities that are exempt from the reforms, and it recently emerged that they would not be implemented until 2021 at the earliest, due to fears of social unrest.[6] Currently, citizens in St Petersburg have three options to recycle their waste: collect rubbish over the period of one month and take it to the self-organised meet-ups; drive to the few recycling points on the edge of the city; or pay 400 roubles to a small business to collect their waste and recycle it on their behalf.

Therefore, unlike the rapidly transforming situation in China, residents across Russia are still not required to change their behaviour, since all waste sorting is to be done by the regional operator. And, while recycling in China is being touted[7] as a lucrative business opportunity that could create millions of new jobs, conflict has broken out in Russian regions where half of tariffs remain unpaid, rubbish is left rotting on the street, and regional operators are going bankrupt.[8] While officials argue that Russian citizens are not yet ‘ready’ to start recycling, independent polls tell a different story. Most citizens would be quite happy to recycle their rubbish if there were facilities nearby.[9]

In St Petersburg, people who recycle tend to describe themselves as environmentalists or as activists. Many are also trying to cut down on meat, buy more items second hand, adopt other environmentally friendly behaviours, and influence the behaviour of friends and family. They are often also strident critics of the Putin regime. But rather than starting with an initial concern about the environment which lead to frustration with government inaction, for most it is the other way round: critical attitudes towards the regime had brought them to environmental issues. Being an environmentalist is one way in which people can show opposition to Putin.

People at the recycling station in Parnas, St Petersburg, work out which bin in which to throw their recycling.

This mentality is amplified in the small business owners who operate local recycling facilities. One explains, “I am basically an environmentally crazy person, an environmentalist. For about 13 years worked in Greenpeace until… it became clear that Greenpeace was working with the government. And it makes no sense to work with the government, it’s all just talk.” Another stated, “There is a myth that Russia is not ready to recycle. It is not true. Everyone is ready. But it’s convenient for the authorities to say that we’re not ready. If you come and ask the local administration to recycling containers installed, they will say no. Because everything is connected with the state and the administration; there, people sit in the warm and don’t want to move or change the system.” Thanks to government inaction, people who want to recycle must have in-depth knowledge about the numerous different types of plastic and must be able to find out for themselves how to recycle their waste. One of the city’s main collection points for recyclables is on the edge of town, about an hour from the city centre by public transport and contains eight different sorting categories. One volunteer with the city’s recycling NGO explained, “You need a lot of motivation to recycle in St Petersburg. A lot of my friends are surprised to hear I’m a volunteer because they find it complicated to maintain an ecological lifestyle in Russia.”

For St Petersburg’s citizens who do not currently recycle, many simply don’t trust the government with the recycling process. “We don’t know anything about what happens with the separated waste. I think that after the work, the company just takes the separated garbage and mixes it with the other waste and leaves it in the landfill.” Some were also sceptical that the Shanghai approach of fining residents for non-compliance would achieve behavioural change in St Petersburg: “All fines will be collected by the government. They will use it as some kind of trick. And then the people will just be thinking about and arguing about the fine, not thinking about sorting their rubbish.”

A mural painted by volunteers in one of Shanghai’s housing estates.

In Shanghai, residents’ views could not be more different: rather than hindering the development of recycling in the city, the local Party-state was seen as paramount to successful implementation. According to a local residents’ committee member, “After all, in China this is driven by the government and it’s compulsory. Right now, the Shanghai Municipal Government is promoting it. It is entirely the Party and the government. Party building is taking the lead.” On the role of local Communist party cadres in the recycling process, another stated, “Party members took the lead in propaganda, took the lead in sorting their waste, and took the lead to volunteer. We ask the party members in our community to stand up.”

At the level of the housing estate in Shanghai, citizens can do more than simply put their rubbish in the recycling bins every evening. Teams of volunteers are recruited in each district to assist struggling residents. One volunteer, an older lady in her 60s sitting by the recycling bins in one housing estate, stated, “We come here 365 days a year, in the heat, in the snow, and in the rain. At New Year, we are still on duty… Yes, we are proud of being volunteers.” Social organisations are frequently invited onto the estates to run workshops, quizzes and other training or themed social events for residents. One resident explained, “This is a response call. Everyone should do something for the country for environmental protection. Yes, I feel obligated. It’s your duty if you live in this place. Well, we’re all living here together and if I make it decent, everyone really feels more comfortable.”

A volunteer and her friends catch up with each other while waiting for their neighbours to bring their recycling.

How can the approach to a single public policy elicit two such different conceptions of citizen engagement? The Russian regulations require individuals to take no action since the responsibility for waste separation is managed by regional authorities. In China, a huge government campaign is enforcing comprehensive societal behavioural change. In St Petersburg, those wishing to engage in recycling processes must do so through the voluntary and private sectors – and expose themselves to a grassroots anti-regime politics. In Shanghai, engagement consists of activating your Party membership, becoming a volunteer or participating in the additional programme of events organised by local residents’ committees and NGOs. In short, the Russian approach disengages the majority of the population while cementing the politics of a kernel of activists; the Chinese approach breeds mass conformity and consent.

The roots of these differences can be traced to four aspects of governance in which Russia and China differ substantially: the structure of political power, the management of the regional economy, levels of public trust in political institutions and the approach to land use. On the first, Russia, typically characterised as a ‘competitive authoritarian’ regime, allows space for limited levels of autonomous activity, while in China’s ‘hegemonic authoritarian’ regime, this space is much smaller and social control by the Communist Party is much greater. In terms of economy, Russian regional public finances have been characterised by fiscal austerity and recentralisation in recent years, while China’s sub-national units have pursued decentralisation, have substantial freedom to experiment with economic strategy and consequently have more finances at their disposal. Thirdly, public trust in the actors and institutions associated with recycling is a vital prerequisite for citizen compliance with the regulations; however, in Russia, citizens are deeply mistrustful of the authorities and levels of public trust are low, while public opinion polls in China consistently reveal high levels of trust in local authorities. And finally, Russia’s vast territory has meant that people have traditionally felt they need not worry about sending waste to landfill in a remote region, while China’s densely populated territory has not permitted this ‘luxury’.

Most of these kinds of distinctions in governance are usually made at the macro level, through the comparative analysis of elite politics, regional-level economic policy or survey data; less is known about how different types of authoritarian governance shape the everyday experiences of public policy and the kinds of orientations towards state power they foster in their citizens. In the case of recycling, poor governmental policy decisions are politicising the issue and creating fertile ground for social conflict in Russia, while in China it is being used to engage citizens more deeply with the local state. It demonstrates that even within the single regime category of ‘authoritarianism’, local experiences of governance and state power can be remarkably different.

All photos by the author

Cover image: Recycling facilities in one of Shanghai’s housing estates

[1] Novye Izvestia, Maybe not spill: ‘Red Bor become an eco-bomb for St. Petersburg, March 2019, https://newizv.ru/news/city/27-03-2019/avos-ne-prolietsya-krasnyy-bor-stal-eko-bomboy-dlya-peterburga

[2] Echo Huang, “What kind of rubbish are you?”: China’s first serious trash-sorting is driving Shanghai crazy, Quartz, July2019, https://qz.com/1659132/shanghai-is-giving-japanese-style-trash-sorting-a-try/

[3] Alice Yen, Shanghai recycling scheme slips up on 9,000 tonnes of wet water churned out each day, South China Morning Post, November 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3035995/shanghai-celebrates-its-war-rubbish-slips-9000-tonnes-waste-it

[4] Ministry of Natural Resources of Russia, Areas of Work: Directions of work of the Ministry of Natural Resources of Russia, 2019, http://www.mnr.gov.ru/activity/directions/natsionalnyy_proekt_ekologiya/

[5] Dmitry Sarkisov, “In the 90s, huge landfills managed by bandits appeared”: The garbage reform has begun in Russia. What will she change?, Lenta.ru, February 2019, https://lenta.ru/articles/2019/02/26/musor/

[6] The Moscow Times, St Petersburg Won’t See Citywide Recycling Until 2021, November 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/11/20/st-petersburg-wont-see-citywide-recycling-until-2021-a68250

[7] Ben Halder, A Plastic Recycling Revolution is Brewing … In China, The Daily Dose, Ozy, April 2019, https://www.ozy.com/acumen/a-plastic-recycling-revolution-is-brewing-in-china/93680/

[8] The Moscow Times, Activists Send Trash Parcels to Russian Deputies in Protest, January 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/01/21/activists-send-trash-parcels-russian-deputies-protest-a64208

[9] Ksenia Agapeeva, From Opinions to Understanding – Press Releases: “Garbage Reform”, Levada.ru, May 2019, https://www.levada.ru/2019/05/15/musornaya-reforma/

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Pleasing China, appeasing at home: Central Asia and the Xinjiang camps

Article by Francisco Olmos

November 29, 2019

Pleasing China, appeasing at home: Central Asia and the Xinjiang camps

Around 1.5 million Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups have been interned in China’s westernmost region of Xinjiang.[1] While the Chinese authorities say they are there of their own free will, recently leaked files from the Chinese government indicate that they are locked up in camps subject to mistreatment, from forced labour to sexual abuse.[2] The reaction of the United States (US) and Europe is known, with the US taking the strongest approach so far in condemning Beijing’s actions and blacklisting a number of organisations for their involvement in the campaign.[3] However, not much attention has been paid to the response of China’s closest neighbours to the west. These countries have closer ties to China, some of them even share a border with Xinjiang, and also have cultural and ethnic links to those minorities victimised by the Chinese authorities. The Central Asian republics have all supported China in regards to its treatment of the Muslim minorities, but the way the governments of these countries have responded to it differs depending on the role and strength of their own civil societies as well as the relationship they have with those being persecuted.

The Uyghurs have not been the only minority, although they are the largest one, targeted by the Chinese authorities. Other Turkic groups, such as Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, and non-Turkic Central Asian groups such as Tajiks, have shared the same fate. However, unlike the Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Tajiks do have states where their kin is the titular nationality. This, together with the fact that in broad terms they share the same religion, puts Central Asian republics in a different position when it comes to dealing with China’s actions in Xinjiang. Nevertheless, rather than a romanticised solidarity of a shared ethnicity or religion, what is defining the Central Asian states’ response is political and economic pragmatism, despite domestic opposition in some cases.

From the Caspian Sea in the west to the Tien Shan Mountains in the east, China is increasingly becoming the main trading and investment partner for the Central Asian nations. Some cases are more extreme than others, with Turkmenistan’s economy depending almost entirely on its exports to China and with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan heavily indebted to Beijing. The unwillingness of the republics to alienate their powerful neighbour is what defines their response to the current situation.

While the five republics have publicly backed China in its actions in Xinjiang, they can be divided into two categories. The first group is made up of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, who have voiced their support of Beijing whenever possible. The second group is formed by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, whose governments have also supported Beijing but have done so in a more tactful manner to better deal with those in their society who vocally oppose China’s repression of their ethnic peers at the other side of the border, fuelling the already existing anti-Chinese sentiment in their countries.

No space for dissent

In July 2019, 36 countries signed a letter supporting China’s policies in Xinjiang as a response to another letter sent to the United Nations Human Rights Council by mostly Western nations calling on China to halt its interment campaign. Two Central Asian republics were among those who defended Beijing: Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. A few weeks later, Uzbekistan joined them.

It should come as no surprise that Turkmenistan stands firmly by China, even when signing the aforementioned letter contravened its policy of neutrality in the international arena. The nation ruled with an iron grip by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov is the country in the region that depends the most on the Asian giant. Through a series of trade blunders and lack of vision, China has become the sole market for Turkmenistan’s gas, notwithstanding Russia’s token imports. This means that China is now the destination for almost 80 per cent of Turkmenistan’s exports.[4] It is therefore expected for Ashgabat, also notorious for its lack of freedoms and human rights abuses, to unequivocally take Beijing’s side.

Tajikistan similarly has links too close to China to be able to afford displeasing it. Dushanbe owes Beijing almost half of its foreign debt, $1.2 billion out of $2.9 billion.[5] Furthermore it has the closest relationship with China in security terms in the region. Up to 40 guard posts along the Tajik-Afghan border have been built or refurbished by the Chinese, who in addition have boots on the ground through an outpost in the Gorno-Badakhshan region.[6] Despite reports of ethnic Tajiks in the internment camps, Emomali Rahmon’s regime has explicitly supported China.

Uzbekistan offers a different perspective to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Despite China already being a major trading partner, Tashkent may not be looking so much to its present situation but rather to the opportunities an increased collaboration with Beijing can bring. As part of President Mirziyoyev’s opening of the country to foreign investment, Uzbekistan is looking to bolster its relations with China. From infrastructure projects to attracting Chinese tourists by waving visas for short stays, Chinese-Uzbek relations are on the rise. As a result, Uzbekistan did not hesitate to deport Gene Bunin, an expert who collects data on the Xinjiang camps, or prevent a small gathering to commemorate the first president, an ethnic Uyghur, of the short-lived Second East Turkestan Republic (1944-49). Uzbekistan’s own Uyghur minority has no presence in wider society and its media does not cover the situation of the Uyghurs in China.[7]

What Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have in common and which defines their stance on the Xinjiang camps is the lack of an active civil society due to the authoritarian nature of their respective regimes. Notwithstanding the differences among the three countries, there is little space for people to voice their discontent on local or national issues, let alone those concerning foreign countries. Therefore, their governments have no impediment to back China. The fact that Tajiks are in camps or that Uzbekistan has an Uyghur minority does not make much of a difference in the authorities’ stance in regards to Xinjiang.

Balancing act

Neither Kazakhstan nor Kyrgyzstan signed the letter in support of China that the other three republics did. This does not mean they do not stand by Beijing’s campaign in Xinjiang. Their governments do, but that view is not supported by some of its citizens. Both countries have to balance the need to be on good terms with China, as it is a vital economic partner, with the growing anti-Chinese sentiment in their populations.

Kazakhstan is finding it the hardest to walk this tight rope. China is the main market for Kazakhstan’s exports, including an important proportion of its oil, bilateral trade that amounts to over $12 billion[8] and Nur-Sultan is a key partner in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. As with the rest of the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan cannot afford to alienate China and has no intention of doing so. However, unlike in the other republics, its demographics and rise of civil society result in a more complex situation. It is estimated that up to 1.5 million ethnic Kazakhs live in the province of Xinjiang and they are among those targeted by Chinese officials.[9] In addition, as a result of the oralman or return programme of ethnic Kazakhs promoted by the government after independence, thousands of families are now divided between Kazakhstan and China, with those that moved to the former playing an active role in defence of their relatives, who in many cases have been interned. Uyghurs, the major group persecuted in Xinjiang, are also present in Kazakhstan, numbering up to 250,000.[10] The diaspora has established organisations to defend the rights of Kazakhs and Uyghurs, like Atajurt Eriktileri, which are raising their voices in defence of those repressed in the neighbouring country.

Kazakh authorities have responded by applying a policy of carrot and stick, with a preponderance of the latter, to navigate this situation. On the one hand, it has sent diplomatic notes to Beijing concerning itself with the situation of ethnic Kazakhs and it has given in to internal and external pressure in some high-profile cases like that of Sairagul Sauytbay, an ethnic Kazakh Chinese national who became a whistle-blower regarding the camps and avoided extradition to China from Kazakhstan to end up in Sweden. But more often than not, the Kazakh government has reacted as one would expect an authoritarian regime to by not allowing protestors to gather and dispersing them when they do. This includes the detention of the leader of Atajurt Eriktileri, Serikjan Bilash, and the co-optation of the group, now split in two.

If the situation in Xinjiang was simply about the internment of people the Kazakh authorities would be able to dismiss such events and opposition since they do not appeal to a majority of the population. However, they add to the existing anti-Chinese sentiment that has been brewing in the country in the last years. The dread of Chinese influence has resulted in a number of protests, from the 2016 demonstrations against a land reform to those in September 2019 against plans for China to build 55 factories, to name the most relevant. Fear of the Chinese taking land, controlling the country and the influx of Chinese workers fuelled the protests. The issue of Xinjiang is now being absorbed, or sits alongside, these anti-Chinese movements. This is taking place at a time when the Kazakh state is experiencing a political transition and civil society is increasingly demanding freedoms and accountability through activist groups like Oyan, Qazaqstan and Qaharman.

Kyrgyzstan faces a similar situation to that of Kazakhstan. Like Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic is heavily indebted to China. In turn, Beijing invests in multiple infrastructure projects around the country, some of doubtful quality like the ill-fated power station that left residents of Bishkek without heating in the middle of winter in 2018.[11] Furthermore, Chinese companies exploit the country’s mineral wealth and employ Chinese workers to do so. All these factors have contributed to a rising Sinophobic sentiment that has also emerged in neighbouring Kazakhstan. The interment of ethnic Kyrgyz in camps in Xinjiang has become part of this wider issue.

In the last year, at least five waves of anti-Chinese protests have taken place in Kyrgyzstan.[12] While expressing support for the ethnic Kyrgyz persecuted in China, the main aim of the demonstrators has been to protest against the inflow of Chinese workers, the way Chinese companies operate and their increasing presence in the country. In response to Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang, Kyrgyz president Sooronbai Jeenbekov has maintained a perceived neutrality that favours China, stating that Bishkek should not meddle in the internal affairs of their neighbour and that diplomacy would run its course on the Xinjiang camps. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan did not join Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in signing the letter officially backing Beijing’s policy in its western province.

The issue of the interment of Muslim minorities in China does not concern the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan besides some minor reputational setbacks in public relations. The numbers of those demanding a stricter response solely in regard to the fate of ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Uyghurs are not significant. The issue for the authorities arises when this feeds into wider anti-Chinese protests and it becomes another tool in the arsenal of demonstrators and, especially in Kazakhstan’s case, of far-reaching movements that call for change and the democratisation of the institutions.

The governments of the five Central Asian republics know where their economic present and future lies, and that is in China. There is no such thing as an ethnic or religious solidarity with those interned in Xinjiang. Pragmatism is the guiding principle of the authorities, who themselves have a poor track-record when it comes to human rights. The same applies to the majority of the citizens in those countries, who have few personal links to those detained and are suffering themselves from the lack of freedoms, namely in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It should come as no surprise that those three countries have been more vocal in the support of China. Only in the cases of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the nations with the most open civil societies in the region, have authorities had to be tactful due to the increasing Sinophobia, whose impact should not be exaggerated but that could sour relations with China, while at the same time controlling the discontent to avoid it spilling into other segments of society. In the meantime, the fate of more than a million people interned in camps fades into the background in the midst of realpolitik.

[1] Adrian Zenz, Brainwashing, Police Guards and Coercive Internment: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s ‘Vocational Training Internment Camps’, Journal of Political Risk, July 2019, http://www.jpolrisk.com/brainwashing-police-guards-and-coercive-internment-evidence-from-chinese-government-documents-about-the-nature-and-extent-of-xinjiangs-vocational-training-internment-camps/

[2] Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, ‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims, The New York Times, November 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html?module=inline

[3] Charles Rollet, Xinjiang Backlash Is Hitting Chinese Firms Hard, Foreign Policy, October 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/18/xinjiang-sanctions-chinese-firms-surveillance/

[4] Sam Bhutia, Turkmenistan’s mainline to China, Eurasianet, October 2019, https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistans-mainline-to-china

[5] Farangis Najibullah, Silver Lining? Tajikistan Defends Controversial Decision To Give Mine To China, RFE/RL, October 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/silver-lining-tajikistan-defends-controversial-decision-to-give-mine-to-china/30199786.html

[6] Catherine Putz, China in Tajikistan: New Report Claims Chinese Troops Patrol Large Swaths of the Afghan-Tajik Border, The Diplomat, June 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/china-in-tajikistan-new-report-claims-chinese-troops-patrol-large-swaths-of-the-afghan-tajik-border/

[7] Eurasianet, Uzbekistan’s invisible Uighurs, July 2019, https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistans-invisible-uighurs

[8] Zhanna Shayakhmetova, Kazakhstan seeks high-tech, agricultural cooperation with China, Astana Times, September 2019, https://astanatimes.com/2019/09/kazakhstan-seeks-high-tech-agricultural-cooperation-with-china-says-tokayev-during-beijing-business-council-meeting/

[9] Bruce Pannier, China’s New Security Concern – The Kazakhs, RFE/RL, August 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-kazakhstan-china-deteriorating-relations-uyghurs/28665937.html

[10] Ryskeldi Satke, Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan hope for peace despite violence, Al Jazeera, January 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/09/uighurs-kyrgyzstan-hope-piece-violence-160915133619696.html

[11] Catherine Putz, Bitter Cold Hits Bishkek, Chinese-Repaired Power Plant Breaks Down, The Diplomat, January 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/bitter-cold-hits-bishkek-chinese-repaired-power-plant-breaks-down/

[12] Elzbieta Pron and Emilie Szwajnoch, Kazakh Anti-Chinese Protests and the Issue of Xinjiang Detention Camps, CACI, October 2019, http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13593-kazakh-anti-chinese-protests-and-the-issue-of-xinjiang-detention-camps.html

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Former Soviet Union

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