Civil Society Organisations Are Losing the Narrative War – How Can Trust Be Rebuilt?

Article by Joldoshbek Osmonov

July 20, 2026

Civil Society Organisations Are Losing the Narrative War – How Can Trust Be Rebuilt?

Civil society is how citizens can hold power to account. But what happens when organisations that exist to defend democratic life are no longer trusted to do so?

In functioning democracies, the answer barely needs asking. Transparent government, free expression, the right to challenge power and insist on the truth, all depend on a civil society that people believe in. It is through civil society that citizens engage with one another, mobilise in times of need, protect human rights, and advocate for change. When that belief erodes, so does the accountability it sustains.

For authoritarian governments, this erosion is not a problem. It is a strategy.

We are living in a time of profound uncertainty. The international rules-based order is no longer guaranteed. As authoritarianism and populism gain ground and democratic values come under pressure, civil society finds itself on the front line – and the forces working against it are organised and deliberate.

Propaganda, legal threats, and institutional failings are making civil society more vulnerable

Kyrgyzstan is a clear example of how civil society can become vulnerable. In April 2024, the country passed a law on ‘foreign representatives’, requiring NGOs that receive foreign funding to register with the government – echoing Russia’s and Georgia’s foreign agent laws, though without the same criminal liability.^[1] This reflects a broader trend: growing authoritarianism and a shrinking civic space that make it harder for citizens and organisations to speak out.

Kyrgyzstan is not an isolated case. Across countries like Russia, Belarus, Georgia, and other Central Asian countries, the pattern is the same: governments are using legal pressure and narrative control to delegitimise the organisations that hold them accountable. In Russia, organised civil society and NGOs have been systematically portrayed as a threat to traditional values and national identity – and that same propaganda playbook is being exported across the region, eroding credibility of civil society organisations beyond its borders.

The threat is not solely external however. Parts of the NGO sector have been undermining their own credibility by remaining overly donor-centric, lacking transparency and failing to communicate their work and impact effectively to the public.

The effect of this sustained pressure on civil society and internal shortcomings is a loss of trust. People no longer believe that civil society organisations tell the truth, stand for something, or have anything meaningful to offer.

And when the connection between people and civil society breaks down, civil society can no longer fulfil its democratic function. The gap between organisations and the communities they exist to serve becomes a gap that weakens democracy.

So how should civil society respond?

Some of the challenges are practical: funding, legal pressure, hostile information environments. But the deeper challenge is rebuilding trust and relevance. Old approaches and instruments are no longer enough. Civil society organisations need to think critically about how they are reaching people, how they come across, and whether they truly understand the context in which they operate.

Starting internally: transparency, accountability, and effectiveness are vital. Suspicions that NGOs are ineffective or opaque are widespread, and organisations need to take this seriously. Trust is rebuilt through actions, not just communication.

Yet internal renewal is only half the work. The deeper challenge is rebuilding the connection with communities – and that begins with an honest reckoning about how that connection was lost in the first place. It means going to where people already are: the school gate, the local market, the community group, the places where trust is built through presence rather than broadcast. It means speaking in a language that people recognise and not jargon that requires explaining. And it means reducing financial dependence on external donors by developing more diversified, locally rooted funding – through the public sector, social entrepreneurship, and direct community support.

Organisations need to be clear about both the work they do and what they stand for. The issues that civil society organisations address are often the issues that matter to people. When organisations can clearly demonstrate their relevance and impact, trust becomes easier to build and sustain.

Finally, where possible, constructive dialogue with governments should not be abandoned. Civil society organisations should seek to cooperate on practical, less politically contested challenges, building confidence and relationships before attempting to address more difficult issues.

What leaders need in this moment

Civil society may be losing the narrative battle – but that does not mean war is lost. Leaders need a clear-eyed understanding of how we got here and what is at stake.

The forces working against democracy and civil society – authoritarianism, populism, propaganda, misinformation – are organised, deliberate, and adaptive. Responding to these forces requires not just resilience, but the willingness to change: to be honest about failure, to engage with people where they are, and to earn trust rather than assume it.

The goal is not simply to survive. It is to rebuild the kind of civil society that people feel belongs to them, one that reflects their concerns, speaks to their realities, and importantly, one that they would fight to defend.

Ultimately, trust cannot be demanded, it must be earned, sustained, and renewed over time.

Explore the full mini-series here.

Joldoshbek Osmonov is the team leader of the Civic Engagement for Development Project in Kyrgyzstan funded by the Swiss Development Agency. He has extensive work experience in international development organisations, think tanks, and the civil society sector and possesses strong expertise in civil society, governance, public policy, and local politics. Joldoshbek holds a master’s degree in public administration from the University of Pennsylvania, the United States, and BA in international relations from the American University of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, April 2024, Law Targeting Foreign-Funded NGOs Sends Chill Through Kyrgyz Civil Society, https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-foreign-agents-chill/32893000.html

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Civil Society

Regions

Kyrgyzstan

No Shortcuts to Trust: Education, Civic Habits, and Social Resilience in Central Asia

Article by Farrukh Irnazarov

In Central Asia, citizens have not simply lost faith in institutions. They have stopped expecting institutions to deserve it.

Citizens are curious about reform, transparency, opportunity, participation, and modernisation. However, their everyday experience may be shaped by uneven services, opaque decision-making, limited civic space, or institutions that respond more readily to status than to need. And yet the instinct is to treat this as something politics alone can fix. It cannot. Trust is not primarily a political product; it is a learned disposition.

In such an environment, ‘leading by example’ is not a soft moral appeal. It is the structural basis of credibility. Where authority is culturally important, public conduct carries unusual weight; people watch whether officials, educators, business leaders, and civic actors behave according to the standards they ask others to accept. Trust is built when words and actions repeatedly meet.

Education as democratic infrastructure

Trust is too often treated as a political problem to be solved only by policy: new laws, new strategies, new platforms, or new communications campaigns. These matter, but they are not enough. People learn, often early, whether cooperation is safe, whether disagreement is dangerous, whether success requires domination, and whether institutions deserve patience when they make mistakes. Education is therefore the overlooked foundation of democratic resilience, not because schools can replace politics, but because they form the habits of mind that make healthy politics possible.

This requires thinking about education more broadly than curriculum reform. It means treating classrooms, youth programmes, universities and informal learning spaces as laboratories of social behaviour. One powerful mechanism is gamification – designing learning environments that teach the logic of mutual gain. This is not about points and prizes. It is about showing young people, through experience, that achievement and contribution are not opposites. Too much public life is organised around zero-sum instincts: if one group advances, another must lose; if one entrepreneur succeeds, society has been exploited; if one community receives attention, another has been forgotten.

A better educational design can show young people that achievement and contribution are not opposites. A student can ‘win’ by building a business model that also solves a local problem. A team can score higher when it helps another team improve. A simulated city, school budget, or environmental challenge can reward cooperation, long-term thinking and shared benefits rather than only individual victory.

This matters in Central Asia because social cohesion cannot be imported through abstract democratic language. The region’s histories, hierarchies, kinship networks, respect for elders, and expectations of authority differ from Western European civic models. A copied template may sound progressive while failing to speak to local trust dynamics. Gamified education can translate democratic habits into lived experience: negotiation, responsibility, reciprocity, compromise, and service. It can show that success does not have to mean someone else’s defeat. That lesson, absorbed early, is a quiet defence against polarisation later.

A second mechanism is debate culture. Debate is not simply public speaking, nor is it the performance of defeating an opponent. At its best, it teaches a harder civic discipline: to hold a position firmly while remaining genuinely open to being changed by another argument. This is one of the deepest foundations of democratic life. A person who has practiced fair debate learns that disagreement is not betrayal, that criticism is not always an attack, and that losing an argument need not mean losing dignity. In societies where authority is often protected from challenge, debate culture can create respectful forms of questioning. It does not require young people to reject elders, institutions or tradition. It teaches them how to examine claims, ask for evidence and recognise complexity without collapsing into cynicism.

The difficulty is that most policy thinking moves in the opposite direction. It is top-down, structural and short-cycle. Governments and donors want measurable outcomes within a funding period. NGOs, especially in Central Asia, often work with precarious financing and constrained civic space, which pushes them toward safe projects, narrow indicators, and cautious language. But trust grows slowly. It needs continuity, repetition, and relationships. A three-month campaign cannot undo years of suspicion. A digital platform cannot substitute for credible behaviour. The most important work may be the least visible: a teacher who models fairness, a youth mentor who allows disagreement, a local project that proves cooperation can produce real results.

Technology, trust and democratic resilience

Technology intensifies both the problem and the possibility. Disinformation widens the gap between rhetoric and reality. It makes it harder for leaders to maintain credibility and harder for citizens to know what deserves belief. In information environments shaped by rumours, propaganda, influencer politics and fragmented media, distrust can become self-protective: people stop believing not only false claims but also true ones. This is especially dangerous in societies where institutional trust is already fragile.

However, technology should not be treated only as a threat. In Central Asia, its effects are already mixed. Kazakhstan’s eGov system, for example, has shown how digital public services can reduce everyday friction between citizens and the state: when people can access documents, payments or applications online without relying on personal connections or opaque bureaucracy, technology can make institutions feel more predictable and less distant. Yet the same region has also shown the limits of digital trust, especially when online spaces are shaped by disinformation, surveillance fears, or sudden restrictions on access. The point is not to promise technological salvation. The point is to try low-risk, low-cost experiments – digital debate clubs, local problem-solving games, transparent community budgeting tools, media-literacy simulations, or platforms that allow citizens to track small public commitments – and to learn honestly from failure. Even attempting imperfect solutions can build trust when the process is transparent. People do not need institutions that never fail. They need institutions that admit limits, correct mistakes, and keep showing up.

In a region with civic actors may face pressure, where respect matters, where authority is personal as well as formal and where young people are navigating both traditional and global digital culture – this is not an abstract principle. Trust between citizens, communities, and institutions must be built from where people actually stand. Education, in this wider sense, is where the bridge can begin.

The African proverb captures the choice: “if you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together”. Trust cannot be rushed into existence by decree, branding, or institutional design alone. It is slow, collective work. It is learned through games that reward mutual success, debates that dignify disagreement, technologies that connect rather than manipulate, and leaders who make credibility visible through example. There are no shortcuts worth taking.

Explore the full mini-series here.

Farrukh Irnazarov is an international development expert with over 15 years of experience in economic policy, investment strategies, labour migration, trade, and agribusiness. He is the Co-Founder and Country Director for Uzbekistan at the Central Asian Development Institute (CADI) and Co-Founder of the RANSIF Group, a policy and research platform promoting responsible and transparent investment in Central Asia. Farrukh’s focus is on fostering constructive capital, designing investment screening mechanisms, and advancing private sector development across the region.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

Topics

Civil Society

Democracy and Elections

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Regions

Central Asia

Gen Z, Agency and Engagement: From Tokenism to Meaningful Collaboration

Article by Aaron Campbell and Gulshat Ayydova

July 16, 2026

Gen Z, Agency and Engagement: From Tokenism to Meaningful Collaboration

Young people are often described as the ‘future’, yet they are already shaping political life in the present. We are two young leaders from very different contexts: the UK and Turkmenistan. Even though our countries are culturally, socially and politically quite different, we found through indepth discussion in both – and we suspect across the globe – Gen Z are navigating complex barriers to formal participation while simultaneously creating new, constructive forms of civic engagement. If our leaders are serious about building resilient and peaceful societies, we have to transform our engagement with young people from tokenistic consultation to meaningful collaboration.

Young people’s agency is expressed not only through formal institutions such as voting or parliamentary participation, but also through civic activism, digital mobilisation, community leadership, and social entrepreneurship. However, our systems frequently fail to recognise this reality. Young people are invited into conversations symbolically rather than substantively, consulted without influence, and expected to participate in systems that were not designed with them in mind.

Through our work we hear from young people that they see themselves mentioned in speeches and strategies, but do not participate in decision-making spaces where power actually sits. Youth councils, consultations, and forums often exist without real influence over policy outcomes, reinforcing frustration and deepening distrust in institutions.

There are both formal and informal barriers for young people to engage with governance structures. These include limited access to policymakers, hierarchical political cultures, and a perception that the youth lack the experience or authority to contribute meaningfully. In formal settings, even practical factors such as language confidence, professional etiquette, and expectations around dress and behaviour can become invisible barriers that exclude young people from participation.

In the UK, organisations like My Life My Say and Flipgenn are actively breaking down these barriers – and it is working. In the lead-up to the most recent local elections, 444,874 young people registered to vote in April 2026 alone, and the Electoral Commission found that 81% of young people see living in a democracy as important.^[1] Yet such organisations remain the exception rather than the rule, and the lack of meaningful institutional pathways for engagement remains one of the greatest barriers young people face.

When those pathways are absent, the consequences are significant. In the UK, polling shows that 63% of 18–24-year-olds doubt any major political party could improve their lives, and 73% feel politicians do not care about people like them.^[2] In Turkmenistan, young people similarly describe a sense of distance from formal decision-making – feeling that their voices sometimes carry weight in community spaces but rarely reach the institutions where policy is shaped. In both contexts, the risk is the same: when young people feel that the system is not working for them, disengagement follows.

One example from Turkmenistan shows what becomes possible when this changes. Through the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) seminars on Climate Negotiations, Model OSCE, and Inclusive Climate Governance, the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) supported Youth Climate Summer School, and the annual Local Conference of Youth (LCOY) endorsed by YOUNGO, young people from across Turkmenistan have come together to learn, exchange ideas, and contribute to addressing environmental challenges.^[3] These initiatives have been made possible thanks to the support of national institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education, as well as international partners such as UNICEF, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the OSCE, and diplomatic missions including the UK Embassy. Working together, these partners have created spaces where young people can develop their skills, collaborate with experts, and transform their ideas into practical initiatives that benefit their communities.

What has been most inspiring is seeing how young people respond when they are trusted and encouraged to contribute. Many participants have gone on to organise awareness campaigns, volunteer activities, and peer-learning initiatives, sharing their knowledge with others and inspiring more young people to get involved. They often speak about the pride and satisfaction they feel from being able to contribute to issues that matter to them and to their communities.^[4] These experiences show that when young people are given opportunities to learn, collaborate, and take responsibility, they develop into confident and active citizens. Society, in turn, benefits from their creativity, enthusiasm, and commitment to building a more sustainable future.

Representation matters. When people see someone like themselves making a difference, they feel empowered to believe they can do the same – and their sense of belonging to their country is strengthened when they can see themselves working within its structures and contributing to its future. But representation must not mean simply inviting young people to the table: it must mean giving them the authority, trust, and resources to shape outcomes. Youth engagement should also extend beyond parliaments and ministries. Community centres, universities, coworking spaces, and local initiatives often provide more accessible and psychologically safe environments for young people to engage in public life.

Leaders and policy-makers concerned about social cohesion among the next generation should understand that empowering young people to be active members of their society – in the spaces where they live, study and work – is precisely how trust and social capital are built. If we are serious about building resilient and inclusive societies, youth engagement must move beyond tokenism and toward genuine representation, civic education, and structural support. It requires real investment and commitment, but the evidence from both our countries is clear: when young people are given the opportunity to contribute, they do – and society as a whole is stronger for it.

Explore the full mini-series here.

Aaron Campbell is located at the intersection of Mental Health, EDI & Liberation, Advocacy for Young People, Higher Education and Politics/Policy, with a passion, drive, and focus on making long lasting and meaningful change within society, particularly for those who are marginalised. They graduated from the University of East Anglia with a degree in Computing and Graphic Design and since have worked with many organisations across multiple sectors including government, mental health, legal and grassroots organisations.

Gulshat Ayydova is a climate and youth advocate from Turkmenistan. She founded the Youth Climate Action Network Turkmenistan and leads a range of initiatives to engage young people in climate action. Her work includes organising eco camps, eco festivals, climate hackathons, and national youth conferences on climate change, as well as co-developing policy recommendations for the government. She currently serves as a member of the EU Youth Sounding Board for Central Asia. Gulshat is committed to advancing inclusive and sustainable climate policies in Turkmenistan.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual authors and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] The Electoral Commission, Young people’s views on politics and voting 2026, March 2026, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/young-peoples-views-politics-and-voting-2026

^[2] From a survey conducted by Opinium, https://www.opinium.com/insight/ and commissioned by My Life My Say, https://www.mylifemysay.org.uk/

^[3] UNICEF, UNICEF Launches Youth Climate Summer School 2025, June 2025, https://www.unicef.org/turkmenistan/press-releases/unicef-launches-youth-climate-summer-school-2025; UN Turkmenistan, Raising a Generation of Climate Leaders: Gulshat and Selbi Empower Youth for Climate Action in Turkmenistan, November 2025, https://turkmenistan.un.org/en/305747-raising-generation-climate-leaders-gulshat-and-selbi-empower-youth-climate-action; OSCE, OSCE promotes youth engagement in climate change issues in Turkmenistan, July 2025, https://ashgabat.osce.org/centre-in-ashgabat/595459; OSCE, Model OSCE promotes youth leadership and climate diplomacy in Turkmenistan, April 2026, https://ashgabat.osce.org/news/centre-ashgabat/663259

^[4] Statement based on participant feedback collected during workshops and informal discussions rather than a formal evaluation.

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Civil Society

Human Rights

Regions

Turkmenistan

United Kingdom

How Can We Secure a Healthy Political and Social Order in a Fragmented World?

Article by Lord John Alderdice

July 13, 2026

How Can We Secure a Healthy Political and Social Order in a Fragmented World?

This article introduces a new series of short essays by JST Fellows – leaders working across Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia – exploring how societies can build the trust, agency and resilience needed for an era of fracture and flux.

We are living through a period of profound change and uncertainty. The erosion of the rules-based international order is causing instability on a global scale. Familiar frameworks and alliances, such as NATO, are no longer seen as providing security guarantees and a basis for shared understanding between states. The institutions that form the foundations of healthy democracy – the media, government, judiciary, and civil society – are not functioning in the way that they should. Media ecosystems no longer offer a shared factual reference point; governments struggle to deliver on the concerns of those they represent; judiciaries face growing pressure on their independence; and civil society is increasingly recast – through propaganda and hostile narratives – as a threat rather than a mechanism for accountability and civic action. It all adds up to a climate of social and political polarisation, creating distrust: in governments, in one another, and in democracy itself.

Added to this, the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) presents both opportunities and threats to how our societies and economies function. The political emergence of Gen Z, with youth-led protests in countries as disparate as Georgia, Nepal, Peru and Madagascar, is seen as evidence of growing frustration of young people with inequality, corruption, and the failure of existing institutions to respond to people’s concerns.^[1]

These forces are not temporary disruptions but structural shifts reshaping political and social life. As such, they demand a new approach. This is not a time for nostalgia but for a collective rethink. Throughout this mini-series, our contributors delve into experiences of culture, trust and agency in their societies to explore a central question: What actions do we need to take and what stories must we ensure are heard, in order to shape and secure a healthy political and social order for the emerging global era?

In the articles that follow, JST Fellows explore this question in depth, offering diverse perspectives on what it means to rethink democracy through the lens of culture, trust, and agency. They look at opportunities and challenges emerging in media, technology, and information systems. They look at the power of identity and narratives, and their effect on social cohesion. And they look at agency and engagement, with a focus on young people.

These are not separate strands but interwoven dynamics that reinforce each other. Technology drives identity narratives. Identity politics shape how young people engage. And youth movements reshape information ecosystems.

Our Fellows, who come from countries across Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, write about how these forces are playing out in the contexts in which they live and work. Questions of identity, culture and memory also run throughout the series. Olga Reka, from Ukraine, writes about the critical role of the arts, culture, and storytelling in creating meaning and agency as a precondition for democracy. Botagoz Zhumabekova examines the psychological foundations of democratic participation, arguing that active citizenship depends not only on political opportunity but also on people feeling safe enough to engage.

Trust – or its absence – is a common theme. Gulshat Ayydova and Aaron Campbell look at what we can learn from the way young people already engage in informal spaces to encourage meaningful participation and build trust in political processes. Joldoshbek Osmonov, from Kyrgyzstan, looks at the legitimacy crisis facing civil society and how organisations can rebuild trust in the face of propaganda that presents them as a threat. Farrukh Irnazarov explores the role of education in building trust in institutions and civic responsibility across Central Asia.

Looking at democratic renewal through a political lens, Palina Brodik reflects on the future of the Belarusian democratic movement, arguing that preserving collective memory while remaining adaptable is essential to sustaining political agency in exile.

The series concludes with Liliana Gutan’s reflection on Moldova, where democracy is measured not only by elections but by what institutions deliver between them. Her article brings together many of the themes explored throughout the series, arguing that democratic resilience ultimately depends on whether people experience dignity, security, and belonging in their everyday lives.

I hope these articles offer both provocation and possibility – showing what it looks like when values-driven leaders think seriously about the challenges of our time. They are part of the generation of diverse leaders needed in this moment, to shape a new order in which people can live in sustainable, peaceful and just societies.

Explore the full mini-series here.

John Alderdice, Professor, the Lord Alderdice. UK Trade Envoy to Azerbaijan & Central Asia and JST Trustee.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] Daniel Boffey, ‘We are very strong’: Georgia’s gen Z drives protests against return to past, The Guardian, May 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/16/georgia-gen-z-drives-protests-against-return-to-past-foreign-agents-law; Omkar Khandekar and Yam Kumari Kandel, How Gen Z-led protests put Nepal’s 1st female prime minister in power, NPR, September 2025, https://www.npr.org/2025/09/20/nx-s1-5545760/nepal-protests-gen-z; Marco Aquino and Alexander Villegas, Peru’s Gen Z rallies against President Boluarte, protesting over pensions and corruption, Reuters, September 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/perus-gen-z-rallies-against-president-boluarte-protesting-over-pensions-2025-09-27/; AP News, How Gen Z protesters brought down Madagascar’s government and now want the president out, October 2025, https://apnews.com/article/madagascar-protests-gen-z-rajoelina-e39ef11bd1f4a92f1f4b353900348219

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Civil Society

Democracy and Elections

Good Governance and Institutional Reform

Human Rights

Regions

Europe

Central Asia

Long read | Recasting the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan

Article by Francisco Olmos

June 23, 2026

Long read | Recasting the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan

On 19 and 20 May Astana held a symposium on the Golden Horde, a descendant state of the Mongol Empire.^[1] This was not, however, an event limited to academics discussing an obscure topic, but rather the culmination of a historical narrative process that has been taking place in Kazakhstan over the past few years.

Since Kassym-Jomart Tokayev became president of Kazakhstan, the authorities have embarked on a quest for a new historical narrative, and they found it in the shape of the Golden Horde. This medieval khanate, which emerged from the descendants of Jochi, the eldest son of Genghis Khan, ruled the Eurasian steppe for three hundred years before disintegrating in the 15^th century. It was a state that had been purposely overlooked by Tokayev’s predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and that had been much maligned during the Soviet period as it had dominated the Russian principalities.^[2]

The process of embracing the Golden Horde started back in 2019. Since then, interest in the Ulus of Jochi has materialised in the establishment of a dedicated institute for its study, archaeological finds, history articles in non-specialised media, and even a TV series, among other developments.^[3]

The timing and use of the Golden Horde by the Kazakh authorities are no coincidence. Tokayev’s New Kazakhstan was missing a national narrative to provide cohesion and distinguish itself from Nazarbayev’s discourse. The need for a historical narrative stretching back centuries became more acute in 2022, after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Kazakhstan’s large neighbour to the north has on multiple occasions questioned Kazakhstan’s sovereignty and national identity, especially in the past few years.^[4] The use of the Ulus of Jochi reaffirms the country’s own history centuries before Russian colonisation. In fact, for much of its existence, the Golden Horde exercised authority over the Russian principalities, but that is not the message Astana wants to emphasise in this New Kazakhstan.

The use being made of the Ulus of Jochi stays away from a bellicose tone or a strong nationalist sentiment. Instead of building the narrative around the Horde’s rulers, famous battles or monuments, Kazakhstan approaches it from a different perspective. It calls upon the medieval state’s diversity, role in global trade, intellectual and financial legacies. There are no bloody conquests or feats that could raise eyebrows in neighbouring countries.

As Tokayev put in the recent symposium: “this [the Golden Horde] is one of the most important pages in the chronicle of our country and all humanity.”^[5] In other words, Astana aims to portray the Ulus of Jochi as a state whose legacy extends beyond modern Kazakhstan and possesses a universal rather than exclusive character.

The Golden Horde in the 21^st century

The use of the Golden Horde by Tokayev for his New Kazakhstan can be considered a right choice for the purpose it seeks to articulate. Although over five centuries have passed since it ceased to exist, some of its characteristics can be useful to the Kazakh authorities in this day and age.

The Ulus of Jochi presents Astana a state in accordance with its current foreign policy aspirations. These descendants of Genghis Khan ruled an extensive empire that, at its height, stretched from the Black Sea in the west to Siberia in the east. At the same time, it maintained diplomatic relations with a wide range of states: from other Mongol successor empires, to European kingdoms and Islamic states. A true Eurasian empire that matches Kazakhstan’s role in modern geopolitics and its multi-vector foreign policy that includes China, Russia and the EU as key partners.

Like Kazakhstan today, the Jochid Ulus was also a multiethnic state. The Horde was home to Mongols, Turkic peoples and Slavs, among others. Despite Kazakhs being now the majority of the population, the country continues to preserve a diverse ethnic and linguistic mix. More than 70 ethnic groups live in the country, with large minority groups such as Russians (14.9% of the population), Uzbeks (3.3%) and Ukrainians (1.9%).^[6] The Golden Horde, despite its strong turco-mongol character, existed before the emergence of nationalism, an ideology that can be harmful to the country’s multiethnic background.

Despite the reasons above, the choice of the Golden Horde as a national narrative is not without its issues and controversies.

This medieval polity occupied territories well beyond Kazakhstan, and Astana is not the only state that can claim its legacy, although so far no other has actively done so. Its principal capitals, for example, were located along the Volga in what is now Russia, even if they were less central to the state than the capitals of more sedentary medieval polities because of the Horde’s nomadic character.

Another key characteristic of the Golden Horde is missing from its modern interpretation: its military might and conquests. Among its most significant achievements was its domination of the Russian principalities and their vassalage to the Horde. This is not a pleasant topic for Moscow, which could use Kazakhstan’s embrace of Jochi’s descendants in its nationalist discourse and usual verbal attacks from its propagandists and officials against Tokayev’s government.

The way the narrative is being built also raises other questionable points. The virtues of the Horde are exalted, as expected, but it lacks historical figures with whom people can identify with. Contrary to what happens in Uzbekistan with Amir Timur (i.e. Tamerlane) and, to a much lesser extent, his descendants Ulugh Beg and Babur, Kazakhstan’s is shying away from the main historical figures of the Jochid Ulus.^[7] And there is no shortage of them: from Batu (r. 1227-55), founder of the Golden Horde, to his brother Berke (1257-66), Uzbeg Khan (1313-41) or Jani Beg (1342-57), to name a few. But besides some mentions of Jochi himself, most other rulers and conquerors are overlooked.

The composition of the Golden Horde is another interesting subject. In its origin it was a Mongol state, and while later the Turkic component would gradually come to predominate, the link with the modern Kazakhs is not straightforward. The same happens from a state perspective. The Golden Horde is not the direct ancestor of Kazakhstan. The Ulus of Jochi fragmented permanently into different khanates in the 15^th century, including those of Crimea, Kazan and Astrakhan, located in modern Ukraine and Russia, as well as the Uzbek and Kazakh khanates. The link between the latter and Kazakhstan is stronger than with the Golden Horde.

Why not the Kazakh Khanate?

There is a loser of Kazakhstan’s new interest in the Golden Horde and that is the Kazakh Khanate. This state established in the mid-15^th century by Kerei and Janibeg, two nomadic leaders who broke away from the Uzbek Khanate in what is now southern Kazakhstan, is the most direct link modern Kazakhstan has to a historical past. It not only occupied roughly the current territory of the republic but was also the state that was later colonised by the Russians before Kazakhstan achieved its independence in 1991.

The Kazakh Khanate had been used to some extent by Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, notably when confronted by a familiar threat: Russia. While a statue of the khanate founders was unveiled in Astana back in 2010, it was not until 2014 that this state rose to prominence. This was a result of Vladimir Putin’s words a year earlier suggesting that “Kazakhs never had a statehood.”^[8] Nazarbayev’s reaction was to celebrate the 550^th anniversary of the khanate’s establishment the following year.

This Central Asian state produced notable rulers that could have been prominently promoted by Astana if the Kazakh Khanate was given more importance within the national narrative.

The khans Kerei and Janibeg might have been considered the principal founding fathers of the Kazakh nation. Kasym Khan could have been elevated as the national figure. Tauke Khan, together with his Zheti Zhargy (Seven Charters), could have been used to prove the existence of the Kazakh statehood from a legalistic perspective back in the 17^th century.^[9] Kenesary Khan (d. 1847), in turn, would have provided a heroic, yet ill-fated, national liberation figure centred on resisting the Russian invaders. However, beyond their presence through a small number of statues, commemorative coins, and educational curricula, these historical figures have largely played a supporting role in Kazakhstan’s nation-building process, rather than occupying a central symbolic position.

However, there are reasons why the Ulus of Jochi may be a more suitable choice for Kazakhstan’s aspiring role in the world. While the Golden Horde spanned the Eurasian steppe, the Kazakh Khanate’s borders were limited to modern-day Kazakhstan. It was a regional power, as the Uzbek Khanates found out through constant wars in the 16^th century, but its role in world history is much more limited. In addition, it had a stronger Kazakh ethnic component, which works well when striking a nationalist chord, but lies out of place in a more diverse Kazakhstan that the authorities seek to promote today.

Conclusion

Five centuries after its dissolution, the Golden Horde is experiencing a revival in one of its former territories. The rediscovery of this medieval state in the 21^st century reflects an attempt to build a historical narrative that supports modern Kazakhstan’s state identity and foreign policy objectives. By elevating the Ulus of Jochi, a Eurasian empire characterised by its territorial extension, multiethnic composition and transregional connectivity, Astana seeks to shape its current aspirations by drawing on the past.

At the same time, this new narrative highlights the limitations and shortcomings of a state-led historical construction. As outlined above, the direct link between the Golden Horde and modern Kazakhstan is open to debate, especially when compared to the Kazakh Khanate. Moreover, many of its key characteristics are deliberately overlooked in the search for a sanitised narrative that can be accepted both at home and abroad. The result is a balancing act that reflects both the opportunities and constraints of using the past as an instrument of modern nation-building.

Francisco Olmos is a Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre. He is a researcher and analyst specializing in Central Asian affairs, focusing on nationalism, power transitions, and the geopolitics of the post-Soviet space. He is a Senior Researcher at GEOPOL 21, where he contributes analysis on Central Asia’s relations with Russia, China, and Western actors. Holding an MA in International Relations and World Order from the University of Leicester, Olmos frequently writes for think tanks and media outlets, participates in academic forums and podcasts, and was awarded the Beca Ruy de Clavijo for his work on Spain’s relations with Central Asia.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

^[1] UNESCO, International Symposium on the Golden Horde Held in Astana under the Patronage of UNESCO, UNESCO, May 2026, https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/international-symposium-golden-horde-held-astana-under-patronage-unesco

^[2] Bakhytzhan Kurmanov, Zhaxylyk Sabitov, and Rustem Kudaibergenov, Making the Golden Horde “Great Again”: Historians as Memory Actors and Reinterpretation of the Historical Narratives in Independent Kazakhstan, Nationalities Papers, Cambridge University Press, October 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/making-the-golden-horde-great-again-historians-as-memory-actors-and-reinterpretation-of-the-historical-narratives-in-independent-kazakhstan/057D6F6125AE71CE3A62B0B5D6B4F147

^[3] Aibarshyn Akhmetkali, Kazakhstan’s Ulus of Jochi Institute Explores Forgotten Eras of Statehood, The Astana Times, January 2025, https://astanatimes.com/2025/01/kazakhstans-ulus-of-jochi-institute-explores-forgotten-eras-of-statehood/; Aibarshyn Akhmetkali, Everything You Need to Know About Ulus of Jochi, The Astana Times, August 2024, https://astanatimes.com/2024/08/everything-you-need-to-know-about-ulus-of-jochi; Dana Omirgazy, The Golden Empire: Everything We Know So Far, Qazinform, July 2025, https://qazinform.com/news/the-golden-empire-everything-we-know-so-far-e7b35d

^[4] Francisco Olmos, La sombra del nacionalismo ruso en Asia Central, Geopol 21, September 2024, https://geopol21.com/la-sombra-del-nacionalismo-ruso-en-asia-central/

^[5] Office of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Akorda), Address by the Head of State Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the International Symposium “The Golden Horde as a Model of Steppe Civilization: History, Archaeology, Culture, Identity”, May 2026, https://www.akorda.kz/ru/vystuplenie-glavy-gosudarstva-kasym-zhomarta-tokaeva-na-mezhdunarodnom-simpoziume-zolotaya-orda-kak-model-stepnoy-civilizacii-istoriya-arheologiya-kultura-identichnost-1945730

^[6] Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan, [Statistical Report / Data File], 2024, https://stat.gov.kz/api/iblock/element/178068/file/en/

^[7] Francisco Olmos, State-building Myths in Central Asia, The Foreign Policy Centre, October 2019, https://fpc.org.uk/state-building-myths-in-central-asia/

^[8] Farangis Najibullah, Putin Downplays Kazakh Independence, Sparks Angry Reaction, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 2014, https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-putin-history-reaction-nation/26565141.html

^[9] Rafail N. Zinurov, “«Жеті Жарғы» («Семь установлений») Тауке-хана как великий памятник права: правовой обычай, судопроизводство и наказание” [“Zheti Zhargy (‘Seven Charters’) by Tauke Khan as a Great Monument of Law: Customary Law, Judicial Procedure, and Punishment”], Pravovoe gosudarstvo: teoriya i praktika, no. 4 (58) (2012): 32–37

Topics

Regions

Central Asia

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyz Parliamentary Election’s Snapshot

Article by Dr Aijan Sharshenova

November 27, 2025

Kyrgyz Parliamentary Election’s Snapshot

The Kyrgyz Parliament – Jogorku Kenesh (Supreme Council) called for an early election in September on the grounds of avoiding an overlap of two important electoral campaigns in 2026 – presidential and parliamentary.^[1] On November 30^th, Kyrgyzstan will hold snap preliminary parliamentary elections.

A brief history of Kyrgyz parliamentarism

Since gaining independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has held eight parliamentary elections and had seven parliamentary convocations. In the early independence years, the country experimented with a bicameral parliamentary system, which consisted of the Legislative Assembly and the Assembly of People’s Representatives. Since 2007, however, the Kyrgyz parliament has been a unicameral body.

Throughout the last 34 years, Kyrgyzstan oscillated between parliamentary, parliamentary-presidential, and presidential-parliamentary forms of governance. Kyrgyz politics, however imperfect they might have been, were dynamic, lively, and left space for public and political debate and contestation. The most recent constitutional amendments, initiated by the current President, Sadyr Japarov, marked an important shift to a strong presidential model of governance.^[2]

Notably, two out of three government coups in independent Kyrgyzstan were triggered by contested parliamentary elections, first in March 2005^[3] and again in October 2020.^[4] In a way, parliamentary elections often contain seeds of public unrest as proven by history. The seventh election’s results were annulled due to the mass protest and the government coup.^[5] The sixth parliamentary convocation had its term extended until 2021. The eight elections, held later that year, formed the current convocation of the Parliament (seventh), which has lost a significant part of its powers in the aftermath of the constitutional referendum of 2021.

A snapshot of the upcoming parliamentary election

The upcoming election will stick to the previous Parliament’s composition of 90 members of parliament. However, there will be some important technical changes. Following the 2025 amendments to the Electoral Code, the electoral system shifted from a mixed system to a majoritarian one: MPs are elected from 30 multi-member constituencies, with each district electing three representatives via plurality voting (the top three candidates win). To ensure gender representation, it is a requirement that at least one woman must be among the top three in each district.^[6]

Kyrgyzstan’s current population stands at approximately 7.5 million people, with around 4.237 million citizens who are eligible and registered to vote.^[7] Voting will occur at 2,492 polling stations across the country, with voters able to cast their ballots at any station. This marks a departure from the country’s Soviet legacy, which tied voters to polling stations based on their registered address. Before, internal migrants had to travel back to their registered address to get a letter allowing them to vote in their current (temporary or permanent) location.

The candidates finished their registration by November 10. At the moment, a total of 467 candidates have been registered (276 men and 191 women). The electoral campaign has officially started and will finish at 08:00 on November 29 2025 – 24 hours before voting begins. Eligibility requirements state that candidates must be at least 25 years old, hold a higher education degree, have resided continuously in Kyrgyzstan for the last five years, and have no criminal record.^[8]

Why this election matters but why it feels stale

The upcoming parliamentary election might lack the usual dynamism of Kyrgyz political scene, but it is important for three reasons.^[9]

First, this election signifies a return to the pre-2007 single mandate voting system. While it might seem like an electoral reform element, this shift is de facto the last nail in the Kyrgyz political party system. In this mode, candidates’ resources, public profile, and local networks tend to outweigh their party affiliations or ideological positions. This probably is an honest move, but it does make political parties and political ideologies even less relevant than before. The changes were approved in June 2025, suggesting the plans to hold this snap election must have been in the making for a while.

Second, there are some changes in the electoral process. These include the administrative division of electoral districts, the possibility to register and vote in different polling stations, and the use of social media and social media influencers in electoral campaigns. The Central Electoral Committee approved 30 multi-mandate districts incorporating roughly 142 thousand voters each in October 2025.^[10] Most of these changes reflect on the current reality of digitalisation and the extended use of social media among populations, as well as the final acknowledgement of the extreme mobility of the electorate. Kyrgyzstan is a country of fluid external and internal migration after all.

Finally, this election consolidates the constitutional changes of 2021, which have significantly reduced the Parliament’s powers while strengthening the presidency. As such, this election effectively closes the chapter on previous efforts to develop a more democratic parliamentary or parliamentary-presidential system. Kyrgyzstan is now a strong presidential system.

Although not directly related to the election, it is important to note two significant developments that are taking place against the background of the electoral campaign. President Putin is expected to make an appearance at the upcoming Collective Security Treaty Organisation’s Council meeting in Bishkek from 25-27 November 2025. A few days before this, several opposition politicians and activists were detained on allegations of plotting mass protests and attempting a coup.^[11]

The parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan feels less dynamic this year. However, it marks two important departures from all previous political processes that have taken place in the country so far. First, it signals the diminishing relevance of political party competition and, to an extent, the existence of political parties in the Kyrgyz political landscape. Second, it signifies the consolidation of a strong undemocratic presidential regime.

Dr Aijan Sharshenova, FPC Senior Fellow. Aijan is the Executive Director at Crossroads Central Asia, an independent think tank in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, and a Leading Visiting Researcher at the Riga Stradins University, Riga, Latvia. She holds two Masters in the EU and Central Asian Studies and in International Studies, and a PhD in Politics from the University of Leeds. Aijan’s research interests include foreign policy, public diplomacy and soft power, as well as democracy promotion and autocracy diffusion. She published extensively on Central Asian politics, focusing on the region’s relations with the EU, Russia and China. Aijan authored a book on the EU democracy promotion in Central Asia and co-edited a recent book on navigating positionality in research.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this piece are those of the individual author and do not reflect the views of The Foreign Policy Centre.

[1] Council of Europe (Venice Commission), ‘Opinion No. 1021/2021 (CDL(2021)021) – Joint Opinion on the Draft Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic’, March 2021, https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/68/163; Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic, Tөрага Нурланбек Тургунбек уулу: “VII чакырылыш өз кызыкчылыгынан өлкөнүн кызыкчылыгын бийик коюп, өзүн‑өзү таратуу чечимин кабыл алдык’, September 2025, https://kenesh.kg/posts/14810; https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL(2021)021

[2] Serik Rymbetov, Kyrgyzstani Parliamentary Elections Strengthen President Japarov’s Rule, Jamestown, July 2021, https://jamestown.org/kyrgyzstani-parliamentary-elections-strengthen-president-japarovs-rule/

[3] Global Nonviolent Action Database, Kyrgyz citizens overthrow President Ayakev (Tulip Revolution) 2005, n.d., https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/kyrgyz-citizens-overthrow-president-ayakev-tulip-revolution-2005

[4] Aijan Sharshenova, Kyrgyzstan elects a potential strongman: Implications for international partners and the future of Kyrgyz democracy, March 2021, https://fpc.org.uk/kyrgyzstan-elects-a-potential-strongman-implications-for-international-partners-and-the-future-of-kyrgyz-democracy/

[5] Asel Doolotkeldieva, Uncovering the Revolutionaries from Epistemic Injustice: The Politics of Popular Revolts in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Affiairs, July 2023, https://brill.com/view/journals/caa/10/2/article-p99_1.xml

[6] AKIpress, Выборы в Жогорку Кенеш: Сколько женщин баллотируются? Список, October 2025, https://kg.akipress.org/news:2347875

[7] AKIpress, ‘В Кыргызстане насчитывается 4 млн 237 тыс. избирателей’, September 2025, https://kg.akipress.org/news:2336910

[8] The Central Electoral Commission, ‘Кандидаты/Талапкерлер: Выдвижение кандидатов’, n.d., https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/Kandidaty_Talapkerler/Vydvijenie_kandidatov/

[9] Aijan Sharshenova, Is Politics Dead in Kyrgyzstan?, The Diplomat, November 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/is-politics-dead-in-kyrgyzstan/

[10] oper.kaktus.media, ЦИК утвердил границы избирательных округов на досрочных выборах в Жогорку Кенеш. Список, n.d., https://oper.kaktus.media/doc/532638_cik_ytverdil_granicy_izbiratelnyh_okrygov_na_dosrochnyh_vyborah_v_jogorky_kenesh._spisok.html

[11] Catherine Putz, Kyrgyz Authorities Arrest Alleged Protest Plotters Ahead of Election, The Diplomat, November 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/kyrgyz-authorities-arrest-alleged-protest-plotters-ahead-of-election/

Topics

Democracy and Elections

Regions

Former Soviet Union

Central Asia

Kyrgyzstan

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