The EU, despite having no direct role in the peace talks, fully supports the current mediation efforts and has called for a peaceful settlement including essential elements such as the non-use of force, principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. At first stance the EU’s position looks rather vague – proposing two opposite solutions, territorial integrity and self-determination, show the EU’s lack of interest in the specifics of the conflicts at the EU’s periphery. Indeed, the EU’s overall strategy towards Nagorno-Karabakh and the South Caucasus in general has been incoherent, resembling to a child who is just about to walk and is still making clumsy steps.

As a hybrid polity the EU has developed its own distinctive, though not always effective, approach to conflict resolution-Europeanisation, comprising both conditionality and social learning. Whilst by applying conditionality, be it through the ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’, the European policy-makers seek to achieve the required changes in the domestic structures in a third country, social learning advocates an internalisation of the EU norms by the domestic actors who would consider these norms both legitimate and intrinsically valuable. However, this ‘nudging’ concept of social learning has little chance of being welcomed in the states like Armenia and Azerbaijan, where the vast implications of the contagious Soviet legacy are still felt throughout. Civil society reform in both countries is far from fully developed. The notorious Armenian presidential elections in 2008, a deteriorating track record of human rights abuses in Azerbaijan, where law-making leads to suppressing rather than strengthening civil society reform, is a brazen challenge to social learning advocates. Supporters of conditionality, despite recent attempts to strengthen the ‘more for more’, ‘less for less’ approach, are still far from achieving concrete results in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The general perception of EU conditionality is that it uses more ‘carrots’ than ‘sticks’ and cannot rely only on treaty-based sanctions. However, it is by the use of sanctions, and in particular targeted sanctions, the EU can and should reinforce and exert its influence, thus yielding positive changes in the policy making of the two South Caucasian countries. That may take the form of sanctions in the event of violations of contractual obligations undertaken by both countries. These positive changes towards democratisation should lead to a more constructive conflict resolution that should be enabled by an active support of civil society initiatives and thus fostering of an open dialogue between conflict-affected parties. This would make the EU’s stake in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution more tangible and effective.

Despite this, reaffirm the general reluctance of the EU to apply a sanctions policy, even when the third countries do not meet the requirements of principal clauses such under ENP Action Plans. Retaining open political channels is still seen as far too crucial. Instead the EU sees awarding carrots as less problematic and this approach is eagerly promoted by Brussels. A rewards-based policy provides a comfort zone for open discussions. Sanctions however, though acknowledged as an option in a range of agreements, are treated cautiously. This opens up more fundamental questions about the EU’s almost chronic inability to set out a vision for its role in the South Caucasus.

The EU has a choice of two patterns of engagement in the South Caucasus: a geo-political approach or one that prioritises policy convergence under the motto of Europeanisation. The latter is of a long-term nature and hence involves a more incremental development with foreseeable positive outcomes in the policy-making of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Strengthening a geo-political role of the EU in the region, a more short-term solution, may enhance the public perception of the EU in the South Caucasus, yet the implications for the parties involved would remain uncertain.
The EU is not regarded as a full geopolitical actor in the region. And this is a bitter or a sweet truth. Yet, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is highly geo-politicised. A widespread belief in conflict-affected countries is that ‘a great game’ should be dictated by ‘great powers’, for example, by the co-chairs of the Minsk Group. The EU is awarded with a secondary role, constrained to its soft diplomacy. What can become a booster for the EU’s geo-politicisation of its role is the potential replacement of France with the EU in OSCE Minsk Group to counterbalance the key regional players Russia and the USA. It could be contentious, though, to infer that the EU’s direct presence in the Minsk Group would invoke a different pattern in the peacemaking process or, some would point to a risk for the EU to be directly involved in the most dangerous conflict of the region. Some would argue that the EU as a co-chair may bring further implications for both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The main concern relates to the EU’s lack of consolidating a common voice considering its inter-institutional discrepancies and differentiations further complicated by a rotating presidency of the EU. This argument certainly has a plausible grounding and echoes a conventional view on the legitimacy deficit of the EU and its non-affirmed identity as a geopolitical actor.
Nevertheless, what should be better propagated to Armenia, Azerbaijan and their diasporas, the majority of which find their second home in liberal democracies, is the EU’s renowned consociational approach involving a guaranteed group representation. Besides, a potential presence of the EU as a co-chair will not break but rather may alter a dynamic in the Minsk group where more tools and instruments of transparent negotiations, intrinsic to the EU’s policy-making style will be delegated. This in turn would lead to a subsequent revision by Armenia and Azerbaijan of their own foreign policy strategies.
Leaving aside a hypothetical boost of the EU’s direct geopolitical role in the conflict resolution, it is the second pattern of its engagement – policy convergence – that the EU has already stepped up in the South Caucasus. This has resulted in the launch of the ENP Action Plans in 2006, Eastern Partnership in 2009 and ongoing negotiations over Association Agreements. From a conflict resolution perspective, the EU’s ubiquitous commitment to encouraging democratic reforms is promising and ambitious, its core instrument being Civil Society initiative. However, as mentioned earlier it is too premature to acknowledge whether the EU’s normative power’s success and confidence-building measures, so eagerly promoted in EU official statements, have been taken on board by Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Policy convergence under the ENP as a technocratic tool is sensible and is a more promising pattern to follow. It has the potential to establish functional and robust democratic institutions in Armenia and Azerbaijan that should incrementally foster an inclusive, consociational style in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution.

It is broadly accepted that the strongest incentive for both parties, when it comes to conflict resolution, is EU membership. However, due to the absence of such an offer under the ENP framework, European policy-makers must look for other potential incentives the EU can propose. None of the countries are overwhelmingly seeking a full integration or enthusiastically internalising the European norms. Policy convergence and European integration in general with no sensible and clear incentives to offer would be regarded less feasible and less prioritised by South Caucasus countries. Only by proposing tangible incentives for policy convergence in both countries will the EU’s leverage to influence the conflict dynamic increase and thus, improve the chances of encouraging the parties to find a compromise.

Dr Simon Mabon from Lancaster University sets out the ways in which Saudi Arabia is using new anti-terrorism legislation to restrict freedom of speech and online activity. The briefing examines changing Saudi social attitudes to women’s political participation, calls for greater accountability from the regime and the UK-Saudi economic and political relationship that has a chilling effect on London’s willingness to speak out against Saudi human rights abuses.

FPC Research Associate Alex Jackson provides a detailed analysis of the recent conflict between the Turkish Government and the PKK, exploring the key dynamics behind recent events. Jackson’s research is supported by a comprehensive database of recent attacks, casualties and other important information.

Turkey wants the United Nations to set up refugee camps “within the borders of Syria” in order to contain the number of Syrians fleeing to Turkey. It urges the international community to respond collectively to the killing of the civilian population. Turkey feels the world needs to stand by it when the threat to use chemical and biological weapons against Turkey exists.

Turkey has responded to a massive humanitarian crisis at its doorstep in a manner befitting a serious country with a long history.

The AKP government’s decision to finally distance itself from, and then take a firm stand against the Assad dictatorship, can only be applauded.

However, it still leaves many unanswered questions.
Even though the speed and extent of Syria’s spiraling violence has taken most of the world by surprise, shouldn’t Turkey, claiming to be “the master, the leader and the servant “ of this region , have been reading and predicting the situation better than most?

The unintended consequences of the conflict in Syria and Turkey’s involvement in it are becoming clearer each day. Lack of contingency planning, failure of foresight and an inability to develop a comprehensive policy that includes courageous steps to deal with its own ethnic question and democratic deficit undermine Turkey’s standing in its region.

As the violence escalates and the stakes become higher, Turkey can no longer afford to continue with a foreign policy that is characterized by an “act now, think later” approach.

The Arab Uprising put a spring in the step of Ahmet Davutoglu, the architect of Turkey’s recent foreign policy. Mr. Davutoglu had talked of In the Turkish Grand National Assembly session where the foreign minister made his statement, the opposition Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) called the government’s policy towards Syria a “fiasco and adventurism”.

However, having failed to formulate a credible alternative which adequately condemned the brutality of the Assad regime, the Republican Peoples’ Party’s warnings went largely unnoticed. The fact is, neither the government nor its fiercest critics had really predicted that unfolding events in Syria would turn into an existential threat for Turkey.

The crisis in Syria tested the limits of Turkey’s influence in the region. It also exposed Turkey’s own ethnic and sectarian divisions.

Alarmed at the power vacuum being filled with an increasingly bold Kurdish presence over the border, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned against Kurdish insurgents establishing camps in northern Syria, saying Turkey would not tolerate it. But it was inside national borders that Kurdish armed group PKK intensified its attacks on the police, military and civilians, carrying the decades old bloody conflict to a new and more dangerous stage.

In late July, PKK militants engaged Turkish armed forces for nearly three weeks in the southeastern region of Semdinli, bordering Iran and Iraq. Over the past month, the PKK attacked and killed two soldiers in the Aegean seaside town of Foca. On August 12th, an outspoken Kurdish/Alevi deputy from the opposition CHP was kidnapped and held for 48 hours by the PKK. On 20th August, the second day of the major Muslim holiday Eid el Fitr, a car bomb exploded near a police station in Gaziantep, a city near Turkey’s south-eastern border with Syria, killing at least nine people including four children and wounding dozens more. The government immediately blamed it on the PKK. The PKK denied involvement.

One of the most dangerous consequences of Turkey’s decision to become an organising hub for the Syrian uprising has been the of its by foreign fighters. The British press has been reporting examples of fighting for Syrian opposition groups and concerns have been raised over young British Muslims being radicalised by the conflict in Syria via Turkey.

The visible presence of home-grown Islamists and foreign jihadists caused alarm among populations in towns and villages along Turkey’s border with Syria. In areas where Turkey’s own Alevi (and in smaller numbers, Arabic speaking Alawite) community lives, security concerns and tension among local people are growing. Turkey’s covert and overt support for the mostly Sunni Syrian rebels fighting the Alawite regime in Syria and its facilitation of Saudi Arabian and Qatari arming and funding of rebels have unsettled many.

Yet increasingly angry complaints raised by the local population about the sectarian and fundamentalist elements arriving in the area have failed to move Turkey’s decision makers. Despite widespread observations that adjoining provinces have become a logistics base for weapons and radical Islamist activity, the only official concern seems to be the threat posed by the Kurdish militancy.

There is no doubt increased indiscriminate violence by the PKK and possible knock-on effects of the rising political aspirations of Syria’s minority Kurds on Turkey’s own Kurds merit serious attention. However, it is difficult to understand the tendency to turn a blind eye, or even to deny the presence of a growing extremism in Turkey and beyond.

Turkish columnist Semih Idiz’s went even further to suggest that it may be intentional. He highlighted the fact that one of the three Al-Qaeda militants killed recently in Aleppo was Baki Yigit, a known Al-Qaeda operative. Baki Yigit was arrested soon after the 2003 Al-Qaeda bombings targeting synagogues, the HSBC bank and the British Consulate in Istanbul, killing 57 people. Yigit was found guilty in 2007 and sentenced to life imprisonment. An appeal court ruling released him in 2010. Mr Idiz asked: “How is it possible that someone like Baki Yigit could freely travel to Syria and join the fight alongside Free Syrian Army?” His answer was chilling: “For a moment, I forgot this was the country where journalists, academics and retired generals rot in jails while convicted murderers walk free”.

Even the obvious change of policy among western governments reacting to reports of recent brutality by some of the Syrian opposition didn’t seem to trigger alarm bells among Turkey’s leaders.

When the US secretary of state Hilary Clinton visited Istanbul to discuss the Syrian conflict, she made it clear that their concerns were not limited to the PKK threat. “Yes, we worry about terrorists, PKK, al Qaeda and others taking advantage of the legitimate fight of the Syrian people for their freedom, to use Syria to promote their own agendas, and even to perhaps find footholds to launch attacks against others,” Clinton said. Very little of the US emphasis on the need to vet rebel factions, in order to ensure weapons did not fall into al Qaeda hands, were mentioned in the Turkish media. Instead, Clinton’s visit was another opportunity to underline common perspectives on the fight against the PKK.

Britain, too, recently announced its own “non lethal” support for Syria’s opposition, with the acknowledgement of difficulties that went with it. Foreign Secretary William Hague confirmed that they were in contact with the “political arm” of the Free Syrian Army, and no military advice or weaponry would be provided. William Hague said that arming the opposition would have risks attached to it, regarding how that equipment would be used because “there have been reports of atrocities on the opposition side”.

On the same day, responding to the Foreign Secretary’s announcement, the Amnesty International UK Syria Campaign welcomed practical measures which aim to protect all of Syria’s civilians. However, it urged the UK Government and its partners Amnesty said: “The UK needs to be crystal clear with the commanders of Syria’s armed opposition that they have a duty to prevent war crimes by those under their command. The UK should also emphasise to them that they may be held criminally responsible if they fail to do so.”

In fact, Turkish authorities didn’t need prompting from the outside in order to have better understanding of the wider security issues facing Turkey. Among others, Mehmet Seker, the Gaziantep deputy from the opposition Republican Peoples’ Party CHP, the government in February about security lapses in refugee camps and loss of control at Turkey’s borders with Syria. Mr Seker spoke again soon after the latest bomb attack in Gaziantep. he said.

The US and the UK have been sending their envoys to Turkey to meet the Syrian opposition, in order to stress the importance of human rights and respect for minorities. On the day Foreign Minister Davutoglu called on the international community to stand by the Syrian people’s rights and ambitions, the European Union urged Turkey to protect freedom of speech of its politicians while fighting against terrorism. The very same day, Turkey’s Interior Minister Idris Naim Sahin threatened journalists who made mildly critical comments about him “to stuff their writings in their mouths”.

That’s the irony of Turkey – a country that glorifies and finds its long lost mission in an Arab Spring, but feels petrified about the prospect of a Kurdish blossoming…

The Commission published its final report on Saturday 14 July at 7.30pm, televised on Channel 4. The report provides a road map for British commitment in Iraq going forward. The report was be delivered to the Prime Minister and the leaders of the main political parties.

Similar in scope to the Iraq Study Group in the U.S, the inquiry heard evidence from over 50 witnesses from Iraq, Britain and the United States – from eminent military personnel, diplomats, business people and civil servants as well as legal experts, humanitarian aid groups and UK community leaders. It also received submissions from across the world. For the remit, witnesses and submissions to the Iraq Commission, see below.

The Iraq Commission is jointly chaired by Lord Ashdown (former High Representative for Bosnia Herzegovina), Baroness Jay (former leader of the House of Lords) and Lord King (Defence Secretary during the first Gulf War and Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee).

Lord Ashdown said, “One of the greatest international challenges of our time is bringing peace and security to Iraq. It is both in Britain’s national interest, and a moral obligation, that a way forward is found for Iraq and its people.”

Baroness Jay said, “The Iraq Commission aims to produce a long term strategy for Britain’s role in Iraq – this will incorporate the challenges of reconstruction, rebuilding and humanitarian relief efforts, as well as security for the Iraqi people and British troops.”

Lord King said, “The current situation threatens the stability of the region, and has major implications for the world as a whole. It is up to policy makers on all sides to consider how best to help resolve it, and enhance the security of Iraq itself and the region.”

The Chairs were supported by nine Commissioners:
Former British Ambassador to the UN, Lord Hannay of Chiswick; Dr Rosemary Hollis, Director of Research, Chatham House; Sir Paul Lever KCMG, Chairman of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; Lt Gen Andrew Ridgway, former UN and NATO Commander; Maeve Sherlock, former Chief Executive of the Refugee Council; Asim Siddiqui, Chairman of the City Circle; Stephen Twigg, Director of the Foreign Policy Centre; Sir Patrick Walker, former Director General of MI5; and Professor Brian Brivati. For biographies of the Commission members, see below.

The hearings were open to the press, and were televised on Channel 4 from 2 July. This was followed on 14 July by a special 90-minute programme in which Jon Snow was joined by the Commission to discuss their recommendations and the implications of the report. All the hearings can be downloaded from www.channel4.com/iraqcommission

Members of the public can watch hearings, read transcripts and join an online debate at www.channel4.com/iraqcommission

Witnesses to the Iraq Commission
• Sir Christopher Meyer, Chair of the Press Complaints Commission & former British Ambassador to the United States
• Rt Hon Denis MacShane MP, Labour MP for Rotherham & former Minister for Europe
• Greg Mutitt, Co-Director of PLATFORM
• Dr Bassam Fattouh, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
• Mohamed Bali, Country Desk Manager for Iraq and Lebanon, Muslim Aid
• Oliver Burch, Iraq Programme Manager, Christian Aid
• Professor Amitai Etzioni, Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies, George Washington University
• Andrew Bearpark, Director General of the British Association of Private Security Companies
• David Horowitz, Editor-in-Chief, The Jerusalem Post
• Marion Birch, Director of MedAct
• Dr Heba Al-Naseri, Member of the UK Iraqi Medical Association
• Tom Porteous, Director of Human Rights Watch
• Noaman Muna, Chairman of Iraqi Al-Amal Association
• Dr Ismail Jalili, Chairman of National Association of British Arabs
• Adnan Al-Dulaimi, General Council for the People of Iraq
• Dr Toby Dodge, Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
• Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, Shadow Security Minister in the Shadow Cabinet and National Security Adviser to Conservative Party Leader
• Dr Ali Ansari, Reader in Modern History at the University of St Andrews, Scotland
• Sir Richard Dalton, Former British Ambassador to Iran
• Jan de Wilde, Chief of Mission at the International Organisation for Migration London
• Thanaa Al Kinani, Lawyer and human rights activist
• Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Former British Ambassador to the United Nations in New York and Her Majesty’s former Special Representative in Iraq
• Peter Bergen, Schwartz Senior fellow at the New America Foundation
• Andrew Alderson, Gulf Capital
• Professor Fred Kagan, Resident Scholar of American Enterprise Institute
• David Horgan, Managing Director of Petrel Resources
• Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP, former Foreign Secretary and Conservative Member of Parliament
• Lt Gen (Ret) Jay Garner, Retired US Army General
• HE Dr Sami Khiyami, Syrian Ambassador to the UK
• Duncan Bullivant, Chief Executive of Henderson Risk Group
• Ammar Al Shahbander, Country Director for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting
• Sir Menzies Campbell, Leader of the Liberal Democrats
• Ghassan Attiyah, Executive Director of the Iraq Foundation for Development and Democracy
• General Sir Mike Jackson, Former Chief of the General Staff
• Dr Barham Salih, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq
• Peter Kellner, Chairman of YouGov
• Mike Gapes, MP for Ilford South and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee
• Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King’s College, London
• Zainab Salbi, CEO and Founder of Women for Women International
• Houzan Mahmoud, UK Head of the Organisation of Women’s Freedom in Iraq and co-founder of the Iraq Freedom Congress
• Dr Ali Allawi, former Minister of Defence and Minister of Finance in the Iraqi Government
• Professor Salama Al Khafaji, Independent Iraqi MP and former member of the Interim Iraqi Governing Council
• Simon Maxwell, Director of the Overseas Development Institute
• Verena Fritz, Research Fellow, Poverty and Public Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute
• James Darcy, Director of Humanitarian Programmes, Overseas Development Institute
• Tom Hardie-Forsyth, Co-Founder and Non Executive director of the Kurdistan Development Corporation.
• Bayan Rahman, High Representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq to the UK and Chair of the Kurdistan Development Corporation
• Roger Wright, UNICEF Representative for Iraq
• Rachel Briggs, Head of Identity Programme, Demos
• Tim Finch, Director of Communications, Refugee Council
• George Graham, the Advocacy and Policy Officer, International Rescue Committee (IRC) UK.
• Richard Fenning, CEO of Control Risks
• Salam Pax, the ‘Baghdad Blogger’
• Patrick Seale, British author and expert on Syria and the Middle East
• Dr Gareth Stansfield, Reader in Middle East Politics at University of Exeter and Associate Fellow, Chatham House.
• Professor Brendan O’Leary, Lauder Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania
• Dr Kahled Salih, Spokesman for the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq
• Abdul Samad Rahman Sultan, Minister for Migration and the Displaced, Government of Iraq

Submissions to The Iraq Commission
The Commission received submissions from across the world. A full list is available at www.channel4.com/iraqcommission

Remit of The Iraq Commission
On the 27th April 2007, The Iraq Commission announced its inquiry into Britain’s future involvement in Iraq.

In coming to its conclusions on the scope and focus of Britain’s future involvement in Iraq, the Commission will take into account the impact any actions will have on:

• Southern Iraq’s internal security dynamic, and approaches to improving stability
• The political and economic situation in Iraq
• The role of UK troops in Iraq, and the strategic objectives of their deployment
• The UK’s wider Middle East strategy including Iran and Syria.
• Domestic political considerations in the UK including the impact on community cohesion
• Consequences for key strategic alliances – the transatlantic relationship, EU and the UN
• Reconstruction and development in Iraq and the role of UK NGOs and other agencies
• Long term support for Iraq, including budgetary, policing, social services, democracy and civil society support

Issues expressly outside the scope of the Commission and the Report include:
• The merits and legality of the UK decision to intervene militarily in Iraq.
• Specific allegations of war crimes by British Forces, or corruption or wrong doing by individual organisations.

Commissioner Biographies

Co-Chairs:

Lord Ashdown served as an officer in the Royal Marines from 1959 to 1972. He then worked for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, before being elected Liberal Member of Parliament for Yeovil in 1983. He was leader of the Liberal Democrats from 1988 to 1999. After leaving Parliament Lord Ashdown was appointed High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2002.

Baroness Jay was formerly Lord Privy Seal, Leader of the House of Lords and Minister for Women. Previously, she was Minister of State at the Department of Health. She was a founding director of the National AIDS Trust and a governor of South Bank University. She is currently Chair of the Overseas Development Institute.

Lord King was elected to Parliament at in 1970. He held the posts of Employment Secretary and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. He also served as Defence Secretary under Prime Minister John Major during the Gulf War in 1991. After retirement to the back benches, he became Chair of the Intelligence and Security Select Committee.

Members:

Lord Hannay of Chiswick, a British diplomat, spent five years as ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations. Most recently he has taken on specialised roles such as Special Representative for Cyprus and was a member of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, reporting to the Secretary-General in December 2004. He is the Chair of the United Nations Association UK.

Dr Rosemary Hollis, director of research at Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs). Previously she was head of the Middle East programme at Chatham House. From 1990-95, she headed the Middle East Programme at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. From 1980-89 she was a lecturer in Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University in Washington, DC, where she also gained a PhD in Political Science.

Sir Paul Lever KCMG, Chairman of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. He retired from the British Diplomatic Service in 2003 as Ambassador to Germany. His previous postings included Head of Security Policy Department and Assistant Under Secretary for Defence at the Foreign Office; Leader of the British Delegation to the Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe in Vienna; Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat in the Cabinet Office; and Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Lieutenant General Andrew Peter Ridgway, CB, CBE, became Lieutenant Governor of Jersey from 14 June 2006 after a long military career. In 1982 he attended the Army Staff College at Camberley, before taking command of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment and the 7th Armoured Brigade (the ‘Desert Rats’). In 1994 he was appointed UN Commander in Central Bosnia and Herzegovina, and became Chief of Staff for the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps for NATO’s entry into the Kosovo War in 1999. Most recently, for 2003 to 2006, he was Chief of Defence Intelligence, although he was not directly involved in producing the controversial intelligence reports that led to 2003 invasion of Iraq and Operation Telic.

Maeve Sherlock, former Chief Executive of the Refugee Council. Before joining the Refugee Council in 2003, Maeve was a special adviser to Gordon Brown, MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer where her brief spanned child poverty, welfare reform and the voluntary sector. Before moving to the Treasury, Maeve was Chief Executive of the National Council for One Parent Families and, prior to that, Director of UKCOSA. She is currently a member of the Advisory Board on Naturalisation and Integration and a Fellow of Durham University.

Asim Siddiqui, chairman of the City Circle, a network body of mainly young Muslim professionals. In addition to local grass root community work, Asim and his team organise weekly public discussion forums providing an outlet for debate on issues of mutual concern between British Muslim communities and wider society. Asim is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and sits on the Guardian’s Muslim Youth Forum.

Stephen Twigg, joined the Foreign Policy Centre as Director in August 2005. He was involved with the FPC from its conception in 1998 and since then as a Member of the Board from 1998 to 2006. After being General Secretary of the Fabian Society from 1996 to 1997, Stephen was elected as a Member of Parliament for Enfield Southgate in 1997, which he represented until 2005. He was Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the House of Commons, the Rt Hon. Robin Cook MP, from 2001 to 2002 and then a junior minister in the Department for Education and Skills between 2002 and 2005, reaching the post of Minister of State in 2004. Stephen also contributes to the Aegis Trust in their work on genocide education and prevention.

Sir Patrick Walker, the 12th Director General of MI5 (1987-1992). Sir Patrick joined the Security Service in 1963, following a period of service in the pre-independence government of Uganda. He became Director General in 1987, overseeing the Service’s transition though the end of the Cold War before his retirement in 1992.

Brian Brivati, is Professor of Contemporary History at Kingston University and runs the human rights programmes at BA and MA level. He was recently part of a panel of leading Ministers, MPs and thinkers who came together in the Houses of Parliament at the end of April this year to discuss the future of humanitarian intervention, after the conflict in Iraq. He has published extensive work on contemporary British politics. His research and teaching has recently extended to comparative work on genocide and human rights.

Further details about The Iraq Commission are available at: www.channel4.com/iraqcommission

Until now, the Assad regime has relied, in part, on a strategy of urbicide. Urbicide is a strategy in which the annihilation of the built environment of a targeted population is carried out and remoulded – or not, as the case maybe – to achieve the desired political, socio-economic, ecological and cultural effects i.e. spatial domination.

The concept of urbicide was developed by Bosnian architects during the 1992-1995 war. Bosnian architects noted that during this conflict the urban fabric was not destroyed through collateral damage but deliberately targeted by fighters.
Political scientist Martin Coward noted that in Bosnia, “Buildings of no military significance were regularly and deliberately shelled. Moreover, the shelling covered a wide variety of buildings: housing, public institutions, cultural monuments, utility buildings, open spaces.”

The Assad regime has resorted to urbicide before. In 1982, Islamists in the small city of Hama revolted against the Hafez al-Assad regime. Syrian historian Patrick Seale noted that the battle for Hama, “was a last ditch battle which one side or the other had to win and which, one way or the other, would decide the fate of the country.” The Assad regime won.

Syrian immunologist Bara Sarraj reported on his visit to Hama following the 1982 onslaught by the regime, “Not a single tombstone was in its place.” In the aftermath of the conflict, the regime reformed the urban fabric of Hama. Instead of political and socio-economic reform, the regime doled out public largess in the form of roads that tore through the urban fabric, large public buildings, parks, and an Olympic-sized swimming pool.

The Assad regime was not just remoulding the urban fabric but the Hama citizen. The Assad regime desired to transmogrify the Hama Islamist into the Hama Ba’thist. Seale noted, “Among the revolutionary changes was the introduction of mixed bathing in 1983 and the first college dormitory block in the whole of Syria to house both male and female students.”

In the current revolt, the regime has once again committed urbicide on Hama. However, this time the byword for massacre and destruction is not only Hama, as it was in 1982, but simultaneously: Homs, Dera’a, Houla, Deir al-Zour and Khan Sheikhoun. And now Damascus.

Previously Damascus could launch an attack, just as Washington or Westminster could wage war, or Rome could once be an empire. Indeed, Hafez al-Assad was known as the butcher of Damascus, a title inherited by his son Bashar. Now, however, Bashar al-Assad regime has lost control of urban space. There is now another Damascus in Damascus.

The battle for Damascus is a watershed moment in the battle for Syria. As in Hama, Homs and other cities across Syria we are likely to see enormous acts of violence against urban dwellers and urbanity itself. It is of note that the fighting started away from Damascus Boulevard, the Four Seasons Hotel, away from Assad’s red carpets and shopping malls. Instead the fighting has started in the old quarters of the city, in the stoned labyrinthine of narrow streets and houses, difficult for the heavy weaponry of the regime to operate in.

The regime now faces an existential crisis. Does the butcher of Damascus, take an axe to itself? Does Assad enact urbicide on its own seat of power? Unlike in Hama or Homs, the Assad regime cannot withdraw from Damascus and annihilate the urban fabric to remold it in a more compliant self-image. Damascus is supposed to be the regime’s image. The predatory ‘success’ of the regime has finally caught up with it.

Where to now? The Syrian conflict is heading into ever more nihilistic ground. The battle over a city once again decides the fate of the country. Who holds Damascus, holds Syria. Things may all fall apart, the centre may not hold. All that is solid may turn to rubble. Or is this the beginning of the end for Assad’s Damascus and the start of another Damascus in Damascus?

As Vladimir Putin broods in the Kremlin wondering what his next foreign policy moves should be, is Georgia on his mind? The small Black Sea and Caucasus state has always been a bother for Russia. With its 3,000 years of history and one of the oldest languages in the world, the heady mix of ski-able mountains and tropical coastal resorts, the mélange of nationalities – Georgian, Armenian, Azeri, Turkic, Abkhazian, Ossetian (the best conductor in England, the LSO ‘s Valery Gergiev, is Ossetian) with minority languages and religions in addition to one of the oldest orthodox churches in the world, Georgia is the most exotic of all the nations that once formed part of the Tsarist then Soviet imperium.

Interestingly enough, according to the country’s constitution, the impeachment of the former Paraguayan leader does not make him ineligible; in other words if he wishes, Lugo could run for President in the upcoming election, because even though he was impeached, the former president preserved all his political rights, and therefore there are no legal limitations to his candidacy. On the other hand, Paraguayan law forbids re-election. Consequentially, Federico Franco, the new President cannot run for re-election.

On 21 April, 2013, all Paraguayan citizens aged 18 to 75 years old are required to vote. The population will choose the president, vice-president, governors and 17 out of the country’s 45 senators alongside 80 congressmen. However, Lugo’s impeachment and the new government of President Federico Franco generated a series of unanswered issues.

Unlike Brazil, where Fernando Collor’s impeachment in 1992 was a slow-paced, gradual-developed process monitored step-by-step by the population, Fernando Lugo’s impeachment happened suddenly and abruptly. Despite a number of tycoon farmers, opposition politicians and even Lugo sensing that “something was in the air,” one cannot deny the incredible efficiency regarding the whole process after the decision to depose Lugo was taken.

Among the few Paraguayan foreign policy concerns, Brazil is undoubtedly the main one. The relationship with Brazil involves, for example, Itaipu, the corridor of Paranaguá, soybean production and the so-called brasiguaios (Paraguayan descendents of Brazilian farming immigrants), who exert significant economic and political influence. Seen as an imperialist country by one of Paraguay’s main newspapers, ABC Color, Brazil is working hard to change this stereotype, accepting, for instance, that it has to negotiate tariffs paid for the Paraguayan excess energy supply from Itaipu. Piracy is definitely the downside that Brazil faces in its relationship with Paraguay. Without a clear solution for the problem, piracy has become important to Paraguay’s poor economy and a problem for the booming Brazilian economy.

Lugo had a great relationship with former President Lula, something which was promising to the relations between the two countries. However, Lugo did not make it clear to the Brazilian government that his domestic relationship with the major law and opinion makers in the country was extremely fragile.

There are several reasons for Friday’s impeachment. Some of the most important are the following:

1. Lugo did not mange to build a decent coalition in Parliament. He lacked the political skills to neutralise enemies and reinforce his allies

2. Despite having the very important support of rural workers, Lugo also needed the support of the country’s elites, which he did not have

3. The dialogue and coordination between tycoon farmers and members of the Colorado Party had been occurring for a long time. Sources in the country point to these two as responsible for deflagrating Lugo’s deposition

4. The press was not favourable to Lugo and it constituted the most important vehicle of popular clamour

5. Paraguay’s domestic policy is strongly influenced by tycoon farmers, the economic and cultural elites of the Asuncion, businessmen and people linked to piracy in Ciudad del Este. Lugo was in direct conflict with the first group, and failed to cultivate a relationship that could favour him with the other groups

The aforementioned facts expose unprecedented weaknesses in a President in South America. If externally, Lugo’s impeachment process, was questioned by the foreign press and neighbouring countries, domestically the population seems nonchalant, and in a political climate of anesthesia. However, once the anesthesia fades, the local political system could be the stage of new upheavals.

By the current scenario of Paraguayan politics, elections will polarise the dispute between traditional Colorado Party candidates – who opposed Lugo and were linked to Stroessner – and the Liberal Party. Some names are being presented as possible candidates for the Presidency, but there are no official confirmations.

The possible candidates for the Colorado Party are Horicio Cartes, Zacarias Irún e Lilian Samaniego, the latter is also the party’s president. The Liberal Party’s possible candidates are Blas Llano, who is a businessman, connected to the Franco government, and Efraim Alegre.

The underlying reason for this assertion is the gaps in development within Guangdong province, China’s largest provincial economy by aggregate GDP. Since the instigation of ‘reform and opening up’ policies at the end of the 1970s, Guangdong’s economy has boomed as it has been at the forefront of China’s integration into global production networks and supply chains, earning it the sobriquet of the ‘world’s factory’. The value of the province’s total trade regularly comes in at a figure greater than its GDP (107% in 2009 for example), compared to something closer to two thirds for China as a whole.

However Guangdong’s development has not been evenly spread within the province, and in reality its integration with the global economy – and hence the most rapid development – has been limited to the PRD, an area made up of nine administrative cities around the provincial capital of Guangzhou and the bustling city of Shenzhen just over the border from Hong Kong.

The city of Qingyuan epitomizes many of the disparities within Guangdong. Qingyuan’s average per capita GDP is around half of Guangdong’s. The minimum wage of RMB850 per month (for 2011, up from RMB580 in 2008) is about two thirds of that in Shenzhen or Guangzhou. Property prices are one third of Guangzhou’s. Qingyuan’s total trade equates to less than 30% of GDP, and net exports only contribute a small proportion of GDP growth. These indicators place Qingyuan closer to many inland provinces than to Guangdong’s bustling Pearl River Delta (PRD).

These disparities are even more marked given the proximity of Qingyuan’s urban centre to Guangzhou. Not all of Qingyuan is so close, though, and the city’s administrative area spreads north to the border with neighbouring Hunan province. Qingyuan is the largest administrative city within the province, though this includes hilly and afforested non-urban areas covering 70-80% of the city, and its four million population are relatively sparsely distributed.

This means that even within Qingyuan there are substantial social and economic disparities, with developmental gaps between the hilly northern areas of the city and the south. This is reflected in the demographic profile. Whereas Guangdong is a substantial net recipient of migrant labour, the net inflows of migrants in southern Qingyuan are small, and migrants flow out of Qingyuan’s northern areas to the other parts of the province or elsewhere. Social issues therefore feature high on the city leadership’s agenda, including a target of 72,600 households to have their annual income raised to RMB 2,500 per person or about £250.

Economic and industrial trends
The primary policy aim, however, is still one of economic development. Qingyuan’s GDP growth over recent years has been the fastest of Guangdong’s cities, rising around 15% in 2011, and there are signs of new investment coming into the city. So far, this is mainly from within China, for example, from Anhui Conch, the country’s largest cement manufacturer, or Guangzhou Automobile.

The city’s strategy is also firmly part of the provincial policy agenda of rebalancing the economy and moving industry out of the PRD, especially in labour-intensive manufacturing: for this, Qingyuan is to play the role of a ‘bridgehead’. With this focus on industrial transfer, the city is now home to three provincial-level industrial zones, with a focus on attracting manufacturers from the PRD, environmental industries, and hi-tech projects. The provincial government has also decided to locate a cluster of technical and vocational training facilities and colleges in the city.

These trends are supported by investment in infrastructure, as is typical in today’s PRC. The city is building its fourth and fifth expressways. The high-speed rail line between Guangzhou and Wuhan (which will eventually go on north to Beijing and south from Guangzhou to Hong Kong) stops at Qingyuan. Guangzhou’s Baiyun airport is less than one hour’s drive away.

The city’s terrain also has rich mineral resources, including rare earths. Non-ferrous metals processing is the largest ‘pillar industry’ in the city, and there are numerous investments by copper companies. But environmental consciousness appears to be reasonably strong among the leadership, not least to avoid damaging the tourist industry which accounts for some 5% of the city’s GDP. There is also plenty of work needed to improve resource efficiency: Qingyuan’s energy use per capita is the second highest in Guangdong.

These developments provide a foundation for growth in trade and investment, and in the local economy. Indeed, perhaps reflecting these opportunities, HSBC have just opened a sub-branch in Qingyuan.

Moving outside the PRD

Places such as Qingyuan create another alternative for moving production outside the PRD. They could offer lower labour and land costs than in the PRD, while retaining proximity to familiar export routes in Guangdong, and to Hong Kong, from where many of these operations are still managed.

The wider implications could be twofold. Firstly, the disparities within Guangdong mean that it is a mistake to think about the province as saturated as a destination for investment or manufacturing, even if the PRD itself is becoming saturated. Secondly, therefore, there is plenty of space still for Guangdong to provide a relatively low-cost location for global production, one which is well integrated into established global production and logistics networks. Even as the PRD becomes more expensive, Guangdong’s global comparative advantage may be far from exhausted.

June 2012

FPC Senior Research Associate William Gumede sets out some his concerns around increasing Chinese control of key South African resources and advises diversifying its sources of investment from other emerging markets. May 2012.