The recent essay collection, The new British politics and Europe: Conflict or cooperation?, co-published by the Foreign Policy Centre puts forward some ideas in answer to this question. Put simply, the real challenge for pro-Europeans is to address the EU as it is, warts and all, and develop a campaign that seeks to build public understanding and acceptance of the principle of European engagement through persistent, practical examples of how action at an EU level can address problems that are relevant both to people’s everyday lives and to the important domestic political issues of the day. To fill the void left by the 2005 collapse of Britain in Europe, what is needed is a pro-European organisation in the same mould as eurosceptic group Open Europe. That would be a dynamic pressure group which is both pragmatic and reformist but which can promote the basic central premise that the EU can be (and often is) a platform for solving transnational issues that matter to Britain, while understanding that Europe isn’t the answer in and of itself. Pro-Europeans need to adopt both the same guerrilla warfare tactics used by their opponents and channel the energy of sympathetic bloggers and other independent researchers, giving a sense of energy and drive that has been sorely lacking on the pro-side of the argument in recent years.

Amongst some in the wider community of pro-Europeans, there remains a desire for a ‘big vehicle’ to get behind to mobilise public opinion in a more positive direction. This must stop. In the UK, such a vehicle is not going to come naturally and this desire c lead to a dangerous flirtation with the idea of an ‘in or out’ referendum, something that would create more heat than light and would be unlikely to settle the issue for any great length of time – an engineered crisis that would risk becoming a real one in today’s volatile political environment.

Mainstream pro-Europeans must clearly show that they are committed to a Europe of nation states that pragmatically work together to face common problems. The flirtations with federalism by some more ardent europhiles should be knocked on the head. Pro-Europeans must at all times show that they understand that sovereignty and legitimacy flow from the people alone, up to the various tiers of government and that the goal of politicians is to assess the best level at which to manage political issues on behalf of their populaces. Subsidiarity, Subsidiarity, Subsidiarity.

Continually complaining about the eurosceptic bias in the print media isn’t going to get anyone very far. No matter how effective a pro-European campaign may become, there will always be more negative stories about EU activities than positive ones, and this is not in and of itself linked to the anti-European sentiments of a handful of newspaper proprietors. It is fairly simple; the EU is, in effect, a tier of government. We do not express surprise that press coverage of domestic politics or government action tends to focus on the comparatively few areas of controversy rather than the majority of cases where it goes about its day to day business. To be honest there are few people who are more intrigued by puff pieces than they are by incisive critiques. To place stories about the EU’s ability to solve important cross-border challenges, it remains essential to spell out the nature of the problems it is looking to tackle in fairly explicit detail in order to set the scene for how action at a European level might help.

The British public is never going to love the EU. Just as with any other level of UK government, there will always be a degree of inherent scepticism about the institution, as befits our national character. So the goal for British pro-Europeans must be to finally gain British public acceptance of the EU as part of the furniture of UK governance, shifting the focus to the content of EU action and where it should do more and where it should do less.

September 2011
Originally published at the <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/adam-hug/getting-britains-proeurop_b_944735.html Huffington Post UK>

One thing was certain about the June 2011 elections in Turkey: AKP would win. Yet speculation over whether or not it would earn a greater share of the vote was rife, as was the forecasting of how many votes the renewed leadership of the leading secular opposition party, CHP (Republican People’s Party) would attract, or whether the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) would make the 10% threshold to enter parliament, or how many MPs the Kurdish BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) would have.

Lessons have clearly been learned from Iraq for post-Gaddafi Libya. They will have been passed on, not least, by the British envoy to the Libyan rebels – John Jenkins, who was ambassador in Baghdad before going to Benghazi. The National Transition Council’s blueprint for preserving order in a post-Gaddafi Tripoli appears designed precisely to stave off the kind of anarchy that prevailed in Baghdad in 2003. Though it has not so far succeeded, that is not for want of thought and planning.

This, of course, is the danger of all lessons learned after an event: simply knowing what went wrong last time does not mean that it can be done the next time around. Events happen rapidly and chaotically, and the parties involved are not necessarily going to stick to any plan that has been given them.

We can be sure, in short, that other things will go wrong in Libya. People will die; shops and government buildings will be looted; the new government will seem weak, or autocratic, or even both; the country’s economy and infrastructure will take years to rebuild. But we should beware hasty despondency just as much as hasty triumphalism. All these things may happen, and yet the revolution will still have been a success, if it can deliver Libya a better future than the one that it faced under Gaddafi.

None of these things should make us want to send foreign troops into Libya. And that, I suggest, is the clearest lesson to be learned from Iraq, Afghanistan and even Vietnam. In each case, the fact that the country’s government needed an outside power to provide its military capabilities had three significant disadvantages. First, it gave its enemies the patriotic high ground. The Taliban have taken full advantage of the fact that they are fighting British soldiers in southern Afghanistan; it has meant they can call on all the folk memories of three Anglo-Afghan wars. A foreign combat presence in Libya risks stoking Islamist sentiment but also stirring painful memories of the Italian occupation of Libya in the 1920s and 1930s, during which tens of thousands of Libyans died in concentration camps.

Second, it made those governments look weak. Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki has sought, ever since taking power, to project strength – and one way he did so was by asking British troops to leave. No wonder: a government that needs foreigners to protect it is not only discredited politically, but is obviously vulnerable. Foreign support being often a fickle thing, it can encourage internal enemies to believe that they need only wait out the foreigners rather than make peace. Even if Libya’s path to peace may be bloodier without foreign help, it will be a surer peace if it is home-grown rather than imposed from outside.

Third, it sapped the initiative and willpower of the countries’ own governments, encouraging an unhealthy dependence on foreigners. Afghan leaders have felt hemmed in by the multifarious advice of their foreign allies, the fact being that a large part of the economy, and the executive arm of the government, has become dependent on them. Sherard Cowper-Coles’s memoir Cables from Kabul, and Roderic Braithwaite’s Afgantsy, illustrate this with examples from the Western and Soviet experience in Afghanistan respectively.

The National Transition Council does deserve our support, but not of that kind; even if it asks for foreign combat forces then Nato should refuse. Unfreezing assets and promoting EU-Libya trade would be better ways to help – putting aid above defence, and trade above aid. It should be a politically savvy kind of help, one which again lets the Libyans decide what structures of government they want, rather than bringing in Western consultants with cookie-cutter solutions and a yen to create in Tripoli the kind of institutions that work in Washington and London.

There are three areas where our advice might be particularly useful. First, on how to keep the oil industry from becoming a source of corruption — as it became in Iraq. Second, how to keep the country’s arsenal of weaponry (including any chemical weapons) from falling into the wrong hands.

The third area is the holding of elections. These can be a powerful legitimising tool. They have often however proved cumbersome, destabilising and divisive – specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan. Afghan election results have split almost consistently on ethnic lines; early elections in Iraq cemented the country’s religious divisions. An abortive Algerian election in 1991 prompted a vicious civil war. None of this shows that elections are wrong, but they do show that they must be adequately prepared for.

A constitutional process, on the other hand, is something that the Libyans should be left to take at their own speed. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, rushed constitutional processes – at least partly designed for the international audience – probably made peace settlements harder by setting the country’s government arrangements in stone.

There is one last lesson that I hope we take from Afghanistan and Iraq. If we hope to influence a country, and if we are in fact (whether we choose it or not) in a position to influence its future for better or worse, then we have a moral duty to treat its people – as Kant would say – as ends, not means. We should care about Libyans’ lives, aspirations, ambitions and fears. Our diplomats should take risks, if need be, to make sure that they continue to listen to the Libyan people. Our leaders should take care to communicate with them, rather than letting them hear Western policies announced at second or third-hand. Arabic satellite channels offer that opportunity. The UK, French and US governments should redouble their efforts to monitor and engage with those satellite channels, in close coordination with the Libyan government, to ensure that political signals in Paris, Washington and London are not misunderstood.

This article was first published at http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2011/08/24/comment-lessons-for-libya-from-iraq-and-afgha

It first started with comments made by the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu two weeks ago. Davutoglu publicly stated that unless the Cyprus issue is resolved by early 2012, negotiations with the EU may be frozen. This deadline is based on the start of Cyprus’ turn for EU presidency. Since Turkey does not officially accept the existence of the Republic of Cyprus, the FM argued that Turkey cannot engage with the EU presidency while Cyprus is in office; thus EU-Turkish relations will, de facto, be frozen.

Then came the harsher comments by the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan over the last week. Prior to his visit to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the PM gave a series of interviews to the Turkish and Cypriot press, as well as some stronger public talks while on the disputed island.

The Prime Minister declared that the issue has to be solved at least in principle, and agreements reached before the EU presidency, underlining Turkey’s preference for a federal unification of both sides of the island. In addition, Erdogan has retracted AK Party’s (AKP) willingness to offer land swaps in certain areas and clearly asserted that if no agreement is reached by July 2012, Turkey and the TRNC will close negotiations and the island will forever be two independent states on current borders. This clear Turkish challenge puts the ball not only in the Greek Cypriot but also the EU’s court.

Erdogan was key in triggering the initiatives undertaken by Kofi Annan, which came to an abrupt end when the Greek Cypriots voted ‘No’ to the UN’s proposals. In contrast, the Turkish Cypriots voted ‘Yes’ with a clear majority. AKP had in fact put serious political capital behind the Annan plan.

While Kofi Annan gave up on solving the issue, the EU took a controversial decision and allowed the Republic of Cyprus into the EU without any concrete solution to the conflict. This has subsequently caused both the TRNC and Turkey to feel betrayed and disillusioned as they upheld their sides of the bargain.

Ever since, Greek Cyprus has vetoed EU-Turkish accession talks at every step of the conversation. Since EU countries remain divided on the Turkish bid, it is no surprise that Turkey believes that neither the Republic of Cyprus nor the EU actually want to solve this problem and quicken the Turkish accession into the EU.

The fact that the UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon recently initiated a preliminary meeting with Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders for a final UN attempt to unite the island, has triggered the latest escalation of Turkey’s focus on the island. The General Secretary too sees these talks as a last chance. Until now, neither the EU nor Greek Cyprus seem moved by Turkish and UN timelines and demands, while sponsor country Greece is too troubled domestically to even engage on the issue.

A catalytic shock was indeed needed to conclude, positively or negatively, the nightmare problem that has caused so many diplomats and mediators severe depression. In such a scenario there are only three possible outcomes from this gamble.

Either, the EU will show their resolve and thus pressure the Republic of Cyprus to let go of maximalist goals and accept in principle a timetable for the unification of the island, thus compromise; or, this would indeed finally end all chances of unification, and see the TRNC and Turkey begin work on long term nation-building.

While the former result would have tremendously positive outcomes both for Cyprus, the EU, Greece, Turkey and the feeble Eastern Mediterranean, the latter would not only result in EU-Turkish relations being frozen during Cypriot presidency, eventual political solutions for EU-Turkey tensions would be much harder to identify.

Even though the populist French and German political mood might seem to argue for exclusion of Turkey from the EU, in actuality, all of the EU states are acutely aware that they need Turkey, both economically and increasingly diplomatically as Turkey deepens its regional power and appeal. While Turkey will never give up bilateral relations with European countries, it also looks less and less in need of EU membership.

The third outcome from this gamble might be that AKP will eventually have to retract its deadlines and harsh tones, and accept the status quo. Then, AKP would have to face serious loss of diplomatic capital and a weaker stand against the EU countries which oppose Turkish membership. This would enable Greek Cyprus to find a way out of being seen as the primary reason why the issue is not solved, and blame Turkey for being the unreasonable party.

It is high time, not only to show genuine will to solve the Cyprus problem, but also once and for all finalize whether Turkey will ever be an EU state. The AKP seem set to force the moment to a crisis to find a conclusion; a dangerous, but much needed gamble.

In a new FPC Briefing Tanweer Ali examines worrying trends in human rights standards in the Czech Republic.

There cannot be any clearer illustration of the impotence of Africa’s continental and regional institutions to find local solutions to the continent’s problems, than their numbing inaction in the face of the wave of popular rebellions against dictators in North Africa sweeping across the continent.

The current leaders of regional and continental institutions are too discredited, the institutions too toothless and the rules for membership too lenient for them to be effective. The solution is to radically overhaul regional institutions – or close them down.
In order to reverse this dispiriting situation, African countries will have to bring new energy, ideas and leaders to make regional and continental institutions work. Furthermore, we need new objectives and new concepts and even new words that are appropriate for our times.
The wave of rebellions against dictators that started in North Africa, the global financial crisis, and the rise of emerging countries such as China, Brazil and India, which is likely to remake the world, offers a critical juncture for African countries to change outdated institutions.
If we do not, the rupture that the global financial crisis is causing to nations may actually make the continent poorer.

Africa’s future prosperity still lies in individual countries pooling their markets, development efforts and attempts to seriously build democracy. Yet the idea of pan-Africanism in which all African countries will join into a happy family is simply silly.

The basis of a revamped African Union (AU) must start with a small group of countries that can pass a double “stress test” based on quality of a democracy and the prudence of their economic governance.

Because membership of the AU is largely voluntary, countries such as Zimbabwe may still be members even if their governments have appalling human rights records, and spectacularly mismanage their countries’ economics and politics.

A revamped AU should be based on a three-track system. The first track would consist of a core group of countries that meet the minimum democratic and economic governance criteria. A second track would be those which did not make the cut in democratic and economic management terms, but which are serious about pursuing the new objectives of the AU. The second track countries should be assessed on an annual basis to see whether they are ready to enter the first track. The rest, the third group, would be the assortment of dictatorships – which should be shunned until they improve.

Stricter rules will mean that the AU will start off initially as a small club of countries. Perhaps only South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana, Cape Verde, Namibia – and then only if the criteria are in some cases flexibly applied.
These top-tier African countries could be the core of the first African-wide set of industrial policies and a long-term economic development strategy to lift African countries up the industrial value chain.

Countries which adhere to these criteria could be rewarded with new investments, development projects and support. Special Africa investment funds could be set up, for example pooling the proceeds from commodities, to finance social and physical infrastructure across the continent. Proceeds from such funds would be distributed on the basis of the willingness of nations to reform.

The fund could be used for targeted development in underdeveloped areas of the countries that make the criteria.

Those countries scoring badly – and showing no willingness to reform – should be sidelined until they shape up.

The sub-regional African institutions, SADC, Comesa and EAC (East Africa Community) should all be collapsed to make way for a revamped continent-wide common market and free trade area.

The difficulties that industrial nations now experience because of the global financial crisis means they are likely to become more protectionist, rather than less.
African countries will just have to trade smarter within, and with new trading partners among emerging markets.
Africa’s manufactures and services may be uncompetitive in relation to industrial nations, but can be traded with other African countries.

Continental and regional institutions’ peace and security policies still have their focus on state security rather than human security. This wrong-headed principle is at the heart of African peers shielding despots such as Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe from criticism, rather than coming to the aid of desperate citizens. African leaders always side with fellow African leaders when they are criticised by the West, no matter the merits of the criticisms.

African solidarity must not be based on leaders or on false unity, but on values such as democracy, social justice, clean government, ethnic inclusiveness and peace.

The AU’s charter will have to be changed from protecting the sovereignty of individual countries to protecting the security of ordinary Africans. The principle of non-interference in the affairs of neighbours still partially informs the AU’s reluctance to intervene forcefully in misgoverned nations.

A new AU must sponsor transparent procedures to impeach leaders who turn into tyrants, so that we do not again have the likes of Mugabe.

Political parties in AU member countries getting state funding should adhere to minimum internal democratic rules – to prevent one-man parties and tribal parties.
Post-independence pan-Africanism failed to build a sense of ownership among African citizens of African integration projects because they were always top-down, leadership focused, exclusive and non-participative rather than bottom-up, citizen driven, inclusive and participative.
This must change: ordinary citizens must be given a real say in the decisions that will ultimately impact on their lives.

The suit was filed on December 21, 2001, by the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), in light of Provisional Measure # 2.158-35/01, published during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, against the levying of IR and CSLL on profits obtained by companies controlled from or co-connected abroad, independently from the availability of these amounts to the controlled or co-connected company in Brazil.

In its original petition, the CNI basically alleged the following:

• The unconstitutionality of § 2, of article 43, of the National Tax Code, plus Complementary Law # 104/01. According to the entity, this provision allows the ordinary legislator to establish the moment of occurrence of the generator factor, and can even do so before the fact has actually taken place, which would be going against the provisions of article 153, subsection III, of the Federal Constitution, and the concept of income contained therein
• defect pointed out in the heading of article 74 of Provisional Measure (PM) # 2.158-35/01, referring to the difference between co-connected and controlled companies
• sole paragraph of article 74 of the PM defends the principles of retroactivity and perviousness

Four justices found that the ADI had grounds, or in other words, for the unconstitutionality of article 74 of Provisional Measure 2.158-35/01: Ellen Gracie (partially, considering “unconstitutional only as far as co-connected companies are concerned”), Marco Aurélio, Lewandowiski and Sepúlveda Pertence, the latter retired (substituted by Dias Toffoli).

Two justices found that the ADI did not have grounds, in other words, for the validity of article 74: Nelson Jobim (substituted by Cármen Lúcia) and Eros Grau (substituted by Luiz Fux).

Justices Carlos Britto, Celso de Mello, Joaquim Barbosa and Cezar Peluso have yet to cast their votes. Gilmar Mendes, due to his previous involvement in the Union Legal Offices (AGU), was impeded from voting.

Currently, the mentioned ADI is under request of review by Justice Carlos Britto.

FPC research associate Andrew Southam explores some of the key issues in US-EU judicial co-operation.

China’s role as a drugs conduit has increased considerably over the past two decades. Throughout the 20th century, opium and later heroin, from the Golden Triangle, was smuggled to Thailand’s seaports and then on to satiate drug markets throughout the world. More effective law enforcement and a stricter drug policy in Thailand in the late 1980s and early 90s reduced the state as an effective trafficking route.

Concurrently, Burmese drug lord Khun Sa, the prime heroin producer and distributer along the Thai-Burmese border, surrendered to the Burmese authorities. With the collapse of Khun Sa’s army, Burma’s foremost heroin trafficking route into Thailand was disrupted. Consequently, China’s role as a narcotics conduit became even more crucial.

Well over half the heroin produced in the Golden Triangle now travels through China, wending its way through southern provinces Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong towards Hong Kong. This shift in regional drug trade routes coincided with rapid economic development in China’s southwest. More robust roads allow for faster and easier transportation of illicit drugs, while an increased fiscal and technological ability to refine heroin locally has driven down its market value and increased local consumption.

By 1989, the HIV virus was detected amongst injecting drug users in China’s most south-westerly province Yunnan. Needle sharing drove the epidemic, and HIV/AIDS rapidly spread to drug users in neighbouring provinces and along trafficking routes. At the turn of the century, HIV infections had been reported in all 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, with drug users accounting for 60-70 per cent of reported cases.

While the Chinese government was slow to engage substantively with a generalised AIDS epidemic in the country, a new administration taking office in 2003 under President Hu Jintao accelerated the commitment to and implementation of evidence-based HIV policies. Having woken up to the seriousness of its HIV/AIDS epidemic, the Chinese government sought increasingly progressive means to combat the crisis, calling on a range of outside actors to implement new and innovative pilot projects. During the 2000s, the government seemingly revoked its zero-tolerance attitude towards drug users, introducing needle exchange programmes and controlled methadone maintenance treatments in the most affected areas.

While the Chinese government continues to take a pragmatic approach to its HIV/AIDS crisis, the good work of these projects is offset by the 2008 Narcotics Law that vastly emphasises law enforcement over medical treatment in the government’s response to drug use. This law calls for the rehabilitation of illicit drug users and for their treatment as patients rather than as criminals, yet the law also allows for the incarceration – without trial or judicial oversight – of individuals suspected by police of drug use for up to six years in drug detention centres.

To allow for this, the 2008 Narcotics Law considerably enhances police power to randomly search people for possession of drugs, and to subject them to urine tests for drug use without reasonable suspicion of crime. The law also empowers the police, rather than medical professionals, to make judgements on the nature of the suspected users’ addiction, and to subsequently assign alleged drug users to detention centres.

According to Human Rights Watch, whilst in detention centres suspected drug users receive no medical care, no support for quitting drugs, and no skills training for re-entering society upon release. In the name of treatment, suspected drug users are confined under “horrific conditions, subject to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and forced to engage in unpaid labour”.

Not only is this law ineffective in tackling China’s growing drug problem and rehabilitating its users, but incarceration of suspected addicts in detention centres represents a serious breach of the basic human rights guaranteed by both China’s domestic and international legal commitments. Furthermore, the law is a counter productive policy for combating HIV/AIDS in China.

The threat of forcible detention only discourages users from seeking professional help to tackle their addictions, and from utilising needle exchange programmes for fear of incarceration. The result is to encourage “underground” illicit drug use that leads to needle sharing and hence the spread of HIV/AIDS. Effective tackling of illicit drug use requires developing voluntary, outpatient treatment based upon effective, proven approaches to drug addiction. Specific reform of the law should reverse the expanded police powers to detain suspected users without trial, and implement specific procedural mechanisms to protect the health and human rights of drug users in a standardised and appropriate way.

The Chinese government has sought to work with outside actors in combating its HIV/AIDS epidemic, particularly in its most affected province Yunnan. The UK Department for International Development (DfID) has been engaged in HIV/AIDS prevention throughout southwest China since the launch of the China-UK HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Programme in 2001. DfID’s Multilateral Aid Review, published in March this year, cut all future development aid to China. The discontinuation of DfID projects in southwest China will weaken efforts to prevent HIV/AIDS and rehabilitate drug users in the region. It also lessens pressure on China to combat these issues in a reasonable and felicitous way.

The international donor community present in China must implement policies that reflect realities on the ground by ensuring that the health care and treatment of drug users is at the core of their HIV/AIDS policies. They should also use their position of influence to nudge Beijing to rectify the flaws in the 2008 Narcotics Law with its negative implications for the human rights of suspected drug users, and for combating the spread of HIV/AIDS.

If the country’s skyrocketing number of intravenous drug users and the resultant HIV/AIDS epidemic are left to fester, it could result in severe health consequences, economic loss and social devastation. China still has time to act, but it should do so now before it is too late.

June 2011