Analysts and researchers observing the region – not to find answers to European and American questions but to understand where it was heading on its own terms – have long been pointing out the demographic and social trends. The growing youth population wanted change, democracy, equal opportunities and an end to corruption and nepotism. They were more interested in connecting with the rest of the world and feeling proud of their countries than joining backward Islamist utopias.

It was clear, if one really wanted to see it, that political Islam had evolved from merely wanting Sharia based isolationism into an attempt to reconcile Islamic faith and its principles with the realities of a global world. In fact, groups such as Al-Qaida and its myriad of local expressions emerged in reaction to this trend. Even then it was clear that the heyday of militant and anarchist groups was passing – though their capacity to cause harm was not. Militant Islamist groups were distant observers of the changes in the Middle East and North Africa, and could claim no victory or achievement in the toppling of rulers which they had been promising to dethrone for years. When the curtains came down, it became clear that while Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood remain political players not to be overlooked, they are a lot less grand than the bogey men they have been made out to be.

Even the governments that traditionally favour stability at the expense of freedoms as the better of evils – such as the United States – were acutely aware that the realpolitik dichotomy of stability versus chaos was only a myth. A quick internet search reveals statements by George Bush and Condoleezza Rice acknowledging that supporting tyrants for short term gains was counterproductive and the promotion of democracy and political freedom was the only guarantors of long term stability. Thus, even the fiercest critiques of Turkey’s ruling conservative Muslim AKP have spoken of it as a model for the rest of Muslim world. Turkey, contrary to all of the scaremongering about an Islamist takeover, was being seen as a success story – a Muslim society that is democratic and cherishes an open market economy.

So, yes, hindsight is great. It comforts us by removing the shocking truth that we have been blind, we have pursued outdated and futile policies, and we have been on the wrong side of history. As European leaders compete against one another to make emotive statements praising the brave uprising of Arabs in feeble attempts to look like they have been with the common people of the region all along, they quickly forget – or wish that we forget – all of the murky connections they had with now out of fashion leaders of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, and their continued dealings with similarly shady governments in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

While we don’t know what exactly the current changes in the region will mean in the long run, one thing is certain. The EU’s problematic and fragmented engagement with the region is in shatters. Unless the EU develops a robust, unified and multi-layered and proactive foreign policy, it will continue to find itself excluded from brand new economic and political opportunities in the Middle East and North Africa. The EU no longer has to compete only with a strong American presence there, but also with the ever increasing diplomatic and economic clout of Turkey and Iran, as well as strong domestic public opinion and civil societies.

Can the EU achieve this and realise its potential as a stabilizing and influential force in the region? At the moment the answer is no. But then again, in the last two months we have learned how quickly stubborn old regimes can give way to liquid and energetic new ones. Who knows, maybe a European revolution is awaiting us around the corner.

Link to the original article: http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/89/europe-must-change-its-attitude-in-the-middle-east

It is probably unfair to judge the Foreign Office solely on its response to crises. Like many big institutions, it finds it hard to re-allocate resources swiftly from one priority to another; and in the past month there have been multiple crises — Libya, Japan, Yemen, and Bahrain. There is still a lot of work to do in Egypt and Tunisia. In most of these cases it involves both a consular and a political response. And there are slow-burning crises like Afghanistan.

The FCO could improve its ability to respond to multiple crises by relaxing its rules on hiring temporary staff, and setting up a roster of security-cleared contractors for such situations. That’s especially useful if they have necessary skills (consular experience, specific language skills, etc.) Also, maybe it should be bringing in people from Whitehall rather than just Foreign Office staff for emergencies.

The bigger question on the Libyan crisis, and Egypt and Tunisia as well, is whether the FCO was well enough prepared for this contingency. My feeling is that on Egypt, it did better than many other countries — David Cameron was right to say ‘there is no stability in Egypt’ when other world leaders were still saying Mubarak was necessary for stability. That reflects well on the team on the ground.

In Libya, it was up against some prodigious obstacles. Diplomats who have served there say it’s one of the hardest countries in the world to find out what’s going on. We still hardly know what’s going on there, even with the world’s journalists trying to find out.

So I think the criticism aimed at the Foreign Office and William Hague over the infamous botched attempt to establish contact with the rebels, was at least partly unfair. It would be worse for the Foreign Office to avoid all risks, in the hope that it would never be exposed to criticism when the risks don’t come off.

But there is a broader issue raised by events in the Middle East, which Hague himself highlighted when he became Foreign Secretary. The core skill of the FCO is its knowledge of foreign countries and ability to use that knowledge to Britain’s benefit. For this, it needs more people that are fluent in foreign languages — a traditional strength, but which has been under threat particularly since its own in-house language school was cut a few years ago.

It also needs its people to get out more. The FCO is great at information-sharing. But the need to consult, confer and deliberate focusses people inwards. There need to be incentives to rebalance this. At the moment, meetings with external contacts are much less visible to those in the organization; even if they win allies for Britain, that is relatively hard to measure. Making friends with ordinary Egyptians or Tunisians, put bluntly, does not often help diplomats to write their reports for London. It is very useful, though, for predicting revolutions.

This extends to London, too. Even if Libyans in Libya can’t talk much, those in the UK can do. The FCO has a great opportunity in London, which is just about the capital of world dissidents, to engage with emigres and learn from them what we can’t find out on the ground.

There is a way to turn this around. There should be a metric to measure diplomatic effect. For a start, MPs should ask the Foreign Secretary annually roughly what proportion of their time his staff spent meeting foreigners — including people from outside the ruling elites; and for some examples of diplomatic success stories that have resulted.

Link to the original article http://www.totalpolitics.com/opinion/153067/refocusing-the-foreign-office.thtml

FPC Senior Research Associate William Gumede gives a facinating take on the potential impact of North Africa’s uprisings on countries south of the Sahara.

On January 29, with protesters defying police brutality and curfews, former Bush adviser Elliott Abrams claimed that ‘Bush had it right – and that the Obama administration’s abandonment of this mind-set [i.e. the ‘freedom agenda’] is nothing short of a tragedy’.

By February 2, Mubarak had sacked his government and had announced that he would not run for re-election in September. ‘The map of Northern Africa and the Middle East is changing’, declared Yale law professor Stephen L Carter. ‘You can easily trace the curve of freedom as the surge moves eastward. At some point, the land of the free has to get ahead of the curve.’

By February 10, with Mubarak’s departure looking imminent, conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer proposed a ‘freedom doctrine’ in four parts. ‘Today, everyone and his cousin supports the “freedom agenda”. Of course’, remembered Krauthammer, ‘yesterday it was just George W Bush, Tony Blair and a band of neo-cons with unusual hypnotic powers who dared challenge the received wisdom of Arab exceptionalism’.

Arab exceptionalism: The notion that the Arabs don’t really want democracy, and aren’t suited to it even if they did. Stated in these terms, the concept has obvious appeal only to the likes of the House of Saud and those keen to excuse their dealings with them. The citizens of Tunisia and Egypt have shown ‘Arab exceptionalism’ to be a nonsense as derogatory and outmoded as the so-called ‘Hindu growth rate’.

Its rejection was a key plank in Bush’s ‘freedom agenda’. As Bush said in 2003: ‘Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe – because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export.’

The popular movements of Tunisia and Egypt have not only debunked ‘Arab exceptionalism’ they have also exposed the limits of a certain brand of ‘realism’, according to which biddable autocrats ‘may be bastards, but they’re our bastards’ (or, in the words Shakespeare gave a Roman at Caesar’s funeral, ‘I fear there will a worse come in his place’).

According to this thinking, the erstwhile dictators of Tunisia and Egypt, with their jet-black hair and reported fabulous wealth, were bulwarks against the rise of extreme Islamist governments. As if propping up regimes that deny their peoples rights and dignity is an obvious way to prevent radicalisation. As if the best answer the world can come up with to the troubling question of Islamic extremism is Hosni Mubarak.

Set aside the morality of this approach (as realists would advise you should). It didn’t work. Mubarak proved unsalvageable. Egypt’s ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has called for elections in six months. And with that same Council announcing that it will honour Egypt’s peace with Israel, the horrors which American support for Mubarak was meant to stave off are unlikely to come to pass.

‘Rights must be more than the grudging concessions of dictators’, said Bush in his 2005 inaugural address. The Egyptians who refused to leave Tahrir Square when Mubarak offered various concessions (that he would resign in September, that his son would not seek the presidency, that his powers would be transferred to the vice-president) evidently agree.

In the debate over the Obama administration’s handling of the crisis, much has been made of the need to get on the ‘right side of history’. Rightly so. Being seen to side with dictators against their peoples is not a good place to be. It is also an inept approach for the world as it is now: An interdependent global society of people who have, broadly speaking, the same aspirations and who use and are connected by the same technology.

Why, then, the controversy over an American ‘freedom agenda’? Why must it be defended by former Bush officials? One is left with the impression that democracy promotion became so associated with Bush and the neo-cons that it is now akin to a partisan cause.

It would be a pity if that remains the case, because there is nothing particularly Republican or neo-conservative about the universal appeal of freedom. Radical philosopher Slavoj Zizek, billed as the ‘Elvis of cultural theory’, would make an unlikely neo-con. ‘Where we are fighting a tyrant we are all universalists’, Zizek told Al Jazeera English last week. ‘Here we have a direct proof … that freedom is universal’.

Clad in a black t-shirt, Zizek went on to claim the removal of dictators in Tunisia and Egypt as blows struck for a ‘universal revolution for dignity, human rights [and] economic justice’. Barack Hussein Obama – African father, childhood years in Indonesia – is uniquely well-placed to bear this message.

The Obama administration has been criticised during the standoff between Mubarak and the protesters for timidity and vacillation. This is unfair. Egypt envoy and old State Department hand Frank Wisner was speaking out of turn when he said Mubarak ‘must stay in office’, and his remarks were quickly disowned. The truth is the Obama administration maintained its room to manoeuvre in what was (and is) a fluid situation, and harsh criticism from the likes of right-wing historian Niall Ferguson is a price it seems willing to pay.

Obama’s call for ‘genuine democracy’ after Mubarak’s resignation is promising. “Egyptians have inspired us”, the president said. They’ve certainly inspired their neighbours.

For the popular rejection of dictatorship has quickly spread. The four-decade rule of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi now hangs in the balance in Libya. Forces loyal to Gaddafi were reportedly shooting unarmed protesters while the North African tyrant, at once brutal and preposterous, appeared on state television “to clarify …. that I am in Tripoli and not in Venezuela”.

His son, Saif, also appeared on television. “We will not leave Libya to the Italians or to the Turks’, he blustered, in a curiously specific riff on the common despot’s refrain that regime opponents are tools of foreign agents. It gets more absurd still. Saif Gaddafi recently completed his doctorate at the London School of Economics. Its aim, Gaddafi wrote, was to analyse ‘how to create more just and democratic global governing institutions’. A fact he could use to impress the protesters he threatened with ‘rivers of blood’ and promised ‘to fight to the last bullet’, should he fall into their hands.

It was John F. Kennedy who urged post-colonial leaders to remember ‘that those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside’. It’s advice the Gaddafi family might like to consider, while Tunisia’s former president – now a guest of Saudi Arabia – didn’t need to be told.

Originally published at http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/44208.html

Tim Flatman gives his take on the challenging situation in Sudan’s Abyei region and makes the case for more robust US and UK engagement.

But this reflexive response to large-scale dissent has set a potential precedent for dealing with civil unrest that could have far-reaching implications. The shutdown of Egypt’s four big Internet service providers put an estimated 93 percent of the country’s networks beyond the reach of its citizens. It was, says Renesys’ James Cowie, ‘an action unprecedented in Internet history.’ Plenty of governments around the world censor the Internet. The Mubarak regime, though, opted to block it entirely.

Internet access in Egypt was restored within a week. But what the Mubarak regime did as an ad hoc emergency measure, others are doing on a more permanent and systematic basis. North Korea is a prime example.

In December’s Pacific Review, academics Cheng Chen, Kyungmin Ko and Ji-Yong Lee outlined Pyongyang’s alleged plan to build an Internet with North Korean characteristics. They estimate that at present, Internet access in North Korea is restricted to ‘no more than a few thousand people in Pyongyang.’ Others—privileged elites in the major cities—have to make do with a domestic intranet. Built in 2002, it encompasses ‘several web sites’ including email, e-commerce and chat room services.

But North Korea has apparently outgrown this arrangement, and its intranet is reportedly no longer able to handle an increasing volume of information. According to the authors, Kim Jong-il’s regime has realized that blocking the Internet in its entirety is a recipe for ‘continuing technological backwardness,’ and so it has resolved to ‘relax its death grip over the use of the Internet’ as part of its economic development strategy.

What will this entail? According to Kim Heung-kwang, a computer scientist who defected from North Korea, the government has developed a ‘roadmap’ to broaden access, in a heavily controlled form. This roadmap is said to be a seven-year plan that’s heavily focused on monitoring, filtering and blocking information. A series of controls is supposed to act as a ‘mosquito net.’ Bad things—new ideas, news and culture—would be kept out. Good things, such as foreign investment, would be allowed through. The final stage of the roadmap is supposed to be the opening up of the Internet ‘to enterprises, organizations and the general public.’

Such an approach would certainly be consistent with remarks attributed to Kim Jong-il by the Yonhap News Agency in 2007. ‘I’m an Internet expert too,’ he is quoted as saying. ‘It’s all right to wire the industrial zone only, but there are many problems if other regions of the North are wired. If that problem is addressed, there’s no reason not to open’ the Internet.

The regime’s goal, according to the defector, is not to allow free personal access to the Internet, but rather to permit ‘North Korean Internet users to access the Internet within a specific time and limited hours, and with restricted sources and defined ranges, and only for public benefits.’

Of course, all of this means that what North Korea is creating isn’t the web in any recognizable form. Instead, what the regime is essentially doing is building a walled garden app.

On the World Wide Web, content is stored on billions of interlinked web pages. But in walled garden apps, content is controlled by the creator—self-contained and often unlinked. Thus, the BBC News app for the iPhone features news only from the BBC. The ridiculously popular ‘Angry Birds’ app contains exactly what its name suggests and little else.

In an article in August titled ‘The Web Is Dead. Long Live the Internet,’ Wired Editor Chris Anderson examined the ‘move from the wide-open Web to semi-closed platforms that use the Internet for transport but not the browser for display.’ It’s driven, says Anderson, by changing preferences and changing technology: The appeal of exploring the web has given way to the convenience of ‘dedicated platforms.’ An increasing proportion of people are accessing the Internet through handheld devices (mainly smart phones, but also tablets like the iPad), which have smaller screens better suited to individual apps than to browsers.

Not everyone welcomes the trend toward walled garden apps. Internet entrepreneur Steven Johnson recently complained: ‘this year, for the first time in my adult life, unlinkable information began growing at a meaningful clip.’ But it’s a trend driven by a familiar trade-off: consumers want convenience and value certain brands; producers want better revenue models than the web generally affords.

But a walled garden state of the kind envisaged by the North Korean ‘roadmap’ would be a totalitarian mirror image of self-contained apps. There would be no equivalent trade-off between government and citizen. Internet users subject to ‘mosquito net’ filtering would be completely cut off from what Anderson calls the ‘wide-open Web of peer production, the so-called generative web where everyone is free to create what they want.’

So why go to the trouble of building a walled garden? North Korea’s government, say the researchers, ‘has largely adopted a “reactive” attitude toward the Internet as a potential political threat.’ It’s suspicious of both domestic dissent (online ‘samizdata’) and foreign meddling (as it would doubtless see ‘21st century statecraft’ practised by the US State Department).

Needless to say, North Korea is an extreme case, while Egypt’s emergency blackout is a path open to virtually any regime facing ‘difficulties.’ But the Egypt example also demonstrates that autocrats who deny their people access to inconvenient content outside the bounds of a walled garden will still face resistance.

The response to Egypt’s Internet blackout was immediate and self-organising, starting when Shervin Pishevar, a technology entrepreneur based in California, posted a message on Twitter: ‘I need volunteers to help build mobile ad hoc mesh networking hidden in backpacks/cars/rooftops powered by satellite that can’t be blocked.’

Thus began an international effort to get ‘mesh network’ software into Egypt, to allow individual laptops to communicate with each other. The goal, Pishevar told The Daily Beast, was ‘a kind of secondary Internet, one that would not be blockable.’ Google also launched an Egypt-specific workaround to let people post Twitter messages by phone.

Pishevar says he now wants to take the ‘mesh network’ technology to ‘any country where there is dictatorship…My dream is that in my lifetime we can get rid of dictatorships.’

This is the new ‘freedom agenda’ facing architects of walled garden states: not the policy of any particular government, but the realm of activists, engineers and entrepreneurs converging to form coalitions of the willing.

Walled garden apps might well represent the future of a predominantly handheld Internet, but no one would want to actually live in one. Attempts to create walled garden states—virtual carve-outs from an interdependent international society—seem unambiguously to represent a throwback to the past.

Link to original article is here http://the-diplomat.com/2011/02/14/living-in-a-despot%e2%80%99s-walled-garden/2/

FPC Senior Research Associate Andrew Monaghan gives his take on the historical and political challenges to be overcome by both the UK and Russia in order to improve their relationship.

For others, the future looks bright. The word “revolution” evokes strong feelings of excitement and exhilaration. The long-awaited era of democracy, human rights, and socio-economic flourishing is seemingly right around the corner. Egypt will be able to accommodate both of its conservatives and liberals in an economic progress-driven, bold and independent government. The archetype, of which the future of Egypt is likened to by the optimists, is Turkey.

Yet, neither Turkey nor Iran is where Egypt’s today and tomorrow lies. The dynamics of the 1979 revolution in Iran and the socio-political and religious structures of the country differ dramatically from Egypt. With no uniting figure like Khomeini, who can appeal to a broad range of people and who can offer a new coherent and radical vision to ‘save’ the country, the Egyptian unrest does not have a specific path to follow. Unlike the strong hierarchical nature of Shi-ite faith, the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood is divided within itself and has no clear or coherent vision for the country, save for discourses on morality and religiosity accompanied by some rhetoric of democracy.

The vast majority of Egyptians do not want a backwards-looking Islamist country, but as Muslims, they want a government that is just and fair and upholds moral codes of Islam.
While the influence and actual capacity of the Muslim Brotherhood is often exaggerated, due to our own fears of Islamism and terror, the complexity and polyphony of the Egyptian social and political landscape are often overlooked. The vast majority of Egyptians do not want a backwards-looking Islamist country, but as Muslims, they want a government that is just and fair and upholds moral codes of Islam.

This is where the image of Turkey as a role model for Egypt seems to make sense. After all, the ruling AKP government in Turkey is just what Egyptians seem to want: a conservative Muslim government with a pragmatic appetite for financial gain and diplomatic independence. However, the factors which enabled AKP to formulate and achieve a new political horizon – such as the long historical process that has modified Islam and Islamists in Turkey, multiple political parties and free elections and strong external pressure for reform due to EU accession talks – are not readily available to Egypt.

Egyptian politics might eventually look like Turkey one day, but in order for that to happen, the country must be willing to endure a chaotic and often paralyzing political stage. Ironically, that first stage will look a lot like Israel.

The only current political narrative that can unite Egypt is nationalism, embodied by the Armed Forces and their positive stand amongst all segments of the Egyptian society. Thus, just like Israel, we have seen and will see more military figures seizing the moment and pursuing political careers.

Just like Israel, Egypt will find a working, but imperfect balance in accommodating religious and secular populations.
The social tensions between the Islamist, mildly Islamist, culturally conservative, socialist and liberal segments of the Egyptian society will continually be a point of contention, just like in Israel. And just like Israel, Egypt will find a working, but imperfect balance in accommodating religious and secular populations.

Increasing political freedoms in Egypt will result in formation of political parties that will reflect all of the colours of Egypt from its 12million-strong Coptic Christians to its Islamists and liberals, all competing to represent their agendas and visions. Thus, with no party having clear majority, subsequent Egyptian governments will be weak coalitions trying to bring together completely opposing political visions, just like Israeli politics.

But for now, the immediate outcome of this month’s social unrest will not be a “revolution” – a word which is now empty of meaning thanks to its frequent metaphorical use – but an “evolution”. And for all we know from our biological evolution, it will be a rather messy process before such an evolution reaches its excellence.

One of the most hardline clerics, Ayatollah Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, known locally as ‘Professor Crocodile’ said: “As a result of the gifts of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, freedom-loving Islamic peoples (in] Tunisia, Egypt and nearby Arab countries are standing up to their oppressive governments.”

For far too long, the fear of an Islamic revolution is what allowed sclerotic governments like Egypt to maintain their authoritarian rule in the face of a cowed middle class and an acquiescent international community.

The fear has always been – as happened in Algeria and Gaza – that elections would allow the triumph of an Islamist movement, which would kick away the ladder of democracy from underneath it.

Rather than being tied to one particular ideology or religion, Egypt’s protests have gathered momentum because they are broad based, with support from both the poor and middle classes.

Without one clear leader, the movement has avoided becoming fractured or co-opted by the state. This diversity and flexibility has allowed the organisers credibly to call for a million people to come on to the streets.

President Mubarak saw the danger early on, reminding himself of what happened in Iran in 2009. One of his earliest decisions was to close down the country’s internet service providers to try to throttle the ability of the opposition to co-ordinate via social networks.

Most managed to get the message out by speaking to families and friends abroad who could get online or by using a new “voice-to-tweet” service set up to circumvent the ban. The movement could not be controlled, with friends calling each other and using more old fashioned methods, such as gathering a core mass at Friday prayers before heading on to the streets. But that organising nexus doesn’t mean that the movement to get rid of Mubarak is being run by the Muslim Brotherhood – they were late to join the protests, so you see few Islamist slogans at the demonstrations and without a charismatic leader of their own have backed Mohammed El Baradei for the time being.

El Baradei has emerged as a consensus figure – a middle class intellectual, he is yet to prove his credibility with ordinary Egyptians and has only been seen at the street protests once, for a brief period. He is the only game in town so far, though – Mubarak’s favoured successors – his son or the new Vice President and ex-spy chief are both badly compromised. Some fear that El Baradei could be a temporary liberal leader of the country – just as there was in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian revolution, but with a long-term takeover by the radicals.

But while Arab despots have argued that greater freedoms would allow the jihadists to take over, it has been young liberal groups that have taken to the streets. And political parties such as Turkey’s AKP prove that Islamism isn’t necessarily a watch-word for extremism.

In fact, it is because of the lack of open political space that more mature, secular opposition parties haven’t emerged to compete with the Islamists. It means that the “orderly transition” will be much more difficult – the West has helped prop up a government that makes such political change trickier. Freedom is messy, to borrow from Donald Rumsfeld.

While there have been many setbacks, the history of recent times shows a steady increase in the number of democracies across the world. Middle East countries face a double squeeze – a burgeoning youth which is more educated and informed than before and huge levels of income inequality. Guaranteeing jobs and economic security in the future will prove increasingly difficult without serious political reform.

We shouldn’t over-exaggerate the nature of the Egyptian regime of course. For all its failings, it is nowhere near as brutal as Iran is today or Iraq was under Saddam. Although that makes it more vulnerable to change from within.

So far Mubarak’s strategy has helped him cling on. He is likely to try to reach an accommodation with the protesters in the coming days and offer fresh elections. Perhaps he will be allowed the dignity of an orderly handover.

But locals tell a joke about when Tunisia’s government collapsed. Ben Ali took his plane to Cairo and went to see Mubarak. “Have you come to stay?” asked the Egyptian President. “No, I’ve come to pick you up.”

New FPC Research Associate Stephen Minas analyses the China’s evolving approach to climate change negotiations from Copenhagen to Cancun and beyond.