In this FPC Briefing Martha Molfetas gives a detailed analysis of the current and historical tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, exploring the role of resources and the needs for long-term development and peace-building.

This FPC briefing by Catherine Owen sets out some of the ways in which the Putin government has acted to stamp down on the protest movement that grew in the wake of the disputed Duma elections in 2011.

The unexpected genesis of the MoU and its far-reaching scope are the most significant evidence to date of the determination of Conservative government members to align UK foreign policy and diplomacy with an idealism that invokes political rhetoric from the past and impedes the attainment of British interests in the future.

Economic Pragmatism…
The last few weeks have seen William Hague sell UK-Canada diplomatic cooperation in mostly pragmatic terms. While steering clear of precise numbers, the UK Foreign Secretary touted the co-location of diplomatic sites and the joint provision of consular services as commonsensical measures to save the British taxpayers’ money. However, even the most superficial survey of British and Canadian diplomatic resources gives enough reason to suspect that, for the UK at least, cooperation will yield rather modest budgetary benefits.

Made up of 180 diplomatic offices, staffed with about 7800 employees, Canada’s diplomatic network is significantly smaller than the UK’s, which boasts around 270 representations with 8800 employees and a much denser network of consular service points. Over the next years, the gap between both countries’ diplomatic resources is set to grow even wider, as the Harper administration is determined to further downsize Canada’s diplomatic operations and personnel.

The FCO can still expect to generate sizeable savings from offering embassy and consulate space to Canadian diplomats. However, opportunities for outsourcing the consular protection of UK nationals to Canadian foreign affairs workers will be limited. Instead, particularly in Europe and Africa, FCO diplomats will face an increased workload from providing consular assistance to Canadian citizens who have no representation of their own government to turn to. Instead of reducing its human resources budget, the FCO might therefore be forced to spend more on staff, severely diminishing if not negating the savings generated by sharing diplomatic premises.

… is Trumped by Anachronistic Idealism
The doubtful prospects of savings suggest that, rather than being the product of pragmatic considerations, UK-Canada diplomatic cooperation is driven by an anachronistic idealism, which has gained influence across Whitehall since the coalition government first came to power in 2010. Formed by the Foreign Secretary and his Conservative government peers, this idealism nourishes the idea that the UK’s global interests are most effectively realised at the helm of a new Commonwealth diplomatic network.

In the FCO’s strategic planning, the MoU with Canada is thus only the first of several diplomatic cooperation agreements with and among what William Hague has labelled “first cousin” countries. Accordingly, UK diplomats in Canberra and Wellington have already sounded out the possibility of Australia and New Zealand becoming the next ‘relatives’ to join diplomatic forces with the UK.

However, contrary to what the Foreign Secretary’s family analogy implies, the three partners of choice neither share the FCO’s enthusiasm for politically driven diplomatic cooperation nor are they likely to support the UK’s foreign policy interests by default. In Canada, the announcement of diplomatic cooperation with the UK has provoked widespread public concern about a creeping erosion of Ottawa’s independence in foreign affairs and an outcry among leading foreign policy experts about the incompatibility of British and Canadian foreign policy agendas. Although the discourse has so far been more nuanced in Australia and New Zealand, foreign affairs officials of both countries have already made clear that their governments are primarily interested in the financial aspects of diplomatic cooperation.

London’s Declining Influence in European Union Foreign Affairs
While the economic expectations and political aspirations Conservative government members have vested in a new Commonwealth diplomatic network are virtually certain to be disappointed, FCO support for the project is unlikely to falter any time soon. The promotion of an antidote to an increasingly assertive European Union (EU) in international diplomacy has bestowed Eurosceptic Conservatives’ unanimous favour on William Hague. To keep this favour, the Foreign Secretary seems even prepared to risk a further downgrading of London’s already weakened credibility and influence in EU foreign affairs.

Indeed, in most EU capitals, the promotion of a new Commonwealth diplomatic network is seen as yet another strong indicator of the UK’s waning interest in taking a lead in EU foreign affairs. Thus, the endeavour to pool diplomatic resources with Commonwealth partners not only marks a sharp departure from past FCO efforts to conclude embassy co-location agreements with European partners, but it also fits the more general picture of a creeping British retreat from shaping EU foreign policy. Thus, over the last two years, UK diplomats have often been content with simply blocking common EU foreign policy statements in Brussels or obstructing long-established procedures of speaking with one EU voice in international organisations when they could have pursued British interests through EU diplomacy instead.

A Missed Opportunity
The Foreign Secretary’s squander of London’s influence in EU foreign affairs should not disguise the fact that deeper EU diplomatic cooperation provides one of the most promising avenues for cutting the FCO’s budget. In fact, the promotion of common EU consular posts figured prominently on the agenda of the British EU Presidency in 2005, because the UK’s initiation of several EU member state embassy co-location projects has produced significant savings.

Likewise, it should be clear that even a network of some of the most potent Commonwealth countries cannot compete with the EU as a platform for effectively promoting the UK’s global interests. Despite the Eurozone crisis, the EU remains a formidable force in international affairs, both as a trade power and as an entrepreneur of international norms. Much of the UK’s appeal to partners beyond Europe is a result of London’s membership and leverage in the EU.

Ironically, while unexploited by the coalition government, the UK’s potential for successfully shaping EU foreign policy and diplomacy has never been better. As Berlin and Paris are consumed with questions of deeper economic and fiscal integration, the UK is currently the only country that has the necessary political clout and resources to determine the grand design of EU foreign policy. London’s Commissioner in Brussels, Catherine Ashton, is not only in charge of the EU’s foreign affairs portfolio but also in desperate need of strategic input for making the EU’s diplomatic service a success. In most international organisations and third states, native command of the English language puts UK diplomats at a distinct advantage when it comes to negotiating common EU positions.

Foreign Policy Rhetoric from the Past
However, instead of seizing the unique opportunity to shape EU diplomacy in order to promote British interests, William Hague prefers to invoke a 60 year old foreign policy rhetoric that has failed the UK before.

In January 1952, Hague’s predecessor as Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, declared that the UK would never become part of closer European cooperation “For Britain’s story and her interests lie far beyond the continent of Europe. Our thoughts move across the seas to the many communities in which our people play their part, in every corner of the world. These are our family ties.”

Less than a decade after Eden’s speech, the UK pledged its first (unsuccessful) bid to join the European Economic Community. Could-shouldering Europe to remain at the helm of a declining Commonwealth had become unviable, both economically and politically. Could-shouldering Europe once again to be at the helm of a new Commonwealth diplomatic will turn out to be just as unviable.

November 2012

Jan Gaspers is a Gates Scholar at the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, and currently engaged in a doctoral research project on EU member state diplomatic cooperation within the OSCE and NATO. In the past, Jan has worked inter alia with the OSCE, the EU Delegation to the International Organisations in Vienna, the EU Institute for Security Studies, and the European Centre for Development Policy Management. His wider research interests include UK foreign policy and diplomacy, the European External Action Service, and the evolution of European and transatlantic security and defence cooperation.

China analysts rarely reach consensus on such matters. If anything, though, the weight of opinion on the new leadership is gloomy – by this reckoning conservatives outweigh reformers. But is this the right way of analysing Chinese politics? In particular, what does “reform” actually mean at this point in time in the Chinese context?

Firstly, let’s look at what the commentariat outside China tends to mean by “reform”. For some this is a catch-all phrase which highlights the idea that bold change is needed to deal with the large number of challenges facing the Chinese leadership, from corruption to inefficient state-owned enterprises and political stasis. Alongside this view lies an analysis of the last decade as a wasted opportunity – see for a prime example of this sort of thinking.

Within China, this thinking is not dominant, though it does exist. There is actually an intense debate about the way forward for China – outgoing Party General Secretary Hu Jintao obliquely referred to this in his 8 November speech to the 18th Party Congress when he said that ““. Below the level of the leadership, “reform” is definitely a term which marks political dividing lines between those who think that more marketisation of the economy and structural reforms to governance and administration are needed, and those who feel that the zealous market reforms of the 1990s created many of the problems China faces today, environmental degradation, income disparities, and so on.

At the leadership level, however, “reform” becomes a much more slippery term. Deng Xiaoping reportedly said in May 1989 that ““. If the meaning of reform was not clear then – a time of real political crisis – it subsequently became clearer: “reform” as the slogan for a pragmatic developmentalism, in the service of which extensive market reforms were made in the 1990s, but much less so in the 2000s after the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization marked a high point of policy when it came to liberalization of the economy.

Still, for top Party elites, no-one would admit to not being a reformer, even more so since a new reference to “reform and opening up” (gaige kaifang) has just been written into the Party constitution at the 18th Congress. On one level, this might be seen as an effort to curtail debate (in the traditions of democratic centralism), and new Party General Secretary Xi Jinping has already exhorted cadres to study these constitutional changes which, although they are presented as “theoretical innovations”, are heavily Dengist in content (with the important and novel exception of environmental protection, translated in constitutional terms to “ecological civilization”). When it comes to reform there may be little in the way of radical ideas.

That does not lessen the political imperative to adapt to deal with existing and new problems. Indeed, Hu’s 18th Congress report and subsequent statements by him and Xi Jinping have both stressed new challenges facing the Party and the country. “Reform” then becomes a useful rhetorical device for rallying the Party around the need to take pragmatic, but innovative, steps to deal with these problems. The actual policy measures taken will, however, be issue specific, and defy easy ideological categorization. Reform is a means, not an end.

Indeed, today’s economy is much more complex, organic forces are stronger, and integration with the global economy much more substantial than in the 1990s when a call for radical market reform was politically difficult, but somehow easier to translate into policy. It is therefore not the case that all is lacking today is the policy determination of the late 1990s. The solutions are more difficult to find. Reform in one direction could make other problems more difficult to resolve – for example, energy prices which were fully marketised might increase both the power of certain state-owned enterprises and exacerbate wealth disparities among the population.

What does this mean for reading the leadership transition?

Firstly, the new PBSC consists of experienced cadres, most of whom have engaged with difficult challenges at the provincial level in recent years. There may have been more innovative individuals in the wings, but this top team will still be committed to addressing the challenges the Party faces in its pursuit of economic and social development – particularly when compared to the outgoing PBSC.

Secondly, the more significant part of the transition was probably not the make up of the PBSC, but Hu Jintao handing over control of the military to Xi Jinping on 15 November, rather than some time in 2013 or 2014. This demonstrates a much clearer transition of top leadership than in 2002-4 or any previous one, and strengthens both Xi and Premier designate Li Keqiang. Their ability to take new steps, relatively quickly, to adjust policy should therefore not be underestimated.

Thirdly, below the much-discussed Standing Committee, the rest of the Politburo is indeed of a younger generation. The balance between decision making by the Politburo and its Standing Committee under this leadership remains to be seen. But a government led by Li Keqiang, also featuring Ma Kai and Wang Yang, with a possible key role for Li Yuanchao (the surprise omission from the PBSC), is likely to push forward with policies to restructure the economy.

Finally, political change will likely remain gradual. We should not expect any dilution of the Party’s desire to remain the dominant force in Chinese politics at the same time as pursuing goals of building a “well off and strong” (fuqiang) China. Within that constraint, admittedly a fundamental one, some of the ideas that have been discussed to improve governance could well be brought forward. Indeed, Xi Jinping’s early rhetorical targeting of corruption, and the placing of the tough Wang Qishan in charge of the anti-corruption portfolio, increases the chances of some progress in that area, although the systemic barriers are substantial.

There is more to be said about the transition, of course, but on the whole, there are reasons to be quietly optimistic. For a start, it took place smoothly and on time (in spite of the political excitement and dire media warnings of the last ten months). Xi Jinping is the unequivocal successor to Hu Jintao. And the wider Politburo membership reflects not just a shift to a new generation of leaders, but also some substantial expertise and interest in addressing the issues which China will face over the next five years.

November 2012

The event got off to a rocky start with logistical problems such as food shortages and widespread problems with Internet access at the IGF venue, the Baku Expo Centre. Twitter was full of complaints from the delegates who were able to get online that they were hungry and deprived of caffeine.

Things took a more sinister turn when local rights groups were to stop distributing two reports on relevant issues in Azerbaijan, on the grounds that they were an attempt to “attack one of the stakeholder group” – the Azerbaijani government. A representative of the Secretariat suggested that the groups would be allowed to distribute the materials if they got permission from the Azerbaijani authorities. The reports examined and in Azerbaijan ahead of the IGF.

The banned reports were not the only issue faced by Azerbaijani participants. A representative of the Expression Online Initiative – the coalition behind one of the banned reports – was harassed when attempting to register, being questioned over whether he was planning a protest at the IGF. Journalists from the online television station were also given trouble in the registration process, being told that the Azerbaijani ICT Ministry did not consider Obyektiv TV to be a media outlet.

The reason for this harassment soon became clear: the registration staff were members of a . This seemed an odd choice given that host country officials are not meant to influence who can and cannot attend the IGF.

But perhaps the lowest point of the week occurred when that the personal computers of two EU officials were hacked at their hotel in Baku. The officials were staff members travelling with Vice President of the European Commission Neelie Kroes, who took a on violations of freedom of expression and Internet freedom in Azerbaijan during the IGF and was from visiting a penitentiary hospital in Baku. The officials confirmed that they were conducting a forensic analysis of the compromised computers.

On the final day of the IGF, that there had been reports of some laptops being infected with malware or viruses at the IGF. Then during the closing ceremony, reported that Facebook had stopped working – although it appeared to be back up several minutes later.

The Azerbaijani government’s attitude towards the event was made clear when President Ilham Aliyev declined to participate in the IGF’s opening ceremony, opting instead to attend the Bakutel ICT Exhibition and Conference being held in the same venue as the IGF. Azerbaijani ICT Minister Ali Abbasov delivered the President’s comments at the IGF on his behalf.

The decision to hold the IGF in a country with a troubling human rights record was the source of much deliberation over whether these factors should be taken into consideration in determining the venue for such events. But seasoned participants commented that there had been more discussion on human rights than at any previous IGF.

Even the government’s most ardent critics saw the positive side of holding the IGF in Baku. As formerly imprisoned blogger Emin Milli said at a workshop during the IGF, holding such an event in an authoritarian country created a unique platform to discuss issues that would otherwise not be permitted.

Rights groups fear potential retaliation for local activists and journalists who were critical of the authorities during the IGF, particularly as many were also outspoken earlier this year in the run-up to the Eurovision Song Contest, which local groups used as a platform to expose human rights problems in the country.

So far these concerns appear to be grounded. On the final day of the IGF, Senior Presidential Adviser Ali Hasanov said in an that some NGOs had “dedicated consistent efforts” to attempting to “diminish the value” of the IGF. The fear remains that once international attention has shifted from the country, the door will be open for the authorities to target these critical voices.

Rebecca Vincent is a freelance human rights consultant and expert on freedom of expression in Azerbaijan. She worked with the and the to compile the banned reports and was formerly based at Article 19 as the Coordinator of the International Partnership Group for Azerbaijan.

William Gumede gives a historical account of the rise of corruption across Africa post-independence and outlines measures that can be taken to tackle the problem.

FPC Research Associate Dr Simon Mabon gives the background to the political unrest and human rights abuses that took place in Bahrain around the Arab Spring. The briefing sets out the geo-political competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran that forms the backdrop to recent events and critiques the UK government’s relations with Bahrain.

FPC Research Associate Tanweer Ali explains the current wave of racism directed at Roma communities across Europe and its historical context, making recommendations for a political response.

FPC Senior Research Associate Firdevs Robinson gives her analysis of the difficulties Turkey is facing with Syrian instability and deteriorating relations with the EU.

In a new FPC Briefing Lancaster University’s Stephen Royle explains some of the main challenges, both historic and current, facing the banking sector in Iran that have helped to trigger recent unrest in the country.